text:
Infantry, Part I: Regular Army / A Diverse Half Century, 1866-1915

 * A Diverse Half Century, 1866-1915

 * Four years of war, and the large army built up during them, conditioned the nation in 1866 to the biggest increase in the Regular infantry since the War of 1812. The result was a postwar military peace establishment of twenty-six more Regular regiments of foot soldiers than had served for the Union. The total was forty-five. All regiments were formed on the prewar pattern with ten companies, and with regiment and battalion one and the same. The new companies were strong in noncommissioned officers and specialists, having a total of nineteen, and privates totaled between fifty and one hundred at the discretion of the President.

 * The expansion of the infantry worked out as follows. The 1st through 10th Infantry retained their numbers. The first battalions of the 11th through the 19th expanded into regiments of the same respective numbers, and the second battalions into the 20th through the 28th Infantry. The first ten regiments needed no expansion, but the converted first and second battalions, being composed of just eight companies, required two more companies apiece. The 29th through the 37th Infantry were supposed to come from the third battalions of the Civil War units, but, since these had never been raised for the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and 19th regiments, and only imperfectly for the other four, the postwar units had to be recruited. The other eight regiments were new. Negro personnel, commanded by white officers, staffed the 38th through the 41st, while men from the Veteran Reserve Corps, wounded but still able to do active duty, filled up the 42nd through the 45th.

 * During 1866, twenty-six of the forty-five regiments remained in the area of the Confederacy, while twelve were sent west into Indian country. To the men who personally fought the Indians, there never seemed to be enough soldiers, but the level of forty-five regiments was altogether too high for the rest of the nation when the stimulus of the great conflict had worn off. In consequence, recruiting was stopped, and in 1867 the companies were directed not to replace their losses until only fifty privates per company remained. Two years later, on 3 March 1869, Congress reduced the infantry to twenty-five regiments. This set off a reorganization which, for disrupting the history and traditions of regiments, almost rivaled the upheaval of 1815. The following consolidations resulted:

 * 1) 43rd consolidated with the 1st to form the new 1st
 * 2) 16th consolidated with the 2nd to form the new 2nd
 * 3) Half of the 37th consolidated with the 3rd to form the new 3rd
 * 4) 30th consolidated with the 4th to form the new 4th
 * 5) Half of the 37th consolidated with the 5th to form the new 5th
 * 6) 42nd consolidated with the 6th to form the new 6th
 * 7) 36th consolidated with the 7th to form the new 7th
 * 8) 33rd consolidated with the 8th to form the new 8th
 * 9) 27th consolidated with the 9th to form the new 9th
 * 10) 26th consolidated with the 10th to form the new 10th
 * 11) 24th consolidated with the 29th to form the new 11th
 * 12) 12th Infantry not affected
 * 13) 13th Infantry not affected
 * 14) 45th consolidated with the 14th to form the new 14th
 * 15) 35th consolidated with the 15th to form the new 15th
 * 16) 11th consolidated with the 34th to form the new 16th
 * 17) 44th consolidated with the 17th to form the new 17th
 * 18) 25th consolidated with the 18th to form the new 18th
 * 19) 28th consolidated with the 19th to form the new 19th
 * 20) 20th Infantry not affected
 * 21) 32nd consolidated with the 21st to form the new 21st
 * 22) 31st consolidated with the 22nd to form the new 22nd
 * 23) 23rd Infantry not affected
 * 24) 38th consolidated with the 41st to form the new 24th
 * 25) 39th consolidated with the 40th to form the new 25th

 * Twenty-one outfits emerged from the reorganization bearing the same numbers they had borne through the war, but the new 11th, 16th, 24th, and 25th Infantry were not so fortunate. They had no connection with the war units of the same numbers. However, the 24th and 25th-created by consolidation of the 38th through the 41st-carried on the tradition of the Negro regiments begun during the Civil War.

 * The Regular infantry stood unchanged at twenty-five regiments for thirty-two years, and was at last altered only because of the need to hold the territory outside the continental United States acquired from Spain in 1898. Within the regiments the size of companies fluctuated. In the trough of economic depression the number of men authorized per company dropped in 1876 as low as thirty-seven. Infantry officers pointed out that when sickness and desertion occurred; these little companies were much too small to do their duty in the Indian country where 180 out of 250 of them were stationed in the 1870's. The severe cut that reduced the companies to skeleton strength came about in the following manner. One month after the famous massacre of Custer's troops in June 1876, Congress reduced the enlisted strength of the Army from 30,000 to 25,000. Then in August the legislators allowed existing cavalry units to be augmented by 2,500 men, since cavalry was considered the chief reliance against the Plains Indians. As a result, the reduction of 5,000 fell almost entirely upon the infantry.

 * By 1890 the long fight against the red man was practically won. This made it possible to abandon some of the small posts, held by one or two companies, and to concentrate the units under regimental control. The shift, however, was not made easily, and as late as 1912 the Secretary of War complained that dispersion made of the Army nothing but a scattered constabulary. In any case, in 1890 it seemed sensible to make the whole infantry establishment more compact without increasing it.. In consequence, Companies I and K of each regiment were stripped of all personnel, and their men and officers used to fill out the remaining companies. Thus, fifty infantry companies existed only in name with their records and trophies preserved by the regiments. The two hundred companies that survived had one sergeant and four corporals fewer than formerly, and a total of forty-six privates each. Within a year, however, the War Department directed that Company I of nineteen of the regiments be filled out with fifty-five Indians, but because it was unsuccessful the, project was soon dropped.

 * While these changes were taking place, observers were pointing out that the ten-company, one-battalion regiment was obsolete. The increased accuracy of firearms, they said, had forced dispersion so that no one man could control ten companies in battle. Accordingly, the Secretary of War in 1890 urged that a regiment of three battalions of four companies each be adopted. Such an arrangement was backed by statistics, for wars in Europe had demonstrated that one-third of a regiment now occupied the same front in battle as an entire regiment once had. This being so, a single leader could hardly be expected to direct more than four companies in action. In the next few years, the Secretary's successors repeated the request, but without success.

 * Throughout the period under consideration, there was ceaseless experimentation with infantry small arms; but, even so, changes came slowly. The reason for this was that the Army had to practice the strictest economy. Accordingly, Ordnance sought for the last refinement before standardizing any model, since once a rifle was adopted, it could not soon be discarded in favor of a new one costing large sums. As a result, the rifle musket of the Civil War remained in general use for a few years after the return of peace.

 * When at last the almost hallowed old piece made way for a new one in the early 1870's, the United States infantry took a forward stride as great as when it had adopted the Minie principle in the 1850's. The new gun, the celebrated Springfield Model 1873, embodied several indispensable improvements. It was the first official infantry rifle to load at the breech. Next, it operated without a touch-hole- an essential in all previous American foot soldiers' guns- because the primer was included as part of a brass cartridge which had replaced paper cartridges. Last but not least, it dropped .13 of an inch in caliber, being .45 instead of .58 across the bore.

 * The Springfield '73 remained the official shoulder arm of the infantry for nineteen years. Actually it served longer than that, for citizen soldiers used it in 1898 and 1899, and the Philippine Scouts even later. When finally it was superseded in 1892, its replacement embodied an advance that had been widely used for decades. Called the Krag-Jorgensen, it was the foot soldier's first standard repeating rifle. In addition, it continued the trend toward smaller bullets, being .30 caliber instead of .45. The Krag lasted nine years before yielding to the Springfield Model 1903. The latter remained standard for almost forty years, that is, to the outbreak of World War II. Although it was not a new departure as the '73 and the Krag had been, it utilized the latest improvements, and was as fine a rifle as infantry had anywhere in the world.

 * All of a sudden, in the spring of 1898, the United States jumped into a war with Spain. There were then 26,000 enlisted men, in round figures, in the Regular Army, of whom half were infantry. A threebattalion organization was put into effect at once by the following arrangement. The existing eight companies in each regiment were divided into two battalions, while the two skeleton companies were filled out and combined with two new companies to make the third battalion. Also, the size of companies rose from around 50 to 106 enlisted men. The result was a substantial regiment of 1,309 enlisted men. However, it still contained 1,000 men fewer than the authorized strength of the 11th through 19th Infantry in the Civil War and 2,400 less than the 3,700-man units of World War I.

 * Conflict with Spain did not add even one to the total of twenty-five Regular infantry regiments, for, as in the Civil War, chief reliance was not placed upon Regulars. No sooner was war declared than Congress passed an act putting a second component beside the Regulars. This was called the Volunteer Army of the United States. The regiments of this force were raised and officered by the states, and in the main sprang from existing organized militia units. Officers of the Regular Army were at liberty, without losing Regular status, to accept commissions for field grades in state units, provided there was no more than one Regular in any volunteer regiment. Congress also ruled that state units had to conform to the organization of the Army, and that general and staff officers for corps, divisions, and brigades be appointed by the President.

 * Before the end of May, President William McKinley made two calls for troops, requesting a total of 141 regiments, 20 separate battalions, and 46 separate companies of infantry, all of which were raised quickly. Most of the regiments came into Federal service with around 950 enlisted men, but three or four contained as few as 650. Nearly all of them recruited up before the war was over, although none reached the 1,309 prescribed. This was not surprising when one considers that, except for the regiments that went to the Philippines, all the volunteer infantry units were released by 8 June 1899, having served in most cases less than a year.

 * It was decided, in the second month of the war (May 1898), to organize ten regiments of volunteers not related to any state, an action for which there was precedent in the United States volunteers of the Civil War. The latter had been raised from special groups such as sharpshooters or Confederate prisoners of war. The earliest regiments of United States Volunteer Infantry in the War with Spain were also made up from a special group, that is, from men who were immune to tropical disease: five regiments of Negroes and five of whites. They were authorized to contain only 992, instead of 1,309, enlisted men, and all had close to that number when they were mustered in.

