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Zoonomia/I.XIV

SECT. XIV.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS.

 * I. Of material and immaterial beings. Doctrine of St. Paul. II. 1. Of the sense of touch. Of solidity. 2. Of figure. Motion. Time. Place. Space. Number. 3. Of the penetrability of matter. 4. Spirit of animation possesses solidity, figure, visibility, &c. Of Spirits and angels. 5. The existence of external things. III. Of vision. IV. Of hearing. V. Of smell and taste. VI. Of the organ of sense by which we perceive heat and cold, not by the sense of touch. VII. Of the sense of extension, the whole of the locomotive muscles may be considered as one organ of sense. VIII. Of the senses of hunger, thirst, want of fresh air, suckling children, and lust. IX. Of many other organs of sense belonging to the glands. Of painful sensations from the excess of light, pressure, heat, itching, caustics, and electricity.

I. Philosophers have been much perplexed to understand, in what manner we become acquainted with the external world; insomuch that Dr. Berkly even doubted its existence, from having observed (as he thought) that none of our ideas resemble their correspondent objects. Mr. Hume asserts, that our belief depends on the greater distinctness or energy of our ideas from perception; and Mr. Reid has lately contended, that our belief of external objects is an innate principle necessarily joined with our perceptions.

So true is the observation of the famous Malbranch, "that our senses are not given us to discover the essences of things, but to acquaint us with the means of preserving our existence," (L. I. ch. v.) a melancholy reflection to philosophers!

Some philosophers have divided all created beings into material and immaterial: the former including all that part of being, which obeys the mechanic laws of action and reaction, but which can begin no motion of itself; the other is the cause of all motion, and is either termed the power of gravity, or of specific attraction, or the spirit of animation. This immaterial agent is supposed to exist in or with matter, but to be quite distinct from it, and to be equally capable of existence, after the matter, which now possesses it, is decomposed.

Nor is this theory ill supported by analogy, since heat, electricity, and magnetism, can be given to or taken from a piece of iron; and must therefore exist, whether separated from the metal, or combined with it. From a parity of reasoning, the spirit of animation, would appear to be capable of existing as well separately from the body as with it.

I beg to be understood, that I do not wish to dispute about words, and am ready to allow, that the powers of gravity, specific attraction, electricity, magnetism, and even the spirit of animation, may consist of matter of a finer kind; and to believe, with St. Paul and Malbranch, that the ultimate cause only of all motion is immaterial, that is God. St. Paul says, "in him we live and move, and have our being;" and, in the 15th chapter to the Corinthians, distinguishes between the psyche or living spirit, and the pneuma or reviving spirit. By the words spirit of animation or sensorial power, I mean only that animal life, which mankind possesses in common with brutes, and in some degree even with vegetables, and leave the consideration of the immortal part of us, which is the object of religion, to those who treat of revelation.

II.1. Of the Sense of Touch.

The first idea we become acquainted with, are those of the sense of touch; for the fœtus must experience some varieties of agitation, and exert some muscular action, in the womb; and may with great probability be supposed thus to gain some ideas of its own figure, of that of the uterus, and of the tenacity of the fluid, that surrounds it, (as appears from the facts mentioned in the succeeding Section upon Instinct.)

Many of the organs of sense are confined to a small part of the body, as the nostrils, ear, or eye, whilst the sense of touch is diffused over the whole skin, but exists with a more exquisite degree of delicacy at the extremities of the fingers and thumbs, and in the lips. The sense of touch is thus very commodiously disposed for the purpose of encompassing smaller bodies, and for adapting itself to the inequalities of larger ones. The figure of small bodies seems to be learnt by children by their lips as much as by their fingers; on which account they put every new object to their mouths, when they are satiated with food, as well as when they are hungry. And puppies seem to learn their ideas of figure principally by the lips in their mode of play.

We acquire our tangible ideas of objects either by the simple pressure of this organ of touch against a solid body, or by moving our organ of touch along the surface of it. In the former case we learn the length and breadth of the object by the quantity of our organ of touch, that is impressed by it: in the latter case we learn the length and breadth of objects by the continuance of their pressure on our moving organ of touch.

It is hence, that we are very slow in acquiring our tangible ideas, and very slow in recollecting them; for if I now think of the tangible idea of a cube, that is, if I think of its figure, and of the solidity of every part of that figure, I must conceive myself as passing my fingers over it, and seem in some measure to feel the idea, as I formerly did the impression, at the ends of them, and am thus very slow in distinctly recollecting it.

When a body compresses any part of our sense of touch, what happens? First, this part of our sensorium undergoes a mechanical compression, which is termed a stimulus; secondly, an idea, or contraction of a part of the organ of sense is excited; thirdly, a motion of the central parts, or of the whole sensorium, which is termed sensation, is produced; and these three constitute the perception of solidity.

