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Sport kite

A sport kite, also commonly known as a stunt kite, is a type of multiline kite that can be maneuvered in the air. A related kite, also controllable and used for recreation, but capable of generating a significant amount of pull and used for providing movement, is the power kite.

Configuration
One common configuration for a sport kite is a roughly triangular "delta" shape based on the Rogallo wing, with two lines for control. Another common configuration is a W-shaped panel based on the Hadzicki wing, with four lines for control. These kites are normally constructed from lightweight ripstop nylon or ripstop polyester with spars made from carbon fiber tubing. The flying lines are made from braided ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene, which is light, does not stretch under tension and stays slippery even when wrapped many times.

Dual-line sport kites are controlled by the pilot adding and releasing tension on the right and left lines. A pilot may pull on the right-hand line to turn right, pull left-hand line to turn left, pull equally for straight flight, push the left-hand line to release air and turn right, and so on. The pitch can be controlled by walking/running forward or backwards, giving the lines different amounts of tension. Using a combination of pulls (to add tension or direct kite motion) and pushes (to give slack and let float into motion), complex tricks and patterns can be flown. These range in difficulty from turns, loops and landings, to maneuvers where the kite is flipped and turned end over end, wrapping the lines or floating on its front or back. During diving maneuvers sport kites may reach speeds of 100 km/h, while in stall type maneuvers they can remain nearly motionless. This type of stall allows for various other acrobatic maneuvers to be performed.

Quad-line kites are controlled with a pair of handles, each with two lines attached to the top and bottom and attached to the kite correspondingly. To control the kite the pilot applies tension to the four lines, typically all four lines have some tension with some lines drawn back more than the others. The kite experiences more force on the lines held on higher tension. The pitch of the kite affects lift and forward drive, and since each of four lines can be moved the kite can be tilted, rotated, twisted, or pitched in any direction. Skilled use of these handles allows a quad-line kite to perform in ways that are difficult or impossible with a dual-line kite. Unique quad-line maneuvers include reverse flight, axis spins, hovers, and side to side flight.

Although some individuals consider fighter kites to be sport kites, they are generally considered a different category. Fighter kites rely on their instability to enter spins or fly straight using line tension on a single kite line. In contrast, sport kites use multiple control lines to precisely steer in any direction and control speed.

Types
There are three main categories of sport kites:

Traditional dual-line sport kites
Controllable dual line kites have been around since at least the mid-1800s, and likely much earlier considering the history of kites into antiquity. Multi-line sport kites were popularized by designs of Francis Rogallo and Domina Jalbert, which were used in televised water skiing shows and movies in the 1960s. The Rogallo wing's simple design of triangular fabric was easy for amateurs to construct on their own. Larger kites were capable of pulling pilots or lifting passengers in water ski shows, smaller designs were flown by pilots on beaches or stands. Traditional sport kites were most prevalent from the 1970s through the 1990s. The sport kites were increasingly built for precise control, which featured heavily in competitions and demonstrations.

Kites are generally considered traditional or "old school" when they are flat and lack modern features. Traditional sport kites are generally flat when not billowed under wind pressure, although some later and transitionary models may include short standoffs. They often are heavier than modern kite designs with a straight-line triangular appearance. Flying was generally limited to linear flying and precise turns relying on straight-on wind pressure. The addition of standoffs, small rods to continually maintain the sail tension and the billowed shape, with kites becoming able to perform actions on slack lines generally and the ability to perform multi-dimensional acrobatic tricks marked the transition from traditional to modern designs.

Modern dual-line sport kites
In the 1990s sport kites saw a design change which transformed sport kite flying. Rather than requiring wind to provide billowed sail shape to catch the wind, designers formed the kite into a 3D shape allowing it to catch the wind at any angle, even when slack, drifting backward, or lying on its back. As the kite was no longer relying on wind pressure to hold its shape there were pronounced gains in competitive precision flying (especially in light winds) and creation of an entirely new branch of slackline trick flying. The major defining factor in modern kites are standoffs, which provide a 3D shape to kites even when not billowed from wind pressure. Modern kites may have additional features like yo-yo stoppers for catching the line on tricks, ballast weights to improve stability or increase instability, tapered spars to allow twisted or curved shapes, multiple horizontal spreaders to introduce curved or recurved leading edges, and battens to further modify or reinforce the shape. The size, aspect ratio, billow, camber, balance and similar design factors all affect how the kite performs. Kites favoring team or precision flying tend to move with more precision and stability, often with a feeling of weight, that taken together make it easier for a team to fly in uniform formation. This style of flying is about demonstrating control of the kite, through flying in preset patterns, in ballet choreographed to music, or through similar complex or precise maneuvers. Kites favoring trick or freestyle flying tend to prefer agility and dexterity, sometimes described as feeling 'floaty', for improved ability to perform 3D slackline maneuvers. This style of flying can push kites to their limits with the kite flipping and rotating in extreme, acrobatic ways.

Quad-line kites

Quad line kites have been in use since at least 1899, documented in designs likely simultaneously invented by Wilbur Wright, John J. Montgomery, and possibly other aviation pioneers for flight control by warping the wing shape which featured as part of the Wright brothers patent war. Modern quad-line sport kites were re-popularized in 1988 with the creation of the "Neos Omega", later called the "Revolution 1". Both historic and modern quad-line kites allow the four lines to tension different areas of the sail body, resulting in both sail shape deformation and tension changes which in turn control the flight.

The modern quad line kites were popularized through 1989 being flown in the "innovative" competition category, and were quickly adopted by top fliers. Performances with the kites achieved top rankings at many competitions in 1989. Quad-line kites further gained popularity after sport kite team The Flying Squad quad-line team won back to back STACK European championships and later Team iQuad receiving industry awards for promoting the sport globally between 2006-2012. Revolution Kites initially dominated the quad-line market thanks to patent protections, but competing brands proliferated after the patents expired.

Quad-line kites are noticeable by the way that they can hover in space unlike any other sport kite. These kites can be extremely precise, hover in orientation, fly in any direction including sideways and reverse, even land at a specific spot on a wingtip.

Technology
Sport kites can be designed to fly in a wide range of conditions. Many standard kites fly best in winds from 1.5 to 6 m/s. "Ultralight" and "super ultralight" designs are made from lightweight materials that can be flown in the slightest breeze or even indoors with calm air. High wind kite designs are often made with mesh panels or an "air brake" attached to the lines to fly in higher winds up to approximately 20 m/s. Wind ranges depend significantly on the skill of the pilot; novice or first time fliers may have difficulty keeping a kite airborne believing the wind is too light while experienced pilots nearby are performing acrobatic tricks in the same wind. For smooth and consistent flying a steady breeze is required, uninhibited by trees, buildings, hills, or other tall objects which may block the wind.

Professional quality kites are made from multiple synthetic materials. Kite sails are primarily made from lightweight ripstop polyester which has been chemically treated to minimize stretch, repel water, increase airtightness, and be UV resistant. Edge material is often heavyweight Dacron or Kevlar to provide reinforcement and strength. Kite frames typically use wrapped carbon fiber tubes which are lightweight and stiff, yet can flex to absorb strong wind forces and survive hard crashes. Kite lines are made from ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene like Spectra or Dyneema woven specifically for kite line to have minimal stretch under tension and slip over itself even when wrapped over itself many times from kites spinning midair. Some have wingtip and tail weight attachments which change the flight characteristics of the kite, making some advanced maneuvers easier or more dramatic. Reinforcements and connectors may be made from nylon, Mylar, aluminum, and similar materials.

A dual-line kite can range from $50 for a beginner kite, to over $300 for competition and performance quality kites. A quad-line kite can range from $150 for a beginner kite to over $400 for professional quality kites. Flying lines are commonly from $50 to over $100 per set.

Some kite designs may be classified as power kites and traction kites, which can be used to tow wheeled kite buggies (kite buggying) or surfboards (kite surfing). Power kites vary in size from "trainers" which often have dual-lines and a small sail area, to large full size traction kites with four lines, designed to pull people on kite boards or vehicles. Many of these strong-pulling designs include a safety strap which can be engaged in emergencies to release or depower the kite, with some designs adding an additional (third or fifth) line for this purpose.

Accessories
Many sport kite pilots have a variety of line sets, in different lengths and strengths (normally measured in lbs or pounds) to suit the wind conditions. Specialized kite bags are designed to tote a collection of kites, along with line sets and repair materials such as tedlar tape (for fixing punctured sails) and spare parts. Kite cases or bags also facilitate traveling with kites, some designed to fit into the overhead compartments on airplanes. Other accessories include hand-held (digital) anemometers for accurate wind speed information and LED lights that attach to the frame of the kite to allow for night flying. Some manufacturers offer replacement spars or spare components for their kites, for replacing damaged components after a particularly unforgiving crash landing.

Competition
Developments in multi-line kites allowed forms of kite flying to develop into a sport. Kite competitions have much in common with figure skating, with competitors being judged on their performance in compulsory figures as well as a ballet-style flying using artistic interpretation of music. Performances are done as individuals, a pair of pilots, or as a team. Team flying is typically the most spectacular, with typically four pilots flying within centimeters of each other and narrowly averting disaster, while performing all manner of figures and formations in the air.

