text: Talk:Gaines v. New Orleans/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Gaines v. De La Croix

As we have mentioned in the preceding case, Daniel Clark died on the 16th day of August, 1813, and his last will not being found, letters testamentary on the will of 1811 were granted to Richard Relf, who remained sole executor until 21st of January, 1814, when Beverly Chew was included in the trust. De la Croix made two purchases of slaves of Relf while thus acting as sole executor. The first purchase was on the 16th of October, 1813, and the last on the 11th of December, 1813.

The will of 1813 being established and received to probate, Mrs. Gaines filed her bill against De la Croix. De la Croix, it will be understood, was the same person so frequently mentioned in the preceding case as Dusuau De la Croix, or the Chevalier De la Croix, one of the persons whom Clark appointed executor of his will of 1813, and tutor to his daughter Myra.

The same counsel who argued the preceding case argued this.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Gaines v. De La Croix


text: Talk:Gaines v. De La Croix

title: Talk:Gaines v. De La Croix


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Gaines v. De La Croix/Opinion of the Court

There are points of difference between this case and that of Gaines v. New Orleans, decided at this term; but, in our opinion, they are not such as to defeat the recovery asked for by the complainant.

It is contended by De la Croix that his titles derived from the purchases from Relf are valid, because he purchased within the year, while the functions of the executors were in full force. This is true if he purchased in good faith, and the requisites of the law on the subject of the sales of succession property were complied with. The examination of these points, in connection with the decision in the New Orleans case, will dispose of this case.

The last sale conveyed no title, because it was a private one, and was forbidden by the law. Executors could only sell at public auction after due advertisement of the property, and the purchaser at a forced sale did not acquire a good title, unless the formalities prescribed by law for the alienation of property were observed. The bill of sale of October 16th, 1813, recites that the property was sold at public auction in conformity to the order of the register of the Court of Probate. This order is not produced, and it seems the recital of it in the act of sale does not prove it.

But Relf, as executor, did petition the Court of Probate, on the day that letters testamentary were issued to him, for leave to sell the movables and immovable property of the succession, and the order was granted for the sale to take place according to law. It may be the effect of a sale under these circumstances would be to confer a good title, if the purchaser bought in good faith; but De la Croix got the property in bad faith, and the vice of his title cannot be cured even if the sale were in all respects regular; nor can the plea of prescription help it. These sales were made shortly after the death of Clark, when everything connected with his last will will was fresh in De la Croix's mind; and he knew the will, under the probate of which he was buying, was not the true will of Daniel Clark. The law imposed on him altogether a different line of conduct from what it would have imposed if he had been ignorant of the existence and contents of the will of 1813. It was his duty as one of the executors under that will, and the u tor of the testator's child-both of which trusts he accepted-to test the question in the courts of Louisiana whether that will could not be proved and established, although it could not be found. If an earnest effort to do so had been made, can we say that the courts of that day would not have reached the same conclusion that the Supreme Court of the State did twelve years ago? Every day's delay increased the difficulty of proving its validity, and yet so full was the proof that the court, as last as 1856, did not hesitate to recognize it. De la Croix doubtless acted on the assumption, that as the will of 1813 could not be found, he had a right to buy under the will which was proved. But he risked everything by so doing; for if it should afterwards be found, or if not found, established by oral proof, as he bought knowing all about it, he would be considered a buyer in bad faith, and his title would fail. As the will of 1813 is in fact now probated, it relates back and affects him as of the time when he purchased with notice of its existence and contents.

It is said he did not know enough about this will to be chargeable with notice. We are sorry to have it to say that there is full proof to the contrary. He knew the will produced was not the will which Clark had shown to him, because the superscription was different, and he was not named in it as one of the executors, and besides Clark had told him of a former will in which Relf & Chew were named as executors. So sure was he that Clark's last will had in some mysterious was disappeared, that only two days after Clark died he requested the Court of Probate to summon the different notaries of New Orleans, to see if a will posterior to the one produced had not been left with one of them, as he had strong reasons to believe such a will was executed, in which he was interested. If he had acted further on his convictions produced by 'these strong reasons,' his memory would have been savied from the obloquy which attaches to it, and his estate from considerable loss.

It is very clear that De la Croix knew of the existence of the will of 1813, and it is equally clear he knew enough of its contents to be affected with notice. The testimony of Boisfontaine removes from the mind all doubt on the subject. He swears to being present at Clark's house a short time before his death, when Clark took a sealed packet, and handed it to De la Croix, and said, 'My last will is finished; it is in this sealed packet with valuable papers. As you consented, I have made you it tutor to my daughter. If any misfortune happen to me, will you do for her all you promised me? Will you take her at once from Davis? I have given her all my estate in my will, an annuity to my mother, and some legacies to friends.' This information gave all the notice required, as it substantially communicated the contents of the will.

It is true De la Croix denied in 1834 that he knew the contents of this will, but this was after controversy had arisen, and when he was interested to sustain the will of 1811. It is a little singular that Clark communicated less freely with De la Croix than with Bellechasse and Pitot; for besides the trust to execute the will committed to them jointly, he reposed especial confidence in De la Croix by intrusting his child to his care; and yet Bellechasse swears Clark read the will to him and Pitot. Bellechasse and Pitot, as Bellechasse says, believed the real will was suppressed, and the provisional will of 1811 fraudulently substituted in its place. De la Croix must have believed the same thing when he asked for process against the notaries; and he admits that he consented to serve as executor. Now is it to be believed that these gentlemen, with the responsibilities cast upon them, which they had voluntarily assumed, and under the circumstances attending the execution and siappearance of the will of a man of the wealth and position of Daniel Clark, should never have met and consulted about it, and talked over the provisions in it? It would require a credulity nt often met with to believe that no such meeting and consultation took place.

That the executors of the last will of Daniel Clark and the guardian of his child did not discharge their duties under the will, and had no realizing sense of their nature and extent, cannot be doubted. Whether the failure to act proceeded from indifference, weakness, or something more censurable, we have no means of determining. Be this as it may, in not doing what duty to their deceased friend and their own honor required them to do, they have entailed hardship and pecuniary loss on others.

Enough has been said in this case to show that De la Croix knew of the making of this will, and also knew substantially what were its contents. If so, in law as well as in morals, he purchased the property in dispute in bad faith, and must account for it to the real owner.

The decree of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana REVERSED, and this clause remanded to that court with instructions to enter a decree for the complainant in conformity with this opinion and the opinion in the case of Gaines v. New Orleans, and to refer the case to a master to take proof, and ascertain the amount due.

GRIER, SWAYNE, and MILLER, JJ., dissented.


text: Talk:Gaines v. De La Croix/Opinion of the Court


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Williamson v. Suydam

ERROR in ejectment to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.

The case was thus:

Mary Clarke, who died in 1802, devised certain land, now town lots in New York City, to the Right Rev. Benjamin Moore, his wife (the daughter of Mrs. Clarke), and a third person, Mrs. Maunsell, in trust, to receive the rents, to pay the same to her grandson, Thomas B. Clarke (a man, apparently, of improvident habits) during life, and upon his death to convey it to his issue, then living, in fee; and leaving none, then to Clement C. Moore, in fee.

In May, 1811, Bishop Moore had become enfeebled in health. His son, on his father's behalf, in that month, addressed a communication to the Diocesan Convention of the State of New York, requesting it to appoint an assistant bishop for that diocese; wherein he stated 'that though the disease with which it had pleased Almighty God to visit him, was somewhat mitigated, yet, that it was impossible, he was assured, that he should ever be able to render or perform the duties of the episcopal functions.' Thereupon the convention appointed an assistant. In July following, the bishop was struck by paralysis, and grew weaker until he died, in February, 1816.

In 1814, the legislature of New York, on the application or Mr. Clarke,-who had at this time two children, a third afterwards born not having as yet come into being,-passed an act, in which reciting that the trustees had agreed by writing to all such acts as the legislature should deem proper to make for the benefit and relief of T. B. Clarke, and did desire that some other persons might be appointed trustees-it was provided, that the Court of Chancery, on his application, might 'appoint one or more trustees to execute and perform the several trusts and duties' specified in the will, in place of the testamentary trustees, who are hereby discharged from the trusts in the said will mentioned: and, further, that the new trustees should, 'as soon as conveniently may be, partition and divide' the land 'into two equal parts, one moiety whereof shall be held by them to the uses and upon the trusts declared in and by the said will, and the remaining moiety shall be subdivided by the said trustees into so many lots as they may think most likely to effect an advantageous sale thereof; and after having completed such subdivision, the said trustees are hereby authorized and required, within a convenient time thereafter, nor to exceed six months, except at the request of the said Clarke, to sell and dispose of the said last subdivided moiety,' the proceeds to be invested, the interest, excepting a certain portion, to be paid to Mr. Clarke, and the principal reservedf or the trusts of the will.

