text:
Balkans: What You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions/BalkanList

BALKANS

ADEMI, Rahim; DOB 30 Jan 1954; POB Karac, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

ADEMI, Xhevat; DOB 8 Dec 1962; POB Tetovo, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

ADILI, Gafur; DOB 5 Jan 1959; POB Kicevo, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

AKSH (a.k.a. ALBANIAN NATIONAL ARMY; a.k.a. ANA) [BALKANS]

ALBANIAN NATIONAL ARMY (a.k.a. AKSH; a.k.a. ANA) [BALKANS]

ALISPAHIC, Bakir; DOB 1 Oct 1956; POB Ahatovici, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

ANA (a.k.a. AKSH; a.k.a. ALBANIAN NATIONAL ARMY) [BALKANS]

ARI (a.k.a. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ILIRIDA) [BALKANS]

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ILIRIDA (a.k.a. ARI) [BALKANS]

ARSENOVIC, Djojo; DOB 6 Jan 1952; POB Donje Crnjelovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

BAJAGIC, Zvonko (a.k.a. "DUGA PUSKA"); DOB 6 Sep 1953; POB Vlasenica, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

BALA, Haradin; DOB 10 Jun 1957; POB Gornja Koretica, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

BANOVIC, Predrag; DOB 28 Oct 1969; POB Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

BASEVIC, Dragan; DOB 2 Mar 1976; POB Belgrade, Serbia (individual) [BALKANS]

BEARA, Ljubisa; DOB 14 Jul 1939; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

BEQIRI, Hidajet (a.k.a. BEQIRI, Idajet); DOB 20 Feb 1951; POB Mallakaster Fier, Albania (individual) [BALKANS]

BEQIRI, Idajet (a.k.a. BEQIRI, Hidajet); DOB 20 Feb 1951; POB Mallakaster Fier, Albania (individual) [BALKANS]

BEXHETI, Nuri; DOB 1962; POB Tetovo, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

BIO CORPORATION (a.k.a. BOSNIAN INVESTMENT ORGANIZATION), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

BJELICA, Milovan (a.k.a. "CICKO"), Starine Novaka Street BB, Sokolac, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 19 Oct 1958; POB Rogatica, Bosnia- Herzegovina; National ID No. 1910958130007 (individual) [BALKANS]

BLAGOJEVIC, Vidoje; DOB 22 Jun 1950; POB Bratunac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

BLASKIC, Tihomir; DOB 2 Nov 1960; POB Brestovsko, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

BORAVCANIN, Ljubomir; DOB 27 Feb 1960; POB Han Pijesak, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

BOROVCANIN, Veljko; DOB 25 Sep 1957; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

BOROVNICA, Goran; DOB 15 Aug 1965; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

BOSKOVSKI, Ljube; DOB 24 Oct 1960 (individual) [BALKANS]

BOSNIAN INVESTMENT ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. BIO CORPORATION), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

BRALO, Miroslav (a.k.a. CICKO); DOB 13 Oct 1967; POB Kratine, Vitez (individual) [BALKANS]

BRDJANIN, Radoslav; DOB 9 Feb 1948; POB Popovac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

BUTKA, Spiro; DOB 29 May 1949 (individual) [BALKANS]

CENGIC, Hasan; DOB 3 Aug 1957; POB Odzak, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

CERKEZ, Mario; DOB 27 Mar 1959; POB Rijeka, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

CESIC, Ranko; DOB 5 Sep 1964; POB Drvar, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

CESIC-ROJS, Ljubo; DOB 20 Feb 1958; POB Posulje, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

CETNIK RAVNAGORSKI POKRET (a.k.a. CRP) [BALKANS]

CICKO (a.k.a. BRALO, Miroslav); DOB 13 Oct 1967; POB Kratine, Vitez (individual) [BALKANS]

CORIC, Valentin; DOB 23 Jun 1956; POB Citluk, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

CRP (a.k.a. CETNIK RAVNAGORSKI POKRET) [BALKANS]

DALIPI, Tahir; DOB 1958; POB Ilince, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

DELIC, Hazim; DOB 13 May 1964; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

DERONJIC, Miroslav; DOB 6 Jun 1945; POB Bratunac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

DJOGO, Jovan; POB Kalinovik, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

DJORDA, Samojko; DOB 13 Jun 1959; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

DJORDJEVIC, Vlastimir (a.k.a. DORDEVIC, Vlastimir); DOB 1948; POB Koznica, Vladicin Han municipality (individual) [BALKANS]

DORDEVIC, Vlastimir (a.k.a. DJORDJEVIC, Vlastimir); DOB 1948; POB Koznica, Vladicin Han municipality (individual) [BALKANS]

DOSEN, Damir; DOB 7 Apr 1967; POB Cirkin Polje, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

DULE (a.k.a. TADIC, Dusan; a.k.a. "DUSKO"); DOB 1956; POB Cajnice, Bosnia- Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

ECIM, Ljuban; DOB 6 Jan 1964; POB Sviljanac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; National ID No. 601964100083 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (individual) [BALKANS]

ELSHANI, Gafur; DOB 29 Mar 1958; POB Suva Reka, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

FBKSH (a.k.a. FRONT FOR ALBANIAN NATIONAL UNITY) [BALKANS]

FRONT FOR ALBANIAN NATIONAL UNITY (a.k.a. FBKSH) [BALKANS]

FURUNDZIJA, Anto; DOB 8 Jul 1969; POB Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

FUSTAR, Dusan; DOB 29 Jun 1954; POB Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

GAJIC-MILOSEVIC, Milica; DOB 1970; daughter-in-law of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

GALIC, Stanislav; DOB 12 Mar 1943; POB Goles, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

GASHI, Sabit; DOB 30 Dec 1967; POB Suva Reka, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

GOTOVINA, Ante; DOB 12 Oct 1955; POB Pasman, Croatia; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

GRUBAN, Momcilo; DOB 19 Jun 1961; Bosnian Serb; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

HABIBI, Skender; DOB 13 Jul 1968; POB Vitina, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

HADZIC, Goran; DOB 7 Sep 1958; POB Municipality of Vinkovci, Croatia (individual) [BALKANS]

HADZIHASANOVIC, Enver; DOB 7 Jul 1950; POB Zvornik, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

HALILI, Nevzat; DOB 15 Sep 1946; POB Poroj, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

HARADINAJ, Daut; DOB 6 Apr 1978; POB Glodjane, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

HASANI, Zhavit; DOB 5 May 1957; POB Tanusevci, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

HAXHIREXHA, Kastriot; DOB 9 May 1961; POB Debar, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

HYSENI, Xhemajl; DOB 15 Aug 1958; POB Lojane, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

IVANOVIC, Milan; DOB 5 Feb 1955 (individual) [BALKANS]

JAKSIC, Marko; DOB 1954; POB Mitrovica, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

JAKUPI, Avdyl; DOB 20 Apr 1974; POB Stimlje, Kosovo, Serbia (individual) [BALKANS]

JANKOVIC, Gojko; DOB 31 Oct 1954; POB Foca, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large; sub-commander of the military police in Foca (individual) [BALKANS]

JELAVIC, Ante; DOB 21 Oct 1963; POB Potprolog, Croatia (individual) [BALKANS]

JELISIC, Goran; DOB 7 Jun 1968; POB Bijeljina, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

JOKIC, Dragan; DOB 20 Aug 1957; POB Grbavci, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

JOKIC, Miodrag; DOB 1935; POB Mionica, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

JOSIPOVIC, Drago; DOB 14 Feb 1955; POB Santici, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KARADZIC, Aleksandar (a.k.a. "SASA"); DOB 14 May 1973; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KARADZIC, Luka; DOB 31 Apr 1951; POB Savnik, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

KARADZIC, Radovan; DOB 19 Jun 1945; POB Petnica, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee at large; former president of the Republika Srpska (individual) [BALKANS]

KARADZIC-JOVICEVIC, Sonja; DOB 22 May 1967; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KKCMTSH (a.k.a. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION AND PROTECTION OF ALBANIAN LANDS) [BALKANS]

KNEZEVIC, Dusan; DOB 23 Jun 1955; POB Orlovci, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

