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Politics of Tunisia

The politics of Tunisia takes place within the framework of a unitary semi-presidential representative democratic republic, with a president serving as head of state, prime minister as head of government, a unicameral legislature and a court system influenced by French civil law. Between 1956 and 2011, Tunisia operated as a de facto one-party state, with politics dominated by the secular Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) under former presidents Habib Bourguiba and then Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. However, in 2011 a national uprising led to the ousting of Ben Ali and the dismantling of the RCD, paving the way for a multi-party democracy. October 2014 saw the first democratic parliamentary elections since the 2011 revolution, resulting in a win by the secularist Nidaa Tounes party with 85 seats in the 217-member assembly.

Tunisia is a member of the Arab League, the African Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It maintains close relations with the United States, France and the European Union, with which it entered an Association Agreement in 1995. Tunisia's favorable relations with the United States and the European Union were earned following years of successful economic cooperation in the private sector and infrastructure modernization.

Tunisia's first democratically elected president, Beji Caid Essebsi, died in July 2019. After him, Kais Saied became Tunisia's president after a landslide victory in the 2019 Tunisian presidential elections in October 2019. He had a reputation of not being corruptible. However, on 25 July 2021 he suspended Parliament, fired the prime minister and consolidated power in what opponents called a "coup."

Government
Tunisia was a representative democracy with an executive president, a legislature and judiciary, starting with elections in 2014 until the president suspended parliament and began ruling by decree on 25 July 2021. Since then, all the trappings of an authoritarian state have returned. The military is neutral and does not play any role in national politics.

Executive branch
In Tunisia, the president was directly elected for a five-year term. The president nominates the candidate of the party that gained the most votes in legislative elections to form a government within a month. The nominee must submit his program to the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and get the trust of the majority of its members before being appointed prime minister. Regional governors and local administrators are appointed by the central government. Mayors and municipal councils are directly elected.

Legislative branch
Tunisia's legislative branch consists of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, with 217 seats. The first elections for the Assembly of the Representative of the People occurred on 26 October 2014.

Before the 2011 revolution the parliament was bicameral. The lower house was the Chamber of Deputies of Tunisia (Majlis al-Nuwaab), which had 214 seats. Members were elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms. At least 25% of the seats in the House of Deputies were reserved for the opposition. More than 27% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies were women. The lower house played a growing role as an arena for debate on national policy, especially as it hosted representatives from six opposition parties. Opposition members often voted against bills or abstained. However, because the governing party enjoyed a comfortable majority, bills usually passed with only minor changes.

The upper house was the Chamber of Advisors, which had 112 members, including representatives of governorates (provinces), professional organizations and national figures. Of these, 41 were appointed by the head of state while 71 were elected by their peers. About 15% of the members of the Chamber of Advisors were women.

Judicial branch
The Tunisian legal system is based on French civil law system. Some judicial review of legislative acts takes place in the Supreme Court in joint session. The judiciary is independent, although the Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the president of the republic.

The Tunisian Order of Lawyers is a non-profit bar association. All Tunisian lawyers are members of the Order, which does not have any political affiliations.

The Constitution of 2014 provides for a newly constituted Constitutional Court. It consists of 12 members, each of whom must have 20 years' experience in order to serve for a single term of nine years. Two thirds are specialized in law. The president of the republic, the president of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and the Supreme Judicial Council each propose four candidates; the Assembly of the Representatives of the People approves nominations with a three-fifths majority. The Constitutional Court appoints its own president and vice president, both specialized in law.

Political parties and elections
Since 1987 Tunisia has reformed its political system several times, abolishing life-term presidencies and opening up the parliament to opposition parties. The number of new political parties and associations has increased since the beginning of Ben Ali's presidency in 1987. Shortly before the revolution of 2011 there were eight recognized national parties, six of which held national legislative seats. President Ben Ali's party, known as the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), commanded majorities in local, regional, and national elections. Although the party was renamed (in President Bourguiba's days it was the Socialist Destourian Party), its policies were still considered to be largely secular and conservative. However, the Tunisian Revolution in 2011 saw its removal from power.

2009 national elections
The Tunisian national elections of 2009, overseen by the Interior Ministry and held on October 25, 2009, elected candidates for president and legislative offices. During the campaign, speeches by candidates were aired on Tunisian radio and television stations. Participation was 89% of resident citizens and 90% of citizens living abroad. In the presidential vote, Ben Ali soundly defeated his challengers, Mohamed Bouchiha (PUP), Ahmed Inoubli (UDU) and Ahmed Ibrahim (Ettajdid Movement) for a fifth term in office. His 89% of the vote was slightly lower than in the 2004 election. In the parliamentary elections, the RCD received 84% of the vote for 161 constituency seats. The MDS won 16 seats under the proportional representation system, followed by the PUP with 12 seats. Fifty-nine women were elected to legislative seats.

The election was criticized by opposition parties and some international observers for limitations placed on non-incumbents. In one instance, the Ettajdid party's weekly publication, Ettarik al-Jadid, was seized by authorities for violating campaign communications laws. Meanwhile, a delegation from the African Union Commission praised the election for taking place with "calm and serenity". Prior to the 2009 election, Tunisia amended its constitution to allow more candidates to run for president, allowing the top official from each political party to compete for the presidency regardless of whether they held seats in parliament.

2011 Constituent Assembly election
Following the 2010–2011 protests and the vacation of the presidency by President Ben Ali, elections for a Constituent Assembly were held on 23 October 2011. Results were announced on 25 October 2011 with the center-right and moderately Islamist Ennahda winning a plurality with 37% of the vote.

2014 parliamentary elections
Parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia on 26 October 2014. Results were announced on 27 October 2014 with secularist Nidaa Tounes winning a plurality with 38% of the vote.

2019 parliamentary and presidential elections
In the parliamentary election, the Ennahda became the biggest party with 52 seats, while the Heart of Tunisia became the second with 38 seats. In the presidential election, independent candidate Kais Saied got a landslide victory with 72.5% of the vote in the second round.

2022 constitutional referendum
In July 2022, Tunisians approved a new constitution in a referendum. The reform gave more powers to Tunisia's president, meaning the role of President Kais Saied strengthened significantly.

Women's equality
The now-defunct Chamber of Deputies had 23% women members in 2009, outpacing the percentage of women serving at the time in the U.S. Congress, which stood at 17% in the 111th Congress. More than one-fifth of the seats in both chambers of parliament were held by women, an exceptionally high level in the Arab world.

Tunisia is the only country in the Arab world where polygamy is forbidden by law. This is part of a provision in the country's Code of Personal Status which was introduced by President Bourguiba in 1956.

Ben Ali regime
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was criticized for the low levels of democracy and freedom of expression in the country by Amnesty International and various other organizations. which documented restrictions of basic human rights and obstruction of human rights organizations. The Economist's 2008 Democracy Index ranked Tunisia 141 out of 167 countries studied and 143 out of 173 regarding freedom of the press. Later in his rule repression became more brutal, corruption more visible and the economy more stagnant.

2010–2011 revolution
The Tunisian Revolution overthrew President Ben Ali in 2011—marking the beginning of the Arab Spring.

On 14 January 2011, president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali officially resigned after fleeing to Saudi Arabia, ending 23 years in power, following the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades. Street protests and civil disobedience against high unemployment, food inflation, corruption,  a lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech and poor living conditions, were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010.

A Constituent Assembly was elected on 23 October 2011, and a new constitution was adopted on 26 January 2014. It was passed on 10 February 2014.

Media
Under the Ben Ali regime, freedom of the press was officially guaranteed, but the press was highly restricted, as was a substantial amount of web content. Journalists were often obstructed from reporting on controversial events. Prior to the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia practiced internet censorship against popular websites such as YouTube. In 2010 Reporters Without Borders included Tunisia in the country list of “Enemies of the Internet". Despite this, Tunisia hosted the second half of the United Nations-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society in 2005, which endorsed the freedom of the internet as a platform for political participation and human rights protection. By 2010, Tunisia had more than 3.5 million regular internet users and 1.6 million Facebook users and hundreds of internet cafes, known as 'publinet.'

Five private radio stations have been established, including Mosaique FM, Express FM, Shems FM and private television stations such as Hannibal TV and Nessma TV.

Administrative divisions
Tunisia is divided into 24 governorates:

 * Ariana Governorate (Aryanah)
 * Béja Governorate (Bajah)
 * Ben Arous Governorate (Bin 'Arus)
 * Bizerte Governorate (Banzart)
 * Gabès Governorate (Qabis)
 * Gafsa Governorate (Qafsah)
 * Jendouba Governorate (Jundubah)
 * Kairouan Governorate (Al Qayrawan)
 * Kasserine Governorate (Al Qasrayn)
 * Kebili Governorate (Qibili)
 * Kef Governorate (Al Kaf)
 * Mahdia Governorate (Al Mahdiyah)
 * Manouba Governorate (Manubah)
 * Medenine Governorate (Madanin)
 * Monastir Governorate (Al Munastir)
 * Nabeul Governorate (Nabul)
 * Sfax Governorate (Safaqis)
 * Sidi Bouzid Governorate (Sidi Bu Zayd)
 * Siliana Governorate (Silyanah)
 * Sousse Governorate (Sousse)
 * Tataouine Governorate (Tatawin)
 * Tozeur Governorate (Tawzar)
 * Tunis Governorate (Tunis)
 * Zaghouan Governorate (Zaghwan)

International organization participation
Tunisia is a participant in the following international organizations:

 * ABEDA
 * ACCT
 * AfDB
 * AFESD
 * AMF
 * AMU
 * AU
 * BSEC (observer)
 * ENP
 * FAO
 * G-77
 * IAEA
 * IBRD
 * ICAO
 * ICC
 * ICFTU
 * ICRM
 * IDA
 * IDB
 * IFAD
 * IFC
 * IFRCS
 * IHO
 * ILO
 * IMF
 * IMO
 * Interpol
 * IOC
 * IOM
 * ISO
 * ITU
 * LAS
 * MICAH
 * MONUC
 * NAM
 * OAPEC
 * OAS (observer)
 * OIC
 * OPCW
 * OSCE (partner)
 * UN
 * UNCTAD
 * UNESCO
 * UNHCR
 * UNIDO
 * UNMEE
 * UNMIK
 * UPU
 * WCO
 * WFTU
 * WHO
 * WIPO
 * WMO
 * WToO
 * WTO

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Politics of Tunisia


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Economy of Tunisia

The economy of Tunisia is in the process of being liberalized after decades of heavy state direction and participation in the country's economy. Prudent economic and fiscal planning has resulted in moderate but sustained growth for over a decade. Tunisia's economic growth historically has depended on oil, phosphates, agri-food products, car parts manufacturing, and tourism. In the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 2015–2016, Tunisia ranks in 92nd place.

