text:
Talk:Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Italics
Is there a standard on namings of court cases involving italics? -- Zoe
 * Well, yes. e.g. Eldred v. Ashcroft.  Koyaanis Qatsi

 * Thanks, KQ. I thought there was.  -- Zoe

 * Not a problem. I should add that to Ortolan's Manual of style.  Koyaanis Qatsi

Direct vs. Indirect (Apportionment and Uniformity)
[The title of 'Tax Protestor Rhetoric' is inflammatory and violates the "neutral point-of-view" guideline that serves as the second of Wikipedia's "Five Pillars", so I changed it to something neutral --Flytrapper 00:07, 9 May 2006 (UTC)]

The article states that the 16th amendment removes the requirement of apportionment for income taxes. This is wrong. It never was removed. ['''Editor's note: False. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC) ]How do I know this? Stanton vs Baltic Mining ( http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=240&invol=103 ) This Surpreme court case is oddly missing from the court case index in this site. When read with this one, it settles this dispute. Both the Brushaber and Standon cases were decided the same day by the Same court. Stanton came second, making numerous references to the Brushaber decision.

We should get the Stanton page up and re-evaluate the claims made by this article.

From Stanton vs Baltic Mining: "by [Brushaber] it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed [240 U.S. 103, 1"13] in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived.

The Brushaber case is quite specific that an income tax MUST be an indirect, more specifically, an excise tax. ['''Editor's Note: False. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC)] The an excise tax can't be imposed by the federal government arbitrarily and willy-nilly. Indeed, it cannot be imposed upon anything but either the exercise of federally-engendered PRIVILEGE *or* federally-SOURCED income. ['''Editor's note: False. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC)] What CANNOT be federally-excise-taxed is any activity to which (or stemming from which) a citizen has a Constitutionally-recognized and -protected RIGHT--such as the right to sell his labor for remuneration in the private sector. Remuneration for private-sector work simply is not federally excise taxable. ['''Editor's Note: False. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC) ] It can only be taxed directly, and thus would be subject to the rule of apportionment. ['''Ed. note: False after the 16th Am. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC)] Direct taxation under constitutional constraints has always been too cumbersome for DC. Hence ALL FEDERAL TAXES ARE, AND HAVE BEEN FOR SOME TIME, INDIRECT (MOSTLY EXCISE) TAXES. ['''Ed. note: False. See below.''' Famspear 21:38, 23 December 2005 (UTC)] But remuneration from private-sector work is not federally excise-taxable. This is the law, and it is actually how the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and U.S. Title 26 are written. Yet private-sector companies continue to issue erroneous W-2's (committing perjury in the process) and workers continue to fail to rebut these erroneous filings, and thus are presumed to have actually received federally-privileged income--which, indeed, is excise taxable by the federal government.

As we can see it is obvious by this quote that income taxation is indirect (and not in deed of apportionment), and notby direct taxation in need of apportionment. Also no third class of taxation was created - the direct but not apportioneded income tax. ***But see above***: Federal excise taxation of private-sector remuneration-for-labor is not constitutional.

 * Comment from Famspear:

 * The statement: "The Brushaber case is quite specific that an income tax MUST be an indirect, more specifically, an excise tax" is quite incorrect. [Editor's note: the preceding statement is "quite incorrect" - assuming incorrectness is not a binary concept, that is - see note below --Flytrapper 00:07, 9 May 2006 (UTC)] The Brushaber Court indicated that income taxes on income from property, under Pollock, began to be treated as direct taxes, but that taxes on income from vocations, employment, etc., were -- both before and after Pollock -- excises (i.e., indirect taxes). The Court also indicated that income taxes on income from employment, etc., as indirect taxes, had never been subject to the apportionment requirement either before or after Pollock, and that such taxes on income from employment, etc., were and had always been constitutional. With regard to income taxes that were direct taxes (e.g., taxes on income from property) -- these taxes were also constitutional even prior to the 16th Amendment as long as they were apportioned' among the states according to population. The Court in Brushaber'' ruled that the Sixteenth Amendment simply removed the requirement that "direct" income taxes (such as taxes on income from property) be apportioned.

 * The statements: "The article states that the 16th amendment removes the requirement of apportionment for income taxes. This is wrong. It never was removed." are also quite incorrect. The Court in Brushaber was very specific on the point that the Amendment did remove the requirement of apportionment (i.e., for income taxes deemed to be direct taxes).

 * The Stanton verbiage ("simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation") is what some legal scholars refer to as a "circumlocutory expression," and older court decisions are full of this kind of archaic language. This language means that the Sixteenth Amendment "prohibited" Congressional power (to tax INCOMES) from being limited by the "direct versus indirect" argument.

 * Nothing in the Sixteenth Amendment (or in Brushaber or Stanton) specifically and literally converted an indirect tax into a direct tax, or a direct tax into an indirect tax. What the Amendment did was to change the treatment of the "direct versus indirect" argument. What the Amendment did was make the distinction -- with respect to INCOME taxes -- constitutionally irrelevant. If you want to look at it another way, the Amendment forced us to treat direct taxes on income (taxes on income from property) the same way we treat indirect taxes on income (such as taxes on income from labor). Since the effective date of the Constitution in the late 1780s, we have always treated indirect taxes on income as NOT required to be "apportioned" among the states according to any "census or enumeration." After the Amendment, all income taxes are treated that way, whether direct or indirect.

 * In effect, the phrase "being placed in the category of direct taxation" means "being placed in the category of being treated as direct taxation subject to the requirement of apportionment as that requirement applied prior to being eliminated (with respect to income taxes) by the Sixteenth Amendment."

 * Before the Amendment (and even after Pollock) the Congress had the power under the Constitution to tax all incomes from whatever source, whether the tax was deemed direct or indirect. The source of the income determines whether the related tax is a direct tax or an excise (an indirect tax). The main limitation prior to the Amendment was that if the income tax was direct (e.g., a tax on income from property), the tax had to be apportioned. After the Sixteenth Amendment, direct taxes on income no longer have to be apportioned. That is part of the teaching of Brushaber and Stanton. Direct income taxes are still direct -- they just don't have to be apportioned any more. They're treated the same as indirect taxes.

 * Statements like "remuneration from private-sector work is not federally excise-taxable. This is the law, and it is actually how the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and U.S. Title 26 are written." are both nonsensical and legally frivolous. The same is true for the statement "it cannot be imposed upon anything but either the exercise of federally-engendered PRIVILEGE *or* federally-SOURCED income." The verbiage "federally-engendered privilege" and "federally-sourced income" have no legal significance with respect to the power of Congress to impose income taxes. Similarly, the statement "Federal excise taxation of private-sector remuneration-for-labor is not constitutional" is false. Neither the Constitution (before or after the Sixteenth Amendment) nor any statute nor any case law has ever prohibited or limited the power of Congress to tax income from "private-sector remuneration-for-labor." Famspear 20:42, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

 * Comment from Flytrapper:

 * I would strongly encourage those interested in the truth regarding this landmark case to simply read it, and would also suggest that those who post comments about the case refrain from supposition and editorialization. The matter is quite clearly stated by the Court: "...the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning, is also wholly without foundation..."

 * This is not opinion. This is not a translation. These are the Court's own words. The contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax...is also wholly without foundation.

 * Brushaber undeniably holds that the Sixteenth Amendment is subject to the rule of uniformity.--Flytrapper 00:09, 9 May 2006 (UTC)

 * As flytrapper pointed out, this is directly from the case (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/240/1/case.html): "... the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax ... is also wholly without foundation". The ellipses represent a compound subordinate clause ("although it ...") with its own subordinate clause ("as it...") because Chief Justice White was apparently not interested in being concise.  You can try to use those subordinate clauses to change the basic sentence, but what he wrote is that the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax is a contention that is wholly without foundation.  You can further expand the scope of what we quoted to discover that he's not simply making this assertion, but rather asserting that this assertion (about the contention being wholly without foundation) "indisputably arises" from the court's previous analysis of the Pollock and Hylton cases.
 * And please stop polluting each others' comments with your bold edits. That is peculiarly confusing and rude. Your writing is more honest and powerful (to those who matter) if you trust your readers to distinguish between truth and falsehood based on evidence rather than spoonfeeding them your own conclusions. I realize that flytrapper was merely following Famspear's bad example, but two wrongs don't make a right.Dscotese (talk) 02:08, 29 June 2017 (UTC)

Dear Dscotese: At the expense of appearing to defend user flytrapper (who I do not intend to defend), and for the purpose of explaining my own use of bolding and other forms of emphasis (which I do intend to explain), I argue that using bolding is not confusing or rude in this context. Honesty and power in writing comes not so much from the use (or non-use) of bolded fonts, but rather from the skill used in implementing the expression and the writer's awareness of the underlying truth of what is being expressed. Famspear (talk) 17:15, 29 June 2017 (UTC)

Misunderstandings
The wording seems to imply that a direct non apportioned tax is implemented. On a second reading it could be read as only describing excise taxes. It should be asserted that income taxes are indirect, that is why they need not be apportioned. See the !6th Amendment wiki for more on this.

