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Talk:Green movement/Premerge

There is no mention of ecofascism anywhere.

 * Greens are members of the peace movement

Which appears to include everyone other than those advocating war.

- Please note that the peace movement article is 95% about the attempt to get the US to withdraw from Vietnam. I'd like to see a little more about this "global peace movement" you're talking about. Is it in anyway connected to, related to, or even remotely reminiscent of any of the Christian concepts of the kingdom of heaven? User:Ed Poor

 * ask Yasser Arafat, who just got swarmed by European peaceniks - six of which just got shot by the Israeli army. A list of groups at least would be good.

From the article:

 * [Soylent Greens]? are more nihilistic, and employ [reverse psychology]? for purposes of [culture jamming]?. They often alternate wild and urban modes.

This is a joke, yes? Please supply a cite for the existence of this movement.

 * not a joke, but they don't talk about themselves online. I could ask some to sign on anonymously and say they exist.  I suspect the first time you'd hear about them would be in some serious encyclopedia that decided to run a page just for strange groups that hate the net to announce themselves.

- It's not a joke, but I don't think the people who do this want to be cited.

The closest I can come to a cite is http://churchofeuthanasia.org or the Anarchist Golfing Association - but the term "Soylents" to describe these people is perhaps idiosyncratic - not sure it's a self-identification.

Oh, there's also the New Zealand Wild Greens who are sort of a youth movement and the more generic Green Anarchists in Eugene Oregon and a few other places.

If you ask about these guys, the usual answer given by Greens is

"Soylent Greens? Oh, Soylent Green is people.  Just people.  Like us."

And that's pretty much as much as you'll ever get. Is that a cite? I'll vouch that I've heard it answered that way. But what am I? An IP number...

Oh, Greens are also for Golf. But I don't think Soylent Greens like Golf.

Individual Greens?
Never heard of them. Sure that this is a real category, a name used somewhere? -- till we ☼ ☽ | Talk 20:58, 29 Sep 2004 (UTC)

--- "Greens" is also a generic term for the non-Communist, non-conservative sides in the Russian Civil War. Might be worth disambiguating this term...

Marchalina hellenica ... The European union must ACT against Greece before it is too late
Marchalina hellenica ... The European union must ACT against Greece before it is too late By Common Sense, may 2006 Pine forests falling victim to beekeepers’ initiative.

The European union must ACT against Greece before it is too late

A pine tree covered in the secretion of Marchalina hellenica. The insect lives off the sap of the tree, producing a white fluff, which bees feed on to produce honey.

HANIA - All over Greece, pine trees are being dessicated because of the introduction by beekeepers of large numbers of an insect whose secretions bees feed on to make honey.

The latest victims of the insect (Marchalina hellenica) are the pine forests in the prefecture of Hania on the island of Crete and in the island’s Samaria Gorge to the south.

According to Hania Prefecture Forestry Director Vassilis Kasiotakis, this infestation occurred with the blessing of the Ministry for Agricultural Development.

The first dead pines were found in forests above Anopoli and Aghios Ioannis in the early 1990s. Kasiotakis said that even then the problem had been attributed to the insects, known to the local beekeepers as “workers.”

Yet in March 2001, the Animal Produce General Directorate’s beekeeping department at the Agriculture Ministry (as it was then known) wrote to local authorities “encouraging” them to introduce the insects into the pine forests.

It actually funded beekeeping associations through the EU’s Third Community Support Framework to the tune of 4,000 drachmas (11.70 euros) per 0.10 hectares without first evaluating the climatological conditions in the area and any future negative effects on the ecosystem. As a result, the population of this parasite multiplied dramatically and spread to pines and cypress trees in forests around the region.

“What they actually did was to fund the beekeepers’s associations to deliberately infest the pine forests,” said Kasiotakis.

“These forests exist in extreme ecological conditions since there is very little water, due to an extended dry period (of up to eight months) and sudden deluges in winter,” he explained. “This is a serious problem, as the existence of a parasite such as Marchalina hellenica maximizes the risks to the forest, as it sucks the sap from the tree in order to survive, thereby weakening the tree. If one adds to that the damage done by the processional caterpillar, then the risks are great indeed.”

