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T-34

The T-34 is a Soviet medium tank from World War II. When introduced, its 76.2 mm (3 in) tank gun was more powerful than many of its contemporaries, and its 60-degree sloped armour provided good protection against anti-tank weapons. The T-34 had a profound effect on the conflict on the Eastern Front, and had a long-lasting impact on tank design. The tank was praised by multiple German generals when encountered during Operation Barbarossa, although its armour and armament were surpassed later in the war. Its main strength was its cost and production time, meaning that German panzer forces would often fight against Soviet tank forces several times their own size. The T-34 is also a critical part of the mechanized divisions that form the backbone of the Deep Battle Strategy.

The T-34 was the mainstay of the Soviet Red Army armoured forces throughout the war. Its general specifications remained nearly unchanged until early 1944, when it received a firepower upgrade with the introduction of the greatly improved T-34-85 variant. Its production method was continuously refined and rationalized to meet the needs of the Eastern Front, making the T-34 quicker and cheaper to produce. The Soviets ultimately built over 80,000 T-34s of all variants, allowing steadily greater numbers to be fielded despite the loss of tens of thousands in combat against the German Wehrmacht.

Replacing many light and medium tanks in Red Army service, it was the most-produced tank of the war, as well as the second most-produced tank of all time (after its successor, the T-54/T-55 series). With 44,900 lost during the war, it also suffered the most tank losses ever. Its development led directly to the T-44, then the T-54 and T-55 series of tanks, which in turn evolved into the later T-62, that form the armoured core of many modern armies. T-34 variants were widely exported after World War II, and as recently as 2023 more than 80 were still in service.

Origins
In 1939, the most numerous Soviet tank models were the T-26 infantry tank and the BT series of fast tanks. The T-26 was slow-moving, designed to keep pace with infantry on the ground. The BT tanks were cavalry tanks: fast-moving and light, designed for manoeuver warfare. Both were Soviet developments of foreign designs from the early 1930s: the T-26 was based on the British Vickers 6-Ton, and the BT tanks were based on a design from American engineer J. Walter Christie.

In 1937, the Red Army had assigned engineer Mikhail Koshkin to lead a new team to design a replacement for the BT tanks at the Kharkiv Komintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). The prototype tank, designated A-20, had a modified BA-20 engine and was specified with 20 mm of armour, a 45 mm (1.77 in) gun, the production model used a Model V-2-34 engine, a less-flammable diesel fuel in a V12 configuration designed by Konstantin Chelpan. It also had an 8×6-wheel convertible drive similar to the BT tank's 8×2, which allowed it to run on wheels without caterpillar tracks. This feature had greatly saved on maintenance and repair of the unreliable tank tracks of the early 1930s, and allowed tanks to exceed 85 km/h on roads, but gave no advantage in combat and its complexity made it difficult to maintain. By 1937–38, track design had improved and the designers considered it a waste of space, weight, and maintenance resources, despite the road speed advantage. The A-20 also incorporated previous research (BT-IS and BT-SW-2 projects) into sloped armour: its all-round sloped armour plates were more likely to deflect rounds than perpendicular armour.

During the Battle of Lake Khasan in July 1938 and the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, an undeclared border war with Japan on the frontier with occupied Manchuria, the Soviets deployed numerous tanks against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Although the IJA Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks had diesel engines, the Red Army's T-26 and BT tanks used petrol engines which, while common in tank designs of the time, often burst into flames when hit by IJA tank-killer teams using Molotov cocktails. Poor-quality welds in the Soviet armour plates left small gaps between them, and flaming petrol from the Molotov cocktails easily seeped into the fighting and engine compartment; portions of the armour plating that had been assembled with rivets also proved to be vulnerable. The Soviet tanks were also easily destroyed by the Japanese Type 95 tank's 37 mm gunfire, despite the low velocity of that gun, or "at any other slightest provocation". The use of riveted armour led to a problem whereby the impact of enemy shells, even if they failed to disable the tank or kill the crew on their own, would cause the rivets to break off and become projectiles inside the tank.

After these battles, Koshkin convinced Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to let him develop a second prototype, a more heavily armed and armoured "universal tank" that reflected the lessons learned and could replace both the T-26 and the BT tanks. Koshkin named the second prototype A-32, after its 32 mm of frontal armour. It had an L-10 76.2 mm (3 in) gun, and the same Model V-2-34 diesel. Both were tested in field trials at Kubinka in 1939, with the heavier A-32 proving to be as mobile as the A-20. A still heavier version of the A-32, with 45 mm (1.77 in) of front armour, wider tracks, and a newer L-11 76.2 mm gun, was approved for production as the T-34. Koshkin chose the name after the year 1934, when he began to formulate his ideas about the new tank, and to commemorate that year's decree expanding the armoured force and appointing Sergo Ordzhonikidze to head tank production.

Valuable lessons from Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol regarding armour protection, mobility, quality welding, and main guns were incorporated into the new T-34 tank, which represented a substantial improvement over the BT and T-26 tanks in all four areas. Koshkin's team completed two prototype T-34s in January 1940. In April and May, they underwent a grueling 2000 km drive from Kharkiv to Moscow for a demonstration for the Kremlin leaders, to the Mannerheim Line in Finland, and back to Kharkiv via Minsk and Kiev. Some drivetrain shortcomings were identified and corrected.

Initial production

Resistance from the military command and concerns about high production cost were finally overcome by anxieties about the poor performance of Soviet tanks in the Winter War in Finland, and the effectiveness of German tanks during the Battle of France. The first production T-34s were completed in September 1940, completely replacing the production of the T-26, the BT series and the multi-turreted T-28 medium tank at the KhPZ plant. Koshkin died of pneumonia (exacerbated by the drive from Kharkiv to Moscow) at the end of that month, and the T-34's drivetrain developer, Alexander Morozov, was appointed Chief Designer.

The T-34 posed new challenges for the Soviet industry. It had heavier armour than any medium tank produced to date, and there were problems with defective armour plates. Only company commanders' tanks could be fitted with radios (originally the 71-TK-3 radio set), due to their expense and short supply – the rest of the tank crews in each company signalled with flags. The L-11 gun did not live up to expectations, so the Grabin Design Bureau at Gorky Factory N.92 designed the superior 76.2 mm F-34 gun. No bureaucrat would approve production of the new gun, but Gorky and KhPZ started producing it anyway; official permission came from the State Defense Committee only after troops praised the weapon's performance in combat against the Germans.

Production of this first T-34 series – the Model 1940 – totalled only about 400, before production was switched to the Model 1941, with the F-34 gun, 9-RS radio set (also installed on the SU-100), and even thicker armour.

Mass production
Subassemblies for the T-34 originated at several plants: Kharkiv Diesel Factory N.75 supplied the model V-2-34 engine, Leningrad Kirovsky Factory (formerly the Putilov works) made the original L-11 gun, and the Dinamo Factory in Moscow produced electrical components. Tanks were initially built at Plant N.183, in early 1941 at the Stalingrad Tractor Factory (STZ), and starting in July at Krasnoye Sormovo Factory N.112 in Gorky.

After Germany's surprise invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa), the Wehrmacht's rapid advances forced the evacuation and relocation of Soviet tank factories eastwards to the Ural Mountains, an undertaking of immense scale and haste that presented enormous logistic difficulties and was extremely punishing to the workers involved. Alexander Morozov personally supervised the evacuation of all skilled engineers and laborers, machinery and stock from KhPZ to re-establish the factory at the site of the Dzerzhinsky Ural Railcar Factory in Nizhny Tagil, renamed Stalin Ural Tank Factory N.183. The Kirovsky Factory, evacuated just weeks before the Germans surrounded Leningrad, moved with the Kharkiv Diesel Factory to the Stalin Tractor Factory in Chelyabinsk, soon to be nicknamed Tankograd ("Tank City"). The workers and machinery from Leningrad's Voroshilov Tank Factory N.174 were incorporated into the Ural Factory and the new Omsk Factory N.174. The Ordzhonikidze Ural Heavy Machine Tool Works (UZTM) in Sverdlovsk absorbed workers and machines from several small machine shops in the path of German forces.

While these factories were being rapidly moved, the industrial complex surrounding the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Factory in Stalingrad continued to work double shifts throughout the period of withdrawal (September 1941 to September 1942) to make up for production lost, and produced 40% of all T-34s during the period. As the factory became surrounded by heavy fighting in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942, the situation there grew desperate: manufacturing innovations were necessitated by material shortages, and stories persist of unpainted T-34 tanks driven out of the factory directly to the battlefields around it. Stalingrad kept up production until September 1942.

Soviet designers were aware of design deficiencies in the tank, but most of the desired remedies would have slowed tank production and so were not implemented: the only changes allowed on the production lines through to 1944 were those to make production simpler and cheaper. New methods were developed for automated welding and hardening the armour plate, including innovations by Prof. Evgeny Paton. The design of the 76.2 mm F-34 gun Model 1941 was reduced from an initial 861 parts to 614. The initial narrow, cramped turrets, both the cast one and the one welded of rolled armour plates bent to shape, were since 1942 gradually replaced with the somewhat less cramped hexagonal one; as it was mostly cast with only a few, simple flat armour plates welded in (roof etc.), this turret was actually faster to produce. Limited rubber supplies led to the adoption of all-steel, internally sprung road wheels, and a new clutch was added to an improved five-speed transmission and engine, improving reliability.

