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Page:Folk-lore - A Quarterly Review. Volume 1, 1890.djvu/397

 Rh Prof. Smith has made out a case for the view that sacrifice among the Semites was in its origin a blood-bond between god and worshipper. The most favourable verdict that can be given for such a contribution is the Scotch one of “Not proven”. Perhaps some of the want of conviction which Prof. Smith’s book produces is due to its style and arrangement. The retention of the lecture-form has given a dogmatic tone to the presentation which is signally inappropriate in a field where facts are so scanty and theories so hypothetical. Little attention has been paid to the reader’s needs for explanation, and the book, as a whole, is decidedly hard reading.

Prof. Smith’s book suffers much by contrast with that of Mr. Frazer, whose literary skill is to be recognised throughout, both in arrangement and his clear and careful summaries at appropriate pauses of his argument. So great is his skill in this respect that one scarcely notices that his book is made up of somewhat incongruous elements. The avowed object of the book is to explain the curious rule of succession to the Arician priesthood, the priest of Aricia being succeeded by the man who managed to slay him after plucking the Golden Bough from the tree under which he lived. But besides this, Mr. Frazer has desired to make known to English readers Mannhardt’s remarkable views and facts about agricultural deities. And beyond this, it is clear that Mr. Frazer has also seized the opportunity of putting into print some of the vast materials of primitive custom and belief that he has been collecting for many years. In noticing his book we may, perhaps, separate these three threads of this cunningly woven weft.

Mr. Frazer’s explanation of the Arician rule is, briefly, that the Priest-king of Aricia had to be slain by his successor, as he represented the sacred life of the fields around him, and this would be kept at its highest point of efficiency by being passed on when the priest’s powers began to fail. He gives elaborate parallels for the existence of priestly kings or royal priests, and for their being


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Talk:Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union

Consolidated as of today or 2007/2010/2012/2016
Just updated the lead description to explain what consolidated means, according to how this article has been written and sourced. I like the current existing ambition of this article, to have for all the European treaties only one "consolidated version (as of today)". However, it comes with the huge problem that update work to the article then needs to be done and maintained by an editor each day, to make sure everything has been correctly updated up until today. Something we can not rely on. I therefore propose we should only choose to create/have "consolidated versions" as per the updated consolidated treaty versions published by OJ. Meaning, that this article should either display:
 * A) The latest "2016-version" with a source link to the OJ-consolidated 2016-version (without notes explaining the difference between 2007 and 2016).
 * B) The original "2007-version" with text being updated and notes made for each legal change implemented up until July 2016, in order to match the text of the article 100% with the latest OJ-consolidated "2016-version" (along with a source link to this file).
 * C) The original "2007-version" without featuring any subsequent amendments. Instead a new consolidated wikisource article version is created each time OJ publish a new updated consolidated version. Meaning we at present then would have up till 8 consolidated versions of each European treaty document, with the latest four being published after the Lisbon treaty was signed in respectively: 2008(2007), 2010, 2012 and 2016 (the other previous 4 consolidated versions were published by OJ in Maastricht=1992, Amsterdam=1997, Nice=2002 and Athens=2006). The year of the consolidated version should in this scenario then be denoted for the article by a parenthesis in its title (i.e. "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (1992)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (1997)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2002)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2006)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2008)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2010)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2012)", "Consolidated protocols, annexes and declarations attached to the treaties of the European Union (2016)").

If we pick option C, then we can build it upon reference to the following OJ source links:
 * 2010 version of EURATOM (note: incl. 4 unique Annexes and 6 Protocols shared with TFEU/TEU)
 * 2012 version of EURATOM (note: incl. 4 unique Annexes and 6 Protocols shared with TFEU/TEU)
 * 2016 version of EURATOM (note: incl. 4 unique Annexes and 6 Protocols shared with TFEU/TEU)
 * 1992 version of TFEU
 * 1997 version of TFEU
 * 2002 version of TFEU
 * 2006 version of TFEU
 * 2008 version of TFEU
 * 2010 version of TFEU
 * 2012 version of TFEU
 * 2016 version of TFEU
 * 1992 version of TEU
 * 1997 version of TEU
 * 2002 version of TEU
 * 2006 version of TEU
 * 2008 version of TEU
 * 2010 version of TEU
 * 2012 version of TEU
 * 2016 version of TEU
 * [1992 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties] (note: The Masstricht treaty (1992) amended articles of TEEC+EURATOM+ECSC, but none of their attached old protocols/conventions/letters. 17 new protocols were attached to TEC+TEU, to be found along with all preexisting TEEC/EURATOM/ECSC protocols+conventions+letters.)
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to ECSC comprised in 1992:  (1) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the ECSC, (2) Protocol on the Relations with the Council of Europe, (3) Exchange of letters between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic concerning the Saar, (4) Convention on the Transitional Provisions.
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to EURATOM comprised in 1992:  (1) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EURATOM, (2) Protocol on application of EURATOM to non-European Netherlands) .
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to TEEC comprised in 1992:  (1) Protocol on the statute of the EIB, (2) Protocol on German International Trade, (3) Protocol on provisions relating to France, (4) Protocol on Italy, (5) Protocol on Luxembourg, (6) Protocol on goods originating..., (7) Protocol on treatment to be applied to products within the province..., (8) Protocol on Mineral Oils, (9) Protocol on application of TEEC to non-European Netherlands, (10) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community, (11) Protocol concerning imports into the European Economic Community of petroleum products refined in the Netherlands Antilles, (12) Protocol on special arrangements for Greenland, (13) Implementing Convention on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community, (14) Protocol on the tariff quota for imports of bananas, (15) Protocol on the tariff quota for imports of raw coffee, (16) Convention of 25 March 1957 on certain institutions common to the European Communities, (17) Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 along with its "Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities".
 * 1995 version of protocol 12-15 annexed to TEC
 * 1999 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties (except protocol 12-15) (note: The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) attached 13 new protocols to TEC/TEU, to be found along with 21 preexisting protocols listed by title without republished text. The full text of all 21 preexisting protocols can be reproduced by combining the source link from 1995+1999. The treaty also cleaned up old stuff by repealing: Protocol nr.7+14+16 from the Maastricht Treaty, 8 protocols and 1 convention from the original TEEC in 1957, Exchange of Letters attached to TECSC, Convention on the transitional provisions attached to TECSC, 1 Protocol attached to the EURATOM treaty, Convention of 25 March 1957 attached to TEEC, and the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 - except for its protocol on privileges and immunities. The list below display the consolidated list of the remaining attached old documents created before 1992 (2 for TSCS, 1 for EURATOM, and 7 for TEC). In top of this, TEU+TEC now additionally have attached 14 Protocols from 1992 and 13 new Protocols from 1997; increasing the total number of TEU+TEC protocols to 34.)
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to ECSC before 1992, comprised in 1997:  (1) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the ECSC, (2) Protocol on the Relations with the Council of Europe, (3) Exchange of letters between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic concerning the Saar, (4) Convention on the Transitional Provisions.
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to EURATOM before 1992, comprised in 1997:  (1) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EURATOM, (2) Protocol on application of EURATOM to non-European Netherlands) .
 * The list of preexisting documents attached to TEEC before 1992, comprised in 1997:  (1) Protocol on the statute of the EIB, (2) Protocol on German International Trade, (3) Protocol on provisions relating to France, (4) Protocol on Italy, (5) Protocol on Luxembourg, (6) Protocol on goods originating..., (7) Protocol on treatment to be applied to products within the province..., (8) Protocol on Mineral Oils, (9) Protocol on application of TEEC to non-European Netherlands, (10) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community, (11) Protocol concerning imports into the European Economic Community of petroleum products refined in the Netherlands Antilles, (12) Protocol on special arrangements for Greenland, (13) Implementing Convention on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community, (14) Protocol on the tariff quota for imports of bananas, (15) Protocol on the tariff quota for imports of raw coffee, (16) Convention of 25 March 1957 on certain institutions common to the European Communities, (17) Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 along with its "Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities".
 * [2002 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties] (note: The Nice Treaty (2001) attached Protocol 34+35 as new ones, replaced Protocol 6+10 by a new version, while the "protocol on the statute of the Court of Justice of the EURATOM" also got repealed and replaced by the new version of Protocol 6. The other 32 protocols have not been changed/repealed since the Amsterdam treaty in 1999, meaning the total number of protocols now has grown to 36. In top of this the 2 old preexisting protocols annexed to TECSC still exists, although they cease to exist together with TECSC in July 2002.)
 * 2006 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties (note: Treaty of Athens made amendments to TEU+TEC in 2003, while the 2003 Act of Accession amended the text of the existing protocols - without repealing any or creating new ones)
 * 2008 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties (note: The Lisbon Treaty (2007) repealed the following 8 old protocol numbers (10)+(12)+(13)+(19)+(23)+(24)+(33)+(35); created the following 9 new protocols 8+9+10+14+25+26+27+30+36; and renumbered the following 28 old protocol numbers: (9)=1, (30)=2, (6)=3, (18)=4, (11)=5, (8)=6, (36)=7, (1)=11, (20)=12, (21)=13, (25)=15, (26)=16, (22)=17, (27)=18, (2)=19, (3)=20, (4)=21, (5)=22, (31)=23, (29)=24, (28)=28, (32)=29, (14)=31, (16)=32, (17)=33, (15)=34, (7)=35, (34)=37). This increased the total number of TEU+TFEU protocols to 37.
 * 2010 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties
 * 2012 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties
 * 2016 version of all Protocols for all EU treaties
 * [1992 version of Annexes for TEC] (note: The attached Annexes for TEC was not published along with the consolidated TEC resulting from the Maastricht treaty's entry into force. The Maastricht treaty however made no amendment/repeal/new annexes to TEC, and the 1992-title of Annex I+II+III+IV (although still without republished text as it appeared in 1992) can be found in the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty)
 * 1997 version of Annexes for TEC (note: Amsterdam Treaty repealed the old Annex I+III, and then renumbered Annex II to I and IV to II, which now also has been published in full updated text)
 * 2002 version of Annexes for TEC
 * 2006 version of Annexes for TEC
 * 2008 version of Annexes for TFEU
 * 2010 version of Annexes for TFEU
 * 2012 version of Annexes for TFEU
 * 2016 version of Annexes for TFEU
 * [1992 version of all Declarations (incl. those already in place for TEEC)]
 * 1997 version of 59 Declarations made by the Amsterdam Treaty
 * 1999 version of all Declarations to SEA (20) + Maastricht (33) + 1 May 1992 event (1) + Amsterdam (59)
 * 2002 version of 27 Declarations made by the Nice Treaty
 * [2006 version of all Declarations]
 * 2008 version of 65 Declarations made by the Lisbon Treaty
 * 2010 version of 65 Declarations made by the Lisbon Treaty
 * 2012 version of 65 Declarations made by the Lisbon Treaty
 * 2016 version of 65 Declarations made by the Lisbon Treaty
 * [1992 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEC]
 * 1997 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TEC
 * [2002 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TEC]
 * [2006 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TEC]
 * 2008 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TFEU
 * 2010 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TFEU
 * 2012 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TFEU
 * 2016 version of EQUIVALENCES TABLES for TEU+TFEU