Competitions are held nationally and internationally under the auspices of Sport Team and Competitive Kiting (STACK). There is a bi-annual World Championship or World Kite Cup, typically held at Berck sur Mer, France, last held in April 2024. The 2020 and 2022 events were cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic. In the United States, the American Kitefliers Association (AKA) is the umbrella organization for sport kite contests; competition winners from the various regions are invited to the annual AKA convention for national championships. Other national organizations include the All-Japanese Sport Kite Association (AJSKA), FFVL France, FLD ev Germany, STACK Holland, STACK-Italia, and STACK-UK.

In 1996 the organizations AKA, STACK, and AJSKA formed the International Rule Book Committee (IRBC) to standardize rules and processes. The rulebooks include overall rules for events, descriptions of figures which may be selected for compulsory-figure flying, and guidelines for judging assorted events.

title: Sport kite


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Battle of Milne Bay

The Battle of Milne Bay (25 August – 7 September 1942), also known as Operation RE or the Battle of Rabi (ラビの戦い) by the Japanese, was a battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II. Japanese marines, known as Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai (Special Naval Landing Forces), with two small tanks attacked the Allied airfields at Milne Bay that had been established on the eastern tip of New Guinea. Due to poor intelligence work, the Japanese miscalculated the size of the predominantly Australian garrison and, believing that the airfields were defended by only two or three companies, initially landed a force roughly equivalent in size to one battalion on 25 August 1942. The Allies, forewarned by intelligence from Ultra, had heavily reinforced the garrison.

Despite suffering a significant setback at the outset, when part of their small invasion force had its landing craft destroyed by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft as they attempted to land on the coast behind the Australian defenders, the Japanese quickly pushed inland and began their advance towards the airfields. Heavy fighting followed as they encountered the Australian Militia troops that formed the first line of defence. These troops were steadily pushed back, but the Australians brought forward veteran Second Australian Imperial Force units that the Japanese had not expected. Allied air superiority helped tip the balance, providing close support to troops in combat and targeting Japanese logistics. Finding themselves heavily outnumbered, lacking supplies and suffering heavy casualties, the Japanese withdrew their forces, with fighting coming to an end on 7 September 1942.

The battle is often described as the first major battle of the war in the Pacific in which Allied troops decisively defeated Japanese land forces. Although Japanese land forces had experienced local setbacks elsewhere in the Pacific earlier in the war, unlike at Milne Bay, these earlier actions had not forced them to withdraw completely and abandon their strategic objective. Nor did they have such a profound impact upon the thoughts and perceptions of the Allies towards the Japanese, and their prospects for victory. Milne Bay showed the limits of Japanese capability to expand using relatively small forces in the face of increasingly larger Allied troop concentrations and command of the air. As a result of the battle, Allied morale was boosted and Milne Bay was developed into a major Allied base, which was used to mount subsequent operations in the region.

Geography
Milne Bay is a sheltered 97 sqmi bay at the eastern tip of the Territory of Papua (now part of Papua New Guinea). It is 22 mi long and 10 mi wide, and is deep enough for large ships to enter. The coastal area is flat with good aerial approaches, and therefore suitable for airstrips, although it is intercut by many tributaries of rivers and mangrove swamps. Owing to the swampy lands and high rainfall, about 200 in per year, the area is prone to malaria and flooding. After floods, the coastal plains become "virtually impassable quagmires of glutinous mud", and the ground is not suited for development. The bay is bounded to its north and south by the Stirling Ranges, which at points rise to 3000 - 5000 ft and are covered in Kunai grass and dense scrubland. The main area of firm ground suitable for construction and development is found directly at the head of the bay. In 1942 this area was occupied by plantations of palm oil, coconuts and cocoa, as well as a number of jetties and villages, connected by what was described by Major Sydney Elliott-Smith of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) as a "modest 'road' system" that was, in actuality, only a dirt track 10 - 12 m wide. The area was sparsely populated, although there were a number of villages along the track. Ahioma was situated the farthest east, and together with Gili Gili in the west, it bounded Lilihoa, Waga Waga, Goroni, KB Mission, Rabi and Kilarbo.

Military situation
The Japanese thrust into the Pacific region had begun in early December 1941 with attacks against British and Commonwealth forces in the Battle of Hong Kong and the Malayan campaign, and against the US Pacific Fleet, much of which was caught at anchor in Pearl Harbor. They rapidly advanced south, overwhelming resistance in Malaya, capturing Singapore in February 1942, and successfully occupying Timor, Rabaul and the Dutch East Indies. While a Japanese naval operation aimed at capturing Port Moresby was defeated in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, elsewhere American forces in the Philippines capitulated, and Japanese forces advanced towards India through Burma.

Although the Japanese had been defeated in the Coral Sea, another attempt at capturing Port Moresby was anticipated. The Allied Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, decided to establish airbases to protect Port Moresby. To the west, he authorised the construction of an airbase at Merauke in Netherlands New Guinea. Another, codenamed "Boston", was authorised to the east in the largely unexplored Abau–Mullins Harbour area on 20 May. Any Japanese force approaching Port Moresby by sea would have to sail past these bases, allowing them to be detected and attacked earlier; but the base in the east had other advantages too. Bombers flying missions to Rabaul and other Japanese bases to the north from there would not have to overfly the Owen Stanley Range, and would not be subject to the vagaries of the weather and air turbulence over the mountains. For that reason, an airstrip suitable for heavy bombers was desired so that they could stage there from Port Moresby and bases in northern Australia.

The Commander in Chief of Allied Land Forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey, selected a garrison for Boston on 24 May. The troops were informed that their mission was only to defend against Japanese raids, and in the event of a major attack they would destroy everything of value and withdraw. The Boston project fell through, as a reconnaissance of the area gave an unfavourable report and Elliott-Smith suggested Milne Bay as a more suitable alternative site. A party of twelve Americans and Australians set out to explore Milne Bay in a Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boat on 8 June. They were impressed by the flat areas, the roads and the jetties, all of which would ease airbase construction. On receipt of a favourable report from the party, MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) cancelled Boston on 11 June and substituted Milne Bay. Milne Bay was given the codename "Fall River". The use of place names as code names proved to be unwise, as some supplies were mistakenly sent to the real Fall River, in Massachusetts.

Allies
The first troops arrived at Milne Bay from Port Moresby in the Dutch KPM ships SS Karsik (1938) and SS Bontekoe (1922), escorted by the sloop HMAS Warrego (U73) and the corvette HMAS Ballarat (J184) on 25 June. Karsik docked at a pontoon wharf that had been hastily constructed from petrol drums by Papuan workers, who had been recruited by ANGAU and who subsequently assisted in unloading the ships. The troops included two and a half companies and a machine gun platoon from the 55th Infantry Battalion of the 14th Infantry Brigade, the 9th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery with eight Bofors 40 mm guns, a platoon of the US 101st Coast Artillery Battalion (Anti-Aircraft) with eight .50 calibre machine guns, and two 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns of the 23rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery. Company E of the 46th Engineers of the US Army Corps of Engineers arrived on Bontekoe with airbase construction equipment. Some 29 KPM ships had escaped to Australia after the fall of the Dutch East Indies. They were manned by Dutch and Javanese crews, and were the lifeline of the garrison at Milne Bay, making roughly two out of every three voyages there during the campaign, the remainder being by Australian, British and US ships. Five KPM ships would be lost during the fighting in Papua.

Work on the first airfield, which became known as No. 1 Airstrip, had commenced on 8 June, with the area near Gili Gili being cleared by Papuan workers under the supervision of ANGAU and by US 96th Engineer Separate Battalion personnel. Company E of the 46th Engineers began working on it on 30 June. In addition to the runway, they had to build camouflaged dispersal areas for 32 fighters, taxiways and accommodation for 500 men. To support the airbase and the garrison, a platoon was diverted to working on the docks and roads. Although the channels in Milne Bay allowed deep draught ships to approach within 40 ft of the shore, they had to be unloaded onto pontoons and the stores manhandled onto vehicles, a labour-intensive process.

Three Kittyhawks from No. 76 Squadron RAAF landed on the airstrip on 22 July, while additional aircraft from No. 76 and also No. 75 Squadron RAAF arrived on 25 July. They found that only 4950 by of the 6000 by runway was covered with Marston Matting, and that water was frequently over it. Landing aircraft sprayed water about, and sometimes skidded off the runway and became bogged.

With No. 1 Airstrip operational, work began on two more airfields. Some 5,000 coconut trees were removed for No. 2 Airstrip, and the site was levelled and graded, but its use first required the construction of at least two 60 ft bridges, so work moved to No. 3 Airstrip near Kilarbo. Its construction was undertaken by the 2nd Battalion of the US 43rd Engineers (less Company E), which arrived on 4 August. That day Japanese aircraft began to bomb and strafe Milne Bay, focusing upon attacking the airfields and the engineers as they worked. Four Zeros and a dive bomber attacked No. 1 Airstrip. One Kittyhawk was destroyed on the ground, while a Kittyhawk from No. 76 Squadron shot down the dive bomber. Following this, the Australians established a workable radar system to provide early warning. On 11 August, 22 Kittyhawks intercepted 12 Zeroes. Despite their numerical advantage, the Australians lost three Kittyhawks, while claiming four Japanese Zeros shot down.