2. Of Figure, Motion, Time, Place, Space, Number.

No one will deny, that the medulla of the brain and nerves has a certain figure; which, as it is diffused through nearly the whole of the body, must have nearly the figure of that body. Now it follows, that the spirit of animation, or living principle, as it occupies this medulla, and no other part, (which is evinced by a great variety of cruel experiments on living animals,) it follows, that this spirit of animation has also the same figure as the medulla above described. I appeal to common sense! the spirit of animation acts, Where does it act? It acts wherever there is the medulla above mentioned; and that whether the limb is yet joined to a living animal, or whether it be recently detached from it; as the heart of a viper or frog will renew its contractions, when pricked with a pin, for many minutes of time after its exsection from the body.—Does it act any where else?—No; then it certainly exists in this part of space, and no where else; that is, it hath figure; namely, the figure of the nervous system, which is nearly the figure of the body. When the idea of solidity is excited, as above explained, a part of the extensive organ of touch is compressed by some external body, and this part of the sensorium so compressed exactly resembles in figure the figure of the body that compressed it. Hence, when we acquire the idea of solidity, we acquire at the same time the idea of FIGURE; and this idea of figure, or motion of a part of the organ of touch, exactly resembles in its figure the figure of the body that occasions it; and thus exactly acquaints us with this property of the external world.

Now, as the whole universe with all its parts possesses a certain form or figure, if any part of it moves, that form or figure of the whole is varied: hence, as MOTION is no other than a perpetual variation of figure, our idea of motion is also a real resemblance of the motion that produced it.

It may be said in objection to this definition of motion, that an ivory globe may revolve on its axis, and that here will be a motion without change of figure. But the figure of the particle x on one side of this globe is not the same figure as the figure of y on the other side, any more than the particles themselves are the same, though they are similar figures; and hence they cannot change place with each other without disturbing or changing the figure of the whole.

Our idea of TIME is from the same source, but is more abstracted, as it includes only the comparative velocities of these variations of figure; hence if it be asked, How long was this book in printing? it may be answered, Whilst the sun was passing through Aries.

Our idea of PLACE includes only the figure of a group of bodies, not the figures of the bodies themselves. If it be asked where is Nottinghamshire, the answer is, it is surrounded by Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire; hence place is our idea of the figure of one body surrounded by the figures of other bodies.

The idea of SPACE is a more abstracted idea of place excluding the group of bodies.

The idea of NUMBER includes only the particular arrangements, or distributions of a group of bodies, and is therefore only a more abstracted idea of the parts of the figure of the group of bodies; thus when I say England is divided into forty counties, I only speak of certain divisions of its figure.

Hence arises the certainty of the mathematical sciences, as they explain these properties of bodies, which are exactly resembled by our ideas of them, whilst we are obliged to collect almost all our other knowledge from experiment; that is, by observing the effects exerted by one body upon another.

3. Of the Penetrability of Matter.

The impossibility of two bodies existing together in the same space cannot be deduced from our idea of solidity, or of figure. As soon as we perceive the motions of objects that surround us, and learn that we possess a power to move our own bodies, we experience, that those objects, which excite in us the idea of solidity and of figure, oppose this voluntary movement of our own organs; as whilst I endeavour to compress between my hands an ivory ball into a spheroid. And we are hence taught by experience, that our own body and those, which we touch, cannot exist in the same part of space.

But this by no means demonstrates, that no two bodies can exist together in the same part of space. Galilæo in the preface to his works seems to be of opinion, that matter is not impenetrable; Mr. Michel, and Mr. Boscowich in his Theoria. Philos. Natur. have espoused this hypothesis: which has been lately published by Dr. Priestley, to whom the world is much indebted for so many important discoveries in science. (Hist. of Light and Colours, p. 391.) The uninterrupted passage of light through transparent bodies, of the electric æther through metallic and aqueous bodies, and of the magnetic effluvia through all bodies, would seem to give some probability to this opinion. Hence it appears, that beings may exist without possessing the property of solidity, as well as they can exist without possessing the properties, which excite our smell or taste, and can thence occupy space without detruding other bodies from it; but we cannot become acquainted with such beings by our sense of touch, any more than we can with odours or flavours without our senses of smell and taste.

But that any being can exist without existing in space, is to my ideas utterly incomprehensible. My appeal is to common sense. To be implies a when and a where; the one is comparing it with the motions of other beings, and the other with their situations.

If there was but one object, as the whole creation may be considered as one object, then I cannot ask where it exists? for there are no other objects to compare its situation with. Hence if any one denies, that a being exists in space, he denies, that there are any other beings but that one; for to answer the question, "Where does it exist?" is only to mention the situation of the objects that surround it.

In the same manner if it be asked—"When does a being exist?" The answer only specifies the successive motions either of itself, or of other bodies; hence to say, a body exists not in time, is to say, that there is, or was, no motion in the world.

4. Of the Spirit of Animation.

But though there may exist beings in the universe, that have not the property of solidity; that is, which can possess any part of space, at the same time that it is occupied by other bodies; yet there may be other beings, that can assume this property of solidity, or disrobe themselves of it occasionally, as we are taught of spirits, and of angels; and it would seem, that THE SPIRIT OF ANIMATION must be endued with this property, otherwise how could it occasionally give motion to the limbs of animals?—or be itself stimulated into motion by the obtrusions of surrounding bodies, as of light, or odour?