Not sure what of the above A/B/C choices would be best? But I think we should at least choose either approach A/B/C, and then make it clear to readers/editors that we consolidate according to this choice. Danish Expert (talk) 12:35, 29 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I tend to favour the above option B/C (but still not sure which one to pick). So I would appreciate opinions being posted here to solve the question, in particular by the previous editors of this article (Billinghurst / L.Tak / JLogan). :-) Danish Expert (talk) 15:00, 29 March 2017 (UTC)

 * To fulfil Wikisource's mandate to be a repository of sources, your option C is the best. Disambiguate by year. Beeswaxcandle (talk) 18:37, 29 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes to C. If we are only to have one copy (for now), I would suggest move and a redirect, just for clarity. — billinghurst  sDrewth  19:38, 29 March 2017 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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Page:Folk-lore - A Quarterly Review. Volume 1, 1890.djvu/398

392 regarded as incarnations of the forest or field divinities. He points out similar cases where king, priest, or even god is slain, so that he should not die a natural death with his powers enfeebled. There can be little doubt that he has proved this part of his case up to the hilt. I am not so convinced, however, of his success with the bough that plays the title rôle to his book. This he considers to be the “external soul” (“Life-Index” was Capt. Temple’s very apt title for it) of the tree, and probably of the grove. So far so good, but why should a would-be successor of the Arician priest have to pluck it before beginning the fight with the present possessor? There can be two or more external souls of a being, answers Mr. Frazer, and both must be slain or annihilated before the soul can pass in fresh to a new external home. The moral of that would seem to be, rather keep one of the external souls vigorous, and all will be well. As one of Mr. Stevenson’s characters remarks, “It’s not much use killing a man if he’s got another life.” The Golden Bough may be the mistletoe, and the external soul of the oak, but why it had to be plucked before the combat in the grove of Nemi, is, I confess, to me a mystery still.

So much for the nominal subject of the book, which, after all, is but one of the curiosities of custom that are interesting to solve indeed, but yet seem by-paths in the search after mythological truth. But those who remember Mr. Frazer’s first and still most brilliant piece of work in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute, for 1885, on Burial Customs, will know that it is his way to tack on to such seeming trivialities an enormous mass of well-digested facts bearing on his nominal subject, but really of more interest than it. He has pursued the same course on the present occasion. He has incorporated in this book the greater part of Mannhardt’s researches on agricultural customs and their significance, with additions from his own unrivalled collections. The most remarkable of these is that deduced from Harvest Home games, which would


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User talk:76.90.217.112

Welcome

Hello, and welcome to Wikisource! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

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In any case, I hope you enjoy donating your time to grow the Wikisource library that is free for everyone to use! In discussions, please sign your comments using four tildes ( ~ ); this will automatically produce your IP address (or username if you're logged in) and the date. If you need help, ask me on my talk page, or ask your question here (click  [ edit] ) and place  before your question. Again, welcome! — billinghurst  sDrewth  14:43, 7 January 2011 (UTC)

title: User talk:76.90.217.112


text:
Page:Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, v3.djvu/228

 their pens, and sat enchanted from near the beginning to quite the close. The speech now lives only in the memory of a few old men, and the enthusiasm with which they cherish their recollection of it is absolutely astonishing. The precise language of this speech we shall never know; but we do know—we cannot help knowing—that with deep pathos it pleaded the cause of the injured sailor, that it invoked the genius of the Revolution, that it apostrophized the names of Otis, of Henry, and of Washington, that it appealed to the interest, the pride, the honor, and the glory of the nation, that it shamed and taunted the timidity of friends, that it scorned and scouted and withered the temerity of domestic foes, that it bearded and defied the British lion, and rising and swelling and maddening in its course, it sounded the onset, till the charge, the shock, the steady struggle, and the glorious victory all passed in vivid review before the entranced hearers.

Important and exciting as was the war question of 1812, it never so alarmed the sagacious statesmen of the country for the safety of the Republic as afterward did the Missouri question. This sprang from that unfortunate source of discord—negro slavery. When our Federal Constitution was adopted, we owned no territory beyond the limits or ownership of the States, except the territory northwest of the River Ohio and east of the Mississippi. What has since been formed into the States of Maine, Kentucky, and Tennessee, was, I believe, within the limits of or owned by Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina. As to the Northwestern Territory, provision had been made even before the


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 Rh seem to render it probable that human sacrifices were common in archaic times to ensure the fertility of the soil. If the inferences of Mannhardt and Mr. Frazer are to be trusted, there is scarcely a field in Europe that has not at one time or another been reddened by the blood of such a sacrifice. I would, myself, hesitate before accepting such a sweeping assertion, simply on inference from folk-lore “survivals”. We should have somewhat more explicit evidence of such general carnage before we can assert its general existence all over the countries where the folk-lore customs extend. Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Frazer seems to me to overlook the imitative nature of man, and the possible spread of the customs and the rhymes from one centre.

Mr. Frazer, again following Mannhardt, applies these agricultural customs to explain some of the most archaic myths, as, e.g., those of the deaths of Osiris and Adonis. These he connects with the habit of killing the “corn-demon” to ensure its vigorous life in another personality. Mr. Frazer confesses, in his preface, to some misgivings that he has pushed his hypothesis too far, and in the cases of Attis, Osiris, and Dionysus this seems to be the case, their connection with agriculture being of the slightest. Mr. Frazer might have taken more account of the thesis of Von Hehn, who suggests that the association of certain plants with certain deities—e.g., the olive with Athene—was really due to its introduction by the priests of the god or goddess. However, it is the duty of every hypothesiser to push his theory to its furthest extent. Someone has said that the use of philosophical systems is in their weak places. So, too, the strength of an hypothesis is best shown in its weak places. Mr. Frazer’s views have some plausibility, even when stretched and strained to their utmost.

