text:
Robinson–Patman Act

The Robinson–Patman Act (RPA) of 1936 (or Anti-Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at )) is a United States federal law that prohibits anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination.

Co-sponsored by Senator Joseph T. Robinson (D-AR) and Representative Wright Patman (D-TX), it was designed to protect small retail shops against competition from chain stores by fixing a minimum price for retail products. Specifically, the law prevents suppliers, wholesalers, or manufacturers from supplying goods to “preferred customers“ at a reduced price. It also prevents coercing suppliers into restrictions as to whom they can and can't sell goods.

The law grew out of practices in which chain stores were allowed to purchase goods at lower prices than other retailers. The amendment to the Clayton Antitrust Act prevented unfair price discrimination for the first time by requiring a seller to offer the same price terms to customers at a given level of trade. The RPA provided for criminal penalties but contained a specific exemption for "cooperative associations". Enforcement of the RPA's provisions began to decline beginning in the 1980s.

Contents
In general, the Act prohibits sales that discriminate in price on the sale of goods to equally-situated distributors when the effect of such sales is to reduce competition. Price means net price and includes all compensation paid. The seller may not throw in additional goods or services. Injured parties or the US government may bring an action under the Act.

Liability under section 2(a) of the Act (with criminal sanctions) may arise on sales that involve:
 * discrimination in price;
 * on at least two consummated sales;
 * from the same seller;
 * to two different purchasers;
 * sales must cross state lines;
 * sales must be contemporaneous;
 * of "commodities" of like grade and quality;
 * sold for "use, consumption, or resale" within the United States; and
 * the effect may be "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."

"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."

Defenses to the Act include cost justification and matching the price of a competitor. In practice, the "harm to competition" requirement often is the make-or-break point.

Sales to Military Exchanges and Commissaries are exempt from the act.

The United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have joint responsibilities for enforcement of the antitrust laws. Though the FTC has some overlapping responsibilities with the Department of Justice, and although the Robinson–Patman Act is an amendment to the Clayton Act, the Robinson–Patman Act is not widely considered to be in the core area of the antitrust laws. The FTC is active in enforcement of the Robinson–Patman Act and the Department of Justice is not.

This act is one in a category of regulatory enactments that attempt to control price discriminations—or different prices for identical products. Similar prohibitions on discrimination have been found in specialized regulatory systems, such as those relating to transportation and communications.

Such statutes typically have exceptions or restrictions on range of application similar to those set out in the Robinson–Patman Act, to allow for differences in costs of output and distribution and differences in the degree of competition facing a vendor.

Early enforcement of the Robinson–Patman Act was difficult, and even today, it continues to be widely unenforced. That was in part because of its complexity, which limited consumers' ability to understand it. Even for consumers who had the education in antitrust law needed to understand the Robinson–Patman Act, it was unclear how its enforcement could benefit them.

In the late 1960s, in response to industry pressure, federal enforcement of the Robinson–Patman Act ceased for several years. Enforcement of the law was driven largely by private action of individual plaintiffs. This most likely led to a decrease in enforcement because of the difficulty individuals tend to have understanding the Act. In the mid-1970s, there was an unsuccessful attempt to repeal the Act. The Federal Trade Commission revived its use of the Act in the late 1980s, alleging discriminatory pricing against bookstores by publishers, but enforcement has declined again since the 1990s. On the other hand, over 20 states have price discrimination statutes similar to Robinson–Patman.

Volume discounts may violate the act if not all customers are made aware of the availability of the discounts.

Notable cases

 * In 1948, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement of the Act in the landmark case Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt. The Commission found that Morton Salt violated the act when it sold its finest "Blue Label" salt, on a purportedly-standard quantity discount available to all customers but was really available only to five national chain stores that bought sufficient quantities of respondent's salt to obtain the discount price. According to the Court, "The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability."
 * In 1976, a dozen Texaco retailers in Spokane, Washington who sued Texaco and won damages of $449,000, which were trebled under antitrust law. Texaco and other oil companies had made a practice of selling gasoline at one price to retailers and a lower price to wholesalers. When some wholesalers went into the retail business, they obtained gasoline for their retail stations at the wholesaler discount, resulting in unlawful price discrimination. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this decision in 1990.
 * In 1994, the American Booksellers Association and independent bookstores filed a federal complaint in New York against Houghton Mifflin Company, Penguin USA, St. Martin's Press and others, alleging that defendants had violated the Robinson–Patman Act by offering "more advantageous promotional allowances and price discounts" to "certain large national chains and buying clubs." Later, complaints were filed against Random House and Putnam Berkley Group, and these cases also were later settled with the entry of similar consent decrees. Eventually, seven publishers entered consent decrees to stop predatory pricing, and Penguin paid $25 million to independent bookstores when it continued the illegal practices. In 1998, the ABA (which represented 3500 bookstores) and 26 individual stores filed suit in Northern California against chain stores Barnes & Noble and Borders Group, which had reportedly pressured publishers into offering the price advantages.

Modern enforcement
Enforcement of the RPA has declined since the 1980s. In 2022, FTC commissioner Alvaro Bedoya endorsed a revival of enforcing the RPA in order to curb price discrimination. Commentators have speculated that the FTC under Lina Khan may ramp up enforcement of the RPA in order to curb the unfair use of market power. In April 2024, there was a group of congressmen writing to FTC urging for a revival of the implementation of the Act.

title: Robinson–Patman Act


text:
Wheeler–Lea Act

The Wheeler–Lea Act of 1938 is a United States federal law that amended Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to proscribe "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" as well as "unfair methods of competition." It provided civil penalties for violations of Section 5 orders. It also added a clause to Section 5 that stated "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are hereby declared unlawful" to the Section 5 prohibition of unfair methods of competition in order to protect consumers as well as competition.

Until this amendment was passed, the Federal Trade Commission could only restrict practices that were unfair to competitors. This broadened the FTC's powers to include protection for consumers from false advertising practices.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Wheeler–Lea Act


text:
Cash and carry (disambiguation)

Cash and carry is a type of sales operation within the wholesale sector

Cash and carry may also refer to:

 * Cash and Carry (game show), the first network-televised game show
 * Cash and carry (World War II), a revision of the Neutrality Acts, designed to aid the British
 * Cash and Carry (film), a 1937 Three Stooges short film
 * Cash and Carry, alternate title of the 1941 film Ringside Maisie
 * Cash&Carry Smart Foodservice, the United States grocery chain
 * Kash n' Karry, the United States supermarket chain
 * An episode of the animated TV-series Garfield and Friends

title: Cash and carry (disambiguation)


text:
Talk:Magnoliopsida

Merging
In view of the confusion that runs rampant in wikipedia it would be silly to remove this small beacon of light.

Besides why merging with dicotyledon? Looks like a random choice. Brya 11:46, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

 * Do not merge. "Magnoliopsida" is THE current, more scientific botanical name for a taxonomical class, decided by the International Association for Plant Taxonomy.  "Dicotyledon" is the common name, based on the much older Cronquist system.  These are distinct words used under different contexts, hence it would be a BAD idea to merge.--Endroit 20:05, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

 * Merge. Or redirect Magnoliopsida in all taxoboxes to Dicotyledones. Current situation causes difficulties in navigation on current (more or less consistent) tree of taxa. Other possible solution is to treat more classes (e. g. Rosopsida(≈Eudicotyledones) and Magnoliopsida (sensu stricto), as in german Wikipedia).--213.247.213.207 21:50, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

 * A point worth noting is that the taxoboxes claim to follow APG II. Dicotyledones is a group that emphatically is rejected by APG II, so that using this is incompatible with the stated purpose. APG II instead recognises eudicots. Brya 17:58, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

 * Well, no merging, but then we should more precisely follow APG, i. e. (1) Make Dicotyledones non-taxoboxed article like current Magnoliopsida with links to Eudicots, Magnoliids, etc.; (2) Change list of classes in Magnoliophyta (Flowering plant) article taxobox to one consistent with APG; (2a) Collect all information about dicots splitting to the Classification section in Magnoliophyta, possibly with a cladogram. (3) If possible, add some text to the articles Eudicots, Magnoliids, Palaeodicots, etc. so that they will consist something more than list of orders.--213.247.213.207 22:04, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

 * Do not merge "Magnoliopsida" is not necessarily equivalant to dicotyledons. There are (at least) 5 possible circumscriptions of Magnoliopsida
 * 1) Equivalent to Magnoliophyta, i.e. dividing the division (phylum) into one class.
 * 2) Rquivalent to dicots, either accepting paraphyletic taxa, or if it turns out that dicots are holophyletic (see Goremykin et al papers).
 * 3) Equivalent to palaeodicots, accepting paraphyletic taxa.
 * 4) Equivalent to magnoliids, in which case there would be 6 to 8 classes in toto.
 * 5) Equivalent to palaeodicot euangiosperms, again accepting paraphyletic taxa.