New Misunderstanding Sighting: Recently, I've found some tax protesters pointing to this decision as the basis for a different reading on the law. In particular, the claim is that this decision permitted the US to tax nonresidents alien. Supposedly, Treasury Decision 2313 contained the following comments (I can find no reliable online sources for this however): "To collectors of internal revenue: Under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railway [sic] Co., decided January 24, 1916, it is hereby held that income accruing to nonresident aliens in the form of interest from the bonds and dividends on the stock of domestic corporations is subject to the income tax imposed by the act of October 3, 1913." The claim here is that Brushaber listed his residence as New York with his business in Manhattan; he was a citizen of New York and was not consequently a citizen of the United States. He was therefore a nonresident alien. Since the Brushaber decision does not refute these claims, the court treated him as a nonresident alien but he was subject to the right of taxation nonetheless and this reading is reinforced by TD2313. The trick, then, for these tax protesters is to prove that their sources of income derive from places not inside the United States (similar logic claims this, too) and since they are nonresident aliens of the U.S., they are not subject to taxation. The only way to be taxed, they say, is to work and live either in D.C, Puerto Rico or on federal grounds. 00:47, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

 * Dear fellow editors: Yes this reading is definitely full of misunderstandings. It's the usual tax protester nonsense.

 * First, nothing in the Brushaher decision granted, to the United States, the power to tax nonresidents aliens -- for the simple reason that the United States government would have already had that power prior to Brushaher and for the second reason that the power to tax nonresident aliens simply was not at issue in the case. From a legal standpoint, it matters not whether Mr. Brushaber was a citizen or a resident alien or a nonresident alien or an alien from Mars. He didn't raise the issue before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court did not consider the issue, and the Supreme Court did not decide the issue. End of story.

 * Second, even assuming that the quote from Treasury Decision 2313 is accurate, nothing in that Treasury Decision would have granted, to the government, the power to tax non-resident aliens (for the same reason).

 * Third, the argument that if someone is a "citizen" of New York he or she "consequently" is not a "citizen" of the United States is completely nonsensical under U.S. law. Forget about tax law. You literally cannot be "citizen" of New York or any other state without being a United States citizen. Indeed, the law works completely the opposite: All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof ARE citizens of the United States, AND of the state wherein they reside. Period. Without getting into technicalities, if you were born here, you ARE a U.S. citizen unless you came under the cloak of some sort of diplomatic immunity (e.g., foreign diplomats). Same thing if you are a foreigner and you later become a naturalized U.S. citizen. Saying that you are "a citizen of New York but not a citizen of the United States" is literally "nonsensical" from the standpoint of American law.

 * Fourth, related to the point that there is no mention in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision of Mr. Brushaber having raised these issues regarding citizenship in the case: The phrase "[s]ince the Brushaber decision does not refute these claims" would also be nonsensical - literally meaningless. It would be like saying that the court in the O.J. Simpson case did not refute the claim that the moon is made of green cheese, when the issue of whether the moon is made of green cheese was not raised in the Simpson case.

 * Fifth, there is absolutely no legal support for the patently ridiculous argument that the only way to be taxed, for Federal income tax purposes, is to live in the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico. What a laugh. Regards to all, Famspear 02:36, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

Unsigned comment moved from article.
I don't know who is responsible for providing the information within this article, but apparently they haven't read the Brushaber case, if they had, they would have noticed the following language:

"We are of opinion, however, [240 U.S. 1, 11]   that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear. . ."

Notice the Court's language of "erroneous"? Furthermore the "direct tax," unapportioned, was with respect to the source derived. A specific tax with general application. Read the case that you have hyperlinked on your own site.

Comments -- by Famspear -- on 10 May 2006 edits by Famspear
From Famspear To Flytrapper and all editors

Dear Flytrapper

In your recent edits you don't state what you feel is incorrect about the article as written. I have found no errors in the language that you deleted. I also argue that some of your edits are incorrect, as explained below.

You indicated that the Brushaber case is constantly misunderstood by "those who refer to constitutional adherents as tax protesters." I argue that your statement is incorrect.

First, tax protesters, to the extent they make arguments about the constitutionality of the tax, are generally arguing that the tax is unconstitutional. By definition, tax protester arguments on constitutionality are not only without legal merit, the arguments are also legally frivolous. This is not merely my position or conclusion. The courts have so ruled without exception for the past 30 years. Indeed, the frivolousness of the arguments is what makes them "tax protester arguments."

This is an astonishing record. Since 1975, when the term "tax protester" was first used in reported decisions in the way we're using it, I have not found and, to the best of my knowledge, no one else has ever found, a reported Federal court decision in which a tax protester argument was ever ruled to be correct. Every single time I have seen a passage in tax protester literature that says that the tax protesters won some particular tax protester argument, the claim has turned out to be false.

Second, the supposed "misunderstanding" you believe exist stems, you say, from the erroneous belief that the Brushaber decision relieves taxes on incomes from the rule of uniformity.

I agree that such a belief would certainly be erroneous -- there's just one problem with your statement. I have never heard anybody make the argument that the Brushaber court ruled that way! Not even the tax protesters make that kind of argument! You seem to be attributing the "misunderstanding" not to the tax protesters, but to those who disagree with the tax protesters (i.e., legal scholars, lawyers, CPAs, the courts, etc.)!

More specifically, the uniformity rule is the rule that excises (i.e., indirect taxes, such as income taxes other than taxes on income from property) must be imposed with geographical uniformity.

Obviously, the Brushaber court never ruled that excises do not have to be geographically uniform. Indeed, that was not even one of the issues presented to the court in the case.

The court did refer to the uniformity rule -- because Mr. Brushaber had talked about it in one of his arguments. But neither Mr. Brushaber nor the railroad company nor the government were really disagreeing about the point that the uniformity rule applies to excises.

It may not be obvious to you, but I assure you it's unlikely anybody (tax lawyer or tax protester) would argue that Brushaber stands for the proposition that excises do not have to be imposed with geographical uniformity. Again, I've never even heard a tax protester make that argument. (I'm not saying it's never happened -- it's just I can't remember ever seeing it, and more importantly it wouldn't make sense for tax protester or anyone else to argue that Brushaber stands for the proposition that Congress could impose an income tax in, say, only New York and Montana -- and not impose the same tax in all the other states.)

Bottom line: If legal scholars were to misunderstand Brushaber as ruling that excises did not have to be uniform, legal scholars would in effect be saying Brushaber stands for the proposition that Congress could validity enact an excise that was imposed only in some states but not others! I have studied the Federal income tax laws for 29 years and I cannot remember ever seeing anyone make such an argument, especially not a tax lawyer, CPA, law professor, or IRS employee. If someone has ever made such an argument, they would be in a very, very small minority.

Next, your comments in the talk page to the effect that the term "tax protester" shouldn't be used are, I argue, off base. "Tax protester" is a term that has negative connotations, and some people undoubtedly become very angry when the term is used to describe them. Congress in 1998 passed a law forbidding IRS employees from using the term in IRS documents.

However, using the term in Wikipedia does not violate the rule against non-neutral point of view. Indeed, "tax protester" is still a technical legal term used constantly by the courts to describe arguments against the Federal income tax that are not only legally meritless, but which have been repeatedly ruled meritless. When courts or others use the term "meritless" or "without merit" or "frivolous" to describe the tax protesters' arguments, that probably makes the protesters very angry as well. However, these are formal legal terms. In Wikipedia, we do not censor ourselves with respect to the use of legal terminology merely because the use of that terminology offends people. Sorry. (I note that you did not actually delete the term "tax protester" from the article itself, and I commend you on that.)

Regarding your statement that the Court's decisions repeatedly assert that income taxation inherently belongs in the category of indirect tax -- yes, this is very close to be correct. In Brushaber the court used terminology very close to that. However, the Court also said that it was not overturning the Pollock ruling that tax on income from one particular source -- namely, income from property -- was a direct tax. What the Brushaber court essentially said was that the Sixteenth Amendment made the dichotomy legally irrelevant. If you want, I can quote the exact wording from the decision.

I am currently working on the history of the Brushaber case and I may actually be making further edits on this article. You are correct that this decision is "misunderstood" -- however, I argue that your edits muddied the water a bit more, rather than clarifying.

Any comments? Yours, Famspear 20:30, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

Post-script from Famspear: I'd like to point out that many tax protesters have been unhappy with my edits here in Wikipedia. If I were simply trying to refute tax protester arguments, and if I wanted to support any argument that opposed tax protester arguments, it would have been easy for me not to question your statement that income taxation inherently belongs in the category of indirect tax. Indeed, the Brushaber court stated almost exactly that very thing. That statement would tend to support the assertion that an income tax law (after the 16th Amendment) is not subject to the rule of apportionment -- a rule of law which I know to be correct. Had I been dishonest, I could have simply let that statement stand in the article. But what the court was saying -- if you read the entire case -- was that the 16th Amendment did not change the Pollock ruling that income taxes on income from property were treated as direct taxes. The court was essentially saying that AS A GENERAL RULE ("generically" I think was the word the court used) an income tax is an excise, but that income taxes on income from property were still direct taxes -- because of Pollock. The Brushaber case, to be very specific, means in this context that IT NO LONGER MATTERS. The plain language of the Amendment says income taxes on income FROM WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (meaning income from property, income from labor, etc.,) may be imposed without apportionment, etc. Neither the amendment nor the court in Brushaber stated that income taxes on income from property were specifically re-denominated as indirect taxes in the way they were denominated prior to the Pollock decision.