On 11 July, troops of the 7th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier John Field, began arriving to bolster the garrison. The brigade consisted of three Militia battalions from Queensland, the 9th, 25th and 61st Infantry Battalions. They brought with them guns of the 4th Battery of the 101st Anti-Tank Regiment, the 2/6th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, and the 2/9th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, along with the first Australian engineer unit, the 24th Field Company. Field assumed command of "Milne Force", a task force which exercised operational control over all Allied air, land and naval forces in the area, but only when an attack was imminent. He reported directly to Blamey's Allied Land Forces in Brisbane rather than New Guinea Force in Port Moresby. His most urgent tasks were of an engineering nature. While the American engineers built the airstrips and wharves, the Australians worked on the roads and accommodation. The small force of sappers had to be augmented by infantry and Papuan labourers.

Although malaria was known to be endemic in the Milne Bay area, precautions taken against the disease were haphazard. Men wore shorts and kept their sleeves rolled up. Their mosquito repellent cream was ineffective, quinine was in short supply and many men arrived without their mosquito nets, which were stowed deep in the ships' holds and took several days to unload. A daily dosage of 10 gr was prescribed but Field's troops were told not to take their quinine until they had been in the area a week. By this time, many had become infected with the disease. The Director of Medicine at Allied Land Forces Headquarters was Brigadier Neil Hamilton Fairley, an expert on tropical medicine. He visited Port Moresby in June, and was alarmed at the ineffectiveness of the measures being taken to combat the disease, which he realised was capable of destroying the entire Allied force in Papua. He made sure that the 110th Casualty Clearing Station left Brisbane for Milne Bay with a fully equipped pathological laboratory and a large quantity of anti-malarial supplies, including 200,000 quinine tablets. However, some equipment was lost or ruined in transit, and the danger from malaria was not yet appreciated at Milne Bay.

The 55th Infantry Battalion's companies were already badly afflicted by malaria and other tropical diseases, and were withdrawn and sent back to Port Moresby in early August, but the garrison was further reinforced with Second Australian Imperial Force troops of Brigadier George Wootten's 18th Infantry Brigade of the 7th Division, which began arriving on 12 August, although it would not be complete until 21 August. This veteran brigade, which had fought in the siege of Tobruk earlier in the war, consisted of the 2/9th, 2/10th and 2/12th Infantry Battalions. Anti-aircraft and artillery support was provided by the 9th Battery of the 2/3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, the US 709th Anti-Aircraft Battery and the 9th Battery of the 2/5th Field Regiment, while various signals and logistics troops provided further support.

With two brigades now at Milne Bay, Major General Cyril Clowes was appointed to command Milne Force, which was placed under the control of New Guinea Force, now commanded by Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell, on 12 August. Clowes' headquarters was formed in Sydney at the end of July and was flown up to Milne Bay. He arrived with some of his staff on 13 August, but had to wait until the rest arrived before he could formally assume command of Milne Force on 22 August. By this time there were 7,459 Australian and 1,365 US Army personnel at Milne Bay, of whom about 4,500 were infantry. There were also about 600 RAAF personnel.

Clowes assigned the inexperienced 7th Infantry Brigade a defensive role, guarding key points around Milne Bay from seaborne or airborne attack, and kept the veteran 18th Infantry Brigade in reserve, ready to counterattack. Lacking accurate maps and finding that their signals equipment was unreliable in the conditions, the Australian command and control system consisted largely of cable telephones, or where there was not enough line available, runners. The soft ground made movement by road and even on foot difficult.

Japanese
Japanese aircraft soon discovered the Allied presence at Milne Bay, which was appreciated as a clear threat to Japanese plans for another seaborne advance on Port Moresby, which was to start with a landing at Samarai Island in the China Strait, not far from Milne Bay. On 31 July the commander of the Japanese XVII Army, Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake, requested that Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's 8th Fleet capture the new Allied base at Milne Bay instead. Mikawa therefore altered his plans for the Samarai operation, and substituted the capture of Milne Bay, which was codenamed Operation RE, and scheduled for the middle of August. Operation RE received a high priority after aircraft from the 25th Air Flotilla discovered the new Milne Bay airfields on 4 August, but was then postponed due to the American landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August.

Under the misconception that the airfields were defended by only two or three companies of Australian infantry (300–600 men), the initial Japanese assault force consisted of only about 1,250 personnel. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was unwilling to conduct the operation as it feared that landing barges sent to the area would be attacked by Allied aircraft. Following an argument between IJA and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) officers, it was agreed that the Navy would have responsibility for the landing. As a result, the assault force was drawn from the Japanese naval infantry, known as Kaigun Rikusentai (Special Naval Landing Forces). Some 612 naval troops from the 5th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF), led by Commander Masajiro Hayashi, were scheduled to land on the east coast near a point identified by the Japanese as "Rabi", along with 197 men from the 5th Sasebo SNLF, led by Lieutenant Fujikawa. It was planned that a further 350 personnel from the 10th Naval Landing Force, along with 100 men from the 2nd Air Advance Party, would land via barge on the northern coast of the peninsula at Taupota, in Goodenough Bay, from where it would strike out over the Stirling Ranges to attack the Australians from behind. Following the battle, the chief of staff of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, assessed that the landing force was not of a high calibre as it contained many 30- to 35-year-old soldiers who were not fully fit and had "inferior fighting spirit". Naval support was to be provided by the 18th Cruiser Division under the command of Rear Admiral Mitsuharu Matsuyama. The Japanese enjoyed some initial advantage in the form of possessing two Type-95 light tanks. After an initial attack, however, these tanks became marooned in the mud and abandoned. They also had control of the sea during the night, allowing reinforcement and evacuation.

Allied intelligence advantage
Countering these Japanese tactical advantages, the Allies enjoyed the strategic advantage of possessing superior intelligence about Japanese plans. The Japanese knew very little about Allied forces at Milne Bay, while the Allies received advance warning that the Japanese were planning an invasion. In mid-July codebreakers under the command of Commander Eric Nave informed MacArthur that toward the end of August the Japanese planned to attack Milne Bay. They provided detailed information about the numbers of soldiers to expect, which units would be involved, their standard of training, and the names of the ships that the Japanese had allocated to the operation. MacArthur's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, had anticipated a Japanese reaction against Milne Force, and interpreted the Japanese reconnaissance on 4 August as foreshadowing an operation. After Allied Naval Forces signals intelligence, given the code word Ultra which covered a number of codes including the Japanese naval code JN-25, decrypted a message that disclosed that a Japanese submarine picquet line had been established to cover the approaches to Milne Bay, Willoughby predicted that an attack was imminent. In response, MacArthur rushed the 18th Infantry Brigade to Milne Bay. Major General George Kenney, the commander of the Allied Air Forces, ordered air patrols stepped up over the likely Japanese invasion routes. He also ordered pre-emptive air strikes against the Japanese airfields at Buna on 24 and 25 August, which reduced the number of Japanese fighters available to support the attack on Milne Bay to just six.

Initial landing

Over the course of 23 and 24 August, aircraft from the 25th Air Flotilla carried out preparatory bombing around the airfield at Rabi. The main Japanese invasion force left Rabaul on 24 August, under Matsuyama's command, at 7:00 am. The fleet was made up of two light cruisers, JAPANESE CRUISER Tenryū and JAPANESE CRUISER Tatsuta, as well as three destroyers, JAPANESE DESTROYER Urakaze, JAPANESE DESTROYER Tanikaze and JAPANESE DESTROYER Hamakaze, in concert with the transports, Nankai Maru and Kinai Maru, and the submarine chasers JAPANESE SUBMARINE CHASER CH-22 and JAPANESE SUBMARINE CHASER CH-24.

At 8:30 am on 24 August, Milne Bay GHQ was alerted by an RAAF Hudson bomber near Kitava Island, off the Trobriand Islands, and coastwatchers that a Japanese convoy was approaching the Milne Bay area. HMAS Arunta (I30) – escorting the transport SS Tasman – left the Milne Bay area and sailed for Port Moresby after learning of the invasion force. Reports of the second Japanese convoy, consisting of seven barges, which had sailed from Buna carrying the force that would land at Taupota were also received at this time. In response to this sighting, after the initially poor weather had cleared, 12 RAAF Kittyhawks were scrambled at midday. The barges were spotted beached near Goodenough Island where the 350 troops of the 5th Sasebo SNLF, led by Commander Tsukioka, had gone ashore to rest. The Australian pilots then proceeded to strafe the barges and, over the course of two hours, destroyed them all and stranded their former occupants.

After the initial sighting, the main invasion force, consisting of the heavy naval screening force and the two transports, remained elusive until the morning of 25 August. In an effort to intercept it, US B-17s operating from bases at Mareeba and Charters Towers in Queensland, were dispatched, although they were unable to complete their mission as bad weather closed in. Later in the afternoon, a number of Kittyhawks and a single Hudson bomber strafed the convoy and attempted to bomb the transports with 250 lb bombs near Rabi Island. Only limited damage was caused to the convoy and no ships were sunk. After this, due to the withdrawal of the only Allied naval presence in the area – Arunta and Tasman – an RAAF tender was sent to act as a picket in the bay, ready to provide early warning of the approaching Japanese.

Meanwhile, earlier in the day, Clowes decided to shorten his lines and passed the order for D Company, 61st Infantry Battalion, which had been sent to Akioma in the east, to withdraw back behind 'B' Company at KB Mission and reposition itself at the No. 3 Airstrip at Gili Gili. A shortage of water craft, however, delayed D Company's departure until the evening of 25/26 August after requisitioning three luggers Bronzewing, Elevala and Dadosee. At around 10:30 pm, the Japanese main force, consisting of over 1,000 men and two Type 95 Ha-Go tanks, had made landfall near Waga Waga, on the northern shore of the bay; due to an error in navigation they came ashore about 3 km east of where they had intended, placing them further away from their objective. Nevertheless, they quickly sent out patrols to secure the area, rounding up local villagers, and established a beachhead.

