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United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a proposal by the United Nations, which recommended a partition of Mandatory Palestine at the end of the British Mandate. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted the Plan as Resolution 181 (II). The resolution recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States linked economically and a Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem and its surroundings.

The Arab state was to have a territory of 11,100 square kilometres or 42%, the Jewish state a territory of 14,100 square kilometres or 56%, while the remaining 2%—comprising the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the adjoning area—would become an international zone. The Partition Plan, a four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate, the gradual withdrawal of British armed forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem.

Part I of the Plan stipulated that the Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw no later than 1 August 1948. The new states would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements, Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism, or Zionism. The Plan also called for Economic Union between the proposed states, and for the protection of religious and minority rights. Jewish organizations collaborated with UNSCOP during the deliberations, and the Palestinian Arab leadership boycotted it.

The plan's detractors considered the proposed plan to be pro-Zionist, with 56% of the land allocated to the Jewish state although the Palestinian Arab population numbered twice the Jewish population. The plan was celebrated by most Jews in Palestine and reluctantly accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine with misgivings. Zionist leaders, in particular David Ben-Gurion, viewed the acceptance of the plan as a tactical step and a stepping stone to future territorial expansion over all of Palestine. The Arab Higher Committee, the Arab League and other Arab leaders and governments rejected it, as in addition to the Arabs forming a two-thirds majority, they owned a majority of the lands. They also indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division, arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny. They announced their intention to take all necessary measures to prevent the implementation of the resolution. Subsequently, a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented.

Background
The British administration was formalized by the League of Nations under the Palestine Mandate in 1923, as part of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. The Mandate reaffirmed the 1917 British commitment to the Balfour Declaration, for the establishment in Palestine of a "National Home" for the Jewish people, with the prerogative to carry it out. A British census of 1918 estimated 700,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews.

In 1937, following a six-month-long Arab General Strike and armed insurrection which aimed to pursue national independence and secure the country from foreign control, the British established the Peel Commission. The Commission concluded that the Mandate had become unworkable, and recommended partition into an Arab state linked to Transjordan; a small Jewish state; and a mandatory zone. To address problems arising from the presence of national minorities in each area, it suggested a land and population transfer involving the transfer of some 225,000 Arabs living in the envisaged Jewish state and 1,250 Jews living in a future Arab state, a measure deemed compulsory "in the last resort". To address any economic problems, the Plan proposed avoiding interfering with Jewish immigration, since any interference would be liable to produce an "economic crisis", most of Palestine's wealth coming from the Jewish community. To solve the predicted annual budget deficit of the Arab State and reduction in public services due to loss of tax from the Jewish state, it was proposed that the Jewish state pay an annual subsidy to the Arab state and take on half of the latter's deficit. The Palestinian Arab leadership rejected partition as unacceptable, given the inequality in the proposed population exchange and the transfer of one-third of Palestine, including most of its best agricultural land, to recent immigrants. The Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, persuaded the Zionist Congress to lend provisional approval to the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiations. In a letter to his son in October 1937, Ben-Gurion explained that partition would be a first step to "possession of the land as a whole". The same sentiment, that acceptance of partition was a temporary measure beyond which the Palestine would be "redeemed ... in its entirety," was recorded by Ben-Gurion on other occasions, such as at a meeting of the Jewish Agency executive in June 1938, as well as by Chaim Weizmann.

The British Woodhead Commission was set up to examine the practicality of partition. The Peel plan was rejected and two possible alternatives were considered. In 1938, the British government issued a policy statement declaring that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable". Representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited to London for the St. James Conference, which proved unsuccessful.

With World War II looming, British policies were influenced by a desire to win Arab world support and could ill afford to engage with another Arab uprising. The MacDonald White Paper of May 1939 declared that it was "not part of [the British government's] policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State", sought to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine and restricted Arab land sales to Jews. However, the League of Nations commission held that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Mandate as put forth in the past. The outbreak of the Second World War suspended any further deliberations. The Jewish Agency hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights, and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism. Aliyah Bet was organized to spirit Jews out of Nazi controlled Europe, despite the British prohibitions. The White Paper also led to the formation of Lehi, a small Jewish organization which opposed the British.

After World War II, in August 1945 President Truman asked for the admission of 100,000 Holocaust survivors into Palestine but the British maintained limits on Jewish immigration in line with the 1939 White Paper. The Jewish community rejected the restriction on immigration and organized an armed resistance. These actions and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In April 1946, the Committee reached a unanimous decision for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine, rescission of the white paper restrictions of land sale to Jews, that the country be neither Arab nor Jewish, and the extension of U.N. Trusteeship. The U.S. endorsed the Commission's findings concerning Jewish immigration and land purchase restrictions, while the British made their agreement to implementation conditional on U.S. assistance in case of another Arab revolt. In effect, the British continued to carry out their White Paper policy. The recommendations triggered violent demonstrations in the Arab states, and calls for a Jihad and an annihilation of all European Jews in Palestine.

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
Under the terms of League of Nations A-class mandates each such mandatory territory was to become a sovereign state on termination of its mandate. By the end of World War II, this occurred with all such mandates except Palestine; however, the League of Nations itself lapsed in 1946, leading to a legal quandary.

In February 1947, Britain announced its intent to terminate the Mandate for Palestine, referring the matter of the future of Palestine to the United Nations. According to William Roger Louis, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's policy was premised on the idea that an Arab majority would carry the day, which met difficulties with Harry S. Truman who, sensitive to Zionist electoral pressures in the United States, pressed for a British-Zionist compromise. In May, the UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to prepare a report on recommendations for Palestine. The Jewish Agency pressed for Jewish representation and the exclusion of both Britain and Arab countries on the Committee, sought visits to camps where Holocaust survivors were interned in Europe as part of UNSCOP's brief, and in May won representation on the Political Committee. The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court, and refused to collaborate with UNSCOP, which had extended an invitation for liaison also to the Arab Higher Committee. In August, after three months of conducting hearings and a general survey of the situation in Palestine, a majority report of the committee recommended that the region be partitioned into an Arab state and a Jewish state, which should retain an economic union. An international regime was envisioned for Jerusalem.

The Arab delegations at the UN had sought to keep separate the issue of Palestine from the issue of Jewish refugees in Europe. During their visit, UNSCOP members were shocked by the extent of Lehi and Irgun violence, then at its apogee, and by the elaborate military presence attested by endemic barb-wire, searchlights, and armoured-car patrols. Committee members also witnessed the SS Exodus affair in Haifa and could hardly have remained unaffected by it. On concluding their mission, they dispatched a subcommittee to investigate Jewish refugee camps in Europe. The incident is mentioned in the report in relation to Jewish distrust and resentment concerning the British enforcement of the 1939 White Paper.

UNSCOP report
On 3 September 1947, the Committee reported to the General Assembly. CHAPTER V: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (I), Section A of the Report contained eleven proposed recommendations (I – XI) approved unanimously. Section B contained one proposed recommendation approved by a substantial majority dealing with the Jewish problem in general (XI). CHAPTER VI: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (II) contained a Plan of Partition with Economic Union to which seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves in favour. CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III) contained a comprehensive proposal that was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) for a Federal State of Palestine. Australia abstained. In CHAPTER VIII a number of members of the Committee expressed certain reservations and observations.

Proposed partition
The report of the majority of the Committee (CHAPTER VI) envisaged the division of Palestine into three parts: an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The proposed Arab State would include the central and part of western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, an enclave at Jaffa, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The proposed Jewish State would include the fertile Eastern Galilee, the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot and most of the Negev desert, including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Jerusalem Corpus Separatum included Bethlehem and the surrounding areas.

The primary objectives of the majority of the Committee were political division and economic unity between the two groups. The Plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish State. In many specific cases, this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev desert), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration. According to the plan, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state.

By virtue of Chapter 3, Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, resided in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem would, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they were resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.

Population of Palestine by religions in 1946: Moslems — 1,076,783; Jews — 608,225; Christians — 145,063; Others — 15,488; Total — 1,845,559.

On this basis, the population at the end of 1946 was estimated as follows: Arabs — 1,203,000; Jews — 608,000; others — 35,000; Total — 1,846,000.

The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945).

In addition there would be in the Jewish State about 90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons.

The land allocated to the Arab State in the final plan included about 43% of Mandatory Palestine  and consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one-third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv. The Jewish State allocated to the Jews, who constituted a third of the population and owned about 7% of the land, was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there. The Jewish State included three fertile lowland plains – the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert, which was mostly not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish State would also be given sole access to the Sea of Galilee, crucial for its water supply, and the economically important Red Sea.

The committee voted for the plan, 25 to 13 (with 17 abstentions and 2 absentees) on 25 November 1947 and the General Assembly was called back into a special session to vote on the proposal. Various sources noted that this was one vote short of the two-thirds majority required in the General Assembly.

