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Saracen

Saracen was a term used both in Greek and Latin writings between the 5th and 15th centuries to refer to the people who lived in and near what was designated by the Romans as Arabia Petraea and Arabia Deserta. The term's meaning evolved during its history of usage. During the Early Middle Ages, the term came to be associated with the tribes of Arabia.

The oldest known source mentioning "Saracens" in relation to Islam dates back to the 7th century, in the Greek-language Christian tract Doctrina Jacobi. Among other major events, the tract discusses the Muslim conquest of the Levant, which occurred after the rise of the Rashidun Caliphate following the death of Muhammad the prophet of Islam. The Roman Catholic Church and European Christian leaders used the term during the Middle Ages to refer to Muslims.

By the 12th century, "Saracen" developed various overlapping definitions, generally conflating peoples and cultures associated with Islam, the Near East and the Abbasid Caliphate. Such an expansion in the meaning of the term had begun centuries earlier among the Byzantine Greeks, as evidenced in documents from the 8th century where "Saracen" is synonymous with "Muslim". Before the 16th century, "Saracen" was commonly used in Western languages to refer to Muslims, and the terms "Muslim" and "Islam" were generally not used, with a few isolated exceptions. The term gradually became obsolete in favour of "Muslim" following the Age of Discovery.

Early usage and origins
The Latin term Saraceni is of unknown original meaning. There are claims of it being derived from the Semitic triliteral root šrq "east" and šrkt "tribe, confederation". Another possible Semitic root is srq "to steal, rob, thief", more specifically from the noun sāriq (سارق), pl. sāriqīn (سارقين), which means "thief, marauder". In his Levantine Diary, covering the years 1699–1740, the Damascene writer Hamad bin Kanan al-Salhi (محمد بن كَنّان الصالحي) used the term sarkan to mean "travel on a military mission" from the Near East to parts of Southern Europe which were under Ottoman Empire rule, particularly Cyprus and Rhodes.

Ptolemy's 2nd-century work, Geography, describes Sarakēnḗ (Σαρακηνή) as a region in the northern Sinai Peninsula. Ptolemy also mentions a people called the Sarakēnoí (οἱ Σαρακηνοί) living in the northwestern Arabian Peninsula (near neighbor to the Sinai). Eusebius in his Ecclesiastical history narrates an account wherein Pope Dionysius of Alexandria mentions Saracens in a letter while describing the persecution of Christians by the Roman emperor Decius: "Many were, in the Arabian mountain, enslaved by the barbarous 'sarkenoi'." The Augustan History also refers to an attack by Saraceni on Pescennius Niger's army in Egypt in 193, but provides little information as to identifying them.

Both Hippolytus of Rome and Uranius mention three distinct peoples in Arabia during the first half of the third century: the Taeni, the Saraceni, and the Arabes. The Taeni, later identified with the Arab people called Tayy, were located around Khaybar (an oasis north of Medina) and also in an area stretching up to the Euphrates. The Saraceni were placed north of them. These Saracens, located in the northern Hejaz, were described as people with a certain military ability who were opponents of the Roman Empire and who were classified by the Romans as barbarians.

The Saracens are described as forming the equites from Phoenicia and Thamud. In one document, the defeated enemies of Diocletian's campaign in the Syrian Desert are described as Saracens. Other 4th-century military reports make no mention of Arabs, but refer to Saracen groups ranging as far east as Mesopotamia who were involved in battles on both the Sasanian and Roman sides. The Saracens were named in the Roman administrative document Notitia Dignitatum, dating from the time of Theodosius I in the 4th century, as comprising distinctive units in the Roman army. They were distinguished in the document from Arabs.

Medieval usage of the term
No later than the early fifth century, Jewish and Christian writers began to equate Saracens with Arabs. Saracens were associated with Ishmaelites (descendants of Abraham's firstborn Ishmael) in some strands of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic genealogical thinking. The writings of Jerome (d. 420) are the earliest known version of the claim that Ishmaelites chose to be called Saracens in order to identify with Abraham's "free" wife Sarah, rather than as Hagarenes, which would have highlighted their association with Abraham's "slave woman" Hagar. This claim was popular during the Middle Ages, but derives more from Paul's allegory in the New Testament letter to the Galatians than from historical data. The name Saracen was not indigenous among the populations so described but was applied to them by Greco-Roman historians based on Greek place names.

As the Middle Ages progressed, usage of the term in the Latin West changed, but its connotation remained associated with opponents of Christianity, and its exact definition is unclear. In an 8th-century polemical work, the Arab monk John of Damascus criticized the Saracens as followers of a false prophet and "forerunner[s] to the Antichrist," and further connected their name to Ishmael and his expulsion.

By the 12th century, Medieval Europeans used the term Saracen as both an ethnic and religious marker. In some Medieval literature, Saracens were equated with Muslims in general and described as dark-skinned, while Christians lighter-skinned. An example is in The King of Tars, a medieval romance. The Song of Roland, an Old French 11th-century heroic poem, refers to the black skin of Saracens as their only exotic feature.

The term Saracen remained in use in the West as a synonym for "Muslim" until the 18th century. When the Age of Discovery commenced, it gradually lost popularity to the newer term Mohammedan, which came into usage from at least the 16th century. After this point, Saracen enjoyed only sporadic usage (for example, in the phrase "Indo-Saracenic architecture") before being outmoded entirely.

In the Wiltshire dialect, the meaning of "Sarsen" (Saracen) was eventually extended to refer to anything regarded as non-Christian, whether Muslim or pagan. From that derived the still current term "sarsen" (a shortening of "Saracen stone"), denoting the kind of stone used by the builders of Stonehenge, long predating Islam.

Use in medieval entertainment: Crusade cycle

The rhyming stories of the Old French Crusade cycle were popular with medieval audiences in Northern France, Occitania and Iberia. Beginning in the late 12th century, stories about the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem gave accounts of battle scenes and suffering, and of Saracen plunder, their silks and gold, and masterfully embroidered and woven tents. From the story of the Frankish knights at the tent of Saracen leader Corbaran:

The tent was very rich, draped with brilliant silk, and patterned green silk was thrown over the grass, with lengths of cut fabric worked with birds and beasts. The cords with which it was tied are of silk, and the quilt was sewn with a shining, delicate samit.

The Maghreb
The Islamic conquest of countries such as Egypt and Syria had allowed the Muslims to create a fleet capable of undermining Byzantine supremacy in the Mediterranean in a relatively short time.

Especially on the Maghreb and Spanish coasts, various emirates had been established where the local component soon merged with the Arab and Berber ones. Each emirate was headed by an emir who, apart from formal subjection to one of the three caliphs who divided the Islamic Empire between themselves between the 8th and 9th centuries (Córdoba, Cairo and Baghdad), were substantially independent.

Crete and the return to the western Mediterranean
The repression of the Umayyad insurrection in al-Andalus was bloody and it is in this period (818) that the mass emigration of Andalusians (so indicated, regardless of ethnic origin and religion) took place along two lines, partly to Morocco and others to Egypt. From here they supported their co-religionists for the 827 Muslim conquest of Sicily. Also in this year, an autonomous Andalusian kingdom was founded in Alexandria, Egypt, which the Abbasid Caliphate put an end to in 825. Then the Andalusians left for the Aegean, where they established the Emirate of Crete, independent and flourishing from a commercial and cultural point of view, as well as powerful from a military point of view, until the Byzantine reconquest in 961.

Crete became the center of numerous military expeditions in the Aegean, in southern Italy, where Traetto was also founded, and Rome was raided in 846, 849 and 876. In the western Mediterranean, due to the weakening of the Carolingian Empire and its fleet, Marseille was raided in 838 and 846, Arles in 842 and 850 and Fréjus in 869. The Muslims established a refuge in the Camargue in these years, as chronicled in the Annales Bertiniani, and from there they raged in the Rhône valley.

The Balearic Islands were finally conquered by the Andalusian Umayyad cause in 902.

The conquest of Sicily and the incursions into southern Italy

From 827 the Aghlabid emirs of Kairouan, in today's Tunisia, began the conquest of Sicily, which took a long time but which marked the apogee of Saracen rule in the Mediterranean for at least two centuries. The conquest was completed in 902, thanks to the offensive against the Byzantines, who had cut off supplies by conquering Crete (827) and Malta (870).

