text:
United States v. Company Commissioners County of Dodge/Opinion of the Court

This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska, denying a peremptory writ of mandamus to command the county commissioners of the county of Dodge, in the state of Nebraska, to levy a special tax upon the taxable property within Fremont precinct, a local subdivision of that county, to pay and satisfy two judgments obtained by the petitioner against the county, in that court, upon interest coupons attached to bonds issued by the county commississioners in behalf of the precinct on September 1, 1871, under the statute of Nebraska of February 15, 1869, for the purpose of building a wagon bridge across the Platte river in that precinct, and purchased by the petitioner in good faith in the usual course of business, and without notice of any defects or infirmities; each of which judgments provided that they should be paid by such a levy.

To an alternative writ of mandamus, alleging the facts above stated, the county commissions filed an answer, alleging that the bonds, which were signed and sealed by the county commissioners, were in this form:

'UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF NEBRASKA:

'It is hereby certified that Fremont precinct, in the county     of Dodge, in the state of Nebraska, is indebted unto the      bearer in the sum of one thousand dollars, payable on or      before twenty years after date, with interest at the rate of      ten per cent. per annum from date. Interest payable annually     on the presentation of the proper coupons hereunto annexed. Principal payable at the office of the county treasurer, in     Fremont, Dodge county, Nebraska; interest payable at the      Ocean National Bank, in the city of New York.

'This bond is one of a series issued in pursuance of and in     accordance with a vote of the electors of said Fremont      precinct at a special election held on the eleventh day of      November, A. D. 1870, at which time the following proposition      was submited:

'Shall the county commissioners of Dodge county, Nebraska,     issue their special bonds on Fremont precinct, in said      county, to the amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars,      to be expended and appropriated by the county commissioners,      or as much thereof as is necessary, in building a wagon      bridge across the Platte river, in said precinct; said bonds      to be made payable on or before twenty years after date, bearing interest      at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, payable annually?'      Which proposition was duly elected, adopted, and accepted by      a majority of the electors of said precinct voting in favor      of the proposition.

'And whereas the Smith Bridge Company, of Toledo, Ohio, have     entered into a contract with said county commissioners to      furnish the necessary materials, and to build and construct      said bridge referred to in the foregoing proposition.

'Therefore this bond, with others, is issued in pursuance     thereof, as well as under the provisions of an act of the      legislature of the state of Nebraska, approved February 15,      A. D. 1869, entitled 'An act to enable counties, cities, and      precincts to borrow money on their bonds, or to issue bonds      to aid in the construction or completion of works of internal      improvement in this state, and to legalize bonds already      issued for such purposes.'

'In witness whereof we, the said county commissioners of said     Dodge county, have hereunto set our hands, this ___ day of      _____, A. D. 1871.'

The answer further alleged that the proposition to vote the bonds, submitted to, and voted upon by, the voters of the precinct, contained a provision that the tax levied in any one year should not exceed one mill on a dollar of the valuation of the taxable property within the precinct, and was entered on the records of the county; and that a tax of one mill had since been annually levied. A general demurrer to the answer was overruled by the circuit court, and judgment entered accordingly; and thereupon this writ of error was sued out. The decision of this case depends upon the peculiar provisions of the statutes of Nebraska, and an examination of those statutes leaves us in no doubt how it should be decided. In the Revised Statutes of 1866, the ninth chapter, concerning county commissioners, contained the following provisions:

'Sec. 19. The said commissioners shall have power to submit     to the people of the county, at any regular or special      election, the question whether the county will borrow money      to aid in the construction of public buildings, the question      whether the county will aid or construct any road or bridge,      or to submitted to the people of the county any question involving an extraordinary outlay of      money by the county; and said commissioners may aid any      enterprise designed for the benefit of the county as      aforesaid, whenever a majority of the people thereof shall be      in favor of the proposition, as provided in this section.

'Sec. 20. When county warrants are at a depreciated value,     the said commissioners may, in like manner, submit the      question whether a tax of a higher rate than that provided by      law shall be levied; and in all cases when an additional tax      is laid, in pursuance of a vote of the people of the county,      for the special purpose of repaying borrowed money, or of      constructing or ordaining to construct any road or bridge, or      for aiding in any enterprise contemplated by the preceding      section, such special tax shall be paid in money and in no      other manner.

'Sec. 21. The mode of submitting questions to the people,     contemplated by the last two sections, shall be the      following: The whole question, including the sum to be      raised, or the amount of the tax desired to be levied, or the      rate per annum, and the whole regulation, including the time      of its taking effect or having operation, if it be of a      nature to be set forth, and the penalty of its violation, if      there be one, is to be published at least four weeks in some      newspaper published in the county. If there is no such     newspaper published, the publication is to be made by being      posted up in at least one of the most public places in each      election precinct in the county. And in all cases the notices     shall name the time when such question will be voted upon,      and the form in which the question shall be taken; and a copy      of the question submitted shall be posted up at each place of      voting during the day of election.

'Sec. 22. When the question submitted involves the borrowing     or expenditure of money, the proposition of the question must      be accompanied by a provision to lay a tax for the payment      thereof, in addition to the usual taxes under section 16 of      this chapter; and no vote adopting the question proposed      shall be valid, unless it likewise adopt the amount of tax to      be levied to meet the liability incurred.

'Sec. 23. The rate of tax to be levied in pursuance of the     last four sections of this chapter shall in no case exceed      three mills on the dollar of the county valuation in one      year. When the object is to borrow money to aid in the     erection of public buildings, the * rate shall be such as to pay the debt in ten years; when the      object is to construct or aid in constructing any road or      bridge, the annual rate shall not exceed one mill on a dollar      of the valuation; and any special tax or taxes levied in      pursuance of this chapter, becoming delinquent, shall draw      the same rate of interest as ordinary taxes levied in      pursuance of the revenue laws of this territory.'

But the statute of February 15, 1869, as amended by a statute of March 3, 1870, and under which the bonds in question were issued, provides as follows:

'Section 1. Any county or city in the state of Nebraska is     hereby authorized to issue bonds to aid in the construction      of any railroad, or other work of internal improvement, to an      amount to be determined by the county commissioners of such      county or the city council of such city, not exceeding ten      per centum of the assessed valuation of all taxable property      in said county or city: provided, the county commissioners or      city council shall first submit the question of the issuing      of such bonds to a vote of the legal voters of said county or      city, in the manner provided by chapter nine of the Revised      Statutes of the state of Nebraska, for submitting to the      people of the county the question of borrowing money.

'Sec. 2. The proposition of the question must be accompanied     by a provision to levy a tax annually for the payment of the      interest on said bonds as it becomes due: provided, that an      additional amount shall be levied and collected to pay the      principal of said bonds, when it shall become due: and      provided further, that no tax shall be levied or collected to      pay any of the principal of said bonds until the year 1880.

'Sec. 3. The proposition shall state the rate of interest     such bonds shall draw, and when the principal and interest      shall be made payable.'

'Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the proper officers of such     county or city to cause to be annually levied, collected, and      paid to the holders of such bonds a special tax on all      taxable property within said county or city, sufficient to      pay the annual interest as the same becomes due, and, when      the principal of said bonds becomes due, such officers shall      in like manner collect an additional amount sufficient to pay the same as it becomes due;' with      certain restrictions as to the amount to be levied and      collected in any one year towards payment of the principal.

'Sec. 6. Any county or city, which shall have issued its     bonds in pursuance of this act, shall be estopped from      pleading want of consideration therefor; and the proper      officers of such county or city may be compelled, by mandamus      or otherwise, to levy the tax herein provided to pay the      same.

'Sec. 7. Any precinct in any organized county of this state     shall have the privilege of voting to aid works of internal      improvement, and be entitled to all the privileges conferred      upon counties and cities by the provisions of this act; and      in such case the precinct election shall be governed in the      same manner as is provided in this act, so far as the same is      applicable, and the county commissioners shall issue special      bonds for such precinct, and the tax to pay the same shall be      levied upon the property within the bounds of such precinct. Such precinct bonds shall be the same as other bonds, but     shall contain a  tatement showing the special nature of such      bonds.'

Under either statute the submission of the question to the people must be accompanied by a provision to levy a tax. But whereas the statute of 1866 provided that no vote adopting the question proposed should be valid unless it likewise adopted the amount of tax to be levied to meet the liability incurred, and that when the object was to construct or aid in constructing any road or bridge, the annual rate should not exceed one mill on a dollar on the valuation; the statute of 1869, as amended by the statute of 1870, omits both these provisions and peremptorily enacts that the proposition of the question shall be accompanied by a provision to levy a tax annually, sufficient for the payment of the interest as it becomes due; that it shall be the duty of the proper municipal officers to cause to be annually levied, collected, and paid to the holders of the bonds a special tax, sufficient so to pay the annual interest; and that they may be compelled, by mandamus or otherwise, to levy such a tax.

