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Fellows v. Blacksmith/Opinion of the Court

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The case was decided by the Court of Appeals of that State; but the record had been remitted, after the decision, to the Supreme Court, from which the appeal had been taken.

The suit in the Supreme Court was an action of trespass, quare clausum fregit, brought by the intestate, John Blacksmith, against the defendants, Joseph Fellows and Robert Kendle, for entering, with force and arms, into the close of the plaintiff, commonly known as an Indian sawmill and yard, at the town of Pembroke, county of Genesee, and then and there having expelled and dispossessed the said plaintiff.

The defendants plead, 1st, not guilty; and 2d, that the said close, &c., was the soil and freehold of the defendant, Fellows, and that the defendant, Fellows, in his own right, and the defendant, Kendle, as his servant, and by his command, broke and entered the said close, &c., as they lawfully might, for the cause aforesaid. To this plea there was a replication, averring that the close, soil, and freehold, was not the close of the defendant, Fellows.

On the trial, it was proved by the plaintiff that the close mentioned in the declaration is situate in the town of Pembroke, county of Genesee, upon a tract of land of twelve thousand eight hundred acres, commonly known as the Tonawanda reservation, and was, at the time of the entry complained of, an Indian improvement upon the same; that said improvement was made about twenty years before the treaty, by the plaintiff and seven other Tonawanda Indians; that the plaintiff is a native Indian, belonging to the Tonawanda band of the Seneca Indians, who reside on that reservation, and are a part of the Seneca Nation, and has so been known for at least thirty-six years; that he has resided on this reservation from his birth, and was in the actual possession of the said improvement at the time of the entry complained of; that on the 13th July, 1846, the defendants entered into and took possession of the said close, and turned the plaintiff out, and in doing so committed the trespass. It was admitted, that a treaty had been made between the United States and the Six Nations of Indians on the 11th November, 1794, by which certain lands in western New York, including this Tonawanda reservation, are declared 'to be the property of the Seneca Nation; and the United States will never claim the same, nor disturb the Seneca Nation, nor any of the Six Nations, or their Indian friends residing thereon, and united with them in the free use and enjoyment thereof; but it shall remain theirs until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have the right to purchase.'

The plaintiff then rested.

The defendants gave in evidence certain documents and acts of the Legislatures of the States of New York and Massachusetts, showing that a dispute had arisen, at an early day, between the two States, in respect to the title to a large tract of land within the limits of New York, of which the locus in quo is a part. That in 1786, the dispute was amicably settled by a cession from Massachusetts to New York of the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the tract, and by a cession from New York to Massachusetts of the right of pre-emption to the soil from the Indians.

The lands were then in the independent occupancy of the Seneca Nation, and owned by them, and that Massachusetts acquired by the cession the exclusive right of purchasing their title whenever they became disposed to sell; that this right had become duly vested in Thomas L. Ogden and Joseph Fellows, by proper conveyances from Massachusetts, which survived to the latter on the death of Ogden.

A treaty was then given in evidence, between the United States and the New York Indians, bearing date 15th January, 1838, and another between the United States and the Seneca Nation, bearing date the 20th May, 1842, under which the defendant claims that he had acquired the Indian title to the close in question, and by virtue of which it is admitted the defence to the action in this case rests.

The treaty of 1838 (7 U.S. Stat., 551) set apart a tract of country, situated west of the State of Missouri, as a permanent home for all the New York Indians, containing one million eight hundred and twenty-four acres of land, being, as is expressed in the treaty, 'three hundred and twenty acres for each soul of said Indians, as their numbers are at present computed.' The tract is particularly described and located. It was intended for the future home of nine tribes of Indians, containing, according to the official estimate, a population of five thousand four hundred and eighty-five. The Seneca tribe, including among them their friends, the Onondagas and Cayugas, numbers a population of two thousand six hundred and thirty-three.

By the tenth section of this treaty, special provision was made concerning this tribe and their friends already mentioned. They were to have assigned to them the easterly part of the tract set apart to the New York Indians, and to extend so far as to include one half section of land for each soul. The tribe agrees to remove from New York to their new home within five years, and continue to reside there. The section then recites the purchase of the title of the Seneca Nation to certain lands described in a deed of conveyance by Ogden and Fellows, assignees of the State of Massachusetts, for the consideration of $202,000, and also that the Nation has agreed that said money shall be paid to the United States, and that out of this sum $102,000 shall be paid to the owners of the improvements on the land so conveyed, the residue to be invested in stocks by the Government, the income of which is to be paid annually to the Nation at their new homes. The improvements were to be appraised, and a distribution of the $102,000 made among the owners, and 'to be paid by the United States to the individuals who were entitled to the same, &c., on their relinquishing their respective possessions to Ogden and Fellows.'

By the fifteenth section of the treaty, the United States agree that they will appropriate the sum of $400,000, to be applied from time to time, under the direction of the President of the United States, in such proportions as may be most for the interest of the Indians who were parties to the treaty, 'to aid them in the removal to their homes, and in supporting them the first year after their removal; to encourage and assist them in education, and in being taught to cultivate their lands; in the erection of mills, houses,' &c.

A large tract of land in Wisconsin that had been set apart to certain Indians was relinquished to the Government.

The deed of conveyance from the Seneca Nation to Ogden and Fellows, and referred to in the treaty, is annexed thereto. It conveys four reservations in western New York: the Buffalo Creek reservation, containing 49,920 acres; the Cattaraugus, 21,680 acres; the Allegany, 30,469 acres; and the Tonawanda, 12,800 acres.

Some difficulty occurred in carrying this treaty into execution, which it is not important to refer to. These difficulties raised by the Indians resulted in a modification of it by a second treaty entered into on 20th May, 1842, which, after refering to the first, and to the deed of conveyance to Ogden and Fellows, and to the differences that had arisen between the parties, provides in the first article that Ogden and Fellows, in consideration of the release and agreements afterwards mentioned, stipulate that the Seneca Nation might continue in the occupation and enjoyment of two of the reservations, the Cattaraugus and the Allegany, the same as before the deed of conveyance. And in the second article, the Seneca Nation, in consideration of the foregoing and other stipulations, agree to release and confirm to Ogden and Fellows the two remaining reservations, the Buffalo Creek and the Tonawanda.