 * S.R. Hinsley, Lavateraguy 17:59, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

I think we should merge because the Magnoliopsida page has substantially less information than the Dicotyledones page. I propose merging them so that there will be one good, easy resource. Into which article is another matter, but I suggest Dicotyledones because it has more information, and refers to the common name. Animalia is under animal. Tracheophyta is under vascular plant. we should try to merge the pages in some way, or at least have taxoboxes on both pages. I have noticed that there is great inconsistency in this matter, and it would be best in my opinion if we resolved it by combining the articles. VashiDonsk 04:08, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

Do not merge but I agree with some of the other suggestions such as: (1) make taxoboxes point to eudicot or magnoliid, not Magnoliopside, and (2) make those articles more informative.

Do not merge; as pointed out by Lavateraguy, "Magnoliopsida" can mean any of several different things, depending upon whose classification you are talking about. It most certainly is not the same as "dicots" except in one of those circumscriptions. (The taxoboxes are another headache entirely, and this article and discussion show one reason why they are problematic.) MrDarwin 16:33, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

 * Okay. I guess we shouldn't merge.  Maybe we could acheive more consistency by having all the taxoboxes point the same place, and having the page that they all do point to point to the right subgroup.  Wikipedia needs a standard for taxynomy.  VashiDonsk 01:18, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

Could we have a disambiguation template then? It took a while to get back on the taxoboxed pages when I ended up here. Bendž|Ť 12:04, 21 June 2007 (UTC)

General Info
This page has lots of technical detail but is lacking a general description useful to a non-technical user. -- cmh 01:30, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Merge redux
OK, I'm going to revisit this old debate. Specifically, I'm going to propose that Magnoliopsida be turned into a redirect to Dicotyledon. I think that the latter already has enough information about what "Magnoliopsida" means and such, for example APG and Cronquist circumscriptions, although it could be expanded if people think that is needed (I certainly most often run into Cronquist or APG or variants of the latter, so I'd lean towards a mere mention of other systems rather than trying to go into detail). My reasoning is to try to straighten out the taxoboxes. My previous suggestion that taxoboxes point to eudicot, magnoliid, or one of the smaller groups went nowhere. Fixes involving Rosopsida, Magnoliidae, etc seem to make things worse, in terms of the problems of discrepencies between different systems. The piping of Magnoliopsida to Dicotyledon (like this: Magnoliopsida) is used in perhaps half the taxoboxes, which has been my preferred solution (in the sense of not seeing a better way), but many taxoboxes just say Magnoliopsida without piping and the pipe seems kind of like a workaround anyway. I don't think that making Magnoliopsida a redirect to Dicotyledon means that the two terms are always synonymous, any more than having Pepys Diary redirect to Samuel Pepys means that those two terms are. It just means that: (1) the Dictotyledon article is where we discuss the term and/or concept magnoliopsida, and (2) in taxoboxes we'll link to Magnoliopsida for all the non-monocot angiosperms (which is already partially current practice). OK, fire away. (Just try to say what you think we should do, not just what is wrong with X, Y, or Z). Kingdon 15:26, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

 * I'm quite surprised that this got no reaction, but rather than beg people for input, I guess I'll be WP:BOLD and make the change. If people want to discuss further, go for it. Kingdon 19:56, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

 * It's been discussed before, and the cosensus was "Do not merge". I don't think any of our opinions have changed.  At least mine didn't.--Endroit 20:09, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

 * Well, I was one of the people who had said "do not merge" back then, so my opinion changed (for whatever that's worth). Anyway, what are your suggestions about how the taxoboxes should be written?  Magnoliopsida (with a pipe)? Magnoliopsida (plain)? eudicot/magnoliid? Something else?  Right now I think we're probably about 50/50 between the first two. Kingdon 21:08, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

 * The basic APG layout from Dicotyledon should go here too. I always arrive here via the taxobox and have to click around to get deeper in the system (e.g. to see whether something is eurosids I or II). Dysmorodrepanis (talk) 00:06, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Clarify the Systems
After the section on the Cronquist system comes a section on Dahlgren and Thorne systems, but only the first sentence of this section refers to Dahlgren and Thorne systems. The next sentence goes back to the Cronquist system. And the third sentence expands this to "Cronquist-based systems" plural. I am sure that many people already know what all this means, but the section should be re-written for people who do not already know it. Colin McLarty (talk) 13:15, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

title: Talk:Magnoliopsida


text:
Selective Service Act

Selective Service Act may refer to:

 * Selective Service Act of 1917, or Selective Draft Act, enacted April 28, 1917, for the American entry into World War I
 * Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, enacted September 16, 1940, in preparation for the American entry into World War II
 * Selective Service Act of 1948, enacted June 24, 1948, now known as the Military Selective Service Act

title: Selective Service Act


text:
Thirteenth Amendment

The Thirteenth Amendment may refer to the:

 * Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime
 * Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of India, established the Indian state of Nagaland
 * Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland, which specified that the prohibition on abortion would not limit freedom of travel
 * Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, which stripped the president of many of his reserve powers
 * Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of South Africa, which re-enacted provisions of the Twelfth Amendment
 * Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which created Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka

title: Thirteenth Amendment


text:
Lend-Lease

Lend-Lease, formally the Lend-Lease Act and introduced as An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, was a policy under which the United States supplied the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Republic of China, and other Allied nations of the Second World War with food, oil, and materiel between 1941 and 1945. The aid was given free of charge on the basis that such help was essential for the defense of the United States.

The Lend-Lease Act was signed into law on March 11, 1941, and ended on September 20, 1945. A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $ in when accounting for inflation) worth of supplies was shipped, or 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S. In all, $31.4 billion went to the United Kingdom, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion to France, $1.6 billion to China, and the remaining $2.6 billion to other Allies. Roosevelt's top foreign policy advisor Harry Hopkins had effective control over Lend-Lease, making sure it was in alignment with Roosevelt's foreign policy goals.

Materiel delivered under the act was supplied at no cost, to be used until returned or destroyed. In practice, most equipment was destroyed, although some hardware (such as ships) was returned after the war. Supplies that arrived after the termination date were sold to the United Kingdom at a large discount for £1.075 billion, using long-term loans from the United States, which were finally repaid in 2006. Similarly, the Soviet Union repaid $722 million in 1971, with the remainder of the debt written off.

Reverse Lend-Lease to the United States totalled $7.8 billion. Of this, $6.8 billion came from the British and the Commonwealth. Canada also aided the United Kingdom and other Allies with the Billion Dollar Gift and Mutual Aid totalling $3.4 billion in supplies and services (equivalent to $61 billion in 2020).

Lend-Lease weakened the United States' neutrality which had been enshrined in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. It was a decisive step away from non-interventionist policy and toward open support for the Allies. Lend-Lease's precise significance to Allied victory in World War II is debated. Khrushchev claimed that Stalin told him that Lend-Lease enabled the Soviet Union to defeat Germany.

Non-interventionism and neutrality

The 1930s began with one of the world's greatest economic depressions, and the later recession of 1937–1938 (although minor relative to the Great Depression) was otherwise also one of the worst of the 20th century. In 1934, following the Nye Committee hearings, as well as the publication of influential books such as Merchants of Death, the United States Congress adopted several Neutrality Acts in the 1930s, motivated by non-interventionism—following the aftermath of its costly involvement in World War I (the war debts were still not paid off), and seeking to ensure that the country would not become entangled in foreign conflicts again. The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 intended to keep the United States out of war by making it illegal for Americans to sell or transport arms or other war materials to warring nations, be they aggressors or defenders.

Cash and carry
In 1939, however—as Germany, Japan, and Italy pursued aggressive, militaristic policies—President Roosevelt wanted more flexibility to help contain Axis aggression. He suggested amending the act to allow warring nations to purchase military goods, arms and munitions if they paid cash and bore the risks of transporting the goods on non-American ships, a policy that would favor Britain and France. Initially, this proposal failed, but after Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in September, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939 ending the munitions embargo on a "cash and carry" basis. The passage of the 1939 amendment to the previous Neutrality Acts marked the beginning of a congressional shift away from isolationism, making a first step toward interventionism.

After the Fall of France during June 1940, the British Commonwealth and Empire were the only forces engaged in war against Germany and Italy, until the Italian invasion of Greece. Britain had been paying for its materiel with gold as part of the "cash and carry" program, as required by the U.S. Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, but by 1941 it had liquidated a large part of its overseas holdings and its gold reserves were becoming depleted in paying for materiel from the United States.