Ad hoc Committee

On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.

During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration. However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case.

The Arab Higher Committee rejected both the majority and minority recommendations within the UNSCOP report. They "concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis". The Arab Higher Committee argued that only an Arab State in the whole of Palestine would be consistent with the UN Charter.

The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration."

Arab states requested representation on the UN ad hoc subcommittees of October 1947, but were excluded from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition.

Sub-Committee 2
The Sub-Committee 2, set up on 23 October 1947 to draw up a detailed plan based on proposals of Arab states presented its report within a few weeks.

Based on a reproduced British report, the Sub-Committee 2 criticised the UNSCOP report for using inaccurate population figures, especially concerning the Bedouin population. The British report, dated 1 November 1947, used the results of a new census in Beersheba in 1946 with additional use of aerial photographs, and an estimate of the population in other districts. It found that the size of the Bedouin population was greatly understated in former enumerations. In Beersheba, 3,389 Bedouin houses and 8,722 tents were counted. The total Bedouin population was estimated at approximately 127,000; only 22,000 of them normally resident in the Arab state under the UNSCOP majority plan. The British report stated: "the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."In respect of the UNSCOP report, the Sub-Committee concluded that the earlier population "estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State."

The Sub-Committee 2 recommended to put the question of the Partition Plan before the International Court of Justice (Resolution No. I ). In respect of the Jewish refugees due to World War II, the Sub-Committee recommended to request the countries of which the refugees belonged to take them back as much as possible (Resolution No. II ). The Sub-Committee proposed to establish a unitary state (Resolution No. III ).

Boundary changes
The ad hoc committee made a number of boundary changes to the UNSCOP recommendations before they were voted on by the General Assembly.

The predominantly Arab city of Jaffa, previously located within the Jewish state, was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State. The boundary of the Arab state was modified to include Beersheba and a strip of the Negev desert along the Egyptian border, while a section of the Dead Sea shore and other additions were made to the Jewish State. The Jewish population in the revised Jewish State would be about half a million, compared to 450,000 Arabs.

The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land. In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission established in 1948 was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred.

The vote
Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of the valid votes, not counting abstaining and absent members, of the UN's then 57 member states. On 26 November, after filibustering by the Zionist delegation, the vote was postponed by three days. According to multiple sources, had the vote been held on the original set date, it would have received a majority, but less than the required two-thirds. Various compromise proposals and variations on a single state, including federations and cantonal systems were debated (including those previously rejected in committee). The delay was used by supporters of Zionism in New York to put extra pressure on states not supporting the resolution.

Reports of pressure for the Plan
Zionists launched an intense White House lobby to have the UNSCOP plan endorsed, and the effects were not trivial. The Democratic Party, a large part of whose contributions came from Jews, informed Truman that failure to live up to promises to support the Jews in Palestine would constitute a danger to the party. The defection of Jewish votes in congressional elections in 1946 had contributed to electoral losses. Truman was, according to Roger Cohen, embittered by feelings of being a hostage to the lobby and its 'unwarranted interference', which he blamed for the contemporary impasse. When a formal American declaration in favour of partition was given on 11 October, a public relations authority declared to the Zionist Emergency Council in a closed meeting: 'under no circumstances should any of us believe or think we had won because of the devotion of the American Government to our cause. We had won because of the sheer pressure of political logistics that was applied by the Jewish leadership in the United States'. State Department advice critical of the controversial UNSCOP recommendation to give the overwhelmingly Arab town of Jaffa, and the Negev, to the Jews was overturned by an urgent and secret late meeting organized for Chaim Weizman with Truman, which immediately countermanded the recommendation. The United States initially refrained from pressuring smaller states to vote either way, but Robert A. Lovett reported that America's U.N. delegation's case suffered impediments from high pressure by Jewish groups, and that indications existed that bribes and threats were being used, even of American sanctions against Liberia and Nicaragua. When the UNSCOP plan failed to achieve the necessary majority on 25 November, the lobby 'moved into high gear' and induced the President to overrule the State Department, and let wavering governments know that the U.S. strongly desired partition.

Proponents of the Plan reportedly put pressure on nations to vote yes to the Partition Plan. A telegram signed by 26 US Senators with influence on foreign aid bills was sent to wavering countries, seeking their support for the partition plan. The US Senate was considering a large aid package at the time, including 60 million dollars to China. Many nations reported pressure directed specifically at them:
 * 🇺🇸 United States (Vote: For): President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me."
 *  undefined (Vote: Against): Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian ambassador to the UN, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right". Pandit occasionally hinted that something might change in favour of the Zionists. But another Indian delegate, Kavallam Pannikar, said that India would vote for the Arab side, because of their large Muslim minority, although they knew that the Jews had a case.
 * 🇱🇷 Liberia (Vote: For): Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries. Harvey S. Firestone Jr., President of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, with major holdings in the country, also pressured the Liberian government
 * 🇵🇭 Philippines (Vote: For): In the days before the vote, Philippines representative General Carlos P. Romulo stated "We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept such responsibility." After a phone call from Washington, the representative was recalled and the Philippines' vote changed.
 *  undefined (Vote: For): The promise of a five million dollar loan may or may not have secured Haiti's vote for partition.
 *  undefined (Vote: For): Shortly before the vote, France's delegate to the United Nations was visited by Bernard Baruch, a long-term Jewish supporter of the Democratic Party who, during the recent world war, had been an economic adviser to President Roosevelt, and had latterly been appointed by President Truman as United States ambassador to the newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission. He was, privately, a supporter of the Irgun and its front organization, the American League for a Free Palestine. Baruch implied that a French failure to support the resolution might block planned American aid to France, which was badly needed for reconstruction, French currency reserves being exhausted and its balance of payments heavily in deficit. Previously, to avoid antagonising its Arab colonies, France had not publicly supported the resolution. After considering the danger of American aid being withheld, France finally voted in favour of it. So, too, did France's neighbours, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
 * 🇻🇪 Venezuela (Vote: For): Carlos Eduardo Stolk, Chairman of the Delegation of Venezuela, voted in favor of Resolution 181.
 *  undefined (Vote: Against): The Cuban delegation stated they would vote against partition "in spite of pressure being brought to bear against us" because they could not be party to coercing the majority in Palestine.
 * 🇹🇭 Thailand (Absent): The credentials of the Siamese delegations were cancelled after Siam voted against partition in committee on 25 November.

There is also some evidence that Sam Zemurray put pressure on several "banana republics" to change their votes.

Reports of pressure against the Plan
According to Benny Morris, Wasif Kamal, an Arab Higher Committee official, tried to bribe a delegate to the United Nations, perhaps a Russian.

A number of Arab leaders argued against the partition proposal on the grounds that it endangered the Jews of Arab countries.

 * A few months before the UN vote on partition of Palestine, Iraq's prime minister Nuri al-Said told British diplomat Douglas Busk that he had nothing against the Iraqi Jews, who were a long established and useful community. However, if the United Nations solution was not satisfactory, the Arab League might decide on severe measures against the Jews in Arab countries, and he would be unable to resist the proposal.

 * At the 30th Meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on 24 November 1947, the head of the Egyptian delegate, Heykal Pasha, said that although there was no animosity against the Jews in Arab countries, nobody could prevent disorders if a Jewish state was established. Riots could break out which governments could not control, endangering the lives of Jews and creating an antisemitism difficult to root out. The UN, in Heykal's view, should consider the welfare of all Jews and not just the wishes of the Zionists. Heykal's words were con

 * In a speech at the General Assembly Hall at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 28 November 1947, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, included the following statement: "Partition imposed against the will of the majority of the people will jeopardize peace and harmony in the Middle East. Not only the uprising of the Arabs of Palestine is to be expected, but the masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab-Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside of Palestine than there are in Palestine. In Iraq alone, we have about one hundred and fifty thousand Jews who share with Moslems and Christians all the advantages of political and economic rights. Harmony prevails among Moslems, Christians and Jews. But any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq; it will breed inter-religious prejudice and hatred."

The Arab states warned the Western Powers that endorsement of the partition plan might be met by either or both an oil embargo and realignment of the Arab states with the Soviet Bloc.

