text:
Dennis v. United States

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA. The Court ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government. In 1969, Dennis was de facto overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio.

Background of the case
In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the act violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and that they served no clear and present danger to the nation. The eleven petitioners were:
 * Benjamin J. Davis – Chairman of the CPUSA's Legislative Committee
 * Eugene Dennis – General Secretary
 * John Gates – Leader of the Young Communist League
 * Gil Green – Member of the National Board
 * Gus Hall – Member of the National Board
 * Irving Potash – Furriers Union official
 * Jack Stachel
 * Robert G. Thompson – Lead of the New York organization
 * John Williamson – Member of the Central Committee
 * Henry Winston – Member of the National Board
 * Carl Winter – Lead of the Michigan organization

The 1949 trial was presided over by S.D.N.Y. Judge Harold Medina, a former Columbia University professor who had been a judge for only 18 months when the trial began. The trial was held in the Foley Square federal courthouse in New York City, and opened on November 1, 1948; preliminary proceedings and jury selection lasted until January 17, 1949; the defendants first appeared in court on March 7; and the trial concluded on October 14, 1949. Although later trials surpassed it, in 1949 it was the longest federal trial in US history.

Prosecutor John McGohey did not assert that the defendants had a specific plan to violently overthrow the US government, but rather alleged that the CPUSA's philosophy generally advocated the violent overthrow of governments. To prove this, the prosecution proffered articles, pamphlets and books (such as The Communist Manifesto) written by authors such as Karl Marx. The prosecution argued that the texts advocated violent revolution, and that by adopting the texts as their political foundation, the defendants were also personally guilty of advocating violent overthrow of the government.

The five attorneys who volunteered to defend the communists were familiar with leftist causes and personally supported the defendants' rights to espouse communist views. They were Abraham Isserman, George W. Crockett, Jr., Richard Gladstein, Harry Sacher, and Louis F. McCabe. Defendant Eugene Dennis represented himself. The ACLU was dominated by anti-communist leaders during the 1940s, and did not enthusiastically support persons indicted under the Smith Act. However, the ACLU did provide an amicus brief for the Foley Square defendants, endorsing a motion for dismissal.

The defense employed a three-pronged strategy: First, portraying the CPUSA as a conventional political party, which promoted socialism by peaceful means; second, employing the "labor defense" tactic to attack the trial as a capitalist venture which could never provide a fair outcome to proletarian defendants; and third, using the trial as an opportunity to publicize CPUSA policies.

The defense deliberately antagonized the judge by making a large number of objections and motions, which led to numerous bitter engagements between the attorneys and Judge Medina. Out of the chaos, an atmosphere of "mutual hostility" arose between the judge and attorneys. Medina came to believe that the defense attorneys were using the trial as an opportunity to publicize communist propaganda, and that they deliberately disrupted the trial using any means they could. Judge Medina attempted to maintain order by removing defendants who were out of order. In the course of the trial, Medina sent five of the defendants to jail for outbursts. Several times in July and August, the judge held defense attorneys in contempt of court, and told them their punishment would be meted out upon conclusion of the trial.

On October 14, 1949, after the defense rested their case, the judge gave the jury instructions to guide them in reaching a verdict. After deliberating for seven and a half hours, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all eleven defendants. The judge sentenced ten defendants to five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine each.

Appeal
Petitioners were found guilty by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari, but limited it to whether section two or three of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment and whether the same two sections violated the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness.

George W. Crockett, Jr., Abraham J. Isserman and Harry Sacher argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief was Richard Gladstein.

Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman and Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With them on the brief were U.S. Attorney General James Howard McGrath, U.S. Assistant Attorney General McInerney, Irving H. Saypol, Robert W. Ginnane, Frank H. Gordon, Edward C. Wallace, and Lawrence K. Bailey.

The court's decision
Handed down as a 6-2 decision by the Court on June 4, 1951, the judgment and a plurality opinion was delivered by Chief Justice of the United States Fred M. Vinson, who was joined by Justices Stanley Forman Reed, Sherman Minton, and Harold H. Burton. Separate concurring opinions were delivered by Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson. Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Tom C. Clark did not participate in this case.

The Court rule affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, a leader of the Communist Party in the United States. Dennis had been convicted of conspiring and organizing for the overthrow and destruction of the United States government by force and violence under provisions of the Smith Act. In affirming the conviction, a plurality of the Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation of the clear and probable danger test, an adaptation of the clear and present danger test:

"In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger."

In his dissent, Black wrote:

These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date: The indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold 3 of the Smith Act authorizing this prior restraint unconstitutional on its face and as applied.... So long as this Court exercises the power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere "reasonableness." Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those "safe" or orthodox views which rarely need its protection.... There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society.

Aftermath
In 1957, the Court in Yates v. United States restricted the holding in Dennis, ruling that the Smith Act did not prohibit advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine. While Yates did not overrule Dennis, it rendered the broad conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act unenforceable. Finally, in 1969, Brandenburg v. Ohio held that "mere advocacy" of violence was per se protected speech. Brandenburg was a de facto overruling of Dennis, defining the bar for constitutionally unprotected speech to be incitement to "imminent lawless action".

title: Dennis v. United States


text:
Attorneys in the United States

An attorney at law (or counsellor-at-law) in the United States is a practitioner in a court of law who is legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in court on the retainer of clients. As of January 1, 2023, there were 1,331,290 active lawyers in the United States. In terms of absolute numbers, the American legal profession was the largest in the world as of 2015, and it is thought to be the largest in the world in proportion to domestic population. A 2012 survey conducted by LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell determined 58 million consumers in the U.S. sought an attorney in the last year and that 76 percent of consumers used the Internet to search for an attorney.

The United States legal system does not draw a distinction between lawyers who plead in court and those who do not, unlike some other common law jurisdictions. For example, jurisdictions in the United Kingdom distinguish between solicitors, who do not plead in court, and barristers, who do. Likewise, civil law jurisdictions distinguish between advocates and civil law notaries. An additional factor that differentiates the American legal system from other countries is that there is no delegation of routine work to notaries public.

Attorneys may be addressed by the post-nominal letters Esq., the abbreviated form of the word Esquire.

Specialization
Many American attorneys limit their practices to specialized fields of law. Often distinctions are drawn between different types of attorneys, but, with the exception of patent law practice, these are neither fixed nor formal lines. Attorneys can be both outside of in-house counsel; doing plaintiff or defendant representation; having transactional or litigation practice; and having trial or appellate litigation specialties.

Despite these descriptions, some states forbid or discourage claims of specialization in particular areas of law unless the attorney has been certified by their state bar or state board of legal specialization.

Some states grant formal certifications recognizing specialties. In California, for example, bar certification is offered in family law, appellate practice, criminal law, bankruptcy, estate planning, immigration, taxation and workers' compensation. Any attorney meeting the bar requirements in one of these fields may represent themselves as a specialist. The State Bar of Texas, for example, formally grants certification of specialization in 21 select areas of law.

The majority of lawyers practicing in a particular field may typically not be certified as specialists in that field (and state board certification is not generally required to practice law in any field). For example, the State Bar of Texas (as of mid-2006) reported 77,056 persons licensed as attorneys in that state (excluding inactive members of the Bar), while the Texas Board of Legal Specialization reported, at about the same time, only 8,303 Texas attorneys who were board certified in any specialty. Indeed, of the 8,303 certified specialists in Texas, the highest number of attorneys certified in one specific field at that time was 1,775 (in personal injury trial law).

Specialization in patent law is administered by the Office of Enrollment and Discipline of the US Patent and Trademark Office, which imposes stringent requirements for applicants to become registered as patent attorneys or patent agents.

Training and accreditation
In the United States, the practice of law is conditioned upon admission to practice of law, and specifically admission to the bar of a particular state or other territorial jurisdiction. Regulation of the practice of law is left to the individual states, and their definitions vary. Arguing cases in the federal courts requires separate admission.

Bar examinations
Each US state and similar jurisdiction (e.g. territories under federal control) sets its own rules for bar admission, which can lead to different admission standards among states. In most cases, a person who is admitted to the bar is thereby a member of the particular bar.

In the canonical case, lawyers seeking admission must earn a Juris Doctor degree from a law school approved by the jurisdiction, and then pass a bar exam administered by it. Typically, there is also a character and fitness evaluation, which includes a background check. However, there are exceptions to each of these requirements.

A lawyer who is admitted in one state is not automatically allowed to practice in any other. Some states have reciprocal agreements that allow attorneys from other states to practice without sitting for another full bar exam; such agreements differ significantly among the states.

