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User interface

In the industrial design field of human–computer interaction, a user interface (UI) is the space where interactions between humans and machines occur. The goal of this interaction is to allow effective operation and control of the machine from the human end, while the machine simultaneously feeds back information that aids the operators' decision-making process. Examples of this broad concept of user interfaces include the interactive aspects of computer operating systems, hand tools, heavy machinery operator controls and process controls. The design considerations applicable when creating user interfaces are related to, or involve such disciplines as, ergonomics and psychology.

Generally, the goal of user interface design is to produce a user interface that makes it easy, efficient, and enjoyable (user-friendly) to operate a machine in the way which produces the desired result (i.e. maximum usability). This generally means that the operator needs to provide minimal input to achieve the desired output, and also that the machine minimizes undesired outputs to the user.

User interfaces are composed of one or more layers, including a human-machine interface (HMI) that typically interfaces machines with physical input hardware (such as keyboards, mice, or game pads) and output hardware (such as computer monitors, speakers, and printers). A device that implements an HMI is called a human interface device (HID). User interfaces that dispense with the physical movement of body parts as an intermediary step between the brain and the machine use no input or output devices except electrodes alone; they are called brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) or brain–machine interfaces (BMIs).

Other terms for human–machine interfaces are man–machine interface (MMI) and, when the machine in question is a computer, human–computer interface. Additional UI layers may interact with one or more human senses, including: tactile UI (touch), visual UI (sight), auditory UI (sound), olfactory UI (smell), equilibria UI (balance), and gustatory UI (taste).

Composite user interfaces (CUIs) are UIs that interact with two or more senses. The most common CUI is a graphical user interface (GUI), which is composed of a tactile UI and a visual UI capable of displaying graphics. When sound is added to a GUI, it becomes a multimedia user interface (MUI). There are three broad categories of CUI: standard, virtual and augmented. Standard CUI use standard human interface devices like keyboards, mice, and computer monitors. When the CUI blocks out the real world to create a virtual reality, the CUI is virtual and uses a virtual reality interface. When the CUI does not block out the real world and creates augmented reality, the CUI is augmented and uses an augmented reality interface. When a UI interacts with all human senses, it is called a qualia interface, named after the theory of qualia. CUI may also be classified by how many senses they interact with as either an X-sense virtual reality interface or X-sense augmented reality interface, where X is the number of senses interfaced with. For example, a Smell-O-Vision is a 3-sense (3S) Standard CUI with visual display, sound and smells; when virtual reality interfaces interface with smells and touch it is said to be a 4-sense (4S) virtual reality interface; and when augmented reality interfaces interface with smells and touch it is said to be a 4-sense (4S) augmented reality interface.

Overview

The user interface or human–machine interface is the part of the machine that handles the human–machine interaction. Membrane switches, rubber keypads and touchscreens are examples of the physical part of the Human Machine Interface which we can see and touch.

In complex systems, the human–machine interface is typically computerized. The term human–computer interface refers to this kind of system. In the context of computing, the term typically extends as well to the software dedicated to control the physical elements used for human–computer interaction.

The engineering of human–machine interfaces is enhanced by considering ergonomics (human factors). The corresponding disciplines are human factors engineering (HFE) and usability engineering (UE) which is part of systems engineering.

Tools used for incorporating human factors in the interface design are developed based on knowledge of computer science, such as computer graphics, operating systems, programming languages. Nowadays, we use the expression graphical user interface for human–machine interface on computers, as nearly all of them are now using graphics.

Multimodal interfaces allow users to interact using more than one modality of user input.

Terminology

There is a difference between a user interface and an operator interface or a human–machine interface (HMI).

 * The term "user interface" is often used in the context of (personal) computer systems and electronic devices.
 * Where a network of equipment or computers are interlinked through an MES (Manufacturing Execution System)-or Host to display information.
 * A human–machine interface (HMI) is typically local to one machine or piece of equipment, and is the interface method between the human and the equipment/machine. An operator interface is the interface method by which multiple pieces of equipment, linked by a host control system, are accessed or controlled.
 * The system may expose several user interfaces to serve different kinds of users. For example, a computerized library database might provide two user interfaces, one for library patrons (limited set of functions, optimized for ease of use) and the other for library personnel (wide set of functions, optimized for efficiency).
 * The user interface of a mechanical system, a vehicle or an industrial installation is sometimes referred to as the human–machine interface (HMI). HMI is a modification of the original term MMI (man–machine interface). In practice, the abbreviation MMI is still frequently used although some may claim that MMI stands for something different now. Another abbreviation is HCI, but is more commonly used for human–computer interaction. Other terms used are operator interface console (OIC) and operator interface terminal (OIT). However it is abbreviated, the terms refer to the 'layer' that separates a human that is operating a machine from the machine itself. Without a clean and usable interface, humans would not be able to interact with information systems.

In science fiction, HMI is sometimes used to refer to what is better described as a direct neural interface. However, this latter usage is seeing increasing application in the real-life use of (medical) prostheses—the artificial extension that replaces a missing body part (e.g., cochlear implants).

In some circumstances, computers might observe the user and react according to their actions without specific commands. A means of tracking parts of the body is required, and sensors noting the position of the head, direction of gaze and so on have been used experimentally. This is particularly relevant to immersive interfaces.

History
The history of user interfaces can be divided into the following phases according to the dominant type of user interface:

1945–1968: Batch interface

In the batch era, computing power was extremely scarce and expensive. User interfaces were rudimentary. Users had to accommodate computers rather than the other way around; user interfaces were considered overhead, and software was designed to keep the processor at maximum utilization with as little overhead as possible.

The input side of the user interfaces for batch machines was mainly punched cards or equivalent media like paper tape. The output side added line printers to these media. With the limited exception of the system operator's console, human beings did not interact with batch machines in real time at all.

Submitting a job to a batch machine involved, first, preparing a deck of punched cards describing a program and a dataset. Punching the program cards was not done on the computer itself, but on keypunches, specialized typewriter-like machines that were notoriously bulky, unforgiving, and prone to mechanical failure. The software interface was similarly unforgiving, with very strict syntaxes meant to be parsed by the smallest possible compilers and interpreters.

Once the cards were punched, one would drop them in a job queue and wait. Eventually, operators would feed the deck to the computer, perhaps mounting magnetic tapes to supply another dataset or helper software. The job would generate a printout, containing final results or an abort notice with an attached error log. Successful runs might also write a result on magnetic tape or generate some data cards to be used in a later computation.

The turnaround time for a single job often spanned entire days. If one was very lucky, it might be hours; there was no real-time response. But there were worse fates than the card queue; some computers required an even more tedious and error-prone process of toggling in programs in binary code using console switches. The very earliest machines had to be partly rewired to incorporate program logic into themselves, using devices known as plugboards.

Early batch systems gave the currently running job the entire computer; program decks and tapes had to include what we would now think of as operating system code to talk to I/O devices and do whatever other housekeeping was needed. Midway through the batch period, after 1957, various groups began to experiment with so-called "load-and-go" systems. These used a monitor program which was always resident on the computer. Programs could call the monitor for services. Another function of the monitor was to do better error checking on submitted jobs, catching errors earlier and more intelligently and generating more useful feedback to the users. Thus, monitors represented the first step towards both operating systems and explicitly designed user interfaces.

1969–present: Command-line user interface

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) evolved from batch monitors connected to the system console. Their interaction model was a series of request-response transactions, with requests expressed as textual commands in a specialized vocabulary. Latency was far lower than for batch systems, dropping from days or hours to seconds. Accordingly, command-line systems allowed the user to change their mind about later stages of the transaction in response to real-time or near-real-time feedback on earlier results. Software could be exploratory and interactive in ways not possible before. But these interfaces still placed a relatively heavy mnemonic load on the user, requiring a serious investment of effort and learning time to master.

The earliest command-line systems combined teleprinters with computers, adapting a mature technology that had proven effective for mediating the transfer of information over wires between human beings. Teleprinters had originally been invented as devices for automatic telegraph transmission and reception; they had a history going back to 1902 and had already become well-established in newsrooms and elsewhere by 1920. In reusing them, economy was certainly a consideration, but psychology and the rule of least surprise mattered as well; teleprinters provided a point of interface with the system that was familiar to many engineers and users.

The widespread adoption of video-display terminals (VDTs) in the mid-1970s ushered in the second phase of command-line systems. These cut latency further, because characters could be thrown on the phosphor dots of a screen more quickly than a printer head or carriage can move. They helped quell conservative resistance to interactive programming by cutting ink and paper consumables out of the cost picture, and were to the first TV generation of the late 1950s and 60s even more iconic and comfortable than teleprinters had been to the computer pioneers of the 1940s.