The settlement of the Saracens was sometimes also encouraged and supported by local lords, as help in disputes, as in the case of Andrea, consul of Naples, who was harassed by the Lombard prince of Benevento Sico and after turning in vain to Louis the Pious he asked the Saracens for help. The intervention was also requested again by his successor Sicard, with the cities of Amalfi, Sorrento and Gaeta joining the Neapolitans: the Saracens behaved correctly towards the cities of Campania, helping them to defeat the Beneventans and signing peace and trade agreements. In exchange the Neapolitans helped the Saracens during the siege of Messina in 843 and maintained a complicit neutrality when Punta Licosa and the islands of Ischia and Ponza fell under Islamic rule.

Again the Neapolitans, to weaken Benevento, had invited the Saracens to attack Brindisi in 838, from which they extended to Taranto and Bari, which became the seat of the eponymous emirate from 840 to 871.

Having defeated a Venetian fleet in the Kvarner Gulf, the Saracens now took advantage of the rivalries between the local powers, acting as masters and now also putting themselves at the service of the unscrupulous Beneventans themselves.

In the year 840 Siconulf, lord of Salerno, fighting with Radelchis and Landulf, lords of Benevento and Capua, called to his aid the Saracens settled in the colony under the Traetto hill, at the mouth of the Garigliano, often and willingly hired by the Duke of Naples, Andrew II. After bloody incursions into some parts of southern Italy, the Saracens found a way to prosper thanks to their raids and their offering themselves as mercenaries to the most diverse Christian lords of the time.

In 843 the Saracens went so far as to destroy Fondi and Monte Cassino, arriving in Ostia and going up the Tiber to reach Rome where they sacked St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican and Basilica of Saint Paul Outside the Walls in Rome.

The gesture prompted a swift reaction against the Saracens. A first attempt to expel the Saracens from southern Italy was made in 866-871 by the emperor and king Louis II, who, having descended into Italy with an army of Franks, Burgundians and Provencals, in addition to the allied troops of Pope Sergius II, of the Doge of Venice, the Duke of Spoleto and that of Naples, he took back Benevento, Capua, Salerno, Bari, destroying Matera and Venosa.

Now uncontrollable Saracen troops had been hired by Adelchis, Duke of Benevento: he forced the people of Bari to accept the protection of the Berber Khalfun, who as payment was promised nothing less than permission to sack and burn some sacred buildings in the area, but he went so far as to raze the city of Capua to the ground. Ludovico, then in Italy, managed to free Benevento from the mercenaries and pacify the Lombard princes, acting as guarantor for the division of the duchy into the two principalities of Salerno and Benevento and the county of Capua.

The compromise solution did not please Pope Leo IV, who in those years was having Rome surrounded with the "Leonine belt" of walls, as proof of the fear that was still alive, so the pontiff sponsored the formation of a Campanian fleet which in 849 defeated the Saracens off the coast of Ostia. Ludovico, nominated emperor in the meantime, moved towards Bari, also begged by the abbots of Monte Cassino and San Vincenzo al Volturno. In the meantime, an emir reigned in Bari who juggled between the various local powers, without denying the granting, upon payment, of safe conducts for pilgrims who wanted to embark for the Holy Land. He also protected the learned Jewish community of Oria. Expelled for the first time from Bari, a nucleus of them entrenched themselves near Monte Matino (Horace's Mons matinus) on a hill which therefore took the name of Mount Saraceno on the Gargano. From there they often came down to plunder and burn towns, villages and cities, to desecrate temples and commit all sorts of cruelties and atrocities. Defeated numerous times by different peoples, the Saracens, who fled from the Gargano in 967, fortified themselves in Bari. The campaign against Bari was long and between various negotiations, alliances and treaties it took place from 855 to 871, with the active combat phase in the four years between 867 and 871. The emir Sawdan, who had also sacked the Sanctuary of Monte Sant'Angelo on the Gargano, was allowed to spend his life in golden captivity by his friend Adelchis, prince of Benevento. But this move turned out to be wrong for the German emperor due to the entry into the scene of the Byzantine emperor Basil I, who frowned upon the intervention in Southern Italy, a territory of Byzantine prerogative for centuries: Basil allied himself with Sawdan and he fomented a revolt of the Lombards of Benevento, who took the emperor prisoner for about two months, while a new Saracen army of twenty thousand men, sent by Kairouan, devastated Calabria and Campania. In 873 Ludovico returned to Campania and defeated the Saracens, but died two years later.

Therefore, the Saracen port of Taranto remained, from which a very rich slave trade took place. It was the Byzantines who recovered Taranto in 876. However, the Saracen raids in the Adriatic did not end with the reconquest of Taranto, indeed in those years the Muslims completed the conquest of Sicily (Syracuse in 878, Taormina in 902). In 882, once again allied with the Campanians, they destroyed the abbeys of San Vincenzo and Montecassino, establishing a nest at the mouth of the Garigliano (Traetto), from which they also held Rome at gunpoint: they were finally expelled only in 915, when the Byzantine empress Zoe Porphyrogenita managed to get the Italian lords to agree on the need to expel the Saracens from the Italian peninsula and began a campaign against them which - thanks to the commitment of Berengar I of Italy, of Pope John X, and of the Dukes of Spoleto and Camerino - reaped the promised fruit. In reality the raids continued, in fact one of the most serious episodes seems to be the new sack of Oria and Taranto which occurred in 925/926, on which occasion the family of the well-known Oritan Jewish scholar Shabbethai Donnolo was captured.

In 970 they returned again to the Gargano, devastating places (the two Roman cities of Siponto and Matinum were razed to the ground), terrifying the inhabitants in massacres and robberies, who were forced to ask Otto the Great for help. It is on Mount Saraceno, where they were strongly entrenched for years, that the Saracens were defeated and driven from the place by Otto the Great.

In 1002/03 Doge Pietro II Orseolo successfully led a fleet of 100 ships against the Saracens who had been besieging Bari for months. As thanks, the Church of San Marco dei Veneziani was built in old Bari.

From Sicily in the 9th century the Arabs continued to plunder the coasts of southern Italy, also establishing new, occasional bridgeheads, such as at Agropoli or Santa Severina, which, despite the unsuccessful intervention of Otto II (in 982), they lasted for a long time, falling away only after 1036, when the death of the Sicilian emir of al-Akhal led to an irreversible fragmentation of power on the island. They were expelled from Sicily in 1071, after ten years of war, by the Normans.

The chain of coastal towers along the Tyrrhenian coast, connected to each other within sight to exchange signals, had the purpose of spotting pirate ships from afar in order to give the alarm to the defenseless populations in time, but they were only built in the 16th century to protect themselves by the Ottoman fleet. The commonly used name "Saracen Tower" is incorrect.

title: Saracen


text:
Talk:Xenu leaflet

Can somebody confirm that this material is public domain and does not infringe Scientology copyrights?

According to http://www.xenu.net/archive/leaflet/, the author of this particular text donated the Copyright irreversibly to the International public domain. Remember that copyright covers only a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself.

Removed text of leaflet. Long quotes are not encyclopedia articles.

 * I do not even agree to this having it's own article, but I figured I let it be for a sec so this can be discussed.

 * The leaflet itself is not an encyclopedia article; it is a criticism aimed at Scientology. As such, it is a primary source for an article about Scientology criticism, but it should not be included in an article about Xenu or Scientology.

 * The leaflet consists of two parts: an explanation of who Xenu is and a discussion. The explanation was set up in such a way that the author could next criticise Scientology more easily. As such the explanation part does not feel like a good description of Xenu to me. Better to write something ourselves.

 * As for 62.98.136.xxx: I don't know why you comment your vandalisms with VR, but it is not funny. Either be serious in contributing to Wikipedia or go away.--branko

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Xenu leaflet


text:
Sherman Antitrust Act

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair monopolies. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.