During this same period, the U.S. government began to mobilize for total war, instituting the first-ever peacetime draft and a fivefold increase in the defense budget (from $2 billion to $10 billion). The Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 set in motion a rapid expansion of the United States Navy. In the meantime, Great Britain was running out of liquid currency and asked not to be forced to sell off British assets. Hampered by public opinion and the Neutrality Acts, which forbade arms sales on credit or the lending of money to belligerent nations, Roosevelt eventually came up with the idea of "lend–lease". As one Roosevelt biographer has characterized it: "If there was no practical alternative, there was certainly no moral one either. Britain and the Commonwealth were carrying the battle for all civilization, and the overwhelming majority of Americans, led in the late election by their president, wished to help them." As the President himself put it, "There can be no reasoning with incendiary bombs."

In September 1940, during the Battle of Britain the British government sent the Tizard Mission to the United States. The aim of the British Technical and Scientific Mission was to obtain the industrial resources to exploit the military potential of the research and development work completed by the UK up to the beginning of World War II, but that Britain itself could not exploit due to the immediate requirements of war-related production. The British shared technology included the cavity magnetron (key technology at the time for highly effective radar; the American historian James Phinney Baxter III later called "the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores"), the design for the VT fuze, details of Frank Whittle's jet engine and the Frisch–Peierls memorandum describing the feasibility of an atomic bomb. Though these may be considered the most significant, many other items were also transported, including designs for rockets, superchargers, gyroscopic gunsights, submarine detection devices, self-sealing fuel tanks and plastic explosives.

On December 7, 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pressed Roosevelt in a 15-page letter for American help. In his December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat radio broadcast, President Roosevelt proclaimed the United States would be the "Arsenal of Democracy" and proposed selling munitions to Britain and Canada. Isolationists were strongly opposed, warning it would result in American involvement with what was considered by most Americans as an essentially European conflict. In time, opinion shifted as increasing numbers of Americans began to consider the advantage of funding the British war against Germany, while staying free of the hostilities themselves. Propaganda showing the devastation of British cities during The Blitz, as well as popular depictions of Germans as savage also rallied public opinion to the Allies, especially after Germany conquered France.

Lend-Lease proposal
After a decade of neutrality, Roosevelt knew that the change to Allied support must be gradual, given the support for isolationism in the country. Originally, the American policy was to help the British but not join the war. During early February 1941, a Gallup poll revealed that 54% of Americans were in favor of giving aid to the British without qualifications of Lend-Lease. A further 15% were in favor of qualifications such as: "If it doesn't get us into war," or "If the British can give us some security for what we give them." Only 22% were unequivocally against the President's proposal. When poll participants were asked their party affiliation, the poll revealed a political divide: 69% of Democrats were unequivocally in favor of Lend-Lease, whereas only 38% of Republicans favored the bill without qualification. At least one poll spokesperson also noted that "approximately twice as many Republicans" gave "qualified answers as ... Democrats."

Opposition to the Lend-Lease bill was strongest among isolationist Republicans in Congress, who feared the measure would be "the longest single step this nation has yet taken toward direct involvement in the war abroad". When the House of Representatives finally took a roll call vote on February 8, 1941, the 260 to 165 vote was largely along party lines. Democrats voted 236 to 25 in favor and Republicans 24 in favor and 135 against.

The vote in the Senate, which occurred on March 8, revealed a similar partisan difference: 49 Democrats (79 percent) voted "aye" with only 13 Democrats (21 percent) voting "nay". In contrast, 17 Republicans (63 percent) voted "nay" while 10 Senate Republicans (37 percent) sided with the Democrats to pass the bill.

President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease bill into law on March 11, 1941. It permitted him to "sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government [whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States] any defense article." In April, this policy was extended to China, and in October to the Soviet Union, which was attacked by Germany on 22 June 1941. Roosevelt approved $1 billion in Lend-Lease aid to Britain at the end of October 1941.

This followed the 1940 Destroyers for Bases Agreement, whereby 50 US Navy destroyers were transferred to the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy in exchange for basing rights in the Caribbean. Churchill also granted the US base rights in Bermuda and Newfoundland for free; this act allowed their British garrison to be redeployed to more crucial theatres. In 1944, Britain transferred several of the US-made destroyers to the USSR.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States entering the war in December 1941, foreign policy was rarely discussed by Congress, and there was very little demand to cut Lend-Lease spending. In spring 1944, the House passed a bill to renew the Lend-Lease program by a vote of 334 to 21. The Senate passed it by a vote of 63 to 1.

Multilateral Allied support
In February 1942, the U.S. and Britain signed the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement as part of a greater multilateral system, developed by the Allies during the war, to provide each other with goods, services, and mutual aid in the widest sense, without charging commercial payments.

Scale, value and economics

A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $ in ) was involved, or 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S. Most, $31.4 billion ($) went to Britain and its empire. Other recipients were led by $11.3 billion ($) to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion ($) to France, $1.6 billion ($) to China, and the remaining $2.6 billion to the other Allies. Reverse lend-lease policies comprised services such as rent on bases used by the U.S., and totaled $7.8 billion; of this, $6.8 billion came from the British and the Commonwealth, mostly Australia and India.

The terms of the agreement provided that the U.S. materiel was to be used until returned or destroyed. In practice, very little equipment was in usable shape for peacetime uses. Supplies that arrived after the termination date were sold to Britain at a large discount for £1.075 billion, using long-term loans from the United States. Canada was not a direct recipient of Lend-Lease aid. To address balance of payment issues between the US and Canada, and to prevent the US monopolizing British orders, the Hyde Park Declaration of 20 April 1941 made weapons and components manufactured in Canada for Britain eligible for Lend-Lease financing as if they had been manufactured in the US. Canada operated a program similar to Lend-Lease called Mutual Aid that sent a loan of Can$1 billion (equivalent to Can$ billion in ) and Can$3.4 billion (Can$ billion) in supplies and services to Britain and other Allies.

Administration
Roosevelt made sure that Lend-Lease policies were supportive of his foreign policy goals by putting his top aide Harry Hopkins in effective control of the program. In terms of administration, the president established the Office of Lend-Lease Administration during 1941, headed by steel executive Edward R. Stettinius. In September 1943, he was promoted to Undersecretary of State, and Leo Crowley became director of the Foreign Economic Administration, which was given responsibility for Lend-Lease.

Lend-Lease aid to the USSR was nominally managed by Stettinius. Roosevelt's Soviet Protocol Committee was dominated by Harry Hopkins and General John York, who were totally sympathetic to the provision of "unconditional aid". Few Americans objected to Soviet aid until 1943.

The program was gradually terminated after V-E Day. In April 1945, Congress voted that it should not be used for post-conflict purposes, and in August 1945, after Japan surrendered, the program was ended.

Significance of Lend-Lease
Lend-Lease contributed to the Allied victory. Even after the United States forces in Europe and the Pacific began to attain full strength during 1943–1944, Lend-Lease continued. Most remaining Allies were largely self-sufficient in frontline equipment (such as tanks and fighter aircraft) by this time but Lend-Lease provided a useful supplement in this category and Lend-Lease logistical supplies (including motor vehicles and railroad equipment) were of enormous assistance. Much of the meaning of Lend-Lease aid can be better understood when considering the innovative nature of World War II, as well as the economic distortions caused by the war. One of the greatest differences with prior wars was the enormous increase in the mobility of armies. This was the first big war in which whole formations were routinely motorized; soldiers were supported with large numbers of all kinds of vehicles. Most belligerent powers severely decreased production of non-essentials, concentrating on producing weapons. This inevitably produced shortages of related products that are required for industrial or logistical uses, particularly unarmored vehicles. On the Allied side, there was almost total reliance upon American industrial production, weaponry and especially unarmored vehicles purpose-built for military use, vital for the modern army's logistics and support. The USSR was very dependent on rail transport and starting during the latter half of the 1920s but accelerating during the 1930s (the Great Depression), hundreds of foreign industrial giants such as Ford were commissioned to construct modern dual-purpose factories in the USSR, 16 alone within a week of May 31, 1929. With the outbreak of war these plants switched from civilian to military production and locomotive production ended virtually overnight. Just 446 locomotives were produced during the war, with only 92 of those being built between 1942 and 1945. In total, 92.7% of the wartime production of railroad equipment by the USSR was supplied by Lend-Lease. including 1,911 locomotives and 11,225 railcars.

Much of the logistical assistance of the Soviet military was provided by hundreds of thousands of U.S.-made trucks and by 1945, nearly a third of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built. Trucks such as the Dodge $3/4$-ton and Studebaker $2 1/2$-ton were easily the best trucks available in their class on either side on the Eastern Front. American shipments of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations and clothing were also critical. Lend-Lease also supplied significant amounts of weapons and ammunition. The Soviet air force received 18,200 aircraft, which amounted to about 30 percent of Soviet wartime fighter and bomber production (mid 1941–45). Most tank units were Soviet-built models but about 7,000 Lend-Lease tanks (plus more than 5,000 British tanks) were used by the Red Army, eight percent of war-time production.