Just as importantly, the existence of an accessible screen—a two-dimensional display of text that could be rapidly and reversibly modified—made it economical for software designers to deploy interfaces that could be described as visual rather than textual. The pioneering applications of this kind were computer games and text editors; close descendants of some of the earliest specimens, such as rogue(6), and vi(1), are still a live part of Unix tradition.

1985: SAA user interface or text-based user interface
In 1985, with the beginning of Microsoft Windows and other graphical user interfaces, IBM created what is called the Systems Application Architecture (SAA) standard which include the Common User Access (CUA) derivative. CUA successfully created what we know and use today in Windows, and most of the more recent DOS or Windows Console Applications will use that standard as well.

This defined that a pulldown menu system should be at the top of the screen, status bar at the bottom, shortcut keys should stay the same for all common functionality (F2 to Open for example would work in all applications that followed the SAA standard). This greatly helped the speed at which users could learn an application so it caught on quick and became an industry standard.

1968–present: Graphical user interface

 * 1968 – Douglas Engelbart demonstrated NLS, a system which uses a mouse, pointers, hypertext, and multiple windows.
 * 1970 – Researchers at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (many from SRI) develop WIMP paradigm (Windows, Icons, Menus, Pointers)
 * 1973 – Xerox Alto: commercial failure due to expense, poor user interface, and lack of programs
 * 1979 – Steve Jobs and other Apple engineers visit Xerox PARC. Though Pirates of Silicon Valley dramatizes the events, Apple had already been working on developing a GUI, such as the Macintosh and Lisa projects, before the visit.
 * 1981 – Xerox Star: focus on WYSIWYG. Commercial failure (25K sold) due to cost ($16K each), performance (minutes to save a file, couple of hours to recover from crash), and poor marketing
 * 1982 – Rob Pike and others at Bell Labs designed Blit, which was released in 1984 by AT&T and Teletype as DMD 5620 terminal.
 * 1984 – Apple Macintosh popularizes the GUI. Super Bowl commercial shown twice, was the most expensive commercial ever made at that time
 * 1984 – MIT's X Window System: hardware-independent platform and networking protocol for developing GUIs on UNIX-like systems
 * 1985 – Windows 1.0 – provided GUI interface to MS-DOS. No overlapping windows (tiled instead).
 * 1985 – Microsoft and IBM start work on OS/2 meant to eventually replace MS-DOS and Windows
 * 1986 – Apple threatens to sue Digital Research because their GUI desktop looked too much like Apple's Mac.
 * 1987 – Windows 2.0 – Overlapping and resizable windows, keyboard and mouse enhancements
 * 1987 – Macintosh II: first full-color Mac
 * 1988 – OS/2 1.10 Standard Edition (SE) has GUI written by Microsoft, looks a lot like Windows 2

Interface design
Primary methods used in the interface design include prototyping and simulation.

Typical human–machine interface design consists of the following stages: interaction specification, interface software specification and prototyping:

 * Common practices for interaction specification include user-centered design, persona, activity-oriented design, scenario-based design, and resiliency design.
 * Common practices for interface software specification include use cases and constrain enforcement by interaction protocols (intended to avoid use errors).
 * Common practices for prototyping are based on libraries of interface elements (controls, decoration, etc.).

Principles of quality
In broad terms, interfaces generally regarded as user friendly, efficient, intuitive, etc. are typified by one or more particular qualities. For the purpose of example, a non-exhaustive list of such characteristics follows:

 * 1) Clarity: The interface avoids ambiguity by making everything clear through language, flow, hierarchy and metaphors for visual elements.
 * 2) Concision: However ironically, the over-clarification of information—for instance, by labelling the majority, if not the entirety, of items displayed on-screen at once, and regardless of whether or not the user would in fact require a visual indicator of some kind in order to identify a given item—can, and, under most normal circumstances, most likely will lead to the obfuscation of whatever information.
 * 3) Familiarity: Even if someone uses an interface for the first time, certain elements can still be familiar. Real-life metaphors can be used to communicate meaning.
 * 4) Responsiveness: A good interface should not feel sluggish. This means that the interface should provide good feedback to the user about what's happening and whether the user's input is being successfully processed.
 * 5) Consistency: Keeping your interface consistent across your application is important because it allows users to recognize usage patterns.
 * 6) Aesthetics: While you do not need to make an interface attractive for it to do its job, making something look good will make the time your users spend using your application more enjoyable; and happier users can only be a good thing.
 * 7) Efficiency: Time is money, and a great interface should make the user more productive through shortcuts and good design.
 * 8) Forgiveness: A good interface should not punish users for their mistakes but should instead provide the means to remedy them.

Principle of least astonishment
The principle of least astonishment (POLA) is a general principle in the design of all kinds of interfaces. It is based on the idea that human beings can only pay full attention to one thing at one time, leading to the conclusion that novelty should be minimized.

Principle of habit formation
If an interface is used persistently, the user will unavoidably develop habits for using the interface. The designer's role can thus be characterized as ensuring the user forms good habits. If the designer is experienced with other interfaces, they will similarly develop habits, and often make unconscious assumptions regarding how the user will interact with the interface.

A model of design criteria: User Experience Honeycomb

Peter Morville of Google designed the User Experience Honeycomb framework in 2004 when leading operations in user interface design. The framework was created to guide user interface design. It would act as a guideline for many web development students for a decade.

 * 1) Usable: Is the design of the system easy and simple to use? The application should feel familiar, and it should be easy to use.
 * 2) Useful: Does the application fulfill a need? A business's product or service needs to be useful.
 * 3) Desirable: Is the design of the application sleek and to the point? The aesthetics of the system should be attractive, and easy to translate.
 * 4) Findable: Are users able to quickly find the information they're looking for? Information needs to be findable and simple to navigate. A user should never have to hunt for your product or information.
 * 5) Accessible: Does the application support enlarged text without breaking the framework? An application should be accessible to those with disabilities.
 * 6) Credible: Does the application exhibit trustworthy security and company details? An application should be transparent, secure, and honest.
 * 7) Valuable: Does the end-user think it's valuable? If all 6 criteria are met, the end-user will find value and trust in the application.

Types

 * 1) Attentive user interfaces manage the user attention deciding when to interrupt the user, the kind of warnings, and the level of detail of the messages presented to the user.
 * 2) Batch interfaces are non-interactive user interfaces, where the user specifies all the details of the batch job in advance to batch processing, and receives the output when all the processing is done. The computer does not prompt for further input after the processing has started.
 * 3) Command line interfaces (CLIs) prompt the user to provide input by typing a command string with the computer keyboard and respond by outputting text to the computer monitor. Used by programmers and system administrators, in engineering and scientific environments, and by technically advanced personal computer users.
 * 4) Conversational interfaces enable users to command the computer with plain text English (e.g., via text messages, or chatbots) or voice commands, instead of graphic elements. These interfaces often emulate human-to-human conversations.
 * 5) Conversational interface agents attempt to personify the computer interface in the form of an animated person, robot, or other character (such as Microsoft's Clippy the paperclip), and present interactions in a conversational form.
 * 6) Crossing-based interfaces are graphical user interfaces in which the primary task consists in crossing boundaries instead of pointing.
 * 7) Direct manipulation interface is the name of a general class of user interfaces that allow users to manipulate objects presented to them, using actions that correspond at least loosely to the physical world.
 * 8) Gesture interfaces are graphical user interfaces which accept input in a form of hand gestures, or mouse gestures sketched with a computer mouse or a stylus.
 * 9) Graphical user interfaces (GUI) accept input via devices such as a computer keyboard and mouse and provide articulated graphical output on the computer monitor. There are at least two different principles widely used in GUI design: Object-oriented user interfaces (OOUIs) and application-oriented interfaces.
 * 10) Hardware interfaces are the physical, spatial interfaces found on products in the real world from toasters, to car dashboards, to airplane cockpits. They are generally a mixture of knobs, buttons, sliders, switches, and touchscreens.
 * 11)  provide input to electronic or electro-mechanical devices by passing a finger through reproduced holographic images of what would otherwise be tactile controls of those devices, floating freely in the air, detected by a wave source and without tactile interaction.
 * 12) Intelligent user interfaces are human–machine interfaces that aim to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and naturalness of human–machine interaction by representing, reasoning, and acting on models of the user, domain, task, discourse, and media (e.g., graphics, natural language, gesture).
 * 13) Motion tracking interfaces monitor the user's body motions and translate them into commands, currently being developed by Apple.
 * 14) Multi-screen interfaces, employ multiple displays to provide a more flexible interaction. This is often employed in computer game interaction in both the commercial arcades and more recently the handheld markets.
 * 15) Natural-language interfaces are used for search engines and on webpages. User types in a question and waits for a response.
 * 16) Non-command user interfaces, which observe the user to infer their needs and intentions, without requiring that they formulate explicit commands.
 * 17) Object-oriented user interfaces (OOUI) are based on object-oriented programming metaphors, allowing users to manipulate simulated objects and their properties.
 * 18) Permission-driven user interfaces show or conceal menu options or functions depending on the user's level of permissions. The system is intended to improve the user experience by removing items that are unavailable to the user. A user who sees functions that are unavailable for use may become frustrated. It also provides an enhancement to security by hiding functional items from unauthorized persons.
 * 19) Reflexive user interfaces where the users control and redefine the entire system via the user interface alone, for instance to change its command verbs. Typically, this is only possible with very rich graphic user interfaces.
 * 20) Search interface is how the search box of a site is displayed, as well as the visual representation of the search results.
 * 21) Tangible user interfaces, which place a greater emphasis on touch and physical environment or its element.
 * 22) Task-focused interfaces are user interfaces which address the information overload problem of the desktop metaphor by making tasks, not files, the primary unit of interaction.
 * 23) Text-based user interfaces (TUIs) are user interfaces which interact via text. TUIs include command-line interfaces and text-based WIMP environments.
 * 24) Touchscreens are displays that accept input by touch of fingers or a stylus. Used in a growing amount of mobile devices and many types of point of sale, industrial processes and machines, self-service machines, etc.
 * 25) Touch user interface are graphical user interfaces using a touchpad or touchscreen display as a combined input and output device. They supplement or replace other forms of output with haptic feedback methods. Used in computerized simulators, etc.
 * 26) Voice user interfaces, which accept input and provide output by generating voice prompts. The user input is made by pressing keys or buttons, or responding verbally to the interface.
 * 27) Web-based user interfaces or web user interfaces (WUI) that accept input and provide output by generating web pages viewed by the user using a web browser program.
 * 28) Zero-input interfaces get inputs from a set of sensors instead of querying the user with input dialogs.
 * 29) Zooming user interfaces are graphical user interfaces in which information objects are represented at different levels of scale and detail, and where the user can change the scale of the viewed area in order to show more detail.