 * As early as March 1899, the use of United States Volunteer Infantry was carried beyond the employment of the 10,000 immunes. By September 1899, twenty-four new regiments, not to remain in service beyond 1 July 1901, had been authorized to be raised from the country at large. Their designating numbers started where the Regular infantry's left off (that is, at 26) and ran through 49. The 36th and 37th were recruited from men already on duty in the Philippines, the 48th and 49th from Negroes. Practically all the officers of field grade for the new outfits came from the Regular Army.

 * In March 1899, companies went up in size to 112 enlisted men and regiments to 1,378. Three months later, companies in active areas, such as the Philippines, increased to 128. Thus enlarged, twenty-four regiments of United States Volunteers and twenty-five of Regulars made up the infantry which garrisoned the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, as well as the United States itself. Soon it was necessary to make new provisions, since after 1 July 1901 the authorization for Volunteers and for the increases in Regulars ran out. The new arrangement, dated 2 February 1901, gave the number of Regular infantry regiments its first boost since 1866. Five new ones were authorized, the 26th through the 30th. These were the fourth units with these numbers to have been in the Regular service, the first having existed during the French crisis in 1798-99, the second during the War of 1812, and the third from 1866 to 1869.

 * This and other legislation of 1901 set the upper limits of the military establishment, but allowed the President to increase the size of companies by 6 noncommissioned officers and to raise the, privates up to a total of 127 if he thought it necessary. Under this discretion, the authorized size of the Army fluctuated by executive order until World War I. Also, two new nationalities joined the infantry establishment, for the law sanctioned up to 12,000 Philippine Scouts and a provisional regiment of Puerto Ricans.

 * Native Filipinos had been organized into companies as early as September 1899, but having no official sanction, had been paid as civilian employees of the Quartermaster. Their official organization, which took effect on 1 October 1901, provided for fifty companies. The officers were from the Regular Army except for the 1st and 2nd lieutenants, who could be selected from qualified natives. A battalion organization was introduced in 1904, and in the following decade thirteen Philippine Scout battalions came into being. After World War I these battalions, most of which had been parts of provisional regiments during the war, were grouped into permanent regiments and given numbers. They became the 43rd, 45th, 57th, and 62nd Infantry (Philippine Scouts).

 * As with the Filipinos, there had been an earlier organization in Puerto Rico, a battalion which had begun to operate during March 1899. This was combined with a battalion of mounted infantry, organized in 1900, to make a regiment. Its companies were smaller than those of the Regulars and of the Philippine Scouts, and it contained two instead of three battalions. The Puerto Rico Regiment was manned by natives of, that island but commanded by officers from the continent. In 1908 this outfit was incorporated into the Regular Army, and in 1920 it was redesignated as the 65th Infantry.

 * The organization of infantry regiments into three battalions of four companies each-finally brought about by the War with Spain-persisted as a permanent alteration. It is interesting to note, that with this change the Army returned to the regimental organization used from 1790 to 1792. This 100-year reversion, however, did not arise from a study of the earlier period-rather it sprang from the experience of the. Civil War, coupled with that of the later wars in Europe. Experience had demonstrated that the old regiments were far too big to be effectively controlled in battle. As long as the system in which battalion and regiment were one and the same was followed, the regiment was a fighting subdivision in the line of battle. On the other hand, in the shift to more modern practice which the infantry was making, the battalion was a fighting subdivision while the regiment exercised administrative control over three battalions. The fault in the shift was that the American battalion was too small to perform its work. This may be illustrated by comparing the new organization with those in Europe. The French and Prussian infantries both used regiments of three battalions, but the battalions were far larger. The Prussians had 1,000 enlisted men in theirs, the French close to 700, wile Americans had no more than 425.

 * One of the major trends in military organization during the second half of the nineteenth century had to do with the organization of infantry below company level. Within two years after the Civil War, a new United States manual on infantry tactics was issued. Prepared by Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, it based all troop evolutions on movement by fours. Since a front of four men in proper line had a rear rank, the basic subdivision of the new system was really a squad, although that term was not used.

 * Upton's Infantry Tactics remained official for twenty-four years. During these years organization within companies took form. Accordingly, the Infantry Drill Regulations (the first manual to bear that name), issued in 1891, defined a squad more sharply than before. A squad contained seven privates and one corporal, and was made the basis of drill in extended order. Since extended order was gradually displacing close order, the squad gained new importance. Likewise, as the duties and the organization of a squad became clearer, those of half companies (that is, platoons) also took firmer form. Indeed, the fire of an advancing infantry line was carried out, according to the manuals, by platoon.

 * Throughout the half century the movement was toward the refinement of organization further and further. This meant giving small knots of men, and combinations of such knots, cohesion and special leadership. The development that launched this movement was the gradual replacement of line tactics by skirmish tactics. Along with it came changes in training and techniques, such as a set of arm signals by which company officers and their subordinates could control their men. All the changes, whether in organization or techniques, stemmed from the growing deadliness of firearms.

 * A weapon that would change the character of warfare, the machine gun, was being developed during this period. The first important model, the Gatling gun patented in 1862, was purchased by the United States during the Civil War. Tests made in the 1870's showed the Gatling to be equal to seventy Springfield rifles well aimed at 150 to 200 yards. Interest in the weapon increased and the United States bought several lots of it in the years after the Civil War.

 * As a result of the intercession of 1st Lt. John H. Parker, an independent battery of four Gatling guns, directly under the corps commander, took an active part in the Santiago campaign. The guns were directed against entrenched Spanish infantry with telling effect, and even against artillery. Parker contended they could do anything necessary to support infantry, but believed they would be more effective if made lighter (they weighed two hundred pounds). He also recommended that some sort of mounting, other than the awkward cannon carriage, be devised for them. Not infected with Parker's enthusiasm, higher commanders were inclined to look at the Gatlings as artillery, and not very good artillery at that.

 * The machine gun made its greatest advance when Hiram Maxim, an American inventor, patented one in 1883 which eliminated the need for a hand crank by operating on the energy of its own recoil. The United States experimented with it as early as 1888 but did not adopt it officially until the first decade of the twentieth century. Tests made in 1910 showed that one machine gun was equal to sixteen riflemen at ranges up to 600 yards; to twenty-two men from 600 to 1,200; and to thirty-nine men beyond 1,200 yards. Comparing these figures with those given for tests in the 1870's, it is clear that the repeating rifle had reduced the discrepancy between shoulder arms and machine guns a good deal. In any case, on account of the unwieldiness of the weapon and for other reasons,, official doctrine on the machine gun remained very conservative.
 * This did not, however, prevent experiments in organization to utilize it. In 1906, for example, a provisional machine gun platoon of twenty-one men and two Vickers-Maxim guns was added to each regiment. Although the Secretary of War reported three years later that this arrangement had not worked well, the salient fact is that infantry regiments were never again without machine guns. In February 1908, an experimental company was constituted, headed by John H. Parker, now a captain. This company, although it went through several changes in organization, was the forerunner of the machine gun companies of infantry regiments in World War I.

 * There were other experiments in organization besides those dealing with machine guns. A headquarters detachment of seventeen enlisted men and fifteen mounted scouts was added to each regiment in 1912 for trial. With the machine gun platoon, it made up a regimental detachment the parts of which were trained intensively in their specialized duties. By 1915 the headquarters detachment had grown into a headquarters company "provisionally provided" for each regiment of infantry. (There had never before been headquarters companies in them.) In the same way, the machine gun platoon became a machine gun company, while a third new company, a supply unit, was also under trial.

 * The size of infantry regiments varied, within the limits imposed by law on the President, according to the duty performed. Regiments in the United States in 1912 had 65 enlisted men per company and a total of 870; those in the Philippines, 150 and 1,836; those in Hawaii and the Canal Zone, 72 and 954; the Puerto Rico Regiment, 65 per company with 591 total. The beginning of World War I in Europe added to the variety, for the possibility of American involvement caused the preparation of alternate tables of organization, one for peace, the other for war. Thus in June 1915, the peace strength of an infantry regiment was set at 959 officers and enlisted men; the war strength at 1,945.

 * Once the nation had become a colonial power on account of the War with Spain, the study of war grew more important, and Americans turned to a review of what they had to fight with. It was clear that the Regular Army was too small to make up the whole defense and that stimulation of the militia was therefore necessary. As a result, one phase of the reform of 1903 was to replace the Federal militia law which had been on the books since 1792. This reform was particularly significant for the infantry because it comprised the bulk of the militia force. When the revised law went into effect, there were 107,422 enlisted men in the organized militia and 93,314 of them, or 8 7 percent, were foot soldiers.

 * The Militia Act of 1903 attempted to draw the National Guard (as the organized militias of the several states were coming to be called) closer into the military force controlled by the Federal government. This implied better training in peace time. When the act was passed, the improved training began to operate, and this, plus the beginning of war in Europe, accelerated the drawing together. Initially, according to the act of 1903, the United States could retain National Guard forces in its service for just nine months, whereas by 1908 Federal power had so enlarged that the President could specify the length of their service. Also, National Guard units volunteering for Federal service in 1903 could keep the officers they had; but by 1914 the power to appoint all officers, when the Guard was on active duty, had fallen to the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

 * The great reforms in the Army which took place in 1903 affected the Regular infantry only indirectly. Creation of a General Staff and Army War College brought about co-ordinated thinking which, of course, touched the infantry. Very early, it was seen that, because of the great preponderance of infantry in the National Guard, the forces of the United States were out of balance. The Secretary of War hoped to offset the imbalance by maintaining a high proportion of cavalry and artillery in the Regular Army. Also, some foot units of the National Guard in seaboard states were converted into coast artillery. This does not mean that there was an excess of Regular infantry. On the contrary, in 1909 the Secretary asked that both infantry and artillery be increased. He fixed the proper proportion of infantry at 50 percent of the whole; but in the decade from 1901 to 1911, the ratio actually dropped from 50 to 35 percent.