The year 2015 was marked by terrorist attacks in Tunisia which are likely to affect economic growth, especially in tourism, one of the main sectors.

Historical trend
GDP per capita soared by more than 380% in the seventies (1970–1980: USD 280–1,369). But this proved unsustainable and it collapsed to a cumulative 10% growth in the turbulent eighties (1980–1990: USD 1,369–1,507), rising again to almost 50% cumulative growth in the nineties (1990–2000: USD 1,507–2,245), signifying the impact of successful diversification.

Growing foreign debt and the foreign exchange crisis in the mid-1980s led the government to launch a structural adjustment program to liberalize prices, reduce tariffs, and reorient Tunisia toward a market economy in 1986. Tunisia's economic reform program was lauded as a model by international financial institutions. The government liberalized prices, reduced tariffs, lowered debt-service-to-exports and debt-to-GDP ratios, and extended the average maturity of its $10 billion foreign debt. Structural adjustment brought additional lending from the World Bank and other Western creditors. In 1990, Tunisia acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In 1996 Tunisia entered into an "Association Agreement" with the European Union (EU) which removed tariffs and other trade barriers on most goods by 2008. In conjunction with the Association Agreement, the EU is assisting the Tunisian government's Mise A Niveau (upgrading) program to enhance the productivity of Tunisian businesses and prepare for competition in the global marketplace.

The government totally or partially privatized around 160 state-owned enterprises after the privatization program was launched in 1987. Although the program is supported by the GATT, the government had to move carefully to avoid mass firings. Unemployment continued to plague Tunisia's economy and was aggravated by a rapidly growing workforce. An estimated 55% of the population is under the age of 25. Officially, 15.2% of the Tunisian workforce is unemployed.

In 2011, after the Arab Spring, the economy slumped but then recovered with 2.81% GDP growth in 2014. However, unemployment is still one of the major issues with 15.2% of the labor force unemployed as of the first quarter of 2014. Tunisia's political transition gained new momentum in early 2014, with the resolution of a political deadlock, the adoption of a new Constitution and the appointment of a new government. The national dialogue platform, brokered by key civil society organizations, played a crucial role in gathering all major political parties. This consensus will allow for further reform in the economy and public sector.

In 2015, the Bardo National Museum attack led to the collapse of the third largest sector of Tunisia's economy; tourism. Tunisian tourist workers in Tunis have said that "tourism is dead, it is completely dead", expressing the severe drop in tourism after the attack.

The number of ragpickers in Tunisia is increasing due to the continuing high level of unemployment, the loss of purchasing power of the most disadvantaged families, and the explosion of plastic waste due to new consumption habits. Ragpickers do not benefit from social protection, granted to professions with a legal status and may be subject to the exploitation of the Recycling industry.

The following table shows the main economic indicators in 1980–2017. Inflation under 5% is in green.

External trade and investment
In 1992, Tunisia re-entered the private international capital market for the first time in 6 years, securing a $10-million line of credit for balance-of-payments support. In January 2003 Standard & Poor's affirmed its investment grade credit ratings for Tunisia. The World Economic Forum 2002-03 ranked Tunisia 34th in the Global Competitiveness Index Ratings (two places behind South Africa, the continent's leader). In April 2002, Tunisia's first US dollar-denominated sovereign bond issue since 1997 raised $458 million, with maturity in 2012.

The Bourse de Tunis is under the control of the state-run Financial Market Council and lists over 50 companies. The government offers substantial tax incentives to encourage companies to join the exchange, and expansion is occurring.

The Tunisian government adopted a unified investment code in 1993 to attract foreign capital. More than 1,600 export-oriented joint venture firms operate in Tunisia to take advantage of relatively low labor costs and preferential access to nearby European markets. Economic links are closest with European countries, which dominate Tunisia's trade. Tunisia's currency, the dinar, is not traded outside Tunisia. However, partial convertibility exists for bona fide commercial and investment transaction. Certain restrictions still limit operations carried out by Tunisian residents.

The stock market capitalisation of listed companies in Tunisia was valued at $5.3 Billion in 2007, 15% of 2007 GDP, by the World Bank.

For 2007, foreign direct investment totaled TN Dinar 2 billion in 2007, or 5.18% of the total volume of investment in the country. This figure is up 35.7% from 2006 and includes 271 new foreign enterprises and the expansion of 222 others already based in the country.

The economic growth rate seen for 2007, at 6.3% is the highest achieved in a decade.

On 29 and 30 November, Tunisia held an investment conference with country chiefs from all around the world with pledges that have reached $30 billion to finance new public projects.

As of 2022, Tunisia's government is in need of international help as the economy grapples with a crisis in public finances that has raised fears it may default on debt and has contributed to shortages of food and fuel, according to government critics. As a result, the government announced in December 2022 that they expect to reduce its fiscal deficit to 5.5% in 2023 from a forecast 7.7% this year, driven by austerity measures that could pave the way for a final deal with the International Monetary Fund on a rescue package.

Loan Guarantee
Source:

On 20 April 2012, U.S. Treasury Secretary and Tunisian Finance Minister Houcine Dimassi signed a declaration of intent to move forward on a U.S. loan guarantee for Tunisia. The U.S. Government would provide this loan guarantee to enable the Tunisian government to access significant market financing at affordable rates and favorable maturities with the backing of a U.S. guarantee of principal and interest (up to 100 percent).

The support would consist of the U.S. guarantee of Tunisian government-issued debt (or of bank loans made to the Government of Tunisia). This guarantee will significantly reduce the Tunisian government's borrowing costs at a time when market access has become more expensive for many emerging market countries. In the weeks ahead, both governments intend to make progress on a loan guarantee agreement that would allow Tunisia to move forward with a debt issuance.

The ceremony took place at the World Bank immediately following the meeting of Finance Ministers of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition.

Microfinance institutions, such as Enda Tamweel, exist to assist those who are unable to access the regular banking system. This comprises those living in rural or impoverished regions where the informal sector thrives, accounting for 34% of Tunisia's GDP.

Enda Tamweel has made over 3 million microloans to over 900,000 people in the 30 years since its inception, infusing more than €1.6 billion into the local economy.

Energy
Tunisia's natural resources are modest when compared to those of its neighbors: Algeria and Libya. This modesty in natural resources forced the country to import oil, which contributed to the rise in the cost of gasoline: on April 26, 2006, the liter crossed the bar of one dinar to sell for 1.50 Tunisian dinars. (a price equivalent to European prices from the point of view of purchasing power parity).

Electricity

 * Production: 16.13 Billion kWh (2011)
 * Production by source:
 * fossil fuel: 96.8% (2010)
 * hydro: 1.7% (2010)
 * other: 1.5% (2010)
 * Consumption: 13.29 billion kWh (2010)
 * Exports: None (2010)
 * Imports: 19 million kWh (2010)

Economic structure
In 2017, the breakdown by economic sector is as follows:

Agriculture
Agriculture - products: olives, grain, tomatoes, citrus fruit, sugar beets, dates, almonds.

In 2018, Tunisia produced:

 * 1.5 million tons of wheat;
 * 1.3 million tons of tomato (16th largest producer in the world);
 * 825 thousand tons of olives (7th largest producer in the world);
 * 700 thousand tons of barley;
 * 548 thousand tons of watermelon;
 * 450 thousand tons of onion;
 * 426 thousand tons of pepper;
 * 423 thousand tons of potato;
 * 241 thousand tons of date (10th largest producer in the world);
 * 217 thousand tons of carrots;
 * 146 thousand tons of grape;
 * 144 thousand tons of orange;
 * 118 thousand tons of peach;
 * 114 thousand tons of apple;
 * 104 thousand tons of grapefruit;
 * 102 thousand tons of melon.

In addition to smaller productions of other agricultural products, like almond (66 thousand tons) and sugar beet (76 thousand tons).

title: Economy of Tunisia


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Transport in Tunisia

Tunisia has a number of international airports to service its sizable tourist trade. Tunis is the center of the transport system as the largest city having the largest port and a light transit system.

Railways
Tunisia inherited much of its rail transport system from the French. The Tunisian Government has developed infrastructure further. The railways are operated by the Société Nationale de Chemins de Fer Tunisiens (SNCFT), the Tunisian national railway. A modernisation program is currently underway. It has a total of 2,152 km consisting of 468 km of railways and 1,674 kilometres of. Tunis has a light rail system. In the south of Tunisia, there is a narrow gauge railway called the Sfax-Gafsa Railway which delivers phosphates and iron ore to the harbour at Sfax. Tunisia has rail links with the neighbouring country of Algeria via the Ghardimaou-Souk Ahras line, and another connection to Tébessa, however, the latter link is currently not used. There are no railways yet in neighbouring Libya though some are under construction in 2008; some gauge conversion would be required for efficient connections.

Railway links to adjacent countries

 * Libya - railways under construction
 * Algeria - yes - same gauge -
 * TGM
 * Lézard rouge, a tourist train
 * Métro léger de Tunis
 * Réseau Ferroviaire Rapide

Highways
As of 2004, there were 18,997 km of highway including 12,310 of paved road and 6,387 of unpaved road. The major cities are all linked by road through the interior. In 2002, Tunisia borrowed €300 million from the European Investment Bank in 2002 to be used to improve roads in the country including €120 million towards building a motorway between Tunis and Sfax. (MEED Middle East Economic Digest, 15 Feb 2002 v46 i7(1))

Motorways

 * A1 motorway
 * A2 motorway (Under Construction) from Tunis to Jilma 186 km First phase, then Jilma to Gafsa 200 km in final phase.
 * A3 motorway
 * A4 motorway

International highways
Route 1 in the Trans-African Highway network passes through Tunisia, linking it to North African nations including Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Egypt, and to West African nations via Mauritania. In addition a feeder road links Tunisia to the Trans-Sahara Highway from Algeria to West Africa.

Pipelines
Tunisia has an extensive pipeline network including 3,059 km of gas pipelines, 1,203 kilometres of oil pipeline and 345 km of refined products. Petrochemicals are Tunisia's third most important export despite the small size of its oil and gas fields as compared to Libya and Algeria. It also gets a royalty rate of 5 per cent on the Algerian gas that runs through Tunis to Sicily through the Trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline. (IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 18 Dec 2003) Libya's National Oil Corporation formed a joint venture with Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz to construct a national gas pipeline between the two countries. (Petroleum Economist, Dec 2003 v70 i12 p43(1))

Ports and harbours
Tunis is the most significant port in Tunisia with other significant ports on the Mediterranean Sea including Bizerte, Gabès, La Goulette, Sfax, Sousse and Zarzis. Tunisia's merchant marine consisted of 14 ships as at 2002.