title: User interface


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The Annotated Alice

The Annotated Alice is a 1960 book by Martin Gardner incorporating the text of Lewis Carroll's major tales, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking-Glass (1871), as well as the original illustrations by John Tenniel. It has extensive annotations explaining the contemporary references (including the Victorian poems that Carroll parodies), mathematical concepts, word play, and Victorian traditions (such as the parlor game snap-dragons) featured in the two books.

History
The original book was first published in 1960. It has been reprinted several times and translated into French, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, German and Hebrew.

In 1990, a sequel, More Annotated Alice, was published. This sequel does not contain the original side notes, and Tenniel's illustrations are replaced by those of Peter Newell. It also contains the "suppressed" chapter "The Wasp in a Wig", which Carroll omitted from the text of Through the Looking-Glass on Tenniel's recommendation.

In 1999, The Definitive Edition was published. It combines the notes from both works and features Tenniel's illustrations in improved quality.

Gardner also compiled a companion volume, The Annotated Snark, dedicated to Carroll's classic nonsense poem The Hunting of the Snark.

In 2015, The Annotated Alice: 150th Anniversary Deluxe Edition was published, combining the previous works of Gardner and expanded by Mark Burstein, president emeritus of the Lewis Carroll Society of North America. It includes features such as more than 100 new or updated annotations, over 100 new illustrations by Salvador Dalí, Beatrix Potter, Ralph Steadman, and 42 other artists and illustrators (in addition to original art by Sir John Tenniel), and a filmography of every Alice-related film by Carroll scholar David Schaefer.

Editions

 * The Annotated Alice: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll, Illustrated by John Tenniel by Martin Gardner (1960), New York, Bramhall House ISBN 0-517-02962-6
 * More Annotated Alice by Martin Gardner (1990) ISBN 0-394-58571-2
 * The Annotated Alice: The Definitive Edition by Martin Gardner (1998/1999) ISBN 0-393-04847-0
 * The Annotated Alice: 150th Anniversary Deluxe Edition by Martin Gardner and Mark Burstein (2015) ISBN 978-0-393-24543-1

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: The Annotated Alice


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Orange County

Orange County may refer to:

U.S. counties

 * Orange County, California, part of the Los Angeles metropolitan area; the most well-known county with the name.
 * Orange County, Florida, containing Orlando
 * Orange County, Indiana
 * Orange County, New York, part of the Hudson Valley area
 * Orange County, North Carolina
 * Orange County, Texas
 * Orange County, Vermont
 * Orange County, Virginia

Other uses

 * Orange County (film), 2002 film set in Orange County, California
 * County of Orange, a feudal state of The Holy Roman Empire from c. 800 to 1163, later the Principality of Orange
 * Orange County Choppers, American motorbike manufacturer
 * Alexander James O'Connor, known professionally as "Rex Orange County"
 * Ju Jun, also known as "Orange County", an American-style suburb near Beijing, China

title: Orange County


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Clear and present danger

Clear and present danger was a doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. Created by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to refine the bad tendency test, it was never fully adopted and both tests were ultimately replaced in 1969 with Brandenburg v. Ohio's "imminent lawless action" test.

History
Before the 20th century, most restrictions on free speech issues in the United States were imposed to prevent certain types of speech. Although certain kinds of speech continue to be prohibited in advance, dangerous speech started to be punished after the fact in the early 1900s, at a time when US courts primarily relied on a doctrine known as the bad tendency test. Rooted in English common law, the test permitted speech to be outlawed if it had a tendency to harm public welfare.

Antiwar protests during World War I gave rise to several important free speech cases related to sedition and inciting violence. In the 1919 case Schenck v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an antiwar activist did not have a First Amendment right to advocate draft resistance. In his majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. introduced the clear and present danger test, which would become an important concept in First Amendment law "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."

In Frohwerk v. United States (1919) Justice Holmes summarized comments critical of U.S. wartime policies written by a newspaperman and stated about these comments the following: "It may be that all this might be said or written even in time of war in circumstances that would not make it a crime. We do not lose our right to condemn either measures or men because the country is at war." This statement "represents an important addendum to the original explication of the clear and present danger test in that it specifies that even during war, courts should regard criticism of government policies and officials as protected speech."

The Schenck decision did not formally adopt the clear and present danger test. Holmes later wrote that he intended the clear and present danger test to refine, not replace, the bad tendency test. Although sometimes mentioned in subsequent rulings, the clear and present danger test was never endorsed by the Supreme Court as a test to be used by lower courts when evaluating the constitutionality of legislation that regulated speech.

The Court continued to use the bad tendency test during the early 20th century in cases such as 1919's Abrams v. United States, which upheld the conviction of antiwar activists who passed out leaflets encouraging workers to impede the war effort. In Abrams, Holmes and Justice Brandeis dissented and encouraged the use of the clear and present test, which provided more protection for speech. In 1925's Gitlow v. New York, the Court made the First Amendment applicable against the states and upheld the conviction of Gitlow for publishing the "Left wing manifesto". Gitlow was decided based on the bad tendency test, but the majority decision acknowledged the validity of the clear and present danger test, yet concluded that its use was limited to Schenck-like situations where the speech was not specifically outlawed by the legislature.

Brandeis and Holmes again promoted the clear and present danger test, this time in a concurring opinion in 1927's Whitney v. California decision. The majority did not adopt or use the clear and present danger test, but the concurring opinion encouraged the Court to support greater protections for speech, and it suggested that  "imminent danger" – a more restrictive wording than "present danger" – should be required before speech can be outlawed. After Whitney, the bad tendency test continued to be used by the Court in cases such as Stromberg v. California, which held that a 1919 California statute banning red flags was unconstitutional.

The clear and present danger test was invoked by the majority in the 1940 Thornhill v. Alabama decision in which a state anti-picketing law was invalidated. Although the Court referred to the clear and present danger test in a few decisions following Thornhill,  the bad tendency test was not explicitly overruled,  and the clear and present danger test  was not applied in several subsequent free speech cases involving incitement to violence. The importance of freedom of speech in the context of "clear and present danger" was emphasized in Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1949), in which the Supreme Court noted that the vitality of civil and political institutions in society depends on free discussion. Democracy requires free speech because it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. Restrictions on free speech are permissible only when the speech at issue is likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the Court that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Dennis v. United States

In May 1950, one month before the appeals court heard oral arguments in the Dennis v. United States case, the Supreme Court ruled on free speech issues in  American Communications Association v. Douds. In that case, the Court considered the clear and present danger test, but rejected it as too mechanical and instead introduced a balancing test. The federal appeals court heard oral arguments in the CPUSA case on June 21–23, 1950. Judge Learned Hand considered the clear and present danger test, but his opinion adopted a balancing approach similar to that suggested in American Communications Association v. Douds.

