text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1649

 1598 SEVENTIETH C ONGRESS. SESS. II. CH. 705. 1929 . mire community building, and including not exceeding $10,000 for camp ground development at Yakima Park ; in all, $122,600. Platt, Okla. Platt National Park, Oklahoma : For administration, protection, maintenance, and improvement, $16,200. Rocky Mountain, Rocky Mountain National Park, Colorado : Fo r ad mi ni st ra ti on , Colo. protection, and maintenance, including not exceeding $1,300 for the maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven passenger- carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in connection with general park work, $82,400 ; for construction of physical improvements, $13,600, including not exceeding $7,500 for the construction of buildings, of which not exceeding $2 .00 0 sh all be available for a stable, and $4,000 for employees' quarters $96,000 . Sequoia, Calif. Sequoia National Park, California : For administration, protec- tion, and maintenance, including not exceeding $1,200 for the main- tenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven passenger-carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in con- nection with general park work, and including not to exceed $10,000 for fire prevention, $105,000 ; fo r co ns tr uc ti on o f ph ys ic al improvements, $25 .000, including not exceeding $7,400 for the con- struction of buildings, of which not exceeding $2,000 shall be avail- able for a warehouse, $3,000 for an employee's cottage, and $1,700 for a comfort station ; in all, $13 0,00 0. Wind cave, S. Dak. Wind Cave National Park, South Dakota : For administration, protection, maintenance, and improvement, $13,500. Yellows tone, W yo. Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming : For administration, pro- tection, and maintenance, including not exceeding $7,500 for the purchase, maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven pas- senger-carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in connection with general park work, not exceeding $8,400 for maintenance of the road in the forest reserve leading out of the park from the east boundary, not exceeding $7,500 for main- tenance of the road in the forest reserve leading out of the park from the south boundary, and including feed for buffalo and other ani mals and sal arie s of buf falo kee pers, $4 20,0 00 of physical improvements, $33,000, including not exceeding $18,900 for extension of sewers and sanitary systems and garbage-disposal facilities, not exceeding $5,000 for auto camps, and not exceeding $12 .800 for the construction of buildings, including not exceeding $2,000 for a bunkhouse ; in all, $453,000. Yosemite, Calif. Yosemite National Park, California : For administration, protec- tion, and maintenance, including not exceeding $3,500 for the pur- chase, maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven passenger- carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in connection with general pa rk work, not exceeding $3,200 for maintenance of that part of the Wawona Road in the Sierra National Forest between the park bound ary two miles north of Wawona and the park boundary near the Mariposa Grove of Big Trees, and not exceeding $2,000 for maintenance of the road in the Stanislaus National Forest connecting the Tioga Road with the Hetch Hetchy Road near Mather Station, and including not exceeding $10,000 for fire prevention and including necessary expenses of a comprehensive study of the problems relating to the use and enjoyment of the Yosemite National Park and the preservation of its natural features, $325 ,000 ; for cons truc tion of phys ical imp rove ment s, $ 87,3 60, of which not to exceed $4,000 shall be available for a ranger station and barn at Glacier Point, $14,100 for three employees' cottages, and not to exceed $4,000 for payment of balance of purchase price of electric transmission line constructed in the park in 1925 by the San Joaquin Light and Power Corporation under contract with the
 * in all.
 * for construction

�


text: Aspinwall v. County of Daviess

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Aspinwall v. County of Daviess


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1650

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CFr. 705. 1929. 1599 Department of the Interior, dated May 21, 1924, and payments here- tofore made to said corporation toward purchase of said electric transmission line under the contract hereinbefore referred to by sup- plyi ng su rplus elec tric ener gy pr oduc ed by the Gove rnmen t hyd ro- electric plant are hereby authorized and confirmed ; in all, $412,360 : Provided, That the unexpended balance of the appropriation of Campground faeili- $65 000 for t he con struct ion of water suppl y and c amp gr ound f acili- ties at Glacier Point. h Balance available. ties at Glacier Point contained in the Interior Department Appro- Ante, p.236. priation Act for the fiscal year 1929 shall remain available until June 30, 1930. Zion, Utah . Zion National Park, Utah : For administration, protection, and maintenance, including not exceeding $2,000 for the purchase, main- tenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven passenger-carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in connec- tion with gene ral p ark work, $28, 500 ; f or con struct ion of physi cal impr oveme nts, $9,80 0, i nclud ing n ot e xceed ing $6,500 for the con- struction of buildings, of which $5,000 shall be available for an employee's cottage ; in all, $38,300. Na ti on al m on um en ts : Fo r admi nistra tion, protec tion, mainte nance, mgist ion al moms « preservation, and improvement of the national monuments, including Administration,etc. not exceeding $550 for the maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-driven passenger-carrying vehicles for the use of the cus- todians and employees in connection with general monument work, and including $5,000 for the construction of two employees' quarters at Petrified Forest National Monument, $1,000 for an addition to employees' quarters at Montezuma Castle National Monument, and $2,500 for an employee's residence at Tumacacori National Monu- ment, and $2,500 for an employee's residence at Chaco Canyon National Monument, $46,000. Carlsbad Cave National Monument, New Mexico : For adminis- MO:rlsbaa cane rv. tration, protection, maintenance, development and preservation, incl udin g not exce edin g $80 0 for the main tenan ce, o pera tion, and repair of motor-driven passenger-carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent and employees in connection with general monu- ment work, $59,500 ; for construction of physical improvements, $40 .500 including not exceeding $1,500 for an addition to the office building, $4,000 for a power house, $12,000 for additional water supply and water storage, $12,000 for a sewage disposal plant, and $500 for a garage to be constructed in Carlsbad, New Mexico ; in all, Pr oriso. $100,000 : Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized Acceptance of site for to accept that certain parcel of land in the town of Carlsbad, New 'ntendent's resi- dence. which has been tendered to the United States of America in fee simple, as a donation, for the site of superintendent's residence, and the appropriation of $5 000 for the construction of a su p eri n- 236. . ~ Ante, p . 236 tendent's residence, contained in the Interior Department Appropri- atio n Act for th e fisc al yea r 1929 shall remain avail able u ntil J une 30, 1930. To enable the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the provisions moth Cave, nd Great of the Act entitled "An Act for the securing of lands in the southern smoky Mountain Appalachian Mountains and in the Mammoth Cave regions of Ken- PEstablishmentoft tucky for perpetual preservation as national parks," approved Feb- 44°pp, sib, 63958 ruary 21, 1925 (43 Stat ., pp . 958-959), the Act entitled "An Act to U. S. Code, p. 1936. provide for the establishment of the Shenandoah National Park in the Stat e of Virg inia and the G reat Smok y Mou ntain Nati onal Park in the States of North Carolina and Tennessee, and for other pur- poses," approved May 22, 19 26 (U. S. C., p. 1936, sec. 403), and the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the establishment of the Mam- moth Cave National Park in the State of Kentucky, and for other purposes," approved May 25, 1926 (U . S . C ., p. 1936, see, 404), includ-
 * Vol.

�


text: Talk:Aspinwall v. County of Daviess

title: Talk:Aspinwall v. County of Daviess


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1651

 1600 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. Srss. II. Cff. 705 . 1929 . ing personal services in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, traveling expenses of members and employees of the commission, printing and binding, and other necessary incidental expenses, $3,000, and the unexpended balance of appropriations for the above- mentioned purposes for the fiscal year 1929 shall continue available during the fiscal year 1930. For reconstruction, replacement, and repair of roads, trails, bridges, buildings, and other physical improvements in national parks or national monuments that are damaged or destroyed by flood, fire, storm, or other unavoidable causes during the fiscal year 1930, and for fighting forest fires in national parks or other areas adm inistered by the National Park Service, or fires that endanger such areas, and for replacing buildings or other physical improve- ments that hav e been destro yed by forest fires within such areas, $20,000, together with not to exceed $60,000 to be transferred upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior from the various appropriations for national parks and national monuments herein contained, any such diversions of appropriations to be reported to Congress in the annual Budget : Provided, That these funds shall not be used for any precautionary fire protection or patrol work prior to actual occurrence of the fire : Provided further, That the allotment of these funds to the various national parks or areas admin- ist ered by the N ational Park Service as may be required for fire- fighting purposes shall be made by the Secretary of the Interior, and then only after the obligation for the expenditure has been incurred. The total of the foregoing amounts shall be immediately available in one fund for the National Park Service : Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior shall not authorize for expenditure prior to July 1, 1929, any of the amounts herein appropriated except those for construction of -physical improvements, for tree-disease and insect-contr ol work in Cr ater Lake, Mes a Verde, and Lafayette National Parks, and for administration, protection, and mainte- nance of Bryce Canyon National Park : Provided further, That in the settlement of the accounts of the National Park Service the amount herein made available for each national park and other main headings shall not be exceeded, except that 10 per centum of the for egoing amount s shall be av ailable interc hangeably for expendi- tures in the various national parks named, and in the national monu- ments, but not more than 10 per centum shall be added to the amount appropriated for any one of said parks or monuments or for any particular item within a park or monument : Provided further, That any interchange of appropriations hereunder shall be reported to Congress in the annual Budget. For the a cquisi tion o f pri vately owned land s and/ or sta nding timber within the boundaries of existing national parks and national monume nts by purch ase o r by c ondemn ation under the p rovisi ons of the Act of August 1, 1888 (U. S. C., p. 1302, sec. 257), whenever in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior acquisition by con- demnation proceedings is necessary or advantageous to the Govern- ment, such condemnation proceedings not to be resorted to for acqui- sition of lands in Acadia, Glacier, Grand Canyon, Great Smoky, Hot Springs, Platt or Yellowstone National Parks not leased to others but occupied by the owner and used exclusively for residence amountt from a or religious purposes by such owner, $250,000, to be expended only na- tions. when matched by equal amounts by donation from other sources for Provisos. Additional land au- the same purpose, to be available until expended : Provided, That in with ed ou tsi de whenm funcs. atched addition to the amount herein appropriated the Secretary of the Interior may i ncur obligati ons and enter into contract s for addi- tional acquisition of privately owned lands and/or standing timber in the existing national parks and national monuments not exceeding Balance available. Ante, p. 236. Roads, trails, etc. Repairing damag es by una voida ble cause s. Fi ghtin g fo rest fires. Diversions authoriz- ed. Provisos. Limit on use. Al lotm ent o nly for incur red obligatio ns. Am ount s imm edia te- ly available. Provisos Limitat ion on expen- di ture prio r to July 1, 1929 . Interchangeable ap- pr opria tion s lim ited. Report to Congress. Acquisition of pri- vately owned lands, etc ., within parks and monuments. Vol.25,p . 357. U.S . Code, p. 1302.