Later that evening, two of the small water craft that D Company were using to withdraw to Gili Gili encountered the Japanese landing force. In the firefight that followed, one of the craft – Elevala – was forced to beach and its occupants forced to return by taking to the jungle on foot, eventually reaching Gili Gili some time later; the other, Bronzewing, was holed and of its passengers, 11 were killed either in the engagement or by the Japanese following their capture.

Japanese advance inland
By dawn of 26 August, advancing west along the coast with armoured support, the Japanese had reached the main position manned by troops from B Company, 61st Infantry Battalion, around KB Mission. The Japanese force moved through the jungle at the edge of the coastal track, and was headed by two light tanks. Although they lacked anti-armour weapons, the Australians were able to turn back the Japanese attack. At this stage, the Japanese suffered a serious setback when their base area was heavily attacked at daylight by RAAF Kittyhawks and a Hudson aircraft, along with B-25s, B-26s and B-17s from the US Fifth Air Force. As a result of the attack, a number of Japanese troops were killed, while a large quantity of supplies was destroyed, as were a number of the landing barges which were beached near the KB Mission. Aside from severely hampering the Japanese supply system, the destruction of the landing barges also prevented their use to outflank the Australian battalions. The Japanese did not have any air cover as the fighters based at Buna which were to patrol over Milne Bay were shot down by Allied fighters shortly after they took off and other aircraft based at Rabaul were forced to turn back due to bad weather.

Nevertheless, the Japanese were still pressing on the 61st Infantry Battalion's positions throughout the day. Field, who had command responsibility for the local area, decided to send two platoons from the 25th Infantry Battalion to provide support. Later, the remaining two rifle companies from the 61st were also dispatched, along with their mortar platoon. The muddy track meant that the Australians were unable to move anti-tank guns into position; however, as a stop-gap measure quantities of sticky bombs and anti-tank mines were moved up to the forward units. At 4:45 pm, with air and artillery support, the Australians launched a minor attack upon the Japanese forward positions which were located about 600 yd to the east of the mission, pushing the Japanese back a further 200 yd. Weary from the day's fighting, though, they withdrew to Motieau, west of the mission.

The Australians then attempted to break contact and withdraw towards a creek line where they hoped to establish a defensive line as darkness came. The Japanese stayed in close contact with the Australians, harassing their rear elements. The men from B Company then sought to establish their position, while the 2/10th Infantry Battalion made preparations to move eastwards towards Ahioma, passing through the lines of the 25th and 61st Infantry Battalions. In the early evening, Japanese ships shelled the Australian positions and later, at 10:00 pm, the Japanese launched a heavy attack on the Australians which continued sporadically through the night. By 4:00 am the following morning, the Japanese began to employ infiltration and deception techniques to try to outflank the Australian positions. Anticipating an armoured attack at dawn, the Australians withdrew back to the Gama River, which was situated 1 mi to the west. During the night, the destroyer Hamakaze entered the bay to make contact with the Japanese troops and land supplies. The landing force had been out of radio contact since 2:00 pm, and the destroyer was unable to raise it with either her radio or visual signalling devices. As a result, Hamakaze departed Milne Bay at 2:30 am without having landed any supplies.

Shortly after dawn, in the air, a Japanese force consisting of eight dive bombers with 12 Zero fighter escorts attacked the Allied airfield at Gili Gili. One of the attacking aircraft was shot down, while only a small amount of damage was inflicted. Meanwhile, around the mission as the Japanese reconnoitred Australian positions, the 2/10th Infantry Battalion, consisting of just 420 men, was ordered to the Gama River by Clowes. This operation was badly planned and did not have a clear purpose; it was launched as both a reconnaissance in force and a counter-attack, but evolved into an attempt to establish a blocking force at KB Mission. Moreover, while the Australians had no knowledge of the strength or intentions of the Japanese, no force would be able to reinforce the battalion once it moved outside the main defensive lines near the airstrips. The 2/10th's forward patrols made contact with the 61st Infantry Battalion at around 10:30 am on 27 August and, upon arrival at around 5:00 pm, they began to establish their position; with only limited entrenching tools, they found the going difficult. At this point, the troops from the 25th and 61st Battalion were ordered to pull back, having lost 18 men killed and a further 18 wounded, along with an unknown number missing in action.

At 8:00 pm the Japanese sent two Type 95 tanks with bright headlights into the plantation. The men from the 2/10th tried to disable them with sticky bombs, but due to the humid conditions the bombs failed to adhere to the Japanese armour. In the fighting that followed over the course of two and a half hours, the Australians suffered heavy casualties. Receiving indirect fire support from the 2/5th Field Regiment's 25 pounder guns situated near Gili Gili, they repelled four frontal attacks. However, by midnight the Japanese were inside the Australian position and in the confusion the 2/10th withdrew in some disorder to a number of scattered positions on the west bank of the Gama, which they reached by about 2:00 am on 28 August. A further assault, however, by tank-mounted infantry forced them back further, moving back through the 61st and 25th Infantry Battalions towards No. 3 Airstrip, which was still under construction, south of Kilarbo. During the brief engagement around KB Mission, they had lost 43 men killed and another 26 wounded.

As the 2/10th withdrew, the 25th Infantry Battalion, which had moved forward from Gili Gili to relieve the 61st, deployed around the airstrip and at Rabi, Duira Creek and Kilarbo, laying mines in key locations. The airstrip proved a perfect defensive location, offering a wide, clear field of fire, while at its end, thick mud served to prevent the movement of Japanese tanks. Around dawn the advancing Japanese troops reached the airstrip and, under the cover of field artillery and mortars, they launched an attack. Although the Australians did not know it, the tanks that were supporting the attack became stuck in the mud and were subsequently abandoned; they would later be discovered by an Australian patrol on 29 August. Meanwhile, troops from the 25th and 61st Infantry Battalions, along with Americans from the 709th Anti-Aircraft Battery, turned back the attacking Japanese infantry. Further strafing by Kittyhawks followed, and the Japanese were forced to fall back 2 km to the east of Rabi.

Following this, for the next two days there was a lull in the fighting. During this time, the Australians consolidated their defences. The 61st Infantry Battalion, despite being seriously depleted from the previous fighting, were ordered back to the perimeter around the airstrip, subsequently deploying around Stephen's Ridge, tying in with the 25th Battalion's positions between the coast and Wehria Creek. Fire support was provided by mortars from the 25th along with Vickers machine guns from the 61st and .30 and .50 calibre machine guns mounted on the American half-tracks. The American engineers and anti-aircraft gunners became the first American troops to engage in ground combat in New Guinea.

Elsewhere, the 2/12th Infantry Battalion began moving forward from Waigani to enable it to join the fighting later as a counterattacking force. They, along with the 2/9th, were subsequently tasked to carry out an attack from No. 3 Airstrip to KB Mission. Meanwhile, the Japanese also sought to reconfigure their forces and Mikawa decided to reinforce the forces that were already ashore. These reinforcements, consisting of 567 men from the 3rd Kure SNLF and 200 from the 5th Yokosuka SNLF, left Rabaul on 28 August. At around 4:30 pm an RAAF patrol spotted the Japanese convoy – consisting of one cruiser and nine destroyers – and subsequently reported this to the Allied headquarters. Believing that further landings were about to occur, Clowes cancelled his plans to begin a counterattack with the troops from the 18th Brigade. Orders were also passed for the 30 Kittyhawks at Gili Gili to be flown off to Port Moresby in case the Japanese succeeded in breaking through to the airfield. The attack did not take place, though, and consequently early in the morning on 29 August they returned, albeit minus two aircraft which had crashed during the move.

The Japanese convoy arrived off Waga Waga at 8:15 pm on 29 August, and began landing troops and supplies. While this was taking place the warships shelled Allied positions around Gili Gili and by 11:30 pm, had completed their landing. The shelling was not significant, however, and no casualties resulted from it. Throughout 30 August, the Australians carried out patrolling operations while the Japanese laid up in the jungle in preparation for an attack that night.

Later that night the Japanese began forming up along the track at the eastern end of No. 3 Airstrip by the sea, and at 3:00 am on 31 August they launched their attack. Advancing over open ground and illuminated by flares fired by the Australians, the first Japanese attack was repelled by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from 25th and 61st Infantry Battalions as well as the 46th Engineer General Service Regiment, and artillery fire from the Australian 2/5th Field Regiment. A further two banzai charges were attempted only to meet the same fate, with heavy Japanese casualties, including the Japanese commander, Hayashi. At this point, Commander Minoru Yano, who had arrived with the Japanese reinforcements on 29 August, took over from Hayashi, and after the survivors of the attack had reformed in the dead ground around Poin Creek, he led them about 200 yd north of the airstrip in an attempt to outflank the 61st Infantry Battalion's positions on Stephen's Ridge. After running into a platoon of Australians who engaged them with Bren light machine guns, the Japanese withdrew just before dawn to the sounds of a bugle call. The Japanese troops who survived this attack were shocked by the heavy firepower the Allied forces had been able to deploy, and the assault force was left in a state of disarray.

