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Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement in the United States must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence at their trial. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.

Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights, which would become known as "Miranda rights". The concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing".

Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010), criminal suspects who are aware of their right to silence and to an attorney but choose not to "unambiguously" invoke them, may find any subsequent voluntary statements treated as an implied waiver of their rights, and used as or as part of evidence. At least one scholar has argued that Thompkins "fully undermined" Miranda.

Legal
During the 1960s, a movement that provided defendants with legal aid emerged from the collective efforts of various bar associations.

In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of Lyndon B. Johnson. Escobedo v. Illinois, a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation. This concept extended to a concern over police interrogation practices, which were considered by many to be barbaric and unjust. Coercive interrogation tactics were known in period slang as the "third degree".

Factual
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix Police Department officers Carroll Cooley and Wilfred Young, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-year-old woman 10 days earlier. After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."

However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession that he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled, and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20–30 years of imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme Court heavily emphasized the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.

Attorney John Paul Frank, former law clerk to Justice Hugo Black, represented Miranda in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gary K. Nelson represented Arizona.

Supreme Court decision
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision in Miranda's favor that overturned his conviction and remanded his case back to Arizona for retrial.

Opinion of the Court
Five justices formed the majority and joined an opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Court ruled that because of the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several police training manuals that had not been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect has been made aware of his rights and the suspect has then waived them:

"The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him."

Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what must happen if a suspect chooses to exercise their rights:

"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning."

Warren also pointed to the existing procedures of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which required informing a suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, provided free of charge if the suspect was unable to pay. If the suspect requested counsel, "the interview is terminated." Warren included the FBI's four-page brief in his opinion.

Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part
In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast." Instead, Justice Clark would use the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated by Justice Goldberg in Haynes v. Washington. Under this test, the court would:

"consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary."

Harlan's dissent
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that "nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." Harlan closed his remarks by quoting former Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."

White's dissent
Justice Byron White took issue with the court having announced a new constitutional right when it had no "factual and textual bases" in the Constitution or previous opinions of the Court for the rule announced in the opinion. He stated: "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment." White did not believe the right had any basis in English common law.

White further warned of the dire consequences of the majority opinion:

"I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process.

In some unknown number of cases, the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity."

Retrial
Miranda was retried in 1967 after the original case against him was thrown out. This time the prosecution, instead of using the confession, introduced other evidence and called witnesses. One witness was Twila Hoffman, a woman with whom Miranda was living at the time of the offense; she testified that he had told her of committing the crime. Miranda was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to serve 20 to 30 years. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied review. Miranda was paroled in 1972. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" that contained the text of the warning for reading to arrestees. Miranda was stabbed to death during an argument in a bar on January 31, 1976. A suspect was arrested, but due to a lack of evidence against him, he was released.

Another three defendants whose cases had been tied in with Miranda's – an armed robber, a stick-up man, and a bank robber – either made plea bargains to lesser charges or were found guilty again despite the exclusion of their confessions.

Reaction
The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. Richard Nixon and conservatives denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming president, promised to appoint judges who would reverse the philosophy that he viewed as "soft on crime." Many supporters of law enforcement were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers.

Miranda warning
After the Miranda decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons or suspects of their rights under the ruling prior to custodial interrogation or their answers would not be admissible in court. Such information is called a Miranda warning. Since it is usually required that the suspects be asked if they understand their rights, courts have also ruled that any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Many American police departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms that a suspect must sign and date (after hearing and reading the warnings again) if an interrogation is to occur.

Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports show a sharp reduction in the clearance rate of violent and property crimes after Miranda. However, according to other studies from the 1960s and 1970s, "contrary to popular belief, Miranda had little, if any, effect on detectives' ability to solve crimes."

Legal developments
The federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda. The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial.

Miranda was undermined by several subsequent decisions that seemed to grant exceptions to the Miranda warnings, challenging the ruling's claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment. The exceptions and developments that occurred over the years included:

 * The Court held in Harris v. New York,, that a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may nonetheless be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony; that is, if the defendant takes the stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce the defendant's confession as a prior inconsistent statement to attack the defendant's credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit this.
 * The Court held in Rhode Island v. Innis,, that a "spontaneous" statement made by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not yet present, is admissible in evidence, as long as the statement was not given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response.
 * The Court held in Berkemer v. McCarty,, that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.
 * The Court held in New York v. Quarles,, that there is also a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning; for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other similar exigent circumstances that require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence. In 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Richard Allen Davis, finding that the public-safety exception applied despite the fact that 64 days had passed from the disappearance of the girl later found to be murdered.
 * The Court held in Colorado v. Connelly,, that the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" mean only that suspects reasonably appear to understand what they are doing and are not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled that it is irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been cognitively or mentally impaired at the time.

United States v. Garibay (1998) clarified an important matter regarding the scope of Miranda. Defendant Jose Garibay barely spoke English and clearly showed a lack of understanding; indeed, "the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused." Because of the defendant's low I.Q. and poor English-language skills, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that it was a "clear error" when the district court found that Garibay had "knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights." The court investigated his waiver and discovered that it was missing all items for which they were looking: he never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally and in English, and no interpreter was provided although they were available. With an opinion that stressed "the requirement that a defendant 'knowingly and intelligently' waive his Miranda rights," the Court reversed Garibay's conviction and remanded his case.

Miranda survived a strong challenge in Dickerson v. United States,, when the validity of Congress's overruling of Miranda through § 3501 was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy. In Dickerson, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld Miranda 7–2 and stated that "the warnings have become part of our national culture". In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required. He cited several cases demonstrating a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, as well as Rehnquist (who had just delivered a contrary opinion), "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."

Over time, interrogators began to devise techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda. In the case of Missouri v. Seibert,, the Supreme Court halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police had been deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then providing the warnings, getting waivers, and eliciting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."

Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) was a ruling in which the Supreme Court held that a suspect's "ambiguous or equivocal" statement, or lack of statements, does not mean that police must end an interrogation. At least one scholar has argued that Thompkins effectively gutted Miranda. In The Right to Remain Silent, Charles Weisselberg wrote that "the majority in Thompkins rejected the fundamental underpinnings of Miranda v. Arizona's prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to protect the rights of suspects" and that "But in Thompkins, neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General were able to cite any decision in which a court found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy questioning. Thompkins persevered for almost three hours before succumbing to his interrogators. In finding a waiver on these facts, Thompkins gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids."

In Vega v. Tekoh (2022), the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that police officers could not be sued under a particular statutory cause of action for failing to administer the Miranda warning, ruling that not every Miranda violation is a deprivation of a constitutional right. In dissent, 3 justices held that the court had "repeatedly and emphatically" determined that the Miranda decision established a constitutional right, and would have allowed such lawsuits. According to pundits, the ruling Vega v. Tekoh "makes it easier for police to obtain coerced confessions – by continuing to ask questions even if someone doesn't want to speak" and "guts a major pathway for incentivizing police to provide a Miranda warning and ensuring their accountability."

Effect on law enforcement
Miranda's impact on law enforcement remains in dispute. Many legal scholars believe that police have adjusted their practices in response to Miranda and that its mandates have not hampered police investigations. Others argue that the Miranda rule has resulted in a lower rate of conviction, with a possible reduction in the rate of confessions of between four and sixteen percent. Some scholars argue that Miranda warnings have reduced the rate at which the police solve crimes, while others question their methodology and conclusions.

In popular culture
The 2023 film Miranda's Victim directed by Michelle Danner explores the origins of the Miranda warning and the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court in favour of Miranda.

title: Miranda v. Arizona


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Talk:Abortion/Archive 1

 * Current discussion page is on Talk:Abortion.

The following was found added to the article:
 * Despite global population pressures which many hold responsible for endemic hunger, overcrowding and environmental impacts, pro-life advocates, largely on religious grounds, argue that it is proper that the numbers of mankind increase, and that it is up to humankind to figure out how to support and care for the products of unwated pregnancies without denying them life. Pro-choice forces point to the misery index of unwanted babies, raised in a hostile environment, and the manner in which an increase of such infants might contribute to a panoply of social ills, from increases in crime, to a broadening of the population base of those living below the poverty level, to a ballooning of the state welfare rolls.