 * Finally, it is necessary to mention the growing role of the Signal Corps in support of infantry. During the Civil War, the Corps had provided strategic communication, but by the time of the War with Spain it gave some tactical communication as well. This was accomplished by means of signal flags and, to an ever increasing extent, by telephones. Telephone lines began to follow the infantry very close to the firing line. This was but a beginning, for telephones supplemented by radios were to be the medium which in the twentieth century would link units of the same force on the vast battlefields, and link them better than they had once been linked by close-order formations.


text:
Robinson Crusoe’s Story

The night was thick and hazy When the “Piccadilly Daisy” Carried down the crew and captain in the sea; And I think the water drowned ’em; For they never, never found ’em, And I know they didn’t come ashore with me.

Oh! ’twas very sad and lonely When I found myself the only Population on this cultivated shore; But I’ve made a little tavern In a rocky little cavern, And I sit and watch for people at the door.

I spent no time in looking For a girl to do my cooking, As I’m quite a clever hand at making stews; But I had that fellow Friday, Just to keep the tavern tidy, And to put a Sunday polish on my shoes.

I have a little garden That I’m cultivating lard in, As the things I eat are rather tough and dry; For I live on toasted lizards, Prickly pears, and parrot gizzards, And I’m really very fond of beetle-pie.

The clothes I had were furry, And it made me fret and worry When I found the moths were eating off the hair; And I had to scrape and sand ’em, And I boiled ’em and I tanned ’em, Till I got the fine morocco suit I wear.

I sometimes seek diversion In a family excursion With the few domestic animals you see; And we take along a carrot As refreshment for the parrot, And a little can of jungleberry tea. “If the roads are wet and muddy we remain at home and study. Then we gather as we travel, Bits of moss and dirty gravel, And we chip off little specimens of stone; And we carry home as prizes Funny bugs, of handy sizes, Just to give the day a scientific tone.

If the roads are wet and muddy We remain at home and study,— For the Goat is very clever at a sum, And the Dog, instead of fighting, Studies ornamental writing, While the Cat is taking lessons on the drum.

We retire at eleven, And we rise again at seven; And I wish to call attention, as I close, To the fact that all the scholars Are correct about their collars, And particular in turning out their toes.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Robinson Crusoe’s Story


text: Talk:Robinson Crusoe’s Story

title: Talk:Robinson Crusoe’s Story


text:
Page:Quatrains of Omar Khayyam (tr. Whinfield, 1883).djvu/78

22

To-day is thine to spend, but not to-morrow, Counting on morrows breedeth naught but sorrow; Oh! squander not this breath that heaven hath lent thee, Nor make too sure another breath to borrow!

'Tis labour lost thus to all doors to crawl, Take thy good fortune, and thy bad withal; Know for a surety each must play his game, As from heaven's dice-box fate's dice chance to fall.

This jug did once, like me, love's sorrows taste, And bonds of beauty's tresses once embraced, This handle, which you see upon its side, Has many a time twined round a slender waist!


text:
Page:Quatrains of Omar Khayyam (tr. Whinfield, 1883).djvu/80

24

Days changed to nights, ere you were born, or I, And on its business ever rolled the sky; See you tread gently on this dust-perchance 'Twas once the apple of some beauty's eye.

Pagodas, just as mosques, are homes of prayer, 'Tis prayer that church-bells chime unto the air, Yea, Church and Kaaba, Rosary and Cross Are all but divers tongues of world-wide prayer.

'Twas writ at first, whatever was to be, By pen, unheeding bliss or misery, Yea, writ upon the tablet once for all, To murmur or resist is vanity.


text:
Infantry, Part I: Regular Army / The First World War

 * The First World War

 * A full ten months ahead of the formal entry of the United States into World War I, the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 erected the framework on which to expand the military establishment if conflict should come. At the time, there were thirty-one regiments of Regular infantry, counting the Puerto Rico Regiment of two battalions, plus thirteen battalions of Philippine Scouts. In addition, the National Guard contained around 110 regiments of infantry.

 * The National Defense Act raised the authorized size of the Army from 100,000 to 175,000, and provided that the increase be made in five annual increments, beginning 1 July 1916. The first increment included seven new infantry regiments, the 31st through the 37th. The 31st was organized in the Philippines, the 32nd in Hawaii, the 33rd in the Canal Zone, and the other four were organized in the continental United States. All seven of them expanded from cadres supplied by specified existing regiments. As soon as the United States entered the war, twenty-seven new infantry regiments were constituted and organized by the transfer of cadres from the other thirty-seven. When this process was completed, the Regular infantry comprised sixty-five regiments, seventeen more than ever before in American history.

 * The National Defense Act recognized four elements in the land forces: the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Reserve Corps, and in wartime the Volunteer Army. Once the nation actually went to war, the character of the latter element changed, for volunteering was scrapped except in the Regular Army and in the National Guard. The Volunteer Army became the National Army, which was raised by conscription. All in all, the wartime Army contained 297 infantry regiments of one kind or another and 165 machine gun battalions classed as infantry.

 * Infantry regiments and machine gun battalions together totaled 462 in World War I, a figure which is dwarfed by the 1,700-plus infantry units that served in the Civil War. One of the reasons for the contrast was the fact that regiments had increased three times in size; but the chief reason was that the units of the later war remained to the end, while those of the earlier one came and went.

 * The War Department came 11 July 1917 set up a system by which infantry units were to be designated. The designating numbers for all segments of the Regular Army began with 1. Regiments ran from 1 through 100, but these slots were never all filled. Just sixty-five Regular infantry regiments, in twenty divisions, came into being, and the higher numbers allocated to the Regulars were finally used by National Army units. No 66th was raised, but during July, August, and September 1918, the 67th through the 90th were organized around cadres from the first sixty-four. None of them (67th-90th) reached the theater of war. The numbers reserved for infantry regiments of the National Guard began at 101 and ran to 300, those for the National Army began with 301. Actually, the Guard regiments never used the numbers beyond 168, nor the National Army those past 388. The 376th through 378th, 381st, 382nd, 385th, and 386th never came into being.

 * Late in the conflict, on 7 August 1918, the distinction between National Guard, Reserve Corps, Regular Army, and National Army was legally abrogated and all four elements were fused into one organization, the United States Army. This was the first time in American history that career soldiers, citizen soldiers, and drafted men of the infantry found themselves on the same legal basis.

 * Three years of observation of the war in Europe had convinced the General Staff that American tables of organization were obsolete. Accordingly, a series of changes in them began. The first one altered the existing triangular division, containing elements grouped by threes, to a square one. In this change, the three brigades of a division and the three regiments of a brigade gave way to two of each. The final result was a much larger division and brigade than any used by the nations of Europe. At the time of the armistice on 11 November 1918, an American division contained 28,105 men, nearly twice the number in European units. Firepower in both division and brigade was greatly augmented.

 * In the transition from triangular to square divisions, and in the consequent alteration of regiments and battalions, the elements of the National Guard were seriously dislocated. Since out of the 367,223 enlisted men of the Guard originally inducted, 242,000 (66 percent) were infantrymen, it was believed necessary to break up many infantry units. As a result, old regiments and other units were consolidated and broken up, thereby losing their identity and their proud state designations.

 * A typical example of the dislocation took place in the infantry elements of the state of Massachusetts. The old 2nd Infantry was fortunate enough to remain intact under a new number as the 104th Infantry. The three other regiments, however, provided men for three infantry regiments (the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd) as well as for the 101st Engineer Train, the 101st Supply Train, the 101st Train Headquarters and Military Police, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Pioneer Infantry.

 * Several of the newly constituted regiments of pioneer infantry drew their personnel from the breakup of National Guard units. Resembling standard infantry regiments only in size (3,551 men), they were in reality a labor force used primarily to repair roads and bridges. Thirtyseven regiments were organized in all, the 1st through the 6th, 51st through 65th, and 801st through 816th. National Guard personnel went into the 1st through the 59th regiments and drafted men into the 60th through the 65th. The outfits in the 800 series were formed of Negro personnel in 1918 to relieve the 1st through the 61st regiments, so that the latter could reorganize for service as combat infantry.

 * Regimental organization underwent some changes, but the National Defense Act forbade increasing the number of companies in a regiment beyond fifteen. Among the fifteen, a headquarters, a supply, and a machine gun company received permanent status for the first time. In any case, the changes reflected the requirements of trench warfare in Europe. Hence, an infantry regiment jumped from 2,002 to 3,720 enlisted men with an even larger increase in firepower.

 * The increase in size resulted from the need for deep formations in both attack and defense. In the attack, two battalions abreast might make up the first wave and the companies within them would be arranged also in depth. Behind the attack wave would come a support wave, perhaps the third battalion, and behind it would be elements withdrawn from the three battalions operating as a reserve. Likewise, successive positions in depth were the standard formation in defense. Such formations to be adequate required large regiments. As had been the case since the War with Spain, infantry regiments contained three battalions of four companies each.