KOJIC, Radomir (a.k.a. "MINEUR"); DOB 23 Nov 1950; POB Bijela Voda, Sokolac Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Passport 3943074 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) issued 27 Sep 2002 in Sarajevo; Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KOMOTKO, 12 Pop Lukina, Belgrade, Serbia; Registration ID 17307746 (Serbia); Tax ID No. 100036378 (Serbia) [BALKANS]

KORDIC, Dario; DOB 14 Dec 1960; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KOS, Milojica; DOB 1 Apr 1963; POB Lamovita, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KOVAC, Tomislav (a.k.a. "TOMO"); DOB 4 Dec 1959; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina; Passport 412959171315 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (individual) [BALKANS]

KOVACEVIC, Vladimir; DOB 15 Jan 1961; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KRAJISNIK, Momcilo; DOB 20 Jan 1945; POB Zabrdje, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KRNOJELAC, Milorad; DOB 25 Jul 1940; POB Birotici, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KRSTIC, Radislav; DOB 15 Feb 1948; POB Nedjeljiste, Vlasenica, Bosnia- Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KRUNIC, Savko (a.k.a. KRUNIC, Savo), Sokolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 27 Jan 1958; POB Sokolac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Passport 3667905 (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Director, Srpska Sume Forestry Company, Sokolac, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KRUNIC, Savo (a.k.a. KRUNIC, Savko), Sokolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 27 Jan 1958; POB Sokolac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Passport 3667905 (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Director, Srpska Sume Forestry Company, Sokolac, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KRYEZIU, Izmet; DOB 3 Oct 1954; POB Pagarusha-Malishev, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

KUBURA, Amir; DOB 4 Mar 1964; POB Kakanj, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KUJUNDZIC, Predrag (a.k.a. "PREDO"); DOB 30 Jan 1961; POB Suho Polje, Doboj, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

KUNARAC, Dragoljub; DOB 15 May 1960; POB Foca, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

KVOCKA, Miroslav; DOB 1 Jan 1957; POB Maricka, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

LALOVIC, Dragan (a.k.a. "MATE"); DOB 14 Jun 1953; POB Vlaholje, nr Kalinovik, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

LANDZO, Esad; DOB 7 Mar 1973; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

LAZAREVIC, Vladimir; DOB 23 Mar 1949; POB Gricar (individual) [BALKANS]

LIBERATION ARMY OF PRESEVO, MEDVEDJA, AND BUJANOVAC (a.k.a. UCPMB) [BALKANS]

LIMAJ, Fatmir; DOB 4 Feb 1971; POB Banja, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

LJUBICIC, Pasko; DOB 15 Nov 1965; POB Nezirovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

LKCK (a.k.a. NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF KOSOVO) [BALKANS]

LLADROVICI, Ramiz; DOB 3 Jan 1966 (individual) [BALKANS]

LPK (a.k.a. POPULAR MOVEMENT OF KOSOVO) [BALKANS]

LUKIC, Milan; DOB 6 Sep 1967; POB Foca, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

LUKIC, Sredoje; DOB 5 Apr 1961; POB Visegrad, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

LUKIC, Sreten; DOB 28 Mar 1955; POB Visegrad municipality, Bosnia and Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

LUKOVIC, Milorad Ulemek (a.k.a. "LEGIJA"); DOB 15 Mar 1968; POB Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

LUSHTAKU, Sami; DOB 20 Feb 1961; POB Srbica, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

MANCO OIL COMPANY [BALKANS]

MANDIC, Momcilo (a.k.a. "MOMO"); DOB 1 May 1954; POB Kalinovik, Bosnia- Herzegovina; National ID No. JMB 0105954171511 (individual) [BALKANS]

MARIJANOVIC, Milovan; DOB 14 Mar 1944; POB Kraljevo, Serbia (individual) [BALKANS]

MARINIC, Zoran; DOB 6 Jun 1963; POB Busovaca, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

MARKOVIC, Mirjana; DOB 10 Jul 1942; wife of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

MARKOVIC, Radovac; DOB 1946; alt. DOB 1947; Ex-FRY Deputy Minister of Interior (individual) [BALKANS]

MARKU, Ton; DOB 13 Jun 1964 (individual) [BALKANS]

MARTIC, Milan; DOB 18 Nov 1954; POB Zagrovic, Croatia; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

MARTINOVIC, Vinko; DOB 21 Sep 1963; POB Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

MEJAKIC, Zeljko; DOB 2 Aug 1964; POB Petrov Gaj, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Borislav; DOB 1936; brother of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Dragomir; DOB 4 Feb 1942; POB Murgas, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Marija; DOB 1965; daughter of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Marko; DOB 2 Jul 1974; son of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Milanka; sister-in-law of Slobodan Milosevic (individual) [BALKANS]

MILOSEVIC, Slobodan; DOB 20 Aug 1941; POB Pozarevac, Serbia and Montenegro; ex- FRY President; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

MILUTINOVIC, Milan; DOB 19 Dec 1942; POB Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro; ex- President of Republika Srpska; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

MLADIC, Ratko; DOB 12 Mar 1943; POB Bozinovici, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

MORINA, Xhavit; DOB 13 Sep 1963; POB Drenovc (individual) [BALKANS]

MRDJA, Darko; DOB 28 Jun 1967; POB Zagreb, Croatia; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

MRKSIC, Milan; DOB 20 Jul 1947; POB Vrginmost, Croatia; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

MUCIC, Zdravko; DOB 31 Aug 1955; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

MUSLIU, Isak; DOB 31 Oct 1970; POB Racak, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

MUSLIU, Jonuz; DOB 5 Jan 1959; POB Konculj, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

MUSLIU, Shefqet; DOB 12 Feb 1963; POB Konculj, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

MUSTAFA, Rrustem; DOB 27 Feb 1971; POB Podujevo, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

NALETILIC, Mladen; DOB 1 Dec 1946; POB Listica, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION AND PROTECTION OF ALBANIAN LANDS (a.k.a. KKCMTSH) [BALKANS]

NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (a.k.a. NLA; a.k.a. UCK) [BALKANS]

NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF KOSOVO (a.k.a. LKCK) [BALKANS]

NDRECAJ, Maliq; DOB 22 Apr 1969; POB Maciteve, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

NIKOLIC, Dragan; DOB 26 Apr 1957; POB Vlasenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

NIKOLIC, Drago; DOB 9 Nov 1957; POB Vlasenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

NIKOLIC, Momir; DOB 20 Feb 1955; POB Bratunac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

NIKOLIC, Zarko; DOB 7 May 1938; POB Sovljak, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

NLA (a.k.a. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY; a.k.a. UCK) [BALKANS]

OBRENOVIC, Dragan; DOB 12 Apr 1963; POB Matino Brdo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

OJDANIC, Dragoljub; DOB 1 Jun 1941; POB Ravni-Cajetina, Serbia and Montenegro; Ex-Fry Minister of Defense; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

ORIC, Naser; DOB 3 Mar 1967; POB Potocari, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

PANDUREVIC, Vinko; DOB 1959; POB Sokolac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

PAVKOVIC, Nebojsa; DOB 10 Apr 1946; alt. DOB 16 Apr 1946; POB Senjski Rudnik, Serbia and Montenegro; Ex-VJ Chief of Staff (individual) [BALKANS]

PCPMB (a.k.a. POLITICAL COUNCIL OF PRESEVO, MEDVEDJA, AND BUJANOVAC) [BALKANS]

PEJCIC, Mile (a.k.a. PEJICIC, Mile); DOB 5 Jan 1971; POB SuhoPolje, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

PEJICIC, Mile (a.k.a. PEJCIC, Mile); DOB 5 Jan 1971; POB SuhoPolje, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

PERIC, Jozo (a.k.a. "TUKESA"); DOB 31 Jan 1959; POB Pjesevac Kula, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

PETRIC, Zoran; DOB 18 Jul 1964; POB Banovici, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

PLAVSIC, Biljana; DOB 7 Jul 1930; POB Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

POLITICAL COUNCIL OF PRESEVO, MEDVEDJA, AND BUJANOVAC (a.k.a. PCPMB) [BALKANS]

POPOVIC, Vujadin; DOB 14 Mar 1957; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

POPULAR MOVEMENT OF KOSOVO (a.k.a. LPK) [BALKANS]

PRCAC, Dragoljub; DOB 18 Jul 1937; POB Omarska, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