In 1763, Delaware created the first bar exam with other American colonies soon following suit.

The bar examination in most U.S. states and territories is at least two days long (a few states have three-day exams). It consists of essay questions, usually testing knowledge of the state's own law. Some jurisdictions choose to use the Multistate Essay Examination (MEE), drafted by the NCBE since 1988, for this purpose. Others may draft their own questions with this goal in mind, while some states both draft their own questions and use the MEE. Some jurisdictions administer questions that specifically test knowledge of that state's law.

Bar exams also usually consist of the Multistate Bar Examination, which is a multiple-choice standardized test created and sold to participating state bar examiners by the National Conference of Bar Examiners since 1972. The MBE contains 200 questions which test six subjects based upon principles of common law and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The State of Washington has a separate Law Clerk program under Rule Six of the Washington Court Admission to Practice Rules. A college graduate of good moral character may be accepted into the four-year Rule Six Law Clerk Program, obtain employment in a law firm or with a judge for at least 30 hours a week and study a prescribed Course of Study under a tutor. After successful completion of the program, a law clerk may take the Washington State Bar Exam and, upon passing, will be admitted as an attorney into the Washington State Bar Association.

Degrees in law
The degree earned by prospective attorneys in the United States is generally a Juris Doctor (Latin for "Doctor of Jurisprudence"; abbreviated J.D.).

The highest law degrees obtainable in the United States are Doctor of Juridical Science (Scientiae Juridicae Doctor, abbreviated S.J.D. or J.S.D.). The S.J.D. is akin to an academic degree that, like the Ph.D., is research-based and requires a dissertation (an original contribution to the academic study of law).

The LL.M. is generally earned by completing studies in a particular area of law. LL.M. is an abbreviation of the Latin, Legum Magister, which means Master of Laws. After earning a J.D., an attorney may seek admission to an LL.M. program. There is no requirement for attorneys to complete an LL.M. program to practice law in the United States, and relatively few attorneys hold an LL.M. In the U.S., for example, some states allow foreign lawyers to seek admission to the bar upon completion of an LL.M., while in other states, a J.D. is required.

Law students in court
Some courts allow law students to act as "certified student attorneys" after the satisfactory completion of their first year of law school and the completion of particular second- and third-year courses with subjects such as evidence.

Many states allow students to argue in front of a court as a certified legal intern (CLI), provided they meet certain prerequisites, such as having completed at least half of their law education, having taken or be taking the law school's ethics class and being under the supervision of a qualified and licensed attorney.

Unlicensed practice of law
Some states provide criminal penalties for falsely holding oneself out to the public as an attorney at law and the unauthorized practice of law by a non-attorney.

An Attorney at law or lawyer must be an individual admitted to a state bar and licensed by a state, not just a person with a professional law degree.

A few areas of law, such as patent law, bankruptcy, or immigration law, are mandated by the U.S. Constitution to be strictly under federal jurisdiction. In this case, state courts and bar associations are not allowed to restrict the practice of that field of law.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Attorneys in the United States


text:
Mathematical folklore

In common mathematical parlance, a mathematical result is called folklore if it is an unpublished result with no clear originator, but which is well-circulated and believed to be true among the specialists. More specifically, folk mathematics, or mathematical folklore, is the body of theorems, definitions, proofs, facts or techniques that circulate among mathematicians by word of mouth, but have not yet appeared in print, either in books or in scholarly journals.

Quite important at times for researchers are folk theorems, which are results known, at least to experts in a field, and are considered to have established status, though not published in complete form. Sometimes, these are only alluded to in the public literature. An example is a book of exercises, described on the back cover: "This book contains almost 350 exercises in the basics of ring theory. The problems form the "folklore" of ring theory, and the solutions are given in as much detail as possible."

Another distinct category is well-knowable mathematics, a term introduced by John Conway. These mathematical matters are known and factual, but not in active circulation in relation with current research (i.e., untrendy). Both of these concepts are attempts to describe the actual context in which research work is done.

Some people, in particular non-mathematicians, use the term folk mathematics to refer to the informal mathematics studied in many ethno-cultural studies of mathematics. Although the term "mathematical folklore" can also be used within the mathematics circle to describe the various aspects of their esoteric culture and practices (e.g., slang, proverb, limerick, joke).

Stories, sayings and jokes
Mathematical folklore can also refer to the unusual (and possibly apocryphal) stories or jokes involving mathematicians or mathematics that are told verbally in mathematics departments. Compilations include tales collected in G. H. Hardy's A Mathematician's Apology and ; examples include:
 * Srinivasa Ramanujan's taxicab numbers
 * Galileo dropping weights from the Leaning Tower of Pisa.
 * An apple falling on Isaac Newton's head to inspire his theory of gravitation.
 * The drinking, duel and early death of Galois.
 * Richard Feynman cracking safes in the Manhattan Project.
 * Alfréd Rényi's definition of a mathematician: "a device for turning coffee into theorems".
 * Pál Turán's suggestion that weak coffee was only suitable for lemma.
 * The "turtles all the way down" story told by Stephen Hawking.
 * Fermat's lost simple proof.
 * The unwieldy proof and associated controversies of the Four Color Theorem.

title: Mathematical folklore


text:
Robert H. Jackson

Robert Houghwout Jackson (February 13, 1892 – October 9, 1954) was an American lawyer, jurist, and politician who served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1941 until his death in 1954. He had previously served as United States Solicitor General and United States Attorney General, and is the only person to have held all three of those offices. Jackson was also notable for his work as Chief United States Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals following World War II.

Jackson was the last U.S. Supreme Court justice who did not have a law degree. He was admitted to the bar via the older tradition of an internship under an established lawyer ("reading law") after studying at Albany Law School for just a year. Jackson is well known for his advice that, "Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect, in no uncertain terms, to make no statement to the police under any circumstances", and for his aphorism describing the Supreme Court, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."

Jackson developed a reputation as one of the best writers on the Supreme Court and one of the most committed to enforcing due process as protection from overreaching federal agencies. He was viewed as a moderate liberal, and is known for his dissents in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, Zorach v. Clauson, Everson v. Board of Education, and Korematsu v. United States, as well as his majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Justice Antonin Scalia, who occupied the seat once held by Jackson, considered Jackson to be "the best legal stylist of the 20th century".

Early life
Jackson was born on his family's farm in Spring Creek Township, Warren County, Pennsylvania, on February 13, 1892, and was raised in Frewsburg, New York. The son of William Eldred Jackson and Angelina Houghwout, he graduated from Frewsburg High School in 1909 and spent the next year as a post-graduate student attending Jamestown High School, where he worked to improve his writing skills.

Jackson decided on a legal career; since attendance at college or law school was not a requirement if a student learned under the tutelage of an established attorney, at age 18 he began to read law with the Jamestown, New York, firm in which his uncle, Frank Mott, was a partner. His uncle soon introduced him to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was then serving as a member of the New York State Senate. Jackson attended Albany Law School of Union University from 1911 to 1912. At the time, students at Albany Law School had three options: taking individual courses without receiving a degree, completing a two-year program and receiving an LL.B. degree, or demonstrating the knowledge required of a first-year student and then taking the second year of the two-year program, which produced a certificate of completion. Jackson chose the third option; he successfully completed the second-year courses, and received his certificate in 1912.

After his year at Albany Law School, Jackson returned to Jamestown to complete his studies. He attained admission to the bar in 1913 at age twenty-one, then joined a law practice in Jamestown. In 1916, he married Irene Alice Gerhardt, in Albany. In 1917, Jackson was recruited to work for Penney, Killeen & Nye, a leading Buffalo firm, primarily defending the International Railway Company in trials and appeals. In late 1918, Jackson was recruited back to Jamestown to serve as the city's corporation counsel.

Over the next 15 years, he built a successful practice, and became a leading lawyer in New York State; he also enhanced his reputation nationally, through leadership roles with bar associations and other legal organizations. In 1930, Jackson was elected to membership in the American Law Institute; in 1933, he was elected Chairman of the American Bar Association's Conference of Bar Association Delegates (a predecessor to today's ABA House of Delegates).

Jackson became active in politics as a Democrat; in 1916, he spearheaded Jamestown's local Wilson for President organization. In the years during and after World War I, he was a member of the New York State Democratic Committee. He also continued his association with Roosevelt; when Roosevelt served as Governor of New York from 1929 to 1933, he appointed Jackson to a commission which reviewed the state judicial system and proposed reforms. He served on that commission from 1931 to 1939. Jackson also turned down Roosevelt's offer to appoint him to the New York Public Service Commission, because he preferred to remain in private practice.

