text:
Steele v. United States (113 U.S. 128)/Opinion of the Court

The appellant was the claimant in the court of claims. He brought his suit April 30, 1880, to recover from the United States the sum of $3,400 for plumbing done by him on the United States steam-ship Quinnobaug under a contract made with I. Hanscom, the chief of the bureau of construction and repair of the navy department, on behalf of the government, in the year of 1875. There was no dispute that there was due to him on his contract for work done the sum sued for. The controversy arose on a plea of cross-demand, filed by the United States, which alleged that the officers of the government delivered to the appellant a large amount of old material to be utilized and reworked by him for the plumbing of the Quinnebaug; that a small portion of the material thus delivered he reworked for that purpose, but the greater portion thereof * *  * he sold to third parties, realizing therefrom the sum of $20,000. The court of claims found that during the spring and summer of the year 1875 there were delivered to the appellant, by R. W. Steele, who was a naval constructor in the United States nevy, 103,949 pounds of old material resulting from the breaking up of certain monitors; that before such delivery there had been no survey or inspection of the old material, and that of the amount so delivered the appellant sold and disposed of 98,748 pounds, for which he received money and property to the amount of $8,975.56, and the residue was lost in breaking up, handling, and sorting. These findings full established the cross-demand of the government for $8,975.56. The court, therefore, in adjusting the controversy, after charging the appellant with a payment on his claim of $3,900 and another item for $300, about neither of which there was any dispute, held him liable for the amount so received by him for the old material, which was sufficient to extinguish his claim and leave a balance of $3,575.56 due the United States. The court, therefore, rendered judgment against him for that amount, and from that judgment the present appeal is taken.

Upon the facts above stated, it is clear that the judgment of the court of claims was right. But the appellant insists that the other facts found by the court show that it was in error, and that its judgment shoula have been for the appellant for the amount of the claim for which his suit was brought. These facts were as follows: In the latter part of March, or early in April, 1875, the appellant had an interview, in the city of Washington, with Isaiah Hanscom, chief of the bureau of construction and repair in the navy department, at which the two came to some verbal understanding that the appellant was to do the necessary plumbing on the United States steam-ship Quinnebaug, which was then on the ways in the Philadelphia navy yard, and that Hanscom gave the appellant verbal instructions to go on with the work. In the same interview the matter of using on the Quinnebaug old mateirla taken out of other vessels was talked of, and Hanscom spoke of the material as being worth $2,000, but it did not appear what material or what quantity of material was referred to. Afterwards, on April 6, 1875, the appellant wrote a letter to Hanscom, in which he offered to furnish all the material and labor necessary for the plumbing of the Quinnebaug for $14,500, and take in whole or part payment any brass or lead from old vessels that he could use for that purpose. On the receipt of this letter, Hanscom directed Edward Hartt, who was a naval constructor on duty at the Philadelphia navy yard, to draw up specifications for the plumbing to be done on the Quinnebaug, and to solicit proposals therefor. Proposals were accordingly called for and received by the bureau of construction and repair, but the proposal contained in the appellant's letter of April 6th was the lowest bid for the work.

On April 15, 1875, Hanscom sent an order in writing to Naval Constructor R. W. Steele to have all the old lead, brass, and composition arising from the breaking up of the monitors, naming them, weighed, boxed up, and sent to Philadelphia, and to report the amount to the bureau. The officer to whom the order was addressed, interpreting it as authority from the bureau to deliver to the appellant the old material therein referred to, delivered it to him, and the appellant received the 103,949 pounds of such material heretofore mentioned as the property of the United States. On July 9, 1875, Naval Constructor R. W. Steele wrote to Hanscom that he had delivered the old material to the appellant, that it was estimated to be worth $2,000, which sum would be deducted from the first payment due him for his work. He added: 'I beg to say that it was impossible to arrive at a satisfactory estimate of its value when appraised; there was much alloy and dirt mixed with it, and the cost of transportation and labor in separating and preparing it for use is not known, which makes it necessary to correct the value after I obtain full information on the subject, and before his contract is completed and adjusted.' Naval Constructor Steele was led to put this estimate upon the value of the old material by the statement made to him by Naval Constructor Hartt, who was superintending the plumbing on the Quinnebaug, that he supposed its value to be $2,000. But it did not appear that Hartt had ever seen any of the 103,949 pounds of old material, but he assumed its value to be $2,000, and so set it down in his account-book in his office, and so charged it against the appellant in the settlement of the account of the latter.

On July 30, 1875, Hanscom, as chief of the bureau of construction and repair, wrote to the appellant declining his proposal to do the plumbing work on the Quinnebaug for $14,500, and offered to pay him therefor the sum of $12,000, but with the following stipulation: 'The old materials, the government will furnish you to be reworked, which have accumulated from the breaking up of the light-draft monitors, [naming them,] will go towards the materials used in this work; the balance to be paid in two equal payments, in money, on the certificate of the naval contractor superintending the work that the work is satisfactorily completed, according to the specifications which will be furnished.' The appellant accepted this proposition by letter, dated August 2, 1875. There was no proof that he did any work on the Quinnebaug until after this correspondence. Upon these facts the contention of the appellant is that the court should have charged him with the value of the old material at $2,000, and not at $8,975.56. This contention is based on the ground that Naval Constructor R. W. Steele, in his letter to Hanscom, dated July 9, 1875, estimated the old material, delivered to the appellant, to be worth $2,000, and stated that this sum would be deducted from his first payment, and that Naval Constructor Hartt so charged it against him at that sum in the settlement of appellant's account. We think this an inadequate reason for allowing the appellant to appropriate for $2,000 property of the United States, which it is shown he disposed of for $8,975.56. There had been no inspection or appraisement by any officer of the United States of the old material delivered to the claimant, but merely a loose estimate of its value by Naval Constructor Hartt, who had never seen it, and there was no contract between the appellant and the United States which bound the latter to deliver this old material at the estimate put upon it by Hartt, or to deliver what was not used on the Quinnebaug at all.

The contract between the parties was that made by the offer contained in the letter of Hanscom to the appellant of July 30, 1875, and its acceptance by the appellant in his letter to Hanscom, dated August 2d following. These letters are set out in the appellant's petition as expressing the contract which was the basis of his cause of action. The previous verbal understanding referred to in the findings of the court of claims was merged in it. It is clear from the terms of the proposition made by Hanscom to the appellant on July 30, 1875, and accepted by the latter on August 2d, that it was only such old material as could be reworked in the plumbing of the Quinnebaug that was to be transferred to the appellant, and its value deducted from the contract price of the work. There was no offer on the part of Hanscom to deliver to the appellant old material which could not be used on the Quinnebaug in payment of the stipulated price for his work. Even if such had been the contract, it would have been unauthorized; for section 1541 of the Revised Statutes provides that 'the secretary of the navy is authorized and directed to sell at public sale such vessels and materials of the United States navy as, in his judgment, cannot be advantageously used, repaired, or fitted out; and he shall, at the opening of each session of congress, make a full report to congress of all vessels and materials sold, the parties buying the same, and the amount realized therefrom, together with such other facts as may be necessary to a full understanding of his acts.' Section 3618 provides that 'all proceeds of old material * *  * shall be deposited and covered into the treasury as miscellaneous receipts on account of proceeds of government property, and shall not be withdrawn or applied except in consequence of a subsequent appropriation made by law.' These sections confer upon the secretary of the navy the only authority by which he can dispose of the materials of the United States navy. When, in the judgment of the secretary, they can be advantageously used, they must be used; when they cannot be so used, they must be sold at public sale, and the proceeds covered into the treasury. No officer of the navy department had any authority, therefore, to deliver to the appellant the materials of the navy to be sold by him, and to allow him to put the proceeds into his own pocket.

If we yield to the contention of the appellant, we should be required to hold that an officer of the navy could, without inspection or appraisement, trade off to a contractor in payment of the money due him on his contract, not only materials of every description, but even the vessels of the United States when, in his judgment, they could not be advantageously used, repaired, or fitted out. It appears, therefore, that the appellant was not entitled, by the terms of the contract, to the material delivered to and sold by him, and if his contract had so provided, it would have been without authority of the statute, and therefore void. The case of the appellant is not aided by the fact of the delivery to him, before the written contract was made, of the old material in question. The delivery was without any authority of the navy department; and, to put it in the most favorable light for the appellant, the delivery was made to him by mistake. But whether with or without authority of the department, if it was intended to vest in the appellant any title to the material, it was without authority of law, and cannot be set up as a ground of any right in him.

The case, therefore, comes to this: The appellant claims to hold, without accounting therefor, except at less than one-fourth its value, the proceeds of old material belonging to the navy of the United States, which had been delivered to him without the sanction of law, and to which he had no title, either by contract or otherwise. The property was the property of the United States, and the appellant must be held accountable for its full value. The fact that the account of the appellant was settled by the officers of the navy department by charging him with the value of the old material at $2,000 is no bar to the recovery of its real value by the government. The whole transaction was illegal, and appellant is chargeable with knowledge of the fact. It was, in effect, a private sale of the property of the United States, without survey, inspection, or appraisement, at a grossly inadequate price. The fact that the account had been settled by the officers of the navy department did not cure the unauthorized acts. Both the disposition of the property and the settlement of the account were without authority of law, and not binding on the government. Nor can laches, in not objecting to the settlement of the appellant's account at an earlier time, be imputed to the United States, and set up as a bar to the recovery of the value of the property unlawfully appropriated. This is a case for the application of the rule, ''nullum tempus occurrit regi. Lindsey v. Miller'', 6 Pet. 669; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.

Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Steele v. United States (113 U.S. 128)/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Independent School-Dist of Ackley v. Hall

This was a suit to recover principal and interest claimed to be due the defendant in error, on negotiable bonds issued by the plaintiff in error.

By an act of the general assembly of the state of Iowa, approved April 6, 1868, it is provided that independent school-districts shall have power and authority to borrow money, for the purpose of erecting and completing school-houses, 'by issuing negotiable bonds of the independent district, to run any period not exceeding ten years, drawing a rate of interest not exceeding ten per centum, which interest may be paid semi-annually; which indebtedness shall be binding and obligatory on the independent school-district for the use of which said loan shall have been made.' The act prescribes the mode in which the school-board shall submit to the voters of the district the question of issuing bonds, and declares that 'if a majority of the votes cast on that question be in favor of such loan, then said school-board shall issue bonds to the amount voted, * * * due not more than ten years after date, and payable, at the pleasure of the district, at any time before due, which said bonds shall be given in the name of the independent district issuing them, and shall be signed by the president of the board and delivered to the treasurer, taking his receipt therefor, who shall negotiate said bonds at not less than their par value, and countersign the same when negotiated.' With those statutes in force there was issued, in the name of the plaintiff in error, (defendant below,) certain instruments in the following form:

'No. 1.   $500.00.

'INDEPENDENT SCHOOL-DISTRICT, ACKLEY, HARDIN COUNTY, IOWA.

'The Independent School-district of Ackley, Hardin county,     Iowa, promises to pay to Foster Brothers, or order, at the      Hardin County Bank, at Eldora, Iowa, on the first day of May,      1872, five hundred dollars, for value received, with interest      at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, said interest payable     semi-annually, on the first day of May and November in each      year thereafter, at the Hardin County Bank, at Eldora, on the      presentation and surrender of the interest coupons hereto      attached.

'This bond is issued by the board of school directors by     authority of an election of the voters of said      school-district, held on the twenty-third day of August,      1869, in conformity with the provisions of chapter 98, acts      Twelfth General Assembly of the state of Iowa.

'In testimony whereof, the said Independent School-district,     by the board of directors thereof, have caused the same to be signed by the president and secretary, this first day of      November, 1869.

[Signed]

'W. H. ROBERTS,

'President of the Board of Directors.

'S. S. LOCKWOOD,

'Secretary of the Board of Directors.

[Countersigned] 'F. EGGERT, Treasurer School-district.'

To each was attached coupons in the following form:

'Treasurer of Independent School-district, Ackley, Hardin     county, Iowa, will pay the holder hereof, on the first day of      November, 1874, at the Hardin County Bank, at Eldora, Iowa,      twenty-five dollars, for interest due on school-house bond      No. 8.

[Signed]

'W. H. ROBERTS, President.

'S. S. LOCKWOOD, Secretary.'

The defendant in error, (plaintiff below,) who is averred to be a citizen of New York, became the holder of eight of these obligations, with interest coupons attached, each one being indorsed in blank by Foster Bros., the original payees. This suit was brought to recover the amount due thereon, without any averment in the pleadings as to the citizenship of the payees. The district made defense upon various grounds. The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and there was a general finding for the plaintiff, upon which a judgment was entered against the district. To that finding and judgment the defendant excepted, (but without preserving, by bill of exceptions, the evidence upon which the court acted), and brought this writ of error.

Galusha Parsons and John F. Duncombe, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 137-138 intentionally omitted]

C. C. Nourse and B. F. Kauffman, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as above stated, and continued:


text: Talk:Independent School-Dist of Ackley v. Hall


text:
Independent School-Dist of Ackley v. Hall/Opinion of the Court

The jurisdiction of the court below is questioned, upon the ground that the bonds in suit are not promissory notes negotiable by the law-merchant, within the meaning of the first section of the act of March 3, 1875, determining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and, consequently, that the court could not take cognizance of the case unless it appeared affirmatively that a suit could have been brought therein by the original payees, Foster Bros., had they not parted with the bonds. In this proposition we do not concur. The recital, on their face, that they were issued on the authority of a popular election, held in conformity with a local statute, does not take from them the qualities and incidents of commercial securities. Indeed, the statute evidently contemplated that the bonds issued under its provisions should be negotiable instruments that would do the work of money in financial circles. They are described as 'negotiable bonds,' to be used for the purpose of borrowing money to be applied in the erection and completion of school-houses for the district. Its treasurer was directed to negotiate them at not less than their par value, and purchasers were assured by the statute that the indebtedness so incurred 'shall be binding and obligatory on the independent school-district for the use of which said loan shall have been made.' And this special enactment is in accord with the general law of Iowa; for, by the Code of that state, 'notes in writing, made and signed by any person, promising to pay to another person, or his order or bearer, or to bearer only, any sum of money, are negotiable by indorsement or delivery in the same manner as inland bills of exchange, according to the custom of merchants,' while the transfer of 'bonds, bills, and all instruments in writing by which the maker promises to pay to another, without words of negotiability, a sum of money,' is declared to be subject to any defense or counter-claim which the maker or debtor had against any assignor thereof before notice of assignment; thus showing that, equally in respect of negotiable promissory notes and negotiable bonds, the rights of the parties are determinable by the law-merchant. Iowa Code 1873, §§ 2082-2084.

These instruments, although described in the Iowa statute as bonds, have every characteristic of negotiable promissory notes. They are promises in writing to pay, at all events, a fixed sum of money, at a designated time therein limited, to named persons or their order. Upon being indorsed in blank by the original payees, the title passes by mere delivery, precisely as it would had they been made payable to a named person or bearer. After such indorsement the obligation to pay is to the holder. The decisions of this court are numerous to the effect that municipal bonds, in the customary form, payable to bearer, are commercial securities, possessing the same qualities and incidents that belong to what are strictly promissory notes, negotiable by the law-merchant. There is no reason why such bonds, issued under the authority of law, and made payable to a named person, or order, should not, after being indorsed in blank, be treated by the courts as having like qualities and incidents. That they are so regarded by the commercial world cannot be doubted. Manuf'g Co. v. Bradley, 105 U.S. 180. But it is contended that the word 'negotiable,' in the Iowa statute, is qualified by that clause, in the same enactment, which provides that bonds issued under it shall be 'payable at the pleasure of the district at any time before due.' These words were not incorporated into the bond. But if the holder took subject to that provision, as we think he did, it is clear that this option of the district to discharge the debt, in advance of its maturity, did not affect the complete negotiability of the bonds; for, by their terms, they were payable at a time which must certainly arrive. The holder could not exact payment be fore the day fixed in the bonds. The debtor incurred no legal liability for non-payment until that day passed. The authorities bearing upon this question are cited in Byles, Bills, (Sharswood's Ed.) c. 7; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 43 et seq.; Chit. Bills, 525 et seq.

In School-district v. stone, 106 U.S. 183, S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 84, it was held, in reference to similar bonds issued by another independent school district in the same county, that their recitals were not sufficiently comprehensive to cut off a defense resting upon the ground that the bonds there in suit were in excess of the amount limited by the state constitution, and consequently invalid. Applying that decision to the present case, counsel for the district insists that, as these bonds may be open to such a defense as was made in School-district v. Stone, they cannot be deemed negotiable by the law-merchant; in other words, that the negotiability of the instrument ceases whenever the maker is permitted, as against a bona fide holder for value, to establish a defense based upon equities between the original parties. But such is not the test prescribed by the statute defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States. If a promissory note is expressed in words of negotiability, the right of the holder of the legal title to invoke the jurisdiction of the proper circuit court of the United States is not affected by the citizenship of any prior holder, or by the circumstance that the party sued asserts, or is able to make out, a valid defense to the actions.

The assignments of error present another question that deserves consideration. The constitution of Iowa provides that 'every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.' The title of the statute under which those bonds were issued is, 'An act to authorize independent school-districts to borrow money and issue bonds therefor for the purpose of erecting and completing school-houses, legalizing bonds heretofore issued, and making school-orders draw six per cent. interest in certain cases.' The act contains six sections; the fourth providing that 'all school-orders shall draw six per cent. interest after having been presented to the treasurer of the district and not paid for want of funds, which fact shall be indorsed upon the order by the treasurer.' As there are two kinds of school-districts in Iowa, 'district township' and 'independent district,' the latter carved out of the former,-it is contended that the title to the act in question embraces two subjects: one relating to matters in which independent school-districts alone are concerned, and the other to matters in which the township district and independent districts are concerned. That whether school-orders, which may be issued for many purposes by districts of either kind, should bear interest or not is wholly foreign to the borrowing of money to build school-houses in independent districts. Iowa Code 1873, c. 9, tit. 12.