Final vote
On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions and 1 absent, in favour of the modified Partition Plan. The final vote, consolidated here by modern United Nations Regional Groups rather than contemporary groupings, was as follows:

In favour (33 countries, 72% of total votes)
Latin American and Caribbean (13 countries): • 🇧🇴 Bolivia

• undefined

• 🇨🇷 Costa Rica

• 🇩🇴 Dominican Republic

• 🇪🇨 Ecuador

• 🇬🇹 Guatemala

• undefined

• 🇳🇮 Nicaragua

• 🇵🇦 Panama

• 🇵🇾 Paraguay

• 🇵🇪 Peru

• 🇺🇾 Uruguay

• undefined Western European and Others (8 countries): • 🇧🇪 Belgium

• 🇩🇰 Denmark

• French Fourth Republic

• 🇮🇸 Iceland

• 🇱🇺 Luxembourg

• 🇳🇱 Netherlands

• 🇳🇴 Norway

• 🇸🇪 Sweden Eastern European (5 countries): • Byelorussian SSR

• Third Czechoslovak Republic

• Polish People's Republic

• Ukrainian SSR

• Soviet Union African (2 countries):

 * 🇱🇷 Liberia
 * Union of South Africa

Asia-Pacific (3 countries)

 * 🇦🇺 Australia
 * 🇳🇿 New Zealand
 * 🇵🇭 Philippines

North America (2 countries)

 * 🇨🇦 Canada
 * 🇺🇸 United States

Against (13 countries, 28% of total votes)
Asia-Pacific (9 countries, primarily Middle East sub-area): • Kingdom of Afghanistan

• Dominion of India

• Pahlavi dynasty

• Kingdom of Iraq

• 🇱🇧 Lebanon

• Dominion of Pakistan

• 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• Syrian Republic

• Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen Western European and Others (2 countries):

 * Kingdom of Greece
 * 🇹🇷 Turkey

African (1 country):

 * Kingdom of Egypt

Latin American and Caribbean (1 country):

 * Republic of Cuba (1902–1959)

Abstentions (10 countries)
Latin American and Caribbean (6 countries): • 🇦🇷 Argentina

• 🇨🇱 Chile

• 🇨🇴 Colombia

• 🇸🇻 El Salvador

• 🇭🇳 Honduras

• 🇲🇽 Mexico Asia-Pacific (1 country):

 * undefined

African (1 country):

 * undefined

Western European and Others (1 country):

 * 🇬🇧 United Kingdom

Eastern European (1 country):

 * Yugoslavia

Absent (1 country)
Asia-Pacific (1 country):

 * 🇹🇭 Thailand

Votes by modern region
If analysed by the modern composition of what later came to be known as the United Nations Regional Groups showed relatively aligned voting styles in the final vote. This, however, does not reflect the regional grouping at the time, as a major reshuffle of regional grouping occurred in 1966. All Western nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of the United Kingdom (the Mandate holder), Greece and Turkey. The Soviet bloc also voted for partition, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was to be expelled from Cominform the following year. The majority of Latin American nations following Brazilian leadership, voted for partition, with a sizeable minority abstaining. Asian countries (primarily Middle Eastern countries) voted against partition, with the exception of the Philippines.

Jews
Jews gathered in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to celebrate the U.N. resolution during the whole night after the vote. Great bonfires blazed at Jewish collective farms in the north. Many big cafes in Tel Aviv served free champagne. Mainstream Zionist leaders emphasized the "heavy responsibility" of building a modern Jewish State, and committed to working towards a peaceful coexistence with the region's other inhabitants: Jewish groups in the United States hailed the action by the United Nations. Most welcomed the Palestine Plan but some felt it did not settle the problem.

Some Revisionist Zionists rejected the partition plan as a renunciation of legitimately Jewish national territory. The Irgun Tsvai Leumi, led by Menachem Begin, and the Lehi (also known as the Stern Group or Gang), the two Revisionist-affiliated underground organisations which had been fighting against both the British and Arabs, stated their opposition. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future." He also stated that "the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized." Begin was sure that the creation of a Jewish state would make territorial expansion possible, "after the shedding of much blood."

Some Post-Zionist scholars endorse Simha Flapan's view that it is a myth that Zionists accepted the partition as a compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned ambitions for the whole of Palestine and recognized the rights of the Arab Palestinians to their own state. Rather, Flapan argued, acceptance was only a tactical move that aimed to thwart the creation of an Arab Palestinian state and, concomitantly, expand the territory that had been assigned by the UN to the Jewish state. Baruch Kimmerling has said that Zionists "officially accepted the partition plan, but invested all their efforts towards improving its terms and maximally expanding their boundaries while reducing the number of Arabs in them." Many Zionist leaders viewed the acceptance of the plan as a tactical step and a stepping stone to future territorial expansion over all of Palestine.

Addressing the Central Committee of the Histadrut (the Eretz Israel Workers Party) days after the UN vote to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion expressed his apprehension, stating:"the total population of the Jewish State at the time of its establishment will be about one million, including almost 40% non-Jews. Such a [population] composition does not provide a stable basis for a Jewish State. This [demographic] fact must be viewed in all its clarity and acuteness. With such a [population] composition, there cannot even be absolute certainty that control will remain in the hands of the Jewish majority... There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%."Despite these reservations, Ben-Gurion also recognized the plan's many accomplishments, stating "I know of no greater achievement by the Jewish people ... in its long history since it became a people."

Arabs
Arab leaders and governments rejected the plan of partition in the resolution and indicated that they would reject any other plan of partition. The Arab states' delegations declared immediately after the vote for partition that they would not be bound by the decision, and walked out accompanied by the Indian and Pakistani delegates.

They argued that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny. The Arab delegations to the UN issued a joint statement the day after that vote that stated: "the vote in regard to the Partition of Palestine has been given under great pressure and duress, and that this makes it doubly invalid."

On 16 February 1948, the UN Palestine Commission reported to the Security Council that: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."

Arab states
A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, told an Egyptian newspaper "Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a dangerous massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades." (This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.) Azzam told Alec Kirkbride "We will sweep them [the Jews] into the sea." Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli told his people: "We shall eradicate Zionism."

King Farouk of Egypt told the American ambassador to Egypt that in the long run the Arabs would soundly defeat the Jews and drive them out of Palestine.

While Azzam Pasha repeated his threats of forceful prevention of partition, the first important Arab voice to support partition was the influential Egyptian daily Al Mokattam: "We stand for partition because we believe that it is the best final solution for the problem of Palestine... rejection of partition... will lead to further complications and will give the Zionists another space of time to complete their plans of defense and attack... a delay of one more year which would not benefit the Arabs but would benefit the Jews, especially after the British evacuation."

On 20 May 1948, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."

The Arab League said that some of the Jews would have to be expelled from a Palestinian Arab state.

Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as Military Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Transjordan Army. He was a former prime minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations.

Arabs in Palestine
Haj Amin al-Husseini said in March 1948 to an interviewer from the Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were annihilated."

Zionists attributed Arab rejection of the plan to mere intransigence. Palestinian Arabs opposed the very idea of partition but reiterated that this partition plan was unfair: the majority of the land (56%) would go to a Jewish state, when Jews at that stage legally owned only 6–7% of it and remained a minority of the population (33% in 1946). There were also disproportionate allocations under the plan and the area under Jewish control contained 45% of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45% of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state. However, most of the proposed Jewish state was the Negev desert. The plan allocated to the Jewish State most of the Negev desert that was sparsely populated and unsuitable for agriculture but also a "vital land bridge protecting British interests from the Suez Canal to Iraq"

Few Palestinian Arabs joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. According to Ian Bickerton, for that reason many of them favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state. He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan.

The Arab Higher Committee demanded that in a Palestinian Arab state, the majority of the Jews should not be citizens (those who had not lived in Palestine before the British Mandate).

According to Musa Alami, the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he would rule the future Arab state.

The Arab Higher Committee responded to the partition resolution and declared a three-day general strike in Palestine to begin the following day.

British government
When Bevin received the partition proposal, he promptly ordered for it not to be imposed on the Arabs. The plan was vigorously debated in the British parliament.

In a British cabinet meeting at 4 December 1947, it was decided that the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948, the complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948, and Britain would not enforce the UN partition plan. On 11 December 1947, the British government publicly announced these plans. During the period in which the British withdrawal was completed, Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with a proposed UN transition regime, to allow the UN Palestine Commission to establish a presence in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, to allow the creation of official Jewish and Arab militias or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor.

United States government
The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union. Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan."

Subsequent events
The Partition Plan with Economic Union was not realized in the days following 29 November 1947 resolution as envisaged by the General Assembly. It was followed by outbreaks of violence in Mandatory Palestine between Palestinian Jews and Arabs known as the 1947–48 Civil War. After Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner of Palestine, left Jerusalem, on the morning of 14 May the British army left the city as well. The British left a power vacuum in Jerusalem and made no measures to establish the international regime in Jerusalem. At midnight on 14 May 1948, the British Mandate expired, and Britain disengaged its forces. Earlier in the evening, the Jewish People's Council had gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum (today known as Independence Hall), and approved a proclamation, declaring "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel". The 1948 Arab–Israeli War began with the invasion of, or intervention in, Palestine by the Arab States on 15 May 1948.

Resolution 181 as a legal basis for Palestinian statehood
In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization published the Palestinian Declaration of Independence relying on Resolution 181, arguing that the resolution continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence. A number of scholars have written in support of this view.