PRIVREDNA BANKA AD SRPSKO SARAJEVO (a.k.a. PRIVREDNA BANKA SARAJEVO AD), Str Srpskih Ratnika br 14, 71420 Pale, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dobroslava Jedevica 14, 71000 Pale, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kralja Nikole Str 65, Srbinje/Foca, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ljube Milanovica Str 12, Trebinje, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Filipa Kljajica Str 6, Zvornik, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 9/11 Str Zagrebacka, Belgrade 11000, Serbia; SWIFT/BIC PRSS BA 22 [BALKANS]

PRIVREDNA BANKA SARAJEVO AD (a.k.a. PRIVREDNA BANKA AD SRPSKO SARAJEVO), Str Srpskih Ratnika br 14, 71420 Pale, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dobroslava Jedevica 14, 71000 Pale, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kralja Nikole Str 65, Srbinje/Foca, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ljube Milanovica Str 12, Trebinje, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Filipa Kljajica Str 6, Zvornik, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 9/11 Str Zagrebacka, Belgrade 11000, Serbia; SWIFT/BIC PRSS BA 22 [BALKANS]

PUMA SECURITY AGENCY (a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY COMPANY; a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY SERVICE), Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Stolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Siroki Brijeg, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

PUMA SECURITY COMPANY (a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY AGENCY; a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY SERVICE), Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Stolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Siroki Brijeg, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

PUMA SECURITY SERVICE (a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY AGENCY; a.k.a. PUMA SECURITY COMPANY), Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Stolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Siroki Brijeg, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

RADIC, Miroslav; DOB 1 Jan 1961; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

RADIC, Mlado; DOB 15 May 1952; POB Lamovita, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

RAJIC, Ivica; DOB 5 May 1958; POB Johovac, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

RASEVIC, Mitar; DOB 1940; POB Cagust, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

REXHEPI, Daut; DOB 1962; POB Poroj, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

ROGULJIC, Slavko; DOB 1952 (individual) [BALKANS]

RUSHITI, Sait (a.k.a. RUXHETI, Sait); DOB 7 Nov 1966 (individual) [BALKANS]

RUXHETI, Sait (a.k.a. RUSHITI, Sait); DOB 7 Nov 1966 (individual) [BALKANS]

SAHINPASIC, Senad; DOB circa 1951; POB Foca, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

SAINOVIC, Nikola; DOB 7 Dec 1948; POB Bor, Serbia and Montenegro; Ex-FRY Deputy Prime Minister; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

SAMIU, Izair; DOB 23 Jul 1963 (individual) [BALKANS]

SANTIC, Vladimir; DOB 1 Apr 1958; POB Donja Veceriska, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

SARAC, Ivan; DOB 4 Jun 1968; POB Sokolac, Serbia (individual) [BALKANS]

SAROVIC, Mirko; DOB 16 Sep 1956; POB Rogatica, Serbia (individual) [BALKANS]

SDS (a.k.a. SERB DEMOCRATIC PARTY; a.k.a. SRPSKA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA), Kralja Alfonsa XIII, Number 1, Banja Luka 78000, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

SELIMI, Rexhep; DOB 15 Mar 1971; POB Iglarevo, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

SERB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (a.k.a. SDS; a.k.a. SRPSKA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA), Kralja Alfonsa XIII, Number 1, Banja Luka 78000, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

SESELJ, Vojislav; DOB 11 Oct 1954; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

SHAQIRI, Shaqir; DOB 1 Sep 1964; POB Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

SHAQIRI, Xhezair; DOB 15 May 1965; POB Tanusevci, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

SIKIRICA, Dusko; DOB 23 Mar 1964; POB Cirkin Pojle, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

SIMATOVIC, Franko (a.k.a. "FRENKI"); DOB 1 Apr 1950; POB Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee in Serb custody (individual) [BALKANS]

SIMIC, Blagoje; DOB 1 Jul 1960; POB Kruskovo Polje; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

SIMIC, Milan; DOB 9 Aug 1960; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

SLJIVANCANIN, Veselin; DOB 13 Jun 1953; POB Zabljak, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

SOPTA, Stanko; DOB 4 Feb 1966; POB Duzice, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

SPASOJEVIC, Dragon, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 5 Jul 1965; National ID No. 050 796 318 3954 (individual) [BALKANS]

SRPSKA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA (a.k.a. SDS; a.k.a. SERB DEMOCRATIC PARTY), Kralja Alfonsa XIII, Number 1, Banja Luka 78000, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BALKANS]

STAKIC, Milomir; DOB 19 Jun 1962; POB Maricka, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

STANISIC, Jovica; DOB 30 Jul 1950; POB Ratkovo, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee in Serb custody (individual) [BALKANS]

STANKOVIC, Radovan; DOB 10 Mar 1953; POB Trebica, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee in custody (individual) [BALKANS]

STEPANOVIC, Novak; DOB 25 Apr 1966; POB Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

STRUGAR, Pavle; DOB 13 Jul 1933; POB Pec, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

SUBOTIC, Bogdan; DOB 25 Apr 1941; POB Bosanska Gradiska, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

SUMA, Emrush; DOB 27 May 1974; POB Dimce, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

SYLA, Azem; DOB 5 Apr 1951; POB Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

TADIC, Dusan (a.k.a. DULE; a.k.a. "DUSKO"); DOB 1956; POB Cajnice, Bosnia- Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

TADIC, Miroslav; DOB 12 May 1937; POB Novi Grad, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

TALIC, Momir; DOB 15 Jul 1942; POB Piskavica, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

THACI, Menduh; DOB 3 Mar 1965; POB Tetovo, Macedonia (individual) [BALKANS]

TODOROVIC, Stevan; DOB 29 Dec 1957; POB Donja Slatina, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

TODOVIC, Savo; DOB 11 Dec 1952; POB Rijeka, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

UCK (a.k.a. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY; a.k.a. NLA) [BALKANS]

UCPMB (a.k.a. LIBERATION ARMY OF PRESEVO, MEDVEDJA, AND BUJANOVAC) [BALKANS]

UKSHINI, Sami (a.k.a. UKSINI, Sami); DOB 5 Mar 1963; POB Gjakova, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

UKSINI, Sami (a.k.a. UKSHINI, Sami); DOB 5 Mar 1963; POB Gjakova, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

VASIC, Dragomir, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 1964; POB Brnjica, Bosina- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

VASILJEVIC, Mitar; DOB 25 Aug 1954; POB Durevici, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

VRACAR, Milenko, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 15 May 1956; POB Nisavici, Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

VUKOVIC, Zoran; DOB 6 Sep 1955; POB Brusna, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

XHAFERI, Shefit; DOB 1960 (individual) [BALKANS]

XHEMAJLI, Emrush; DOB 5 May 1959; POB Urosevac, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

XHEMAJLI, Muhamet; DOB 8 Feb 1958; POB Muhovac, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

ZARIC, Simo; DOB 25 Jul 1948; POB Trnjak, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

ZDRAVO, 12 Pop Lukina, Belgrade, Serbia; Registration ID 17317105 (Serbia); Tax ID No. 100036386 (Serbia); juice manufacturer [BALKANS]

ZELEN-KARADZIC, Ljiljana; DOB 27 Nov 1945; POB Sarajevo Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

ZELENOVIC, Dragan; DOB 12 Feb 1961; ICTY indictee at large (individual) [BALKANS]

ZIGIC, Zoran; DOB 20 Sep 1958; POB Balte, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

ZUPLJANIN, Stojan; DOB 1951; POB Maslovare, Bosnia-Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

"CICKO" (a.k.a. BJELICA, Milovan), Starine Novaka Street BB, Sokolac, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina; DOB 19 Oct 1958; POB Rogatica, Bosnia- Herzegovina; National ID No. 1910958130007 (individual) [BALKANS]

"DUGA PUSKA" (a.k.a. BAJAGIC, Zvonko); DOB 6 Sep 1953; POB Vlasenica, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

"DUSKO" (a.k.a. DULE; a.k.a. TADIC, Dusan); DOB 1956; POB Cajnice, Bosnia- Herzegovina; ICTY indictee (individual) [BALKANS]

"FRENKI" (a.k.a. SIMATOVIC, Franko); DOB 1 Apr 1950; POB Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro; ICTY indictee in Serb custody (individual) [BALKANS]

"LEGIJA" (a.k.a. LUKOVIC, Milorad Ulemek); DOB 15 Mar 1968; POB Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro (individual) [BALKANS]