Aviation
As of 2002, Tunisia had 30 airports including several international airports. The most important one is the Tunis-Carthage International Airport but other significant airports serve Sfax, Djerba-Zarzis, Enfidha, Monastir, Tozeur and Tabarka. Tunisair is the national airline.

title: Transport in Tunisia


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Demographics of Tunisia

Tunisia's population was estimated to be around 12.04 million in 2022. In the generally youthful African continent, Tunisia's population is among the most mature. This is because the government has supported a successful family planning program that has reduced the population growth rate to just over 1% per annum, contributing to Tunisia's economic and social stability.

The population of Tunisia is made up of Arabs (98%), Berbers (1%), and others (1%). Around 98 percent of the population are Muslim. There is a Jewish population on the southern island of Djerba and in Tunis. There also exists a small autochthonous group of Christian adherents.

Population History
Source: National Institute of Statistics and United Nations Statistics Division

Ethnic groups
The majority of the population of Tunisia is made up of Arabs (98% of the population). The first people known to history in what is now Tunisia were the Berbers, who currently make up 1% of the population, and were ultimately conquered by the Arabs in the 7th century. There was a continuing inflow of nomadic Arab tribes to the Maghreb from the Arabian Peninsula since the 7th century with a major wave in the 11th century.

Whilst the Ottoman influence has been particularly significant in forming the Turco-Tunisian community, other peoples have also migrated to Tunisia during different periods of time, including Sub-Saharan Africans, Greeks, Romans, Phoenicians (Punics), Jews, and French settlers. The Tunisian, by 1870 the distinction between the Arabic-speaking mass and the Turkish elite had blurred. There is also a small Berber (1% at most) population located in the Dahar mountains and on the island of Djerba in the south-east and in the Khroumire mountainous region in the north-west.

From the late 19th century to after World War II, Tunisia was home to large populations of French and Italians (255,000 Europeans in 1956), although nearly all of them, along with the Jewish population, left after Tunisia became independent. The history of the Jews in Tunisia goes back some 2,000 years. In 1948 the Jewish population was an estimated 105,000, but by 2013 only about 900 remained.

After the Reconquista and expulsion of non-Christians and Moriscos from Spain, many Spanish Muslims and Jews also arrived. According to Matthew Carr, "As many as eighty thousand Moriscos settled in Tunisia, most of them in and around the capital, Tunis, which still contains a quarter known as Zuqaq al-Andalus, or Andalusia Alley."

Genetics
Tunisians mainly carry haplogroup J1 (34.2%) and haplogroup E (55%).

"In fact, the Tunisian genetic distances to European samples are smaller than those to North African groups. (...) This could be explained by the history of the Tunisian population, reflecting the influence of the ancient Punic settlers of Carthage followed, among others, by Roman, Byzantine, Arab and French occupations, according to historical records. Notwithstanding, other explanations cannot be discarded, such as the relative heterogeneity within current Tunisian populations, and/or the limited sub-Saharan genetic influence in this region as compared with other North African areas, without excluding the possibility of the genetic drift, whose effect might be particularly amplified on the X chromosome.",

However, later research has suggested instead that Tunisians exhibit a mostly indigenous North African ancestral component similar to other Northwest African populations; characterized by a high amount of native Northwest African genes, but with higher Middle Eastern input than in Algeria or Morocco.

Y-Chromosome
Listed here are the human Y-chromosome DNA haplogroups in Tunisia.

Migration
Detailed article : Tunisian diaspora

Other demographic statistics
The following demographic statistics of Tunisia in 2022 are from the World Population Review.

The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated.

Population
11,896,972 (2022 est.)

Religions
Muslim (official; Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) <1%

Age structure

 * 0-14 years: 25.28% (male 1,529,834/female 1,433,357)
 * 15-24 years: 12.9% (male 766,331/female 745,888)
 * 25-54 years: 42.85% (male 2,445,751/female 2,576,335)
 * 55-64 years: 10.12% (male 587,481/female 598,140)
 * 65 years and over: 8.86% (male 491,602/female 546,458) (2020 est.)

Birth rate

 * 14.62 births/1,000 population (2022 est.) Country comparison to the world: 119th

Death rate

 * 6.36 deaths/1,000 population (2022 est.) Country comparison to the world: 143rd

Total Fertility Rates

 * 1.96 children born/woman (2023 est.) Country comparison to the world: 113th
 * 2 children born/woman (2022 est.) Country comparison to the world: 108th
 * 2.03 children born/woman (2021 est.)

Contraceptive prevalence rate

 * 50.7% (2018 est.)

Population growth rate

 * 0.69% (2022 est.) Country comparison to the world: 129th
 * 0.75% (2021 est.)

Median age

 * total: 32.7 years. Country comparison to the world: 107th
 * male: 32 years
 * female: 33.3 years (2020 est.)

Net migration rate

 * -1.33 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2022 est.) Country comparison to the world: 154th
 * -1.34 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2021 est.)
 * -1.6 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2018 est.)
 * -0.41 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2010 est.)

Urbanization

 * urban population: 70.2% of total population (2022)
 * rate of urbanization: 1.34% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)

 * Urban population: 69.9% of total population (2021)
 * Rate of urbanization: 1.34% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)

Education expenditures

 * 7.3% of GDP (2016) Country comparison to the world: 18th

Sex ratio

 * At birth: 1.06 male(s)/female
 * 0-14 years: 1.07 male(s)/female
 * 15-24 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
 * 25-54 years: 0.95 male(s)/female
 * 55-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female
 * 65 years and over: 0.9 male(s)/female
 * total population: 0.99 male(s)/female (2020 est.)

Infant mortality rate

 * Total: 12.16 deaths/1,000 live births (2021 est.)
 * Male: 13.67 deaths/1,000 live births
 * Female: 10.57 deaths/1,000 live births

Life expectancy at birth

 * Total population: 76.57 years (2021 est.)
 * Male: 74.88 years
 * Female: 78.36 years

Nationality

 * noun: Tunisian(s)
 * adjective: Tunisian

Ethnic groups

 * Arabs 98%
 * Berbers 1%
 * Jews and others 1%

Languages

 * Modern Standard Arabic (official, one of the languages of commerce and education)
 * Tunisian Arabic (local dialect of Arabic, everyday use)
 * French (commerce and education)
 * Berber (minority language spoken by <1% of the population)

Literacy
definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 81.8% male: 89.6% female: 74.2% (2015 est.)

The literacy rate among the Tunisian population increased greatly after its independence from France. According to the 1996 census data, the literacy rate of the last generation of Tunisian men educated under the French rule (those born 1945–49) was less than 65%. For the first generation educated after independence (born 1950–1954), literacy in Arabic among males had increased to nearly 80%. (Sixty-two percent were also literate in French and 15 percent literate in English). Among the youngest generation included in the census (those born 1980–1984), 96.6% were literate in Arabic.

Among Tunisian women, the increase in literacy was even greater. The literacy rate among the last generation of women educated under the French was less than 30%. In the first generation educated after independence, this increased to just over 40%. For the youngest generation of women cited (born 1980–1984), literacy in Arabic had increased to slightly over 90%; over 70% of women were also literate in French.

Life expectancy

 * total population: 76.82 years. Country comparison to the world: 99th
 * male: 75.14 years
 * female: 78.6 years (2022 est.)

Source: UN World Population Prospects

Literacy
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
 * total population: 81.8%
 * male: 89.6%
 * female: 74.2% (2015)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)

 * total: 15 years
 * male: 14 years
 * female: 16 years (2016)

Unemployment, youth ages 15-24

 * total: 34.9%
 * male: 33.8%
 * female: 37.2% (2017 est.)

title: Demographics of Tunisia


text:
Tunisian Armed Forces

The Tunisian Armed Forces (القوات المسلحة التونسية) consist of the Tunisian Army, Air Force and Navy.

As of 2019, Tunisia had armed forces with more than 150,000 active-duty personnel, of which 80,000 were conscripts. Paramilitary forces consisted of a 12,000-member national guard. Tunisia participates in United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the DROC (MONUSCO) and Côte d'Ivoire. Previous United Nations peacekeeping deployments for the Tunisian armed forces have included Cambodia (UNTAC), Namibia (UNTAG), Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE), and the 1960s mission in the Congo, ONUC. AL-fehri AL-akermi Great Britain:FERI AKRIM 19/05/1995

History

The modern Tunisian army was formed in 1831 by Al-Husayn II ibn Mahmud. During the period of the French Protectorate (1881–1956) Tunisians were recruited in significant numbers into the French Army, serving as tirailleurs (infantry) and spahis (cavalry). These units saw active service in Europe during both World Wars, as well as in Indo-China prior to 1954. The only exclusively Tunisian military force permitted under French rule was the Beylical Guard.

Following independence
On June 30, 1956, the Tunisian army was officially founded by decree, in the form of a combined-arms regiment. The necessary equipment was made available to the young state from French stocks. The new army initially comprised 25 Tunisian officers, 250 NCOs and 1,250 men transferred from French Army service, plus 850 former members of the Beylical Guard. Approximately 4,000 Tunisian soldiers continued in French Army service until 1958, when the majority transferred to the Tunisian Army, which reached a strength of over 6,000 that year.

Intakes of conscripts for military service, made mandatory in January 1957, plus the recall of reservists allowed the army to grow to twelve battalions numbering 20,000 men by 1961. Sixty per cent of those troops were deployed for border monitoring and defense duties.

Tunisian units first saw action in 1958 after French intrusions into the south in pursuit of National Liberation Army (Algeria) fighters. In 1960 Tunisian troops served with the United National Peacekeeping Force in the Congo. 1,020 troops from the Tunisian Armed Forces were amongst the first UN troops to arrive in the Congo, by 20 July 1960. In 1961 clashes occurred with French forces based at Bizerte. More than 600 men fell in battle against the French forces. The French evacuated the base after subsequent negotiations with the Tunisian Government.

The Tunisian Navy, founded in 1958, received its first ship in the fall of 1959. The Air Force acquired its first combat aircraft in 1960. While the Tunisian armed forces obtain equipment from several sources, the United States remains the largest single supplier. Officer and specialist training for Tunisian personnel was formerly undertaken in French and American military academies. Tunisian trainees are now gradually being assigned to newly established military schools within the country. The January 10, 1957, a law prohibits any military officer to be a member of a group or a political party. However, after 7 November 1987 when the former Prime Minister, General Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali took power senior officers such as Abdelhamid Escheikh and Mustapha Bouaziz took up ministerial appointments.

On 30 April 2002, at around 18.15, the direction of the Army - Brigadier General Abdelaziz Skik who led the Tunisian contingent to Cambodia, two colonels - majors, three colonels, four majors, two lieutenants and a sergeant-major - disappeared in a helicopter crash near the town of Medjez el-Bab.

Tunisia has contributed military forces to United Nations peacekeeping missions, including an army company to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the Rwandan genocide. In his book Shake Hands with the Devil, Canadian force commander Roméo Dallaire gave the Tunisian soldiers high credit for their skills and effort in the conflict and referred to them as his "ace in the hole".

