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Rh greatest benefits that ever God gave me is, that he sent me so sharp and severe parents and so gentle a schoolmaster. For when I am in presence either of father or mother, whether I speak, keep silence, sit, stand, or go, eat, drink, be merry or sad, be sewing, playing, dancing, or doing anything else; I must do it as it were in such weight, measure and number, even so perfectly as God made the world; or else I am so sharply threatened—yea, presently sometimes with pinches, nips, and bobs and other ways (which I will not name for the honour I bear them), that I think myself in hell, till time come that I must go to Mr. Elmer; who teacheth me so gently, so pleasantly, with such fair allurements to learning that I think all the time nothing whiles I am with him. And when I am called from him I fall on weeping, because whatsoever I do else but learning is full of grief, trouble, and fear." Likewise the Princess Elizabeth so displeased her father that she was sent away from Court for a whole year, when he at last forgave her. The learning of the Princess Mary rivalled that of Elizabeth and Lady Jane Grey. At the age of twelve she was "ripe in the Latin tongue," at


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ROM the necessarily serious attitude of our forefathers under the religious changes of the early Tudors, it is a relief to turn to the study of England under her first great Queen, to dream once again of that "merrie" country so fantastically described by Spenser, and to realise that

so dramatically represented by Shakspere, resembles more closely than heretofore the England of to-day.

The Middle Ages have gone for ever. Past is

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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162 the vision of glittering knights pricking over solitary plains, making their way through gloomy and pathless forests in lowering twilight to the relief of phantom ladies in distress; gone is the splendid glow of colour; pierced at last is the impenetrable mist concealing the real humanity of our medieval ancestry. Individuals stand forth from the crowd, and at the head of all reigns the Maiden Queen, Elizabeth, ludicrous perhaps in her artificiality, but very human, frivolous, and fanciful. She knew—who better?—the temper of her people; she was ready to encourage their enterprise, to smile compassionately at their devotion, to reward, however shabbily, their deeds of heroism and daring. Hence the Elizabethan age is one of restless energy and splendid achievement, tempered with unbounded courage and reckless daring. Once more the blood of the Viking was passionately stirred, and across the tempestuous seas the Elizabethan explorer sailed to new lands and new scenes, in boats which showed no very marked advance on those in which our Saxon forefathers had approached our shores, some thousand years before. New worlds had opened before their astonished eyes, and with


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Rh the delight of children they bounded forward to take possession of their new-found lands across the seas. The expeditions were full of danger, but faith in an omnipotent God steeled their spirits. Every explorer took the sacrament in his parish church before he set forth on his adventures, and his first act on landing in a strange country was to kneel in thanksgiving for his safe arrival in port. There were many who never returned home, and in days of few letters and no telegrams one can picture the anxiety of the eager throng that would crowd round the weather-beaten sailors—bronzed and bearded men with deep-set eyes and hollow cheeks—men who had seen strange sights and heard strange tales. Their ships were laden with gold dust and ingots of silver, pearls, emeralds, and diamonds; they had negroes on board and Red Indians, crocodile skins, chattering monkeys, and gorgeous-hued parrots. "The little world had become … inconceivably large."

Wealth increased by leaps and bounds, and commerce began that more rapid development which till the end of the Victorian era made England supreme among nations. London, too was becoming the wonder of the world, "a large


text:
Dictionary of National Biography, 1901 supplement

 * /Prefatory Note/ by Sidney Lee, editor.

 * /Memoir of George Smith/ by Sidney Lee, editor.

 * Vol. I, II & III List of Writers

Biographical Navigation pages

 * Volume I - Abbott - Childers

 * Volume II - Chippendale - Hoste

 * Volume III - How-Woodward

 * Dictionary of National Biography, 1904 errata


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164 excellent, and mighty city of business, and the most important in the whole kingdom," as a foreigner truly remarked after a residence in this country. "Most of the inhabitants are employed in buying and selling merchandise, and trading in almost every corner of the world, since the river is most useful and convenient for this purpose, considering that ships from France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Hamburg, and other kingdoms, come almost up to the city, to which they convey goods and take away others in exchange. One can scarcely pass along the streets on account of the throng." When Queen Elizabeth ascended the throne the commercial centre of the world was Antwerp; when she died the commercial centre was London. The opening of the Royal Exchange—the gift of a rich merchant—by the Queen herself marks the commercial progress of the day. Foreign merchants, picturesque in their native costumes, brought their wares to the new "Burse." At six o'clock in the morning a bell rang from the lofty tower, summoning all together for the day's work. New luxuries found their way into the country, amongst which may be mentioned apricots, turkeys, hops, tobacco, and potatoes. New


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Rh manufactures sprang up in England, and for the first time we find such things as pins, needles, shoe buckles, tacks, paper, fans, and wigs being made in this country. This is no place to speak fully of the great woollen industry that grew apace in the Eastern Counties, of the increase in dyeing and spinning, or the fame of English wool. The results are directly visible in the lives of the people. Shopkeepers, merchants, farmers, manufacturers, all grew rich and prosperous, and an increase of comfort and luxury in ordinary life was the natural outcome of the new energy. Yet wise men shook their heads over the growth of luxury, even as they do to-day. That it would "eat out the hardihood of the people" was their growing anxiety, for in the increase of comfort they saw the signs of England's decay. "We see the change," cries one, "for when our houses were builded of willow, then had we oken men; but now that our houses are come to be made of oke, our men are not onlie become willow, but a great many altogether of straw, which is a sore alteration. Now have we manie chimneys and yet our tenderlings complaine of rheums, catarrhs, and poses. Then had we


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166 none but reredosses and our heads did never ake."

"England spendeth more on wines in one year than it did in ancient times in four years," grumbled another. The increase of luxury has undoubtedly its dangers, but there are degrees of luxury after all, and one can hardly regret the substitution of chimneys for the open hearth, of carpets for the stale rushes with their accompanying accumulations of dirt, of forks for fingers, not to mention items which to-day are considered necessaries rather than luxuries, as nightgowns, potatoes, and toothbrushes.

If the great feudal household was a creation of the past, and the hall no longer found the lord and his lady sitting at board with their array of feudal retainers, yet the Elizabethan household was an immense affair. The sixteenth century was the era of palaces, spacious and stately buildings, where open hospitality still reigned as in the bygone days, though the old simplicity of life had past. Elaborate and complicated were these Tudor palaces, with their fretted fronts and gilded turrets, their picturesque gables and castellated gateways. The foreign element was as visible in Elizabethan architecture as in


text: The American Journal of Sociology/Volume 03/Number 6/The Persistence of Social Groups II


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Rh else Elizabethan. Everything was ornamented, nothing was plain. Outside and inside there was carving, painting, sculpture, and needlework. Turrets, gables, and domes were decorated, brick chimneys were elaborately carved, towers were surmounted with carved figures, roofs were castellated, and oriel windows ridiculously exaggerated. From the narrow and draughty Gothic loophole of the past the sixteenth-century architect turned to an almost painful extreme of glaring light. We hear of a window with 3,200 panes of glass in it, and remember Lord Bacon's warning, "You shall have sometimes fair houses so full of glass that one cannot tell where to be out of the sun or cold." From these windows the wealthy English owner could look out on to his newly laid out garden, with its stately terrace, its broad flights of steps, its vases and fountains, mazes and grass plots, its yew hedges in grotesque shapes. The primitive medieval garden, which had developed into the pleasure garden of the early Tudors, had now grown into the formal old English garden of the Elizabethan era. The architect who designed the house, as a matter of course in those days, designed the garden also. In front lay the wide terrace, from