Parts of the Hania prefecture where the problem has assumed major dimensions are around Anopoli and Aghios Ioannis, at Prasse north of the White Mountains, at Aghii Apostoli and within the national park of the Samaria Gorge.

According to Kasiotakis, a survey carried out four years ago by the Institute for Forestry Research found that the pines had been affected by a number of species of nematodes, worms that live in the soil and attack the roots of the trees. Scientists from the Benaki Phytopathology institute, who took soil samples for further analysis, said these nematodes had been found in forests in Attica where Marchalina hellenica had also been found in large numbers.

The problem appears to lie in the fact that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate this insect using the means permitted by the European Union. In 1996, the Italian government passed a special law on the eradication of Marchalina hellenica and spent large sums for the purpose, yet Greece has done just the opposite.

According to a document from the Institute for Mediterranean Forestry Ecosystems and Forestry Product Technology at the National Agricultural Research Foundation (ETHIAGE), this occurred because of “incompetence and insufficient knowledge on the part of those responsible for the program, who had no idea of the harm the insect could cause, and who approved and encouraged the spread of the insect populations with funds from the Greek state.”

So these huge populations of Marchalina hellenica that have spread throughout the prefecture of Hania can no longer be controlled and are continuing on their path of destruction — and all this in order to increase the amount of honey produced.

The authorities cannot estimate the magnitude of the destruction, but it is certain that the extent of the destruction is enormous, particularly in the National Park of Samaria.

The Hania Forestry Department has issued a document calling the presence of the insect in the Samaria gorge a “danger to the structure and operation of the ecosystem” and that because of the rate at which it multiplies, the trees will be destroyed at the same rate, threatening the economy of the island.

The department recommends an awareness campaign along with on-the-spot evaluation by experts.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Marchalina_hellenica"

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:European_Union"

Different kinds of Greens
All of the "different kinds of greens" mentioned in this section seem to be utter minorities with no mention of other major "types of greens".

title: Talk:Green movement/Premerge


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Pareto efficiency

In welfare economics, a Pareto improvement formalizes the idea of an outcome being "better in every possible way". A change is called a Pareto improvement if it leaves everyone in a society better-off (or at least as well-off as they were before). A situation is called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if all possible Pareto improvements have already been made; in other words, there are no longer any ways left to make one person better-off, unless we are willing to make some other person worse-off.

In social choice theory, the same concept is sometimes called the unanimity principle, which says that if everyone in a society (non-strictly) prefers A to B, society as a whole also non-strictly prefers A to B.

The Pareto front consists of all Pareto-efficient situations.

In addition to the context of efficiency in allocation, the concept of Pareto efficiency also arises in the context of efficiency in production vs. x-inefficiency: a set of outputs of goods is Pareto-efficient if there is no feasible re-allocation of productive inputs such that output of one product increases while the outputs of all other goods either increase or remain the same.

Besides economics, the notion of Pareto efficiency has also been applied to selecting alternatives in engineering and biology. Each option is first assessed, under multiple criteria, and then a subset of options is identified with the property that no other option can categorically outperform the specified option. It is a statement of impossibility of improving one variable without harming other variables in the subject of multi-objective optimization (also termed Pareto optimization).

History
The concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian civil engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution.

Pareto originally used the word "optimal" for the concept, but this is somewhat of a misnomer: Pareto's concept more closely aligns with an idea of "efficiency", because it does not identify a single "best" (optimal) outcome. Instead, it only identifies a set of outcomes that might be considered optimal, by at least one person.

Overview
Formally, a state is Pareto-optimal if there is no alternative state where at least one participant's well-being is higher, and nobody else's well-being is lower. If there is a state change that satisfies this condition, the new state is called a "Pareto improvement". When no Pareto improvements are possible, the state is a "Pareto optimum".

In other words, Pareto efficiency is when it is impossible to make one party better off without making another party worse off. This state indicates that resources can no longer be allocated in a way that makes one party better off without harming other parties. In a state of Pareto Efficiency, resources are allocated in the most efficient way possible.

Pareto efficiency is mathematically represented when there is no other strategy profile s' such that ui (s') ≥ ui (s) for every player i and uj (s') > uj (s) for some player j. In this equation s represents the strategy profile, u represents the utility or benefit, and j represents the player.