The Sherman Act broadly prohibits 1) anticompetitive agreements and 2) unilateral conduct that monopolizes or attempts to monopolize the relevant market. The Act authorizes the Department of Justice to bring suits to enjoin (i.e. prohibit) conduct violating the Act, and additionally authorizes private parties injured by conduct violating the Act to bring suits for treble damages (i.e. three times as much money in damages as the violation cost them). Over time, the federal courts have developed a body of law under the Sherman Act making certain types of anticompetitive conduct per se illegal, and subjecting other types of conduct to case-by-case analysis regarding whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.

The law attempts to prevent the artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply. "Innocent monopoly", or monopoly achieved solely by merit, is legal, but acts by a monopolist to artificially preserve that status, or nefarious dealings to create a monopoly, are not. The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect competitors from harm from legitimately successful businesses, nor to prevent businesses from gaining honest profits from consumers, but rather to preserve a competitive marketplace to protect consumers from abuses.

Background
In Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447 (1993) the Supreme Court said:

"The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself."

According to its authors, it was not intended to impact market gains obtained by honest means, by benefiting the consumers more than the competitors. Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts, another author of the Sherman Act, said the following:

"... [a person] who merely by superior skill and intelligence...got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist...(but was if) it involved something like the use of means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition.'"

At Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 310 U.S. 469, 310 U. S. 492-93 and n. 15:

"The legislative history of the Sherman Act, as well as the decisions of this Court interpreting it, show that it was not aimed at policing interstate transportation or movement of goods and property. The legislative history and the voluminous literature which was generated in the course of the enactment and during fifty years of litigation of the Sherman Act give no hint that such was its purpose. They do not suggest that, in general, state laws or law enforcement machinery were inadequate to prevent local obstructions or interferences with interstate transportation, or presented any problem requiring the interposition of federal authority. In 1890, when the Sherman Act was adopted, there were only a few federal statutes imposing penalties for obstructing or misusing interstate transportation. With an expanding commerce, many others have since been enacted safeguarding transportation in interstate commerce as the need was seen, including statutes declaring conspiracies to interfere or actual interference with interstate commerce by violence or threats of violence to be felonies. Footnote 14 appears here:

'See, e.g. regulation of; interstate carriage of lottery tickets, 28 Stat. 963 (1895), 18 U.S.C. § 387; Transportation of obscene books, 29 Stat. 512 (1897), 18 U.S.C. § 396; transportation of illegally killed game, 31 Stat. 188 (1900), 18 U.S.C. §§ 392–395; interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors, 35 Stat. 1136 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §§ 388–390; white slave traffic, 36 Stat. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C. §§ 397–404; transportation of prize-fight films, 37 Stat. 240 (1912), 18 U.S.C. §§ 405–407; larceny of goods moving in interstate commerce, 37 Stat. 670 (1913), 18 U.S.C. § 409; violent interference with foreign commerce, 40 Stat. 221 (1917), 18 U.S.C. § 381; transportation of stolen motor vehicles, 41 Stat. 324 (1919), 18 U.S.C. § 408; transportation of kidnapped persons, 47 Stat. 326 (1932), 18 U.S.C. § 408a–408c; threatening communication in interstate commerce, 48 Stat. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 408d; transportation of stolen or feloniously taken goods, securities or money, 48 Stat. 794 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 415; transporting strikebreakers, 49 Stat. 1899 (1936), 18 U.S.C. § 407a; destruction or dumping of farm products received in interstate commerce, 44 Stat. 1355 (1927), 7 U.S.C. § 491. Cf.

National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C., Ch. 7, § 151,

'Findings and declaration of policy. The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce. . . .'

The Anti-Racketeering Act, 48 Stat. 979, 18 U.S.C. §§ 420a-420e (1934), is designed to protect trade and commerce against interference by violence and threats. § 420a provides that

'any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to move in trade or commerce --'

'(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations. . . not including, however, the payment of wages by a bonafide employer to a bona fide employee; or'

'(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right; or'

'(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate subsections (a) or (b); or'

'(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any of the foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000 or both.'

But the application of the provisions of § 420a to labor unions is restricted by § 420d, which provides:

'Jurisdiction of offenses. Any person charged with violating section 420a of this title may be prosecuted in any district in which any part of the offense has been committed by him or by his actual associates participating with him in the offense or by his fellow conspirators: Provided, That no court of the United States shall construe or apply any of the provisions of sections 420a to 420e of this title in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed in existing statutes of the United States.'

It is significant that Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code, dealing with 'Offenses Against Foreign And Interstate Commerce' and relating specifically to acts of interstate transportation or its obstruction, makes no mention of the Sherman Act, which is made a part of the Code which deals with social, economic and commercial results of interstate activity, notwithstanding its criminal penalty.'

The law was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and of 'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern. The goal was to prevent restraints of free competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices, or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury. Footnote 15 appears here:

'The history of the Sherman Act, as contained in the legislative proceedings, is emphatic in its support for the conclusion that 'business competition' was the problem considered, and that the act was designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a significant effect on such competition.

On July 10, 1888, the Senate adopted without discussion a resolution offered by Senator Sherman which directed the Committee on Finance to inquire into, and report in connection with, revenue bills

'such measures as it may deem expedient to set aside, control, restrain or prohibit all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations, made with a view, or which tend to prevent free and full competition. . . with such penalties and provisions. . . as will tend to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competition of increasing production, the lowering of prices by such competition. . .'

(19 Cong.Rec. 6041).

This resolution explicitly presented the economic theory of the proponents of such legislation. The various bills introduced between 1888 and 1890 follow the theory of this resolution. Many bills sought to make void all arrangements

'made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth or production,. . .'

S. 3445; S. 3510; H.R. 11339; all of the 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) were bills of this type. In the 51st Cong. (1889), the bills were in a similar vein. See S. 1, sec. 1 (this bill as redrafted by the Judiciary Committee ultimately became the Sherman Law); H.R. 202, sec. 3; H.R. 270; H.R. 286; H.R. 402; H.R. 509; H.R. 826; H.R. 3819. See Bills and Debates in Congress relating to Trusts (1909), Vol. 1, pp. 1025–1031.

Only one, which was never enacted, S. 1268 in the 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892), introduced by Senator Peffer, sought to prohibit

'every willful act. . . which shall have the effect to in any way interfere with the freedom of transit of articles in interstate commerce,. . .'

When the antitrust bill (S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.) came before Congress for debate, the debates point to a similar purpose. Senator Sherman asserted the bill prevented only 'business combinations' 'made with a view to prevent competition', 21 Cong.Rec. 2457, 2562; see also ibid. at 2459, 2461.

Senator Allison spoke of combinations which 'control prices,' ibid., 2471; Senator Pugh of combinations 'to limit production' for 'the purpose of destroying competition', ibid., 2558; Senator Morgan of combinations 'that affect the price of commodities,' ibid., 2609; Senator Platt, a critic of the bill, said this bill proceeds on the assumption that 'competition is beneficent to the country,' ibid., 2729; Senator George denounced trusts which crush out competition, 'and that is the great evil at which all this legislation ought to be directed,' ibid., 3147.

In the House, Representative Culberson, who was in charge of the bill, interpreted the bill to prohibit various arrangements which tend to drive out competition, ibid., 4089; Representative Wilson spoke in favor of the bill against combinations among

'competing producers to control the supply of their product, in order that they may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the market, and may secure release from the stress of competition among themselves,'

ibid., 4090.

The unanimity with which foes and supporters of the bill spoke of its aims as the protection of free competition permits use of the debates in interpreting the purpose of the act. See White, C.J. in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 50 ; United States v. San Francisco, ante, p. 310 U. S. 16.

See also Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce on Control of Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S.Rept. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913), pp. 2, 4; Report of Federal Trade Commission, S.Doc. 226, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929), pp. 343–345.'

For that reason the phrase 'restraint of trade,' which, as will presently appear, had a well understood meaning in common law, was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. The addition of the words 'or commerce among the several States' was not an additional kind of restraint to be prohibited by the Sherman Act, but was the means used to relate the prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes, Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 286 U. S. 434, so that Congress, through its commerce power, might suppress and penalize restraints on the competitive system which involved or affected interstate commerce. Because many forms of restraint upon commercial competition extended across state lines so as to make regulation by state action difficult or impossible, Congress enacted the Sherman Act, 21 Cong.Rec. 2456. It was in this sense of preventing restraints on commercial competition that Congress exercised 'all the power it possessed.' Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, supra, 286 U. S. 435."

At Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 85 F.2d 1, affirmed, 175 U. S. 175 U.S. 211;

At Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 221 U. S. 54-58.

Original text
The Sherman Act is divided into three sections. Section 1 delineates and prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct, while Section 2 deals with end results that are anti-competitive in nature. Thus, these sections supplement each other in an effort to prevent businesses from violating the spirit of the Act, while technically remaining within the letter of the law. Section 3 simply extends the provisions of Section 1 to U.S. territories and the District of Columbia.

"Section 1:
 * Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.

Section 2:
 * Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor [. . . ]"

Subsequent legislation expanding its scope
The Clayton Antitrust Act, passed in 1914, proscribes certain additional activities that had been discovered to fall outside the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act. For example, as The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History states, the Clayton Act added certain practices to the list of impermissible activities:
 * "price discrimination" between different purchasers, if such discrimination tends to create a monopoly
 * "exclusive dealing" agreements
 * " 'tying' " arrangements
 * mergers and acquisitions that substantially reduce market competition.

The Robinson–Patman Act of 1936 amended the Clayton Act. The amendment proscribed certain anti-competitive practices in which manufacturers engaged in price discrimination against equally-situated distributors.

Legacy
The federal government began filing cases under the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. Some cases were successful and others were not; many took several years to decide, including appeals.

Notable cases filed under the act include:
 * United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans (1893), which was the first to hold that the law applied to labor unions.
 * Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States (1902), in which the trust was dissolved
 * Northern Securities Co. v. United States (1904), which reached the Supreme Court, dissolved the company and set many precedents for interpretation.
 * Hale v. Henkel (1906) also reached the Supreme Court. Precedent was set for the production of documents by an officer of a company, and the self-incrimination of the officer in his or her testimony to the grand jury. Hale was an officer of the American Tobacco Co.
 * Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States (1911), which broke up the company based on geography, and contributed to the Panic of 1910–11.
 * United States v. American Tobacco Co. (1911), which split the company into four.
 * United States v. General Electric Co (1911), where GE was judged to have violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, along with International General Electric, Philips, Sylvania, Tungsol, and Consolidated and Chicago Miniature. Corning and Westinghouse made consent decrees.
 * Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center (2010), where nurses alleged Albany Medical Center suppressed their wages in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by sharing wage information with other area hospitals. References: (1) Casetext Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center (2) Justia Docket No. 10-0846-mv
 * United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. (1915), which ruled that the company was abusing its monopolistic rights, and therefore, violated the Sherman act.
 * Federal Baseball Club v. National League (1922) in which the Supreme Court ruled that Major League Baseball was not interstate commerce and was not subject to the antitrust law.
 * United States v. National City Lines (1953), related to the General Motors streetcar conspiracy.
 * United States v. AT&T Co., which was settled in 1982 and resulted in the breakup of the company.
 * Wilk v. American Medical Association (1990) Judge Getzendanner issued her opinion that the AMA had violated Section 1, but not 2, of the Sherman Act, and that it had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade "to contain and eliminate the chiropractic profession."
 * United States v. Microsoft Corp. was settled in 2001 without the breakup of the company.

Constitutional basis for legislation
Congress claimed power to pass the Sherman Act through its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. Therefore, federal courts only have jurisdiction to apply the Act to conduct that restrains or substantially affects either interstate commerce or trade within the District of Columbia. This requires that the plaintiff must show that the conduct occurred during the flow of interstate commerce or had an appreciable effect on some activity that occurs during interstate commerce.

Elements
A Section 1 violation has three elements: E.g., [https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=c2cdaffd0ce470de6e524fd3149b710f&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b54%20Fordham%20L.%20Rev.%20247%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=322&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b547%20F.%20Supp.%20893%2cat%20917%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=27&_startdoc=21&wchp=dGLzVtb-zSkAB&_md5=79b43fe5414599f9b527852cc3923437 Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1981)], aff'd, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982); [https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=c2cdaffd0ce470de6e524fd3149b710f&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b54%20Fordham%20L.%20Rev.%20247%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=324&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b480%20F.%20Supp.%20640%2cat%20648%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=27&_startdoc=21&wchp=dGLzVtb-zSkAB&_md5=e2b70f0ee5ddeea95366fc31069e1498 Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Association, 480 F. Supp. 640, 648 (D. Kan. 1979)]; [https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=c2cdaffd0ce470de6e524fd3149b710f&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b54%20Fordham%20L.%20Rev.%20247%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=325&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b474%20F.%20Supp.%20628%2cat%20636%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=27&_startdoc=21&wchp=dGLzVtb-zSkAB&_md5=6fd0f7818a17e24b32e8c0e6cbc4083e Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 636 (D.D.C. 1979).]
 * (1) an agreement;
 * (2) which unreasonably restrains competition; and
 * (3) which affects interstate commerce.

A Section 2 monopolization violation has two elements:
 * (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and
 * (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.

Section 2 also bans attempted monopolization, which has the following elements:
 * (1) qualifying exclusionary or anticompetitive acts designed to establish a monopoly
 * (2) specific intent to monopolize; and
 * (3) dangerous probability of success (actual monopolization).

Violations "per se" and violations of the "rule of reason"
Violations of the Sherman Act fall (loosely ) into two categories:
 * Violations "per se": These are violations that meet the strict characterization of Section 1 ("agreements, conspiracies or trusts in restraint of trade"). A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the practice's actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in the practice. Conduct characterized as unlawful per se is that which has been found to have a "'pernicious effect on competition' or 'lack[s] . . . any redeeming virtue'" Such conduct "would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." When a per se rule is applied (in contrast to a rule of reason analysis), a civil violation of the antitrust laws is found merely by proving that the conduct occurred and that it fell within a per se category. Conduct considered unlawful per se includes horizontal price-fixing, horizontal market division, and concerted refusals to deal.
 * Violations of the "rule of reason": A totality of the circumstances test, asking whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses market competition. Unlike with per se violations, intent and motive are relevant when predicting future consequences. The rule of reason is said to be the "traditional framework of analysis" to determine whether Section 1 is violated. The court analyzes "facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraining, and the reasons why it was imposed," to determine the effect on competition in the relevant product market. A restraint violates Section 1 if it unreasonably restrains trade.
 * Quick-look: A "quick look" analysis under the rule of reason may be used when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets," yet the violation is also not one considered unlawful per se. Taking a "quick look," economic harm is presumed from the questionable nature of the conduct, and the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove harmlessness or justification. The quick-look became a popular way of disposing of cases where the conduct was in a grey area between illegality "per se" and demonstrable harmfulness under the "rule of reason".

Inference of conspiracy
A modern trend has increased difficulty for antitrust plaintiffs as courts have come to hold plaintiffs to increasing burdens of pleading. Under older Section 1 precedent, it was not settled how much evidence was required to show a conspiracy. For example, a conspiracy could be inferred based on parallel conduct, etc. That is, plaintiffs were only required to show that a conspiracy was conceivable. Since the 1970s, however, courts have held plaintiffs to higher standards, giving antitrust defendants an opportunity to resolve cases in their favor before significant discovery under FRCP 12(b)(6). That is, to overcome a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs, under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, must plead facts consistent with FRCP 8(a) sufficient to show that a conspiracy is plausible (and not merely conceivable or possible). This protects defendants from bearing the costs of antitrust "fishing expeditions"; however it deprives plaintiffs of perhaps their only tool to acquire evidence (discovery).

Manipulation of market
Second, courts have employed more sophisticated and principled definitions of markets. Market definition is necessary, in rule of reason cases, for the plaintiff to prove a conspiracy is harmful. It is also necessary for the plaintiff to establish the market relationship between conspirators to prove their conduct is within the per se rule.