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many cases the structure of the group is from the beginning adjusted to such alternation between functions immediately discharged by the group and those that are performed by an organ. Thus in stock companies, the technical management of which is committed to directors, while the stockholders in general meeting may either remove the directors or prescribe conditions which the latter may be either indisposed or incompetent to adopt for themselves. Small associations which are accustomed either to manage their affairs through a president or a committee are usually so arranged that these organs either voluntarily or involuntarily surrender their powers so soon as they cease to be equal to the burden or the responsibility of their functions. Every revolution which deposes a political government from power and gives back legislation and administration to the immediate initiative of the elements belongs in this sociological form. It follows as a matter of course that not every group can adapt itself to such reversion of type. In very large groups, or in those that live under very complicated conditions, the assumption of administrative functions by the group directly is a simple impossibility. The structure of organs is not to be recalled, and their flexibility and vital interdependence with the elements can at most show themselves in the ability of the elements to change the persons who at a given moment compose the organ, and replace them with more suitable persons. Nevertheless it is continually happening, even in cases of rather high sociological development, that the group power flows back from the organs to its original source, though this may be but a process of transition to the formation of new organs. The Episcopal church in the United States was at the disadvantage of being without a bishop until the end of the last century, because the mother


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 church of England, which alone could consecrate a bishop, refused to do so for political reasons. In dire extremity and in danger of complete disruption the congregations resolved to help themselves. In the year 1784 they appointed delegations, laymen and clergymen, who assembled and constituted themselves the supreme unifying body and central organ of church government. A special historian of this epoch pictures it in these words: “Never had so strange a sight been seen before in Christendom as this necessity of various members knitting themselves together into one. In all other cases the unity of the common episcopate had held such limbs together; every member had visibly belonged to the community of which the present bishop was the head.” The imminent coherence of the communicants, which up to that time had centered in the organ—the bishop—which at the same time had become a reality outside of this organ, now came into view in its original character. The power was restored to that immediate reciprocity of the elements which had projected it from itself.

This case is especially interesting because the function of holding the church members together was conferred on the bishop by consecration, that is, it came from a superior source, apparently independent of that function. Now, however, it is restored by a purely sociological process and in this process the source of its energy is unequivocally revealed. That the local churches had the sagacity, after so protracted and so efficient determination of their sociological powers to an organ, to supply the place of this again by the immediate exercise of those powers was a symptom of extraordinary health in their religio-social life. Very many communities of the most various sorts have failed because the relation between their elementary social powers and the organs which they had produced was not constructive enough to refer the functions necessary for social self-preservation back to the elementary powers, in case the organs differentiated for those functions disappeared or became inefficient.

The elaboration of differentiated organs is, so to speak, a


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 aid to social self-preservation. Thereby a new member grows upon the structure of society. We must treat quite apart from this the question how the impulse of self-preservation affects the life of the group in functional respects. The question whether this group life progresses in undifferentiated unity or with specialized organs is for this purpose secondary. The question is rather with reference to the general form or tempo in which the life processes of the group proceed. We meet here two chief possibilities. The group may be preserved, (1) by conserving with the utmost tenacity its firmness and rigidity of form, so that the group may meet approaching dangers with substantial resistance, and may preserve the relation of its elements through all change of external conditions; (2) by the highest possible variability of its form, so that adaptation of form may be quickly accomplished in response to change of external conditions, so that the form of the group may adjust itself to any demand of circumstances. This duality of possibilities obviously arises from a quite general demeanor of the group. Analogies may be found in every possible realm, even the physical. A body is protected against destruction from stress and shock either by rigidity and unyielding cohesion of its elements, so that the attacking force makes no impression; or by pliability and elasticity, by virtue of which it gives way before every onset, to be sure, but after each attack ceases it recovers its previous form. We have now to discuss these two ways of social preservation.

Persistence by means of the conservative policy seems to be the method indicated wherever the aggregate consists of very diverse elements with latent or potent antipathies, so that every attack, no matter of what sort, is dangerous, and even measures for maintenance and for positive usefulness must be avoided if they entail agitation. Accordingly a state that is very complex, and must perpetually balance a somewhat unstable equilibrium, as is the case with Austria, will, on the whole, be strongly conservative because any disturbance might produce an irreparable disarrangement of the equilibrium. This consequence attaches


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 itself in general to the form of heterogeneity of the component elements in a large group, unless this diversity leads to the harmonious interlacing of interests that comes from essential unity. The danger to the maintenance of the social status quo lies here in the fact that every disturbance must produce very different sorts of consequences in the different strata of the group, because they are the repositories of highly contrasted energies. The smaller the amount of essential compatibility between the elements of the group, the more probable is it that new agitations, new stimulations of consciousness, new occasions for resolves and for developments will force the contrasted elements still further apart. There are countless ways in which people may be estranged from each other, but often only a single way of approach. Consequently it makes no difference how useful the changes might be in themselves, their effects upon the elements will bring the entire heterogeneity of the latter to expression, and to heightened expression, just as the mere lengthening of divergent lines makes the divergence more evident. The avoidance of every innovation, of every departure from the previous way, a severe and rigid conservatism, is here indicated, therefore, in order to hold the group in its existing form.

But without a divergence of group elements to the extent of enmity, the same conservative character will be favorable to the maintenance of the group whenever the divergence, of whatever


text: Index:Pierre.djvu

title: Index:Pierre.djvu


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 sort, is considerable. Where the social differences are very marked, and where they do not merge into each other through intermediate gradations, any sudden movement and disturbance of the structure of the whole must be much more dangerous than when many intermediate strata are present. This follows from the fact that evolution always affects at first a portion of the group exclusively or with especial energy. Accordingly, in the case last considered, the consequences or extension of the evolution will appear but gradually, while in the first case the movement will be much more violent and will take sudden hold of portions of the group that are most distant and most opposed. The intermediate classes act then as buffers. In the event of sudden developments, or unavoidable disturbance of the structure of the whole, they graduate, mollify, and distribute the shock.

It is most necessary to preserve at all hazards the social peace, stability, and conservative character of the group life in those instances in which the group structure is discontinuous and characterized by sharp internal differences. For that reason we notice, as a matter of fact, that in groups containing tremendous and irreconcilable class contrasts, peace and persistence of the forms of social life are more apt to prevail than in cases of approach and mediation and commingling between the extremes of the social scale. In the latter case preservation of the whole in the status quo ante is much more likely to be along with unstable conditions, sudden developments, and progressive tendencies.

This connection between stability of the social character and width of distances between social elements betrays itself in the opposite direction. In case the preservation of the group, by means of stability, is mechanically forced, abrupt social differences often take shape with that end in view. This appears in the development of peasant serfdom in Russia. In the Russian there has always been a strong nomadic impulse. The level character of the country tended to confirm this impulse. To insure regular cultivation of the soil it was consequently necessary to take from the peasant his liberty to come and go at will.