The later statute, as to objects included in it, clearly repeals to this extent the earlier statute, removes the limit imposed upon the amount to be levied, and takes away the power of the voters to limit that amount, and requires a tax to be levied and collected sufficient to pay the whole interest for the year; and it is equally clear that a bridge across the Platte river is a work of internal improvement, for the benefit of the public, and within the scope and the terms of the statute of 1869. Co. Com'rs v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 205; Fremont Building Ass'n v. Sherwin, 6 Neb. 48. The petitioner is therefore entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus to the county commissioners to levy a tax on the taxable property of Fremont precinct, sufficient to pay the amount of the judgments recovered in the circuit court for the interest due on the bonds held by him. Davenport v. Dodge Co. 105 U.S. 237.

Judgment reversed.


text: Talk:United States v. Company Commissioners County of Dodge/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Bissell v. Township of Spring Valley (110 U.S. 162)

This was an action brought by the plaintiff in error to recover the amount of certain interest coupons attached to municipal bonds, which, it is alleged in the petition or complaint, were made, issued, and delivered by the defendant, a municipal corporation of Kansas, to aid in the construction of a railroad running within and through its corporate limits, under and in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Kansas, entitled 'An act to enable municipal townships to subscribe for stock in any railroad, and to provide for the payment of the same,' approved February 25, 1870, under and in pursuance of an order of the board of county commissioners of the county of Cherokee, and under an in pursuance of a vote of more than three-fifths of the qualified voters of the township, voting at an election duly held therein for such purpose, being negotiable bonds payable to bearer. It is further alleged 'that afterwards, to-wit, on December 15, A. D. 1871, each of the said bonds, with all the interest coupons thereto attached, was put upon the market and sold and delivered to bona fide purchasers for value, the same passing from hand to hand like other negotiable securities. That afterwards, to-wit, on April 11, A. D. 1872, each of the said bonds, with all the interest coupons thereto attached, was duly registered in the office of the auditor of the state of Kansas, according to law, and the fact that each of the said bonds was so registered was then and there, under the hand and official seal of the said auditor, in writing duly certified and indorsed upon each of the said bonds, a copy of which said certificate and indorsement is filed herewith, made part hereof, and marked Exhibit B.' It is also alleged that after the issuing and delivering of the said bonds, and before the maturity, either of the bonds or of any of the coupons sued upon, they were sold and delivered to the plaintiff for the price of 90 cents on the dollar thereof in cash.

The following is the form of the bond:

'No. ___ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ($1,000.

'COUNTY OF CHEROKEE, STATE OF KANSAS.

'Spring Valley Township Bond.

'Know all men by these presents that Spring Valley township,     county of Cherokee, state of Kansas, acknowledges itself and      is firmly bound to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company in      the sum of one thousand dollars, which sum the said township      therein promises to pay to the said Atlantic & Pacific      Railroad Company, or bearer, at the office of Northrop &      Chick, in the city of New York, and state of New York, on the      fifteenth day of December, 1886, together with the interest      on the first day of July in each and every year, until this      bond matures, at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, which     interest shall be payable annually on the presentation and      delivery at said office of the coupons of interest hereto      attached.

'This bond being issued under and pursuant to an order of the     board of county commissioners of Cherokee county, in the      state of Kansas, by virtue of an act of the legislature of      the state of Kansas, approved February 25, 1870, entitled 'An      act to enable municipal townships to subscribe for stock in      any railroad, and to provide for the payment of the same;'      and authorized by a vote of the people taken on the fourth      day of February, 1871, as required by law, upon the      proposition to subscribe one hundred and fifty thousand      dollars to aid in the construction of the said railroad,      which proposition was voted upon on the day aforesaid, and      three-fifths of the votes of said township being cast in      favor of said proposition.

'In testimony whereof the said board of county commissioners     of Cherokee county have executed this bond by the chairman of said board, under the order thereof, signing his name      hereunto, and by the clerk of said board attesting the same      and affixing the seal of said board.

'This done at Columbus, Cherokee county, this fifteenth day     of December, 1871.

'[Seal of Cherokee county, Kansas.]

WM. H. CLARK,

'Chairman Board of County Commissioners.

'J. G. DUNLAVY, County Clerk.'

The certificate of registration is as follows:

'I, A. Thoman, auditor of the state of Kansas, do hereby     certify that this bond has been regularly and legally issued,      that the signatures thereto are genuine, and that such bond      has been duly registered in my office in accordance with an      act of the legislature, entitled 'An act to authorize      counties, incorporated cities, and municipal townships to      issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, aiding in      the construction of railroads, or other works of internal      improvement, and providing for the registration of such      bonds, the registration of other bonds, and the repealing of      all laws in conf ict therewith,' approved March 2, 1872.

'Witness my hand and official seal, this eleventh day of     April, 1872.

'[SEAL.]

A. THOMAN, Auditor of State.'

The defendant, in answer to the petition, pleaded the following defense: 'That it ought not to be charged with the said supposed debt, by virtue of the said supposed bonds and coupons, because it, by its attorneys, says that J. G. Dunlavy, whose name appears on said bonds and coupons as county clerk, never signed his name thereto or thereon, nor ever authorized any party or parties to sign his name thereto or thereon, and that said signature is not his signature. Nor did he affix or authorize to be affixed the seal of said county of Cherokee to said bonds or coupons.'

To this the plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiff declining to reply, judgment was rendered for the defendant, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted. The assignment of error relied on is that this defense being insufficient in law, the demurrer thereto should have been sustained and judgment rendered for the plaintiff.

Mr. Alfred Ennis for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 166 intentionally omitted]

W. H. Rossington, for defendant in error.

MATTHEWS, J.


text: Talk:Bissell v. Township of Spring Valley (110 U.S. 162)


text:
Bissell v. Township of Spring Valley (110 U.S. 162)/Opinion of the Court

ontends that this judgment is erroneous on several grounds, which we proceed to consider in their order.

1. It is claimed, in the first place, that the defense is not sufficient, because the signature of the county clerk is not essential to the validity of the bonds, nor that the county seal should have been affixed thereto by him. The statute of Kansas, (Laws Kan. 1870, c. 90, p. 189,) under which the bonds in question purport to have been issued, contains the following provisions:

'Section 1. Whenever fifty of the qualified voters, they     being freeholders, of any municipal township in any county in      the state, shall petition in writing the board of county      commissioners of such county to submit to the qualified voters of such      township a proposition to take stock, in the name of such      township, in any railroad proposed to be constructed into or      through such township, and shall in such petition designate      the railroad company and the amount of stock proposed to be      taken, and the mode and terms of payment for the same,      together with the conditions of such subscription, if any, it      shall be the duty of such board of county commissioners to      cause an election to be held by the qualified voters of such      township, to determine whether such subscription shall be      made: provided, that the amount of bonds voted by any      township shall not be above such an amount as will require a      levy of more than one per cent. per annum on the taxable     property of such township to pay the yearly interest on the      amount of bonds issued.

'Sec. 5. If three-fifths of the electors voting at such     election vote for the subscription of the stock, the board of      county commissioners shall order the county clerk to make      such subscription in the name of the township, and shall      cause such bonds as may be required by the terms of said vote      and subscription to be issued in the name of such township to      be signed by the chairman of the board, and attested by the      clerk, under the seal of the county: provided, that the      commissioners shall not cause such bonds to be issued until      the railroad shall have been completed through the township      voting such bonds, or to such point in said township as may      be conditioned in said bonds.'

It is argued, as the board of county commissioners is the prescribed authority which orders every step to be taken to issue the bonds, and as the clerk acts only as directed by it, and signs and seals the bonds merely as a witness of its orders and acts, that it is only what that board does and directs which becomes important, and that if it issues bonds with the name of the clerk signed and the seal of the county attached, it is not material whether the clerk writes his name or affixes the seal, or whether it is done by another. It is alleged in the petition that the defendant corporation, the municipal township, made, issued, and delivered the bonds on which the suit is founded, and that it was done under, and in pursuance of, an order of the board of county commissioners of the county of Cherokee. But it is sufficient to say, that the power of the board of county commissioners to bind the township is conferred by the statute to be exercised only in the mode pointed out, and the attesting signature of the clerk is as material to the integrity and validity of the bonds as is that of the chairman of the board of county commissioners. The township had no power to bind itself for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad, by subscription to its capital stock and the issue of bonds to pay for the same, except as authorized by this statute; the board of county commissioners of the county did not represent the township for any other purpose, and could not execute its power to issue bonds by instruments not conforming to the substantial requirements of the law. That law required the bonds to be executed in a particular manner, and the signature of the clerk is essential to the valid execution of them, even though he had no discretion to withhold it. Anthony v. County of Jasper, 101 U.S. 693-697; McGarrahan v. Mining Co. 96 U.S. 316. Admitting that the board could cause his signature to be affixed, without his assent, by another specially or generally appointed to do so; still, that it was so affixed in the present case does not appear as matter of fact, and if the fact could be supplied by supposition, the signature would still, in law, be the signature of the clerk. But the answer denies that fact, and the demurrer admits the truth of the denial. So that the defense set forth in the answer is, in law, that the bonds sued on are not the bonds of the township, and that is admitted by the demurrer to be true.