The defendants appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States. The 6–2 decision was issued on June 4, 1951, and upheld Hand's decision. Chief Justice Fred Vinson's opinion stated that the First Amendment does not require that the government must wait "until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited" before it interrupts seditious plots. In his opinion, Vinson endorsed the balancing approach used by Judge Hand:

"Chief Judge Learned Hand ... interpreted the [clear and present danger] phrase as follows: 'In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words."

Importance
Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was replaced in 1969 by Brandenburg v. Ohio, and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an "imminent lawless action".

The vast majority of legal scholars have concluded that in writing the Schenck opinion, Justice Holmes never meant to replace the "bad tendency" test which had been established in the 1868 English case R. v. Hicklin and incorporated into American jurisprudence in the 1904 Supreme Court case U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams. This is demonstrated by the use of the word "tendency" in Schenck itself, a paragraph in Schenck explaining that the success of speech in causing the actual harm was not a prerequisite for conviction, and use of the bad-tendency test in the simultaneous Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States decisions (both of which cite Schenck without using the words "clear and present danger").

However, a subsequent essay by Zechariah Chafee titled "Freedom of Speech in War Time" argued despite context that Holmes had intended to substitute clear and present danger for the bad-tendency standard a more protective standard of free speech. Bad tendency was a far more ambiguous standard where speech could be punished even in the absence of identifiable danger, and as such was strongly opposed by the fledgling American Civil Liberties Union and other libertarians of the time.

Having read Chafee's article, Holmes decided to retroactively reinterpret what he had meant by "clear and present danger" and accepted Chafee's characterization of the new test in his dissent in Abrams v. United States just six months after Schenck. Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs all resulted in unanimous decisions, while Abrams did not.

Brandenburg
For two decades after the Dennis decision, free speech issues related to advocacy of violence were decided using balancing tests such as the one initially articulated in Dennis. In 1969, the court established stronger protections for speech in the landmark case Brandenburg v. Ohio, which held that  "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action". Brandenburg is now the standard applied by the Court to free speech issues related to advocacy of violence.

title: Clear and present danger


text:
Biosafety

Biosafety is the prevention of large-scale loss of biological integrity, focusing both on ecology and human health. These prevention mechanisms include the conduction of regular reviews of biosafety in laboratory settings, as well as strict guidelines to follow. Biosafety is used to protect from harmful incidents. Many laboratories handling biohazards employ an ongoing risk management assessment and enforcement process for biosafety. Failures to follow such protocols can lead to increased risk of exposure to biohazards or pathogens. Human error and poor technique contribute to unnecessary exposure and compromise the best safeguards set into place for protection. The international Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety deals primarily with the agricultural definition but many advocacy groups seek to expand it to include post-genetic threats: new molecules, artificial life forms, and even robots which may compete directly in the natural food chain.

Biosafety in agriculture, chemistry, medicine, exobiology and beyond will likely require the application of the precautionary principle, and a new definition focused on the biological nature of the threatened organism rather than the nature of the threat.

When biological warfare or new, currently hypothetical, threats (i.e., robots, new artificial bacteria) are considered, biosafety precautions are generally not sufficient. The new field of biosecurity addresses these complex threats.

Biosafety level refers to the stringency of biocontainment precautions deemed necessary by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for laboratory work with infectious materials.

Typically, institutions that experiment with or create potentially harmful biological material will have a committee or board of supervisors that is in charge of the institution's biosafety. They create and monitor the biosafety standards that must be met by labs in order to prevent the accidental release of potentially destructive biological material. (note that in the US, several groups are involved, and efforts are being made to improve processes for government run labs, but there is no unifying regulatory authority for all labs.

Biosafety is related to several fields:

 * In ecology (referring to imported life forms from beyond ecoregion borders),
 * In agriculture (reducing the risk of alien viral or transgenic genes, genetic engineering or prions such as BSE/"MadCow", reducing the risk of food bacterial contamination)
 * In medicine (referring to organs or tissues from biological origin, or genetic therapy products, virus; levels of lab containment protocols measured as 1, 2, 3, 4 in rising order of danger),
 * In chemistry (i.e., nitrates in water, PCB levels affecting fertility)
 * In exobiology (i.e., NASA's policy for containing alien microbes that may exist on space samples. See planetary protection and interplanetary contamination), and
 * In synthetic biology (referring to the risks associated with this type of lab practice)

Hazards
Chemical hazards typically found in laboratory settings include carcinogens, toxins, irritants, corrosives, and sensitizers. Biological hazards include viruses, bacteria, fungi, prions, and biologically derived toxins, which may be present in body fluids and tissue, cell culture specimens, and laboratory animals. Routes of exposure for chemical and biological hazards include inhalation, ingestion, skin contact, and eye contact.

Physical hazards include ergonomic hazards, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, and noise hazards. Additional safety hazards include burns and cuts from autoclaves, injuries from centrifuges, compressed gas leaks, cold burns from cryogens, electrical hazards, fires, injuries from machinery, and falls.

In synthetic biology
A complete understanding of experimental risks associated with synthetic biology is helping to enforce the knowledge and effectiveness of biosafety. With the potential future creation of man-made unicellular organisms, some are beginning to consider the effect that these organisms will have on biomass already present. Scientists estimate that within the next few decades, organism design will be sophisticated enough to accomplish tasks such as creating biofuels and lowering the levels of harmful substances in the atmosphere. Scientist that favor the development of synthetic biology claim that the use of biosafety mechanisms such as suicide genes and nutrient dependencies will ensure the organisms cannot survive outside of the lab setting in which they were originally created. Organizations like the ETC Group argue that regulations should control the creation of organisms that could potentially harm existing life. They also argue that the development of these organisms will simply shift the consumption of petroleum to the utilization of biomass in order to create energy. These organisms can harm existing life by affecting the prey/predator food chain, reproduction between species, as well as competition against other species (species at risk, or act as an invasive species). Synthetic vaccines are now being produced in the lab. These have caused a lot of excitement in the pharmaceutical industry as they will be cheaper to produce, allow quicker production, as well as enhance the knowledge of virology and immunology.

In medicine, healthcare settings and laboratories
Biosafety, in medicine and health care settings, specifically refers to proper handling of organs or tissues from biological origin, or genetic therapy products, viruses with respect to the environment, to ensure the safety of health care workers, researchers, lab staff, patients, and the general public. Laboratories are assigned a biosafety level numbered 1 through 4 based on their potential biohazard risk level. The employing authority, through the laboratory director, is responsible for ensuring that there is adequate surveillance of the health of laboratory personnel. The objective of such surveillance is to monitor for occupationally acquired diseases. The World Health Organization attributes human error and poor technique as the primary cause of mishandling of biohazardous materials.

Biosafety is also becoming a global concern and requires multilevel resources and international collaboration to monitor, prevent and correct accidents from unintended and malicious release and also to prevent that bioterrorists get their hands-on biologics sample to create biologic weapons of mass destruction. Even people outside of the health sector needs to be involved as in the case of the Ebola outbreak the impact that it had on businesses and travel required that private sectors, international banks together pledged more than $2 billion to combat the epidemic. The bureau of international Security and nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. nonproliferation policies, programs, agreements, and initiatives, and biological weapon is one their concerns Biosafety has its risks and benefits. All stakeholders must try to find a balance between cost-effectiveness of safety measures and use evidence-based safety practices and recommendations, measure the outcomes and consistently reevaluate the potential benefits that biosafety represents for human health. Biosafety level designations are based on a composite of the design features, construction, containment facilities, equipment, practices and operational procedures required for working with agents from the various risk groups.

Classification of biohazardous materials is subjective and the risk assessment is determined by the individuals most familiar with the specific characteristics of the organism. There are several factors taken into account when assessing an organism and the classification process.

 * Risk Group 1: (no or low individual and community risk) A microorganism that is unlikely to cause human or animal disease.
 * Risk Group 2 : (moderate individual risk, low community risk) A pathogen that can cause human or animal disease but is unlikely to be a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the community, livestock or the environment. Laboratory exposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of infection is limited.
 * Risk Group 3 : (high individual risk, low community risk) A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease but does not ordinarily spread from one infected individual to another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available.
 * Risk Group 4 : (high individual and community risk) A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease and that can be readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available.

See World Health Organization Biosafety Laboratory Guidelines (4th edition, 2020): World Health Organization Biosafety Laboratory Guidelines

Investigations have shown that there are hundreds of unreported biosafety accidents, with laboratories self-policing the handling of biohazardous materials and lack of reporting. Poor record keeping, improper disposal, and mishandling biohazardous materials result in increased risks of biochemical contamination for both the public and environment.