 * At the root of the organizational changes listed, and others that took place, were the demands of weapons. The machine gun led the list. The necessity to develop a proper organizational framework for the best use of that lethal arm raised a thorny problem, a problem which was heightened by the great increase in the number of guns. In May 1917 there was but one machine gun company for each infantry regiment, while by July the number had risen to one per battalion. The ideal arrangement, after July, was to include three machine gun companies in every infantry regiment. Unfortunately, this could not be done-because of the way the National Defense Act was worded-without cutting some rifle companies out of the regiment. Accordingly, it was necessary to create machine gun battalions that were elements of brigades and divisions, leaving just one company organic to infantry regiments. In numbering, the machine gun battalions followed the general rule. Battalions of Regular divisions and brigades were given numbers from 1 through 60; those of the National Guard from 101 through 151; and those of the National Army from 301 through 366. Since the 6th, 46th, 352nd through 357th, 361st, 362nd, 364th, and 365th were not organized, there was a total of 165 active infantry machine gun battalions during World War I. These units had to be put together from diverse segments of others that were broken up, hence their histories have not been passed down to modern outfits except in the National Guard.

 * The brigade battalions of machine guns contained three companies, while the division battalion was at first organized with four. This made a very awkward arrangement since machine gun companies had to be drawn from three sources-regiment, brigade, and division-in order to work with infantry battalions. Although the arrangement remained awkward throughout the war, and brigade and divisional battalions continued to exist, the division machine gun battalion was finally reduced to two companies. These were motorized and used as a highly mobile element of the divisional reserve.

 * It was easier to alter organization in order to include machine guns than it was to supply these weapons. Although machine guns had been included in American arms since 1862, World War I expanded their use so much that manufacturers in the United States could not at first supply enough of them. As a result, American doughboys employed Chauchat automatic rifles and Hotchkiss heavy machine guns made in France, as well as some British and American Vickers machine guns. The new American .30caliber heavy machine guns and automatic rifles invented by John M. Browning were not used against the enemy at all until September 1918, only a few weeks before the armistice.

 * Of all the weapons an infantryman handled, his rifle changed the least. For supply reasons, the British Enfield became standard. It did not differ very much from the Springfield Model 1903, which the soldier knew. Likewise, the bayonet of the Enfield, a knife seventeen inches long, resembled the one it temporarily replaced. In short, the standard rifle required no changes in the organization of units, but its power, coupled with that of other weapons, enforced changes. in fighting formations.

 * Trench warfare brought with it a pressing need for weapons that were decisive in close combat. Out of this need came hand grenades, rifle grenades, and more extensive use of pistols and revolvers. Such short-range fireweapons tended to supersede cold steel and rifle butts as the tools of shock action, but American doctrine considered proficiency with the bayonet as still indispensable because it gave confidence and aggressiveness to foot soldiers.

 * In addition to the weapons that infantrymen handled as individuals, there were two served by crews. One, also a creature of trench warfare, was the Stokes mortar, which could lob projectiles into enemy trenches and shell holes. Another was the one-pounder cannon, an antitank and antimachine gun piece. These two weapons were placed together in a platoon of the headquarters company of every infantry regiment.

 * The weapons mentioned above, coupled with artillery, gas, tanks, and aircraft, dictated the minor tactics of infantry and slaughtered the troops of commanders who failed to heed their dictates. Indeed, machine guns are credited with having created the war of position and the accompanying stalemates which prevailed during 1915, 1916, and 1917. General John J. Pershing carried this interpretation farther. He said that trench warfare had caused the belligerents in Europe to embrace a faulty doctrine. They placed too great a reliance on artillery and on mechanical aids. Pershing insisted, in contrast, that the basis of a sound army remained, as it had always been, a sturdy infantry. Accordingly, he required that American foot soldiers be trained primarily for open warfare, and only incidentally for duty in the trenches.

 * As already noted, depth was necessary to infantry formations. In the attack this meant successive waves of men; in defense, numerous positions, staggered irregularly one behind the other. Thus, all units from division down to platoon were organized to give the required depth within their respective sectors. The war confirmed the trend toward refining the organization of infantry units. Squads and platoons proved to be indispensable in twentieth century combat. Frequently the outcome of a fight depended on the integrity of those elements since they, and they alone, could be controlled personally by their leaders when under very heavy fire.

 * In addition to being organized to give depth, units at all levels were formed to give effect to the new weapons and to avoid losses from them in the hands of the enemy. It has been noted that the expanding use of machine guns required reorganizations which reached from divisions down to companies. The other weapons exacted changes, but they were not quite as widely disseminated. For example, infantry mortars and one-pounder guns found a place in the headquarters companies of regiments. Hand grenades, rifle grenades, and automatic rifles caused many changes in the organization of companies and their components. The question as to their best arrangement was never definitely settled during the war. All were included in a rifle company, but sometimes the automatic riflemen were formed together, as were the grenadiers and rifle grenadiers, other times they were scattered among the squads. As late as November 1918, in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, the specialists stayed together in combat groups, but the trend was toward dispersion so that every squad contained at least one automatic rifleman, one good grenade thrower, and one rifle grenadier.

 * Whatever the organization, extended order became necessary in combat. Men could not bunch up and live. Therefore, close formations had to break up when they came within artillery range. Approach to the enemy resulted in a progressive extension, and this in turn threw a greater burden on the commanders of platoons and squads. Small units of men inched themselves forward, taking advantage of shell holes and other cover.

 * It remains to mention briefly two allies of infantrymen that virtually revolutionized their combat methods. The first was the motor truck, which gave foot soldiers greater mobility than they had ever before had. The second was a miscellany of signal equipment. This helped the infantry to operate with some degree of co-ordination on huge battlefields where arm signals could no longer be seen and noise drowned out the human voice. It aided in making foot troops an effective instrument of the will of the commander, and served to rectify, at least a little, the disorganization that resulted from the necessity for soldiers to disperse widely in order to survive.


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/5


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/6


text:
Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/7

 FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1896.

VOLUME I.

WASHINGTON:

1896.


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/8


text:
Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/9

10em Washington, D. C., December 3, 1896.

The Department of the Interior comprises such a variety and magnitude of interests, extending over such an expanse of territory, that its care or supervision must entail great labor and responsibility. The brief time that has elapsed since I assumed this trust has not admitted of my becoming thoroughly familiar with its duties and opportunities, but its importance and possibilities have so impressed and interested me that I have given to it all the time and thought at my command.

Herewith I have the honor to present the annual report of the work of the Department and such suggestions and recommendations as to policy and legislation as my limited experience prompts me to offer. In submitting this report, I should be untrue to my own convictions and unjust to my predecessor, Hon. Hoke Smith, whose resignation took effect September 1 last, if I failed to testify to his fidelity and efficiency as the head of this Department from March 4, 1893, to the date named.

In making this report, I must of necessity have been largely dependent on heads of bureaus and chiefs of divisions in acquiring information concerning the operations of the Department and the effect of its administration. The interest in the service manifested by the officers and employees has been earnest and commendable, the assistance rendered cheerful and intelligent, and I am pleased to bear testimony thereto.

DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATIONS.

The comprehensiveness and diversity of this branch of the Government can be most approximately estimated by considering the amounts Rh


text:
Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/10

IV and objects of the appropriations for the last fiscal year, which aggregate $157,179,656.37 and appear in detail in the following table:


text: Category:Wikisource semi-protected templates


text:
Infantry, Part I: Regular Army /Between World Wars, 1919-1941

 * Between World Wars, 1919-1941

 * During the two decades between world wars, the infantry underwent startling changes that exceeded any in its previous history. The greatest of these was in speed. In 1919 a prime object had been to secure trucks to replace horses, so that foot soldiers could move toward the battlefield at fifteen to twenty-five miles an hour. In contrast, twenty years later the equivalent object was to use aircraft so that doughboys could hurtle toward fields of battle ten times as fast.

 * These twenty years were as contradictory as they were revolutionary. In them, the foot establishment declined steadily for the first seventeen years, and then soared to great heights in the last two.

 * During the first of the two decades, the impact of World War I was naturally dominant. Civilian Americans were determined to retrench from the unheard of costs of world war and, while they were at it, to forget warfare altogether. As a result, the authorized strength of the Regular infantry slid from 110,000 in 1920 to 40,331 in 1932. The proportion of foot soldiers to the whole establishment likewise dropped from near 50 percent to slightly less than 25.

 * So great a cut in the infantry-it amounted to 63 percent-of course played havoc with the regiments. Of the sixty-five in the Regular service, eighteen were inactivated in 1921 and eight during 1922. None of these were revived until 1940 and after. This heavy pruning left the block of regiments from the 1st through the 31st intact, with scattered numbers thereafter. The 33nd, 34th, 35th, 38th, 42nd, 45th (Philippine Scouts), 57th (Philippine Scouts) , and 65th (Puerto Rico) Infantry survived, but the 42nd was inactivated in 1927.

 * Even after twenty-seven infantry regiments had been inactivated, it was necessary to lop some battalions from those that survived. In consequence, by 1938 there were fourteen regiments out of the thirty-eight with but two battalions apiece. Nor was the whole reduction yet complete. Next, it was necessary to modify the tables of organization so that in peacetime all but two regiments had headquarters detachments instead of companies, while only one had a howitzer company, the rest having howitzer platoons. Also, rifle and machine gun companies contained two instead of three platoons. Thus reduced, they were hard pressed to turn out one war-strength platoon for purposes of training.

 * It is apparent from the figures just given that the thinking of Congress and of the people was more isolationist than before World War I. This fact, reflected in the emaciation of the Army, enforced a defensive psychology on the officers in the service. Accordingly, during the 1920's strategic planning was based on the assumption that if a major war came, it would be waged against the United States by some first-class power fighting in the Western Hemisphere.

 * The squeeze was aggravated by the expansion of the Air Corps, whose growth could only proceed at the expense of the other arms. By mid-1931 the infantry had already given 2,656 enlisted men to the growing air arm, and was soon to be drawn on for more. It was necessary to inactivate five battalions in 1930 to meet the quota.