We are not referred to any adjudication by the supreme court of Iowa which sustains the point here made. On the contrary, the principles announced in State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 281, show that the act before us is not liable to the objection that its title embraces more than one subject. The object of the constitutional provision, that court said, was 'to prevent the union in the same act of incongruous matter, and of objects having no connection, no relation,' and 'to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another;' but that 'it cannot be held with reason that each thought or step towards the accomplishment of an end or object should be embodied in a separate act;' that 'the unity of object is to be looked for in the ultimate end, and not in the details or steps leading to the end;' and that 'so long as they are of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general denomination or object,' the act is constitutional. The doctrines of that case have been approved by the same court in subsequent decisions, and they are decisive against the point here raised. Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 83; Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104; McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 342; ''Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Highsmith'', 44 Iowa, 334. The general subject to which this special act relates is the system of common schools. That system is maintained through the instrumentality of district schools of different kinds. Provisions in respect of those instrumentalities-those referring to the erection and completion of school-houses in independent school-districts with money raised upon negotiable bonds, and others, to the rate of interest which all school orders shall bear relate to the same general object, and are only steps towards its accomplishment. See, also, Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 153, S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 391, where this subject was considered.

Other questions have been discussed by counsel; but, as they are not deemed important in the determination of the case, they will not be specially noticed. Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Independent School-Dist of Ackley v. Hall/Opinion of the Court


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Bovillus


text:
Page:Travels with a Donkey In The Cevennes.djvu/97

Rh than the main court, laid out in sandy paths and beds of party-coloured dahlias, and with a fountain and a black statue of the Virgin in the centre. The buildings stand around it four-square, bleak, as yet unseasoned by the years and weather, and with no other features than a belfry and a pair of slated gables. Brothers in white, brothers in brown, passed silently along the sanded alleys; and when I first came out, three hooded monks were kneeling on the terrace at their prayers. A naked hill commands the monastery upon one side, and the wood commands it on the other. It lies exposed to wind; the snow falls off and on from October to May, and sometimes lies six weeks on end; but if they stood in Eden, with a climate like heaven's, the buildings themselves would offer the same wintry and cheerless aspect; and for my part, on this wild September day, before I was called to dinner, I felt chilly in and out. When I had eaten well and heartily, Brother Ambrose, a hearty conversable Frenchman (for all those who wait on strangers have the liberty to speak), led me to a little room in that part of


text:
Clawson v. United States (113 U.S. 143)

[Statement of Case from pages 143-145 intentionally omitted]

F. S. Richards and Wayne MacVeagh, for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 145-146 intentionally omitted]

''Sol. Gen. Phillips'', for appellee.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court:

title: Clawson v. United States (113 U.S. 143)


text: Talk:Clawson v. United States (113 U.S. 143)


text:
Clawson v. United States (113 U.S. 143)/Opinion of the Court

By the laws of Utah regulating the mode of procedure in criminal cases, it is provided, among other things, that the defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the supreme court of the territory from any order, made after judgment, affecting his substantial rights. Laws Utah, 1878, tit. 8. c. 1, § 360. To that class belonged the order made by the court of original jurisdiction refusing bail, and remanding the accused to the custody of the marshal. But no appeal was taken from that order. And as the accused sued out an original writ of habeas corpus from the supreme court of the territory, we cannot, upon the present appeal, consider whether the court of original jurisdiction properly interpreted the local statutes in holding that the accused 'ought not to be admitted to bail, after conviction and sentence, unless some extraordinary reason therefor is shown.' There is nothing before us for review, except the order of the supreme court of the territory, which discloses nothing more than the denial of the application to it for bail, and the remanding of the prisoner to the custody of the marshal. That order, in connection with the petition for habeas corpus, assuming all of the allegations of fact contained in it to be true, only raises the question whether, under the laws of the territory, the accused, upon perfecting his appeal and filing the required certificate of probable cause, was entitled, as matter of right and without further showing, to be let to bail, pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Upon the part of the government it is insisted that the court below had by the statute a discretion in the premises which, upon appeal, will not be reviewed.

By the laws of the territory it is provided that 'an appeal to the supreme court from a judgment of conviction stays the execution of the judgment, upon filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction was had a certificate of the judge of such court, or of a justice of the supreme court, that in his opinion there is probably cause for appeal, but not otherwise;' also, that if this certificate is filed, 'the sheriff must, if the defendant is in his custody, upon being served with a copy thereof, keep the defendant in his custody without executing the judgment, and detain him to abide the judgment on appeal.' Laws Utah 1878, p. 138. Upon the subject of bail, the same laws provide that 'a defendant charged with an offense punishable with death cannot be admitted to bail when the proof of his guilt is evident, or the presumption thereof great;' also, that 'if the charge is for any other offense, he may be admitted to bail before conviction as a matter of right;' further, that 'after conviction of an offense not punishable with death, a defendant who has appealed may be admitted to bail: (1) As a matter of right when the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine only; (2) as a matter of discretion in all other cases;' still further, that 'in the cases on which the defendant may be admitted to bail upon an appeal, the order admitting him to bail may be made by any magistrate having the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus.' Id. 142, 146.

These statutory provisions so clearly indicate the legislative intent that no room is left for interpretation. As the judgment did not impose upon the appellant a fine only, his admission to bail, pending the appeal from that judgment, was not a matter of right, but was distinctly committed, by the statute, to the discretion of the court of judge to whom the application for bail may be made. The exercise of that discretion is not expressly nor by necessary implication forbidden in cases in which the certificate of probable cause is granted; for, by the statute, that certificate only operated to suspend the execution of the judgment of conviction, requiring the officer having the accused in charge to retain him in his own custody to abide the judgment on appeal. We do not mean to say that the granting of such a certificate is not a fact entitled to weight in the determination of an application for bail, but only that the statute does not make it so far conclusive of the question of bail as to prevent the court from considering every circumstance which should fairly and reasonable control or affect its discretion. Whether the supreme court of the territory abused its discretion in the present case is a question not presented by the record before us; for it does not contain any finding of facts, nor the evidence (if there was any apart from the record of the trial and of the proceedings upon the first application for bail) upon which the court below acted. Its judgment denying bail cannot, therefore, be reversed, unless, as contended by appellant, the certificate of probable cause necessarily carried with it the right to bail, and deprived the court of all discretion in the premises. But that construction of the statute is not, we think, admissible.

At the argument counsel for appellant laid stress upon the fact, averred in the last petition for habeas corpus, that the order committing him to the custody of the marshal had been executed by confining him at the penitentiary. The return of the officer is that the accused is in his custody under and by virtue of the order of commitment. It is not claimed that he is treated as a convict in the penitentiary, undergoing the sentence pronounced in pursuance of the judgment appealed from, but only that the officer uses that institution as a place for the confinement of the accused while the latter is in his custody. Whether that action of the officer be legal, is a question that does not now arise; for the application to the supreme court of the territory for habeas corpus only raised the question of the right of the accused to be discharged, on bail, from all custody whatever; and the present appeal is from the order, in that court, refusing such discharge, and remanding him to the custody of the marshal. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.


text: Talk:Clawson v. United States (113 U.S. 143)/Opinion of the Court


text:
United States Code/Title 42/Chapter 85/Section 7506a

§ 7506a. Interstate transport commissions CAA § 176A

(a) Authority to establish interstate transport regions
Whenever, on the Administrator’s own motion or by petition from the Governor of any State, the Administrator has reason to believe that the interstate transport of air pollutants from one or more States contributes significantly to a violation of a national ambient air quality standard in one or more other States, the Administrator may establish, by rule, a transport region for such pollutant that includes such States. The Administrator, on the Administrator’s own motion or upon petition from the Governor of any State, or upon the recommendation of a transport commission established under subsection (b) of this section, may—
 * (1) add any State or portion of a State to any region established under this subsection whenever the Administrator has reason to believe that the interstate transport of air pollutants from such State significantly contributes to a violation of the standard in the transport region, or
 * (2) remove any State or portion of a State from the region whenever the Administrator has reason to believe that the control of emissions in that State or portion of the State pursuant to this section will not significantly contribute to the attainment of the standard in any area in the region.

The Administrator shall approve or disapprove any such petition or recommendation within 18 months of its receipt. The Administrator shall establish appropriate proceedings for public participation regarding such petitions and motions, including notice and comment.

(1) Establishment

 * Whenever the Administrator establishes a transport region under subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator shall establish a transport commission comprised of (at a minimum) each of the following members:
 * (A) The Governor of each State in the region or the designee of each such Governor.
 * (B) The Administrator or the Administrator’s designee.
 * (C) The Regional Administrator (or the Administrator’s designee) for each Regional Office for each Environmental Protection Agency Region affected by the transport region concerned.
 * (D) An air pollution control official representing each State in the region, appointed by the Governor.
 * Decisions of, and recommendations and requests to, the Administrator by each transport commission may be made only by a majority vote of all members other than the Administrator and the Regional Administrators (or designees thereof).