But the merit of Mr. Frazer’s book resides, not so much in his theories, ingenious as they are, as in his facts and in his co-ordinations of them. “The Golden Bough” is really


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Page:Folk-lore - A Quarterly Review. Volume 1, 1890.djvu/400

394 a series of monographs on folk-lore and mythological subjects. Some of these attain almost to the rank of treatises, e.g., the section on royal and priestly taboos in vol. i, and that on the external soul in vol. ii. Mr. Frazer’s mastery of the whole literature of folk-lore and savage life is something remarkable, and is clearly based on a thorough and systematic search through all likely sources (the Dutch reports on their Eastern possessions are a quite unworked field). One quite envies Mr. Frazer the hours of happy work which must have been passed in compiling this mass of information. He must often have felt the supreme joy of the researcher in finding his chaotic materials slowly rounding themselves into an intelligible whole. He must, by this time, have pigeon-holed the greater part of savagism and folk-lore (if we can distinguish between the two), and “The Golden Bough” from this point of view offers greater promise than even its very great performance.

Looking back on the two books, which I have now, perhaps, sufficiently though summarily characterised, a few general remarks suggest themselves. Though to a certain degree the authors have worked together, it is somewhat curious to find them tending to opposite conclusions on the same point. Thus Prof. Smith traces the theocracy, or the conception of God as king, to the establishment of monarchy in Israel; Mr. Frazer, on the other hand, regards kingship as primarily incarnate deity on earth. Royal taboos, according to Mr. Frazer, are strictly the divinity that doth hedge a king. Prof. Smith regards taboo as the origin of holiness. I have already referred to the different attitudes of the two authors as regards human sacrifice, though it is fair to remember that Mr. Frazer is speaking mainly of the agricultural stage, Prof. Smith of the nomad or pastoral.

The two books, indeed, suggest that in the very near


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Page:Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, v3.djvu/229

 of the Constitution that slavery should never go there. On the admission of States into the Union, carved from the territory we owned before the Constitution, no question, or at most no considerable question, arose about slavery—those which were within the limits of or owned by the old States following respectively the condition of the parent State, and those within the Northwest Territory following the previously made provision. But in 1803 we purchased Louisiana of the French, and it included with much more what has since been formed into the State of Missouri. With regard to it, nothing had been done to forestall the question of slavery. When, therefore, in 1819, Missouri, having formed a State constitution, without excluding slavery, and with slavery already actually existing within its limits, knocked at the door of the Union for admission, almost the entire representation of the non-slaveholding States objected. A fearful and angry struggle instantly followed. This alarmed thinking men more than any previous question, because unlike all the former, it divided the country by geographical lines. Other questions had their opposing partisans in all localities of the country and in almost every family, so that no division of the Union could follow such without a separation of friends to quite as great an extent as that of opponents. Not so with the Missouri question. On this a geographical line could be traced, which in the main would separate opponents only. This was the danger. Mr. Jefferson, then in retirement, wrote:

 I had for a long time ceased to read newspapers or to pay any attention to public affairs, confident they were


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Rh future we may see the very desirable application of institutional archæology to mythology. The gods and rituals of a nomad or pastoral people will differ from those of an agricultural type of society, and we should find traces of the difference in the passage of one nation through these stages. Prof. Smith at times makes use of this criterion, but the institutional archæology of the Semites is in too immature a state to be of much use in this direction at present.

Both books are slightly old-fashioned in assuming a unity and solidarity among both Aryans and Semites, which all recent research tends to disprove. In all branches of pre-historic and folk-lore research the tendency is to regard customs, language, and institutions as having a definite origin at a fixed place and epoch, and their spread is to be explained through diffusion by borrowing. I have already referred to this in connection with Mr. Frazer’s book, but the point is important enough to deserve reiteration. The borrowing hypothesis is clearly applicable to mythology, since the religions of the whole world have been borrowed from opposite races, the Buddhism of the Mongol races from the Aryans of India, the Christianity of Europe from the Semites of Judæa, and the Mahommedanism of Turkey, India, and Africa from Semitic Arabia. Those are borrowing facts which lend great plausibility to the borrowing hypothesis on a smaller scale and in less wide areas.

The last two books on our list deal on a large scale with this borrowing process, in language, custom, and institutions among the early Aryans. Dr. Schrader’s book gives the facts of the pre-historic antiquities of the Aryan peoples, as deduced from their languages and their material archaeology, with German thoroughness; but, alas! with German unreadableness. Though professing to review and revise the facts of philology by the facts of archæology, the book is, in the main, philological. It chiefly interests us here as giving the latest word on the original Aryan


text: Cartoon portraits and biographical sketches of men of the day/William Hepworth Dixon


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Page:Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, v3.djvu/230

  in good hands and content to be a passenger in our bark to the shore from which I am not distant. But this momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated, and every irritation will mark it deeper and deeper. I can say with conscious truth that there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would to relieve us from this heavy reproach in any practicable way. The cession of that kind of property—for it is so misnamed—is a bagatelle which would not cost me a second thought if in that way a general emancipation and expatriation could be effected, and gradually and with due sacrifices I think it might be. But as it is, we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.

Mr. Clay was in Congress, and, perceiving the danger, at once engaged his whole energies to avert it. It began, as I have said, in 1819; and it did not terminate till 1821. Missouri would not yield the point; and Congress—that is, a majority in Congress—by repeated votes showed a determination not to admit the State unless it should yield. After several failures and great labor on the part of Mr. Clay to so present the question that a majority could consent to the admission, it was by a vote rejected, and as all seemed to think, finally. A sullen gloom hung over the nation. All felt that the rejection of Missouri was equivalent to a dissolution of the Union, because those States which already had what Missouri was rejected for refusing to relinquish would go with Missouri. All deprecated and deplored this, but none saw how to avert it.


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396 mythology, which, twenty years ago, was going to give us the key to all the mythologies. Judging from Dr. Schrader’s results, the key has broken in the wards. He declines to grant a single god common to the whole of Aryan-speaking peoples.

The resemblances in names are reduced to two or three notably Zeus = Dyaus, and these are explained away without the resort to the hypothesis of a common worship of the early Aryans. Thus, of the great mythological myth of the sixties one great stronghold is taken. The Aryans had no common gods. Dr. Schrader is even so heretical as to deny that they ever had a common home, and certainly not in Asia. This is a theme taken up with great skill by Canon Taylor, whose lucidity is a pleasant contrast to Dr. Schrader’s painstaking piling up of materials for a book. Canon Taylor adds to the subsidiary aids of philology the use of anthropology. His craniology strikes one as somewhat amateurish, but his ethnological treatment of the subject brings out the main thesis of his book with great skill. This I take to be that the Aryan tongue was imposed upon the peoples now speaking Aryan by conquest, and was not a common possession of six or seven sets of races. In short, there was only one Aryan race and tongue, and the latter has been passed on to various races by conquest. Authorities are disagreed as to the Ur-Aryans: some are for the Scandinavians, some for the Celts. Canon Taylor himself has a brief for the Letts; but all seem to agree that there was never such a thing as a common Aryan race from whom Celts, Teutons, etc., “swarmed off” as they increased in numbers. The whole outcome is a remarkable lesson against precipitate decision in such inquiries. Twenty years ago we could all have sworn that the original home of the Aryans was in Asia, that they were all of one blood, that they had a common culture and worship, and that they passed into Europe westwards. All this was presented to us with such confidence, eloquence, and insistence, that denial seemed ignorant presumption. Now all this is changed, and great is the


text:
Talk:Plan of Bill Proposed by Hon. George H. Earle, Jr., Philadelphia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives [ of the United States of America ] in Congress assembled:

That it is and shall be the public policy of the United States to prevent and prohibit every combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce among the States or with foreign nations (Loewe v. Lalor, 208 U. S., 274), or restricts, in that regard, the liberty to enter into or engage in business (Harriman v. Northern Securities case, 197 U. S., 291); or to secure such powers, as, in view of natural temptation to acquire gain, if exercised, tend to so prevent competition as to restrain such commerce. It being now declared to accord with said policy to keep such trade free from all obstruction, or dangerous probability of obstruction, whether it be physical or economic, denominated "reasonable" or "unreasonable," "due" or "undue," "direct" or "indirect." It being further expressly declared that all things that tend to, or actually obstruct, limit, or diminish such trade or commerce, in any degree, and whether for private benefit or not, are injurious, unreasonable, and harmful to the public, and illegal. It being further declared to be part of such policy to regard all monopolies, or attempts to monopolize, whether of transportation, or the buying, selling, or making of commodities that, in whole or part, usually pass into national commerce; or of establishing power of applying unified tactics as to prices, as tending to such advance of prices as to naturally and directly restrain and limit the flow of interstate, as well as that of intrastate trade. It being further declared to be the national policy to regard all monopolies of commodities as but the creation of an unlawful power of irregularly imposing taxation upon trade among the States and with foreign nations, and thus directly tending to restrain it. It is hereby declared not to be part of said public policy, to regard all cooperation as necessarily injurious, nor all competition as necessarily beneficial; it being a chief purpose of national policy now declared to so safeguard both that whilst all beneficial cooperation may be permitted and encouraged, competition shall never be so restrained or limited as to create natural tendency to, or dangerous probability of, injury of power to injure the public; or to substitute an arbitrary fixing of prices through contracts, unified tactics, or other means or methods, for the natural results following from free competition.