A particular critical aspect of Lend-Lease was the supply of food. The invasion had cost the USSR a huge amount of its agricultural base; during the initial Axis offensive of 1941–42, the total sown area of the USSR fell by 41.9% and the number of collective and state farms by 40%. The Soviets lost a substantial number of draft and farm animals as they were not able to relocate all the animals in an area before it was captured and of those areas in which the Axis forces would occupy, the Soviets had lost 7 million of out of 11.6 million horses, 17 million out of 31 million cows, 20 million of 23.6 million pigs and 27 million out of 43 million sheep and goats. Tens of thousands of agricultural machines, such as tractors and threshers, were destroyed or captured. Agriculture also suffered a loss of labour; between 1941 and 1945, 19.5 million working-age men had to leave their farms to work in the military and industry. Agricultural issues were also compounded when the Soviets were on the offensive, as areas liberated from the Axis had been devastated and contained millions of people who needed to be fed. Lend-Lease thus provided a massive quantity of foodstuffs and agricultural products.

According to the Russian historian Boris Vadimovich Sokolov, Lend-Lease had a crucial role in winning the war:

"On the whole the following conclusion can be drawn: that without these Western shipments under Lend-Lease the Soviet Union not only would not have been able to win the Great Patriotic War, it would not have been able even to oppose the German invaders, since it could not itself produce sufficient quantities of arms and military equipment or adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition. The Soviet authorities were well aware of this dependency on Lend-Lease. Thus, Stalin told Harry Hopkins [FDR's emissary to Moscow in July 1941] that the U.S.S.R. could not match Germany's might as an occupier of Europe and its resources."

Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs:

"I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were 'discussing freely' among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so."

In a confidential interview with the wartime correspondent Konstantin Simonov, the Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov is quoted as saying:

"Today [1963] some say the Allies didn't really help us ... But listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us material without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war."

David Glantz, an American military historian known for his books on the Eastern front, offers a similar view:

"Although Soviet accounts have routinely belittled the significance of Lend-Lease in the sustainment of the Soviet war effort, the overall importance of the assistance cannot be understated. Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic raw materials necessary for Soviet victory. Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhaps most directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken twelve to eighteen months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches."

Returning goods after the war
Roosevelt, eager to ensure public consent for this controversial plan, explained to the public and the press that his plan was comparable to lending a garden hose to a neighbor whose house is on fire. "What do I do in such a crisis?" the president asked at a press conference. "I don't say ... 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it' ... I don't want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over." To which Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), responded: "Lending war equipment is a good deal like lending chewing gum—you certainly don't want the same gum back."

In practice, very little was returned except for a few unarmed transport ships. Surplus military equipment was of no value in peacetime. The Lend-Lease agreements with 30 countries provided for repayment not in terms of money or returned goods, but in "joint action directed towards the creation of a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world." That is the U.S. would be "repaid" when the recipient fought the common enemy and joined the world trade and diplomatic agencies, such as the United Nations.

U.S. deliveries to the Soviet Union
If Germany defeated the Soviet Union, the most significant front in Europe would be closed. Roosevelt believed that if the Soviets were defeated the Allies would be far more likely to lose. Roosevelt concluded that the United States needed to help the Soviets fight against the Germans. Because of its utmost importance, Roosevelt directed his subordinates to heavily prioritise shipments of aid to the Soviet Union above most other uses of available shipping. Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov significantly contributed to the Lend-Lease agreement of 1941. American deliveries to the Soviet Union can be divided into the following phases:
 * "Pre Lend-lease" June 22, 1941, to September 30, 1941 (paid for in gold and other minerals)
 * First protocol period from October 1, 1941, to June 30, 1942 (signed October 7, 1941), these supplies were to be manufactured and delivered by the UK with US credit financing.
 * Second protocol period from July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943 (signed October 6, 1942)
 * Third protocol period from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944 (signed October 19, 1943)
 * Fourth protocol period from July 1, 1944 (signed April 17, 1945), formally ended May 12, 1945, but deliveries continued for the duration of the war with Japan (which the Soviet Union entered on August 8, 1945) under the "Milepost" agreement until September 2, 1945, when Japan capitulated. On September 20, 1945, all Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union was terminated.

Delivery was via the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely.

The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total.

The Pacific Route opened in August 1941, but was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the U.S.; after December 1941, only Soviet ships could be used, and, as Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be transported. Nevertheless, some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total.

In total, the U.S. deliveries to the USSR through Lend-Lease amounted to $11 billion in materials (equivalent to $ in ): over 400,000 jeeps and trucks; 12,000 armored vehicles (including 7,000 tanks, about 1,386 of which were M3 Lees and 4,102 M4 Shermans); 11,400 aircraft (of which 4,719 were Bell P-39 Airacobras, 3,414 were Douglas A-20 Havocs and 2,397 were Bell P-63 Kingcobras) and 1.75 million tons of food.

Roughly 17.5 million tons of military equipment, vehicles, industrial supplies, and food were shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR, 94% coming from the US. For comparison, a total of 22 million tons landed in Europe to supply American forces from January 1942 to May 1945. It has been estimated that American deliveries to the USSR through the Persian Corridor alone were sufficient, by US Army standards, to maintain sixty combat divisions in the line.

In the first weeks and months of the German–Soviet war, the USSR lost a huge number of military aircraft. Some of them were lost at airfields in the first days of the fighting, some were abandoned for various reasons, and some were lost in air battles. The losses of Soviet aviation in 1941 is one of the most controversial topics for military historians and publicists. The situation was aggravated by the loss of many aircraft factories that produced aircraft and components for them, which remained in the territory occupied by the Germans. Some of the factories were hastily evacuated to the east of the country, but it took time to resume production and reach its maximum capacity. In December 1941, all aircraft factories of the Soviet Union produced only 600 aircraft of all types. This was the reason that the supply of aircraft, primarily fighters and bombers, became the main topic in the negotiations between the top leadership of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States. The vast majority of the total number of aircraft received by the USSR under the Lend-Lease program was made up of British Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, American P-39 Airacobra, P-40 fighters, known in Russia under the names "Tomahawk" and "Kittyhawk", P-63 Kingcobra, American bombers A-20 Havoc, B-25 Mitchell. A significant amount of C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft and PBY Catalina flying boats were also delivered. For the needs of the Soviet Navy, 2,141 aircraft were delivered to the USSR. Not all of the delivered aircraft could be fully called modern models. But even those that could be called obsolete (the English Hurricane and the American Tomahawk) were more advanced and superior in most characteristics than the I-153 and I-16 aircraft that made up the basis of Soviet fighter aviation in the most difficult first months of the war. The superiority in high-altitude characteristics of American and British aircraft, powerful armament and the provision of communications ensured their use in the air defense forces – out of 10 thousand aircraft received by the USSR during the war, 7 thousand were from received via Lend-Lease.

From October 1, 1941, to May 31, 1945, the United States delivered to the Soviet Union 427,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, 35,170 motorcycles, 2,328 ordnance service vehicles, 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products (gasoline and oil) or 57.8 percent of the aviation fuel including nearly 90 percent of high-octane fuel used, 4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.), 1,911 steam locomotives, 66 diesel locomotives, 9,920 flat cars, 1,000 dump cars, 120 tank cars, and 35 heavy machinery cars. Ordnance goods (ammunition, artillery shells, mines, assorted explosives) provided amounted to 53 percent of total domestic consumption. One item typical of many was a tire plant that was lifted bodily from the Ford Company's River Rouge Plant and transferred to the USSR. The 1947 money value of the supplies and services amounted to about $11.3 billion.

British deliveries to the Soviet Union
On 12 July, 1941, within weeks of the German invasion of the USSR, the Anglo-Soviet Agreement was signed and the first British aid convoy set off along the dangerous Arctic Sea route to Murmansk, arriving in September. It carried 40 Hawker Hurricanes along with 550 mechanics and pilots of No. 151 Wing in Operation Benedict, to provide air defence of the port and to train Soviet pilots. The convoy was the first of many convoys to Murmansk and Archangelsk in what became known as the Arctic convoys, the returning ships carried the gold that the USSR was using to pay the US.

By the end of 1941, early shipments of Matilda, Valentine and Tetrarch tanks represented only 6.5% of total Soviet tank production but over 25% of medium and heavy tanks produced for the Red Army. The British tanks first saw action with the 138 Independent Tank Battalion in the Volga Reservoir on November 20, 1941. Lend-Lease tanks constituted 30 to 40 percent of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941.