During the 2011 Libyan civil war, Tunisian forces, mostly border guards, saw some limited action when fighting between Libyan rebels and loyalist soldiers spilled over the border.

The military and politics
The Library of Congress Country Study says: His exclusive power to promote military officers has been among the strongest components of Bourguiba's control over the armed forces. From independence, high-ranking officers—general staff and senior commanders in particular—have been carefully selected for their party loyalty more than for their professional experience and competence. This began in the late 1950s when the president dismissed those officers who had trained in the Middle East and who might therefore have been expected to sympathize with the militant Pan-Arab policies of Egypt's Nasser. The hand-picked senior officers, in turn, carefully screened all officers who were considered for positions of authority in line units to ensure that antiregime elements did not pose potential threats at any level of the military establishment.

As a result of these promotion policies, the Tunisian officer corps took on a very homogeneous character that only began to break down in the 1970s. Senior officers have been generally representative of Tunisia's economically and politically dominant families from the north, the coastal areas, and the major cities. Although military men have been kept from operating major business ventures or holding political office while in uniform, it has been common for family members to be prominent in business or in the Destourian political movement. Generally Western and Francophile in outlook, tied by kinship to the country's upper socioeconomic stratum, and personally familiar with leading figures in the PSD, high-ranking Tunisian officers must be classed as part of the national elite. In 2021, Tunisia boosted the role of military in their fight to curb the pandemic's spread. On Monday 5th, the Tunisian presidency announced that medical and paramedical university graduates of the last three years will be drafted by the army. The intent was to remedy to a shortage of medical staff in public and private hospitals because hundreds of unhappy health professionals have left the country in recent years. Among other decisions, a vaccination campaign will be waged by joint civilian-military teams around the country under the supervision of the army.

General Staff
The supreme commander of the armed forces is the President of the Republic of Tunisia.

In December 2010, the staff is composed as follows: Chief of Staff of the Army corps is the Field Marshall Mohamed el ghoul, one of the Air Force is Brigadier General Taieb Lajimi and that the navy is Rear Admiral Mohamed Khamassi. In April 2011, Ammar became chief of staff inter-armed.

The Inspector General of the armed forces is Rear Admiral Tarek Faouzi Larbi, the Director of Military Engineering is Brigadier General Mohammed Hedi Abdelkafi and the director of military security Brigadier General Ahmed Chabir.

Tunisian Army
The Tunisian Army is 80,000 strong and is composed essentially of:

The army was also enlisted to help in curbing the spread of Covid in the country in July 2021 when the Tunisian presidency announced that medical and paramedical university graduates of the last three years would be drafted by the army.
 * three mechanised brigades baséd at Kairouan (3rd), Gabès (1st) and Béja (2nd). Each is composed of:
 * one armoured régiment (M60 Patton tanks)
 * two regiments of mechanised infantry (M113 armoured personnel carriers) (11th-17th Mechanised Infantry Regiments have been reported)
 * one artillery regiment (M198 howitzer)
 * one reconnaissance company (AML 90)
 * one Saharan territorial group at Borj el-Khadra and Remada, consisting of two light infantry regiments
 * one special forces group (Groupe des Forces Spéciales)
 * one military police régiment

Air Force
The Tunisian Air Force is equipped with 10 Northrop F-5E Tiger II and two Northrop F-5F Tiger II. These form 15 Squadron at Bizerte-Sidi Ahmed Air Base. It also includes 12 Aero L-59T, as well as three Aermacchi MB-326K (combat capable) as well as 4 MB-326B, and 3 MB326L. Previously up to 8 Aermacchi MB-326B, 7-16 Aermacchi MB-326KT, and 4 Aermacchi MB-326LT were in service.

The IISS Military Balance 2013 lists six Lockheed C-130B Hercules, one Lockheed C-130H Hercules, five G-222s, three Let L-410UVP Turbolet (all assigned to one transport squadron) plus a liaison unit with two S-208A. Other reported transport aircraft include one Boeing 737-700/BBJ, two Dassault Falcon 20, and two Lockheed C-130J-30 Super Hercules.

Reported attack helicopters include four Hughes MD 500 Defenders, and 7-8 SNIAS SA-342 Gazelle.

Reported training/COIN and liaison aircraft include 12 SIAI Marchetti SF.260WC Warriors and 9 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260C, as well as 4 SIAI-Marchetti S.208A/M and one Reims F406.

Apart from Bizerte Sidi-Ahmed, there are military airfields reported at Bizerte (La-Kharouba), Gabes, Gafsa, and Sfax.

Navy
Established in 1959, the Marine nationale tunisienne (Tunisian National Navy) initially received French assistance, including advisory personnel and several small patrol vessels. On 22 October 1973, the U.S. Edsall-class destroyer escort USS Thomas J. Gary (DE-326) was decommissioned in ceremonies at the Quai d'Honneur, Bizerte. Moments later, the ship was commissioned by the Tunisian Navy as the President Bourgiba. In the mid-1980s the force included President Bourguiba, two United States-built coastal minesweepers, and a variety of fast-attack and patrol craft. The most important additions to the fleet in the 1980s were three La Combattante III type fast attack craft armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles. Apart from these vessels, however, most of the fleet's units were old and capable of little more than coastal patrol duties.

During the 1960s and 1970s the navy was primarily involved in combating the smuggling of contraband, the illegal entry of un- desirable aliens, and unauthorized emigration as well as other coastal security activities. In these matters the overall effort was shared with agencies of the Ministry of Interior, especially the customs agents and immigration personnel of the Surete Nationale.

President Bourgiba suffered a major fire on 16 April 1992 and later left operational service. Today the Tunisian Navy reportedly has bases at Bizerte, Kelibia, La Goulette, and Sfax. Formerly reported in service were six Kondor-II class minsweepers of 635 tons, equipped with 3 twin 25mm Guns. However, none were listed in service by the IISS Military Balance 2013. Also formerly in use were MBDA MM-40 Exocet and Nord SS-12M surface-to-surface missiles.

Fast attack craft

 * 3 La Combattante III type fast attack craft La Galite class in Tunisian service (with 8xMM-40 SSMs, 1x76mm Gun, 2x40mm Guns, 4x30mm Guns)
 * 6 Type-143 Lurssen Albatros class (2x76mm Gun, Mine Laying Capability) P506 Hannon is possibly out of service after the delivery of third MSOPV-1400 named Hannon
 * 3 P-48 Bizerte class with 4x37mm Guns. Eight SS-12M SSMs were removed as obsolete.
 * 3-5 Modified Hazhui\Shanghai-II class (128 ft,30 knots, 4x37mm Guns, 4x25mm Guns)

Patrol boats

 * 4 Damen Group MSOPV-1400 72m Offshore patrol vessel
 * 65 Foot (20.3M) Full Cabin Inboard Patrol Boats- Features dual 1600 hp MTU 10V2000 diesel engines, shock mitigating seating, climate control, navigation package, and are capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. Built by U.S. Boat Builder SAFE Boats International and propulsion system designed and supplied by Pacific Power Group.
 * 1 Ch.Navals De Lestrel 31.5m class (104 ft,30 knots,2x20mm Guns)
 * 3 Ch.Navals De Lestrel 25m (83 ft,23 knots,1x20mm)
 * 5 Bremse class (22.6m,2x14.5mm HMGs)
 * 4 Gabes class(12.9m,2x12.7mm HMGs)
 * 4 Rodman-38 class(11.6m)
 * 2 Vosper Thornycroft 103 ft class (27 knota,2x20mm Guns)
 * 6 20meter long PCs
 * 4 Istiklal (Independence ) (3 on construction) 26.5meter Long PC
 * 1 52mt patrol vessel on construction source + Picture

Landing craft and auxiliary vessels
Landing craft and auxiliary vessels include one LCT-3 class LCT, one Robert Conard class 63.7m Survey vessel (NHO Salammbo), one Wilkes class (T-AGS-33) survey ship (NRF Khaireddine), two El Jem class training ships (ex A 5378 Aragosta and A 5381 Polipo delivered by Italian Navy on 17 July 2002), one Simeto class Tanker ( Ain Zaghouin - ex A 5375 delivered by Italian Navy on 10.7.2003) and one White Sumac 40.5m class, one diver training vessel Zarzis.

Aircraft

 * Boeing Insitu ScanEagle

title: Tunisian Armed Forces


text:
Telecommunications in Tunisia

Telecommunications in Tunisia includes telephones (fixed and mobile), radio, television, and the Internet. The Ministry of Communication Technologies, a cabinet-level governmental agency, is in charge of organizing the sector.

Telephones

 * International calling code: 216 (for calls from outside of Tunisia)
 * International call prefix: 00 (for international calls from within Tunisia)
 * Fixed lines: 1.2 million (2011), 1.3 million (2009), 1.2 million (2005); 654,000 (1997)
 * Mobile cellular: 12.4 million (2011), 9.8 million (2009), 7.2 million (2007); 1.9 million (2003); 50,000 (1998)
 * Teledensity: ~100 telephones per 100 persons (fixed-line and mobile-cellular combined)
 * System: Above the African average and continuing to be upgraded; key centers are Sfax, Sousse, Bizerte, and Tunis; telephone network is completely digitized
 * domestic: trunk facilities consist of open-wire lines, coaxial cable, and microwave radio relay
 * international: 5 submarine cables; 2 satellite earth stations - Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) and Arabsat; coaxial cable and microwave radio relay to Algeria and Libya; participant in Medarabtel; 2 international gateway digital switches

Radio and television
First radio service began in 1935 in Tunisia.

 * Radio stations: Several state-owned and private radio networks (2012)
 * Radios: 2.06 million (1997)
 * Television stations: State-owned and private national TV channels; Egyptian, French, and pan-Arab satellite TV command large audiences (2012)
 * Televisions: 920,000 (1997)
 * Households with television: 91.7% (2003)

The government of former President Ben Ali tightly controlled the press and broadcasting. But since the 2011 popular revolt, many journalists have enjoyed new-found freedoms. The number of radio and TV channels and print publications has increased, as has their freedom to report and debate political and social issues. State TV, which had toed the government line, has changed tack, giving airtime to the former opposition.

Prior to the Tunisian revolution there were four private radio stations operating in Tunisia. In June 2011, following the Tunisian revolution, a recommendation to license twelve new private radio stations was forwarded to the interim Prime Minister. In August 2011 none of the recommendations had been acted upon. However, several stations began broadcasting under time-limited provisional licenses. The stations operate without specific operating rules because a new regulatory framework is not yet in place. In part due to the lack of a regulatory framework the government's National Office of Broadcasting (ONT) requires broadcasters to pay a licensing fee of 120,000 dinars (approximately $75,000), and while that license is not necessary to broadcast, it confers a certain amount of legitimacy that broadcasters need to draw advertisers. The large fee is difficult for new start-up stations and the new stations feel that the fees provide an unfair advantage for the older more established private groups organized under the previous regime.