If the spirit of animation was always necessarily penetrable, it could not influence or be influenced by the solidity of common matter; they would exist together, but could not detrude each other from the part of space, where they exist; that is, they could not communicate motion to each other. No two things can influence or affect each other, which have not some property common to both of them; for to influence or affect another body is to give or communicate some property to it, that it had not before; but how can one body give that to another, which it does not possess itself?—The words imply, that they must agree in having the power or faculty of possessing some common property. Thus if one body removes another from the part of space, that it possesses, it must have the power of occupying that space itself: and if one body communicates heat or motion to another, it follows, that they have alike the property of possessing heat or motion.

Hence the spirit of animation at the time it communicates or receives motion from solid bodies, must itself possess some property of solidity. And in consequence at the time it receives other kinds of motion from light, it must possess that property, which light possesses, to communicate that kind of motion; and for which no language has a name, unless it may be termed Visibility. And at the time it is stimulated into other kinds of animal motion by the particles of sapid and odorous bodies affecting the senses of taste and smell, it must resemble these particles of flavour, and of odour, in possessing some similar or correspondent property; and for which language has no name, unless we may use the words Saporosity and Odorosity for those common properties, which are possessed by our organs of taste and smell, and by the particles of sapid and odorous bodies; as the words Tangibility and Audibility may express the common property possessed by our organs of touch, and of hearing, and by the solid bodies, or their vibrations, which affect those organs.

5 . Finally, though the figures of bodies are in truth resembled by the figure of the part of the organ of touch, which is stimulated into motion; and that organ resembles the solid body, which stimulates it, in its property of solidity; and though the sense of hearing resembles the vibrations of external bodies in its capability of being stimulated into motion by those vibrations; and though our other organs of sense resemble the bodies, that stimulate them, in their capability of being stimulated by them; and we hence become acquainted with these properties of the external world; yet as we can repeat all these motions of our organs of sense by the efforts of volition, or in consequence of the sensation of pleasure or pain, or by their association with other fibrous motions, as happens in our reveries or in sleep, there would still appear to be some difficulty in demonstrating the existence of any thing external to us.

In our dreams we cannot determine this circumstance, because our power of volition is suspended, and the stimuli of external objects are excluded; but in our waking hours we can compare our ideas belonging to one sense with those belonging to another, and can thus distinguish the ideas occasioned by irritation from those excited by sensation, volition, or association. Thus if the idea of the sweetness of sugar should be excited in our dreams, the whiteness and hardness of it occur at the same time by association; and we believe a material lump of sugar present before us. But if, in our waking hours, the idea of the sweetness of sugar occurs to us, the stimuli of surrounding objects, as the edge of the table, on which we press, or green colour of the grass, on which we tread, prevent the other ideas of the hardness and whiteness of the sugar from being exerted by association. Or if they should occur, we voluntarily compare them with the irritative ideas of the table or grass above mentioned, and detect their fallacy. We can thus distinguish the ideas caused by the stimuli of external objects from those, which are introduced by association, sensation, or volition; and during our waking hours can thus acquire a knowledge of the external world. Which nevertheless we cannot do in our dreams, because we have neither perceptions of external bodies, nor the power of volition to enable us to compare them with the ideas of imagination.

III. Of Vision.

Our eyes observe a difference of colour, or of shade, in the prominences and depressions of objects, and that those shades uniformly vary, when the sense of touch observes any variation. Hence when the retina becomes stimulated by colours or shades of light in a certain form, as in a circular spot; we know by experience, that this is a sign, that a tangible body is before us; and that its figure is resembled by the miniature figure of the part of the organ of vision, that is thus stimulated.

Here whilst the stimulated part of the retina resembles exactly the visible figure of the whole in miniature, the various kinds of stimuli from different colours mark the visible figures of the minuter parts; and by habit we instantly recall the tangible figures.

Thus when a tree is the object of sight, a part of the retina resembling a flat branching figure is stimulated by various shades of colours; but it is by suggestion, that the gibbosity of the tree, and the moss, that fringes its trunk, appear before us. These are ideas of suggestion, which we feel or attend to, associated with the motions of the retina, or irritative ideas, which we do not attend to.

So that though our visible ideas resemble in miniature the outline of the figure of coloured bodies, in other respects they serve only as a language, which by acquired associations introduce the tangible ideas of bodies. Hence it is, that this sense is so readily deceived by the art of the painter to our amusement and instruction. The reader will find much very curious knowledge on this subject in Bishop Berkley's Essay on Vision, a work of great ingenuity.

The immediate object however of the sense of vision is light; this fluid, though its velocity is so great, appears to have no perceptible mechanical impulse, as was mentioned in the third Section, but seems to stimulate the retina into animal motion by its transmission through this part of the sensorium: for though the eyes of cats or other animals appear luminous in obscure places; yet it is probable, that none of the light, which falls on the retina, is reflected from it, but adheres to or enters into combination with the choroide coat behind it.