2. This disposes of the second ground of the contention of the plaintiff in error, which is that the township defendant is estopped by the bonds, and the recitals contained in them, to dispute their validity. But there can be no ground for such an estoppel, unless the bonds, which are supposed to effect it, are the bonds of the defendant. We have just seen that, by the pleadings, they are admitted not to be such; and the position of the plaintiff in error is not improved by the supposition that he is an innocent holder for value. If the bonds are not the act and deed of the defendant, they do not bind it at all, and cannot be made obligatory by their own contents.

3. It is argued, however, finally, that the defendant township is estopped to dispute the validity and obligation of these bonds by the fact and certificate of registration. The statute of Kansas, (Laws Kan. 1872, c. 68, p. 110,) to authorize counties, etc., to issue bonds, and providing for their registration, etc., contained ample and specific provisions, according to which municipal corporations were authorized to lend their credit to aid in the construction of works of internal improvement. It required that when bonds were to be issued for such purpose, the opfficers of the municipal body making them, should deliver them in the first instance to the treasurer of the state, to be held by him in escrow, or to an agent agreed on, until full compliance with the conditions of the agreement on which they were to issue, when the treasurer or agent was required to deliver them to the parties entitled to them. The officers of the municipal corporation were also required to make registration thereof, in a book kept for that purpose, and to certify a statement of the same to the auditor of the state; and, if within 30 days after their issue the holder of such bonds should present them to the auditor of state for registration, he was required, upon being satisfied that such bonds had been issued according to the act, and that the signatures thereto of the officers signing the same were genuine, to register the same in his office, in a book kept for that purpose, in the same manner that such bonds were required to be registered by the officers issuing the same, and also, to certify upon such bonds the fact that they had been regularly and legally issued, that the signatures thereto were genuine, and that such bonds had been registered in his office according to law. The act also makes provision for the registration of bonds not issued under it, but issued either before its enactment or in pursuance of agreements entered into before it took effect. The fifteenth section is as follows:

'Sec. 15. That the holder of bonds heretofore issued, or that may hereafter be issued, in pursuance of any contract     heretofore made under any law of this state, may have the      benefits of this act by having such bonds registered in the      office of said auditor of state as provided herein for the      registration of bonds (issued) by virtue hereof. It shall be     the duty of the auditor of state, upon the registration of      any bonds not issued under the provisions of this act, within      ten days thereafter, to notify the officers issuing the same      of such registration, which fact shall be entered by such      officers in a book wherein the record of such bonds is kept,      and such bonds shall thereafter be considered registered      bonds.'

Under this section it is claimed that the bonds sued on were registered, having been issued prior to the passage of the registration act of 1872; and it is insisted, upon the authority of the case of Lewis v. Com'rs Barbour Co. 105 U.S. 739, that the registration is conclusive of their validity, as against the defense made in the answer. It is shown, however, by a comparison of the fifteenth section with the other sections of the act in reference to registration, that distinct and diverse provisions are made for different classes of bonds,-those issued under the act and those previously issued or agreed to be issued under prior acts. As to the former class, the bonds authorized are to be registered, in the first instance, according to the mandate of the twelfth section, by the officers of the municipality acting in that behalf, who are required to transmit to the auditor of state a certified statement of the number, amount, and character of the bonds so issued, to whom issued, and for what purpose, which statement is required to be attested by the clerk of the municipal corporation issuing the same under its corporate seal. The registration thus provided for consists of two parts,-that which is recorded by the officers of the corporation in their books, and that which the auditor records in his own,-and in that case the last step is taken by the auditor, who certifies it on the bonds themselves, presented by the holder for that purpose. This certificate is intended to be based not merely upon what the auditon himself has done, but upon the knowledge officially certified to him of what had previously been done by the officers of the municipal corporation issuing the bonds. But as to the other class of bonds, those not issued under the act of 1872, the order of the steps in registration is reversed. The first record is made by the auditor on presentation of the bonds by the holder for that purpose. Within 10 days thereafter he is required by the fifteenth section of the act to notify the officers issuing the same of such registration by him, which fact, it is provided, shall be entered by such officers in a book wherein the record of such bonds is kept, and such bonds, the statute then proceeds to declare, shall thereafter be considered registered bonds. That necessarily means that they shall not be so considered until the happening of that event; and it is that complete and perfected registration, and that alone, which confers upon the holder of such bonds the benefits of the act.

The bonds that were in controversy in the case of Lewis v. Com'rs, supra, were issued under the act of 1872, and their registration was governed by the provisions of the statute relating to that class. The bonds on which the present suit is based were issued under the act of 1870, and belong to the class the registration of which is governed by the provisions of the fifteenth section of the act.

It is alleged in the petition that 'each of said bonds, with all the interest coupons thereto attached, was duly registered in the office of the auditor of the state of Kansas, according to law, and the fact that each of the said bonds was so registered was then and there, under the hand and official seal of the said auditor, in writing, duly certified and indorsed upon each of the said bonds,' and a copy of the certificate and indorsement is set out as already exhibited. But it is not alleged that the auditor notified the officers of Cherokee county of this record, nor that these officers entered the fact in the record kept by themselves; and without these additional steps, what was done by the auditor was incomplete and ineffective. Without showing compliance with these requisitions, the bonds cannot be considered registered bonds, nor entitled as such to the benefits of the act.

If complete and conclusive effect were, on the contrary, given to the ex parte record of the auditor of state, as is claimed for it, the obvious design and just purpose of the statute would be not secured, but subverted; and municipal corporations might be subjected to liability for bonds purporting to be issued by them, which in fact and in law were not their obligations by virtue of a proceeding of which they had no notice, resulting in an adjudication which they had no opportunity of contesting. A construction of the statute that necessarily leads to that conclusion is not warranted by its terms, and would be repugnant to fundamental principles of common right. If the registration of bonds issued under the act itself is to have the force of an adjudication by the auditor, the preliminary record by the officers of the municipal corporation transmitted to him must be the indispensable foundation of his jurisdiction, without which he cannot lawfully act; and as to bonds issued, as were these now in suit under previous statutes, the action of the auditor is itself but the preliminary proceeding of which confirmation by the subsequent record of the officers issuing them is essential to its efficacy as a registration. If these officers refuse to recognize the registry of the auditor, whether rightfully or wrongfully, the holder loses no rights. He has the bonds as he acquired them, and may test the liability of the corporation by judicial proceedings. If, on the other hand, the statute is construed to allow him by a proceeding before the auditor conclusively to fix the liability of the municipal corporation without notice and without a hearing, certainly, in respect to bonds previously issued, it would be open to the gravest objections on constitutional grounds, for if a law cannot impair the obligation of a contract, neither can it create one, or by a mere fiat take from a party an existing and meritorious defense. It appears then, by the record in this cause, that the bonds sued on are the obligations of the defendant in error.

The judgment in its favor is therefore affirmed.


text: Talk:Bissell v. Township of Spring Valley (110 U.S. 162)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron

''Sol. Gen. Phillips'', for plaintiff in error.

in error.

A. W. Griswold, for defendant in error.

MATTHEWS, J.

title: Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron


text: Talk:Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron

title: Talk:Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron


text:
Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron/Opinion of the Court

This action was begun on December 30, 1854, in the supreme court of New York by the defendant in error to recover from the collector of the port of New York money alleged to have been illegally exacted by him for customs dues and paid under protest. It was removed by certiorari to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in which, on December 15, 1856, the testimony having been heard, it appears by the record that 'by direction of the court and consent of counsel the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, subject to the opinion of the court upon a case to be made, with liberty to either party to turn the same into a bill of exceptions, and subject to adjustment at the custom-house as to the amount.' The next step in the cause taken in court was on June 9, 1882, when, on motion of the plaintiffs' attorney, the plaintiffs in error, as personal representatives of the defendant, who had died, were made parties. And then, on January 19, 1883, it was ordered that the case, of which it appeared a copy had been served by the plaintiffs' attorney on the United States attorney in January, 1857, be considered as having been then agreed upon and settled between the parties, and that the same be filed in the office of the clerk as part of the record in the case. On April 30, 1883, the cause was heard upon that case made and served pursuant to the verdict of December 16, 1856, and it was thereupon ordered that judgment be entered on the verdict for the sum of $715.70, with interest thereon from December 8, 1854, and for costs; and on August 22, 1883, a formal judgment was entered against the plaintiffs in error for the said sum and interest, as aforesaid, said, amounting to $2,128.16 damages, besides costs. To reverse that judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.