In early cases, it was easier for plaintiffs to show market relationship, or dominance, by tailoring market definition, even if it ignored fundamental principles of economics. In U.S. v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the trial judge, Charles Wyzanski, composed the market only of alarm companies with services in every state, tailoring out any local competitors; the defendant stood alone in this market, but had the court added up the entire national market, it would have had a much smaller share of the national market for alarm services that the court purportedly used. The appellate courts affirmed this finding; however, today, an appellate court would likely find this definition to be flawed. Modern courts use a more sophisticated market definition that does not permit as manipulative a definition.

Monopoly
Section 2 of the Act forbade monopoly. In Section 2 cases, the court has, again on its own initiative, drawn a distinction between coercive and innocent monopoly. The act is not meant to punish businesses that come to dominate their market passively or on their own merit, only those that intentionally dominate the market through misconduct, which generally consists of conspiratorial conduct of the kind forbidden by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.

Application of the act outside pure commerce
While the Act was aimed at regulating businesses, its prohibition of contracts restricting commerce was applied to the activities of labor unions until the 1930s. This is because unions were characterized as cartels as well (cartels of laborers). In 1914 the Clayton Act created exceptions for certain union activities, but the Supreme Court ruled in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering that the actions allowed by the Act were already legal. Congress included provisions in the Norris–La Guardia Act in 1932 to more explicitly exempt organized labor from antitrust enforcement, and the Supreme Court upheld these exemptions in United States v. Hutcheson 312 U.S. 219.

Preemption by Section 1 of state statutes that restrain competition
To determine whether the Act preempts a state law, courts will engage in a two-step analysis, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.
 * First, they will inquire whether the state legislation "mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or ... places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661; see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) ("Our decisions reflect the principle that the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws authorizing or compelling private parties to engage in anticompetitive behavior.")
 * Second, they will consider whether the state statute is saved from preemption by the state action immunity doctrine (aka Parker immunity). In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for applying the doctrine: "First, the challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by the State itself." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The antitrust laws allow coincident state regulation of competition. The Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining when a state statute is in irreconcilable conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act in Rice v. Norman Williams Co. Different standards apply depending on whether a statute is attacked on its face or for its effects.
 * A statute can be condemned on its face only when it mandates, authorizes or places irresistible pressure on private parties to engage in conduct constituting a per se violation of Section 1.
 * If the statute does not mandate conduct violating a per se rule, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires an examination of the conduct's actual effects on competition. If unreasonable anticompetitive effects are created, the required conduct violates Section 1 and the statute is in irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act. Then statutory arrangement is analyzed to determine whether it qualifies as "state action" and is thereby saved from preemption.

Rice sets out guidelines to aid in preemption analysis. Preemption should not occur "simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws." This language suggests that preemption occurs only if economic analysis determines that the statutory requirements create "an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of anticompetitive effect," and does not occur simply because it is possible to use the statute in an anticompetitive manner. It should not mean that preemption is impossible whenever both procompetitive and anticompetitive results are conceivable. The per se rule "reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them."

Another important, yet, in the context of Rice, ambiguous guideline regarding preemption by Section 1 is the Court's statement that a "state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect." The meaning of this statement is clarified by examining the three cases cited in Rice to support the statement.

 * In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., automobile manufacturers and retail franchisees contended that the Sherman Act preempted a statute requiring manufacturers to secure the permission of a state board before opening a new dealership if and only if a competing dealer protested. They argued that a conflict existed because the statute permitted "auto dealers to invoke state power for the purpose of restraining intrabrand competition."

 * In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, oil companies challenged a state statute requiring uniform statewide gasoline prices in situations where the Robinson-Patman Act would permit charging different prices. They reasoned that the Robinson-Patman Act is a qualification of our "more basic national policy favoring free competition" and that any state statute altering "the competitive balance that Congress struck between the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts" should be preempted.

 * In both New Motor Vehicle and Exxon, the Court upheld the statutes and rejected the arguments presented as

 * Merely another way of stating that the . . . statute will have an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the Sherman Act – 'our charter of economic liberty'. . . . Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating the . . . statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.

 * This indicates that not every anticompetitive effect warrants preemption. In neither Exxon nor New Motor Vehicle did the created effect constitute an antitrust violation.  The Rice guideline therefore indicates that only when the effect unreasonably restrains trade, and is therefore a violation, can preemption occur.

 * The third case cited to support the "anticompetitive effect" guideline is Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, in which the Court rejected a facial Sherman Act preemption challenge to a statute requiring that persons selling liquor to wholesalers affirm that the price charged was no higher than the lowest price at which sales were made anywhere in the United States during the previous month. Since the attack was a facial one, and the state law required no per se violations, no preemption could occur. The Court also rejected the possibility of preemption due to Sherman Act violations stemming from misuse of the statute.  The Court stated that rather than imposing "irresistible economic pressure" on sellers to violate the Sherman Act, the statute "appears firmly anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any attempts by the appellants to preserve their . . . price level [in one state] by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the country." Thus, Seagram indicates that when conduct required by a state statute combines with other conduct that, taken together, constitutes an illegal restraint of trade, liability may be imposed for the restraint without requiring preemption of the state statute.

Rice v. Norman Williams Co. supports this misuse limitation on preemption. Rice states that while particular conduct or arrangements by private parties would be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis to determine liability, "[t]here is no basis . . . for condemning the statute itself by force of the Sherman Act."

Thus, when a state requires conduct analyzed under the rule of reason, a court must carefully distinguish rule of reason analysis for preemption purposes from the analysis for liability purposes. To analyze whether preemption occurs, the court must determine whether the inevitable effects of a statutory restraint unreasonably restrain trade. If they do, preemption is warranted unless the statute passes the appropriate state action tests. But, when the statutory conduct combines with other practices in a larger conspiracy to restrain trade, or when the statute is used to violate the antitrust laws in a market in which such a use is not compelled by the state statute, the private party might be subjected to antitrust liability without preemption of the statute.

Evidence from legislative history
The Act was not intended to regulate existing state statutes regulating commerce within state borders. The House committee, in reporting the bill which was adopted without change, declared: "No attempt is made to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws can be devised by Congress alone which would effectually protect the people of the [322 U.S. 533, 575]    United States against the evils and oppression of trusts and monopolies. Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the subject within the States, and the States have no authority to legislate in respect of commerce between the several States or with foreign nations."

See also the statement on the floor of the House by Mr. Culberson, in charge of the bill, "There is no attempt to exercise any doubtful authority on this subject, but the bill is confined strictly and alone to subjects over which, confessedly, there is no question about the legislative power of Congress. ..."

And see the statement of Senator Edmunds, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee which reported out the bill in the form in which it passed, that in drafting that bill the committee thought that "we would frame a bill that should be clearly within our constitutional power, that we would make its definition out of terms that were well known to the law already, and would leave it to the courts in the first instance to say how far they could carry it or its particular definitions as applicable to each particular case as the occasion might arise."

Similarly Senator Hoar, a member of that committee who with Senator Edmunds was in charge of the bill, stated "Now we are dealing with an offense against interstate or international commerce, which the State cannot regulate by penal enactment, and we find the United States without any common law. The great thing that this bill does, except affording a remedy, is to extend the common-law principles, which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the United States."

Criticism
Alan Greenspan, in his essay entitled Antitrust described the Sherman Act as stifling innovation and harming society. "No one will ever know what new products, processes, machines, and cost-saving mergers failed to come into existence, killed by the Sherman Act before they were born. No one can ever compute the price that all of us have paid for that Act which, by inducing less effective use of capital, has kept our standard of living lower than would otherwise have been possible." Greenspan summarized the nature of antitrust law as: "a jumble of economic irrationality and ignorance." Greenspan at that time was a disciple and friend of Ayn Rand, and he first published Antitrust in Rand's monthly publication The Objectivist Newsletter. Rand, who described herself as "a radical for capitalism", opposed antitrust law not only on economic grounds but also morally, as a violation of property rights, asserting that the "meaning and purpose" of antitrust law is "the penalizing of ability for being ability, the penalizing of success for being success, and the sacrifice of productive genius to the demands of envious mediocrity."