Federal appointments, 1934–1938
In 1932, Jackson was active in Franklin Roosevelt's presidential campaign as chairman of an organization called Democratic Lawyers for Roosevelt. (Another Robert H. Jackson was also active in the Roosevelt campaign. That Jackson (1880–1973) was Secretary of the Democratic National Committee, and was a resident of New Hampshire.)

In 1934, Jackson agreed to join the Roosevelt administration; he served initially as Assistant General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Internal Revenue (today's Internal Revenue Service), where he was in charge of 300 lawyers who tried cases before the Board of Tax Appeals. In 1936, Jackson became Assistant Attorney General, heading the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and in 1937, he became Assistant Attorney General, heading the Antitrust Division.

Jackson was a supporter of the New Deal, litigating against corporations and utilities holding companies. He participated in the 1934 prosecution of Samuel Insull, the 1935 income tax case against Andrew Mellon,  and the 1937 anti-trust case against Alcoa, in which the Mellon family held an important interest.

U.S. Solicitor General, 1938–1940
In March 1938, Jackson became United States Solicitor General, succeeding Stanley Forman Reed, who had been appointed to the Supreme Court. Jackson served as Solicitor General until January 1940, working as the government's chief advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. During his time in this post, he argued 44 cases to the Supreme Court on behalf of the federal government, and lost only six. His record of accomplishment caused Justice Louis Brandeis to once remark that Jackson should be Solicitor General for life.

Roosevelt regarded Jackson as a possible successor to the presidency in 1940, and worked with his staff on an effort to raise Jackson's public profile. Their plan was to mention Jackson favorably in presidential remarks as often as possible, and to have Jackson take part frequently in Roosevelt's public appearances. Roosevelt and his advisers next intended for Jackson to become the Democratic nominee for Governor of New York in 1938. They abandoned their effort to create a groundswell of support for Jackson's gubernatorial candidacy when they ran into resistance from state Democratic Party leaders. In addition, Roosevelt's decision to run for a third term in 1940 rendered moot the need to identify and promote a successor. Instead of running for Governor or President, Jackson joined Roosevelt's cabinet when he was appointed as Attorney General.

U.S. Attorney General, 1940–1941
Jackson was appointed as United States Attorney General by Roosevelt, on January 4, 1940, replacing Frank Murphy, whom Roosevelt had appointed to the Supreme Court. As Attorney General, Jackson supported a bill introduced by Sam Hobbs that would have legalized wiretapping by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any other government agency, if it was suspected that a felony was occurring. The bill was opposed by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chairman James Lawrence Fly, and it did not pass. While in office, he also helped President Roosevelt organize the Lend-Lease agreement, which allowed the United States to supply materials to help with the war effort to the Allied forces, before formally entering World War II.

U.S. Supreme Court, 1941–1954
On June 12, 1941, Roosevelt nominated Jackson as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to fill the vacancy created when Harlan Fiske Stone replaced Charles Evans Hughes as chief justice. Jackson was confirmed by the United States Senate on July 7, 1941, and took the judicial oath of office on July 11, 1941. On the Court, he was known for his eloquent writing style and championing of individual liberties.

In 1943, Jackson wrote the majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which overturned a public school regulation making it mandatory to salute the flag, and imposing penalties of expulsion and prosecution upon students who failed to comply. Jackson's stirring language in Barnette concerning individual rights is widely quoted. Jackson's concurring opinion in 1952's Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (forbidding President Harry Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War to avert a strike), in which Jackson formulated a three-tier test for evaluating claims of Presidential power, remains one of the most widely cited opinions in Supreme Court history.

Feud with Hugo Black
Justices Jackson and Hugo Black had profound professional and personal disagreements dating back to October 1941, the first term during which they served together on the Supreme Court. According to Dennis Hutchinson, editor of The Supreme Court Review, Jackson objected to Black's practice of importing his personal preferences into his jurisprudence. Hutchinson quotes Jackson as having remarked, "With few exceptions, we all knew which side of a case Black would vote on when he read the names of the parties." While Hutchinson points out that Jackson objected to Black's style of jurisprudence in such cases as Minersville v. Gobitis (1940) and United States v. Bethlehem Steel (1942), Black's involvement in the Jewell Ridge case struck Jackson as especially injudicious.

In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers (1945), the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether to grant the coal company's petition for a rehearing, on the grounds that the victorious miners were, in a previous matter, represented by Crampton P. Harris, who was Justice Black's former law partner and personal lawyer. Despite this apparent conflict of interest, Black lobbied the Court for a per curiam denial of the petition. Justice Jackson objected, with the result that Jackson filed a concurrence disassociating himself from the ruling and, by implication, criticizing Black for not addressing the conflict of interest. Jackson also strongly objected to Black's judicial conduct in Jewell Ridge for another reason. As Jackson later alleged, while Justice Murphy was preparing his opinion, Black urged that the Court hand down its decision without waiting for the opinion and dissent. In Jackson's eyes, the "...only apparent reason behind this proposal was to announce the decision in time to influence the contract negotiations during the coal strike" between the coal company and the miners, which were taking place at the time.

Jackson probably regarded Black's conduct as unbecoming of a Supreme Court Justice in another related matter. On April 3, 1945, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare held a dinner, at which it honored Justice Black as the 1945 recipient of the Thomas Jefferson Award. Fred M. Vinson spoke at the dinner. While Jackson declined an invitation to the event, citing a conflict arising out of the fact that a number of leading sponsors of the dinner were then litigants before the Supreme Court, Black attended the dinner and received his award. Crampton Harris, counsel in two pending cases, Jewell Ridge and CIO v. McAdory (1945), was one of the sponsors.

Jackson later took these grievances public in two cables from Nuremberg. Jackson had informally been promised the Chief Justiceship by Roosevelt; however, the seat came open while Jackson was in Germany, and Roosevelt was dead. President Harry S. Truman was faced with two factions, one recommending Jackson for the seat, and the other advocating for Hugo Black. In an attempt to avoid controversy, Truman appointed Vinson. Jackson blamed machinations by Black for his being passed over for the seat, and publicly exposed some of Black's controversial behavior and feuding within the Court. The controversy was heavily covered in the press, casting the New Deal Court in a negative light, and had the effect of tarnishing Jackson's reputation in the years that followed.

On June 8, 1946, Jackson sent a cable to President Truman. Jackson's cable to Truman began with an insincere offer of congratulations to the President for his appointment of Vinson. However, the cable then quickly addressed the rumor, which Jackson had gotten wind of in Nuremberg, according to which Truman had appointed Fred Vinson, in part, to avert a resignation on the part of Justice Black. Rumors had been circulating in Washington that Black would resign in the event that Truman chose Jackson as Chief Justice Stone's successor. "I would be loath to believe that you would concede to any man a veto over court appointments." Jackson closed his cable by stating that he could not continue his service as an Associate Justice under Vinson if an associate "had something on [him]", which would disqualify him from serving, or if he, Truman, regarded Jackson's opinion in the Jewell Ridge case as a "gratuitous insult" to Justice Black.

After receiving a response from Truman in which he denied having given consideration to, or having even heard of, the rumor of Black's threatened resignation, Jackson rashly fired off a second cable to Congress, on June 10. This cable stated Jackson's reasons for his belief that Justice Black faced a conflict of interest in Jewell Ridge, from which he wrongfully, at least, in Jackson's eyes, did not recuse himself, and ended with Jackson's threat that if such a practice "is ever repeated while I am on the bench, I will make my Jewell Ridge opinion look like a letter of recommendation by comparison."

"Clear and present danger" test
In 1919, the Supreme Court decided Schenck v. United States. In Schenck, the petitioners, members of the Socialist Party, were convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 for printing and distributing circulars asserting that American citizens had a right to oppose the draft during World War I because, among other things, it violated the United States Constitution. The Schenck decision promulgated the "clear and present danger test," which provided the standard for sustaining a conviction when speech is relied upon as evidence that an offense has been committed. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the decision of the lower court positing:

"We admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done ... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances, and are of such a nature as to create a 'clear and present danger' that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

Background
In 1951, the Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States. In Dennis, the petitioners were zealous Communists who organized for the purpose of teaching the "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine." The principal texts used to teach the doctrine were: History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Foundations of Leninism by Stalin; The Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels; and State and Revolution by Lenin. The Petitioners were convicted for violating clause 2 and clause 3 of the Smith Act which, among other things, made it unlawful to conspire to organize a group which advocates the overthrow of the United States government by force or violence. The issue before the Supreme Court was "[w]hether either §2 or §3 of the Smith Act, inherently, or as construed and applied in the instant case, violates the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights ..."