"MATE" (a.k.a. LALOVIC, Dragan); DOB 14 Jun 1953; POB Vlaholje, nr Kalinovik, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

"MINEUR" (a.k.a. KOJIC, Radomir); DOB 23 Nov 1950; POB Bijela Voda, Sokolac Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Passport 3943074 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) issued 27 Sep 2002 in Sarajevo; Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

"MOMO" (a.k.a. MANDIC, Momcilo); DOB 1 May 1954; POB Kalinovik, Bosnia- Herzegovina; National ID No. JMB 0105954171511 (individual) [BALKANS]

"PREDO" (a.k.a. KUJUNDZIC, Predrag); DOB 30 Jan 1961; POB Suho Polje, Doboj, Bosnia-Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

"SASA" (a.k.a. KARADZIC, Aleksandar); DOB 14 May 1973; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]

"TOMO" (a.k.a. KOVAC, Tomislav); DOB 4 Dec 1959; POB Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina; Passport 412959171315 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (individual) [BALKANS]

"TUKESA" (a.k.a. PERIC, Jozo); DOB 31 Jan 1959; POB Pjesevac Kula, Bosnia- Herzegovina (individual) [BALKANS]


text: On the Magnet/VI-1

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: On the Magnet/VI-1


text:
Page:The Burton Holmes Lectures Vol. X p 2.jpg

 THE

BURTON HOLMES

LECTURES

With Illustrations from Photographs By the Author

COMPLETE IN TEN VOLUMES VOL. X

BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN THE LITTLE-PRESTON COMPANY, LIMITED M C M I Top


text: On the Magnet/VI-2

title: On the Magnet/VI-2


text: On the Magnet/VI-3

title: On the Magnet/VI-3


text: On the Magnet/VI-4

title: On the Magnet/VI-4


text: Page:Englishmen in the French Revolution.djvu/22


text: On the Magnet/VI-5

title: On the Magnet/VI-5


text: On the Magnet/VI-6

title: On the Magnet/VI-6


text: On the Magnet/VI-7

title: On the Magnet/VI-7


text:
The New International Encyclopædia/Stein, Charlotte von

STEIN,, (1742-1827). A friend of Goethe. She was platonically intimate with him from 1775 to the time of his Italian journey (1786), by which he won emancipation. To her he addressed the Briefe aus der Schweiz (1779), which are among the classics of travel, and a multitude of letters, first published in 1848, and best edited in the Weimar edition of his Works (1886). Her letters to Goethe were long supposed destroyed, but they have recently been recovered in part. After Goethe's union with Christiane Vulpius there was an estrangement between him and Frau von Stein, gradually overcome later on. Consult: Höfer, Goethe und Charlotte von Stein (Stuttgart, 1878); Düntzer, Charlotte von Stein (ib., 1874).


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 on his journey, as he would then be pretty well out of the smell of the Giant. Jack then returned, and liberated the Giant from the vault, who asked what he should give him for saving the castle.

"Why," quoth Jack, "I desire nothing but the old coat and cap, together with the old rusty sword and slippers which are at your bed’s head."

Quoth the Giant, "Thou shalt have them; and pray keep them for my sake, for they are things of excellent use: the coat will keep you invisible, the cap will furnish you with knowledge, the sword cuts asunder whatever you strike, and the shoes are of extraordinary swiftness. These may be serviceable to you: therefore take them, with all my heart."

They soon arrived at the dwelling of the beautiful lady, who was under the power of a wicked Magician. She received the Prince with fair words, and made a noble feast for him; when it was ended, she arose, and wiping her mouth with a fine handkerchief, said, "My Lord, you must shew me this handkerchief to-morrow, or lose your head."


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/John XV (pope)


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 She then went out of the room, taking the handkerchief with her.

The Prince went to bed right sorrowful; but Jack put on his cap of knowledge, which told him that the lady was forced, by the power of the enchantment, to meet the wicked Magician every night in a forest. Jack now put on his coat of darkness and his shoes of swiftness, and went to the forest, where he saw the lady give the handkerchief to the Magician. Whereupon Jack, who was surrounded by a host of evil spirits, with his sword of sharpness, at one blow cut off his head, and regained the handkerchief for the Prince; the enchantment was ended in a moment, and the lady restored to her virtue and goodness.


text: On the Magnet/VI-8

title: On the Magnet/VI-8


text: Index:Kosovo OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION in KOSOVO Regarding the Removal of Emrush Xhemajli, Gafurr Elshani and Sabit Gashi from the List of Candidates for the November 2001 Elections E3011029a.pdf


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 OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION in KOSOVO  Ex officio Investigation 10. 19/01 Regarding the removal of  from the List of Candidates for the November 2001 Elections

The Ombudsperson for Kosovo, pursuant to Sections 4.4 and 4.9 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/38on the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo and Rules 18 and 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsperson Institution, on 29 October 2001,

has presented the following Report to Mr. Hans Haekkerup, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, within the meaning of those provisions:

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OMBUDSPERSON  1. On 24 September 2001, the Ombudsperson was informed about the cases of Mr. Emrush Xhemajli and Mr. Gafurr Elshani, who are respectively President and Vice-president of the Peoples' Movement of Kosovo (hereinafter PMK) and Mr. Sabit Hajdin Gashi, Vice-president of the National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (hereinafter NMLK). According to the information received by the Ombudsperson, all of these persons were removed from the candidates lists of their respective political parties for the Kosovo Assembly elections to take place on 17 November 2001. The names apparently were removed from the lists on the bases of one or more Executive Orders issued by Mr. Hans Haekkerup, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (hereinafter the SRSG), to the Central Election Commission. [Throughout this Report, Mr. Emrush Xhemajli, Mr. Gafurr Elshani and Mr. Sabit Hajdin Gashi will be referred to as ‘the three individuals’ or ‘the individuals affected’.]

2. On 8 October 2001, the Ombudsperson opened an ex officio investigation regarding the case, which was registered under ex officio Registration No. 19/01.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE The facts of the case,

The facts of the case, in so far as they can be ascertained, may be summarized as follows:

A.

3. In summer 2001, several newspapers in Kosovo published a list of persons considered to be ‘undesirable’ by the Government of the United States, which became known as the "George Bush list"or the "black list". The names of Mr. Emrush Xhemajli and Mr. Gafurr Elshani appeared on the list.

4. On 10 September 2001, the People's Movement of Kosovo (PMK) presented its electoral list to the Central Elections Commission in Kosovo. The names of Mr. Emrush Xhemajli and Mr. Gafurr Elshani were included on this list as candidates for election to the Kosovo Assembly.


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 She returned with the Prince to the court of King Arthur, where they were received with welcome; and the valiant Jack was made one of the Knights of the Round Table.


text: The story of Jack and the Giants/Part 2

title: The story of Jack and the Giants/Part 2


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 Thereupon Jack took leave of the King, the Prince, and all the Knights of the Round Table, and set off. He went along over the hills and mountains, until he came to a large forest, through which his road lay. On a sudden he heard piercing shrieks. He forced his way through the trees, and saw a huge


text:
The New International Encyclopædia/Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Baron vom

STEIN,, Baron (1757-1831). A Prussian statesman. He belonged to an old Franconian family, and was born at Nassau. He studied at Göttingen, entered the Prussian civil service, and in 1784 was at the head of the Department of Mines for Westphalia. In 1786 he visited England and made a study of its institutions, and his experiences bore fruit at a later period in his guidance of Prussian affairs. In October, 1804, he entered the Prussian Ministry as chief of indirect imposts, taxes, manufactures, and commerce. He introduced useful reforms in his department, particularly by abolishing various restrictions on the internal trade of the nation; but he was hampered in his endeavors by the spirit of Prussian conservatism. In 1807 he was dismissed from office by the King, but the Peace of Tilsit opened the eyes of the sovereign to the wisdom of Stein's policy, and he was recalled, with the approbation of Napoleon, who had as yet no idea of the deep and earnest patriotism of the Minister. Seeing clearly that, from a military point of view, Prussia was powerless for the moment, he set about developing her internal resources by initiating a series of administrative and political reforms, the principal of which were the abolition of serfdom, with indemnification to the territorial lords; the subjection of the nobles to manorial imposts; promotion in the State service by merit alone, without distinction of caste; and the establishment of a modern municipal system. While he was paving the way for German unity, the Prussian army was being reorganized by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ( qq.v.) As the result of a letter criticising Napoleon's policy, which was brought to the knowledge of the French Emperor, Stein was obliged to resign (November 24, 1808), and retired to Austria. In danger of being surrendered by Austria to Napoleon, Stein was summoned in 1812 to Russia by the Emperor Alexander, and contributed by his counsels to the formation of the coalition of the German States against Napoleon. After the battle of Leipzig, in 1813, Stein became head of the council for the administration of the reconquered German countries, as well as of the territory which France had annexed west of the Rhine. He was a leader in all the military diplomacy of that stirring time up to the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle. After his retirement from political life he devoted himself to the promotion of German science and art and formed the society for the study of early German history whose publications are celebrated as the Monumenta Germaniæ Historica. He died at Kappenberg (Westphalia) June 29, 1831. Consult: Seeley, Life and Times of Stein (London, 1879); Pertz, Leben des Freiherrn vom Stein (1885).