In 1890, Representative William E. Mason said "trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to one cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong done to people of this country by the trusts which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprise." Consequently, if the primary goal of the act is to protect consumers, and consumers are protected by lower prices, the act may be harmful if it reduces economy of scale, a price-lowering mechanism, by breaking up big businesses. Mason put small business survival, a justice interest, on a level concomitant with the pure economic rationale of consumer interest.

Economist Thomas DiLorenzo notes that Senator Sherman sponsored the 1890 William McKinley tariff just three months after the Sherman Act, and agrees with The New York Times which wrote on October 1, 1890: "That so-called Anti-Trust law was passed to deceive the people and to clear the way for the enactment of this Pro-Trust law relating to the tariff." The Times went on to assert that Sherman merely supported this "humbug" of a law "in order that party organs might say...'Behold! We have attacked the trusts. The Republican Party is the enemy of all such rings.'" Dilorenzo writes: "Protectionists did not want prices paid by consumers to fall. But they also understood that to gain political support for high tariffs they would have to assure the public that industries would not combine to increase prices to politically prohibitive levels. Support for both an antitrust law and tariff hikes would maintain high prices while avoiding the more obvious bilking of consumers."

Robert Bork was well known for his outspoken criticism of the antitrust regime. Another conservative legal scholar and judge, Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, does not condemn the entire regime, but expresses concern with the potential that it could be applied to create inefficiency, rather than to avoid inefficiency. Posner further believes, along with a number of others, including Bork, that genuinely inefficient cartels and coercive monopolies, the target of the act, would be self-corrected by market forces, making the strict penalties of antitrust legislation unnecessary. Conversely, liberal U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas criticized the judiciary for interpreting and enforcing the antitrust law unequally: "From the beginning it [the Sherman Act] has been applied by judges hostile to its purposes, friendly to the empire builders who wanted it emasculated... trusts that were dissolved reintegrated in new forms... It is ironic that the Sherman Act was truly effective in only one respect, and that was when it was applied to labor unions. Then the courts read it with a literalness that never appeared in their other decisions."

According to a 2018 study in the journal Public Choice, "Senator John Sherman of Ohio was motivated to introduce an antitrust bill in late 1889 partly as a way of enacting revenge on his political rival, General and former Governor Russell Alger of Michigan, because Sherman believed that Alger personally had cost him the presidential nomination at the 1888 Republican national convention... Sherman was able to pursue his revenge motive by combining it with the broader Republican goals of preserving high tariffs and attacking the trusts."

title: Sherman Antitrust Act


text:
Machaeridia (annelid)

Machaeridia is an extinct group of armoured, segmented annelid worms, known from the Early Ordovician (Late Tremadoc) to Carboniferous. It consists of three distinct families: the plumulitids, turrilepadids and lepidocoleids.

Fossils
Only the calcitic sclerites ("armour plates") of these worms tend to be preserved in the fossil record. These are tiny, and usually found disarticulated: articulated specimens reach about a centimeter in length, and are incredibly rare – hence the limited degree of study since their description in 1857.

The machaeridians are characterized by having serialized rows of calcitic shell plates. The dorsal sclerites were convex and almost isometric; lateral sclerites were flatter and longer. The plates comprised two calcite layers: the outer layer is thin and formed by lamellar deposition, whereas new elements were added to the thicker inner layer as it grew. Scales are ridged with growth lines, implying that they grew episodically. A few taxa experimented with different approaches to scale formation; some were only very weakly calcified and may have mainly been organic in nature. They were never moulted, and each scale could be moved with an attached muscle.

The front two segments of the machaeridians were commonly different from the rest, bearing fewer spiny projections.

The plumulitids are flattened from above and looks much like the coat of mail armour of chitons. The two other families are laterally compressed and some lepidocoleids formed a dorsal hinge, which make these machaeridians look like a string of bivalves.

Ecology
Machaeridians are often found in association with stylophorans - the cornutes and mitrates. This suggests that they possessed a similar ecology. They probably fed on organic detritus, perhaps even the faeces of the accompanying stylophorans.

Their scales almost certainly performed a defensive role.

The organisms would have had limited ability to flex to the right and left (in the sagittal plane), but would have been able to roll up. While most possessed bilateral symmetry, the scales on the right and left side of Turrilepas wrightiana are different in shape and form. The Plumulitid machaeridians would have moved across the surface of the sea floor using parapodia, whereas the fully armoured Turrelepids and Lepidocoelids burrowed in a peristaltic fashion reminiscent of their evolutionary cousins, the earthworms. This burrowing role has subjected them to the same evolutionary pressures which affect burrowing bivalves; convergent evolution as a result of their shared function probably contributed to early suggestions that the machaeridians should be classified with the molluscs.

Taxonomic affinity
Historically the group has been assigned to the echinoderms, barnacles, annelids and mollusks. Relationships to other Cambrian forms (such as the Halkieriids) have been proposed and discounted. In 2008, the discovery of a fossil preserving soft tissue (including chaetae and parapodia) established an annelid affinity. Machaeridians represent the only instance of this group developing calcitic armour (notwithstanding certain polychaetes that integrate calcite into their chaetae). The exact position with annelids remains unresolved, though some characters indicate a relationship to Aphroditacean annelids (Vinther et al. 2008). In an accompanying commentary, Jean-Bernard Caron suggested that machaeridians must be a stem group based on number of specialised features. However, one cannot assess crown group/stem group affinities based on autapomorphies, but on shared morphological traits or the lack thereof. He also suggested that machaeridians might be polyphyletic, but machaerdians are a well defined group with a number of shared characters and morphological gradations among all three families.

Study in 2019 recognized machaeridian as Phyllodociids based on their jaws.

Articulated specimens
Articulated machaeridians are known from:

... and possibly elsewhere

title: Machaeridia (annelid)


text:
Property damage

Property damage (sometimes called damage to property), is damage or destruction of real or tangible personal property, caused by negligence, willful destruction, or an act of nature. Destruction of property (sometimes called property destruction, or criminal damage in England and Wales) is a sub-type of property damage that involves damage to property that results from willful misconduct and is punishable as a crime.

Destruction of property encompasses vandalism (deliberate damage, destruction, or defacement) and arson (destroying property with fire), and similar crimes that involve unlawful infliction of damage to or destruction of personal property or real property.

title: Property damage


text:
Electoral fusion in the United States

Electoral fusion in the United States is an arrangement where two or more U.S. political parties on a ballot list the same candidate, allowing that candidate to receive votes on multiple party lines in the same election.

Electoral fusion is also known as fusion voting, cross endorsement, multiple party nomination, multi-party nomination, plural nomination, and ballot freedom.

Electoral fusion was once widespread in the United States; however, as of 2024, it remains legal and common only in New York and Connecticut. It was once legal in every state and credited by advocates as being instrumental in enabling major democratic advances.

Overview
In 2016, Business Insider wrote: "Fusion voting gives voters a chance to support a major candidate while registering their unhappiness with that candidate's party. A cross-endorsement from a smaller party like the Women's Equality Party can also help inform voters about where candidates stand on certain issues".

In 2019, The Nation wrote: "Fusion is a response to the winner-take-all electoral system. It solves the “wasted vote” or 'spoiler' dilemmas that otherwise plague third parties, and allows citizens who don’t fit neatly into the Democratic or Republican boxes to nevertheless participate constructively in politics".

Before the Civil War, fusion balloting was a common electoral tactic of abolitionist forces, who formed a number of anti-slavery third parties, including the Liberty and Free Soil parties. These and other abolitionist third parties cross-nominated major party candidates running under the Whig label, fusing more than one party behind a single candidate.

After the Civil War, agrarian interest groups and the political parties they founded continued to use fusion balloting to form alliances between third parties and the weaker of the two major parties, usually the Democrats in the West and Midwest. In the 19th and early 20th century, minor parties used fusion as a way to signal that their support for a major party candidate brought a meaningful number of voters to the candidate. Votes for fusion candidates were tallied first by party, then added together to produce the outcome. Argersinger (1980) argues that this helped ‘‘maintain a significant third party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters’ votes could be more than symbolic protest’’ (p. 288). Fusion allowed minor parties to avoid the 'wasted vote' and 'spoiler' dilemmas that small parties face in a non-proportional voting system.