 * A sharp pinch persisted until 1935, when the government's policy of spending to combat the Great Depression finally reached the Army and resulted, among other things, in an increased appropriation for personnel. This policy was abetted by the troubled state of Europe. At first the growth was slow, so that by 1939 the infantry had risen 17,000 from its 1932 low. That year the overall policy changed. Whereas before 1939 the Army had been recognized as no more than a cadre, afterwards there was official recognition that an army-in-being was needed, and $1,000,000,000 appropriated to implement its creation.

 * Beginning in 1940, some of the Regular infantry regiments, inactive for eighteen or nineteen years, were reactivated. That same year, forty regiments of National Guard infantry were inducted into Federal service, and the next year, thirty-six more. Hence, by mid-1941, there were 379,845 infantrymen of all types in service, organized in 136 regiments (including 18 armored), 32 battalions (15 of them tank) , and 34 separate companies.

 * Even this number did not seem adequate to the Chief of Infantry, whose office was created in 1920. He pointed out that combat infantrymen made up less than 25 percent of the whole Army under the expansion plans, as contrasted with 50 percent in the German establishment. Such a proportion, he said, was not justified. It resulted from the fact that certain elements had been brought into the Army which tended to squeeze the infantry out. One of these was the heavy siege elements introduced during World War I for reducing trenches; the other was the armored element brought in afterward for use in distant maneuver. If the high command shared this view, it did not show the fact by altering the ratio of infantry to the whole Army. However, basic doctrine as late as 1939 restated the old principle that infantry was the prime element in combat, and that rifle and bayonet were still the chief weapons.

 * The experience of World War I was distilled into one document that cut across every phase of military life. This was the National Defense Act of 1920. It touched the infantry in many ways, but the principal way was in the creation of a Chief of Infantry. For some years agitation to provide the combat arms with chiefs had been growing. As a result of the National Defense Act, the doughboys after 1 July 1920, for the first time in United States history, had a chief who was the peer of the chiefs of the cavalry, coast artillery, field artillery, and of the technical services.

 * Another consequence of that comprehensive act was the assignment of tank units to the infantry. Thereafter for twenty years, development of tank materiel and doctrine was a responsibility of the Chief of Infantry. Tank units were known as "infantry (tanks)." A Tank Board and a Tank School were transferred in 1920 from the abolished Tank Corps of World War I, along with a number of tank companies. In 1929 some of these companies were formed into two newly constituted regiments, designated the 1st and 2nd Tank Regiments. In 1932 they were redesignated as the 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) and 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks), respectively. The next year saw the constitution of two additional light tank regiments, the 68th and 69th, which were kept inactive. In 1940 the 69th was disbanded and the other three regiments, together with the former divisional tank companies, were assigned to the new Armored Force.

 * Lean as the infantry establishment was between world wars-even with the tanks in it-it nonetheless benefited from more careful planning and study than ever before. A few months prior to the appointment of a Chief, an Infantry Board designed to guide and plan developments in weapons and organization came into being at Fort Benning, Georgia. This body reported to The Adjutant General through the Infantry School. Attached to it was a Department of Experiment whose mission was to subject weapons and equipment to extensive tests. Naturally, when the Chief took office these units became responsible to him.

 * The Chief of Infantry, the Infantry School, the Infantry Board, the Department of Experiment, the Tank Board, and the Tank School engaged vigorously in the development of infantry. Their earliest contribution was a complete revision of the tables of organization. In this alteration, made during the twenties, the square division survived, but some of its infantry components were considerably modified. The most extreme change took place in infantry battalions, where one rifle company was eliminated and replaced by a machine gun company. This corrected the confusion of World War I in the use of machine guns by placing heavy machine guns under the control of infantry battalion commanders. Almost as extreme was the reduction of the number of platoons in a rifle company from four to three. Both these changes were in the direction of what was later called "triangularization," although it was not yet accepted as a broad principle.

 * Such changes, of course, reduced the firepower actually carried forward by infantrymen in an assault. No one claimed that the heavy machine guns, now organic to a battalion, could keep pace with the attacking doughboy. The reduction stemmed in part from the experience of the recent war which had shown that the number of rifles in a regiment was close to impossible to control. Also, it stemmed from the shrinking quantity of manpower available to the Army. In any case, two types of tables of organization were prepared, one for war, the other for peace. This dualism persisted to the very eve of the next war.

 * By the early thirties, improvements in weapons had made it possible for fewer men to deliver the same volume of fire. As an example, experts tinkered with the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) in an effort to correct its known weaknesses. By adding a butt plate, a small bipod, and a cyclic rate regulator, they greatly augmented the value of the weapon. The improvements, unfortunately, added five pounds to its weight.

 * The automatic rifle remained located within the rifle squad where it had come to rest at the close of the war. In 1930, one more was added provisionally to build up infantry firepower, making two to every squad. This arrangement did not last long but gave place to the older order in which one BAR was in every squad. Not until 1 February 1940 was this organization disturbed. Then, at the express request of the Chief of Infantry, who thought the added weight of the gun had put it out of the class of arms to be carried forward by riflemen, the BAR was removed from the rifle squad and put into a separate squad within the rifle platoon.

 * The BAR was not regarded as the decisive element in infantry firepower. American emphasis remained on the individual doughboy's shoulder arm. Accordingly, in the effort to substitute firepower for manpower there was a continuous search for an efficient self-loading rifle. Experiments by the Infantry Board soon made it clear that a semiautomatic rifle could increase the infantryman's rate of fire from ten or fifteen aimed shots to twenty or thirty per minute. What is more, the rounds could be better aimed because the marksman did not have to unsettle his aim to operate a bolt.

 * The Garand rifle, designated Ml, was selected for development. By 1934 there were eighty Ml's on hand, and by the fall of 1938 they were replacing the 1903 Springfield at the rate of 150 per week. Even so, the new rifle did not replace the old until after war had begun. Since the new rifle could deliver twice the fire of its predecessor, it made possible reductions in other weapons. For example, the total of automatic rifles in a regiment dropped from 189 to 81 in 1943. Although the figure subsequently rose, it never again, not even in war, attained the earlier level.

 * Likewise, the M1 influenced fire tactics. Notwithstanding that arms like it were known and used in Europe, they did not affect doctrine the same way as in this country. On the continent, firepower was increased principally by augmenting the number of light machine guns, while in the United States the increase came principally from the faster shooting shoulder arm of the individual rifleman. Thus in Europe, fire superiority depended on a gun served by a crew; in the United States it depended on the individual doughboy and his weapon. It is not implied that the American Army slighted light machine guns. On the contrary, the World War I weaknesses of the BAR, together with its limitations, provoked much research to develop a suitable light machine gun. During the twenties and part of the thirties, the BAR was included in infantry armament only as a substitute for a hypothetical light machine gun which experts expected to be developed. Finally, in February 1940, at the suggestion of the Chief of Infantry, a true light machine gun appeared for the first time in the table of equipment. As this weapon was in very short supply, the improved BAR was made the official substitute. As a result, for the time being, BAR's were found in two different portions of an infantry company. They were standard armament in each rifle squad, and in addition, they were substitute armament in what was called the weapons platoon.

 * This weapons platoon (new in 1939) was part of a trend to integrate all necessary weapons except artillery and tanks into the basic tactical unit, the battalion. That trend .made every element of an infantry battalion, even the squad, a more complex organization than before, and at the same time vastly increased its firepower. The heightened complexity, of course, brought with it the need for better communications, better training, and above all better leadership.

 * The improvements in portable weapons were important, but by no means as sharp a break with the past as the development of the arms that have come to be known as heavy weapons. These were first used during World War I; hence there was much to be done toward improving them and adjusting organization to use them most efficiently.

 * The first change to accommodate organization to the heavy weapons was the creation in 1920 of a howitzer company in each regiment to utilize the Stokes mortars and one-pounder cannon. Since the Regular infantry had not enough men to maintain the new howitzer companies, they were reduced to platoons. The National Guard, however, continued to support full companies. Into the howitzer unit, whether platoon or company, from time to time went various heavy infantry weapons devised between the wars. Among these were 81-mm. mortars, which were first used in very limited quantities in 1932; the various types of 37-mm. cannon, which replaced the one-pounder cannon; and .50-caliber machine guns.

 * The howitzer company was always more of an aspiration than a reality. Its name gave no clue to the weapons in it. Rather the name indicated the desire for a howitzer to accompany the infantry, a need which combat in World War I had seemed to reveal. In the years between wars no adequate accompanying cannon was developed. Finally, in the sweeping revision of 1939, the howitzer company was eliminated and its 37-mm. cannon put into a new antitank company in each regiment.

 * In the same broad revision, the old machine gun companies of infantry battalions were reorganized to become heavy weapons companies. They absorbed the .30-caliber heavy machine guns of the older company and, in addition, acquired two 81-mm. mortars and two .50-caliber machine guns. The creation of the battalion heavy weapons company was part of the trend to include all weapons within a battalion that it would need to use whether attacking or defending. The process added greatly to the firepower of a battalion.

 * All the changes in organization and all the vigorous experiment with arms did not actually produce the weapons that were needed for training. Everything was in very short supply. In consequence, as late as 1941 mortar crews went through maneuvers with stove pipes and the crews of light machine guns set up and aimed broomsticks. These harsh facts caused the Chief of Infantry to state on the eve of war that a consciousness of obsolescence in all their arms had seriously damaged the morale of American infantrymen.

 * After 1939, battalion heavy weapons companies, regimental antitank companies, and weapons platoons within rifle companies were largely manned by soldiers, who required some side arm other than the heavy Garand rifle. The ideal weapon for the crews of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns had to be light, have a rapid rate of fire, and yet have greater range and accuracy than a pistol. As a result, the number of pistols authorized declined steadily, while new light side arms multiplied. One of the latter was the carbine, which came into general use in 1942. Another was the submachine gun, which had been used experimentally since 1922.