The third article provides for reducing the amount of the purchase-money to be paid by Ogden and Fellows, so as to correspond with the relative value of the two reservations released to the value of the four, as fixed in the treaty of 1838.

The fourth article provides for the appraisal of the land and improvements in these two reservations, by appraisers-one to be appointed by the Secretary of War, and the other by Ogden and Fellows-and to report their proceedings to the Secretary, and also to Ogden and Fellows.

The fifth article provides that the possession of the two tracts confirmed to Ogden and Fellows should be surrendered up as follows: the unimproved lands on the tracts within one month after the reports of the appraisers, and the improvements within two years, provided that the amount to be ascertained and awarded as the proportionate value of said improvements shall, on the surrender thereof, be paid to the President of the United States, to be distributed among the owners according to the determination of the appraisers; and provided, also, the consideration for the release and conveyance of the lands shall, at the time of the surrender thereof, be paid or secured to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War, the income of which to be paid to the Seneca Indians annually.

The seventh article provides that the modification in this treaty of 1842 shall be a substitute for that of 1838, wherein it differs from it, and to this extent shall be deemed to repeal it.

It will be seen that the principal change under the second treaty consists in the release, by Ogden and Fellows, to the Indians, of two of the four reservations conveyed to them under the treaty of 1838, and the corresponding reduction of the price to be paid. Most of the other provisions of the treaty are untouched, and remained in force. The assignment by the Government of the large tract of country for the New York Indians west of the Missouri-the special tract therein assigned to this Seneca Nation their agreement to remove to their new homes, and the large appropriation to aid in their removal and in their support and encouragement after they had arrived-all these provisions remained unaffected by the second treaty.

Neither treaty made any provision as to the mode or manner in which the removal of the Indians or surrender of the reservations was to take place. The grantees have assumed that they were authorized to take forcible possession of the two reservations, or of the four, as the case would have been under the first treaty. The plaintiff in this case was expelled by force; and unless this mode of removal can be sustained, the recovery against the defendants for the trespass was right, and must be affirmed.

The removal of tribes and nations of Indians from their ancient possessions to their new homes in the West, under treaties made with them by the United States, have been, according to the usage and practice of the Government, by its authority and under its care and superintendence. And, indeed, it is difficult to see how any other mode of a forcible removal can be consistent with the peace of the country, or with the duty of the Government to these dependent people, who have been influenced by its counsel and authority to change their habitations.

The negotiations with them as a quasi nation, possessing some of the attributes of an independent people, and to be dealt with accordingly, would seem to lead to the conclusion, unless otherwise expressly stipulated, that the treaty was to be carried into execution by the authority or power of the Government, which was a party to it; and more especially, when made with a tribe of Indians who are in a state of pupilage, and hold the relation to the Government as a ward to his guardian. It is difficult to believe that it could have been intended by the Government that these people were to be left, after they had parted with their title to their homes, to be expelled by the irregular force and violence of the individuals who had acquired it, or through the intervention of the courts of justice. As we have seen, the Seneca Nation upon the four reservations consisted of a population of some two thousand six hundred and thirty-three souls; and if we include the Tuscaroras, whose lands were also purchased under the same treaty, nearly three thousand. It is obvious that any such litigation would be appalling.

If we look into the provisions of the two treaties, we think the conclusion as clear, from a consideration of them, that no such means or manner of removal were contemplated, as that derived from a consideration of their unfitness and impropriety under the circumstances stated.

The treaty of 1838 contemplated a removal to the tract west of the State of Missouri, and putting the Indians in possession of it. A large fund was appropriated, and in the hands of the Government, to be disbursed in aid of such removal, and of their support and encouragement after their arrival. It did not, therefore, separate these Indians from the care and protection of the Government on its ratification, but contemplated further duties towards them, and for which means were supplied. Besides, the purchase-money for the reservations was to be paid to the Government; and, by the express terms of the treaty of 1842, the appraised value of the improvements was, on the surrender of the possessions, to be paid to the President of the United States, to be distributed among the owners of the improvements according to the award of the appraisers. This provision shows, that the Government was to be present at the surrender and payment for the improvements.

The clause in the treaty of 1838 is still more specific, which was, that the improvements were 'to be paid by the United States to the individuals who were entitled to the same,' &c., 'on their relinquishing their respective possessions to the said Ogden and Fellows.' It is also worthy of remark, that the St. Regis Indians, one of the nine tribes of the New York Indians, in giving their assent to the treaty of 1838, deemed it necessary to guard against a forcible removal to the West, by a clause providing that they 'shall not be compelled to remove under the treaty;' a removal to the West being in contemplation.

We think, therefore, that the grantees derived no power, under the treaty, to dispossess by force these Indians, or right of entry, so as to sustain an ejectment in a court of law; that no private remedy of this nature was contemplated by the treaty, and that a forcible removal must be made, if made at all, under the direction of the United States; that this interpretation is in accordance with the usages and practice of the Government in providing for the removal of Indian tribes from their ancient possessions, with the fitness and propriety of the thing itself, and with the fair import of the language of the several articles bearing upon the subject.

An objection was taken, on the argument, to the validity of the treaty, on the ground that the Tonawanda band of the Seneca Indians were not represented by the chiefs and head men of the band in the negotiations and execution of it. But the answer to this is, that the treaty, after executed and ratified by the proper authorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation, than they can behind an act of Congress. (1 Cranch, 103; 6 Pet., 735; 10 How., 442; 2 Pet., 307, 309, 314; 3 Story Const. Law, p. 695.)