(2) Recommendations

 * The transport commission shall assess the degree of interstate transport of the pollutant or precursors to the pollutant throughout the transport region, assess strategies for mitigating the interstate pollution, and recommend to the Administrator such measures as the Commission determines to be necessary to ensure that the plans for the relevant States meet the requirements of section 7410 (a)(2)(D) of this title. Such commission shall not be subject to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

(c) Commission requests
A transport commission established under subsection (b) of this section may request the Administrator to issue a finding under section 7410 (k)(5) of this title that the implementation plan for one or more of the States in the transport region is substantially inadequate to meet the requirements of section 7410 (a)(2)(D) of this title. The Administrator shall approve, disapprove, or partially approve and partially disapprove such a request within 18 months of its receipt and, to the extent the Administrator approves such request, issue the finding under section 7410 (k)(5) of this title at the time of such approval. In acting on such request, the Administrator shall provide an opportunity for public participation and shall address each specific recommendation made by the commission. Approval or disapproval of such a request shall constitute final agency action within the meaning of section 7607 (b) of this title.


text:
Bicknell v. Comstock

E. F. Bullard, for plaintiff in error.

A. B. Olmstead, for defendant in error.

MILLER, J.

title: Bicknell v. Comstock


text: Talk:Bicknell v. Comstock

title: Talk:Bicknell v. Comstock


text:
Bicknell v. Comstock/Opinion of the Court

This is a writ of error to the circuit court for the Eastern district of New York. The action is for a breach of covenants of warranty in a conveyance of land located in Iowa. It is a manifest attempt to obtain the judgment of this court on one of the complicated phases of the disputed titles growing out of the grants of lands on the Des Moines river to aid in improving the navigation of that river, and in constructing railroads through these lands, with a strong probability of the absence and ignorance of this suit on the part of all the persons really interested in the questions here raised. The plaintiff below (Comstock) is not the original grantee in the deed on whose covenants he sues. He does not allege that he has been evicted under any judicial proceedings from possession of the land, but, on the contrary, it is one of the agreed facts on which the case was heard by the court without a jury, that defendant, Bicknell, and those claiming under his deed, including, of course, the plaintiff, have been in actual possession of the land in question ever since May 23, 1862, a period of more than 22 years. We shall be able, however, to decide this case without answering the 24 errors assigned, by considering the thirteenth assignment alone, namely, that, under the facts in this case, the court should have found a perfect title was vested in Bicknell to the lot in question.

One of the facts admitted in the case stated is that: 'It is admitted that on the first day of May, 1869, a patent in due form was executed by the president of the United States, conveying to said Bicknell said lots 3 and 4, which patent was duly recorded in the general land-office on the same day at Washington, D. C., and thereupon the original was transmitted to the United States land-office at Fort Dodge, Iowa, for said Bicknell.' In June, 1878, the commissioner of the general land-office ordered a return of this patent to his office, and thereupon 'tore off the seals and erased the president's name front said patent, and mutilated the record thereof in the general land-office, all without the consent, and against the protest, of the grantees of said Bicknell.' That this action was utterly nugatory, and left the patent of 1869 to Bicknell in as full force as if no such attempt to destroy or nullify it had been made, is a necessary inference from the principles established by the court in the case of McBride v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378. That principle is that when the patent has been executed by the president, and recorded in the general land-office, all power of the executive department over it has ceased. It is not necessary to decide whether this patent conveyed a valid title or not. It divested the title of the United States, if it had not been divested before, so that Bicknell or his grantees being in possession under claim and color of title, the statute of limitation began to run in their favor.

The agreed case further finds that 'it is also admitted that the defendant, Bicknell, and his grantees, have been in actual possession of the premises in question ever since May 23, 1862, and during that period made permanent improvements upon said lot 3 of the value of more than $6,000.' As all title was out of the United States prior to this deed, in which this suit is brought, and vested in some one else capable of suing under the various acts cited to defeat Bicknell's title, or passed out of the United States by the patent to Bicknell in 1869, at the latest, the case makes a continued uninterrupted possession under Bicknell's title adverse to all the world of 15 years. Under the statute of Iowa 10 years of such possession is a perfect bar to any action to recover the land; and this applies to suits in chancery as well as actions at law. See Code Iowa, § 2529, subd. 5. The defense, therefore, of the plaintiff in this action to any suit brought against him for the land covered by Bicknell's deed is perfect, and he is in the undisturbed possession of the land held under Bicknell's claim for over 22 years. This court has more than once held that the lapse of time provided by the statutes makes a perfect title. In Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, it is said that 'the lapse of time limited by such statutes not only bars the remedy, but it extinguishes the right, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder.' And this doctrine is repeated in Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 289, and in Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 583. The court was asked on the trial to rule that under the facts found in this case a perfect title was vested in Bicknell to the lot in question. An though this may not be literally true in regard to Bicknell, we think it is true in regard to the title of Bicknell under which the property is now held by plaintiff. For this reason the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, with directions to enter a judgment for defendant, Bicknell, on the agreed facts.


text: Talk:Bicknell v. Comstock/Opinion of the Court


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Bowack, John


text:
United States v. Mueller

''Sol. Gen. Phillips'', for United States.

Enoch Tolten, for Mueller.

BLATCHFORD, J.

title: United States v. Mueller


text: Talk:United States v. Mueller

title: Talk:United States v. Mueller


text:
United States v. Mueller/Opinion of the Court

Before July 23, 1872, the United States advertised for proposals for furnishing and delivering at the site of the United States governmment BUILDING TO BE ERECTED AT CHICAGO, ILLINois, 'all of the dimension stone required in its construction.' John M. Mueller submitted a proposal, dated July 23, 1882, 'to furnish dimension stone in accordance with the attached advertisement,' at specified prices. This proposal was accepted by a notice to him, which said: 'You are hereby notified that your proposal to furnish all the dimension stone that may be needed for the exterior of the new custom-house building to be erected in the city of Chicago,' for specified prices, 'the stone to be delivered at the site of the building, and in such quantities and at such times as the department, or its duly-authorized agent, may direct, is accepted.' On the second of September, 1872, a written contract, in pursuance of such advertisement and proposal, was made between the United States and Mueller, which described Mueller as the person 'to whom was awarded a contract for certain dimension stone required in the construction of the new custom-hosue, court-house, and post-office building, at Chicago, Illinois, on his bid received under advertisement, and dated July 23, A. D. 1872.' By the contract, which was made on behalf of the United States by the supervising architect of the treasury department, Mueller agreed to furnish from his quarry, 'and deliver at the site of the aforesaid buildings, all of the dimension stone that may be required in the construction of said building,' and to furnish and deliver 100,000 cubic feet of the stone on or before the first of January, 1873, 'and the remainder at such times, and in such quantities, as may be required' by the supervising architect; and the United States agreed to pay to Mueller certain specified prices. The stone was known as 'Buena Vista freestone.'

On the ninth of December, 1871, Mueller entered into another contract with the United States, on his bid made under an advertisement, by which he agreed to furnish the cutting of the Buena Vista freestone to be used in the basement story, sill, and lintel course of said building, in accordance with a specification attached, by which he was to deliver the stone, cut and ready for setting, 'promptly and as required by the superintendent, so that the progress of the work will not be interrupted.' By the contract, all the stone for the area wall was to be cut, lewised and ready for setting on or before the first of March, 1873, and the pier-stones, and sill and lintel course, as soon thereafter as required by the superintendent.

On the eighteenth of July, 1873, Mueller entered into another contract with the United States, by which he agreed 'to furnish such number of mechanics and laborers as may be required from time to time' by the superintendent, and all of the tools and materials necessary to cut, dress, and if necessary box, all of the stone required for the construction of said building, 'and to cut such stone in such manner and at such place as may be required' by the superintendent, and to furnish, free of cost, to the government all shops, sheds and machinery necessary to cut, dress, and box said stone; and it was agreed, that all materials required for the cutting or boxing of said stone should be supplied only upon the requisition of the superintendent, and that not less than 250 stone-cutters, with the necessary complement of mechanics and laborers, should be employed 'at any time during the progress of the work;' Mueller to be paid for the labor full market rates 'of the labor' actually performed, increased by 15 per centum, and for the materials the lowest trade prices, increased by 15 per centum thereof.

On the fourth of August, 1873, Mueller entered into another contract with the United States, on a bid of his, by which he was to furnish all the tools, machinery, shops, and sheds, etc., required to saw, and to saw such of the stone supplied under his contract of September 2, 1872, as might be found necessary by the superintendent; the sawing to be done at such times and in such quantities as the superintendent might require, and Mueller to be paid a specified price for all stone sawn.

Mueller brought a suit, on these contracts, against the United States, in the court of claims, to recover sundry items, and, among them, pay for certain stones furnished, for which he had not been fully paid; also damages for suspensions and delays, enforced and caused by the United States, of work under the contracts, which kept Mueller and his men, machinery, plant, and capital idle; also damages because dimension stone was required for the construction of 'the steps and approaches leading up into said building,' but he was not allowed to furnish it. The court of claims allowed to him $20,000, as damages for suspensions of the work enforced by the United States, and $2,758.25 additional pay for the stones referred to, and rejected all the other items sued for, and rendered a judgment in his favor for $22,758.25. Among the items rejected was the claim for damages in respect to the stone for the 'steps and approaches.' The United States have appealed because of the allowance of the $20,000; and Mueller has appealed as to the item for 'steps and approaches.'