Jackson's concurrence
In Dennis, Jackson concluded that the "clear and present danger test" should not be applied. To this end, Jackson analyzed: the effect Communism had outside the United States; the nature of Communists; and the problems with applying the test. Jackson's analysis can be summarized as follows:

On the effect that Communists historically had on foreign countries, Jackson analyzed their effect on Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia, a Communist organization disguised as a competing political faction secretly established its roots in key control positions "of police and information services." During a period of national crisis, a clandestine Communist organization appeared and overthrew the Czechoslovakian government. Establishing control of mass communication and industry, the Communist organization's rule was one of "oppression and terror." Ironically, as Jackson points out, the Communist organization suppressed the very freedoms which made its conspiracy possible.

On the nature of Communists, Jackson characterized them as an extraordinarily dedicated and highly selective group, disciplined and indoctrinated by Communist policy. The goal of Party members is to secretly infiltrate key positions of government, industry, and unions and to leverage their power once in such positions. Jackson goes on to say that, although "Communist[s] have no scruples against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob disorder," they "advocate force only when prudent," which "may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception may be enough."

On the problems with applying the clear and present danger test in Dennis, Jackson deemed significant that the test was authored "before the era of World War II revealed the subtlety and efficacy of modernized revolutionary technique used by totalitarian parties." Jackson believed that the application of the test should be limited to cases bearing strong enough likeness to those for which it was originally crafted – i.e., "...criminality of hot-headed speech on a street corner, or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of Jehovah Witness school children to salute our flag." Expressing strong concern that the expansive construction the Court had recently given the test in Bridges v. California, Jackson asserted that the test provided Communists with "unprecedented immunities," while the "Government is captive in a judge-made verbal trap." Jackson goes on to describe the application of the test to Communists, when determining the constitutionality of the Smith Act facially, or as applied as one of "...apprais[ing] imponderables, including international and national phenomena, which baffle the best informed foreign offices and our most experienced politicians."

Jackson concludes his First Amendment analysis in Dennis by asserting that:

"The authors of the 'clear and present danger test' never applied it to a case like this, nor would I. If applied as it is proposed here, it means that the Communist plotting is protected during its period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organization and preparation are immune from the law; the Government can move only after imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late."

Conclusion
In the end, the Court applied its own version of the "clear and present danger test" in Dennis, essentially disregarding the analytical elements of probability and temporality which had previously appeared to be requirements of the doctrine. Jackson, however, as one commentator put it, expressed in Dennis (at least with regards to Communists) that, "when used as part of a conspiracy to act illegally, speech loses its First Amendment protection."

Background
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, there was great suspicion surrounding Japanese-Americans, particularly those residing on the West Coast of the United States. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, giving the War Department permission to declare some zones "military zones" in which they could prohibit certain people from accessing prescribed areas. With this executive order, the War Department was able to declare that all United States citizens of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from areas in California that were deemed unsafe for Japanese-American habitation for national security purposes, and it forced them into internment camps.

Fred Korematsu, born to Japanese parents on American soil, believed that this was an unconstitutional infringement on an individual's civil liberty. The question that came before the Supreme Court was whether the Executive and Legislative branches went beyond their war powers by depriving citizens of rights with no criminal basis.

Jackson's dissent
The Supreme Court decided that the President and Congress did not stretch their war powers too far by choosing national security over an individual's rights in a time of war. Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion for this case, and Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion. The opening paragraph of Jackson's dissent illustrated his view of the case:

"Korematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes him a citizen of the United States by nativity, and a citizen of California by residence. No claim is made that he is not loyal to this country. There is no suggestion that apart from the matter involved here, he is not law-abiding and well- disposed. Korematsu, however, has been convicted of an act not commonly a crime. It consists merely of being present in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived."

Jackson warned of the danger that this great allowance of executive power presented, through the War Department's ability to deprive individuals of their rights in favor of national security in time of war:

"But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. That is what the Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not. I cannot say, from any evidence 	before me, that the orders of General DeWitt were not reasonably expedient military precautions, nor could I say that they were. But even if they were permissible military 	procedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional. If, as the Court holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order will be constitutional, and have done with it."

Jackson was not concerned in evaluating the validity of DeWitt's claim that the internment of Japanese citizens on the West Coast was necessary for national security purposes, but whether this would set a precedent of war-time racial discrimination that would be used to strip individual liberties.

"But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principles of racial discrimination in criminal procedure, and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking, and expands it to new purposes."

Brown v. Board of Education
One of Jackson's law clerks during 1952 – 53, William H. Rehnquist, was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971, and became chief justice in 1986. In December 1971, after Rehnquist's nomination had been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and was pending before the full Senate, a 1952 memorandum came to light that he had written as Jackson's law clerk in connection with the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education that argued in favor of affirming the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. Rehnquist wrote a brief letter attributing the views to Jackson, and was confirmed. In his 1986 hearing, he was questioned about the matter. His explanation of the memorandum was disputed in both 1971 and 1986 by Jackson's former secretary, and scholars have questioned its plausibility. However, the papers of Justices Douglas and Frankfurter indicate that Jackson voted for Brown in 1954 only after changing his mind.

The views of Justice Jackson about Brown can be found in his 1954 unpublished draft concurrence. The "Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson, March 15th, 1954", is available with Jackson's papers in the Library of Congress, but did not become publicly available until after Rehnquist's 1986 hearing for chief justice. Jackson's draft concurrence in Brown, divided into four parts, shows how he struggled with how to write an effective opinion to strike down segregation. In Part 1 of Jackson's draft concurrence in Brown, he wrote that he went to school where "Negro pupils were very few" and that he was "predisposed to the conclusion that segregation elsewhere has outlived whatever justification it may have had." Despite his own opinions regarding desegregation, Jackson acknowledged the inability of the Court to "eradicate" the "fears, prides and prejudices" that made segregation an important social practice in the South. Jackson thus concluded that the Northerners on the Court should be sensitive to the conditions that brought segregation to the South.

In Part 2 of the draft memorandum, Jackson described the legal framework for forbidding segregation in "Does Existing Law Condemn Segregation?". Jackson notes that it was difficult for the Court, which expected "not to make new law, but only to declare existing law," to overturn a decision of such longevity as Plessy. Looking at the doctrine of original intent with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, Jackson found no evidence that segregation was prohibited, particularly since states that had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had segregated schools at the time. Jackson concluded, "I simply cannot find in the conventional material of constitutional interpretation any justification for saying" that segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Part 3 of the draft memorandum, titled "Enforcement Power Limits", describes enforcement by Congress of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson addressed the possibility of leaving enforcement to Congress, particularly because the "courts have no power to enforce general declarations of law." Jackson noted that while segregation was already fading in some states, it would be difficult to overcome in those states where segregation was firmly established. While Jackson recognized the difficulties in the Supreme Court enforcing its judgment, he did not want the task to be left to the lower courts, as suggested by the Government. Jackson concluded that the Court must act because "our representative system has failed", and even though this "premise is not a sound basis for judicial action."

Finally, in Part 4 of the draft memorandum, "Changed Conditions", Jackson began by stating that prior to Brown, segregation was legal. According to Jackson, the premise for overruling Plessy was the now erroneous "factual assumption" that "there were differences between the Negro and the white races, viewed as a whole." The draft asserted that the "spectacular" progress of African-Americans, under adverse circumstances, "enabled [them] to outgrow the system and to overcome the presumptions on which it was based." Jackson emphasized that the changed conditions, along with the importance of a public education, required the Court to strike down the concept of "separate but equal" in public education. While Jackson could not justify the decision in Brown in law, he did so on the basis of a political and social imperative. It is unknown if Jackson ever intended to publish this concurrence.

Jackson was in the hospital from March 30 to May 17, 1954. It is reported that Chief Justice Warren visited Jackson in the hospital several times, and discussed both Jackson's draft opinion and Warren's drafts. One suggestion that Warren took from Jackson was adding the following sentence: "Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world." This quote is tied to the arguments in Part 4 of Jackson's draft opinion. On May 17, 1954, Jackson went to the Court from the hospital, so that he could be there the day that the Brown decision was handed down. When the Brown decision was handed down, a full court was present, to emphasize the unanimity of the decision. Robert H. Jackson died on October 9, 1954, and so there was not enough time between Brown and the death of Jackson to fully explore his views on desegregation.