The case made, which by the terms of the verdict either party was at liberty to turn into a bill of exceptions, sets forth the entire evidence adduced at the trial, but is not an agreed statement of facts, nor a special verdict, nor a finding of facts by the court, and contains no exceptions. It cannot, therefore, be treated as the basis for any assignment of errors, and the questions argued, as if arising thereon, must be dismissed without further consideration. We are of opinion, however, that the court erred in allowing interest from December 8, 1854, until the entry of judgment on August 22, 1883,-a period of nearly 29 years,-upon the amount found due to the defendant in error. The delay in the prosecution of the suit must be attributed to the plaintiff below. It was the actor, and had come into court for the purpose of asserting and enforcing a right which the defendant below contested and denied, and which it was necessary to determine and ascertain. The verdict was purely formal, and was entered by consent, after the hearing of the evidence, merely as a basis for further proceedings, which were to consist in an adjudication by the court of the questions of fact and law arising upon the testimony, and liquidation of the amount to be recovered in case the legal liability was found to exist. No step for this purpose was taken by the plaintiff after January, 1857, when he served upon the defendant the case made, until January, 1883, when he procured the order to bring into court and file it,-a period of 26 years. In the mean time the suit had abated by the death of the defendant, having been revived in the names of his personal representatives in June, 1882, after a lapse of what period since the defendant's death the record does not disclose. This delay in prosecution would certainly have justified the court in dismissing the action on its own motion. So far as the rights of third parties might have been affected by it, as a lis pendens, it had lost its force without such a dismissal; for, as to innocent strangers, acquiring interests to be affected by it, it would have been treated as abandoned and obsolete. Fox v. Reeder, 28 Ohio St. 181. There is nothing in the record, by which alone we must be governed, to show any reasonable excuse for the unusual and extraordinary delay in the progress of the suit; and that delay, as we have said, must be attributed to the defendant in error.

Interest is given on money demands as damages for delay in payment, being just compensation to the plaintiff for a default on the part of his debtor. Where it is reserved expressly in the contract, or is implied by the nature of the promise, it becomes part of the debt, and is recoverable as of right; but when it is given as damages it is often matter of discretion. In cases like the present, of recoveries for excessive duties paid under protest, it was held in Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75, that the jury might add interest, the plaintiff ordinarily being entitled to it from the time of the illegal exaction. But where interest is recoverable, not as part of the contract, but by way of damages, if the plaintiff has been guilty of laches in unreasonably delaying the prosecution of his claim, it may be properly withheld. Bann v. Dalzell, 3 Car. & P. 376; Newel v. Ex'r of Keith, 11 Vt. 214; Adams Exp. Co. v. Milton, 11 Bush, 49.

The statute of New York allowing interest on verdicts, relied on in argument as applicable, was intended for the government of the ordinary practice of the court, and cannot furnish the rule for a case that is excepted from it by the unexplained negligence and delay of the plaintiff. The verdict, indeed, in the present instance was purely formal,-as much so as the penalty of a bond which does not represent the amount equitably due, but stands only as security for it. In ordinary practice it may be convenient, and certainly would not be improper nor unjust, that interest properly allowed on the real amount subsequently ascertained should be calculated from the date of such a verdict; but in such cases it is not interest on the verdict in fact, because, until the amount is liquidated by the subsequent action of the court, there is no sum certain due on which interest could be computed. The finding of the court fixing the amount due, is, in fact and in contemplation of law, the equivalent for the verdict of the jury, upon which interest may be allowed; and when that has been, as in the present instance, unreasonably delayed by the neglect of the plaintiff, he cannot justly claim interest by way of damages for delay which has been altogether his own. The date of the order for judgment in the present case is April 30, 1883, from which time only interest should have been allowed.

For this error, accordingly, the judgment is reversed, with costs in this court, and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter a judgment for the defendant in error for the sum of $715.70, with interest thereon from April 30, 1883, together with costs in the circuit court.


text: Talk:Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron/Opinion of the Court


text:
Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman

An act passed by the legislature of the State of Ohio, respecting the administration of assignments by insolvent debtors, provides as follows: 'Creditors shall present their claims * * * to the assignee for allowance, and the assignee shall indorse his allowance or rejection thereon, and claimants whose claims are rejected shall be required to bring suit against the assignee to enforce such claims, * * * in which, if he recover, the judgment shall be against the assignee that he allow the same in the settlement of his trusts: provided, however, that the assignee may make any defense to such action that the assignor might have made to a suit instituted against him before the assignment for the same cause of action.' 1 Swan & C. St. p. 710, § 74. The bill in this case was filed in pursuance of this statute. It was brought by the appellant, the Quebec Bank of Toronto, against Max Hellman, assignee of P. Weyand and D. Jung, partners as Weyand & Jung. The bill alleges an assignment by Weyand & Jung under the insolvent laws of the state, and the qualification of the assignee, and that Weyand & Jung, at the time of the assignment, were indebted to the Quebec Bank of Toronto upon a promissory note of which the following is a copy:

'CINCINNATI, February 7, 1870.

'Sixty days after date we promise to pay to the order of Geo. M. Bacon & Co. five thousand dollars at Merchants' National Bank. Value received.

'$5,000.

P. WEYAND and D. JUNG.' The note was indorsed as follows:

'GEO. M. BACON & CO.

'JOHN HUGHES.'

The bill further alleged that the note was indorsed and delivered to the plaintiff, before maturity, for value; that the plaintiff was the owner thereof; that a claim based on the note had been presented to the assignee for allowance against the estate of Weyand & Jung, and disallowed. The prayer of the bill was that the assignee be required to allow the claim of the plaintiff for the amount due on said note, to-wit, $5,000, with interest, in the settlement of his trust as assignee of Weyand & Jung. Two defenses were set up in the answer-First, that the appellant was not the owner of the note; and, second, that the note was without consideration and void. Upon final hearing the circuit court made a decree dismissing the bill. That decree is brought up for review by this appeal.

J. B. Stallo, E. W. Kittredge, and Joseph Wilby, for appellant.

John F. Follett and A. A. Kramer, for appellee.

WOODS, J.

title: Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman


text: Talk:Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman

title: Talk:Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman


text:
Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman/Opinion of the Court

The record discloses the following facts: George M. Bacon & Co. were a firm dealing in barley and other brewers' supplies in Cincinnati, Ohio. They purchased barley at Toronto, Canada, and advanced a part of the price of the barley purchased. When a shipment was made, a draft was drawn upon them by the consignor for the balance remaining unpaid on the shipment, which was usually a time draft, and accompanied by a bill of lading for the barley shipped. On November 10, 1869, a draft, accompanied by a bill of lading for 15,000 bushels of barley, was drawn on Bacon & Co. by Thomas Clarkson & Co., of Toronto, Canada, for the sum of $6,502.56, payable in gold 25 days after date. This draft was indorsed by Thomas Clarkson & Co., and on presentation to the drawees, Bacon & Co., was accepted by them. Upon the arrival of the barley in Cincinnati, Bacon & Co. received and disposed of it. Before the draft Bacon & Co. made an arrangement with the appellant, the Quebec Bank of Toronto, which was the holder of the draft, by which the time for payment was to be extended 45 days on their giving a note with indorsers, which was to be substituted for the draft. Bacon & Co. accordingly made their note, dated December 23, 1869, for $6,616.35, payable in gold 45 days after date, to the order of Thomas Clarkson & Co. and indorsed by John Hughes, which they forwarded to the Quebec bank. The note was not acceptable to the bank and was returned by it to its correspondent and agent at Cincinnati, the Merchants' National Bank, with the information that Bacon & Co. had been requested to furnish a new note properly drawn, with another indorser besides Hughes. No such note was made or forwarded by Bacon & Co., and on February 2, 1870, the Quebec bank instructed the Merchants' bank to demand payment of Bacon & Co. of the draft accepted by them. On February 7, 1870, Bacon & Co. represented to Weyand & Jung, a firm doing business in Cincinnati, that they were embarrassed for want of means to pay the debt represented by the draft of November 10, 1869, the extended credit on which was about to expire, and, to aid in paying off said claim, obtained from them the note in controversy in this suit, the same being an accommodation note for which Weyand & Jung received no consideration. Bacon & Co. presented this note to the Merchants' bank for discount on the morning of February 7th, with the purpose of having it applied to the payment of the claim of the Quebec bank. The Merchants' bank, after submitting the note to its discount committee at noon that day, refused to accept it, and it was handed back to Bacon & Co.

So far the facts are not disputed by either party. But here a controversy arises. The appellant contends that on the afternoon of that day, February 7th, Bacon & Co. again presented the note to the Merchants' bank, which, acting for appellant, accepted it. The defendant insists that the note never was delivered to the Merchants' bank, but that, on February 9th, after Bacon & Co. had made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors, the cashier of the bank, having induced George M. Bacon to let him see the note, and thus getting it into his possession, fraudulently retained possession, against the protest of Bacon & Co. In the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to settle the question whether or not there was a manual delivery of the note on February 7th. We shall assume that the note was left by Bacon & Co. with the Merchants' bank, as agent of the appellant, on that day. The purpose for which Bacon & Co. presented the note of Weyand & Jung to the Merchants' bank is not left in doubt by the testimony. It was that the note or its proceeds might to credited on the claim against Bacon & Co. held by the appellant, the Quebec Bank of Toronto. They were of opinion that if they could thus reduce the amount due on the claim they would be able to raise money enough to pay off the residue, and thus save their credit and go on with their business. The note, assuming that it was left with the Merchants' bank on February 7th, as claimed by appellant, was taken for the very purpose which Bacon & Co. had in view. On this point Fallis, the president of the Merchants' bank, testified as follows: 'The note was left with us about that time. I told him (George M. Bacon, of Bacon & Co.) it would not be discounted to check against, but we would take it and credit proceeds on claim of Quebec bank, taking said note on account of said claim.'