Brushaber is a difficult case to read. It contains archaic language and periphrasis, or circumlocutory expression. It contains language that can certainly result in confusion. But I assure you that the meaning of Brushaber can be distilled if we study it long enough.

By the way, there is some argument that the Pollock decision -- that income taxes on income from property were direct taxes -- was essentially eviscerated by a decision rendered AFTER Brushaber. That is a separate point. In other words, you might make the argument that TODAY all income taxes are considered indirect taxes (I don't really care right now). I'm just saying that the Brushaber court did not make that specific ruling. Yours, Famspear 23:01, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

Comments -- by Flytrapper
Hey there, Famspear, thanks much for taking the time to state your case so clearly. Ironically, that is ultimately the problem I have with the article. Namely, that it is *your* case, and nowhere relies on specific cites from the Brushaber decision. While you do make convincing arguments in support of your interpretation, it is, nevertheless, an interpretation. I would think something striving to be an encyclopedia would be free from motivation and judgement, and rely specifically on that which is factually indisputable such as the text of the Court's decision.

You asked for specifics regarding the corrections I made to the article, and I do apologize for not having done so. I will attempt to rectify that here. In the first paragraph you state:

"and thus eliminated the need to determine whether the income tax was a direct tax or, alternatively, an excise (an indirect tax)."

This is completely false. Not only is there nothing anywhere in the Brushaber decision to support this belief, there is a clear an unequivocal refutation of such an interpretation:

"the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning, is also wholly without foundation"

The Brushaber decision in no way, shape or form relieves Congress from having to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. The contention that the Amendment treats income tax as a direct tax is wholly without foundation. Brushaber, through the text of the Court's own writing, clearly supports that the ditinction between direct and indirect remains relevant.

This citation from the Court's ruling also completely contradicts the "Holding" section of the article, so that has been changed as well.

If you disagree with this reading, I would appreciate it if you would provide a citation from the Brushaber decision that I may have overlooked.

As for the term "tax protester", if you do mean to use it in the legal sense, then cite at least one case by directly quoting a Court decision that referred to a plaintiff as a "tax protester". Or, alternatively, if the IRS has such a legal classification, clarifying it as an IRS term would be helpful.

For what it's worth, you and I probably agree that the overwhelming majority (if not all) of those who have challenged the federal income tax in the courts have based their challenges on misguided interpretations of Brushaber and Stanton. The popular misinterpretation I have seen throughout these court cases is that Brushaber deemed the income tax to be an excise tax. This is not true, and those who argue it in court invariably lose. The income tax is an indirect tax. And an excise tax is an indirect tax. But it does not follow that income taxes are excise taxes. It would be like saying all beagles are dogs; all poodles are dogs; therefore all beagles are poodles. And perhaps *that* misunderstanding belongs in the article.

However, I still maintain that there is still an important legal distinction between direct and indirect, and that the Brushaber decision explicitly recognizes that distinction.

--68.230.194.50 18:05, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

 * If you seek court cases defining people as tax protesters [Flytrapper: I was not seeking them for my own edification - I was aware of the existence of the term. What I sought was inclusion of cites in the article. Thanks!!], this I can supply in abundance:

 * It is readily apparent that Hattman's appeal and "petitions" in this Court, as well as his petition for redetermination filed in the Tax Court, are nothing other than the thinly veiled arguments of a tax protester. These types of tax protester arguments have been rejected as patently frivolous, and require no additional analysis here.
 * Hattman v. Commissioner, NO. 05-1376 (3d Cir. 2005)

 * Some people believe with great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest. Tax protesters have convinced themselves that wages are not income, that only gold is money, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional, and so on. These beliefs all lead--so tax protesters think--to the elimination of their obligation to pay taxes."
 * Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986).

 * Thomas is a tax protester, and one of his arguments is that he did not need to file tax returns because the sixteenth amendment is not part of the constitution.
 * United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 187 (1986):

 * See also United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975) (first case to describe persons who refuse to pay taxes based on flawed constitutional arguments as tax protesters).

 * Cheers! bd2412  T 18:38, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Dear Flytrapper: Thanks for your comments. No offense, but we just aren't buying it. At any rate, as I previously said I am going to be working on some revision to the article, so I'll just let it rest for now (although I am contending that your verbiage is simply incorrect and mine is correct).

For now, you might want to be thinking about the following in connection with the article: You are contending that the language "and thus eliminated the need to determine whether the income tax was a direct tax or, alternatively, an excise (an indirect tax)" is completely false. Without getting back into what the court in Brushaber said at this point (we'll deal with it later, though), you might want to think about the implications of what you are saying. If there were still a need, in enacting Federal income tax legislation, to determine whether a particular income tax was "direct" or "indirect," why isn't this being done?

You say that the Brushaber decision "in no way, shape or form relieves Congress from having to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. The contention that the Amendment treats income tax as a direct tax is wholly without foundation." If that were correct, why hasn't Congress been doing any "distinguishing" since 1913?

Since 1913, for example, income taxes on rental income, interest income, and dividend income have not been apportioned among the states according to population. Those are the classic examples of "income from property" that were ruled to be "direct taxes" in Pollock. How do you explain the fact that after the Sixteenth Amendment, we're not apportioning those taxes? We also don't apportion income taxes on income from wages. So, with respect to the lack of the need for apportionment, all those kinds of taxes are being treated the same. So, how is is that we are treating those kinds of income taxes the same as the income tax on wages, salaries, etc.? How do you explain that? If there were still a constitutional "need" to determine whether a particular kind of income tax is direct or indirect, how is it that the source of the income (whether from property or from labor) has not been considered in any tax legislation since 1913?

And how is it that every time a tax protester raises arguments about the Sixteenth Amendment, the tax protester loses? If you were correct, why wouldn't someone have won a case on your argument? Why is it that you don't see Congressman or the staff people that write the tax statutes saying "Oh, gee, we need to apportion interest income among the states according to population"?

You say you "still maintain that there is still an important legal distinction between direct and indirect, and that the Brushaber decision explicitly recognizes that distinction." If that were correct, why is it that 99.9999% of all the tax lawyers, the CPAs, the law professors, the Congressman, etc., have not recognized that "important legal distinction"? Do you really believe that there is a gigantic conspiracy? Do you really believe that the tax protesters, without formal legal or tax training, have figured it all out, and that 99.9999% of all tax lawyers, CPAs, law professors, etc. -- literally hundreds of thousands of people since 1913 -- are somehow "wrong" because they can't figure it out, or are somehow in some sort of conspiracy to protect their economic interests? What's your theory?

You say that the "popular misinterpretation I have seen throughout these court cases is that Brushaber deemed the income tax to be an excise tax." Again, it appears you're getting hung up on the periphrasis found in the case -- which, admittedly can be massively confusing. (I think I am going to address the problem of understanding circumlocutory expression in the text of the case as I work on the rewrite for the article.)

Regarding your request that, for the term "tax protester," I cite to at least one case by directly quoting a Court decision that referred to a plaintiff as a "tax protester" -- you've got to be kidding! Do you have any idea how easy it was for BD2412 to find those quotes? Are you serious?

Look, I recently found a Wikipedia edit by a tax protester who stated flatly (obviously without having done the slightest bit of homework) that the "Internal Revenue Code" contained no reference to the agency known as the Internal Revenue Service. In short order, I was able to come up with over seventy specific references to "Internal Revenue Service" in the Internal Revenue Code (at last count, I had eventually found over 90 such references, plus numerous references to the agency in other titles of the United States Code).

I'm sorry, but I just can't resist this one. Look if you still want more even after BD2412's reply, I can provide you with a list of cases where the courts have specifically either referred to the taxpayer (whether plaintiff, petitioner, defendant, or whatever), as a "tax protester" or referred to the arguments he/she made as "tax protester" arguments. It's gonna be a pretty long list. It averages 50 to 70 or so Federal cases a year in the last few years. Sorry, but "tax protester" is a very commonly used term in the texts of court decisions -- and it's used in connection with what the courts have ruled are legally frivolous arguments. Let me know if you really want the list!

Regarding the IRS let me know if you really want to see the provision from the 1998 statute that prohibited IRS employees from using the term "tax protester."

I assume from your comments that you really didn't realize that the term "tax protester" was a specific legal term in the United States. Does this mean that you don't have access to the case law, or that you haven't had a chance to read it? Even if you're not a lawyer or CPA, you should at least have access to U.S. Supreme Court decisions. They're available on www.findlaw.com. You can find at least one "tax protester" case there yourself, because the Supreme Court uses the term!

