text:
Talk:Battle of Waterloo

William of Orange in commanders/leaders box 2
As always when a POV is being pushed, a source is ultra-reliable when it supports the POV, but is "not omniscient" when he contradicts the POV. Shame.

Wellington no doubt wrote favourably of Trip because he was aware that Trip's cavalry charge had saved a big part of the British Heavy cavalry after Uxbridge set off on a suicidal mad-cap adventure. (Siborne pg 447) Uxbridge actually had very good reason to be grateful to Trip.

Of course the POV contends that this charge was a "mathematical" success, but in reality it was an expensive and avoidable stuff-up. As Wellington himself had noted, "the British cavalry never know when to stop charging". When Uxbridge returned from his mad-cap adventure, Wellington received him cooly.

That same Trip encountered Uxbridge later in the battle, when Uxbridge was galloping around like a beetle on acid looking for surviving cavalry formations to lead on more suicidal charges. Trip watched Uxbridge send the Household Cavalry to destruction against a "strong column of French infantry, supported by cavalry." (Siborne pg 462-465). When Uxbridge turned to Trip's unit for the next suicidal charge, Trip blew him off. Uxbridge tried again, "appealing to the Brigade in terms the most exhorting and encouraging, and inciting them by gestures the most animated and significant." Trip could recognize stupidity when he saw it, and declined to lead his men in a suicidal charge. When the French cavalry attacked, they withdrew.

Uxbridge became "exasperated and indignant", and rode off to find more cannon-fodder elsewhere. He happened upon the 3rd Hussars of the KGL, and sent them into a suicidal charge - three KGL squadrons against six French squadrons. The Hussars were predictably decimated, proving Trip right again.

Unlike Hake of the Cumberland Regiment, Trip was not court martialled, even after the dust had settled and the officers had all been debriefed, so it seems that Higher Authority subsequently recognized the abject stupidity of the Uxbridge orders.

As night fell, Wellington's line was faltering before the attack of the Old Guard. It was then the Dutch division under Chassé who broke the first French column, and sent the French grenadiers into retreat. Siborne's sources give little credit to this action, which effectively precipitated the French collapse. Fortunately other authors have given due credit – some of them British. So much for your "hysterical defence" accusation.

Enough already with the POV pushing please. Wdford (talk) 12:12, 11 May 2023 (UTC)
 * POV pushing? Look to the beam in your own eye. Thank you for admitting that Trip disobeyed a direct order when in action. You have condemned his actions, well done! Soldiers, as a fundamental maxim of all military forces, are not allowed to refuse a direct order under any circumstances. They can suggest alternatives, but if their suggestions are rebutted they must obey, or risk being court marshalled. The charge of the British heavy cavalry was not a madcap stunt, it was perfectly timed and repulsed the attack of an entire army corps. Had D'Erlon's men established themselves on the ridge, the whole of Wellington's position would have been rolled up, and he would have been forced to retire westwards to his 17,000-strong flank guard at Hal. The Prussians would have arrived to find the French in possession of the battlefield and Napoleon would have won another famous victory. Therefore, the charge was both successful and necessary, the only fault in its execution was that Uxbridge did not personally organise adequate supports to move forward in its wake. The same could be said of Murat's grand charge at Eylau, which lost up to 1,500 of his cavalrymen. He also did not organise supports and was lucky that the commander of the Imperial Guard cavalry moved his men forward in order to bring off Murat's exhausted regiments on their blown horses. Murat's exploit gains deserved praise for saving a battle from being a defeat, at the cost of heavy casualties, but Uxbridge is just vilified for achieving the same thing. I suspect double standards. Urselius (talk) 13:22, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

 * Trip was not British. He was also not just a soldier – he was a senior general, commanding a significant percentage of his country's military capacity. Trip refused to accept stupid orders from a foreign general who had demonstrated his serious lack of competence. He probably had orders to that effect from his government. Trip was never court martialed for this supposed offence, so seemingly he was justified after all. You can rant all you want, but facts are facts.

 * The charge of the British heavy cavalry was poorly conceived and poorly lead. A short and controlled charge would have successfully achieved the objectives, and would have also retained a serious cavalry capacity to be used later on in the day when things were getting really serious. The main fault in its execution was that the commander (Uxbridge) lost control completely, the cavalry continued to gallop until their horses were blown, and then they were at the mercy of the French counter-attack and had to be rescued, suffering heavy losses in the process, as well as causing additional losses to the supporting cavalry who had to rescue them. Wellington was well aware of the propensity for British cavalry to lose their heads in a charge – how did Uxbridge not know all this as well? How did you miss all that?

 * Uxbridge demonstrated that he had not earned the respect of his senior officers, who apparently ignored his orders to halt the charge. Were they all court martialed for disobeying direct orders from their senior officer? No? Double standards indeed! Wdford (talk) 14:20, 11 May 2023 (UTC)
 * Trip and the whole of the Dutch-Belgian cavalry division was formally placed under the command of Uxbridge, before the battle. Uxbridge was Trip's commander, as indeed he was of Collaert, the Dutch cavalry division commander. The British heavy cavalry's 1st charge was perfectly timed and very successful. Because no supports were immediately available, like all disordered cavalry mounted on blown horses, they were vulnerable to a counterattack by fresh enemy cavalry. They were cut up, not because they kept attacking, but because there were no formed cavalry in immediate support. This is what Uxbridge admitted later, he should have been in the rear organising and bringing forward his reserves. The instinct of all cavalrymen and officers is to keep their sabres in the back of a fleeing enemy. The controlled charge was demonstrated by the Lifeguards during the rearguard action at Genappe the day before Waterloo, and by other British regiments during the French cavalry charges during the battle itself. British cavalry were capable of making controlled charges, but controlled charges are generally made by single squadrons or regiments, not at brigade level. When large bodies of cavalry charge, without being given specific orders of when and where to rein-in beforehand, tend to continue until the troopers have reason to look for further orders. This tendency was not limited to the British cavalry, the French were guilty as well. At Liebertwolkwitz in 1813, Murat's cavalry charged far beyond what was prudent and, caught without a formed reserve, were badly mauled by a counterattack. Urselius (talk) 17:04, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

Very interesting that you freely throw the word "cowardice" at a general and a brigade who just hours earlier – according to Siborne pg 447 - had attacked a column of Cuirassiers and "a body of Lancers" and driven them all back a distance onto their own cannons. And that they did all this at great cost to themselves, purely in order to rescue a bunch of British cavalry who had lost the plot and abandoned all discipline and common sense, as well as disobeyed the orders of their commander.

Siborne also says (page 447) that the problem arose because "some of the British regiments, giving too much rein to their ardour, carried their pursuit rather too far." This directly contradicts your British apologetic, does it not?

If Wellington knew that British cavalry could not be trusted to charge sensibly, then why did Uxbridge not know this also? Was it because he was himself an insensible cavalryman? Why did he not arrange proper support first, before leading the charge in person? Why did he – and his unit commanders – not anticipate that they would blow their horses by reckless pursuit? Why could cavalry officers not control their "instinct" to gallop around blindly? If brigade-level charges were prone to anarchy, why did the British not plan and train better? If they needed to be "given specific orders of when and where to rein-in beforehand", then why did Uxbridge not give them such orders beforehand? And why did they disobey Uxbridge when he called a halt to the charge? And why were they not court-martialled for this serious offence? This all makes Uxbridge look seriously incompetent, does it not?

Trip and his men were not British, they were Allies not servants, and they were not required to serve blindly as cannon fodder at the whim of a British nutcase, whose incompetence was repeatedly displayed. Trip was never court-martialled, so clearly he was in the right. Wellington specifically reported that Trip "likewise conducted himself much to my satisfaction". You need to get over your attitude that the Brits are automatically the Boss of Everyone.

The reality is that the British Army was heavily reliant on the valuable service of its Dutch-Belgian and German allies, and that the British Army was rescued from defeat by the Prussian Army – whom they had callously abandoned at Ligny. Jingoistic British armchair experts will continue to defend the performance of their army, as always, but the real facts are obvious to all. Wdford (talk) 21:16, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

 * Interesting that you mention the fact that Wellington did not keep his promise to support Bluecher at Ligny. De Bas has a lot to say about that in his and Wommersoms's volume about Quatre Bras. In pp.475-476 they remind us that in the famous interview at the windmill of Bussy between the two (with gen. Geneisenau) Wellington (thinking that his British troops were far further along than they were in reality, based on faulty information from his own chief of staff De Lancey), rashly promised his support, which later did not materialize, simply because everybody was still busy fighting the Battle of Quatre Bras. Cf. . So maybe it was more incompetence (on the part of De Lancey), than bad faith on the part of Wellington, but that didn't help the Prussians at Ligny, did it? Ereunetes (talk) 00:23, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * The whole miasma of 'Wellington tricked Bluecher into fighting at Ligny', was revived in an exaggerated form by Hofschroer, who we now know to have been mentally unstable. Hofschroer manipulated both primary and secondary sources to support his thesis. This thesis was very thoroughly refuted, and effectively destroyed, by John Hussey (see: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013876 ). It is a total canard. Urselius (talk) 09:10, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * On the subject of Wellington's promised support to Blucher at Ligny, herewith a direct quote from Siborne, page 135: "Upon a calculation being made, however, of the time which would elapse ere the Duke would be able to collect the requisite force for undertaking this operation, and of the possibility of Blucher being defeated before it could be carried into effect, it was considered preferable that Wellington should, if practicable, move to the support of the Prussian Right by the Namur road. But a direct support of this kind was necessarily contingent on circumstances, and subject to the Duke's discretion. The latter having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive, rode back to Quatre Bras." Seems clear enough. Or was Siborne also "mentally ill"? Wdford (talk) 13:19, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * What you quoted does not uphold Hofschroer's thesis that Wellington knowingly mislead Bluecher. Urselius (talk) 13:32, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * What is all this dumping on Hofschroer while he so ardently defended your hero Siborne against all comers in . Was Hofschroer also "mentally unstable" when he wrote this? Or was this one of his lucid moments, maybe? Personally, I consider this apologia he wrote for Siborne as a "total canard". But that is my POV, of course :-) Ereunetes (talk) 22:42, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