Significant numbers of British Churchill, Matilda and Valentine tanks were shipped to the USSR.

Between June 1941 and May 1945, Britain delivered to the USSR: In total 4 million tonnes of war material including food and medical supplies were delivered. The munitions totaled £308m (not including naval munitions supplied), the food and raw materials totaled £120m in 1946 index. In accordance with the Anglo-Soviet Military Supplies Agreement of June 27, 1942, military aid sent from Britain to the Soviet Union during the war was entirely free of charge.
 * 7,411 aircraft (>3,000 Hurricanes and >4,000 other aircraft)
 * 27 naval vessels
 * 5,218 tanks (including 1,380 Valentines from Canada)
 * >5,000 anti-tank guns
 * 4,020 ambulances and trucks
 * 323 machinery trucks (mobile vehicle workshops equipped with generators and all the welding and power tools required to perform heavy servicing)
 * 1,212 Universal Carriers and Loyd Carriers (with another 1,348 from Canada)
 * 1,721 motorcycles
 * £1.15bn ($1.55bn) worth of aircraft engines
 * 1,474 radar sets
 * 4,338 radio sets
 * 600 naval radar and sonar sets
 * Hundreds of naval guns
 * 15 million pairs of boots

Some of the 3,000 Hurricanes given to Soviets were broken up & buried after the war to avoid paying US back under the Lend-Lease legislation. In 2023 eight broken up planes were found buried together in a forest south of Kyiv and were excavated in an archaeological dig by the State Aviation Museum of Ukraine.

Reverse Lend-Lease
Reverse Lend-Lease was the supply of equipment and services to the United States. Nearly $8 billion (equivalent to $124 billion today) worth of war material was provided to U.S. forces by its allies, 90% of this sum coming from the British Empire. Reciprocal contributions included the Austin K2/Y military ambulance, British aviation spark plugs used in B-17 Flying Fortresses, Canadian-made Fairmile launches used in anti-submarine warfare, Mosquito photo-reconnaissance aircraft, and Indian petroleum products. Australia and New Zealand supplied the bulk of foodstuffs to United States forces in the South Pacific.

Though diminutive in comparison, the Soviet Union supplied the United States with chrome and manganese ore, platinum, gold and wood.

In a November 1943 report to Congress, President Roosevelt said of Allied participation in reverse Lend-lease:

"... the expenditures made by the British Commonwealth of Nations for reverse lend-lease aid furnished to the United States, and of the expansion of this program so as to include exports of materials and foodstuffs for the account of United States agencies from the United Kingdom and the British colonies, emphasizes the contribution which the British Commonwealth has made to the defense of the United States while taking its place on the battle fronts. It is an indication of the extent to which the British have been able to pool their resources with ours so that the needed weapon may be in the hands of that soldier—whatever may be his nationality—who can at the proper moment use it most effectively to defeat our common enemies."

While in April 1944 Congress were briefed by the Foreign Economic Administrator, Leo T Crowley:

"Just as the RAF's operations against Germany and the invasion coasts would not have been possible on their present scale without lend-lease so the United States Eighth and Ninth air forces daylight missions from Britain would not have been possible without reverse lend-lease. Our Fortresses and Liberators take off from huge air bases built, equipped and serviced under reverse lend-lease at a cost to them of hundreds of millions of dollars. Many of our pilots fly Spitfires built in England, many more are flying American fighter planes powered by British Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, turned over to us by the British. And many of the supplies needed by our Air Force are procured for us without cost by reverse lend-lease. In fact our armed forces in Britain, ground as well as air, receive as reverse lend-lease, with no payment by us, one third of all the supplies and equipment they currently require, Britain furnishes 90% of their medical supplies and in spite of her food shortage, 20% of their food."

In 1945–46, the value of Reciprocal Aid from New Zealand exceeded that of Lend-Lease, though in 1942–43, the value of Lend-Lease to New Zealand was much more than that of Reciprocal Aid. Britain also supplied extensive material assistance to American forces stationed in Europe, for example the USAAF was supplied with hundreds of Spitfire Mk V and Mk VIII fighter aircraft.

"The cooperation that was built up with Canada during the war was an amalgam compounded of diverse elements of which the air and land routes to Alaska, the Canol project, and the CRYSTAL and CRIMSON activities were the most costly in point of effort and funds expended.

... The total of defense materials and services that Canada received through lend-lease channels amounted in value to approximately $419,500,000.

... Some idea of the scope of economic collaboration can be had from the fact that from the beginning of 1942 through 1945 Canada, on her part, furnished the United States with $1,000,000,000 to $1,250,000,000 in defense materials and services.

... Although most of the actual construction of joint defense facilities, except the Alaska Highway and the Canol project, had been carried out by Canada, most of the original cost was borne by the United States. The agreement was that all temporary construction for the use of American forces and all permanent construction required by the United States forces beyond Canadian requirements would be paid for by the United States, and that the cost of all other construction of permanent value would be met by Canada. Although it was not entirely reasonable that Canada should pay for any construction that the Canadian Government considered unnecessary or that did not conform to Canadian requirements, nevertheless considerations of self-respect and national sovereignty led the Canadian Government to suggest a new financial agreement.

... The total amount that Canada agreed to pay under the new arrangement came to about $76,800,000, which was some $13,870,000 less than the United States had spent on the facilities."

Repayment
Congress had not authorized the gift of supplies delivered after the cutoff date, so the U.S. charged for them, usually at a 90% discount. Large quantities of undelivered goods were in Britain or in transit when Lend-Lease was ended on September 2, 1945, following the surrender of Japan. Britain wished to retain some of this equipment in the immediate post-war period. In 1946, the post-war Anglo-American loan further indebted Britain to the United States. Lend-Lease items retained were sold to Britain at 10% of nominal value, giving an initial loan value of £1.075 billion for the Lend-Lease portion of the post-war loans. Payment was to be stretched out over 50 annual payments, starting in 1951 and with five years of deferred payments, at 2% interest. During the war, the US lent Britain 88 million ounces of silver. In 1946, Britain switched its coinage from silver to cupronickel as the price of silver had risen by 250% during the war due to its market scarcity, while the price of nickel matched the stamped coinage value; this recovered 20m ounces of silver per year for five years as the old coinage was progressively retired, generating a £30m net financial surplus after the US silver loan had been repaid.

The final payment of $83.3 million (£42.5 million), due on December 31, 2006 (repayment having been deferred in the allowed five years and during a sixth year not allowed), was made by Britain on December 29, 2006 (the last working day of the year). After this final payment, Britain's Economic Secretary to the Treasury formally issued thanks to the U.S. for its wartime support.

While repayment of the interest-free loans was required after the end of the war under the act, in practice the U.S. did not expect to be repaid by the USSR after the war. The U.S. received $2 million in reverse Lend-Lease from the USSR. This was mostly in the form of landing, servicing, and refueling of transport aircraft; some industrial machinery and rare minerals were sent to the U.S. The U.S. asked for $1.3 billion at the cessation of hostilities to settle the debt, but was only offered $170 million by the USSR. The dispute remained unresolved until 1972, when the U.S. accepted an offer from the USSR to repay $722 million linked to grain shipments from the U.S., representing 25% of the initial debt with inflation taken into account, with the remainder being written off. During the war the USSR provided an unknown number of shipments of rare minerals to the US Treasury as a form of cashless repayment of Lend-Lease. This was agreed upon before the signing of the first protocol on October 1, 1941, and extension of credit. Some of these shipments were intercepted by the Germans. In May 1942, HMS Edinburgh (16) was sunk while carrying 4.5 tonnes of Soviet gold intended for the U.S. Treasury. This gold was salvaged in 1981 and 1986. In June 1942, SS Port Nicholson (1918) was sunk en route from Halifax to New York, allegedly with Soviet platinum, gold, and diamonds aboard; the wreck was discovered in 2008. However, none of this cargo has been salvaged, and no documentation of its treasure has been produced.

Legacy
Modern Russia tends to downplay the United States' role in World War II, including Lend-Lease—instead portraying the victory over Germany as an exclusively Soviet achievement.

In 2022—citing the precedent set by the 1941 Lend-Lease program (and its extensions) for U.S. World War II aid to Britain and others in Europe—the U.S. Congress passed, and President Joe Biden signed, the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022, to supply military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in its defense against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

title: Lend-Lease


text:
Office of Price Administration

The Office of Price Administration (OPA) was established within the Office for Emergency Management of the United States government by Executive Order 8875 on August 28, 1941. The functions of the OPA were originally to control money (price controls) and rents after the outbreak of World War II.