The combination of the particles of light with opake bodies, and therefore with the choroide coat of the eye, is evinced from the heat, which is given out, as in other chemical combinations. For the sunbeams communicate no heat in their passage through transparent bodies, with which they do not combine, as the air continues cool even in the focus of the largest burning-glasses, which in a moment vitrifies a particle of opaque matter.

IV. Of the Organ of Hearing.

It is generally believed, that the tympanum of the ear vibrates mechanically, when exposed to audible sounds, like the strings of one musical instrument, when the same notes are struck upon another. Nor is this opinion improbable, as the muscles and cartilages of the larynx are employed in producing variety of tones by mechanical vibration: so the muscles and bones of the ear seem adapted to increase or diminish the tension of the tympanum for the purposes of similar mechanical vibrations.

But it appears from dissection, that the tympanum is not the immediate organ of hearing, but that like the humours and cornea of the eye, it is only of use to prepare the object for the immediate organ. For the portio mollis of the auditory nerve is not spread upon the tympanum, but upon the vestibulum, and cochlea, and semicircular canals of the ear; while between the tympanum and the expansion of the auditory nerve the cavity is said by Dr. Cotunnus and Dr. Meckel to be filled with water; as they had frequently observed by freezing the heads of dead animals before they dissected them; and water being a more dense fluid than air is much better adapted to the propagation of vibrations. We may add, that even the external opening of the ear is not absolutely necessary for the perception of sound: for some people, who from these defects would have been completely deaf, have distinguished acute or grave sounds by the tremours of a stick held between their teeth propagated along the bones of the head, (Haller. Phys. T. V. p. 295).

Hence it appears, that the immediate organ of hearing is not affected by the particles of the air themselves, but is stimulated into animal motion by the vibrations of them. And it is probable from the loose bones, which are found in the heads of some fishes, that the vibrations of water are sensible to the inhabitants of that element by a similar organ.

The motions of the atmosphere, which we become acquainted with by the sense of touch, are combined with its solidity, weight, or vis intertiæ; whereas those, that are perceived by this organ, depend alone on its elasticity. But though the vibration of the air is the immediate object of the sense of hearing, yet the ideas, we receive by this sense, like those received from light, are only as a language, which by acquired associations acquaints us with those motions of tangible bodies, which depend on their elasticity; and which we had before learned by our sense of touch.

V. Of Smell and of Taste.

The objects of smell are dissolved in the fluid atmosphere, and those of taste in the saliva, or other aqueous fluid, for the better diffusing them on their respective organs, which seem to be stimulated into animal motion perhaps by the chemical affinities of these particles, which constitute the sapidity and odorosity of bodies with the nerves of sense, which perceive them.

Mr. Volta has lately observed a curious circumstance relative to our sense of taste. If a bit of clean lead and a bit of clean silver be separately applied to the tongue and palate no taste is perceived; but by applying them in contact in respect to the parts out of the mouth, and nearly so in respect to the parts, which are immediately applied to the tongue and palate, a saline or acidulous taste is perceived, as of a fluid like a stream of electricity passing from one of them to the other. This new application of the sense of taste deserves further investigation, as it may acquaint us with new properties of matter.

From the experiments above mentioned of Galvani, Volta, Fowler, and others, it appears, that a plate of zinc and a plate of silver have greater effect than lead and silver. If one edge of a plate of silver about the size of half a crown-piece be placed upon the tongue, and one edge of a plate of zinc about the same size beneath the tongue, and if their opposite edges are then brought into contact before the point of the tongue, a taste is perceived at the moment of their coming into contact; secondly, if one of the above plates be put between the upper lip and the gum of the fore-teeth, and the other be placed under the tongue, and their exterior edges be then brought into contact in a darkish room, a flash of light is perceived in the eyes.

These effects I imagine only shew the sensibility of our nerves of sense to very small quantities of the electric fluid, as it passes through them; for I suppose these sensations are occasioned by slight electric shocks produced in the following manner. By the experiments published by Mr. Bennet, with his ingenious doubler of electricity, which is the greatest discovery made in that science since the coated jar, and the eduction of lightning from the skies, it appears that zinc was always found minus, and silver was always found plus, when both of them were in their separate state. Hence, when they are placed in the manner above described, as soon as their exterior edges come nearly into contact, so near as to have an extremely thin plate of air between them, that plate of air becomes charged in the same manner as a plate of coated glass; and is at the same instant discharged through the nerves of taste or of sight, and gives the sensations, as above described, of light or of saporocity; and only shews the great sensibility of these organs of sense to the stimulus of the electric fluid in suddenly passing through them.

VI. Of the Sense of Heat.

There are many experiments in chemical writers, that evince the existence of heat as a fluid element, which covers and pervades all bodies, and is attracted by the solutions of some of them, and is detruded from the combination of others. Thus from the combinations of metals with acids, and from those combinations of animal fluids, which are termed secretions, this fluid matter of heat is given out amongst the neighbouring bodies; and in the solutions of salts in water, or of water in air, it is absorbed from the bodies, that surround them; whilst in its facility in passing through metallic bodies, and its difficulty in pervading resins and glass, it resembles the properties of the electric aura; and is like that excited by friction, and seems like that to gravitate amongst other bodies in its uncombined state, and to find its equilibrium.