Australian counterattack

Early on 31 August, the 2/12th Infantry Battalion began moving towards KB Mission, with 'D' Company leading the way and struggling through muddy conditions along the track, which had been turned into a quagmire due to the heavy rain and equally heavy traffic. After passing through the 61st Infantry Battalion's position, at around 9:00 am they began their counterattack along the north coast of Milne Bay. As the Australians went they were harassed by snipers and ambush parties. They also encountered several Japanese soldiers who tried to lure the Australians in close for attack by pretending to be dead. In response, some Australians systematically bayoneted and shot the bodies of Japanese soldiers. At noon, the 9th Infantry Battalion, a Militia unit from the 7th Infantry Brigade, dispatched two companies to occupy some of the ground that the 2/12th had regained around No. 3 Airstrip and the mission.

Making slow going amidst considerable resistance, the Australians nevertheless reached KB Mission late in the day. A force of Japanese remained there, and the Australians attacked with bayonets fixed. In the fighting that followed 60 Japanese were killed or wounded. The Australians were then able to firmly establish themselves at the mission. Meanwhile, the two companies from the 9th Battalion took up positions at Kilarbo and between the Gama River and Homo Creek with orders to establish blocking positions to allow the 2/12th to continue its advance the following morning.

That night, a force of around 300 Japanese who had been falling back since they had run into the 61st Infantry Battalion on Stephen's Ridge, encountered positions manned by the 2/12th and 9th Infantry Battalions around the Gama River. In a surprise attack, the Australians inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese. After the battle the Australians estimated that up to 90 had been killed. Following this the Japanese began to employ infiltration techniques in an attempt to pass through the numerous listening posts that had been set up along the side of the track which formed the front of one side of the 2/12th's position. Elsewhere, at the mission, starting at around 8:00 pm, they carried out harassment operations in an effort to distract the Australians and assist their comrades to try to break through the Australian positions from the Gama River. This lasted throughout the night.

The following morning, 1 September, the 2/12th Infantry Battalion went on the offensive again, while a force of seven Kittyhawks attacked the Japanese headquarters around Waga Waga. By this time, the Japanese had abandoned the objective of reaching the airfields and instead sought only to hold off the Australians long enough to be evacuated. This information was not known by the Allies, however, who were in fact expecting the Japanese to undertake further offensive action. In this regard, the 2/9th, initially with orders to join the 2/12th's counterattack, was delayed an extra day after an erroneous intelligence report from MacArthur's headquarters warning Clowes of a renewed Japanese attack forced him to briefly adopt a more defensive posture. The attack did not occur and, as a result, on 2 September the 2/9th was moved by barge up to the KB Mission. The next day it took over from the 2/12th and led the Australian advance. With the Japanese position at Milne Bay close to collapse, on 2 September Yano sent a radio message to the headquarters of the 8th Fleet which stated: "[w]e have reached the worst possible situation. We will together calmly defend our position to the death. We pray for absolute victory for the empire and for long-lasting fortune in battle for you all".

The terrain in this part of the bay offered significant advantage to defending forces, lined as it was with numerous creeks which slowed movement and obscured firing lanes. Throughout 3 September, the 2/9th Infantry Battalion came up against significant resistance; in one engagement that took place around mid-morning along a stream to the west of Elevada Creek they lost 34 men killed or wounded as they attempted to force their way across a creek. Engaged with sustained machine gun fire, the two assault platoons withdrew back across the creek while elements of another company that was in support moved to the northern flank. Launching their assault, they found that the Japanese had withdrawn, leaving about 20 of their dead.

Following this, the 2/9th advanced a further 500 yd, reaching Sanderson's Bay, before deciding to set up their night location. That night Japanese ships again shelled Australian positions on the north shore of the bay, but without causing any casualties among the defenders.

On 4 September, the Australian advance continued as the 2/9th moved up the coast either side of the coastal track. After about one hour, the advance company struck a Japanese defensive position at Goroni. Throughout the day the Australians worked to outflank the position before launching an attack at 3:15 pm. During this action, one of the 2/9th's sections was held up by fire from three Japanese machine gun positions. Corporal John French ordered the other members of the section to take cover before he attacked and destroyed two of the machine guns with grenades. French then attacked the third position with his Thompson submachine gun. The Japanese firing ceased and the Australian section advanced to find that the machine gunners had been killed and that French had died in front of the third position. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for his "cool courage and disregard of his own personal safety" which "saved members of his section from heavy casualties and was responsible for the successful conclusion of the attack". By the end of the 4th, the Japanese force included only 50 fully fit soldiers; all the other surviving troops were either incapacitated or could only offer token resistance. In addition, the commanders of all the Japanese companies had been killed and only three or four platoon leaders remained.

Japanese withdrawal
Following the fighting on 31 August, the Japanese forces ashore had reported the situation to their headquarters at Rabaul. In response, plans were made to send the Aoba Detachment, which comprised the Army's 4th Infantry Regiment and an artillery company, to Rabi to complete the capture of the airfield. However, they were not scheduled to arrive until 11 September and so it was planned in the meantime to reinforce Yano's men with 130 men from the 5th Yokosuka SNLF. An abortive attempt was made to land these troops on 2 September and then again on 4 September. By that time, however, as further reports were received by the Japanese headquarters, it became apparent that Yano's troops would not be able to hold out until the Aoba Detachment could arrive. As a result, on 5 September, the Japanese high command ordered a withdrawal. This was carried out from the sea that evening.

Meanwhile, six Beauforts of No. 100 Squadron RAAF had arrived at Milne Bay on 5 September. An additional three Beaufighters of No. 30 Squadron RAAF, the first to operate this aircraft, joined them the following day. The Beauforts were tasked with providing additional support against further landings and undertaking anti-shipping missions. On 6 September, the Allied offensive reached the main camp of the Japanese landing force, fighting a number of minor actions against small groups that had been left behind after the evacuation.

Shortly after ten on the evening of 6 September, as the freighter MV Anshun (1930) was continuing unloading cargo under her lights, the port came under fire from the Japanese cruiser Tenryū and the destroyer JAPANESE DESTROYER Arashi with Anshun receiving about ten hits from the cruiser and rolling onto her side. The Japanese ships also shelled shore positions at Gili Gili and Waga Waga and illuminated, but did not fire on, the hospital ship Manunda which was displaying her hospital ship colours and lights. The next night, two Japanese warships – a cruiser and a destroyer – bombarded Australian positions causing a number of casualties for 15 minutes before leaving the bay; it would be their final act in the battle. During the mopping up operations that followed, patrols by Australian troops tracked down and killed a number of Japanese troops who were attempting to trek overland to Buna.

The 350 Japanese troops who had been stranded on Goodenough Island after their barges were destroyed on 24 August were not rescued until late October. An attempt to evacuate the force on 11 September ended in failure when the two destroyers assigned to this mission were attacked by USAAF aircraft, resulting in the loss of JAPANESE DESTROYER Yayoi. Two further attempts to rescue the force on 13 and 22 September were unsuccessful, though supplies were air-dropped on Goodenough Island. A submarine landed further supplies and evacuated 50 sick personnel on 3 and 13 October. As part of the preparations for the attack on Buna and Gona, the 2/12th Infantry Battalion was assigned responsibility for securing Goodenough Island on 19 October. The battalion landed on the island three days later. A series of small engagements on 23 and 24 October cost the Australian force 13 killed and 19 wounded, and the Japanese suffered 20 killed and 15 wounded. The remaining Japanese troops were evacuated by two barges to nearby Fergusson Island on the night of 24 October, and the light cruiser Tenryū rescued them two days later. After securing the island, the 2/12th began work on building Vivigani Airfield on its east coast.

Base development

The Allies continued to develop the base area at Milne Bay in support of the counter-offensive along the northern coast of Papua and New Guinea. The American base became US Advanced Sub Base A on 21 April 1943, US Advance Base A on 14 August and US Base A on 15 November. Its Australian counterpart, the Milne Bay Base Sub Area, was formed on 14 June 1943. Two 155 mm coastal guns with searchlights were provided to protect the base from naval threats. New roads were built and the existing ones upgraded to make them passable in the wet conditions. A meteorological record was set on 29 April 1944, when 24 in of rain fell in a 24-hour period. By June 1944, there was over 100 mi of road in the area.

A bitumen-surfaced second runway was built at No. 1 Airstrip by No. 6 Mobile Works Squadron RAAF, after which the original runway was only used for emergencies and taxiing. The minefield around No. 3 Airstrip was lifted and the airstrip was completed, with revetments and hardstands for 70 medium bombers. A new wharf, known as Liles' wharf after the American engineer who supervised its construction, was built in September and October 1942. This was capable of handling Liberty ships. Henceforth ships could sail direct to Milne Bay from the United States, reducing the pressure on Australian ports and saving two or three days' sailing time in addition to the time formerly taken to unload and then reload the cargo on smaller ships in those ports. PT boats were based at Milne Bay from December 1942, with PT boat overhaul facilities, a destroyer base, a transshipment and staging area and a Station Hospital also constructed.

On 14 April 1943, the Allied base was attacked by 188 Japanese aircraft during the Japanese air offensive, Operation I-Go. The base's anti-aircraft defences were limited, but a force of 24 RAAF Kittyhawk fighters were on hand to respond to the attack. Minor damage was inflicted on the supply dumps around the airfields, while one British motorship, Gorgon, was damaged and Van Heemskerk, a Dutch transport carrying US troops, was sunk. At least three Allied aircraft were shot down, while the Japanese lost seven aircraft. Later, Milne Bay was used as a staging area for mounting the landing at Lae in September 1943, and the New Britain Campaign in December. The base at Milne Bay remained operational until the end of the war.