The People's Party (also known as the Populists) is regarded as the most successful third party of the era. That success produced a counter-reaction from the dominant major parties, who then used state legislatures to enact bans against fusion in the late nineteenth and early 20th century. In northern and western states, fusion was largely banned by Republican-led legislatures. One Republican Minnesota state legislator said: "We don't propose to allow the Democrats to make allies of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other party, and get up combination tickets against us. We can whip them single-handed, but don't intend to fight all creation." In southern states, fusion was largely banned by Democrats who supported Jim Crow, in an attempt to prevent political alliances between newly-enfranchised Black voters and poor white farmers.

Most states banned fusion by the early 20th century. South Dakota banned the practice in 1999, Delaware banned it in 2011, and South Carolina banned it in 2022. In Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna (1996), the United States Supreme Court ruled that prohibiting electoral fusion does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Electoral fusion was once widespread in the United States, but as of 2024, it remains legal and common only in New York and Connecticut. It is partially legal in three others: California allows fusion in presidential elections only, and Pennsylvania and Maryland permit it in certain elections, including but not limited to the judiciary. In Oregon and Vermont, a system of dual-labeling exists, which allows a candidate to list multiple party endorsements on a single line, but disallows the traditional fusion system in which a minor party has its own ballot line and votes are tallied by party. In New Hampshire, fusion is legal in rare cases when primary elections are won by write-in candidates.

As of 2024, the New Jersey Moderate Party, the Common Sense Party in Michigan and the United Kansas Party are attempting to use litigation to bring back fusion voting in their states.

Presidential elections
In 1872, both the newly formed Liberal Republican Party and the Democratic party nominated the Liberal Republican Horace Greeley as their candidate for President of the United States: "If [the Democratic party] was to stand any chance at all against Grant, it must avoid putting up a candidate of its own who would merely split the opposition vote. It must take Greeley."

In the Presidential election of 1896, William Jennings Bryan was nominated by both the Democratic Party and the Populist Party, albeit with different vice presidential candidates, Arthur Sewall for the Democrats and Thomas E. Watson for the Populists. This election led to the downfall of the Populist Party, especially in Southern states (such as Watson's Georgia, as well as North Carolina and Tennessee) where the Populist party had engaged in electoral fusion or other alliances with Republicans against the dominant Bourbon Democrats.

In the 1936 and 1940, the American Labor Party nominated Franklin Roosevelt for president, and in 1944, the Liberal Party of New York cross-nominated Roosevelt, fusing with the ALP. Roosevelt won the state of New York in each election, but in 1940 and 1944 he would not have won New York without the support of votes gained via the fusion parties and their voters.

Donald Trump appeared on the 2016 presidential ballot in California with two ballot labels by his name, as the nominee of both the Republican Party and the American Independent Party, a small far-right party. Trump was the first fusion presidential candidate on the California ballot in at least eighty years.

New York
In 1936, labor leaders in New York City took advantage of fusion and founded the American Labor Party (ALP). Their immediate goal was to provide a way for New Yorkers who despised the Tammany Hall political machine to support Franklin Roosevelt without voting for the Democratic Party. In its first showing at the polls, the party garnered a significant amount of the vote in New York City, but was not important with regard to Roosevelt's victory. In the 1937 election cycle, the ALP built on it past performance by electing members to the city council, and by delivering so many votes to Mayor LaGuardia that the New York Times ran a front page article declaring that the ALP held the balance of power in city and state politics. The importance of the ALP was demonstrated again in 1938 when the party provided the margin of victory for the Democratic candidate for Governor, and in 1940 when the ALP did the same for President Roosevelt. In the 1944 presidential election, fusion provided CIO unions in New York an opportunity to build and back a labor party, an uncommon occurrence in the United States. Labor leaders knew that fusion permitted them to field candidates and win elections on the American Labor Party line in local elections, and to back Democrats in statewide or national races where they did not have the capacity to field successful candidates. Given the presence of fusion in New York, the Greater New York Industrial Union Council (GNYIUC), the CIO's local labor federation in New York, formally affiliated with the party making it the political arm of the New York CIO. This relationship would continue until 1948 when the GNYIUC opted to back Henry Wallace for president, instead of using fusion to back President Truman. This led to internal conflicts within the CIO and ultimately contributed to the decision by the National CIO to revoke the charter of the GNYIUC, thereby ending its relationship with the ALP.

As of 2023, to obtain or maintain automatic ballot access, a party's candidate for Governor of New York in midterm years or President of the United States in presidential years must receive either 130,000 votes or 2% of votes cast (whichever is greater) on that party's line.

Other parties, such as the Libertarian Party of New York, the Green Party of New York, and others, now seek ballot access by, first, getting a gubernatorial candidate on the ballot via petition (by collecting 45,000 valid signatures of registered voters), and then by getting 130,000 votes for that candidate on their line. As a general rule, neither party uses electoral fusion, and both rely on their own candidates. The Green Party, which had first achieved ballot status in 1998, failed to gain 50,000 votes (then the requirement) and also lost its ballot status in 2002, but regained its line when the 2010 election results were certified. In 2018, Larry Sharpe, the Libertarian Party candidate for governor, received over 90,000 votes, giving the party ballot status for the first time in its history.

In July 2019, the New York Legislature passed a budget bill that included the creation of a Public Campaign Financing Commission, which was given authority to investigate and create rules for public financing of campaigns. The Conservative Party of New York and the Working Families Party each filed lawsuits against the state in response, alleging that the commission was a disguised attempt to end fusion voting and thus the existence of New York's third parties.

Oregon
Prior to 1958, Oregon practiced a form of fusion that required the state to list multiple nominating parties on the candidate's ballot line. Sylvester Pennoyer was elected governor in 1886 and 1890 as a candidate of the Democratic and People's parties. In 1906, seven members of the Oregon House were also elected as candidates of the People's Party and either the Democratic or Republican parties. In 2008, a lawsuit was brought by the Independent Party of Oregon against the Oregon Secretary of State claiming that modifications to the ballot design statute in 1995 once again required the state to list multiple nominating parties on the candidate's ballot line. The lawsuit gave rise to legislation to allow candidates to list up to three party labels after their name. This bill passed both houses of the Oregon legislature during the 2009 legislative session. Governor Ted Kulongoski signed the bill into law on 23 July 2009.

Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, fusion can occur when members of a party write in the name of a member of a different party in a primary election, and secure enough write-in votes to nominate that party's candidate. For example, if Bob Jones is running for school board in a primary election as a Democrat and secures both enough votes from members of his own party as well as enough write-in votes from members of the Republican Party, then electoral fusion occurs, and Bob will appear on the ballot as both a Republican and a Democrat. Similarly, a member of one party may lose their own party's nomination in a primary election but gain enough write-in votes from members of the opposing party to win that party's nomination. For example, in May 2023, Stephen Zappala lost the Democratic primary for Allegheny County District Attorney to challenger Matt Dugan. However, although Zappala is a Democrat, Zappala received the requisite number (500 or more) of write-in votes from Republicans to appear as a Republican on the ballot in November 2023. Running on the ballot as a Republican, Zappala won the general election in November 2023, beating challenger Matt Dugan.

Wisconsin
In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, during the heyday of the sewer socialists, the Republican and Democratic parties would agree not to run candidates against each other in some districts, concentrating instead on defeating the Socialists. These candidates were usually called "non-partisan", but sometimes were termed "fusion" candidates instead.

title: Electoral fusion in the United States


text:
Bodily harm

Bodily harm is a legal term of art used in the definition of both statutory and common law offences in Australia, Canada, England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions. It is a synonym for injury or bodily injury and similar expressions, though it may be used with a precise and limited meaning in any given jurisdiction. The expression grievous bodily harm first appeared in a statute in Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).

Canada
In the Canadian Criminal Code, "bodily harm" is defined as "any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature."

England and Wales
The expression is not defined by any statute. It currently appears in a number of offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (ss. 18, 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35, and 47) and in the offence of burglary under the Theft Act 1968 (s. 9). It is also used in the definition of murder (as it appears in case law) in the guise of grievous bodily harm.

Psychiatric disorder

Non-physical or psychiatric injury can be considered "bodily harm" whether "actual" or "grievous", but there must be formal medical evidence to verify the injury.