History
President Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated the Council of National Defense Advisory Commission on May 29, 1940, to include Price Stabilization and Consumer Protection Divisions. Both divisions merged to become the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS) within the Office for Emergency Management by Executive Order 8734, on April 11, 1941. Civil supply functions were transferred to the Office of Production Management.

It became an independent agency under the Emergency Price Control Act, January 30, 1942. The OPA had the power to place ceilings on all prices except agricultural commodities, and to ration scarce supplies of other items, including tires, automobiles, shoes, nylon, sugar, gasoline, fuel oil, coffee, meats and processed foods. At the peak, almost 90% of retail food prices were frozen. It could also authorize subsidies for production of some of those commodities.

Dissolution
As early as 1944, in its annual debate about price control extension, Congress discussed limiting the power of the OPA as World War II drew to a close and the necessity of price controls was called into question. While some argued for the continuation of price controls to hold post war inflation in check, there was widespread support among conservatives and businessmen for the rapid deregulation of the economy as it reconverted to a civilian footing. Groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Retail Dry Good Association sought to guarantee companies a minimum amount of profits, thereby effectively limiting the price control measures. However, the OPA still enjoyed widespread popular support and the agency was renewed in 1944 and again in 1945. While these renewals were considerable successes for many consumer advocacy groups, they also marked the height of the OPA, from which the agency's power and popularity would decline in the next two years.

By June 1946, significant opposition by NAM and NRDA had been mounted to sway Congress, which, only two days before the existing legislation was set to expire, passed a bill that would have left the OPA a much-weakened version of its past self. President Harry S. Truman vetoed this bill in hopes of forcing Congress to create a stronger one, but as the month of June came to an end, the OPA shut down, and its price and rent controls went with it. The result was a sharp jump in prices, with food increasing by 14 percent and the cost of overall living rising by 6 percent, an equivalent to more than 100 percent per year. Consumers all over the nation turned out in varying numbers to protest these increases, with labor unions forming a major part of the participants.

By the end of July, Congress had reversed course and passed legislation reinstating the OPA and price controls, though this bill was no stronger than what President Truman had vetoed earlier. This much-weakened version of the OPA did not last long, as meat packers launched their own form of protest against the agency, slowing slaughtering rates and withholding meat from market. The resulting widespread shortages did much to damage the public faith in the OPA, which was now seen as ineffective, and the Democrat-led Congress. When faced with the choices of higher prices or no meat, the consumers chose the latter. Although President Truman ended price controls on meat, on October 14, just two weeks before the election, in a rejection of price controls and as a sign of the changing attitude of the American public towards a control-free re-conversion, many Democratic incumbents were defeated, and Republicans gained control of Congress. Following this defeat, Truman lifted almost all price and wage controls and, while the OPA was authorized to exist through June 30, 1947, its range of tasks and ability to effectively regulate prices was curtailed severely, being reduced to rent control and some price control over a very limited number of goods. Most functions of the OPA were transferred to the newly established Office of Temporary Controls (OTC) by Executive Order 9809, December 12, 1946. The Financial Reporting Division was transferred to the Federal Trade Commission. By the end of December 1946, many of OPA's local offices and price boards were closed, and the OPA did not survive until its authorized June 30 extension.

The OPA was abolished effective May 29, 1947 by the General Liquidation Order, issued March 14, 1947, by the OPA Administrator. Some of its functions were taken up by successor agencies:
 * Sugar and sugar products distribution by the Sugar Rationing Administration in the Department of Agriculture pursuant to the Sugar Control Extension Act (61 Stat. 36), March 31, 1947
 * Price controls over rice by the Department of Agriculture by Executive Order 9841, on April 23, 1947, effective May 4, 1947
 * Food subsidies by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, effective May 4, 1947
 * Rent control by the Office of the Housing Expediter, effective May 4, 1947
 * Price violation litigation by the Department of Justice, effective June 1, 1947
 * All other OPA functions by the Division of Liquidation, Department of Commerce, effective June 1, 1947.

Famous employees include economist John Kenneth Galbraith, legal scholar William Prosser, President Richard Nixon, and law professor John Honnold.

The OPA is featured, in fictionalized form as the Bureau of Price Regulation, in Rex Stout's Nero Wolfe mystery novel The Silent Speaker.

The OPA unsuccessfully tried to revoke the car dealer license of unorthodox businessman Madman Muntz for violating used car regulations, subject to price control. Muntz was acquitted in Los Angeles Superior Court on 1 August 1945.

During the Korean War, similar functions were performed by the Office of Price Stabilization (OPS).

Women and the OPA
The success of the OPA’s price controls and rationing policies depended on the support of women who acted as the main shoppers of their households, especially during wartime. Local community organizations, governments, and OPA boards held educational seminars aimed at women, targeted women to join local price and rationing boards, and recruited women for volunteer programs. Many women led local volunteer War Price and Rationing Boards that ensured adherence to stabilization policies through check-ins with stores to report businesses breaking the rules. Women involved with the OPA largely fell into two broad categories: those who were part of already organized groups, such as labor unions, women’s groups, and consumer groups, among others, often with agendas that aligned with OPA’s goals of price stabilization; and women not already part of organized groups, who came from diverse backgrounds. They used the OPA as a legally established and legitimate framework for organizing themselves.

The OPA’s enlistment of women to ensure that local businesses were complying with federal policies extended the public sphere into the private sphere and the effective growth of “state supervision.” This resulted in a pseudo-militant attitude toward regulation and made it more difficult for politicians to curb the power of the OPA.

The OPA worked with consumer activists in a “mutually empowering” and mutually reliant fashion to ensure the effectiveness of its policies and activists’ interests. Thus, a large swathe of consumer activists helped to ensure that businesses were compliant with its policies. Widespread support of the OPA came from the belief that the agency could help establish postwar prosperity.

African Americans and the OPA
Black consumer activists also were among those who supported the OPA, which gave them support from the federal government in fighting market discrimination.

The OPA had a base of consumer support that included different socioeconomic classes and racial groups who supported the agency because of their belief it would bring about a postwar vision of “broad popular participation and consumer rights." The OPA worked to defend consumers from exploitation by businesses while also acting as a space for citizens to become involved in politics.

Administrators of the office

 * Leon Henderson, 1941–1942
 * Prentiss Marsh Brown, 1943
 * Chester Bliss Bowles, 1943–1946

OPA points
OPA points are small vulcanized fibre red and blue ration tokens issued during World War II to make change for ration coupons. Approximately 1.1 billion red and 0.9 billion blue were produced, and even though many were collected and destroyed after the war, they are still quite common today. The red OPA points are a bit more common than the blue. Each token has two letters on it, and some people collect them by letter combination.

title: Office of Price Administration


text:
Presidential Succession Act

The United States Presidential Succession Act is a federal statute establishing the presidential line of succession. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to enact such a statute:

"Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Congress has enacted a Presidential Succession Act on three occasions: 1792, 1886 , and 1947. The 1947 Act was last revised in 2006.

Although none of these succession acts have ever been invoked, an invocation was a distinct possibility on several occasions. However, the future likelihood that a person in the line of succession beyond the vice president will be called upon under normal circumstances to be acting president has diminished greatly due to the Twenty-fifth Amendment's provision for filling vice presidential vacancies.

Presidential Succession Act of 1792
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to declare who should act as president if both the president and vice president died or were otherwise unavailable to serve during their terms of office. Legislation to establish such a line of succession was introduced in December 1790 in the United States House of Representatives, in the 1st Congress. When brought up for discussion the following month, the president pro tempore of the United States Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives were proposed; the United States secretary of state and the chief justice of the United States were as well. Lawmakers failed to reach consensus on who should be the statutory successor. Naming the secretary of state was unacceptable to most Federalists, as they did not want the office's then-occupant, Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the growing anti-administration opposition that would become the Democratic-Republican Party, placed so close to the presidency. Constitutional and policy objections were raised to naming the president pro tempore of the Senate or the speaker of the House, as it was assumed the individual would retain their office and seat in Congress while temporarily performing duties of the presidency; similar separation of powers concerns were also raised regarding the chief justice.

The matter was raised again when the 2nd Congress convened later in 1791. On November 30, the Senate approved legislation titled "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice President", which was sent to the House for concurrence. It contained a provision naming the president pro tempore of the Senate, or, if that office were vacant, the speaker of the House as acting president if a vacancy arose in both the presidency and vice presidency. Various representatives, including a number of the Constitution's framers, criticized the arrangement as being contrary to their intent. As a result, after a contentious debate, on February 15, 1792, the House struck out the president pro tempore and speaker and inserted the secretary of state in their place. The Senate rejected the House change a few days later, and the House relented. The bill became law on March 1, 1792, with the signature of President George Washington.