This is a perfect example of text that fails to adhere to a neutral point of view. If you want to contribute to Wikipedia, you must make a very strong effort to write from a neutral point of view. If you think this is impossible or a bad idea, please ie neutral point of view, where all is made clear and plausible. Wikipedia is not a platform for advocacy of any kind, period. By the way, I think the above could be rewritten and included, but I don't have the time and energy to do it. I hope someone else will. --LMS

I agree with Larry on this one, if the pro-life position was correctly stated. Something along the following lines would be much more accurate than what is written: "Pro-life advocates largely adhere to the view that life begins at conception. Thus abortion is considered murder, proscribed in most religious traditions."

No disputing that many pro-lifers carry an excessive amount of accessory cultural baggage that appears at least archaic if not incomprehensible to many contemporary people, but the "abortion is murder" theme is the basic issue. DMD

I think it's better now...

Superb. DMD

I didn't like Hank's evisceration of the religious basis for the pro-life argument. It is simply a fact that most pro-lifers are such for religious reasons, and it's dishonest to soft-pedal that. --LDC

Hm, but I think it has gone too far the other way now, esp. with the statement about a vague biological basis. I'm anti-abortion personally for religious reasons. I'm also against it politically, but here I switch to a biological and civil argument rather than expecting everyone to adopt my religious views. I'll put those arguments below for everyone's amusement, but the point is that I think there's a danger of taking the fact that we're religous to imply that our political argument is also fundamentally religous.

If you think its too anti-religion now I certainly won't object to a more neutral wording, so long as it is clear that the majority of of pro-lifers hold their view for religious reasons; that's simply a fact. They also _justify_ their beliefs by appeal (rational and otherwise) to non-religious argument, but that's a reaction after-the-fact. They know that religious arguments don't wash with pro-choicers, so they have to resort to non-religious arguments for a point of view that they still nonetheless hold for religious reasons.

BTW, is the pro-abortion side any more grounded biologically?

The idea of an average timeframe in which a fetus is viable isn't really disputed, nor is the idea that a fetus is always of species homo sapiens. The arguments I see from both sides tend to be on a civil rights basis, anyway. Where's the controversy (or room for vagueness) in the biology itself?

I don't think there are any arguments about the biology: the arguments are about social policy. We do want to enact social policies forbidding certain kinds of harm to certain persons in certain situations. The question is whether that desire is rationally applied to fetuses in conflict with our equally valid desire to protect the self-determination of the women carrying them.

Anyway, here's my argument from the non-religous point of view. Biologically, we're always the same species from conception. In terms of civil rights, then, to argue that babies which can't survive without mom don't warrant protection as other homo sapiens is to judge the right to life on essentially technological grounds - if somebody invented a machine which could support a 1 week old fetus outside the mother after, say, it was removed by induced labor, and then let it develop to maturity, we should then move the legal cutoff back to 1 week, since we could, with no difference to the mother, raise the child to maturity. But this philosophy says that we let the state of available technology affect what we elsewhere call inalienable rights. And how different is that from selectively offering rights based on the business concept in which one holds a receipt for purchase of a slave?

I'm certainly not arguing "technological grounds". "Viability" is certainly one other point at which we might say the state can step in, and it is perhaps a more rational one than conception, but I don't think that pro-choicers in general hang their argument on that one hook. Even if there were some technical means to bring any conception to term, I for one would certainly not require it--that would be even more horrific. The majority of conceptions have genetic defects and either never implant or are spontaneously miscarried without the woman ever knowing. It would be just as irrational to interfere with that natural process to protect every zygote as it would be to interfere by aborting every zygote.

Or even more fundamentally, in a balance between a women's freedom to choose a non-critical (to her own life or long-term health) medical procedure and the question of whether a certain creature is considered human, shouldn't we adopt a person-until-proven-otherwise attitude? Biologically, sure, there are differences in how a pre-natal fetus must be provided its oxygen and food (from an umbilical connection to its mother) and how an infant must be provided its sustenance (by being slapped on the butt and then fed by hand), but what bearing does that have on human rights? We have negligence laws for people who let infants die by not feeding them, even if they live out in the woods and can't give them away without taking a 9-month long hike to town. Here neither biology /nor/ religion are really at issue, AFAICT.

The question to ask is WHY we wish, as social policy, to protect persons from harm in ways we don't apply to other things like objects, animals, human tissues, and similar things? A dog is an aware, sentient being no less than a person, but we don't protect them unconditionally. My own skin cells are living cells with my unique DNA no less than the few cells of the zygote from which I came, yet I shed thousands of them to die regularly. What is it about people that makes us want to protect them? I think it is rational to point to things like feeling: people experience feelings, perceptions, thoughts; they have memories, opinions, intentions. Murdering a person puts an end to all those valuable things, while my shedding a few skin cells (or even killing a few brain cells with a drink) does not. Killing a cow might cause it to experience pain, but we even allow that on grounds that the benefit to society of the food is great enough to justify it. If we make these kinds of judgments about other biological things, why should we not make the same judgments about zygotes? Clearly, an 8-cell zygote that hasn't even started cell differentiation yet, and has no nerve cells, no brain, no sense organs, etc. does not possess any of those qualities--intentions, memories, thoughts--that we find special about "people", so applying the protections we grant people to those cells is as ridiculous as applying them to my skin cells. On the other hand, one might reasonably argue that an infant at some later point of development does have some of those things--so it might be reational to apply some of those protections at some point before birth. This argument has nothing to do with "viability".

So again, the question is not biology; it's social policy and religion. If you think it is rational to use force (and make no mistake--if you advocate laws, you are advocating force) to restrict a woman's freedom to protect some cells that don't have any special properties my own skin cells don't have, you must convince me WHY it is rational to do so. If your only reason is that those cells have a "soul" or something, then I remain unconvinced. --LDC

 * I think it might be helpful if we let pro-life people rather than pro-choice people characterize the pro-life position, and vice versa. Rebuttal to the pro-life positiion should be included with the pro-choice position of which it is a part, rather than inserted in the description of the pro-life position. --HWR

I wouldn't disagree--as long as you present the position honestly and accurately, that is, as long as the argument accurately reports what most people on that side of the argument actually believe and what arguments they actually use. I would expect the same from the pro-choice side. So while I, for example, do not think "viability" and "dependence" have any relevance to my position on the issue, those arguments are in fact used by many others on the pro-choice side, so I would expect them to be included here. --LDC MURDERERS

opedia article than in the arguments themselves, but as long as we're here--please don't dignify your semantic arguments by calling them "biology". Real science doesn't hide behind definitions and wordplay, but actual observable facts. Every cell of every organism has some unique feature; something that distinguishes it. "Developing organism" is meaningless; all cells develop in some way. If I put a skin cell in a Petri dish with food and water it would live, metabolize, grow, divide, and continue living and developing for many generations, no different from an amoeba or any other living cell. If I implanted into someone geneticially similar to me, it would attach itself and go to work. Unlike a fertilized egg, it will never become anything but a skin cell--but neither will an amoeba become anything but an amoeba. You can't say that, however, about cord-blood stem cells. They can develop into anything, from a heart to a brain, and they've always been discarded for all of history. If you judge the "value" or "worth" of a cell by what it can become, then cord-blood stem cells deserve equal treatment to embryonic stem cells. If you emplant a cord-blood stem cell into a developing embryo at the right stage, it will attach itself and divide and become part of the growing organism just like any of the other cells, and the embryo will grow up to be a genetic chimera (which occur naturally from time to time as well).