Regarding the case law, I am just curious. I assume you have actually read the entire Brushaber decision, since you do quote from it, and it's available for free on the internet. Why do you think you have not been able to find single a case after 1913 where a court ruled that a Federal income tax was unconstitutional because it wasn't apportioned? Do you think you'll ever find such a case after the Sixteenth Amendment?

Revision of the article is just one of my projects, so it will take awhile. Again, thanks for your input. Yours, Famspear 23:35, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

 * PS: Dear Flytrapper. I'd also like to address more of your comments. Let's read some of your statements again (I have added some bolding to some of your comments):

 * Brushaber decision in no way, shape or form relieves Congress from having to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. The contention that the Amendment treats income tax as a direct tax is wholly without foundation. Brushaber, through the text of the Court's own writing, clearly supports that the ditinction [sic] between direct and indirect remains relevant.

 * Later on, you say:

 * The income tax is an indirect tax. And an excise tax is an indirect tax. But it does not follow that income taxes are excise taxes. It would be like saying all beagles are dogs; all poodles are dogs; therefore all beagles are poodles.

 * I sort of agree with your statement that the Amendment -- the Amendment itself -- does not treat income tax as a direct tax, if that's what you're really saying. I am not arguing that the Sixteenth Amendment itself "treats" an income tax as a direct tax, or that the Amendment expressly treats an income tax as an indirect tax either (although you can argue that the effect of the Amendment is to treat all income taxes as though they were indirect and therefore not required to be apportioned). The key is that it's the Pollock decision that treated certain income taxes as direct taxes (and therefore subject to the apportionment rule).

 * The Sixteenth Amendment simply changed the legal effect of Pollock -- by making the apportionment requirement irrelevant and inapplicable to any and all income taxes, regardless of the source of the income, and regardless of whether any particular income tax is a "direct" tax or not. The Amendment basically says that Congress may impose taxes on incomes from whatever source derived without having to apportion the total dollar amount collected from the taxpayers of each state according to that state's pro-rata share of population as determined by the "census or enumeration" mentioned in the Constitution.

 * The Amendment does not say Congress shall have power to imposes taxes on incomes as long as we first figure out whether those taxes are direct taxes, or indirect taxes, or upside down taxes, or left taxes, or right taxes or any other kind of taxes. The Amendment does not say that it covers "just income taxes that are direct taxes," or "just income taxes that are indirect taxes." For income taxes, the "direct versus indirect" distinction is legally irrelevant under the plain language of the Sixteenth Amendment. [Famspear notation: Actually, this statement of mine is too broad; I should have said "For income taxes, the direct versus indirect distinction is legally irrelevant under the plain language of the Sixteenth Amendment with respect to what the Sixteenth Amendment is about -- which is the apportionment rule, not the uniformity rule. Yours, Famspear 22:11, 14 June 2006 (UTC)]

 * The key is that you're saying that the income tax is an indirect tax. Are you saying that all income taxes are treated as indirect taxes? Because if you are, then that also blows away your argument that after the Sixteenth Amendment, the dichotomy between direct and indirect taxes is somehow still relevant or important for income taxes. [Flytrapper: my argument was that the dichotomy is still relevant for ALL taxes - indirect taxes must be uniform; direct taxes must be apportioned - and this is all I have ever really argued - and Brushaber supports it.] [Famspear reply: Dear Flytrapper, you are correct that indirect taxes must be uniform. That has always been correct, both before and after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. After the Amendment, however, the apportionment rule applies only to "direct taxes that do not happen to be income taxes." The apportionment rule, after the Sixteenth Amendment, no longer applies to any income taxes. Yours, Famspear 22:11, 14 June 2006 (UTC)]

 * Remember, indirect taxes are subject to the rule of geographical uniformity, not to the rule of apportionment. If all income taxes are (or are treated as) indirect taxes, then the apportionment rule no longer applies to any income taxes at all. "Apportionment among the states according to population" is a requirement only for direct taxes. Certainly, I agree that the current U.S. constitutional law is that the apportionment rule no longer applies to any kind of income taxes at all!

 * The problem for tax protesters is that if your statement that "the income tax is an indirect tax" is correct, then how are tax protesters going to claim that the income tax violates the constitution? They can't argue that an indirect tax has to be apportioned. The apportionment rule applies only to direct taxes.

 * To maintain credibility, the tax protesters can argue only that an indirect tax must be geographically uniform. How would they credibly argue that the income tax is not geographically uniform (i.e., that it is not being imposed all over the country)? Has anyone ever argued that any tax statute was applicable ONLY IN NEW YORK AND MONTANA, for example? Or ONLY IN STATES EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI? Has anyone ever found any such language in a tax statute? Has anyone ever discovered a single state in the United States of America where the government says the Federal income tax does not apply? If anything, some tax protesters argue that the income tax is invalid because it IS being imposed all over the country -- not that it ISN'T! Whether you believe the income tax is being imposed validly or correctly or not, I suspect that almost no one (tax protester or otherwise) has tried to argue that it's not currently being imposed everywhere in the United States of America!

 * Of course, since all income taxes either are indirect taxes or are treated as indirect taxes (since all income taxes are subject to the geographical uniformity rule, and no income taxes have to be apportioned), then the tax protesters are stuck!

 * If there is such a thing as "an income tax that is a direct tax," it's still an income tax. If there is such a thing as "an income tax that is an indirect tax," it is still an income tax. The Sixteenth Amendment does not say that the Amendment applies "only to income taxes that happen to be direct taxes." The Sixteenth Amendment does not say "only income taxes that happen to be indirect taxes." The Sixteenth Amendment does not say "only income taxes on income that happens to be from certain sources." The Sixteenth Amendment does not say "only income taxes on income from property." The Sixteenth Amendment does not say "only income taxes on income from wages." The Sixteenth Amendment does not say "only income taxes that happen to be excises." The Sixteenth amendment does not say "only income taxes that are not excises." Go back and read the text of the Sixteenth Amendment. If it's an income tax, then the Sixteenth Amendment applies. This is not rocket science.

 * No Federal income tax statute (before, during, or after 1913) has ever apportioned income taxes among the states according to each state's population. So, ask yourself why you have not been able to find even one court decision since 1913 where, because of a lack of apportionment, a taxpayer was able to get a Federal income tax ruled unconstitutional. If you really believe that "Brushaber, through the text of the Court's own writing, clearly supports that the ditinction [sic] between direct and indirect remains relevant", ask yourself why you have not been able to find even a single court decision since 1913 where a taxpayer was successful in getting a tax statute ruled unconstitutional based on such a "distinction." Yours, Famspear 21:48, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Hey there, Famspear! Yowza!! Looks like we might be talking past each other, because I certainly ain't selling what you claim not to be buying! :^)

In one case, the confusion is clearly my fault - when I brought up the point about citing cases or the IRS regarding the term "tax protester", I did not mean to challenge its existence, though I can see how it would read that way. My point was that it might be helpful to include those cites in the article. Otherwise the term "tax protester" comes across as a generalization. My apologies for not being clear, there.

On to your other comments. Most of what you say early in your recent comments seems to support the notion that popularity necessitates legality, but then you get to a much clearer point in the PS section. And I think we reach agreement there. But to quickly address this "99.999% endorse it so it is legal/constitutional" argument - what majority of people endorsing that which is factually incorrect is necessary to make a false thing true? Was the world once flat? Does Congress truly have the power to cede its War Declaration powers to the President? The point of these questions is NOT to shed any light on the validity or uselessness of my claims pertaining to the Brushaber case, but rather to suggest that our disagreement might be better served by sticking to what you and I can or cannot demonstrate by appealing to evidence, rather than what might be bogus interpretations of other people, whether they are lawyers, CPAs, or tax protesters.

Anyway, enough of that. :^) Back to OUR discussion. It seems to me that you think I think the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional. I do not think that. Nor do I believe that any federal income tax on wages is unconstitutional. I get the sense that you do think I believe otherwise. If I have misread you, I apologize, but if true, I think this is the danger of throwing around terms like "tax protester" because while I might "protest" the current application of the federal income tax, the term "tax protester" has been applied by the Courts and the IRS largely in a pejorative manner to dismiss all such "protests" as "frivolous".

I have the *same* question you do: why has there not yet been a case brought challenging the uniformity of the federal income tax? Does "uniform" only mean "the same for all states"? Does a uniform lack of uniformity constitute uniformity? :^) That is, if the federal income tax were simplified to be "13% for anyone under 6 feet in height and 42% for anyone over 6 feet in height" and uniformly applied to all states, would that satisfy the uniformity requirement? I am not saying one way or the other. It might. Certainly there would be an Equal Protection problem, but what is truly meant by "Uniformity" in the context of indirect taxes?