The Presidential Succession Act of 1792, sections 9 and 10 of a larger act regarding the election of the president and vice president, provided that the president pro tempore of the Senate would be first in line for the presidency should the offices of the president and the vice president both be vacant. The speaker of the House was second in line. Section 9 provided that the statutory successor would serve in an acting capacity until a new president could be elected. If such a double vacancy occurred, Section 10 directed the secretary of state to notify the governor of each state of the vacancies and of the special election to fill them. This special election would take place no fewer than two months later. The persons elected president and vice president in such a special election would have served a full four-year term beginning on March 4 of the next year; no such election ever took place.

Potential implementation
While the succession provisions of the 1792 Act were never invoked, there were ten instances when the vice presidency was vacant:
 * April 20, 1812 – March 4, 1813 following the death of George Clinton
 * November 23, 1814 – March 4, 1817 following the death of Elbridge Gerry
 * December 28, 1832 – March 4, 1833 following the resignation of John C. Calhoun
 * April 4, 1841 – March 4, 1845 following the accession of John Tyler to the presidency
 * July 9, 1850 – March 4, 1853 following the accession of Millard Fillmore to the presidency
 * April 18, 1853 – March 4, 1857 following the death of William R. King
 * April 15, 1865 – March 4, 1869 following the accession of Andrew Johnson to the presidency
 * November 22, 1875 – March 4, 1877 following the death of Henry Wilson
 * September 19, 1881 – March 4, 1885 following the accession of Chester A. Arthur to the presidency
 * November 25, 1885 – March 4, 1889 following the death of Thomas A. Hendricks

In each case, had the incumbent president died, resigned, been removed from office or been disabled during one of these vice presidential vacancies, the president pro tempore of the Senate would have become the acting president. Such a double vacancy nearly occurred on three occasions:
 * In 1844, President John Tyler narrowly missed being one of the several people killed when a gun on the newly built USS Princeton (1843) exploded during a ceremonial cruise. Had Tyler died, Senate President pro tempore Willie Person Mangum would have become acting president.
 * In 1865, the conspirators in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln planned, but failed, to assassinate Vice President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State William H. Seward as well. Had Johnson also been killed, Senate President pro tempore Lafayette S. Foster would have become acting president.
 * In 1868, after President Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives, the Senate came one vote short of removing Johnson from office in his impeachment trial. Had he been removed, President pro tempore Benjamin Wade would have become acting president, as the vice-presidency remained vacant after Johnson succeeded to the presidency.

As a consequence of the sometimes lengthy vacancies in the office of vice president, the person serving as president pro tempore of the Senate garnered heightened importance, for although he did not assume the vice presidency, he was then next in line for the presidency. Several who served during these vacancies were referred to informally as "Acting Vice President".

Presidential Succession Act of 1886
The death of President James A. Garfield on September 19, 1881 – after his lengthy incapacity following an assassination attempt – resulted in Vice President Chester A. Arthur ascending to the presidency. Upon Arthur becoming President, the offices of vice president, president pro tempore of the Senate, and speaker of the House of Representatives were vacant.

However, a new president pro tempore of the Senate was named on October 10, 1881, and a new speaker of the House of Representatives was named in December 1881.

In 1884, Grover Cleveland was elected president, with Thomas A. Hendricks being elected vice president. Hendricks' death in November 1885, just eight months into his term, once again left no direct successor, which forced Congress to address the inadequacies of the 1792 Succession Act.

A bill to transfer the succession from congressional officers to members of the Cabinet was introduced in the Senate by George Hoar in 1882. It was passed by the Senate the following year, but failed in the House. Hoar laid out several reasons why the succession statute needed to be changed: among them, that the four-year term of a president elected in a special election might be out of sync with the congressional election cycle, resulting in "confusion and trouble". He also pointed out the negative constitutional and practical implications of having the president pro tempore and the speaker in the line of succession. To buttress this argument, he pointed out that since the federal government began operations 96 years earlier in 1789, six secretaries of state had gone on to be elected president, serving in that office for 36 of those 96 years. Reintroduced shortly after the death of Vice President Hendricks, Senator Hoar's bill was passed by the Senate after vigorous debate, in December 1885, and by the House one month later. It became law on January 19, 1886, with President Cleveland's signature.

The Presidential Succession Act of 1886 substituted the Cabinet secretaries— listed in the order in which their department was created — for the President pro tempore and Speaker in the line of succession. It provided that in case of the removal, death, resignation or inability of both the President and Vice President, such officer would "act as President until the disability of the President or Vice-President is removed or a President shall be elected."

It mandated that if Congress were not then in session nor due to meet within twenty days, the acting president was to call a special session of Congress, giving no less than twenty days' notice. It also stipulated that for a member of the Cabinet to act as president, he had to have been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and be eligible to the office of president, and not under impeachment. This last provision also repealed the 1792 Act's provision for a double-vacancy special election.

Potential implementation
While it never became necessary to invoke the 1886 Act, the vice presidency was vacant at the time of its adoption, and would become vacant five more times during the 61 years that it was in effect:
 * November 21, 1899 – March 4, 1901 following the death of Garret Hobart.
 * September 14, 1901 – March 4, 1905 following the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency.
 * October 30, 1912 – March 4, 1913 following the death of James S. Sherman.
 * August 2, 1923 – March 4, 1925 following the accession of Calvin Coolidge to the presidency.
 * April 12, 1945 – January 20, 1949 following the accession of Harry S. Truman to the presidency.

Had the president died, resigned, been removed from office or been disabled during one of these vacancies, the secretary of state would have become the acting president. Although such circumstances never arose, President Woodrow Wilson apparently drew up a plan (given the turmoil of World War I) whereby, if his Republican opponent Charles Evans Hughes had won the 1916 election, then Wilson would have dismissed his secretary of state, Robert Lansing, and recess-appointed Hughes to the post before Wilson and Vice President Thomas R. Marshall both resigned, thus allowing President-elect Hughes to serve as acting president until his March 4, 1917 inauguration. Wilson's narrow victory over Hughes rendered the plan moot.

Also of note is that 1940 Republican presidential nominee Wendell Willkie and vice presidential nominee Charles L. McNary both died in 1944 (October 8, and February 25, respectively), the first (and only) time both members of a major-party presidential ticket died during the term for which they sought election. Had they been elected, Willkie's death would have resulted in the secretary of state becoming acting president for the remainder of the term ending on January 20, 1945.

Presidential Succession Act of 1947
In June 1945, two months after becoming president upon Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, Harry S. Truman sent a message to Congress urging the revision of the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. He recommended that the speaker of the House and president pro tempore of the Senate be restored to, and given priority in, the presidential line of succession over members of the Cabinet. The arrangement reflected Truman's belief that the president should not have the power to appoint to office "the person who would be my immediate successor in the event of my own death or inability to act", and that the presidency should, whenever possible, "be filled by an elective officer". Cabinet officials are appointed by the president, whereas the speaker and the president pro tempore are elected officials. He also recommended that a provision be made for election of a new president and vice president should vacancies in both of those offices occur more than three months before the midterm congressional elections.

A bill incorporating the president's proposal was introduced in the House on June 25, 1945, by Hatton W. Sumners and approved—minus the special election provision—four days later by a wide margin. The measure was forwarded to the Senate, which took no action on it during the balance of the 79th Congress. Truman renewed his request in 1947, when the 80th Congress convened following the 1946 midterm elections. Early in 1947, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry introduced a bill in the Senate which, like the previous 1945 version, put the speaker and the president pro tempore second and third in the succession order respectively, and contained no provision for a special election. After considerable debate the measure was approved on June 27, 1947, by a vote of 50 to 35. Forwarded to the House, the legislation engendered little debate, and was passed on July 10 by a vote of 365 to 11. President Truman signed the bill into law on July 18.

The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 restored the speaker of the House and president pro tempore of the Senate to the line of succession—in reverse order from their positions in the 1792 act—and placed them ahead of the members of the Cabinet, who are positioned once more in the order of the establishment of their department: secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, secretary of war, attorney general, postmaster general, secretary of the navy, and secretary of the interior. Three Cabinet secretaries were added to the lineup, reflecting the creation of three Cabinet-level departments post-1886: secretary of agriculture, secretary of commerce, and secretary of labor. The act stipulates, that in order for either the speaker or the president pro tempore to become acting president, he or she must meet the requirements for presidential eligibility, and must, prior to acting as president, resign from office, including from Congress.

Like the 1886 act, this statute specifies that only Cabinet members who are constitutionally eligible to the office of president, and not under impeachment by the House at the time the powers and duties of the presidency devolve upon them, may become the acting president. However, unlike the 1886 act, this statute mandates that any Cabinet officer who accedes to the powers and duties of the presidency resign their Cabinet post. It also contains a clause stipulating that any Cabinet officer acting as president may be "bumped" from office (supplanted) by a qualified individual higher up the line of succession, a provision not contained in either of the earlier succession acts.