For the purposes of this act: (a) The expressions "trade" and "commerce," unless otherwise determined by the context, shall relate to trade and commerce among the States and with foreign nations. (b) The expression "combination in the form of trust or otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce" is used to cover, include, and mean combinations of two or more persons, to do or accomplish any of the things declared to be in contravention of the public policy of the United States, as in this act declared; or to, in any wise, accomplish any purpose that will restrain, or tend to restrain, trade or commerce; and which would not have been criminal but for the provisions of this act, though unenforceable at common law; and no such combination is to be deemed "reasonable," "due," or lawful. (c) The expression "conspiracy in restraint of trade among the States or with foreign nations" is used to cover, include, and mean all combinations that actually do, or naturally tend to, restrain trade or commerce, where there is either means or end that would make such conspiracy action giving, to a party injured, or criminal, at common law. And no such conspiracy is deemed to be "reasonable," or "due," or lawful. (d) The expression "contracts in restraint of trade or commerce among the States or with foreign nations" is used to include, cover, and mean voluntary contractual contracts whereby one or more agree voluntarily to limit his or their right and freedom to engage in such trade or commerce. Such contracts are declared to be prima facie unlawful; but to become lawful only upon it being established that they do not actually and naturally tend to restrain such trade or commerce; really tending to aid and benefit it, without injuring the public, and with no purpose or dangerous probability or tendency of injuring it, by creating the power of or establishing monopolies and fixing trade prices by unified tactics in relation thereto. (e) The expression "monopolize or attempt to monopolize" is used to cover, include, and mean not only all completed monopolies, but all efforts or arrangements naturally tending thereto, and especially all cases where power is sought or obtained to so fix the cost of producing, delivering, buying, or selling anything that naturally flows in or involves trade or commerce among the States or with foreign nations, by unified tactics, as distinguished from such prices fixed and controlled by natural law where free and effective competition exists, it being the opinion of Congress that all such attempts to monopolize, whether completed or not, naturally and directly restrain trade and commerce among the States and with foreign nations by increasing prices and decreasing consumption more injuriously and odiously than in any other way or by any other means, such attempts, when successful, in the opinion of Congress, placing in private hands, whether authorized by State action or not, a power of arbitrary taxation of national commerce not even possessed by the sovereign States themselves.

The purpose and object of this act, to be considered in its interpretation, being to preserve the liberty of all to freely enter into and continue in a free flow of national trade; to constitute all monopolies of commodities, as well as all things actually tending to restrain such trade, prima facie evidence of an intent to restrain; to encourage and make lawful everything that may aid and foster it, and to prohibit and punish all things that either tend to or do limit, obstruct, burden, or destroy it, and to regard and be governed by actualities and not mere appearances or nomenclature. [ SEC. 1. ] Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. [ SEC. 2. ] Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. [ SEC. 3. ] Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. [ SEC. 4. ] The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises. [ SEC. 5. ] Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four of this act may be pending that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not, and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof. [ SEC. 6. ] Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law. [ SEC. 7. ] Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, or in any district where the "injury" for which suit is brought is alleged to have been in whole or part inflicted, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. And damages may be proved in any legal way, including proof of prior earnings of the plaintiff in a business unlawfully interfered with or by the earnings of the defendant or defendants in the most profitable part of their business, not exceeding in amount the amount of business which could and would probably have been done but for the wrongs complained of. No action, however, to be sustainable where the plaintiff's case does not exceed a mere unacted upon desire or intent to so engage in such trade. This act is declared to be severable in every word, phrase, and part, and it is the intention that all or any of its provisions that can be lawfully enforced shall be, notwithstanding deficiencies in any other part. [ SEC. 8. ]That the word "person" or "persons," wherever used in this act, shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.


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 Rh fall of the originators thereof. And with their fall has gone the folk-etymology theory of the origin of the early mythologies.

No one theory has taken the place of the sun-myths and the rest. A wise syncretism is taking the place of the single key that was to fit all wards. There are gods of the woods and of the fields, there are totem-gods and ancestral gods, the generative powers were worshipped, stocks and stones received their cult, even the sun and moon had their votaries. Few would nowadays be prepared to reduce all these forms of man’s reverence for the Divine to any one single principle. And even in details, the passion for explaining away the facts as given in ancient records is fast disappearing. When the sacrifice was given “as a sweet savour unto the Lord” the modern inquirer does not desire to explain this away. He thinks the ancient who spoke thus meant what he said, and no more or less. The results thus reached may often seem ludicrous, but they are not more so than facts observed every day in savage life. We ought not perhaps to be surprised to find that as man has risen from the beasts we can catch him at times in stages of mind which can be but little higher than the beast’s.

The hope that the study of comparative religion would throw some light on religion itself seems to be fading away. It seems, in fact, as if the mythological show has somewhat disappointed the sight-seers. They have been invited by eloquent showmen to enter and take their seats, and they would see what they would see. What they have seen has been a curtain covered with figures, some beautiful and some grotesque, but all of lower orders of art. Many have been the guesses as to the meaning of these figures, and as to what was behind the curtain. But the curtain has never been raised, and some among the audience are beginning to ask, “Is the curtain the picture, and is there nothing behind the veil, behind the veil?”

.


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 For the judgment of members to be convinced of the necessity of yielding was not the whole difficulty; each had a constituency to meet and to answer to. Mr. Clay, though worn down and exhausted, was appealed to by members to renew his efforts at compromise. He did so, and by some judicious modifications of his plan, coupled with laborious efforts with individual members and his own overmastering eloquence upon that floor, he finally secured the admission of the State. Brightly and captivatingly as it had previously shone, it was now perceived that his great eloquence was a mere embellishment, or at most but a helping hand to his inventive genius, and his devotion to his country in the day of her extreme peril.

After the settlement of the Missouri question, although a portion of the American people have differed with Mr. Clay, and a majority even appear generally to have been opposed to him on questions of ordinary administration, he seems constantly to have been regarded by all as the man for a crisis. Accordingly, in the days of nullification, and more recently in the reappearance of the slavery question connected with our territory newly acquired of Mexico, the task of devising a mode of adjustment seems to have been cast upon Mr. Clay by common consent—and his performance of the task in each case was little else than a literal fulfillment of the public expectation.

Mr. Clay's efforts in behalf of the South Americans, and afterward in behalf of the Greeks, in the times of their respective struggles for civil liberty, are among the finest on record, upon the noblest of all themes, and bear ample


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 of what I have said was his ruling passion—a love of liberty and right, unselfishly, and for their own sakes.

Having been led to allude to domestic slavery so frequently already, I am unwilling to close without referring more particularly to Mr. Clay's views and conduct in regard to it. He ever was on principle and in feeling opposed to slavery. The very earliest, and one of the latest, public efforts of his life, separated by a period of more than fifty years, were both made in favor of gradual emancipation. He did not perceive that on a question of human right the negroes were to be excepted from the human race. And yet Mr. Clay was the owner of slaves. Cast into life when slavery was already widely spread and deeply seated, he did not perceive, as I think no wise man has perceived, how it could be at once eradicated without producing a greater evil even to the cause of human liberty itself. His feeling and his judgment, therefore, ever led him to oppose both extremes of opinion on the subject. Those who would shiver into fragments the Union of these States, tear to tatters its now venerated Constitution, and even burn the last copy of the Bible, rather than slavery should continue a single hour, together with all their more halting sympathizers, have received, and are receiving, their just execration; and the name and opinions and influence of Mr. Clay are fully and, as I trust, effectually and enduringly arrayed against them. But I would also, if I could, array his name, opinions, and influence against the opposite extreme—against a few but an increasing number of men who, for the sake of perpetuating slavery, are beginning to assail and to ridicule the


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 Held at 22, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, on Tuesday Evening, June 24th, 1890.

., Director, in the Chair.

HE Report of the Council was read by the Secretary, Mr. :—

The Council have deemed it desirable to revert to an earlier date for the Annual Meeting of the Society than has been the practice of the past two years.

There is only six months’ work to report, therefore, and though a great deal of attention has been given by the Council and their Committees to the recommendations adopted by the Society in November last, it is too early to report definite results.