Over two years, the unit production cost of the T-34 was reduced from 269,500 Rbls in 1941, to 193,000 Rbls, and then to 135,000 Rbls.

In 1943, T-34 production had reached an average of 1,300 per month; this was the equivalent of three full-strength tank divisions. By the end of 1945, over 57,300 T-34s had been built: 34,780 T-34 tanks in multiple variants with 76.2 mm guns in 1940–44, and another 22,609 of the revised T-34-85 model in 1944–45. The single largest producer was Factory N.183 (UTZ), building 28,952 T-34s and T-34-85s from 1941 to 1945. The second-largest was Krasnoye Sormovo Factory N.112 in Gorky, with 12,604 in the same period.

At the start of the German-Soviet war, T-34s comprised about four percent of the Soviet tank arsenal, but by the end it made up at least 55% of tank production (based on figures from; Zheltov lists even larger numbers

Following the end of the war, a further 2,701 T-34s were built prior to the end of Soviet production. Under licence, production was restarted in Poland (1951–55) and Czechoslovakia (1951–58), where 1,380 and 3,185 T-34-85s were made, respectively, by 1956. Altogether, as many as 84,070 T-34s are thought to have been built, plus 13,170 self-propelled guns built on T-34 chassis. It was the most-produced tank of the Second World War, and the second most-produced tank of all time, after its successor, the T-54/55 series.

Overview
The T-34 had well-sloped armour, a relatively powerful engine and wide tracks. The initial T-34 version had a powerful 76.2 mm gun, and is often called the T-34/76 (originally a World War II German designation, never used by the Red Army). In 1944, a second major version began production, the T-34-85, with a larger 85 mm gun intended to deal with newer German tanks.

Comparisons can be drawn between the T-34 and the U.S. M4 Sherman tank. Both tanks were the backbone of the armoured units in their respective armies, both nations distributed these tanks to their allies, who also used them as the mainstay of their own armoured formations, and both were upgraded extensively and fitted with more powerful guns. Both were designed for mobility and ease of manufacture and maintenance, sacrificing some performance for these goals. Both chassis were used as the foundation for a variety of support vehicles, such as armour recovery vehicles, tank destroyers, and self-propelled artillery. Both were an approximately even match for the standard German medium tank, the Panzer IV, though each of these three tanks had particular advantages and weaknesses compared with the other two. Neither the T-34 nor the M4 was a match for Germany's heavier tanks, the Panther (technically a medium tank) or the Tiger I; the Soviets used the IS-2 heavy tank and the U.S. used the M26 Pershing as the heavy tanks of their forces instead.

Dimensions, road speed and engine horsepower of the various models did not vary significantly, except for the T-43, which was slower than the T-34.

Armour

The heavily sloped armour design made the tank better protected than the armour thickness alone would indicate. The shape also saved weight by reducing the thickness required to achieve equal protection. A few tanks also had appliqué armour of varying thickness welded onto the hull and turret. Tanks thus modified were called s ekranami (с экранами, "with screens").

The USSR donated two combat-used Model 1941 T-34s to the United States for testing purposes in late 1942. The examinations, performed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, revealed problems with overall armour build quality, especially of the plate joins and welds, as well as the use of soft steel combined with shallow surface tempering. Leak issues were noted: "In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition". Earlier models of the T-34, until the Model 1942, had cast turrets whose armour was softer than that of the other parts of the tank, and offered poor resistance even to 37 mm anti-aircraft shells. Early T-34s also suffered from poor quality welds, leading to instances of shells which would not have penetrated the tank under normal circumstances to penetrate anyway. They also suffered from rushed manufacturing, leading to inconsistent protection.

In addition, close examination of the T-34 at the Aberdeen Testing Ground showed that a variety of alloys were used in different portions of the armour on the T-34. "Mn-Si-Mo steels were employed for the thinner rolled armour sections, Cr-Mo steels for the thicker rolled armour sections, Mn-Si-Ni-Cr-Mo steels were employed for both rolled and cast steel components from 2" to 5" in thickness, and Ni-Cr-Mo steels were employed for some of the moderately thick cast armour sections". The armour was heat-treated in order to prevent penetration by armour-piercing shells, but this also caused it to be structurally weak, as the armor was very hard and thus brittle, resulting in strikes by high explosive shells causing spalling.

Despite these deficiencies, the T-34's armour proved problematic for the Germans in the initial stages of the war on the Eastern Front. In one wartime account, a single T-34 came under heavy fire upon encountering one of the most common German anti-tank guns at that stage of the war: "Remarkably enough, one determined 37 mm gun crew reported firing 23 times against a single T-34 tank, only managing to jam the tank’s turret ring." Similarly, a German report of May 1942 noted the ineffectiveness of their 50 mm gun as well, noting that "Combating the T-34 with the 5 cm KwK tank gun is possible only at short ranges from the flank or rear, where it is important to achieve a hit as perpendicular to the surface as possible." However, a Military Commissariat Report of the 10th Tank Division, dated 2 August 1941 reported that within 300–400 m the 37 mm Pak 36's armour-piercing shot could defeat the frontal armour. According to an examination of damaged T-34 tanks in several repair workshops in August to September 1942, collected by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry in January 1943, 54.3% of all T-34 losses were caused by the German long-barreled 5 cm KwK 39 gun.

As the war went on, the T-34 gradually lost some of its initial advantages. The Germans responded to the T-34 by fielding large numbers of improved anti-tank weapons such as the towed 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun, while hits from 88 mm-armed Tigers, anti-aircraft guns and 8.8 cm Pak 43 anti-tank guns usually proved lethal. In 1942 the German Panzer IVs were refitted with the 7.5 cm KwK 40 due to the inadequate anti-tank performance of previous German tank designs against the T-34. The upgunned Panzer IV posed a serious threat to the T-34-76, being able to penetrate the frontal turret of a T-34-76 at a range of 1200 m at any angle.

A Wa Pruef 1 report estimated that, with the target angled 30° sideward, a Panther tank could penetrate the turret of a T-34-85 from the front at ranges up to 2000 m, the mantlet at 1200 m, and the frontal hull armour at 300 m. According to the Pantherfibel (the Panther tank manual for its crew), the T-34's glacis could be penetrated from 800 m and the mantlet from 1500 m at 30° sideward angle.

A Waffenamt-Prüfwesen 1 report estimated that with the T-34 angled 30 degrees sidewards and APCBC round, the Tiger I's 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 would have to close in to 100 meters to achieve a penetration in the T-34's glacis, and could penetrate the frontal turret of a T-34-85 at 1,400 m, the mantlet at 400 m, and the nose at 300 m Ground trials by employees of NIBT Polygon in May 1943 reported that the 88 mm KwK 36 gun could pierce the T-34 frontal hull from 1,500 meters at 90 degrees and cause a disastrous burst effect inside the tank. The examined hull showed cracks, spalling, and delamination due to the poor quality of the armour. It was recommended to increase and improve the quality of welds and armour.

Analysis of destroyed T-34 tanks in the Korean War found that the 76 and 90 mm armour-piercing rounds of the M41 Walker Bulldog and M46 Patton could penetrate the T-34 at most angles from 800 yard. The maximum range at which the tanks could penetrate the T-34 could not be determined due to a lack of data at higher combat ranges.

In late 1950 a T-34-85 tank was captured by the UN security force in the Korean War. An evaluation of the tank was conducted by the USA which found that the sloped armour of the T-34 was desirable for deflecting shells. They also concluded that the armour was deemed as satisfactory as armour strength was comparable to US armour of similar hardness and that the quality of the material used was "high-grade". Similarly, casting was seen as high quality although casting defects were found in the side armour of the tank that negatively affected armour strength. The abundance of gaps in the joints of the armour was seen as an undesirable feature of the tank due to the risk of injury from "entry of bullet splash and shell fragments".

Firepower
The 76.2 mm F-34 gun, fitted on the vast majority of T-34s produced through to the beginning of 1944, was able to penetrate any early German tank's armour at normal combat ranges. When firing APCR shells, it could pierce 92 mm at 500 m and 60 mm of armour at 1000 m The best German tanks of 1941, the Panzer III and Panzer IV, had no more than 50 or of flat frontal armour. However by 1942 the Germans had increased the hull armour on the Panzer IV to 80 mm which provided good protection at normal combat distances. The F-34 also fired an adequate high explosive round.

The gun sights and range finding for the F-34 main gun (either the TMFD-7 or the PT4-7 ) were rather crude, especially compared to those of their German adversaries, affecting accuracy and the ability to engage at long ranges. As a result of the T-34's two-man turret, weak optics and poor vision devices, the Germans noted:

The Germans also noted that the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets, while their own tanks could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34. As the war progressed the Germans created heavier tank designs like the Tiger I or Panther which were both immune to the 76mm gun of the T-34 when fired upon from the front. This meant that they could only be penetrated from the sides at ranges of a few hundred metres. Due to low anti-tank performance, the T-34 was upgraded to the T-34-85 model. This model, with its 85 mm (3.35 in) ZiS gun, provided greatly increased firepower compared to the previous T-34's 76.2mm gun. The 85 mm gun could penetrate the turret front of a Tiger I tank from 500 m and the driver's front plate from 300 m at the side angle of 30 degrees, and the larger turret enabled the addition of another crew member, allowing the roles of commander and gunner to be separated and increasing the rate of fire and overall effectiveness. The D-5T was capable of penetrating the Tiger I's upper hull armour at 1,000 metres. When firing on the frontal armour of the Panther at an angle of 30 degrees sidewards, the T-34-85 could not penetrate its turret at 500 m. This meant that the T-34 would have to resort to using tungsten rounds or firing on the weaker sides of the Panther to destroy it.