The view we have taken of the case makes it unnecessary to examine the ground upon which the learned court below placed their decision; that court held the appraisal of the improvements, and payment therefor, were conditions precedent to the surrender of them by the Indians; and that the refusal of the Tonawanda band to permit the appraisal did not excuse the performance of these conditions. The ground upon which we have placed our judgment is not in conflict with this view. We hold that the performance was not a duty that belonged to the grantees, but for the Government under the treaty.

We think the judgment of the court below right, and should be affirmed.


text: Talk:Fellows v. Blacksmith/Opinion of the Court

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Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Michigan.

It will be seen, by reference to 18 Howard, that this court, at the last term, in a case between these same parties, decided in favor of Cooper's title to a tract of land in Michigan. In order to recover a part of the tract which was not included in the former suit, Cooper brought an ejectment against Roberts, and obtained a judgment against him. Roberts then brought the case up to this court by writ of error.

But in consequence of its being so low upon the docket as not to be reached at the present term, Mr. Vinton, counsel for Cooper, moved for an order requiring the plaintiff in error to give additional security in the sum of $25,000, or for such other sum as, in the judgment of the court, would be sufficient to answer all damages and costs which Cooper might suffer if the writ of error should not be prosecuted with effect; and filed an affidavit by Cooper in support thereof.

The motion was argued by Mr. Vinton in support, and by Mr. Romeyn against it.

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)


text: Talk:Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)

title: Talk:Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)


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Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)/Opinion of the Court

In this case, Roberts, who is the plaintiff in error, on the allowance of the writ of error, gave security in the sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned that he would prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he failed to make his plea good. Cooper now declares that the bond for one thousand dollars is not sufficient to answer all the damages and costs, if Roberts should fail to prosecute his writ to effect, and refers to an affidavit filed by him as the basis of this motion to show that fact.

Mr. Vinton, counsel of Cooper, now moves the court for an order requiring Roberts to give additional security in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, or such other sum as the court may deem to be sufficient to cover all damages which Cooper may suffer, if the writ of error should not be prosecuted with effect.

The case between the parties is for the recovery of land in ejectment. Cooper represents that he holds the legal title to the land in controversy in trust for the National Mining Company, incorporated by the Legislature of the State of Michigan, to carry on the business of mining for copper, and that he is the secretary and treasurer of the company; that he instituted this suit to recover the possession of this land for them, that they might have the use and occupation of it for their chartered purposes. It is also stated by the affiant that a decision had been given by the Supreme Court of the United States at its last term, on a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the district of Michigan, between the same parties in controversy, for the same land, establishing, on the merits of the case, the title of the affiant to the land, and that the mining company, in consequence of it, had prepared to prosecute its mining business to the extent of their ability upon the land, which is known to contain a very valuable deposit of copper ore, which could be worked with great profit; and that the company was prevented from working the deposit, in consequence of the pending writ of error, which Roberts sued out upon a judgment which had been rendered in this case against him, and in favor of the legal title of the affiant, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Michigan, at its last term. And the affiant also states that the damages which the company will sustain by the delay caused by the writ of error will amount to at least the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, and to a larger amount, if Roberts shall not prosecute his writ of error to effect.

We have not been able to find a precedent for this motion. The counsel making it did not cite one, but relied upon that part of the twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth sections of the judiciary act of 1789, the first of which declares that every justice or judge signing a citation on any writ of error shall take good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good, which, considered in connection with the twenty-third and twenty-fourth sections, he thought, empowered this court to grant the motion. In our interpretation, and the proper application of those sections, regard must be had to the nature of the action upon which a writ of error has been brought, and to the damages to which a plaintiff who has had a verdict and judgment may be entitled. If it be for a money demand, on which a sum certain has been given by a judgment, it is the duty of the judge, who signs the citation on a writ of error, to take care that good and sufficient security is given. Should it be neglected, and it shall be brought to the notice of this court, when such a case is before it upon a writ of error, upon a motion to enlarge the security, this court would take care that the party claiming its intervention should have the full benefit of the security intended by the law, on a case when the writ of error was a supersedeas.

But when a verdict and judgment upon it has been had in ejectment, on which nominal damages are only awarded, (except in cases between landlord and tenant, and that in England, in virtue of the statute of 1 George IV, chap. 87, sec. 2,) and a writ of error has been sued out by the defendant, and security given, as has been done in this case, this court cannot interfere to enlarge the security, to cover damages which a plaintiff may recover in an action for mesne profits, or for any other losses which he may allege he will sustain by being kept out of the possession of his land by any delay there may be in prosecuting the writ of error. Besides, this court cannot award damages in any case brought to it by writ of error, or require an enlargement of a bond given upon a writ of error, except as it is authorized to do in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth sections of the judiciary act of 1789, neither of which comprehend cases of apprehended losses, except when they are a part of the original suit, and then only 'when its reversal is in favor of the plaintiff, or petitioner in the original suit, and the damages to be assessed or the matter to be decreed are uncertain; in which case, the cause is remanded for a final decision.'

We must deny this motion. It is not provided for by any legislation of Congress. And the utmost extent for which the enlargement of security upon nominal damages in ejectment has been found necessary in England, is given by the statute 16 Charles II, sec. 8; and that is, where a defendant there brings error, he may be bound to the plaintiff in such reasonable sum as the court shall think proper, which sum has been settled at double the amount of one year's rent. (4 Burrows, 2,502.) The courts in England will also oblige a defendant in ejectment, who brings error, to enter into a rule of undertaking not to commit waste or destruction pending the writ. (3 Burrows, 1,823; Palmer's Practice in the House of Lords, 159.)

The motion to enlarge the security in this case is overruled.


text: Talk:Roberts v. Cooper (60 U.S. 373)/Opinion of the Court


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McRea v. Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas, sitting in equity.