Efficiency is an important criterion for judging behavior in a game. In a notable and often analyzed game known as Prisoner's Dilemma, depicted below as a normal-form game, this concept of efficiency can be observed, in that the strategy profile (Cooperate, Cooperate) is more efficient than (Defect, Defect). Using the definition listed above, u(Ci) ≥ u(Di) for i ∈ {1, 2}, thus yielding this strategy as a Pareto efficient strategy. In other words, both players receive an increase in payoff by selecting Cooperate over Defect.

In zero-sum games, every outcome is Pareto-efficient.

A special case of a state is an allocation of resources. The formal presentation of the concept in an economy is the following: Consider an economy with $$ n$$ agents and $$ k $$ goods. Then an allocation $$ \{x_1, \dots, x_n\} $$, where $$ x_i \in \mathbb{R}^k $$ for all i, is Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible allocation $$ \{x_1', \dots, x_n'\} $$ where, for utility function $$ u_i $$ for each agent $$ i $$, $$ u_i(x_i') \geq u_i(x_i) $$ for all $$ i \in \{1, \dots, n\} $$ with $$ u_i(x_i') > u_i(x_i) $$ for some $$ i$$. Here, in this simple economy, "feasibility" refers to an allocation where the total amount of each good that is allocated sums to no more than the total amount of the good in the economy. In a more complex economy with production, an allocation would consist both of consumption vectors and production vectors, and feasibility would require that the total amount of each consumed good is no greater than the initial endowment plus the amount produced.

Under the assumptions of the first welfare theorem, a competitive market leads to a Pareto-efficient outcome. This result was first demonstrated mathematically by economists Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu. However, the result only holds under the assumptions of the theorem: markets exist for all possible goods, there are no externalities, markets are perfectly competitive, and market participants have perfect information.

In the absence of perfect information or complete markets, outcomes will generally be Pareto-inefficient, per the Greenwald–Stiglitz theorem.

The second welfare theorem is essentially the reverse of the first welfare theorem. It states that under similar, ideal assumptions, any Pareto optimum can be obtained by some competitive equilibrium, or free market system, although it may also require a lump-sum transfer of wealth.

Pareto efficiency and market failure
An ineffective distribution of resources in a free market is known as market failure. Given that there is room for improvement, market failure implies Pareto inefficiency.

For instance, excessive use of negative commodities (such as drugs and cigarettes) results in expenses to non-smokers as well as early mortality for smokers. Cigarette taxes may help individuals stop smoking while also raising money to address ailments brought on by smoking.

Pareto efficiency and equity
A Pareto improvement may be seen, but this does not always imply that the result is desirable or equitable. After a Pareto improvement, inequality could still exist. However, it does imply that any change will violate the "do no harm" principle, because at least one person will be worse off.

A society may be Pareto efficient but have significant levels of inequality. The most equitable course of action would be to split the pie into three equal portions if there were three persons and a pie. The third person does not lose out (even if he does not partake in the pie), hence splitting it in half and giving it to two individuals would be considered Pareto efficient.

On a frontier of production possibilities, Pareto efficiency will happen. It is impossible to raise the output of products without decreasing the output of services when an economy is functioning on a basic production potential frontier, such as at point A, B, or C.

Pareto order
If multiple sub-goals $$f_i$$ (with $$i > 1$$) exist, combined into a vector-valued objective function $$\vec{f}=(f_1, \dots f_n)^T$$, generally, finding a unique optimum $$\vec{x}^* $$ becomes challenging. This is due to the absence of a total order relation for $$n >1$$. In this case, various solutions can be "incomparable" as there is no total order relation to facilitate the comparison $$\vec{f}(\vec{x}^*) \geq \vec{f}(\vec{x})$$. Only the Pareto order is applicable:

Consider a vector-valued minimization problem: $$\vec{y}^{(1)} \in \mathbb{R}^n$$ Pareto dominates $$\vec{y}^{(2)} \in \mathbb{R}^n$$ if and only if: :$$\forall i \in {1,\dots m}:\vec{y}_i^{(1)} \leq \vec{y}_i^{(2)}$$ and $$\exists j \in {1,\dots m}:\vec{y}_j^{(1)} < \vec{y}_j^{(2)}.$$ We then write $$\vec{y}^{(1)} \prec \vec{y}^{(2)}$$, where $$\prec$$ is the Pareto order. This means that $$\vec{y}^{(1)}$$ is not worse than $$\vec{y}^{(2)}$$ in any goal but is better (since smaller) in at least one goal $$j$$. The Pareto order is a strict partial order, though it is not a product order (neither non-strict nor strict).