�


text:
Aspinwall v. County of Daviess/Opinion of the Court

THIS case came up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof.

The nature of the case and the certificate of division in opinion are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Vinton and Mr. Benjamin for the plaintiffs, upon which side there was also a brief filed by Mr. Judah, and by Mr. Porter, upon a brief filed by himself and Mr. McDonald, for the defendants.

The points for the plaintiffs were very much illustrated by Mr. Vinton and Mr. Benjamin, in their arguments. Essentially, however, they are stated in the brief of Mr. Judah, from which the following statement of them is taken:

The first question on which the judges differed relates to the nature of the right granted by the act of incorporation, and by the amendment to that act to the railroad company, to receive county subscriptions. In other words, was it a vested right, beyond the reach of a law or Constitution made afterwards?

There is no provision in the new Constitution of Indiana as to existing rights, either personal or corporate, except the ordinary declarations, 'No man's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation.'

Art. 1, sec. 21.

And 'no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.'

Art. 1, sec. 24.

We assume that the property of private corporations is protected by section 21.

By the act of incorporation, a capital of five millions is contemplated; but the company is allowed to organize on the subscription of two hundred thousand dollars, and a payment at the time of subscription is required. By the 12th section, counties are authorized to subscribe for stock, as, by the 6th section, all persons of lawful age and all corporations of the United States may subscribe. Does the power exist anywhere to restrain these rights, against the will of the company? If the company may be deprived of one of these classes of subscribers, it may be deprived of all; and thus its entire capacity may be destroyed, and itself in effect annihilated.

But it is argued that counties are municipal corporations; that municipal corporations are under the control of State legislation; and that those who contract with them contract subject to this control. And we answer, it is true that municipal corporations are subject to the control of the Legislature. That is the general rule. Is there not, in the nature of things, an exception? If the Legislature creates a municipal corporation, and endows it with other powers-with powers 'to contract and be contracted with;' with powers of a private and not of a political nature; with powers including the rights and duties and obligations of private corporations and individuals-does it not creat an exception as to such rights, duties, and obligations? In such case, the Legislature may control, may dissolve the corporation, but the rights, the duties, and obligations, will remain chargeable on its property. And we refer to the opinions of this court in at least two cases.

Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Peters, 280.

Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How., 310.

The second question on which the judges differed covers more ground than the first question.

The declaration states and the demurrer admits an election and vote in favor of subscription in March, 1849, before the new Constitution. The question is, whether, by virtue of the act of incorporation and the amendment, and the election, the railroad company acquired such right to the subscription as would be protected by the Constitution of the United States.

We submit that this question only differs from the first question in being, if anything, stronger than the first in favor of the plaintiffs. In the first, a mere right, dependent on a certain discretion, is claimed. In this a right is claimed, so perfected that nothing remained but the discharge of a ministerial duty.

The law is plain: 'And if a majority of the votes given shall be in favor of subscription, the county board of said county shall subscribe.'

Sec. 2, act Jan. 15, 1849.

There is no discretion. There is only a duty; and this, by the law of Indiana, may be enforced by mandamus. Writs of mandate issue 'to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.'

Section 739.

And 'obedience to such writs may be enforced by attachment, and fine or imprisonment, or both.'

Sec. 745, 2 Rev. Stat., 197, 198.

Hence, when the new Constitution took effect, there was an absolute vested right in the company to $30,000 subscription from the county of Daviess, to be paid in bonds of a certain description; and we submit, that this right is a matter of contract, secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How., 301.

Slack et al. v. Lex. and Maysville Railroad Co., 13 B. Munroe, 1.

And so in 12 Ben. Munroe, 150.

The counsel for the defendants, after stating the case, made the following points:

By the statutes of Indiana, county commissioners are bodies 'corporate and politic.'

1 R. S. of 1852, p. 225.

The declaration charges them as 'a corporation created by the State of Indiana.' Touching the matter in controvercy, the first act which they performed-that of subscribing the stock-they performed as a corporation, on the 10th September, 1852. And the question is, did the Constitution of 1850 prohibit that act? We say it did. And in support of this view, we suggest the following considerations:

1. The constitutional prohibition is that 'no county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription.' The spirit and intent of this clause seem very plain. Certainly the design was to prohibit counties from involving their people in debt for corporation stocks. And it is equally certain that any subscription by which such a debt is created is within the prohibition. Nor is it less clear that the prohibition applies to all such debts, whether created directly or indirectly for such stocks. The mischief intended to be guarded against was the burdening of the people with taxes to pay debts contracted for corporation stocks. And the power to impose that burden in any manner is the thing prohibited.

2. Was the stock 'paid for at the time of the subscription?'

The existence of this suit is an answer to the question.

The phrase, 'paid for at the time,' in the Constitution, certainly means more than the making of a promise or obligation to pay. The writer of the declaration in question no doubt intended, in drawing it, to escape the prohibition in the Constitution by averring that 'in payment for the said stock' the bonds were executed. But this is a mere evasion. The making of the coupon bonds could not be a payment within the meaning of the Constitution; at most, it was only an engagement to pay. If the Constitution tolerates such a mode of payment as that, its provision is utterly idle. For then every county may run in debt as much as it pleases for corporation stock by the mere trick of saying the stock was 'paid for at the time' by making bonds. It is obvious that, upon such a construction, the very evil intended to be guarded against-burdening the county with debt would still exist in full vigor; and that not only the chief object, but the sole object of the prohibition would be thwarted.

Payment is a technical term, and in strictness implies the discharge of a debt by the delivery of money. Thus, in pleading, if the defence is that we have done what we engaged to do, we allege, in cases of engagements to do something besides paying money, performance, and in cases of money debts, we plead payment. Every lawyer knows the distinction between the pleas of performance and payment. The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that a plea of payment in anything else than money is a bad plea.

Sinard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf., 353.

The two words debt and payment always refer to money. Thus we say we pay a debt, and we perform a contract for the delivery of property, or to do work.

The constitutional provision in question requires that the stock subscribed 'be paid for at the time of such subscription.' Payment must be simultaneous with subscription. In this case, we contend that payment has not yet been made; but if even in this we were wrong, still it does not appear that the payment alleged in the declaration was made 'at the time' of the subscription. The averment is, that 'afterwards, to wit: on the day and year aforesaid, in payment for said stock,' the bonds were issued.

The 'subscription' mentioned in the declaration must, in terms, have been a money subscription, an engagement to pay money for stock. The declaration says, that 'in conformity with the said acts, the defendants subscribed for 600 shares,' &c., 'of the value of $30,000.' The subscription, then, was 'in conformity with the acts.' These acts give the form of the subscription. It is found in the fifth section of the charter of 1848, thus:

'We, whose names are subscribed hereto, do promise to pay to the president and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company the sum of fifty dollars for every share of stock set opposite to our names, respectively, in such manner, proportions, and times, as shall be determined by said company in pursuance of the charter thereof.'

This is the only form of subscription given in the two acts. Section 5 of the charter requires this form to be pursued. Both by the declaration and the charter, it must be supposed to have been pursued in the subscription under consideration. It was undoubtedly an engagement to pay money 'in such manner, proportions, and times,' as the company should afterwards determine.

Now, as the engagement was to pay in money, the delivery of something else-bonds, for example-could not in any event amount to payment, unless accepted by the company as payment. It would indeed then be an accord and satisfaction, and not a payment. But even supposing that it might be regarded as payment, it certainly could not be so considered unless it was received as such by the company. This is the doctrine of Maze v. Miller, 1 Wash. C. C. R., 328.

Now, the declaration has no averment that the company ever received these bonds either as payment or in accord and satisfaction. It therefore does not appear that payment for the stock was made 'at the time' of the subscription.

The Supreme Court of Indiana has given a construction to the prohibitory clause in the Indiana Constitution. They say, 'This section, by implication, concedes the power to counties to take stock, at all events by permission of the Legislature, in companies chartered to construct works of internal improvements, under the new Constitution, by making cash payment at the time.'

The City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. R., 78.

Cash payment is the meaning of the section.

Even if the stock was paid for at the time, still the transaction was clearly in violation of that part of the Indiana Constitution which declares that no county shall 'loan its credit to any incorporated company.'