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 That took place under Feodor in 1593. When the peasant was once bound to the soil he gradually lost the elements of freedom that he had formerly possessed. The forced immobility of the peasant became here, as in all the rest of Europe, the leverage by which the landlord degraded him lower and lower. That at first merely provisional device at last turned the peasant into a mere chattel of the estate. Thus the impulse of self-preservation in the group produces, not alone in case of existing contrasts, a tendency to stability of life forms; but, in case this impulse directly calls these contrasts into existence, growing social differences attach themselves to the impulse, and thus afford evidence of the essential relationship here asserted.

A further instance in which the self-preservation of the group makes for all possible stability and rigidity of its forms is evident in the case of outlived structures which have no longer an inherent right of existence, and whose elements really belong in other relations and social formations. Starting with the end of the Middle Ages, for example, the German community-associations suffered reduction of their effectiveness and of their rights through the growth of centralized administrations. Instead of retaining the vital power of cohesion which they had possessed by virtue of the importance of their former social role, there remained to them only the mask and externalities of those former possessions. In this plight the final means of self-preservation was very rigid exclusiveness, an unqualified prevention of the entrance of new associates. Every quantitative extension of a group requires certain qualitative modifications and adaptations. An obsolete structure cannot go through these changes without collapse. The social form is in very close dependence upon the numerical definiteness of its elements. That structure of a society which is appropriate for a given number of members is no longer appropriate when a certain increase has occurred. The process of transformation into the new form demanded force, the assimilation and disposition of the new elements consume force. Structures which have lost their essential meaning have no strength left for this task. They


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 must rather use all the energy remaining to protect the still surviving form against internal and external dangers. That rigid exclusion of new associates, which later characterizes the outlived Zunft organizations, signified immediately, therefore, that the group was confirming its stability by the exclusion which confined it to its once acquired members and their descendants. It signified still further, however, an avoidance of those reconstructions which are necessary with every quantitative extension of the group, modifications for which a structure that has outlasted its usefulness has no longer the requisite strength. The instinct of self-preservation will consequently lead such a group to measures of rigid conservatism. In general, structures that are unfit for competition will incline to these means, for in the degree in which their form is variable, in which it passes through different stages and accomplishes new adaptations, occasion is given to competitors for dangerous attacks. The most assailable stage for societies as for individuals is that between two periods of adjustment. Whoever is in motion cannot at every moment be so guarded on all sides as he may be who is in a position of stability and repose. A group which has a feeling of insecurity with reference to its competitors will on that account for the sake of its self-preservation avoid all variation, and will live in accordance with the principle quieta non movere.

This rigid self-limitation is especially to the purpose whenever competition is not yet present, but the aim is to prevent its appearance, because of conscious inability to cope with it. Rigorous measures of exclusion alone will in this case maintain the status, because if new relationships arise, if new points of connection with parties outside the group are offered, the group will be drawn into a wider sphere, in which it might encounter competition that could not be overcome. This sociological norm may be operative very widely in the following connection. An irredeemable paper currency has the peculiarity, in contrast with redeemable paper money, that it circulates only within the territory of the government that issues it, and cannot be exported. This is proclaimed as its greatest advantage. It


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 remains in the country. It is ready at hand for all enterprises. It does not take part in that equalization of precious metal with other states which immediately produces importation of foreign goods and the outflow of money, if there is a superfluity of money and consequent rise of prices. Consequently, if the circulating power of currency is limited to the country of issue, the circulating medium becomes an inner bond of unity for that country, and a means by which it maintains its social form, since it shuts the country off from the great competition of the world’s markets. A country that is industrially strong and equal to any competitive enterprise would not need this means. It would rather be sure that it would increase the strength of its essential form in the variability of exchange, and in the developments of reciprocal dependence.

3em


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168 which a flight of steps led to broad, straight walks, intersected with flower-beds geometric in form. The patterns harmonised with the details of architecture; the tracery surmounting the Elizabethan house found its counterpart in the design of the flower-beds. The garden was square "because it doth best agree with a man's dwelling," and bounded by a high brick wall, often covered with rosemary and "divers sweet smelling plants." But the old formal garden is too well known to need description, for it has many imitations in these modern days. Familiar in our minds are the quaint yew hedges fantastically clipped, the "covert walks" and "shade alleys" formed by intertwining willows and wych elms, where "one might walk twoe myle … before he came to their ends." Familiar the maze set with privet, some six feet high, with lavender, marjoram, or thyme, and cut into "meanders, circles, semicircles, windings, and intricate turnings, the walks or intervals whereof are all grass plots"; familiar the fair fountains with their marble sculpture, Neptune and his horses, Thetis and her dolphins, Triton and his fishes, with water spurting vehemently upwards. Indeed these fountains gave rise to many a practical


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walford, Thomas


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walkden, Peter


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walkelin


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Adam


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Alexander


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Andrew Barclay


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Anthony


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Charles Pyndar Beauchamp


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Rh joke, for it was a favourite pastime to order the gardener at a distance to turn a wheel, which, forcing the water through a number of little pipes, played upon the ladies standing by so as to wet them thoroughly from "top to toe."

On another side of the house lay the kitchen or cook's garden, no longer given up entirely to herbs as of yore. Here grew melons, gourds, cucumbers, radishes, parsnips, carrots, turnips, and salad herbs, for these were no longer the food of the "poor commons," but to be found henceforth at the "tables of delicate merchants, gentlemen and the nobility." Hence more care was given to their cultivation. But by far the most important addition to the kitchen garden was the potato, now brought back from the New World for the first time, "thicke, fat and tuberous," some round as a ball, some oval or egg fashion, some longer and others shorter, which "knobbie rootes are fastened into the stalkes with an infinite number of threddie strings." Such was the potato of these days; it was cooked, "either rosted in the embers, or boiled and eaten with oile, vinegar and pepper, or dressed any other way by the hand of some cunning in cookery." The Elizabethan orchard, which "takes away


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Charles Vincent


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Edward


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Frederick


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170 the tediousness and heavie load of three or four score years," was usually to the east side of the flower garden, so that the fruit trees might shelter the tender plants, while tall forest trees in their turn sheltered the fruit trees. The newly imported "apricocke" was carefully tended on the south wall with peaches and nectarines; quinces and plums were grown on the west, spread up and fastened to the walls by the help of tacks, now used for the first time. In front of the wall fruit was usually a path bordered with low trained fruit trees, cherries, gooseberries, pippins and currants—a sort of wild grape—while between the raspberries and currants the ground was "powdered with strawberries." What a joy these gardens were to our forefathers is well expressed by a contemporary writer: "A garden then so appointed as wherein aloft upon sweet shadowed walk of terrace, in heat of summer, to feel the pleasant whisking wind above or delectable coolness of the fountain spring beneath; to taste of delicious strawberries, of sweet odours, breathing from the plants, herbs and flowers; to hear such natural melodious musick and tunes of birds, to have in eye, for mirth, sometime there under springing streams, then, the woods, the waters, the deer, the


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George (1618-1690)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George (d.1777)


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90 "Don't you realize that a ghost might want release? And others beside the Hessians found a tragic death here. Two women, didn't you say—I heard a voice ask for the final repetition of my spell. Again, it said."