 * World War I had displayed two very pressing needs in warfare. One was for protection from devastating fires, the other for greater mobility. When applied to infantry, the two were contradictory, for the more protection the infantryman had, the heavier and slower he tended to become. After the war, tanks were made part of the infantry. They offered foot soldiers some added mobility and some protection. Accordingly, infantry doctrine took tanks into account, and the American infantry division included a company of light tanks in its organic structure. Indeed, in the basic theory expressed in the Field Service Regulations of 1939, armor was given the primary mission of helping the infantry advance. This being so, one can understand why the Chief of Infantry strongly protested when in July 1940 armor was removed from infantry control. As of 1939, tanks dropped out of infantry divisions, and never re-entered organically until after World War II.

 * Mobility was slowly increased in the infantry by the use of trucks. Hardly anyone doubted the value of motor vehicles to speed the movement of foot troops, but lack of funds restricted their use. Beginning in 1922 trucks replaced animals in the field and combat trains of four regiments. Later, other regiments received vehicles for the same purpose. By 1932, twelve were partly motorized. The trucks, however, were mostly worn-out leftovers from World War I.

 * It was the priming of the economic pump that finally secured some new vehicles for the infantry. In 1936 Congress authorized the purchase of 1,000 trucks and cars. With these, division and regimental headquarters could have autos, and six regiments could motorize their machine gun companies and howitzer and communications platoons.

 * Experiments with organization, motorization, weapons, and equipment were continuous in the decades between the wars, but the culminating experiments took place in 1937, 1938, and 1939. These were brought about by a growing belief among military leaders that the square divisional organization of World War I was too large and too unwieldy. Experts did not expect the static warfare of 1915-17 to recur; hence they no longer saw the need for the great power of penetration possessed by the square division. On the contrary, mobility was rising in importance, and it was hampered by large numbers. Regimental organization was in such confusion that there were five different types in the United States, while no two regiments serving overseas were alike. This was another consideration which prompted attempts to reorganize.

 * The object sought was an infantry division that was smaller and faster than the old one but with as much firepower. To obtain it the infantry establishment, from squad up to division, was given the most thorough examination it had ever received. Not everyone engaged in the examination agreed as to the means to the end. Most accepted three infantry regiments to a division, but differed as to their composition. The Chief of Infantry, for example, proposed four instead of three platoons to a rifle company, and a fourth rifle company in each battalion.

 * In any case, in 1937 the 2nd Division was formed into a provisional unit to test the various proposals. For several months it tried out the suggested arrangements in the field. The trials were remarkably thorough, although they were handicapped by shortages of weapons and vehicles. For example, no light mortars were available, while only one regiment could be completely equipped with the M1 rifle. There were not enough .50-caliber machine guns and, of course, no light machine guns at all.

 * What emerged from the tests was a full new set of tables of organization which became effective during 1939. The new tables were built upon a triangular basis in which elements within an infantry division, from squads up to regiments, were associated by three's. Two levels of organization in the infantry were eliminated altogether, one large and the other small. These were brigades and sections. Triangularization made possible a simple and effective tactical doctrine, but some experts belittled this aspect. They said that the real reform in 1939 did not come from embracing a triangular organization but from the modernization of weapons that accompanied it.

 * The cornerstone of all infantry organization, the squad, was enlarged for wartime from eight men to twelve. This was done in spite of the evidence produced in the field tests that seven or eight men were all one corporal could hope to control in battle. The Chief of Infantry strongly urged the increase. The command weakness of so large a squad was corrected late in 1940 when the leader was made a sergeant and his assistant a corporal. With two noncoms in charge of it, the infantry squad would remain at twelve throughout the coming war.

 * One fact that made smaller divisions feasible was the fixed principle that divisions would usually operate as parts of larger units, that is, corps and armies. As parts, they could draw upon pools established in the big elements whenever they needed more men or more equipment than was normal. In other words, they would retain as organic only the units they needed for normal operations. The War Department called this arrangement "pooling," and put it into effect wherever practicable. The new grouping of heavy and crew-served weapons into battalion heavy weapons companies was a practical application of pooling. Also, the antitank weapons of regiments were pooled in antitank companies, and light machine guns and mortars in the weapons platoons of rifle companies.

 * The regiment adopted in 1939 was much smaller than before, containing but 2,542 men. According to the Chief of Infantry, such a regiment was too small by several hundred for effective combat action, and he vehemently protested. This protests resulted in new tables of organization the next year which raised the strength of a regiment by 907 men, and battalion and company proportionately.

 * The new triangular organization was put into effect in the Regular Army during 1939. Within the National Guard, however, the square organization, somewhat modified, persisted even after many units had entered Federal service in 1940.

 * All in all, the Chief of Infantry contended, and rightly, that in the years from 1937 to 1941 American infantry had undergone a real revolution. The foot establishment had been arranged along lines that were more carefully tested than ever before in peacetime. As for weapons, they were turned over completely, except for the .30-caliber heavy machine gun. The 60-mm. mortar (first adopted as standard in 1937, but remaining scarce) had replaced the old Stokes and its successors, while the heavier 81-mm. mortar had been introduced. A light machine gun had actually been adopted, and the BAR was so much improved as to be virtually made over. Finally, the 1903 Springfield shoulder rifle had yielded its place to the semi-automatic M1. In addition, new small arms such as carbines and submachine guns had entered infantry armament, together with a larger machine gun, the .50-caliber.

 * As a result of the revolution, the Chief of Infantry believed his branch to be organized on sound principles. The battalion, he said, was now a complete combat unit which contained within itself all elements, save armor and artillery, necessary to attack or to defend. Its weapons could be employed in direct or indirect fire and for high angle missions, or, if needed, for those requiring flat trajectories and high muzzle velocity. It was no longer dependent on attachments from regimental units for its firepower, needing to draw on pools only under unusual conditions.

 * Moreover, the elements of infantry were arranged according to mobility. A squad had the standard mobility of a rifleman; a platoon that of a BAR man. Platoons contained no crew-served weapons, and none requiring continuous resupply of ammunition. No weapon in the platoon served as a focus for hostile fire. At company level, the heaviest weapons (light machine guns and 60-mm. mortars) could be carried by hand; even a battalion contained no guns which could not be manhandled for several hundred yards. All weapons needing prime movers were placed in regimental units.


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/4


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/3


text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 22.djvu/59

 Godwin ward and Leofric to Winchester on 16 Nov. to confiscate the possessions of Emma, the king's mother. In 1044 he joined Eadward in a plan for securing Archbishop Eadsige [q. v.] in the see of Canterbury by allowing him to appoint a coadjutor bishop.

The appointment of Robert, abbot of Jumièges, to the see of London in this year was the first step towards the overthrow of the earl's power. Robert had unbounded influence over the king, and never ceased whispering accusations against Godwine and his sons, urging especially that the earl was guilty of the death of Ælfred. It may fairly be assumed that the appointment of certain Lotharingian clergy to English sees and abbeys was due to Godwine's desire to keep out the Frenchmen, whom the king would naturally have preferred (Norman Conquest, ii. 79–85). His position must have been weakened by the disgrace of his eldest son, Swegen, who after seducing the abbess of Leominster left England in 1046, and was outlawed. The next year a request for help from Swend Estrithson, the king of the Danes, the nephew of Gytha the earl's wife, was laid before the witan. He had lost nearly all his kingdom, and asked for an English fleet to act against his enemy, Magnus of Norway. Godwine proposed that fifty ships should be sent to his succour, but Leofric objected, and his arguments prevailed with the assembly (Worcester Chronicle, sub an. 1048;, i. 200). In 1048 Swend, who had meanwhile got possession of his kingdom, again asked for help. Again, unless the story is a repetition of the events of the previous year, did Godwine plead his cause, and again he was unsuccessful. The earl's influence seems to have been on the wane, but it was still strong enough to prevent Swegen's earldom from passing from his family; it was divided between Harold and Beorn. Later in the year, while he was with the fleet which he and the king had gathered for the defence of the coast of Wessex against the attacks of some northern pirates, his son Swegen returned to England and slew his cousin Beorn [q. v.] The crime excited general indignation, and can scarcely have failed to injure Godwine's position. He soon, however, gained a conspicuous advantage. Swegen found shelter in Flanders. About this time some hostile measures were taken by Eadward in alliance with the emperor against Baldwin V. The amicable relations which followed were almost certainly brought about by Godwine. He probably desired to secure the friendship of the Count of Flanders as a counterpoise to the power and influence of William of Normandy, who was already seeking to marry the count's daughter, Matilda. Before long Godwine arranged a marriage between his third son Tostig and Judith the sister (Vita, p. 404) or daughter of Baldwin. The alliance with Baldwin was connected with the return of Swegen, whose outlawry was reversed. His reinstatement was a triumph for his father, but it was an impolitic measure, for, as later events showed, it outraged public feeling (, Conquest of England, p. 524). On the death of Archbishop Eadsige in 1050 Godwine sustained a serious defeat from the French party, which was now becoming all-powerful at the court; the claim of his kinsman Ælfric [q. v.], for whom he had tried to obtain the see of Canterbury, was rejected by the king, who gave the archbishopric to the earl's enemy Robert of Jumièges. The new archbishop used every means in his power to destroy the earl's influence, and his hatred was increased by the fact that the lands of the earl and of the convent of Christ Church, Canterbury, lay side by side. Disputes arose about their respective rights, and Robert declared that Godwine had taken into his own possession lands which belonged to his church (Vita, p. 400). The earl is said by his panegyrist to have tried to keep the peace, and to have restrained his men from retaliating on the archbishop. Eadward listened willingly to the archbishop's complaints against Godwine, and above all to the accusation, which seems to have been renewed at this time, that he had slain the ætheling.