A letter from Cpt. Charles Radclyffe, 1st Royal Dragoons (Union Brigade), dated 4 July 1815. Radclyffe had been wounded early in the Waterloo battle and was evacuated from the field. He says, "Amongst other trophies, 3 wagons loaded with French cuirasses picked up on the field were brought here; they are to be given to the Belgique Carabineers, whom the prince [presumaby 'of Orange'] found occasion to praise; two great bands of them, besides stragglers, passed me [during his evacuation from the field of battle] at full gallop, sword in hand on the road to Brussels, the last at least 6 miles from Waterloo; no doubt the p[rince] is right, but it struck me, they were 'running away'." Another less than complimentary eyewitness account. Urselius (talk) 13:32, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

 * On the subject of the report from Captain Radclyffe:
 * He was so badly wounded that he was evacuated. He was probably not in great shape to be making accurate observations.
 * He wrote this more than two weeks later, after enduring two weeks of 1815 medical science.
 * He claims to have noticed three wagons of French cuirasses taken as trophies. These would take time to remove from bodies, so it seems unlikely that there would have been wagon-loads of these trophies moving back to Brussels so early in the battle - when the battle was in the balance and men and transport were at a premium.
 * It seems unlikely that they would have evacuated the wounded many miles back to Brussels so early in the day, when the battle was in the balance and men and transport were at a premium – did this really happen, or did they move the wounded behind the lines for first aid, and then miles back to Brussels days later?
 * If the encounter happened 6 miles from the battlefield, they were about two thirds of the distance to Brussels. Why would fleeing cavalry still be galloping "sword in hand" over such a distance?
 * A fit horse can gallop for about 3 miles max. Uxbridge and his cavalry proved that limit, the hard way. A horse that has been ridden hard for days, and has been ridden in battle that very day (including rescuing the British cavalry), and which is carrying a heavy soldier, will not be able to run "at full gallop" for six miles. Far from it.
 * It is more probable that poor Radclyffe saw the "Belgique Carabineers" charging into battle, sword in hand and at full gallop. The 1st Royal Dragoons (Union Brigade) were among the main victims of the Uxbridge madcap Grand Charge, and were rescued by the "Belgique Carabineers", so this is an easy inference to make.
 * Most likely, poor Radclyffe weeks later on his feverish sick-bed juxtaposed the charging "Belgique Carabineers" coming to rescue him, with wagon-loads of trophies heading north some days later – perhaps when he was being evacuated all the way back to Brussels for better treatment.
 * Whichever way, poor wounded Radclyffe cannot be considered a reliable source. Why did you even bring this up? Wdford (talk) 16:02, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * Radclyffe was an eye-witness, and you are not. I preferentially believe eyewitnesses, or at least those eyewitnesses who are not under pressure to whitewash their shameful conduct. The Cumberland Hussars fled in a body to Brussels, there is no inherent reason why other cavalry would find it impossible to do the same. Urselius (talk) 19:59, 2 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Radclyffe was a feverish wounded man, and cannot be considered a reliable eye-witness - especially since he alleges a very notable incident, which makes no sense, and which NOBODY ELSE SAW OR COMMENTED ON. Your obsessive insistence in this matter, as well as your choice of words ("whitewash their shameful conduct"), cast grave doubts on your neutrality. Wdford (talk) 20:54, 2 October 2023 (UTC)
 * So wounded eyewitnesses are unreliable, while insane and mendacious historians are entirely reliable. I think your logic walks on crutches. Urselius (talk) 11:34, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Yet another blatant strawman diversion, from an increasingly hysterical editor. Your obsession with Hofschroer is ridiculous, since nobody is using Hofschroer as any kind of benchmark. The fact remains, as you well know, that literally NOBODY ELSE commented on any DB cavalry running away from the battle all the way to Brussels, or anything remotely like what Radclyffe subsequently claimed to have remembered seeing. Clearly, Radclyffe was not a reliable witness. Live with it. Wdford (talk) 13:46, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

So wounded eyewitnesses are unreliable
 * And once again you take refuge behind Hofschroer. Siborne (page 135) makes it crystal clear that Wellington "expressed his confident expectation" of providing the support to Blucher at Ligny. Siborne bases his work on British sources, as we know. Blucher would have fought there anyway, but would have arranged his forces differently if he had not been expecting an extra Corps to arrive to reinforce his flank.
 * Siborne again (page 205) "it must also be acknowledged that although the inference was incorrectly drawn, it accorded in substance with the real fact, that Blucher did rely upon the arrival of a portion of Wellington's forces by the Namur road from Quatre Bras." Seriously, this could not be clearer.
 * Carefully worded strawman phrases like "tricked into fighting" and "knowingly mislead" obscure the reality – Wellington did create the expectation that he would participate at Ligny, and Blucher planned his battle accordingly, then had to adjust on the fly when Wellington let him down. By contrast, when Blucher created the expectation that he would assist at Waterloo with two Corps, he arrived with three, having fought his way past many obstacles to get there.
 * John Hussey is not a historian, but more of an enthusiastic (and dedicated) amateur. His treatment of Gneisenau however is biased and patronising, and his apologetic treatment of the British actions carefully avoids the real issues. Hussey may have been aiming purely at Hofschroer, but he certainly does nothing to remove the clear interpretation that Blucher acted as he did at Ligny with the firm anticipation of receiving reinforcements from his Anglo-Allies. You can see the full Hussey work here . Wdford (talk) 15:19, 12 May 2023 (UTC)
 * Well, Hussey has a BA in history, which is what Hofschroer has, he also has an OBE. Most importantly, Hussey, unlike Hofscroer, has not been found guilty of falsifying and deliberately misinterpreting primary sources. Hussey, unlike Hofschroer, is not forcibly detained in a facility for the mentally ill. So your point is ...? Urselius (talk) 11:27, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Yet another blatant strawman diversion, from an increasingly hysterical editor. Your obsession with Hofschroer is ridiculous, since nobody is using Hofschroer as any kind of benchmark. The fact remains, as I explained in detail above, that Hussey is tiptoeing around with semantics to protect Wellington, and slandering Gneisenau in the process, while Siborne clearly and unambiguously states that Wellington promised to participate in strength at Ligny. Siborne does not resort to semantics, he states his details clearly. Hussey probably deserved his OBE in full, but it had nothing to do with his knowledge of the Battle of Ligny, now did it? Wdford (talk) 13:52, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * You have not come across anyone actually hysterical, quite obviously. You were egregiously attacking Husseys credentials, I defended them. Do you know that Hofschroer and Hussey engaged in a long and tortuous duel over whether or not Wellington DELIBERATELY mislead Bluecher? Hofschroer became increasingly hysterical (yes, real hysteria), making baseless accusations against anyone who took a contrary stance to his, in the defence of his position, which was built on lies and distortions. Hofschroer actually contacted the employer of one of his opponents to accuse him of baseless malfeasance. Everyone knows why Wellington could not link up with Bluecher, because Ney's wing of the French army was in the way, not to mention D'Erlon's corps, shuttling between Ligny and Quatre Bras.
 * I was not attacking Hussey's credentials, I was pointing out that he is not a recognized expert on the Battle of Ligny. You saw fit to throw in mention of an OBE - very British and all - but the OBE has no relevance to this article, so I again question your neutrality. Once again you demonstrate your obsession with Hofschroer. Any "long and tortuous duel" between Hofschroer and Hussey, whether real or imagined, has no relevance to this article either. What is very relevant, is that Wellington promised Blucher that he would fight alongside Blucher at Ligny. Blucher arranged his forces at Ligny in the expectation of an extra Corps arriving to cover the flank, and when that promised extra Corps failed to arrive, his formation was weaker than planned - which cost him at the end of a long bloody day. There is a viewpoint that Wellington could have made much more of an effort to get troops to Ligny, but whatever that may have been, the FACT remains that Wellington promised to participate but failed to do so. You tried again to sweep this FACT under the carpet with your "whole miasma" comment, but the FACT is sourced from Siborne. Hussey didn't directly contradict Siborne, he merely attempted to side-track the issue by creating a strawman of his own - that Wellington deliberately tricked Blucher into fighting, and similar nonsense. Wdford (talk) 20:46, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * You show a startlingly poor grasp of military strategy/tactics. No, even slightly competent, commander would trail any part of his command across the front of an actively engaged enemy. A march by any substantial part of Wellington's army across the front of Ney and D'Erlon's forces would probably have resulted in a disastrous attack on their flank while strung out in marching order. Wellington would have rightly suffered Admiral Byng's fate - a firing squad. Wellington had overestimated how quickly he could concentrate his forces, they were arriving piecemeal throughout the Battle at Quatre Bras. This is not a particular fault of Wellington, as Bluecher was missing his largest corps (Bulow's 30,000 men) at Ligny. The speed and direction of Napoleon's advance wrong-footed both Wellington and Bluecher, arguably more so in Wellington's case. Urselius (talk) 07:42, 5 October 2023 (UTC)
 * And yet again, a strawman diversion. The point is NOT finding excuses for why Wellington could not safely march his troops to Ligny to keep his promise. The point is that Wellington promised Blucher that he would fight alongside Blucher at Ligny, that Blucher accordingly arranged his forces at Ligny in the expectation of an extra Corps arriving to cover the flank, and when that promised extra Corps failed to arrive, the Prussians were dangerously exposed and suffered for trusting Wellington. This is from Siborne, a reliable source using eyewitness accounts. Bulow's non-arrival is irrelevant - Blucher already knew Bulow would not make it to Ligny in time, and his final plan took this into account. Unfortunately the final plan also took into account the promise from Wellington of providing support, which promise was not kept. Napoleon did not wrong-foot Blucher - Blucher saw him coming, and planned to fight him at Ligny. However the manner of the battle, and in particular Blucher's arrangement of his forces, was undermined by Wellington "having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive," which turned out to be massive over-confidence from a commander who had been dancing at a ball while Napoleon and Blucher were doing their jobs. Stop already with the white-wash. Wdford (talk) 09:38, 5 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I promise to pick my wife up from work at a certain time, with every intention of doing so, but there is an accident on the road and it is blocked for a long time. I am unable to get there. How is it my fault? That Wellington had no certain knowledge of how fast the French were advancing and where Ney's forces were until very late, is well known; his intelligence system and the over-extended distribution of his units left him in a bad position. Only Ney's lack of drive and the piecemeal arrival of his own troops at Quatre Bras saved the situation. Wellington had even ordered the only troops originally at Quatre Bras to Nivelles, so poor was his knowledge of where the French were. In these circumstance, Wellington's inability to move any troops to Ligny is perfectly understandable to the meanest intellect. Hofschroer, based his thesis on erroneous assertions by Zieten in his memoires, written decades after Waterloo, that Wellington had been much earlier informed of the French attack on Prussian outposts than was the case. Working from this false assumption he accused Wellington of deliberately misleading Bluecher as to his ability to link up. "The head of the Prussian military archives prior to World War I, Professor Julius von Pflugk-Harttung, reached this conclusion [that Zieten's memoires were incorrect on the timing of messages sent to Wellington] after studying all the available evidence, including that provided to Siborne in 1848. “Die Preußische Berichterstattung an Wellington vor der Schlacht bei Ligny,” Historisches Jahrbuch 24 (1903), 54-55; idem., Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance—Wellington (Berlin: Richard Schröder, 1903), 49-50. Two recent studies of this issue agree and have demonstrated that postwar statements made by Zieten about his message to Wellington are not credible because their alleged times of dispatch took place before the start of hostilities at 4:30 a.m. (In addition to the above-mentioned 1819 letter, Zieten claimed a dispatch time of 2:15 a.m. in his error-ridden 1839 autobiography that Peter Hofschröer mistakenly identified as an 1815 journal in 1815, 1:170, 193.) John Hussey, “At What Time on 15 June 1815 Did Wellington Learn of Napoleon’s Attack on the Prussians,” War in History 6 (1999), 88-116; Gregory W. Pedlow, “Back to the Sources: General Zieten’s Message to the Duke of Wellington on 15 June 1815,” First Empire no. 82 (2005), 30-36." Urselius (talk) 10:50, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