The testimony of Yerguson, the cashier of the Merchants' bank, confirms the evidence of Fallis in respect to the terms on which the bank took the note of Weyand & Jung from Bacon & Co. If, therefore, there was a manual delivery of the note to the Merchants' bank on February 17th, it was on the condition, as the officers of the bank concede, that either the note or its proceeds should be credited on the claim of the Quebec Bank of Toronto. This condition was not performed. On the contrary, it is not disputed that the Merchants' bank, as the agent of appellant, after it had got possession of the note of Weyand & Jung, retained and still retains the draft of November 10, 1869, for $6,502.56, accepted by Bacon & Co. with the bill of lading for 15,000 bushels of barley accompanying its, and also the note of George M. Bacon & Co., in dorsed by Hughes, for $6,616.35; that no credit whatever was ever indorsed on either said draft or note; that on February 9, 1870, two days after the note of Weyand & Jung had been received by the Merchants' bank, the note of Bacon & Co. for $6,616.35 was, at the instance of the Merchants' bank, protested for non-payment, and on the same day Bacon & Co. executed a deed of assignment for the benefit of their creditors, for the reason, as they alleged and testified, that they were unable to pay said note or draft. On February 25, 1870, suit was brought by the Quebec Bank of Toronto, in the superior court of Cincinnati, against Bacon & Co., as makers, and John Hughes, as indorser, on the note above mentioned, for the full amount thereof, namely, $6,616.35, and interest. It is clear that the deposit of a promissory note with an agent of a third party, on the condition that it should be used by the agent's principal for a specified purpose, will not confer title so as to authorize the principal to hold the note for a different purpose. Thus, in Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 46, it was said by Lord ELDEN: 'If a person give a bill for a particular purpose, and that is known to the party taking the bill, as, for example, to answer a particular demand, then the party taking the bill cannot apply it to a different purpose.' See, also, Delauney v. Mitchell, 1 Stark. 439; Puget v. Forbes, 1 Esp. 117; Evans v. Kymer, 1 Barn. & Adol. 528.

Under such circumstances, without the performance of the condition, there is no delivery in the commercial sense, and no title passes. The present suit is an attempt by the appellant to use the note for a purpose not contemplated by either party when the manual delivery of the note took place. The case of appellant is not aided by the fact that on March 25, 1871, more than a year after Bacon & Co. had failed in business and made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors, it amended its petition in the suit brought on the note of Bacon & Co. for $6,616.35, by averring that the note of Weyand & Jung was taken as a payment on the note sued on in that case, and demanding judgment for only $1,616.35, the balance due after allowing the credit. According to the version of the appellant's witnesses, the understanding was that the credit should be made on February 7, 1870, when the note of Weyand & Jung was handed to the Merchants' bank. By the omission of the Merchants' bank on that day to credit the proceeds of the note of Weyand & Jung, on the claim of appellant, Bacon & Co. were deprived of all the advantages, to secure which the note was left with the bank. The appellant is bound by the acts and omissions of its agent. Having failed in 1870 to use this note for the only purpose for which it was placed in the possession of its agent, it cannot now exact payment thereof as a bona fide holder.

Under the circumstances of this case we are of opinion that there was no delivery of the note of Weyand & Jung to the appellant, and that no title passed to it. As the controversy is between the original parties, and the appellant is not an innocent holder, it is not entitled to the relief prayed for in its bill. The decree of the circuit court, by which the bill was dismissed, was therefore right, and must be affirmed.


text: Talk:Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman/Opinion of the Court


text:
White v. Crow

While the events above mentioned in reference to this property were happening in Colorado the supreme court of the city and county of New York, in a suit therein pending against the company on May 29, 1882, appointed a receiver, to whom, on October 23, 1882, the company, by order of the court, conveved all its property. At a sale made by the receiver about December 1, 1882, the appellant, John E. White, became the purchaser of the property of the company in Chaffee county, Colorado, and on December 5th received a deed therefor from the receiver, and on December 6th a deed from the company. At the time of his purchase White knew of the liens against and sales of the property, and that the time for redemption was about to expire. He redeemed the property from the sale to Robinson before the time for redemption expired and paid off two judgments junior to those above mentioned. He, however, failed and refused to redeem the property from the sale to Crow within the time limited for redemption. After the time had expired White offered to redeem from the Crow sale, but the appellees refused to allow the property to be redeemed. Thereupon, on February 12, 1883, the appellant, John E. White, filed the bill in this case, to which Henslee, Crow, and the above-mentioned purchasers of said judgments, and Robert Ray, the sheriff of Chaffee county were made parties. The bill prayed that Ray, the sheriff of Chaffee county, might be enjoined from making a deed to the owners of the certificate of sale issued to Joseph R. Crow, and that the certificate might be declared null and void, and that upon payment by the complainant of the amounts found due to Crow on his claim against the property he might be compelled to execute a deed of release to him for said property. The only questions controverted on the final hearing were whether or not the judgment in favor of Crow and the certificate issued upon the sale made to him should be declared void, and whether the sheriff of Chaffee county should be enjoined from making a deed to him for the property in question, and whether the owners of the judgment and lien of Crow should, upon payment thereof, execute deeds of release to the appellant for said property. The circuit court decided all these questions in the negative, and directed that the defendants in interest should repay to the complainant the sums paid by him to discharge the leins upon said property, and, upon such payment, decreed that the bill should be dismissed. This appeal brings that decree under review.

L. S. Dixon, for appellant.

John D. Pope, for appellees.

WOODS, J.

title: White v. Crow


text: Talk:White v. Crow

title: Talk:White v. Crow


text:
White v. Crow/Opinion of the Court

The first assignment of error which we shall notice is, that the circuit court erred in not declaring the judgment recovered by Joseph R. Crow against the Brittenstine Silver Mining Company void,-First, because fraudulently obtained; and, secondly, because the court was without jurisdiction to render it. We have been unable to find in the record any support for the contention that the judgment was fraudulently obtained. All the alleged facts set out in the bill on which the charge of fraud is based are clearly disproven by the testimony. But if the Brittenstine Silver Mining Company were itself assailing the judgment as fraudulently procured, it could not have it enjoined in equity unless it could aver and prove that it had a good defense upon the merits. Hair v. Lowe, 19 Ala. 224; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Ableman v. Roth, 12 Wis. 90. There is no pretense that the company had any defense. It has never complained of the judgment. On the contrary, it promised to pay it, provided execution were stayed; and upon its promise of payment execution was stayed. Much less, therefore, does it lie in the mouth of appellant to complain of fraud in the obtaining of the judgment. On this point he has no standing in court.

The complainant insists, however, that the judgment was void because, on the fourth day after service of summons, and before the time for filing the answer had expired, Henslee appeared in court and consented that judgment might be entered in favor of Crow, against the Brittenstine Mining Company, for the sum due on the obligation upon which the suit was brought, and judgment was thereupon accordingly entered. The Civil Code of Colorado, § 46, provides as follows: 'From the time of service of summons in a civil action the court shall be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction.' The summons in this case gave full and particular notice to the defendant of the cause of action. It was served, as clearly appears from the return, in the county where the suit was brought. It was served on Henslee as the person appointed to receive service of process for the company. It is not pretended that it was not served in the county where the company had its principal office, or where its principal business was carried on, or that Henslee was not the right person on whom service should have been made. The service was regular and effectual. The court, therefore, had jurisdiction of the parties. It had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the judgment which it rendered was within the jurisdiction conferred on it by law. The judgment which it rendered recited that Henslee was the general agent of the company, and as such consented that judgment might be entered against the defendant.' The law, therefore, when the judgment is questioned, presumes that the court was satisfied by proof that the agent had authority to give the consent of the company to the rendition of the judgment. The fact that he was such general agent, and authorized to consent to the entry of judgment, is not denied in the bill, nor is there any proof in the record to show that he was not the agent of the company, fully authorized to consent to the rendition of the judgment. But if he was not such agent, the question arises whether the rendition of the judgment before the time for filing defendant's answer had expired renders the judgment void. We are of opinion that it does not; that its rendition was simply erroneous and nothing more. The court having jurisdiction to render the judgment, and having rendered it, the law, when the judgment is collaterally attacked, will make all presumptions necessary to sustain it. Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319. The defendant being in court, was bound to take notice of its proceedings, and might have corrected the error at any time during the term. It did not move to set the judgment aside. It filed no answer. The presumption, therefore, which the law makes is either that it consented to a submission of the case before the time for answer expired, or that it subsequently waived the error by not seeking to correct it. 'It is of no avail,' said the court in Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 'to show that there are errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment rendered was beyond its power. This principle has been often held by this court and by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of law.' And in Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, it was declared that 'the settled rule of law is that jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud.' See, also, Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157; Voorhess v. Bank of U.S. 10 Pet. 449; Grignon v. Astor, supra; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23; Glover v. Holman, 3 Heisk. 519; West v. Williamson, 1 Swan, (Tenn.) 277. The judgment, therefore, cannot be declared void. It could not be successfully attacked in this collateral way even by the defendant, mush less by one not a party to it. We must assume the judgment to be valid and binding until reversed in a direct proceeding.