The finding of facts by the court of claims as to the $20,000 item is this: 'On the thirteenth of May, 1875, claimant was directed to stop shipment of stone until further orders, and on the fifteenth he was directed to stop cutting. On the twenty-fifth of May he was notified formally, in accordance with the language of the contract, 'that the party of the first part does not require that any more stock should be delivered at the present time. Whenever more is required you will be notified.' On the sixteenth of October, 1875, he was notified to resume cutting. In the summer and fall of 1877, when the work was nearing completion, he was directed to discharge workmen from time to time, so that the number was reduced below the minimum fixed in his contract. The work of sending forward stone was also resumed about the middle of October, and continued until about the first of December. The second suspension lasted until about the middle of February. These suspensions arose from a well-founded doubt as to the desirability of completing the Chicago custom-house with the Buena Vista stone, and on the site. Several commissions made lengthy and exhaustive examinations of the foundation and stone, pending which the United States stopped the work. The damages resulting to the claimant therefrom were $20,000.' The court was of opinion that, as the delay was caused by a contemplated change of purpose in regard to the stone and the site, the enforced suspension and delay were unjustifiable, and not covered by the stipulations in the contracts that the stone and the work should be furnished as 'required.' 19 Ct. Cl. 591. We are of opinion that the court was correct in its view. U.S. v. Smith, 94 U.S. 214.

The finding of facts as to the 'steps and approaches,' was as follows: 'The approaches or steps leading up into the building required, according to the plans for said building, a large quantity of cut dimension stone, to-wit, 17,-473.10 cubic feet, and, although the claimant was able and willing to furnish the same under his agreement, the officers of the United States refused to permit him to furnish the same; but it does not appear that he made any proposition to furnish it. The defendants determined that granite would be more suitable than sandstone for these approaches, and the amount required was furnished by other parties. If the claimant had been allowed to furnish sandstone, he would have made a profit of $6,115.58.' The court was of opinion that there was no violation of the contract. 19 Ct. Cl. 592.

The expression, 'steps and approaches leading up into said building,' used in the petition, and the expression, 'approaches or steps leading up into the building,' used in the finding of facts, are, perhaps, somewhat vague. But we must infer that the expression used in the finding means structures wholly outside of the building, not a part of it, but constituting a means of ascent on the way into the building. In this view, the stone used in the approaches or steps was not stone used in the construction of the building, within the meaning of the first contract and the original advertisement. The approaches may have been of cut dimension stone, and necessary for use in connection with the building after it was constructed; but, in the absence of anything more definite in the finding, it cannot be said that they were in the building, or a part of it. Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:United States v. Mueller/Opinion of the Court


text:
Consolidated Safety-Valve Company v. Crosby Steam Gage Value

[Syllabus from pages 157-158 intentionally omitted]

''Thos. Wm. Clarke and B. F. Butler'', for appellants.

B. F. Thurston and J. H. Millett, for appellees.

BLATCHFORD, J.


text: Talk:Consolidated Safety-Valve Company v. Crosby Steam Gage Value


text:
Consolidated Safety-Valve Company v. Crosby Steam Gage Value/Opinion of the Court

On the twenty-seventh of May, 1879, the Consolidated Safety-valve Company, a Connecticut corporation, brought a suit in equity, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, against the Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Company, a Massachusetts corporation, for the infringement of letters patent No. 58,294, granted to George W. Richardson, September 25, 1866, for an improvement in steam safety-valves. The specification of the patent is as follows:

'Be it known that I, George W. Richardson, of the city of Troy, in the county of Rensselaer, in the state of New York, have invented a new and useful improvement on a safety-valve for steam generators, and I do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear, and exact description of the construction and operation of the same, reference being had to the annexed drawings, making a part of this specification, in which Fig. 1 is an end view of my improved safety-valve and its seat, as seen from the bottom; Fig. 2 is an end view of the valve alone, as seen from the bottom; Fig. 3 is a vertical section at x, x, Fig. 1, of the valve and seat in position; Fig. 4 is a vertical section at y, y, Fig. 2, of the valve alone. Similar colors and letters of reference indicate corresponding parts in the several figures A, A, is the head of the safety-valve; B, B, B, B, are wings to guide the valve into its seat, E, E; c, c, is a circular or annular flange or lip, extending over, slightly below, and fitting loosely around, the outer edge of the valve-seat, E. E; D, D, is a circular or annular chamber, into which the steam immediately passes when the valve lifts from its seat at the ground joint, F, F; E, E, is the valve-seat; F, F, is the ground joint of the valve and seat; P is the countersink or center upon which the point of the stud extending from the scale lever rests, in the usual manner. The nature of my invention consists in increasing the area of the head of the common safety-valve outside of its ground joint, and terminating it in such a way as to form an increased resisting surface, against which the steam escaping from the generator shall act with additional force after it has lifted the valve from its seat at the ground joint, and so, by overcoming the rapidly increasing resistance of the spring or scales, insure the lifting of the valve still higher, thus affording so certain and free a passage for the steam to escape as effectually to prevent the bursting of the boiler or generator, even when the steam is shut off and the damper left open.

'To enable others skilled in the art of make and use my invention, I will proceed to describe its construction and operation. To the head of the common safety-valve, indicated by all that portion of Fig. 2 lying within the second circle from the common center, I add what is indicated by all that portion lying outside of the said circle, in about the proportion shown in the figure. A transverse vertical section of this added portion is indicated, in Fig. 4, by those portions of the figure lying outside of the dotted lines, p p, p, while all that portion lying within the dotted lines, p p, p p, indicatesa transverse vertical section of the common safety-valve alone. This increased area may be made by adding to a safety-valve already in use, or by casting the whole entire. I terminate this addition to the head of the valve with a circular or annular flange or lip, c, c, which projects beyond the valve-seat, E, E, Fig. 3, and extends slightly below its outer edge, fitting loosely around it, and forming the circular or annular chamber, D, D, whose transverse section, shown in the figure, may be of any desirable form or size. This flange or lip, c, c, fitting loosely around the valve-seat, E, E, is separated from it by about 1-64 of an inch, for an ordinary spring or balance. For a strong spring or balance this space should be diminished, and for a weak spring or balance it should be increased, to regulate the escape of the steam, as required. Instead of having the flange or lip, c, c, project beyond and extend below and around the outer edge of the valve-seat, as shown in Fig. 3, a similar result may be obtained by having the valve-seat itself project beyond the outer edge of the valve-head, and terminating it with a circular or annular flange or lip, extending slightly above, and fitting loosely around, the outer edge of the flange or lip, c, c, of the valve-head; but I consider the construction shown in Fig. 3 preferable. With my improved safety-valve, constructed as now described, and attached to the generator in the usual way, the steam, escaping in the direction indicated by the arrows in Fig. 3, first lifts the valve from its seat at the ground joint, F, F, and then, passing into the annular chamber, D, D, acts against the increased surface of the valve-head, and by this means, together with its reaction produced by being thrown down wards upon the valve-seat, E, E, it overcomes the rapidly increasing resistance of the spring or balance, lifts the valve still higher, and escapes freely into the open air until the pressure in the generator is reduced to the degree desired, when the valve will be immediately closed by the tension of the spring or balance. The escape of the steam by means of this safety valve is so certain and free that the pressure of the steam in the generator or boiler will not increase beyond the point or degree at which the value is set to blow off.'

The claim of the patent is this: 'What I claim as my improvement, and desire to secure by letters patent, is a safety-valve with the circular or annular flange or lip, c, c, constructed in the flange or lip, c, c, constructed in the manner, shown, so as to operate as and for the purpose herein described.' On the second of June, 1879, the same plaintiff brought a suit in equity, in the same court, against the same defendant, for the infringement of letters patent No. 85,963, granted to the same George W. Richardson, January 19, 1869, for an improvement in safety-valves for steam boilers or generators. So much of the specification of the patent as is involved in this suit is as follows:

'Be it known that I, George William Richardson, of Troy, in the state of New York, have invented certain new and useful improvements in safety-valves for steam boilers or generators; and I do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear, and exact description thereof, reference being had to the accompanying drawings making part of this specification, in which Fig. 1 is a vertical section of the safety-valve and its connections, taken in the plane of the axis of the valve-stem; Fig. 2, a horizontal section taken in the plane of the line, A, a, of Fig. 1; and Fig. 3 another horizontal section at the line, B, b, of Fig. 1. Fig. 4 is a vertical section taken in the plane of the axis of the valve, representing a modification of my said invention; and Fig. 5 a horizontal section thereof, taken in the plane of the line, C, c, of Fig. 4. My said invention relates to improvements in the invention described in letters patent granted to me, and bearing date the twenty-fifth day of September, 1866, which said patented invention relates to a means for providing a more free escape for the steam than could be obtained by safety-valves as constructed prior thereto, and to insure the keeping of the valve open until the pressure of the steam in the boiler or generator falls below the pressure which was required to open it; the said means so patented consisting in forming the valve with a surface outside of the ground joint, for the escaping steam to act against, the said surface being surrounded by a projecting or overlapping lip, rim, or flange, leaving a narrow escape for the steam when the valve is opened, but which although of greater diameter than the valve-seat, by reason of the said lap, presents a less area of opening for the escape of steam than is produced at the valve-seat, so that the steam which escapes through the area between the valve shall exert pressure against the said surrounding surface, and thereby not only open the valve completely, but hold it up until the pressure of the steam in the boiler falls below the pressure by which the valve was opened.