The 1886 and 1947 acts diverge in one other way. The 1886 act describes "such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to the offices therein named" as being eligible to serve as acting president, whereas the 1947 act describes "officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" as being eligible. The less explicit 1947 language raises the question of whether acting secretaries are in the line of succession. The nonpartisan Continuity of Government Commission, in a 2009 report, said "[r]ead literally, this means that the current act allows for acting secretaries to be in the line of succession as long as they are confirmed by the Senate for a post (even for example, the second or third in command within a department)." Although a case for their inclusion can be made, it is not clear whether acting secretaries are indeed in the line of succession.

The 1947 act established that a person who becomes an acting president under the act will earn the same compensation given to the president. Additionally, based on authority granted by Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment, the act applies to situations where the president-elect, alone or together with the vice president-elect, fails to meet the qualifications for the office of president. Based on that same authority, the act also applies to situations in which there is neither a president-elect nor a vice president-elect on Inauguration Day.

Revisions
The 1947 act has been modified by a series of incidental amendments to reflect the creation of new federal departments. Less than two weeks after the Act was enacted, Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law. This statute (in part) merged the Department of War (renamed as the Department of the Army) and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment (renamed Department of Defense in 1949), headed by the secretary of defense. It also included a provision substituting the secretary of defense for the secretary of war in the line of succession and striking out the secretary of the navy.

In 1953, a new Cabinet department was created; this led to the creation of a new position behind the secretary of labor in the line of succession: the secretary of health, education and welfare. In 1965, another new Cabinet department was created; the secretary of housing and urban development joined the line of succession. The secretary of transportation was added the following year. In 1970 and 1977, respectively, the postmaster general was removed as a result of the Postal Reorganization Act, and the secretary of energy was inserted at the end of the list. In 1979, when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was divided by the Department of Education Organization Act, its secretary was replaced in the order of succession by the secretary of health and human services, and the new secretary of education was added in the last position. In 1988 and 2006, respectively, the secretary of veterans affairs and then the secretary of homeland security were added, becoming the 16th and 17th statutory successors (including the vice president) to the powers and duties of the presidency.

When the Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002, the act creating it did not contain a provision adding the new department's secretary into the line of presidential succession. Secretaries of newly created cabinet-level departments are not automatically included, but must be specifically incorporated. Companion bills to include the secretary of homeland security (SHS) in the line of succession were introduced in the 108th Congress (in 2003) and again in the 109th (in 2005) by Senator Mike DeWine and Representative Tom Davis. Both bills strayed from tradition, however, by proposing to place the SHS in the line of succession directly after the attorney general (rather than at the end of the line). Proponents of placing the SHS high in the order of succession (eighth overall, as opposed to seventeenth) argued that, given the department's many responsibilities in the areas of security and national preparedness, the officer responsible for disaster relief and security could be expected to possess the relevant knowledge and expertise to capably function as acting president following a catastrophic event; the same could not be said of every cabinet secretary. Referred to committee, no action was taken on these proposals. The matter remained unresolved until March 2006, when the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act added the secretary of homeland security to the presidential line of succession, at the end.

Potential invocations
While it has not become necessary to invoke the 1947 Act, the vice presidency was vacant at the time of its adoption, and has been vacant three more times since:
 * November 22, 1963 – January 20, 1965 following Lyndon B. Johnson succeeding to the presidency
 * October 10, 1973 – December 6, 1973 following Spiro Agnew resigning the vice presidency
 * August 9, 1974 – December 19, 1974 following Gerald Ford succeeding to the presidency

Had the president died, resigned, been removed from office or been disabled during one of these vacancies the speaker of the House would have become acting president. The nation faced the prospect of such a double-vacancy in the autumn of 1973. With the future of Richard Nixon's presidency in doubt on account of the Watergate scandal, and with the vice presidency vacant following Spiro Agnew's resignation, there was a possibility that Speaker of the House Carl Albert might become acting president. Recourse in this case to the 1947 Act was not necessary, because Section 2 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, ratified only six years earlier, established a mechanism for filling an intra-term vice presidential vacancy. As a result, rather than Carl Albert becoming acting president when Richard Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford became president on that date.

The Twenty-fifth Amendment also established a procedure for responding to presidential disabilities whereby a vice president could assume the powers and duties of the presidency as acting president. Its procedures for declaring a temporary disability have been invoked on four occasions by three presidents.

During the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Secret Service carried out its plan for ensuring the continuity of government, which in part called for gathering up persons in the presidential line of succession and taking them to a secure location, to guarantee that at least one officer in the line of succession would survive the attacks. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and several other congressional leaders went; President pro tempore of the Senate Robert Byrd did not, choosing instead to be taken to his Capitol Hill home. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta went into an underground bunker at the White House; a few Cabinet members were out of the country that day.

Designated successor
There is a long history, dating back to the Cold War era, of keeping a designated successor away from events at which numerous high-ranking federal officers—including the president, vice president, congressional leaders, and Cabinet members—will be gathered. This is done to ensure that there is always someone available to assume the reins of government if all the other officers are killed at the event. For example, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue was the Cabinet member so designated when President Donald Trump delivered his 2018 State of the Union Address. Perdue was taken to a secure location several hours beforehand, and remained there throughout the event. Although any cabinet secretary could be selected, the person appointed has usually come from one of the newer departments low in the line of succession. The person chosen must also meet the constitutional requirements to serve as president.

Constitutionality
The 1947 act has been widely criticized over the years as unconstitutional. Akhil Amar, who is a legal scholar in constitutional law, has called it "a disastrous statute, an accident waiting to happen". There are two main areas of concern.

Meaning of "officer"
There are concerns regarding the constitutionality of having members of Congress in the line of succession. The Constitution's Succession Clause—Article II, Section 1, Clause 6—specifies that only an "Officer" may be designated as a Presidential successor. Constitutional scholars from James Madison to the present day have argued that the term "Officer" refers to an "Officer of the United States", a term of art that excludes members of Congress. During a September 2003 joint hearing before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Rules and Administration and Committee on the Judiciary, M. Miller Baker said:

"The 1947 Act is probably unconstitutional because it appears that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate are not "Officers" eligible to act as President within the meaning of the Succession Clause. This is because in referring to an "Officer", the Succession Clause, taken in its context in Section 1 of Article II, probably refers to an "Officer of the United States", a term of art under the Constitution, rather than any officer, which would include legislative and state officers referred to in the Constitution (e.g., the reference to state militia officers found in Article I, Section 8). In the very next section of Article II, the President is empowered to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments" and to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, "Officers of the United States". These are the "Officers" to whom the Succession Clause probably refers. This contextual reading is confirmed by Madison's notes from the Constitutional Convention, which reveal that the Convention's Committee of Style, which had no authority to make substantive changes, substituted "Officer" in the Succession Clause in place of "Officer of the United States", probably because the Committee considered the full phrase redundant."

In "Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?", Akhil Amar and Vikram Amar refer to the Incompatibility Clause (Article I, Section 6, Clause 2)—which bars officials in the federal government's executive branch from simultaneously serving in either the U.S. House or Senate—as evidence that members of the Congress cannot be in the Presidential line of succession.

Bumping
The current act is also controversial because it provides that an officer who is acting as president due to the disability or failure to qualify of an officer higher in the order of succession does so only until the other officer's disability or disqualification is removed. If this happens, the previously entitled officer can "bump" the person then acting as president. During testimony in 2004 before the United States House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, Akhil Reed Amar stated that this provision violates "the Succession Clause, which says that an officer named by Congress shall 'act as President ... until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

In its 2009 report, the Continuity of Government Commission argued that as well as going against the language of the Constitution, bumping violates the doctrine of separation of powers by undermining the independence of the executive from the Congress:

"The Constitution on its face seems to stipulate that once a person is deemed to be acting president by the Presidential Succession Act, he or she cannot be replaced by a different person. This interpretation makes some logical sense as the provision would presumably prevent the confusion that would arise if the presidency were transferred to several different individuals in a short period of time. It would also seemingly prevent Congress from exercising influence on the executive branch by threatening to replace a cabinet member acting as president with a newly elected Speaker of the House."

On a practical level, it has been argued that this provision could result in there being multiple acting presidents in a short period of time during a national crisis and weaken the public legitimacy of successors. In a January 2011 Roll Call op-ed, Representative Brad Sherman wrote,

"[The bumping provision] creates a game of musical chairs with the presidency and would cause great instability. In a time of national crisis, the nation needs to know who its president is."

title: Presidential Succession Act