You really must get over your unhealthy obsession with Hofschröer. The pseudo-debate about when did Wellington receive initial warning is also irrelevant - yet another strawman. Wellington was well aware of developments from internal reports on 15 June, and was sending out incorrect orders on 15 June already. At Quatre Bras, the heavy skirmishing was already underway at dawn on 16 June. Wellington only rode to Ligny late that morning, so he only made his rash promise of support around noon. At this time, he was still willing to have "expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive." It is a bit weak now to blame this on poor intelligence, when he already knew that the battle at Quatre Bras was well underway. Stop already with the white-wash. Wdford (talk) 12:17, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

 * As for the meeting before Ligny. Both commanders promised each other support, IF POSSIBLE, both sides heard what they wanted to hear. Wellington, a master of the use of terrain, advised Bluecher to use the dead ground behind a slight ridge to protect some of his troops from French artillery, but was ignored. This might have reduced Prussian casualties. Some of the Prussians present took away the impression that Wellington was confident of supporting them at Ligny, the British had the impression that it was understood that their ability to fulfill this ambition was contingent on circumstances. It's a bit like Uxbridge and Trip, you believe whichever you want to believe. However, given the inherent uncertainties of war, the British interpretation of what passed at the meeting is inherently more believable. Urselius (talk) 13:31, 6 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Siborne, writing from British sources, says that Wellington made a firm commitment. Siborne uses the phrasing of Wellington "having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive," which sounds very unambiguous. Blucher arranged his forces in a pattern which only made sense if there was going to be an extra Corps taking up position on the flank closest to Wellington's army, so clearly Blucher was certain of what Wellington had promised, and Blucher was expecting Wellington to keep that promise. Blucher knew that Wellington already had troops at Quatre Bras, and that Wellington himself had been able to ride the distance to Ligny unmolested that very morning, so no doubt Blucher had good grounds for trusting Wellington's confidence. Therefore, given the clear evidence of what subsequently took place, the Prussian interpretation of what passed at the meeting is inherently more believable. As Siborne rightly records. Wdford (talk) 18:33, 6 October 2023 (UTC)
 * The impossible is the impossible. Siborne, p 105, "Wellington, though he had been COMPELLED to relinquish all hope of being enabled to afford that aid to Blucher which, in the morning, he had proffered to him, yet, by maintaining his ground at Quatre Bras sufficiently long to admit of the arrival of reinforcements which enabled him to obtain a brilliant victory, he completely succeeded in frustrating the grand object of Ney's movements, which had been to defeat the Anglo-allied troops thus advancing, in detail, and also operate upon Blucher's right flank." By holding on to the crossroads at Quatre Bras, Wellington was still affording Bluecher great assistance in preventing Ney from falling on the Prussian right flank. This would have been utterly disastrous for the Prussian army. Urselius (talk) 19:30, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

 * It is good that you have finally abandoned the futile and transparent pretence that Wellington never promised he would join the fight at Ligny. That is good progress indeed.
 * However I see that you are now claiming that this broken promise was actually a good thing, because Wellington “did at least stop Ney from attacking the Prussian flank”. This is still seriously POV, firstly because Blucher arranged his forces on the assumption that Wellington could be trusted to keep his promise, and Blucher was thus left in difficult circumstances at Ligny when Wellington failed to deliver on that promise.
 * Second, Napoleon's main goal was to keep the Prussian and Anglo-allied armies separate, and to fight them separately. Ney’s job therefore was to hold up the Anglo-allies at Quatre Bras so that the rest of the French forces could focus on the Prussians alone. This clearly explains why Ney acted as he did. Siborne stoutly claims Quatre Bras as a “brilliant victory” for Wellington, but actually it was not important if Wellington “held the field”, as long as Wellington did not move forces to Ligny in time to make a difference. This was made clear the next day when Wellington abandoned Quatre Bras without any further ado.
 * Having successfully blocked Wellington at Quatre Bras, Ney’s next job was to march on Brussels. Attacking the Prussians at Ligny was never Ney’s responsibility – he was ordered to stop the Anglo-allied forces from participating at Ligny, and he accomplished this admirably, with minimal losses.
 * Had Wellington originally informed Blucher that the Anglo-allied army would not be participating, Blucher would have arranged the battle of Ligny differently from the outset. Considering that the French only succeeded in pushing back one section of the Prussian line, and only by a few hundred meters, in good order, and only right at dusk when an overwhelming Prussian counterattack from both flanks was no longer possible, that small adjustment to the original deployment would have made a huge difference to the final outcome. Gneisenau was thus fully justified in holding Wellington responsible for creating dangerous false expectations which influenced core decision-making.
 * A real example of “protecting the flank from a distance” would be the Prussian fight at Wavre to keep Grouchy away from Waterloo. Although in that case, Blucher did IN ADDITION also manage to keep his promise and sent three Corps to fight at Waterloo, where they propped up Wellington’s crumbling left flank, hammered Napoleon in the French right flank until they wore him out and broke through, broke the French final assault by shattering Durette’s cavalry charge on Wellington’s left flank and breaking d'Erlon's I Corps, thereby precipitating the collapse of the Old Guard attack in the face of the Dutch counter-attack in the centre.
 * Wdford (talk) 11:54, 7 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I am wasting no more time on you. You have nothing useful to say, your analyses are biased and have no relationship to either history or the realities of warfare. Urselius (talk) 12:07, 7 October 2023 (UTC)
 * All of my edits were taken directly from reliable sources. That is how encyclopedias are meant to work. Wdford (talk) 12:49, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

Nassau troops in Dutch service
I have seen multiple sources that state that the Nassau troops fought under Dutch command or in Dutch service. Shouldn't they be counted as part of the Dutch force? DavidDijkgraaf (talk) 08:46, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

 * The following may be a usefrul source : .(I accessed this article via the Wikipedia Library). It gives a short history of the 1st battalion of the 2nd Light Regiment Nassau, that fought in French service during the Peninsular War, then (after the Battle of Leipzig} in British service, and became part of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Netherlands division at Quatre Bras and Waterloo.(p. 229) If we compare the info boxes of Battle of Quatre Bras and this article we find a discrepancy. In the Quatre Bras article Saxe-Weimar is mentioned as one of the commanders on the Allied side, with a Dutch allegiance flag next to his name, and the Nassauers are not mentioned separately in the troop-strength line. In this article the Nassauers are suddenly separated out of the Dutch strength. There seems to be some inconsistency there. (I mention between parentheses that in the article Mittelacher primarily complains about the shabby way the Nassauers are treated in most British historiography about the Battle of Waterloo; he thinks that is due to the wish to puff up the role of British troops, by disparaging the Nassau contribution). Ereunetes (talk) 17:54, 3 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I have researched the matter a bit further. There were two Nassau regiments at Waterloo (see also Order of battle of the Waterloo campaign). I have already mentioned the 2nd regiment of Saxe-Weimar, that was part of the 2nd Netherlands division. But there was also the First Regiment under August von Kruse, that was part of the Allied Reserve, directly commanded by Wellington. The complement of this First Regiment was about 3,000 men (the number mentioned in the info box for the total Nassau troops). But all Nassau troops (also those of Kruse) were in Dutch service. (In this context it becomes explainable why the Prince of Orange led this first regiment into the charge in which he was wounded). I think it needs explanation why one of the two Nassau regiments is counted as a separate "Nassau contingent", while the other is apparently counted as part of the Dutch contingent. Finally, I noticed that in the article Battle of Bayonne the Nassau troops (that Wellington fondly remembered in several quotes from the Mittelacher article above) are not mentioned separately (or at all), whereas other contingents are mentioned separately. I think this is because they were counted among the British contingent, and this seems eminently justifiable in the circumstances. But why follow a different policy here, as it pertains to the Dutch contingent? Ereunetes (talk) 20:25, 3 October 2023 (UTC)
 * So would you be in favour of a description like this: Netherlands: 20,000 (17,000 Dutch-Belgian and 3,000 Nassauer)? DavidDijkgraaf (talk) 22:13, 3 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Actually, I think the "17,000" Dutch-Belgian seem to comprise the 2700 (see Order of Battle ) of the 2nd Nassau Regiment, so if we want to give the Nassau troops their full due it should be "Netherlands 20,000 (14,300 Dutch Belgian and 5700 Nassauer)". But don't take my word for it. If we can trust the numbers in Order of battle of the Waterloo campaign we should be able to figure the correct numbers. Note that the Dutch contingent apparently does not comprise the 1st Netherlands division (6400 men) in II Corps, as this was "not present at the battle", like 10,000 of other contingents (see again the Order of Battle article). Ereunetes (talk) 23:17, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

The basic question is were the all or part of Nassauer's an integral part of the Dutch-Belgian army, or were they 'on loan', as it were? If, like the British army's KGL regiments, the Nassau regiments had been raised by the United Netherlands and fully integrated into the Dutch-Belgian army, then they should be included, but not otherwise. The Hanoverians were subjects of the King of Great Britain as he was also the King of Hanover, but are not included in the numbers of the British army, if anything similar pertained to the Nassauers relative to the King of the United Netherlands, then their treatment needs to be identical. Urselius (talk) 11:42, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

 * @Urselius That is not the integral question. Auxiliaries are normally included within the army in which they served. Like we do at the page of the War of the Spanish Succession for example. A personal union is not neccecerily the same. Countries can have the same king or leader, but seperate armed forces. DavidDijkgraaf (talk) 11:51, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * There were two distinct bodies of Nassau troops at Waterloo, the Nassau contingent under Kruse (furnished to the Anglo-allied army under treaty) and the Nassauers of the 2nd brigade, 2nd Netherland Division, these should not be conflated.