Along with the precautions taken during the handling process of biohazardous materials, the World Health Organization recommends: Staff training should always include information on safe methods for highly hazardous procedures that are commonly encountered by all laboratory personnel, and which involve:
 * 1) Inhalation risks (i.e. aerosol production) when using loops, streaking agar plates,
 * 2) pipetting, making smears, opening cultures, taking blood/serum samples, centrifuging, etc.
 * 3) Ingestion risks when handling specimens, smears and cultures
 * 4) Risks of percutaneous exposures when using syringes and needles
 * 5) Bites and scratches when handling animals
 * 6) Handling of blood and other potentially hazardous pathological materials
 * 7) Decontamination and disposal of infectious material.

Biosafety management in laboratory
First of all the laboratory director, who holds immediate responsibility for the laboratory, is tasked with ensuring the development and adoption of a biosafety management plan as well as a safety or operations manual. Secondly, the laboratory supervisor, who reports to the laboratory director, is responsible for organizing regular training sessions on laboratory safety.

The third point, the personnel must be informed about any special hazards and be required to review the safety or operations manual and adhere to established practices and procedures. The laboratory supervisor is responsible for ensuring that all personnel have a clear understanding of these guidelines, and a copy of the safety or operations manual should be readily available within the laboratory. Finally, adequate medical assessment, monitoring, and treatment must be made available to all personnel when needed, and comprehensive medical records should be maintained.

Legal information
In June 2009, the Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversight recommended the formation of an agency to coordinate high safety risk level labs (3 and 4), and voluntary, non-punitive measures for incident reporting. However, it is unclear as to what changes may or may not have been implemented following their recommendations.

United States Code of Federal Regulations
The United States Code of Federal Regulations is the codification (law), or collection of laws specific to a specific to a jurisdiction that represent broad areas subject to federal regulation. Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations addresses laws concerning Public Health issues including biosafety which can be found under the citation 42 CFR 73 to 42 CFR 73.21 by accessing the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) website. Title 42 Section 73 of the CFR addresses specific aspects of biosafety including occupational safety and health, transportation of biohazardous materials and safety plans for laboratories using potential biohazards. While biocontainment, as defined in the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories and Primary Containment for Biohazards: Selection, Installation and Use of Biosafety Cabinets manuals available at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website much of the design, implementation and monitoring of protocols are left up to state and local authorities. The United States CFR states "An individual or entity required to register [as a user of biological agents] must develop and implement a written biosafety plan that is commensurate with the risk of the select agent or toxin" which is followed by three recommended sources for laboratory reference:

 * 1) The CDC/NIH publication, "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories."
 * 2) The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations in 29 CFR parts 1910.1200 and 1910.1450.
 * 3) The "NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules" (NIH Guidelines).

While clearly the needs of biocontainment and biosafety measures vary across government, academic and private industry laboratories, biological agents pose similar risks independent of their locale. Laws relating to biosafety are not easily accessible and there are few federal regulations that are readily available for a potential trainee to reference outside of the publications recommended in 42 CFR 73.12. Therefore, training is the responsibility of lab employers and is not consistent across various laboratory types thereby increasing the risk of accidental release of biological hazards that pose serious health threats to the humans, animals and the ecosystem as a whole.

Agency guidance
Many government agencies have made guidelines and recommendations in an effort to increase biosafety measures across laboratories in the United States. Agencies involved in producing policies surrounding biosafety within a hospital, pharmacy or clinical research laboratory include: the CDC, FDA, USDA, DHHS, DoT, EPA and potentially other local organizations including public health departments. The federal government does set some standards and recommendations for States to meet their standards, most of which fall under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. but currently, there is no single federal regulating agency directly responsible for ensuring the safety of biohazardous handling, storage, identification, clean-up and disposal. In addition to the CDC, the Environmental Protection Agency has some of the most accessible information on ecological impacts of biohazards, how to handle spills, reporting guidelines and proper disposal of agents dangerous to the environment. Many of these agencies have their own manuals and guidance documents relating to training and certain aspects of biosafety directly tied to their agency's scope, including transportation, storage and handling of blood borne pathogens (OSHA, IATA). The American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) has a list of such agencies and links to their websites, along with links to publications and guidance documents to assist in risk assessment, lab design and adherence to laboratory exposure control plans. Many of these agencies were members of the 2009 Task Force on BioSafety. There was also a formation of a Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, but this is more concerned with national defense programs and biosecurity.

Ultimately states and local governments, as well as private industry labs, are left to make the final determinants for their own biosafety programs, which vary widely in scope and enforcement across the United States. Not all state programs address biosafety from all necessary perspectives, which should not just include personal safety, but also emphasize an full understanding among laboratory personnel of quality control and assurance, exposure potential impacts on the environment, and general public safety.

Toby Ord puts into question whether the current international conventions regarding biotechnology research and development regulation, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and the scientific community are adequate.

State occupational safety plans are often focused on transportation, disposal, and risk assessment, allowing caveats for safety audits, but ultimately leaves the training in the hands of the employer. 22 states have approved Occupational Safety plans by OSHA that are audited annually for effectiveness. These plans apply to private and public sector workers, and not necessarily state/ government workers, and not all specifically have a comprehensive program for all aspects of biohazard management from start to finish. Sometimes biohazard management plans are limited only to workers in transportation specific job titles. The enforcement and training on such regulations can vary from lab to lab based on the State's plans for occupational health and safety. With the exception of DoD lab personnel, CDC lab personnel, First responders, and DoT employees, enforcement of training is inconsistent, and while training is required to be done, specifics on the breadth and frequency of refresher training does not seem consistent from state to state; penalties may never be assessed without larger regulating bodies being aware of non-compliance, and enforcement is limited.

Medical waste management in the United States
Medical waste management was identified as an issue in the 1980s, with the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988 becoming the new standard in biohazard waste disposal.

Although the Federal Government, EPA & DOT provide some oversight of regulated medical waste storage, transportation, and disposal the majority of biohazard medical waste is regulated at the state level. Each state is responsible for regulation and management of their own biohazardous waste with each state varying in their regulatory process. Record keeping of biohazardous waste also varies between states.

Medical healthcare centers, hospitals veterinary clinics, clinical laboratories and other facilities generate over one million tons of waste each year. Although the majority of this waste is as harmless as common household waste, as much as 15 percent of this waste poses a potential infection hazard, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Medical waste is required to be rendered non-infectious before it can be disposed of. There are several different methods to treat and dispose of biohazardous waste. In the United States, the primary methods for treatment and disposal of biohazard, medical and sharps waste may include:
 * Incineration
 * Microwave
 * Autoclaves
 * Mechanical/Chemical Disinfection
 * Irradiation

Different forms of biohazardous wasted required different treatments for their proper waste management. This is determined largely be each states regulations. Currently, there are several contracted companies that focus on medical, sharps and biological hazard disposal. Stericycle and Daniels Health are two national leaders in medical waste and pharmaceutical disposal in the United States.

Incidents of non-compliance and reform efforts
The United States Government has made it clear that biosafety is to be taken very seriously. In 2014, incidents with anthrax and Ebola pathogens in CDC laboratories prompted the CDC director Tom Frieden to issue a moratorium for research with these types of select agents. An investigation concluded that there was a lack of adherence to safety protocols and "inadequate safeguards" in place. This indicated a lack of proper training or reinforcement of training and supervision on regular basis for lab personnel.

Following these incidents, the CDC established an External Laboratory Safety Workgroup (ELSW), and suggestions have been made to reform effectiveness of the Federal Select Agent Program. The White House issued a report on national biosafety priorities in 2015, outlining next steps for a national biosafety and security program, and addressed biological safety needs for health research, national defense, and public safety.

In 2016, the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) had a presentation at their annual meeting focused on improving biosafety culture. This same year, The UPMC Center for Health Security issued a case study report including reviews of ten different nations' current biosafety regulations, including the United States. Their goal was to "provide a foundation for identifying national‐level biosafety norms and enable initial assessment of biosafety priorities necessary for developing effective national biosafety regulation and oversight."

title: Biosafety


text:
Biosecurity

Biosecurity refers to measures aimed at preventing the introduction and/or spread of harmful organisms (e.g. viruses, bacteria, plants, animals etc.) intentionally or unintentionally outside their native range and/or within new environments. In agriculture, these measures are aimed at protecting food crops and livestock from pests, invasive species, and other organisms not conducive to the welfare of the human population. The term includes biological threats to people, including those from pandemic diseases and bioterrorism. The definition has sometimes been broadened to embrace other concepts, and it is used for different purposes in different contexts.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a recent example of a threat for which biosecurity measures have been needed in all countries of the world.

Background and terminology
The term "biosecurity" has been defined differently by various disciplines. The term was first used by the agricultural and environmental communities to describe preventative measures against threats from naturally occurring diseases and pests, later expanded to introduced species. Australia and New Zealand, among other countries, had incorporated this definition within their legislation by 2010. New Zealand was the earliest adopter of a comprehensive approach with its Biosecurity Act 1993. In 2001, the US National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) defined biosecurity as "the sum of risk management practices in defense against biological threats", and its main goal as "protect[ing] against the risk posed by disease and organisms".