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 beard were as thick rods of iron wire; and his locks of hair hung down like curling snakes. Jack alighted from his horse, and turned him into a thicket; then he put on his invisible coat, and drew a little nearer, to behold this figure; and said softly, "O monster, are you there! it will not be long before I shall take you fast by the beard."

The Giant, all this while, could not see him, by reason of his invisible coat: then Jack came quite close to him, and


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text: Index:Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans.pdf


text:
Page:Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans.pdf/1

Executive Order 13219 was issued effective 12:01a.m. eastern daylight time on June 27, 2001:

"By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, have determined that the actions of persons engaged in, or assisting, sponsoring, or supporting, (i) extremist violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in southern Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and elsewhere in the Western Balkans region, or (ii) acts obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia or United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999 in Kosovo, threaten the peace in or diminish the security and stability of those areas and the wider region, undermine the authority, efforts, and objectives of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international organizations and entities present in those areas and the wider region, and endanger the safety of persons participating in or providing support to the activities of those organizations and entities, including United States military forces and government officials. I find that such actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U. S. C. 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Title IX, Pub. L. No. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of:

(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and

(ii) persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found:

(A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of threatening the peace in or diminishing the stability or security of any area or state in the Western Balkans region, undermining the authority, efforts, or objectives of international organizations or entities present in the region, or endangering the safety of persons participating in or providing support to the activities of those international organizations or entities, or

(B) to have actively obstructed, or to pose a significant risk of actively obstructing, implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia or United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 in Kosovo, or

(C) materially to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, such acts of violence or obstructionism, or

(D) to be owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing persons, that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.

(b) I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by United States persons to persons designated in or pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order. Accordingly, the blocking of property and interests in property pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section includes, but is not limited to, the prohibition of the making by a United States person of any such donation to any such designated person, except as otherwise authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(c) The blocking of property and property interests in or pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section includes, but is not limited to, the prohibition of the making or receiving by a United States person of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a person designated in or pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

Sec. 2. Any transaction by a United States person that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited. Any conspiracy formed to violate the prohibitions of this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) The term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) The term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and

(c) The term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. - 1 -


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 "I hope," said Jack, "you will not tarry here long; but pray tell me, what is the meaning of your captivity?"

"Alas!" said one, "we have been taken by the Giants that hold this cave, and are kept till they have a feast; then the fattest of us is killed and cooked. It is not long since they took three for this purpose."

"Say you so?" said Jack; "I have given them such a dinner that it will be long enough before they want more." The captives were amazed at his words. "You may believe me,"


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xiv


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 Giant, thirty-five feet high, dragging along by the hair of their heads a Knight and his beautiful Lady, one inn each hand, with as much ease as if they had been a pair of gloves. Jack shed tears at such a sight, and alighting from his horse, and tying him to an oak, put on his invisible coat, under which he carried his sword off sharpness.

When he came up to the Giant, he made many strokes at him, but could not reach his body, on account of his great height. Still, he wounded his ankles in many places: at last, putting both hands to his sword, and aiming with all his might, he cut off both the Giant’s legs below the garter; so that his body tumbled to the ground.

ACK then set one foot upon his neck, and cried out, "Thou cruel wretch! behold I give thee the just reward of thy crimes." And so plunging his sword into the Giant’s body,m the monster gave a loud groan and yielded up his life; while the noble Knight and his Lady were joyful at their deliverance. They heartily thanked Jack for what he had done, and invited him to their house to refresh himself.


text: On the Magnet/VI-9

title: On the Magnet/VI-9


text:
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush/Opinion of the Court

[p186] SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge:

This suit was brought by a domestic organization that advocates reproductive rights and by attorneys employed by the organization. Plaintiffs challenge the so-called "Mexico City Policy," pursuant to which the United States government requires foreign organizations, as a condition of receiving government funds, to agree neither to perform abortions nor to promote abortion generally. Plaintiffs maintain that these restrictions violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The district court was following the general rule, set forth by the Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210, 118 S.C.t. 1003 (1998), that a federal court may not assume it has jurisdiction over a matter and proceed directly to the merits. The instant case is exceptional, however. Some twelve years ago we entertained and rejected, on the merits, the same constitutional challenge to the provision at issue here. We therefore find that this case falls within an exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Steel Co., and we dismiss the First Amendment claim on the merits without deciding the standing question. Plaintiffs also bring claims under the Due Process Clause and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. We dismiss the due process claim under the doctrine of prudential standing, as plaintiffs' alleged harm does not fall within the zone of interests protected by the Due Process Clause. We dismiss the equal protection claim as without merit; while plaintiffs do have standing for this claim under the concept we have dubbed "competitive advocate standing," the classification they challenge does not constitute an equal protection violation.

[p187]

BACKGROUND
We accept the allegations in the complaint as true on this motion to dismiss. The facts of this case, which are set forth in greater detail by the district court, see Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, No. 01 CIV. 4986, 2001 WL 868007 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2001) ("CRLP"), are as follows. Plaintiff The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy ("CRLP") is a nonprofit advocacy organization devoted to the promotion of reproductive rights. Individual plaintiffs Janet Benshoof, Anika Rahman, Katherine Hall Martinez, Julia Ernst, Laura Katzive, Melissa Upreti and Christina Zampas are CRLP staff attorneys engaged in the organization's global mission of reproductive law reform. Defendant George W. Bush is the President of the United States. Defendant Colin Powell is the U.S. Secretary of State and is thus responsible for "ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act. . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 6593(b)(2). Defendant Andrew Natsios is the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"). At issue in this case is the so-called "Mexico City Policy" of the United States government, whereby foreign non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") receiving U.S. government funds must agree to a provision called the "Standard Clause," which prohibits the organizations from engaging in activities that promote abortion (also referred to as the "challenged restrictions").

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ("FAA") authorizes the President "to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for voluntary population planning." 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b). The President's authority to allocate FAA funding has been delegated to the Secretary of State and, in turn, to the Administrator of USAID. See Exec. Order No. 13,118, 64 Fed. Reg. 16,595 (Mar. 31, 1999); State Department Delegation of Authority No. 145-1, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,974 (Aug. 5 1980); International Development Cooperation Agency Delegation of Authority No. 7, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,470 (Aug. 7, 1980). In 1973, Congress enacted the Helms Amendment, which prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds to pay for, among other things, "the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions." 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1). This restriction applies only to the use of U.S. government funds; foreign NGOs receiving assistance may still promote abortion with non-U.S. government funds without violating the terms of the statute. The executive branch, however, has attached additional conditions to the granting of foreign assistance funds, as it is authorized to do by the FAA. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b). These additional conditions are the subject of this suit.

The challenged restrictions originated in August 1984, when President Ronald Reagan announced the Mexico City Policy ("the Policy"). The Policy expressed the government's disapproval of abortion as an element of family planning programs and set forth various ways in which the government would prohibit its funds from being used to support abortion overseas. Among these, it was announced that "the United States will no longer contribute to separate nongovernmental organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in [p188]  other nations." CRLP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, 2001 WL 868007, at *4 (citations omitted).