There is no circumstance of more consequence in the animal economy than a due proportion of this fluid of heat; for the digestion of our nutriment in the stomach and bowels, and the proper qualities of all our secreted fluids, as they are produced or prepared partly by animal and partly by chemical processes, depend much on the quantity of heat; the excess of which, or its deficiency, alike gives us pain, and induces us to avoid the circumstances that occasion them. And in this the perception of heat essentially differs from the perceptions of the sense of touch, as we receive pain from too great pressure of solid bodies, but none from the absence of it. It is hence probable, that nature has provided us with a set of nerves for the perception of this fluid, which anatomists have not yet attended to.

There may be some difficulty in the proof of this assertion; if we look at a hot fire, we experience no pain of the optic nerve, though the heat along with the light must be concentrated upon it. Nor does warm water or warm oil poured into the ear give pain to the organ of hearing; and hence as these organs of sense do not perceive small excesses or deficiences of heat; and as heat has no greater analogy to the solidity or to the figures of bodies, than it has to their colours or vibrations; there seems no sufficient reason for our ascribing the perception of heat and cold to the sense of touch; to which it has generally been attributed, either because it is diffused beneath the whole skin like the sense of touch, or owing to the inaccuracy of our observations, or the defect of our languages.

There is another circumstance would induce us to believe, that the perceptions of heat and cold do not belong to the organ of touch; since the teeth, which are the least adapted for the perceptions of solidity or figure, are the most sensible to heat or cold; whence we are forewarned from swallowing those materials, whose degree of coldness or of heat would injure our stomachs.

The following is an extract from a letter of Dr. R. W. Darwin, of Shrewsbury, when he was a student at Edinburgh. "I made an experiment yesterday in our hospital, which much favours your opinion, that the sensation of heat and of touch depend on different sets of nerves. A man who had lately recovered from a fever, and was still weak, was seized with violent cramps in his legs and feet; which were removed by opiates, except that one of his feet remained insensible. Mr. Ewart pricked him with a pin in five or six places, and the patient declared he did not feel it in the least, nor was he sensible of a very smart pinch. I then held a red-hot poker at some distance, and brought it gradually nearer till it came within three inches, when he asserted that he felt it quite distinctly. I suppose some violent irritation on the nerves of touch had caused the cramps, and had left them paralytic; while the nerves of heat, having suffered no increased stimulus, retained their irritability."

Add to this, that the lungs, though easily stimulated into inflammation, are not sensible to heat. See Class III. 1. 1. 10.

VII. Of the Sense of Extension.

The organ of touch is properly the sense of pressure, but the muscular fibres themselves constitute the organ of sense, that feels extension. The sense of pressure is always attended with the ideas of the figure and solidity of the object, neither of which accompany our perception of extension. The whole set of muscles, whether they are hollow ones, as the heart, arteries, and intestines, or longitudinal ones attached to bones, contract themselves, whenever they are stimulated by forcible elongation; and it is observable, that the white muscles, which constitute the arterial system, seem to be excited into contraction from no other kinds of stimulus, according to the experiments of Haller. And hence the violent pain in some inflammations, as in the paronychia, obtains immediate relief by cutting the membrane, that was stretched by the tumour of the subjacent parts.

Hence the whole muscular system may be considered as one organ of sense, and the various attitudes of the body, as ideas belonging to this organ, of many of which we are hourly conscious, while many others, like the irritative ideas of the other senses, are performed without our attention.

When the muscles of the heart cease to act, the refluent blood again distends or elongates them; and thus irritated they contract as before. The same happens to the arterial system, and I suppose to the capillaries, intestines, and various glands of the body.

When the quantity of urine, or of excrement, distends the bladder, or rectum, those parts contract, and exclude their contents, and many other muscles by association act along with them; but if these evacuations are not soon complied with, pain is produced by a little further extension of the muscular fibres: a similar pain is caused in the muscles, when a limb is much extended for the reduction of dislocated bones; and in the punishment of the rack: and in the painful cramps of the calf of the leg, or of other muscles, for a greater degree of contraction of a muscle, than the movement of the two bones, to which its ends are affixed, will admit of, must give similar pain to that, which is produced by extending it beyond its due length. And the pain from punctures or incisions arises from the distention of the fibres, as the knife passes through them; for it nearly ceases as soon as the division is completed.

All these motions of the muscles, that are thus naturally excited by the stimulus of distending bodies, are also liable to be called into strong action by their catenation, with the irritations or sensations produced by the momentum of the progressive particles of blood in the arteries, as in inflammatory fevers, or by acrid substances on other sensible organs, as in the strangury, or tenesmus, or cholera.