If you don't want to use the word "soul", then tell me why you seem to think that (1) there is some definition of "life"--using only physically observable facts of nature--that applies to a newly fertilized zygote that does not apply to a cord-blood stem cell; or (2) why you think it is rational to apply laws designed to protect "people" from harm to entities that have no means of experiencing harm or anything else. You can't even say that a zygote is unique in that it can become a human being while other cells can't--that's not true anymore. Somatic cells can be cloned and develop into full organisms. And you certainly can't say that clones won't have rights--because then natural identical twins wouldn't either. --LDC

 * As I said, each human life begins at conception. This is a basic fact of human reproductive biology. Natural conception results from the union of parental gametes, but it may also be possible to achieve conception through various artificial cell manipulations. In either case, a human life is created. A zygote does not "become" a human being, it "is" a human being. (This would be true of zygotes produced by cloning as well as fertilization.) A human life is not a property (or a potential), it is a process. The beginning of that process is conception. -- HWR

That's not a fact, it's a definition. Definitions aren't facts, they're just semantic games. If that's the way you want to play it, then fine--I totally concede your definition of "human life" to include zygotes (although you don't specify at what point that achieve this--"conception" is not a point, it is itself a multi-stage process). It's also clearly a mistake to say that anything is "created" at conception--a fertilized egg does not contain any atoms or energy that didn't already exist in the gametes, so I fail to see your point there. But so what? That's just a definition, it doesn't actually say anything. Your argument seems to be: (1) "Human life" includes people at all stages of development; (2) The state should step in to protect "human life"; (3) Therefore, the state should protect zygotes. Premise 1 is a completely rational definition, and I think many pro-choicers would even agree. But then premise 2 becomes false, because the majority of people don't believe that the state should protect zygotes at the expense of their mother's autonomy. So in order to make your argument work, you must explain why premise 2 remains true under your definition of life that includes zygotes, using real political arguments, not just sematic wordplay. Until you do that, you're just blowing hot air.

Secondly, all of this belongs on commentary pages. The "Abortion" page should report on the basics of the arguments, and maybe even link to some more detailed ones, but it should not contain the arguments themselves. --LDC

I agree that the debate itself should happen here. Deciding how to characterize the positions from a neutral point of view is a tricky one, though, and I like the suggestion that it represent the most common arguments from each side, whether they be religous or whatever. I started looking around for demographic info, but so far the normal rhetoric is all I'm finding. Anybody know of sources which have attempted to survey how many people hold a particular view on abortion? -J

http://blackgenocide.org/sayso_video.html Genocide against African-American people through abortion. If this short blurb survives the Stalinist Left cleaner squads at this depth of removal from the main "Abortion" entry, I'll come back and put more work into an article. Get tired of putting in much time and work only to have *those* come in and undo it. When *is* this going to be a democratically assembled encyclopedia, anyway?

pretending neutrality
Hi,

It is not acceptable that this encyclopedia claims to be neutral since it is most definetely biased. I have read two articles now and I am very disappointed. Take the article about abortion for instance. It does not even attempt to make the positive case for abortion even though it pays considerable attention on the possibly real and totally fabricated or not generally accepted drawbacks of abortion. Instead, those who support abortion rights are labelled as hardcore feminists who have some totally twisted views about nature. In addition, the completely biased author cannot even stop himself from attacking this position in a section where he is supposed to make the pro-abortion case. I for one support abortion rights on some very real and reasonable philosophical basis, (since I think doctrinal religions are a fairy tale comparable to believing in the ancient Greek gods) and I am not certainly not a woman. I am not an extremist though since I am completely willing to admit that abortion can be physically dangerous and emotionally difficult to go through for the woman especially. What I cannot stand is mispresentation, exaggerating and lying in order to support some teleological ideologies or religions. Given the nature of this "neutral" encyclopedia, I do realise I am probably wasting my time writing this. It is most likely to be removed as a bad edit or something. Or what I am writing will at least be denied in some unlikely way. It is a crazy old world this one, especially in the US.

Tommi I love Babies Finland

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Abortion/Archive 1


text:
Schenck v. United States

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., concluded that Charles Schenck and other defendants, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished.

The Court followed this reasoning to uphold a series of convictions arising out of prosecutions during wartime, but Holmes began to dissent in the case of Abrams v. United States, insisting that the Court had departed from the standard he had crafted for them and had begun to allow punishment for ideas. In 1969, Schenck was largely overturned by Brandenburg v. Ohio, which limited the scope of speech that the government may ban to that directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action (e.g. a riot).

Background
Schenck was the first in a line of Supreme Court cases defining the modern understanding of the First Amendment. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote the often-cited opinion. The United States' entry into the First World War had caused deep divisions in society and was vigorously opposed, especially by socialists, pacifists, isolationists, and those who had ties to Germany. The Wilson administration launched a broad campaign of criminal enforcement that resulted in thousands of prosecutions. Many of these were for trivial acts of dissent that today would be protected by the First Amendment.

In the first case arising from this campaign to come before the CourtBaltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593 (1918)South Dakota farmers had signed a petition criticizing their governor's administration of the draft, threatening him with defeat at the polls. They were charged with obstructing the recruitment and enlistment service, and convicted. When a majority of the Court voted during their conference to affirm the conviction, Holmes quickly drafted and circulated a strongly worded dissenting opinion:"Real obstructions of the law, giving real aid and comfort to the enemy, I should have been glad to see punished more summarily and severely than they sometimes were. But I think that our intention to put out all our powers in aid of success in war should not hurry us into intolerance of opinions and speech that could not be imagined to do harm, although opposed to our own. It is better for those who have unquestioned and almost unlimited power in their hands to err on the side of freedom."Rather than proceed in the face of Holmes's biting dissent, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White set the case aside. Word of the situation evidently reached the Administration, because it abandoned the prosecution. White then asked Holmes to write the opinion for a unanimous Court in the next case, one in which they could agree, Schenck v. United States. Holmes wrote that opinion and wrote again for a unanimous court upholding convictions in two more cases that spring, Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States, establishing the standard for deciding the constitutionality of criminal convictions based on expressive behavior. Holmes disliked legislative-style formulas, and he did not repeat the language of "clear and present danger" in any subsequent opinion, however. Schenck alone accordingly is often cited as the source of this legal standard, and some scholars have suggested that Holmes changed his mind and offered a different view in his equally famous dissent in Abrams v. United States. The events leading to the assignment of the Schenck opinion to Holmes were discovered when Holmes's biographer Sheldon Novick unearthed the unpublished Baltzer opinion among Holmes's papers at Harvard Law School.

The facts of the Schenck case were as follows. Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were members of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party in Philadelphia, of which Schenck was General Secretary. The executive committee authorized, and Schenck oversaw, printing and mailing more than 15,000 fliers to men slated for conscription during World War I. The fliers urged men not to submit to the draft, saying "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," and urged men not to comply with the draft on the grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.

After jury trials Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating Section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917. Both defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that their conviction, and the statute which purported to authorize it, were contrary to the First Amendment. They relied heavily on the text of the First Amendment, and their claim that the Espionage Act of 1917 had what today one would call a "chilling effect" on free discussion of the war effort.

The Court's decision
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., held that Schenck's criminal conviction was constitutional. The statute only applied to successful obstructions of the draft, but common-law precedents allowed prosecution for attempts that were dangerously close to success. Attempts made by speech or writing could be punished like other attempted crimes; the First Amendment did not protect speech encouraging men to resist induction, because, "when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." In other words, the court held, the circumstances of wartime allow greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowed during peacetime, if only because new and greater dangers are present.

The opinion's most famous and most often quoted passage was this: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. ... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." The phrase "shouting fire in a crowded theater" has since become a popular metaphor for the dangers or limitations of free speech, even though Holmes limited it to "falsely" shouting and did not specify a "crowded" theater.

Subsequent jurisprudence
In subsequent cases, when it appeared to him that the Court was departing from the precedents established in Schenck and companion cases, Holmes dissented, reiterating his view that expressions of honest opinion were entitled to near absolute protection, but that expressions made with the specific intent to cause a criminal harm, or that threatened a clear and present danger of such harm, could be punished. In Abrams v. United States, he elaborated on the common-law privileges for freedom of speech and of the press, and stated his conviction that freedom of opinion was central to the constitutional scheme because competition in the "marketplace" of ideas was the best test of their truth. In Whitney v. California (1927), concerning a conviction for seditious speech forbidden by California law, Holmes joined a concurring opinion written by Justice Louis D. Brandeis once again explaining the clear-and-present-danger standard for criminal attempts in these terms, reiterating the argument that political speech was protected because of the value of democratic deliberation. The Supreme Court continued to affirm convictions for seditious speech in a series of prosecutions of leftists, however, culminating in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) in which a bitterly divided Court upheld the sedition convictions for the leaders of the Communist Party. Judge Learned Hand in the court below and Chief Justice Vinson for the plurality in the Supreme Court cited Schenck, and the language of "clear and present danger" accordingly fell into disfavor among the advocates of free speech and freedom of the press.