In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) provided an information note describing biosecurity as a strategic and integrated approach to analysing and managing relevant risks to human, animal and plant life and health and associated risks for the environment. In another document, it describes the aim of biosecurity being "to enhance the ability to protect human health, agricultural production systems, and the people and industries that depend on them", with the overarching goal being "to prevent, control and/or manage risks to life and health as appropriate to the particular biosecurity sector".

Measures taken to counter biosecurity risks typically include compulsory terms of quarantine, and are put in place to minimise the risk of invasive pests or diseases arriving at a specific location that could damage crops and livestock as well as the wider environment.

In general, the term is today taken to include managing biological threats to people, industries or environment. These may be from foreign or endemic organisms, but they can also extend to pandemic diseases and the threat of bioterrorism, both of which pose threats to public health.

Laboratory biosafety and intentional harm
The definition has sometimes been broadened to embrace other concepts, and it is used for different purposes in different contexts. A 2016 draft handbook on biosecurity education produced by the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre at Bradford University in the UK, where the focus is on the dangers of "dual-use" research, defines the term as meaning "successful minimising of the risks that the biological sciences will be deliberately or accidentally misused in a way which causes harm for humans, animals, plants or the environment, including through awareness and understanding of the risks".

From the late 1990s, in response to the threat of biological terrorism, the term started to include the prevention of the theft of biological materials from research laboratories, called "laboratory biosecurity" by WHO. The term laboratory biosafety refers to the measures taken "to reduce the risk of accidental release of or exposure to infectious disease agents", whereas laboratory biosecurity is usually taken to mean "a set of systems and practices employed in legitimate bioscience facilities to reduce the risk that dangerous biological agents will be stolen and used maliciously". Joseph Kanabrocki (2017) source elaborates: "Biosafety focuses on protection of the researcher, their contacts and the environment via accidental release of a pathogen from containment, whether by direct release into the environment or by a laboratory-acquired infection. Conversely, biosecurity focuses on controlling access to pathogens of consequence and on the reliability of the scientists granted this access (thereby reducing the threat of an intentional release of a pathogen) and/or access to sensitive information related to a pathogen's virulence, host-range, transmissibility, resistance to medical countermeasures, and environmental stability, among other things".

In the US, the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity was created in 2004 to provide biosecurity oversight of "dual-use research", defined as "biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security". In 2006, the National Academy of Sciences defined biosecurity as "security against the inadvertent, inappropriate, or intentional malicious or malevolent use of potentially dangerous biological agents or biotechnology, including the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons as well as outbreaks of newly emergent and epidemic disease".

A number of nations have developed biological weapons for military use, and many civilian research projects in medicine have the potential to be used in military applications (dual-use research), so biosecurity protocols are used to prevent dangerous biological materials from falling into the hands of malevolent parties.

Laboratory program
Components of a laboratory biosecurity program include:
 * Physical security
 * Personnel security
 * Material control and accountability
 * Transport security
 * Information security
 * Program management
 * Biological Security

Animals and plants
Threats to animals and plants, in particular food crops, which may in turn threaten human health, are typically overseen by a government department of agriculture.

Animal biosecurity encompasses different means of prevention and containment of disease agents in a specific area. A critical element in animal biosecurity is biocontainment – the control of disease agents already present in a particular area and work to prevent transmission. Animal biosecurity may protect organisms from infectious agents or noninfectious agents such as toxins or pollutants, and can be executed in areas as large as a nation or as small as a local farm.

Animal biosecurity takes into account the epidemiological triad for disease occurrence: the individual host, the disease, and the environment in contributing to disease susceptibility. It aims to improve nonspecific immunity of the host to resist the introduction of an agent, or limit the risk that an agent will be sustained in an environment at adequate levels. Biocontainment works to improve specific immunity towards already present pathogens.

The aquaculture industry is also vulnerable to pathogenic organisms, including fungal, bacterial, or viral infections which can affect fish at different stages of their life cycle.

Human health
Direct threats to human health may come in the form of epidemics or pandemics, such as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic and other influenza epidemics, MERS, SARS, or the COVID-19 pandemic, or they may be deliberate attacks (bioterrorism). The country/federal and/or state health departments are usually responsible for managing the control of outbreaks and transmission and the supply of information to the public.

Medical countermeasures
Medical countermeasures (MCMs) are products such as biologics and pharmaceutical drugs that can protect from or treat the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack or in the case of public health emergencies. MCMs can also be used for prevention and diagnosis of symptoms associated with CBRN attacks or threats.

In the US, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) runs a program called the "FDA Medical Countermeasures Initiative" (MCMi), with programs funded by the federal government. It helps support "partner" agencies and organisations prepare for public health emergencies that could require MCMs.

Agricultural biosecurity and human health
Various international organisations, international bodies and legal instruments and agreements make up a worldwide governance framework for biosecurity.

Standard-setting organisations include the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) develop standards pertinent to their focuses, which then become international reference points through the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), created in 1995. This agreement requires all members of the WTO to consider all import requests concerning agricultural products from other countries. Broadly, the measures covered by the agreement are those aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant life or health from certain risks.

Other important global and regional agreements include the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Codex Alimentarius, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947).

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and WHO are the most important organisations associated with biosecurity.

The IHR is a legally binding agreement on 196 nations, including all member states of WHO. Its purpose and scope is "to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks and that avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade", "to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide".

Biological weapons

 * The Biological Weapons Convention was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons, being biological weapons.
 * UN Resolution 1540 (2004) "affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolution obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery". Resolution 2325, reaffirming 1540, was adopted unanimously on 15 December 2016.

Laboratory safety

 * OECD Best Practice Guidelines for Biological Resource Centres, a consensus report created in 2001 after experts from OECD countries came together, calling upon "national governments to undertake actions to bring the BRC concept into being in concert with the international scientific community". BRCs are "repositories and providers of high-quality biological materials and information".

As international security issue
For a long time, health security or biosecurity issues were not considered as an international security issue, especially in the traditional view of international relations. However, some changes in trend have contributed to the inclusion of biosecurity (health security) in discussions of security. As time progressed, there was a movement towards securitisation. Non-traditional security issues such as climate change, organised crime, terrorism, and landmines came to be included in the definition of international security. There was a general realisation that the actors in the international system not only involved nation-states but also included international organisations, institutions, and individuals, which ensured the security of various actors within each nation became an important agenda. Biosecurity is one of the issues to be securitised under this trend. On 10 January 2000, the UN Security Council convened to discuss HIV/AIDS as a security issue in Africa and designated it a threat in the following month. The UNDP Millennium Development Goals also recognise health issues as international security issue.

Several instances of epidemics such as SARS increased awareness of health security (biosecurity). Several factors have rendered biosecurity issues more severe: there is a continuing advancement of biotechnology, which increases the possibility for malevolent use, evolution of infectious diseases, and globalising force which is making the world more interdependent and more susceptible to spread of epidemics.

Controversial experiments in synthetic biology, including the synthesis of poliovirus from its genetic sequence, and the modification of flu type H5N1 for airborne transmission in mammals, led to calls for tighter controls on the materials and information used to perform similar feats. Ideas include better enforcement by national governments and private entities concerning shipments and downloads of such materials, and registration or background check requirements for anyone handling such materials.

Challenges
Diseases caused by emerging viruses are a major threat to global public health. The proliferation of high biosafety level laboratories around the world has resulted in concern about the availability of targets for those that might be interested in stealing dangerous pathogens. The growth in containment laboratories is often in response to emerging diseases, and many new containment labs' main focus is to find ways to control these diseases. By strengthening national disease surveillance, prevention, control and response systems, the labs have improved international public health.

One of the major challenges of biosecurity is that harmful technology has become more available and accessible. Biomedical advances and the globalisation of scientific and technical expertise have made it possible to greatly improve public health; however, there is also the risk that these advances can make it easier for terrorists to produce biological weapons.

Communication between the citizen and law enforcement officials is important. Indicators of agro-terrorism at a food processing plant may include persons taking notes or photos of a business, theft of employee uniforms, employees changing working hours, or persons attempting to gain information about security measures and personnel. Unusual activity is best handled if reported to law enforcement personnel promptly. Communication between policymakers and life sciences scientists is also important.

The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, with its socio-political unrest, diverse cultures and societies, and recent biological weapons programs, faces particular challenges.

Future
Biosecurity requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and law enforcement officials.

The emerging nature of newer biosecurity threats means that small-scale risks can blow up rapidly, which makes the development of an effective policy challenging owing to the limitations on time and resources available for analysing threats and estimating the likelihood of their occurrence. It is likely that further synergies with other disciplines, such as virology or the detection of chemical contaminants, will develop over time.