The Council’s first attention was directed to the publications of the Society. They appointed an Editorial Committee, consisting of the Hon. J. Abercromby, Mr. Gomme, and Mr. Nutt, to whom were deputed the duties attendant upon the publication of the Journal of the Society. The title of this Journal was the first important question to be decided, and the Council congratulate the Society upon the one adopted—Folk-Lore. The Committee has the valuable aid of Mr. Joseph Jacobs as Editor of Folk-Lore, and the result of the new arrangement will, the Council believe, be satisfactory to the Members of the Society, and a distinct advantage to the scientific study of Folk-lore. The Council hope that Members will use every effort to make the new Journal known in all parts of the country, and will forward to the Editor all contributions that may prove of service.


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 white man's charter of freedom, the declaration that "all men are created free and equal." So far as I have learned, the first American of any note to do or attempt this was the late John C. Calhoun; and if I mistake not, it soon after found its way into some of the messages of the Governor of South Carolina. We, however, look for and are not much shocked by political eccentricities and heresies in South Carolina. But only last year I saw with astonishment what purported to be a letter of a very distinguished and influential clergyman of Virginia, copied, with apparent approbation, into a St. Louis newspaper; containing the following to me very unsatisfactory language:

 I am fully aware that there is a text in some Bibles that is not in mine. Professional Abolitionists have made more use of it than of any passage in the Bible. It came, however, as I trace it, from Saint Voltaire, and was baptized by Thomas Jefferson, and since almost universally regarded as canonical authority, "All men are born free and equal."

 This is a genuine coin in the political currency of our generation. I am sorry to say that I have never seen two men of whom it is true. But I must admit I never saw the Siamese Twins, and therefore will not dogmatically say that no man ever saw a proof of this sage aphorism.

This sounds strangely in republican America. The like was not heard in the fresher days of the republic. Let us contrast with it the language of that truly national man whose life and death we now commemorate and lament. I quote from a speech of Mr. Clay delivered before the American Colonization Society in 1827:

 We are reproached with doing mischief by the agitation of this question. The society goes into no


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  to disturb its domestic tranquillity. It addresses itself to no slaves to weaken their obligations of obedience. It seeks to affect no man's property. It neither has the power nor the will to affect the property of any one contrary to his consent. The execution of its scheme would augment instead of diminishing the value of property left behind. The society, composed of free men, concerns itself only with the free. Collateral consequences we are not responsible for. It is not this society which has produced the great moral revolution which the age exhibits. What would they who thus reproach us have done? If they would repress all tendencies toward liberty and ultimate emancipation, they must do more than put down the benevolent efforts of society. They must go back to the era of our liberty and independence, and muzzle the cannon which thunders its annual joyous return. They must renew the slave-trade, with all its train of atrocities. They must suppress the workings of British philanthropy, seeking to meliorate the condition of the unfortunate West Indian slave. They must arrest the career of South American deliverance from thraldom. They must blow out the moral light around us and extinguish that greatest torch of all which America presents to a benighted world—pointing the way to their rights, their liberties, and their happiness. And when they have achieved all those purposes their work will be yet incomplete. They must penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love of liberty. Then, and not till then, when universal darkness and despair prevail, can you perpetuate slavery and repress all sympathy and all humane and benevolent efforts among free men in behalf of the unhappy portion of our race doomed to bondage.

The American Colonization Society was organized in 1816. Mr. Clay, though not its projector, was one of its earliest members; and he died, as for many preceding years he had been, its president. It was one of the most cherished objects of his direct care and consideration, and the association of his name with it has probably been its very greatest collateral support. He


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 it no demerit in the society that it tended to relieve the slaveholders from the troublesome presence of the free negroes; but this was far from being its whole merit in his estimation. In the same speech from which we have quoted he says:

 * There is a moral fitness in the idea of returning to Africa her children, whose ancestors have been torn from her by the ruthless hand of fraud and violence. Transplanted in a foreign land, they will carry back to their native soil the rich fruits of religion, civilization, law and liberty. May it not be one of the great designs of the Ruler of the universe, whose ways are often inscrutable by short-sighted mortals, thus to transform an original crime into a signal blessing to that most unfortunate portion of the globe?

This suggestion of the possible ultimate redemption of the African race and African continent was made twenty-five years ago. Every succeeding year has added strength to the hope of its realization. May it indeed be realized. Pharaoh's country was cursed with plagues, and his hosts were lost in the Red Sea, for striving to retain a captive people who had already served them more than four hundred years. May like disasters never befall us! If, as the friends of colonization hope, the present and coming generations of our countrymen shall by any means succeed in freeing our land from the dangerous presence of slavery, and at the same time in restoring a captive people to their long-lost fatherland with bright prospects for the future, and this too so gradually that neither races nor individuals shall have suffered by the change, it will indeed be a glorious consummation. And if to such a consummation the efforts of Mr. Clay


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 Rh The second volume of the year is the Exempla of Jacques de Vitry, to be edited by Professor Crane. This is now nearly through the press, and will he ready for issue in a short time.

The Tabulation of Folk-tales, to which the Council have given so much attention, has been the subject of some criticism, both at the Folk-lore Congress at Paris in 1889, and by scholars at home. The Council, while admitting that some improvement in detail might be adopted, consider that their plan on the whole will supply students with the most satisfactory collection of material for the proper study of folk-tales. They have, however, somewhat varied their plan of action. To arrive at quicker results, they consider that the tales should be taken up group by group, and as the tabulation of all the tales belonging to each group is completed, they have resolved to publish these separately for the use of Members. The first group selected for this purpose is “Cinderella”. Miss Roalfe Cox kindly consented to edit the tabulation of this group, and accordingly all Members engaged in tabulation are now at work upon the several variants. As soon as this group has been completed, another will be taken up, and by this means a survey of the variants of each tale will be supplied, and, it is hoped, at no great distance of time.

The Handbook of Folk-Lore is not yet finished, but will be ready before the autumn session of the Society opens, and the Council hope that Members will do their utmost to make it widely known and used, both at home and by travellers abroad. As soon as this is out of the way, the Council hope to be able to press forward Mr. Gomme’s English Bibliography of Folk-Lore.

At the Folk-lore Congress held at Paris in July 1889 it was resolved unanimously to hold the second meeting in London, in 1891, and Mr. C. G. Leland, President of the Gipsy-lore Society, was nominated by the meeting “pour s’occuper de son organisation”. The Council, feeling the importance of the subject, have entered into hearty co-operation with Mr. Leland, and have decided to use every effort to promote the success of such a gathering. Many important detailed arrangements are necessary, and the Council look forward to the help of all Members, both to give our foreign visitors and fellow-workers a hearty welcome, and to advance by these international exchanges of thought the progress


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 shall have contributed, it will be what he most ardently wished, and none of his labors will have been more valuable to his country and his kind.

But Henry Clay is dead. His long and eventful life is closed. Our country is prosperous and powerful; but could it have been quite all it has been, and is, and is to be, without Henry Clay? Such a man the times have demanded, and such in the Providence of God was given us. But he is gone. Let us strive to deserve, as far as mortals may, the continued care of Divine Providence, trusting that in future national emergencies, He will not fail to provide us the instruments of safety and security.

Government is a combination of the people of a country to effect certain objects by joint effort. The best framed and best administered governments are necessarily expensive; while by errors in frame and maladministration most of them are more onerous than they need be, and some of them very oppressive. Why, then, should we have government? Why not each individual take to himself the whole fruit of his labor, without having any of it taxed away, in services, corn, or money? Why not take just so much land as he can cultivate with his own hands, without buying it of any one?

The legitimate object of government is "to do for the people what needs to be done, but which they can not, by individual effort, do at all, or do


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400 of our study. The Council will issue further particulars as soon as definite arrangements are made, and so that no expense shall fall upon the funds of the Society, they propose the formation of a small guarantee fund to cover any expenditure in excess of the Congress fee.

During the last session the following evening meetings have been held, and have been very well attended.

The roll of members has increased from 346 to 375.

The moved the adoption of the Report, which was seconded and agreed to ''nem. con.''