A unanimous Court in a brief per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), abandoned the disfavored language while seemingly applying the reasoning of Schenck to reverse the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member prosecuted for giving an inflammatory speech. The Court said that speech could be prosecuted only when it posed a danger of "imminent lawless action," a formulation that is sometimes said to reflect Holmes' reasoning as more fully explicated in his Abrams dissent, rather than the common law of attempts explained in Schenck. Brandenburg is also taken to have repudiated the clear-and-present-danger standard as construed in Dennis, and to have adopted something more like the explication given by Holmes and Brandeis in subsequent opinions. Partly because the standard for protecting expressive behavior under the First Amendment was stated differently in his different opinions, "revisionist" scholars have argued that Holmes changed his mind in the summer of 1919, and that after writing three opinions for a unanimous court, he stated a different and more liberal view in his Abrams dissent a few weeks later. Bolstered by this argument, a number of advocates for freedom of expression have insisted that the Supreme Court has rejected Schenck and the majority opinion in Abrams, and in practice has followed the reasoning of Holmes' Abrams dissent and Brandeis' and Holmes' concurring opinion in Whitney.

title: Schenck v. United States


text:
Talk:Monotonicity

There are now two articles on monotonicity, the other one being monotonic function. Monotonic function is more extensive and contains the general definitions. It might therefore be good to include the "monotonicity" article into the structure of "monotonic function".

I also do not know about the definitions given here: where do we actually deal with "commensurate difference functions" and "equal monotonicity" (which is clearly different from monotonicity in the general sense)? Are there examples? Is this generally accepted terminology (reference books?)? The given notion of "convergence" also needs some explanation/motivation: Where is it applied? How does it compare to all the other concepts of convergence in mathematics?

There is also a problem with redirects. We cannot redirect "monotone function" to "monotonicity" if there is some "monotonic function".

--Markus Krötzsch 13:31, 21 Mar 2004 (UTC)

 * Fixed the redirects and links to this page. Actually all links to this page really wanted the monotonicity from order theory as given in monotonic function or the calculus version (also given there). No articles seem to refer to the actual content of this page here... --Markus Krötzsch 14:17, 21 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Thanks for the correction, Frank  W ~@) R 05:05 Jan 14, 2003 (UTC).

This article needs: -- Tarquin 17:03 Jan 14, 2003 (UTC)
 * 1) a layperson-frienldy intro
 * 2) a section of monotonic sequences, which is probalby the number one referrer to the page

This page makes little sense
This page makes little sense to me.

 * 1) "Monotonicity" should point to monotonic function (in fact one could make an argument that "monotonic function" should be renamed to "monotonicity", and "monotonic function" should redirect to it.)
 * 2) It introduces terminology "equal monotonicity" and "opposite monotonicity", which I've never heard used before. The usual terms are "monotone" (or "order-preserving) and "antitone" (or "order-reversing") respectively.
 * 3) It uses an odd definition for monotonicity: x < y -> f(x) ≤ f(y) instead of the usual (and equivalent): x ≤ y  -> f(x) ≤ f(y).
 * 4) It defines a generalized notion of convergence for functions between posets. However I've never seen this definition before and I wonder where this definition has been used before.

I propose the following:

 * 1) Merge with Monotonic function whatever needs merging from this article. (I've already merged, and generaslized, the bit about constant maps — the only part which seems relevant to me.)
 * 2) If the generaslized convergence stuff is important, then either merge it with limit (mathematics) say, or move it to it's own article perhaps.
 * 3) Redirect this article to monotonic function.

Comments? Paul August ☎ 16:52, Mar 8, 2005 (UTC)

 * I don't find the "odd" definition so odd; the two definitions mentioned are obviously exactly equivalent. Also, the terms "monotone increasing" and "monotone decreasing" are commonplace, but I've seldom heard or seen "antitone". Michael Hardy 02:12, 9 Mar 2005 (UTC)

 * The reason probably is that "monotone decreasing" is far more common in functional analysis, while it is typically not used in order or lattice theory. Other names which are also common in the latter areas are "order-reversing" and "anti-monotone". Etymologically, "antitone" probably is derived from the latter of these, and may thus be the youngest of these terms. I like it because (a) its short and (b) it has a unique spelling (computer searches may care if someone searches "order reversing" instead of "order-reversing") (c) there is no other notion named like this. --Markus Krötzsch 14:44, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Regarding Paul's 4 objections:
 * 1) The good article title is Monotonic function (or Monotone function, if that's more common), since this is a more concrete idea (than the abstract property of monotonicity).
 * 2) This terminology (using the noun "monotony" rather than "monotonicity", BTW ) seems to have been introduced to Wikipedia by Fwappler. Normally I'd say, ask the original editor where they got the terms, so that we can correctly cite their usage. In Fwappler's case, however ... well, let me just say that in the decade that I've known him online, I've seen him use more nonstandard terminology than standard (and not just in mathematics). Since he hasn't been active lately, I wouldn't bother trying very hard to document those terms.
 * 3) I agree with Michael that this definition is not particularly odd. Still, it's inferior to the version that uses ≤ in the antecedent because (if for no other reason) you need ≤ for constructivist analysis. (As a part-time constructivist, at least I think that this is important ^_^.)
 * 4) This is the one thing of real value, IMO, in the current article. I IRC , you can find this documented (albeit not in quite the same form) in Handbook of Analysis and its Foundations , by Eric Schechter.

Regarding Paul's 3 proposals:
 * 1) This is the obvious right thing to do.
 * 2) Depending on room, this could be a section in Monotonic function or an article linked from Monotonic function; in either case, there should also be a link from Limit (mathematics).
 * 3) Yes, I think that Monotonic function is the best title.

-- Toby Bartels 01:11, 2005 Mar 11 (UTC)

Thanks Michael Hardy and [User:Toby Bartels|Toby Bartels]] for your comments.

Based on the comments so far, what I would do is simply make this page a redirect to monotonicity, and since Toby thinks that the generalized convergence bit is worth keeping, find a home for it. The only remaining question for me then is where should it go?:

 * Monotonic function?
 * Limit (mathematics)?
 * Its own page? what title?

Paul August ☎ 23:15, Mar 11, 2005 (UTC)

I think that Order convergence would be the right title for its own page -- I've seen that phrase before. The material could probably be placed on any of those three pages, as long as each of them linked to the material. Perhaps the cleanest solution is to rename this page Order convergence, remove the redundant material, and create appropriate links. -- Toby Bartels 23:36, 2005 Mar 12 (UTC)

Removing the redundant content from this article leaves the following:

(Beginning of quoted text)

The notion of monotonicity allows one to express the principal instances of convergence (to a limit):

Given that a commensurate difference relation is defined between the members of S; that is, such that for any four (not necessarily distinct) members g, h, j, and k of S, either g − h ≤ j − k, or g − h ≥ j − k, and given that M from T to S is a map of equal monotonicity, then the values M(s) are called converging (to an upper limit), as the argument s increases, if either:
 * the set T has a last and largest member (which M maps explicitly to the corresponding limit value l in set S); or
 * for each member m of T, there exists a member  m such that for any two further members x > y with y > n, M(n) − M(m) ≥ M(x) − M(y).

As far as the set of all values M(s) does therefore have an upper bound (either within set S, or besides), and as far as every set which is bounded (from above) does have a least upper bound l, the values M(s) are called converging to the upper limit l as the argument s increases.

Similarly one may consider convergence of the values M(s) to a lower limit, as the argument s decreases; as well as convergence involving maps of opposite monotonicity.

(End of quoted text)

If I were going to try to turn the above into its own article with the title of "Order convergence" as suggested by Toby above, I would create something like the following:

(beginning of new text)

In mathematics, order convergence is a generalized notion of convergence defined for partially ordered sets.