 * Automatically translated from the German original, so technical terms may not be ideally translated.

 * "From mid-December 1813, a new (1st) regiment with two battalions began to be formed from the teams still available. The 2nd Regiment, which returned from Great Britain, was also replenished. ... Nassau left [lent??] this infantry regiment [the 2nd] with 3 battalions and a target strength of 3,032 men to the newly founded Kingdom of the Netherlands for a period of 6 years. However, initially only 24 officers and 610 men were available to form a battalion in Maastricht. It was not until April 1815 that the regiment had the agreed strength of 85 officers and 2,947 men.

 * "Both regiments were supposed to be combined into one brigade, but this never happened because the 2nd Regiment was already deployed within the Allied Army (see appendices) and so it was not until June 22nd that they were merged. During the campaign, the 1st Regiment formed an independent “Ducal Nassau Brigade” under the command of Major General August von Kruse (Born in 1779, in Nassau service since 1803. Major General on August 22, 1814, retired in 1837, died in 1848) .... She [it] was initially assigned to the Hanoverian reserve corps under Lieutenant General von Decken. It was not until June 16th that the order was given to unite with the 1st Army Corps under the Prince of Orange south of Brussels."

 * It is plain from the above that all the Nassau units at Waterloo were raised by Nassau, not the Netherlands. One brigade had been, in effect, lent to the Netherlands for a term of 6 years. Therefore, the Kruse Nassauers were definitely independent of the Netherlands army, and the others were much less an integrated part of the Netherlands army than the KGL units were of the British army. Also the assertion that both Nassau regiments were supposed to be brigaded together makes it more sensible to treat all the Nassauers as being essentially the contribution of the Duchy of Nassau, than to have one regiment described as being an integral part of the Dutch contribution to the allied army. Make of this what you will. Urselius (talk) 17:33, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * It seems to have gone rather quiet on this proposal, any response? Urselius (talk) 13:32, 6 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Are you in a hurry?
 * Anyway, I don't see why they have to be raised by the Netherlands or be an integral part of the Netherlands army to be considered part of the forces of the Netherlands. They were loaned to the Netherlands, so they were part of the forces the Netherlands provided to the alliance. And it isn't just me who argues this. Historians like Baker-Smith clearly consider all the Nassau troops as part of the Netherlands force. DavidDijkgraaf (talk) 11:05, 10 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I seem to remember a proposal that all the Nassau troops present be included as being part of the Netherlands contribution, and that definitely cannot stand. We also know that it was intended that both Nassau regiments should to be brigaded together, and in fact were a few days after the battle. I would argue that the available evidence points to both of the Nassau regiments being raised and equipped from and by the Duchy of Nassau, and that the intention was that they be brigaded together. That one brigade was integrated into a Netherlands division seems to have been a short term expedient within the context of the campaign, whatever the longer term intentions were. Treating the 2nd Regiment as being part of the Netherlands contribution to the allied army in the same way as the KGL was part of the British army (raised, instituted, paid, clothed and equipped by the British government) seems misleading. Urselius (talk) 16:22, 10 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Maybe this is helpful. In, a source that is considered authoritative in the Netherlands, Belgium and France, the history of the two ducal regiments is given. There is no doubt that the second Nassau regiment was part of the Dutch contingent at the time of the Battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo. That the two Nassau regiments were reformed into a division under the command of von Kruse on 24 June 1815 (so after the battle) does not alter this fact. Also supposed intentions to form them into a Nassovian brigade are irrelevant, as such intentions had not been put into effect at the time of the battle. I don't think rewriting history along the lines of what might have happened, but did not happen, is the mission of Wikipedia. Ereunetes (talk) 19:14, 10 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I don't see why it cannot stand. Various historians think that it can.
 * And the fact that the Netherlands army wasn't organized the same way as the British army doesn't mean that those troops weren't part of the Netherlands force. That is quite and Anglo-centric way of thinking.
 * But anyway, as a solution we could state the differences between the KGL and the Nassau regiments in a footnote or in the article itself if you want. DavidDijkgraaf (talk) 19:23, 10 October 2023 (UTC)
 * You would have to show that either a consensus, or at least majority, of relevant scholars supported your argument. Anything less is insufficient to make it unequivocally correct in an encyclopaedic treatment. Wikipedia must follow scholarly usage, it cannot under any circumstances lead. It cannot be used to create precedents. Urselius (talk) 09:25, 15 November 2023 (UTC)

What happened to "Waterloo_in_popular_culture" wiki article
It looks like the article was deleted, and the reference to Abba was added to this article. Keith H99 (talk) 20:26, 20 November 2023 (UTC)

 * Yes, indeed
 * Record of its deletion
 * Articles for deletion/Waterloo in popular culture
 * Scrape prior to deletion.
 *
 * Nothing further to see, move along. Keith H99 (talk) 20:28, 20 November 2023 (UTC)

Peninsular War veterans and Waterloo
Many years ago, I was given my older cousin's copy of Patterson Blick Instant Pictures transfers Book number 20, which had been published in 1970, just in time for the Bondarchuk movie about the battle. One of the things that stuck in my mind was the mention that the British Army was in North America. I thought no more of this, my age being in single figures, but I always accepted this as a fact.

In more recent years, I have questioned this. A sticker book for children is not a reliable source, granted. Yet, this seems to have come from Chandler's 1966 publication, and appears to have gone unchallenged. p.1093 At best the Allied army was a very hybrid collection of multinational formations, and the number of British troops present formed rather less than half of the men in the field. Furthermore, even they were not for the most part the veterans of the Peninsular War, most of whom were on their way in transports to North America. A substantial part of the British contingent at Waterloo was made up of depot battalions and men from militia units, while much of the cavalry had never seen service outside the British Isles. Yet they fought magnificently throughout a long and exhausting day, ably assisted by their comrades of the King’s German Legion and the other Allied contingents, most particularly the Nassauers.

Given that the Treaty of Ghent had been signed on 24 December 1814, there would have been no reason for British troops to have been sent to North America during 1815.

The last battle of the War of 1812 was the Battle of New Orleans. Some of the combatants were present at Waterloo. There has been very little interest on the part of British historians in the War of 1812, nonetheless the assertion that 'veterans of the Peninsular War, most of whom were on their way in transports to North America' was not challenged at the time.

In 2001, Donald Graves has challenged the statement that most of the Peninsular War veterans were sent to North America.

[https://www.warof1812.ca/redcoats.htm The Redcoats are Coming!: British Troop Movements to North America in 1814 by Donald E. Graves]

Similarly, in 2005, Barbero's opinion, reproduced in the article, contradicts the statement made by Chandler. All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers and the majority of them had served in the Peninsula. Of the 23 British regiments in action, only 4 (the 14th, 33rd, 69th, and 73rd Foot) had not served in the Peninsula, and a similar level of experience was to be found in the British cavalry and artillery.

One advantage of researching the regiments of that time period today, as opposed to performing the task in 1966, is the way in which various regimental histories, detailing the postings of regiments, have been digitised and can be accessed from home.

To my mind, Chandler's comment seems like "donkeys led by lions", a statement that I do not believe is proven, when looking at unit histories to determine where various regiments were. There was no fleet of transports shipping Peninsular War veterans to the USA in March 1815, when Napoleon's return to mainland France caused panic among the nations of the Seventh Coalition. Keith H99 (talk) 23:28, 17 November 2023 (UTC)

 * A similar comment from Cornwell, pg.17, there being an absence of inline citations:

 * But Britain had just fought a war with the United States, and many of the best regiments, veterans of Wellington's victories, were still across the Atlantic. They were returning, and found themselves travelling straight from America to the Netherlands. The Duke would have been more confident if he had possessed his Peninsular army, which had been one of the best that ever fought under British colours.

 * It reads like Robert Remini, regurgitating info from popular histories without tying back to source material to verify the assertion.

 * For 'some battalions', there is the battalion of the 4th Foot, and the detachment of 5 companies of riflemen from the 3rd Battalion, 95th Foot.

 * The 4th Foot did not go straight to the Netherlands. It briefly returned to England in May 1815, before embarking for Flanders a few weeks later to fight at the Battle of Waterloo in June. Source: Cannon (1839), pg 129.
 * The riflemen detachment embarked aboard HMS Dover and the Norfolk transport, which set sail on 4 April 1815. They disembarked on the south coast of England on 2 June 1815. They embarked at Dover on 10 July 1815 and disembarked at Antwerp on 13 July. In due course they joined the other 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion, upon reaching Paris. Source: Surtees (1833) pp. 403-409.