Pursuant to the Mexico City Policy, USAID incorporated the "Standard Clause" into its family planning assistance agreements and contracts. The Standard Clause provides that in order to be eligible for USAID funding, a foreign NGO must certify in writing that it "will not, while receiving assistance under the grant, perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in AID-recipient countries or provide financial support to other foreign nongovernmental organizations that conduct such activities." Id. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, [WL] at *5 (quotation marks omitted). The restrictions established in the Standard Clause extend to all activities of recipient NGOs, not merely to projects funded by USAID. Thus, in order to receive U.S. government funds, a foreign NGO may not engage in any activities that promote abortion. These restrictions do not apply to domestic NGOs such as plaintiff CRLP.

The Mexico City Policy was rescinded by President Bill Clinton in January 1993, but was reinstated by President George W. Bush in March 2001. President Bush issued an official memorandum that restored the abortion-related restrictions discussed above, including the Standard Clause. See Memorandum, Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,303, 17,309 (Mar. 28, 2001) ("Restoration Memorandum"). Accordingly, as a condition of receiving U.S. government funds, foreign NGOs again are required to agree not to perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning.

Plaintiffs bring this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs' primary claim, and the one with which the district court appears exclusively to have concerned itself, is based on the First Amendment. The thrust of this claim is that, as a result of the challenged restrictions, foreign NGOs are chilled from interacting and communicating with domestic abortion rights groups such as plaintiff CRLP, thus depriving plaintiffs of their rights to freedom of speech and association in carrying out the mission of the organization. Plaintiffs also allege that the restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment by preventing plaintiffs from competing on "equal footing" with domestic anti-abortion groups, and that they violate the Due Process Clause by failing to give clear notice of what speech and activities they prohibit and by encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Finally, plaintiffs attempt to bring a claim under customary international law, the substance of which appears to be identical to their First Amendment claim.

The district court dismissed the action in its entirety on the ground that plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The court first noted that because the challenged restrictions apply only to foreign NGOs, not to domestic organizations such as CRLP, the Mexico City Policy does not affect plaintiffs directly. CRLP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, 2001 WL 868007, at *7. The court then applied the three-pronged standing test set out by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S.C.t. 2130 (1992), and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that (1) concrete injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the alleged injury and the government's conduct, and (3) that the alleged injury is sufficiently redressable by a favorable [p189]  decision. CRLP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, 2001 WL 868007, at *8-*12.

Our review is de novo. ''See Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc.'', 287 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2002). "The reviewing court may, of course, affirm on any ground appearing in the record below." MFS Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 277 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 2002).

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations
The crux of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is their contention that the restrictions chill foreign NGOs from collaborating with domestic NGOs like CRLP because such collaboration may be viewed as promoting abortion and thus would jeopardize the foreign NGOs' receipt of U.S. government funds. Plaintiffs argue that such collaboration is essential to their ability to carry out their mission as advocates of reproductive rights and that depriving them of this ability violates their freedom of speech and association.

Specifically, plaintiffs allege that they depend on collaboration with foreign NGOs in order to advocate abortion law reform in foreign countries; to gather reliable information regarding abortion laws; to disseminate publications and reports; to reach audiences worldwide in order to promote abortion law reform; to access victims and witnesses of human rights abuses; to lobby the United States government to rescind the Restoration Memorandum; to influence international conferences, international legal tribunals, and world public opinion; to increase protection for the right to abortion in the United States; and to engage in open and free discussion about abortion. See Am. Compl. PP 7, 85, 88, 90, 91, 105-107.

Plaintiffs list several countries in which they currently have projects involving these activities and where foreign NGOs have agreed to the Standard Clause, id. P 71, and they allege that all of these activities are significantly hindered in those countries. The use of the Standard Clause, according to plaintiffs, "prevents Plaintiffs from forming alliances with potential partner organizations in order to increase their abortion-related advocacy efforts' effectiveness." Id. P 100. One of the ways in which this problem manifests itself is by depriving plaintiffs of their audience for reproductive rights advocacy. Plaintiffs allege that the use of the Standard Clause "interferes with Plaintiffs' conveyance of their ideas and political speech about abortion by chilling or prohibiting [foreign NGOs] from attending presentations given by Plaintiffs and from listening to Plaintiffs' political advocacy." Id. P 106. These hindrances, according to plaintiffs, violate their right to freedom of speech and association. Similarly, plaintiffs allege that the challenged restrictions impede their ability to disseminate publications and reports "because [foreign NGOs] that would otherwise distribute the publications in foreign countries are prohibited or chilled from doing so." Id. P 103. Plaintiffs argue that this harm is actionable under Supreme Court precedent holding that "the First Amendment protects [individuals'] right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425, 108 S.C.t. 1886 (1988). Plaintiffs also invoke their right to receive information, claiming that the Standard Clause "interferes with Plaintiffs' ability to obtain information necessary to accomplish their abortion law reform efforts from USAID recipient [foreign NGOs]," and impedes plaintiffs' access [p190]  to victims and witnesses of human rights abuses related to reproductive issues. Am. Compl. PP 101-102. Plaintiffs explain that foreign NGOs are often the only vehicle to provide access to both general information and first-hand accounts regarding conditions in foreign countries, id., and that obtaining such information is necessary for domestic NGOs to fulfill their mission of advocating reproductive rights--including their ability to lobby the United States government, id. P 108.

B. The Planned Parenthood Case
We have been over this ground before. In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Agency for International Development, 915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990), this Court entertained a constitutional challenge to the same Standard Clause incorporated by the USAID into financial assistance agreements with foreign NGOs. Like the instant case, Planned Parenthood involved a First Amendment challenge, based on freedom of speech and association, brought by domestic NGOs. As in the instant case, the plaintiffs argued before this Court that the Mexico City Policy effectively prevented them from associating and collaborating with foreign NGOs, which in turn prevented them from fulfilling their mission regarding reproductive rights advocacy. Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 62-63.

This Court rejected the challenge on the merits, finding "no constitutional rights implicated" by the Policy and the Standard Clause. Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 66. The Court reasoned that the domestic NGOs remained free to use their own funds to pursue abortion-related activities in foreign countries and that "the harm alleged in the complaint is the result of choices made by foreign NGOs to take AID's money rather than engage in non-AID funded cooperative efforts with plaintiffs-appellants." Id. at 64. "Such an incidental effect" on the activities of the domestic NGOs, the Court held, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. The Court concluded that "the Standard Clause does not prohibit plaintiffs-appellants from exercising their first amendment rights." Id. Moreover, the Court explained that whatever one might think of the Mexico City Policy, "the wisdom of, and motivation behind, this policy are not justiciable issues," and the Court found the restrictions to be rationally related to the "otherwise nonjusticiable decision limiting the class of beneficiaries of foreign aid." Id. at 64-65. Having rejected plaintiffs' claims on the merits, this Court declined to address the question of whether plaintiffs had standing under Article III. Id. at 66.

Planned Parenthood not only controls this case conceptually; it presented the same issue. Planned Parenthood rejected the same First Amendment challenge to the same provision--the Standard Clause that was first instituted by President Reagan in the 1980s and was reinstated by President George W. Bush in 2001 --and no intervening Supreme Court case law alters its precedential value.

Plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish Planned Parenthood are unavailing. [p191] First, plaintiffs argue that Planned Parenthood did not involve an equal protection challenge. This is true, but does not affect the First Amendment question. Second, plaintiffs argue that Planned Parenthood "mischaracterizes the [restrictions'] effect as 'incidental.'" This argument does not distinguish Planned Parenthood at all, but simply disagrees with its holding. Third, plaintiffs argue that the effect on their speech is more substantial than in Planned Parenthood because the provision "impedes Plaintiffs' entire mission, not just one component of that mission." The significance of this point is not clear to us as a legal matter and, in any event, the allegations made in the two cases are far too similar to support this distinction as a factual matter.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that Planned Parenthood "did not assess the right to obtain and impart information," and that the litigants in Planned Parenthood "did not claim that their law reform advocacy in the United States and the United Nations was impeded." By rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the Mexico City Policy prevented them from associating and collaborating with foreign NGOs, however, this Court's opinion in Planned Parenthood did, in fact, assess and reject the claim that plaintiffs' right to obtain and impart information was impeded. See Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 63-64 (noting and rejecting plaintiffs' argument that "it is impractical for United States citizens or organizations to engage in abortion-related activities abroad without the cooperation of foreign organizations and that the Standard Clause deters 'many of the most logical and effective foreign partners'"); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2430, No. 87 CIV. 0248, 1990 WL 26306, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1990) ("Plaintiffs argue that [the Standard Clause] has the effect of preventing foreign NGOs that receive AID funds and domestic NGOs from associating with each other for purposes of receiving or disseminating abortion information using non-U.S. government money . . . ." (emphasis added)). Likewise, although this Court's opinion in Planned Parenthood did not explicitly describe the scope of plaintiffs' claim regarding the restrictions on their law reform advocacy to include advocacy in the U.S. and in international tribunals, our holding clearly contemplated and rejected that claim. See Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 62 (noting that the Standard Clause does not hinder plaintiffs' use of non-AID funds "in the United States or abroad"); Planned Parenthood, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2430, 1990 WL 26306, at *7 ("[Plaintiffs] also allege that the 'reason for the promulgation of the policy and the Standard Clause was to advance the Reagan Administration's effort to suppress pro-choice views and activities in the United States . . . and not for any purported concern with foreign policy . . . .'" (quoting complaint)).