In 1815, on the application of Mr. Clarke, a supplemental act was passed authorizing HIM 'to execute and perform every act in relation to the real estate, with like effect that trustees duly appointed under the said act might have done, and that HE apply the whole of the interest and income of the said property to the maintenance and support of his family and the education of his children;' and further providing that 'no sale of any part of the said estate shall be made by the said Clarke until he shall have procured the assent of the chancellor to such sale, who shall, at the time of giving such assent, also direct the mode in which the proceeds of such sale shall be vested in the said Clarke as trustee; and, further, that it shall be the duty of the said Clarke annually to render an account to the chancellor, or to such person as he may appoint, of the principal of the proceeds of such sale only, the interest to be applied by the said Clarke in such manner as he may think proper for his use and benefit, and for the maintenance and education of his children.'

In July, 1815, an order was made by the chancellor, on the petition of Mr. Clarke, authorizing him to sell and dispose of the eastern moiety of the estate, 'to be divided by the line in the manner for that purpose mentioned in the said petition,' the sales to be made under the direction of a master, and the proceeds to be paid to the master, and applied and invested according to the directions of the order.

In 1816, a third act was passed, authorizing Clarke, 'under the order heretofore granted by the chancellor, or under any subsequent order, either to mortgage or to sell the premises which the chancellor has permitted, or hereafter may permit him to sell, and to apply the money so raised, by mortgage or sale, to the purposes required by the chancellor, under the acts' theretofore passed.

In March, 1817, the chancellor, upon the petition of Mr. Clarke, made an order that Mr. Clarke be authorized to sell the southern moiety of the said estate,. . . instead of the eastern moiety, as permitted and directed by the orders theretofore made, and further authorizing him to mortgage all or any part or parts of the said southern moiety of the said estate, if in his judgment it would be more beneficial to mortgage than to sell the same; and to convey and parts of the southern moiety, in satisfaction of any debts due from him, upon a valuation to be agreed on between him and his respective creditors: provided, that every sale and mortgage and conveyance in satisfaction, that might be made by the said Clarke, should be approved by one of the masters of the court, &c.

In October, 1818, Clarke executed a deed of twenty lots to one McIntyre. The consideration recited in the deed is the indebtedness of the grantor to the grantee 'in a large sum of money,' and $3750 paid.

In this state of things, Clarke having died in 1826, leaving children, Mrs. Williamson and others, these all now brought suit against Suydam to recover two lots in the western moiety of the estate, as first divided, held by him under title from McIntire. The court below held the title of the defendant good The correctness of such view was now the matter here.

To understand the case better, it is necessary to state that these statutes and what was done under them had been the subject, previous to the present case, of consideration in the State courts of New York, as, also, in this court. The present case itself had been here twice before.

Questions under the statutes first arose in the courts of New York, in Sinclair v. Jackson, in which case the court declined to express an opinion, respecting 'the constitutionality of the laws, or the efficacy of the proceedings under them.' The next case was Cochran v. Van Surlay, where the Court of Errors, by a much divided court, held, that the statutes were constitutional, and that the proceedings shown in that case had been take in conformity to the statutes.

After this decision was made, proceedings under these statutes came before the courts of the United States, and on certificate of division were decided by this court in Williamson v. Berry, 3 Williamson v. Ball.

This court then decided various questions, which arose respecting the conformity of the proceedings to the requisitions of the statutes. But the decision in Clarke v. Van Surley, having been so far from unanimous, the majority of this court thought that the questions might be examined anew, and their view was different from that of the majority in the State court. The present case, which, as already mentioned, had been here twice before, was first decided by the Circuit Court, and in conformity to the decisions of this court just mentioned. Coming here again the judgment was reversed, on the ground that subsequently to the cases already referred to in this court, the courts of New York had, in Towle v. Forney, and Clarke v. Davenport, reiterated the decision in Cochran v. Van Surley, and thus by repeated decision had established in a way which, by its unanimity, had fixed what was decided a law of property, which the Federal courts must now enforce, whatever might be their own opinion or decision.

Mr. David Dudley Field, for the plaintiff in error:

Since this court has thus determined, that it will look only to the State courts for the exposition of statutes and documents affecting the title to land, even though it may have previously adjudged that such exposition was erroneous, and however contrary to reason that exposition may be, the plaintiffs must abstain from debating any of the questions so resolved. But two questions remain that have never been passed on by any court, and these we now make:

I. The power to partition the estate into two equal parts was exhausted by the partition into an eastern and western portion.

II. The discharge of the trustees by the legislature of New York was in contravention of that clause of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

These two points Mr. Field argued at length.

No opposing counsel appeared in this case. In one quite like it-Williamson v. Moore-the defendant was represented by Mr. H. E. Davies, who contended—

1. That it was a matter of necessity, in the condition of his health, that Bishop Moore should be discharged, and also that the two female trustees named should be discharged, and that provision by law should be made for the appointment of competent and proper trustees.

2. That both the questions now raised had been in fact decided in the State courts and in the last decision in this court.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Williamson v. Suydam


text: Talk:Williamson v. Suydam

title: Talk:Williamson v. Suydam


text:
Williamson v. Suydam/Opinion of the Court

The action was ejectment to recover the possession of two lots of land, situated in the city of New York, and numbered sixty-four and sixty-five, as delineated on a certain map made by the city surveyor. Exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs to the instructions of the Circuit Court, in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. Judgment was accordingly rendered for the defendant, and the plaintiffs sued out this writ of error.

Detailed statement of the material facts of the case may be found in the reported decisions of this court, when the case was before the court on two former occasions. Accurate report of the material facts involved in the controversy is also given in the case of Williamson v. Berry, which was substantially overruled by the decision of this court, when the case was last before the court prior to the present hearing.

Prior to her death the land in controversy belonged to Mary Clarke, who died in 1802, having devised the same to three persons in trust to receive the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and to pay the same to Thomas B. Clarke during his natural life, and upon his death, in further trust to convey the same to his lawful issue living at his death, in fee; and if he should not leave any lawful issue at the time of his death, then, in the further trust, to convey the premises to Clement C. Moore and his heirs, or to such person in fee as he might by will appoint, in case of his death prior to the devisee of the life estate.

Admitted facts are that Thomas B. Clarke died on the first day of May, 1826, leaving three children-Catharine, Isabella, and Bayard-who, with the husbands of the two daughters, were the original plaintiffs. Two of the trustees died before the devisee of the life estate, and the survivor died on the fourth day of December, 1838. Title and right of the plaintiff to possession are complete, unless the defendant can establish a valid alienation of the property. He deraigned his title from Thomas B. Clarke, alleging that he was authorized by certain private acts of the legislature of the State of New York, and by certain orders of the chancellor of that State, to make the conveyance. Clarke conveyed to Peter McIntire by deed of the twentieth of October. 1818, and McIntire conveyed by deed of the thirtieth of January, 1830, to Elijah Humphreys, and the plaintiff also introduced the deed from Philo T. Ruggles, one of the masters in chancery of the State, of the nineteenth February, 1845, to James H. Suydam, the defendant. By the act of the first of April, 1814, the Court of Chancery was authorized, on the application of Thomas B. Clarke, to constitute and appoint one or more trustees to execute and perform the several trusts and duties specified in the will of Mary Clarke, in the place of the testamentary trustees; and it also provided that the trustees last named 'are hereby discharged from the trusts in the said will mentioned.'

Provision was also therein made that the new trustees should, as soon as conveniently might be, partition and divide the land into two equal parts, one moiety whereof should be held by them to the uses and upon the trusts declared in the will, and the other moiety should be subdivided by the trustees, or the major part of them, into so many lots as they, or the major part of them, might think most likely to effect an advantageous sale thereof. Having completed the subdivision, as required, the provision was that the trustees, or a majority of them, were authorized and required, within a convenient time thereafter, not to exceed six months, except at the request of the petitioner, to sell and dispose of the last subdivided moiety, and that they should invest the proceeds as they, or a majority of them, should deem most for the interest of the parties concerned, paying the interest or income, except a certain portion of it, to the petitioner, and reserving the principal for the trusts of the will.

On the application of said Thomas B. Clarke a supplemental act was passed March 24th, 1815, authorizing and empowering the petitioner to execute and perform every act, matter, and thing in relation to the real estate mentioned in the preceding act, in like manner and with like effect that trustees duly appointed under it might have done, and that he might apply the whole of the interest and income of the property to the maintenance and support of his family, and the education of his children; and further providing that no sale of any part of the real estate should be made by him until he should have procured the assent of the chancellor to such sale, who, at the time of giving such assent, was also required to direct the mode in which the proceeds of such sale, or so much thereof as he should think proper, should be vested in the petitioner as trustee, and that its hould be the duty of the trustee annually to render an account to the chancellor, or to such person as the chancellor might appoint, of the principal of the proceeds of such sale, leaving the interest to be applied by the trustee in such manner as he might think proper, for his use and benefit, and for the maintenance and education of his children.