The Treasurer’s Report was then read by Mr. , and adopted ''nem. con. (See opposite page'')

Mr. moved the election of Mr. Andrew Lang as President; Lord Beauchamp, Sir John Lubbock, Dr. E. B. Tylor, and General Pitt-Rivers as Vice-Presidents;


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Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln/Volume 3/Eulogy of Henry Clay

bg:Ейбрахам Линкълн: Похвално слово за Хенри Клей


text: Folk-Lore/Volume 1/Recent Research in Comparative Religion


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Rh relatively to each other. In their simple relation they already constitute two kinds of pursuits, two different regions of consciousness, and we pass to and fro from the one to the other alternately only. Thus man has in his actual worldly life a number of working days during which he occupies himself with his own special interests, with worldly aims in general, and with the satisfaction of his needs; and then he has a Sunday, when he lays all this aside, collects his thoughts, and, released from absorption in finite occupations, lives to himself and to the higher nature which is in him, to his true essential being. But into this separateness of the two sides there directly enters a double modification.

($$\alpha$$.) Let us consider first of all the religion of the godly man; that is, of one who truly deserves to be so called. Faith is still presupposed as existing irrespective of, and without opposition to, anything else. To believe in God is thus in its simplicity, something different from that where a man, with reflection and with the consciousness that something else stands opposed to this faith, says, “I believe in God.” Here the need of justification, of inference, of controversy, has already come in. Now that religion of the simple, godly man is not kept shut off and divided from the rest of his existence and life, but, on the contrary, it breathes its influence over all his feelings and actions, and his consciousness brings all the aims and objects of his worldly life into relation to God, as to its infinite and ultimate source. Every moment of his finite existence and activity, of his sorrow and joy, is lifted up by him out of his limited sphere, and by being thus lifted up produces in him the idea and sense of his eternal nature. The rest of his life, in like manner, is led under the conditions of confidence, of custom, of dutifulness, of habit; he is that which circumstances and nature have made him, and he takes his life, his circumstances, and rights as he receives everything, namely, as a lot or destiny which he does not


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 understand. It is so. In regard to God, he either takes what is His and gives thanks, or else he offers it up to Him freely as a gift of free grace. The rest of his conscious life is thus subordinated, without reflection, to that higher region.

($$\beta$$.) From the worldly side, however, the distinction involved in this relation develops until it becomes opposition. It is true that the development of this side does not seem to affect religion injuriously, and all action seems to limit itself strictly to that side in the matter. Judging from what is expressly acknowledged, religion is still looked upon as what is highest; but as a matter of fact it is not so, and starting from the worldly side, ruin and disunion creep over into religion. The development of this distinction may be generally designated as the maturing of the understanding and of human aims. While understanding awakens in human life and in science, and reflection has become independent, the will sets before itself absolute aims; for example, justice, the state, objects which are to have absolute worth, to be in and for themselves. Thus research recognises the laws, the constitution, the order, and the peculiar characteristics of natural things, and of the activities and productions of Spirit. Now these experiences and forms of knowledge, as well as the willing and actual carrying out of these aims, is a work of man, both of his understanding and will. In them he is in presence of what is his own. Although he sets out from what is, from what he finds, yet he is no longer merely one who knows, who has these rights; but what he makes out of that which is given in knowledge and in will is his affair, his work, and he has the consciousness that he has produced it. Therefore these productions constitute his glory and his pride, and provide for him an immense, an infinite wealth—that world of his intelligence, of his knowledge, of his external possession, of his rights and deeds.

Thus the spirit has entered into the condition of


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 —as yet, it is true, artlessly, and without at first knowing it—but the opposition comes to be a conscious one, for the spirit now moves between two sides, of which the distinction has actually developed itself. The one side is that in which the spirit knows itself to be its own, where it lives in its own aims and interests, and determines itself on its own authority as independent and self-sustaining. The other side is that where the spirit recognises a higher Power—absolute duties, duties without rights belonging to them, and what the spirit receives for the accomplishment of its duties is always regarded as grace alone. In the first instance it is the independence of the spirit which is the foundation, here its attitude is that of humility and dependence. Its religion is accordingly distinguished from what we have in that region of independence by this, that it restricts knowledge, science, to the worldly side, and leaves for the sphere of religion, feeling and faith.

($$\gamma$$.) Notwithstanding, that aspect of independence involves this also, that its action is conditioned, and knowledge and will must have experience of the fact that it is thus conditioned. Man demands his right; whether or not he actually gets it, is something independent of his efforts, and he is referred in the matter to an Other. In the act of knowledge he sets out from the organisation and order of nature, and this is something given. The content of his sciences is a material outside of him. Thus the two sides, that of independence and that of conditionality, enter into relation with each other, and this relation leads man to the avowal that everything is made by God—all things which constitute the content of his knowledge, which he takes possession of, and uses as means for his ends, as well as he himself, the spirit and the spiritual faculties of which he, as he says, makes use, in order to attain to that knowledge.

But this admission is cold and lifeless, because that which constitutes the vitality of this consciousness, in


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 which it is “at home with itself,” and is self-consciousness, this insight, this knowledge are wanting in it. All that is determined comes, on the contrary, to be included in the sphere of knowledge, and of human, self-appointed aims, and here, too, it is only the activity belonging to self-consciousness which is present. Therefore that admission is unfruitful too, because it does not get beyond the abstract-universal, that is to say, it stops short at the thought that all is a work of God, and with regard to objects which are absolutely different (as, for example, the course of the stars and their laws, ants, or men), that relation continues for it fixed at one and the same point, namely this, that God has made all. Since this religious relation of particular objects is always expressed in the same monotonous manner, it would become tedious and burdensome if it were repeated in reference to each individual thing. Therefore the matter is settled with the one admission, that God has made everything, and this religious side is thereby satisfied once for all, and then in the progress of knowledge and the pursuit of aims nothing further is thought of the matter. It would accordingly appear that this admission is made simply and solely in order to get rid of the whole business, or perhaps it may be to get protection for the religious side as it were relatively to what is without. In short, such expressions may be used either in earnest or not.

Piety does not weary of lifting up its eyes to God on all and every occasion, although it may do so daily and hourly in the same manner. But as religious feeling, it really rests in singleness or single instances; it is in every moment wholly what it is, and is without reflection and the consciousness which compares experiences. It is here, on the contrary, where knowledge and self-determination are concerned, that this comparison, and the consciousness of that sameness, are essentially present, and then a general proposition is


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 enunciated once for all. On the one side we have understanding playing its part, while over against it is the religious feeling of dependence.

b. Even piety is not exempt from the fate of falling into a state of division or dualism. On the contrary, division is already present in it implicitly, in that its actual content is only a manifold, accidental one. These two attitudes, namely, that of piety and of the understanding that compares, however different they seem to be, have this in common, that in them the relation of God to the other side of consciousness is undetermined and general. The second of these attitudes has indicated and pronounced this unhesitatingly in the expression already quoted, “God has created all things.”

($$\alpha$$.) The manner of looking at things, however, which is followed by the religious man, and whereby he gives a greater completeness to his reflection, consists in the contemplation of the constitution and arrangement of things according to the relations of ends, and similarly in the regarding all the circumstances of individual life, as well as the great events of history, as proceeding from Divine purposes, or else as directed and leading back to such. The universal divine relation is thus not adhered to here. On the contrary, this becomes a definite relation, and consequently a more strictly defined content is introduced—for the manifold materials are placed in relation to one another, and God is then considered as the one who brings about these relations. Animals and their surroundings are accordingly regarded as beings definitely regulated, in that they have food, nurture their young, are provided with weapons as a defence against what is hurtful, stand the winter, and can protect themselves against enemies. In human life it is seen how man is led to happiness, whether it be eternal or temporal, by means of this or that apparent accident, or perhaps misfortune. In short, the action, the will of


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 God, is contemplated here in definite dealings, conditions of nature, occurrences, and such-like.

But this content itself, these ends, representing thus a finite content, are accidental, are taken up only for the moment, and even directly disappear in an inconsistent and illogical fashion. If, for example, we admire the wisdom of God in nature because we see how animals are provided with weapons, partly to obtain their food and partly to protect them against enemies, yet it is presently seen in experience that these weapons are of no avail, and that those creatures which have been considered as ends are made use of by others as means.

It is therefore really progressive knowledge which has depreciated and supplanted this external contemplation of ends; that higher knowledge, namely, which, to begin with, at least demands consistency, and recognises ends of this kind, which are taken as Divine ends, as subordinate and finite—as something which proves itself in the very same experience and observation to be worthless, and not to be an object of the eternal, divine Will.