'One part of my pressent invention relates to a means for regulating or adjusting the area of the aperture for the escape of the steam after acting on the said surface outside of the valve-seat, so that the valve may be set to close at any desired pressure below the pressure which will open it; and this part of my invention consists in making the aperture or apertures for the escape of the steam, after it has acted on the said surface outside of the valve-seat, adjustable. * *  * I will first describe the preferred mode of application of my said invention, as represented in Figs. 1, 2, and 3 of the accompanying drawings. In the said figures, a represents the valve-seat, which is to be attached to a steam boiler or generator in the usual or any other suitable manner, and which is formed, in the usual manner, with a beveled seat from the valve, b, fitted thereto by what is well-known as a 'ground joint.' * *  * It is desirable that, so soon as the pressure of the steam in the boiler or generator reaches the pressure at which it should be relieved, the safety-valve should open wide for the free escape of steam, and that the valve should remain open until the pressure in the boiler is reduced below the pressure by which the valve was opened, and that it should be so organized that the engineer may be able to adjust it so that it will close at any desired number of pounds pressure below the pressure at which it was opened. To accomplish these results was the main object of my said invention.

'To the upper surface of the valve, I secure a cap-plate or annulus, m, formed with a downward-projecting flange, n, at its outer periphery, leaving an annular space, o, all around between the outer periphery of the valve and the inner periphery of the flange, n, of the said cap. And the upper surface of the valve-seat, a, is extended all around, a little beyond the outer peripheryof the flange, n, of the cap, leaving an annular surface, p, surrounded by an upward-projecting rim, q, the plane of the upper edge of which, when the valve is closed, extends a short distance above the plane of the lower edge of the flange, n, of the cap. The said cap-plate, m, is connected with the top of the valve by studs, r, r, or cast with it, in such manner as to leave an open space, s, between the two, for the passage of steam to the central aperture, t, in the cap, through which steam can escape when the valve is lifted from its a threaded ring, u, that can be by a projecting cylindrical flange, threaded on the outside, to which is fitted a threaded ring, u, that can be turned up or down to any desired elevation, and there secured by a set-screw, v. The disk-like projection, f, on the valve rod or stem, e, extends over the said central aperture, t, in the cap-plate, m, and at such an elevation that the upper edge of the adjustable ring can be set in contact with it, or let down so far below it as to leave sufficient space for the free escape of steam.

'From the foregoing it will be seen that, when the pressure of steam in the boiler or generator becomes sufficient to lift the valve from its seat, it acts against the surface of the annular space, o, between the bevel of the valve-seat and the downward-projecting flange, n, of the cap, to assist in lifting and holding up the valve, particularly when the valve is borne down by the tension of a spring, which presents an increasing resistance as the valve is lifted. If the projecting rim, q, were in the same plane with the lower edge of the flange, n, the diameter of these parts being greater than that of the valve-seat, on the lifting of the valve and cap, the area of the opening between the flange, n, of the cap, and the projecting rim, q, would be greater than the area of the opening between the valve and its seat, just in proportion as the diameter of the one is greater than the other, and the steam escaping from the valve would pass unchecked between the flange, n, and rim, q, and would not exert any force against the surface of the annular space, o; but, as the rim, q, extends above the lower edge of the flange, n, of the cap-plate, it follows that the aperture between the valve and its seat, by the lifting of the valve, is always greater than the aperture between the flange, n, and the rim,q, and hence the escaping steam, by its elastic force, will act against the surface of the annular space, o, to assist in lifting and holding up the valve until the pressure in the boiler or generator falls below the pressure by which the valve was first opened. The difference between the pressure against which the valve will close and the pressure by which it will be opened will depend upon the distance between the outer periphery of the flange, n, of the cap-plate and the inner periphe y of the projecting rim, q. To render this adjustable, the area of the aperture for the escape of steam beyond the valve-seat must be adjustable. This is effected by the raising or lowering of the ring, u. If it be set to its lowest position, the steam escaping from the valve will be free to escape between the top of the valve and the cap, through the central aperture, and thence between the upper edge of the ring, u, and the disk, f, without materially aiding to lift or hold up the valve; but, by setting the ring, u, nearer to the under surface of the disk, f, and thereby reducing the space for the escape of steam, it will be caused to act, by its elastic force, against the annular space, o, of the cap-plate, and thus assist in lifting the valve and holding it up.

'I have described and represented this as the simplest mode of adjusting the area of the aperture for the escape of the steam after it passes the valve-seat; but it will be obvious that the same result may be attained by equivalent means, such, for instance, as making the ring, q, in adjustable segments, so that its diameter can be increased or diminished; but this would be mont complicated than the mode first and fully described; and it will also be obvious that the devices for holding up the valve may be inverted, as represented in Figs. 4 and 5 of the accompanying drawings, in which a is the valve-seat, and b the valve, with its beveled ground joint, the valve-seat, a having a flat annular surface, c, beyond the bevel, and the valve an annular surface, d, with a down ward-projecting flange, e, the lower edge of which, when the valve is closed, extends a little below the plane of the surface, c, of the valve-seat, and a narrow annular space being left for the escape of steam between the inner periphery of the said flange and the outer periphery of the valve-seat, a, as set forth in my patent of September 25, 1866.'

The claim of the patent is as follows: 'What I claim as new, and desire to secure by letters patent, is the combination of the surface beyond the seat of the safety-valve, with the means herein described for regulating or adjusting the area of the passage for the escape of steam, substantially as and for the purpose described.'

The answers in the two suits set up want of novelty, and cite, as anticipating patents, three English patents: one to Charles Ritchie, No. 12,078, August 3, 1848; one to James Webster, No. 1,955, July 12, 1857; and one to William Hartley, No. 2,205, August 19, 1857; also an English publication made in 1858, called 'The Artizan.' Infringement is denied, and it is averred that the valves which the defendant makes and sells are the inventions of George H. Crosby, and are described in two patents granted to him, and owned by the defendant: one, No. 159,157, dated Junuary 26, 1875; and the other, No. 160,167, dated February 23, 1875. The same proofs were taken in the two suits, and they were heard together in the circuit court. In each suit that court made a decree dismissing the bill, (7 Fed. Rep. 768,) and from each decree the plaintiff has appealed.

When Richardson applied for his patent of 1866 his claim read thus: 'What I claim as my improvement, and desire to secure by letters patent, is increasing the area of the head of the common safety-valve, outside of the ground joint, F, F, and terminating this addition with the circular or annular flange or lip, c, c, constructed in the manner, or substantially in the manner, shown, so as to operate as and for the purpose herein described.' This claim was rejected as defective, because not for a device, and it was amended to read as granted.

In this application for the patent of 1869 there were two claims. The second related to means for preventing the guides and stem of the valve from binding, and was rejected as not new, and stricken out, though the descriptive matter on which it was founded was retained. The first claim, as applied for, was this: 'What I claim as new, and desire to secure by letters patent, is combining with the surface beyond the beveled, or equivalent, seat of a safety-valve, the means herein described, or the equivalent thereof, for regulating or adjusting the area of the passage for the escape of steam beyond the bevel, or equivalent, seat, substantially as and for the purpose described.' This claim was amended, on suggestions made by the patent-office, to read as granted.

The view taken by the circuit court, in dismissing the bills, was that some valves had been made before 1866, which embodied the same general principle as Richardson's, and were of some value, operating through the expansive power of steam exerted upon an additional chamber outside of the ground joint; and that what Richardson did was to so regulate the action of the chamber outside of the ground joint, by a crack or opening between the lip of the valve and its main body, that the steam would be confined or huddled, when it sought to escape from the chamber, and so the valve would be held up just long enough, and could fall rapidly before too much steam was lost. But the cases went off on the question of infringement, and the circuit court found that while the defendant's valve employed an additional surface to lift the valve as soon as it began to blow, and the pressure was regulated in part by a stricture, it differed from the plaintiff's, in that the additional area was not outside of the ground joint, but inside, and was not acted on independently of the valve itself, but was a part of it, and the escaping steam did not act at all by impact, but wholly by expansion. The conclusion was that, as Richardson was not the first to apply the idea of an additional area or of a stricture, he could not enjoin a valve which resembled his only in adopting such general ideas, and that his claims did not cover a valve having the mode of operation of the defendant's.