We shall conclude this account of the sense of extension by observing, that the want of its object is attended with a disagreeable sensation, as well as the excess of it. In those hollow muscles, which have been accustomed to it, this disagreeable sensation is called faintness, emptiness, and sinking; and, when it arises to a certain degree, is attended with syncope, or a total quiescence of all motions, but the internal irritative ones, as happens from sudden loss of blood, or in the operation of tapping in the dropsy.

VIII. Of the Appetites of Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Extension, the want of fresh Air, animal Love, and the Suckling of Children.

Hunger is most probably perceived by those numerous ramifications of nerves that are seen about the upper opening of the stomach; and thirst by the nerves about the fauces, and the top of the gula. The ideas of these senses are few in the generality of mankind, but are more numerous in those, who by disease, or indulgence, desire particular kinds of foods or liquids.

A sense of heat has already been spoken of, which may with propriety be called an appetite, as we painfully desire it, when it is deficient in quantity.

The sense of extension may be ranked amongst these appetites, since the deficiency of its object gives disagreeable sensation; when this happens in the arterial system, it is called faintness, and seems to bear some analogy to hunger and to cold; which like it are attended with emptiness of a part of the vascular system.

The sense of want of fresh air has not been attended to, but is as distinct as the others, and the first perhaps that we experience after our nativity; from the want of the object of this sense many diseases are produced, as the jail-fever, plague, and other epidemic maladies. Animal love is another appetite, which occurs later in life, and the females of lactiferous animals have another natural inlet of pleasure or pain from the suckling their offspring. The want of which either owing to the death of their progeny, or to the fashion of their country, has been fatal to many of the sex. The males have also pectoral glands, which are frequently turgid with a thin milk at their nativity, and are furnished with nipples, which erect on titillation like those of the female; but which seem now to be of no further use, owing perhaps to some change which these animals have undergone in the gradual progression of the formation of the earth, and of all that it inhabit.

These seven last mentioned senses may properly be termed appetites, as they differ from those of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell, in this respect; that they are affected with pain as well by the defect of their objects as by the excess of them, which is not so in the latter. Thus cold and hunger give us pain, as well as an excess of heat or satiety; but it is not so with darkness and silence.

IX. Before we conclude this Section on the organs of sense, we must observe, that, as far as we know, there are many more senses, than have been here mentioned, as every gland seems to be influenced to separate from the blood, or to absorb from the cavities of the body, or from the atmosphere, its appropriated fluid, by the stimulus of that fluid on the living gland; and not by mechanical capillary absorption, nor by chemical affinity. Hence it appears, that each of these glands must have a peculiar organ to perceive these irritations, but as these irritations are not succeeded by sensation, they have not acquired the names of senses.

However when these glands are excited into motions stronger than usual, either by the acrimony of their fluids, or by their own irritability being much increased, then the sensation of pain is produced in them as in all the other senses of the body; and these pains are all of different kinds, and hence the glands at this time really become each a different organ of sense, though these different kinds of pain have acquired no names.

Thus a great excess of light does not give the idea of light but of pain; as in forcibly opening the eye when it is much inflamed. The great excess of pressure or distention, as when the point of a pin is pressed upon our skin, produces pain, (and when this pain of the sense of distention is slighter, it is termed itching, or tickling), without any idea of solidity or of figure: an excess of heat produces smarting, of cold another kind of pain; it is probable by this sense of heat the pain produced by caustic bodies is perceived, and of electricity, as all these are fluids, that permeate, distend, or decompose the parts that feel them.

title: Zoonomia/I.XIV


text:
Zoonomia/I.XV

SECT. XV.

OF THE CLASSES OF IDEAS.

 * I. 1. Ideas received in tribes. 2. We combine them further, or abstract from these tribes. 3. Complex ideas. 4. Compounded ideas. 5. Simple ideas, modes, substances, relations, general ideas. 6. Ideas of reflexion. 7. Memory and imagination imperfectly defined. Ideal presence. Memorandum-rings. II. 1. Irritative ideas. Perception. 2. Sensitive ideas, imagination. 3. Voluntary ideas, recollection. 4. Associated ideas, suggestion. III. 1. Definitions of perception, memory. 2. Reasoning, judgment, doubting, distinguishing, comparing. 3. Invention. 4. Consciousness. 5. Identity. 6. Lapse of time. 7. Free-will.

I. 1 . As the constituent elements of the material world are only perceptible to our organs of sense in a state of combination; it follows, that the ideas or sensual motions excited by them, are never received singly, but ever with a greater or less degree of combination. So the colours of bodies or their hardnesses occur with their figures: every smell and taste has its degree of pungency as well as its peculiar flavour: and each note in music is combined with the tone of some instrument. It appears from hence, that we can be sensible of a number of ideas at the same time, such as the whiteness, hardness, and coldness, of a snow-ball, and can experience at the same time many irritative ideas of surrounding bodies, which we do not attend to, as mentioned in Section VII. 3. 2. But those ideas which belong to the same sense, seem to be more easily combined into synchronous tribes, than those which were not received by the same sense, as we can more easily think of the whiteness and figure of a lump of sugar at the same time, than the whiteness and sweetness of it.