Suppose that T and S are partially ordered sets, and f : T → S, is a order-preserving function, that is x ≤ y implies that f(x) ≤ f(y), and that a commensurate difference relation is defined between the members of S; that is, for any four (not necessarily distinct) members g, h, j, and k of S, either g − h ≤ j − k, or g − h ≥ j − k, then the values f(x) are said to converge (to an upper limit), as the argument x increases, if either:
 * the set T has a last and largest member (which f maps explicitly to the corresponding limit value L in S); or
 * for each member m of T, there exists a member n > m such that for any two further members x > y with y > n, f(n) − f(m) ≥ f(x) − f(y).

As far as the set of all values f(x) does therefore have an upper bound (either within set S, or besides), and as far as every set which is bounded (from above) does have a least upper bound L, the values f(x) are called converging to the upper limit L as the argument x increases.

Similarly one may consider convergence of the values f(x) to a lower limit, as the argument x decreases; as well as convergence involving order-reversing maps.

(end of new text)

I would also spend more time reworking the above (since in my view it could be worded better). However I'm flying blind here, as I'm unfamiliar with this concept. Googling for "order convergence", I do see the term used, but I can't find a definition, and none of my books mentions it or anything like it. Consequently I'm not comfortable making such a change.

What I would like to do is make this article a redirect to Monotonic function — and let other, more competent editors, either create a new article from the above or rename (and make appropriate changes to) this article and create a new article titled "Monotonicity" which redirects to Monotonic function.

Paul August ☎ 14:39, Mar 13, 2005 (UTC)

 * I completely agree with the objections and the proposed solution. Someone be bold please. --Markus Krötzsch 14:44, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I have now made this page a redirect to Monotonic function. Paul August ☎ 20:46, Mar 14, 2005 (UTC)

title: Talk:Monotonicity


text:
Chambers v. Florida

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the extent to which police pressure resulting in a criminal defendant's confession violates the Due Process Clause.

Case
The case was argued on January 6, 1940, in front of the court by S.D. McGill, a Black civil rights attorney involved with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, representing four black men convicted for the murder of a white man in Florida. McGill, joined by Leon A. Ransom of the NAACP National Legal Committee, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. Thurgood Marshall, special counsel for the NAACP, appeared on the defendants’ brief but did not participate in the courtroom arguments.

The defendant Chambers, along with three other co-defendants, were four of up to forty transient black men arrested for the murder of Robert Darcy, an elderly local man, in Pompano Beach, Florida. The community was outraged by the murder, and the Broward County Sheriff's department was apparently under pressure to close the case. Chambers and the other defendants were taken to Miami for questioning, ostensibly to protect them from the mob that had formed, and then to Fort Lauderdale.

The state did not contest that the defendants were held without access to legal counsel, and were not arraigned for a week. They were subjected to questioning on a random basis, often alone in a room with up to ten police officers and other members of the community. In the legal climate before Miranda, they were not informed of their right to remain silent. After a week of questioning, and despite previous denials, the four co-defendants eventually confessed to the crime and were convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Their convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Decision
On February 13, 1940, the court delivered its ruling. The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Hugo Black of Alabama.

This was Marshall's first of many triumphs in front of the nation's highest tribunal; the Court ruled in favor of the defendants, and overturned their convictions. The court found that on the facts admitted by the police and sheriff's officers, the confessions had clearly been compelled and were therefore inadmissible. It marked one of the first times that the court had accepted the contention that treatment short of physical violence should result in the suppression of evidence.

Several of the features of this case, such as not allowing defendants to contact anyone, holding them without formal charges or arraignment, and denying them counsel during questioning were common tactics in law enforcement at the time and were eventually rejected by the court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), a case in which Marshall argued on behalf of the United States government as Solicitor General of the United States.

Aftermath
In subsequent proceedings before the Florida courts, the indictment against the defendants was quashed on the ground that blacks had been arbitrarily and intentionally excluded from the grand jury.

title: Chambers v. Florida


text:
1993 Long Island Rail Road shooting

On December 7, 1993, a mass shooting occurred aboard a Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) train in Garden City Park, New York, United States. As the train arrived at the Merillon Avenue station, passenger Colin Ferguson began firing at other passengers with a semi-automatic pistol. Six of the victims were killed and nineteen others were wounded before Ferguson was tackled and held down by other passengers on the train.

Ferguson's trial was noted for a number of unusual developments, including him dismissing his defense counsel, insisting on representing himself and questioning his victims on the stand. He was convicted in February 1995 on six counts of murder and nineteen counts of attempted murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He is currently incarcerated at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, with an earliest possible release date of August 6, 2309.

Shooting
On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson boarded the 5:33 p.m. eastbound train at Penn Station in Manhattan, New York, which stopped at the Jamaica station in Queens. He boarded the third car of the eastbound Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter train from Penn Station to Hicksville, along with more than eighty other passengers. He sat on the southwestern end of the car, carrying a Ruger P89 semi-automatic pistol and a canvas bag filled with 160 rounds of ammunition.

As the train approached the Merillon Avenue station in Garden City Park, Long Island, Ferguson drew the gun, dropped several cartridges on the ground, stood up, and opened fire at random. During the next three minutes, he killed six people and injured another nineteen. Some passengers mistook the gunshots for caps or fireworks until a woman shouted, "He's got a gun! He's shooting people!" Ferguson walked east (forward) on the train, pulling the trigger steadily about every half second. Several passengers tried to hide beneath their seats, while others fled to the eastern end of the train and tried to enter the next car. Ferguson walked down the aisle of the train and shot people to his right and left as he passed each seat, briefly facing each victim before firing. An article in The New York Times called Ferguson's actions "as methodical as if he were taking tickets." Ferguson said, "I'm going to get you," over and over as he walked down the aisle.

Other passengers farther away in the train did not realize that a shooting had occurred until after the train stopped, as a crowd of panicked passengers fled from the third car into neighboring cars. One man appeared annoyed by their unruliness and said, "Be calm," before they forced a train door open and fled into the station. Two people were injured in the stampede of passengers. The train's conductor was informed of the shooting, but he decided against opening the train doors right away because two of the cars were not yet at the platform. An announcement was made ordering conductors not to open the doors, but engineer Thomas Silhan climbed out the window of his cab and opened each door from the outside so that panicked passengers could escape.

Ferguson had emptied two 15-round magazines during the shooting. While he was reloading his third magazine, somebody yelled, "Grab him!" Passengers Michael O'Connor, Kevin Blum, and Mark McEntee tackled him and pinned him to one of the train's seats. Several other passengers ran forward to grab his arms and legs and helped to pin him across a three-seat row with his head towards the window and legs towards the aisle. While he was pinned, Ferguson said, "Oh God, what did I do? What did I do? I deserve whatever I get." He also repeatedly pleaded with those holding him, "Don't shoot me. I'm sorry, I'm sorry." Five to six people continued to hold him pinned for several minutes while they awaited relief. Andrew Roderick, an off-duty LIRR police officer who was picking up his wife from the train, then boarded the train and handcuffed him. Of the people who were killed, five died on the day of the shooting while the sixth died five days later. The deceased victims ranged in ages 24 to 52.

Investigation
Police detectives later said it appeared Ferguson had been planning the shooting for more than a week. LIRR police chief Joseph Flynn said, "This was the work of a deranged, maniacal person who for a variety of reasons decided to explode." None of Ferguson's victims were Black, although it was unclear whether any other Black passengers were aboard the train. Ferguson showed no emotion as he sat in the back of a police car, which some passengers said was as shocking and disturbing as the violence of the shooting itself. Upon seeing Ferguson, one of the victims became hysterical and shouted, "How can he be sitting there so calm after everything he did?"