C. The Standing Issue
The district court dismissed the instant case, not on the merits as we did in Planned Parenthood, but for lack of constitutional standing. A federal court has jurisdiction only if a claim presents a "case" or "controversy" under Article III of the U.S.C.onstitution. This "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an "injury in fact," i.e., an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there is a causal connection such that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. "Since this case [p192]  remains at the pleading stage, all facts averred by the plaintiffs must be taken as true for purposes of the standing inquiry--as they must be for any other issue presented." ''Lerman v. Bd. of Elections,'' 232 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2000).

The district court held that plaintiffs failed to show these elements of standing. See CRLP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10903, 2001 WL 868007, at *8-*12. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily on our analysis in Planned Parenthood. See, e.g., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2430 [WL] at *10 ("The Court of Appeals has already held that the government is within its constitutional authority in imposing restrictions or conditions on the receipt of USAID funding by [foreign NGOs]."). In particular, the district court placed great weight on our statement in Planned Parenthood that the harm alleged by domestic NGOs is the result not of the Mexico City Policy itself, but of "choices made by foreign NGOs to take AID's money rather than engage in non-AID funded cooperative efforts with plaintiffs-appellants." 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2430 [WL] at *10, *11 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 64). Based on this language from Planned Parenthood, the district court found that "plaintiffs have failed to show that their alleged harms are caused by the challenged government policies." 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2430[WL] at *12.

It is not clear, however, that the district court's reliance on Planned Parenthood is entirely justified in this context. We found in Planned Parenthood that the alleged harm suffered by domestic NGOs is attributable to independent decisions of foreign NGOs, but only for purposes of the merits of plaintiffs' First Amendment claims. It does not necessarily follow that Planned Parenthood answers the question of causation with respect to constitutional standing.

One reason why Planned Parenthood might be deemed to resolve the standing question is that Planned Parenthood, though adjudicated on the merits, was decided on the pleadings. Thus, one could argue that this Court decided as a matter of law that the Mexico City Policy could not be deemed the legal "cause" of the alleged harm to domestic NGOs. Although this finding was used to form a different conclusion in Planned Parenthood--that plaintiffs' claims failed on the merits--it arguably could be employed in our standing analysis here. On the other hand, it could be argued that Planned Parenthood is not dispositive, particularly in light of an intervening Supreme Court case that clarified the causation aspect of the standing inquiry. In Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281, 117 S.C.t. 1154 (1997), plaintiffs argued that a Biological Opinion by the Fish and Wildlife Service influenced the Bureau of Reclamation to reduce the quantity of irrigation water available to plaintiffs. Rejecting the government's contention that plaintiffs lacked standing because the Bureau's conduct constituted an "independent" act breaking the chain of causation under Lujan, the Supreme Court explained that "this wrongly equates injury 'fairly traceable' to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation." Id. at 168-69. The Court stated that while "it does not suffice if the injury complained of is the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court . . . that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else." Id. at 169 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Bennett can be read to support plaintiffs' standing argument in the instant case.

We are thus faced with a situation of a sui generis nature, inasmuch as our conclusion depends in large part on how much weight one places on our language in [p193]  Planned Parenthood--a case that analyzed essentially the same factual allegations as the instant case but in a somewhat different context. As Planned Parenthood does not, as the district court implied, resolve the standing issue conclusively, we are confronted with a novel question of Article III standing.

D. The Steel Co. Case and Our Authority to Proceed to the Merits
Because we believe that our decision in Planned Parenthood dooms plaintiffs' First Amendment claims on the merits, we must decide whether we should first address plaintiffs' novel theory of constitutional standing with respect to these claims.

Between the time that we decided Planned Parenthood and the filing of the instant action, the Supreme Court issued a decision in which it criticized the practice whereby a court proceeds directly to the merits of a case while assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs have constitutional standing to bring the suit. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-101, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210, 118 S.C.t. 1003 (1998). This practice, referred to by some courts as "hypothetical jurisdiction," United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996), was often used by federal courts seeking to avoid a difficult or novel issue of standing in favor of a relatively easy merits question. In Steel Co., however, Justice Scalia explained that the determination of standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, and that a court lacks the authority to rule on a case unless it determines that jurisdiction exists. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94. "For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires." Id. at 101-02. Justice Scalia's decision in Steel Co. commanded a five-Justice majority, although two of the five issued a concurring opinion, which expressed a more permissive view toward the practice of assumed jurisdiction. See id. at 110-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.) (stating that "the Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in reserving difficult questions of jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party") (quotation marks and alterations omitted). This Court has heeded the admonitions of Steel Co., acknowledging that ordinarily we are not to assume the existence of jurisdiction in favor of reaching an "easier" merits issue. Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1998); see also In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 267-68 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Steel Co. rule).

The Steel Co. majority opinion, however, discussed several previous Supreme Court decisions which, according to the Court, "must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101. Moreover, the Court chose not to state simply that, to the extent that previous cases might be read to permit assumed jurisdiction, those cases are overruled. Instead, the Court distinguished the cases on various grounds, thus leaving their precedential value intact. Two such cases are of particular relevance here.

[p194] The first is Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 49 L. Ed. 2d 672, 96 S.C.t. 2771 (1976), in which the Court declined to address a jurisdictional issue and answered the merits question regarding whether certain aspects of the Social Security Act were unconstitutional. The Steel Co. Court distinguished Norton on the ground that, in Norton, "we declined to decide the jurisdictional question, because the merits question was decided in a companion case, Mathews v. Lucas, with the consequence that the jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98 (internal citation omitted). The Steel Co. Court explained that the outcome in Norton was "foreordained by Lucas" and thus "Norton did not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed." Id.

The Steel Co. Court also distinguished and did not overrule Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1033, 94 S.C.t. 3039 (1974). The Court explained, "Avrech also involved an instance in which an intervening Supreme Court decision definitively answered the merits question." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98-99. Avrech involved a constitutional challenge to a provision of the Code of Military Justice. When another case, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439, 94 S.C.t. 2547 (1974), rejected a similar constitutional challenge to the same provision, the Court decided to dispose of Avrech on the merits, stating that it was "unwilling to decide the difficult jurisdictional issue which the parties have briefed." Avrech, 418 U.S. at 677. The Avrech Court explained its rationale: "We believe that even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits is thus foreordained." Id. at 678. The Steel Co. Court thus distinguished Avrech, finding that the "peculiar circumstances" of Avrech did not permit the case to be cited for the more general proposition that any "easy" merits question may be decided on the assumption of jurisdiction. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 99.

Thus, the majority opinion in Steel Co. appears to allow an exception to the rule against assuming the existence of standing in those "peculiar circumstances" where the outcome on the merits has been "foreordained" by another case such that "the jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome," provided the court "does not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed." Id. at 98; ''cf. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States'', 219 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (using the Steel Co. Court's approval of Norton as authority to bypass a jurisdictional question and decide the merits in an "unusual situation" where the [p195]  two issues are intertwined). We find ourselves in largely the same situation as the Supreme Court found itself in Norton and Avrech: plaintiffs in this case challenge a governmental provision (the use of the Standard Clause) as unconstitutional, and there is a controlling case in which this Court entertained and rejected the same constitutional challenge to the same provision. Our outcome on the merits is thus "foreordained" by Planned Parenthood. Under the Norton/Avrech exception acknowledged in Steel Co., we need not reach the academic question of Article III standing in this case.