Pursuant to the authority therein conferred, the chancellor, on the petition of said Thomas B. Clarke, made an order, dated the third day of July, 1815, authorizing him to sell and dispose of the eastern moiety of the estate, 'to be divided by the line, in the manner for that purpose mentioned in the said petition;' the sale to be made under the direction of a master, and the proceeds to be paid to the master, and applied and invested as directed in the order. Subsequently a second supplemental act was passed, approved March 29th, 1816, which authorized the petitioner, under the order heretofore granted by the chancellor, or under any subsequent order, either to mortgage or to sell the premises which the chancellor has permitted, or may hereafter permit him to sell as trustee under the will, and to apply the money so raised by mortgage or sale to the purposes required or to be required by the chancellor, under the legislative acts to which reference is made. Application was accordingly made to the chancellor, May 30th, 1816, for authority to proceed under the second supplemental act, and an order was passed on that day authorizing him to mortgage instead of selling the lands embraced in the preceding order of the court; the moneys thereby procured, and the debts therewith extinguished, to be appropriated and adjusted in the same manner and under the same checks as was provided in the prior order.

Such power, however, proved to be unavailing, as the trustee, on the eighth day of March, 1817, represented to the chancellor that, notwithstanding that authority, he could not effect any sales or raise any money upon mortgage without a sacrifice of property greater than he felt warranted to make; that the pressure of his debts and the necessities of his family required some measures for their relief. The measures of relief suggested were that the estate should be divided by an eastern and western, instead of a northern and southern line, and that power should be granted to him to sell or mortgage the southern, instead of the eastern moiety of the estate, as directed in the prior order. Authority was accordingly given to the trustee by an order made March 15th, 1817, authorizing him to sell and dispose of the southern moiety of the estate, the same being divided by a line running east and west through the centre of Twenty-sixty Street, &c., instead of the eastern moiety of the estate, as permitted and directed by the orders heretofore made in the premises. By virtue of that order he might convey and part of the southern moiety in payment and satisfaction of his debts, upon a valuation agreed on between him and his respective creditors, but it was required that every sale, mortgage, or conveyance he might make for that purpose should be approved by a master of the court, and that a certificate of such approval should be indorsed upon every sale or mortgage that should be made by the trustee. Power was also conferred upon him in the order to receive and take the moneys arising from the premises, and apply the same to the payment of his debts, and to invest the surplus in such manner as he should deem proper to yield an income for the maintenance and support of his family.

Clarke, October 20th, 1818, conveyed twenty lots to Peter McIntire, including the two mentioned in the declaration. Consideration, as recited in the deed, is that the grantor was indebted to the grantee 'in a large sum of money,' and also of three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, lawful money. The proofs show that the defendant was in possession, and the actual occupant of the premises at the commencement of the suit on the thirteenth day of August, 1845, and that the w o lots in question are situated within the southern moiety, and were also within the western moiety as the estate was first divided.

Objections were made by the plaintiff to the three orders of the chancellor when offered in evidence by the defendant, but the court overruled the several objections, and the plaintiff excepted to the rulings. He also objected to the admissibility of the deed of Charles W. McIntire, also to the indorsement thereon of the approval of the master, and also to the admissibility of the several other deeds introduced by the defendant, but the court overruled the several objections, and the plaintiff excepted to the respective rulings, as more fully explained in the record.

Testimony was also introduced by the defendant proving that there was formerly on file in the Court of Chancery certain papers in which were the orders of the chancellor, but that they were lost, and the witness testified that he knew nothing of their genuineness, whereupon the defendant rested, and the court ruled that he was entitled to a verdict, and the verdict and judgment were rendered in his favor, and the plaintiff excepted and sued out this writ of error.

1. Questions touching the validity of the before-mentioned acts of the legislature of the State were first considered judicially in the case of Sinclair v. Jackson, in the court for the correction of errors, but the decision turned upon another point, and the court cautiously avoided expressing any opinion as to their validity. The next case was Cochran v. Van Surlay, decided originally in the Supreme Court of the State. Statement of the court in that case was that when the first act was passed all the parties interested in the trust estate, who were capable of acting for themselves, were before the legislature, and were applicants for the law. Besides Clarke, the tenant for life, in his own right, and the natural guardian of his children, to whom the remainder was limited, there was Clement C. Moore, the contingent remainder-man in fee, and the trustees named in the will, who had the whole legal estate, and represented the minors as fully as they could be represented in any form.

Leading features of the acts are that they changed the trustees appointed by the will and authorized a sale of a part of the estate without the consent of the minors, who were entitled to the remainder in fee after the termination of the life estate. Pursuant to their request the act of April 1st, 1814, discharged the trustees named in the will from the execution of the trusts and authorized the court of chancery to appoint one or more trustees in their place. Subsequent act passed March 24th, 1815, authorized and empowered Thomas B. Clarke to execute and perform every act, matter, and thing in relation to the real estate, in like manner and with like effect that trustees duly appointed under the former act might have done. Decision of the court was that the court of chancery, without an act of the legislature, could have discharged the trustees named in the will and might have appointed others in their place, and that the act of the legislature was not an act beyond their constitutional power, as the mere substitution of a new trustee could neither defeat the trust nor divest the rights of those beneficially interested in the property. Critical examination of the power to sell, as conferred under the act of April 1st, 1814, and as modified under the act of March 24th, 1815, and of the power to mortgage or sell as conferred under the act of March 29th, 1816, was made at the same time, and the unqualified conclusion reached was that the several acts were valid and constitutional, although they did not extend to other cases of a like character.

Objections were also taken that the orders of the chancellor were not made in pursuance of the acts of the legislature, but those objections were overruled as unsupported in fact or as entirely unavailing, unless presented in some direct proceeding, a by appeal or by application to the chancellor for new orders and directions in the premises. Conclusions of the court were: (1) That the acts of the legislature authorizing the sale of the property for the support and maintenance of the tenant for life, and of his family, and the education of his children, were fully warranted by the State constitution, and that they did not in any manner conflict with the Constitution of the United States; (2) That the orders of the chancellor in carrying those provisions into effect were regular and proper, and that the deeds of conveyance were sufficient to convey the title to the estate to the grantees.

Dissatisfied with the judgment the plaintiff sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into the court for the correction of errors, where the questions were again fully argued, but the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State was in all things affirmed.

Pending that litigation certain suits were commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and the justices of that court being opposed in opinion in respect to the principal question involved in the controversy, they were certified into this court for decision, and the majority of this court adopted in substance and effect the views of the minority of the court for the correction of errors.

Same questions in respect to the same estate were subsequently presented to the Superior Court of the City of New York, and the court adopting the State decisions, held that those acts of the legislature were not inhibited by the State constitution, nor by that clause of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

Judgment was for the plaintiff, and the defendant insisting that the views of this court, as expressed in the answers given on the occasion when certain questions were certified here by the circuit judges of that district, appealed to the Court of Appeals that the questions might be re-examined. Express decision of the Court of Appeals was that the judgment of the Court of Errors in Cochran v. Surlay, was a final determination of the court of last resort in the State, not only upon all the questions of law in the case, but upon the identical title in controversy, and that they ought not to reexamine the grounds of that decision. They also held that, as between judgments of their own courts and those of the Federal government, where there is a conflict between them, they ought to follow their own decisions, except in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the Union.

Present case was first decided in the Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiff, but the defendant being dissatisfied removed cause into this court by writ of error, where it was affirmed because there was no bill of exceptions. By consent a bill of exceptions was subsequently allowed and the cause brought here on a second writ of error. Parties were again fully heard and the court came to the unanimous conclusion that the decision of the Court of Errors, sanctioned by the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals, established a rule of property in that State which it was the duty of this court to follow in questions of real property situated in that State.

Plaintiff admits, in view of the ruling of this court in that case, that it will regard the decision of the State courts as rules of decision in respect to titles to real estate, that most of the questions presented in this record are closed in favor of the defendant. Where any principle of law establishing a rule of real property is settled in the State court the same rule will be applied by this court in the same or analogous cases Conceding that the rule established in that case was to that effect, still the plaintiff contends that two questions arising in the record remain open for discussion. One is a question touching the construction of the second section of the act of April 1st, 1814, which authorized the trustees to partition and divide the estate into two equal parts for the purpose before mentioned, which, as he insists, was never before a State court; and that the other is a question which belongs to this court to determine under the Constitution of the United States.

Questions not determined in the State court, because not raised and presented for decision by the complaining party in the court below, will not in general be examined in this court, but it is not necessary to place the decision in this case upon any such ground. Authority to partition is conceded, but the argument is that when the estate was divided into an eastern and western partition the power was exhausted. Assent of the chancellor was given in the first order to the sale by the petitioner of the eastern moiety, to be divided by the line in the manner for that purpose mentioned in the petition. By the second order the chancellor gave his assent that the petitioner might mortgage instead of selling the estate embraced in the former order. Third order bears date on the fifteenth of March, 1817, and by it the chancellor gave his assent that the petitioner might sell and dispose of the southern moiety of the estate, the same being divided by a line running east and west, instead of the eastern moiety as permitted and described by the previous orders. Even regarded as an original question there can be no doubt of the power of the chancellor to make that order under the act of the twenty-ninth of March, 1816, as construed in connection with the preceding acts to which it is supplemental.