Police found pieces of notebook paper in Ferguson's pockets with scribbled notes with the heading "reasons for this". One of the notes referred to "racism by Caucasians and Uncle Tom Negroes". They included a reference to "the false allegations against me by the filthy Caucasian racist female on the #1 line", a reference to his February 1992 arrest. Ferguson's notes expressed anger towards the New York State Workers' Compensation Board, Asians, Governor Mario Cuomo, and "so-called civil right leaders such as the Rev. Herbert Daughtry, C. Vernon Mason, and Calvin Butts." They also included the names and telephone numbers of the Lt. Governor, the Attorney General, and the Manhattan law firm that Ferguson had previously threatened, whom he referred to as "those corrupt 'black' attorneys who not only refuse to help me but tried to steal my car". The notes indicated Ferguson planned to wait to start the killings until he was beyond the New York City limit out of respect for outgoing Mayor David Dinkins and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.

Ferguson showed no remorse during hours of questioning from the Nassau County District Attorney's Office. Officials there said, "He was lucid and clear and aware of what was going on." Ferguson was arraigned on December 8, 1993. He never spoke during the arraignment and did not enter a plea. He was ordered held without bail. As Ferguson was escorted from the courthouse, a reporter asked him if he hated whites, to which Ferguson replied, "It's a lie".

Perpetrator
Colin Ferguson was born in Kingston, Jamaica, on January 14, 1958 to Von Herman and May Ferguson. Von Herman was a wealthy pharmacist and the managing director of the large pharmaceutical company Hercules Agencies, and was described by Time magazine as "one of the most prominent businessmen in Jamaica". Ferguson attended the Calabar High School in Red Hills Road, Kingston, from 1969 to 1974, where the principal described him as a "well-rounded student" who played cricket and soccer. He graduated in the top third of his class.

Von Herman was killed in a car crash in 1978 when Ferguson was aged 20, and his funeral was attended by government and military luminaries. Ferguson's mother died from cancer soon afterwards, and the deaths destroyed the family's fortunes. Family friends said that this deeply disturbed Ferguson. He moved to the United States in 1982 on a visitor's visa. His friends speculated that he had trouble dealing with racism in the U.S. and that he felt frustrated because he couldn't find work outside of menial jobs.

Ferguson married Audrey Warren on May 13, 1986, a native of Southampton County, Virginia, which qualified him for permanent U.S. residence. The couple moved to a house on Long Island where they often fought, sometimes to the point that police intervention was required. On May 18, 1988, she obtained an uncontested divorce from Ferguson, claiming that the marriage ended because they had "differing social views". Acquaintances said that she left Ferguson because he was "too aggressive or antagonistic" for her, and that the divorce was a "crushing blow" to Ferguson.

Ferguson got a job doing clerical work for the Ademco Security Group in Syosset, New York. He slipped and fell on August 18, 1989, while standing on a stool to reach invoices from a filing cabinet, injuring his head, neck, and back, and the injury led to his termination. Ferguson filed a complaint with the state workers' compensation agency, which reviewed the matter over the next several years. He enrolled at Nassau Community College in East Garden City, where he made the dean's list three times. Also that year, he was forced to leave a class after a disciplinary hearing board found that he had acted overly aggressive towards the teacher.

In late 1990, Ferguson transferred to Adelphi University in Garden City, where he majored in business administration. He spoke out against coexistence with whites, routinely made calls for retributive revolution, and regularly accused others around him of racism. On one occasion, he complained that a white woman in the library shouted racial epithets at him after he asked her about a class assignment, but an investigation concluded that the incident never occurred. Later, he attended a symposium by a faculty member discussing her experiences in South Africa under apartheid. Ferguson interrupted the professor by shouting, "We should be talking about the revolution in South Africa and how to get rid of the white people" and, "Kill everybody white!" Students and teachers tried to quiet him, but he started threatening them, repeatedly saying, "The black revolution will get you." He was suspended from the school in June 1991 as a result of the threats. Although he was free to reapply after the suspension, he chose not to.

In 1991, Ferguson rented a room in Flatbush, Brooklyn. He was unemployed and lived around many other West Indian immigrants. Neighbors said that he dressed very neatly but kept to himself and rarely smiled or spoke to anybody, except occasionally to say hello. "He had delusions of grandeur," his landlord Patrick Denis recounted. "He felt like, 'I'm such a great person. There must be only one thing holding me back. It must be white people.'" In 1992, Ferguson's ex-wife filed a complaint with police alleging that he pried open the trunk of her car. Prior to the shooting, she had not seen him since the divorce.

In February 1992, Ferguson was arrested and charged with harassing a woman on a subway. The woman tried to sit in a vacant seat alongside Ferguson and asked him to move over, prompting him to scream at her and press his leg and elbow against her until police officers pinned him to the ground. Ferguson tried to escape the police and shouted, "Brothers, come help me!" He sent letters to the New York City Police Commissioner and other officials complaining about his arrest, describing it as "viscous [sic] and racist," and claiming that he was brutalized by the officers who arrested him. The New York City Transit Authority investigated and dismissed the claims.

In September 1992, Ferguson was awarded $26,250 for his workers' compensation claim against Ademco Security Group. In April 1993, he insisted that he was still in pain and demanded that the case be reopened so that he could get more money for medical treatment. In the following weeks, Ferguson visited a Manhattan law firm for a consultation, and attorney Lauren Abramson said that she immediately felt uncomfortable and threatened by him. She asked a law clerk to sit in on the meeting because she did not want to be alone with Ferguson, which she had never done before. Ferguson was neatly dressed during the consultation, but he acted strangely and identified himself by a false name before providing his real name. Months later, he made threatening calls to members of the firm, claiming that they were discriminating against him. In one of the calls, he made reference to a massacre which occurred in California. The calls prompted the lawyers to start locking their inner office doors out of fear. Ferguson tried to have his workers' compensation claim reopened by the New York State Workers' Compensation Board, which reexamined the case due to his persistence, but it was ultimately rejected. The board placed him on a list of potentially dangerous people whom security guards were to watch for.

In April 1993, Ferguson moved to California in search of new career opportunities. He unsuccessfully applied for several jobs, including at a car wash where the manager laughed at him. Ferguson purchased a Ruger P89 9×19mm pistol at a Turner's Outdoorsman in Long Beach for $400 after waiting the fifteen-day period required under California's gun laws. He presented himself as a California resident by providing a driver's license that he received two months earlier, which had an address of the Long Beach motel where he stayed. He had been robbed by two men, so he started carrying the gun with him in a paper bag. Ferguson moved back to New York in May 1993 because, as he told a friend, he did not like competing with immigrants and Hispanics for jobs. His Flatbush landlord said that he appeared even more unstable upon his return, speaking in the third person about "some apocryphal-type doom scenario" which included black people rising up and striking down "their pompous rulers and oppressors." Ferguson started taking five showers a day and could be heard by neighbors repeatedly chanting at night "all the black people killing all the white people." His landlord became increasingly concerned about Ferguson's obsession with racism and apparent growing mental instability, and asked him to move out by the end of the month.

Early court appearances
Anthony J. Falanga was appointed Ferguson's attorney on December 11, 1993. Falanga called for his client to receive a psychiatric evaluation. Under New York state law, an insanity defense would require Ferguson's lawyers to prove he suffers from a mental disease or defect and, as a result, could not tell whether his actions were right or wrong. At the time, lawyers and mental health experts said such a defense would be difficult because Ferguson appeared to have carefully planned the attacks, and because he said, "oh God, what did I do" after he was stopped. However, media outlets and legal experts at the time speculated a defense could argue Ferguson suffered from paranoia, particularly based on Ferguson's history of irrational racism allegations and claims that whites were discriminating against him. Ferguson was placed on suicide watch in the Nassau County Jail.

On December 18, 1993 Ferguson asked a judge to let him replace Falanga with Colin A. Moore, a Brooklyn-based attorney with a reputation for pursuing allegations of racism in the criminal-justice system. Moore offered to represent Ferguson pro bono. Before a ruling was even made on the request, Moore held a press conference announcing he would seek a change of venue to Brooklyn, claiming it was impossible for Ferguson to receive a fair trial in a Nassau court due to a "severe underrepresentation of African-Americans on the Nassau County jury panel." Later, Moore withdrew his offer to represent Ferguson, citing conflicts he did not explain. Ferguson told a judge he questioned Falanga's integrity, disagreed with his handling of the case and had no intention of cooperating with him. Dr. Allen Reichman, a psychiatrist who interviewed Ferguson, indicated in his report that Ferguson may have been feigning mental illness when he spoke of conspiracies against him. Reichman said Ferguson's assertions were "vague and somewhat evasive," in contrast to the normally detailed and highly focused nature of systematized paranoid delusional thinking. On January 5, 1994, a report by a court-appointed psychologist and psychiatrist concluded Ferguson was suffering from paranoid personality disorder but was competent to stand trial.