The bill was filed by the Branch Bank of Alabama, under the circumstances which are stated in the opinion of the court. It had a double aspect; first, setting up a lien upon the slaves, by virtue of the deed of trust to Gale; and secondly, as a creditor in common with others, to set aside the bill of sale to Margaret McRea, as fraudulent and void, as against creditors.

The Circuit Court decreed that the bill of sale from John D. Bracy to Margaret McRea was fraudulent and void, made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of Bracy, and especially the complainants. They therefore decreed that it should be set aside, and in case the administrators did not pay the account of the Bank, which had been presented to them, that the marshal should sell the slaves for the benefit of all the creditors of Bracy who should signify their willingness to come in and bear their share in the costs and expenses incurred, in the mode which is custimary in a creditor's bill.

From this decree the administrators appealed to this court.

The case was argued by Mr. Lawrence for the appellee, no counsel appearing for the appellants.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:McRea v. Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile


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McRea v. Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas.

It appears from the allegations of the bill, which are supported by the proofs, that in December, 1843, John D. Bracy, then a resident of Alabama, borrowed of the Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile (the appellees in this case) the sum of $9,065, and that Maria Matheson, who was his mother, and another person, joined in the promissory note which was given to the bank for the loan. To indemnify Mrs. Matheson, Bracy conveyed certain negro slaves to one Gale, in trust, to save her harmless. The debt not being paid at maturity, the bank recovered a judgment on it in November, 1845. The trustee afterwards sold some of the slaves, and their price was applied to reduce the debt; but some time in the year 1846, Bracy privately left the State of Alabama, and carried away with him the residue of the slaves, and some other property, not leaving, so far as appears, any other property in that State, out of which the judgment in favor of the bank could be satisfied. He appears to have been for a time in the State of Mississippi. Sometime in 1847 he went to Louisiana; and in the year 1848 he removed with these slaves to White county, in the State of Arkansas, where he employed them in making some improvements on a tract of Government land, where he and they resided. In September, 1849, Bracy went to Louisiana, where Margaret McRea, his sister, one of the appellants, then resided, and there made a bill of sale of all the slaves to her. She sent one of her sons to take possession of them; and Bracy also returned to their place of residence, in White county, where he continued to reside until the spring of 1850, when Mrs. McRea moved thither; and from that time they resided together, she having entered the land on which the plantation was, and taken a title in her own name. Bracy continued to reside there, having the principal ostensible management of the business of the plantation, until about a year before his decease, in April, 1852, when he removed to the county town, about six miles distant, to practise his profession as an attorney. He died deeply insolvent, the debts proved against his estate being upwards of fourteen thousand dollars; the sales of all his inventoried effects amounting only to the sum of $345.90. The bill asserts a lien on these slaves by virtue of the trust-deed, of which it avers Mrs. McRea had notice when she purchased. But our opinion is, that Gale, the trustee, and Mrs. Matheson, the cestui que trust, are indispensable parties to a bill for the subjection of this property to the claim of the bank, by virtue of the trust-deed. Upon that footing the bill cannot be maintained.

But we are all of opinion, that the sale to Mrs. McRae was in fraud of creditors, and especially of the bank. Without detailing the evidence, we think it enough to say, that the removal of the property from Alabama by Bracy, leaving the judgment of the bank unsatisfied, his insolvency, the relation between the parties, their subsequent residence together, the manner in which the property was held and managed, are causes of very grave suspicion. The bill charges, that if this property was conveyed to her, 'it was so conveyed with intent and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of the said John D. Bracy.' The answer of Mrs. McRae does not deny this allegation.

In the course of responding to the claim of the bill founded on the trust-deed, her answer says: 'She therefore charges, that there was no encumbrance whatever on the said slaves, or any of them, at the time she purchased them; and avers that she purchased them in good faith, and without any notice or knowledge whatever of a subsisting lien upon them by virtue of said deed of trust.' We understand this averment of good faith on her part to relate simply to her ignorance of a lien by the trust-deed, and that it does not meet the explicit allegation in the bill, that the purpose of the sale was to conceal the property from creditors; and though the failure of the answer to meet this charge in the bill does not operate as a technical confession of its truth, it does lay a foundation for the belief that if the defendant could have truly denied it, she would not have foregone the decided advantage of such a denial in an answer which puts the complainant on proof of the contested fact by more than one witness.

The answer alleges, that the agreed price of the sale was $3,500, payable in instalments of $875 each, in five, six, seven, and eight years; and that four promissory notes were executed accordingly. It does not say what was done with the notes, after they were executed. No such notes were found among the effects of Bracy, to be inventoried. Neither of these notes, if in existence, had become payable when this bill was filed, and we think the attempt to show that something had been paid on account of them by the delivery of some cotton is not successful.

In our opinion, the charge in the bill, that the sale was fraudulent as to creditors, is made out in proof, and this is aufficient to sustain the decree of the Circuit Court.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed with costs.


text: Talk:McRea v. Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile/Opinion of the Court


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Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Michigan Southern Railroad Company

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.

The case is fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Walker moved to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, which motion was sustained by himself in argument, and opposed by Mr. Joy on behalf of the plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Michigan Southern Railroad Company


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Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Michigan Southern Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

This case is before us on a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

It is a bill in chancery originating in the Circuit Court of Wayne county, in the State of Michigan, and afterwards taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State.

In order to give this court jurisdiction under the 25th section of the judiciary act, the record of the case must show, by direct averment or necessary intendment, that one of the questions enumerated in that section did arise, and was decided by the State court, as required.

If the subject of complaint be, that a State statute is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void, and that the State court has declared it to be valid, this fact should appear by some direct averment, either on the bill or answer, or in the decree of the court.

After scrutinizing with great care the rather prolix pleadings of this case, we are unable to find any complaint, by the bill or answer, that the Legislature of Michigan have passed any act affecting the rights of either party which 'impairs the obligation of a contract;' nor is there an intimation in the decree that any such question arose in the case; nor is there any necessary intendment that such a question did arise, and was necessarily decided, from anything that does appear in the pleadings, evidence, or decree; on the contrary, it shows affirmatively that no such question did or could arise.