"We-ell—" began Scrope uncertainly.

"The spirits of those two women are here, too," said Pursuivant confidently. "The evil of the place is too strong to let them escape, even though they're dead."

"Judge!" gasped Scrope, very pale. He swallowed twice, and continued:

"You realize something? If something happens to us—"

"Exactly," agreed Pursuivant, very steadily. "We'd be caught, too. For all eternity. I realize it perfectly. That is why we must push this thing through to the end—and win."

He rose once again and went to the door. Foot on the sill, he leaned ever so narrowly in. Then he drew quickly back, like a spectator from the cage of an angry beast.

"Still here," he reported. "Ready for us. It, too, knows that the showdown's at hand."

Scrope studied the doorway, eyes and lips hard. "I've got a theory. It stays in that part of the house, the middle part. Might it live in the cellar?"

"Why?" asked Judge Pursuivant.

"Because the cellar—the old basement—lies only under the bathroom and the hall and that guestroom, with only a bit lapping under parts of the kitchen and—"

"By thunder, you have it!" interrupted Pursuivant excitedly.

While Scrope stared, the judge fished his pen from his vest pocket. He began to sketch, on the table-top.

"See here," he lectured as he drew. "Your house is sprawling—great big rooms, making a wide base, like this." He outlined a square. "And the cellar is rather centrally located, so." He marked in a smaller rectangle, which took a middle slice of the square.

"Yes. That's about like it," nodded Scrope. "What are you getting at?"

"Don't you see, man?" cried Pursuivant, almost roughly. "That basement shows the limits of the old house—narrow and high, just as this new one is broad and low. The spirit haunted the old place. Your house takes in that original territory, and some new ground as well."

He threw down the pen.

"You're only half haunted, Scrope."

Understanding dawned into the little man's face. He sprang to his feet. He began a glad jabber:

"That changes everything. We're safe. If we don't go in there—"

"Oh, but we're going in there."

Scrope looked wide-eyed, scared. Pursuivant elaborated:

"The last recital of the spell will take place right in that thing's den—right on his own dunghill, so to speak. We'll destroy him forever, where he can't seek refuge from us."

an hour was passed. The two rose from their chairs in the kitchen.

"It's time," said Scrope, looking at his wrist watch. "Judge, must I come in there with you?"

"You must," Pursuivant assured him. "into that front bedroom. The creature must face his final exorcism."

He walked to to the hall, and in. Scrope kept close behind, on feet that sounded amazingly heavy for so small a body. They stood together in the hall's dimness.

It was no longer the hall, new and narrow and fresh-painted in light color. It was a corner of something else.

Despite the gloom, Pursuivant could see plainly that the walls had somehow fallen away. He stood as in a wide and ruinous apartment, with shattered windows extending almost to the high ceiling. The


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George (1772-1847)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George (1803-1879)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George Alfred


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George Townshend


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Rh people, the fruit trees, the plants, the herbs, the flowers, the change in colours, the birds fluttering, the fountain streaming, the fish swimming, all in such delectable variety, order, dignity; whereby at one moment, in one place, at hand, without travel, to have so full fruition of so many of God's blessings, worthy to be called Paradise." Neither can one forget Spenser's joyous voice singing—

Indoors, too, flowers abounded. In summer time the chimneys were trimmed with banks of moss and a white flower "called everlasting." "Their chambers and parlours strawed over with sweete herbs refreshed me," says a Dutch traveller in 1560. "Their nosegays finely intermingled with sundry sorts of fragrant flowers in their bed-chambers with comfortable smell, cheered me up and entirely delighted my senses." But flowers were a small detail of the luxuries which filled the inside of Elizabethan houses.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, George Washington


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, Hovenden


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James (1748-1808?)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James (1764-1831)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James (1770?-1841)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James (1809-1885)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James Robertson-


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, James Thomas


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172 The great hall of feudal fame, now robbed of its ancient importance, was merely the stately approach to a wide and decorated staircase, leading to magnificent banqueting rooms and endless wide galleries, which were hung with rich tapestries and embroideries, and adorned with cloths of gold and silver, with some few pictures of Royal personages carefully tended behind little curtains. Long passages led to suites of gorgeous bedrooms occupied by huge four-post beds—the glory of the Tudors. The massive pillars reaching to the ceiling, richly carved and gilded, bore a weight of heavy hangings, often edged with gold and silver lace, caught up at intervals with long loops and buttons. Over the feather bed, the blankets, and the sheets lay a gorgeous silk and satin coverlet, embroidered in Venetian gold, with silver spangles, and lined with foreign silks of glorious hues. Then there were seats with quilted cushions, inlaid cabinets shining with gold and silver and precious stones, basins of silver "filled at convenient times with sweete and pleasaunt waters," Thus Imogen's bedroom:


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Walker, John (1674-1747)


text:
Page:The Celtic Review volume 4.djvu/357

344 all words of more than one syllable final dh, occasionally pronounced gh, is usually g, as in achadh, field, ‘achag,’ Murchadh, Murdoch, ‘Murchag,’ sileadh, dropping, ‘si1eag,’ shileadh, would drop, ‘shileag,’ adhlaiceadh, burying, ‘adhlaiceag.’ Fasadh, a dwelling, a residence, whence Fassiefern, Dochanassie, and in Perthshire Foss, Gaelic Fas, but genitive as in Bràigh Fasaidh, Brae of Foss appears as fasag, genitive fasaidh, in several place-names throughout West Ross, as Fasag at Torridon, Cromasag (crom, crooked) at Kenlochewe, Fasagrianach (grianach, sunny) at Lochbroom, and am Fasag àluinn, the lovely dwelling, the Gaelic name of the modern Duncraig Castle (or, strictly speaking, of its site) near Plockton.

The sound of Gaelic u, like u in English ‘rule,’ is given almost invariably in Sutherland to adh in words of more than one syllable. Achadh, for example, is ‘achu,' altachadh ‘altachu,’ and so geamhradh, winter, samhradh, summer, Murohadh; parts of verbs, as dheanadh, would do, ag cruinneachadh, gathering, etc. The same pronunciation is met with in Easter Ross, and prevails, excepting in the verbs, in great part of Ireland.

The sound of bh or v, which, as we have seen, is given to broad gh in Sutherland, is given also to broad dh at the end of accented syllables both there and in Easter Ross, as in diadhaidh, diadhair, fiadhaich, and gràdh. This pronunciation is most prevalent probably in Easter Ross. Within the county of Sutherland it is most frequent in the part adjoining Easter Ross; it is rare in the_ east of Sutherland, and has not been noticed in the north.

The same sound is given to dh in subjunctives of verbs in Knapdale, and as far north as the border of Lorne; dheanadh e sin, he would do that, for example, is there dheanabh (‘dheanav’) e sin.

Dh, medially and finally is often silent, and sometimes sounds as w, e.g. bodhar, deaf, often ‘bowar.’