The next contention of the appellant is that the sale made to Crow under his judgment is void because the property was sold in bulk and not in parcels. This contention is based on the statute of Colorado, which provides as follows: 'When any property, real or personal, shall be taken in execution, if such property is susceptible of division, it shall be sold in such quantities as may be necessary to satisfy such execution and costs.' Gen. Laws, c. 53, § 1416, p. 525. There are two sufficient answers to this objection to the sale. In the first place, there is not a word of proof in the record to show that any part of the property would have sold for a sum sufficient to satisfy the execution and costs. On the contrary, the record shows that the entire property was sold on execution four different times during the year 1882, and that in no instance did it bring more that the debt and costs, and that it brought more at the sale which is attacked in this case than at any of the others. At one sale it only brought $346; at another it only brought half the debt. At every sale it was bought in by the judgment creditor. In the second place, the evidence shows that at the sale which is complained of in the bill the sheriff first offered the claims singly and separately and received no bids. He then offered and sold them en masse. These facts make it unnecessary to inquire whether the objection to a sale en masse could be successfully made after the time for redemption had passed, where both the party making the objection and the party claiming under the sale were strangers to the judgment.

The next contention of appellant is that the certificate issued by the sheriff to Joseph R. Crow on the sale made to him June 17, 1882, recited that said sale was made 'subject to an execution in favor of George M. Robinson,' and that appellant having redeemed from what was thus recited to be the elder lien, the title thus acquired by him would be superior to that based on what he had reason to suppose was the younger lien of Crow. It is not disputed that in fact the lien of the judgment in favor of Crow was the older lien. It became a lien on January 17, 1882, when the transcript was filed in the office of the recorder of Chaffee county. Section 214, Civil Code Colo. The levy of the Robison attachment was not recorded until January 20, 1882; and it acquired a lien upon the property on that day. Civil Code, § 98. The sale on the judgment in favor of Crow took place June 17 1882, the sale on the judgment in favor of Robison took place on July 8, 1882. These matters were all of public record, and were made such that all parties interested might have notice. The appellant cannot derive any advantage from the mistake in the sheriff's certificate, which the public records of the county corrected, and for which neither Crow nor his vendees were responsible. But even if the judgment in favor of Robison had been the senior judgment, it would not aid the case of appellant. As grantee of the defendant company he would be required to redeem from all the sales. He could not acquire title to the property by redeeming it from a sale on the oldest lien, for in Colorado a redemption annuls the sale. The General Laws of Colorado, c. 52, p. 527, § 1419, provides as follows: 'On such sum,' the redemption money, 'being paid as aforesaid' to the purchaser or sheriff, 'the said sale and the certificate thereupon granted shall be null and void.' The appellant might as well claim that the payment of the oldest incumbrance on real estate discharged all the subsequent incumbrances. We are of opinion that there is no merit in the appellant's case. The judgment in favor of Crow against the Brittenstine Silver Mining Company was a valid judgment, rendered on a just demand; it was obtained without fraud; it has never been assailed, directly or indirectly, by the judgment debtor. The sale made under it was, so far as the record shows, fair and regular; the time within which the property sold could be redeemed was shown by the public records, it was well known to the agent of appellant. The appellant failed and refused to redeem the property within the time limited by law, and thereby lost his right to redeem, unless he is able to show some fraud or wrong on the part of the defendants by which a redemption was prevented. Without showing he is not entitled to relief in equity. Hay v. Baugh, 77 Ill. 501. Nothing of the kind has been shown.

We find no error in the record. The decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

title: White v. Crow/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:White v. Crow/Opinion of the Court

title: Talk:White v. Crow/Opinion of the Court


text:
City of Jonesboro v. Cairo

''Wm. S. Day and Sidney Grear'', for appellant.

''Geo. A. Sanders'', for appellees.

HARLAN, J.

title: City of Jonesboro v. Cairo


text: Talk:City of Jonesboro v. Cairo

title: Talk:City of Jonesboro v. Cairo


text:
City of Jonesboro v. Cairo/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree in the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Illinois, dismissing a bill in equity filed by the city of Jonesboro, in that state, against the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company, an Illinois corporation, the auditor of state, the county clerk, and sheriff of Union County, Illinois, and the 'unknown holders of the Janesboro city bonds, issued in aid of the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company.' The suit was commenced in one of the courts of the state. Its object was to obtain a decree perpetually enjoining the state and county officers, who were made defendants, from levying, certifying, and extending any tax for the payment either of the principal or interest of said bonds. There was no defense upon the part of those officers, and after publication against the 'unknown holders' of the bonds in the mode prescribed by the local statute, a decree pro confesso was passed, giving the relief asked, and declaring the bonds invalid as against the city. Subsequently, Luther R. Graves, a citizen of Vermont, presented his petition, in conformity with the state law, alleging his ownership of some of the bonds, and asking that the default be set aside, with permission to him to plead, demur, or answer under the orders of the court. The petition was granted, and he was made a party defendant. Thereafter, on his further petition, the cause was removed to the court from whose decree this appeal is taken.

The evidence shows that on the second day of March, 1868, a resolution was passed by the city council of Jonesboro submitting to the legal voters of that municipality, at its then next regular election, held April 6, 1868, the question whether that city should, upon certain named conditions, subscribe $50,000 to the capital stock of the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company, payable in bonds within 20 years after date at the option of the city, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from date of issue. The election was held at the time indicated. Subsequently, by an act of the general assembly of Illinois, which became a law on March 3, 1869, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company," approved February 16, 1865, authority was given to the several towns, cities, and counties through or near which that railroad might pass, and to the several townships in said counties which may have adopted, or might thereafter adopt, township organization, to subscribe for and take stock in the company, or to make a donation in aid of the construction of the road, and issue bonds for such subscriptions or donations, to be paid by taxation upon the property of the municipality issuing them. It was provided that no subscription or donation should be made, nor bonds issued, nor tax levied, unless a majority of the legal voters of the municipality, voting at an election called and held as provided in the act, should assent to the subscription or donation. But it was further provided in the same act 'that all elections heretofore had in any county, city, or town, in reference to a subscription to said railroad, are hereby declared legal and binding, and the county court of any county, and the corporate authorities of any city or town in which such elections have been already held, and a majority of the votes cast were for subscription, shall have authority to issue bonds for such an amount as was voted for, notwithstanding any insufficiency, informality, or irregularity in such election or in the notice thereof.' 3 Priv. Laws Ill. 1869, pp. 256-258.

By an ordinance of the city council of Jonesboro, passed July 21, 1871,-which referred to the resolutions of March 2, 1868, and recited that at the election of April 6, 1868, all the votes cast favored the subscription,-it was enacted that the proposed subscription of $50,000 'be and is hereby made upon the conditions specified in said resolutions,' and that bonds be issued for the purpose of paying the same. The clerk was directed to have them prepared and delivered to John E. Naill, who by the ordinance was 'appointed agent on behalf of the city to receive from the clerk the said bonds and to deliver the same to the said company, its authorized agent or officer, upon compliance by the said company with the conditions in said resolutions specified, and at the same time to receive from the said company its certificate or certificates of stock (paid up) in said company to an amount equal to the amount of the bonds so delivered, and that he immediately deliver such certificate or certificates to the city council.' Under date of July 1, 1872, there was executed and delivered to Naill $25,000 of the bonds directed to be issued. They purport to have been issued by the city, were signed by its mayor and countersigned by its treasurer and clerk, and made payable to the railroad company or bearer at the Bank of Commerce in New York. Each one recites that 'This bond is issued under and by virtue of the charter of said city, and of ordinances passed in pursuance thereof, in payment of so much of the subscription by said city for fifty shares of the capital stock of said Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company. The proposition to subscribe for said stock having been first submitted, as required by law, to the qualified voters of said city for their approval or rejection, at a special election regularly held for that purpose at the various voting precincts or wards in and of said city, on the sixth day of April, A. D. 1868, and more than two-thirds of said voters having at said election assented thereto, and said majority of voters also being a majority over all the votes cast at the last preceding regular election held in and for said city, and said Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company having duly performed all the conditions of said subscription to be performed on its part before said bond was to be issued.'

On the thirteenth day of October, 1874, there was filed in the office of the auditor of state the official sworn certificate of the then mayor of Jonesboro, (who as clerk had attested the bonds when issued,) attested by the city clerk, to the effect that the before-mentioned bonds, amounting to $25,000, were entitled to registration in the office of the auditor under the act of April 16, 1869, entitled 'An act to fund and provide for paying the railroad debts of counties;' that they were issued by said city to said railroad company 'under and by authority of the provisions of an act of the general assembly of Illinois, approved March 3, 1869, and by a vote of the people of said city at an election held on the 6th day of April, 1868.' The certificate concluded: 'And I, as mayor of said city, do hereby certify that all the preliminary conditions in the act in force April 16, 1869, required to be done to authorize the registration of these bonds, and to entitle them to the benefits of said act last referred to, have been fully complied with to the best of my knowledge and belief.' On the day that certificate was filed, the auditor of state indorsed on each bond that it had been registered in his office pursuant to the provisions of the said act in force April 16, 1869. It was stipulated in the cause that the interest on the bonds so issued had been regularly paid by the city from date of their delivery to the issuing of the injunction by the state court in September, 1882.