Edward H. Ashcroft, as assignee of William Naylor, obtained reissued letters patent of the United States, No. 3,727, dated November 9, 1869, on the surrender of letters patent No. 58,962 issued to said Naylor, October 16, 1866, for an improvement in safety-valves. Ashcroft brought a suit in equity, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, against the Boston & Lowell Railroad Company, for the infringment of reissue No. 3,727. The infringement consisted in the use of valves constructed according to the patent of 1866 to Richardson. The court dismissed the bill, (5 O. G. 725; 1 Holmes, 366; 1 Ban. & A. 215), and, on an appeal to this court by the plaintiff, the decree was affirmed. 97 U.S. 189. In view of an English patent, No. 1,038, granted to Charles Beyer, April 25, 1863, it was held by this court that Naylor was not the first person who devised means for using the recoil action of steam to assist in lifting the valve, or who invented the combination, in a spring safety-valve, of an overhanging downward curved lip, with an annular recess surrounding the valve-seat, into which steam is deflected as it issues between the valve and its seat. In speaking of the invention of Richardson, as described in his patent of 1866, this court said: 'His invention, as he describes it, consists in increasing the area of the head of the common safety-valve outside of its ground joint, and terminating it in such a way as to form an increased resisting surface, against which the steam escaping from the generator shall act with additional force, after lifting the valve from its seat at the ground joint, and so, by overcoming the rapidly increasing resistance of the spring or scales, will insure the lifting of the valve still higher, thus affording so certain and free a passage for the steam to escape as effectually to prevent the bursting of the boiler or generator, even when the steam is shut off and the damper left open. Safety-valves previously in use were not suited to accomplish what was desired, which was to open for he purpose of relieving the boiler, and then to close again at a pressure as nearly as possible equal to that at which the valve opened. Sufficient appears to show that Richardson so far accomplished that purpose as to invent a valve which would open at the given pressure to which it was adjusted, and relieve the boiler, and then close again when the pressure was reduced about two and one-half pounds to the inch, even when the pressure in the generator was one hundred pounds to the same extent of surface, which made it, in practice, a useful spring safety-valve, as proved by the fact that it went almost immediately intc general use. * *  * When the valve opens, the steam expands and flows into the annular space around the around joint. Its free escape, which might otherwise be too free, is prevented by a stricture or narrow space formed by the outer edge of the lip and the valve-seat. By these means, the steam escaping from the valve is made to act, by its expansive force, upon an additional area outside of the device, as ordinarily constructed, to assist in raising the valve.' On these views, it was held by this court that although important functions, not very dissimilar in the effect produced, were performed by the two valves there in controversy, the means used and the mode of operation were substantially different in material respects.

In the present case, the defendant has introduced in evidence the beforenamed English patents to Ritchie, Webster, and Hartley, and the English patent to William Naylor, No. 1,830, granted July 1, 1863; and also letters patent of the United States, No. 10,243, granted to Henry Waterman, November 15, 1853, and the reissue of the same, No. 2,675, granted to him July 9, 1867. In view of all these patents, and of the state of the art, it appears that Richardson was the first person who described and introduced into use a safety-valve which, while it automatically relieved the pressure of steam in the boiler, did not, in effecting that result, reduce the pressure to such an extent as to make the use of the relieving apparatus practically impossible, because of the expenditure of time and fuel necessary to bring up the steam again to the proper working standard. His valve, while it automatically gives relief before the pressure becomes dangerously great, according to the point at which the valve is set to blow off, operates so as to automatically arrest with promptness the reduction of pressure when the boiler is relieved. His patent of 1866 gave a moderate range of pressure, as the result of the proportions there specified, and his patent of 1869 furnished a means of regulating that range of pressure, by a screw-ring, within those narrow limits which are essential in the use of so subtle an agent as steam.

In regard to all the abouve patents, adduced against Richardson's patent of 1866, it may be generally said, that they never were, in their day, and before the date of that patent, or of Richardson's invention, known or recognized as producing any such result as his apparatus of that patent produces, as above defined. Likenesses in them, in physical structure, to the apparatus of Richardson, in important particulars, may be pointed out, but it is only as the anatomy of a corpse resembles that of the living being. The prior structures never effected the kind of result attained by Richardson's apparatus, because they lacked the thing which gave success. They did not have the retarding stricture which gave the lifting opportunity to the huddled steam, combined with the quick falling of the valve after relief had come. Taught by Richardson and by the use of his apparatus, it is not difficult for skilled mechanics to take the prior structures and so arrange and use them as to produce more or less of the beneficial results first made known by Richardson; but, prior to 1866, though these old patents and their descriptions were accessible, no valve was made producing any such results. Richardson's patent of 1866 states that the addition to the head of the valve terminates in an annular lip, which fits loosely around the valve-seat, and is separated from it by about one sixty-fourth of an inch for an ordinary spring, and a less space for a strong spring, and a greater space for a weak apring, forming an annular chamber, and regulating the escape of the steam; that the steam, when the valve is lifted, passes beyond the valve-seat, and into the annular chamber, and acts against the increased surface of the valvehead, and thus overcomes the increasing resistance of the spring due to its compression, and lifts the valve higher, and the steam escapes freely into the open air, until the pressure is sufficiently reduced, when the spring immediately closes the valve. It is not shown that, before 1866, any known valve produced this result. On the contrary, Richardson testifies that, for about 20 years before 1866, he was acquainted with safety-valves in practical use, by working in the locomotive repair-shops of railroad companies, part of the time as foreman, and as a locomotive engineer, and that he never, before his invention, knew, in practical use or on sale, of any spring loaded safety-valve capable of opening to relieve the boiler when the working pressure was exceeded, and of automatically closing with a small loss of working pressure. He also says that he was in England, for about four months, in 1873, bringing his valve to the notice of officials in the shops of some of the largest railroad companies, (his valve being one especially useful on locomotive engines on railroads;) that, while he was in England, he found no man who professed to be acquainted with, or to have heard of, a safety-valve which would automatically open and relieve the boiler at a predetermined working pressure, and automatically close when such working pressure had been slightly reduced, or who admitted that such a valve could be made untill he had seen Richardson's valve work; that the master mechanics at the shops named did not believe he could make a valve close within 25 pounds of the blowing-off point; that he showed them the working of his valve with no excess beyond working pressure, and with but from 3 to 5 pounds reduction from a pressure of 130 pounds per square inch in the boiler; that he did not hear, in England, of any of the Ritchie, Webster, or Hartley valves, but heard the Naylor valve blow; and that, when it blew, the steam rose several pounds above the point where it commenced to blow, and it did not close promptly, tightly, or suddenly. There is no evidence to contradict, or vary the effect of, this testimony.

Thomas Adams, of Manchester, England, who has spent a life-time in the manufacture and practical working of safety-valves, testifies that the Ritchie and Webster valves have never been in use practically in England, and the Hartley only in two or three cases, when it was a failure; that he himself has made and applied, in England, about 15,000 of Richardson's valves; that, if loaded at 120 pounds per square inch, his valve returns to its seat with a very small loss of pressure; that the Beyer valve, loaded at 120 pounds, reduces the pressure 30 pounds, before returning to its seat; and that Naylor's has been superseded by Richardson's. It appears to have been easy enough to make a safety-valve which would relieve the boiler, but the problem was to make one which, while it opened with increasing power in the steam against the increasing resistance of a spring, would close suddenly and not gradually, by the pressure of the same spring against the steam. This was a problem of the reconciliation of antagonisms, which so often recurs in mechanics, and without which practically successful results are not attained. What was needed was a narrow stricture, to hold back the escaping steam, and secure its expansive force inside of the lip, and thus aid the direct pressuro of the steam from the boiler, in lifting the valve against the increasing tension of the spring, with the result hat, after only a small, but a sufficient, reduction in the boiler pressure, the compressed spring would, by its very compression, obtain the mastery and close the valve quickly. This problem was solved by Richardson and never before. His patent of 1869 describes the arrangement and operation of the whole apparatus, with the adjustable ring, thus: When the pressure of the steam lifts the valve, the steam acts against the surface of an annular space between the bevel of the valve-seat and the downward-projecting flange of the cap-plate, to assist in holding up the valve against the increasing resistance of the spring. The aperture between the valve and its seat is always greater than that between the flange and the upward-projecting rim, and thus the steam in the annular space assists in holding up the valve till the boiler pressure falls below that at which the valve opened. The difference between the closing pressure and the opening pressure depends on the distance between the flange and the rim. There is a central aperture in the cap, through which the steam escapes when the valve is lifted, which is surrounded by a projecting cylindrical flange, threaded on the outside, to which is fitted a threaded ring, which can be turned up or down, and secured by a set-screw. By this means, the area of the aperture for the escape of steam beyond the valve-seat is adjustable, the space being largest when the ring is down and smallest when the ring is up.

Ritchie's patent, in speaking of his valve, says: 'This valve is weighted by a helical spring, i, (shown at Fig. 2,) of sufficient power according to the required pressure of the steam; and, when it is intended to be used as a reserve safety-valve, I place the spring around that part of the stem below the valve, that is to say, within the boiler, as shown at Fig. 2. The advantage of this form of construction of valve over the ordinary valve is as follows: As soon as the pressure of the steam raises the valve from its seat, the flange,h, being exposed to the pressure of the steam, presents an increased surface, which compensates for the increasing resistance of the helical spring, i, until the valve has been raised to a height equal to the area of the steam-way, when it allows the steam or vapor to escape freely.' In an article in the Artizan, published in England, in July, 1858, signed by Ritchie, and referring to his patent of 1848, it is said of his valve: 'The top area being made double that of the under side or steam-way, such a valve would quickly reduce the pressure in the boiler to half that at which the valve lifted; and so, also, of other proportions. Hence it is chiefly suited for a reserved valve.' This shows the existence of the very evil which Richardson remedied. Ritchie's patent and publication say nothing about any stricture.