Procedural due process
Jackson was a staunch defender (along with Felix Frankfurter) of procedural due process, for the rule of law that protects members of the public from overreaching by government agencies. One of his hymns to due process is often quoted:

"Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which compromise substantive law.

If it be conceded that in some way [the agency could take the action it did], does it matter what the procedure is? Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedure matters not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures, than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration."

International Military Tribunal, 1945–1946
In 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Jackson (who took a leave of absence from the Supreme Court), as U.S. Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. He helped draft the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which created the legal basis for the Nuremberg Trials. He then served in Nuremberg, Germany, as United States Chief Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal. Jackson pursued his prosecutorial role with a great deal of vigor. His opening and closing arguments before the Nuremberg court were widely celebrated. In the words of defendant Albert Speer, the Nazi Minister of Armaments and War Production, "The trial began with the grand, devastating opening address by the Chief American Prosecutor, Justice Robert H. Jackson. But I took comfort from one sentence in it which accused the defendants of guilt for the regime's crimes, but not the German people." However, some believe that his cross-examination skills were generally weak, and it was British prosecutor David Maxwell Fyfe who got the better of Hermann Göring in cross-examination, rather than Jackson, who was rebuked by the Tribunal for losing his temper and being repeatedly baited by Göring during the proceedings.

Death and legacy
On March 30, 1954, Jackson suffered a massive heart attack. He was confined to the hospital until May 17 when he returned to the Court for the announcement of the Brown decision. He remained functioning in his position as Justice until October 4, 1954. On Saturday, October 9, 1954, Jackson had another heart attack. At 11:45 a.m. he died at age 62. Funeral services were held in Washington's National Cathedral and later in Jamestown's St. Luke's Church. All eight of the other Supreme Court Justices traveled together to Jamestown, New York, to attend his funeral service; the last time, for security purposes, that the Supreme Court all traveled together. Other prominent guests included Thomas E. Dewey. He was interred near his boyhood home in Frewsburg, New York. His headstone reads "He kept the ancient landmarks and built the new."

Jackson was the last justice to die while in active service to the Court until his former law clerk, now Chief Justice Rehnquist's passing on September 3, 2005, and the last Associate Justice to die while in active service until Antonin Scalia, who occupied the seat Jackson once held, on February 13, 2016.

The Robert H. Jackson Center in Jackson's hometown of Jamestown, New York, offers guided tours to visitors who can see exhibits on Jackson's life, collections of his writings, and photos from the International Military Tribunal. An extensive collection of Jackson's personal and judicial papers is archived at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and is open for research. Smaller collections are available at several other repositories.

There are statues dedicated to Jackson outside the Robert H. Jackson Center in Jamestown, New York, as well as the Robert H. Jackson field at the Chautauqua County-Jamestown Airport. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York main courthouse, which is located in Buffalo and opened in November 2011, is dedicated to Jackson and is named the Robert H. Jackson United States Courthouse.

Honors and awards

 * Awarded the Medal for Merit by President Harry Truman on February 7, 1947.

Portrayal in popular culture
Jackson has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television, and theater productions:
 * Andrzej Łapicki, in the 1970 Polish TV production, Epilog norymberski by Jerzy Antczak
 * Henderson Forsythe, in the 1991 telefilm, Separate but Equal
 * Alec Baldwin, in the 2000 Canadian/U.S. TV production Nuremberg
 * Edmund Dehn, in the 2005 German TV miniseries Speer und Er
 * Colin Stinton, in the 2006 British television docudrama Nuremberg: Nazis on Trial

title: Robert H. Jackson


text:
Naïve physics

Naïve physics or folk physics is the untrained human perception of basic physical phenomena. In the field of artificial intelligence the study of naïve physics is a part of the effort to formalize the common knowledge of human beings.

Many ideas of folk physics are simplifications, misunderstandings, or misperceptions of well-understood phenomena, incapable of giving useful predictions of detailed experiments, or simply are contradicted by more thorough observations. They may sometimes be true, be true in certain limited cases, be true as a good first approximation to a more complex effect, or predict the same effect but misunderstand the underlying mechanism.

Naïve physics is characterized by a mostly intuitive understanding humans have about objects in the physical world. Certain notions of the physical world may be innate.

Examples
Some examples of naïve physics include commonly understood, intuitive, or everyday-observed rules of nature:

 * What goes up must come down
 * A dropped object falls straight down
 * A solid object cannot pass through another solid object
 * A vacuum sucks things towards it
 * An object is either at rest or moving, in an absolute sense
 * Two events are either simultaneous or they are not

Many of these and similar ideas formed the basis for the first works in formulating and systematizing physics by Aristotle and the medieval scholastics in Western civilization. In the modern science of physics, they were gradually contradicted by the work of Galileo, Newton, and others. The idea of absolute simultaneity survived until 1905, when the special theory of relativity and its supporting experiments discredited it.

Psychological research
The increasing sophistication of technology makes possible more research on knowledge acquisition. Researchers measure physiological responses such as heart rate and eye movement in order to quantify the reaction to a particular stimulus. Concrete physiological data is helpful when observing infant behavior, because infants cannot use words to explain things (such as their reactions) the way most adults or older children can.

Research in naïve physics relies on technology to measure eye gaze and reaction time in particular. Through observation, researchers know that infants get bored looking at the same stimulus after a certain amount of time. That boredom is called habituation. When an infant is sufficiently habituated to a stimulus, he or she will typically look away, alerting the experimenter to his or her boredom. At this point, the experimenter will introduce another stimulus. The infant will then dishabituate by attending to the new stimulus. In each case, the experimenter measures the time it takes for the infant to habituate to each stimulus.

Researchers infer that the longer the infant takes to habituate to a new stimulus, the more it violates his or her expectations of physical phenomena. When an adult observes an optical illusion that seems physically impossible, they will attend to it until it makes sense.

It is commonly believed that our understanding of physical laws emerges strictly from experience. But research shows that infants, who do not yet have such expansive knowledge of the world, have the same extended reaction to events that appear physically impossible. Such studies hypothesize that all people are born with an innate ability to understand the physical world.

Smith and Cassati (1994) have reviewed the early history of naïve physics, and especially the role of the Italian psychologist Paolo Bozzi.

Types of experiments
The basic experimental procedure of a study on naïve physics involves three steps: prediction of the infant's expectation, violation of that expectation, and measurement of the results. As mentioned above, the physically impossible event holds the infant's attention longer, indicating surprise when expectations are violated.

Solidity
An experiment that tests an infant's knowledge of solidity involves the impossible event of one solid object passing through another. First, the infant is shown a flat, solid square moving from 0° to 180° in an arch formation. Next, a solid block is placed in the path of the screen, preventing it from completing its full range of motion. The infant habituates to this event, as it is what anyone would expect. Then, the experimenter creates the impossible event, and the solid screen passes through the solid block. The infant is confused by the event and attends longer than in probable event trial.

Occlusion
An occlusion event tests the knowledge that an object exists even if it is not immediately visible. Jean Piaget originally called this concept object permanence. When Piaget formed his developmental theory in the 1950s, he claimed that object permanence is learned, not innate. The children's game peek-a-boo is a classic example of this phenomenon, and one which obscures the true grasp infants have on permanence. To disprove this notion, an experimenter designs an impossible occlusion event. The infant is shown a block and a transparent screen. The infant habituates, then a solid panel is placed in front of the objects to block them from view. When the panel is removed, the block is gone, but the screen remains. The infant is confused because the block has disappeared indicating that they understand that objects maintain location in space and do not simply disappear.

Containment
A containment event tests the infant's recognition that an object that is bigger than a container cannot fit completely into that container. Elizabeth Spelke, one of the psychologists who founded the naïve physics movement, identified the continuity principle, which conveys an understanding that objects exist continuously in time and space. Both occlusion and containment experiments hinge on the continuity principle. In the experiment, the infant is shown a tall cylinder and a tall cylindrical container. The experimenter demonstrates that the tall cylinder fits into the tall container, and the infant is bored by the expected physical outcome. The experimenter then places the tall cylinder completely into a much shorter cylindrical container, and the impossible event confuses the infant. Extended attention demonstrates the infant's understanding that containers cannot hold objects that exceed them in height.