If that manner of looking at the matter be accepted, and if, at the same time, its inconsistency be disregarded, yet it still remains indefinite and superficial, for the very reason that all and every content—no matter what it be—may be included in it; for there is nothing, no arrangement of nature, no occurrence, which, regarded in some aspect or other, might not be shown to have some use. Religious feeling is, in short, here no longer present in its naive and experimental character. On the contrary, it proceeds from the universal thought of an end, of a good, and makes inferences, inasmuch as it subsumes present things under these universal thoughts. But this argumentation, this inferential process, brings the religious man into a condition of perplexity, because however much he may point to what serves a purpose, and is useful in this immediate world of natural things,


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 he sees, in contrast to all this, just as much that does not serve a purpose, and is injurious. What is profitable to one person is detrimental to another, and therefore does not serve a purpose. The preservation of life and of the interests bound up with existence, which in the one case is promoted, is in the other case just as much endangered and put a stop to. Thus an implicit dualism or division is involved here, for in contradiction to God’s eternal manner of operation, finite things are elevated to the rank of essential ends. The idea of God and of His manner of operation as universal and necessary is contradicted by this inconsistency, which is even destructive of that universal character.

Now, if the religious man considers external ends and the externality of the whole matter in accordance with which these things are profitable for an Other, the natural determinateness, which is the point of departure, appears indeed to be only for an Other. But this, more closely considered, is its own relation, its own nature, the immanent nature of what is related, its necessity, in short. Thus it is that the actual transition to the other side, which was formerly designated as the moment of selfness, comes about for ordinary religious thought.

($$\beta$$.) Religious feeling, accordingly, is forced to abandon its argumentative process; and now that a beginning has once been made with thought, and with the relations of thought, it becomes necessary, above all things to thought, to demand and to look for that which belongs to itself; namely, first of all consistency and necessity, and to place itself in opposition to that standpoint of contingency. And with this, the principle of selfness at once develops itself completely. “I,” as simple, universal, as thought, am really relation; since I am for myself, am self-consciousness, the relations too are to be for me. To the thoughts, ideas which I make my own, I give the character which I myself am. I am this simple point, and that which is for me I seek to apprehend in this unity.


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 Knowledge so far aims at that which is, and the necessity of it, and apprehends this in the relation of cause and effect, reason and result, power and manifestation; in the relation of the Universal, of the species and of the individual existing things which are included in the sphere of contingency. Knowledge, science, in this manner places the manifold material in mutual relation, takes away from it the contingency which it has through its immediacy, and while contemplating the relations which belong to the wealth of finite phenomena, encloses the world of finiteness in itself so as to form a system of the universe, of such a kind that knowledge requires nothing for this system outside of the system itself. For what a thing is, what it is in its essential determinate character, is disclosed when it is perceived and made the subject of observation. From the constitution of things, we proceed to their connections in which they stand in relation to an Other; not, however, in an accidental, but in a determinate relation, and in which they point back to the original source from which they are a deduction. Thus we inquire after the reasons and causes of things; and the meaning of inquiry here is, that what is desired is to know the special causes. Thus it is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the cause of the lightning, or of the downfall of the Republican system of government in Rome, or of the French Revolution; here it is perceived that this cause is only an entirely general one, and does not yield the desired explanation. What we wish to know regarding a natural phenomenon, or regarding this or that law as effect or result, is, the reason as the reason of this particular phenomenon, that is to say, not the reason which applies to all things, but only and exclusively to this definite thing. And thus the reason must be that of such special phenomena, and such reason or ground must be the most immediate, must be sought and laid hold of in the finite, and must itself be a finite one. Therefore this knowledge does not go


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 above or beyond the sphere of the finite, nor does it desire to do so, since it is able to apprehend all in its finite sphere, is conversant with everything, and knows its course of action. In this manner science forms a universe of knowledge, to which God is not necessary, which lies outside of religion, and has absolutely nothing to do with it. In this kingdom, knowledge spreads itself out in its relations and connections, and in so doing has all determinate material and content on its side; and for the other side, the side of the infinite and the eternal, nothing whatever is left.

($$\gamma$$.) Thus both sides have developed themselves completely in their opposition. On the side of religion the heart is filled with what is Divine, but without freedom, or self-consciousness, and without consistency in regard to what is determinate, this latter having, on the contrary, the form of contingency. Consistent connection of what is determinate belongs to the side of knowledge, which is at home in the finite, and moves freely in the thought-determinations of the manifold connections of things, but can only create a system which is without absolute substantiality—without God. The religious side gets the absolute material and purpose, but only as something abstractly positive. Knowledge has taken possession of all finite material and drawn it into its territory, all determinate content has fallen to its share; but although it gives it a necessary connection, it is still unable to give it the absolute connection. Since finally science has taken possession of knowledge, and is the consciousness of the necessity of the finite, religion has become devoid of knowledge, and has shrivelled up into simple feeling, into the contentless or empty elevation of the spiritual to the Eternal. It can, however, affirm nothing regarding the Eternal, for all that could be regarded as knowledge would be a drawing down of the Eternal into the sphere of the finite, and of finite connections of things.


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 Now when two aspects of thought, which are so developed in this way, enter into relation with one another, their attitude is one of mutual distrust. Religious feeling distrusts the finiteness which lies in knowledge, and it brings against science the charge of futility, because in it the subject clings to itself, is in itself, and the as the knowing subject is independent in relation to all that is external. On the other hand, knowledge has a distrust of the totality in which feeling entrenches itself, and in which it confounds together all extension and development. It is afraid to lose its freedom should it comply with the demand of feeling, and unconditionally recognise a truth which it does not definitely understand. And when religious feeling comes out of its universality, sets ends before itself, and passes over to the determinate, knowledge can see nothing but arbitrariness in this, and if it were to pass in a similar way to anything definite, would feel itself given over to mere contingency. When, accordingly, reflection is fully developed, and has to pass over into the domain of religion, it is unable to hold out in that region, and becomes impatient with regard to all that peculiarly belongs to it.

c. Now that the opposition has arrived at this stage of development, where the one side, whenever it is approached by the other, invariably thrusts it away from it as an enemy, the necessity for an adjustment comes in, of such a kind that the infinite shall appear in the finite, and the finite in the infinite, and each no longer form a separate realm. This would be the reconciliation of religious, genuine simple feeling, with knowledge and intelligence. This reconciliation must correspond with the highest demands of knowledge, and of the Notion, for these can surrender nothing of their dignity. But just as little can anything of the absolute content be given up, and that content be brought down into the region of finiteness; and when face to face with it knowledge must give up its finite form.


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 In the Christian religion, more than in other religions, the need of this reconciliation has of necessity come into prominence, for the following reasons:—

($$\alpha$$.) The Christian religion has its very beginning in absolute dualism or division, and starts from that sense of suffering in which it rends the natural unity of the spirit asunder, and destroys natural peace. In it man appears as evil from his birth, and is thus in his innermost life in contradiction with himself, and the spirit, as it is driven back into itself, finds itself separated from the infinite, absolute Essence.

($$\beta$$.) The Reconciliation, the need of which is here intensified to the uttermost degree, appears in the first place for Faith, but not in such a way as to allow of faith being of a merely ingenuous kind. For the spirit has left its natural simplicity behind, and entered upon an internal conflict; it is, as sinful, an Other in opposition to the truth; it is withdrawn, estranged from it. “I,” in this condition of schism, am not the truth, and this is therefore given as an independent content of ordinary thought, and the truth is in the first instance put forward upon authority.

($$\gamma$$.) When, however, by this means I am transplanted into an intellectual world in which the nature of God, the characteristics and modes of action which belong to God, are presented to knowledge, and when the truth of these rests on the witness and assurance of others, yet I am at the same time referred into myself, for thought, knowledge, reason are in me, and in the feeling of sinfulness, and in reflection upon this, my freedom is plainly revealed to me. Rational knowledge, therefore, is an essential element in the Christian religion itself.

In the Christian religion I am to retain my freedom or rather, in it I am to become free. In it the subject, the salvation of the soul, the redemption of the individual as an individual, and not only the species, is an essential end. This subjectivity, this selfness (not selfishness) is just the principle of rational knowledge itself.


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 Rational knowledge being thus a fundamental characteristic in the Christian religion, the latter gives development to its content, for the ideas regarding its general subject-matter are implicitly or in themselves thoughts, and must as such develop themselves. On the other hand, however, since the content is something which exists essentially for the mind as forming ideas, it is distinct from unreflecting opinion and sense-knowledge, and as it were passes right beyond the distinction. In short, it has in relation to subjectivity the value of an absolute content existing in and for itself. The Christian religion therefore touches the antithesis between feeling and immediate perception on the one hand, and reflection and knowledge on the other. It contains rational knowledge as an essential element, and has supplied to this rational knowledge the occasion for developing itself to its full logical issue as Form and as a world of form, and has thus at the same time enabled it to place itself in opposition to this content as it appears in the shape of given truth. It is from this that the discord which characterises the thought of the present day arises.