The greater length of the 85 mm gun barrel – 4.645 m – made it necessary for crews to be careful not to plough it into the ground on bumpy roads or in combat. Tank commander A.K. Rodkin commented: "the tank could have dug the ground with it in the smallest ditch [filling the barrel with dirt]. If you fired it after that, the barrel would open up at the end like the petals of a flower", destroying the barrel. Standard practice when moving the T-34-85 cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret.

During the Korean War, the USA captured a T-34-85. US engineering analysis and testing concluded that the T-34-85 could penetrate 4.1 in at 1000 yd, performing similarly to the HVAP rounds of the M41. The Americans also concluded the maximum range of the gun was 2 –, but the effective range was only up to 1900 m.

Mobility

The T-34 was powered by a Model V-2-34 38.8 L V12 Diesel engine of 500 hp (370 kW), giving a top speed of 53 km/h (33 mph). It used the coil-spring Christie suspension of the earlier BT-series tanks, using a "slack track" tread system with a rear-mounted drive sprocket and no system of return rollers for the upper run of track, but dispensed with the heavy and ineffective convertible drive. T-34 tanks equipped with the 4-speed gearbox could only use 4th gear on road, being limited to 3rd on terrain. In the first batch of T-34s, shifting from 2nd to 3rd required a force of 46-112 kg. In September 1941, however, changes were made which lowered the effort to under 31 kg by changing the 3rd gear ratio, which lowered top speed in 3rd gear from 29 km/h to 25 km/h, but made shifting easier. Using the 5-speed gearbox allowed the T-34 to use 4th gear on terrain, with which it could reach 30 km/h.

The T-34-76's ground pressure was around 0.72 kg/cm². Its wide tracks allowed for superior performance on dirt roads and off-road when compared to contemporary tanks. There were, however, still examples of T-34s getting stuck in mud. For example, in 1944 February 4, the 21st Guards Tank Brigade with 32 T-34, was ordered to proceed by road to Tolstoye Rogi, a journey of approximately 80 kilometers. Of the 32 tanks, no less than 19 got stuck in the mud or suffered mechanical breakdowns.

Ergonomics
The original 76mm armed T-34 suffered from the unsatisfactory ergonomic layout of its crew compartment compared to the later 85mm variant. The two-man turret crew arrangement required the commander to aim and fire the gun, an arrangement common to most Soviet tanks of the day. The two-man turret was "cramped and inefficient" and was inferior to the three-man (commander, gunner, and loader) turret crews of German Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks. The Germans noted the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets while the Panzers could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34.

Early in the war, the commander fought at a further disadvantage; the forward-opening hatch and the lack of a turret cupola forced him to observe the battlefield through a single vision slit and traversable periscope. German commanders liked to fight "heads-up", with their seat raised and having a full field of view – in the T-34 this was impossible. Soviet veterans condemned the turret hatches of the early models. Nicknamed pirozhok ("stuffed bun") because of its characteristic shape, it was heavy and hard to open. The complaints of the crews urged the design group led by Alexander Morozov to switch in August 1942 to using two hatches in the turret.

The loader also had a difficult job due to the lack of a turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns); the same fault was present on all German tanks prior to the Panzer IV. The floor under the T-34's turret was made up of ammunition stored in small metal boxes, covered by a rubber mat. There were nine ready rounds of ammunition stowed in racks on the sides of the fighting compartment. Once these rounds had been used, the crew had to pull additional ammunition out of the floor boxes, leaving the floor littered with open bins and matting and reducing their performance.

Most of the problems created by the cramped T-34/76 turret, known before the war, were corrected with the provision of a bigger cast three-man turret on the T-34-85 in 1944.

General reliability
The T-34's wide track and good suspension gave it excellent cross-country performance. Early in the tank's life, however, this advantage was greatly reduced by the numerous teething troubles the design displayed: a long road trip could be a lethal exercise for a T-34 tank at the start of the war. When in June 1941, the 8th Mechanised Corps under Dmitry Ryabyshev marched 500 km towards Dubno, the corps lost half of its vehicles. A.V. Bodnar, who was in combat in 1941–42, recalled:

The T-34 gearbox had four forward and one reverse gear, replaced by a five-speed box on the last of the 1943 model of the T-34.

The tracks of early models were the most frequently repaired part. A.V. Maryevski later remembered:

The USSR donated two combat-used Model 1941 T-34s to the United States for testing purposes in late 1942. The examinations, performed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, highlighted these early faults, which were in turn acknowledged in a 1942 Soviet report on the results of the testing:

Testing at Aberdeen also revealed that engines could grind to a halt from dust and sand ingestion, as the original "Pomon" air filter was almost totally ineffective and had an insufficient air-inflow capacity, starving the combustion chambers of oxygen, lowering compression, and thereby restricting the engine from operating at full capacity. At the time of the Aberdeen testing, the alleged air filter issue was already remedied by the addition of "Cyclone" filters on the Model 1943, and even more efficient "Multi-Cyclone" filters on the T-34-85.

The testing at Aberdeen revealed other problems as well. The turret drive also suffered from poor reliability. The use of poorly machined, low quality steel side friction clutches and the T-34's outdated and poorly manufactured transmission meant frequent mechanical failure occurred and that they "create an inhuman harshness for the driver". A lack of properly installed and shielded radios – if they existed at all – restricted their operational range to under 16 km.

Soviet tests on newly built T-34’s showed that in April 1943 only 10.1% could complete a 330 km trial and in June ’43 this went down to 7.7%. The percentage stayed below 50% till October 1943 when it rose to 78%, in the next month it dropped to 57% and in the period December ’43 – January ’44 the average was 82%. During February 1944 tests, 79% of tanks reached 300 kilometers, and of the test batches 33% reached 1,000 kilometers. This became immediately apparent to the tank troops. The deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, P. G. Dyner, commented that tanks in 1943 would reach only 75 percent of their guaranteed life span in engine hours and mileage, but in 1944 they reached 150 percent.

In 1944 June, a report written by the 2. Panzerjäger-Abteilung Company 128 (23. PzDiv.) described experiences acquired during operations with its Beutepanzer SU-85 and T-34:

On January 29, 1945, the State Defense Committee approved a decree that extended the service life guarantee of the T-34's V-2-34 engine from 200 hours to 250 hours. A report by the 2nd Guards Tank Army in February 1945 revealed that the average engine service life of a T-34 was lower than the official warranty at 185–190 hours. For comparison, the US M4 Sherman had an average engine service life of 195–205 hours.

Operation Barbarossa (1941)

Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, its invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941. At the start of hostilities, the Red Army had 967 T-34 tanks and 508 KV tanks concentrated in five of their twenty-nine mechanized corps. The existence of the T-34 and KV heavy tanks proved a psychological shock to German soldiers, who had expected to face an inferior enemy. The T-34 was superior to any tank the Germans then had in service. The diary of Alfred Jodl seems to express surprise at the appearance of the T-34 in Riga, noting "the surprise at this new and thus unknown wunder-armament being unleashed against the German assault divisions". Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist, called it "the finest tank in the world" and Heinz Guderian affirmed the T-34's "vast superiority" over German tanks.

Initially, the Wehrmacht had great difficulty destroying T-34s in combat, as standard German anti-tank weaponry proved ineffective against its heavy, sloped armour. In one of the first known encounters, a T-34 crushed a 3.7 cm PaK 36, destroyed two Panzer IIs, and left a 14 km long swathe of destruction in its wake before a howitzer destroyed it at close range. In another incident, a single Soviet T-34 was hit more than 30 times by a battalion-sized contingent of German 37mm and 50mm anti-tank guns, yet survived intact and drove back to its own lines a few hours later. The inability to penetrate the T-34's armour led to the Germans' standard anti-tank gun, the 37 mm PaK 36, being dubbed the Panzeranklopfgerät ("tank door knocker") because the PaK 36 crew simply revealed their presence and wasted their shells without damaging the T-34's armour. Anti-tank gunners began aiming at tank tracks, or vulnerable margins on the turret ring and gun mantlet, rather than the bow and turret armour. The Germans were forced to deploy 105 mm field guns and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns in a direct fire role to stop them.

Despite this, the Soviet corps equipped with these new tanks lost most of them within weeks. The combat statistics for 1941 show that the Soviets lost an average of over seven tanks for every German tank lost. The Soviets lost a total of 20,500 tanks in 1941 (approximately 2,300 of them T-34s, as well as over 900 heavy tanks, mostly KVs). The destruction of the Soviet tank force was accomplished not only by the glaring disparity in the tactical and operational skills of the opponents, but also by mechanical defects that afflicted Soviet armour. Besides the poor state of older tanks, the new T-34s and KVs suffered from initial mechanical and design problems, particularly with regard to clutches and transmissions. Mechanical breakdowns accounted for at least 50 percent of the tank losses in the summer fighting, and recovery or repair equipment was not to be found. The shortage of repair equipment and recovery vehicles led the early T-34 crews to enter combat carrying a spare transmission on the engine deck.