If $$\vec{f}(\vec{x}_1) \prec \vec{f}(\vec{x}_2)$$, then this defines a preorder in the search space and we say $$\vec{x}_1$$ Pareto dominates the alternative $$\vec{x}_2$$ and we write $$\vec{x}_1 \prec_{\vec{f}} \vec{x}_2$$.

Weak Pareto efficiency
Weak Pareto efficiency is a situation that cannot be strictly improved for every individual.

Formally, a strong Pareto improvement is defined as a situation in which all agents are strictly better-off (in contrast to just "Pareto improvement", which requires that one agent is strictly better-off and the other agents are at least as good). A situation is weak Pareto-efficient if it has no strong Pareto improvements.

Any strong Pareto improvement is also a weak Pareto improvement. The opposite is not true; for example, consider a resource allocation problem with two resources, which Alice values at {10, 0}, and George values at {5, 5}. Consider the allocation giving all resources to Alice, where the utility profile is (10, 0):
 * It is a weak PO, since no other allocation is strictly better to both agents (there are no strong Pareto improvements).
 * But it is not a strong PO, since the allocation in which George gets the second resource is strictly better for George and weakly better for Alice (it is a weak Pareto improvement) – its utility profile is (10, 5).

A market does not require local nonsatiation to get to a weak Pareto optimum.

Constrained Pareto efficiency
Constrained Pareto efficiency is a weakening of Pareto optimality, accounting for the fact that a potential planner (e.g., the government) may not be able to improve upon a decentralized market outcome, even if that outcome is inefficient. This will occur if it is limited by the same informational or institutional constraints as are individual agents.

An example is of a setting where individuals have private information (for example, a labor market where the worker's own productivity is known to the worker but not to a potential employer, or a used-car market where the quality of a car is known to the seller but not to the buyer) which results in moral hazard or an adverse selection and a sub-optimal outcome. In such a case, a planner who wishes to improve the situation is unlikely to have access to any information that the participants in the markets do not have. Hence, the planner cannot implement allocation rules which are based on the idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals; for example, "if a person is of type A, they pay price p1, but if of type B, they pay price p2" (see Lindahl prices). Essentially, only anonymous rules are allowed (of the sort "Everyone pays price p") or rules based on observable behavior; "if any person chooses x at price px, then they get a subsidy of ten dollars, and nothing otherwise". If there exists no allowed rule that can successfully improve upon the market outcome, then that outcome is said to be "constrained Pareto-optimal".

Fractional Pareto efficiency
Fractional Pareto efficiency is a strengthening of Pareto efficiency in the context of fair item allocation. An allocation of indivisible items is fractionally Pareto-efficient (fPE or fPO) if it is not Pareto-dominated even by an allocation in which some items are split between agents. This is in contrast to standard Pareto efficiency, which only considers domination by feasible (discrete) allocations.

As an example, consider an item allocation problem with two items, which Alice values at {3, 2} and George values at {4, 1}. Consider the allocation giving the first item to Alice and the second to George, where the utility profile is (3, 1):
 * It is Pareto-efficient, since any other discrete allocation (without splitting items) makes someone worse-off.
 * However, it is not fractionally Pareto-efficient, since it is Pareto-dominated by the allocation giving to Alice 1/2 of the first item and the whole second item, and the other 1/2 of the first item to George – its utility profile is (3.5, 2).

Ex-ante Pareto efficiency
When the decision process is random, such as in fair random assignment or random social choice or fractional approval voting, there is a difference between ex-post and ex-ante Pareto efficiency: If some lottery L is ex-ante PE, then it is also ex-post PE. Proof: suppose that one of the ex-post outcomes x of L is Pareto-dominated by some other outcome y. Then, by moving some probability mass from x to y, one attains another lottery L' that ex-ante Pareto-dominates L.
 * Ex-post Pareto efficiency means that any outcome of the random process is Pareto-efficient.
 * Ex-ante Pareto efficiency means that the lottery determined by the process is Pareto-efficient with respect to the expected utilities. That is: no other lottery gives a higher expected utility to one agent and at least as high expected utility to all agents.