Indictment
On January 19, 1994, after three days of evidence presentation, a grand jury handed up a 93-count indictment against Ferguson, which carried the possibility of up to 175 years in prison. Nassau County District Attorney Denis Dillon said of the sentence maximum; "it's not quite infinity, but it will do." Dillon also announced he would not agree to any plea bargain in the case. The indictment included two counts of murder for each slain victim, both for intentional murder and for depraved indifference to human life. It also included 19 counts of attempted murder, 34 counts of assault, criminal possession of a weapon, intent to use the weapon, violation of civil rights of each of the 25 victims and "intent to harass, annoy, threaten and alarm" the victims "because of their race, color or national origin."

On March 1, 1994, William Kunstler and Ron Kuby, law partners known for representing unpopular clients, announced they had accepted a request by Ferguson to handle his case. Kunstler, who said he would not collect a fee for the defense, said Ferguson had been made out to be a "pariah" by the media and public. In April 1994, District Attorney Dillon sought a gag order for all lawyers involved in the case, arguing Kunstler and Kuby had made statements to the media that might be inadmissible during the trial and could influence potential jurors. Kunstler and Kuby argued they would have no problem finding 12 unbiased jurors and claimed Ferguson had already been publicly attacked in the press by government and police officials. Nassau County Judge Donald E. Belfi rejected the gag order on April 23, claiming the impact of inflammatory statements already made by lawyers, politicians and police would fade in the months before the trial began. However, Belfi warned attorneys from both sides to follow a State Court professional disciplinary rule which already limited their comments to news organizations.

Prison attacks
Shortly after his incarceration began, Ferguson complained about his treatment, claiming correction officers attacked him with milk crates and a fire extinguisher, while depriving him of necessities like soap and antiperspirant spray. Ferguson said: "Of course, there is no sympathy for me in the institution. When I suffered and screamed I was told that it was a good sign by the prison guards because they were hoping for my swift departure from life." Later, Ron Kuby argued Ferguson had been a frequent target of harassment at the Nassau County jail, and requested that the United States Department of Justice intervene to ensure Ferguson's safety.

On March 23, 1994, while returning to his cell from the medical unit, Ferguson was attacked in jail by a group of inmates. Ferguson suffered a broken nose and a swollen left eye. Prison officials had been notified by Kuby that an assault was imminent, and were in the process of following up on the warning when Ferguson was attacked. Kuby, who said he had been warned of the attack by another inmate, stated "the word was out. Everyone in the institution knew he was going to be set up." Kuby called the attack racially motivated, and later alleged some jail officials and guards had advance knowledge of the impending assault. Five inmates were charged with second-degree assault for their connection in the attack.

In November 1994, Ferguson's lawyers claimed prison guards taunted him with claims that the election of Governor George Pataki, a death penalty supporter, meant Ferguson would be executed if found guilty. Ferguson's lawyers claimed prison guards showed him the headlines of newspaper stories about Pataki and claimed Ferguson was "headed for electrocution sometime soon." Ferguson was deeply troubled by the claims, despite assurances from his attorneys that the death penalty could only be imposed in crimes committed after a capital punishment bill became law. Ferguson was not reassured until after a judge told him the same thing, at the request of Kunstler.

"Black rage" defense
Kunstler and Kuby proposed an innovative defense: Ferguson had been driven to temporary insanity by a psychiatric condition they termed "black rage". Kunstler and Kuby argued Ferguson had been driven insane by racial prejudice and could not be held criminally liable for his actions, even though he had committed the killings. The attorneys compared it to the utilization of the battered woman defense, posttraumatic stress disorder, and the child abuse syndrome in other cases to negate criminal liability. Kuby said the notes carried by Ferguson on the day of his arrest demonstrated that Ferguson was motivated by rage during the shootings. Donald E. Belfi, the Nassau County Judge assigned to the Ferguson case, criticized Kunstler for speaking to the media about the proposed defense before it had been examined by a mental health professional. Belfi said "Mr. Kunstler may have many talents, but until he receives his medical degree with a specialty in psychiatry, these types of conclusions should best be left for medical experts and the triers of the facts."

Black rage was first proposed by psychologists William Henry Grier and Price Cobbs in their 1968 book, Black Rage (ISBN 1-57910-349-9). Grier and Cobbs argue that black people living in a racist, white supremacist society are psychologically damaged by the effects of racist oppression. They argue that this damage causes black people to act abnormally in certain situations.

Ferguson started to claim he was not involved in the Long Island Rail Road shootings at all, and repeatedly refused to meet with a psychiatrist chosen by Kunstler and Kuby. Ferguson told the attorneys he was receiving messages straight from God, and spoke of conspiracies to destroy him by those opposed to God. On August 12, 1994, Kunstler and Kuby asked Judge Belfi to reconsider Ferguson's competence to stand trial, claiming he was growing more delusional, paranoid and obsessive by the day, and that he was too mentally unbalanced for them to mount any kind of defense. George Peck, the prosecutor in Ferguson's trial, insisted Ferguson's apparent lack of cooperation with his lawyers was a defense tactic to avoid a trial.

On August 20, 1994, Ferguson appeared before Belfi and rejected his lawyer's efforts to have him declared mentally unfit to stand trial. Ferguson spoke in a long and rambling manner, occasionally ignoring Belfi when the judge tried to interrupt him. Ferguson claimed a police officer who escorted him from the Nassau County Jail said to him, "You realize someone else, in fact, was actually responsible for the shooting." When asked if Ferguson understood the role of the prosecuting attorney, Ferguson replied; "to perpetrate injustices against me". Kunstler and Kuby argued Ferguson's behavior was indicative of his mental imbalance, but Belfi refused the lawyers' request to reconsider his competence, citing the original psychiatric report that concluded Ferguson was able to understand the charges against him and was "malingering in an attempt to create an impression" that he was mentally imbalanced and unable to cooperate with his attorney. When Belfi ended the proceeding, Ferguson tried to continue talking. After he was placed into handcuffs by guards, Ferguson shouted "they have made it too tight," collapsed to the floor, and had to be dragged from the courtroom. Denis Dillon suggested Kunstler was trying to create "such a bizarre situation" that the court would reverse its earlier ruling regarding Ferguson's competence.

Removal of Kunstler and Kuby
On September 20, 1994, Kunstler and Kuby filed notice that they would pursue an insanity defense despite the objections of their client. Ferguson continued to claim he was not involved in the shootings and proposed defending himself during the trial. In the following months, Ferguson sent Judge Belfi several letters regarding disputes between Ferguson, Kunstler and Kuby. Ferguson claimed in the letters that he was not insane, and rejected Kunstler's and Kuby's "black rage" defense. Although George Peck argued the letters proved Ferguson was able to understand the charges against him and was actively participating in his defense, Kuby argued the letters only further demonstrated Ferguson's confused state of mind. On November 11, Ferguson agreed he would stop resisting efforts to meet with a court-appointed psychiatrist. As a result, Judge Belfi agreed to hold a third hearing as to whether Ferguson was mentally competent to stand trial.

On December 10, 1994, Judge Belfi ruled Ferguson was competent to stand trial. Belfi said he based his decision in part on his conversations with Ferguson in the courtroom, including Ferguson's concern over Governor Pataki's promise to sign a death-penalty bill. Belfi strongly advised Ferguson against defending himself, but Ferguson said he intended to do so anyway. Kuby said of the decision, "What we will have now is a complete circus. A crazy man cannot defend himself. Mr. Ferguson, evidence to the contrary, believes he is not guilty and that someone else killed all those people aboard the train." Kuby continued, "Without a psychiatric defense, Ferguson has no defense. There was no doubt that he was there, that he fired the weapon, that he would have fired it more had he not been wrestled to the ground. There is no doubt that Colin Ferguson, if sane, was guilty."