Other key factors diminishing the initial impact of T-34s on the battlefield were the poor state of leadership, tank tactics, initial lack of radios in tanks, and crew training; these factors were partially consequences of Stalin's purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937, reducing the army's efficiency and morale. This was aggravated as the campaign progressed by the loss of many of the properly trained personnel during the Red Army's disastrous defeats early in the invasion. Typical crews went into combat with only basic military training plus 72 hours of classroom instruction; according to historian Steven Zaloga:

Further action (1942–1943)
As the invasion progressed, German infantry began receiving increasing numbers of the 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank guns, which were capable of penetrating the T-34's armour at long range. Larger numbers of the 88 mm Flak guns also arrived, which could easily defeat a T-34 at very long ranges, though their size and general unwieldiness meant that they were often difficult to move into position in the rough Soviet terrain.

At the same time, the Soviets incrementally upgraded the T-34. The Model 1942 featured increased armour on the turret and many simplified components. The Model 1943 (confusingly also introduced in 1942) had yet more armour, as well as increased fuel capacity and more ammunition storage. Also added were an improved engine air filter and a new clutch mated to an improved and more reliable five-speed transmission. Finally, the Model 1943 also had a new, slightly roomier (but still two-man) turret of a distinctive hexagonal shape that was easier to manufacture, derived from the abandoned T-34M project.

The T-34 was essential in resisting the German summer offensive in 1942, and executing the double encirclement manoeuvre that cut off the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in December 1942. The Sixth Army was surrounded, and eventually surrendered in February 1943, a campaign widely regarded as the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front.

In 1943, the Soviets formed Polish and Czechoslovak armies-in-exile, and these started to receive the T-34 Model 1943 with a hexagonal turret. Like the Soviet forces themselves, the Polish and Czechoslovak tank crews were sent into action quickly with little training, and suffered high casualties. In July 1943, the Germans launched Operation Citadel, in the region around Kursk, their last major offensive on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. It was the debut of the German Panther tank, although the numbers employed at the resulting Battle of Kursk were small and the brunt of the burden was carried by the Panzer III, StuG III, and Panzer IV. The campaign featured the largest tank battles in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armour engagement at Prokhorovka, which began on 12 July, though the vast majority of armour losses on both sides were caused by artillery and mines, rather than tanks. Over 6,000 fully tracked armoured vehicles, 4,000 combat aircraft, and 2 million men are believed to have participated in these battles.

The Soviet high command's decision to focus on one cost-effective design, cutting costs and simplifying production wherever possible while only allowing relatively minor improvements, had proven to be an astute choice for the first two years of the war. However, the battles in the summer of 1943 demonstrated that the 76.2 mm gun of the T-34 was no longer as effective as it was in 1941. Soviet tank crews struggled at longer ranges with the additional frontal armour applied to the later variants of the Panzer III and Panzer IV, and were unable to penetrate the frontal armour of the new German Panther or Tiger I tank at standard combat ranges without tungsten rounds, and had to rely on tactical skill through flanking manoeuvres and combined arms.

T-34-85
After improved German Panzer IVs with the high-velocity 7.5cm (2.95 in) KwK 40 gun were encountered in combat in 1942, a project to design an entirely new Soviet tank was begun, with the goals of increasing armour protection while adding modern features like a torsion-bar suspension and a three-man turret. The new tank, the T-43, was intended to be a universal model to replace both the T-34 and the KV-1 heavy tank. However, the T-43 prototype's armour, though heavier, was not capable against German 88 mm guns, while its mobility was found to be inferior to the T-34. Finally, although the T-43 shared over 70% of its components with the T-34, manufacturing it would still have required a significant slow-down in production. Consequently, the T-43 was cancelled.

The Germans improved not only the weaponry of their tanks, but their armor as well. Soviet firing tests against a captured Tiger I heavy tank in April 1943 showed that the T-34's 76 mm gun could not penetrate the front of the Tiger I at all, and the side only at very close range. A Soviet 85 mm anti-aircraft gun, the M1939 (52-K), was found capable of doing the job, and so derivatives of it were developed for tanks. One of the resulting guns used on the original T-34 85 model (the D-5T) was capable of penetrating the Tiger I's upper hull armour at 1,000 metres. It was still not enough to match the Tiger, which could destroy the T-34 from a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 m, but it was a noticeable improvement.

With the T-43 canceled, the Soviet command made the decision to retool the factories to produce an improved version of the T-34. Its turret ring was enlarged from 1,425 mm (56 in) to 1,600 mm (63 in), allowing a larger turret to be fitted supporting the larger 85 mm gun. The prototype T-43's turret design was hurriedly adopted by Vyacheslav Kerichev at the Krasnoye Sormovo Factory to fit the T-34. This was a larger three-man turret, with radio (previously in the hull) and observation cupola in the roof. Now the tank commander needed only to command (aided by cupola and radio systems), leaving the operation of the gun to the gunner and the loader. The turret was bigger and less sloped than the original T-34 turret, making it a bigger target (due to the three-man crew and bigger gun), but with thicker 90 mm armour, making it more resistant to enemy fire. The shells were 50% heavier (9 kg) and were much better in the anti-armour role, and reasonable in a general purpose role, though only 55–60 could be carried, instead of 90–100 of the earlier shells. The resulting new tank, the T-34-85, was seen as a compromise between advocates for the T-43 and others who wanted to continue to build as many 76 mm-armed T-34s as possible without interruption.

Production of the T-34-85 began in January 1944 at Factory No. 112, first using the D-5T 85 mm gun. Parallel to the production of the T-34-85 with the D-5T gun, production of the T-34-85 using the S-53 gun (later to be modified and redesignated as the ZIS-S-53 gun) began in February 1944 at Factory No. 112. The improved T-34-85 became the standard Soviet medium tank, with an uninterrupted production run until the end of the war. A T-34-85 initially cost about 30 percent more to produce than a Model 1943, at 164,000 Rbls; by 1945 this had been reduced to 142,000 Rbls during the course of World War II the cost of a T-34 tank had almost halved, from 270,000 Rbls in 1941, while its top speed remained about the same, and its main gun's armour penetration and turret frontal armour thickness both nearly doubled.

The T-34-85 gave the Red Army a tank with better armour and mobility than the German Panzer IV tank and StuG III assault gun. While it could not match the armour or weapons of the heavier Panther and Tiger tanks, its improved firepower made it much more effective than earlier models, and overall it was more cost-effective than the heaviest German tanks. In comparison with the T-34-85 program, the Germans instead chose an upgrade path based on the introduction of completely new, expensive, heavier, and more complex tanks, greatly slowing the growth of their tank production and helping the Soviets to maintain a substantial numerical superiority in tanks. By May 1944, T-34-85 production had reached 1,200 tanks per month. In the entire war, production figures for all Panther types reached no more than 6,557, and for all Tiger types (including the Tiger I and Tiger II) 2,027. Production figures for the T-34-85 alone reached 22,559.

On 12 January 1945, a column of Tiger IIs and other tanks from 424th Heavy Panzer Battalion were involved in a short-range engagement with T-34-85 tanks near the village of Lisow. Forty T-34-85 tanks commanded by Colonel N. Zhukov were attacked by the 424th Heavy Panzer battalion, which had been reinforced by 13 Panthers. The Germans permanently lost five Tiger IIs, seven Tiger Is and five Panthers for the loss of four T-34-85 tanks burnt out.

German use of T-34s

The German army often employed as much captured materiel as possible and T-34s were not an exception. Large numbers of T-34s were captured in fighting on the Eastern Front though few were T-34-85s. These were designated by the Germans as Panzerkampfwagen T-34 747(r). From late 1941, captured T-34s were transported to a German workshop for repairs and modification to German requirements. In 1943 a local tank factory in Kharkiv was used for this purpose. These were sometimes modified to German standards by the installation of a German commander's cupola and radio equipment.

The first captured T-34s entered German service during the summer of 1941. In order to prevent recognition mistakes, large-dimension crosses or even swastikas were painted on the tanks, including on top of the turret, in order to prevent attack by Axis aircraft. Badly damaged tanks were either dug in as pillboxes or were used for testing and training purposes.

After the end of World War II, East Germany continued to utilize the T-34.

Manchurian campaign (August 1945)
Just after midnight on 9 August 1945, though the terrain was believed by the Japanese to be impassable by armoured formations, the Soviet Union invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria. Red Army combined-arms forces achieved complete surprise and used a powerful, deep-penetrating attack in a classic double encirclement pattern, spearheaded by the T-34-85. The opposing Japanese forces had been reduced as elite units had been drawn off to other fronts and the remaining forces were in the middle of a redeployment. The Japanese tanks remaining to face them were all held in the rear and not used in combat; the Japanese had weak support from IJAAF forces, engineering, and communications. Japanese forces were overwhelmed, though some put up resistance. The Japanese emperor transmitted a surrender order on 14 August, but the Kwantung Army was not given a formal cease-fire until 17 August.