The opposite is not true: ex-ante PE is stronger that ex-post PE. For example, suppose there are two objects – a car and a house. Alice values the car at 2 and the house at 3; George values the car at 2 and the house at 9. Consider the following two lotteries:
 * 1) With probability 1/2, give car to Alice and house to George; otherwise, give car to George and house to Alice. The expected utility is (2/2 + 3/2) = 2.5 for Alice and (2/2 + 9/2) = 5.5 for George. Both allocations are ex-post PE, since the one who got the car cannot be made better-off without harming the one who got the house.
 * 2) With probability 1, give car to Alice, then with probability 1/3 give the house to Alice, otherwise give it to George. The expected utility is (2 + 3/3) = 3 for Alice and (9 × 2/3) = 6 for George. Again, both allocations are ex-post PE.

While both lotteries are ex-post PE, the lottery 1 is not ex-ante PE, since it is Pareto-dominated by lottery 2.

Another example involves dichotomous preferences. There are 5 possible outcomes (a, b, c, d, e) and 6 voters. The voters' approval sets are (ac, ad, ae, bc, bd, be). All five outcomes are PE, so every lottery is ex-post PE. But the lottery selecting c, d, e with probability 1/3 each is not ex-ante PE, since it gives an expected utility of 1/3 to each voter, while the lottery selecting a, b with probability 1/2 each gives an expected utility of 1/2 to each voter.

Bayesian Pareto efficiency
Bayesian efficiency is an adaptation of Pareto efficiency to settings in which players have incomplete information regarding the types of other players.

Ordinal Pareto efficiency
Ordinal Pareto efficiency is an adaptation of Pareto efficiency to settings in which players report only rankings on individual items, and we do not know for sure how they rank entire bundles.

Pareto efficiency and equity
Although an outcome may be a Pareto improvement, this does not imply that the outcome is equitable. It is possible that inequality persists even after a Pareto improvement. Despite the fact that it is frequently used in conjunction with the idea of Pareto optimality, the term "efficiency" refers to the process of increasing societal productivity. It is possible for a society to have Pareto efficiency while also have high levels of inequality. Consider the following scenario: there is a pie and three persons; the most equitable way would be to divide the pie into three equal portions. However, if the pie is divided in half and shared between two people, it is considered Pareto efficient – meaning that the third person does not lose out (despite the fact that he does not receive a piece of the pie). When making judgments, it is critical to consider a variety of aspects, including social efficiency, overall welfare, and issues such as diminishing marginal value.

Pareto efficiency and market failure
In order to fully understand market failure, one must first comprehend market success, which is defined as the ability of a set of idealized competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources that is Pareto-optimal in terms of resource allocation. According to the definition of market failure, it is a circumstance in which the conclusion of the first fundamental theorem of welfare is erroneous; that is, when the allocations made through markets are not efficient. In a free market, market failure is defined as an inefficient allocation of resources. Due to the fact that it is feasible to improve, market failure implies Pareto inefficiency. For example, excessive consumption of depreciating items (drugs/tobacco) results in external costs to non-smokers, as well as premature death for smokers who do not quit. An increase in the price of cigarettes could motivate people to quit smoking while also raising funds for the treatment of smoking-related ailments.

Approximate Pareto efficiency
Given some ε > 0, an outcome is called ε-Pareto-efficient if no other outcome gives all agents at least the same utility, and one agent a utility at least (1 + ε) higher. This captures the notion that improvements smaller than (1 + ε) are negligible and should not be considered a breach of efficiency.

Pareto-efficiency and welfare-maximization
Suppose each agent i is assigned a positive weight ai. For every allocation x, define the welfare of x as the weighted sum of utilities of all agents in x:

 * $$W_a(x) := \sum_{i=1}^n a_i u_i(x).$$

Let xa be an allocation that maximizes the welfare over all allocations:

 * $$x_a \in \arg\max_x W_a(x).$$

It is easy to show that the allocation xa is Pareto-efficient: since all weights are positive, any Pareto improvement would increase the sum, contradicting the definition of xa.