This will clearly appear from an examination of the bill and answer.

The bill alleges, that the complainants were incorporated by an act entitled 'An act to authorize the sale of the Central railroad and to incorporate the Michigan Central Railroad Company,' approved March 28, 1846; that they purchased the Central railroad, according to the terms of their charter, and have since that time completed and run said railroad; that, at the time of the act, the State of Michigan owned both the Central and Southern railroads; that the management of the Central road was found onerous and unprofitable; that it was an object to sell the same; that the road was not worth, to exceed $800,000; and that the franchises and exclusive rights secured by the charter alone made it worth the sum they paid, viz: $2,000,000; and that it was for the interest of the State to grant such franchises and exclusive rights, and that the exclusive privileges secured to them by the following provision in section five of their charter were especially valuable to them, and without which they would not have purchased said road:

'And no railroad or railroads from the eastern or southern boundary of the State shall be built or constructed or maintained, or shall be authorized to be built, constructed, or maintained, by or under any law of this State, any portion of which shall approach, westwardly of Wayne county, within five miles of the line of said railroad, as designated in this act, without the consent of this company.'

The bill further alleges, that the State at the same time resolved to sell the Southern railroad, but that said sale was only to take effect on the completion of the sale of the said Central railroad; that it was well understood by the complainants, the State, and the defendants, (the Southern Railroad Company,) that the sale of said Southern railroad was subordinate to the sale of the Central railroad, and that the act incorporating the said Michigan Southern Railroad Company, approved May 9, 1846, was subject to the complainants' charter; and that, by the sixth section of that act of incorporation, it is provided as follows:

'And the said Southern Railroad Company shall also, within three years after the passage of this act, extend, construct, and complete the Tecumseh branch from the village of Tecumseh, by way of Clinton, to the village of Jackson, by way of Manchester, and along the line of railroads formerly authorized to be constructed by the Jackson burgh and Palmyra Railroad Company, or so far along the same as may not conflict with the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to authorize the sale of the Central railroad, and to incorporate the Michigan Central Railroad Company,' approved March 28, 1846, and put the same in operation, with sufficient motive power to do the business of the country depending on said branch.'

The bill further alleges, that the defendants are threatening to construct, and are taking the preliminary steps for constructing, said Tecumseh branch to the village of Jackson, and that ten miles of said branch railroad, if constructed, will be within five miles of the complainants' railroad; and that said branch, together with the Erie and Kalamazoo railroad from Toledo to Adrian, and the Michigan Southern railroad to Monroe, will, in fact and effect, constitute one railroad, both to the eastern and southern boundary of the State, and therefore will be an invasion of the rights and privileges guarantied to the complainants by that provision of their charter before cited, and beyond the powers granted to said Southern company; and therefore an injunction is prayed for.

The answer of the defendants denies that the provision of the complainants' charter above cited applies to such a road as the Tecumseh branch, but only to parallel roads, or those nearly so; it avers that the Legislature could not grant powers so large and exclusive as those set up by the complainants; and that the Tecumseh branch, if built, would not, in fact or effect, together with the other railroads named, constitute one line of railroads, either to the eastern or southern boundary of the State, and the construction of the same would be no violation of the rights and privileges guarantied to the complainants by their charter, and that by their own charter they are not only authorized, but required, to construct said branch to Jackson.

The gravamen of the bill is, that the defendants are acting without legislative authority, and are usurping rights not granted to them by their charter. It nowhere asserts that they are acting under authority conferred on them by a legislative act which infringes the rights previously granted in the complainants' charter, or impairs the obligation of their contract. The answer puts in issue nothing but the construction of certain statutes which both parties admit to be valid. It is therefore abundantly apparent that this court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan in this case.

A manuscript opinion of one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Michigan has been referred to by the counsel, in their argument in support of our jurisdiction. But even if this opinion had introduced some speculations on points not involved in the pleadings of the case, this court cannot resort to anything therein contained in order to support their jurisdiction. In the case of the Ocean Insurance Company v. Polleys, we have decided, 'that it is to the record, and to the record alone, that this court can resort to ascertain its appellate jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.'

The writ of error must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text: Talk:Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Michigan Southern Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court


text:
Ballard v. Thomas

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Schley for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Cushing (Attorney General) for the defendant.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Ballard v. Thomas


text: Talk:Ballard v. Thomas

title: Talk:Ballard v. Thomas


text:
Ballard v. Thomas/Opinion of the Court

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

The suit was brought in the court below by the plaintiffs against the defendant, collector of the port of Baltimore, to recover back an excess of duties paid under protest on an importation of iron.

The iron was shipped from Liverpool, and, on an appraisal at the custom-house in Baltimore, the invoice price was adopted as the minimum market value upon which to assess the duties. The plaintiffs claimed that the iron ought to be appraised at the actual cash market value, or cash wholesale price, instead of the actual market value or wholesale price at a credit of four months, the usual time in the purchase of iron. But the collector insisted upon the invoice price as the minimum valuation. Two invoices are given in the record as specimens of those produced at the trial. One of them contains the price of the iron, with a deduction of two and a half per cent. for prompt payment, which means cash; the other adds at the foot, four months credit, which is the customary credit in the trade.

The court charged the jury, that it being admitted that the duties were levied on the prices at which the iron was charged in the invoices, they were lawfully exacted, and the plaintiffs not entitled to recover; and that the entry in the invoice, that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a deduction for prompt payment, could not affect the amount of duty chargeable.

The eighth section of the act of 1846 (9 U.S. St., p. 43) provides, 'that under no circumstances shall the duty be assessed upon an amount less than the invoice value, any law of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding.'

It is claimed that this section has been repealed by the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, (9 St. U.S., p. 629,) which provides that the collector shall 'cause the actual market value, or wholesale price thereof at the period of the exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from which the same shall have been imported, &c., to be appraised, &c., and to such value or price shall be added all costs and charges, &c., as the true value at the port where the same may be entered,' &c.