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Rh Nor must we omit the looking-glass, a product of this century, often framed in copper and gilt and bordered with gems or velvet. All this outward show was a direct result of the sudden contact, with other countries. Luxuries and comforts hitherto undreamt of found their way into England and completely revolutionised the social life of the people. And yet, with all this increase of comfort, it is strange to find that a great many of the common necessities of modern life were still entirely absent. Thus, it has been noted, in the absence of soap, clothes were washed with cow-dung, hemlock and nettles, which gave them such a disagreeable savour that we are not surprised at the exclamation of an Englishman of the age, "I cannot abide to weare them on my bodie." A clean shirt was a luxury, not a necessity, as it is to-day. Nightgowns were only just invented. The Queen's first nightgown was made of black velvet with lace of murrey silk and


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174 gold, lined with fur, and one smiles at her order for the delivery of fourteen yards of murrey damask for the "making of a nyghtgowne for the Erle of Leycester." But this brings us to the subject of Elizabethan dress and a brief description of—


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Page:Copyright, Its History And Its Law (1912).djvu/209

 a dramatization. It is not necessary that there should be both speech and action in dramatic performances although dialogue and action usually characterize them." In this case the defendants had caused persons to represent the action in certain scenes of "Ben Hur" and photographed this representation on a moving picture film, which they reproduced for sale to theatoriums, where public exhibitions were given for profit. The court held under the old law that "moving pictures would be a form of expression infringing the author's exclusive right to dramatize his writings and publicly to perform such dramatization." The contrary view was held in the English case of Karno v. Pathé Frères in 1908, where also the Court of Appeal held, in 1909, that not the manufacturer but the exhibitor of such a film would be the responsible party if there were infringement.

The doctrine that copyright does not depend on literary merit, was strengthened in a dramatic case in Henderson v. Tompkins in 1894, in the U.S. Circuit Court in Massachusetts by Judge Putnam, who held that a paraphrase of "I wonder if dreams come true," from " Ali Baba," constituted an infringement, though the offending piece had slight literary merit.

As to what is a musical composition, the term defines itself. But the phrase "dramatico-musical compositions," as used in the American code, bristles with perplexities, not altogether solved by the definitions of the Copyright Office Rules, above cited. It means, of course, music and drama in association, but in this combination the definition of the dramatic side is peculiarly difficult. Whether a dance, ballet or other choregraphic work, with or without music, is included, is a mooted question. In 1892, in Fuller v. Bemis, where the plaintiff sought to protect a skirt dance of which she had filed a description for copyright as a


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Page:A short history of social life in England.djvu/195

HE same outward show and display of wealth that characterised the Elizabethan dwellings likewise characterised their dress. "Oh, how much cost is bestowed nowadays upon our bodies, and how little upon our souls!" laments the historian of the period. "How long time is asked in decking up of the first and how little space left wherein to feed the latter. How curious, how nice also, are a number of men and women, and how hardly can the tailor please them in fitting their bodies! How many times must it be sent back again to him that made it! What chafing, what fretting, what reproachful language,


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176 doth the poor workman bear away!" Words that might be uttered to-day as well as three hundred years ago, yet they are not surprising if we examine for a moment the elaborate dress of the Elizabethan era. Artificiality reigned supreme. No regard was paid to the natural form of the body, but the whole figure was deformed by means of steel and whalebone. There were no more loose and flowing sleeves, no more trailing skirts with tight-fitting bodies, as in the past—all was rigid and stiff and uncomfortable as artifice could make it. And this was greatly admired by Englishmen in the sixteenth century:—

The vanity of the Queen herself was proverbial, and the three thousand dresses found at her death bore witness to it. She would endure no criticism, and when the Bishop of London preached before her on the "vanitie of deckinge the bodie too finely," she remarked sternly, "If the Bishop held discourse on such matters she wolde fitte him for heaven, but he sholde walke thither without a staffe and leave his mantle behind him."

Such being the case, fashions became more


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Page:Weird Tales volume 36 number 01.djvu/65

Rh floor boards were strewn with rubbish, like plaster fallen away from ancient laths. Wind—there was surely wind here, in the very center of Scrope's snug home. Yes, wind, blowing through the cracks in this big wrecked place to which they had somehow been wafted

"Judge," breathed Scrope, "I know. This is the old mill—it looked like this before they tore it down—"

"Quiet," bade Pursuivant. He moved in the direction where he remembered the front bedroom's door to be. It was before him now—he felt its knob under his hand though he could not see it. Hinges creaked. They could walk farther into the room that had been part of the razed mill.

Again things were changed to their eyes.

A sort of blue-green light, such as filters down to the bottom of deep water, showed them spacious floor, high ceiling, great windows—but no more in ruins. The room was suddenly fresh, solidly built, a room for living. Painted plaster, broad white sills and jambs, some furry pelts spread like rugs—and furniture. Even in the weird soft glimmer, Pursuivant knew valuable antiques when he saw them. Yonder table was such—dark, stout, gleaming. The chairs, too. The table was spread with white linen, set with silver and china. And somebody—something—was seated there, as if to eat.

The Hessian—of course. Or what bad been the Hessian.

It faced them across the table. Now Pursuivant knew where the watery glow come from.

That semi-shape exuded it, like touchwood. He could dimly make out a clarification of outline and detail—a dress coat of ancient British style, powdered hair, elegance strangely out of place upon such a brute body. The most light came from around the head, which still did not have a face.

Pursuivant began to recite once more:

"All ye evil spirits, I forbid you this man's bed, his couch—"

The blue light dimmed. The shape rose and came toward them.

"Scrope," muttered Pursuivant, between phrases of his formula. "Lights—turn them on—"

He put himself where the approaching shape would find him. "I forbid you, in heaven's name—" he continued.

Strong hands seized him, hands as cold as marsh ice. He had a sense of filth and ferocity being hurled at him. He fought back.

was big, strong and cunning, but here was his match. It worked those cold hands to his throat, striving to shut off his breath and the words he spoke. He heard it panting and snarling, like the unknown animals of which one dreams. His own fists struck for that featureless face, battering it backward upon its cloudy shoulders, but the thing wrestled closer and closer, trying to throttle him.

"The lights—won't work!" Scrope was screaming. He struck a match, set it to a scrap of paper he whisked out of his pocket. This little torch he held aloft.

The rosy light dominated the blue, and Scrope saw plainly the thing that Pursuivant grappled. He screamed louder, and dropped the blazing paper. It floated side-wise, into some sort of a wall hanging. A stronger flame leaped up. Pursuivant caught the hard, chill wrists of his enemy and tore himself free.

"—unto you and yours, in the name of Trinity!" he finished.

Then he wheeled abruptly, seized and lifted Scrope, and hurried him away. They found themselves in the parlor, the room they had known before. Behind them flames gushed and roared, like a blast furnace.

Scrope, set on his feet again, seemed


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Rh ludicrous and pronounced. The crinoline, appearing in France in 1530, soon made its way into England. It was first worn as a round petticoat stiffened with whalebone; later it was distended at the hips till the circumference below the waist was greater than round the bottom, and formed a sort of table, on which the arms could rest. The upper part of the figure was squeezed into a stiff pointed bodice, involving severe compression and consequent discomfort. Round the neck was worn the famous ruff, so familiar to students of Elizabethan times. This was of Spanish origin. It began as a large slender collar of cambric, which grew larger and higher as time passed on, till the wearer found it so inconvenient, "flap-flapping" in the wind, that wires were inserted to hold it out from the neck. Six years after the accession of Queen Elizabeth, the ruff was re-organised by the introduction of starch, "the devil's liquor" as it was afterwards called by the Puritans. The wife of the Queen's Dutch coachman set up a clear-starching establishment in London, and soon had her hands so full of crumpled ruffs to stiffen and starch that she took pupils at five guineas each to learn the trade, which every good laundress to-day


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Page:Triangles of life, and other stories.djvu/25

 Billy woke at his usual time, and in his usual manner, save for saying cheerily, "Oh! I'm all right now, mates!" Then with a fearful pause, he flung his wavering fingers up hopelessly to his head and said, "Oh—oh, them Voices, Bob!"