When, early in September 1051, Godwine was celebrating the marriage of his son Tostig, he received orders from the king to harry the town of Dover, which lay within his earldom [see under ]. He refused to inflict misery on his own people for the sake of the king's foreign favourites. If they had just cause of complaint they should, he urged, proceed against the men of Dover in a legal court; if the Dover people could prove their innocence, they had a right to go free, and if not they should be punished in a lawful manner (Gesta Regum, i. 337). Then he went his way, taking little heed of the king's rage, which he believed would soon pass away. Robert, however, seized the opportunity of stirring up the king against him, and Eadward summoned the witan to meet at Gloucester, to receive and decide on all the charges which might be brought against him. Godwine and his party had a further grievance against the king's foreign favourites, for one of them had built a castle in Swegen's earldom, and was doing much mischief. Godwine and his sons gathered their forces together at Beverstone in Gloucestershire, though ‘it


text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 22.djvu/66

 his battalion to Gibraltar. He marched with the light company, as part of a provisional light battalion, from Gibraltar to Tarifa, and took part in the first defence. He was a volunteer under Lord Blayney in the attempt on Fuengarola, near Malaga. He commanded a detachment of two flank companies of his battalion at Cadiz, at the second defence of Tarifa, and at the battle of Barossa, where he was severely wounded. For his Peninsular services he was made brevet-major and C.B. In May 1814 he was appointed major in the old 5th West India regiment, and in November 1815 lieutenant-colonel of the 41st foot. Godwin took that regiment out to India in 1822, accompanied it to Burmah in 1824, and was present in every action in the first Burmese war, from the capture of Rangoon until peace was signed in sight of Ummeerapoora in February 1826, except during the latter part of 1824, when he was employed with a detached force in reducing the Burmese province of Martaban. Godwin twice received the thanks of the governor-general in council for his services. He exchanged to half-pay in 1827, became colonel in 1837, and major-general in 1846. In 1850 he was appointed to a divisional command in Bengal, and in 1852 was selected for the command of the Bengal division of the Burmese expeditionary force, of which he took the command in chief. The second Burmese war began with the bombardment of Martaban on 5 April 1852. In November Godwin recaptured Pegu, and in December the annexation of the province of Pegu to India was proclaimed by Lord Dalhousie. Further operations followed at Prome and in the Rangoon river, and on 1 July 1853 the expeditionary force, known officially as the ‘army of Ava,’ was broken up, and Godwin returned to India. His personal activity, in spite of his years, had been remarked throughout, and he was a great favourite with the troops; but the protracted character of the later operations had drawn upon him much undeserved abuse from certain portions of the English and Indian press. He appears to have acted throughout in accordance with the instructions of Lord Dalhousie, by whom his conduct was fully approved. On Godwin's return to India, he was appointed to command the Sirhind division of the Bengal army. He died at Simla, at the residence of the commander-in-chief, Sir William Gomm, who had been his brother subaltern in the 9th foot, on 26 Oct. 1853, at the age of sixty-nine, from the results of exposure and over-exertion in Burmah. Notification of his appointments as K.C.B. and colonel 20th foot was received in India after his death. His only daughter married [q. v.]

GODWIN, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT (1759–1797), miscellaneous writer, born 27 April 1759, was granddaughter of a rich Spitalfields manufacturer of Irish extraction. Her father, Edward John Wollstonecraft, spent the fortune which he had inherited, tried farming, took to drinking, bullied his wife, and rambled to various places, sinking lower at each move. By his wife, Elizabeth Dixon, an Irishwoman (d. 1780), he had six children. Edward, the eldest, was an attorney in the city of London. There were three daughters, Mary, Everina, and Eliza; and two other sons. Mary and Eliza had much talent, though little education. Mary in 1778 became companion to a Mrs. Dawson. In 1780 her mother died, and the sisters, finding their father's house intolerable, resolved to become teachers. Mary went to live with a friend, Fanny Blood, whose father was as great a scamp as Wollstonecraft, and who helped to support her family by painting. Her mother, Mrs. Blood, took in needlework, in which Mary Wollstonecraft helped her. Everina Wollstonecraft kept house for her brother Edward; and Eliza, although still very young, accepted a Mr. Bishop, in order to escape misery at home. Bishop's brutality made her wretched. Her life is described in her sister's ‘Wrongs of Women.’ Mrs. Bishop went into hiding till a legal separation was arranged, when about 1783 she set up a school at Newington Green with Mary Wollstonecraft. It lingered for two years. During this period she acquired some friends, and was kindly received, shortly before his death, by Dr. Johnson. Fanny Blood, who lived with the sisters for a time, married Hugh Skeys, a merchant, and settled in Lisbon. She died in childbed soon afterwards (29 Nov. 1785). Mary went out to nurse her, but arrived too late. After her return she wrote a pamphlet called ‘Thoughts on the Education of Daughters,’ for which Johnson, the publisher in St. Paul's Churchyard, gave her 10l. 10s. She then became governess (October 1787) in the family of Lord Kingsborough, afterwards Earl of Kingston. She thought him a coarse squire and his wife a mere fine lady. Lady Kingsborough was jealous of the children's affection for their governess, and dismissed her after a year. She then settled in London, showed a story called ‘Mary’ to Johnson, and was employed by him as reader and in


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/2


text: Page:U.S. Department of the Interior Annual Report 1896.djvu/1


text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 22.djvu/67

Godwin translating from the French. She worked for five years, liberally helped her sisters and brothers, sending Everina to France, and saw some literary society. Here, in November 1791, she met [q. v.] for the first time, when he disliked her because her fluent talk silenced the taciturn Thomas Paine, who was of the company. She published her ‘Vindication of the Rights of Women’ in 1792. It had some success, was translated into French, and scandalised her sisters. She proposed to visit France in company with Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. Fuseli. Knowles (in his ‘Life of Fuseli’) says that Mary Wollstonecraft had fallen in love with Fuseli, who was already married; that she got rid of her previously slovenly habits of dress in order to please him, and that she proposed to stay in his house in order to be near him. Mrs. Fuseli hereupon, he adds, forbade her the house, and she went to Paris to break off the attachment. Mr. Paul (Mary Wollstonecraft, p. xxxi) denies the story, chiefly on the ground that she remained a ‘close friend’ of Mrs. Fuseli. Knowles quotes some phrases from her letters to Fuseli, which are certainly significant, but he does not give them in full. She went to Paris alone in December 1792. Here she met, who had been a captain in the American army during the war of independence, had written letters descriptive of the north-west territory (published in 1792, 2nd edit. 1797), and was now engaged in commercial speculations. She agreed to live with him as his wife—a legal marriage for an Englishwoman being probably difficult at the time, and not a matter of importance according to her views (Letters to Imlay, p. xxxix). She joined him at Havre at the end of 1793, and on 14 May 1794 gave birth to a child, called Fanny. She published an ‘Historical View of the French Revolution’ soon afterwards. Imlay's speculations separated him from her for long periods, and her letters soon show doubts of his affection and suspicions of his fidelity. She followed him to England in 1795, and in June sailed to Norway to make arrangements for some of his commercial speculations. Passages of her letters to him, descriptive of the country, were published in 1796. Returning to England in the autumn she found that he desired a separation, and was carrying on an intrigue with another woman. She tried to drown herself by leaping from Putney Bridge, but was taken out insensible by a passing boat. According to Godwin, she still listened to some proposals from Imlay, and was even willing to return to him upon degrading terms. She finally broke with him in March 1796. She refused to take money from him, but accepted a bond for the benefit of her daughter. Neither principal nor interest was ever paid. She returned to writing, resumed her friendship with Johnson, and went into literary society. She soon became intimate with Godwin, who had been favourably impressed by the ‘Letters from Sweden.’ Though both of them disapproved of marriage, they formed a connection about September 1796. The expectation of a child made a legal union desirable; and they were married 29 March 1797 [see ]. Their relation, in spite of some trifling disagreements due to Godwin's peculiarities, was happy. The birth of her child Mary was fatal to her, and she died 10 Sept. 1797. She was buried at Old St. Pancras churchyard, and her remains were moved in 1851 to Bournemouth. She is described as Marguerite in her husband's ‘St. Leon.’

Mrs. Godwin was an impulsive and enthusiastic woman, with great charms of person and manner. A portrait, painted by Opie during her marriage and engraved by Heath in 1798, was in the possession of the late Sir Percy Shelley. Another, also by Opie, was engraved by Ridley for the ‘Monthly Mirror’ in 1796, and is now in the possession of Mr. William Russell. Engravings of both are in Mr. Paul's ‘Mary Wollstonecraft.’ Her books show some genuine eloquence, though occasionally injured by the stilted sentimentalism of the time. The letters are pathetic from the melancholy story which they reveal. Her faults were such as might be expected from a follower of Rousseau, and were consistent with much unselfishness and nobility of sentiment, though one could wish that her love-affairs had been more delicate.