A General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Judge Abdul Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed." In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.

Retrospect
In 2011, Mahmoud Abbas stated that the 1947 Arab rejection of United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a mistake he hoped to rectify.

Commemoration
A street in the Katamon neighborhood of Jerusalem is named Kaf-tet benovember (29 November Street). On 29 November 2022, a monument designed and executed by sculptor Sam Philipe was unveiled on a hilltop in Netanya to mark the 75th anniversary of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine. The date also marks the annual International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.


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1949 Armistice Agreements

The 1949 Armistice Agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. They formally ended the hostilities of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and also demarcated the Green Line, which separated Arab-controlled territory (i.e., the Jordanian-annexed West Bank and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip) from Israel until the latter's victory in the 1967 Arab–Israeli War.

To monitor the agreed-upon de facto border, the United Nations (UN) established supervising and reporting agencies; discussions related to the ceasefire's enforcement led to the signing of the separate Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France pledged to take action within and outside of the UN in order to prevent violations of the frontiers. It also outlined their commitment to peace and stability in the area, their opposition to the use or threat of force, and reiterated their opposition to the development of an arms race between Arab countries and Israel.

With Egypt
On 6 January 1949, Ralph Bunche announced that Egypt had finally consented to start talks with Israel on an armistice. The talks began on the Greek island of Rhodes on 12 January. Shortly after their commencement, Israel agreed to the release of a besieged Egyptian brigade in Faluja, but soon rescinded their agreement. At the end of the month, the talks floundered. Israel demanded that Egypt withdraw all its forces from the former area of Mandate Palestine. Egypt insisted that Arab forces withdraw to the positions which they held on 14 October 1948, as per the Security Council Resolution S/1070 of 4 November 1948, and that the Israeli forces withdraw to positions north of the Majdal–Hebron road.

The deadlock culminated on 12 February 1949 with the murder of Hassan al-Banna, leader of the Islamist group Muslim Brotherhood. Israel threatened to abandon the talks, whereupon the United States appealed to the parties to bring them to a successful conclusion.

On 24 February the Israel–Egypt Armistice Agreement was signed in Rhodes. The main points of the armistice agreement were:
 * The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate "settlement of the Palestine question".
 * The armistice demarcation line was drawn for the most part along the 1922 international border between Egypt and Mandatory Palestine, except near the Mediterranean Sea, where Egypt remained in control of a strip of land along the coast, which became known as the Gaza Strip.
 * The Egyptian forces besieged in the Faluja Pocket were allowed to return to Egypt with their weapons, and the area was handed over to Israeli military control.
 * A zone on both sides of the border around 'Uja al-Hafeer was to be demilitarized, and became the seat of the bilateral armistice committee.

With Lebanon
The agreement with Lebanon was signed on 23 March 1949. The main points were:
 * The provisions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.
 * The armistice line ("Green Line", see also Blue Line [Lebanon]) was drawn along the international boundary between Lebanon and Mandatory Palestine.
 * Israel withdrew its forces from 13 villages in Lebanese territory, which were occupied during the war.

With Jordan
These armistice talks began on 4 March, and were conducted on Jordanian territory. Despite the insistence by Ralph Bunche that in all four talks, the ceasefire be strictly observed, while negotiating with Jordan Israel engaged in military operations to occupy extensive swathes of territory in both the central and southern Negev desert. It also managed to secure further land by using the threat of military intervention unless some claims were accepted. The agreement with Jordan was signed on 3 April 1949. The main points:
 * No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.
 * Jordanian forces remained in most positions held by them, particularly East Jerusalem which included the Old City.
 * Jordan withdrew its forces from their front posts overlooking the Plain of Sharon. In return, Israel agreed to allow Jordanian forces to take over positions previously held by Iraqi forces.
 * Exchange of territorial control: Israel received control in the area known as Wadi Ara and the Little Triangle in exchange for territory in the southern hills of Hebron.

In March 1949 as the Iraqi forces withdrew from Palestine and handed over their positions to the smaller Jordanian legion, 3 Israeli brigades maneuvered into positions of advantage in Operation Shin-Tav-Shin and Operation Uvda. The operations allowed Israel to renegotiate the cease fire line in the southern Negev (giving access to the Red Sea) and the Wadi Ara area in a secret agreement reached on 23 March 1949 and incorporated into the General Armistice Agreement. The Green Line was then redrawn in blue ink on the southern map to give the impression that a shift of the Green Line had been made. The events that led to a change in the Green Line was an exchange of fertile land in the Bethlehem area to Israeli control and the village of Wadi Fukin being given to Jordanian control. On 15 July when the Israeli Army expelled the population of Wadi Fukin after the village had been transferred to the Israeli-occupied area under the terms of the Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and the Jordan Kingdom the Mixed Armistice Commission decided on 31 August, by a majority vote, that Israel had violated the Armistice Agreement by expelling villagers across the demarcation line and decided that the villagers should be allowed to return to their homes. However, when the villagers returned to Wadi Fukin under the supervision of the United Nations observers on September 6, they found most of their houses destroyed and were again compelled by the Israeli Army to return to Jordanian controlled territory.

The United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Commission, Colonel Garrison B. Coverdale (US), pressed for a solution of this issue to be found in the Mixed Armistice Commission, in an amicable and UN spirit. After some hesitation, this procedure was accepted and finally an agreement was reached whereby the Armistice Demarcation Line was changed to place Wadi Fukin under Jordanian authority who, in turn, agreed to transfer of some uninhabited, but fertile territory south of Bethlehem to Israel control.

 * A Special Committee was to be formed to make arrangements for safe movement of traffic between Jerusalem and Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University, along the Latrun-Jerusalem Highway, free access to the Holy Places, and other matters.

With Syria
Armistice talks with Syria started at Gesher B'not Yaacov, on the River Jordan, in April 1949, after the other armistice agreements had been concluded. The agreement with Syria was signed on 20 July 1949.

Syria withdrew its forces from most of the territories it controlled west of the international border, which became demilitarized zones. The territory retained by Syria that lay west of the 1923 Palestinian Mandate border and which had been allocated to the Jewish state under the UN partition plan comprised 66 square kilometers in the Jordan Valley. These territories were designated demilitarized zones (DMZs) and remained under Syrian control. It was emphasised that the armistice line was "not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements." (Article V)

Iraq
Iraq, whose forces took an active part in the war (although it has no common border with Israel), withdrew its forces from the region in March 1949. The front occupied by Iraqi forces was covered by the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, and there was no separate agreement with Iraq.

Cease-fire line vs. permanent border
The new military frontiers for Israel, as set by the agreements, encompassed about 78% of mandatory Palestine as it stood after the independence of Transjordan (now Jordan) in 1946. The Arab populated areas not controlled by Israel prior to 1967 were the Jordanian ruled West Bank and the Egyptian occupied Gaza Strip.

The armistice agreements were intended to serve only as interim agreements until replaced by permanent peace treaties. However, it took three decades to achieve a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and it took another 15 years after that to achieve a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. To this day, no peace treaty has been signed between Israel and Lebanon nor between Israel and Syria.

The armistice agreements were clear (at Arab insistence) that they were not creating permanent borders. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement stated "The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

The Jordanian-Israeli agreement stated: "... no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Party hereto in the peaceful settlement of the Palestine questions, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations" (Art. II.2), "The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto." (Art. VI.9)

As the Armistice Demarcation Lines were technically not borders, the Arabs considered that Israel was restricted in its rights to develop the DMZ and exploitation of the water resources. Further that as a state of war still existed with the Arab nations, the Arab League was not hindered in their right to deny Israel the freedom of navigation through the Arab League waters. Also it was argued that the Palestinians had the right of return and that the Israeli use of abandoned property was therefore not legitimate.

In the Knesset then Foreign Minister and future Prime Minister Moshe Sharett called the armistice lines "provisional boundaries" and the old international borders which the armistice lines, except with Jordan, were based on, "natural boundaries". Israel did not lay claim to territory beyond them and proposed them, with minor modifications except at Gaza, as the basis of permanent political frontiers at the Lausanne Conference, 1949.

After the 1967 Six-Day War several Israeli leaders argued against turning the Armistice Demarcation Lines into permanent borders on the grounds of Israeli security:
 * Prime Minister Golda Meir said the pre-1967 borders were so dangerous that it "would be treasonable" for an Israeli leader to accept them (The New York Times, December 23, 1969).
 * The Foreign Minister Abba Eban said the pre-1967 borders have "a memory of Auschwitz" (Der Spiegel, November 5, 1969).
 * Prime Minister Menachem Begin described a proposal for a retreat to the pre-1967 borders as "national suicide for Israel."