In R v Ireland, R v Burstow, Lord Steyn said:

"The proposition that the Victorian legislator when enacting sections 18, 20 and 47 of the Act 1861, would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry was in its infancy in 1861."

In modern times, the practice of statutory interpretation frequently refers to the actual intention of the draftsman as expressed in the words of the Act, but considered in the light of contemporary knowledge. R v. Chan Fook applied this approach. Hobhouse LJ. said the prosecution "chose to introduce into the case an allegation that even if Mr Martins had suffered no physical injury at all as a result of the assault upon him by the Appellant, he had nevertheless been reduced to a mental state which in itself, without more, amounted to actual bodily harm. The only evidence to which the prosecution could point in support of this allegation was the evidence of Mr Martins that he felt abused and humiliated, that he had been threatened with further violence, and that he was very frightened. There was no medical or psychiatric evidence to support the allegation. There was no evidence that he was in a state of shock at any time prior to receiving the injuries which he suffered as a result of falling from the window."

Hobhouse LJ. said:

"The first question on the present appeal is whether the inclusion of the word 'bodily' is the phrase 'actual bodily harm' limits harm to harm to the skin, flesh and bones of the victim. Mr Justice Lynskey rejected this submission. In our judgment he was right to do so. The body of the victim includes all parts of his body, including his organs, his nervous system and his brain. Bodily injury therefore may include injury to any of those parts of his body responsible for his mental and other faculties."

He went on to say:

"Accordingly the phrase 'actual bodily harm' is capable of include psychiatric injury. But it does not include mere emotions such as fear or distress nor panic nor does it include, as such, states of mind that are not themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical condition."

He said that juries "should not be directed that an assault which causes a hysterical and nervous condition is an assault occasioning actual bodily harm".

This was followed by the Court of Appeal in R v Constanza, and the House of Lords which confirmed the principle in R v Burstow, R v Ireland. Ireland caused three women to develop psychiatric illnesses. Burstow's victim was fearful of personal violence and was diagnosed with a severe depressive illness. The best medical practice today accepts a link between the body and psychiatric injury, so the words "bodily harm" in sections 20 and 47 were capable of covering recognised psychiatric illnesses, such as an anxiety disorders or a depressive disorder, which affect the central nervous system of the body. However, to qualify, those neuroses must be more than simple states of fear, or problems in coping with everyday life, which do not amount to psychiatric illnesses.

Venereal and other communicable disease

See R v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103

The Law Commission stated its view that "the deliberate or reckless causing of disease should not be beyond the reach of the criminal law" and there is continuing debate over whether the transmission of HIV is covered as grievous bodily harm or under sections 22 to 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

In R v Clarence, it appeared that at a time when the prisoner knew, but his wife did not know, that he had gonorrhoea, he had "connection" with her; that the result was that the disease was communicated to her, and that had she been aware of the prisoner's condition she would not have submitted to the intercourse.

Lord Coleridge CJ., Pollock and Huddleston BB., Stephen, Manisty, Mathew, A L Smith, Wills and Grantham JJ., held that the conduct of the prisoner did not amount to an offence under either section 20 or section 47. Field, Hawkins, Day and Charles JJ. dissented.

Wills J. said "the facts are ... that he infected her, and that from such infection she suffered grievous bodily harm".

Hawkins J. said:

"In this condition of things the prisoner had sexual intercourse with his wife and in doing so communicated to her his disease and thereby caused her grievous bodily harm."

Field J. said (a footnote has been included in the body of the text, indicated by "(1)"):

"It is, I think, also clear that if the condition of the man is such that it is an ordinary and natural consequence of the contact to communicate an infectious disease to the woman, and he does so, he does in fact inflict upon her both 'actual' and 'grievous bodily harm.' Such an act produces what a great authority, Lord Stowell, describes as 'an injury of a most malignant kind:' see the note to Durant v. Durant. (1) 1 Hagg. Eccl. Cases, 768."

Unconsciousness

See T v. DPP [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin), [2003] Crim LR 622.

Hair

See DPP v. Smith [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin)

Pain or hurt such as persisting headaches, vomiting, pains in joints, stomach aches not caused by physical trauma

Mentioned in R v. Morris (Clarence Barrington) [1998] Cr App R 386

Great pain followed by tenderness and soreness for some time afterwards

This may constitute actual bodily harm, even though there is no physically discernible injury. See Reigate Justices ex p. Counsell (1984) 148 JP 193, DC

title: Bodily harm


text:
Talk:Bodily harm

2007-11-6 Automated pywikipediabot message
--CopyToWiktionaryBot 07:19, 6 November 2007 (UTC)

The transwiki has been deleted. See here http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Transwiki:Bodily_harm James500 (talk) 15:40, 4 June 2011 (UTC)

Origin/Etymology
Could someone confirm whether the 1803 Act is the original coinage of this expression (or just of the expression grievous bodily harm) or not. Thank you. James500 (talk) 18:44, 13 December 2008 (UTC)

Psychiatric injury
I have merged the section on psychiatric injury from the article Grievous bodily harm into this article after expanding and redrafting it. I did not think it was desirable to have multiple co-tracts on the subject in that article and in the article assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The following material formerly appeared in the latter article. I will leave it here for the moment just in case I have missed something:James500 (talk) 12:36, 4 June 2011 (UTC)

Non-physical injury
Non-physical or psychiatric injury can be considered actual bodily harm, although there must be medical evidence of the injury. ...

R v Chan Fook (1994) 1 WLR 689 did not accept hysteria or other very strong emotions as an injury when the defendant locked up a suspected thief who became very upset and tried to escape. This was followed by the Court of Appeal in R v Constanza (1997) 2 Cr. App. R. 492, and the House of Lords which confirmed the principle in R v Burstow, R v Ireland (1997) AC 147. During a three month period, Ireland, harassed three women by making repeated silent or heavy breathing telephone calls to them at night. This caused his victims to suffer psychiatric illness. ...

More
I have moved the following material here from Talk:Grievous bodily harm:

Non-physical injury
Changed it from suspected shoplifter to the flatmate, since that's what the case write up says R v. Chan Fook, don't know if that case should mention that the victim claims there was actual physical assult (the defense argued against that) and that his face was bruised and battered. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.226.20.93 (talk) 09:50, 1 July 2010 (UTC)

The intention of Parliament
It appears to me that the following passage is an attempt to paraphrase the quotes from Lord Steyn and Hobhouse LJ. that are now in the article. I do not think that what this passage says neccessarily follows from what Lord Steyn said. I am not sure that Lord Steyn's opinion is equal to a virtual certainty, or that he is making this inference from the language of the Act (rather than from the date on which it was passed or some other source). So I have replaced what I can with sourced material and cut the rest. James500 (talk) 09:53, 3 June 2011 (UTC)

The original legislative intent was almost certainly restricted to physical injury because Parliament required "bodily" (i.e. harm to the skin, flesh and bones of the victim) rather than "mental" or "emotional" harm. After all, psychiatry was in its infancy in 1861.

title: Talk:Bodily harm


text:
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act

The Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA) was a United States bill proposed in 2002 that would have prohibited any kind of technology that could be used to read digital content without digital rights management (DRM)—which prohibits copying and reading any content under copyright without permission of the copyright owner. The bill was known in early drafts as the Security Systems and Standards Certification Act (SSSCA) and was sometimes called the Consume But Don't Try Programming Act.

Legislation
The CBDTPA was proposed by South Carolina senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had stated that he could "not support" the proposed legislation and, as chairman, intended to block consideration of the controversial bill. This essentially killed the bill in 2002.

Proposed penalties for violating the CBDTPA ranged from five to twenty years in prison, and fines between $50,000 and $1 million.

Richard Stallman criticized this act due to the restrictions that it would place in the immediate and long-term future on free software, dubbing the bill the "Consume But Don't Try Programming Act."

Other U.S. senators named as sponsors of the CBDTPA bill include:
 * John Breaux (D-LA)
 * Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
 * Daniel Inouye (D-HI)
 * Bill Nelson (D-FL)
 * Ted Stevens (R-AK)