Some uncertainties about the policy implementation for biosecurity remain for future. In order to carefully plan out preventive policies, policy makers need to be able to somewhat predict the probability and assess the risks; however, as the uncertain nature of the biosecurity issue goes it is largely difficult to predict and also involves a complex process as it requires a multidisciplinary approach. The policy choices they make to address an immediate threat could pose another threat in the future, facing an unintended trade-off.

Philosopher Toby Ord, in his 2020 book The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, puts into question whether the current international conventions regarding biotechnology research and development regulation, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and the scientific community are adequate.

American scientists have proposed various policy-based measures to reduce the large risks from life sciences research – such as pandemics through accident or misapplication. Risk management measures may include novel international guidelines, effective oversight, improvement of US policies to influence policies globally, and identification of gaps in biosecurity policies along with potential approaches to address them.

Role of education
The advance of the life sciences and biotechnology has the potential to bring great benefits to humankind through responding to societal challenges. However, it is also possible that such advances could be exploited for hostile purposes, something evidenced in a small number of incidents of bioterrorism, particularly by the series of large-scale offensive biological warfare programs carried out by major states in the last century. Dealing with this challenge, which has been labelled the "dual-use dilemma", requires a number of different activities. However, one way of ensuring that the life sciences continue to generate significant benefits and do not become subject to misuse for hostile purposes is a process of engagement between scientists and the security community, and the development of strong ethical and normative frameworks to complement legal and regulatory measures that are developed by states.

General

 * Biosecurity Commons, a Wiki Database
 * – A peer-reviewed, open access electronic journal for cross-disciplinary research in all aspects of human or animal epidemics, pandemics, biosecurity, bioterrorism and CBRN, including prevention, governance, detection, mitigation and response.

Articles and books

 * Chen, Lincoln, Jennifer Leaning, and Vasant Narasimhan, eds. (2003). Global Health Challenges for Human Security Harvard University Press.
 * Hoyt, Kendall and Brooks, Stephen G. (2003). "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity". International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3.
 * Koblentz, Gregory D. (2012). "From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats". International Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1.
 * Lakoff, Andrew, and Sorensen, Georg. (October 2008). Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question, Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231146067. (Details here.)
 * Paris, Roland. (2001). "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?". International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2.
 * Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. and Chenoy, Anuradha. (2007). Human Security: Concepts and Implications. New York, Routledge. ISBN 978-0415473385 p. 42. (Also 2005 article here)
 * Paris, Roland. (2001). "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?". International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2.
 * Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. and Chenoy, Anuradha. (2007). Human Security: Concepts and Implications. New York, Routledge. ISBN 978-0415473385 p. 42. (Also 2005 article here)

title: Biosecurity


text:
De Bruijn–Newman constant

The de Bruijn–Newman constant, denoted by $$\Lambda$$ and named after Nicolaas Govert de Bruijn and Charles Michael Newman, is a mathematical constant defined via the zeros of a certain function $$H(\lambda,z)$$, where $$\lambda$$ is a real parameter and $$z$$ is a complex variable. More precisely,
 * $$H(\lambda, z):=\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{\lambda u^{2}} \Phi(u) \cos (z u) \, du$$,

where $$\Phi$$ is the super-exponentially decaying function
 * $$\Phi(u) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} (2\pi^2n^4e^{9u}-3\pi n^2 e^{5u} ) e^{-\pi n^2 e^{4u}}$$

and $$\Lambda$$ is the unique real number with the property that $$H$$ has only real zeros if and only if $$\lambda\geq \Lambda$$.

The constant is closely connected with Riemann's hypothesis concerning the zeros of the Riemann zeta-function: since the Riemann hypothesis is equivalent to the claim that all the zeroes of $$H(0,z)$$ are real, the Riemann hypothesis is equivalent to the conjecture that $$\Lambda\leq 0$$. Brad Rodgers and Terence Tao proved that $$\Lambda\geq 0$$, so Riemann's hypothesis is equivalent to $$\Lambda=0$$. A simplified proof of the Rodgers–Tao result was later given by Alexander Dobner.

History
De Bruijn showed in 1950 that $$H$$ has only real zeros if $$\lambda\geq 1/2$$, and moreover, that if $$H$$ has only real zeros for some $$\lambda$$, $$H$$ also has only real zeros if $$\lambda$$ is replaced by any larger value. Newman proved in 1976 the existence of a constant $$\Lambda$$ for which the "if and only if" claim holds; and this then implies that $$\Lambda$$ is unique. Newman also conjectured that $$\Lambda\geq 0$$, which was then proven by Brad Rodgers and Terence Tao in 2018.

Upper bounds
De Bruijn's upper bound of $$\Lambda\le 1/2$$ was not improved until 2008, when Ki, Kim and Lee proved $$\Lambda< 1/2$$, making the inequality strict.

In December 2018, the 15th Polymath project improved the bound to $$\Lambda\leq 0.22$$. A manuscript of the Polymath work was submitted to arXiv in late April 2019, and was published in the journal Research In the Mathematical Sciences in August 2019.

This bound was further slightly improved in April 2020 by Platt and Trudgian to $$\Lambda\leq 0.2$$.

title: De Bruijn–Newman constant


text:
Measure space

A measure space is a basic object of measure theory, a branch of mathematics that studies generalized notions of volumes. It contains an underlying set, the subsets of this set that are feasible for measuring (the $σ$-algebra) and the method that is used for measuring (the measure). One important example of a measure space is a probability space.

A measurable space consists of the first two components without a specific measure.

Definition
A measure space is a triple $$(X, \mathcal A, \mu),$$ where
 * $$X$$ is a set
 * $$\mathcal A$$ is a $σ$-algebra on the set $$X$$
 * $$\mu$$ is a measure on $$(X, \mathcal{A})$$

In other words, a measure space consists of a measurable space $$(X, \mathcal{A})$$ together with a measure on it.

Example
Set $$X = \{0, 1\}$$. The $\sigma$ -algebra on finite sets such as the one above is usually the power set, which is the set of all subsets (of a given set) and is denoted by $\wp(\cdot).$ Sticking with  this convention, we set $$\mathcal{A} = \wp(X)$$

In this simple case, the power set can be written down explicitly: $$\wp(X) = \{\varnothing, \{0\}, \{1\}, \{0, 1\}\}.$$

As the measure, define $\mu$ by $$\mu(\{0\}) = \mu(\{1\}) = \frac{1}{2},$$ so $\mu(X) = 1$ (by additivity of measures) and $\mu(\varnothing) = 0$  (by definition of measures).

This leads to the measure space $(X, \wp(X), \mu).$ It is a probability space, since $\mu(X) = 1.$  The measure $\mu$  corresponds to the Bernoulli distribution with $p = \frac{1}{2},$  which is for example used to model a fair coin flip.

Important classes of measure spaces
Most important classes of measure spaces are defined by the properties of their associated measures. This includes, in order of increasing generality:
 * Probability spaces, a measure space where the measure is a probability measure
 * Finite measure spaces, where the measure is a finite measure
 * $$ \sigma$$-finite measure spaces, where the measure is a $ \sigma $-finite measure

Another class of measure spaces are the complete measure spaces.

title: Measure space


text:
Infinite loop

In computer programming, an infinite loop (or endless loop) is a sequence of instructions that, as written, will continue endlessly, unless an external intervention occurs, such as turning off power via a switch or pulling a plug. It may be intentional.

There is no general algorithm to determine whether a computer program contains an infinite loop or not; this is the halting problem.

Overview
This differs from "a type of computer program that runs the same instructions continuously until it is either stopped or interrupted". Consider the following pseudocode:

The same instructions were run continuously until it was stopped or interrupted. . . by the FALSE returned at some point by the function is_there_more_data.

By contrast, the following loop will not end by itself:

birds will alternate being 1 or 2, while fish will alternate being 2 or 1. The loop will not stop unless an external intervention occurs ("pull the plug").

Details
An infinite loop is a sequence of instructions in a computer program which loops endlessly, either due to the loop having no terminating condition, having one that can never be met, or one that causes the loop to start over. In older operating systems with cooperative multitasking, infinite loops normally caused the entire system to become unresponsive. With the now-prevalent preemptive multitasking model, infinite loops usually cause the program to consume all available processor time, but can usually be terminated by a user. Busy wait loops are also sometimes called "infinite loops". Infinite loops are one possible cause for a computer hanging or freezing; others include thrashing, deadlock, and access violations.

Intended vs unintended looping
Looping is repeating a set of instructions until a specific condition is met. An infinite loop occurs when the condition will never be met due to some inherent characteristic of the loop.

Intentional looping
There are a few situations when this is desired behavior. For example, the games on cartridge-based game consoles typically have no exit condition in their main loop, as there is no operating system for the program to exit to; the loop runs until the console is powered off.