The internationally recognized border between Egypt and Israel was eventually demarcated as part of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty. The border between Israel and Jordan (except for Jordan's border with the post-1967 West Bank) was demarcated as part of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty. This occurred after Jordan had recognized Palestine, which had not declared its borders at the time. In its application for membership to the United Nations, Palestine declared its territory to consist of the West Bank and Gaza, implying that some of Jordan's previous border with Israel is now with Palestine.

Violations
In each case Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) were formed under the auspices of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, (UNTSO) which investigated complaints by all parties and made regular reports to the UN Security Council.

As part of its dispute with Syria over use of the Demilitarized Zone created by the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement, Israel from 1951 refused to attend meetings of the Israel/Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The U.N. Security Council, in its resolution of 18 May 1951, criticized Israel's refusal to participate in Mixed Armistice Commission meetings as being "inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement".

The discussion of complaints by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission during the year 1952 resulted in:

 * 1. Jordan being condemned for 19 violations of the General Armistice Agreement;
 * 2. Israel being condemned for 12 violations of the General Armistice Agreement;

Statistics Taken from The Official Records of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Period from 1 January 1953 Through 15 October 1953:

 * The discussion of the 171 Israeli complaints by the Mixed Armistice Commission resulted in Jordan being condemned for 20 violations of the General Armistice Agreement.
 * The discussion of the 161 Jordanian complaints by the Mixed Armistice Commission resulted in Israel being condemned for 21 violations of the General Armistice Agreement.

Specific incidents
On 28–29 January 1953 Israeli military forces estimated at 120 to 150 men, using 2 in mortars, 3-inch mortars, PIAT weapons, bangalore torpedoes, machine-guns, grenades and small arms, crossed the demarcation line and attacked the Arab villages of Falameh (Falāma, Falamya) and Rantis. At Falameh the mukhtar was killed, seven other villagers were wounded, and three houses were demolished. The attack lasted four and a half hours. Israel was condemned for this act by the Mixed Armistice Commission.

22 April 1953, firing broke out at sunset within Jerusalem along the demarcation line on a length of about 4 kilometres. It lasted two hours, until the cease-fire arranged by United Nations observers came into effect. On the following day, there were isolated shots in the early morning and in the afternoon. There were twenty Jordanian casualties—ten killed and ten wounded. Six Israelis were wounded. The Jerusalem incident was investigated by United Nations observers. After studying the evidence collected, General Riley, in a report to the Security Council on the violation of the cease-fire [S/3607], stated that it appeared impossible to determine who fired the first shot.

On 25, 26, and 27 May, the two parties submitted complaints alleging violation of the General Armistice Agreement by civilians and military personnel in the Al-Dawayima area. In an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, both parties agreed to a mixed investigation. United Nations observers accompanied the representatives to the demarcation line to establish the facts. Despite the cease-fire which had been previously arranged, heavy firing broke out during the investigation. Israel troops had fired across the demarcation line at Jordanians in Jordan territory in response to illegal border trespassing by Jordanian farmers and Israeli soldiers were suspected to have burned crops in Jordan territory. The origin of the incident was the illegal cultivation by Jordanians of land in Israel territory. Armed Jordanians had penetrated Israel territory to harvest crops, and other Jordanians had fired across the demarcation line to protect the harvesters. The Jordanian government took no action to encourage or prevent the actions taken, though later considerations were made.

During the latter part of May 1953, incidents took place which cost the lives of three persons and in which six others were wounded. On the night of 25–26 May, an armed group from Jordan attacked two homes in Beit Arif, wounding two women. The same night, armed Jordanians attacked a home in Beit Nabala, killing a woman and wounding her husband and two children. Jordan was condemned for all three of these attacks. On the night of 9 June, armed Jordanians blew up a house in Tirat Yehuda, killing one man, and two nights later an armed band struck at a house in Kfar Hess, killing a woman and seriously wounding her husband. Jordan was again condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for these attacks. Both governments were greatly concerned over the happenings during this fortnight, and a great effort was made to stop the work of these groups, which seemed bent on creating tension along the border.

11 August 1953, Israel military forces using demolition mines, bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch mortars, machine-guns and small arms attacked the villages of Idna, Surif and Wadi Fukin, inflicting casualties among the inhabitants and destroying dwellings. The body of an Israel soldier in full uniform with identification tag was found in the village of Idna after the attack. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel for these attacks.

2 September 1953: Arabs, infiltrated from Jordan, reached the neighbourhood of Katamon, in the heart of Jerusalem where they threw hand grenades in all directions. Miraculously, no one was hurt.

3 September 1953: Sovereignty over the DMZ (Demarcation Zone) between Syria Israel is questioned when Israel start a creeping border attempt by using a water diversion in DMZ; USA threatens to end aid channelled to Israel by the Foreign Operations Administration. Israel moves intake out of DMZ.

In September 1953 the General Headquarters orders Unit 101 to drive Bedouins out from the Negev and push them southward to Sinai. Unit 101 soldiers act aggressively: they raid the Bedouin camp, shooting aimlessly, confiscating arms and burning tents. The Bedouins run away, leaving many wounded behind. For a few days Unit 101 pursuits the Bedouins until they are out of the Negev.

2 October 1953: The explosion of a land mine on the Israel railway north of Eyal derailed an Israel freight train. The Mixed Armistice Commission has held Jordan responsible for this act of violence which fortunately caused no loss of life and relatively little damage, as the train was made up of empty tank cars.

14 October 1953: Qibya massacre – 130 Israeli troops crossed the demarcation line into Qibya village, attacking the inhabitants by firing from automatic weapons and explosives. Forty-one dwelling houses and a school building were destroyed. Resulting in the murder of forty-two lives and the wounding of fifteen persons and the damage of a police car, and at the same time, the crossing of a part of the same group into Shuqba village, breaching article III, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. A number of unexploded hand grenades, marked with Hebrew letters and three bags of TNT were found in and about the village.

24 November 1953: Resolution 101 the Security Council is passed which "took note of the fact that there is substantial evidence of crossing of the demarcation line by unauthorized persons, ten resulting in acts of violence and requests the Government of Jordan to continue and strengthen the measures which they are already taking to prevent such crossing." The Security Council condemned Israel for the operation in Qibya.

December 1953: The Jordanian authorities carried out the following measures:-

 * (a) Increase of the number of Jordanian police assigned to the border area;
 * (b) Increase of the number of patrols of the Jordanian border by Jordanian forces;
 * (c) Replacement of village mukhtars and area commanders, where laxity of border control was suspected;
 * (d) Removal from the border area of suspected infiltrators and imposing of heavy sentences on known infiltrators;

16 December 1953, two Israeli soldiers were killed while on patrol inside Israel territory (approximate M. R. 1433–1097). On 21 December, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Jordan for this incident.

18 December 1953, a car was ambushed on the Hebron road (approximate M.R. 1658–1221) inside Jordan and an Arab Legion medical officer was killed. Israel was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for this incident (21 December).

21 December 1953, an armed group attacked a Bedouin camp near Tarqumyia (approximate M.R. 1512–1092) wounding one man. Israel was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for this incident (23 December).

21 December, an armed group, using explosives and automatic weapons, attacked a house near Hebron (approximate M.R. 1591–1066) killing one pregnant woman and two men, and wounding another man. Israel was condemned for this incident (24 December). The last three incidents were apparently reprisal attacks for the killing of the two Israeli soldiers on 16 December. Two Arabs responsible for this crime were arrested by the Jordan police a few days later.

14 February 1954, an Israeli villager on guard duty at Mahasyia, near Deiraban, (approximate M. R. 1510–1282) in the central area, was killed. No evidence was introduced to indicate that Jordanians were guilty of this crime and on 18 February the Chairman voted against the Israeli draft resolution condemning Jordan.

17 February 1954: the Israel delegation complained that five armed persons dressed in khaki crossed the demarcation line during the night and, on the morning of 16 February, stole a flock of 260 sheep belonging to an Israeli kibbutz. According to the complaint, the Israeli shepherd and his flock were taken into caves and kept there till 5.30 p.m. when the shepherd was released and the marauders returned to the Gaza Strip with the flock crossing the demarcation line at M.R. 1067–1024. The Israel delegation considered that "the above was a carefully planned action ordered by the Egyptian authorities and carried out by a well-trained military unit."

17 February 1954: the Israel delegation complained that two Arabs crossed the demarcation line into Israel at M.R. 1018–0992, on 16 February. According to the complaint, they started to escape when challenged by Israeli guards, and fire having been opened on them, one was hit and was dragged over the demarcation line by the second.

18 February, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel and Jordan for firing across the demarcation line on 14 February near Deir el Ghusun (approximate M. R. 1575–1955) in the northern area. This firing resulted in the killing, of one Jordanian.