Next day, the last of the job, Billy was worse, and they had to run him down or round him up several times, but the drays came out and the men cleared up without loss of time, and went into the station for their cheques, taking Billy with them. And leaving the King Billy monarch of all he surveyed—just think of it, for hundreds of miles—and sixteen dogs and two gins. They took Billy with them—and a trusted, sober, station hand, sent by the super—to the coach road, where Poisonous Jimmy kept a pub-store and post office, and there was a "police camp" (a brick and iron one) handy. Billy had a pleasant ride—through English lanes—to Poisonous Jimmy's—though he rode and walked with devils most of the time. He pointed out all the features of the imaginary panorama—to propitiate them perhaps. Poisonous Jimmy's was like a deserted and dried-up slaughter yard, with the offal shed only left and cleaned up a bit, and set in big dust and sand patch in the blazing scrub desert. Here the stranger got a packet of dusty letters and a lot of copies of a Sydney paper. Then he began to act peculiar. He got the loan of the private parlour from the landlady, and, after much hunting, borrowed some scraps of brown paper. Then he got on the right side of the girl to make him some paste. Then he went through his bundle of papers and marked


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178 knows so well. The innovation was greatly opposed at first. "The devil's kingdom of great ruffs is underpropped … by a certain kind of liquid matter, which they call starch," cries an angry contemporary, "wherein the devil hath learned them to wash and die their ruffs, which being dry, will stand stiff and inflexible about their necks." The ruff reached so nearly to the top of the head that hair could no longer be worn long, as in the last century. Elaborately dressed hair now took the place of head-dresses. It was "curled, frizzled and crisped, laid out on wreaths and borders from one ear to the other"; it was dyed golden to match that of the Queen, and false hair was abundantly added. "Her hair shall be of what colour it please God," says Benedick, describing the woman of his choice, in condemnation of the prevailing fashion. Indeed, in such demand was false hair that it was not safe for children with good hair to be seen alone, lest it were cropped by the women who sold long tresses for curls and twists. Freely, too, were the dead robbed:


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Blease v. Garlington

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.

Mr. James Lowndes for the appellant.

Mr. W. W. Boyce for the appellee.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Blease v. Garlington


text: Talk:Blease v. Garlington

title: Talk:Blease v. Garlington


text:
Blease v. Garlington/Opinion of the Court

This suit was brought for the foreclosure of a mortgage made by Blease to Garlington. The bill is in the ordinary form. Blease, in his answer, admits the execution of the note and mortgage, but insists, by was of defence, that Garlington 'deceived him as to the value of the consideration of the said note and mortgage, and has not complied with his positive agreement.' The history of the transaction, he says, is as follows:--

'The complainant, as the administrator of J. M. Young, deceased, held a large claim against the estate of John B. O'Neall, deceased, who had been the guardian of the said J. M. Young; and Robert Stuart and H. H. Kinard were the sureties on his bond. The complainant had commenced suit on said bond against Robert Stuart, and proceedings to force him into bankruptcy; and his life seemed to be endangered by the excitement which this last proceeding produced, he being naturally in very feeble health. Under these circumstances, negotiations were commenced between the complainant and this respondent, the friend of the said R. Stuart, in regard for the sale of the claim of the said complainant against the said Robert Stuart, as surety on the said guardianship-bond of said J. B. O'Neall, deceased; and this respondent was induced to purchase said claim at $6,000 ($4,000 of which was paid in cash, and the note described in bill given for $2,000) by the assurance of the complainant that said claim was worth at least $6,000, and he made some calculations to show this, and said, as this claim was worth $6,000, it would not be right for him to take less than that sum, and that he would not do it. This purchase was made upon the further assurance and undertaking of the complainant that he would obtain judgment for this respondent. This defendant avers that said purchase would not have been made by him at that price but for the said assurance and promise of the complainant, in which this respondent put implicit confidence. This respondent, further answering, states, that the said Robert Stuart died before judgment was obtained on said claim; and this respondent has been informed and believes that his estate is so utterly insolvent that it will not pay any thing like the sum of $6,000 on said claim, and he asks that this case be not tried until the true condition of said estate can be ascertained. This defendant further submits to this honorable court, that the complainant, having deceived this defendant as to the value of said claim against Robert Stuart, and not having complied with his part of the contract to obtain judgment on said claim, is not entitled to enforce collection of said note and mortgage in this court, where equity is administered, and asks that the whole contract may be set aside, and the complainant required to deliver up to this defendant the said note and mortgage to be cancelled, and to refund the $4,000 paid in cash to him on said contract, with interest.'

Upon the hearing in the court below, after the plaintiff had submitted his case upon the pleadings and his mortgage, the defendant presented himself as a witness to be examined orally in open court, and proposed to testify to the following facts, to wit:--

'1. That one of the conditions of the original agreement for the sale of the liability of Robert Stuart, as one of the sureties on the bond of J. B. O'Neall, as guardian of J. M. Young, plaintiff's intestate, to the defendant, was that the plaintiff should obtain judgment against the said R. Stuart; and that, when the agreement was drawn up and presented to the defendant, he called attention of plaintiff to the fact that that part of the agreement which obligated him to get judgment had been left out, and insisted that it should be inserted; and he was assured that that condition should be carried out, and that it was not necessary to rewrite the agreement for the purpose of putting it in.

'2. That, during the negotiations for the sale of the aforesaid liability of R. Stuart, the plaintiff represented to the defendant that said liability or claim was worth at least $6,000; and that, in fact, it is not worth $2,500.

'3. That the defendant did not know the then financial condition of R. Stuart, and put implicit confidence in the promises and representations of the plaintiff, and would not have made the trade but for such assurance.'

His proposition, made in writing, is sent here as part of the record. The court refused to receive the testimony, and it was not taken. A decree having been entered in favor of Garlington, Blease brings the case here by appeal.

Cases in equity come here from the circuit courts, and the district courts sitting as circuit courts, by appeal, and not by writ of error. Rev. Stat., sect. 692. They are heard upon the proofs sent up with the record from the court below. No new evidence can be received here. Rev. Stat., sect. 698.

The facts relied upon by Blease were neither proved nor admitted in the court below. Testimony in support of them was offered; but it was not received. We do not know, that if it had been received, it would have been sufficient. If we find that the court erred in refusing the testimony, we shall be compelled to affirm the decree because of the lack of proof, or send the case back for a new hearing.