2 . As these ideas, or sensual motions, are thus excited with greater or less degrees of combination; so we have a power, when we repeat them either by our volition or sensation, to increase or diminish this degree of combination, that is, to form compounded ideas from those, which were more simple; and abstract ones from those, which were more complex, when they were first excited; that is, we can repeat a part or the whole of those sensual motions, which did constitute our ideas of perception; and the repetition of which now constitutes our ideas of recollection, or of imagination.

3 . Those ideas, which we repeat without change of the quantity of that combination, with which we first received them, are called complex ideas, as when you recollect Westminster Abbey, or the planet Saturn: but it must be observed, that these complex ideas, thus re-excited by volition, sensation, or association, are seldom perfect copies of their correspondent perceptions, except in our dreams, where other external objects do not detract our attention.

4 . Those ideas, which are more complex than the natural objects that first excited them, have been called compounded ideas, as when we think of a sphinx, or griffin.

5 . And those that are less complex than the correspondent natural objects, have been termed abstracted ideas: thus sweetness, and whiteness, and solidity, are received at the same time from a lump of sugar, yet I can recollect any of these qualities without thinking of the others, that were excited along with them.

When ideas are so far abstracted as in the above example, they have been termed simple by the writers of metaphysics, and seem indeed to be more complete repetitions of the ideas or sensual motions, originally excited by external objects.

Other classes of these ideas, where the abstraction has not been so great, have been termed, by Mr. Locke, modes, substances, and relations, but they seem only to differ in their degree of abstraction from the complex ideas that were at first excited; for as these complex or natural ideas are themselves imperfect copies of their correspondent perceptions, so these abstract or general ideas are only still more imperfect copies of the same perceptions. Thus when I have seen an object but once, as a rhinoceros, my abstract idea of this animal is the same as my complex one. I may think more or less distinctly of a rhinoceros, but it is the very rhinoceros that I saw, or some part or property of him, which recurs to my mind.

But when any class of complex objects becomes the subject of conversation, of which I have seen many individuals, as a castle or an army, some property or circumstance belonging to it is peculiarly alluded to; and then I feel in my own mind, that my abstract idea of this complex object is only an idea of that part, property, or attitude of it, that employs the present conversation, and varies with every sentence that is spoken concerning it. So if any one should say, "one may sit upon a horse safer than on a camel," my abstract idea of the two animals includes only an outline of the level back of the one, and the gibbosity on the back of the other. What noise is that in the street?—Some horses trotting over the pavement. Here my idea of the horses includes principally the shape and motion of their legs. So also the abstract ideas of goodness and courage are still more imperfect representations of the objects they were received from; for here we abstract the material parts, and recollect only the qualities.

Thus we abstract so much from some of our complex ideas, that at length it becomes difficult to determine of what perception they partake; and in many instances our idea seems to be no other than of the sound or letters of the word, that stands for the collective tribe, of which we are said to have an abstracted idea, as noun, verb, chimæra, apparition.

6 . Ideas have been divided into those of perception and those of reflection, but as whatever is perceived must be external to the organ that perceives it, all our ideas must originally be ideas of perception.

7 . Others have divided our ideas into those of memory, and those of imagination; they have said that a recollection of ideas in the order they were received constitutes memory, and without that order imagination; but all the ideas of imagination, excepting the few that are termed simple ideas, are parts of trains or tribes in the order they were received; as if I think of a sphinx, or a griffin, the fair face, bosom, wings, claws, tail, are all complex ideas in the order they were received: and it behoves the writers, who adhere to this definition, to determine, how small the trains must be, that shall be called imagination; and how great those, that shall be called memory.

Others have thought that the ideas of memory have a greater vivacity than those of imagination: but the ideas of a person in sleep, or in a waking reverie, where the trains connected with sensation are uninterrupted, are more vivid and distinct than those of memory, so that they cannot be distinguished by this criterion.

The very ingenious author of the Elements of Criticism has described what he conceives to be a species of memory, and calls it ideal presence; but the instances he produces are the reveries of sensation, and are therefore in truth connections of the imagination, though they are recalled in the order they were received.

The ideas connected by association are in common discourse attributed to memory, as we talk of memorandum-rings, and tie a knot on our handkerchiefs to bring something into our minds at a distance of time. And a school-boy, who can repeat a thousand unmeaning lines in Lilly's Grammar, is said to have a good memory. But these have been already shewn to belong to the class of association; and are termed ideas of suggestion.

II. Lastly, the method already explained of classing ideas into those excited by irritation, sensation, volition, or association, we hope will be found more convenient both for explaining the operations of the mind, and for comparing them with those of the body; and for the illustration and the cure of the diseases of both, and which we shall here recapitulate.

1 . Irritative ideas are those, which are preceded by irritation, which is excited by objects external to the organs of sense: as the idea of that tree, which either I attend to, or which I shun in walking near it without attention. In the former case it is termed perception, in the latter it is termed simply an irritative idea.

2 . Sensitive ideas are those, which are preceded by the sensation of pleasure or pain; as the ideas, which constitute our dreams or reveries, this is called imagination.