Previous to this act, the time when the value of the article in the foreign market was to be ascertained, was the time of the purchase, (Act 30th August, 1842, sec. 16, 5 St. U.S., p. 563;) now, by the act of 1851, the time of exportation. There is no change, however, in the rule which must govern in making the valuation-it is the actual market value or wholesale price in the principal markets of the country from which the article shall have been imported. The only real change, therefore, in respect to this matter, under the law of 1851, from that of 1842 and 1946, would seem to be a change of the time when the valuation is to take place, without intending to interfere with any other of the regulations in the former laws. This was the interpretation given by the Department of the Government having charge of this subject, soon after the passage of the act in question, and, we think, may be sustained upon the principles that this court has uniformly applied in interpreting these revenue laws.

The construction is also borne out by the case of Stairs et al. v. Peaslee, (18 How., 522.) That case recognises the eighth section of the act of 1846 as in force since the act of 1851, and the clause in question is a part of it.

In respect to the deduction from the price on account of prompt payment, we think the fact does not vary or affect the price of the article, as stated in the invoice. It relates simply to the mode of payment, which may, if observed, operate as a satisfaction of the price to be paid by the acceptance of a less sum.

We think the ruling of the court below right, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

title: Ballard v. Thomas/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Ballard v. Thomas/Opinion of the Court


text:
Platt v. Jerome

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

Mr. Collamer, counsel for the plaintiff in error, moved that the writ of error be dismissed, and in support thereof filed the following paper, viz:

'This cause, which is now pending, on writ of error, from the United States Circuit Court of New York, is hereby settled and discontinued by mutual consent, each party to pay their own cost, and satisfaction is hereby acknowledged of all claims and demands between the parties hereto.

'Dated Waterbury, December 20, 1856.

'CHAUNCEY JEROME.

'O. H. PLATT.'

On the 24th of December, it was dismissed.

On the 9th of January, 1857, Mr. Foster, counsel for Jerome, moved to set aside the order of dismissal, and reinstate the case upon the docket, upon the ground that the agreement to dismiss was made by the party himself, when he was represented by counsel in court; and that Jerome had become insolvent, whereby all his interest, which was only for costs, had passed to this assignee. By dismissing the writ of error, the lien of defendant's counsel for fees, in this court and in the court below, would be lost.

This motion was argued by Mr. Foster in support thereof, and by Mr. Collamer in opposition thereto.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Platt v. Jerome


text: Talk:Platt v. Jerome

title: Talk:Platt v. Jerome


text:
Platt v. Jerome/Opinion of the Court

This is a motion, on behalf of the attorney for the defendant in error, to restore the cause on the docket, which has been dismissed upon a stipulation of a settlement between the parties. The judgment was for the defendant, Jerome, in the court below, for costs of suit, upon which the plaintiff took out a writ of error. The attorney claims that he had a lien on the judgment for his costs.

It is quite clear that he can have no lien for any costs in this court, as none have been recovered against the plaintiff in error. The suit is still pending; and as to the question of the dismissal of the writ, the court looks no further than to see that the application for the dismissal is made by the competent parties, which are usually the parties to the record. No doubt, if either party had assigned his interest to a third person, by which such third person had become possessed of the beneficial interest, and the party to the record merely nominal, the court would protect such interest, and give him the control of the suit. As in the present case, if the application had been made by the insolvent assignee of Jerome, and he had shown that he had succeeded to the interest of the insolvent, the court might protect his rights.

The attorney, however, even if he has a lien on the judgment, according to the course of proceedings in the court where it was recovered, stands in a different situation. He is not a party to the suit, nor does he stand in the place of the party in interest. He is in no way responsible for the costs of the proceedings, and to permit him to control them would, in effect, be compelling the client to carry on the litigation at his own expense, simply for the contingent benefit of the attorney.

We think, therefore, that this cause has been dismissed from the docket by the competent parties, for aught that appears before us, and that the motion to restore it should be denied.

title: Platt v. Jerome/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Platt v. Jerome/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/166

SYRIA, THE LAND OF LEBANON a church. In the marble wall beside its most beautiful prayer-niche is set a large mosaic panel, among whose intricate geometric traceries there stand out distinctly three large Maltese crosses. The Moslem artist apparently copied the design from some earlier decoration without realizing that he was including the hated symbol of Christianity. So the worshipers in the Great Mosque who face towards Mecca face also the Cross!

But the strangest feature of this ancient sanctuary is seldom viewed by travelers; for it is hard to reach, and dragomans are averse to taking the necessary trouble. You must go to the Joiners' Bazaar, which lies just south of the mosque, and borrow a long ladder. Setting this up in the busy street, you then climb through a small hole which has been broken in the wall just under the roof of the covered bazaar, and step out upon a dusty housetop. Here is seen a bit of an old stone portal, elaborately carved with leaves and flowers, and bearing on its lintel the unexpected Greek inscription, standing out clearly in capital letters—

THY KINGDOM, O CHRIST, IS AN EVERLASTING KINGDOM,

AND THY DOMINION ENDURETH THROUGHOUT ALL GENERATIONS.

It is a startling, suggestive sentence to read upon [ 126 ]


text:
United States v. City Bank of Columbus (60 U.S. 385)

THIS case came up on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Cushing (Attorney General) for the United States, and by Mr. Stanberry for the defendant.

Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:United States v. City Bank of Columbus (60 U.S. 385)


text:
United States v. City Bank of Columbus (60 U.S. 385)/Opinion of the Court

This cause is brought before us upon a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio.

The United States instituted their action of assumpsit against the defendants, for the recovery of a sum of money, laying their damages at two hundred thousand dollars.