Undoubtedly the issuance of the bonds in question was lending the credit of the county to this railroad company. This was the prime object of the transaction. The bonds were drawn in the usual form to be put into the market. They were put into the market, or the plaintiffs would never have got them; and putting them in market was using the credit of the county which it had loaned to the company.

3. It is said by the plaintiffs that the vote to take stock, given by the people of Daviess county before the Constitution of 1850 took effect, amounts to a contract, the obligation of which is protected by the Federal Constitution against the prohibition in the Constitution of Indiana.

It is understood that the plaintiffs claim, first, that the vote amounted to a 'contract' within the 10th section of the 1st article of the Federal Constitution; and, secondly, that the prohibition in the Indiana Constitution is in violation of the company's charter, which permits 'the county commissioners of any county through which the railroad passes' to subscribe stock. Let us examine each of these points:

1. Did the vote of the people amount to a 'contract,' which the Federal Constitution protects? We say, no; for that vote was not a contract at all. 'A contract is an agreement upon a sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing.' 'An agreement' is the binding assent of both parties. This aggregatio mentium is indispensable to every contract. In this sense, the people of the county could not by vote enter into an 'agreement;' for they are not a body politic, and they cannot be sued. It is the board of commissioners that can agree, not the voters. This contract is not alleged to have been made with the voters, but with the commissioners. Not the voters, but the commissioners, are sued. If the vote amounted to a contract, it was the contract of the voters; and it will be time enough, when these voters are sued, to inquire whether they contracted. It is, for the present, enough to know that the present defendants, the board of commissioners, never contracted till after the Constitution of 1850 took effect.

And if the voters had power to make a contract by a vote to take stock, still their vote could not amount to a contract till the company also agreed. To a contract there must, of course, be the assent of both parties. Now, it does not appear by the record that the railroad company ever assented to this supposed contract till the time of the subscription, which, as we have seen, was long after the constitutional prohibition took effect. As, then, there was no assent by both parties till after the first day of November, 1851, there could have been no contract till after that day. And as the making of the contract after that day was prohibited by the Indiana Constitution, there could not have been, in the case, any contract protected by the Federal Constitution.

The case of the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad v. Nebit, 10 Howard, 395, is fully in our favor on this point. There the charter provided that the company might take land for the use of the road, upon having the damages to the owner assessed by a jury, and upon tender of such damages to the owner. Damages had been so assessed, and afterwards, and before a tender, the Legislature, by law, set aside the assessment. The question was, did this violate a contract? And it was held that it did not, because, there having been no tender, no acceptance by the corporation, there was no contract. And the reasoning of Mr. Justice Daniel, on p. 399, supra, applies with full force to the present case.

Whether there was a subsisting contract at any time before November 1, 1851, may be tested by inquiring whether it could before that time have been enforced against the company. Suppose that before that date, and after the voting, the county commissioners had insisted on their right to subscribe pursuant to the vote, and the company had refused to take the subscription, it is perfectly clear the company would not have been liable for such refusal. The obvious answer to any action for so refusing would have been, that the company had never assented to the proposition presented by the voters to take stock.

2. Is the prohibition in the Indiana Constitution in violation of the company's charter, which provided that county subscriptions of stock might be taken? In other words, since a charter is in some respects and in some sense a contract, is the provision in the charter of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, allowing counties to subscribe for stock therein, such a contract as is contemplated by the Federal Constitution?

All the provisions of the charter and its amendments touching county subscriptions are above copied into this brief. These provisions gave no vested right of property to the company; they merely bestow on counties the power to subscribe for stock-a power which, by the general laws of Indiana, did not before exist. They merely operate as enabling acts-as acts removing disabilities.

Touching the constitutional prohibition against the passage of laws 'impairing the obligation of contracts,' Mr. Story says: 'That the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government, is admitted; and it has never been so construed.'

Story on the Constitution, sec. 1392.

Undoubtedly, the Indiana Legislature might at any time repeal all laws incorporating counties and county boards, and thus disable them from subscribing for any stock or making any contract. Nor is it to be for a moment tolerated that the Legislature of Indiana, by granting a charter to a railroad company, could have intended to abandon any portion of its legislative power over the counties of the State.

As every charter stands, all natural persons not laboring under disabilities may take stock. But who ever thought that the Legislature may not, after the grant of the charter, by law impose disabilities on some of these natural persons? Suppose that at the time of the passage of a charter, married women were by law capable of contracting by subscribing for stock, can it be said that the Legislature cannot afterwards by law impose on them the usual disability of femes covert? So, we think it clear that the Constitution of Indiana might impose on the counties the disability in question.

In the case of the Richmond, &c., Railroad Company v. the Louisa Railroad Company, 13 Howard, 71, where the Legislature of Virginia, in a charter, gave a pledge not to allow any other railroad to be constructed near the one chartered, and afterwards another railroad was chartered contrary to that pledge, it was held that the first charter was not violated within the meaning of the United States Constitution touching the obligation of contracts. That was certainly a much stronger case than the one now under discussion; and as long as it stands for law, surely the defendant in this case is safe.

The case of Covington and Lexington Railroad Company v. Kenton County Court, 12 B. Munroe, 144, is in point on this question. There the charter of the company had authorized the county court, under a certain vote of the people, to subscribe stock. The people had voted for it, but the County Court refused to subscribe, and in the mean time the Legislature repealed the provision of the charter authorizing county subscriptions. This repeal was held no violation of a contract, because, 'until an actual subscription of the stock was made, no right to it vested in the company.'

Upon the whole, we submit that it is perfectly clear that the question propounded in this case, for the decision of the court, ought to be decided in the affirmative.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The case comes up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.

The suit was brought by the plaintiffs against the board of commissioners of the county of Daviess, to recover two instalments of interest accruing upon certain bonds issued by the board for stock subscribed to the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company; and on the hearing the following questions arose, upon which the judges of the court divided in opinion:

1. Whether, by the said act of incorporation of the said railroad company, and the amendment thereto of January 15, 1849, any such right to county subscriptions vested in said company as would exclude the operation of the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect on the 1st day of November, 1851.

2. Whether, by virtue of the said acts, and of the said election in the declaration set forth, the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company acquired any such right to the subscription of the defendants as would be protected by the Constitution of the United States against the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect on the 1st day of November, 1851.

The charter of the railroad company, passed February 14, 1848, provides that it should be lawful for the county commissioners through which the road passed to subscribe for stock on behalf of the county, at any time within five years after the opening of the books of subscription, if a majority of the qualified voters of said county, at an annual election, shall vote for the same.

The amended act of January 15, 1849, made the holding of the election in the county peremptory on the first Monday of March (then) next, to determine the question of subscription or not to the stock.

The election was held in pursuance of this law, and a majority of the votes of the county cast in favor of the subscription. This was on the first Monday of March, 1849; and on the 10th September, 1852, the board of commissioners in pursuance of the acts and of election aforesaid, subscribed for six hundred shares of the stock of the railroad company, of the value of $50 per share, in the whole amounting to $30,000, and in payment of said stock issued thirty bonds, of $1,000 each, duly signed and sealed by the president of the board of commissioners, and attested by the auditor of the county, and delivered the same to the president and directors of the railroad company. By the terms of the obligations, they were made payable at the North River Bank in the city of New York, twenty-five years from date, to the railroad company or bearer, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable annually on the 1st March, at the bank aforesaid, upon the presentation and delivery of the proper coupons attached, signed by the auditor of the said county. The plaintiffs are the holders and owners of sixty of these coupons The new Constitution of the State of Indiana contains the following provision:

'No county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription; nor shall any county loan its credit to any incorporated company, nor borrow money for the purpose of taking stock in any such company.' Sec. 6, art. 10, Constitution of Indiana.

This Constitution took effect on the 1st November, 1851. The subscription was not made nor bonds issued by the board of commissioners of the county, as we have seen, until the 10th September, 1852. The question therefore arises, whether the subscription and bonds, thus made and issued after the Constitution went into effect, were not forbidden by the 6th section of the 10th article above cited, and therefore null and void.

The precise question first presented by the court below, upon which the judges divided, is as follows:

Whether, by the said act of incorporation of said railroad company, and the amendment thereto of January 15, 1849, any such right to county subscriptions vested in said company as would exclude the operation of the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect on the 1st November, 1851.

The question admits, at least by implication, that this sixth section of the Constitution applies to the acts of the board of commissioners, in making the subscription and issuing the bonds; but presents the question, whether, at the time it went into effect, there was not such a right to the subscription and bonds vested in the railroad company as could be upheld, notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition?

This view is sought to be sustained by force of the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no State shall pass any law 'impairing the obligation of contracts.'

The argument is, that the provisions in the railroad charter and amendment, conferring power upon the board of commissioners of the county, and making it their duty to subscribe for stock, and issue bonds therefor, if a majority of the qualified voters of the county should determine at an election in favor of the same, import a contract with the railroad company on behalf of the State, which is protected by the clause referred to in the Constitution of the United States; and hence the State constitutional prohibition is inoperative to annul the subscription or the bonds. That this right to the subscription and bonds, resting upon a contract in the charter, is unaffected by any subsequent statute or organic law of the State.