An important question of practice is thus presented for our consideration.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 88, sect. 30) provided that the mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court should be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial of causes in equity as of actions at common law. By sect. 19 of the same act, it was made the duty of the Circuit Court, in equity cases, to cause the facts on which they founded their decree fully to appear upon the record, either from the pleadings and decree, or a statement of the case agreed upon by the parties or their counsel, or, if they disagreed, by a stating of the case by the court. Subsequently, in 1802 (2 Stat. 166, sect. 25), it was enacted that in all suits in equity the court might in its discretion, upon the request of either party, order the testimony of witnesses therein to be taken by depositions. In 1803 (2 Stat. 244, sect. 2) an appeal was given to this court in equity cases, and it was provided, that, upon the appeal, a transcript of the bill, answer, depositions, and all other proceedings in the cause, should be transmitted here. The case was to be heard in this court upon the proofs submitted below.

In Conn. et al. v. Penn., 5 Wheat. 424, decided in 1820, this court held that a decree founded in part upon parol testimony must be reversed, because that portion of the testimony which was oral had not been sent up. For this reason, among others, the cause was sent back for further proceedings according to equity. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, said (p. 426),-- 'Previous to this act (that of 1803), the facts were brought before this court by the statement of the judge. The depositions are substituted for that statement; and it would seem, since this court must judge of the fact as well as the law, that all the testimony which was before the Circuit Court ought to be laid before this court. Yet the section (of the act of 1789) which directs that witnesses shall be examined in open court is not, in terms, repealed. The court has felt considerable doubt on this subject, but thinks it the safe course to require that all the testimony on which the judge founds his opinion should, in cases within the jurisdiction of this court, appear in the record.'

Under the authority of the act of May 8, 1792 (1 Stat. 276, sect. 2), this court, at its February Term, 1822, adopted certain rules of practice for the courts of equity of the United States. 7 Wheat. v. Rules 25, 26, and 28 related to the taking of testimony by depositions, and the examination of witnesses before a master or examiner; but by Rule 28 it was expressly provided that nothing therein contained should 'prevent the examination of witnesses viva voce when produced in open court.'

These rules continued in force until the January Term, 1842, when they were superseded by others then promulgated, of which 67, 68, 69, and 78 related to the mode of taking testimony, but made no reference to the examination of witnesses in open court, further than to provide, at the end of Rule 78, that nothing therein contained should 'prevent the examination of witnesses viva voce when produced in open court, if the court shall, in its discretion, deem it advisable.'

Afterwards (in August, 1842) Congress authorized this court to prescribe and regulate the mode of taking and obtaining evidence in equity cases. 5 Stat. 518, sect. 6. While these Rules remained in force substantially as originally adopted, and before any direct action of the court under the special authority of this act of Congress, the case of Sickles v. Gloucester Co., 3 Wall., Jr., 186, came before Mr. Justice Grier on the circuit; and he there held, that, notwithstanding the rules, witnesses might still be examined in open court. It was his opinion that the act of 1789 guaranteed to suitors the right to have their witnesses so examined, if they desired it; that Rule 67 did not affect or annul the act of Congress or the policy established by it; and that a party had therefore the right to demand an examination of witnesses within the jurisdiction of the court ore tenus, according to the principles of the common law, either by having them produced in court, or by having leave to cross-examine them, face to face, before the examiner.

This case was decided in 1856; and at the December Term, 1861, of this court, Rule 67 was amended so as to provide for the oral examination of witnesses before an examiner. The part of the rule as amended, pertinent to the present inquiry, is as follow:--

'Either party may give notice to the other that he desires the evidence to be adduced in the cause to be taken orally; and thereupon all the witnesses to be examined shall be examined before one of the examiner of the court, or before an examiner to be specially appointed by the court, the examiner to be furnished with a copy of the bill and answer, if any; and such examination shall take place in the presence of the parties or their agents by their counsel or solicitors, and the witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination and re-examination, and which shall be conducted as near as may be in the mode now used in common-law courts. The depositions taken upon such oral examinations shall be taken down in writing by the examiner in the form of narrative, unless he determines the examination shall be by question and answer in special instances, and, when completed, shall be read over to the witness and signed by him in the presence of the parties or counsel, or such of them as may attend; provided, if the witness shall refuse to sign the said deposition, then the examiner shall sign the same: and the examiner may, upon all examinations, state any special matters to the court as he shall think fit; and any question or questions which may be objected to shall be noted by the examiner upon the deposition, but he shall not have power to decide on the competency, materiality, or relevancy of the questions; and the court shall have power to deal with the costs of incompetent, immaterial, or irrelevant depositions, or parts of them, as may be just.'

The act of 1789, in relation to the oral examination of witnesses in open court, was not expressly repealed until the adoption of the Revised Statutes, sect. 862 of which is as follows:-- 'The mode of proof in causes of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to the rules now or hereafter prescribed by the Supreme Court, except as herein specially provided.'

Since the amendment of Rule 67, in 1861, there could never have been any difficulty in bringing a case here upon appeal, so as to save all exceptions as to the form or substance of the testimony, and still leave us in a condition to proceed to a final determination of the cause, whatever might be our rulings upon the exceptions. The examiner before whom the witnesses are orally examined is required to note exceptions; but he cannot decide upon their validity. He must take down all the examination in writing, and send it to the court with the objections noted. So, too, when depositions are taken according to the acts of Congress or otherwise, under the rules, exceptions to the testimony may be noted by the officer taking the deposition, but he is not permitted to decide upon them; and when the testimony as reduced to writing by the examiner, or the deposition, is filed in court, further exceptions may be there taken. Thus both the exceptions and the testimony objected to are all before the court below, and come here upon the appeal as part of the record and proceedings there. If we reverse the ruling of that court upon the exceptions, we may still proceed to the hearing, because we have in our possession and can consider the rejected testimony. But under the practice adopted in this case, if the exceptions sustained below are overruled here, we must remand the cause in order that the proof may be taken. That was done in Conn. et al. v. Penn., supra, which was decided before the promulgation of the rules. One of the objects of the rule, in its present form, was to prevent the necessity for any such practice.

While, therefore, we do not say, that, even since the Revised Statutes, the circuit courts may not in their discretion, under the operation of the rules, permit the examination of witnesses orally in open court upon the hearing of cases in equity, we do say that now they are not by law required to do so; and that, if such practice is adopted in any case, the testimony presented in that form must be taken down or its substance stating in writing, and made part of the record, or it will be entirely disregarded here on an appeal. So, too, if testimony is objected to and ruled out, it must still be sent here with the record, subject to the objection, or the ruling will not be considered by us. A case will not be sent back to have the rejected testimony taken, even though we might, on examination, be of the opinion that the objection to it ought not to have been sustained. Ample provision having been made by the rules for taking the testimony and saving exceptions, parties, if they prefer to adopt some other mode of presenting their case, must be careful to see that it conforms in other respects to the established practice of the court.

The act of 1872 (17 Stat. 197, Rev. Stat., sect. 914) providing that the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding, in civil causes in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, &c., in the courts of the States, has no application to this case, because it is in equity, and equity and admiralty causes are in express terms excepted from the operation of that act.

We might, therefore, affirm the decree below, because there is no testimony before us in support of the defence; but, if we waive this question of practice,-which, on account of its importance, and the misapprehension that exists in respect to it in some of the circuits, we have thought it proper at some length to consider and determine,-and look to the merits of the case, we find no error.