Trial
Ferguson's trial proved to be bizarre, as he cross-examined the police officers that arrested him and victims he shot. It was broadcast live by local media and Court TV, but was overshadowed by the O. J. Simpson murder case, going on simultaneously on the West Coast.

Ferguson argued that the 93 counts he was charged with were related to the year 1993, and had it been 1925 he would have been charged with only 25 counts. He admitted bringing the gun onto the train, but claimed he fell asleep and another man grabbed his gun and began firing. He also argued of a mysterious man named Mr. Su, who had information concerning a conspiracy against him. He found another man who was willing to testify that the government had implanted a computer chip in Ferguson's brain, but at the last minute decided not to call him to the stand. This individual, Raul Diaz, was a parapsychologist from Manhattan who claimed during a press conference on the courthouse steps to have witnessed an Asian man press a chip into Ferguson's head prior to the attack. According to Diaz, the Asian man told him to behold what he was about to do prior to pushing the button. "He was lasered out by a remote-control device," Diaz told reporters outside the courtroom. "He was zapped, just like that, right out of the twilight zone" and was "commanded to go up and down the aisle shooting people."

His cross-examination questions mostly started with "is it your testimony..." and would simply force the witness to repeat testimony already given. When a witness refused to answer the question to his satisfaction, he would often ask the judge to "admonish the witness to answer the question." During the course of his cross-examinations, Ferguson would refer to himself in the third person, particularly asking the victims of the shooting, "did you see Colin Ferguson..." to which the witness would reply, "I saw you shoot me." Legal experts pointed out that Ferguson's questions were pointless and were not geared towards rebutting testimony. By not recognizing when to object to testimony and closing arguments, he lost his right to appeal on those grounds. Among the defense witnesses Ferguson requested was President Bill Clinton.

Ferguson originally sought to question himself on the witness stand, but ultimately did not do so. He told the judge and media that he intended to call a number of witnesses who would prove his innocence, including a ballistic expert, a handwriting expert and two regular eyewitnesses, but they were afraid to come forward and take the stand. Ultimately, he did not call any of the witnesses. He also told Judge Belfi of an alleged conspiracy by the Jewish Defense League to kill him in prison if he was convicted. He said the prison slaying of serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer was "set up as a prelude against me."

Conviction
Ferguson was convicted on February 17, 1995, of murder of the six passengers who died of their injuries. He was also convicted of attempted murder for wounding nineteen passengers. He received 315 years and eight months to life, meaning his current earliest possible parole date is August 6, 2309. The judge said, "Colin Ferguson will never return to society, and will spend the rest of his natural life in prison." At the sentencing, Judge Donald E. Belfi called Ferguson a "selfish, self-righteous coward." He also used the sentencing as an opportunity to criticize New York's controversial Sentencing Cap Law, which would have capped each of Ferguson's sentences at 50 years and required that they all be served concurrently had no one died in the massacre, since all of the felonies he committed on the train were part of one occurrence. After his conviction, Ferguson was put in the position to argue in appellate briefs that he had incompetent counsel (himself).

After his sentencing, Ferguson was incarcerated for a time at the Attica Correctional Facility in upstate New York.

Lawsuits
Carolyn McCarthy — whose husband Dennis McCarthy was killed by Ferguson, and whose son Kevin McCarthy was severely injured — was subsequently elected to the United States Congress on a platform of gun control. She was motivated to run for Congress after the representative in her district, Dan Frisa, voted against an assault weapons bill. Some of Ferguson's other victims and their family members have also become involved in gun control efforts.

McCarthy also sued Olin Corporation, the parent of Winchester Ammunition, under products liability and negligence theories for their manufacture of the Black Talon bullets used by Ferguson. The cartridges carry hollow-tipped bullets that expand upon impact, increasing the severity of wounds. One month before the LIRR shooting, Winchester Ammunition announced they were voluntarily withdrawing the Black Talon cartridges from the market. McCarthy's suit failed, partly because New York State law placed no responsibility on manufacturers for the criminal misuse of their products.

At least a half-dozen lawsuits related to the shootings were filed against the Long Island Rail Road and its parent company, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Carolyn McCarthy filed a $36 million damage lawsuit against the two entities, claiming they failed to provide adequate protection for passengers and should have installed metal detectors and used undercover police officers. The suit sought $1 million for Dennis McCarthy's pain and suffering, $10 million for his death and for damages to survivors, and $25 million for injuries to Kevin McCarthy.

Reaction
Many African-Americans expressed concern that the LIRR shooting would lead to a backlash of violence and racial animosities against the black community. Civil rights activists Al Sharpton and Herbert Daughtry urged that African-Americans in general not be blamed for the crime; Sharpton, in particular, criticized what he called attempts "to demonize black and Hispanic dissatisfaction" by linking those groups to the murders. Civil rights activist Jesse Jackson delivered a sermon at the Cathedral of the Incarnation in Garden City, during a service attended by the victims' grieving families. Audrey Warren released a statement shortly after the shootings expressing sorrow for the victims and their families. Jackson stressed the shootings were the result of one man and should not be seen as indicative of all African-Americans. The day after the shootings, Nassau County Executive Thomas Gulotta called Ferguson "an animal." Jackson and other African-American leaders criticized the comment as racially charged, but Gulotta later said his statement had nothing to do with race.

During a press conference in the days after the shooting, the Long Island Rail Road Police Benevolent Association called the trains "unsafe" and said the railroad needed to triple the size of its 216-person police force. LIRR officials responded by noting that the rate of crime against passengers had dropped over the past few years before the shooting. The Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North Commuter Railroad placed more officers on trains and increased the visibility of police in response to the shootings. LIRR officials also made counselors available for passengers who wanted one, and sent senior railroad officials out to trains to answer riders' questions. A New York Times editorial called for stronger gun control laws in response to the murders, specifically citing the ease with which Ferguson obtained a handgun in California, which had one of the country's stricter gun laws. Several Adelphi University students expressed concern that Ferguson may have been taking the train to the school with plans of shooting people out of revenge for his past experiences there, although the train Ferguson took was not the closest one to Adelphi. Most of the regular commuters who used the 5:33 Hicksville local returned to the train the day after the shootings. In interviews with the media, a number of passengers cited the need to face their fears and the psychological trauma created by the incident, rather than avoid riding their regular train.

Politicians
President Bill Clinton took notice of the LIRR shooting, calling it a "terrible human tragedy". The day after the shooting, Clinton announced he had asked Attorney General Janet Reno to review a proposal by New York City Mayor-elect Rudy Giuliani that would set up a national uniform licensing system for gun buyers. Clinton cited the Ferguson murders as a factor in his support of the program, which would include background checks, tests and required renewals every two years. About one week after the shooting, Clinton visited with O'Connor, Blum and McEntee. During his first major speech since his election as mayor, Giuliani cited the Ferguson murders while he repeated his previous calls for the death penalty and a uniform gun licensing law. During his monthly radio call-in show, Governor Mario Cuomo called the Ferguson shootings "a dramatic, spectacular slaughter", and called for stronger gun control measures. U.S. Senator Al D'Amato said the Ferguson case demonstrated the need for capital punishment in New York State because "that is the only fitting punishment for this cold-blooded killer".

In media
Ferguson was the subject of a Saturday Night Live comedy sketch in which he, portrayed by Tim Meadows, declared "I did not shoot them, they shot me" and asked witnesses questions about shooting him while they were on the stand, then ducking when they pointed to him as the killer.

A 2002 book by trial consultant Mark C. Bardwell and criminal justice professor Bruce A. Arrigo examined the competency issues in the Ferguson case.

title: 1993 Long Island Rail Road shooting


text:
Talk:1993 Long Island Rail Road shooting

Additional sources

Could be helpful in bringing the article up to date. —Sangdeboeuf (talk) 03:45, 2 February 2021 (UTC)

Victims?
There is no mention of the victims in the massacre, no listing of their names, nor photographs.

Also, the only sources are The New York Times articles that sit behind a pay wall.

What are you trying to hide? 71.105.117.76 (talk) 22:28, 5 October 2023 (UTC)