Without stopping to inquire whether or not the power conferred upon the board of commissioners in the charter and amendments of the railroad company, in the form and with the conditions therein mentioned, constitutes a contract, the court is of opinion that, in view of the body upon which the power is conferred, and of the nature of the power itself, no such contract existed, if any, as is contemplated by this clause of the Federal Constitution. The power or authority contained in the charter, and out of which the right in question is claimed to arise, is conferred upon the county, a public corporation or civil institution of government, and upon public officers employed in administering its laws; and the power or authority itself concerns this body in its public political capacity.

Chief Justice Marshall observed, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (4 Wh., 627,) that the word contract, in its broadest sense, would comprehend the political relations between the Government and its citizens; would extend to offices held within a State for State purposes, and to many of those laws concerning civil institutions, which must change with circumstances and be modified by ordinary legislation, which deeply concern the public, and which, to preserve good government, the public judgment must control. But, he observes, the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed, (p. 629.) And Mr. Justice Washington observed, in the same case, (p. 663,) in respect to public corporations, which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c., the Legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify, enlarge, or restrain them; securing, however, the property for the use of those for whom, and at whose expense, it was purchased. (See also pages 693, 694.)

It would be difficult to mention a subject of legislation of more public concern, or in a greater degree affecting the good government of the county, than that involved in the present inquiry. The power conferred upon the board of commissioners by the provisions in the charter, among other things, embraced the power of taxation, this being the ultimate resort of paying both the principal and interest of the debt to be incurred in the subscription and issuing of the bonds.

The second question presented, upon which the judges differed, is as follows:

Whether, by virtue of said acts, and of the said election in the declaration set forth, the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company acquired any such right to the subscription of the defendants as would be protected by the Constitution of the United States against the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect the 1st November, 1851.

The acts of 1848 and 1849, already referred to, made it the duty of the board of commissioners to subscribe for the stock, if a majority of the qualified voters at an election determined in favor of the subscription.

The election took place on the first Monday of March, 1849, when a majority of the votes was cast for the subscription. The Constitution of Indiana took effect 1st November, 1851. But the subscription was not made till the 10th September, 1852, and the bonds were issued after this date. It is insisted that the contract of subscription became complete when, at the election, a majority of the votes was cast in its favor, and did not require the form of a subscription on the books for the stock of the railroad company to make it obligatory upon the parties; and which, if true, it is agreed the contract would be protected within the Constitution of the United States, as it would then have been complete before the constitutional prohibition of Indiana. But the court is unable to concur in this view. It holds, that a subscription was necessary to create a contract binding upon the county, on one side, to take the stock and pay in the bonds; and upon the other, to transfer the stock, and receive the bonds for the same. Until the subscription is made, the contract is unexecuted, and obligatory upon neither party.

We have arrived at the conclusion that both of the questions presented to us by the court below must be answered in the negative with some reluctance, as, for aught that appears in the case, the subscription to the stock by the board of commissioners was made and the bonds issued in good faith to the railroad company, and also sold by it, and purchased by the plaintiff in confidence of their validity; but, after the best consideration the court has been able to give the case, it has been compelled to hold, for the reasons above stated, that the subscription was made, and the bonds issued, in violation of the Constitution of Indiana, and therefore without authority, and void.

We have not been able to find that the courts of Indiana have passed upon this clause of their Constitution, and have, therefore, been obliged to expound it with the best lights before us. We should have felt very much relieved, if a construction had been given to it by the judicial authorities of the State, and have readily followed it.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana, and on the points or questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court:

1. That by the act of incorporation of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company of the 14th February, 1848, and the amendment thereto of January 15th, 1849, no such right to county subscriptions vested in said company as excluded the operation of the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect on the 1st day of November, 1851.

2. That by the virtue of the said acts, and of the said election in the declaration set forth, the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company acquired no such right to the subscription of the defendants as would be protected by the Constitution of the United States against the new Constitution of Indiana, which took effect on the 1st day of November, 1851. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.


text: Talk:Aspinwall v. County of Daviess/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1652

 SEVENTIETH C ONGRESS. SESS. II. CH. 705. 1929. a total of $2,750,000 as matching funds from outside sources are donated for the same purpose, and his action in so doing shall be con- sidered contractual obligations of the Federal Government : P r ov i d e d further, That the sum herein appropriated and the appropriations herein authorized shall be available to reimburse any future donor of privately owned lands and/or standing timber within the boundaries of any existing national park or national monument to the extent of one-half the actual purchase price thereof : Provided further, That as part consideration for the purchase of lands, the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion and upon such con- ditions as he de ems proper, lease lands purchased to the grantors for periods, however, not to exceed the life of the particular grantor, and the matching of funds under the provisions hereof shall not be governed by any cash value placed upon such leases : Pr ov id ed fu r- ther, That appropriations heretofore and herein made and author- ized for the purchase of privately owned la nds and/or standing timber in the national parks and national monuments shall be avail- able for the payment in full of expenses incident to the purchase of said lands and/or standing timber. j Construction, and so forth, of roads and trails : For the construc- tion, reconstruction, and improvement of roads and trails, inclusive of necessary bridges, in national parks and monuments under the urisdiction of the Department of the Interior, including the roads from Glacier Park Station through the Blackfeet Indian Reserva- tion to various points in the boundary line of the Glacier National Park and the international boundary, and the grand Canyon High- way from the Nat ional Old Trails Highway to the south boundary of the Grand Canyon National Park as authorized by the Act approved June 5, 1924 (43 Stat ., p . 423), and including that part of the Wawona Road in the Sierra National Forest between the Yosemite National Park boundary two miles north of Wawona and the park boundary near the Maripos a Grove of Big Trees, and that part of the Yakima Park Highway between the Mount Ranier National Park boundary and connecting with the Cayuse Pass State Highway, to be imme- diately available and remain available until expended, $5,000,000, which includes $4,000,000, the amount of the contractual authorization contained in the Act making appropriations for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year 1929, approved March 7, 1928 (45 Stat., pp. 237, 238) : Provid ed, That not to exceed $18,000 of the amount herein appropriated may be expended for personal services in the District of Columbia during the fiscal year 1930 : Provided further, That in addition to the amount herein appropriated the Secretary of the Interior may also approve projects, incur obliga- tions, and enter into contracts for additional work not exceeding a total of $2,500, 000, and his action in so doing shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the Federal Government for the payment of the cost thereof and appropriations hereafter made for the con- struction of roads in national parks and monuments shall be con- sidered available for the purpose of discharging the obligation so created. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act approved May 1 8, 1 928 (45 Stat ., p . 603), entitled "An Act authorizing an appropriation to enable the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the provisions of the Act of May 26, 1926 (U . S. C., Supp. I, p. 77, sec. 37), to make additions to the Absaroka and Gallatin National Forests and the Yellowstone National Park, and to improve and extend the winter-feed facilities of the elk, antelope, and other game animals of Yellowstone National Park and adjacent land," $75,000, to be avail- able until expended : Prov ided, That the total expenditures from this appropriation shall not exceed the combined total of the sums 1601 Rei mbu rs eme nt of fut ure donor. Lease of purc hased lands to grantor. Payment of expenses incident to purchase, etc. Roads and trails. Const ructi on, etc ., o f, in parks and monu- ments. Special au tho riz a- tions. Vol. 43, p. 423. Ante, p. 237. Provisos. Services in the Dis- trict. Contr acts for appro v- ed projects deemed Feder al ob liga tions. Absaroka and Galla. tin National Forests. Additions to, for win- ter feed facilities of game animals. Ante, p.603. U.S. Code, Supp.I, p.77. Pro vi so. Expenses not to ex- ceed comb ined tota l of private, etc ., agencies.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1653

 1G02 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cri. 705. 1929 . Vol, 44, p. say. cont ribut ed by priv ate or ot her a genc ies u nder the provi sions of clause (a) of section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1926, and the appraised values of land donated or bequeathed under the provisions of clause (b) of section 1 of said Act. Use forbidden where None of the appropriations for the National Park Service, when- camp-ground privileges are charged . for . ever made, shall be available for expenditure within any park or national monument where in a charge is made or collected by the Park Service for camp-ground privileges. Tra nsporting pe rson- Appropriations herein made for national parks shall be available al sheets of employees, on changing stations. for payment of traveling expenses, including the costs of packing, crating, and transportation (including drayage) of personal effects of e mploy ees u pon p erma nent chang e of stat ion, unde r reg ulati ons to be prescribed by the Secretary of the interior. E ducat ion Bure au. BURE AU OF ED UCATI ON SALA RIE S Co mmissioner, and For the Commissioner of Education and other personal services office personnel. in the Distri ct of Columb ia, $230 ,960. General expenses. GENERAL EXP ENSE S Travel, a ttend ance For necessary traveling expenses of the commissioner and em. at meetings, etc. ployees actin g unde r his direct ion, i ncludin g atte ndance at me etings of educational associations, societies, and other organizations ; for Distributing doc u- Compens ation not to excee d $1,2 00 of employe es in field servic e ; fo r ments. purchase, distribution, and exchange of educational documents, motion-picture films, and lantern slides ; collection, exchange, and catal oguin g of educ ation al ap para tus a nd ap plian ces, arti cles of school furniture and models of school buildings illustrative of fo reign and do mestic syste ms and metho ds of e ducati on, an d repa iring the same ; and other expenses not herein provided for, $11,000. All other expenses. For all expenses, including personal service in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, purchase of supplies, traveling expenses, printing, and all other incidental expenses not included in the Study of land grant foregoing, to enable the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau agricultural colleges, etc. of Education, at a total cost of not to exceed $117,000, to make a vol. 12, p. 50", vol . study of the organization, administration, and work of the land- 26, p. 417; Vol. d .4, p. grant institutions established and endowed by Acts approved July 2, 12 u: S. Code, pp. 111- 1862 (U . S . C ., pp . 111-114, sees . 301-308), August 30, 1890 (U. S. C., 114 . pp. 113-114, sees . 321-328), March 4, 1907 (U. S. C., p. 113, sec. 322), and Acts ame ndat ory the reof or supp leme nta ry t here to, $8,0 00 : Provisos . Provided That the u nexpe nded bala nces of t he ap propr iatio ns f or Balances available . 9 1 these purposes for the fiscal years 1928 and 1929 shall remain avail- Employment of spe- able for the same purposes for the fiscal year 1930 : Provided further, cialists, etc . That specialists and experts for this investigation may be employed at rates to be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior to correspond to those established by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, and without reference to the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1883. Se cond ary s choo ls. Study of organize. For all expenses, including personal services in the District of work, etc., cf. Columbia and elsewhere, purchase and rental of equipment, purchase of supplies, traveling expenses, printing, and all other incidental expenses not included in the foregoing, to enable the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Education, at a total cost of not to exceed $225,000, to make a study of the organization, admin- istration, financing, and work of secondary schools and of their Provisos. articulation with elementary and higher education, $50,000 : Pr o- Emp loym ent tc. nt of spe- cialists, vided That specialists and experts for tem orar service in this s, investigation may be employed at rates to be fixed by the Secretary