18 February: the Israel delegation complained that on 18 February at 1 p.m. two armed Egyptian soldiers crossed the demarcation line at M.R. 10884–10486. According to the complaint, the Egyptian soldiers refused to stop, when challenged by an Israeli patrol; two warning shots were fired; one of the Egyptian soldieries escaped, and the other was killed 15 meters inside Israel territory

18 February: the Israel delegation complained that on 18 February four armed infiltrators crossed the demarcation line into Israel and that when challenged by an Israel patrol at M.R. 1023-1123 they started to escape while firing on the patrol. During the exchange of fire one of the infiltrators was killed.

19 February: the Egyptian delegation complained that on 18 February, at M.R. 1087–1050, a patrol of two Egyptian soldiers in Egyptian territory was attacked by armed Israelis hiding in ambush. One of the Egyptian soldiers was kidnapped and killed inside Israel-controlled territory, close to the demarcation line (Cf. sub-paragraph (c) above summarizing an Israeli complaint dated 18 February).

19 February: the Egyptian delegation complained that on 19 February armed Israelis opened automatic fire across the demarcation line at an Arab working in his field at M.R. 0952–0931. The Arab was seriously injured.

24 February One Arab was reported killed and another wounded by the Egyptian delegation.

16 March 1954, Israelis of the Ein Gev colony began ploughing 130 dunums of land situated near the colony and belonging to the Arab population of demilitarised Nuqeib, in violation of the verbal agreement concluded at Samara in 1950 to the effect that the two parties should retain and work the said land until the problem was settled.

17 March 1954: Ma'ale Akrabim massacre [Scorpion Pass]. Terrorists ambushed a bus traveling from Eilat to Tel Aviv, and opened fire at short range when the bus reached the area of Maale Akrabim in the northern Negev. In the initial ambush, the terrorists killed the driver and wounded most of the passengers. The terrorists then boarded the bus, and shot each passenger, one by one. Eleven passengers were murdered. Survivors recounted how the murderers spat on the bodies and abused them. The Israeli claimed that the terrorists could clearly be traced back to the Jordanian border, some 20 km from the site of the terrorist attack. The MAC investigation found that the claim could not be substantiated and that the attack was more likely to have been by Bedu tribesman from within Israel and the Israeli complaint was not upheld.

23 March 1954: The Israel Government has severed all connections with the Mixed Armistice Commission. It has also discontinued attendance at the local commanders' meetings provided for under a separate Israel-Jordan agreement. Israel communications referring to alleged violations by Jordan of the General Armistice Agreement have been addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the request that they should be circulated to the members of the Security Council. The Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem has been informed of such alleged violations of the General Armistice Agreement only on receiving from New York a copy of the Security Council document. The non-co-operation of the Israel Government has prevented the investigation of such alleged violations in conformity with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement.

On 29 March 1954, at 07.00 hours, local time, the Jordanian delegation presented to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission a verbal complaint dealing with an incident which had occurred on 29 March 1954 at 07.00 hours, local time, at Nahhalin village, some 35 kilometers from the demarcation line "an Israel armed force, well equipped, surrounded the village from three directions and penetrated inside the village and opened fire from different automatic weapons, threw hand-grenades and placed mines at some houses, including the mosque of the village. As a result of this brutal attack, 9 persons—8 men and 1 woman—were killed, and 14 others were injured and taken to hospital. Fire lasted for about one hour and a half, and was returned by the village guards. Then the aggressors withdrew. Mines, grenades and other warlike materials bearing Hebrew markings were found on the spot. This complaint was upheld by the Mixed Armistice Commission

30 June 1954, two Israeli armoured launchers attacked the Syrian post of El Koursi, situated on Syrian soil, with their 20-mm. and 57-mm. guns, this time with the support of Israel field artillery sited in the defensive area. This artillery continued firing for approximately one hour and 45 minutes, causing material damage to the post.

5 December 1954, at approximately 16.30 hours, a group of 8 armed Israel State policemen stationed approximately at MR 209600 233400 opened fire on two Arab farmers at approximately MR 209600 233450 in the southern demilitarised zone (Tawafiq). The fire was returned by the two Arabs. One of them was hit by a bullet and immediately taken to hospital. The MAC Decided that the presence of a regular Israel police force in the southern demilitarised zone is a flagrant violation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement and requested that the Israel authorities to pay to the wounded Arab civilian an appropriate compensation.

A list of 29 complaints are alleged in the 27 October 1953 Report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. See appendix I, II and II for a tabulated list of Israel and Jordanian complaints to the MAC the number of condemnations given to each country as a result of MAC investigations infractions of the agreement by Jordan was submitted on April 6, 1954. These alleged infractions included alleged Jordanian attacks on an Israeli civilian bus, killing 11 people (see 17 March above), attacks on Israeli farmers and Bedouin shepherds, sniping at Israeli civilians from the Old City of Jerusalem, kidnappings, shooting at civilian aircraft, ambushing roads and laying mines. In violation of the agreements, the Jordanians denied Jewish access to the holy places in Jerusalem, prohibited visits to Rachel's Tomb and vandalized the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, using tombstones for construction of pavements and latrines. The 'Uja al-Hafeer demilitarized zone on the Israeli-Egyptian border was the site of numerous border incidents and armistice violations. In September 1955, Ariel Sharon's paratroopers entered the United Nation sector of the demilitarized zone. Benny Morris writes that Sharon "didn't realize that the UN area was off limits for his men." On May 28, 1958, Israel reported a shooting incident in the demilitarized zone on Mount Scopus in which 4 Israel police officers patrolling the botanical gardens of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, along with the United Nations observer sent to extricate them, were killed by Jordanian fire from Issawiya. Israel sent soldiers into Jordanian territory to conduct raids in retaliation for incursions by armed persons into Israel. From their positions on the Golan Heights Syrian forces shelled Israeli settlements in the demilitarized zone, attacked fishing boats on the Kinneret and fired on agricultural workers.

Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

 * Camp David 2000 Summit
 * Camp David Accords (1978)
 * Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919)
 * International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
 * Egypt–Israel peace treaty (1979)
 * Israel–Jordan peace treaty (1994)
 * List of Middle East peace proposals
 * Madrid Conference of 1991
 * Oslo Accords (1993)
 * Paris Peace Conference, 1919
 * Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs

Texts
The complete texts of the Armistice Agreements can be found at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School
 * Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949
 * Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, April 3, 1949
 * Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, March 23, 1949
 * Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949

A search at the United Nations web site for "Mixed Armistice Commission" will reveal many of the reports made to the UN by those commissions.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: 1949 Armistice Agreements


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USCF

USCF may refer to:

 * United States Chess Federation, the governing body for chess competition in the United States.
 * United States Commodity Funds
 * USA Cycling - United States Cycling Federation

title: USCF


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Iraqi

Iraqi or Iraqis (in plural) means from Iraq, a country in the Middle East, and may refer to:
 * Iraqi people or Iraqis, people from Iraq or of Iraqi descent
 * A citizen of Iraq, see demographics of Iraq
 * Iraqi or Araghi, someone or something of, from, or related to Persian Iraq, an old name for a region in Central Iran
 * Iraqi Arabic, the colloquial form of Arabic spoken in Iraq
 * Iraqi cuisine
 * Iraqi culture
 * The Iraqis (party), a political party in Iraq
 * Iraqi List, a political party in Iraq
 * Fakhr-al-Din Iraqi, 13th-century Persian poet and Sufi.

title: Iraqi


text:
Grip

Grip(s) or The Grip may refer to:

Common uses

 * Grip (job), a job in the film industry
 * Grip strength, a measure of hand strength

Music

 * Grip (percussion), a method for holding a drum stick or mallet
 * Grip (album), a 2024 album by serpentwithfeet
 * The Grip, a 1977 album by Arthur Blythe
 * Grip, a 1996 album by Husking Bee
 * The Grip, a 2011 EP by Cerebral Ballzy
 * "Grip", a song by Lights from Pep, 2022
 * "Grip" (song), by Seeb and Bastille, 2018
 * "(Get A) Grip (On Yourself)", a 1977 song by the Stranglers
 * "Grip!", a 2003 song by Every Little Thing from Many Pieces

Organizations

 * Grip Ltd., a Toronto, Canada, design firm, originally founded to publish Grip magazine
 * Grip (magazine), an 1873–1894 satirical magazine
 * Grip Digital, a Czech video game developer and publisher
 * German Research Institute for Public Administration, Speyer, Rhineland Palatinate, Germany
 * National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Minato, Tokyo, Japan

People

 * Grip (rapper) (born 1989), rapper
 * Jouko Grip (born 1949), Finnish Paralympic athlete
 * Håvard Fjær Grip, Norwegian cybernetics engineer

Places

 * Grip, Norway, an archipelago and deserted fishing village in Møre og Romsdal county
 * Grip (municipality), an 1897–1964 municipality that included the archipelago
 * Grip Lighthouse
 * Grips-Theater, a youth theater in Berlin, Germany