Baillargeon's research
The published findings of Renee Baillargeon brought innate knowledge to the forefront in psychological research. Her research method centered on the visual preference technique. Baillargeon and her followers studied how infants show preference to one stimulus over another. Experimenters judge preference by the length of time an infant will stare at a stimulus before habituating. Researchers believe that preference indicates the infant's ability to discriminate between the two events.

title: Naïve physics


text:
Queen Catherine

Queen Catherine may refer to:

 * Catherine Sunesdotter (died 1252), wife of Eric "XI" of Sweden
 * Catherine of Lancaster (1372–1418), wife of Henry III of Castile
 * Catherine of Valois (1401–1437), wife of Henry V of England
 * Catherine Karlsdotter (died 1450), wife of Carl II of Sweden and Norway
 * Catherine of Bosnia (1425–1478), wife of Stephen Thomas of Bosnia
 * Catherine of Poděbrady (1449–1464), wife of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary
 * Catherine Cornaro (1454–1510), queen regnant of Cyprus
 * Catherine of Navarre (1468–1517), queen regnant of Navarre
 * Catherine of Aragon (1485–1536), first wife of Henry VIII of England
 * Catherine of Saxe-Lauenburg (1513–1535), first wife of Gustav I of Sweden
 * Catherine of Austria, Queen of Portugal (1507–1578), wife of John III of Portugal
 * Catherine Parr (1512–1548), sixth and last wife of Henry VIII of England
 * Catherine de' Medici (1519–1589), wife of Henry II of France
 * Catherine Howard (c.1523–1542), fifth wife of Henry VIII of England
 * Catherine Stenbock (1535–1621), third wife of Gustav I of Sweden
 * Catherine of Austria, Queen of Poland (1533–1572), third wife of Sigismund II Augustus of Poland
 * Catherine Jagiellon (1526–1583), wife of John III of Sweden
 * Catherine Månsdotter (1550–1612), wife of Eric XIV of Sweden
 * Ketevan the Martyr (1565–1624), wife of David I of Kakheti and Saint of the Georgian Orthodox Church
 * Anne Catherine of Brandenburg (1575–1612), wife of Christian IV of Denmark
 * Catherine of Braganza (1638–1705), wife of Charles II of England
 * Catherine Opalińska (1680–1747), wife of Stanisław I of Poland
 * Catharine Montour (1710–1804), prominent Iroquois woman
 * Catherine Pavlovna of Russia (1788–1819), second wife of William I of Württemberg

title: Queen Catherine


text:
Effects of cannabis

The effects of cannabis are caused by chemical compounds in the cannabis plant, including 113 different cannabinoids such as tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and 120 terpenes, which allow its drug to have various psychological and physiological effects on the human body. Different plants of the genus Cannabis contain different and often unpredictable concentrations of THC and other cannabinoids and hundreds of other molecules that have a pharmacological effect, so the final net effect cannot reliably be foreseen.

Acute effects while under the influence can sometimes include euphoria or anxiety. Although some assert that cannabidiol (CBD), another cannabinoid found in cannabis in varying amounts, may alleviate the adverse effects of THC that some users experience, little is known about CBD effects on humans. Cannabinoid receptor antagonists have previously been tested as antidotes for cannabis intoxication with success, reducing or eliminating the physiological and psychological effects of intoxication. Some of these products are currently in development as cannabis antidotes.

In the United States, medical cannabis research is limited by federal restrictions.

Cannabis use disorder is defined as a medical diagnosis in the fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).

Cannabinoids and cannabinoid receptors
The most prevalent psychoactive substances in cannabis are cannabinoids, particularly THC. Some varieties, having undergone careful selection and growing techniques, can yield as much as 34% THC. Another psychoactive cannabinoid present in Cannabis sativa is tetrahydrocannabivarin (THCV), but it is only found in small amounts and is a cannabinoid antagonist.

There are similar compounds in cannabis that do not exhibit psychoactive response but are obligatory for functionality: cannabidiol (CBD), an isomer of THC; cannabivarin (CBV), an analog of cannabinol (CBN) with a different side chain, cannabidivarin (CBDV), an analog of CBD with a different side chain, and cannabinolic acid. CBD is believed to regulate the metabolism of THC by inactivating cytochrome P450 enzymes that metabolize drugs; one such mechanism is via generation of carbon monoxide (a pharmacologically active neurotransmitter) by upon metabolism of CBD. THC is converted rapidly to 11-hydroxy-THC, which is also pharmacologically active, so the euphoria outlasts measurable THC levels in blood.

Biochemical mechanisms in the brain
Cannabinoids usually contain a 1,1'-di-methyl-pyran ring, a variedly derivatized aromatic ring and a variedly unsaturated cyclohexyl ring and their immediate chemical precursors, constituting a family of about 60 bi-cyclic and tri-cyclic compounds. Like most other neurological processes, the effects of cannabis on the brain follow the standard protocol of signal transduction, the electrochemical system of sending signals through neurons for a biological response. It is now understood that cannabinoid receptors appear in similar forms in most vertebrates and invertebrates and have a long evolutionary history of 500 million years. The binding of cannabinoids to cannabinoid receptors decrease adenylyl cyclase activity, inhibit calcium N channels, and disinhibit K+A channels. There are at least two types of cannabinoid receptors (CB1 and CB2).

Sustainability in the body
Most cannabinoids are lipophilic (fat soluble) compounds that are easily stored in fat, thus yielding a long elimination half-life relative to other recreational drugs. The THC molecule, and related compounds, are usually detectable in drug tests from 3 days up to 10 days according to Redwood Laboratories. Long-term users can produce positive tests for two to three months after ceasing cannabis use (see drug test).

Toxicities
When cannabis is smoked, blood levels of THC peak rapidly after a few minutes and then decline, although the psychotropic effects persist for longer. Edible forms of cannabis often contain several hundred milligrams of THC, much more than the 32 mg of a typical cannabis cigarette. The rise of edible cannabis products has been responsible for a large increase of poisoning of children and young people. Symptoms in children can include lethargy, sedation and seizure.

Cannabis is suspected of being a potential contributory factor or direct cause of sudden death, due to the strain it can place on the cardiovascular system, or because of cannabinoid hyperemesis syndrome.

Related to cannabinoids
THC, the principal psychoactive constituent of the cannabis plant, has an extremely low toxicity and the amount that can enter the body through the consumption of cannabis plants poses no threat of death. In dogs, the minimum lethal dose of THC is over 3000 mg/kg. According to The Merck Index, the of THC (the dose which causes the death of 50% of individuals) is 1270 mg/kg for male rats and 730 mg/kg for female rats from oral consumption in sesame oil, and 42 mg/kg for rats from inhalation.

Cannabinoids and other molecules present in cannabis can alter the metabolism of other drugs, especially due to competition for clearing metabolic pathways such as cytochromes CYP450, thus leading to drug toxicities by medications that the person consuming cannabis may be taking.

Related to smoking
A 2007 study found that while tobacco and cannabis smoke are quite similar, cannabis smoke contained higher amounts of ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, and nitrogen oxides, but lower levels of carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). This study found that directly inhaled cannabis smoke contained as much as 20 times as much ammonia and 5 times as much hydrogen cyanide as tobacco smoke and compared the properties of both mainstream and sidestream (smoke emitted from a smouldering 'joint' or 'cone') smoke. Mainstream cannabis smoke was found to contain higher concentrations of selected polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) than sidestream tobacco smoke. However, other studies have found much lower disparities in ammonia and hydrogen cyanide between cannabis and tobacco, and that some other constituents (such as polonium-210, lead, arsenic, nicotine, and tobacco-specific nitrosamines) are either lower or non-existent in cannabis smoke. A 2021 longitudinal study conducted among populations of HIV-positive and HIV-negative adults found that smoke-related carcinogenic toxicants and biomarkers detected in tobacco smokers were also detected in exclusive marijuana smokers, including carbon monoxide (CO), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), aldehydes (such as acrolein), acrylonitrile and acrylamide metabolites, but exposures are lower compared with tobacco or dual smokers. Increased levels of acrolein exposure by tobacco smoking but not exclusive marijuana smoking were detected both in HIV-positive and HIV-negative adults, and contribute to increased diagnoses of cardiovascular diseases and respiratory diseases among tobacco smokers.