Korean War (1950–1953)

A full North Korean People's Army (KPA) brigade equipped with about 120 Soviet-supplied T-34-85s spearheaded the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The WWII-era 2.36-inch bazookas initially used by the US troops in South Korea were useless against the KPA's T-34 tanks, as were the 75 mm main guns of the M24 Chaffee light tank. However, following the introduction of heavier and more capable armour into the war by US and UN forces, such as the American M4 Sherman, M26 Pershing and M46 Patton tanks, as well as the British Comet and Centurion tanks, the KPA began to suffer more T-34 tank losses in combat from enemy armour, aside from further losses due to numerous US/UN airstrikes and increasingly-effective anti-tank firepower for US/UN infantry on the ground, such as the then-new 3.5-inch M20 "Super Bazooka" (replacing the earlier 2.36-inch model). By the time the NKPA were forced to withdraw from the south, about 239 T-34s and 74 SU-76 assault guns had been lost or abandoned. After October 1950, NKPA armour was rarely encountered. Despite China's entry into the conflict in the following month, no major armour deployments were carried out by them, as the Chinese focus was on massed infantry attacks rather than large-scale armour assaults. Several T-34-85s and a few IS-2 tanks were fielded, primarily dispersed amongst their infantry, thus making armoured engagements with US and UN forces rare from then on.

A Chinese T-34 tank No. 215 from 4th Tank Regiment, 2nd Tank Division, allegedly destroyed four enemy tanks and damaged another M46 Patton tank during its fight from 6 to 8 July 1953. It also destroyed 26 bunkers,9 artillery pieces, and a truck. That tank is now preserved in the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution.

In summary, a 1954 US military survey concluded that there were, in all, 119 tanks vs. tank actions involving US Army and US Marine units against North Korean and Chinese forces during the Korean War, with 97 T-34-85 tanks knocked out and another 18 considered probable. American losses were somewhat greater.

Angolan Civil War (1975–1988)
One of the last modern conflicts which saw the extensive combat deployment of the T-34-85 was the Angolan Civil War. In 1975, the Soviet Union shipped eighty T-34-85s to Angola as part of its support for the ongoing Cuban military intervention there. Cuban crewmen instructed FAPLA personnel in their operation; other FAPLA drivers and gunners accompanied Cuban crews in an apprentice role.

FAPLA began deploying T-34-85s against the UNITA and FNLA forces on June 9, 1975. The appearance of FAPLA and Cuban tanks prompted South Africa to reinforce UNITA with a single squadron of Eland-90 armoured cars.

Balkans

In early 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army possessed 250 T-34-85s, none of which were in active service. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, the T-34-85s were inherited by the national armies of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro and continued to see action during the Yugoslav Wars. Some were also acquired from Yugoslav reserve stocks by Serbian separatist armies, namely the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (SVK) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). Most of these tanks were in poor condition at the beginning of the conflict and some were soon rendered unserviceable, likely through inadequate maintenance and lack of spares.

On 3 May 1995, a VRS T-34-85 attacked an UNPROFOR outpost manned by the 21st Regiment of the Royal Engineers in Maglaj, Bosnia, injuring six British peacekeepers, with at least one of them sustaining a permanent disability. A number of T-34s being stored by the VRS at a base in Zvornik were temporarily confiscated by UNPROFOR as part of a local disarmament programme the following year.

Middle East
Czechoslovak-produced T-34-85s were used by Egypt in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1967 (Six-Day War) in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt went on to build the T-34-100, a local and unique conversion that was made up of a Soviet BS-3 100 mm heavy field-artillery gun mounted within a heavily modified turret, as well as the T-34-122 mounting the D-30 gun. In 1956, they were used as regular tanks to support Egyptian infantry, the tank was still in use by the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.

The Syrian Army also received T-34-85s from the Soviet Union and they took part in the many artillery duels with Israeli tanks in November 1964 and in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Warsaw Pact
T-34-85s equipped many of the armies of Eastern European countries (later forming the Warsaw Pact) and the armies of other Soviet client-states elsewhere. East German, Hungarian and Soviet T-34-85s served in the suppression of the East German uprising of 17 June 1953 as well as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Afghanistan
T-34-85s were sporadically available in Afghanistan. During the Soviet–Afghan War, most of the T-34s were fielded by the Sarandoy internal security forces. Some were also kept in service with the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

China

After the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Soviet Union sent many T-34-85s to the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA). Factory 617 had the ability to produce every part of the T-34-85, and during decades of service many modifications were made that visibly distinguish the PRC T-34-85 from the original specification, but no T-34-85 was actually made in China. The production plan of the T-34-85 in China was ended soon after the PRC received T-54A main battle tanks from the Soviet Union and began to build the Type 59 tank, a licensed production version of the T-54A.

Cuba

Cuba received 150 T-34-85 tanks as military aid from the Soviet Union in 1960. The T-34-85 was the first Soviet tank to enter service with the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), along with the IS-2. Many T-34-85 tanks first saw action in April 1961 during the Bay of Pigs Invasion with an unknown number destroyed or knocked out during the battle. In 1975, many T-34-85s were also donated by the USSR to the FAR to support its lengthy intervention in the Angolan Civil War.

A platoon of five Cuban T-34-85s saw combat in Angola against South African troops during the Battle of Cassinga. The tanks were based along with a company of Cuban mechanized infantry equipped with BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers. In May 1978, South Africa launched a major airborne raid on Cassinga with the objective of destroying a SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) base there. The Cuban forces were mobilised to stop them. As they approached Cassinga they were strafed by South African aircraft, which destroyed most of the BTR-152s and three of the T-34-85s; a fourth T-34-85 was disabled by an anti-tank mine buried in the road. The remaining tank continued to engage the withdrawing South African paratroops from a hull down position until the battle was over.

Over a hundred Cuban T-34-85s and their respective crews remained in Angola as of the mid 1980s. In September 1986, Cuban president Fidel Castro complained to General Konstantin Kurochkin, head of the Soviet military delegation to Angola, that his men could no longer be expected to fight South African armour with T-34s of "World War II vintage"; Castro insisted that the Soviets furbish the Cuban forces with a larger quantity of T-55s. By 1987 Castro's request appeared to have been granted, as Cuban tank battalions were able to deploy substantial numbers of T-54Bs, T-55s, and T-62s; the T-34-85 was no longer in service.

Cyprus
Cypriot National Guard forces equipped with some 35 T-34-85 tanks helped to support a coup by the Greek junta against President Archbishop Makarios on 15 July 1974. They also saw extensive action against Turkish forces during the Turkish invasion in July and August 1974, with two major actions at Kioneli and at Kyrenia on 20 July 1974.

Namibia
In 1984, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) made a concerted attempt to establish its own conventional armoured battalion through its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). As part of this effort, SWAPO diplomatic representatives in Europe approached the German Democratic Republic with a request for ten T-34 tanks, which were delivered. PLAN T-34s were never deployed during offensive operations against the South African military, being confined to the role of protecting strategic bases inside northern Angola.

By 1988 the PLAN T-34-85s had been stationed near Luanda, where their crews received training from Cuban instructors. In March 1989, the PLAN tanks were mobilised and moved south towards the Namibian border. South Africa accused PLAN of planning a major offensive to influence Namibia's pending general elections, but the tank crews did not cross the border and refrained from intervening in a series of renewed clashes later that year. Between 1990 and 1991, SWAPO ordered the PLAN tanks in Angola repatriated to Namibia at its own expense. Four later entered service with the new Namibian Army.

Finland
The Soviet and Finnish armies used T-34s until the 1960s; the former included the 76.2 mm-armed versions until at least 1968, when they were used in filming the sequel to the movie The Alive and the Dead. The Finnish tanks were captured directly from the Soviets or purchased from Germany's captured stocks. Many of the Т-34-85s were enhanced with Finnish or Western equipment, such as improved optics.

Vietnam
During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Army was equipped with many Soviet T-34-85 and these were used in the Operation Lam Son 719, the 1972 Easter Offensive and the 1975 Spring Offensive. They were later used during the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Sino-Vietnamese War. A small number are currently being used as trainers. The rest are in storage and no longer serve as active duty battle tanks.

Yemen
In 2015, both T-34-85 Model 1969 tanks and SU-100 self-propelled guns were photographed being used in Houthi takeover in Yemen. Some were even being fitted with anti-tank guided missiles.

Current active service
In 2018, there were nine countries that maintained T-34s in the inventories of their national armed forces: Cuba, Yemen, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. Of these operators, Vietnam possessed the largest known surviving fleet of T-34 series tanks, with 45. Yemen possessed 30, Guinea 30, Guinea-Bissau 10, Mali 21, and Laos 30. It was unclear how many Cuban and North Korean T-34s remained in service. All the Congolese, Namibian and Malian tanks were believed to be in reserve storage or inoperable. The Laotian Army retired its T-34s in early 2019 and sold them to Russia, to be used for public displays and museum exhibits.

Successors
In 1944, pre-war development of a more advanced T-34 tank was resumed, leading to the T-44. The new tank had a turret design based on the T-34-85's, but featured a new hull with torsion-bar suspension and transversely mounted engine; it had a lower profile than the T-34-85 and was simpler to manufacture. Between 150 and 200 of these tanks were built before the end of the war. With substantial drivetrain changes, a new turret, and 100 mm gun, it became the T-54, starting production in 1947.