Internet

 * Top level domain (TLD): .tn
 * Access: Available throughout the country using a fibre-optic backbone
 * Internet Service Providers (ISPs): 12 (2005)
 * International bandwidth: 62 Gbit/s in 2012, 50 Gbit/s in 2010, 1.3 Gbit/s in 2006
 * Internet users: 4,196,564 (2012), 840,000 (2005); 410,000 (2001)
 * Internet penetration: 39.1% (2011), 36.8% (2010), 17.1% (2007), 9.7% (2005), 2.8% (2000)
 * Fixed (wired) Internet subscriptions: 604,102 (2011); 543,290 (2010); 253,149 (2007); 150,220 (2005); 36,657 (2000)
 * Broadband Internet subscribers: 544,392 or 5.1% (2011), 481,810 or 4.6% (2010), 372,818 or 3.6% (2009), 43,845 or 0.4% (2006)
 * Facebook subscribers: 2,602,640 (2011)
 * Facebook penetration: 24.5% (2011)
 * Public CyberCafés: 350 (2005)

Information and communications technology
The Tunisian government considers information and communications technology (ICT) an important tool to boost the country's economy and to adapt the education system to the opportunities available from using Information Technology (IT) as a tool. E-commerce, e-learning, and e-medicine are all areas of strong interest where the Government is seeking international partnership and investments. During the last 15 years, several important efforts were made to invest in ICT and the Internet. Physical infrastructures were modernised. In July 2004 the World Bank approved a $13 million loan to the Tunisian government to support the government effort in accelerating its ICT reforms. Though, beyond the high priority the government is giving to ICT, development of telecommunications in Tunisia has been slower than expected compared to other developing countries in Middle East and North Africa.

2005 World Summit on the Information Society
The first World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was held in Geneva in 2003. Tunisia hosted the second World Summit in November 2005. The Tunisian government took the initiative to host the summit in 1998. It was organised by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) under the auspices of UNESCO. A declaration of Principles and Plan of Action were approved in order to bridge the digital gap between developing and developed countries within the World Information Society.

title: Telecommunications in Tunisia


text:
Grand Canal

Grand Canal can refer to multiple waterways:

 * Grand Canal (China) in eastern China
 * Grand Canal (Ireland), between the River Shannon and Dublin in Ireland
 * Grand Canal (Venice) in Venice, Italy
 * Grand Canal d'Alsace in eastern France
 * Grand Canal (Phoenix) in Arizona, United States
 * GRAND Canal or Great Recycling and Northern Development Canal, proposed for Great Lakes region of North America
 * The proposed Pan Korea Grand Waterway (한반도 대운하) in South Korea, sometimes referred to as the "Grand Canal"
 * The proposed Nicaragua Grand Canal that would link the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean
 * The Great Man-Made River in Libya

Other

 * The Grand Canal (Streeton) – a 1908 painting by Arthur Streeton
 * One of the playable boards in the Nintendo video game Mario Party 7

title: Grand Canal


text:
Yellow River

The Yellow River is the second-longest river in China, after the Yangtze; with an estimated length of 5464 km it is the sixth-longest river system on Earth. Originating at an elevation above 15,000 ft in the Bayan Har Mountains, it empties into the Bohai Sea. The Yellow River basin was the birthplace of ancient Chinese civilization. Its yellow sediments are carried downstream from the Loess Plateau. The river experiences frequent devastating floods and course changes produced by the continual elevation of the river bed, sometimes above the level of its surrounding farm fields.

Etymology
When the Yellow River was still somewhat clear, it was simply referred to as 'the river' (河, Old Chinese: *gâi). Observations made at the Yumenkou gorge, where the river leaves the modern Loess Plateau, indicated the river changed to muddy sometime between 367 BC and 165 AD, according to chronicles' records. The alternative names 'murky river' (, *drôk-gâi) and '(muddy) yellow river' (, *gwâŋ-gâi) were attested in 145 BC and in 429 AD respectively. The name Yellow River edges out Murky River by the end of Tang dynasty, for unclear reasons.

In the Shaanxi loess plateau, it is referred to as 'river, my lord' (老爺河, ) in the Jin language. In Mongolian, it is called Šar mörön ( 'yellow river') or Khatan gol ( 'queen river'). The river is mentioned in the Kul Tigin stele as the 'green river' (Old Turkic: yašïl ügüz, 𐰖𐱁𐰞𐰽𐰺𐰍). The Tibetan name is "River of the Peacock".

Dynamics

The Yellow River first formed between 56 million and 34 million years ago during the Eocene epoch, while the familiar shape appeared around 7 thousand years ago.

The river has long been critical to the development of northern China, and is regarded by scholars as one cradle of civilization. Flooding of the river has also caused much destruction, including multiple floods that have resulted in the deaths of over one million people. Among the deadliest were the 1332–33 flood during the Yuan dynasty, the 1887 flood during the Qing dynasty which killed anywhere from 900,000 to 2 million people, and a Republic of China era 1931 flood (part of a massive number of floods that year) that killed 1–4 million people.

The cause of the floods is the large amount of fine-grained loess carried by the river from the Loess Plateau, which is continuously deposited along the bottom of its channel. The sedimentation causes natural dams to slowly accumulate. These subaqueous dams are unpredictable and generally undetectable. Eventually, the enormous amount of water needs to find a new way to the sea, forcing it to take the path of least resistance. When this happens, it bursts out across the flat North China Plain, sometimes taking a new channel and inundating most farmland, cities or towns in its path.

The traditional Chinese response of building higher and higher levees along the banks sometimes also contributed to the severity of the floods: When flood water did break through the levees, it could no longer drain back into the river bed as it would after a normal flood, as the river bed was sometimes now higher than the surrounding countryside. These changes could cause the river's mouth to shift as much as 480 km, sometimes reaching the ocean to the north of the Shandong Peninsula and sometimes to the south.

Another historical source of devastating floods is the collapse of upstream ice dams in Inner Mongolia with an accompanying sudden release of vast quantities of impounded water. There have been 11 such major floods in the past century, each causing tremendous loss of life and property. Nowadays, explosives dropped from aircraft are used to break the ice dams before they become dangerous.

Before modern dams appeared in China, the Yellow River used to be extremely prone to flooding. In the 2,540 years from 595 BC to 1946 AD, the Yellow River has been reckoned to have flooded 1,593 times, shifting its course 26 times noticeably and nine times severely. These floods include some of the deadliest natural disasters ever recorded. Before modern disaster management, when floods occurred, some of the population might initially die from drowning and many more would suffer later from the ensuing famine and spread of diseases.

Ancient times
In Chinese mythology, the giant Kua Fu drained the Yellow River and the Wei River to quench his burning thirst as he pursued the Sun. Historical documents from the Spring and Autumn period and Qin dynasty indicate that the Yellow River at that time flowed considerably north of its present course. These accounts show that after the river passed Luoyang, it flowed along the border between Shanxi and Henan Provinces, then continued along the border between Hebei and Shandong before emptying into Bohai Bay near present-day Tianjin. Another outlet followed essentially the present course.

The river left these paths in 602 BC and shifted several hundred kilometers to the east. Sabotage of dikes, canals, and reservoirs and deliberate flooding of rival states became a standard military tactic during the Warring States period. As the Yellow River valley was the major entryway to the Guanzhong area and the state of Qin from the North China Plain, Qin heavily fortified the Hangu Pass; it saw numerous battles and was also an important chokepoint protecting the Han capitals of Chang'an and Luoyang. Major flooding in AD 11 is credited with the downfall of the short-lived Xin dynasty, and another flood in AD 70 returned the river north of Shandong on essentially its present course.

Imperial times
From around the beginning of the 3rd century, the importance of the Hangu Pass was reduced, with the major fortifications and military bases moved upriver to Tongguan. In AD 923, the desperate Later Liang general Duan Ning again broke the dikes, flooding 1000 sqmi in a failed attempt to protect his realm's capital from the Later Tang. A similar proposal from the Song engineer Li Chun concerning flooding the lower reaches of the river to protect the central plains from the Khitai was overruled in 1020: the Chanyuan Treaty between the two states had expressly forbidden the Song from establishing new moats or changing river courses.

Breaches occurred regardless: one at Henglong in 1034 divided the course in three and repeatedly flooded the northern regions of Dezhou and Bozhou. The Song worked for five years futilely attempting to restore the previous course – using over 35,000 employees, 100,000 conscripts, and 220,000 tons of wood and bamboo in a single year – before abandoning the project in 1041. The more sluggish river then occasioned a breach at Shanghu that sent the main outlet north towards Tianjin in 1048

In 1128, Song troops under the Kaifeng governor Du Chong (, Dù Chōng, d.1141) breached the southern dikes of the Yellow River in an effort to stop the advancing Jin army. The resulting major river avulsion allowed the Yellow to capture the Si and other tributaries of the Huai River. For the first time in recorded history, the Yellow River shifted completely south of Shandong Peninsula and flowed into the Yellow Sea. By 1194, the mouth of the Huai had been blocked. The buildup of silt deposits was such that even after the Yellow River later shifted its course, the Huai could no longer flow along its historic course, but instead, its water pools into Hongze Lake and then runs southward toward the Yangtze River.

A flood in 1344 returned the Yellow River south of Shandong. The Yuan dynasty was waning, and the emperor forced enormous teams to build new embankments for the river. The terrible conditions helped to fuel rebellions that led to the founding of the Ming dynasty. The course changed again in 1391 when the river flooded from Kaifeng to Fengyang in Anhui. It was finally stabilized by the eunuch Li Xing during the public works projects following the 1494 flood. The river flooded many times in the 16th century, including in 1526, 1534, 1558, and 1587. Each flood affected the river's lower course.

The 1642 flood was man-made, caused by the attempt of the Ming governor of Kaifeng to use the river to destroy the peasant rebels under Li Zicheng who had been besieging the city for the past six months. He directed his men to break the dikes in an attempt to flood the rebels, but destroyed his own city instead: the flood and the ensuing famine and plague are estimated to have killed 300,000 of the city's previous population of 378,000. The once-prosperous city was nearly abandoned until its rebuilding under the Kangxi Emperor in the Qing dynasty.