Hitherto we have considered the progressive growth of the antitheses only in the form in which they have not yet developed into actual philosophy, or in which they still stand outside of it. Therefore the questions which primarily come before us are these: 1. How does philosophy in general stand related to religion? 2. How does the Philosophy of Religion stand related to philosophy? and 3. What is the relation of the philosophical study of religion to positive religion?  II.—The Position of the Philosophy of Religion relatively to Philosophy and to Religion. 1. The Attitude of Philosophy to Religion generally.

In saying above that philosophy makes religion the subject of consideration, and when further this


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 of it appears to be in the position of something which is different from its object, it would seem as if we are still occupying that attitude in which both sides remain mutually independent and separate. In taking up such an attitude in thus considering the subject, we should accordingly come out of that region of devotion and enjoyment which religion is, and the object and the consideration of it as the movement of thought would be as different as, for example, the geometrical figures in mathematics are from the mind which considers them. Such is only the relation, however, as it at first appears, when knowledge is still severed from the religious side, and is finite knowledge. On the contrary, when we look more closely, it becomes apparent that as a matter of fact the content, the need, and the interest of philosophy represent something which it has in common with religion.

The object of religion as well as of philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God. Philosophy is not a wisdom of the world, but is knowledge of what is not of the world; it is not knowledge which concerns external mass, or empirical existence and life, but is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of His nature. For this His nature must reveal and develop itself. Philosophy, therefore, only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion. As thus occupied with eternal truth which exists on its own account, or is in and for itself, and, as in fact, a dealing on the part of the thinking spirit, and not of individual caprice and particular interest, with this object, it is the same kind of activity as religion is. The mind in so far as it thinks philosophically immerses itself with like living interest in this object, and renounces its particularity in that it permeates its object, in the same way, as religious consciousness does, for the latter also does not seek to have anything of its own, but desires only to immerse itself in this content.


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 Thus religion and philosophy come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God. Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is commonly called religion as such. What they have in common is, that they are religion; what distinguishes them from each other is merely the kind and manner of religion we find in each. It is in the peculiar way in which they both occupy themselves with God that the distinction comes out. It is just here, however, that the difficulties lie which appear so great, that it is even regarded as an impossibility that philosophy should be one with religion. Hence comes the suspicion with which philosophy is looked upon by theology, and the antagonistic attitude of religion and philosophy. In accordance with this antagonistic attitude (as theology considers it to be) philosophy seems to act injuriously, destructively, upon religion, robbing it of its sacred character, and the way in which it occupies itself with God seems to be absolutely different from religion. Here, then, is the same old opposition and contradiction which had already made its appearance among the Greeks. Among that free democratic people, the Athenians, philosophical writings were burnt, and Socrates was condemned to death; now, however, this opposition is held to be an acknowledged fact, more so than that unity of religion and philosophy just asserted.

Old though this opposition is, however, the combination of philosophy and religion is just as old. Already to the neo-Pythagoreans and neo-Platonists, who were as yet within the heathen world, the gods of the people were not gods of imagination, but had become gods of thought. That combination had a place, too, among the most eminent of the Fathers of the Church, who in their


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 religious life took up an essentially intellectual attitude inasmuch as they set out from the presupposition that theology is religion together with conscious thought and comprehension. It is to their philosophical culture that the Christian Church is indebted for the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This union of religion and philosophy was carried out to a still greater extent in the Middle Ages. So little was it believed that the knowledge which seeks to comprehend is hurtful to faith, that it was even held to be essential to the further development of faith itself. It was by setting out from philosophy that those great men, Anselm and Abelard, further developed the essential characteristics of faith.

Knowledge in constructing its world for itself, without reference to religion, had only taken possession of the finite contents; but since it has developed into the true philosophy, it has the same content as religion.

If we now look provisionally for the distinction between religion and philosophy as it presents itself in this unity of content, we find it takes the following form:—

a. A speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the Idea, so that everything is apprehended as Idea; the Idea, however, is the True in thought, and not in mere sensuous contemplation or in ordinary conception. The True in thought, to put it more precisely, means that it is something concrete, posited as divided in itself, and in such away, indeed, that the two sides of what is divided are opposed characteristics of thought, and the Idea must be conceived of as the unity of these. To think speculatively means to resolve anything real into its parts, and to oppose these to each other in such a way that the distinctions are set in opposition in accordance with the characteristics of thought, and the object is apprehended as unity of the two.

In sense-perception or picture-thought we have the object before us as a whole, our reflection distinguishes, apprehends different sides, recognises the diversity in


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 them, and severs them. In this act of distinguishing, reflection does not keep firm hold of their unity. Sometimes it forgets the wholeness, sometimes the distinctions; and if it has both before it, it yet separates the properties from the object, and so places both that that in which the two are one becomes a third, which is different from the object and its properties. In the case of mechanical objects which appear in the region of externality, this relation may have a place, for the object is only the lifeless substratum for the distinctions, and the quality of oneness is the gathering together of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not merely an aggregate, an externally united multiplicity, the object is one, although it has characteristics which are distinguished from it, and it is speculative thought which first gets a grasp of the unity in this very antithesis as such. It is in fact the business of speculative thought to apprehend all objects of pure thought, of nature and of Spirit, in the form of thought, and thus as the unity of the difference.

b. Religion, then, is itself the standpoint of the consciousness of the True, which is in and for itself, and is consequently the stage of Spirit at which the speculative content generally, is object for consciousness. Religion is not consciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolute truth, of truth as the Universal, the All-comprehending, outside of which there lies nothing at all. The content of its consciousness is further the Universally True, which exists on its own account or in and for itself, which determines itself, and is not determined from without. While the finite required an Other for its determinateness, the True has its determinateness, the limit, its end in itself; it is not limited through an Other, but the Other is found in itself. It is this speculative element which comes to consciousness in religion. Truth is, indeed, contained in every other sphere, but not the highest absolute truth, for this exists only in perfect universality of characterisation or determination, and in


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 the fact of being determined in and for itself, which is not simple determinateness having reference to an Other, but contains the Other, the difference in its very self.

c. Religion is accordingly this speculative element in the form, as it were, of a state of consciousness, of which the aspects are not simple qualities of thought, but are concretely filled up. These moments can be no other than the moment of Thought, active universality, thought in operation, and reality as immediate, particular self-consciousness.

Now, while in philosophy the rigidity of these two sides loses itself through reconciliation in thought, because both sides are thoughts, and the one is not pure universal thought, and the other of an empirical and individual character, religion only arrives at the enjoyment of unity by lifting these two rigid extremes out of this state of severance, by rearranging them, and bringing them together again. But by thus stripping off the form of dualism from its extremes, rendering the opposition in the element of Universality fluid, and bringing it to reconciliation, religion remains always akin to thought, even in its form and movement; and philosophy, as simply active thought, and thought which unites opposed elements, has approached closely to religion.

The contemplation of religion in thought has thus raised the determinate moments of religion to the rank of thoughts, and the question is how this contemplation of religion in thought is related generally to philosophy as forming an organic part in its system.

2. The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the System of Philosophy.

a. In philosophy, the Highest is called the Absolute, the Idea; it is superfluous to go further back here, and to mention that this Highest was in the Wolfian Philosophy called ens, Thing; for that at once proclaims itself


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 an abstraction, which corresponds very inadequately to our idea of God. In the more recent philosophy, the Absolute is not so complete an abstraction, but yet it has not on that account the same signification as is implied in the term, God. In order even to make the difference apparent, we must in the first place consider what the word signify itself signifies. When we ask, “What does this or that signify?” we are asking about two kinds of things, and, in fact, about things which are opposed. In the first place, we call what we are thinking of, the meaning, the end or intention, the general thought of this or that expression, work of art, &c.; if we ask about its intrinsic character, it is essentially the thought that is in it of which we wish to have an idea. When we thus ask “What is God?” “What does the expression God signify?” it is the thought involved in it that we desire to know; the idea we possess already. Accordingly, what is signified here is that we have got to specify the Notion, and thus it follows that the Notion is the signification; it is the Absolute, the nature of God as grasped by thought, the logical knowledge of this, to which we desire to attain. This, then, is the one signification of signification, and so far, that which we call the Absolute has a meaning identical with the expression God.

b. But we put the question again, in a second sense, according to which it is the opposite of this which is sought after. When we begin to occupy ourselves with pure thought-determinations, and not with outward ideas, it may be that the mind does not feel satisfied, is not at home, in these, and asks what this pure thought-determination signifies. For example, every one can understand for himself what is meant by the terms unity, objective, subjective, &c., and yet it may very well happen that the specific form of thought we call the unity of subjective and objective, the unity of real and ideal, is not understood. What is asked for in such a case is the meaning in the very opposite sense from that