Science and technology

 * Grip (software), a CD-ripping software program
 * Grip, a part of a scrollbar
 * Battery grip, a camera accessory
 * Cable grip, a component of cable car systems
 * Pistol grip, the handle of a firearm, or a similar handle on a tool
 * Glutamate receptor-interacting protein
 * Greenland ice core project

Sports

 * Grip (auto racing), the cornering performance of a race car
 * Grip (badminton), how a badminton racket is held
 * Grip (cricket bowling), how a cricket ball is held by a bowler
 * Grip (gymnastics), a device worn on the hands of gymnasts
 * Grip (sport fencing), the hilt of a fencing weapon
 * Grip (sword), part of the hilt of a blade weapon
 * Grip (tennis), how a tennis racket is held

Other uses

 * Grip: Combat Racing, a racing video game
 * Grip (raven), talking raven kept as a pet by Charles Dickens
 * "Grip", a raven character in Charles Dickens' Barnaby Rudge
 * The Grip (TV series), a 1994–1998 Irish children's sports programme
 * Coordinated Regional Incident Management (Netherlands), an emergency management procedure in the Netherlands
 * Governance for Railway Investment Projects, United Kingdom, for managing railway infrastructure projects

title: Grip


text:
Guard

Guard or guards may refer to:

Professional occupations

 * Bodyguard, who protects an individual from personal assault
 * Crossing guard, who stops traffic so pedestrians can cross the street
 * Lifeguard, who rescues people from drowning
 * Prison guard, who supervises prisoners in a prison or jail
 * Security guard, who protects property, assets, or people
 * Conductor (rail) § Train guard, in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and India

Computing and telecommunications

 * Guard (computer science), in programming language, an expression that directs program execution
 * Guard (information security), a device for controlling communication between computer networks
 * Guard interval, intervals in transmission, used in telecommunications
 * Aircraft emergency frequency, commonly referred to as "guard"

Governmental and military

 * Border guard, a state security agency
 * Coast guard, responsible for coastal defence and offshore rescue
 * Colour guard, a detachment of soldiers assigned to the protection of regimental colors
 * Commander-in-Chief's Guard, a unit of the Continental Army that protected General George Washington
 * Foot guards, a senior infantry unit in some armies, often with ceremonial duties
 * Garda Síochána, Irish police force informally known as Guards
 * Guard of honour, primarily ceremonial
 * Guards (Russia), elite military in pre-revolutionary Russia
 * Guards unit, a title earned by distinguished units in the former Soviet Union and in some contemporary ex-Soviet states
 * Police in medieval contexts
 * Royal Guard, military bodyguards, soldiers or armed retainers responsible for the protection of a royal person, often an elite unit of the regular armed forces.

Sports

 * Guard (gridiron football), a player between the center and the tackles on the offensive line
 * Guard (basketball)
 * Point guard, or "playmaker"
 * Shooting guard, or "off guard"
 * Combo guard, combining both point and shooting guard
 * Guard (grappling), a position in martial arts
 * Color guard (flag spinning), people who toss flags, spin a rifle and a saber at performances with a marching band
 * Winter guard, people who spin and toss flags, rifles, and/or sabers at indoor performances on a tarp

Other uses

 * Guard (surname)
 * Guards (band), an American rock band
 * Guards (steamboat)
 * Guard (weapon), part of the handle of a sword designed to protect the user's hand
 * Guard (knife), finger protection barrier between the handle and the blade
 * Guard dogs, guard llamas and guard geese, animals employed to watch for unwanted or unexpected animals or people
 * Abdominal guarding, in medicine, the tensing of the abdominal wall muscles to guard inflamed organs
 * Mate guarding, guarding of a potential or former mate from other individuals
 * Mouthguard, a protective device for the mouth
 * Wächter (Anatol) (Guards), several monumental sculptures by Anatol Herzfeld

title: Guard


text:
Talk:Grip

I'm not sure this is a good redirect. Eventually, somebody will probably want to write about the film career. Maybe a disambiguation page? -- Zoe

Ilnesss
What about the illness called grip? --Crackthewhip775 (talk) 20:47, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

The german word for 'flue' is 'Grippe'. -- 89.217.62.88 (talk) 19:26, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

shooting movies
Sometimes in the credits there is a category 'Grip'. What is it? -- 89.217.62.88 (talk) 19:26, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Added grips
For whatever reason, this page listed neither power grips nor precision grips. It should probab;y list different types of pencil grips too. 72.66.39.198 (talk) 01:17, 4 December 2011 (UTC)

title: Talk:Grip


text:
Talk:Guard

Again, probably not a good redirect. -- Zoe

Small addition under Person
After searching the Wikipedia for the rank hierarchy of prison guards (I searched the terms guard, prison guard, prison, penetentiary, warden & Corrections Canada) I finally happened upon corrections officer, which linked to prison officer. As you can see, I've added prison officer to the Person subsection. I hope my wording is appropriate. wbm 17:59, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Another small revision to the same line of text. wbm 07:24, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Dab page formatting
This is a disambiguation page, please familiarize yourself with MOS:Disambiguation pages before editing. Dreadlocke ☥  08:07, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

 * Much better, this time. I was actually going to suggest that you create a list of military guard units!  Perfect timing and nice job! Dreadlocke  ☥  16:59, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

This is a disambiguation page, not a dictionary entry!

 * My cleanup of March 20 2007 has just been reversed. This page is now again what it was: a dictionary entry and not a disambiguation page. A dictionary entry starts with "The word guard may mean:"; a dab page starts with "Guard may refer to:", meaning "Any of the following articles could be titled Guard:". May someone see the difference and make things right. (In the meanwhile, I'm putting the cleanup tag back on the article.)--maf 17:44, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
 * This is still not a proper DAB page, but apparently some editors are willing to edit war over it. I'm just watching to see what happens.  We may have to get the DAB team in here to comment and work on it.  Dreadlocke  ☥  02:37, 22 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Where a disambig meaning needs a very short definition, it is often more convenient to the reader to put that definition in the disambig page line that to force the reader to refer to another page for it. Anthony Appleyard 07:26, 22 March 2007 (UTC)
 * This dab page is hard to keep from becoming a dictionary page, simply because there are too many (separate) meanings that all have a separate wiki article. I honestly don't know how to improve this page, but it could definately need some improvement. Maf's version seemed like a good attempt, but there are just too many topic themes concerning the word "guard" so that it still looks a little cluttered. I'll offer my cleaned-up version soon; I've found that going with a separation of "list of articles with guard in the title" and "list of synonyms that have wiki articles" works well. (Example: Spinner dab page.) It's IMO still a good idea to have the bigger sport section separate. – sgeureka t•c 15:49, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
 * We can keep on reshuffling and rereshuffling this page and the result would not 100% satisfy everybody. OK, the word "guard" has developed many meanings, and they all need disambiguating between. The current arrangement looks satisfactorily clear to me. Anthony Appleyard 16:16, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
 * So we delete the cleanup tag and live with the current look of this page? Fine by me (for the moment). Although I would recommend to reduce the huge section headers from " ==Section== " to "In section:", especially since there are so many sections that have just two or less entries. – sgeureka t•c 20:28, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I am the user who started this thread because my cleanup was reversed. Anthony Appleyard, who has commented on this thread, is the person who did the reversal. His comments may give the impression that he is a third party in this matter. Well, he isn't. In my opinion, he should abstain from commenting in his own interest, just like I am doing. Let others decide, as so far only sgeureka has participated in the discussion. --maf 04:07, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I'd say just try again for a cleanup with the suggestions from this thread, Maf, and be careful not to be too bold. (Or do a cleanup in two steps: Minor cleanup for style; major cleanup for deletion of dictionary entries. This way, a revert doesn't lose everything but still makes this dab page look better.) – sgeureka t•c 14:35, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I think that maf was being appropriately bold with his cleanup of March 20, 2007. As the page now appears (the reverted version), it is not in keeping with Manual of Style (disambiguation pages). A few examples: There are problems such as using a definition as a section heading (Someone who guards) and including information about the word origin, and more minor problems such as the use of a colon and hyphen together when only a colon is called for. I agree with Sgeureka in that I also prefer the look of the page when bold words are used to divide up groupings rather than the current use of formal section headings and table of contents. --Paul Erik 00:57, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I support whichever version conforms best to the Manual of Style. As far as I can tell, that's maf's version, and the question is settled. --Smack (talk) 04:18, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
 * OK, so that's settled. I'll take on my previous cleanup and I'll apply the suggestions above. Thank you. --maf 04:41, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Ah, this current version looks great!  Nice job maf! Dreadlocke  ☥  05:09, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Looks very clean and ordered. Good job. – sgeureka t•c 06:59, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