The evidence in the present case shows, satisfactorily, that valves made in conformity with the measurements of the drawing of Ritchie's patent do, in practice, reduce the pressure in the boiler to such an extent, after that pressure is properly relieved, and before they close, as to involve great loss of time and consumption of fuel before the initial pressure is restored. The experimental valves produced by the defendant as structures made according to Ritchie's patent vary from the dimensions of his drawing, and the variations are those which result from the instructions given by Richardson in his patents. Ritchie gives no information how to make a valve work at a predetermined pressure, or how to make it work with a small range of difference between the opening and closing pressures, or how to proportion the strength of the spring and the size of the stricture to each other. The same thing is true of the Webster and the Hartley patents. The Webster patent shows a huddling chamber and a stricture. But the evidence shows that valves made with the proportions shown in the drawings of Webster work with so large a loss of boiler pressure, before closing, as to be practically a d economically worthless. Webster's patent describes a means of making the area fot the escape of steam adjustable consisting in adjusting up and down, on a smooth valve-stem, a sliding collar or flange, and fixing it in place by a set-screw. But it does not show the screw-ring of Richardson, with its minute delicacy of adjustment and action. Nothing further need be said as to the Hartley valve or the Beyer valves.

The original patent to Waterman was issued in 1853. His attention had been turned to the subject of safety-valves for locomotive-engines. He invented what is described in that patent, but he testifies that before 1866 he never saw a safety-valve capabel of keeping the pressure at a point not above working pressure, and of relieving the boiler with but a small loss of pressure; that his valve would let the steam down about 15 pounds, and was not practical lfor an ordinary locomotive; and that the Richardson valve, when introduced, went at onec into general use. The Waterman valve had a supplemental surface, on which the steam acted to aid in the raising of the valve; and this was shown in the drawing of Waterman's original patent, but the specification did not describe it. Waterman's original patent did no show the use of a spring, and prior to its reissue his valve had not been made with a spring. After Richardson obtained his patent of 1866, and Waterman knew of Richardson's valve,-they combined the interests in their two patents, and the reissue of Waterman's was obtained, with the co-operation of Richardson, he signing, as a witness, the specification of the reissue. That specification, granted in 1867, describes an overhanging part of the valve as increasing its area outside of and beyond the ground joint and a concentric rim or ledge, which directs the steam upward against such overhanging part of the valve, so that the valve is assisted in rising. The specification was drawn in view of Richardson's patent and valve, and for the purpose of making a claim, which was then made, and which was not in Waterman's original patent, to a combination of the concentric rim or ledge with the overhanging part of the valve. The specification states that the valve and its seat are so constructed that the escaping steam will act on an increased area of the valve after it has risen from its seat, and strike the overhanging or projecting annular surface above and outside of and beyond the ground joint. It also states that a proper modification of the overhanging or projecting annular surface will modify the force of the steam; that if such surface be large the valve will be opened suddenly and discharge so much steam that the pressure in the boiler will be considerably reduced before the valve closes; that such surface may be made so small that but little more than the surplus steam will escape; that the success or efficiency of the valve will depend on a proper proportion between the overhanging annular surface and the concentric rim or ledge, because, if a free discharge of steam between them is allowed, the valve will not be assisted in rising, and if the escape of steam is too small, the valve will rise too easily, and remain open too long, and the steam will be so much reduced in pressure as seriously to impair the economical and efficient action of the apparatus; and directions are given as to the sizes of the overhanging part, and of the ledge or rim, and of the opening, for a valve of a specified diameter acting with a specified pressure of steam. Nothing of all this was found in the specification of the original Waterman patent. It therefore has no effect, as against Richardson's patent of 1866, to destroy the validity of that patent.

If anything which Richardson did in respect to reissuing the Waterman patent, could, in any event, affect the rights of the present plaintiff under either patent sued on,-as to which we express no opinion,-it is sufficient to say that the present defendant claims, in its answers, no benefit from any action of Richardson's in respect to the Waterman patent, as operating in its favor or inuring to its benefit, as an equitable defense in these suits.

Richardson is, therefore, entitled to cover, by the claim of his patent of 1866, under the language, ' a safety-valve with the circular or annular flange or lip, c, c, constructed in the manner, or substantially in the manner, shown, so as to operate as and for the purpose herein described,' a valve in which are combined an initial area, an additional area, a huddling chamber beneath the additional area, and a strictured orifice leading from the huddling chamber to the open air, the orifice being proportioned to the strength of the spring, as directed. The direction given in the patent is that the flange or lip is to be separated from the valve-seat by about one sixty-fourth of an inch for an ordinary spring, with less space for a strong spring, and more space for a weak spring, to regulate the escape of the steam, as required. As matter of law, this description is sufficient, within the rule laid down in Wood v. Underhill, 5 How. 1, and it is not shown to be insufficient, as a matter of fact. Richardson is also entitled to cover, by the claim of his patent of 1869, under the language, 'the combination of the surface beyond the seat of the safetyvalve, with the means herein described, for regulating or adjusting the area of the passage for the escape of steam, substantially as and for the purpose described,' the combination with the surface of the huddling chamber, and the strictured orifice, of a screw-ring, to be moved up or down to obstruct such orifice more or less, in the manner described.

The Richardson patents have a disk valve, an annular huddling chamber, an annular stricture at the outer extremity of the radii from the center of the valve, an additional area which is radially beyond the disk valve, and a cylindrical steam-way. But, before 1866, an annular form of safety-valve was well known. Such a valve necessarily requires an annular steam-way. In the defendant's valve, complainant's Exhibit A, the same effects, in operation, are produced as in the Richardson valve, by the means described in Richardson's claims. In both structures the valve is held to its seat by a spring, so compressed as to keep the valve there until the pressure inside of the boiler is sufficient to move the valve against the pressure of the spring, so that the steam escapes through the ground-joint into a chamber covered by an extension of the valve, in which chamber the steam acts expansively against the extended surface, and increases the pressure in opposition to the increasing pressure of the spring, and assists in opening the valve wider. This chamber, in the defendant's valve, has, at its termination, substantially the same construction as Richardson's valve, namely, a stricture, which causes the steam to act, by expansive force, against the extended surface of the valve; and in both valves, after the pressure of the steam has been somewhat reduced in the boiler, the closing movement is quickened, as the valve nears its seat, in consequence of the reduced pressure of the steam on the extended surface, and the valve comes suddenly to its seat. In the Richardson valve, the valve proper is a disk, and the extended surface is an annulus surrounding the disk, while, in the defendant's valve, the valve proper is an annulus, and the extended surface is a disk inside of the annulus. But this is a mere interchange or form between the valve proper and the extended surface, within the skill of an ordinary mechanic.

There is one structural difference between the two valves, which is now to be mentioned. In the Richardson valve, all the steam which escapes into the open air escapes from the huddling chamber, through a stricture which is smaller than the aperture at the ground joint. In the defendant's valve, the valve proper has two ground joints, one at the inner periphery of the annulus, and the ther at its outer periphery, and only a part of the steam, namely, that which passes through one of the ground joints, passes into the huddling chamber and then through the stricture; the other part of the steam passing directly from the boiler into the air through the other ground joint. But all of that part of the steam which passes into the huddling chamber and under the extended surface, passes through the constriction at the extremity of such chamber, in both valves; the difference being only one of degree, but with the same mode of operation. In the Richardson patent of 1869, the stricutre is regulated as to size by an adjustable screw-ring. In the defendant's valve, there is a screw-ring or sleeve, which closes the escape orifices from the central chamber, more or less. In the defendant's valve, the huddling chamber is at the center instead of the circumference, and is in the seat of the valve under the head, instead of in the head, and the stricture, instead of being at the circumference of the head, is at the circumference of the seat of the valve. But this is only the use of means equivalent to those shown by Richardson, while the mode of operation of the parts of the mechanism is the same, in their relation to each other, and the result is the same.

Richardson's invention brought to success what prior inventors had essayed and partly accomplished. He used some things which had been used before, but he added just that which was necessary to make the whole a practically valuable and economical apparatus. The fact that the known valves were not used, and the speedy and extensive adoption of Richardson's valve, are facts in harmony with the evidence that his valve contains just what the prior valves lacked, and go to support the conclusion at which we have arrived on the question of novelty. When the ideas necessary to success are made known, and a structure, embodying those ideas, is given to the world, it is easy for the skillful mechanic to vary the form by mechanism which is equivalent, and is, therefore, in a case of this kind, an infringement.

Is follows, from these views, that the decrees of the circuit court must be reversed, and each case be remanded to that court, with a direction to enter a decree sustaining the validity of the patent sued on, and decreeing infringement, and awarding an account of profits and damages, as prayed for, and to take such further proceedings as may be proper and not inconsistent with this opinion, and with the further direction, as to the suit brought on the patent of 1869, to grant a perpetual injunction, according to the prayer of the bill.


text: Talk:Consolidated Safety-Valve Company v. Crosby Steam Gage Value/Opinion of the Court


text:
United States Code/Title 42/Chapter 85/Section 7508

§ 7508. Guidance documents CAA § 178

The Administrator shall issue guidance documents under section 7408 of this title for purposes of assisting States in implementing requirements of this part respecting the lowest achievable emission rate. Such a document shall be published not later than nine months after August 7, 1977, and shall be revised at least every two years thereafter.