War crimes
During the Australian counterattack, the advancing troops found evidence that the Japanese had committed a number of war crimes at Milne Bay, specifically the execution of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians. None of the 36 Australian troops who were captured by the Japanese survived; a number of them were found to have been executed with some showing signs of having been mutilated as well. In addition, at least 59 civilians were also murdered between 25 August and 6 September; included in this were a number of Papuan women who were sexually assaulted before being killed. The war crimes committed at Milne Bay hardened Australian soldiers' attitudes towards Japanese troops for the remainder of the war. Historian Mark Johnston has written that "the Australians' relentless killing of Japanese then and thereafter owed much to a determination both to retaliate in kind and to take revenge for Japanese atrocities and rumoured maltreatment of POWs".

Later, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, commissioned a report by William Webb on war crimes committed by the Japanese. Webb took depositions about the Milne Bay incident from members of the Allied forces who had been present, and used them to form part of his report. In 1944 this was submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, which had been set up by the Allies following the Moscow Declaration. Evidence about the crimes was presented to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal on 2 January 1947, but no Japanese personnel were prosecuted for actions during the fighting at Milne Bay.

Results
The Australians estimated Japanese casualties to be around 700 to 750 killed in action, and a Japanese source reported 625 killed in action. Of the 1,943 Japanese soldiers that were landed at Milne Bay, ships from the Japanese 18th Cruiser Division managed to evacuate 1,318 personnel, including 311 who were wounded. The Australians suffered 373 casualties, of which 167 were killed or missing in action. US forces lost 14 personnel killed and several wounded.

Although Allied casualties during the battle had been light, in the wake of the battle, Milne Bay suffered an epidemic of malaria that posed a threat to the base as great as that from the Japanese attack. Over one-sixth of Milne Force, including Clowes, came down with the disease. The incidence of malaria soared to 33 per thousand per week in September (equivalent to 1,716 per thousand per annum), and to 82 per thousand per week in December (equivalent to 4,294 per thousand per annum). At this rate, the whole force could have been incapacitated in a matter of months. It placed enormous strain on the medical units and the supplies of anti-malarial drugs. The Chief Pathologist of New Guinea Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ford, went to see Blamey, who was now in personal command of New Guinea Force, and told him that 1,000 men and a large quantity of anti-malarial supplies were urgently required at Milne Bay to avert a disaster. Blamey took a personal interest in the matter. He expedited supply shipments, and made the required personnel available. The arrival of quantities of the new drug atabrine allowed this more effective drug to be substituted for quinine. The incidence of malaria dropped dramatically after December, the month in which atabrine became the official Australian prophylactic drug, and by March 1943 the crisis had passed. After this, the incidence of malaria amongst the garrison at Milne Bay was similar to other bases in Papua and New Guinea.

Strategically, as a result of the fighting around Milne Bay, Japanese operations within the region were constrained. The defeat at Milne Bay kept them from bypassing the holding action that the Australians were conducting on the Kokoda Track. Milne Bay showed the limits of Japanese capability to expand using relatively small forces in the face of increasingly larger Allied troop concentrations and command of the air. The Japanese commanders were then forced to change their plans in the region, shifting their focus towards repelling the US forces that had landed on Guadalcanal, while maintaining a smaller effort around Buna–Gona, under Major General Tomitarō Horii. Once they had retaken Guadalcanal, they planned to reinforce Horii's forces and launch a reinvigorated attack on the Australians around Port Moresby. In the end, subsequent defeats at Buna–Gona and on Guadalcanal did not allow them to implement these plans, as the Allies gained the ascendency in the region throughout late 1942 and the Japanese were forced to fall back to the northern coast of New Guinea. In the aftermath of the battle, a large amount of intelligence was also gained by the Allies, providing their planners with a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese and their equipment. It also demonstrated that the Militia were an effective fighting force.

The most significant result, though, was the effect that the victory had on the morale of Allied servicemen elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, especially those on the Kokoda Track, and British troops fighting in Burma. Although the Japanese had previously suffered minor local defeats, such as those around Changsha in China, as well as the first landing at Wake Island and the Battle of the Tenaru on Guadalcanal, these actions, unlike Milne Bay, had not resulted in complete Japanese withdrawal and the abandonment of the military campaign. The Allied victory at Milne Bay therefore represented the first "full-scale defeat [of the Japanese] on land".

In Australia, initial public reaction to the victory at the time was one of cautious optimism. An article in The Canberra Times from early September 1942 labelled the victory a "tonic surprise", and while highlighting the example as a portent of future battlefield success by Australian forces in the region, also pointed out the task that lay ahead of the Australians in New Guinea remained a "major problem". Most significantly, though, it highlighted the importance of morale in turning the tide in the war, describing it as "the bridge that must carry all the vast and complicated effort being directed towards victory". Another article, which appeared in The West Australian at the same time, while also preparing the Australian public for the tough fighting that would follow in New Guinea, hailed the victory at Milne Bay as a "turning point", the instance of which signalled an end of a "rearguard campaign" and the start of an Allied offensive in the region.

Amongst individual Australian soldiers, the news of the victory helped to dispel some of the notions about the invincibility of the Japanese soldier that had developed in the psyche of Allied soldiers following the defeats of early 1942, and which had impacted on Allied planning up to that point. Some of these notions would remain until the end of the war, but the news of Milne Bay allowed some soldiers to rationalise the Japanese soldiers' past victories as being the result of tangible factors, such as numerical superiority, that could be overcome, rather than innate factors associated with the intangible qualities of the Japanese soldier that were not so easily overcome. After this, amongst the Allies there was "a sense that fortune's wheel was turning", and although leaders such as Blamey emphasised the difficulties that lay ahead, a feeling of confidence in eventual victory emerged. MacArthur warned the War Department that success was attributable to good intelligence that allowed him to concentrate a superior force at Milne Bay, and might not be repeatable.

After the war, the Australian Army commemorated the battle through the awarding of a battle honour titled "Milne Bay" to a number of the units that took part. The units chosen were the 9th, 25th, 61st, 2/9th, 2/10th and 2/12th Infantry Battalions. The two RAAF fighter squadrons that had taken part in the fighting were also singled out for praise by the Australian commanders for their role in the battle. Rowell stated: "the action of 75 and 76 Squadrons RAAF on the first day was probably the decisive factor", a view Clowes endorsed in his own report.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Battle of Milne Bay


text:
Talk:War of 1812

Infobox and belligerents, with Spain on the list
As things as they currently are, I have 3 observations

 * 1) Strength of US Allies is only 125 Choctaw. Surely, there must be more numbers for the various tribes?
 * 2) The Regency of Algiers has been added in good faith, but I do not think this should remain for much longer.
 * 3) Spain is listed. Given the Peninsular War was taking place, it did not have the resources to actively intervene, to launch an offensive, in overseas territories. (Simon Bolivar took advantage of Spain's weakness at this time.) A jittery Governor of Pensacola, Mateo González Manrique had his territory and his neutrality violated by the British officer Edward Nicolls, then Jackson came along and violated the neutrality. When Nicolls left, he took half the Spanish garrison away, which was stranded elsewhere for the remainder of the conflict.

There is no declaration of war on the part of Spain against the US, or vice versa. There was effectively a border dispute with the Battle of Pensacola (1814), but the impotence of the Spanish was not going to see any ongoing conflict on their part.

I don't see the US Navy listed as pro-Arab forces in the Six Day War, and I don't see the Brazilian armed forces, or the Finns, as combatants in the War in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945.

Spain has been mentioned in passing in the past

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:War_of_1812/Archive_22#Spain

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:War_of_1812/Archive_20#Infobox

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:War_of_1812/Archive_8#Spain?%60

I think as it currently stands, it is misleading, and implies Spanish forces engaged from 1813 through 1814. I am only aware of the capture of Pensacola on November 7, 1814 as the one time Spanish forces were engaged against the US Army during the War of 1812. I don't think being sandwiched between the fiery and ill-tempered personalities of Jackson and Nicolls was a particularly appealing prospect! Keith H99 (talk) 20:05, 24 April 2024 (UTC)

 * Where one side fights two separate wars at the same time, it does not mean that they are the same war or that the belligerents against a common belligerents are cobelligerents - unless the sources explicitly tell us otherwise. That two things happen at the same time does not mean they are the one thing. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:27, 26 April 2024 (UTC)