Reference to the principal case will show that the order in question was directly under the consideration of the court, and it must be regarded as a necessary intendment that the point now raised was determined adversely to the views of the plaintiff. Same remarks also apply to the case of Towle v. Forney, where this order, as well as those of prior date, were again before the court. Judgment of the court was that the title of the plaintiff in that case was valid, which affirmed the power of the chancellor to issue the orders. Appeal was taken by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment was affirmed.

Careful examination was also given to that order by this court when the case was here on the last occasion before the present hearing. Thorough examination of the whole case was made at that time, and the court in conclusion say that there is no room for doubt as to what the settled opinion of the State courts is in reference to this title, and therefore that there could be no hesitation as to the proper judgment to be rendered.

Second question presented by the plaintiff is that the discharge of the trustees named in the will by the legislature of the State, was in contravention of that clause of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

Whenever the title of the estate conveyed has been put in issue the validity of that act of the legislature has been drawn in question, and the decision in every case, except the one first made in this court, has sustained the validity of the act. None of the adjudications in form dispose of the question, but the clear and necessary intendment of each is to that effect, especially the last decision of this court, as it reverses the former views of the court in respect to the whole merits of the controversy. All the persons interested in the will who were capable of acting for themselves were before the legislature when that act passed, and the trustees named in the will were applicants for the law.

Trustees may undoubtedly be discharged by the chancellor, even without an act of the legislature, and as the mere substitution of a new trustee could neither defeat the trust nor divest the rights of those interested, it is not possible to see how the proposition of the plaintiff can be sustained.

The rights of the trustees were not invaded, as they asked to be discharged; and the cestuis que trust cannot complain, for the reason that the substitution of a new trustee did not defeat or impair the trust or divest their interest. But the true answer to the proposition is that there is no matter of contract involved in the substitution of new trustees, with the assent of the chancellor, in the place of those named in a testamentary devise, unless the act be one which infringes some vested right of the trustees. Nothing of the kind is pretended in this case and there is no foundation for the proposition.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.


text: Talk:Williamson v. Suydam/Opinion of the Court


text:
Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp

THESE were two appeals from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, one by Crawshay and Oddie and one by Vose, to review an order confirming the sale of a railroad under a mortgage. The case was shortly this:

Soutter and Knapp, surviving Bronson, were trustees for the benefit of bondholders of a mortgage called a land-grant mortgage given by the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company on a part of its road. The mortgage had been foreclosed, and as is frequent in such cases in Wisconsin, a new company, named the St. Paul, was formed by the purchasers; here the bondholders. Among the bondholders were Crawshay, Oddie, and Vose, the appellants. The two former surrendered all their bonds, and took certificates of stock. The latter (who had been appointed by his cocreditors a trustee to organize the new company), however, yet had in his possession, bonds for $5000, for which he held certificates of the trustees entitling him to a corresponding amount of stock in the new company. A difference arose between him and his co-trustees; and the court having confirmed the sale of the old road under the mortgage, he, Crawshay and Oddie appealed from its action. The confirmation had been made subject to payment by the new company of his debt, principal and interest.

Mr. Ryan, for the appellants; Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, contra.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court in the cases.

title: Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp


text: Talk:Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp

title: Talk:Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp


text:
Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp/Opinion of the Court

After a protracted litigation, the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin, at its last September Term, confirmed the sale made by the marshal in what is known as the land-grant foreclosure suit, brought by Soutter and Knapp, surviving trustees, against the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company. These appeals are brought here to review that order of confirmation, and will be considered together. Various exceptions were taken in the court below, and are renewed here, to the report of the marshal of the sale of the mortgaged premises, but it is unnecessary to notice them, as Crawshay and Oddie are not in a condition to avail themselves of them; and the rights of Vose, as owner of bonds or certificates, are protected by the order of confirmation. Crawshay and Oddie were original bondholders under the land-grant mortgage, but before filing their exceptions to the report of sale, they had surrendered their bonds to the trustees, appointed under the scheme for the adjustment of the affairs of the La Crosse company; took certificates of stock, and subsequently the bonds and stock of the St. Paul company, as provided in the agreement for organizing it. By doing this, they elected to abide by the action of the trustees, and cannot now be heard to interpose any objection to the confirmation of the sale.

Vose was one of the trustees appointed by the pondholders of the La Crosse company to adjust its affairs, and form a new company, but differences sprung up between him and his co-trustees, resulting in their refusal to co-opert e with him. It is unimportant to inquire whether his co-trustees were justified in their treatment of him, because, before the confirmation of the sale by the court, the trust agreement was substantially closed. All the bondholders, except Vose, had exchanged their securities for the bonds and stock of the St. Paul company. Vose, at the time of filing exceptions to the report of the sale, was the owner of five bonds of the La Crosse company, for which he held the certificates of the trustees, entitling him to a corresponding amount in bonds and stock of the new company. It is not necessary to determine whether, by exchanging his old bonds for certificates of stock in the new company, he was not so far committed to the adjustment scheme, as to prevent his withdrawal from it, for in any aspect of the case, all rights that he could possibly have under the land-grant mortgage, were protected by the court. The order of confirmation was expressly made subject to the payment to him by the St. Paul company, of five bonds of one thousand dollars each, with all accrued and unpaid interest, upon the surrender by him of the certificates of the trustees, and all claims for dividends.

He certainly could reasonably ask no more than the payment of the principal and interest of his La Crosse bonds-if he was unwilling to take the stock and bonds of the St. Paul company with their unpaid dividends, according to the trust agreement,-and as the court obliged the St. Paul company to pay him the full amount of his La Crosse bonds, it is hard to see how he is aggrieved by the order of confirmation.

DECREE AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Crawshay v. Soutter and Knapp/Opinion of the Court


text:
Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company (73 U.S. 742)

Two appeals from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin; the parties being in the first case the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company appellant, against the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company; and in the second, Soutter and Knapp, survivors, against the company, appellants in the first.

Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, for the appellants; Messrs. Cushing and Stark, contra.

Mr. Justice NELSON stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company (73 U.S. 742)


text:
Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company (73 U.S. 742)/Opinion of the Court

The case was before the court on a demurrer to the bill, and is reported in 2 Wallace, p. 609. It involved a question as to the ownership of the rolling stock on the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad, extending from Milwaukee to La Crosse, some two hundred miles.

This company mortgaged the Western Division, from Portage to La Crosse, one hundred and five miles, to Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, on the 31st December, 1856, to secure the bondholders; and, on the 17th August, 1857, mortgaged the Eastern Division, from Milwaukee to Portage, ninety-five miles, to Bronson and Soutter to secure the bondholders on that division. The mortgage on the Western Division was foreclosed in default of payment, purchased in, and a new company formed called the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad, which is the defendant in this suit, and which sets up a right to the rolling stock by virtue of the purchase and title under the mortgage.

This La Crosse and Milwaukee Company also executed a mortgage on the first of June, 1858, to W. Barnes to secure another issue of bonds, which covered the whole of the road from Milwaukee to La Crosse. This mortgage was also foreclosed in default of payment, purchased in, and a company organized called the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company, and is the complainant in this suit, and which sets up a title to the rolling stock as owner of the equity of redemption of the Eastern Division, there being prior mortgages on it to Bronson and Soutter, and others; the ground of claim being, that this stock belonged to that division, and not to the Western, and was covered by this Bronson and Soutter mortgage and others. The description of the rolling stock in each of the mortgages was substantially the same, and is as follows: 'And, also, all and singular the locomotive engines and other rolling stock, and all ote r equipments of every kind and description which have already been, or may hereafter be, procured for or used on said road,' &c. Each of the three mortgages mentioned was made subject, in express terms, to the lien of all prior mortgages on the road. When the question came before this court on the bill and demurrer, a majority of the court held it sufficiently appeared by the facts set forth in the bill, and which were admitted by the demurrer, that the rolling stock belonged to the Eastern Division by some division or assignment of it, or, if not, it sufficiently appeared in the foreclosure and sale of the mortgage on the Western Division in the District Court of the United States, and under which the defendant derived title, that that court had decided the stock belonged to the Eastern Division, and hence the complainant, the Minnesota Company, as owner of the equity of redemption, claimed it had made out a title to it. The demurrer was, of course, overruled, and the cause remanded to the court below for further proceedings. On the cause coming down to that court, leave was given to the defendant to answer, which was put in accordingly, and to which there was a replication, and the parties went to their proofs. A large amount of testimony was taken on both sides, which is in the record, and the cause is now before us on the pleadings and proofs. The bill was dismissed in the court below on account of a division of opinion between the judges. It is here on appeal by the complainant, the Minnesota Company.