Japanese neo-Walrasian economist Takashi Negishi proved that, under certain assumptions, the opposite is also true: for every Pareto-efficient allocation x, there exists a positive vector a such that x maximizes Wa. A shorter proof is provided by Hal Varian.

Use in engineering
The notion of Pareto efficiency has been used in engineering. Given a set of choices and a way of valuing them, the Pareto front (or Pareto set or Pareto frontier) is the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient. By restricting attention to the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient, a designer can make trade-offs within this set, rather than considering the full range of every parameter.

Use in public policy
Modern microeconomic theory has drawn heavily upon the concept of Pareto efficiency for inspiration. Pareto and his successors have tended to describe this technical definition of optimal resource allocation in the context of it being an equilibrium that can theoretically be achieved within an abstract model of market competition. It has therefore very often been treated as a corroboration of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" notion. More specifically, it motivated the debate over "market socialism" in the 1930s.

However, because the Pareto-efficient outcome is difficult to assess in the real world when issues including asymmetric information, signalling, adverse selection, and moral hazard are introduced, most people do not take the theorems of welfare economics as accurate descriptions of the real world. Therefore, the significance of the two welfare theorems of economics is in their ability to generate a framework that has dominated neoclassical thinking about public policy. That framework is that the welfare economics theorems allow the political economy to be studied in the following two situations: "market failure" and "the problem of redistribution".

Analysis of "market failure" can be understood by the literature surrounding externalities. When comparing the "real" economy to the complete contingent markets economy (which is considered efficient), the inefficiencies become clear. These inefficiencies, or externalities, are then able to be addressed by mechanisms, including property rights and corrective taxes.

Analysis of "the problem with redistribution" deals with the observed political question of how income or commodity taxes should be utilized. The theorem tells us that no taxation is Pareto-efficient and that taxation with redistribution is Pareto-inefficient. Because of this, most of the literature is focused on finding solutions where given there is a tax structure, how can the tax structure prescribe a situation where no person could be made better off by a change in available taxes.

Use in biology
Pareto optimisation has also been studied in biological processes. In bacteria, genes were shown to be either inexpensive to make (resource-efficient) or easier to read (translation-efficient). Natural selection acts to push highly expressed genes towards the Pareto frontier for resource use and translational efficiency. Genes near the Pareto frontier were also shown to evolve more slowly (indicating that they are providing a selective advantage).

Common misconceptions
It would be incorrect to treat Pareto efficiency as equivalent to societal optimization, as the latter is a normative concept, which is a matter of interpretation that typically would account for the consequence of degrees of inequality of distribution. An example would be the interpretation of one school district with low property tax revenue versus another with much higher revenue as a sign that more equal distribution occurs with the help of government redistribution.

Criticism
Some commentators contest that Pareto efficiency could potentially serve as an ideological tool. With it implying that capitalism is self-regulated thereof, it is likely that the embedded structural problems such as unemployment would be treated as deviating from the equilibrium or norm, and thus neglected or discounted.

Pareto efficiency does not require a totally equitable distribution of wealth, which is another aspect that draws in criticism. An economy in which a wealthy few hold the vast majority of resources can be Pareto-efficient. A simple example is the distribution of a pie among three people. The most equitable distribution would assign one third to each person. However, the assignment of, say, a half section to each of two individuals and none to the third is also Pareto-optimal despite not being equitable, because none of the recipients could be made better off without decreasing someone else's share; and there are many other such distribution examples. An example of a Pareto-inefficient distribution of the pie would be allocation of a quarter of the pie to each of the three, with the remainder discarded.

The liberal paradox elaborated by Amartya Sen shows that when people have preferences about what other people do, the goal of Pareto efficiency can come into conflict with the goal of individual liberty.

Lastly, it is proposed that Pareto efficiency to some extent inhibited discussion of other possible criteria of efficiency. As Wharton School professor Ben Lockwood argues, one possible reason is that any other efficiency criteria established in the neoclassical domain will reduce to Pareto efficiency at the end.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Pareto efficiency