 * Per sources that I currently have available at hand (I'll find more later), but I've read about the British-Spanish alliance for years now.
 * " The Slaves Gamble: Choosing Sides in the War of 1812 by Gene Allen Smith (pg156)
 * "The rising fear that Andrew Jackson's army would soon descend on Pensascola convinced West Florida governor Mateo González Manrique to request British assistance, and within days the entire British Gulf force occupied Pensacola. Nicolls hoisted the Union Jack over the city in mid-August 1814 and declared himself the military commander of the city." Per Smith, the plan by Nicolls at Pensacola was to use the British forces (including the Colonial Marines), native tribes, and any available Spanish forces (with townspeople). The Spanish slaves were recruited from the city and this was a cause of friction because of their alliance.
 * " The Slaves Gamble: Choosing Sides in the War of 1812 by Gene Allen Smith (pg157)
 * "Cochrane had instructed Nicholls not to recruit Spanish slaves because Britain and Spain were then allies."
 * " The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World by Nathaniel Millett (pg47)
 * "“For centuries Spanish Florida had relied on blacks and Indians to defend itself against the aggressive encroachments of the British and the Anglo Americans. Now the Spanish were forced to rely on the British to defend them against the United States in an alliance that would have mystified earlier generations on both sides of the border." Millett notes that West Florida (Mobile) was mentioned by the British as part of the United States's violated of Article IX in the Treaty of Ghent.
 * " The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World by Nathaniel Millett (pg88)
 * “In the same month that the war officially ended, Alexander Cochrane expressed an opinion shared by many British politicians and military leaders when he wrote that Britain must take active measures, "for relieving West Florida from the usurped authority of the American Government (being a colony belonging to Spain) and at the same time to afford to the Indian Nations an opportunity of recovering territories of which they have been so unjustly deprived by the United States." The British feared an American Florida and wanted their Red Stick allies to recover the lands taken from them by the Treaty of Fort Jackson. These two goals were intertwined with the realization that a strong and well-armed Red Stick and Seminole presence in the Southeast represented the most realistic hope for Spain to maintain possession of the Floridas. With this in mind, the British encouraged the Red Sticks to endorse the Treaty of Ghent because of the inclusion of Article 9, calling for the restoration of Indian lands to their 1811 boundaries. Accordingly, Cochrane instructed Nicolls to "tell our Indian Allies that they have been included [in the treaty] and that they are placed as to territory as they were in 1811[.] If the peace shall not be ratified, you will have a large reinforcement sent to you at Apalachicola."
 * " The Greatest Fury: The Battle of New Orleans and the Rebirth of America by William C. Davis " (pg333)
 * "In fact, Britain's existing alliances with Spain and the Indian tribes complicated adherence to Ghent's territorial provisions. Spain wanted a friendly buffer state between an expansionist United States and its colonial possessions in Texas, Mexico, East Florida, and that part of West Florida east of the Pearl River."  Davis ends the paragraph with, "Returning New Orleans or any part of Louisiana defeated both goals and left the Americans poised to spread west across the Mississippi, and east to Spanish East Florida's doorstep.  That could only complicate British relations with its Spaniard allies.  It came down to the value Whitehall put on those alliance."  Davis noted that forces on the ground (Colonel Thorton and Captain Roberts) planned to ransom New Orleans back to President Madison.  Bathurst envisioned the possibility of keeping all or part of Louisiana indefinitely.
 * " The Greatest Fury: The Battle of New Orleans and the Rebirth of America by William C. Davis " (pg334)
 * "Whitehall repeatedly emphasized that the United States had no lawful title to Louisiana. It explicitly told Cochrane and Pakenham they could encourage Louisianans to seek independence from the United States or a return to Spanish dominion so long as they did not promise British assistance or alliance. Pakenham was actually told that New Orleans would probably be handed over to Spain, and Spaniards shared that expectation." Ironic Luck (talk) 21:15, 13 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Britain and Spain were allied against France. I don’t believe there was an alliance against the US and none of the sources you have quoted remotely suggest that there was.--Ykraps (talk) 19:47, 14 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Did France ever plan to attack Pensacola in 1814? I am aware of the British-Spanish alliance against the French.  Jackson tested the neutrality of the local Spanish authorities at Pensacola with a flag of truce brought forth by Major Pierre, but he (Pierre) was immediately fired upon.  Jackson additionally charged the local Spanish authorities with "providing shelter to British troops" (per Daughan) for his reasoning to storm Pensacola.
 * "1812: The War Nobody Won by Albert Martin" (pg142)
 * "As soon as the war began, the War Department asked Tennessee's governor for militia units to drive the British out of Florida. Florida at this time belonged to Spain, Britian's ally in the Napoleonic Wars. Although neutral in the American struggle, Spain went out of its way to be "neutral" in favor of Britain.  The Royal Navy freely used Florida's harbors, especially Pensacola, as if they were home ports."
 * I would add Ronald Drez's book (which also called out the British-Spanish alliance), but I was informed that he is considered non-RS per the current Wikipedia standards.
 * Here is what I see as a reasonable change: " Spanish Floridas (1814) " instead of "Spain (1813)"
 * The Spanish military had abandoned the local Spanish authorities, but this was primarily due to their decline. Professor McDougall notes this in his book:
 * "Freedom Just Around the Corner: A New American History 1585-1828 by Walter A. McDougall " (pg423)
 * "The War of 1812 settled the matter. Britain held Canada, but failed to arrest the growth of the United States.  Spain gripped her empire with no more than one legal finger.  All Indians within reach were vanquished."
 * The sources that I note above clearly have it written that there was an alliance between the local Spanish authorities and the British government. And it seems more than coincidental that there were discussions related to U.S. territory upon that British-Spanish alliance.  Ironic Luck (talk) 12:28, 15 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I was, of course, referring to a formal Spanish-British alliance; an alliance between the governments of Spain and Britain, not a temporary co-operation between local authorities and British troops, against an American land-grab. I don’t see anything in your sources to suggest the former and, in fact, one specifically states that Spain was neutral in the American struggle.--Ykraps (talk) 18:24, 15 June 2024 (UTC)

 * Martin noted that it was not really neutral, hence he used "neutral" with quotation marks in his book. Spain needed the British support and the local authorities asked for it.  The British were driven out; this outcome also hurt their reputation among the allied-Creeks.  The books that I cited do not refer to this as a "temporary co-operation."  Personally, I see it as fair to change it to Spanish Floridas (1814) as they were the ones whom executed the support for the British. Ironic Luck (talk) 00:57, 16 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Irrespective of Martin's confusion over what the terms of the neutrality were, he notes that they were neutral. Monroe also considered them neutral, writing to Jackson to tell him to not risk war with Spain. You are of course free to propose whatever changes you wish to the infobox. Personally, I would like to see an end to infoboxes entirely, not just here, simply because they cannot convey the whole story accurately.--Ykraps (talk) 07:55, 16 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I think there is more merit with Spanish Florida (1814) than what there currently is.Keith H99 (talk) 18:36, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I agree with the change to "Spanish Florida (1814)" instead of "Spain (1813)" on the belligerents section. Ironic Luck (talk) 07:57, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

 * The Patriot War, which took place at the same time as the War of 1812, appears to be so insignificant that it does not have a corresponding article in the Spanish language!!! Keith H99 (talk) 17:58, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Looking through the references posted here (I admit, I haven't read much on Spain and the war apart from this) it would seem Spain was officially neutral, so should be removed from the infobox as a belligerent. As a comparison, Ireland was officially neutral in WW2, even though it favoured the UK rather than German, but certainly isn't listed as a belligerent against Germany in the WW2 article.Deathlibrarian (talk) 08:30, 24 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Also, as per User:Cinderella157's comment I had also assumed there must be more US native allies than just 125 Choctaw. I knew the numbers favoured the UK, but only 125???Deathlibrarian (talk) 08:45, 24 June 2024 (UTC)

 * The belligerent should be changed to "Spanish Florida (1814)" based on the material cited. It's neutral on paper but not in practice; hence Spain (as a country) wanted Louisiana back and Spanish Floridas wanted British protection from the United States.  Was there ever an Irish city that Germany military took over and where (local) authorities were legally charged by Germany with "providing shelter to British troops" in comparison? Ironic Luck (talk) 07:57, 4 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Changed to reflect Spanish Florida. I would like to see a reliable source as to Spanish casualties at Pensacola. The most significant outcome was that the Spanish troops were taken elsewhere and marooned for the rest of the conflict. Keith H99 (talk) 18:48, 16 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Yep, I support Spanish Florida as well. Makes sense. Deathlibrarian (talk) 09:18, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

There was scarcely any War of 1812 content on the Spanish Florida article, which was surprising. There's some conflicting orders from Cochrane to Nicolls. He is to respect Spanish neutrality, yet at the same time he is to enter their territory, parley with the Indians, and recruit them to the British cause. The Spanish were in no position to stop the British, and Manrique saw Jackson as a more credible threat, on the back of recent fighting with the Patriot War and the Creek War. Perfidious Albion or Manifest Destiny, a rock and a hard place. Manrique's judgement went against that of his superior Apodaca, who wanted to maintain Spanish neutrality. Keith H99 (talk) 11:54, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

 * An interesting quote from the article on Pintado
 * 'Cochrane ordered the return of all slaves and Spanish troops captured by the British to Pensacola aboard one of his ships'
 * Do you capture your allies under usual circumstances? The Spanish source did not consider the British to be allies of the Spanish, clearly! Keith H99 (talk) 19:36, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 14 July 2024
remove claim about spainbeing on brtiain's side since no citation for it and it is not true. 64.189.18.51 (talk) 07:28, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Removed the citation needed tag as it was not needed.   [[User:CanonNi ]]  (talk • contribs) 12:41, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * @CanonNi A cursory google search suggests it is a matter of interpretation. Maybe a note on it? The "casualties" section also lists below 20. JackTheSecond (talk) 14:22, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:War of 1812


text:
Talk:Regime change

Untitled
To contribute to this article I will discuss international explanations for democratization. I will expand on the foreign imposed regime change section of the article but explaining how the use of sanctions and force can result in regime change. I will also explain Gunitsky’s typology on diffusion. I will also including a section on autocritization, focusing on the work of Bermeo. Carter925 (talk) 11:29, 9 April 2020 (UTC)

@Carter925 I think your plan for contribution is very clear, it is good you are focusing on a section and expanding on it with good literature, you have a clear direction. Wmair00 (talk) 16:09, 12 May 2020 (UTC)

Untitled
This says nothing about the international legal aspects of the topic (that to work towards a stated aim of overthrowing the government of a soverign nation is contrary to international law). --Daniel C. Boyer

 * Because, after all,

 * Regime change is a euphemism for the overthrow, either peaceful or via military coup d'etat, of a leader or government (regime) by another force.