1. It is entirely clear that when the vote of April 6, 1868, was taken, the city of Jonesboro was not authorized by its charter, or by any statute of Illinois, to make a subscription to the capital stock of the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company. The power given to its city council, 'to borrow money on the credit of the city and issue their bonds under the seal of the city therefor,' did not alone confer authority to subscribe to the stock of a railroad company, and issue bonds in payment thereof. The bonds upon their face showed that they were not issued for an ordinary municipal purpose. Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U.S. --; [2 SUP. CT. REP. 634.]

2. But the act passed April 15, 1869, and which became a law on March 3, 1869, declared legal and binding all elections theretofore held in any county, city, or town, in reference to a subscription to the stock of the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company, and gave power to the county court of any county, and the corporate authorities of any city or town in which such elections had already been held, and a majority of the votes cast were for subscription, to issue bonds for the amount voted, 'notwithstanding any insufficiency or informality or irregularity in such election, or in the notice thereof.' The election of April 6, 1868, was something more than informal or irregular. It was insufficient, in itself, as authority for an issue of bonds. But its insufficiency was removed by the act of 1869, if the general assembly of Illinois had the power to do so. That it had such power cannot well be doubted. It has been frequently decided by the supreme court of that state-and upon that point there has been no disagreement between that learned tribunal and the courts of the Union-that prior to the adoption of the Illinois constitution of 1870, an incorporated city, its corporate authorities being thereunto authorized by the legislature, could make a subscription to the capital stock of a railroad company without referring the question of subscription to a popular vote. Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405, 421; Q., M. & P. R. Co. v. Morris, 84 Ill. 410; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218, 225; Quincy v. Cooke, 107 U.S. 554; [2 SUP. CT. REP. 614.] The legislature, therefore, could make the election of 1868 legal and binding as as expression of the popular will; and, upon the basis of the election thus legalized, empower or authorize the corporate authorities of the municipality to issue the bonds for the amount indicated by the popular vote. There is no question here, such as has arisen in some cases in the supreme court of Illinois and in this court, as to the power of the legislature, prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1870, to compel the corporate authorities of a municipality to issue bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad. While the act of 1869 legalized the election of 1868, it did not require an issue of bonds, but only gave power to the corporate authorities of the municipality to do so; such authorities, in the case of an incorporated city, being not the voters, but its mayor and council. Williams v. Town of Roberts, 88 Ill. 22; Quincy v. Cooke, supra. If the conditions attached to the subscription by popular vote, or by the ordinance of the city council of Jonesboro, had not been complied with when the curative act of 1869 was passed, then the railroad company would not have been entitled to have the bonds issued. This shows that the curative act does not belong to that class which the supreme court of the state has, in some cases, held to be beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to pass.

3. The next question to be considered is whether the constitution of Illinois adopted in 1870 took from the city of Jonesboro the power thereafter to issue the bonds voted by the election of 1868 and authorized by the act of 1869. That instrument declares that 'no county, city, town, township, or other municipality shall ever become subscribers to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to or loan its credit in aid of such corporation: provided, however, that the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same have been authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities prior to such adoption.' We are of opinion that the right of the city to make the subscription in question, and to issue bonds in payment thereof, was saved by the proviso of that section. Before and at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1870, the city, by its corporate authorities, had power to subscribe to the stock of this railroad company. Power to that end was conferred by the act of 1869, which was itself based upon a vote of the people of Jonesboro. The vote, when taken, was, it is true, without legal sanction, but it was made effective as an expression of the popular will by the statute subsequently passed and in force before the constitution of 1870 was adopted. The phrase 'under existing laws,' in the section of the constitution referred to, relates, we think, to the time of the adoption of the constitution, rather than to the time when the vote of the people was in fact taken. Looking at the purpose of the proviso in the constitution of 1870, we cannot suppose that the framers of that instrument intended to make a difference, in the operation of that proviso, between a subscription authorized by a vote legally taken, and a subscription authorized by a vote taken without legislative authority, but subsequently, and before the constitution went into operation, legalized by a valid act of assembly.

4. But it is insisted that that part of the act of 1869 legalizing the election of 1868, and conferring authority to issue bonds for the amount voted at that election, was in violation of section 23 of article 3 of the Illinois constitution of 1848, which provides that 'no private or local law which may be passed by the general assembly shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.' The title of the act is 'An act to amend the charter of the Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company.' The contention is that the legalization of an election previously held, and at which the people voted in favor of a subscription of stock to that company and the granting of authority to issue bonds in payment of such subscription, is not a subject expressed by the title of the act. In this view we do not concur, and our conclusion is justified by the later decisions of the supreme court of Illinois construing a similar provision in the state constitution of 1870. It was held in Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 436, that the constitution 'does not require that the subject of the bill must be specifically and exactly expressed in the title; hence, we conclude that any expression in the title which calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required.' People v. Loewenthal, 93 Ill. 205. The authority of municipalities to make subscriptions in aid of the construction of railroads in Illinois has frequently, if not generally, been given in the charters of the respective railroad corporations. Whether a particular municipality has legislative authority for a subscription to the stock of a particular railroad company can be determined, ordinarily, by referring to the charter of that company. The general subject of municipal subscriptions to the stock of this particular company was, therefore, germane to and fairly embraced by the title of the act of 1869. Upon like grounds a provision in the same act legalizing a previous election at which the people voted in favor of a subscription, and giving authority to issue bonds for the amount indicated by the popular vote, was sufficiently covered by a title showing that the act in question was amendatory of the original charter of the company; this, because the validity of bonds so issued would depend upon the existence of legislative authority to issue them, and the existence of such authority would ordinarily be ascertained by reference to the charter and amended charter of the railroad corporation. Our decision in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 152, [2 SUP. CT. REP. 391,] expresses substantially the same views, upon this general subject, as those announced by the supreme court of Illinois in Johnson v. People. We are of opinion that no error was committed in dismissing the bill, so far as it questioned the authority of the state officers to assess, levy, and extend taxes in payment of the bonds held by the appellee Graves.

The decree is consequently affirmed. It is so ordered.


text: Talk:City of Jonesboro v. Cairo/Opinion of the Court


text:
Zane v. Soffe

''Thos. Wm. Clarke'', for appellants.

Henry P. Wells, for appellee.

BRADLEY, J.

title: Zane v. Soffe


text: Talk:Zane v. Soffe

title: Talk:Zane v. Soffe


text:
Zane v. Soffe/Opinion of the Court

This writ was brought by Zane and Roach, as assignees of one Nathaniel Jenkins, against the defendant, Soffe, for infringing (as charged) certain letters-patent granted to said Jenkins, June 22, 1865, for an improvement in self-acting cocks or faucets. The general feature of the invention patented, so far as material to be considered, may be described as follows: The valve is situated in a chamber below the valve-seat, where the water is introduced by the induction pipe and is kept in place against the valve-seat by a spiral spring underneath resting on the bottom of the chamber; on its upper side the valve is connected by a swivel with a stem which projects upward through the top o the faucet, where it is provided with a handle by which it may be turned; a screw is formed on the upper part of the stem by which, when the stem is turned by the hand, it is forced downward and pushes the valve from its seat, thus permitting the water to flow out of the cock; on letting the handle go, the spiral spring below the valve, aided by the pressure of the water, forces the valve back to its seat, and the flow of water is stopped. In the specification the stem is called a screw-follower. The patent has two claims, only the first of which is claimed to be infringed by the defendant, and this in the following words, to-wit: 'What I claim as new and desire to secure by letters-patent is, (1) the screw-follower, H, in combination with the valve of a self-closing faucet, substantially as set forth, and for the purpose described.'

The defendant answered the bill, denying that Jenkins was the first inventor of the thing patented, denying infringement, and setting up a patent granted to defendant himself on the tenth of May, 1874, under and according to which the faucets manufactured by him were made, and which he alleges are no infringement of the Jenkins patent. The answer specifically refers to only one patent as anticipating the supposed invention of Jenkins, namely, a patent granted to one Frederick H. Bartholomew, in August, 1846, in which (as alleged) all the essential elements of the faucet patented to Jenkins are described and exhibited. The answer, however, contains the following general averment:

'This defendant, further answering, denies that the patent     granted said Nathaniel Jenkins is valid; and alleges that      prior to the invention described in said patent, a screw and      spring, worked in opposition to each other, had been used to      open and close faucets and hydrants, in which faucets any      hydrants the screw did all the work of opening the faucets      and hydrants, and the spring did all or most of the work of      closing the valve of the faucets and hydrants; that faucets      and hydrants operated in the above manner had been in public      and general use and for sale in the cities of New York and      Brooklyn, and in various other places long prior to, and at      least fifteen years before, the date of the alleged invention      of Nathaniel Jenkins; and defendant is advised and believes      that, by reason of said prior public use and sale, the patent      granted to said Jenkins is invalid.'