Cannabis smoke contains thousands of organic and inorganic chemical compounds. This tar is chemically similar to that found in tobacco smoke or cigars. Over fifty known carcinogens have been identified in cannabis smoke. These include nitrosamines, reactive aldehydes, and polycylic hydrocarbons, including benz[a]pyrene. Marijuana smoke was listed as a cancer agent in California in 2009. A study by the British Lung Foundation published in 2012 identifies cannabis smoke as a carcinogen and also finds awareness of the danger is low compared with the high awareness of the dangers of smoking tobacco particularly among younger users. Other observations include possible increased risk from each cigarette; lack of research on the effect of cannabis smoke alone; low rate of addiction compared to tobacco; and episodic nature of cannabis use compared to steady frequent smoking of tobacco. Professor David Nutt, a UK drug expert, points out that the study cited by the British Lung Foundation has been accused of both "false reasoning" and "incorrect methodology". Further, he notes that other studies have failed to connect cannabis with lung cancer, and accuses the BLF of "scaremongering over cannabis".

Short-term effects
When smoked, the short-term effects of cannabis manifest within seconds and are fully apparent within a few minutes, typically lasting 1–3 hours, varying by the person and the strain of cannabis. After oral ingestion of cannabis, the onset of effect is delayed relative to smoking, taking 30 minutes to 2 hours, but the duration is prolonged due to continued slow absorption. The duration of noticeable effects has been observed to diminish after prolonged, repeated use and the development of increased tolerance to cannabinoids.

Cannabis use can decrease blood pressure, which increases the risk of fainting. Combining alcohol with cannabis greatly increases the level of impairment and the risk of injury or death from accidents.

Psychological effects
The psychoactive effects of cannabis, known as a "high", are subjective and vary among persons and the method of use.

When THC enters the blood stream and reaches the brain, it binds to cannabinoid receptors. The endogenous ligand of these receptors is anandamide, the effects of which THC emulates. This agonism of the cannabinoid receptors results in changes in the levels of various neurotransmitters, especially dopamine and norepinephrine, which are closely associated with the acute effects of cannabis ingestion, such as euphoria and anxiety. Some effects may include a general altered state of consciousness, euphoria, relaxation or stress reduction, increased appreciation of the arts, including humor and music, joviality, metacognition and introspection, enhanced recollection (episodic memory), and increased sensuality, sensory awareness, libido, and creativity. Abstract or philosophical thinking, disruption of linear memory and paranoia or anxiety are also typical. Anxiety is cannabis's most commonly reported adverse side effect. Up to 30 percent of recreational users experience intense anxiety and/or panic attacks after smoking cannabis. Some report anxiety only after not smoking cannabis for a prolonged period of time. Inexperience and use in an unfamiliar environment are major contributing factors to this anxiety. Cannabidiol (CBD), another cannabinoid found in cannabis, has been shown to mitigate THC's adverse effects, including anxiety.

Cannabis produces many other subjective effects, including increased enjoyment of food taste and aroma, and marked distortions in the perception of time. At higher doses, effects can include altered body image, auditory or visual illusions, pseudohallucinations, and ataxia from selective impairment of polysynaptic reflexes. In some cases, cannabis can lead to acute psychosis and dissociative states such as depersonalization and derealization.

Furthermore, even in those with no family history of psychosis, the administration of pure THC in clinical settings has been demonstrated to elicit transient psychotic symptoms. Any episode of acute psychosis that accompanies cannabis use usually abates after six hours, but in rare instances, heavy users may find the symptoms continuing for many days.

While psychoactive drugs are typically categorized as stimulants, depressants, or hallucinogens, cannabis exhibits a mix of all of these effects. Scientific studies have suggested that other cannabinoids like CBD may also play a significant role in its psychoactive effects.

Somatic effects
Some of the short-term physical effects of cannabis use include increased heart rate, dry mouth, reddening of the eyes (congestion of the conjunctival blood vessels), a reduction in intra-ocular pressure, muscle relaxation, and a sensation of cold or hot hands and feet.

Electroencephalography (EEG) shows somewhat more persistent alpha waves of slightly lower frequency than usual. Cannabinoids produce a marked depression of motor activity via activation of receptors of cannabinoid receptor type 1.

Duration
Peak levels of cannabis-associated intoxication occur about 20 minutes after smoking it and last several hours. The total short-term duration of cannabis use when smoked depends on the potency, method of smoking – e.g. whether pure or in conjunction with tobacco – and quantity. Peak levels of intoxication typically last an average of three to four hours. When taken orally (in the form of capsules, food, or drink), the psychoactive effects take longer to manifest and generally last longer, typically an average of four to six hours after consumption. Oral ingestion use eliminates the need to inhale toxic combustion products created by smoking and therefore negates the risk of respiratory harm associated with cannabis smoking.

Appetite
Increased appetite after cannabis use has been documented for hundreds of years and is known colloquially as the "munchies". Clinical studies and survey data have found that cannabis increases food enjoyment and interest in food. A 2015 study suggests that cannabis triggers uncharacteristic behaviour in proopiomelanocortin (POMC) neurons, which are usually associated with decreasing hunger.

Endogenous cannabinoids, more commonly known as endocannabinoids, exist in cow and human milk. It is widely accepted that the neonatal survival of many species is largely dependent upon their suckling behavior, and research has identified the endogenous cannabinoid system as the first neural system to display complete control over milk ingestion and neonatal survival.

Cardiovascular effects
Short-term (one to two hours) effects on the cardiovascular system can include increased heart rate, dilation of blood vessels, and fluctuations in blood pressure. There are medical reports of occasional heart attacks or myocardial infarction, stroke, and other cardiovascular side effects. Cannabis's cardiovascular effects are not associated with serious health problems for most young, healthy users. Researchers reported in the International Journal of Cardiology, "Marijuana use by older people, particularly those with some degree of coronary artery or cerebrovascular disease, poses greater risks due to the resulting increase in catecholamines, cardiac workload, and carboxyhemoglobin levels, and concurrent episodes of profound postural hypotension. Indeed, marijuana may be a much more common cause of myocardial infarction than is generally recognized. In day-to-day practice, a history of marijuana use is often not sought by many practitioners, and even when sought, the patient's response is not always truthful".

A 2013 analysis of 3,886 myocardial infarction survivors over an 18-year period showed "no statistically significant association between marijuana use and mortality".

A 2008 study by the National Institutes of Health Biomedical Research Centre in Baltimore found that heavy, chronic smoking of marijuana (138 joints per week) changed blood proteins associated with heart disease and stroke.

A 2000 study by researchers at Boston's Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Massachusetts General Hospital, and Harvard School of Public Health found that a middle-aged person's risk of heart attack rises nearly fivefold in the first hour after smoking cannabis, "roughly the same risk seen within an hour of sexual activity".

Cannabis arteritis is a very rare peripheral vascular disease similar to Buerger's disease. There were about 50 confirmed cases from 1960 to 2008, all in Europe.

Memory and learning
Studies on cannabis and memory are hindered by small sample sizes, confounding drug use, and other factors. The strongest evidence regarding cannabis and memory focuses on its temporary negative effects on short-term and working memory.

In a 2001 study of neuropsychological performance in long-term cannabis users, researchers found "some cognitive deficits appear detectable at least 7 days after heavy cannabis use but appear reversible and related to recent cannabis exposure rather than irreversible and related to cumulative lifetime use". Of his studies on cannabis use, lead researcher and Harvard professor Harrison Pope said he found it is not dangerous over the long term, but there are short-term effects. From neuropsychological tests, Pope found that chronic cannabis users showed difficulty with verbal memory in particular for "at least a week or two" after they stopped smoking. Within 28 days, memory problems vanished and the subjects "were no longer distinguishable from the comparison group". Researchers at the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine failed to show substantial, systemic neurological effects from long-term cannabis use. Their findings were published in the July 2003 issue of the Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society. The research team, headed by Igor Grant, found that cannabis use affects perception but does not cause permanent brain damage. Researchers looked at data from 15 previously published controlled studies involving 704 long-term cannabis users and 484 nonusers. The results showed long-term cannabis use was only marginally harmful on memory and learning. Other functions such as reaction time, attention, language, reasoning ability, and perceptual and motor skills were unaffected. The observed effects on memory and learning, they said, showed long-term cannabis use caused "selective memory defects", but "of a very small magnitude". A study by Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine found that heavy cannabis use is associated with decrements in neurocognitive performance even after 28 days of abstinence.

Effects on driving
Several studies have shown increased risk associated with cannabis use by drivers, but others have found no increased risk. Cannabis usage has been shown in some studies to have an adverse effect on driving ability. The British Medical Journal indicated that "drivers who consume cannabis within three hours of driving are nearly twice as likely to cause a vehicle collision as those who are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol".