The question of how aggressively flooding should be controlled, and whether it should be steered back to its original channels when it migrated, was a topic of controversy in the imperial court. Rival cliques made arguments based on budgetary, technical and strategic criteria. Geographer Charles Greer identifies two competing schools of thought on how to control the Yellow River. One, which he identifies as Confucian, advocated containing the river between higher levees, thus maximizing the amount of river basin land that could be cultivated. The other, which he associates with Taoism, favored lower levees separated by as much as 5-10 kilometers. In one particular long-running debate during the 11th century reigns of the Renzong and Shenzong emperors, when the river repeatedly broke its levees and migrated north and west, officials battled over whether expensive measures should be taken to return the river to its former channels. The Shenzong emperor ultimately decreed that the river be allowed to remain in its new course.

Traditional flood control techniques made use of levees, revetments to absorb the energy of the water, overflow basins, drainage canals and polders. Treatises on traditional flood control techniques were written by officials such as Pan Jixun, who argued that joining branches of the river increased the water's power and this in turn increased its ability to flush sediment. The difficult situation around the confluence of the Yellow River, the Huai, and the Grand Canal, however, still led to a major flood of the regional center Sizhou and Pan's dismissal from court. Subsequently, the river's 1680 flood entirely submerged Sizhou and the nearby Ming Zuling tombs beneath Hongze Lake for centuries until modern irrigation and flood control lowered the water level enough to permit their excavation and the tombs' restoration.

Recent times
Between 1851 and 1855, the Yellow River returned to the north amid the floods that provoked the Nien and Taiping Rebellions. The 1887 flood has been estimated to have killed between 900,000 and 2 million people, and is the second-worst natural disaster in history (excluding famines and epidemics). The Yellow River more or less adopted its present course during the 1897 flood.

The 1931 flood killed an estimated 1,000,000 to 4,000,000, and is the worst natural disaster recorded (excluding famines and epidemics).

On 9 June 1938, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Nationalist troops under Chiang Kai-shek broke the levees holding back the river near the village of Huayuankou in Henan, causing what has been called by Canadian historian, Diana Lary, a "war-induced natural disaster". The goal of the operation was to stop the advancing Japanese troops by following a strategy of "using water as a substitute for soldiers". The 1938 flood of an area covering 54000 km2 took some 500,000 to 900,000 Chinese lives, along with an unknown number of Japanese soldiers. The flood prevented the Japanese Army from taking Zhengzhou, on the southern bank of the Yellow River, but did not stop them from reaching their goal of capturing Wuhan, which was the temporary seat of the Chinese government and straddles the Yangtze River.

In 1954, the People's Republic of China announced its General Plan to Fundamentally Control Yellow River Flood Disasters and Develop Yellow River Waterworks. It sought to address both flooding risks and to convert rainfall-fed fields of the North China Plain to irrigated agriculture. Construction began in earnest in 1957.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, the dry-up trends accelerated, with the Yellow River failing to reach its mouth for an average of approximately 180 days per year in the 1990s. In 1997, the Yellow River did not reach the sea for 226 consecutive days.

Geography
The Yellow River basin has an east–west extent of about 1900 km and a north–south extent of about 1100 km. Its total drainage area is about 795000 km2.

According to the China Exploration and Research Society, the source of the Yellow River is at 34.49194°N, 96.34028°W in the Bayan Har Mountains near the eastern edge of the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The source tributaries drain into Gyaring Lake and Ngoring Lake on the western edge of Golog Prefecture high in the Bayan Har Mountains of Qinghai. In the Zoige Basin along the boundary with Gansu, the Yellow River loops northwest and then northeast before turning south, creating the "Ordos Loop", and then flows generally eastward across the North China Plain to the Gulf of Bohai, draining a basin of 752443 km2 which nourishes 140 million people with drinking water and irrigation.

The Yellow River passes through seven present-day provinces and two autonomous regions, namely (from west to east) Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong. Major cities along the present course of the Yellow River include (from west to east) Lanzhou, Yinchuan, Wuhai, Baotou, Luoyang, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, and Jinan. The current mouth of the Yellow River is located at Kenli County, Shandong.

The river is commonly divided into three stages. These are roughly the northeast of the mountainous Tibetan Plateau, the Ordos Loop and Loess Plateau, and the North China Plain. However, different scholars have different opinions on how the three stages are divided. This article mainly adopts the division used by the Yellow River Conservancy Commission.

The Yellow River derived sediments have been transported out of the Bohai Sea, all way to the North Yellow Sea and South Yellow Sea, and formed a Distal Depocenter around the Shandong Peninsula.

Upper reaches

The upper reaches of the Yellow River constitute a segment starting from its source in the Bayan Har Mountains and ending at Hekou Town (Togtoh County), Inner Mongolia just before it turns sharply to the south. This segment has a total length of 3472 km and total basin area of 386000 km2, 51.4% of the total basin area. Along this length, the elevation of the Yellow River drops 3496 m, with an average grade of 0.10%.

The source section flows mainly through pastures, swamps, and knolls between the Bayan Har Mountains, and the Anemaqen (Amne Machin) Mountains in Qinghai. The river water is clear and flows steadily. Crystal clear lakes are characteristic of this section. The two main lakes along this section are Lake Gyaring (Zhaling) and Lake Ngoring (Eling), with capacities of 4.7 billion and 10.8 billion m3 (166 and 381 billion ft3), respectively. At elevations over 4290 m above sea level they are the two largest plateau freshwater lakes nationwide. A significant amount of land in the Yellow River's source area has been designated as the Sanjiangyuan ("'Three Rivers' Sources") National Nature Reserve, to protect the source region of the Yellow River, the Yangtze, and the Mekong.

Flowing east at the eastern edge of the Amne Machin Mountains, the Yellow River enters Maqu County in Gansu. Here, the river skirts through the high-altitude peat bog known as the Zoigê Wetlands and makes a sharp turn towards the northwest forming the border between Maqu and Zoigê County in Sichuan. Flowing now along the northern edge of Amne Machin, the river reenters Qinghai and gradually curves north towards the Longyang Gorge at Xinghai.

The valley section stretches from Longyang Gorge in Qinghai to Qingtong Gorge in Gansu. Steep cliffs line both sides of the river. The water bed is narrow and the average drop is large, so the flow in this section is extremely turbulent and fast. There are 20 gorges in this section, the most famous of these being the Longyang, Jishi, Liujia, Bapan, and Qingtong gorges. The flow conditions in this section makes it the best location for hydroelectric plants. The Yellow River exits Qinghai for the second and final time in these gorges and enters Gansu for the second time just before Liujia Gorge. Downstream from the Yanguo Gorge, the provincial capital of Lanzhou is built upon the Yellow River's banks. The Yellow River flows northeasterly out of Gansu and into Ningxia before the Qingtong Gorge.

After emerging from the Qingtong Gorge, the river comes into a section of vast alluvial plains, the Yinchuan Plain and Hetao Plain. In this section, the regions along the river are mostly deserts and grasslands, with very few tributaries. The flow is slow. The Hetao Plain has a length of 900 km and width of 30 to 50 km. It is historically the most important irrigation plain along the Yellow River.

Middle reaches
The Ordos Loop formed by an enormous twist of the Yellow River, beginning at Zhongning County in Ningxia and ending with a drastic eastward turn at its confluence with the Wei at Tongguan in Shaanxi. However, the official division for the middle reaches of the river run from Hekou in Togtoh County, Inner Mongolia, to Zhengzhou, Henan. The middle reaches are 1206 km long, with a basin area of 344000 km2, 45.7% of the total, with a total elevation drop of 890 m, an average drop of 0.074%. There are 30 large tributaries along the middle reaches, and the water flow is increased by 43.5% on this stage. The middle reaches contribute 92% of the river's silts.

The middle stream of the Yellow River passes through the Loess Plateau, where substantial erosion takes place. The large amount of mud and sand discharged into the river makes the Yellow River the most sediment-laden river in the world. The highest recorded annual level of silts discharged into the Yellow River is 3.91 billion tons in 1933. The highest silt concentration level was recorded in 1977 at 920 kg/m3 (57.4 lb/ft3). These sediments later deposit in the slower lower reaches of the river, elevating the river bed and creating the famous "river above ground". From Hekou to Yumenkou, the river passes through the longest series of continuous valleys on its main course, collectively called the Jinshan Valley. The abundant hydrodynamic resources stored in this section make it the second most suitable area to build hydroelectric power plants. The famous Hukou Waterfall is in the lower part of this valley on the border of Shanxi and Shaanxi.

Lower reaches
In the lower reaches, from Zhengzhou to its mouth, a distance of 786 km, the river is confined to a levee-lined course as it flows to the northeast across the North China Plain before emptying into the Bohai Sea. The basin area in this stage is only 23000 km2, a mere 3% of the total, because few tributaries add to the flow in this stage; nearly all rivers to the south drain into the Huai River, whereas those to the north drain into the Hai River. The Huai River Basin, for example, is separated from the Yellow River Basin by the south dike of the Yellow River. The total drop in elevation of the lower reaches is 93.6 m, with an average grade of 0.012%.

The silts received from the middle reaches form sediments here, elevating the river bed. Excessive sediment deposits have raised the riverbed several meters above the surrounding ground. That is why this part of the river is called the 'Earth Suspended River'. At Kaifeng, Henan, the Yellow River is 10 m above the ground level.

Tributaries
Tributaries of the Yellow River listed from its source to its mouth include: The lower reaches of the Yellow River have no tributaries.
 * White River
 * Daxia River
 * Tao River
 * Huang Shui
 * Datong River
 * Zhuanglang River
 * Zuli River
 * Qingshui River
 * Dahei River
 * Kuye River
 * Wuding River
 * Fen River
 * Wei River (the Wei River is the largest of these tributaries)
 * Luo River
 * Qin River
 * Dawen River

Characteristics
The Yellow River is notable for the large amount of silt it carries—1.6 billion tons annually at the point where it descends from the Loess Plateau. If it is running to the sea with sufficient volume, 1.4 billion tons are carried to the sea per year. One estimate gives 34 kilograms of silt per cubic meter, as opposed to 10 for the Colorado and 1 for the Nile.

Its average discharge is said to be 2,110 cubic meters per second (32,000 for the Yangtze), with a maximum of 25,000 and minimum of 245. However, since 1972, it often runs dry before it reaches the sea. The low volume is due to increased agricultural irrigation, increased by a factor of five since 1950. Water diverted from the river as of 1999 served 140 million people and irrigated 74,000 km2 of land. The Yellow River delta totals 8,000 km2. However, with the decrease in silt reaching the sea, it has been reported to be shrinking slightly each year since 1996 through erosion.

The highest volume occurs during the rainy season from July to October, when 60% of the annual volume of the river flows. Maximum demand for irrigation is needed between March and June. In order to capture excess water for use when needed and for flood control and electricity generation, several dams have been built, but their expected life is limited due to the high silt load. A proposed South–North Water Transfer Project involves several schemes to divert water from the Yangtze: one in the western headwaters of the rivers where they are closest to one another, another from the upper reaches of the Han River, and a third using the route of the old Grand Canal.