In any case, this is all rather tangential to Brushaber. My original problem with the article was what I saw as a clear bias toward the belief that Brushaber establishes that any and all application of the federal income tax is constitutional, without any regard to uniformity, and that anyone who does not interpret Brushaber as you do is a frivolous "tax protester". It seems to me that Wikipedia articles should be bias-free, and your original article does more than just report the facts about Brushaber. I will admit that my reaction to that was not as clear-headed as it should have been, and my edits are also not without bias. Ideally, if you have any interest in doing so, we could collaborate on a re-write that tries to achieve impartiality. Or we can agree to disagree and keep reverting the article every couple of days. :^)

Thanks for your time and contribution. It has made me investigate this issue more thoroughly, and I appreciate that. --128.239.105.60 14:28, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

 * Dear Flytrapper: Just a note -- I haven't forgotten about our Brushaber discussion. "Real life" has pulled me away from Wikipedia a lot lately. Eventually, however, I do want to do a complete analysis of all the holdings in Brushaber. It's just gonna take a while to get to it. As an aside, since you have been interested in the concept of the uniformity clause, we might want to do something on that as well. If you want to take a stab at analyzing the case law on uniformity, be my guest. Maybe any "article-quality" discussion we come up with on uniformity should go in a separate article - I'm not sure. Anyway, stay tuned. I have just made some provisional edits to the Brushaber article to try to at least get the article to something we can both agree on for the time being. Please check it out and see what you think.

 * I put in a separate section on your point about uniformity.

 * I also changed the sections on the holding(s). In this case, as in many court cases, there are actually multiple holdings, so this will be greatly modified later. As you may know, a mere quote from a court decision does not constitute a statement of a "holding" or ruling in the case.

 * On another point, the verbiage implying that "tax protesters" are "constitutional adherents" simply does not belong in an encyclopedia article. By definition, tax protester arguments are not only incorrect from a legal standpoint, the arguments are often ruled legally "frivolous." Many tax protesters of course in effect argue that they are following the constitution, but what the constitution means is a matter of law. As a matter of law, under the U.S. legal system only the courts are authoritative on what the constitution means when a case is actually litigated.

 * Further, the reference to those who refer to "constitutional adherents" as "tax protesters" as somehow "misunderstanding" Brushaber as standing for the proposition that indirect taxes don't have to be uniform is simply incorrect. As far as I know, no reputable legal scholar has ever tried to make that argument. The arguments between legal scholars and tax protesters (with respect to 16th Amnd & Brushaber) are almost always about apportionment -- not uniformity.

 * Also, I understand your point about direct taxes and indirect taxes and constitutional relevancy. In a few places, I had made the blanket statement that the dichotomy was no longer relevant, and that was theoretically incorrect. What I meant was that the dichotomy was no longer relevant in the context of the apportionment rule -- which is what the big battle was about in Pollock, resulting in the Sixteenth Amendment and cases like Brushaber. For example, I agree that the direct-indirect dichotomy could theoretically be relevant if the Congress were to try to impose an indirect tax that was not geographically uniform (to use the example I had used, an indirect tax imposed only in New York and Montana). I should have been more precise about what I was saying. Yours, Famspear 20:35, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

Dear Flytrapper, regarding your coments where you say that early some of my comments, I seem to be supporting "the notion that popularity necessitates legality" - well, no, what I am saying is that the courts have uniformly ruled a certain way. Tax protesters, as a group, contend that the courts are somehow "wrong." Under the U.S. legal system, the law is what the courts say the law is, not what I say the law is, not what the tax protesters say the law is. Tax protesters as a group repeatedly say that 99.99999% of legal experts are wrong. I am reporting that this is a very common tax protester position, so it's not me saying that popularity of a particular view of the law necessitates the legality of that position. Again, the law is what the courts rule that the law is.

Regarding the following commentary:

 * [...] why has there not yet been a case brought challenging the uniformity of the federal income tax? Does "uniform" only mean "the same for all states"? Does a uniform lack of uniformity constitute uniformity? :^) That is, if the federal income tax were simplified to be "13% for anyone under 6 feet in height and 42% for anyone over 6 feet in height" and uniformly applied to all states, would that satisfy the uniformity requirement? I am not saying one way or the other. It might. Certainly there would be an Equal Protection problem, but what is truly meant by "Uniformity" in the context of indirect taxes?

Actually, there have been some cases where people challenged the Federal income tax, arguing that it is not "uniform." In every case, the courts rejected the arguments. What I am saying is that I know of no case where anyone actually argued that the tax was not imposed with geographical uniformity, which is what the courts have ruled the uniformity clause requires. There might be such a case out there -- I'm saying I haven't researched the details of every case yet. I kinda think very few sane people would try to argue that the Federal income tax isn't at least being imposed everywhere in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, but maybe someone somewhere has tried to make such an argument. I'm saying that regardless of what theory anyone has ever used, to my knowledge no Federal court has ever ruled that any Federal income tax violates the uniformity clause.

Regarding your last question in the quoted material, the courts have (as far as I know) always ruled that "uniformity" means "geographical" uniformity and not "intrinsic" uniformity, to use the courts' terms. The "13% for anyone under 6 feet" etc., hypothetical that you gave might not be a violation of uniformity -- but maybe you might want to study all the leading Federal cases on the uniformity clause for a more definite answer, if there is one.

Yours, Famspear 22:11, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

Footnote: Also, I have added a description of the Court's holding on the the validity of the income tax law under the uniformity clause. The court in Brushaber did not rule that the Sixteenth Amendment is "subject to" the uniformity clause. What the court ruled was that the tax statute in question did not violate the uniformity clause. The Court in Brushaber did not rule that the uniformity clause no longer applies to indirect taxes (excises), and I know of no other case where a court has made any such ruling. Yours, Famspear 22:34, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

Backround material moved to separate article
Dear fellow editors: I have moved a large chunk of this article to the article on the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The bulk of the discussion that I moved really relates to the genesis of the Sixteenth Amendment, and not to the Brushaber case in particular. Yours, Famspear 21:42, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

people i am not sure who the editor is but would you please email me at wildbill_b@hotmail.com

your statements are patently false and appear to be based on thoughts of others.

brushaber tests the 16th in 3 ways and it fails all 3. this is clear as you can see below.

this is VERBATIM from 240 US 1 the BRUSHABER CASE

If you fail to acknowledge your misunderstanding i can only conclude that truth is not sought after here.

The brushaber case CLEARLY shows that the 16th made NO taxation changes for the average person.

From this in substance it indisputably arises, first, that all the contentions which we have previously noticed concerning the assumed limitations to be implied from the language of the Amendment as to the nature and character of the income taxes which it authorizes find no support in the text and are in irreconcilable conflict with the very purpose which the Amendment was adopted to accomplish ( that is to say making ALL income taxable). Second, that the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning, is also wholly without foundation since the command of the Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the taxed income may be derived

240 US 1

We are of opinion, however, [240 U.S. 1, 11]  that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows:

1.The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is void(does not provide for non apportioned direct tax of income) as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.

2.As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes 'from whatever source derived,' the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized, and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment.(does not provide for non apportioned direct tax of income)

3.As the right to tax 'incomes from whatever source derived' for which the Amendment provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general and pre-existing provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment. (does not provide for non apportioned direct tax of income)

But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [240 U.S. 1, 12]  under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. (clearly says that it, by attempting to remove the apportionment requirement, renders itself invalid because it directly conflicts with the constitution in that "no direct tax maybe be unapportioned. you can not presume to tell me that congress has the power to override the constitution?)

So exactly how does anyone claim that this case upholds the 16th's power to lay direct tax on the average income or that it gave any NEW powers of taxation to the government ?

has anyone even read the cited cases?

There are many lawyers who are misquoting this. but if you look at it closely you will find that it Clearly and Plainly says the 16th amendment made no change to congress's ability to tax us.

I am quite open to anything proving otherwise.

69.245.136.69 05:48, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Dear user: You are simply quoting the same material that tax protestsers quote over and over. With all due respect, have YOU actually read the case, or are you simply copying and pasting material from tax protester web sites? This has already been covered over and over in Wikipedia.

The Court in Brushaber UPHELD the Federal income tax. No lawyers are "misquoting" the case. The tax protesters are taking quotes from the case and arguing that the quotes mean something other than what they say. Mr. Frank Brushaber argued that the Federal income tax was unconstitutional. HE LOST THE CASE. The case did not even involve an income tax on individuals. It involved corporate income tax. Nobody is claiming that the Sixteenth Amendment gave "new" powers" to Congress, etc., etc. Indeed, that's the whole point that the tax protesters miss. As the courts have said over and over, Congress has ALWAYS had the power to tax the incomes of individuals.

Take a deep breath and read the article more slowly. Yours, Famspear 10:06, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Just so that you know I have read it many times. I have retained multiple lawyers to confirm what i believed to be the fact of the matter. To date NOT ONE lawyer has attempt to tell me what you claim.

They have all concluded that in fact it is erroneous for any court to conclude that the 16th amendment GAVE congress the ability to tax income of the individual who was not taxable BEFORE it.

You are incorrect to claim or assume that i am quoting material from tax protesters sir.

If i had not read the case then how do you suppose i posted verbatim the courts finding ? please do not patronize me. I could truly care less whether wikipedia is givng accurate information or not. I simply chose to point this out so that it could be corrected.