 * So, 'some battalions' was in fact just one battalion. Keith H99 (talk) 20:59, 18 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Forgive me, but I do not see how your argument affects the wording of the Wikipedia article as it stands. Urselius (talk) 09:34, 19 November 2023 (UTC)
 * The wording of the article did not reflect the wording used by Chandler, so it was amended. There is the inconsistency within the article that on the one hand, it states that most of Wellington's veterans of the Peninsular War were on transport ships heading to North America in March 1815, and this is later contradicted by the more recent output of Barbero.
 * The elephant in the room, as I see it, is there would have been a reduction in the British Army in 1814 as a consequence of peace. The article makes no mention that some of the veterans had been effectively made redundant, and as they were not part of the smaller peacetime establishment, that is why they were not available.
 * There was a reduction in the Royal Marine establishment in June 1814, it took effect 17 August 1814, and this was completed in September 1814. It had comprised 31,400 men in 182 administrative companies. This was reduced to 120 companies, I do not know how many men were in the peacetime establishment of the Royal Marines.
 * So, in conclusion, my post relates to the question around the quality of the British troops under Wellington's command. The argument that a number of veterans were in North America does seem to have been countered by Barbero and Graves. The question about just how smaller the British Army was, as a consequence of the peace dividend occurring after the first abdication of Napoleon in April 1814, fourteen months prior to this battle, does not get addressed in the article, that I can tell.
 * The apologists bemoan that Wellington in 1815 did not have his Peninsular War army, with which to fight Boney, and that this was unfair. I daresay that MacArthur was in a similar position in 1945, sorry that should be 1950, as compared to 1945 insofar as he did not have access to a large, coherent apparatus that was well-tuned after several years of consistent operation. Keith H99 (talk) 19:52, 19 November 2023 (UTC)
 * At its peak, in 1813, the British Army contained over 250,000 men. By 1821 the army numbered only 101,000 combatants. That's quite a reduction from war establishment to peace establishment. Keith H99 (talk) 20:03, 19 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Would it be possible for you to boil your argument down to something readily digestible? Then say exactly what you want changed. Chandler was certainly inaccurate some of the time. He says that after the charge of the British heavy cavalry, "... 2,500 Allied horsemen had been laid low ..." an entirely ridiculous statement given the lie by many eyewitnesses in the heavies and Uxbridge himself, who described their considerable and useful activity later in the day. Urselius (talk) 12:15, 20 November 2023 (UTC)
 * In essence, there are those who will say that Wellington was disadvantaged, insofar as he didn't have the Peninsular War British Army of 1813.
 * Chandler says that all the veterans were in North America, which is wrong. It's an easy theory that has not been researched whatsoever. Cornwell has fallen into the same trap and made things up in support, which is not good.
 * The fact that more than twelve months of peace will have seen the British Army on a different footing, and therefore smaller, does not get addressed in the article. This will take a while to research, and I will need to set time aside to do this.
 * There's an argument for cohesion in seasoned units, which could apply to the British infantry, the KGL and the Brunswickers, which does not apply to the new Hanoverian & Dutch-Belgian armies.
 * I do see the first paragraph as having something of a nationalistic element to it, "Even with his right hand tied behind his back, Wellington and his not quite suitable British troops still got one over on Boney" with a narrative that sounds like Dad's Army meets The A Team. That fourth paragraph also has the risk of a nationalistic element akin to "Those Dutchies were rubbish, just like the Portuguese were rubbish in WW1," whilst ignoring that Wellington's best cavalry were arguably the KGL. Keith H99 (talk) 19:49, 20 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Which first and fourth paragraphs are these? The fourth paragraph in the lead does not mention the Dutch. Urselius (talk) 21:18, 22 November 2023 (UTC)
 * By the end of 1814 the British government had some 47,000 fewer men with the colours than when Napoleon had abdicated less than nine months before. These cuts fell hardest on foreign corps and second line troops but cavalry and artillery were also sharply reduced (7,000 artillerymen and drivers) and many excellent second battalions were disbanded (Fortescue History of the British Army vol 10 p 228). Keith H99 (talk) 14:52, 22 November 2023 (UTC)
 * 'In Dec 1814 the army was reduced, mainly by disbanding 22 x 2nd battalions.'
 * Source: BRITISH ARMY ESTABLISHMENTS DURING THE NAPOLEONIC WARS (PART 1)
 * Roderick MacArthur, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, (Volume 87 Number 350 in Summer 2009) Keith H99 (talk) 15:11, 22 November 2023 (UTC)

Consigned, I hope this is of interest, regarding the incorrect assertion by Chandler that in June 1815 the British Army of the Peninsular War was being shipped to fight a war in North America that was ended on 24 December 1814. Keith H99 (talk) 21:07, 16 May 2024 (UTC)

 * Thanks Keith H99. I agree it seems like Chandler is mistaken or incorrect, but is it challenged directly in another source? I wonder how to present this in the article without using original research or synthesis. Consigned (talk) 23:19, 16 May 2024 (UTC)
 * This is the text as it currently stands:
 * Chandler incorrectly asserts that most of the British veterans of the Peninsular War were being transported to North America to fight in the War of 1812.
 * @Consigned would you be able to edit the sentence, in a manner that addresses your synthesis concern, and will result in the CN tag being removed, please? Keith H99 (talk) 08:10, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

Wdford, subsequent research since 1966 calls into question Chandler's comment as a reliable source. That said, I think Barbero should be cited. Keith H99 (talk) 14:49, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Cool. I am happy to cite them both. Wdford (talk) 14:52, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I was likewise puzzled by Chandler's comment about British militia
 * 'only the British contingent was entirely composed of regular soldiers, because in Great Britain constitutional guarantees blocked the use of the militia outside the kingdom.'
 * Barbero, pg21
 * Currently unable to find where the Peninsular War veterans (only 4 regiments were not there) quote is from; it is not Barbero. Keith H99 (talk) 15:12, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

 * In general, I am happy to accept Chandler as a reliable source, so I would not lightly discount him, unless he is contradicted by another reliable source. However if there is a contradicting source, then fair enough – please add it all in.

 * I have seen mentions elsewhere that the British Army was not as solid as Wellington would have liked – there must be some foundation to this? Just how inexperienced were they?

 * In cases where an army is being deliberately demobilised after a war, it seems to be the tendency that men who want to go home are released, and those who want to stay are then grouped into a smaller number of battalions. It would be silly to hold onto men who want to return to their families, while kicking out men who have nowhere else to go?
 * If they had demobilized every second battalion etc, as reported, then when they are preparing for a new war, they would have tried to recruit additional men, and a lot of those discharged veterans may have volunteered to join back in - perhaps even in different regiments?
 * The concept of “regular soldiers” does not automatically mean they were Peninsular veterans. It is possible that many British line regiments were present in the Peninsular, but that they were not involved in serious battles, or that they had high turnover of personnel in the years before Waterloo – perhaps due to retirements, or demands in North America? I do however agree that it is unlikely that they were all green troops – nobody would try to take on Napoleon with an army of rookies.
 * As a temporary compromise, maybe we could just leave out entirely the text “All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers, and the majority of them had served in the Peninsula. [citation needed] Of the 23 British line infantry regiments in action, only four (the 14th, 33rd, 69th, and 73rd Foot) had not served in the Peninsula, and a similar level of experience was to be found in the British cavalry and artillery. Chandler asserts that most of the British veterans of the Peninsular War were being transported to North America.[61] ”. I’m sure that there are reliable sources somewhere, and then we can fill in the blanks when we find them.Wdford (talk) 15:55, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * It was my misapprehension that the following, and an extra bit of text, were from Barbero. Only the extra bit is from Barbero, though. ('In addition, there were 17,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, 11,000 from Hanover, 6,000 from Brunswick, and 3,000 from Nassau.')
 * All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers and the majority of them had served in the Peninsula. Of the 23 British regiments in action, only 4 (the 14th, 33rd, 69th, and 73rd Foot) had not served in the Peninsula, and a similar level of experience was to be found in the British cavalry and artillery.
 * In fact, Barbero picks up on the inexperience of British cavalry when compared with the French, on page 141, accessed via the archive.org site. The first part of the text looks plausible to me, but where did it come from?
 * This was in the article in 2022
 * Of these, 25,000 were British.. All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers, but only 7,000 of them were Peninsular War veterans.
 * Not good. Keith H99 (talk) 16:28, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Here is the anonymous edit
 * edited by 82.13.181.124  (talk) at 22:25, 4 November 2022 (I have removed incorrect statistics - 30,500 British troops fought at Waterloo, not 25,000, and the claim that only 7,000 of these had seen action in the Peninsula is extremely inaccurate. The source for this erroneous claim was Longford's biography of Wellington. Goodness knows where she got that figure from but it's certainly not based on research.)
 * Hopefully the text can be attributed, else it is POV and the Longford content ought to be added back, in the absence of source material. Keith H99 (talk) 16:45, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

Is Longford generally considered to be a reliable source? Wdford (talk) 22:25, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

 * Good question. The info attributable to Longford was added at some point prior to 2019, so it would appear. Keith H99 (talk) 10:11, 21 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Looks like it was added at the start of 2007. Keith H99 (talk) 14:19, 21 May 2024 (UTC)

Headcount for Wellington's Allied Army
Hi @Ochoa diego,

The article used to state the following:
 * there were 17,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, 11,000 from Hanover, 6,000 from Brunswick, and 3,000 from Nassau

You have amended the text to the following, but these new numbers are not from Barbero:
 * there were 21,035 (28.3%) Dutch-Belgian and Nassuer troops, 11,496(15.5%) from Hanover and 6,124(8.2) from Brunswick.

Can you please amend the article, so the actual source of the numbers that you used is showing.

Thanks! Keith H99 (talk) 16:07, 20 May 2024 (UTC) Keith H99 (talk) 16:07, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

 * Done. Thanks. Ochoa diego (talk) 21:08, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Many thanks! Keith H99 (talk) 21:12, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Do these sources definitively lump all the Nassau troops into the Dutch-Belgian army? I think that a consensus of available scholarly sources supporting this is absolutely necessary before it is included in a Wikipedia article. A couple of sources is not sufficient. Wikipedia has to follow the scholarship, it cannot create precedent! See the extensive discussion on this exact subject above. Urselius (talk) 10:59, 21 May 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Battle of Waterloo


text:
John Frost (Chartist)

John Frost (25 May 1784 – 27 July 1877) was a prominent leader of the British Chartist movement in the Newport Rising.

Early life
John Frost was born in Newport, Monmouthshire, where his father, also named John, kept the "Royal Oak Inn", in Thomas Street (a blue plaque honouring Frost's birthplace is located on the side of the old Post Office in the High Street, marking the approximate street location). John was mainly brought up as an orphan by his grandfather, a bootmaker. He was apprenticed to a woollen draper in Bristol and was later a shopman in London. Frost's political affiliations were greatly influenced by Thomas Paine and William Cobbett. John and Sarah Frost worshipped at Hope Baptist Chapel, situated behind the present day Commercial Street and Skinner Street and their eight children were all baptised there.