Due to its heavy load of silt the Yellow River is a depositing stream – that is, it deposits part of its carried burden of soil in its bed in stretches where it is flowing slowly. These deposits elevate the riverbed which flows between natural levees in its lower reaches. Should a flood occur, the river may break out of the levees into the surrounding lower flood plain and take a new channel. Historically this has occurred about once every hundred years. In modern times, considerable effort has been made to strengthen levees and control floods.

Hydroelectric power dams
Below is the list of hydroelectric power stations built on the Yellow River, arranged according to the first year of operation (in brackets):

 * Sanmenxia Dam (1960; Sanmenxia, Henan)
 * Sanshenggong Dam (1966)
 * Qingtong Gorge hydroelectric power station (1968; Qingtongxia, Ningxia)
 * Liujiaxia Dam (Liujia Gorge) (1974; Yongjing County, Gansu)
 * Lijiaxia Dam (1997) (Jainca County, Qinghai)
 * Yanguoxia Dam (Yanguo Gorge) hydroelectric power station (1975; Yongjing County, Gansu)
 * Tianqiao Dam (1977)
 * Bapanxia Dam (Bapan Gorge) (1980; Xigu District, Lanzhou, Gansu)
 * Longyangxia Dam (1992; Gonghe County, Qinghai)
 * Da Gorge hydroelectric power station (1998)
 * Li Gorge hydroelectric power station (1999)
 * Wanjiazhai Dam (1999; Pianguan County, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia)
 * Xiaolangdi Dam (2001) (Jiyuan, Henan)
 * Laxiwa Dam (2010) (Guide County, Qinghai)
 * Yangqu Dam (2016) (Xinghai County, Qinghai)
 * Maerdang Dam (2018) (Maqên County, Qinghai)

As reported in 2000, the 7 largest hydro power plants (Longyangxia, Lijiaxia, Liujiaxia, Yanguoxia, Bapanxia, Daxia and Qinglongxia) had the total installed capacity of 5,618 MW.

Crossings
The main bridges and ferries by the province names in the order of downstream to upstream are:

Shandong
 * Dongying Yellow River Bridge
 * Shengli Yellow River Bridge (Dongying)
 * Lijin Yellow River Bridge (Dongying)
 * Binzhou Yellow River Road-Railway Bridge
 * Binzhou Yellow River Highway Bridge
 * Binzhou–Laiwu Expressway Binzhou Yellow River Bridge (Binzhou–Zibo)
 * Huiqing Yellow River Bridge (Binzhou–Zibo)
 * Jiyang Yellow River Bridge (Jinan)
 * G20 Qingdao–Yinchuan Expressway Jinan Yellow River Bridge (Jinan)
 * Jinan Yellow River Bridge
 * Luokou Yellow River Railway Bridge (Jinan)
 * Jinan Jianbang Yellow River Bridge
 * Beijing–Shanghai High-speed Railway Jinan Yellow River Bridge (Jinan–Dezhou)
 * Beijing–Taipei Expressway Jinan Yellow River Bridge (Jinan–Dezhou)
 * Beijing–Shanghai Railway Jinan Yellow River New Bridge (Jinan–Dezhou)
 * Pingyin Yellow River Bridge (Jinan-Liaocheng)

Shandong–Henan
 * Beijing–Kowloon Railway Sunkou Yellow River Bridge (Jining–Puyang)
 * Juancheng Yellow River Highway Bridge (Heze–Puyang)
 * Dongming Yellow River Highway Bridge (Heze–Puyang)

Henan
 * Kaifeng Yellow River Bridge (Kaifeng)
 * Zhengzhou Yellow River Bridge (Zhengzhou)

Shanxi–Henan
 * Sanmen Yellow River Bridge (Sanmenxia)

Shaanxi–Henan
 * Hancheng Yumenkou Yellow River Bridge

Ningxia
 * Yinchuan Yellow River Bridge (Yinchuan)

Inner Mongolia
 * Baotou Yellow River Bridge (Baotou)

Gansu
 * Lanzhou Yellow River Bridge
 * Zhongshan Bridge (Lanzhou)

Qinghai
 * Dari Yellow River Bridge

Fish

The Yellow River basin is rich in fish, being the home of more than 160 native species in 92 genera and 28 families, including 19 species found nowhere else in the world (endemic). However, due to habitat loss, pollution, introduced species and overfishing many of the natives have declined or disappeared entirely; several are recognized as threatened on China's Red List. Dams and their reservoirs have increased the habitat for species of slow-moving and static waters, while it excluded species of flowing waters and prevented the up- and down-stream breeding migration of others. In the 2000s, only 80 native fish in 63 genera and 18 families were recorded in the Yellow River basin. In contrast, introduced fish have risen in both abundance and number of species; only one introduced fish species was recorded in the 1960s when ichthyologist Li Sizhong published his original survey of fish fauna of the region, but by the 2000s there were 26.

As typical of Asian rivers, Cyprinidae is by far the most diverse family in the Yellow River basin. More than 85 cyprinids have been recorded in this basin, including species that still are present and species that no longer are present. Other highly diverse families are the stone loaches (more than 20 species), gobies (c. 15 species), true loaches (c.  10 species) and bagrid catfish (c.  10 species). Although there are species found throughout much of the river, several have a more restricted range. For example, the uppermost, highest parts on the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau has relatively few native species, notably snowtrout and allies (Gymnocypris, Gymnodiptychus, Platypharodon and Schizopygopsis), and Triplophysa loaches. Of the 18 endemics in the Yellow River basin, 12 are (or were) found in the upper part. These in particular have become threatened and the fish fauna in many headwaters are now dominated by introduced salmonids. In contrast, the lowermost part of the river and its delta are home to many brackish water or euryhaline species, like gobies (although there are also true freshwater gobies in the Yellow River), Asian seabasses, flatfish and Takifugu pufferfish.

Fishing remains an important activity, but catches have declined. In 2007, it was noted that 40% fewer fish were caught in the Yellow River compared to earlier catches. Large cyprinids (Asian carp, predatory carp, Wuchang bream and Mongolian redfin) and large catfish (Amur and Lanzhou catfish) are still present, but the largest species, the Chinese paddlefish, kaluga sturgeon and Yangtze sturgeon, have not been reported from the Yellow River basin in about 50 years. Other species that support important fisheries include white Amur bream, ayu, mandarin fish, Protosalanx icefish, northern snakehead, Asian swamp eel and others.

Annual fishing ban has been implemented since 2018, covering the entire Yellow River basin from 1 April to 30 June each year. A total ban of fishing of natural fishes is being implemented in the upper reaches of the Yellow River starting 1 April 2022, covering Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu provinces, until the end of 2025. For the rest of the basin, the annual ban is extended to a period from 1 April to 31 July.

Aquaculture

The Yellow River is generally less suitable for aquaculture than the rivers of central and southern China, such as the Yangtze or Pearl rivers, but aquaculture is also practiced in some areas along the Yellow River. An important aquaculture area is the riverside plain in Xingyang, upstream from Zhengzhou. Since the development of fish ponds started in Xingyang's riverside Wangcun Town in 1986, the pond systems in Wangcun have grown to the total size of 15,000 mu (10 km2), making the town the largest aquaculture center in north China.

Two turtle species are native to the Yellow River basin: the Chinese pond turtle and Chinese softshell turtle. Both species—but especially the softshell—are widely farmed for food. A variety of the Chinese softshell turtle popular in Chinese gourmets is called the Yellow River turtle (黄河鳖). Nowadays most of the Yellow River turtles eaten in China's restaurants comes from turtle farms, which may or may not be near the Yellow River. In 2007, construction started in Wangcun, Henan on a large farm for raising this turtle variety. With the capacity for raising 5 million turtles a year, the facility was expected to become Henan's largest farm of this kind.

The huge, entirely aquatic Chinese giant salamander, a species that has declined drastically due primarily to persecution for food and traditional medicine, is native to the Yellow River and other Chinese rivers. It is farmed in large numbers in several parts of China and genetic studies have revealed that the captive stock mostly is of Yellow River origin. As these often are released back into the wild, the Yellow River type of the Chinese giant salamander has spread to other parts of China, which represents a problem to the other types.

Pollution
On 25 November 2008, Tania Branigan of The Guardian filed a report "China's Mother River: the Yellow River", claiming that severe pollution has made one-third of China's Yellow River unusable even for agricultural or industrial use, due to factory discharges and sewage from fast-expanding cities. After reaching the first major city, Xining, the river is heavily polluted. The Yellow River Conservancy Commission had surveyed more than 8384 mi of the river in 2007 and said 33.8% of the river system registered worse than "level five" according to the criteria used by the UN Environment Program. Level five is unfit for drinking, aquaculture, industrial use, or even agriculture. The report said waste and sewage discharged into the system last year totaled 4.29b tons. Industry and manufacturing made up 70% of the discharge into the river with households accounting for 23% and just over 6% coming from other sources.

In culture
A traditional belief was that the Yellow River flowed from Heaven as a continuation of the Milky Way. In a Chinese legend, Zhang Qian is said to have been commissioned to find the source of the Yellow River. After sailing up-river for many days, he saw a girl spinning and a cow herd. Upon asking the girl where he was, she presented him with her shuttle with instructions to show it to the astrologer Yan Junping (嚴君平). When he returned, the astrologer recognized it as the shuttle of the Weaving Girl (Vega), and, moreover, said that at the time Zhang received the shuttle, he had seen a wandering star interpose itself between the Weaving Girl and the cow herd (Altair).

The provinces of Hebei and Henan derive their names from the Yellow River. Their names mean, respectively, "North of the River" and "South of the River", although the border between them historically has never been stable, and currently the border between Hebei and Henan is not the Yellow River, but the Zhang River instead.

Traditionally, it is believed that the Chinese civilization originated in the Yellow River basin. The Chinese refer to the river as "the Mother River" and "the cradle of the Chinese civilization". During the long history of China, the Yellow River has been considered a blessing as well as a curse and has been nicknamed both "China's Pride" and "China's Sorrow". In the twentieth-century, the river became a symbol of the rising Chinese nation in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism.
 * Mother river, China's Sorrow, and cradle of Chinese civilization.

Despite Yellow River having a central role in the development of Chinese civilization on North China Plain, flooding and constant rerouting of the river have also caused many great disaster to population along the river for long, hence it is also known as a River of disaster, with the disaster brought by the River said as history of disaster in the development of Chinese civilization, and the management of Yellow River have been a great political trouble to various Chinese dynasties throughout the history since ancient time.
 * River of disaster

Sometimes the Yellow River is poetically called the "Muddy Flow". The Chinese idiom "when the Yellow River flows clear" is used to refer to an event that will never happen and is similar to the English expression "when pigs fly".
 * When the Yellow River flows clear

"The Yellow River running clear" was reported as a good omen during the reign of the Yongle Emperor, along with the appearance of such auspicious legendary beasts as qilin (an African giraffe brought to China by a Bengal embassy aboard Zheng He's ships in 1414) and zouyu (not positively identified) and other strange natural phenomena.

title: Yellow River


text:
Yellow Sea

The Yellow Sea, also known as North Sea, is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean located between mainland China and the Korean Peninsula, and can be considered the northwestern part of the East China Sea.