In Cannabis and driving: a review of the literature and commentary, the United Kingdom's Department for Transport reviewed data on cannabis and driving, finding that, although impaired, "subjects under cannabis treatment appear to perceive that they are indeed impaired. Where they can compensate, they do". In a review of driving simulator studies, researchers found that "even in those who learn to compensate for a drug's impairing effects, substantial impairment in performance can still be observed under conditions of general task performance (i.e. when no contingencies are present to maintain compensated performance)."

A 2012 meta-analysis found that acute cannabis use increased the risk of an automobile crash. An extensive 2013 review of 66 studies of crash risk and drug use found that cannabis is associated with slightly but not statistically significantly increased odds of injury or fatal accident.

In the largest and most precisely controlled study of its kind, carried out by the U.S. Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it was found that other "studies that measure the presence of THC in the drivers' blood or oral fluid, rather than relying on self-report tend to have much lower (or no) elevated crash risk estimates. Likewise better controlled studies have found lower (or no) elevated crash risk estimates". The study found that "after adjusting for age, gender, race and alcohol use, drivers who tested positive for marijuana were no more likely to crash than those who had not used any drugs or alcohol prior to driving". A 2018 study found that fatal crashes involving cannabis increased in Colorado, Washington, and Massachusetts after recreational cannabis legalization or decriminalization.

Combination with other drugs
A confounding factor in cannabis research is the prevalent usage of other recreational drugs, especially alcohol and nicotine. Such complications demonstrate the need for studies with stronger controls, and investigations into alleged symptoms of cannabis use that may also be caused by tobacco. Some critics question whether agencies doing the research make an honest effort to present an unbiased summary of the evidence without "cherry-picking" data to please funding sources such as the tobacco industry or governments dependent on cigarette tax revenue; others caution that the raw data, and not the final conclusions, are what should be examined.

The Australian National Household Survey of 2001 found that cannabis is rarely used in Australia without other drugs. 95% of cannabis users also drank alcohol; 26% took amphetamines; 19% took ecstasy and only 2.7% reported not having used any other drug with cannabis. While there has been research on the combined effects of alcohol and cannabis on performing certain tasks, little has been done on the reasons this combination is so popular. Evidence from a controlled experimental study by Lukas and Orozco suggests that alcohol causes THC to be absorbed more rapidly into the user's blood plasma. Data from the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing found that three-quarters of recent cannabis users reported using alcohol when cannabis was not available, suggesting that the two have similar effects.

Pathogens and microtoxins
Most microorganisms found in cannabis affect only plants, not humans, but some, especially those that proliferate when the herb is not correctly dried and stored, can be harmful to humans. Some users store cannabis in an airtight bag or jar in a refrigerator to prevent fungal and bacterial growth.

The fungi Aspergillus flavus, Aspergillus fumigatus, Aspergillus niger, Aspergillus parasiticus, Aspergillus tamarii, Aspergillus sulphureus, Aspergillus repens, Mucor hiemalis (not a human pathogen), Penicillium chrysogenum, Penicillium italicum, and Rhizopus nigricans have been found in moldy cannabis. Aspergillus mold species can infect the lungs via smoking or handling of infected cannabis and cause opportunistic and sometimes deadly aspergillosis. Some of the microorganisms found create aflatoxins, which are toxic and carcinogenic. Mold is also found in smoke from mold-infected cannabis, and the lungs and nasal passages are a major means of contracting fungal infections. Levitz and Diamond (1991) suggest baking cannabis in home ovens at 150 °C [302 °F], for five minutes before smoking. Oven treatment killed conidia of A. fumigatus, A. flavus and A. niger, and did not lower THC levels. Cannabis contaminated with Salmonella muenchen was correlated with dozens of cases of salmonellosis in 1981. Thermophilic actinomycetes were also found in cannabis.

Long-term effects
Exposure to marijuana may have biologically based physical, mental, behavioral, and social health consequences and is "associated with diseases of the liver (particularly with co-existing hepatitis C), lungs, heart, eyesight, and vasculature" according to a 2013 literature review by Gordon and colleagues. The association with these diseases has only been reported in cases where people have smoked cannabis. The authors cautioned that "evidence is needed, and further research should be considered, to prove causal associations of marijuana with many physical health conditions".

Cannabis use disorder is defined in the fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as a condition requiring treatment. Several drugs have been investigated in an attempt to ameliorate the symptoms of stopping cannabis use. Such drugs include bupropion, divalproex, nefazodone, lofexidine, and dronabinol. Of these, dronabinol (a trade name for THC) has proven the most effective. The drugs buspirone and rimonabant have shown some success in helping maintain cannabis abstinence.

There is evidence that long-term use of cannabis increases the risk of psychosis, regardless of confounding factors, and particularly for people who have genetic risk factors. A 2019 meta-analysis found that 34% of people with cannabis-induced psychosis transitioned to schizophrenia. This was found to be comparatively higher than hallucinogens (26%) and amphetamines (22%).

Long-term cannabis users are at risk for developing cannabinoid hyperemesis syndrome (CHS), characterized by recurrent bouts of intense vomiting and abdominal cramping during or within 48 hours of heavy cannabis use. The mechanism behind CHS is poorly understood and is contrary to the antiemetic properties of cannabis and cannabinoids. Of those who went to the emergency department (ED) with recurrent vomiting in one institution in the United States from 2005 to 2010, about 6% had the condition. The condition is usually not responsive to traditionally used antiemetics and the primary treatment is cessation from cannabis use.

Smoking cannabis can potentially cause cancer, due to carcinogens present in smoke.

Effects in pregnancy
Cannabis consumption in pregnancy might be associated with restrictions in growth of the fetus, miscarriage, and cognitive deficits in offspring based on animal studies, although there is limited evidence for this in humans at this time. A 2012 systematic review found although it was difficult to draw firm conclusions, there was some evidence that prenatal exposure to cannabis was associated with "deficits in language, attention, areas of cognitive performance, and delinquent behavior in adolescence". A report prepared for the Australian National Council on Drugs concluded cannabis and other cannabinoids are contraindicated in pregnancy as it may interact with the endocannabinoid system.

Effects in pediatrics
Children can become exposed to cannabis, typically through accidental exposure which can lead to very high doses, especially in the case of edibles. Unlike in adults, these levels of exposure can lead to major complications in children. These complications include encephalopathy, hypotension, respiratory depression severe enough to require ventilation, somnolence, coma, and in extreme cases, reports of death. Pediatric exposure to edibles is of increasing concern because these products are typically sweets (gummies, cookies, etc.), and their prevalence is increasing as cannabis is legalized or decriminalized in many territories.

title: Effects of cannabis


text:
Legality of cannabis

[[File:Map-of-world-cannabis-laws.svg|thumb|400px|alt=Map of world cannabis laws for non-medical use| Legal status of cannabis possession for recreational use

{{legend|#0d00f2|Legal}} {{legend|#ffb700|Illegal but decriminalized}} {{legend|#ff9e9e|Illegal but often unenforced}} {{legend|#ff3c3c|Illegal}} {{legend|#b8b8b8|Legality unknown}}]]

The legality of cannabis for medical and recreational use varies by country, in terms of its possession, distribution, and cultivation, and (in regards to medical) how it can be consumed and what medical conditions it can be used for. These policies in most countries are regulated by three United Nations treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Cannabis was reclassified in 2020 to a Schedule I-only drug under the Single Convention treaty (from being a Schedule I and IV drug previously), with the schedules from strictest to least being IV, I, II, and III. As a Schedule I drug under the treaty, countries can allow the medical use of cannabis but it is considered to be an addictive drug with a serious risk of abuse.

The use of cannabis for recreational purposes is prohibited in most countries; however, many have adopted a policy of decriminalization to make simple possession a non-criminal offense (often similar to a minor traffic violation). Others have much more severe penalties such as some Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries where possession of even small amounts is punished by imprisonment for several years. Countries that have legalized recreational use of cannabis are Canada, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay, plus 24 states, 3 territories, and the District of Columbia in the United States and the Australian Capital Territory in Australia. Commercial sale of recreational cannabis is legalized nationwide in three countries (Canada, Thailand, and Uruguay) and in all subnational U.S. jurisdictions that have legalized possession except Virginia and Washington, D.C. A policy of limited enforcement has also been adopted in many countries, in particular the Netherlands where the sale of cannabis is tolerated at licensed coffeeshops.

Countries that have legalized medical use of cannabis include Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Others have more restrictive laws that allow only the use of certain cannabis-derived pharmaceuticals, such as Sativex, Marinol, or Epidiolex. In the United States, 38 states, 4 territories, and the District of Columbia have legalized the medical use of cannabis, but at the federal level its use remains prohibited.

title: Legality of cannabis