Estimated numbers in service, 2023

 * Republic of the Congo: In reserve.
 * 🇬🇳 Guinea: 45; 30 operational reported by IISS in 2023.
 * 🇬🇼 Guinea-Bissau: 10.
 * 🇳🇦 Namibia: 4; serviceability doubtful.
 * 🇰🇵 North Korea: Estimated ~650; official number in service undisclosed.
 * 🇾🇪 Yemen: 250 reported in 2016; 30 reported operational by IISS in 2014. Unknown number in 2023, possibly non-serviceable.
 * Vietnam: 300 delivered; 45 in service reported in 2023.

Former

 * 🇦🇫 Afghanistan: 175
 * 🇩🇿 Algeria: 113
 * 138
 * 🇦🇴 Angola: 80
 * 🇦🇹 Austria: 25
 * Bosnia-Herzegovina: 5 reported by IISS in 2010
 * 🇧🇬 Bulgaria: 599
 * 🇨🇳 China: 2,500
 * 🇨🇺 Cuba: 642; undisclosed number in 2010.
 * 🇨🇾 Cyprus: 32
 * Czechoslovakia: 1,800
 * 🇪🇬 Egypt: 380
 * 🇬🇶 Equatorial Guinea
 * 🇪🇹 Ethiopia: 56
 * 🇫🇮 Finland: 9 captured
 * undefined: Captured (designated "Pz. 747(r)")
 * East Germany: 872
 * 🇭🇺 Hungary: 150
 * undefined: Captured.
 * undefined: 175
 * Laos: 30
 * 🇱🇧 Lebanon
 * 🇱🇾 Libya: 65
 * 🇲🇱 Mali: 30; retired from service.
 * 🇲🇳 Mongolia: 40
 * 🇲🇿 Mozambique: 200
 * 🇵🇰 Pakistan: 25
 * Palestine Liberation Organization: 24
 * 🇵🇱 Poland: 1,000
 * 🇷🇴 Romania:
 * Kingdom of Romania: 2 captured by 1 November 1942, 4 more captured in March 1944. It was proposed to heavily modify the first two.
 * Socialist Republic of Romania: 935 T-34-85s received from the USSR and Czechoslovakia from 1949 to 1957. They had faced local modifications. Furthermore, 12 armored recovery vehicles and 12 SPK-5 mobile cranes (both models based on the T-34-85 chassis) were acquired in 1955–58.

 * 🇸🇴 Somalia: 120
 * Soviet Union
 * 🇸🇩 Sudan: 20
 * Syria: 200
 * 🇹🇬 Togo: 7 T-34-85 from Egypt in 1981
 * 🇺🇬 Uganda: 10
 * UNITA
 * North Yemen: 150
 * South Yemen: 80
 * Yugoslavia: 889
 * 🇿🇼 Zimbabwe: 10

Symbolism

In Russia, in both 2023 and 2024, a single T-34-85 appeared as the sole tank in the Victory Day Parade held in Red Square in Moscow, leading to ridicule from Western media.

A T-34-85 tank monument in the East German city of Chemnitz (then known as Karl-Marx-Stadt) became the target of a 1980 bomb-attack that inflicted minor damage on the vehicle and blew out nearby windows. The bomber, Josef Kneifel, was sentenced to life imprisonment in Bautzen, but was released after a deal with the West German government in 1987. After German unification in 1990, the tank was transferred to a museum in Ingolstadt.

Another such tank, mounted atop the monument to Soviet tank crews in Prague, was the focus of significant controversy. The monument (known locally as 'Saint Tank') was intended to represent Lt I.G. Goncharenko's T-34-85 (the first Soviet tank to enter Prague during the liberation of Czechoslovakia in May 1945), but actually bore an IS-2M heavy tank. To many in Prague, the tank was also a reminder of the Soviet invasion which ended the Prague Spring of 1968. The tank was painted pink by artist David Černý in 1991. Following an official protest from the Russian government, the arrest of Černý, a coat of official green paint, public demonstrations, and a further coat of pink paint applied by fifteen parliamentary deputies, the tank was finally removed to a military museum.

Czterej pancerni i pies ("Four Tank-men and a Dog"), a very successful war-themed Polish television series of the 1960s, adapted the novel of the same name by the Polish writer Janusz Przymanowski (1922–1998), himself a People's Army of Poland volunteer. The series made T-34 tank number 102 an icon of Polish popular culture. It was also shown in other Soviet-bloc countries where it was also well received, surprisingly even in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). At the beginning of the 21st century reruns of the black and white series still manage to attract a large audience.

In Budapest on 23 October 2006, the 2006 protests in Hungary climaxed during the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Protesters managed to start an unarmed T-34 tank which was part of a memorial exhibit, and used it in riots against police forces. The tank drove a few hundred metres, then stopped in front of the police, causing no personal injury.

Variants
There were two main production families of the T-34, each with subvariants. The identification of T-34 variants can be complicated. Turret castings, superficial details, and equipment differed between factories; new features were added in the middle of production runs, or retrofitted to older tanks; damaged tanks were rebuilt, sometimes with the addition of newer-model equipment and even new turrets.

The Red Army never had a consistent policy for naming the T-34. Since at least the 1980s, however, many academic sources (notably, AFV expert Steven Zaloga) have used Soviet-style nomenclature: T-34 for the models armed with 76.2 mm guns, and T-34-85 for models armed with 85 mm guns, with minor models distinguished by year, as T-34 Model 1940. Some Russian historians use different names: they refer to the first T-34 as the T-34 Model 1939 instead of 1940, all T-34s with the original turret and F-34 gun as Model 1941 instead of Models 1941 and 1942, and the hexagonal-turret T-34 as Model 1942 instead of 1943.

German military intelligence in World War II referred to the two main production families as T-34/76 and T-34/85, with subvariants receiving letter designations such as T-34/76A – this nomenclature has been widely used in the West, especially in popular literature. When the German Wehrmacht used captured T-34s, it designated them Panzerkampfwagen T-34(r), where the "r" stood for russisch ("Russian"). The Finns referred to the T-34 as the Sotka after the common goldeneye, because the side silhouette of the tank resembled a swimming waterfowl. The T-34-85 was called pitkäputkinen Sotka ("long-barreled Sotka").

The T-34 (German designation: T-34/76) was the original tank with a 76.2 mm gun in a two-man turret.
 * Model 1940 (T-34/76A): Early, small production run (about 400 built ) with the L-11 76.2 mm tank gun.
 * Model 1941 (T-34/76B): Main production with thicker armour and the superior F-34 76.2 mm gun.
 * Model 1942 (T-34/76C): Thicker armour, many minor manufacturing improvements.
 * Model 1943 (T-34/76D, E, and F): Introduced May 1942 (not 1943). More ammunition and fuel, very minor armour increase. New hexagonal turret, nicknamed "Mickey Mouse" by the Germans because of its appearance with the twin, round turret-roof hatches open. Later production had a new commander's cupola.

The T-34-85 (German designation: T-34/85) was a major improvement with an 85 mm gun in a three-man turret. All T-34-85 models are externally very similar.
 * Model 1943: Short production run of January–March 1944 with D-5T 85 mm gun.
 * Model 1944: Produced from March 1944 through to the end of that year, with simpler ZiS-S-53 85 mm gun, radio moved from the hull into a turret with improved layout and new gunner's sight.
 * Model 1945: Produced from 1944 to 1945, with an electrically powered turret traverse motor, an enlarged commander's cupola with a one-piece hatch, and the TDP smoke system with electrically detonated MDSh canisters. Most produced variant of the T-34-85.
 * Model 1946: Production model with the improved V-2-34M engine, new wheels, and other minor details.
 * Model 1960: A refurbishing program introduced a new V-2-3411 engine and other modernizations.
 * Model 1969 (also called T-34-85M): Another refurbishing program introducing night driving equipment, additional fuel, and other modernizations.

Other armoured fighting vehicles

 * Flame-thrower tanks: OT-34 and OT-34-85 had an internally mounted flamethrower ATO-41 (ATO-42 later) replacing the hull machine-gun. 1170 OT-34-76 (mostly based on 1942/43 versions) and 331 OT-34-85 were built.
 * PT-1 T-34/76: Protivominniy Tral ("counter-mine trawl") Mine roller tank, mostly built on T-34 Model 1943 or T-34-85 chassis.
 * Samokhodnaya Ustanovka (Self-propelled guns and tank destroyers):
 * SU-122, a self-propelled howitzer based on T-34 Model 1943 chassis.
 * SU-85, a tank destroyer based on T-34 Model 1943 chassis.
 * SU-100, a tank destroyer based on T-34-85 chassis.
 * T-34-57: 14 T-34s were fitted with the 57-mm ZiS-4 (1941, 10 tanks) or the ZIS-4M (1943/44, 4 tanks) high-velocity 57 mm gun to be used as tank destroyers.