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1654

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 705. 1929 . 1603 of the Interio r to co rrespo nd to t hose es tablis hed by the Cla ssific ation Act of 1923, as amended, and without reference to the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1883. WORK IN ALASKA Alaska. Education in Alaska : To enable the Secretary of the Interior, in Education of natives. his discretion and under his direction, to provide for the education and support of the Eskimos, Aleuts, Indi ans, and other natives of Alaska, including necessary traveling expenses of pupils to and from industrial boarding schools in Alaska ; erection, purchase, repair, and rental of school buildings ; textbooks and industrial apparatus ; pay and necessary traveling expenses of superintendents, teachers, physi- Specified allotments. cians, and other employees ; repair, equipment, maintenance, and operat ion of Unite d Sta tes sh ip Box er ; and all othe r necessary miscellaneous expenses which are not included under the above special heads, including $299,400 for salaries in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, $16,000 for traveling expenses, $12 5,00 0 for equip- ment, supplies, fuel, and light, $17,500 for repairs of buildings, $64,0 00 for purchase or erection of buildings, 50,000 for freight, including operation of United States ship Boxer, $4,000 for equip- ment and repairs to United States ship Boxer, $3,000 for rentals, and $1,500 for telephone and telegraph ; total, $580,400, to be immedi- ately available : Provided, That not to exceed 10 per centum of the Provisos. Interchangeable amounts appropriated for the various items in this paragraph shall amounts. be available interchangeably for expenditures on the objects included in this paragraph, but no more than 10 per centum shall be added to any one ite m of appropri ation except in cases of ex traordinary emergency and then only upon the written order of the Secretary of the Interior : Provided further, That of said sum not exceeding Services in the Dis- $8,000 may be expended for personal services in the District of trict. Columbia : Provided further, That all expenditures of money appro- Supervision of ex- priated herein for school purposes in Alaska for schools other than sioner ioner of ores by Education. - t ion those for the education of white children under the jurisdiction of the governor thereof shall be under the supervision and direction of the Commissioner of Education and in conformity with such conditions, rules, and regulations as to conduct and methods of instruction and expenditures of money as may from time to time be recommended by him and ap proved by the Secretary of the Interior. Medical relief in Alaska : To enable the Secretary of the Interior, Medical and sani- in his discretion and under his direction, with the advice and coopera- tary reuef of natives. tion of the Public Health Service, to provide for the medical and sanitary relief of the Eskimos, Aleuts, Indians, and other natives of Ala ska ; erecti on, pur chase, repair, renta l, and equipm ent of hospi- tal buildings ; books and surgical apparatus ; pay and necessary traveling expenses of physicians, nurses, and other employees, and all other ne cessary misce llaneous expe nses which are not included under the above special heads, $171,780, to be available immediately. Reindeer for Alaska : For support of reindeer stations in Alaska Reindeer stations. and instruction of Alaskan natives in the care and management of reindeer, including salaries of necessary employees in Alaska, sub- sistence, clothing, and other necessary personal supplies for appren- tices with Govern ment herds, trave ling e xpens es of employ ees, purchase, erection, and repair of cabins for supervisors, herders, and apprenti ces, equipmen t, and all ot her necessary miscellaneous expenses, $19,800, to be available immediately. The appropriations for education of natives of Alaska, medical Traveling expenses, relie f in Al aska, a and reindeer for Alaska shall be available for the e vo tcf of new ap pointe es wed from appropri- payment of traveling expenses of new appointees from Seattle, Wash- ations. ington, to their posts of duty in Alaska, and of traveling expenses,

�


text:
Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Company (63 U.S. 380)

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.

It was a bill filed on the equity side of the court, by Ogilvie, Angle, & Co., traders in partnership in Iowa, together with twelve other persons, citizens of Missouri, Ohio, and Michigan, against the Knox Insurance Company, and against Levi Sparks and thirty-six other persons, subscribers to the capital stock of the company. Being a creditor's bill, filed by the complainants and such other creditors as might make themselves parties, thirty-two other creditors came in and made themselves parties to the suit. The bill alleged that the complainants had recovered divers judgments against the insurance company, upon which executions had issued, the return to which had been, 'no property;' that the other defendants severally subscribed for stock in the company, and were still indebted for it, payment not having been enforced by the company. The prayer of the bill was, that they might be decreed to pay their subscriptions, and that the judgments might be satisfied from the fund thus produced.

At the September rules, 1852, the bill was taken pro confesso against all the defendants; but afterwards they all (except the company) appeared, demurred, and, upon the demurrer being overruled, answered. The securities, being the subscription notes, were brought into court. Collum's answer was adopted by most of the other defendants, which answer is particularly noticed in the opinion of this court. After sundry other proceedings, not necessary to be mentioned, the court dismissed the bill, and the complainants appealed to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Gillet for the appellants, upon which side there was also a brief filed by Mr. Judah, and submitted on a printed argument by Mr. Crawford for the appellees.

The points made by the counsel for the appellants were, of course, similar in substance. The following were the fourth and fifth points of Mr. Gillet, and the third and fourth of Mr. Judah:

Mr. Gillet:

IV. The subscriptions and obligations of the defendants are not void, or voidable, even if it shall be admitted that the facts set up in their answers are true.

The defendants do not aver that the company authorized the false representations complained of, or that they approved of them after they were made. Nor do they aver that they repudiated the transaction as soon as they learned the true state of things. Nor do they state that they offered to restore things to their original condition. They set up that, on the 25th of June, 1851, more than a year afterwards, they would have nothing more to do with the company, nor would they pay their notes or bills. This was about a year after they knew of the heavy losses. In order to defeat their liability, they must connect the company with the fraud alleged. This they have wholly failed to do, both in their answers and evidence. An unauthorized falsehood, told by their agent, was no act of theirs, and they cannot be held responsible for it.

If Carnan misrepresented the condition and affairs of the company, that was a matter between him and those who subscribed on the strength of the representation. It was he, and not the company, that deceived them. The answers do not set up a legal defence to the defendant's obligations. They do not even aver that they offered to restore things to their original condition. They do not allege that they returned, or offered to return, the stock to be cancelled. Nor do they state that they asked the company to do anything at all. They kept the consideration of their obligations, and at the same time repudiated them, not because the company had deceived them, but because Carnan told them two falsehoods, as they aver. As they have presented their case by their pleadings, the defendants have no defence to their obligations.

'It (a corporation) is not, however, responsible for unauthorized or unlawful acts, even of its officers, though done colore officii. To fix the liability, it must either appear that the officers were expressly authorized to do the act, or that it was done bona fide, in pursuance of a general authority in relation to the subject of it, or that the act was adopted or ratified by the corporation.'

Angel and Ames, pp. 250, 251.

In Thayer v. Boston, (19 Pick., 516, 517,) Chief Justice Shaw used the same language.