 * The term was popularized by American President George W. Bush, in reference to Saddam Hussein's regime.

 * is too NPOV as it stands. --Calieber 20:07, Oct 27, 2003 (UTC)

And shouldn't it be the "policy" some other nation or nation, or entity or entities, "to support efforts to remove the regime headed by George W. Bush from power in the United States and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime?" --Daniel C. Boyer

credit the administration with sincerely seeking the good of the Iraqi people - yeah, those Baghdad firemen got some really keen fusible nylon T-shirts out of it - "The US wrecked my country and I all I got was this lousy T-shirt" - when has the US ever sought the good of the locals? - including the Kurds - although the admin promised Turkey before the war the Kurds would gain nothing - as well as seeking stablity in the region - even though some yahoo by the name of George H. W. Bush said c1998 that removing Saddam would destabilise the area... sorry to rant, but what kinda fool seriously thought it'd turn out any different than it has?

 * The kind who grew up as billionaire's sons surrounded by boot licking yes-men who always bailed them out and swept problems under the rug, and consequently these spoiled rich kids have never faced any consequences of their own failures and think that they can talk their way out of anything. Sorry to rant, but you're 100% right. -- Noclevername 07:21, 5 January 2007 (UTC)

Is there any reason why all references to regime change are typed in italics (like this: regime change)? Gaurav 08:22, 1 Jan 2004 (UTC)

Would it be worth adding some non-US examples of regime change, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?
 * It would, since the lack thereof means that the article doesn't have global perspective or whateveritscalled. -Fsotrain09 17:52, 22 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Regime change is actually a recurring occurrence throughout history. Any sort of conquest is often "an external overthrow of government." Sargon of Agade overthrew Lugal-zaggesi's regime in the 3rd millennium B.C.E. So are we making a distinction with this from regular old conquests? Most of the American regime changes are sort of along the lines of "replacing regimes unfavourable to our country's interests," which isn't the sort of rationale conquerors use. Brutannica 03:23, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

I would go as far as saying that no western government has ever sought the good of the people when changing any other countries government, unless we are talking about the people in the country whom is administering the change. --SprSynJn 22:24, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

Should this article even be here at all? It talks about "regime change" as if it is a recognized name for a general phenomenon in international relations, when in fact, AFAICT, it is just the phrase used by the Bush administration for what he wanted to see in Iraq. Are there any scholarly works about the general phenomenon of "regime change", with that name? Otherwise this entire article is original research.

I think a neutral and accurate description would be to modify the sentence criticized above as follows:

 * Regime change refers to the replacement of one leader or government (regime) by another.

 * The term was popularized by American President George W. Bush, in reference to Saddam Hussein's regime, and U.S. plans to affect such a change.

But this would arguably be original research too. --Mark Foskey 02:04, 7 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm flagging it as original research. Consider:

 * It can be argued that the idea of overthrowing a government from the outside and replacing it with a new one built "from scratch" traces back to the Potsdam Agreement, which suggested post-World War II designs for Germany but became largely irrelevant for the era of the Cold War.

"It can be argued" is a red flag for original research/analysis. Who made that argument? The citation makes no reference to the Potsdam Agreement.

A coup is regime change
I don't understand why this article is focussed on regime change via external forces. A coup is regime change, by definition! (Google "regime change" coup. While many of the hits are about externally-driven revolution, many correctly use the term regime change to refer to the changing of a regime by internal means.)

I intend to put some factual structure into this article! Starting... real soon now.

Don't be put off by misunderstanding what the US government's been on about throughout the noughties. They have actually been using the term correctly ("our desired outcome is regime change in Iraq...") despite what whoever wrote this article seems to think. 129.16.97.227 (talk) 17:48, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

...and so is revolution, restructuring, and reconstruction following a failed state! 129.16.97.227 (talk) 17:59, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

 * OK, I'm done for the moment. 129.16.97.227 (talk) 17:37, 29 December 2007 (UTC)

Need better citation on use of term since 1925
The second sentence of the article claims that "use of the term [regime change] dates to at least 1925." The citation is merely a link to the Oxford English Dictionary website, not to a specific article. Access to the definition is restricted to subscribers. Perhaps this is new, but it renders the citation useless for most readers.

Can someone provide a better citation? If not, i fear that we should remove the claim. That would be a shame, as it's interesting, but it should be verifiable. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mgllama (talk • contribs) 21:03, 12 March 2009 (UTC)

 * I have replaced the reference with a pointer to the Los Angeles Times article which the OED cites. I cannot find that LA Times archives are available on-line, however.--Keith Edkins ( Talk ) 22:38, 14 October 2015 (UTC)

General/medical use
I'm familiar with the term "regime change" as any change that would change the environment of a studied phenomenon without direct effect on the phenomenom itself. For example in medical usage (IRC) a regime change might change the balance of drugs a patient is on in an attempt to improve poor response.

It seems to me that the intro to the article is essentially US-centric and it is taking a phrase in regular use in British English and mis-specialising it for American. (I'm a native English speaker, being English.) Comments? (BTW I don't read my talk page, email jbowler@acm.org.)

Jbowler (talk) 05:41, 15 June 2009 (UTC) (that's four ~, or whatever the rune is, the UI sucks)

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Popular use
When your leader is a penis, "Regime change through penectomy" is a funny joke. 166.170.34.238 (talk) 12:18, 2 July 2016 (UTC)

Edit proposal "Internal regime change"
I plan to expand and improve the subheading "Internal regime change". I intend to do this by looking at multiple forms of internal regime change, making a distinction between change led by the elite or by the masses, and violent or non-violent. Additionally, I will elaborate on these different forms by providing examples (or matching the existing examples) and look at the outcomes of internal regime change. To improve the overall quality of the article, I will add references to reliable sources. Tips are always welcome! Nsanorbart (talk) 13:40, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

five reasons government change
five reasons government change — Preceding unsigned comment added by 105.112.104.223 (talk) 14:10, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

'Forcible or coercive?'
Article begins by defining regime chanfe as 'forcible or coercive' but then includes many references to states meddling in overseas elections. How is this 'forcible or coercive'? Crawiki (talk) 17:38, 1 November 2022 (UTC)

State reconstruction vs regime change
State reconstruction is partly forcible (defeated troops/insurgents must be disarmed and demobilised) and partly not(creation of new judiciary, police, civil service, executive etc), and very obviously, elections cannot be 'forcible' or theyre invalid. So is state reconstruction a separate topic requiring a separate article? Crawiki (talk) 12:43, 18 November 2022 (UTC)

title: Talk:Regime change


text:
List of governors of Connecticut

The governor of Connecticut is the head of government of Connecticut, and the commander-in-chief of the state's military forces. The governor has a duty to enforce state laws, and the power to either approve or veto bills passed by the Connecticut General Assembly and to convene the legislature. Unusual among governors, the governor of Connecticut has no power to pardon. The governor of Connecticut is automatically a member of the state's Bonding Commission. He is an ex-officio member of the board of trustees of the University of Connecticut and Yale University.

There have been 69 post-Revolution governors of the state, serving 73 distinct spans in office. Four have served non-consecutive terms: Henry W. Edwards, James E. English, Marshall Jewell, and Raymond E. Baldwin. The longest terms in office were in the state's early years, when four governors were elected to nine or more one-year terms. The longest was that of the first governor, Jonathan Trumbull, who served over 14 years, but 7 of those as colonial governor; the longest-serving state governor — with no other position included in the term — was his son, Jonathan Trumbull Jr., who served over 11 years. The shortest term was that of Hiram Bingham III, who served only one day before resigning to take an elected seat in the United States Senate. Additionally, Lowell Weicker is noted for a rare third party win in American politics, having been elected to a term in 1990 representing A Connecticut Party.

The current governor is Ned Lamont, a Democrat who took office on January 9, 2019.

Governors
Connecticut was one of the original Thirteen Colonies and was admitted as a state on January 9, 1788. Before it declared its independence, Connecticut was a colony of the Kingdom of Great Britain.

Connecticut did not create a state constitution for itself until several decades after it became a state; until 1818, the state operated under the provisions of its colonial charter. The charter called for the election of a governor every year, but not more than once every two years, with the term commencing on the second Thursday in May.

The current Constitution of Connecticut, ratified in 1965, calls for a four-year term for the governor, commencing on the Wednesday after the first Monday in the January following an election. The previous constitution of 1818 originally had only a one-year term for governor; this was increased to two years in 1875, and four years in 1948. The 1875 amendment also set the start date of the term to its current date; before then, it was the first Wednesday in the May following an election. The constitution provides for the election of a lieutenant governor for the same term as the governor. The two offices are elected on the same ticket; this provision was added in 1962. In the event of a vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor becomes governor. Before the adoption of the 1965 constitution, the lieutenant governor only acted as governor. There is no limit of any kind on the number of terms one may serve.

title: List of governors of Connecticut