2.As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes 'from whatever source derived,'

the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized,

and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment. verbatim from 240 US 1

Notice please in plain simple english that the court clearly says that claiming the 16th gives congress the power to "tax income from whatever source derived" is erroneous.

and the reason given ???? because it does NOT conform to apportionment.

do you presume to have a better understand then the supreme court?

that you can ignore what they tell you it means and use your own interpretation of it ?

your arguments are patently false and grossly incorrect.

it is becoming clear that it is not the desire of wikipedia to show the facts of the case but to simply continue to obfusicate them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.245.136.69 (talk • contribs) on 13 August 2007.

 * Dear user at IP 69:245.136.69: Here is the text of the portion of the Court's opinion in Brushaber that you cited -- this time, however, with MY interlineations in brackets, rather than yours:

 * The various propositions [of Mr. Frank Brushaber, the Appellant] are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however, that the confusion [of Mr. Frank Brushaber, the Appellant] is not inherent, but rather arises from the [erroneous] conclusion [by Mr. Brushaber] that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption [by Mr. Brushaber] will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced [by Mr. Brushaber] in argument to support it, as follows: (a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned. (b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes 'from whatever source derived,' the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized, and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment. (c) As the right to tax 'incomes from whatever source derived' for which the Amendment provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general and pre-existing provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment. (d) As the power conferred by the Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in the statute to make its provisions retroactively apply is void because, so far as the retroactive period is concerned, it is governed by the pre-existing constitutional requirement as to apportionment.

 * The arguments, a, b, c, and d, were arguments by Mr. Frank Brushaber -- the Appellant. The Court was simply listing those arguments here. With all due respect, sir, your posting is erroneous. You, like many, many tax protesters, are trying to pass off the Court's descriptions of Mr. Frank Brushaber's arguments as being the rulings of the Court itself. This is a common tax protester tactic. Unfortunately, the complete text is available to all internet users for free at www.findlaw.com.

 * In the very language you yourself quoted, the Court goes on to REJECT Mr. Brushaber's arguments. Go back and read the language you yourself posted.

 * You even stated in one of your interlineations that the Court in Brushaber "caused the statute to be void." That is completely false. The Court in that case upheld the statute (i.e., the Revenue Act of 1913).

 * Again, Mr. Brushaber was the APPELLANT. He LOST the case. Look at the verbiage at the end of the case: "AFFIRMED." Translated from the legalese, if you read the ENTIRE text you find that this means that the Supreme Court UPHELD the tax statute -- the Revenue Act of 1913.

 * You actually ARE correct when you say: "The brushaber case CLEARLY shows that the 16th made NO taxation changes for the average person." The problem is that you do not seem to understand what that means. As the Supreme Court and the other Federal courts have stated over and over, the Sixteenth Amendment created no new power of taxation. The Congress has always had the power to tax incomes, whether of individuals, corporations, trusts, estates, or eight-headed donkeys. Even in the 1895 Pollock case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that!

 * You accused me of "patronizing" you. To "patronize" means "to treat or deal with in a condescending manner." Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, p. 1042 (2d Coll. Ed. 1978). To "condescend" means "to deal with others in a proud or haughty way." Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, p. 295 (2d Coll. Ed. 1978). You are the one who came in to this talk page with the following statements:

 * people i am not sure who the editor is but would you please email me at wildbill_b@hotmail.com

 * your statements are patently false and appear to be based on thoughts of others.

 * [ . . . ] If you fail to acknowledge your misunderstanding i can only conclude that truth is not sought after here.

 * If you are going to come in to Wikipedia as a new user and act like you know what you are talking about when it comes to formal legal analysis, and act like everyone else who has brought this article to its present state (many of whom are lawyers or CPAs with many years of experience) is wrong, you had better be correct.

 * Your main argument seems to be that the Supreme Court "clearly says" in Brushaber that it is "erroneous" to claim that the Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to tax income from whatever source derived. You seem to be saying that the Court in Brushaber ruled that the income tax was invalid -- and that the "reason given" as you put it was that the tax did not conform to apportionment.

 * You are completely, wildly, and hilariously incorrect. The argument you are claiming is a ruling by the Supreme Court was actually the losing argument of Mr. Frank Brushaber!

 * The Sixteenth Amendment states that Congress has the power to tax incomes from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. The Supreme Court in Brushaber ruled that the Federal income tax imposed under the 1913 Revenue Act was indeed valid -- was indeed constitutional -- EVEN THOUGH THE TAX WAS NOT APPORTIONED.

 * And no competent lawyer -- or competent first year law student -- would make the kind of mistake you made.

 * Yours, Famspear 20:58, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Post-script: At the expense of appearing to beat a dead horse, I want to reprint your quote from above:

 * Just so that you know I have read it many times. I have retained multiple lawyers to confirm what i believed to be the fact of the matter.
 * To date NOT ONE lawyer has attempt to tell me what you claim.

 * They [the lawyers] have all concluded that in fact it is erroneous for any court to conclude that the 16th amendment GAVE congress the ability to tax income of the individual who was not taxable BEFORE it.

The lawyers you spoke to are CORRECT. It IS ERRONEOUS to conclude that the Sixteenth Amendment GAVE Congress the ability to tax income of the individual who was not taxable before the Amendment! Nothing in the Wikipedia article on the Brushaber case says that the Amendment gave Congress a "new" power to tax income of an individual that was not taxable before the Amendment. What the Amendment did was to remove the Pollock apportionment requirement -- and the Pollock apportionment requirement applied only to taxes on income from property (such as interest, dividends and rent), not to income taxes on compensation for personal services, not to taxes on income from "employments" (in other words, not to wages, not to salaries).

Again, what tax protesters do is make the mistake of going a step further and making the FALSE claim that Congress did not have the power to tax the income of individuals BEFORE the amendment. Congress has ALWAYS had the power, and Congress still has that power. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other Federal court has ever ruled otherwise. Not even once. Yours, Famspear 21:38, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

 * Post-post script: Here is the language from the article that might be the source of some of your confusion:

 * In subsequent cases, the courts have interpreted the Sixteenth Amendment and the Brushaber decision as standing for the rule that the Amendment allows a direct tax on "wages, salaries, commissions, etc. without apportionment." Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9209 (5th Cir. 1984) (closing parenthesis in original has been omitted) [ . . . ]

 * The above statement is a statement of how the Federal court in the cited case viewed the Sixteenth Amendment. It is not a statement that the Amendment gave the Congress a new power to tax the incomes of individuals that the Congress did not already have prior to February of 1913, when the Amendment was ratified. When you read the cases down through the years, you will find that the tax protesters were often arguing that under the Sixteenth Amendment itself the Congress could not tax the incomes of individuals, or at least could not tax such incomes without apportioning the tax. The courts were simply rejecting those arguments.

 * There is nothing in the Sixteenth Amendment that prohibits Congress from taxing wages of an individual, regardless of whether the tax is apportioned or not. Likewise, the Amendment itself did not "create" that Congressional power; Congress has always had that power to tax wages, and has always had the power to tax wages without apportionment. Saying that the Sixteenth Amendment "allows" the Congress to income taxes (which it DOES) is not the same as saying that the Amendment created that power for Congress. That confusion is what hangs some people up. Yours, Famspear 21:57, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

 * My reading of Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 is that the Politz erred or lied. He wrote that the Brushaber court determined something.  What it was, he wrote, that the Brushaber court determined is exactly that which the Brushaber court referred to as an erroneous assumption.  I understand that some people cannot conceive of federal court appellate judges  making errors, but their inability is not my inability.  I know everyone is fallible.  I applaud the mental gymnastics that some people can do in order to believe Politz (who wrote the Parker decision) didn't screw up, but I think they are a product of a dangerous lack of respect for their own minds.  It is as if Hansel and Gretel, instead of getting out of the oven, sang songs of gratitude to the witch for keeping them warm while she cooked them. Too much sugar, perhaps. Dscotese (talk) 02:42, 29 June 2017 (UTC)

Dear Dscotese: First of all, where I (or other people) use bolded font on a talk page, and whether such use is appropriate, is my decision (or other people's decision) to make, not yours.

No, Politz did not "lie" or "err."

Here are some excerpts from the exact wording of the Parker text by the Court:

 * "The Supreme Court promptly determined in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916), that the sixteenth amendment provided the needed constitutional basis for the imposition of a direct non-apportioned income tax. [ . . .] The sixteenth amendment merely eliminates the requirement that the direct income tax be apportioned among the states."

Nowhere did Politz say (or rule, or "determine") that the Brushaber Court had ruled that the income tax IS a "direct" tax. The Brushaber court did not say or rule that the income tax is a "direct" tax, and the Parker court did not say (or rule) that the Brushaber court made such a ruling. The Parker Court (Politz) is saying that the Brushaber Court determined that the Amendment provided the basis for a "direct non-apportioned income tax". It was the Pollock Court that ruled that certain Federal income taxes were to be treated as "direct" taxes.