The proofs show that the rolling stock in dispute was purchased by the funds of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company; that it was placed and used on the entire line of the road, embracing both divisions; and that no division of the stock had ever been made by the company between the two divisions, but was purchased out of the common funds, and used on the whole line for the common benefit. The mortgage on the Western Division was the oldest, and to which was attached priority of lien on the road by its very terms. It is manifest, therefore, if there was nothing else in the case, that an interest in and right to the use of the rolling stock became vested in the defendant, the St. Paul's Company, by the foreclosure of this mortgage and purchase, under which it acquired title to the Western Division.

It is insisted, however, that the right and title to this rolling stock were adjudicated to the Eastern Division by the court in the foreclosure suit, which opinion was entertained by a majority of the court as the case was presented in the bill and admitted by the demurrer. The question comes before us now, however, in a different aspect, after answer, replication, and proofs, and several matters which were stated in the bill and admitted by the demurrer have been denied and disproved by the proofs. One of these matters, namely, the division of the rolling stock and assignment of the portion in question to the Eastern Division, has already been referred to and explained. Another, and most material matter, is the action of the court in the foreclosure suit, and alleged adjudication of this stock in the same to the Eastern Division, which is denied in the answer, and all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the question, very fully presented in the proofs, and upon which, it is the opinion of a majority of the court, that no such adjudication took place; that, on the contrary, the order of sale in the foreclosure suit included this rolling stock; also the advertisement of the marshal, his report of the sale, and the confirmation of the same. It is true that there is some obscurity in one or two of the preliminary orders in the foreclosure proceedings; but we think they have been explained by the proofs in the case, and the more full examination of all the orders made therein by the court. An instance is the order of the court, May 7th, 1863, soon after he order of confirmation of the sale, which was supposed to indicate the understanding of the court according to the interpretation of h e complainant. It now appears that it was not intended as a final order, but temporary, providing for the custody of the property during the time allowed the Minnesota Company to prepare an answer to resist the application by the St. Paul Company for the possession of this rolling stock. The final order was not made till the 12th of June, in which this rolling stock was ordered to be delivered to the St. Paul Company, subject to other previous liens on the same; and it now appears, also, that no rolling stock was ever delivered under the order of the 7th of May, but was delivered under that of the 12th of June.

Our conclusion is, that the foreclosure of the mortgage of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company, of the 31st of December, 1856, to Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, which included the rolling stock in question, a right to the use of this stock on the road passed to the St. Paul Company under the foreclosure and organization of the company in pursuance thereof.

The decree of the court below must, therefore, be AFFIRMED.

It appears that a second supplemental bill was filed by the complainant, the Minnesota Company, against the same defendant, setting up, among other things, a right to the rolling stock in controversy in the first, and also a right, as against the St. Paul Company, to compensation for the use of said rolling stock running on the Western Division.

There are also many allegations in the bill charging the St. Paul Company with a breach of the original charter in the construction of a road for the purpose of disconnecting the Western from the Eastern Division, and interrupting a through line from La Crosse to to Milwaukee. It is quite apparent that the matters set forth in this bill are not the subject of a supplemental bill. The first supplemental bill set up a claim to the rolling stock under the decree in the original suit of foreclosure of the mortgage. The present bill is filled with matters of complaint, which have occurred since the original decree of foreclosure and sale, and which have no necessary connection with that decree, such as a claim for the use of the rolling stock, the right to which was in litigation in the first supplemental bill, and in respect to which no right could be set up for the use of it until the title had been determined in its favor; and, as it respects the portion of the bill relating to the violation of the charter, and attempt to divert the travel and interrupt the through line in running the road, the matter could have no possible connection with the original bill or decree, of which this is claimed as supplemental. The decree below was, therefore, right is dismissing the bill.

DECREE AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED TO COURT BELOW.

The cross-bill, also, to the first supplemental bill, which was founded on a second mortgage given by the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company to Bronson, Soutter, and Knapp, which was in the nature of a further assurance concerning the rolling stock, was properly dismissed. As the effect of dismissing the supplemental bill was to affirm the right of the St. Paul Company to the use of the rolling stock on the Western Division on the ground it was covered by the first mortgage, and which we have affirmed, the cross-bill was useless and of no effect.

DECREE AFFIRMED; CAUSE REMANDED TO COURT BELOW.

In the first of these two appeals, Mr. Justice MILLER dissented.


text: Talk:Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company (73 U.S. 742)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Fleming v. Soutter

APPEALS in three decretal orders from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin.

Messrs. Cushing and Stark, for the appellants; Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, contra.

Mr. Justice NELSON stated the facts and delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Fleming v. Soutter


text: Talk:Fleming v. Soutter

title: Talk:Fleming v. Soutter


text:
Fleming v. Soutter/Opinion of the Court

These are appeals from decretal orders made in the case of Soutter, survivor, &c., v. The La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company and others. That suit was instituted for the foreclosure of a mortgage on the Eastern Division of the road of the La Corsse and Milwaukee Company, and a der ee had been entered in the Circuit Court in pursuance of a mandate from this court, in which it was directed that the complainant shall be at liberty, when further instalments of interest should become due and unpaid, to apply for an order for the sale of the said mortgaged premises in accordance with the mandate. On the 18th September, 1866, an order was entered directing a sale of the premises on account of default in the payment of $40,000, an instalment of interest that had become due on the first of the same month, which order was entered on petition and due notice, and after argument by counsel. The first two appeals were taken from this order.

A second default was made in payment of another instalment on the first of March, 1867, and after hearing the parties on both sides, an order for a sale was made on the fifth of the same month. The third appeal is from this order.

We have examined the proceedings to which objections have been taken, and are of opinion that they are in conformity with the principal decree in the cause, and that the order should be

AFFIRMED.

title: Fleming v. Soutter/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Fleming v. Soutter/Opinion of the Court


text:
Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain

THESE were two appeals from the Circuit Court for the District or Wisconsin; one by the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company against Chamberlain, the other by the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company against both the parties to the other case.

In the first case the bill of complaint was filed by the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company against Chamberlain, to set aside a lease executed to him by the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad on the 26th September, 1857, of their road, with the intent to hinder and delay their creditors; and, also, to set aside a judgment which the company had confessed to Chamberlain for the sum of $429,089.72 on the 2d October, 1857, which, it was also charged, was confessed with the like intent. The Milwaukee and St. Paul Company were admitted as defendant on the ground that it had become the owner of the lease and judgment. Answers were put in by both the defendants, and proofs taken.

On the 23d May, 1865, the Milwaukee and St. Paul Company filed a cross-bill against the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company and Chamberlain, setting forth the indebtedness of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company to Chamberlain; that the complainant had become the equitable owner of this debt for a full consideration; that the lease and judgment, the former being a security for the latter, were liens on the Eastern Division of the road, which was largely encumbered by prior mortgages, and which, together with the aforesaid judgment, far exceeded its value, and that the complainant had no adequate remedy at law. The bill then prayed that the judgment might be decreed a valid and subsisting lien on the road, appurtenances, and franchises, and that they might be decreed to be sold to satisfy it. The defendants put in an answer, and the cause went to the proofs. This was the second suit of the two above-mentioned suits. Much testimony was taken on both sides, which was found in the record; and the court below, after full consideration, dismissed the bill in the principal suit on the merits as to the Chamberlain judgment, and decreed in favor of the force and effect of that judgment; but dismissed the cross-bill for the reason that the two companies were incompetent to litigate the matter set forth in that bill on account of the residence of the parties, both being corporations of the State of Wisconsin.

Mr. Cushing, for the appellant in the first case; Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, contra; the position of counsel being reversed in the cross-bill.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court

title: Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain


text: Talk:Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain

title: Talk:Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain


text:
Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain/Opinion of the Court

We think that the court erred in dismissing the cross-bill. It was filed for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, which was in the Circuit Court, and could be filed in no other court, and was but ancillary to and dependent upon the original sui-an appropriate proceeding for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction. The lease was in the nature of a mortgage, and held only as collateral security, and followed the judgment.

The decree in the first suit must be affirmed, and that in the second reversed, and the cause remitted to the court below to enter a decree

IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION.


text: Talk:Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain/Opinion of the Court


text:
Railroad Company v. James

THESE were three appeals from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin. The case was this:

On the 7th October, 1857, Cleveland recovered judgment for $111,727 against the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company. The legislature of Wisconsin, incorporating the road, provided that the title to lands which it might take in building its road, should, on its payment for them, 'vest in the said company in fee,' and provided also by general statute that rolling stock should be a fixture on any railroad, in connection with which it was used. Cleveland assigned his judgment to James. Subsequently to the entry of this judgment, the company mortgaged its road to one Barnes, and under this mortgage the Eastern Division of the road was sold (a Western Division having been sold under liens prior to either Barnes's mortgage or Cleveland's judgment). The purchasers of this Eastern Division organized a new company under the name of the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company, and took possession of the road. James now filed his bill in the Circuit Court for Wisconsin against the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company, for the purpose of having his judgment declared a lien on the Eastern Division of the road, and the same sold in order to obtain satisfaction.