Her works are: 1. ‘Thoughts on the Education of Daughters,’ 1787. 2. ‘Original Stories from Real Life, with considerations calculated to regulate the affections,’ 1788, 1791, and edition illustrated by Blake, 1796. 3. ‘Vindication of the Rights of Men,’ a letter to Edmund Burke, 1790. 4. ‘Vindication of the Rights of Women,’ 1792, vol. i. (all published). 5. ‘Historical and Moral View of … the French Revolution,’ vol. i. 1794 (all published). 6. ‘Letters written in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark,’ 1796. 7. ‘Posthumous Works,’ 1798 (vols. i. and ii. ‘The Wrongs of Women, or Maria’ (fragment of a novel); iii. and iv. ‘Letters and Miscellaneous Pieces’). 8. ‘Letters to Imlay,’ with prefatory memoir by C. K. Paul, 1879. She also translated Salzmann's ‘Moralisches Elementarbuch’ (‘Elements of Morality’) in 1790, illustrated by Blake, who adapted forty-


text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 22.djvu/70

 Foresight of Faith.’ This work while in manuscript fell into the hands of Dr. William Twiss of Newbury in Berkshire, who promptly challenged the writings of Godwin. A warm dispute ensued between the two, in which, according to Samuel Clarke, ‘Dr. Twiss promptly whipped the old schoolmaster.’

 GODWIN, WILLIAM, the younger (1803–1832), reporter, only son of William Godwin the elder, by his second wife, was born 28 March 1803. He was sent as a day boy to the Charterhouse at the age of eight; then (1814) to the school of the younger Dr. Burney at Greenwich; in 1818 to a commercial school at Woodford, Essex; and in 1819 to a mathematical school under Peter Nicholson. In 1820 his father tried to introduce him into Maudslay's engineering establishment at Lambeth, and afterwards to apprentice him to Nash the architect. The boy was wayward and restless, but in 1823 surprised his father by producing some literary essays, which were printed in the 'Weekly Examiner;' and in the same year became reporter to the 'Morning Chronicle,' a position which he retained till his death. He wrote occasional articles, one of which, 'The Executioner,' was published in 'Blackwood's Magazine,' and he founded a weekly Shakespeare club called 'The Mulberries.' He died of cholera 8 Sept. 1832, leaving a widow but no children. He left a novel, 'Transfusion,' somewhat in the vein of his father's 'Caleb Williams.' It was published in 3 vols. in 1835, with a memoir prefixed by his father.

[Memoir as above; C. K. Paul's William Godwin, ii. 90, 257, 276, 295, 321.]  GODWIN, WILLIAM, the elder (1756–1836), author of ‘Political Justice,’ son of John Godwin, was born 3 March 1756 at Wisbeach, Cambridgeshire, where his father, born 1723, was a dissenting minister. His mother's maiden name was Hull. He was the seventh of thirteen children (Notes and Queries, 3rd ser. i. 503, gives a few particulars about the family). He was physically puny, but intellectually precocious, and was brought up upon strict puritanical principles. His father moved in 1758 to Debenham, Suffolk. An Arian minority in his congregation opposed him, and about 1760 he settled finally at Guestwick in Norfolk; he never received above 60l. a year. William was sent to a dame school at Guestwick, and in 1764 to a school kept by Robert Akers at Hindolveston, in the neighbourhood. He used to steal secretly into the meeting-house to preach to a fellow-pupil, and became a promising student. In 1767 he was sent as a pupil to Samuel Newton, an independent minister at Norwich, of whose severity he afterwards complained. He had an attack of smallpox in 1768, having refused, from religious scruples, to be inoculated. He read Rollin's ‘Ancient History,’ and was influenced by his tutor's Wilkite politics and Sandemanian theology. In 1771 he became usher in his old school under Akers. His father died 12 Nov. 1772. In April 1773 he went to London with his mother, and, after being refused admission to Homerton Academy on suspicion of Sandemanian tendencies, entered the Hoxton Academy in 1773. Here he was under Kippis, who became a useful friend. He was ‘famous for calm and dispassionate discussion;’ he rose at five and went to bed at twelve, in order to have time for metaphysical inquiries, and, though a Calvinist in theology, formed the philosophical opinions as to materialism and necessity to which he adhered through life. He had arguments with Dr. Rees of the ‘Cyclopædia,’ then the head of the college. In 1777 he preached at Yarmouth and Lowestoft in the summer season, and in 1778, after an unsuccessful application at Christchurch, Hampshire, became minister at Ware in Hertfordshire. Here he came under the influence of Joseph Fawcet, a follower of Jonathan Edwards and a strong republican. In August 1779 Godwin moved to London, and in 1780 became minister at Stowmarket, Suffolk, where his faith in Christianity was shaken by a study of French philosophers, though he was for a time reconverted by Priestley's ‘Institutes.’ He fell out with his congregation in 1782, went to London, and began to try his hand at authorship. For the first half of 1783 he was again on trial as a minister at Beaconsfield, but finally settled to the profession of literature in the autumn. His ‘Life of Chatham’ was published in the spring of 1783, and he afterwards wrote pamphlets, articles, and novels. Murray employed him on the ‘English Review,’ and in translating Simon, lord Lovat's memoirs; but he had often to pawn his watch or books to procure a dinner. In 1785 he was appointed, through Kippis's introduction, to write the historical article in the ‘New Annual Register.’ He now dropped the title of ‘reverend,’ and henceforth saw little of his family, though to the end of her life his mother, a shrewd old lady, wrote occasional letters of bad spelling and grammar, full of religious advice and maternal affection.


text: Poems (Coates 1916)/Volume I/A Maid's Defence


text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 22.djvu/71

 Godwin She lived near her eldest son, a farmer at Wood Dalling, Norfolk, and died 13 Aug. 1809. Godwin did his best to help his brothers in later life (, Godwin, ii. 58, 122). Godwin's politics brought him into contact with Sheridan and other whig politicians, but he was ‘not venal enough’ to accept offers of support as a party writer. He was known to the more extreme party, and became especially intimate with Thomas Holcroft [q. v.] He took a pupil or two at intervals, to one of whom, Thomas Cooper, a distant relation, and afterwards an unsuccessful actor, he showed much kindness through life. Godwin was among the ardent sympathisers with the French revolution, and frequented the house of Helen Maria Williams. He read Paine's ‘Rights of Man’ in manuscript, having made the author's acquaintance at the house of Brand Hollis [q. v.] In 1792 he became acquainted with Horne Tooke. He now settled at a small house in Chalton Street, Somers Town, where he lived with great economy and seclusion. He had no regular servant, an old woman coming in to clean his rooms and cook his mutton-chop. He went a good deal into society and formed friendships with distinguished men, such as Thomas Wedgwood, Porson, and Ritson. He also became intimate with Mrs. Inchbald and with Mrs. Reveley, afterwards Maria Gisborne [q. v.] Godwin's ‘Political Justice’ appeared in February 1793. He received seven hundred guineas for the copyright, and three hundred guineas more after a sale of three thousand copies. It was profitable to the publisher, and made Godwin known as the philosophical representative of English radicalism. It is a curious instance of extreme principles advocated dispassionately with the calmness of one-sided logic. It was modified in later editions, and in the preface to ‘St. Leon’ (1799) he announces that he can find a place in his system for the domestic virtues previously omitted. It escaped prosecution, it is said, because the government supposed that little harm could be done by a three-guinea publication. The impression made by it upon young men is curiously illustrated in Crabb Robinson's ‘Diary’ (i. 32–52), where there is a correspondence between Robinson and Robert Hall. ‘Political Justice’ was followed in May 1794 by the remarkable novel ‘Caleb Williams,’ suggested partly by some of his views as to the falseness of the common code of morality, but preserved by the striking situation and considerable merits of style. It was dramatised by Colman the younger [q. v.], who showed little regard for the author's feelings (, Table Talk, pp. 252, 253), as ‘The Iron Chest.’ In 1794 Godwin was profoundly interested by the trials of Joseph Gerrald [q. v.] in Scotland, and afterwards of Horne Tooke, Holcroft, and others in London. He wrote a pamphlet in answer to the charge of Chief-justice Eyre in the latter case, and he became acquainted with many of the leading whigs, whom he met at the house of Lord Lauderdale.

Godwin had talked about marriage in a philosophic calmness soon after coming to London; but a match proposed by his sister came to nothing. He had some tenderness for Amelia Alderson, afterwards Mrs. Opie, and for Mrs. Inchbald. In 1796 he formed an attachment to Mary Wollstonecraft [see ], who was now living as Mrs. Imlay in the literary circle frequented by Godwin. Although he objected to marriage on principle, he admitted that it had advantages when he expected to become a father, and he appears to have been as sincerely in love as his nature admitted. The marriage took place at Old St. Pancras Church 29 March 1797. It was kept private for a short time, and Godwin took a separate apartment in the Polygon, Somers Town, twenty doors from his own house, in conformity with his theory that too close an intimacy was provocative of mutual weariness. Mrs. Inchbald was deeply aggrieved by the marriage (, Mary Wollstonecraft, p. lx). Mrs. Reveley wept, but was reconciled. Mrs. Godwin gave birth to a daughter, Mary, afterwards Mrs. Shelley, 30 Aug. 1797, caught a fever, and died 10 Sept. following. Godwin was sincerely affected, though the story is told that when his wife exclaimed that she was ‘in heaven,’ he replied, ‘You mean, my dear, that your physical sensations are somewhat easier.’ A painful correspondence with Mrs. Inchbald, whom he accused of using her ill, immediately followed. They were never quite reconciled, though at intervals they had a correspondence, and it was mutually irritating. He saw a few friends and set about compiling a memoir of his wife, which appeared in the following year.

Godwin returned to his studies and to society in 1798. He was left in charge of his infant daughter and of Fanny Godwin (as she was called), Mary Wollstonecraft's daughter by Imlay. A Miss Jones who took care of the children had apparently some wish to be their stepmother. Godwin thought that a second wife might be desirable, but had no fancy for Miss Jones. He visited Bath in March 1798, and made acquaintance with Sophia and Harriet Lee [q. v.], writers of the ‘Canterbury Tales.’ He made an offer to Harriet soon afterwards and reasoned at great