Surviving vehicles
An enormous number of T-34s and T-34-85s were produced; the Soviets used them aggressively in campaigns in Europe and Asia, and they were distributed to the Soviets' allies all over the world. Due to all three factors, there are hundreds of surviving T-34s. Examples of this tank are in the collections of most significant military museums, and hundreds more serve as war memorials. Many are in private ownership, and demilitarised working tanks change hands for U.S. $20,000–40,000. Some still may serve in a second-line capacity in a number of Third World militaries, while others may find use in a civilian capacity, primarily in film-making. In many World War II films, such as Saving Private Ryan, Battle of Neretva, and Kelly's Heroes, T-34-85 tanks were modified to resemble Tiger I tanks, due to the rarity of the latter. In Sydney Pollack's 1969 movie Castle Keep, barely modified T-34-85 tanks were used as German tanks.

In 2000, a T-34 Model 1943 was recovered that had spent 56 years at the bottom of a bog in Estonia. The tank had been captured and used by retreating German troops, who dumped it in the swamp when it ran out of fuel. The anaerobic environment of the bog preserved the tank and ensured there were no signs of oil leakage, rust, or other significant water damage. The engine was restored to full working order.

Other significant surviving T-34s include a Model 1941 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground (intersection of Deer Creek Loop and Target Loop) in Maryland, one of the oldest surviving vehicles. The French Musée des Blindés at Saumur holds two T-34s, including one in full working condition that is displayed in action at its summer "Carrousel" live tank exhibition. The Mandela Way T-34 Tank, a privately owned T-34-85 named after the street in which it is sited (in Bermondsey, London), is frequently repainted by artists and graffitists.

Tanks of comparable role, performance, and era

 * British Comet
 * British Cromwell
 * Canadian Grizzly I
 * German Panzer III
 * German Panzer IV
 * German Panther
 * Hungarian Turán III
 * Italian Carro Armato P 40
 * Italian P43 (proposal)
 * Japanese Type 3 Chi-Nu
 * Japanese Type 4 Chi-To
 * Romanian 1942 medium tank (proposal)
 * Soviet KV-13
 * Swedish Stridsvagn m/42
 * American M4 Sherman

title: T-34


text:
Michael Behe

Michael Joseph Behe (born January 18, 1952) is an American biochemist and an advocate of the pseudoscientific principle of intelligent design (ID).

Behe serves as professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and as a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture. He advocates for the validity of the argument for irreducible complexity (IC), which claims that some biochemical structures are too complex to be explained by known evolutionary mechanisms and are therefore probably the result of intelligent design. Behe has testified in several court cases related to intelligent design, including the court case Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, where his views were cited in the ruling that intelligent design is not science and is religious in nature.

Behe's claims about the irreducible complexity of essential cellular structures have been rejected by the vast majority of the scientific community, and his own biology department at Lehigh University published a statement repudiating Behe's views and intelligent design.

Early life and education
Behe was born in Altoona, Pennsylvania, and grew up in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where he graduated from Bishop McDevitt High School. He graduated from Drexel University in Philadelphia in 1974 with a B.S. in chemistry. He received his Ph.D. in biochemistry at the University of Pennsylvania in 1978 for his dissertation research on sickle-cell disease.

From 1978 to 1982, he did postdoctoral work on DNA structure at the National Institutes of Health. From 1982 to 1985, he was assistant professor of chemistry at Queens College in New York City, where he met his wife, Celeste. In 1985, he moved to Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where he is currently a professor of biochemistry. From 2005 to 2024, Lehigh University's department of biological sciences exhibited a position statement on its website stating that its faculty reject Behe's views on evolution:

"The department faculty, then, are unequivocal in their support of evolutionary theory, which has its roots in the seminal work of Charles Darwin and has been supported by findings accumulated over 140 years. The sole dissenter from this position, Prof. Michael Behe, is a well-known proponent of 'intelligent design.' While we respect Prof. Behe's right to express his views, they are his alone and are in no way endorsed by the department. It is our collective position that intelligent design has no basis in science, has not been tested experimentally, and should not be regarded as scientific."

As of 2024, his faculty webpage states: "My arguments about irreducible complexity and intelligent design are my own, and are not endorsed either by Lehigh University in general or by the Department of Biological Sciences in particular."

Career
Behe says he once fully accepted the scientific theory of evolution, but that after reading Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (1985), by Michael Denton, he came to question evolution. Later, Behe came to believe that there was evidence, at a biochemical level, that some biological systems were "irreducibly complex". He thought that these systems could not, even in principle, have evolved by natural selection. He believed that the only possible alternative explanation for such complex structures was that they were created by an "intelligent designer". Irreducible complexity has been rejected by the scientific community.

The 1987 Edwards v. Aguillard U.S. Supreme Court decision barred the required teaching of creation science from public schools but allowed evolutionary theory on the grounds of scientific validity. After the decision, a later draft of the textbook Of Pandas and People (1989) systematically replaced each and every cognate of the word "creation" with the phrase "intelligent design" or similar ID terms. The books of lawyer Phillip E. Johnson on theistic realism dealt directly with criticism of evolutionary theory and its purported biased "materialist" science, and aimed to legitimize the teaching of creationism in schools. In March 1992, a conference at Southern Methodist University brought Behe together with other leading figures into what Johnson later called the "wedge strategy." In 1993, the "Johnson-Behe cadre of scholars" met at Pajaro Dunes, California, and Behe presented for the first time his idea of irreducibly complex molecular machinery. Following a summer 1995 conference, "The Death of Materialism and the Renewal of Culture," the group obtained funding through the Discovery Institute.

For the 1993 edition of Pandas, Behe wrote a chapter on blood clotting, presenting arguments which he later presented in very similar terms in a chapter in his 1996 book Darwin's Black Box. Behe later agreed that they were essentially the same when he defended intelligent design at the Dover trial.

In 1996, Behe became a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, later renamed the Center for Science and Culture, an organization dedicated to promoting intelligent design.

Darwin's Black Box
In 1996, Behe published his ideas on irreducible complexity in his book Darwin's Black Box. Behe's refusal to identify the nature of any proposed intelligent designer frustrates scientists, who see it as a move to avoid any possibility of testing the positive claims of ID while allowing him and the intelligent design movement to distance themselves from some of the more overtly religiously motivated critics of evolution.

As to the identity of the intelligent designer, Behe responds that if, deep in the woods, one were to come across a group of flowers that clearly spelled out the name "LEHIGH", one would have no doubt that the pattern was the result of intelligent design. Determining who the designer was, however, would not be nearly as easy.

In 1997, Russell Doolittle, on whose work Behe based much of the blood-clotting discussion in Darwin's Black Box, wrote a rebuttal to the statements about irreducible complexity of certain systems. In particular, Doolittle mentioned the issue of the blood clotting in his article, "A Delicate Balance." Later on, in 2003, Doolittle's lab published a paper in the peer-reviewed journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences which demonstrates that the pufferfish lacks at least three out of 26 blood clotting factors, yet still has a workable blood clotting system. According to Doolittle, this defeats a key claim in Behe's book, that blood clotting is irreducibly complex.

In reviewing a book by Robert T. Pennock, Behe took issue with the "intelligent design" group being associated with "creationism," saying readers would typically take that to mean biblical literalism and young Earth creationism (YEC). In 2001 Pennock responded that he had been careful to represent their views correctly, and that while several leaders of the intelligent design movement were young Earth creationists, others including Behe were "old-earthers" and "creationists in the core sense of the term, namely, that they reject the scientific, evolutionary account of the origin of species and want to replace it with a form of special creation."

Behe and Snoke article
In 2004, Behe published a paper with David Snoke, in the scientific journal Protein Science that uses a simple mathematical model to simulate the rate of evolution of proteins by point mutation, which he states supports irreducible complexity, based on the calculation of the probability of mutations required for evolution to succeed. However, the paper does not mention intelligent design nor irreducible complexity, which were removed, according to Behe, at the behest of the reviewers. Nevertheless, the Discovery Institute lists it as one of the "Peer-Reviewed & Peer-Edited Scientific Publications Supporting the Theory of Intelligent Design."

Michael Lynch authored a response, to which Behe and Snoke responded. Protein Science discussed the papers in an editorial.

Numerous scientists have debunked the work, pointing out that not only has it been shown that a supposedly irreducibly complex structure can evolve, but that it can do so within a reasonable time even subject to unrealistically harsh restrictions, and noting that Behe and Snoke's paper does not properly include natural selection and genetic redundancy. When the issue raised by Behe and Snoke is tested in the modern framework of evolutionary biology, numerous simple pathways to complexity have been shown. In their response, Behe and Snoke assumed that intermediate mutations are always damaging, where modern science allows for neutral or positive mutations. Some of the critics have also noted that the Discovery Institute continues to claim the paper as 'published evidence for design,' despite its offering no design theory nor attempting to model the design process, and therefore not providing an alternative to random chance.

Many of Behe's statements have been challenged by biologist Kenneth R. Miller in his book, Finding Darwin's God (1999). Behe has subsequently disputed Miller's points in an online essay.

The Edge of Evolution
In 2007, Behe's book The Edge of Evolution was published arguing that while evolution can produce changes within species, there is a limit to the ability of evolution to generate diversity, and this limit (the "edge of evolution") is somewhere between species and orders.