3 . Voluntary ideas are those, which are preceded by voluntary exertion, as when I repeat the alphabet backwards: this is called recollection.

4 . Associate ideas are those, which are preceded by other ideas or muscular motions, as when we think over or repeat the alphabet by rote in its usual order; or sing a tune we are accustomed to; this is called suggestion.

III. 1 . Perceptions signify those ideas, which are preceded by irritation and succeeded by the sensation of pleasure or pain, for whatever excites our attention interests us; that is, it is accompanied with, pleasure or pain; however slight may be the degree or quantity of either of them.

The word memory includes two classes of ideas, either those which, are preceded by voluntary exertion, or those which are suggested by their associations with other ideas.

2 . Reasoning is that operation of the sensorium, by which we excite two or many tribes of ideas; and then re-excite the ideas, in which they differ, or correspond. If we determine this difference, it is called judgment; if we in vain endeavour to determine it, it is called doubting.

If we re-excited the ideas, in which they differ, it is called distinguishing. If we re-excite those in which they correspond, it is called comparing.

3 . Invention is an operation of the sensorium, by which we voluntarily continue to excite one train of ideas, suppose the design of raising water by a machine; and at the same time attend to all other ideas, which are connected with this by every kind of catenation; and combine or separate them voluntarily for the purpose of obtaining some end.

For we can create nothing new, we can only combine or separate the ideas, which we have already received by our perceptions: thus if I wish to represent a monster, I call to my mind the ideas of every thing disagreeable and horrible, and combine the nastiness and gluttony of a hog, the stupidity and obstinacy of an ass, with the fur and awkwardness of a bear, and call the new combination Caliban. Yet such a monster may exist in nature, as all his attributes are parts of nature. So when I wish to represent every thing, that is excellent, and amiable; when I combine benevolence with cheerfulness, wisdom, knowledge, taste, wit, beauty of person, and elegance of manners, and associate them in one lady as a pattern to the world, it is called invention; yet such a person may exist,—such a person does exist!—It is —— ——, who is as much a monster as Caliban.

4 . In respect to consciousness, we are only conscious of our existence, when we think about it; as we only perceive the lapse of time, when we attend to it; when we are busied about other objects, neither the lapse of time nor the consciousness of our own existence can occupy our attention. Hence, when we think of our own existence, we only excite abstracted or reflex ideas (as they are termed), of our principal pleasures or pains, of our desires or aversions, or of the figure, solidity, colour, or other properties of our bodies, and call that act of the sensorium a consciousness of our existence. Some philosopher, I believe it is Des Cartes, has said, "I think, therefore I exist." But this is not right reasoning, because thinking is a mode of existence; and it is thence only saying, "I exist, therefore I exist." For there are three modes of existence, or in the language of grammarians three kinds of verbs. First, simply I am, or exist. Secondly, I am acting, or exist in a state of activity, as I move. Thirdly, I am suffering, or exist in a state of being acted upon, as I am moved. The when, and the where, as applicable to this existence, depends on the successive motions of our own or of other bodies; and on their respective situations, as spoken of Sect. XIV. 2. 5.

5 . Our identity is known by our acquired habits or catenated trains of ideas and muscular motions; and perhaps, when we compare infancy with old age, in those alone can our identity be supposed to exist. For what else is there of similitude between the first speck of living entity and the mature man?—every deduction of reasoning, every sentiment or passion, with every fibre of the corporeal part of our system, has been subject almost to annual mutation; while some catenations alone of our ideas and muscular actions have continued in part unchanged.

By the facility, with which we can in our waking hours voluntarily produce certain successive trains of ideas, we know by experience, that we have before reproduced them; that is, we are conscious of a time of our existence previous to the present time; that is, of our identity now and heretofore. It is these habits of action, these catenations of ideas and muscular motions, which begin with life, and only terminate with it; and which we can in some measure deliver to our posterity; as explained in Sect. XXXIX.

6 . When the progressive motions of external bodies make a part of our present catenation of ideas, we attend to the lapse of time; which appears the longer, the more frequently we thus attend to it; as when we expect something at a certain hour, which much interests us, whether it be an agreeable or disagreeable event; or when we count the passing seconds on a stop-watch.

When an idea of our own person, or a reflex idea of our pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, makes a part of this catenation, it is termed consciousness; and if this idea of consciousness makes a part of a catenation, which we excite by recollection, and know by the facility with which we excite it, that we have before experienced it, it is called identity, as explained above.

7 . In respect to freewill, it is certain, that we cannot will to think of a new train of ideas, without previously thinking of the first link of it; as I cannot will to think of a black swan, without previously thinking of a black swan. But if I now think of a tail, I can voluntarily recollect all animals, which have tails; my will is so far free, that I can pursue the ideas linked to this idea of tail, as far as my knowledge of the subject extends; but to will without motive is to will without desire or aversion; which is as absurd as to feel without pleasure or pain; they are both solecisms in the terms. So far are we governed by the catenations of motions, which affect both the body and the mind of man, and which begin with our irritability, and end with it.

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title: Zoonomia/I.XV