The declaration consisted of two counts. The first was upon an alleged agreement between the United States and the City Bank of Columbus, whereby the latter, on the 1st day of November, 1850, contracted and undertook to transfer for the plaintiff's the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, the money of the plaintiffs, from the city of New York to the city of New Orleans, and to deposit the same at the latter place, in the treasury of the United States, by the 1st day of January, 1851, free of charge.

In this count, the receipt of the money by the bank, viz: one hundred thousand dollars, for the purposes stated, the failure to make the transfer and deposit in conformity with the agreement, the conversion of the money so received by the bank to its own use, are all expressly averred.

The second count was the common indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received to the plaintiffs' use. Upon the trial before the jury of the issues joined by the parties, at the October term of the Circuit Court, in the year 1855, the plaintiffs, in order to establish the alleged agreement and undertaking on the part of the bank, gave in evidence the following papers, viz:

First, a letter from Thomas Moodie, cashier of the City Bank of Columbus, in these words:

'CITY BANK OF COLUMBUS,

Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1850.

'Hon. Thomas Corwin, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington city.

'SIR: The bearer, Col. William Miner, a director of this bank, is authorized, on behalf of this institution, to make proposals for the purchase of United States stocks to the amount of one hundred thousand dollars. Any arrangement he may make will be recognized and fully carried out by this bank. He is also authorized, if consistent with the rules of the Treasury Department, to contract on behalf of this institution for the transfer of money from the East to the South or West, for the Government.

'I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

'THOMAS MOODIE, Cashier.' Second. The following contract:

'W. CITY, November 1, 1850.

'This will certify that I have contracted with the United States Treasury, as the agent of the City Bank of Columbus, to transfer $100,000 from New York to New Orleans, to be deposited in the treasury at the latter-named city by the first day of January, 1851, free of charge. I have, in pursuance of said contract, this day received a draft in my own name for $100,000 on the United States Treasury at New York city, which is to be accounted for on said contract.

'WILLIAM MINER.'

'Upon the production of these papers, and proof of their execution, and further proof that said letter was the act of said cashier alone, without the knowledge or sanction of the directory of said bank, before, at the time of, or subsequent thereto, but was copied in the letter-book of the bank at the time of its execution, a question arose as to the validity thereof, upon which question the judges of this court were divided in opinion. It is therefore, by the request of both the parties, hereby ordered, that the said question be certified to the Supreme Court of the United States-that is to say, 'Do said papers, so made, constitute a valid contract between the parties to this suit?' It was agreed that the defendant is an independent bank under the act of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio of 1844-'5, to incorporate the State Bank of Ohio and other banking companies.

'Wednesday, November 28, 1855.

(Signed) 'JOHN McLEAN. [Seal.]

'H. H. LEAVITT. [Seal.]'

In considering this certificate of division, and the inquiry it propounds, an insuperable difficulty is perceived, arising from the partial and imperfect form in which the facts assumed as the foundation of the inquiry are presented, and from the obvious absence of facts and circumstances pertinent to the case, and by which, if disclosed, its complexion might be entirely controlled.

This court is asked to say, whether the above-cited letter of the cashier of the City Bank of Columbus, written without the knowledge of the directory, though copied at the time of its date in the letter-book of the bank, was a legal and valid act and authority.

Now, it must be obvious that the legality or validity of the letter of the cashier, and his authority to write that letter, do not depend solely and necessarily upon the fact of knowledge in the directory at the time of writing that letter, nor on that of express direction or permission given at the time of its composition. The letter might have been legal and valid in the absence of either such knowledge or direction, or of both.

The powers of the cashier of a bank are such as are incident to, and implied in, his official character, as generally understood, as cash keeper, cash receiver, or payer, as negotiator and correspondent for the corporation, or as agent for various acts that are necessary and appropriate to the functions of such an officer, and inseparable from the operations of the bank; or those powers and duties may be created by a general or special authority declared in the charter or in the by-laws of the corporation. It would seem inconsistent with these considerations to determine upon an isolated fact or act of the cashier, not absolutely irreconcilable with the customary functions of such an officer, as being decisive of his capacities and duties; and this, irrespective of reference or inquiry as to the powers with which he might have been clothed, but, on the contrary, by cutting off all proofs as to the existence of any such powers, when by the introduction of those proofs the competency of such powers, or the recognition of them by the bank, might perhaps have been shown.

The true character of this cause seems not to have been developed before the Circuit Court, nor is it made apparent upon the certificate now before this court.

We think that all the evidence relevant to the acts and authority of the cashier, either inherent and exercised strictly virtue officii, or as an agent, general or special, of the bank, under either the authority of its charter or its by-laws, and proof, if any, of the ratification or rejection by the bank of this or of similar acts of the cashier, should have been fully brought out, to be passed upon by the jury under instructions from the court, or in the mode of a certificate of division, in the event of a disagreement between the judges. This court, therefore, refusing to respond upon the question, as propounded to them upon the certificate from the Circuit Court, remands this case to that court for trial.


text: Talk:United States v. City Bank of Columbus (60 U.S. 385)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Burke v. Gaines

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Lawrence for the defendants in error, no counsel appearing for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Burke v. Gaines


text: Talk:Burke v. Gaines

title: Talk:Burke v. Gaines


text:
Burke v. Gaines/Opinion of the Court

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. A brief summary of the case will be sufficient to show that this court have no jurisdiction.

The defendants in error, who were the plaintiffs in the court below, brought their action of ejectment in the State court to recover certain premises described in the declaration.

By a statute of Arkansas, a party may maintain an ejectment upon an equitable title. And the defendants in error, in order to show such a title in themselves, offered in evidence certain documents tending to prove that a certain Ludovicus Belding had, by settlement in 1829, acquired a pre-emption right to the land in question, and that they are his heirs at law, and have paid to the proper officer the price fixed by the Government.

The plaintiff in error offered no evidence of title in himself, although he was in possession of the land. And at the trial, the defendants in error asked the court to instruct the jury that the papers and documents read in evidence by them were sufficient to maintain the action, if the defendant in error was in possession of any part of the land at the commencement of the suit, and also that they were entitled to recover, by way of damages, reasonable rents and profits.