Frost's mother Sarah died early in his childhood and he was brought up by his grandparents. He was apprenticed as a bootmaker to his grandfather and left home at the age of sixteen to become a draper's apprentice and tailor, first in Cardiff, then Bristol and later London. He returned to Newport in 1806 to start his own business, which became prosperous. He married a widow Mary Geach in 1812 and over the course of eleven years they had eight children. He was held in great esteem and affection for his appealing character and was commended for being "studious, quiet and obedient."

Political career
In 1821, Frost became embroiled in a dispute with a Newport solicitor, Thomas Prothero, who was also Town Clerk, over his uncle's will. In a letter Frost accused Prothero of being responsible for the former's exclusion from the will. Prothero sued for libel and Frost was ordered to pay £1,000. Frost then accused Prothero of malpractice. Again, Prothero sued for libel and again won. In February 1823, Frost was imprisoned for six months and told in no uncertain terms that further accusations against Prothero would lead to a longer sentence.

After his release Frost turned his anger against Prothero's friends and business partners, notably Sir Charles Morgan of Tredegar House and Park, a major Newport and south Wales landowner and industrialist. In a pamphlet of 1830, he accused Morgan of mistreating his many tenants and advocated electoral reform as a means of bringing Morgan and others like him to account. An appreciation both of Frost's literary skill and his mounting exasperation can be gained from his letters, to Sir Charles Morgan himself amongst others. In the early 1830s Frost increasingly became a champion of universal suffrage.

Establishing himself as a prominent Chartist, he was elected in 1835 as a town councillor for Newport and appointed as a magistrate. He also became an Improvement Commissioner and Poor Law Guardian and the following year became Mayor of Newport. His aggressive behaviour and election as a delegate to the Chartist Convention in 1838 antagonised his old enemies. He was defeated in the mayoral election the following year and the Home Secretary also revoked his appointment as magistrate.

Letter to Lord John Russell
Because of his continuing role within the Chartist Movement, Home Secretary Russell dismissed Frost from his position as justice of the peace. In response, while at a Chartist Convention in Pontypool, Frost responded to Russell in a straightforward letter, containing the contemporary Chartist songs of Wales, which gave expression to the feelings and determination of the Welsh coal miners:

Nonetheless, while the desire amongst the Welsh to rebel was ever stronger, Frost himself still wished to postpone the date of an uprising. By the end of October, the Welsh Chartists were holding daily meetings in Monmouthshire in an attempt to force an armed rebellion. Records suggest that ultimately, finding himself unable to postpone the date of an organised uprising any longer and still doubting its success, Frost burst into tears. A thirty-member conference ultimately fixed the date for 3 November.

The Newport Rising

On 3–4 November 1839 John Frost, together with William Jones and Zephaniah Williams, led a Chartist march on the Westgate Inn in Newport. The rationale for the set piece confrontation remains opaque, although it may have its origins in Frost's ambivalence towards the more violent attitudes of some of the Chartists, and the personal animus he bore towards some of the Newport establishment who were ensconced in the hotel along with 60 armed soldiers. The Chartist movement in south east Wales was chaotic in this period, after the arrest of Henry Vincent, a leading agitator, who was imprisoned nearby in Monmouth gaol and the feelings of the workers were running extremely high, too high for Frost to reason with and control. One of his contemporaries, William Price described Frost's stance at the time of the Newport Rising as being akin to "putting a sword in my hand and a rope around my neck."

The march, which had been gathering momentum over the course of the whole weekend as Frost and his associates led the protestors down from the valley towns above Newport, numbered some 3,000 when it entered the town. According to the plan, three columns from three directions were to march upon Newport and take the town before dawn. The contingent starting from Blackwood was commanded by Frost, the detachment coming from Nantyglo by Williams and the main body of Pontypool by Jones. The three columns were to meet at Risca, but this did not come to pass; owing to a storm raging in the night, all of them arrived late, and the worst trouble was that the delay gave the Newport authorities ample time to get wind of what was afoot and make ready to confront the coming armed Chartists. Special constables were sworn in hastily, the known Chartists of Newport were arrested and shut up in the Westgate Hotel where the mayor held 30 soldiers in reserve. The Chartist troops led by Frost, proceeding to the hotel at 9:30 am and demanding the surrender of the Chartist prisoners with armed menace, advanced to the door. When the soldiers posted in the hotel started firing, ten to fifteen Chartists died instantly, about 50 were wounded. The bloody event was over in 20 minutes. The Chartist miners were in a very bad strategic position, and the firing took them by surprise. When they withdrew, they met the contingent of Williams and outside the town, the column of Jones. The Times estimated that the strength of the Chartists contingent at 8,000 whilst the chartist Robert Gammage estimated 20,000.

Overall the battle of the Westgate lasted only about 25 minutes, but at its close some 22 people lay dead or dying and upwards of 50 had been injured. An eyewitness report spoke of one man, wounded with gunshot, lying on the ground, pleading for help until he died an hour later.

Reprisal by the local council
The reprisal by the local council followed immediately. The three commanders and 150 Chartists were arrested in a short time. The rumour spread that the Chartists insurgents intended to take Cardiff on 5 November. The Cardiff magistrates were seized with panic: in addition to mobilising the special constables they built up serious military defences and the crew of an American vessel lying at anchor in the port were also brought to the aid of the authorities. After Newport, however the Welsh Valleys were wrapped in quiet, and even the English manufacturing districts were paralysed for a short while.

Trial and sentencing

A reward of £100 was offered for Frost's capture and he was arrested by solicitor and clerk Thomas Jones Phillips (an ancestor of Jack Whitehall and Michael Whitehall) and charged with high treason. Early in 1840, along with Jones and Williams, was tried at Monmouth's Shire Hall. All three were found guilty and became the last men in Britain to be sentenced to be hanged, drawn and quartered. The Chartists stood up as one man for the Newport leaders under sentences of death. O'Connor, O'Brien, Harney Taylor and other Chartists leaders free on bail rose to speak on their behalf. O'Connor offered one week's income of the Northern Star for a Frost fund and retained one of the best lawyers of the time, Sir Frederick Pollock as defence counsel. Following a huge public outcry, however, these sentences were discussed by the Cabinet and on 1 February the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, announced that the executions would be commuted to transportation for life.

On reaching Van Diemen's Land (modern Tasmania), Frost was immediately sentenced to two years' hard labour for making a disparaging remark about Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary. Frost was indentured to a local storekeeper in New Town after his probation term ended in November 1843. He spent three years working as a clerk, before being sent to Bothwell in May 1846 and receiving his ticket of leave in November 1846. He worked as a school teacher in various locations around Tasmania for almost eight years until he received a conditional pardon on 27 Jun 1854.

Chartists in Britain continued to campaign for the release of Frost. Thomas Duncombe pleaded Frost's case in the House of Commons but his attempt to secure a pardon in 1846 was unsuccessful. Duncombe refused to be defeated and in 1854 he persuaded the Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, to grant Frost a pardon on the condition that he never returned to Britain. Frost sailed for the United States six months after receiving his conditional pardon, with his daughter, Catherine, who had joined him in Tasmania, and toured the country, organised by William Prowting Roberts, lecturing on the supposed unfairness of the British system of government.

Later life
In 1856, when the residency condition was lifted, Frost was given an unconditional pardon and he straightaway sailed for Bristol, arriving on 12 July. He retired to Stapleton, near the city, but continued to publish articles advocating reform until his death there, aged 93, in 1877.

Frost was buried in the churchyard of the Church of the Holy Trinity with St Edmund, Horfield, Bristol in accordance with his will. In the 1980s Richard Frame found Frost's lost grave site and organised for a new headstone to be created and erected on the site, with the aid of a grant from Newport council. The new headstone was unveiled by Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock.

A plaque has been added to the wall of The Mynde in Caerleon reading:

"In the last quarter of the twentieth century we have taken the Right to Vote for granted. This was not always so, and in 1839 after the failure of petitioning the Government of the day, the men of Britain and South Wales sought to change the system through marches and demonstration – this was known as the Chartist Uprising. John Jenkins the owner of Mynde House and Master of the Ponthir Tin Plate Works, concerned for his property, constructed the Mynde Wall in order to keep marauding demonstrators out. The wall in front of you is what remains of his efforts."

John Frost Square, in Newport city centre, was named in his honour. A 1978 mural of the Newport Rising by Kenneth Budd in the square was demolished in 2013. A trust is to be set up to commission a new memorial with £50,000 of funding provided by Newport City Council. A planning application was approved on 3 Apr 2019 to set up a quarter-scale replica of the Newport Rising mural in Rogerstone, three miles from the city centre. Kenneth Budd's son Oliver has been commissioned to make it using the original drawings from 1978. In 1991, three statues by Christopher Kelly commemorating the Chartist Newport Rising entitled Union, Prudence, Energy were installed outside the Westgate Hotel in Newport.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: John Frost (Chartist)


text:
Miami people

The Miami (Miami–Illinois: Myaamiaki) are a Native American nation originally speaking one of the Algonquian languages. Among the peoples known as the Great Lakes tribes, they occupied territory that is now identified as north-central Indiana, southwest Michigan, and western Ohio. The Miami were historically made up of several prominent subgroups, including the Piankeshaw, Wea, Pepikokia, Kilatika, Mengakonkia, and Atchakangouen. In modern times, Miami is used more specifically to refer to the Atchakangouen. By 1846, most of the Miami had been forcefully displaced to Indian Territory (initially to what is now Kansas, and later to what is now part of Oklahoma). The Miami Tribe of Oklahoma are the federally recognized tribe of Miami Indians in the United States. The Miami Nation of Indiana, a nonprofit organization of self-identified descendants of Miamis who were exempted from removal, have unsuccessfully sought separate recognition.

Name
The name Miami derives from Myaamia (plural Myaamiaki), the tribe's autonym (name for themselves) in their Algonquian language of Miami–Illinois. This appears to have been derived from an older term meaning "downstream people." Some scholars contended the Miami called themselves the Twightwee (also spelled Twatwa), supposedly an onomatopoeic reference to their sacred bird, the sandhill crane. Recent studies have shown that Twightwee derives from the Delaware language exonym for the Miamis, tuwéhtuwe, a name of unknown etymology. Some Miami have stated that this was only a name used by other tribes for the Miami, and not their autonym. They also called themselves Mihtohseeniaki (the people). The Miami continue to use this autonym today.