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1655

 1604 SEVENTIETH CO NG RE SS. SESS. II. CH. 705 . 1929 . pa cking, c rating, and tran sportati on (incl uding dr ayage) o f person al ef fects of employe es upon permanen t change of stat ion with in Alask a, un der regu lations to be pr escribed by the Secretar y of the Interio r. GOV ER NME NT IN THE TERRITORIES TERR ITO RY OF ALASKA Government in the Territories . Alaska. Governor and scare- tart'. Governor, $7,000 ; secretary, $3,700 ; in all, $10,700. Conti ngent expens es. For incidental and contingent expenses, clerk hire, not to exceed $3,520 ; janitor service for the governor's office and the executive man- s ion, not to ex ceed $2, 940 ; tra veling e xpenses of the g overnor while absent from the capital on official business, and of the secretary of the Territory while traveling on official business under direction of the governor ; rent of executive offices, repair an d pres ervatio n of governor's house and furniture ; for care of grounds and purchase of necessary equipment ; stationery, lights, water, and fuel ; in all, $14,800, to be expended under the direction of the governor. Care of insane. Insane of Alaska : For care and custody of persons legally adjudged insane in Alaska, including transportation, burial, and Provisos . other expenses, 5157,000 : Provided, That authority is granted to the Payment to Sanita- riu m Company. Secretary of the Interior to pay from this appropriation to the Sanitarium Company, of Portland, Oregon, or to other contracting institution or institutions, not to exceed $624 per capita per return, etc ., of per- annum for the care and maintenance of Alaskan insane patients sons not Alaska rest- during the fiscal year 1930 : Provided further, That so much of this dents, su m as may be requ ired sha ll be av ailable for all necessar y expens es in ascertaining the residence of inmates and in returning those who are not legal residents of Alaska to their legal residence or to their friends, and the Secretary of the Interior shall, so soon as practicable, return to their places of residence or to their friends all inmates not residents of Alaska at the time they became insane, and the commit- ment papers for any person hereafter adjudged insane shall include a state ment by the committing authority as to t he legal residence of such person. Suppressing liq uor traffic. in intoxicating liquors : For suppression of the traffic in. intoxicating liquors among the natives of Alaska, to be expended under the direction of the secretary of the Interior, $16,200. Ala ska Railr oad. Mai nten ance , etc The Alaska Railroad : For every expenditure requisite for and ., expenses. incident to th e authorized work of the Alaska Railroad, including maintenance, operation, and improvements of railroads in Alaska ; Operati on of vessels. maintenance and operation of river steamers and other boats on the Yukon R iver and its tributaries in Alaska ; operation and maint e- nance of ocean-going or coastwise vessels by ownership, char ter, or arra ngement with other branches of the Gover nment service, for the purpose of providing additional facilities for the transportation of freight, passengers, or mail, when deemed necessary, for the bene- fit and development of industries and travel affecting territory tribu- tary to the Alaska Railroad ; stores for resale ; payment of claims for losses and damages arising from operations ; payment of amounts Payment for injuries. due connecting lines under traffic agreements ; payment of compensa- u l. Coep.al. tion and expenses as authorized by section 42 of the Injury Com- pensation Act approved September 7, 1916 (U . S . C ., p . 81, sec . 793), ditional. Rai lroa dreoe ipts, ad- to be reimb ursed as therein provide d, $1,20 0,000, i n additi on to al l amo unts rec eived by the Ala ska Rail road dur ing the fiscal y ear 1930 , Provisos. to continue available until expended : Provided, That not to exceed Services in the Dis- trict. 6 .000 of this fund shall be available for personal services in the Printing and bind- District of Columbia during the fiscal year 1930 : Provided further, mg. That not to exceed $8,000 of such fund shall be available for printing and binding : Provided further, That $400,000 of such fund shall be

�


text: Talk:Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Company (63 U.S. 380)


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1656

 SEVENTIETH C ONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 705. 1929. 1605 available only for such capital expenditures as are chargeable to saC pitl account of capital account under accounting regulations prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which amount shall be available immediately. TER RITORY OF HAWAII Haw aii . Governor, $10,000 ; secretary, $5,800 ; in all, $15,800. For contingent expenses, to be expended by the governor, for stationery, postage, and incidentals, $1,000 ; private secretary to the governor, $3,100 ; temporary clerk hire, $500 ; for traveling expenses of the governor while absent from the capital on official business, $500 ; in all, $5,100. SA INT ELI ZABETHS HOSPITA L Governo r, secretary. Conting ent expenses. Sa int Elizabeths Hospital. For support, clothing, and treatment in Saint Elizabeths Hospital maintenance, etc. for the Insane from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, inmates of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, persons charged with or convicted of crimes against the United States who are insane, all persons who have become insane since their entry into the military and naval service of the United States, civilians in the quartermaster service of the Army, persons transferred from the Canal Zone who have been admitted to the hospital and who are indigent, and beneficiaries of the United States Veterans' Bureau, Vehicles, etc. including not exceeding $27,000 for the purchase, exchange, mainte- nance, repair, and operation of motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles for the use of the superintendent, purchasing agent, and general hospital business, and including not to exceed $150,000 for repairs and improvements to buildings and grounds $955,000, includ- ing maintenance and operation of necessary facilities for feeding employees and others (at not less than cost), and the proceeds there- from shall reimburse the appropriation for the institution ; and not exceeding $1,500 of this sum may be expended in the removal of patie nts to th eir frien ds, not e xceeding $1,500 i n the pur chase of such books, periodicals, and newspapers, for which payment may be made in advance, as may be required for the purposes of the hospital and for the medical library, and not exceeding $1,500 for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the apprehension and return to the Provisos. hospital of escaped patients : Provided, That so much of this sum as Ret urni ng p atien ts may be required shall be available for all necessary expenses in not a Federal charge. ascertaining the residence of inmates who are not or who cease to be properly chargeable to Federal maintenance in the institution and in Mo nt hly payments returning them to such places of residence : Provided further, That for District patients. during the fiscal year 1930 the District of Columbia, or any branch of the Government requiring Saint Elizabeths Hospital to care for patients for which they are responsible, shall pay by check to the superintendent, upon his written request, either in advance or at the end of each month, all or part of the estimated or actual cost of such maintenance, as the case may be, and bills rendered by the Superin- tendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital in accordance herewith shall not be subject to audit or certification in advance of payment ; proper adjustments on the basis of the actual cost of the care of patients paid for in advance shall be made monthly or quarterly, as may be agreed upon between the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital and the District of Columbia government, department, or establishments sums paid for pa- tients to be credited to co ncern ed. All sums paid to the Superintendent of Saint Eliza- maintenance accounts. bet hs Hospit al for th e care of patients that he is author ized by l aw to receive shall be deposited to the credit on the books of the Treasury Department of the appropriation made for the care and maintenance of the patients at Saint Elizabeths Hospital for the year in which the support, clothing, and treatment is provided, and be subject to requi-

�


text:
Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Company (63 U.S. 380)/Opinion of the Court

The answers in the present case do not aver what is here required to be proved, to make the corporation liable for any supposed wrong on the part of Carnan.

V. The fact that from May, when the true amount of the Vincennes stock must have been known by the Jeffersonville stockholders, to the middle of August, no complaint was made on that account, is conclusive evidence that the defendants did not consider themselves injured by that fact.

The evidence is explicit and clear, that in April, 1850, Ryan made out a statement, truly showing the condition of the company, and that it had some $25,000 or $26,000 of surplus on hand, and of course showed that there was no $40,000 of Eastern exchange. It also showed the amount of stock, because it was the same statement shown to Savitz and Hughs in August, and Savitz swears that he then noticed that the whole stock of the company amounted to only $97,000. Now, it appears that Carnan took this statement to Jeffersonville in May, 1850, and there showed it. He states that he never showed any other statement to them there; the stockholders then knew that $75,000 had not been subscribed at Vincennes. He swears he told them that he was sorry that they had taken $67,000, because it was a good deal more than had been taken at Vincennes, and he proposed to go and increase the stock at the latter place. But the Jeffersonville subscribers objected, because they wanted the smallest possible amount of stock to spread the anticipated dividend over. They then knew the facts as well as they ever did, and did not object, as they would have done, if they had thought themselves injured by the smallness of the Vincennes subscription. Not even a hint of complaint escaped the Jeffersonville subscribers until the middle of August, and then no formal objection made, nor for a very long time. They would not have been thus silent, if they had been really wronged.

III. But further, admitting the charge of fraud to be proven, and that defendants relied on the representations, the defendants cannot protect themselves by it. It is too late.

When a party has the right to rescind, repudiate, on the ground of fraud, 'he must do so at once, on discovering the fraud.'

2 Parsons Cont., 278.

At the earliest moment after he has knowledge of the fraud.

Masson v. Burt, 1 Denio, 69.

2 Parsons Cont, 278, note S.

Any delay is a waiver, and mere lapse of time may be conclusive.

2 Parsons Cont., 279.

The party must act promptly, and rescind in toto.

Wheaton v. Baker, 14 Bart., 594.

Mann v. Worral, 16 Bart., 221.

But these men had the statement, called paper Z, on 4th May, 1850, and yet, up to the 4th June, increased their subscriptions $10,500, as appears by the dates of the securities, bill, and answers; and these men had the report of their committee, and the statement called W, in August or September, 1850-full knowledge of all the facts. And yet, between the 28th of September and 4th of October, these men, and amongst them Cullom, on his own stock, renewed their securities on 225 shares and $22,500. This whole defence is an afterthought.

IV. If these defendants might set up this fraud against the company, or their co-stockholders, they cannot set it up against the creditors of the company.

Suppose A, by fraud, induces B to become his partner in the firm of A & Co.; that A, in the name of A & Co., purchases goods for the firm on credit, and that, before payment is made, or even due, B discovers the fraud, and immediately rescinds for the sufficient fraud, what will be the effect on the sellers of the goods, creditors of the firm?

In such case, who will suffer? Nay, who should suffer? The rule is, that when one of two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud of a third party, he of the two who afforded the means, or gave the credit, must bear the loss.

Story on Agency, sec. 127, pp. 142, 143, and note 1.

Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 384, 385, 386, 387, 388.

Hiorns v. Holtom, 13 Eng. L. and E., 596.

So long as a man is a partner or a stockholder, however innocently, as relates to third and also innocent parties, he should suffer the consequences.

These men represented two-thirds of the capital; they had their names in the firm as stockholders, directors, officers.

Only some of the arguments of the counsel for the appellees can be given, and those are selected which are replies to the arguments upon the other side.