The court decreed that the judgment was a lien from the time of its rendition, and that the sum of $98,901.51 was due thereon, that the La Crosse Company had ceased to exist as a corporation, and that the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company had succeeded to its rights as to the Eastern Division, subject to all prior liens, and directed a sale by the marshal of the road from Milwaukee to Portage. A sale was made accordingly, and on a report to the court, was duly confirmed.

The three appeals now taken to this court were—

One on a petition of two stockholders in the Minnesota Company, Bright and Gunneseon, asking that the decree might be vacated, and they let in to defend;

One on a petition of the Minnesota Company to stay sale and open and vacate the decree, which was denied;

One, an appeal by the same company from the order confirming the sale.

Messrs. Cushing and Stark, for the appellants; Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, contra.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Railroad Company v. James


text: Talk:Railroad Company v. James

title: Talk:Railroad Company v. James


text:
Railroad Company v. James/Opinion of the Court

The La Crosse and Milwaukee Company, by virtue of its charter and the proceedings under it, acquired a title in fee to the road-bed; and the rolling stock owned by it, and used and employed in connection with the road, is made a fixture by an express statute of the State of Wisconsin, and such, we think, is the law according to the true construction of the charter, independent of the statute. By the statute law of Wisconsin judgments are liens on real estate, and we do not doubt but that this judgment became a lien on the road from the time of its rendition, and that a sale under a decree in chancery, and conveyance in pursuance thereof, confirmed by the court, passed the whole of the interest of the company existing at the time of its rendition to the purchaser.

A great many objections have been taken to the decrees below, but those of any substance or force will be found answered by the principles above stated.

DECREES AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Railroad Company v. James/Opinion of the Court


text:
James v. Railroad Company

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin; James, Brewer, Greenleaf, Justice, and others, being the appellants, and the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroads appellee.

Messrs. Cary and Carlisle, for the appellants; Messrs. Cushing and Stark, contra.

Mr. Justice NELSON stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.

title: James v. Railroad Company


text: Talk:James v. Railroad Company

title: Talk:James v. Railroad Company


text:
James v. Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

The bill before us is a creditor's bill, filed by four different judgment creditors, against the defendants, to set aside as fraudulent and void against creditors the sale under a mortgage made to Barnes, 21st of June, 1858, for two millions of dollars, by the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company, which sale took place on the 21st of May, 1859, and under which the defendants' company was organized; and that the company be perpetually enjoined and restrained from exercising any control over the property or franchises mentioned in said mortgage, or from interfering in any manner with the road or its franchises; and, further, that the said company be decreed to take nothing under the sale, and that the property and franchises of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company may be sold and applied, after discharging all prior liens, to the satisfaction of the judgments of the complainants.

The complainants consist of the firm of F. P. James &Co., who are the owners of a judgment against the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company for $26,353.51, recovered in the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, on the 5th of October, 1858, in favor of Edwin C. Litchfield, and which came to the complainants by assignment.

Nathaniel S. Bouton, who recovered in the same court a judgment against the same company for $7937.37, on the 5th of April, 1859, and which judgment came to the firm of F. P. James & Co., by assignment; Philip S. Justice and others, who recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County against the same company for $235.33, and E. Bradford Greenleaf, a judgment in the same court against the same company for $840.06. These judgments were liens on the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad, subsequent to the mortgage to Barnes, already referred to, which, with the sale under it, is sought to be set aside as fraudulent and void against creditors.

The mortgage was given to secure the payment of an issue of bonds for two millions of dollars, on the 21st of June, 1858, and which were issued accordingly by the president and secretary, and were made payable in thirty years. One thousand bonds of one thousand dollars each, fourteen hundred of five hundred dollars each, and three thousand of one hundred dollars each, interest at seven per cent., payable semi-annually on the first day of January and July in each year, with coupons attached. The sale under the mortgage took place on default of the payment of the first instalment of interest, six months after it was executed. Barnes, the mortgagee, acted as auctioneer, and bid off the property himself, as trustee for the bondholders, who soon after organized the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company, one of the defendants in this suit.

As appears from the proofs at the time of this sale, there had not been two hundred thousand dollars advanced on the entire issue of the two millions of bonds; indeed, the actual amount is but little over one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Five hundred and fifty thousand dollars of the bonds do not appear to have been negotiated at all, which were held in trust and never used, and one hundred and three thousand had been returned and cancelled, making in the aggregate six hundred and fifty-three thousand. Four hundred thousand were given to Chamberlain to secure a note of the company for $20,000, which he sold at auction, and which were bid in, principally, by the directors, at five cents on the dollar. Three hundred and ten thousand dollars of the bonds were given to secure a loan of $15,500, and which came into the hands of the same persons, or their friends, for about five cn ts on the dollar.

It is charged in the bill, and the proofs are very strong in support of it, that this note to Chamberlain for $20,000, and the loan of $15,500 to secure the payment of which these bonds were given-$400,000 in amount for the first sum, and $310,000 for the second-were made by the company for the purpose, and with the intention of obtaining a division of them among the directors, at merely nominal prices. It is very fully established that this was, in point of fact, the result of the two transactions.

We have looked with some care into the proofs, and into the brief of the learned counsel for the defendants, to ascertain the portion or amount of these bonds, or, of the stock of the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company, into which some of them were converted, that are now in the hands of bona fide holders, and we find no evidence in the record tending to show any amount beyond the sum already mentioned, less than $200,000. These were the only outstanding bonds existing at the time of the foreclosure and sale for which value had been paid; the remainder of the two millions of dollars were either in the hands of the directors or under their control, and not negotiated, or, they were in their hands under the fraudulent arrangements we have already states, at nominal prices. Nor, do we find that the present holders of the bonds or stock of the company are in any better or more favorable condition than those who organized the defendants.

The notice of sale set forth that the mortgage debt was two millions of dollars, and that seventy thousand dollars of interest were due.

It needs no authorities to show that such a sale cannot be upheld without sanctioning the grossest fraud and injustice to the La Crosse and Milwaukee Company, the mortgagee, and its creditors. This deceptive notice was calculated to destroy all competition among the bidders, and, indeed, to exclude from the purchase every one, except those engaged in the perpetration of the fraud. The sale, therefore, must be set aside, and the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company be perpetually enjoined from setting up any right or title under it-the mortgage to remain as security for the bonds in the hands of bona fide holders for value, and that the judgment creditors, the complainants, be at liberty to enforce their judgments against the defendants therein, subject to all prior liens or incumbrances.

Mr. Justice MILLER dissented.


text: Talk:James v. Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court


text:
Smith v. Cockrill

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas.

The suit was an action of ejectment by Cockrill against Smith, to recover the possession of several lots of land in the city of Leavenworth.

The plaintiff claimed title under a sale on a judgment against one Clark, recovered in a State court on the 4th of April, 1862. The sale took place on execution upon the judgment on the 23d of July, 1863, at which the plaintiff, Cockrill, became the purchaser, and received a deed from the sheriff of the lots in question.

The defendant, Smith, also claimed title under a sale on execution upon two judgments against Clark, recovered in the District Court of the United States-one on the 29th of May, 1861, the other on the next day of the same month. And the sale took place under the executions by the marshal on the 8th August, 1861, and Smith became the purchaser, and received a deed from the marshal for the same lots.

Both parties thus set up title under Clark; and as Smith, the defendant below, had the elder title, if there was nothing else in the case, he would have been entitled to recover.

It was objected, however, that the deed to him from the marshal under the sale was void, for the reason that it was not made in conformity with the code of civil procedure of Kansas, which requires an appraisement of the property levied on, and that it shall be sold on the execution for two-thirds of its appraised value.

It being admitted that the property was not thus appraisd, nor sold, the court below held that the sale was void, and that the marshal's deed conveyed no title to the purchaser. The correctness of this view raised the only question in the case.

Mr. T. A. Hendricks and Mr. R. Breckenridge, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. Clough and Wheat, with an elaborate brief of Mr. Lysander B. Wheat, setting out the statutes and authorities bearing on the case-contra.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Smith v. Cockrill


text: Talk:Smith v. Cockrill

title: Talk:Smith v. Cockrill


text:
Smith v. Cockrill/Opinion of the Court

The State of Kansas was admitted into the Union by act of Congress on the 29th January, 1861, the fourth section of which provided, 'that from and after the admission of the State of Kansas, as heretofore provided, all the laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within that State as in other States of the Union: and the said State is hereby constituted a judicial district,' &c.

The act of 1828 provided, 'that the forms of mesne process, except the title, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits in the courts of the United States, held in those States admitted into the Union since the 29th of September, 1789, in those of common law, shall be the same in each of the said States, respectively, as are now used in the highest court of original and general jurisdiction of the same; in proceedings in equity, according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to courts in equity, &c., except so far as may have been otherwise provided for by acts of Congress, subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the courts of the United States shall, in their discretion, deem expedient,' &c.