Our approach not only comports with the language of the Steel Co. majority opinion, but also advances the underlying rationale of Steel Co. and makes good sense as a constitutional matter. The concern of the Steel Co. majority was that deciding a case on the mere assumption of jurisdiction can lead to the rendering of advisory opinions in violation of Article III: "Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment--which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 (citations omitted). Turning to the instant case, we note that where the precise merits question has already been decided in another case by the same court, it is the adjudication of the standing issue that resembles an advisory opinion--the very concern that animates the Steel Co. rule. It would be ironic if, in our desire to avoid rendering an advisory opinion, we were to address a novel standing question in a case where the result is foreordained by another decision of this Court. See id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that by addressing a standing issue unnecessarily "the Court is engaged in a version of the 'hypothetical jurisdiction' that it has taken pains to condemn"). We further note that the question of Article III standing is itself of constitutional dimensions, see id. at 124, and "the Supreme Court has for generations warned against reaching out to adjudicate constitutional matters unnecessarily," Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1999).

We hold that where, as here, a governmental provision is challenged as unconstitutional, and a controlling decision of this Court has already entertained and rejected the same constitutional challenge to the same provision, the Court may dispose of the case on the merits without addressing a novel question of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court followed this approach in Norton and Avrech, and approved of those cases in Steel Co. Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim. uishable from their First Amendment claims, they are dismissed on the same ground. We express no view as to whether those claims are otherwise viable.

II. Due Process Claim: Lack of Prudential Standing
Because Planned Parenthood did not address due process claims brought by domestic NGOs in this context, we address the due process claim separately and dismiss it on the alternative ground of prudential standing.

"The doctrine of standing, which addresses the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues, embraces both 'constitutional' and 'prudential' requirements." ''Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth.'', 962 F.2d 1101, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992) (quotation [p196]  marks and brackets omitted). The constitutional requirements, derived from Article III, are the injury in fact, causation, and redressability elements set out by the Supreme Court in Lujan. On the other hand, "the prudential requirements of standing have been developed by the Supreme Court on its own accord and applied in a more discretionary fashion as rules of judicial 'self-restraint' further to protect, to the extent necessary under the circumstances, the purpose of Article III." Id. (internal citations omitted). Pursuant to the doctrine of prudential standing, a court must ask whether a plaintiff's claim rests on the legal rights of a third party, asserts only a generalized grievance, or asserts a claim that falls outside the zone of interests protected by the legal provision invoked. ''See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United'', 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S.C.t. 752 (1982); ''In re Appointment of Indep. Counsel'', 766 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1985). Of particular concern in the instant case is "the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked," Crist v. Comm'n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S.C.t. 3315 (1984)), coupled with the rule against asserting the rights of a third party. Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the Due Process Clause.

Plaintiffs' due process claim is based on their allegation that the challenged restrictions fail to give clear notice of what political speech, public education, and law reform activities they prohibit and that they encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Am. Compl. P 140. It is not the plaintiffs, however, who are allegedly left uncertain of their rights by unconstitutionally vague language in a government provision; it is the foreign NGOs who are allegedly left in this position. Plaintiffs' harm is derivative of this due process-type harm, and their alleged injury (albeit an unactionable one) concerns First Amendment interests. Plaintiffs' allegation, simply put, is that the vague language of the Standard Clause causes the foreign NGOs to be overly cautious in avoiding interaction with plaintiffs, which in turn harms plaintiffs' speech and association interests. On appeal, plaintiffs expressly acknowledge that "this vagueness claim is premised on the [restrictions'] chilling effect on protected speech and association." As plaintiffs do not assert a harm to their own interest in receiving due process of law, this is precisely the sort of claim that the prudential standing doctrine is designed to foreclose. Plaintiffs cannot make their First Amendment claims actionable merely by attaching them to a third party's due process interests. ''See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey,'' 257 U.S. App. D.C. 367, 809 F.2d 794, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that because due process rights "do not protect a relationship" between a third party and a litigant, a plaintiff "could never have standing to challenge a statute solely on the ground that it failed to provide due process to third parties not before the court"). Plaintiffs' due process claim is therefore dismissed for lack of prudential standing.

A. Plaintiffs Have "Competitive Advocate Standing"
Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to undertake a separate analysis of their Article III standing to bring an equal protection claim. Because we agree with plaintiffs that the case law regarding constitutional standing for equal protection claims is distinct, and because Planned Parenthood does not foreclose this claim on the merits, we address the question of Article III standing with respect to this [p197]  claim. As the case law and the legal theories involved are quite different, this constitutional standing analysis does not inform the question on which we reserved judgment above regarding constitutional standing to bring the First Amendment claims. We find that plaintiffs do have constitutional standing to bring an equal protection claim.

With respect to the equal protection claim, the relevant portion of the complaint reads:

"The [use of the Standard Clause] violates the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it prohibits plaintiffs from associating with USAID-recipient [foreign NGOs] for the purpose of promoting abortion law reform, but permits other United States citizens and residents to associate with USAID-recipient [foreign NGOs] for the purpose of opposing abortion law reform, and, more generally, permits association with USAID-recipient [foreign NGOs] for the purpose of rendering speech opposed to abortion more effective."

Am. Compl. P 138. On appeal, plaintiffs flesh out the equal protection claim by explaining that the use of the Standard Clause, "by prohibiting [foreign NGOs] from collaborating with Plaintiffs, denies Plaintiffs the opportunity to compete on an equal footing with opponents of abortion law reform."

Though plaintiffs do not employ the term, this argument is essentially a theory that this Court has dubbed "competitive advocate standing." We have acknowledged the possibility that a plaintiff may have standing to bring an equal protection claim where the government's allocation of a particular benefit "creates an uneven playing field" for organizations advocating their views in the public arena. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989). In order to "satisfy the rule that he was personally disadvantaged," a plaintiff must "show that he personally competes in the same arena with the party to whom the government has bestowed the assertedly illegal benefit." Id.

Plaintiffs have standing under this theory. CRLP is an advocacy organization that communicates its viewpoint regarding issues of abortion and reproductive rights, and it competes with anti-abortion groups engaged in advocacy around the very same issues. The Standard Clause has bestowed a benefit on plaintiffs' competitive adversaries by rewarding their suppliers of information, the foreign NGOs, with government grants, while withholding those grants from suppliers of information who would deal with CRLP. This is precisely the type of situation that the doctrine of competitive advocate standing contemplates. ''See id.; cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'', 515 U.S. 200, 211, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S.C.t. 2097 (1995) (finding, under the test for standing articulated in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, that a non-minority subcontractor had standing to contest a government policy that gave a financial incentive to general contractors to give preference to minority subcontractors in awarding subcontracts).

B. The Equal Protection Claim is Without Merit
Because this classification "neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights," it must "be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211, 113 S.C.t. 2096 (1993); see also Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). Here there can be no [p198]  question that the classification survives rational basis review. The Supreme Court has made clear that the government is free to favor the anti-abortion position over the pro-choice position, and can do so with public funds. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233, 111 S.C.t. 1759 (1991). Plaintiffs' equal protection challenge is thus without merit.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this action, though on different grounds.


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ACK resolved not to live in idleness for the future, but to do what services he could for the honour of the king and the nation. He therefore humbly besought King Arthur to furnish him with a horse and money, that he might travel in search of new and strange exploits. "For," said he to the King, "there are many Giants yet among the mountains of Wales, and they oppress the people: therefore, if it please you, Sire, to favour my designs, I will soon rid your kingdom of these Giants and monsters."

When the King heard this offer, and thought of the cruel deeds of these bloodthirsty Giants and savage monsters, he gave Jack every thing proper for such a journey.


text: Talk:Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush


text: On the Magnet/Index

title: On the Magnet/Index


text:
The New International Encyclopædia/Stein, Lorenz von

STEIN, (1815-90). A distinguished German political scientist, born at Eckernförde, in Schleswig. He studied law and philosophy at Kiel and Jena; became a professor in Kiel in 1846; and from 1855 till 1885 was professor of political science at Vienna. He published: Französische Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte (1846-48); System der Staatswissenschaft (1852-56); Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft (1858, 1878, 1887); Lehrbuch der Finanzwissenschaft (1885-86).


text: Index:Albania Law No. 8788 On Non-Profit Organizations.pdf