Prehistory
Early Miami people are considered to belong to the Fischer Tradition of Mississippian culture. Mississippian societies were characterized by maize-based agriculture, chiefdom-level social organization, extensive regional trade networks, hierarchical settlement patterns, and other factors. The historical Miami engaged in hunting, as did other Mississippian peoples.

Written history of the Miami traces back to missionaries and explorers who encountered them in what is now Wisconsin, from which they migrated south and eastwards from the mid-17th century to the mid-18th century, settling on the upper Wabash River and the Maumee River in what is now northeastern Indiana and northwestern Ohio. By oral history, this migration was a return to the region where they had long lived before being invaded during the Beaver Wars by the Iroquois. Early European colonists and traders on the East Coast had fueled demand for furs, and the Iroquois – based in central and western New York – had acquired early access to European firearms through trade and had used them to conquer the Ohio Valley area for use as hunting grounds, which temporarily depopulated as Algonquin woodlands tribes fled west as refugees. The warfare and ensuing social disruption – along with the spread of infectious European diseases such as measles and smallpox for which they had no immunity – contributed to the decimation of Native American populations in the interior.

Historic locations

European contact

When French missionaries first encountered the Miami in the mid-17th century, generating the first written historical record of the tribe, the indigenous people were living around the western shores of Lake Michigan. According to Miami oral tradition, they had moved there a few generations earlier from the region that is now northern Indiana, southern Michigan, and northwestern Ohio to escape pressure from Iroquois war parties seeking to monopolize control over furs in the Ohio Valley. Early French explorers noticed many linguistic and cultural similarities between the Miami bands and the Illiniwek, a loose confederacy of Algonquian-speaking peoples. The term "Miami" has imprecise meaning to historians. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the term "Miami" generally referred to all of these bands as one grand tribe. Over the course of the 19th century, "Miami" came to specifically refer to the Atchakangoen (Crane) band.

Around the beginning of the 18th century, with support from French traders coming down from what is now Canada who supplied them with firearms and wanted to trade with them for furs, the Miami pushed back into their historical territory and resettled it. At this time, the major bands of the Miami were:
 * Atchakangouen, Atchatchakangouen, Atchakangouen, Greater Miami or Crane Band (named after their leading clan, largest Miami band – their main village was Kekionga / Kiihkayonki ("blackberry bush") at the confluence of the Saint Joseph (Kociihsa Siipiiwi) (″Bean River″), Saint Marys (Nameewa Siipiiwi/Mameewa Siipiiwi) (″River of the Atlantic sturgeon″) and Maumee River (Taawaawa Siipiiwi) (″River of the Odawa″) on the western edge of the Great Black Swamp in present-day Indiana – this place was although called saakiiweeki taawaawa siipiiwi (lit. ″the confluence of the Maumee River″); Kekionga / Kiihkayonki was although the capital of the Miami confederacy)
 * Kilatika, Kilatak, Kiratika called by the French, later known by the English as Eel River Band of Miamis; autonym: Kineepikomeekwaki (″People along the Snake-Fish-River, i.e. Eel River″, their main village Kineepikwameekwa/Kenapekwamakwah/Kenapocomoco ("Snake-Fish-Town" or "Eel River Village") moved its location from the headwaters of the Eel River (Kineepikwameekwa Siipiiwi) ("Snake-Fish-River") (near Columbia City, Indiana) down to its mouth at the Wabash River (Waapaahšiki Siipiiwi) (″Shining White River/Bright Shiny River″) (near Logansport, Indiana) in northern Indiana; the Kilatika Band of the French years had their main village at the confluence of the Kankakee River and Des Plaines Rivers to form the Illinois River about 16 km southwest of today's Joliet, Illinois)
 * Mengakonkia or Mengkonkia, Michikinikwa ("Little Turtle")' people
 * Pepikokia, Pepicokea, later known as Tepicon Band or Tippecanoe Band; autonym: Kiteepihkwana (″People of the Place of the buffalo fish″), their main village Kithtippecanuck / Kiteepihkwana (″Place of the buffalo fish″) moved its location various times from the headwaters of the Tippecanoe River (Kiteepihkwana siipiiwi) (″River of the buffalo fish″) (east of Old Tip Town, Indiana) to its mouth into the Wabash River (Waapaahšiki Siipiiwi) (near Lafayette, Indiana) – sometimes although known as Nation de la Gruë or Miamis of Meramec River, possibly the name of a Miami–Illinois band named Myaarameekwa (″Ugly Fish, i.e. Catfish Band″) that lived along the Meramec River (″River of the ugly fish″)
 * Piankeshaw, Piankashaw, Pianguichia; autonym: Peeyankihšiaki (″those who separate″ or ″those who split of″) lived in several villages along the White River in western Indiana, the Vermilion River (Peeyankihšiaki Siipiiwi) (″River of the Peeyankihšiaki/Piankashaw″) and Wabash Rivers (Waapaahšiki Siipiiwi) in Illinois and later along the Great Miami River (Ahsenisiipi) (″Rocky River″) in western Ohio, their first main village Peeyankihšionki (″Place of the Peeyankihšiaki/Piankashaw″) was at the confluence of Vermilion River and the Wabash River (near Cayuga, Indiana) – one minor settlement was at the confluence of the main tributaries of the Vermilion River (near Danville, Illinois), the second important settlement was named Aciipihkahkionki / Chippekawkay / Chippecoke (″Place of the edible Root″) and was situated at the mouth of the Embarras River in the Wabash River (near Vincennes, Indiana), in the 18th century a third settlement outside the historic Wabash River Valley named Pinkwaawilenionki / Pickawillany (″Ash Place″) was erected along the Great Miami River (which developed into Piqua, Ohio)
 * Wea, Wiatonon, Ouiatanon or Ouaouiatanoukak; autonym: Waayaahtanooki or Waayaahtanwa (″People of the place of the whirlpool″), because their main village Waayaahtanonki (″Place of the whirlpool″) was at the riverside where a whirlpool was in the river, under the term "Ouiatanon" was both referred to a group of extinct five Wea settlements or to their historic tribal lands along the Middle Wabash Valley between the Eel River to the north and the Vermilion River to the south, the ″real″Quiatanon at the mouth of the Wea Creek into the Wabash River was their main village

In 1696, the Comte de Frontenac appointed Jean Baptiste Bissot, Sieur de Vincennes as commander of the French outposts in northeast Indiana and southwest Michigan. He befriended the Miami people, settling first at the St. Joseph River, and, in 1704, establishing a trading post and fort at Kekionga, present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana, the de facto Miami capital which controlled an important land portage linking the Maumee River (which flowed into Lake Erie and offered a water path to Quebec) to the Wabash River (which flowed into the Ohio River and offered a water path to the Mississippi Valley).

By the 18th century, the Miami had for the most part returned to their homeland in present-day Indiana and Ohio. The eventual victory of the British in the French and Indian War (Seven Years' War) led to an increased British presence in traditional Miami areas.

Shifting alliances and the gradual encroachment of European-American settlement led to some Miami bands, including the Piankeshaw, and Wea, effectively merging into what was sometimes called the Miami Confederacy. Native Americans created larger tribal confederacies led by Chief Little Turtle; their alliances were for waging war against Europeans and to fight advancing white settlement, and the broader Miami itself became a subset of the so-called Western Confederacy during the Northwest Indian War.

The U.S. government later included the Miami with the Illini for administrative purposes. The Eel River band maintained a somewhat separate status, which proved beneficial in the removals of the 19th century. The Miami nation's traditional capital was Kekionga.

Locations
French years
 * 1718–94 Kekionga, Portage of the Maumee and Wabash rivers, Fort Wayne, Indiana
 * 1720–49 Portage of the Miami River, St. Joseph and Kankakee rivers
 * unknown – 1733 Tepicon of the Wabash, Fort Ouiatenon, Lafayette, Indiana
 * 1733–51 Tepicon of the Tippecanoe, headwaters of the Tippecanoe River near Warsaw
 * 1748–52 Pickawillany, Piqua on the Great Miami River in Ohio
 * 1752 Headwaters of the Eel River, southwest of Columbia City, Indiana
 * 1752 Le Gris, Maumee River (Miami River), east of Fort Wayne

British years
 * 1763 Captured British at Fort Miami (1760–63) as a part of the Pontiac's Rebellion
 * 1774 Warriors participated in Lord Dunmore's War in Ohio
 * 1778 Kenapacomaqua, Wabash at the mouth of the Eel River, Logansport, Indiana
 * 1780 October – Agustin Mottin de La Balme (French, from St. Louis) headed a raid of Detroit. Stopped and raided Kekionga. La Balme withdrew to the west, where Little Turtle destroyed the raiders, killing one third of them, on November 5.

United States and Tribal Divide
The Miami had mixed relations with the United States. Some villages of the Piankeshaw openly supported the American rebel colonists during the American Revolution, while the villages around Ouiatenon were openly hostile. The Miami of Kekionga remained allies of the British, but were not openly hostile to the United States (except when attacked by Augustin de La Balme in 1780).

In the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolutionary War, Britain transferred its claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Territory – modern-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin – to the new United States. White pioneers pushed into the Ohio Valley, leading to disputes over whether they had a legal right to carve out homesteads and settlements on land the tribes considered unceded territory. The Miami invited tribes displaced by white settlers, the Delaware (Lenape) and Shawnee to resettle at Kekionga, forming the nucleus of the pan-tribal Western Confederacy. War parties attacked white settlers, seeking to drive them out, and whites – including Kentucky militia members – carried out sometimes indiscriminate reprisal attacks on Native American villages. The resulting conflict became known as the Northwest Indian War.

Seeking to bring an end to the rising violence by forcing the tribes to sign treaties ceding land for white settlement, the George Washington administration ordered an attack on Kekionga in 1790; American forces destroyed it but were then repulsed by Little Turtle's warriors. In 1791, Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson launched what he thought was a clever raid. At the Battle of Kenapacomaqua, Wilkinson killed 9 Wea and Miami, and captured 34 Miami as prisoners, including a daughter of Miami war chief Little Turtle. Many of the confederation leaders had been considering terms of peace to present to the United States, but when they received news of Wilkinson's raid, they readied for war. Wilkinson's raid thus had the opposite effect and united the tribes for a war. Later in 1791, the Washington administration organized a second expedition to attack Kekionga with further orders to build a fort there to permanently occupy the region, but the Western Confederacy attacked its camp en route and destroyed it; the battle, known as St. Clair's Defeat, is recognized as the worst defeat of an American army by Native Americans in U.S. history. In 1794, a third invading force under General "Mad" Anthony Wayne defeated the confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, burned tribal settlements along dozens of miles of the Maumee River, and erected Fort Wayne at Kekionga. Wayne then imposed the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, which ended the Northwest Indian War. Under it, confederacy leaders like Little Turtle agreed to cede most of what is now Ohio, along with other tracts to the west including what is now central Detroit, Chicago, and Fort Wayne, in exchange for annual payments.