Since November 1, 2018, the Yellow Sea has served as the location of "peace zones" between North and South Korea.

Names
It is one of four seas named after color terms (the others being the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the White Sea), and its name is descriptive of the golden-yellow color of the silt-ridden water discharged from major rivers.

The innermost bay of northwestern Yellow Sea is called the Bohai Sea (previously Gulf of Zhili / Beizhili), into which flow some of the most important rivers of northern China, such as the Yellow River (through Shandong province and its capital Jinan), the Hai River (through Beijing and Tianjin) and the Liao River (through Liaoning province). The northeastern extension of the Yellow Sea is called the Korea Bay, into which flow the Yalu River, the Chongchon River and the Taedong River.

Extent
The International Hydrographic Organization defines the limits of the Yellow Sea ("Hwang Hai") as follows: "The Yellow Sea is separated from the Sea of Japan by the boundary from the southern end of Haenam Peninsula in Jeollanamdo to Jeju Island and divided into the East China Sea by the boundary from the west end of Jeju Island to the Yangtze River estuary."

Physiography

The Yellow Sea, excluding the Bohai, extends by about 960 km from north to south and about 700 km from east to west; it has an area of approximately 380000 km2 and a volume of about 17000 km3. Its depth is only 44 m on average, with a maximum of 152 m. The sea is a flooded section of continental shelf that formed after the last glacial period (some 10,000 years ago) as sea levels rose 120 m to their current levels. The depth gradually increases from north to south. The sea bottom and shores are dominated by sand and silt brought by the rivers through the Bohai Sea (Liao River, Yellow River, Hai He) and the Korea Bay (Yalu River). These deposits, together with sand storms are responsible for the yellowish colour of the water referenced in the sea's name. The sea annually receives so much sand and silt from rivers such as the Yellow River, that it actually turns into a golden-yellow colour.

The seas surrounding Korea, which occupy a corner of Northeast Asia, border the "island nation" from the east, south, and west. Korea has named these the East Sea, South Sea, and West Sea (officially known as the Yellow Sea), respectively.

Major islands of the sea include Anmado, Baengnyeongdo, Daebudo, Deokjeokdo, Gageodo, Ganghwado, Hauido, Heuksando, Hongdo, Jejudo, Jindo, Muuido, Sido, Silmido, Sindo, Wando, Yeongjongdo and Yeonpyeongdo (all in South Korea).

Climate and hydrology
The area has cold, dry winters with strong northernly monsoons blowing from late November to March. Average January temperatures are -10 C in the north and 3 C in the south. Summers are wet and warm with frequent typhoons between June and October. Air temperatures range between 10 and 28 C. The average annual precipitation increases from about 500 mm in the north to 1000 mm in the south. Fog is frequent along the coasts, especially in the upwelling cold-water areas.

The sea has a warm cyclone current, forming part of the Kuroshio Current, which diverges near the western part of Japan and flows northward into the Yellow Sea at a speed of less than 0.8 km/h. Southward currents prevail near the sea coast, especially in the winter monsoon period.

The water temperature is close to freezing in the northern part in winter, so drift ice patches and continuous ice fields form and hinder navigation between November and March. The water temperature and salinity are homogeneous across the depth. The southern waters are warmer at 6 - 8 C. In spring and summer, the upper layer is warmed up by the sun and diluted by the fresh water from rivers, while the deeper water remains cold and saline. This deep water stagnates and slowly moves south. Commercial bottom-dwelling fishes are found around this mass of water, especially at its southern part. Summer temperatures range between 22 and 28 C. The average salinity is relatively low, at 30‰ in the north to 33–34‰ in the south, dropping to 26‰ or lower near the river deltas. In the southwest monsoon season (June to August) the increased rainfall and runoff further reduce the salinity of the upper sea layer. Water transparency increases from about 10 m in the north up to 45 m in the south.

Tides are semidiurnal, i.e. rise twice a day. Their amplitude varies between about 0.9 and 3 m at the coast of China. Tides are higher at the Korean Peninsula, typically ranging between 4 and 8 m and reaching the maximum in spring. The tidal system rotates in a counterclockwise direction. The speed of the tidal current is generally less than 1.6 km/h in the middle of the sea, but may increase to more than 5.6 km/h near the coasts. The fastest tides reaching 20 km/h occur in the Myeongnyang Strait between Jindo Island and the Korean Peninsula.

The tide-related sea level variations result in a land pass 2.9 km long and 10 - 40 m wide opening for approximately an hour between Jindo and Modo islands. The event occurs about twice a year, at the beginning of May and in the middle of June. It had long been celebrated in a local festival called "Jindo Sea Parting Festival", but was largely unknown to the outside world until 1975, when the French ambassador Pierre Randi described the phenomenon in a French newspaper.

Flora and fauna

The sea is rich in seaweed (predominantly kelp, Laminaria japonica), cephalopods, crustaceans, shellfish, clams, and especially in blue-green algae which bloom in summer and contribute to the water color (see image above). For example, the seaweed production in the area was as high as 1.5 million tonnes in 1979 for China alone. The abundance of all these plant and animal species increases toward the south and indicates a high sea productivity, accounting for the diversity of fish species and high fish yield from the sea. Several species of goby new to science have been discovered recently in the Yellow Sea.

The southern part of the Yellow Sea, including the entire west coast of Korea, contains a 10 km belt of intertidal mudflats, which has the total area of 2850 km2 and is maintained by 4 - 10 m. Those flats consist of highly productive sediments with a rich benthic fauna and are of great importance for migratory waders and shorebirds. Surveys show that the area is the single most important site for migratory birds on northward migration in the entire East Asian – Australasian Flyway, with more than 35 species occurring in internationally significant numbers. Two million birds, at minimum, pass through at the time, and about half that number use it on southward migration. About 300,000 migrating birds were transiting annually only through the Saemangeum tidal flat area. This estuary was however dammed by South Korea in 1991–2006 that resulted in drying off the land. Land reclamation also took 65% of the intertidal area (of China, North Korea and South Korea) between the 1950s and 2002, and as of 2005 there were plans to reclaim a further 45%.

Populations of oceanic megafauna, such as marine mammals, sea turtles, and larger fish, have decreased in modern times, not only due to pollution but also due to hunting. Japanese industrial whaling and illegal mass operations by the Soviet Union with support from Japan have been major drivers of population decline. Species that reside in the area today include spotted seals, and cetaceans such as minke whales, killer whales, false killer whales, and finless porpoises, but nonetheless all the remnants of species listed could be in very small numbers. Historically, large whales were very abundant either for summering and wintering in the Yellow and Bohai Seas. For example, a unique population of resident fin whales and gray whales were historically presented, or possibly hosted some North Pacific right whales and Humpback whales (3 whales including a cow calf pair was observed at Changhai County in 2015 ) year-round other than migrating individuals, and many other migratory species such as Baird's beaked whales. Even blue whales, Japanese sea lions, dugongs (in southern regions only), and leatherback turtles used to breed or migrate into Yellow and Bohai seas.

Spotted seals are the only resident species of seal in the Yellow Sea. A sanctuary for these seals is situated at Baengnyeongdo, which is also known for its finless porpoises. Great white sharks have also been known to prey on seals in the area.

Economy
The coasts of the Yellow Sea are very densely populated, at approximately 250 PD/km2. The sea waters had been used for fishing by the Chinese, Korean and Japanese ships for centuries. Especially rich in fish are the bottom layers. About 200 fish species are exploited commercially, especially sea bream, croakers, lizard fishes, prawns, cutlassfish, horse mackerel, squid, eel, filefish, Pacific herring, chub mackerel, flounder and jellyfish. The intensity of fishing has been gradually increasing for China and Korea and decreasing for Japan. For example, the production volumes for China rose from 619,000 tonnes in 1985 to 1,984,400 tonnes in 1996. All species are overfished, however, and while the total catchments are rising, the fish population is continuously declining for most species.

Navigation is another traditional activity in the Yellow Sea. The main Chinese ports are Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao and Qinhuangdao. The major South Korean ports on the Yellow Sea are Incheon, Gunsan and Mokpo, and that for North Korea is Nampho, the outport of Pyongyang. The Bohai Train Ferry provides a shortcut between the Liaodong Peninsula and Shandong. A major naval accident occurred on 24 November 1999 at Yantai, Shandong, China when the 9,000-ton Chinese ferry Dashun caught fire and capsized in rough seas. About 300 people were killed, making it the worst maritime incident in China.

Oil exploration has been successful in the Chinese and North Korean portions of the sea, with the proven and estimated reserves of about 9 and 20 billion tonnes, respectively. However, the study and exploration of the sea is somewhat hindered by insufficient sharing of information between the involved countries. China initiated collaborations with foreign oil companies in 1979, but this initiative declined later.

A major oil spill occurred on 16 July 2010 when a pipeline exploded at the north-east port of Dalian, causing a wide-scale fire and spreading about 1,500 tonnes of oil over the sea area of 430 km2. The port had been closed and fishing suspended until the end of August. Eight hundred fishing boats and 40 specialized vessels were mobilized to relieve the environmental damage.

State of the environment
The Yellow Sea is considered among the most degraded marine areas on earth. Loss of natural coastal habitats due to land reclamation has resulted in the destruction of more than 60% of tidal wetlands around the Yellow Sea coastline in approximately 50 years. Rapid coastal development for agriculture, aquaculture and industrial development are considered the primary drivers of coastal destruction in the region. This degree of loss of area, widespread pollution, algal blooms and declines of invertebrate and vertebrate fauna have resulted in the classification of this ecosystem as endangered.

In addition to land reclamation, the Yellow Sea ecosystem is facing several other serious environmental problems. Pollution is widespread and deterioration of pelagic and benthic habitat quality has occurred, and harmful algal blooms frequently occur. Invasion of introduced species are having a detrimental effect on the Yellow Sea environment. There are 25 intentionally introduced species and 9 unintentionally introduced species in the Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem. Declines of biodiversity, fisheries and ecosystem services in the Yellow Sea are widespread.

The tidal flats of the Yellow Sea are considered endangered.

Location of Korean Peace Zones
On 1 November 2018, officials from South Korea's Ministry of National Defense confirmed that "peace zones" had been established by the North and South Korean militaries in the Yellow Sea area that touches the North and South Korean demarcation line. A buffer zone was also created in the Yellow Sea's Northern Limit Line (NLL).

title: Yellow Sea