This act was re-enacted August 1st, 1842. The act of 1828, is one of the acts extended over the State of Kansas, and which is declared 'to have the same force and effect within that State as in other States of the Union.' As it respects that State, it was a virtual re-enactment of it. It had the effect, therefore, to adopt as the forms and modes of proceeding, in suits in the Federal courts at common law, the same as existed at the time, and were used in the highest common law courts of the State; and by the third section of the act of 1828, writs of execution and other final process issued on judgments rendered in courts of the United States, were to be the same as used in the State. #fn-s-s

In the absence of this provision in the act admitting Kansas into the Union, extending the Federal laws over it, there would be great difficulty in finding any authority in the court to issue the execution, or in the marshal to execute it, but with it all difficulty disappears. The result, however, is, that the sale by the marshal in not conforming the mode of proceeding in levying the execution, and making the sale, to the State practice, is irregular and void, and the deed to Smith, the defendant, conveyed no title. The civil code of procedure of the Territory requiring the appraisal, and sale at two-thirds of the appraised value, was continued in force at the formation of the State, and, consequently, was the mode of proceeding adopted on the introduction of the process act of 1828-1842, and to which the marshal should have conformed in making the sale.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

title: Smith v. Cockrill/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Smith v. Cockrill/Opinion of the Court


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Union Insurance Company v. United States

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; the case being thus:

An act of Congress, of August 6th, 1861, passed during the late rebellion, and entitled 'An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' provides, in different sections, as follows:

The first section provides that property used in aid of the rebellion, with consent of the owner, shall be the 'lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found,' and makes it the duty of the President to cause it' to be seized, confiscated, and condemned.'

The second section provides that such 'prizes and captures shall be condemned in the District or Circuit Court of the United States having jurisdiction of the amount, or in admiralty, in any district in which the same may be seized, or into which the same may be taken and proceedings commenced.'

The third section provides that 'the attorney-general, or any district attorney of the United States, in which said property may at the time be, may institute the proceedings of condemnation, and in such cases they shall be wholly for the benefit of the United States; or any person may file an information with such attorney, in which case the proceedings shall be for the use of such informer and the United States in equal parts.'

With this statute in force, a square of ground in New Orleans, with the buildings upon it, was leased, on the 17th of September, 1861, by one Leonce Burthe to a firm, Cook & Brother, who, in October or November, established on the premises a manufactory of arms for the rebel government, and continued the business until the occupation of the city by the national forces in the spring of 1862.

On the 8th of October, 1861, the Union Insurance Company of New Orleans took a mortgage from Burthe upon three undivided twenty-fifths of the property to secure the payment of a note for $3500, due from him to the company.

Subsequently, suit was instituted upon the mortgage, and in due course a decree of sale was rendered, under which the insurance company became purchasers of the mortgaged premises for $1400, and on the 26th of February, 1864, received the sheriff's deed of the property.

In April, 1864, the company obtained a judgment for $2735, being the balance due on the note of Burthe, and was about to sell the residue of the property, when further proceeding was arrested by a military order.

It appeared further from the evidence that three minors of the Burthe family were legal owners of four thirty-sixths of the property on which the gun factory was established.

The Cooks, to whom Burthe made the lease, were wellknown manufacturers of arms on a large scale for the rebel government, and the lease stated the fact that they intended to establish in the property leased 'engines, machinery,' &c.

At the time, however, when the insurance company took its mortgage, the Cooks had not taken possession of the property, nor was it proved otherwise than as the mere taking of the mortgage proved it, that the company had consented to the use which the Cooks meant to make of the premises.

On the 4th of April, 1865, the District Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, a libel of information against the property thus leased. The libel described the case as one of seizure and forfeiture, and after reciting the already mentioned act of Congress of August 6th, 1861, which declared the property of all persons who should knowingly use or employ it, or consent to the use and employment of it in aid of the rebellion, to be lawful subject of prize and capture, proceeded to allege that the property leased had been so used and employed, and asked a decree for its condemnation and forfeiture to the use of the United States and the informant.

Upon the filing of this libel, notice was given, monition was published, claims were interposed, and testimony was taken in general conformity with the practice of courts of admiralty.

The Circuit Court condemned the whole property as forfeited to the United States, except the four thirty-sixths, called in the decree four twenty-fifths, of the minors.

An appeal was taken by the Union Insurance Company, and another claimant, who abandoned the prosecution of his appeal. No appeal was taken by the United States from that part of the decree which exempted the interests of the minors from condemnation.

Three points were made in this court on the appeal:

1. That the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction under the ac of 1861; that the proceedings were in admiralty form throughout,-a form dispensing with jury; that the Constitution securing to the citizen trial by jury, Congress had no power to convert into a 'case in admiralty,' and so to bring into admiralty jurisdiction, cases which were not admiralty cases, and were not liable to be brought within that jurisdiction when the Constitution was made, and that such a purpose was not to be presumed; that it was impossible to regard the proceeding in this case-one against real estate in the midst of a great city, and under a statute of municipal forfeiture-as an 'admiralty case,' in any true definition of those terms.

2. That the proceeding should have been by the course of the common law, and with a jury, when the decree of the court below would have come up by writ of error, which form of bringing the matter here, and not appeal, was the proper form.

3. That on the merits the decree was wrong.

Mr. Durant, for the appellants; Mr. Stanbery, A. G., and Mr. Ashton, special counsel of the United States, contra.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Union Insurance Company v. United States


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Union Insurance Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The first questions in this cause relate to jurisdiction.

It was urged in argument, that the act of Congress does not authorize the proceedings instituted in the Circuit Court.

The answer to this proposition must be determined by the construction of the act.

It is sufficiently obvious that the general object of the enactment was to promote the suppression of rebellion by subjecting property employed in aid of it with the owner's consent, to confiscation. It extended to all descriptions of property, real or personal, on land or on water. All alike were made subjects of prize and capture, and, under the direction of the President, of seizure, confiscation, and condemnation.

The act must be construed with reference to this general purpose. In ordinary use the words 'prizes and capture' refer, doubtless, to captures on water as maritime prize; but in the section under consideration here they plainly refer to property taken on land as well as on water, and the duties prescribed to the President include the taking of this property by civil process as well as by naval or military force, and sanction proceedings for confiscation and condemnation in civil courts without regard to the mode of seizure.

The second and third sections of the statute prescribe the action to be taken in the courts. This action is described, generally, in the third section, as 'proceedings for condemnation,' to be instituted by the attorney-general, or any district attorney. And jurisdiction of these 'proceedings' is given to the District or Circuit Court having jurisdiction of the amount, or in admiralty, in any district where the property is seized or into which it may be taken.

This language is certainly not clear. But we think that the construction which, as we understand, has been generally adopted in the District and Circuit Courts in cases of proceedings for the condemnation of real estate or property on land, is substantially correct. That construction treats the grant of jurisdiction in admiralty as a grant of jurisdiction of the 'proceedings of condemnation' to the Circuit or District Court according to the amount in suit; with power to both courts to shape those 'proceedings' in general conformity to the practice in admiralty.

Such proceedings do not necessarity constitute a cause in admiralty. When instituted for condemnation of property on land, they have relation exclusively to matters which, in their nature, are not of admiralty cognizance. But Congress may, doubtless, give jurisdiction of such proceedings to the Circuit as well as to the District Courts, and may authorize the exercise of this statutory jurisdiction in the form and modes analogous to those used in admiralty. And this, we think, was the purpose of the act.

The difficulty of construction arises from the terms in which jurisdiction is granted 'to any District or Circuit Court havingj urisdiction of the amount, or in admiralty, in any district where the property is found.' It is said that the use of the disjunctive or restricts the jurisdiction in admiralty to the District Courts. And this view is certainly not without some warrant in the phraseology of the act. But when we look beyond the mere words to the obvious intent we cannot help seeing that the word 'or' must be taken conjunctively; and that the sense of the law is that both the Circuit and the District Courts shall have jurisdiction 'according to the amount' and 'in admiralty.'

This construction impairs no rights of parties. In cases of seizures on land the right of trial by jury is not infringed. In such cases the proceeding must be in general conformity to the course in admiralty; but issues of fact, on the demand of either party, must be tried by jury. Where the seizure is made on navigable waters, the course of admiralty may be strictly observed.

That this construction carries into effect the true intention of Congress sufficiently appears on reference to the act of July 17th, 1862, in which it is provided expressly that proceedings for confiscation shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or revenue cases.

We think, therefore, that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the cause.

It remains to be considered whether the decree of the court can be reviewed here on appeal. No appeal is expressly provided by the act of 1861. The Constitution, however, gives to this court appellate jurisdiction in all cases of which the inferior courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make; and the act of 1803 provides, generally, for appeals from decisions in admiralty. Some of the judges think it a reasonable construction of the act that it was not intended to except decrees under it from the appellate jurisdiction of this court; but that it was intended to apply to them the general regulations of admiralty proceedings in respect to appellate as well as to original jurisdiction; while a majority of the court is of opinion that appellate jurisdiction may be taken of the cause, because the proceedings below, though in a case of common law jurisdiction, were substantially according to the course in admiralty; but only for the purpose of reversing the decree of the Circuit Court as irregular, and directing a new trial.