Whether you leave the word "direct" in the quoted Parker (Politz) material, or you take the word "direct" out, the legal effect is the same. '''Under the Sixteenth Amendment, with respect to apportionment, it does not matter whether a particular income tax is deemed to be "direct" or not. If that tax is a Federal income tax, then that tax is not required to be apportioned, regardless of whether one court calls it "direct" while some other court calls it "indirect." '''

Period.

For years, tax protesters huffed and puffed and turned themselves blue arguing about whether "the" federal income tax is a "direct" tax or an "excise" (indirect tax), in a misguided, failed attempt to try to establish that, even after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, some (or all) Federal income taxes were unconstitutional under one or more goofy theories. Such arguments never won.

One of the basic mistakes that some non-lawyers make in trying to understand legal materials is to focus too much on what a court "said" and then trying to argue that what the court "said" was a "mistake", and that therefore somehow the court decision was legally incorrect. Judicial precedent is a function of what a court DECIDES -- not a function of what a court "says" in passing on its way to reaching its decision. A non-lawyer cannot acquire the ability to consistently analyze texts of legal materials correctly -- to figure out what a court decided -- by reading one, or ten, or even a hundred court cases. Famspear (talk) 16:31, 29 June 2017 (UTC)

 * Here is the main issue that was presented to and decided by the court of appeals in Parker: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment allows a direct tax on property (wages, salaries, commissions, etc.) without apportionment. The main decision of the court in Parker was that the Sixteenth Amendment does allow a direct tax on property (wages, salaries, commissions, etc.) without apportionment. THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE PARKER COURT RULED THAT THE INCOME TAX IS A DIRECT TAX, AND THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE PARKER COURT RULED THAT THE INCOME TAX IS NOT A DIRECT TAX.

 * Again, the inclusion of the word "direct" in those sentences is not a mistake. Under the Sixteenth Amendment, the source of the income is legally irrelevant in determining whether the Federal income tax in question must be apportioned. If it's a Federal income tax, it's not required to be apportioned -- regardless of whether Court A calls it a "direct" tax and Court B calls it "not a direct tax." Famspear (talk) 17:04, 29 June 2017 (UTC)

Main holding
The main holding in this case is the ruling that an income tax is an excise tax. Some people are confused by this and deny that income taxes are indirect taxes, so it is necessary to quote the case, rather than merely summarize. Mpublius 20:55, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

 * Dear Mpublius: What's your authority for contending that this is the "main holding" in the case. Aren't you just quoting from the case, rather than distilling the holding? How do you determine what the "holding" is? Famspear 21:09, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

 * Dear Mpublius: The verbiage in your edit is correct, but I think it goes in the section on the discussion of "excise" (indirect tax), so I have moved it down there. You have provided a quotation from the case. The quotation might or might not be one of the holdings in the case, though. I'll have to check to be sure. The term "holding" is a technical legal term. Most of the verbatim text in a court opinion is not part of the "holding" or "holdings," so you have to be careful about terminology. Famspear 21:34, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

The phrase "income tax on wages"
A new user at IP 72.10.14.226 is objecting to the use of the phrase "income tax on wages." The explanation for this objection does not appear valid. Obviously, the U.S. Federal income tax includes (but it not limited to) a tax on "wages". And this is so regardless of whether one refers to "wages" as being "income" or as a "source of income." Any comments? Famspear (talk) 22:50, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

Also, the explanatory edit statement by IP72.10.14.226 that "income can be derived from wages" needs more clarification. What does IP72.10.14.226 think the difference would be between saying "income can be derived from wages" and "wages are income"? Famspear (talk) 22:56, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

I am unclear as to what you don't understand? Are you defending the original text by stating that the Federal Income Tax is a tax on wages? Is not stating that the Federal Income Tax is a tax on income legally correct where the prior isn't? Since this article is "legal" in nature then I would think this "technicality" is of import.

As to whether this change is confusing, etc. that is a question for another person, since I was not the original author. However the original wording could be redone to include the word wages, hence my statement alluding to wages being a source of income but not income itself. But the simple statement of "income tax on wages" is obviously incorrect (from a Federal Income Tax point of view) and is not a distinction without a difference.

If you require a deeper explanation before a change to the wording I can go to the effort of giving it but I think the above logic should be self evident for someone familiar with the legal background of the current Federal Income Tax. I hope this helps...cheers —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.10.14.226 (talk) 19:09, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

 * Dear IP72.10.14.226: Your commentary is completely incorrect from a legal standpoint. Wages are income. That is a legally correct statement. You may want to re-read the article. The courts themselves have specifically rejected the argument that wages are not income. Wages are not merely a "source" of income. The "source" distinction is a legally frivolous tax protester argument. Wages are 100% income. There is no part of any wage that is not income (except for certain exceptions in the law, like certain combat pay, fringe benefits, etc.). As a general proposition, wages are income, not merely a source of income. There are only so many ways to say it. The simple phrase "income tax on wages" is correct. I am right. You are wrong. Famspear (talk) 19:23, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

Are you being serious? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.10.14.226 (talk) 21:26, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

 * Dear IP72.10.14.226: The question should be: Are YOU being serious? I am serious about Wikipedia, which is what this is about. Famspear (talk) 21:55, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

Dear readers in general: Since the user at IP72.10.14.226 has not stated specifically what he or she is driving at, I will provide some background for why I believe he or she is making this argument about what might seem to be trivial hair-splitting.

For years, various tax protesters have argued in one form or another that for Federal income tax purposes, wages may be a "source" of income but that "wages" are not actually "income." This argument is a preface to a specious "rationale" that goes something like this: "Although I admit that I received 'wages' for personal services I performed for my employer, none of my 'wages' constituted 'income' because (fill in the blank xxxxx") (and in the blank the tax protesters fill in any one or more of various nonsensical theories that I will not go into right now). The tax protester argument then goes on to say something like "therefore, since my wages are not 'income', they cannot be included in 'gross income' under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, etc. etc., and therefore none of my wages are taxable." This is one of the basic formulations for these kinds of arguments.

In Federal tax cases, the courts have rejected these arguments in every single case, without a single exception, for what will be obvious reasons when you read the decisions. There are perhaps hundreds of these cases. In a famous tax protester case decided by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun wrote:

 * It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with "the complexity of the tax laws," [ . . . ] but with the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income? [ . . . ] [I]t is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least minimum intellectual competence.

--see Cheek v. United States. In this criminal tax case, the tax protester (John Cheek) ultimately lost his case and went to prison.

I am deliberately not going to go into more details at this time, nor am I going to cite any other court cases yet, since the user at IP72.10.14.226 has not been specific about why he or she is trying to split hairs (about "wages" and "sources") in the first place. Famspear (talk) 23:39, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

My question as to whether you were being serious was sincere, since your comments struck me as offensive, but I know at times the written word does not come across the same as the spoken so I did not want to make a rash judgment. But now I see that my initial reaction was the correct one.

At first I did not understand the source of the your vitriolic comments but having read the comments prior to mine and some of the various links to your other comments I think I have an understanding now.

You my friend, lack not only manners, but also to have a trait of what my pappy would call a "dog in the manger"...hunkering over his bones, as it were, and snarling at anyone that comes near....even a friend.

I came to this page in good faith regarding the specifics of a legal case, wanting only to correct a language issue germane to the legal case before us. You, however, have sought to turn this into something it isn't and have accused me of various nefarious and convoluted claims. One person's hairsplitting is another person's science (once the personal agendas are removed of course). The specific wording in question is not only directly from the federal statute (61), the text of the case (which you yourself quote and expound upon extensively from above) but most importantly directly from the Constitution.

I fail to see why you demand of me "specific" reasoning (even after I have repeatedly given it) when it is obviously self evident. All the while implying that somehow I am responsible for the wording as if I was the one that wrote the Constitution or statutes implementing it! If you claim these words have no meaning or significance then why is this peculiar wording given? why did the court specifically address them? and, of course, what gives you the right to ignore them?

But I see now, this is your self-proclaimed manger and additions or subtractions to your bone-pile is strictly prohibited. So, my friend, I bid you adieu.......cheers.... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.10.14.226 (talk) 23:36, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

 * Dear user at IP72.10.14.226: The term "vitriolic" means "extremely biting or caustic; sharp and bitter". Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, p. 1589 (World Publishing Co., 2nd Coll. ed. 1978). I do know what specific comments of mine you consider "vitrolic" or "offensive" or why you believe I "lack manners." I will note however, that my comments have been directed at the change in wording you proposed, and not at you as a person. The rule in Wikipedia is: comment on the material, not on the editor. Where I found your material to be incorrect, I bluntly stated that you were wrong. I don't believe my admittedly blunt statement is an attack you personally; neither is my statement "vitriolic" or "lacking in manners." Unfortunately, you apparently did find it "offensive."

 * When I suggested that a clarification was needed, this was your response (in part):

 * I [user IP72.10.14.226] am unclear as to what you [Famspear] don't understand? Are you defending the original text by stating that the Federal Income Tax is a tax on wages?  Is not stating that the Federal Income Tax is a tax on income legally correct where the prior isn't?  Since this article is "legal" in nature then I would think this "technicality" is of import.