Modern interactive computers require that the computer constantly be monitoring for user input or device activity, so at some fundamental level there is an infinite processing idle loop that must continue until the device is turned off or reset. In the Apollo Guidance Computer, for example, this outer loop was contained in the Exec program, and if the computer had absolutely no other work to do, it would loop run a dummy job that would simply turn off the "computer activity" indicator light.

Modern computers also typically do not halt the processor or motherboard circuit-driving clocks when they crash. Instead they fall back to an error condition displaying messages to the operator (such as the blue screen of death), and enter an infinite loop waiting for the user to either respond to a prompt to continue, or reset the device.

Spinlocks
Spinlocks are low-level synchronization mechanisms used in concurrent programming to protect shared resources. Unlike traditional locks that put a thread to sleep when it can't acquire the lock, spinlocks repeatedly "spin" in an infinite loop until the lock becomes available. This intentional infinite looping is a deliberate design choice aimed at minimizing the time a thread spends waiting for the lock and avoiding the overhead of higher level synchronisation mechanisms such as mutexes.

Multi-threading
In multi-threaded programs some threads can be executing inside infinite loops without causing the entire program to be stuck in an infinite loop. If the main thread exits, all threads of the process are forcefully stopped, thus all execution ends and the process/program terminates. The threads inside the infinite loops can perform "housekeeping" tasks or they can be in a blocked state waiting for input (from socket/queue) and resume execution every time input is received.

Unintentional looping
Most often, the term is used for those situations when this is not the intended result; that is, when this is a bug. Such errors are most common by novice programmers, but can be made by experienced programmers also, because their causes can be quite subtle.

One common cause, for example, is that a programmer intends to iterate over sequence of nodes in a data structure such as a linked list or tree, executing the loop code once for each node. Improperly formed links can create a reference loop in the data structure, where one node links to another that occurs earlier in the sequence. This makes part of the data structure into a ring, causing naive code to loop forever.

While most infinite loops can be found by close inspection of the code, there is no general method to determine whether a given program will ever halt or will run forever; this is the undecidability of the halting problem.

Interruption
As long as the system is responsive, infinite loops can often be interrupted by sending a signal to the process (such as SIGINT in Unix), or an interrupt to the processor, causing the current process to be aborted. This can be done in a task manager, in a terminal with the Control-C command, or by using the kill command or system call. However, this does not always work, as the process may not be responding to signals or the processor may be in an uninterruptible state, such as in the Cyrix coma bug (caused by overlapping uninterruptible instructions in an instruction pipeline). In some cases other signals such as SIGKILL can work, as they do not require the process to be responsive, while in other cases the loop cannot be terminated short of system shutdown.

Language support
Infinite loops can be implemented using various control flow constructs. Most commonly, in unstructured programming this is jump back up (goto), while in structured programming this is an indefinite loop (while loop) set to never end, either by omitting the condition or explicitly setting it to true, as.

Some languages have special constructs for infinite loops, typically by omitting the condition from an indefinite loop. Examples include Ada, Fortran , Go , Ruby , and Rust.

Examples of intentional infinite loops
A simple example (in C):

The form  for an infinite loop is traditional, appearing in the standard reference The C Programming Language, and is often punningly pronounced "forever".

This is a loop that will print "Infinite Loop" without halting.

A similar example in 1980s-era BASIC:

A similar example in DOS batch files: Here the loop is quite obvious, as the last line unconditionally sends execution back to the first.

An example in Java

An example in Bourne Again Shell

An example in Rust

Mathematical errors
Here is one example of an infinite loop in Visual Basic: This creates a situation where  will never be greater than 5, since at the start of the loop code,   is assigned the value of 1 (regardless of any previous value) before it is changed to   + 1. Thus the loop will always result in  = 2 and will never break. This could be fixed by moving the  instruction outside the loop so that its initial value is set only once.

In some languages, programmer confusion about mathematical symbols may lead to an unintentional infinite loop. For example, here is a snippet in C:

The expected output is the numbers 0 through 9, with an interjected "a equals 5!" between 5 and 6. However, in the line " " above, the = (assignment) operator was confused with the == (equality test) operator. Instead, this will assign the value of 5 to  at this point in the program. Thus,  will never be able to advance to 10, and this loop cannot terminate.

Rounding errors
Unexpected behavior in evaluating the terminating condition can also cause this problem. Here is an example in C:

On some systems, this loop will execute ten times as expected, but on other systems it will never terminate. The problem is that the loop terminating condition  tests for exact equality of two floating point values, and the way floating point values are represented in many computers will make this test fail, because they cannot represent the value 0.1 exactly, thus introducing rounding errors on each increment (cf. box).

The same can happen in Python:

Because of the likelihood of tests for equality or not-equality failing unexpectedly, it is safer to use greater-than or less-than tests when dealing with floating-point values. For example, instead of testing whether  equals 1.1, one might test whether , or  , either of which would be certain to exit after a finite number of iterations. Another way to fix this particular example would be to use an integer as a loop index, counting the number of iterations that have been performed.

A similar problem occurs frequently in numerical analysis: in order to compute a certain result, an iteration is intended to be carried out until the error is smaller than a chosen tolerance. However, because of rounding errors during the iteration, the specified tolerance can never be reached, resulting in an infinite loop.

Multi-party loops
An infinite loop may be caused by several entities interacting. Consider a server that always replies with an error message if it does not understand the request. Even if there is no possibility for an infinite loop within the server itself, a system comprising two of them (A and B) may loop endlessly: if A receives a message of unknown type from B, then A replies with an error message to B; if B does not understand the error message, it replies to A with its own error message; if A does not understand the error message from B, it sends yet another error message, and so on.

One common example of such situation is an email loop. An example of an email loop is if someone receives mail from a no reply inbox, but their auto-response is on. They will reply to the no reply inbox, triggering the "this is a no reply inbox" response. This will be sent to the user, who then sends an auto reply to the no-reply inbox, and so on and so forth.

Pseudo-infinite loops
A pseudo-infinite loop is a loop that appears infinite but is really just a very long loop.

Very large numbers
An example in bash:

Impossible termination condition
An example for loop in C: It appears that this will go on indefinitely, but in fact the value of  will eventually reach the maximum value storable in an   and adding 1 to that number will wrap-around to 0, breaking the loop. The actual limit of  depends on the details of the system and compiler used. With arbitrary-precision arithmetic, this loop would continue until the computer's memory could no longer hold. If  was a signed integer, rather than an unsigned integer, overflow would be undefined. In this case, the compiler could optimize the code into an infinite loop.

Infinite recursion
Infinite recursion is a special case of an infinite loop that is caused by recursion.

The following example in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) returns a stack overflow error:

Break statement
A " " loop looks infinite at first glance, but there may be a way to escape the loop through a break statement or return statement. Example in PHP:

Alderson loop
Alderson loop is a rare slang or jargon term for an infinite loop where there is an exit condition available, but inaccessible in an implementation of the code, typically due to a programmer error. These are most common and visible while debugging user interface code.

A C-like pseudocode example of an Alderson loop, where the program is supposed to sum numbers given by the user until zero is given, but where the wrong operator is used:

The term allegedly received its name from a programmer (last name Alderson) who in 1996 had coded a modal dialog box in Microsoft Access without either an OK or Cancel button, thereby disabling the entire program whenever the box came up.

title: Infinite loop


text:
Military fiat

Military fiat is a process whereby a decision is made and enforced by military means without the participation of other political elements. The Latin term fiat, translated as "let it be," suggests the autocratic attitude ascribed to such a process. For example, many coups involve the imposition of a new government by military fiat.

title: Military fiat


text:
NGO (disambiguation)

NGO is an abbreviation for non-governmental organization.

It also may refer to:

 * Ngô (吴), a Vietnamese surname equivalent to Chinese name Ng or Wu
 * Wu (surname), Ngo in Hokkien
 * Ao (surname), Ngo in Cantonese
 * Ngo, a district and a town in the Republic of the Congo
 * .ngo, a file extension for an NG Linker Object (NGML) file
 * New Gravitational-wave Observatory, a European Space Agency project
 * Chūbu Centrair International Airport, IATA airport code designation
 * Nagoya Airfield, its former designation

title: NGO (disambiguation)


text:
Cuthbert (disambiguation)

St. Cuthbert of Lindisfarne (c. 634–687) was an Anglo-Saxon saint, bishop, monk and hermit.

Cuthbert may also refer to:

Places in the United States:
 * Cuthbert, Georgia, a city
 * Cuthbert, South Dakota, an unincorporated community
 * Cuthbert, Texas, a ghost town

People:
 * Cuthbert (given name)
 * Cuthbert (surname)

Other uses:
 * Cuthbert, Western Australia, Australia
 * "Cuthbert", World War II Allied spy Virginia Hall's nickname for her prosthetic leg

title: Cuthbert (disambiguation)