We proceed then to the questions arising upon the merits.

There is no reasonable doubt that the Cooks established their manufactory of arms on the ground leased by him to them with the full knowledge and consent of Leonce Burthe. It thus became within the express terms of the act the lawful subject of prize and capture from the time of that establishment.

The evidence in respect to the rights of the insurance company is not so clear. To the extent of the interest created by the mortgage the company may, doubtless, be properly regarded as owner. But there is no direct proof of consent to the unlawful use; and, indeed, no proof at all, except the fact of taking the mortgage, and it does not appear that the Cooks had taken possession under their lease before the execution of the mortgage. We do not think this evidence of consent sufficient to support a forfeiture.

The counsel for the company very properly abandoned any claim under the judgment recovered for the balance due on the mortgage note. The forfeiture was incurred when the Cooks went into actual use of the premises under the lease, and the subsequent seizure for condemnation divested all intermediate liens.

The decree of the Circuit Court must be REVERSED as irregular, and the cause remanded for new trial in conformity with this opinion. The property seized having been real estate, the proceedings on the new trial must be conformed in respect to trial by jury and exception to evidence to the course of proceeding by information on the common law side of the court in cases of seizure upon land.


text: Talk:Union Insurance Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court


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Armstrong's Foundry

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the proceeding below being one for condemnation of property as used in aid of the rebellion, and resembling in its general features the case just disposed of. It was thus:

An act of Congress passed August 6th, 1861, 'to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' enacted that property used in aid of the rebellion with consent of the owner, should be the lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found, and made it the duty of the President to cause it 'to be seized, confiscated, and condemned.' It enacted further that 'such prizes and captures shall be condemned in the District or Circuit Court of the United States having jurisdiction of the amount, or in admiralty in any district in which they may be seized, or into which they may be taken,' &c. And the attorney-general or any district attorney was to institute proceedings of condemnation himself, or by aid of an informer.

Under this act a libel of information was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which it was charged that certain property in New Orleans, known as Armstrong's Foundry, had been seized as forfeited to the United States by reason of having been used, with the consent of the owner, in aid of the rebellion. This libel closed with the usual prayer for condemnation. A claim was interposed by John Armstrong as owner, and another claim was interposed by the Citizens' Bank as mortgagee. Armstrong also pleaded the amnesty offered by President Lincoln, and his acceptance of it and compliance with the terms. On the hearing the plea of pardon was rejected, and a decree of condemnation was rendered. Armstrong alone appealed.

Subsequently, and while the cause was pending in this court, the President of the United States granted to 'the said John Armstrong a full pardon and amnesty for all offences by him committed, arising from participation, direct or implied, in the said rebellion, conditioned as follows.' Certain conditions were annexed. At this term Armstrong was allowed, in conformity with the usual course in admiralty cases, to plead the new matter, and to file with his plea a statement of facts agreed between his counsel and the Attorney-General, showing, among other things, that he had complied with all the conditions of the pardon granted to him.

The question now on the appeal was, whether this pardon relieved from forfeiture the property seized.

Mr. Stanbery, Attorney-General, and Mr. Ashton, special counsel for the United States:

1. 'A pardon,' this court declared in Ex Parte Garland, 'reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. The effect of this pardon, then, is to relieve the petitioner from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason committed by his participation in the rebellion.' But this is the extent of a pardon. It cannot reach a forfeiture of property imposed, in virtue of the unlawful predicament in which the property may be found.

Now, the act of August 6th, 1861, does not affect property with liability to condemnation as a punishment for any offence of the owners, but as a means of suppressing the insurrection, then flagrant, by depriving those engaged therein of property subject to their control, and dedicated to their uses. The property is made the 'lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found.' These words draw the property in question within the category of enemy property, and establish a rule of capture.

2. But however affecting the interest of the United States, it cannot operate to remit the moiety which accrues to the informer. He has acquired a property in his part of the penalty.

3. Under a statute of municipal forfeiture, such as this, proceedings for the condemnation of property seized on land, without the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, are, ex necessitate rei, according to the course of the common law. If reversed, the proceedings should follow that course.

Mr. Humphrey Marshall, contra.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Armstrong's Foundry


text: Talk:Armstrong's Foundry

title: Talk:Armstrong's Foundry


text:
Armstrong's Foundry/Opinion of the Court

Upon the case presented, it is necessary to consider a single question only.

It was insisted, in argument, that the pardon pleaded by the appellant cannot avail to relieve him from the forfeiture of the property seized, because the liability to seizure arose, under the statute, from the mode in which the property was employed, and was not to be regarded as a penal consequence of the act of the owner.

We are unable to concur in this view. We think it clear that the statute regarded the consent of the owner to the employment of his property in aid of the rebellion as an offence, and inflicted forfeiture as a penalty. The general pardon of Armstrong, therefore, relieved him of so much of the penalty as accrued to the United States. We think it unnecessary to express any opinion at present in relation to the rights of the informer.

The proceedings below related to a seizure of land, and though conducted under the statute in the forms of admiralty, must be regarded as a case of common law jurisdiction, a final decision in which can be reviewed here only on writ of error.

The decree of the Circuit Court, therefore, must be REVERSED as irregular, and the cause REMANDED, with directions to allow a new trial, the proceedings in which shall be conformed, in respect to trial by jury and exceptions to evidence, to the course of the common law.

Mr. Justice MILLER dissented.

At the same time with the two preceding cases was decided, on appeal from the same circuit (Mr. Durant, for the appellant), the case of St. Louis Street Foundry; not distinguishable,-as the Chief Justice stated was the opinion of the court,-in principle from them.

It appeared in it that Cronan, in the Circuit Court, pleaded the amnesty proclaimed by President Lincoln on the 8th of December, 1863, and the oath taken by himself in pursuance of the proclamation; but there was no averment in this plea that Cronan was not within any of certain exceptions made by that proclamation.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion.

The plea was properly overruled.

Upon proper pleading and proof, however, the claimant of property seized under the act of August 6th, 1861, is entitled to the benefit of amnesty to the same extent as, under like pleading and proof, he would be entitled to the benefit of pardon.

The decree of the Circuit Court must be REVERSED as irregular, and the cause remanded, with directions to allow a new trial, the proceedings in which shall be conformed, in respect to trial by jury and exceptions to evidence, to the course of the common law.


text: Talk:Armstrong's Foundry/Opinion of the Court


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United States v. Hart

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico, the case being thus:An act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, entitled 'An act to facilitate the collection of revenue in El Paso County, Texa, ' &c., revives and re-enacts by its first section, a previously repealed statute, providing—

'That the District Court for the Territory of New Mexico shall have and exercise jurisdiction over all cases which shall arise in the collection district of Paso del Norte, in the administration of the revenue laws, in the same manner as if the said district was entirely within the Territory of New Mexico.'

And by its second section, enacts:

'That the jurisdiction of the District Court of New Mexico shall extend over the citizens of El Paso County, Texas, only in cases not instituted by indictment; and the trial and proceedings for violations of the revenue laws in said District Court of New Mexico, shall be the same as in other District Courts of the United States invested with admiralty powers: and this act shall take effect from and after its passage.'

In this state of congressional enactment, the United States filed a libel of information in the District Court of the United States for the third judicial district of the Territory of New Mexico, to subject certain real estate of Hart, situated in El Paso County, Texas, to condemnation, under the sixth section of the act of Congress passed 17th of July, 1862, which subjects to seizure and confiscation the property of any person within any of the States or Territories of the United States, being engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the United States, or aiding and abetting such rebellion, after public warning by the President of the United States.

The district judge entertaining jurisdiction of the case upon his construction of the above-quoted act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, such proceedings were had that, a decree was entered December 2d, 1865, condemning the property, and directing it to be sold. An appeal was taken from this decree to the Supreme Court of the Territory, which reversed the same, and remanded the cause to the court below, directing that court to dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction in said court over the real estate in the County of El Paso, Texas. From this decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico, the case was now before this court on appeal.

Mr. Robert Leech, for the appellee, and in support of the decree below, contended that—

1. The legislation in question, while it extended the jurisdiction of the District Court of New Mexico, over the citizens of El Paso County, Texas, in certain revenue cases, manifestly conferred no jurisdiction on said court in proceedings against real estate, under the Confiscation Act of July 17th, 1862.

2. The District Court, under proceedings on libel, and as a court of admiralty, had no jurisdiction of the subject; the doctrine being settled, that in the trial of all cases of seizure on land, the court sits as a court of common law, and that in all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: United States v. Hart


text: Talk:United States v. Hart

title: Talk:United States v. Hart