Garda Síochána
Can we put a link to Garda Síochána here? Colloquially "guards" in Irish English. Kanjo Kotr (talk) 00:27, 11 November 2013 (UTC)

title: Talk:Guard


text:
Talk:Madeleine Albright

german ancestors
Körbel is a german family name, not a tschechosslovakia family name. Her father must have german ancestors. In Tschechoslovakia, formerly Böhmen (part of Austria), lived many german people since 13. century or earlier. 2001:9E8:B42E:FD00:DC6A:60E5:165A:6C3D (talk) 14:12, 25 October 2022 (UTC)

 * In Czech republic German surnames are very common and nowadays most bearer aren't German (and even before WWII not all were). It's because of hundrets of years of common history with Sudeten Germans, Austrians and neighboring Germany. (In Slovakia the most common surname is Horváth - Hungarian word for Croat - does it mean that all its bearers are Hungarians?). --Pan Někdo (talk) 07:08, 18 January 2023 (UTC)

Connections of Madeleine Albright to Herbalife
In the entire Wikipedia article, there are no references to the connections of Madeleine Albright to Herbalife. "Albright was a longtime brand ambassador for Herbalife Nutrition, a dietary supplement company. According to the New York Post, she was paid $10 million for these efforts over six years. Below she can be seen enthusing about Herbalife in an infomercial, saying, “You have a great product. That makes all the difference. I’m a product of the product!” Albright’s firm, the Albright Stonebridge Group, has used her diplomatic credibility to open doors for Herbalife abroad. She was particularly effective in getting Herbalife licenses in China, which takes a dim view of multilevel marketing companies, sources said. In a 2016 settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, Herbalife agreed to pay $200 million in response to charges that it had “deceived consumers” into participating as the dupes in a pyramid scheme." Alexfactcheck (talk) 22:31, 1 September 2023 (UTC)

 * See WP:NYPOST. It's not a reliable source for politics, and the headline of that article claiming without any basis that Albright was "freaking out" shows why. That being said, there do appear to be some WP:RS when I google "Madeleine Albright Herbalife", such as . So what can be said about this with RS? – Muboshgu (talk) 23:33, 1 September 2023 (UTC)

title: Talk:Madeleine Albright


text:
User talk:Daeron

May 2015
It seems somebody just tried to hijack my account. Hopefully they will not succeed in using this account as a sock-puppet. Daeron (talk) 03:17, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

October 2012
You have been pushing your ideas about Indonesia and Western New Guinea for over 7 years, and in that time it seems as if you have always focused upon those who choose to challenge your edits, rather than the content itself. (your contributions, your user page and talk page histories can be blanked but they are still there and are adequate evidence of this)

You might just happen to be wrong? No need to go to Jimbo and complain, it just shows you have no idea how wikikpedia works if you ever try that one again. Just listen to those who have to waste their time reverting your edits.

This time, if you keep it up as you have in the past, I would suggest to other editors who have to cope with your style - a process of getting you to (a) desist (b) stop focusing on others and accusing them of things  (c) try to learn that after 8 years you are not going to change the content of wikipedia through your behaviour.

WP:AGF, and all the rest of the templates that can be invoked, can be misused as much by you for your purpose as others who are trying to get you to understand other points of view.

SatuSuro 02:38, 26 October 2012 (UTC)

Nomination for deletion of Template:Melanesia
Template:Melanesia has been nominated for deletion. You are invited to comment on the discussion at the template's entry on the Templates for discussion page. Bgwhite (talk) 23:54, 6 February 2015 (UTC)

ArbCom elections are now open!
MediaWiki message delivery (talk) 08:52, 23 November 2015 (UTC)

History of Indonesia
Hi. I reverted your edit to this page. I don't understand what you types, and the URL you gave is dead - it leas to a UN page with the text, "There is no document matching your request Pas de reponse a votre demande". Please don't add content unless it is clear and cited. Regards Davidelit (Talk) 15:40, 4 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Hi again. I'm afraid I still don't understand what your edit means. Would it be possible to add an explanation? Regards Davidelit (Talk) 07:47, 17 September 2017 (UTC)
 * It might look like vandalism if I have to write an explanation addressed to you in the article. Perhaps you could explain what you are having trouble understanding? I hope you may agree that the article is meant to be about the "History of Indonesia" and not "Theories of Indonesian History", and therefore where possible should contain facts in preference to theories. Facts are things like the Dutch in 1946 told the United Nations (see Assembly resolution 66) that the Netherlands was legally required to perform the functions of UN Charter article 73e in relationship to the Netherlands East Indies, which article 73e says is a "sacred trust" with purpose until the territory has a "full measure of self-government".

"self-government" = independence or whatever else your people decide they want to do which is what the word "self" is referring to. Its a concept people in other parts of the world have heard of from the UN Charter article 1 that its purpose is also to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". That's what the Netherlands in 1946 has declared and legally locked itself into for Indonesia; the Church and other business owners might be pissed off and try to get get public support to demand the Hague undoes this commitment, but that is not an option allowed by 73e. And there's Sukarno who might not want the Javanese to be allowed to design their own government or vote for their own choice of leaders. Currently the article includes theories alleging the Netherlands had a unspoken policy never to allow independence, which have been popular theories for a long time and still are popular (especially in Indonesia); but including that theory should not be reason to exclude the fact that the Netherlands made a legal commitment about Indonesia at the United Nations in/from 1946.Daeron (talk) 10:44, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

 * Hi. Thanks for responding. I don't understand the following:

 * "transmit data" - what data? Transmitted by what and to whom?
 * "fulfill “sacred trust” and decolonisation requirements of the ‘’Charter of the United Nations article 73‘’" - what does "sacred trust" mean in this context, and what are the "decolonisation requirements"? How is this relevant to the history of Indonesia?
 * I'm afraid this isn't clear to anybody without knowledge of the relevant articles of the UN charter, and appears not to follow WP:RKN. Regards Davidelit (Talk) 04:37, 18 September 2017 (UTC)
 * By end of World War Two most people thought slavery and owning people was not a good thing, that nations should not loot colonies or commit genocide for fun and profit ; so the governments agreed to adopt a new law called the "Charter of the United Nations" in which a colony or "non-self-governing territory" is NOT property that the foreign colonial power owns, it is a "trust" that the colonial power is "administrating" for benefit of the local colonial people until they are able to administrate their own affairs. What you call "Indonesia" from 1945 was the beneficiary of the "sacred trust" that the Netherlands admitted in 1946 it had, a trust to ensure that the local Javanese people would be able to rule their own affairs.Daeron (talk) 05:31, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

My revert of your manual of style ediit
You should not have templated me. I reverted you with an edit summary reading "Not an improvement IMHO, please take this to the talk page" and instead of doing that you template me. You also ignored the message on the page saying " Any substantive edit to this page should reflect consensus. When in doubt, discuss first on the talk page." That was a substantive edit with both content and grammar issues. Additionally, I have no idea why you used the word "garrulous" which means "talkative, loquacious, voluble, verbose, long-winded, chatty, chattery, chattering, gossipy, gossiping, babbling, blathering, prattling, prating, jabbering, etc". Doug Weller talk 18:00, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

Question
I asked a question here about the March 2020 ANI discussion. I know it's irritating but it is ancient history as far as Wikipedia is concerned. Given your level of activity it might not be worth pursuing the matter but I will see what responses occur. Johnuniq (talk) 05:12, 5 June 2020 (UTC)
 * Thanks. To be honest after the edit war business (you have no idea how many times they moved & renamed & did other weird stuff to the Papua related pages), the hussle with this editor who allegedly joined in 2006 was more than I could stomach. But irrespective whether I return to more regular editing, "daeron" is not an anonymous or random name but has been my Net handle since the 1990s and is a significant part of my public identity.Daeron (talk) 06:53, 5 June 2020 (UTC)
 * OK, I see what you mean. Johnuniq (talk) 07:31, 5 June 2020 (UTC)
 * After looking at this a bit more, I see that a discussion is required. Examples of previous similar discussions are at this search link. I nominated the category for deletion here. If you post there, please be brief and calm without flowery language. Johnuniq (talk) 04:03, 6 June 2020 (UTC)

Deletion pages are to discuss the merits of a proposal to delete a page. Talking about other editors and their edits suggests that you are the problem. Johnuniq (talk) 10:08, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
 * Thanks but I was only providing an alternate theory about the purpose of his category. As the category creator begins his reponse by commenting on my post to ANI and then "Daeron's contribs" and "his position on the articles", I get the impression he is still implying POV and likely other undesirable conduct on my part. If I am wrong that the creator's response is an on-going allegation, I do not understand why he then proclaims he has a "screen shot of the IP's" and invites others to undertake an investigation.

 * In short, he is still being unnecessarily disparaging about myself and my edits, I still refute his allegations. I suggest his category is due to a 'personality conflict' and despite his claim of ignorance that he knows whether his category is not supported by "Wikipedia policy".Daeron (talk) 05:18, 12 June 2020 (UTC)

title: User talk:Daeron