This answer was not excepted to, and evidence was given by the defendant, without objection, showing that a large number of faucets and hydrants were made by Bartholomew, and publicly used in the city of New York, several years before the issuing of the patent sued on, differing in some respects from the specific device described in Bartholomew's patent, referred to in the answer, but relied on as anticipating the alleged invention of Jenkins; or, at least, as containing all the essential elements of the faucets manufactured by the defendant. The court below held that this evidence was competent to show the state of the art at the time Jenkin's patent was granted, and might be used for the purpose of limiting its construction, but not for the purpose of showing such a previous knowledge and use of the invention as would affect the validity of the patent. But since the decision of this case in the circuit court, we have held, in Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 595, that under a general denial of the patentee's priority of invention, evidence of prior knowledge and use, taken without objection, is competent at the final hearing on the question of the validity of the patent. And, since in the present case there was neither an exception to the answer nor any objection to the evidence, except as to a single faucet marked Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, (which may be laid out of the case,) we think the remaining evidence of prior knowledge and use might well have been considered by the court on the question of priority as affecting the validity of the patent. Viewing the evidence, h wever, with the court below, only as demonstrative of the state of the art, and therefore competent to limit the construction of the patent to the precise form of parts and mechanism described and claimed therein, it was amply sufficient to sustain the decree.

Self-closing cocks and faucets were no new thing in June, 1865, when the patent of Jenkins was issued. Bartholomew had manufactured and sold them for a period of 10 or 15 years before that time. As early as 1854 he had made and sold faucets in which the valve was kept on its seat by the pressure of a spiral spring, and when a flow of water was desired, the valve was lifted from its seat against the force of the spring by means of a stem, operated by a collar of cross-piece moving around on a fixed circular inclined plane or cam, having the same effect as a screw; when the handle, or thumb-piece, attached to the collar was liberated or let go, the spiral spring would force the valve back to its seat, and the flow of water would be stopped.

The improvement of Jenkins, (or what was patented to him as such), as we have seen, was the employment of a screw on the upper part of the valve stem, in lieu of the circular cam or inclined plane, to force the valve from its seat. This valve stem, called by him the screw-follower, forced the valve not only against the pressure of the spring, but against that of the water, both of which were exerted in carrying the valve back to its seat as soon as the force operating upon the screw was removed. Now, in view of the fact that an inclined plane or cam was previously used by Bartholomew as a means of producing the same result upon the valve stem as that produced by the screw made upon it by Jenkins, it is clear that the claim of the latter in his patent, of 'the screw-follower, H, in combination with the valve of a self-closing faucet, substantially as set forth,' must be limited to the precise form of mechanism designated. It must be limited to a screw-follower, and cannot be construed to embrace a cam arrangement for moving the valve. Whether it is also to be limited to a valve which moves to its seat concurrently with, and not against, the pressure of the water, it is not necessary to determine. The limitation to the screw is sufficient to determine this case. In the faucet manufactured by the defendant the screw is not used, but the old cam device is employed for lifting the valve from its seat. It is true that the cam, instead of being placed at the top of the stem, on the outside of the faucet, as was done by Bartholomew, is placed at its lower extremity, by the valve, inside of the faucet; but this does not change the principle of its construction or operation. We concur with the court below in holding that, construed as the patent of Jenkins must be in view of the state of the art at the time of its issue, the defendant has not infringed it, and the bill of complaint was properly dismissed.

The decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill is therefore affirmed.

title: Zane v. Soffe/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Zane v. Soffe/Opinion of the Court

title: Talk:Zane v. Soffe/Opinion of the Court


text:
Sioux City Company v. United States

E. S. Bailey, for plaintiff in error.

''Sol. Gen. Phillips'', for defendant in error.

BRADLEY, J.

title: Sioux City Company v. United States


text: Talk:Sioux City Company v. United States


text:
Sioux City Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court

This was an action brought by the United States against the Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company to recover certain arrears of taxes alleged to have accrued from November, 1868, to September, 1871, inclusive. The first count of the declaration states that for the 11 months ending September 30, 1868, the gross receipts of the company from passengers were $51,786.12, on which it became liable to pay a tax of 2 1/2 per cent., or $1,294.55; and that the undivided net earnings of the company for the same period, which were carried to the construction fund or account, were $43,889.39, on which the company became liable to pay a tax of 5 per cent., amounting to $2,194.41; that the company paid the tax on gross receipts, but refused to pay the tax on net earnings carried to construction account. Three other counts for the following years showed an aggregate arrearage (including that stated in the first count) of over $11,000. There were four other counts for penalties, to which the statute of limitations was pleaded, and which are not the subject of controversy. Issue being taken on the first four counts, the parties entered into a stipulation for the purpose of showing the precise matter in dispute.

This stipulation, after stating the title of the cause, was as follows:

'The parties to the above-entitled action hereby stipulate to     waive a jury on the trial thereof. For the purpose of the     trial of this action the following facts are admitted:

'(1) All the material facts alleged in the first count of the     petition are true, subject to the following statement and      exception, to-wit: The amount of interest accrued during the      period mentioned said count on the subsidy bonds, (so-called)      issued by the United States to said defendant in pursuance of      the act of congress entitled 'An act to aid in the      construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the      Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the      government the use of the same for postal, military, and      other purposes', approved July 1, 1862, and the amendments      thereto, was the sum of thirty-six thousand dollars      ($36,000.) If the said sum of $36,000 is subject in law to be      deducted from the gross receipts of the defendant, in order      to ascertain the net earnings thereof for the period named,      then the amount of the net earnings liable to a tax of five      per cent., is the sum of seven thousand eight hundred and      eighty-eight and 39-100 dollars ($7,883.39,) and the tax on      the same is three hundred ninety-four and 41-100 dollars      ($394.41,) instead of the sum of $2,194.41, as claimed in      said count.'

Similar admissions were made with regard to the other counts, and the stipulation concluded as follows:

If the court is of the opinion that the interest which     accrued on the said subsidy bonds for the several periods      named is subject to be deducted from the gross receipts in order to ascertain the      net earnings, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover—

On the first count, only.......... $ 394

On the second count, only............ 52

On the third count, only.......... 1,434

And on the fourth count,............ 221

---

But if on the other hand the court should be of the opinion     that the said interest accrued on said bonds is not subject      to be deducted, the plaintiff is entitled to receive—

On the first count,.............. $2,194

On the second count,.............. 3,944

On the third count,............... 3,416

On the fourth count,................ 221

"Making a total of      $9,777

Upon this state of facts the court gave judgment for the latter sum, and the company has brought this writ of error to review said judgment. We think that the judgment was right. The accruing interest on the subsidy bonds loaned by the government to the company is payable by the company at a future day, to-wit, at the maturity of the bonds; and if a sufficient amount of the company's annual net earnings is laid aside (as it should be) to meet that interest when it shall become due, the amount so laid aside would be directly within the scope of the internal revenue act, as it stood when the net earnings in question arose. The 122d section of that act, as amended in 1866, imposed a 5 per cent. tax, not only on all payments of interest due on bonds and on all dividends declared by any railroad or canal company, but also on 'all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund, or used for construction.' The profits here referred to are the profits arising from the operation of the road or canal without deduction of interest paid to its bondholders, or dividends paid to its stockholders, and correspond to the phrase 'net earnings' used in the stipulation of the parties in this case. U. Pacific R. Co. v. U.S. 99 U.S. 402. The expression in the act, 'profits carried to the account of any fund,' would cover the exact case here if any portion of such net earnings had been carried to a fund created for meeting the interest to be paid on the subsidy bonds. It is very clear, therefore, that whether the whole of said net earnings were carried to construction account (as admitted in the stipulation) or a part of it were carried to account of such accruing interest fund, it would be expressly taxable by the internal revenue act.

The same result, we think, would have followed had the interest in the subsidy bonds been payable by the company semi-annually as it fell due; for although the words of the internal revenue act, as that act stood when the transactions in question occurred, (14 St. 138,) imposed the 5 per cent. tax upon interest due and payable by a railroad or canal company only where such company was indebted for 'money for which bonds or other evidence of indebtedness have been issued, payable in one or more years after date, upon which interest is stipulated to be paid, or coupons representing the interest;' which words may be regarded as literally referring only to 'bonds or other evidence of indebtedness' issued by the company itself; yet, if the company had been obliged to pay the interest accruing on the subsidy bonds semi-annually as the same fell due, said bonds would have been, in effect, the bonds 'or other evidence of indebtedness' of the company. Though in form government bonds, the subsidy act makes them a mortgage lien on the property of the company, and ultimately payable by the company, principal and interest, (12 St. at Large, 492, 493;) and if an obligation had been imposed by the statute to pay both principal and interest as they respectively fell due, it would have made them substantially and in effect, the bonds of the company, and fairly taxable under the internal revenue act. Be this, however, as it may, it is clear that where, as in the present case, the interest is to be provided for by a fund, in the nature of a sinking fund, to be laid by for the purpose, the case comes within the express terms of the internal revenue act, and no deduction of such accruing interest can be made from the taxable net earnings of the company.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.


text: Talk:Sioux City Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court


text:
Dimpfel v. Ohio

C. W. Hassler and ''Thos. N. McCarter'', for appellan s.

Edgar M. Johnson and ''Benj. Harrison'', for appellees.

FIELD, J.

title: Dimpfel v. Ohio


text: Talk:Dimpfel v. Ohio

title: Talk:Dimpfel v. Ohio