Those Miami who still resented the United States gathered around Ouiatenon and Prophetstown, where Shawnee Chief Tecumseh led a coalition of Native American nations. Territorial governor William Henry Harrison and his forces destroyed Prophetstown in 1811, and in the War of 1812 – which included a tribal siege of Fort Wayne – attacked Miami villages throughout the Indiana Territory.

Although Wayne had promised in the Treaty of Greenville negotiations that the remaining unceded territory would remain tribal land – the origin of the name "Indiana" – forever, that is not what happened. Wayne would die a year later. White traders who came to Fort Wayne were used by the government to deliver the annual treaty payments to the Miami and other tribes. The traders also sold them alcohol and manufactured goods. Between annuity days, the traders sold them such things on credit, and the tribes repeatedly ran up more debts than the existing payments could cover. Harrison and his successors pursued a policy of leveraging these debts to induce tribal leaders to sign new treaties ceding large swaths of collectively-held reservation land and then to agree to the tribe's removal. As incentives to induce tribal leaders to sign such treaties, the government gave them individual deeds and other personal perks, such as building one chief a mansion. In 1846, the government forced the tribe's rank-and-file to leave, but several major families who had acquired private property to live on through this practice were exempted and permitted to stay in Indiana, creating a bitter schism.

Those who affiliated with the tribe were moved to first to Kansas, then to Oklahoma, where they were given individual allotments of land rather than a reservation as part of efforts to make them assimilate into the American culture of private property and yeoman farming. The U.S. government has recognized what is now the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma as the official tribal government since 1846.

In the 20th century, the Indiana-based Miami unsuccessfully sought separate federal recognition. Although they had been recognized by the U.S. in an 1854 treaty, that recognition was stripped in 1897. In 1980, the Indiana legislature recognized the Eastern Miami as a matter of state law and voted to support federal recognition, but in 1993, a federal judge ruled that the statute of limitations on appealing their status had expired. In 1996, the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma changed its constitution to permit any descendant of people on certain historical roles to join, and since then hundreds of Indiana-based Miami have become members. Today the Oklahoma-based Miami tribe has about 5,600 enrolled members. However many other Indiana-based Miami still consider themselves a separate group that has been unfairly denied separate federal recognition. The Miami Nation of Indiana does not have federal tribal recognition. Senate Bill No. 311 was introduced in the Indiana General Assembly in 2011 to formally grant state recognition to the tribe, giving it sole authority to determine its tribal membership, but the bill did not advance to a vote.

Locations
United States years
 * 1785 – Delaware villages located near Kekionga (refugees from American settlements)
 * 1790 – Pickawillany Miami join Kekionga (refugees from American settlements)
 * 1790 Gen. Josiah Harmar is ordered to attack and destroy Kekionga. On October 17, Harmar's forces burn the evacuated villages but are then defeated by Little Turtle's warriors.
 * 1790-1791 – Rather than rebuilding Kekionga, tribes resettle further down the Maumee River, including at what is now Defiance, Ohio
 * 1791 Gen. Arthur St. Clair attempts to attack Kekionga again and build a fort there, but before he can get there the Western Confederacy attacks his camp and destroys his army near the future Fort Recovery.
 * Kentucky Militia destroy Eel River villages.
 * 1793 December – General Anthony Wayne launches third invasion and builds Fort Recovery on the site of St. Clair's Defeat.
 * 1794 June – Fort Recovery repulses attack by Western Confederacy
 * 1794 August – Battle of Fallen Timbers near modern-day Toledo; Wayne's forces defeat Western Confederacy
 * 1794 September – Wayne's forces march up the Maumee River, burning tribal villages and fields (where tribes resettled after Harmar destroyed Kekionga) for dozens of miles, before reaching the abandoned ruins of Kekionga at its headwaters and building Fort Wayne
 * 1795 – Tribal leaders sign the Treaty of Greenville, ceding most of what is now Ohio as well as the area around Fort Wayne that includes its historic capital of Kekionga and the Maumee-Wabash land portage
 * 1809 – Gov. William Henry Harrison orders destruction of all villages within two days' march of Fort Wayne. Villages near Columbia City and Huntington destroyed.
 * 1812 17 December – Lt. Col. John B. Campbell ordered to destroy the Mississinewa villages. Campbell destroys villages and kills 8 Indians and 76 were taken prisoner, including 34 women and children.
 * 1812 18 December, at Silver Heel's village, a sizeable Native American force counterattacked. The American Indians were outnumbered, but fought fiercely to rescue the captured villagers being held by Campbell, A joint cavalry charge led by Major James McDowell and Captains Trotter and Johnston finally broke the attack. an estimated 30 Indians were killed; Americans repulsed and return to Greenville.
 * 1813 July – U.S. Army returns and burns deserted town and crops.
 * 1817 Maumee Treaty – lose Ft. Wayne area (1400 Miami counted)
 * 1818 Treaty of St. Mary's (New Purchase Treaty) – lose south of the Wabash – Big Miami Reservation created. Grants on the Mississinewa and Wabash given to Josetta Beaubien, Anotoine Bondie, Peter Labadie, Francois Lafontaine, Peter Langlois, Joseph Richardville, and Antoine Rivarre. Miami National Reserve (875,000) created.
 * 1818 Eel River Miami settle at Thorntown, northeast of Lebanon).
 * 1825 1073 Miami, including the Eel River Miami
 * 1826 Mississinewa Treaty – Tribe cedes most of its remaining reservation land in northeastern Indiana, which the government wanted to create a right of way for a canal linking Lake Erie to the Wabash River. Miami chief Jean Baptiste de Richardville receives deed to a large personal property and funds to build a mansion on it for signing. Eel River Miami leave Thorntown, northeast of Lebanon, for Logansport area.
 * 1834 Western part of the Big Reservation sold (208,000 acre)
 * 1838 Potawatomi removed from Indiana. No other Indian tribes in the state. Treaty of 1838 made 43 grants and sold the western portion of the Big Reserve. Richardville exempted from any future removal treaties. Richardsville, Godfroy, Metocina received grants, plus family reserves for Ozahshiquah, Maconzeqyuah (Wife of Benjamin), Osandian, Tahconong, and Wapapincha.
 * 1840 Remainder of the Big Reservation (500,000 acre) sold for lands in Kansas. Godfroy descendants and Meshingomesia (s/o Metocina), sister, brothers and their families exempted from the removal.
 * 1846 – October 1, removal was supposed to begin. It began October 6 by canal boat. By ship to Kansas Landing Kansas City and 50 mi overland to the reservation. Reached by 9 November.
 * 1847 Godfroy Reserve, between the Wabash and Mississinewa
 * Wife of Benjamin Reserve, east edge of Godfroy
 * Osandian Reserve, on the Mississinewa, southeast boundary of Godfroy
 * Wapapincha Reserve, south of Mississinewa at Godfroy/Osandian juncture
 * Tahkonong Reserve, southeast of Wapapincha south of Mississinewa
 * Ozahshinquah Reserve, on the Mississinewa River, southeast of Peoria
 * Meshingomesa Reserve, north side of Mississinewa from Somerset to Jalapa (northwest Grant County)
 * 1872 Most reserves were partially sold to non-Indians.
 * 1922 All reserves were sold for debt or taxes for the Miamis.

Places named for the Miami
A number of places have been named for the Miami nation. However, Miami, Florida is not named for this tribe, but for the Miami River in Florida, which is in turn named after the unrelated Mayaimi people.

Towns and cities

 * Maumee, Ohio
 * Miami, Indiana
 * Miami, Oklahoma
 * Miami, Missouri
 * Miami Bend, Indiana
 * Miami Shores, Ohio
 * Miami Villa, Ohio
 * Miamisburg, Ohio
 * Miamitown, Ohio
 * Miamiville, Ohio
 * New Miami, Ohio
 * Miami, Texas

Townships

 * Maumee Township, Allen County, Indiana
 * Miami Township, Cass County, Indiana
 * Miami Township, Miami County, Kansas
 * Miami Township, Reno County, Kansas
 * Miami Township, Clermont County, Ohio
 * Miami Township, Greene County, Ohio
 * Miami Township, Hamilton County, Ohio
 * Miami Township, Logan County, Ohio
 * Miami Township, Montgomery County, Ohio

Counties

 * Miami County, Indiana
 * Miami County, Ohio
 * Miami County, Kansas

Forts

 * Fort Miami (Indiana)
 * Fort Miami (Michigan)
 * Fort Miami (Ohio)

Bodies of water and geographical locations

 * Little Miami River, Great Miami River, and Miami Valley in Ohio
 * Maumee River in Indiana and Ohio
 * Miami and Erie Canal

Institutions

 * Miami University in Oxford, Ohio

Sports teams

 * Toledo Maumees

Notable Miami people

 * Memeskia (Old Briton) (c. 1695–1752), Miami chief
 * Francis Godfroy (Palawonza) (1788–1840), Miami Chief
 * Tetinchoua, a powerful 17th-century Miami chief
 * Little Turtle (Mishikinakwa) (c. 1747–1812), 18th-century war chief
 * Pacanne (c. 1737–1816), 18th-century chief
 * Francis La Fontaine (1810–1847), last principal chief of the united Miami tribe
 * Jean Baptiste de Richardville (Peshewa) (c. 1761–1841), 19th-century chief
 * Frances Slocum (Maconaquah) (1773–1847), adopted member of the Miami tribe
 * William Wells (Apekonit), adopted member of the Miami tribe
 * Daryl Baldwin (Kinwalaniihsia), recognized in 2016 with an award from the MacArthur Foundation; founding director of the Myaamia Center nationally and internationally recognized for its research, planning, and implementation of community language and cultural revitalization efforts at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio

title: Miami people