The plaintiffs have objected, that if Carnan did practice this fraud upon the defendants, it was his own wrong only; the insurance company did not authorize it, nor ought she to be affected by it. It is true she had the alternative to reject or adopt the unauthorized acts of her agent. If she had rejected them, there would have been no contract between her and the defendants. But she chose to adopt them, and therefore she took them tainted as they were.

Chit. Con., 679; 2 Par. Con., 276, and n.(a); 1 Story Eq., Jur., sec. 256.

Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story, 735.

Atwood v. Small, 6 Cl. and Fin., 448.

Mason v. Crosby, 1 Woodb. and M., 342.

Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend., 518.

Swatara R. R. Co. v. Brune, 6 Gill, 41.

Crump v. U.S. Mining Co., 7 Gratt., 352.

But the plaintiffs contend, that if the fraud has been ever so strongly proved, and it has not been waived, and might be a good defence in a suit brought by the insurance company, yet it is no defence against them. They claim to have a peculiar equity.

Yet their complaint alleges that the defendants severally made the subscriptions, notes, and bills, stated in it, and the issue joined; and the very question therefore to be tried is, as to their validity. It follows that the plaintiffs must prove them to be valid and binding on the defendants, or they do not maintain the issue. If the transactions are void on account of the fraud, then there is legally no subscription, note, or bill.

The plaintiffs allege that there are debts due from the defendants respectively to the insurance company, which she has failed to collect, and they pray that the defendants may be decreed to pay, so that the plaintiffs' judgments may thus be satisfied. In effect, they ask to be substituted in the place of the insurance company, and to be permitted to enforce the payment of debts which she has wrongfully neglected to enforce. This is the whole amount of all the right set forth in the complaint, and of the prayer with which it concludes. Then, if there is no valid debt due from any of the defendants to the insurance company, there is no matter alleged in the complaint on which the plaintiffs can recover. By being substituted in place of the insurance company, and allowed to assert her rights, the plaintiffs can acquire no greater rights than she had; and where she had none, they acquire none.

Hyde v. Lynde, 4 Com., 387; In matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 125.

Mech. Bank v. N. York and N. Hav. R. R. Co., 3 Kern, 599.

Roberts v. Alb. and W. Stock. R. R. Co., 25 Barb., 662.

If the insurance company had before sued the defendants severally on their notes and bills, and, upon the trial, judgments had been rendered against her on account of the fraud, we submit that such judgments would be a bar to this action; for these plaintiffs come in as privies only, asking the enforcement of her right which she has neglected to enforce. So, if these defendants had filed their several complaints against the insurance company for relief, on account of the fraud, and the court had decreed their notes and bills were void, and should be given up, evidently such decrees would be a bar to this suit. And it is, as a general proposition, true, that what would be good matter of defence against the insurance company would be good also against the plaintiffs.

We admit two exceptions to this general proposition, and can imagine no others. One is, if the insurance company had fraudulently conveyed and of her property to the defendants, the fraud would be a good defence against her, but not against her creditors, in a suit to recover it. The other is, if the defendants had represented, or in any way really held out to the plaintiffs, that their notes and bills were valid, and a fund on the faith of which the plaintiffs might safely insure, they would be estopped from making this defence. But the defendants have done nothing of that kind. The mere fact that the insurance company had these fraudulent notes and bills in her possession did not authorize the plaintiffs to trust her on the defendants' credit. As well might it be claimed, that a note not negotiable, and void, in the hands of the payee, for his fraud in obtaining it, still gave him such a credit with the world, that his assignee might enforce it as perfectly valid against the defrauded maker.

However, there is no ground whatever for the pretence that the plaintiffs trusted the insurance company on the credit of the defendants' names or paper. There is no evidence tending in any degree to prove the averment of the complaint, that the plaintiffs insured after the defendants gave their notes and bills.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

The complainants in this case are judgment creditors of the Knox Insurance Company. The numerous other defendants are stockholders of the company, and are severally charged as debtors to it, for the unpaid portion of the stock subscribed by them.

The company is insolvent, or at least is unable to pay its creditors, without calling in the capital subscribed and secured, but not actually paid in cash. This it has failed or refused to do. This bill is filed to compel these stockholders or debtors to the corporation to pay the amount of their debts, in order that the creditors of the company may obtain satisfaction.

The bill was taken pro confesso as against the corporation. The other defendants, being corporators, are consequently concluded as to the averments of the bill affecting them as such. As stockholders who have not paid in the whole amount of the stock subscribed and owned by them, they stand in the relation of debtors to the corporation for the several amounts due by each of them. As to them, this bill is in the nature of an attachment, in which they are called on to answer as garnishees of the principal debtor.

Where a number of special partners are incorporated to carry on the business of insurance, the stock subscribed and owned by the several stockholders or partners constitutes the capital or fund publicly pledged to all who deal with them. Insurance companies or corporations, unless they have the privilege of using their capital for banking purposes, seldom require the actual payment of it all in cash. Contracts of insurance or indemnity, though not literally 'gaming contracts,' are nevertheless in the nature of wagers against the happening of a certain event. The calculation of chances is greatly in favor of the insurer. In a large number of policies, it is but reasonable to expect that the amount of premiums will exceed that of the losses. The insured are thun made to pay one another, and with common good fortune afford an overplus to make a dividend for the insurers. Hence the Knox Insurance Company, like others of the same description, did not require their stockholders to pay in cash more than ten per cent. of their several shares. They were allowed to retain the remaining ninety per cent. in their own possession, substituting therefor their bonds, or other securities. Thus every stockholder became a borrower from, and debtor to, be capital stock of the company. If in the course of events the chances were favorable, a dividend of twenty per cent. on capital would give a profit of two hundred on the money actually paid out by them. On the contrary, if they were adverse, the capital represented by securities must necessarily be paid in to satisfy the just debts of the company.

The ninety per cent. retained by the stockholders is as much a part of the capital pledged as the cash actually paid in. When that portion of the capital represented by these securities is required to pay the creditors of the company, the stockholders cannot be allowed to refuse the payment of them, unless they show such an equity as would entitle them to a preference over the creditors, if the capital had been paid in cash.

Let us now examine their defence, and see if they have established such an equity.

They do not deny that they paid the ten per cent., gave their securities for the balance, and have received their certificates for their several shares of stock; but they contend that they are not bound to pay these securities, because the agent of the corporation, who took the subscriptions of stock made certain representations concerning the state of the affairs of the corporation, which were not true; and, as a consequence thereof, they are not bound to pay these securities.

The numerous defendants, with some immaterial variations and qualifications, adopt the answer of their co-defendant, Collum, which we shall give verbatim from the record, to show we have not misstated or mistaken the nature of the defence set up.

'And, by way of defence to said suit, said Collum alleges that just before he gave said note, accepted said first bill, Robert N. Carnan, an agent of said insurance company, came to Jeffersonville to procure persons there to give notes and bills for stock in said insurance company; and in order to induce said Collum to give his said note, and accept said first bill for such stock, said Carnan, as such agent, then and there falsely and fraudulently said and represented to said Collum, and in his hearing, that stock in said insurance company to the amount of seventy-five dollars had then been subscribed for at Vincennes, and on the Wabash river, and all of said amount had then been paid or secured as the charter of said insurance company required. Said Collum did not then know, nor then have the means of knowing, to the contrary of said representations, and he fully believed them to be true, and with that belief he gave his said note, and accepted said two bills for stock in said insurance company; and if he had not fully believed said representations, he would not have given said note nor accepted said bills, or either of them. At the time said representations were so made, and said given and said first bill accepted, there had not been more than twenty-five thousand dollars of stock in said insurance company subscribed for and paid and secured, as said charter required, at Vincennes, on the Wabash river, which said Carnan then well knew. Said Carnan also, at and just before said Collum made his said note and accepted his said first bill, represented to him that said insurance company then had $40,000 of funds on hand, mostly in Eastern exchange, which they could not dispose of at Vincennes, and they wished to get stockholders at Jeffersonville, so as to have an officer of said insurance company there, and they would then send those funds there to be sold and used. Said Collum did not then know, and had no means of knowing, to the contrary of said representation, but he believed it, and it was a strong inducement with him to make his said note and accept his said bills; yet he is now informed and believes said representation was grossly false, and that said insurance company did not at that time have and had not at any time had that sum or anything like that sum of money on hand, and mostly in Eastern exchange, which they could not dispose of at Vincennes.'

Carnan, who was examined as a witness, denies the charges made in this answer, and declares that he was not authorized by the company to make such representations, and did not make them.

To establish their defence, several of the defendants themselves were called as witnesses, alleging that, as their responsibility was several, and not joint, each one may be called as a witness for all the rest. Much of the argument of this case has been expended on the question of the competency of these witnesses to testify in their own case; but we do not think it necessary to decide it, as there are other facts in the case which show clearly that the matter pleaded cannot affect the relative rights of the parties in the case, assuming it to be true.

Those who seek to set aside their solemn written contracts, by proving loose conversations, should be held to make out a very clear case; and when they charge others with fraud, founded on such evidence, their own conduct and acts (which speak louder than words) should be consistent with such a hypothesis. Assuming the fact that Carnan did make the representations charged, what was the conduct of these Jeffersonville stockholders, who now seek to repudiate their contracts on the allegation of fraud? After having a full opportunity to examine for themselves into the affairs of the company, they alleged no fraud, nor expressed any desire to withdraw their subscriptions; on the contrary, when fully informed that the amount of stock subscribed at Vincennes did not equal that taken at Jeffersonville, and when an offer was made to increase the Vincennes subscriptions, so as to equal those at Jeffersonville, the defendants and those who acted with them objected, and insisted that the lower the amount of stock the higher would be the dividend, and consequently it had better not be increased till after the first dividend of twenty-five per cent. had been made.