The plaintiff in error, on his part, asked the court to instruct to jury that the certificates and documents offered by the defendants in error were void, and conferred no title to the premises.

This is the substance of the instructions asked for by the respective parties, although drawn out at greater length, and shows the questions presented for the decision of the court. The court gave the instructions asked for by the defendants in error, and refused those requested by the plaintiff.

Under these instructions, the jury found a verdict in favor of the defendants in error, and a judgment was entered accordingly, which was afterwards affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State; and upon that judgment, this writ of error was brought.

It appears, therefore, that no right was claimed by the plaintiff in error under any act of Congress, or under any authority derived from the United States. He merely objected to the validity of the title claimed by the defendants in error. As the case appears on the record, he was a mere trespasser, holding possession in opposition to a title claimed under the United States. The decision of the State court in favor of the title thus claimed by the defendants in error can certainly give the plaintiff no right to bring this writ under the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789. He claimed no right under the United States, and consequently can have no foundation for his writ of error.

The case cannot be distinguished from that of Fulton and others v. McAffea, (16 Pet., 149,) and the writ must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

title: Burke v. Gaines/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Burke v. Gaines/Opinion of the Court


text:
Bulkley v. Honold

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Taylor for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Benjamin for the defendant.

Mr. Taylor contended that, if the law of Louisiana governed, there was error, because—

1. The defect in the ship was an apparent defect, in the legal sense of the term, the existence of which imposed no responsibility on the vendor.

2. Because the obligation of warranty, implied in sales of ships, does not extend to cases of decay, to which they are, from their nature, liable.

3. The defendant in error, by failing to offer to place the defendant in the court below in the position he was in before the sale, by tendering back the ship, &c., lost all right to maintain his action in redhibition or in diminution of the price.

He contended, also, that the case was not governed by the law of Louisiana, but by the law of New York, where the vendor had his domicil, or by the commercial law of the United States.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Bulkley v. Honold


text: Talk:Bulkley v. Honold

title: Talk:Bulkley v. Honold


text:
Bulkley v. Honold/Opinion of the Court

The defendant in error brought his action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, founded on the allegations, that he purchased at New Orleans, of the plaintiff in error and others, a vessel called the Ashland, for the sum of $27,500; that the vessel was then partly laden as a general ship for an outward foreign voyage, and it was agreed the purchaser should take on himself the expenses and advantages of that condition of the vessel; that, accordingly, the cargo was completed and the vessel went to sea, but was found to be unseaworthy, returned to New Orleans, the cargo was removed, and the hull examined and ascertained to be so decayed and rotten as to be of no value without very extensive and costly repairs. The court found these facts proved, and allowed to the plaintiff below damages equal to the difference between the price paid and the actual value of the vessel, adding the expenses of the vessel and cargo, incurred by the plaintiff below by reason of the sale.

The petition averred a fraudulent concealment by the vendors of the defects of the vessel, but the court found this not proved.

The law of Louisiana imposes on the seller the obligation of warranting the thing sold against its hidden defects. (Civ. Code, arts. 2,450, 2,451.) Hidden defects are those which could not be discovered by simple inspection. (Civ. Code, art. 2,497.) In case the seller desires to rescind the contract by reason of the breach of such a warranty, he may do so by an action of redhibition. But he may also retain the thing sold, and have an action for reduction of the price by reason of the difference in value between the thing as warranted and as it was in fact. (Civ. Code, arts. 2,519, 2,520.) And in this action only such a part of the price as will indemnify the vendee for the difference between the value of the thing as warranted and the thing actually sold, together with the expenses incurred on the thing, after deducting its fruits, can be recovered. (Civ. Code, arts. 2,522, 2,509.) The Circuit Court appears to have strictly pursued these rules in framing its judgment.

But it is insisted the defects were apparent, and not hidden defects. We do not think so. Certainly they were discoverable, but not on what the code terms simple inspection. It was necessary to strip or bore the vessel, to ascertain the state of its frame; and this, we think, the vendee was not bound to do under the law of Louisiana.

It is further argued that the implied warranty does not extend to the soundness of a vessel, because it is known to all, that, from the nature of the thing, it must decay, and the purchaser may be considered as knowing this, and making allowance therefor in the price. It is true that vessels must, after some time, decay; and it is also true that most subjects of sale must at some time become of less or of no value. But it is not true that vessels exposed to sale are generally unsound and unseaworthy. The buyer has no notice, from the nature of the article, that any particular vessel offered to be sold is unseaworthy by reason of the decayed state of that part of its frame which is concealed from sight. We do not perceive, therefore, why any different rule should be applicable to vessels, from that applied to most other subjects of sale. (See De Armas v. Gray et al., 10 Louis. R., 575.)

Another objection is, that the plaintiff below did not offer to restore the vessel. But this proceeds on a misapprehension of the nature of the remedy. In an action of redhibition, such an offer would be necessary. Here, the contract is to stand unrescinded, and the buyer retains the thing, the price only being lessened as much as is necessary to do justice.

It was also argued that this contract was not to be governed by the laws of Louisiana, but by the laws of New York, where the vendors resided. But the contract was made and performed in Louisiana, and must be governed by its laws. (Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Peters, 635; Cox v. United States, 6 Peters, 172; Bell v. Bruin, 1 How., 169.)

The counsel for the plaintiff in error also urged, that if the law of Louisiana ought to govern the contract, that law was to be found, not in the civil code of that State, but in the general commercial law of the country. Without pausing upon the difficulties which otherwise might attend this proposition, we think it sufficient to say, that we find the subject of sales, with the obligations which attend them, regulated by the civil code of Louisiana, and we see no sound reason why sales of vessels are not within those laws.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

title: Bulkley v. Honold/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Bulkley v. Honold/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Dred Scott v. Sandford (60 U.S. 393)