 * [ . . . ]

 * If you [Famspear] require a deeper explanation before a change to the wording I [user IP72.10.14.226] can go to the effort of giving it but I think the above logic should be self evident for someone familiar with the legal background of the current Federal Income Tax.

 * That was your response.

 * No one has accused you of "nefarious and convoluted claims." I asked you to explain, on this talk page, why you believe "income tax on wages" is legally incorrect and why you believe "income tax on income" is preferred. When all I got was the above response, I pointed out to other readers some of the history of the specious tax protester arguments that "wages are not income." That was done to show general readers -- who might not be familiar with what the "wages are not income" argument is about -- why this is important.

 * You say you came here regarding the "specifics of a legal case." You objected to the phrase "income tax on wages" - yet you still have not provided any reliable, previously published third party source for why you believe that phrase is incorrect. You are the editor proposing the change, and under Wikipedia rules you bear the burden of persuading others that you are correct.

 * Now you have added vague references to the Constitution and Internal Revenue Code section 61; these do not support your objection in my view. Furthermore, the Federal courts interpreting the Constitution and section 61 have specifically ruled that "wages" are "income." Wages are a form of "compensation for services" -- the language of section 61(a). The courts use the specific term "wages" and refer to "wages" as income under section 61. If you want specific examples, those can be provided.

 * As a side note: Some tax protesters have argued that because the term "wage" is not found in section 61, a "wage" is not "income." To the extent that this argument has been raised in court cases, it has been rejected by the courts every time. The cases are already cited in other articles here in Wikipedia, and can be provided here if requested.

 * You had changed the text from "income tax on wages" to "income tax on income." I pointed out that "income tax on wages" is legally correct, and that "income tax on income" in this context is needlessly redundant. There is nothing "self evident" about the correctness of your arguing that the phrase "income tax on wages" should be changed to "income tax on income," and in my view there is nothing self-evident in your responses that would justify the change. Famspear (talk) 00:28, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

Talk:Tax protester/Request for comment
A request for comment has been opened on the general topic of tax protester theories, and whether the articles that address them are NPOV. bd2412 T 18:08, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

Talk:Tax protester/Request for comment reminder
Just a reminder that I have proposed to call for a conclusion to this discussion on tax protester rhetoric on February 6. If anyone has anything more to add to the discussion, speak now! bd2412 T 16:56, 3 February 2008 (UTC)


text:
Socinianism

Socinianism is a Nontrinitarian Christian belief system developed and co-founded during the Protestant Reformation by the Italian Renaissance humanists and theologians Lelio Sozzini (Latin: Laelius Socinus) and Fausto Sozzini (Latin: Faustus Socinus), uncle and nephew, respectively.

It was developed among the Polish Brethren in the Polish Reformed Church between the 16th and 17th centuries, and embraced by the Unitarian Church of Transylvania during the same period. Socinianism is most famous for its Nontrinitarian Christian beliefs about the unitary nature of God and the human nature of Jesus but contains a number of other distinctive theological doctrines, such as the denial of divine foreknowledge regarding the actions of free agents and rejection of the pre-existence of Christ.

Origins
The beliefs of Socinianism date from the wing of the Protestant Reformation known as the Radical Reformation and have their root in the Italian Anabaptist movement of the 1540s, such as the anti-trinitarian Council of Venice in 1550. Lelio Sozzini was the first of the Italian anti-trinitarians to go beyond Arian beliefs in print and deny the pre-existence of Christ in his Brevis explicatio in primum Johannis caput – a commentary on the meaning of the Logos in John 1:1–15 (1562). Lelio Sozzini considered that the "beginning" of was the same as  and referred to the new creation, not the Genesis creation. His nephew Fausto Sozzini published his own longer Brevis explicatio later, developing his uncle's arguments. Many years after the death of his uncle in Switzerland, Fausto Sozzini consulted with the Unitarian Church in Transylvania, attempting to mediate in the dispute between Giorgio Biandrata and Ferenc Dávid.

He moved to Poland, where he married the daughter of a leading member of the Polish Brethren, the anti-trinitarian minority, or ecclesia minor. In 1565, it had split from the Calvinist Reformed Church in Poland. Sozzini never joined the ecclesia minor, but he was influential in reconciling several controversies among the Brethren: on conscientious objection, on prayer to Christ, and on the virgin birth. Fausto persuaded many in the Polish Brethren who were formerly Arian, such as Marcin Czechowic, to adopt his uncle Lelio's views.

Fausto Sozzini furthered his influence through his Racovian Catechism, published posthumously, which set out his uncle Lelio's views on Christology and replaced earlier catechisms of the Ecclesia Minor. His influence continued after his death through the writings of his students published in Polish and Latin from the press of the Racovian Academy at Raków, Kielce County.

The term Socinian started to be used in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of England from the 1610s onward, as the Latin publications were circulated among early Arminians, Remonstrants, Dissenters, and early English Unitarians. In the late 1660s, Fausto Sozzini's grandson Andreas Wiszowaty and great-grandson Benedykt Wiszowaty published the nine-volume Biblioteca Fratrum Polonorum quos Unitarios vocant (1668) in Amsterdam, along with the works of F. Sozzini, the Austrian Johann Ludwig von Wolzogen, and the Poles Johannes Crellius, Jonasz Szlichtyng, and Samuel Przypkowski. These books circulated among English and French thinkers, including Isaac Newton, John Locke, Voltaire, and Pierre Bayle.

In Great Britain and North America, Socinianism later became a catch-all term for any kind of dissenting belief. Sources in the 18th and 19th centuries frequently attributed the term Socinian anachronistically, using it to refer to ideas that embraced a much wider range than the narrowly defined position of the Racovian catechisms and library.

Beliefs
Socinian theology, as summarised in the Racovian Catechism, rejected the views of orthodox Christian theology on God's knowledge, on the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ, and on soteriology.

Christology
The Racovian publications, like the Sozzinis, rejected the pre-existence of Christ and held that Jesus did not exist until he was conceived as a human being. This view had been put forward before by the 4th-century bishop Photinus, but it conflicts with the mainline Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholic views, which hold that the Logos referred to in the Gospel of John was Jesus.

Human nature
The Socinians held that humans were created mortal in the beginning and would have died naturally whether Adam and Eve had eaten from the tree or not. They also rejected the doctrine of original sin.

Atonement
Socinianism also rejected the propitiatory view of atonement.

Predestination and omniscience
The Socinians believed that God's omniscience was limited to what was a necessary truth in the future (what would definitely happen) and did not apply to what was a contingent truth (what might happen). They believed that, if God knew every possible future, human free will was impossible and as such rejected the "hard" view of omniscience. Modern process theology and open theism advance a similar viewpoint.

Skepticism
Later writers such as Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823–86) asserted that Socinian theology was rooted in skepticism. However, the original Polish Socinians were believers in miracles and the virgin birth,  although there were a few radicals, such as Symon Budny and Jacobus Palaeologus, who denied these.

Conscientious objection
Although not directly a doctrinal belief, the principle of conscientious objection and the obedient relation of the believer to the state became a distinct position of Socinianism as it was formalized in the Racovian publications. Before F. Sozzini's arrival in Poland, there had been a wide range of positions from the total otherworldliness, common property, and withdrawal from the state of Marcin Czechowic of Lublin through to the advocacy of military service by Symon Budny. The next generation of Polish Brethren stabilized between these two positions, carrying wooden swords to follow the letter of the law and allowing senior Socinians such as Hieronim Moskorzowski to vote in the Sejm.

Offshoots
The direct doctrinal descendants of the original Socinians are the Unitarian Christians of Transylvania and England. Although the Polish Brethren never adopted the name "Unitarian" while in Poland, when they were disbanded in 1658, those who fled to Holland eventually embraced the term "Unitarian" (which they got from the Transylvanians), as they preferred not to be called Socinians. The term had been used by the Unitarian Church of Transylvania as early as 1600. Socinian theology continued in Transylvania, where Polish exiles such as Andrzej Wiszowaty Jr., taught in the Unitarian College (1726–1740), as evidenced in the Summa Universae Theologiae Christianae secundum Unitarios of Mihály Lombard de Szentábrahám, recognized as the statement of faith of the Unitarian Church of Transylvania by Emperor Joseph II in 1782. Early English Unitarians such as Henry Hedworth and John Biddle retroactively applied the term "Unitarian" to the Polish Brethren. By 1676 there were at least three Socinian meeting houses in London, even if the Act of Toleration of 1689 saw Socinians and Catholics excluded from official recognition. Socinian ideas continued to have significant influence on Unitarians in England throughout the entire period of their development.

Modern Socinians (in Christological terms) include the small number of "Biblical Unitarian" churches such as the Christadelphians, the Church of God General Conference and the Church of the Blessed Hope,   though these churches are not direct descendants of the Polish Brethren.

Related beliefs
At the time of Fausto Sozzini, Symon Budny held a variant of unitarianism including denial of the virgin birth of Jesus and arguing that Jesus was the son of Joseph, for which he was excluded from the Racovian community.

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title: Socinianism