2. After the defendants had a full opportunity to know the situation of the company, its funds and its property, they organized at Jeffersonville a branch of the corporation, having resident directors at that place. This board met from time to time, through the months of April, May, June, July, and up to 13th August, 1850. While there was a prospect of a dividend if 250 per cent. on the amount of cash paid in, their eyes were shut to the deceit supposed to have been practiced on them. In the month of May, a fire at Owensville, Kentucky, was reported, in which the company lost about $50,000. His seemed to injure the prospect of the large dividend; yet even then it was not so clearly perceived that the defendants were defrauded.

The directors at Jeffersonville, who represented their interests, continued to meet till the middle of August, and till a succession on losses made it apparent that the capital of the company would be nearly all required to pay for the losses incurred. When these facts became patent, the directors at Jeffersonville, at their last meeting in August, 'after taking time to consider what was best to be done,' concluded to consider themselves defrauded, and withdraw their capital from the company.

We need not cite authorities to show that this discovery was made too late, and that a court of equity cannot receive such a pretence as a valid defence against the creditors of this corporation.

II. The objection made to the bill for want of proper parties is equally untenable. The creditors of the corporation are seeking satisfaction out of the assets of the company to which the defendants are debtors. If the debts attached are sufficient to pay their demands, the creditors need look no further. They are not bound to settle up all the affairs of this corporation, and the equities between its various stockholders or partners, corporators or debtors. If A is bound to pay his debt to the corporation, in order to satisfy its creditors, he cannot defend himself by pleading that these complainants might have got their satisfaction out of B quite as well. It is true if it be necessary to a complete satisfaction to the complainants that the corporation be treated as an insolvent, the court may appoint a receiver, with authority to collect and receive all the debts due to the company, and administer all its assets. In this way, all the other stockholders or debtors may be made to contribute.

For these reasons, we are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed, with costs, and that the record be remanded, with instructions to that court to enter a decree for the complainants against the respondents severally, for such amount as it shall appear was due and unpaid by each of them on their shares of the capital stock of the Knox Insurance Company, and to have such other and further proceedings as to justice and right may appertain.


text: Talk:Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Company (63 U.S. 380)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1657

 1606 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Ca. 705. 1929 . sition by the disbursing agent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, upon the Allowance of guar- approval of the Secretary of the Interior : Provided further, That the t ers, subs isten ce, e tc ., of superintendent, etc., practice of allowing quarters, heat, light, household equipment, sub- living at the hospital continued without de- sistence, and laundry service to the superintendent and other du ction from s alary, employees who are required to live at Saint Elizabeths Hospital may etAnte, p. 193 . be continued without deduction from their salary, notwithstanding the Act of March 5, 1928 (45 Stat ., p . 193), pending determination by the Me dica l and sur gical Personnel Classification Board, in accordance with said Act. building. F or co mplet ion of th e med ical and surgi cal b uild ing, $475, 000, including cost of supervision of work and including the removal and reconstruction of the isolation building. Co lumbia tionforteDeaf nstit u- COLUMB IA IN STITU TION FOR THE DEA F Maintenance. For suppo rt of the in stitut ion, i ncludi ng sala ries a nd inc identa l expenses, books and illustrative apparatus, and general repairs and improvements, $120,000. Ho ward University. HOWARD UNIVERSITY Salaries. Salaries : For payment in full or in part of the salaries of the Ante, 9 .1021. officers, professors, teachers, and other regular employees of the univers ity, t he bal ance t o be p aid fr om priv ately contri buted funds, $225,00 0, of which sum no t less than $2,200 shall be use d for normal instructi on ; Eguipment,sup- General expenses : For equipment, supplies, apparatus, furniture, plies' etc' cases and shelving, stationery, ice, repairs to buildings and grounds, and f or ot her n eces sary expen ses, incl uding reim burs ement to t he appropriation for Freedmen's Hospital of actual cost of heat and light furnished, $95,000 ; Chemistry building . For the completion of the construction and equipment of a chem- istry building, $240,000 ; Dormitory for young women. For an a ddit ional amou nt f or th e con stru ction and equip ment of Ante p. 904. an additional dormitory for young women, as provided in the Sec- ond Deficiency Act, fiscal year 1928, to be immediately available, $40,000 ; Total, Howard University, $600,000. Free dmen's Hos pi- tal . FREEDMEN'S HOSPITAL Sa larie s, e tc. For officers and employees and compensation for all other profes- sional and other services that may be required and expressly Conti ngent expens es. approved by the Secretary of the Interior, $175,220 ; for subsistence, fu el and light, clot hing, to inc lude w hite du ck sui ts and white can- vas shoes for the use of internes, and rubber surgical gloves, bedding, forage, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, surgical instruments, el ectric light s, rep airs, replac ement of X-ra y appa ratus, furni ture, motor-propelled ambulance, including not exceeding $300 for the purchase of books, periodicals, and newspapers for which payments may be made in advance ; and not to exceed $1,200 for the special instruction of pupil nurses, and other absolutely necessary expenses, One-half charged to $ 84, 96 0 ; in all, for Fr eedmen 's Hos pital, $260,1 80, of which amoun t the District, on e-half shall be ch argeab le to the Di strict of Col umbia and pa id in like manner as other appropriations of the District of Columbia are paid. Field w ork appro- SEC. 2. Appropriations herein made for field work under the Gen- ron i available for work era l Land Offic e, the Burea u of I ndian Affairs, the Bureau of Re cla- work animals, vehicles, etc « mation, the Geological Survey, and the National Park Service shall be available for the hire, with or without personal services, of work an imals and anim al-dr awn a nd m otor- prope lled vehi cles and e quip - ment. Approved, March 4, 1929.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1658

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cii. 706. 1929 . 1607 CHAP. 706.-An Act Making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies March 4,1929. in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, and prior fiscal [n .R. 15348 .] years, to provide urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending [Pu blic, No. 1034 .] June 30, 1929, and for other purposes. Be it enacted b f the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United States o f Amer ica in C ongress assemble d, That the following 19 9irst Deficiency Act, sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not other- wise appropriated, to supply urgent deficiencies in certain appropria- tions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, and prior fiscal years, to provide urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, and for other purposes, namely LEGISLATIVE SENATE To pay Amanda J. Gooding, widow of Honorable Frank R. Good- ing, late a Senator from the State of Idaho, $10,000. For payment to Ingham G. Mack for services rendered as assistant cler k to the Co mmitt ee on Publi c Lan ds an d Surv eys i nvest igatin g the occupation, leasing of, and contracts for oil and oil lands in the Salt Creek field in Wyoming ; the transactions and activities of the Continental Tra di ng Co mpa ny of Canada and the continued investi- gation of all oil leases as authorized by Senate resolutions of the presen t Congre ss numbe red 101, 202, an d 237, r espectiv ely, and reso- lutions numbered 282 and 294 of the Sixty-ninth Congress, continued during the present Congress, fiscal year 1929, $2,500. For the purc hase and exc hang e of an auto mobi le for the V ice President, fiscal year 1929, $5,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary. For stationery for Senators, committees, and officers of the Senate, fiscal year 1929, $3,500. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Legislati ve. Senate. Frank R . Gooding. Pay to widow. Ingham G. Mack. Services. Automobile for Vice President. Stationery. Rouse of Representa- tives. For to the widow of Thomas S. Butler, late a Re resenta- P But ler. payme nt ~ p P ay y to w wid e widow. tive from th e State of Penns ylvania, $10,000. For payment to the wido w of Louis A. Frothingham, late a Rep- ham. A. Frothing - For from th e State of Massa chusetts, $10,00 0. Pay to widow. For payment to the widow of Henry R. Rathbone, late a Rep re- Pay to y w. Rathbone. widow. sentative from the State of Illinois, $10,000. For payment to the widow of Thomas L. Rubey, late a Repre- Thomas to widow. Rubey . sentative from the State of Missouri, $10,000. The four pre cedi ng a ppro pria tion s sh all be d isbu rsed by the Sergeant at Ar ms of the House. Committee on Ways and Means : Those members of the Committee ways and Means Committee. on Ways and Mea ns of the Ho use of R epre sent ati ves of the S ev- Members elect of entieth Congress who are 71st Congress, author. Members elect to the Seventy-first Con- ized to hold meetings, emp loy expe rts, etc ., gress, or a majority of the m, after March 4, 1929, and until the ct to g ather inf ormat ion meeting of the first session of the Seventy-first Congress are author- for revision of Tariff of 192-, etc. ized, by subcommittee or otherwise, to' hold such hearings and to sit at such times and places within the United States, to employ such expert, clerical, and stenographic services, and to gather such infor- mation, throug h Government agents or oth erwise, as to them may seem fit in the preparation of a bill or bills for the revision of the Printing and other Tariff Act of 1922 and other customs laws ; and they are authorized necessary e xpenses. to have such printing and bindi ng do ne (no twith stand ing an y lim i- tation in existing law as to number of copies of any document) and to incur such othe r expe nses as may be deemed necessary ; all such expenses (except for printing and binding, which shall be charged