In this book Behe's central assertion is that Darwinian evolution actually exists but plays only a limited role in the development and diversification of life on Earth. To this aim, he examines the genetic changes undergone by the malaria plasmodium genome and the human genome in response to each other's biological defenses, and identifies that "the situation resembles trench warfare, not an arms race", by considering the hemoglobin-destroying, protein pump-compromising as a "war by attrition". Starting from this example, he takes into account the number of mutations required to "travel" from one genetic state to another, as well as population size for the organism in question. Then, Behe calculates what he calls the "edge of evolution", i.e., the point at which Darwinian evolution would no longer be an efficacious agent of creative biological change, arguing that purposeful design plays a major role in the development of biological complexity, through the mechanism of producing "non-random mutations", which are then subjected to the sculpting hand of natural selection .

The book was reviewed, by prominent scientists in The New York Times, The New Republic, The Globe and Mail, Science, and Nature who were highly critical of the work noting that Behe appears to accept almost all of evolutionary theory, barring random mutation, which is replaced with guided mutation at the hand of an unnamed designer. The book earned Behe the Pigasus Award for the year 2007.

Darwin Devolves
Behe also promotes intelligent design in his 2019 book, Darwin Devolves whose central premise is that the combination of random mutation and natural selection, apart from being incapable of generating novelty, is mainly a degradative force. Like his previous books, Darwin Devolves received negative reviews from the scientific community, including a scathing review in Science by Nathan H. Lents, Richard Lenski, and S. Joshua Swamidass, a harsh critique by Jerry Coyne in The Washington Post, and a scholarly rebuttal in Evolution from Gregory Lang and Amber Rice, Behe's colleagues at Lehigh University. Lents said of Darwin Devolves and The Edge of Evolution: "his [ ] two books totally missed their marks and were easily dismissed by the scientific community."

Lang and Rice's assessment noted that while Behe rightfully acknowledges that organisms have common ancestry, it is posited that a designer is required for more distant relationships like at the family level, and that the presentation of degradative processes is exaggerated with evidence of beneficial adaptations dodged. The article also criticized the use of false analogies and neglecting evidence of new genetic raw material production for evolution ("Behe is correct that the loss of genetic information is an important mechanism. However, the opposing processes of gene duplication, horizontal gene transfer, and introgression balance out gene loss, providing a source of new genetic material"). They then concluded with examples of adaptation that contradict the book's conclusions and expound on the flaws of Irreducible Complexity, adding that "why evolution by natural selection is difficult for so many to accept is beyond the scope of this review; however, it is not for a lack of evidence."

Publications
Behe has written for the Boston Review, The American Spectator, and The New York Times.

Dover testimony
In Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, the first direct challenge brought in United States federal courts to an attempt to mandate the teaching of intelligent design on First Amendment grounds, Behe was called as a primary witness for the defense and asked to support the idea that intelligent design was legitimate science. Some of the most crucial exchanges in the trial occurred during Behe's cross-examination, where his testimony would prove devastating to the defense. Behe was forced to concede that "there are no peer reviewed articles by anyone advocating for intelligent design supported by pertinent experiments or calculations which provide detailed rigorous accounts of how intelligent design of any biological system occurred" and that his definition of 'theory' as applied to intelligent design was so loose that astrology would also qualify. Earlier during his direct testimony, Behe had argued that a computer simulation of evolution he performed with Snoke shows that evolution is not likely to produce certain complex biochemical systems. Under cross examination however, Behe was forced to agree that "the number of prokaryotes in 1 ton of soil are 7 orders of magnitude higher than the population [it would take] to produce the disulfide bond" and that "it's entirely possible that something that couldn't be produced in the lab in two years... could be produced over three and half billion years."

Many of Behe's critics have pointed to these exchanges as examples they believe further undermine Behe's statements about irreducible complexity and intelligent design. John E. Jones III, the judge in the case, would ultimately rule that intelligent design is not scientific in his 139-page decision, citing Behe's testimony extensively as the basis for his findings:
 * "Consider, to illustrate, that Professor Behe remarkably and unmistakably claims that the plausibility of the argument for ID depends upon the extent to which one believes in the existence of God."
 * "As no evidence in the record indicates that any other scientific proposition's validity rests on belief in God, nor is the Court aware of any such scientific propositions, Professor Behe's assertion constitutes substantial evidence that in his view, as is commensurate with other prominent ID leaders, ID is a religious and not a scientific proposition."
 * "First, defense expert Professor Fuller agreed that ID aspires to 'change the ground rules' of science and lead defense expert Professor Behe admitted that his broadened definition of science, which encompasses ID, would also embrace astrology. Moreover, defense expert Professor Minnich acknowledged that for ID to be considered science, the ground rules of science have to be broadened to allow consideration of supernatural forces."
 * "What is more, defense experts concede that ID is not a theory as that term is defined by the NAS and admit that ID is at best 'fringe science' which has achieved no acceptance in the scientific community."
 * "We therefore find that Professor Behe's claim for irreducible complexity has been refuted in peer-reviewed research papers and has been rejected by the scientific community at large."
 * "ID proponents primarily argue for design through negative arguments against evolution, as illustrated by Professor Behe's argument that 'irreducibly complex' systems cannot be produced through Darwinian, or any natural, mechanisms. However, … arguments against evolution are not arguments for design. Expert testimony revealed that just because scientists cannot explain today how biological systems evolved does not mean that they cannot, and will not, be able to explain them tomorrow. As Dr. Padian aptly noted, 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.'… Irreducible complexity is a negative argument against evolution, not proof of design, a point conceded by defense expert Professor Minnich."
 * "Professor Behe's concept of irreducible complexity depends on ignoring ways in which evolution is known to occur. Although Professor Behe is adamant in his definition of irreducible complexity when he says a precursor 'missing a part is by definition nonfunctional,' what he obviously means is that it will not function in the same way the system functions when all the parts are present. For example in the case of the bacterial flagellum, removal of a part may prevent it from acting as a rotary motor. However, Professor Behe excludes, by definition, the possibility that a precursor to the bacterial flagellum functioned not as a rotary motor, but in some other way, for example as a secretory system."
 * "Professor Behe has applied the concept of irreducible complexity to only a few select systems: (1) the bacterial flagellum; (2) the blood-clotting cascade; and (3) the immune system. Contrary to Professor Behe's assertions with respect to these few biochemical systems among the myriad existing in nature, however, Dr. Miller presented evidence, based upon peer-reviewed studies, that they are not in fact irreducibly complex."
 * "In fact, on cross-examination, Professor Behe was questioned concerning his 1996 claim that science would never find an evolutionary explanation for the immune system. He was presented with fifty-eight peer-reviewed publications, nine books, and several immunology textbook chapters about the evolution of the immune system; however, he simply insisted that this was still not sufficient evidence of evolution, and that it was not "good enough."
 * "With ID, proponents assert that they refuse to propose hypotheses on the designer's identity, do not propose a mechanism, and the designer, he/she/it/they, has never been seen. ... In addition, Professor Behe agreed that for the design of human artifacts, we know the designer and its attributes and we have a baseline for human design that does not exist for design of biological systems. Professor Behe's only response to these seemingly insurmountable points of disanalogy was that the inference still works in science fiction movies."

Jones would later say that Eric Rothschild's cross examination of Behe was "as good a cross-examination of an expert witness as I have ever seen. It was textbook."

ACSI v. Roman Stearns
Behe received $20,000 for testifying as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs in Association of Christian Schools International v. Roman Stearns. The case was filed by Association of Christian Schools International, which argued that the University of California was being discriminatory by not recognizing science classes that use creationist books. The 2005 filing claimed that University of California's rejection of several of their courses was illegal "viewpoint discrimination and content regulation prohibited by the Free Speech Clause." In 2007, Behe's expert witness report claimed that the Christian textbooks, including William S. Pinkston, Jr.'s Biology for Christian Schools (1980; 2nd ed. 1994), are excellent works for high school students. He defended that view in a deposition.

In August 2008, Judge S. James Otero rejected Behe's claims, saying that Behe "submitted a declaration concluding that the BJU [Bob Jones University Press] text mentions standard scientific content. ... However, Professor Behe 'did not consider how much detail or depth' the texts gave to this standard content." Otero ruled in favor of the University of California's decision to reject courses using these books.

Personal life
Behe is a Catholic. He is married to Celeste Behe and they have nine children who are homeschooled.

Books

 * "Papers from a conference, entitled Design and its Critics, held at Concordia University, Mequon, Wis., June 22–24, 2000."
 * "Papers from a conference, entitled Design and its Critics, held at Concordia University, Mequon, Wis., June 22–24, 2000."
 * "Papers from a conference, entitled Design and its Critics, held at Concordia University, Mequon, Wis., June 22–24, 2000."
 * "Papers from a conference, entitled Design and its Critics, held at Concordia University, Mequon, Wis., June 22–24, 2000."
 * "Papers from a conference, entitled Design and its Critics, held at Concordia University, Mequon, Wis., June 22–24, 2000."

Journal articles

 * DNA structure
 * Protein structure
 * Evolution
 * Protein structure
 * Evolution
 * Protein structure
 * Evolution
 * Protein structure
 * Evolution
 * Evolution
 * Evolution
 * Evolution
 * Evolution

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title: Michael Behe


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Sai Baba

Sai Baba or Saibaba (साईं sāĩ, "Swami", and बाबा bābā, "Baba") is an honorific term for ascetics in India. It may refer to:

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 * Sai Baba of Shirdi (c. 1838–1918), Indian guru
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