The defence, as stated in the answer, amounts to nothing more than that Garlington, in the progress of the negotiations for the sale of the claim against Stuart to Blease, stated that the claim was worth $6,000, and undertook to obtain judgment upon it for Blease, and that Stuart died before a judgment was obtained, and his estate was so utterly insolvent that it would not pay any thing like $6,000 on the claim. There is no pretence that there was not at least $6,000 due from Stuart, or that Garlington had any better means of knowing his pecuniary condition than Blease had: on the contrary, it appears that Blease made the purchase because he was the friend of Stuart, and desired to put a stop to the proceeding on the part of Garlington to force him into bankruptcy, which seemed to be endangering his life in his then feeble state of health. Certainly, under such circumstances, it would have been easy for Blease to test the truth or falsehood of the statement made by Garlington; and, if he did not, it was his own fault. He had no right to rely upon the representations of Garlington. It was his duty to use reasonable diligence to inquire and ascertain for himself whether Garlington's estimate of the value of the claim was correct or not.

But again: from the answer itself, it is apparent that the statement relied upon was only an expression of opinion as to the value of the claim, and that Blease had no right to consider it as any thing else. The language is, that 'this respondent was induced to purchase said claim at $6,000 by the assurance of the complainant that said claim was worth at least $6,000; and he made some calculations to show this, and said, as this claim was worth $6,000, it would not be right for him to take less than that sum, and that he would not do it.' There seems to have been no dispute as to the amount. All depended upon the ability of Stuart to pay. Each of the parties had equal opportunity of judging as to that. Certainly there is nothing to show that Garlington had any advantage over Blease in this respect. Garlington was pressing Stuart into bankruptcy to coerce payment. This Blease desired to prevent, and for that purpose was willing to purchase the debt, and pay for it as much as it was worth. The parties were engaged in endeavoring to ascertain what this was, and the whole subject was equally open to both for examination and inquiry. Under such circumstances, neither party is presumed to trust the other, but to rely upon his own judgment. Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 37.

So, too, as to the alleged undertaking on the part of Garlington to obtain judgment on the claim. There is no allegation that he was not proceeding for that purpose, without unnecessary delay, up to the time of the death of Stuart, or that Blease, when Stuart did die, was not in as good condition, for all the purposes of collection, without a judgment, as he could have been with. We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that the answer, if taken as true, did not present a valid defence; and, as the defendant could not make any defence by his proof different from that set out in his pleading, the court below very properly refused to hear any testimony in support of the answer.

This makes it unnecessary to consider the questions presented in the argument as to the competency of the proof offered.

Decree affirmed.


text: Talk:Blease v. Garlington/Opinion of the Court


text:
Gaines v. Fuentes

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

This is an action in form to annul an alleged will of Daniel Clark, the father of the plaintiff in error, dated on the 13th of July, 1813, and to recall the decree of the court by which it was probated. It was brought in the Second District Court for the Parish of Orleans, which, under the laws of Louisiana, is invested with jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons, and of appointments necessary in the course of their administration.

The petition sets forth, that on the 18th of January, 1855, the plaintiff in error applied to that court for the probate of the alleged will; and that, by decree of the Supreme Court of the State, the alleged will was recognized as the last will and testament of the said Daniel Clark, and was ordered to be recorded and executed as such; that this decree of probate was obtained ex parte, and by its terms authorized any person at any time, who might desire to do so, to contest the will and its probate in a direct action, or as a means of defence by way of answer or exception, whenever the will should be set up as a muniment of title; that the plaintiff in error subsequently commenced several suits against the petitioners in the Circuit Court of the United States to recover sundry tracts of land and properties of great value, situated in the parish of Orleans and elsewhere, in which they are interested, setting up the alleged will as probated as a muniment of title, and claiming under the same as instituted heir of the testator; and that the petitioners are unable to contest the validity of the alleged will so long as the decree of probate remains unrecalled. The petitioners then proceed to set forth the grounds upon which they ask for a revocation of the will and the recalling of the decree of probate; these being substantially the falsity and insufficiency of the testimony upon which the will was admitted to probate, and the status of the plaintiff in error, incapacitating her to inherit or take by last will from the decedent.

A citation having been issued upon the petition, and served upon the plaintiff in error, she applied in proper form, with a tender of the necessary bond, for removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, under the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, on the ground that she was a citizen of New York, and the petitioners were citizens of Louisiana. The court denied the application, for the alleged reason, that, as she had made herself a party to the proceedings in the court relative to the settlement of Clark's succession by appearing for the probate of the will, she could not now avoid the jurisdiction when the attempt was made to set aside and annul the order of probate which she had obtained. The court, however, went on to say, in its opinion, that the Federal court could not take jurisdiction of a controversy having for its object the annulment of a decree probating a will.

The plaintiff in error then applied for a removal of the action under the act of March 2, 1867, on the ground, that, from prejudice and local influence, she would not be able to obtain justice in the State court, accompanying the application with the affidavit and bond required by the statute. This application was also denied, the court resting its decision on the alleged ground that the Federal tribunal could not take jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversy.

Other parties having intervened, the applications were renewed, and again denied. An answer was then filed by the plaintiff in error, denying generally the allegations of the petition except as to the probate of the will, and interposing a plea of prescription. Subsequently a further plea was filed, to the effect that the several matters alleged as to the status of the plaintiff in error had been the subject of judicial inquiry in the Federal courts, and been there adjudged in her favor. Upon the hearing a decree was entered, annulling the will, and revoking its probate. The Supreme Court of the State having affirmed this decree, this writ of error was sued out.

The act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 558), is as follows:--

'That where a suit is now pending, or may hereafter be brought, in any State court in which there is controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of $500 exclusive of costs, such citizen of another State, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, if he will make and file in such State court an affidavit stating that he has reason to and does believe that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, may, at any time before final hearing or trial of the suit, file a petition in such State court for the removal of the suit into the next Circuit Court of the United States to be held in the district where the suit is pending, and offer good and sufficient surety for his entering in such court, on the first day of its session, copies of all process, pleadings, depositions, testimony, and other proceedings in said suit, and doing such other appropriate acts as, by the act to which this act is amendatory, are required to be done upon the removal of a suit into the United States Court: and it shall be thereupon the duty of the State court to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the suit; and, the said copies being entered as aforesaid in such court of the United States, the suit shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process; and all the provisions of the act to which this act is amendatory, respecting any bail, attachment, injunction, or other restraining process, and respecting any bond of indemnity or other obligation given upon the issuing or granting of any attachment, injunction, or other restraining process, shall apply with like force and effect in all respects to similar matters, process, or things in the suits for the removal of which this act provides.'

Mr. Jeremiah S. Black and Mr. George W. Paschal for the plaintiff in error.

Two objections are made to the right of the plaintiff in error to remove this suit from the Second District Court of the Parish of Orleans to the Circuit Court of the United States. (1.) That said District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy. (2.) That the Circuit Court of the United States has no original jurisdiction of a suit of this description; and it could, therefore, not be removed thereto.

The first objection is grounded upon a mistaken assumption. It is settled by repeated adjudications in Louisiana that such a suit might be brought in her courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Reals v. McKnight, 5 Mart. N. S. 9; Cull v. Phillips, 6 id. 304; Palmer v. Palmer, 1 L. R. 100; Casanova v. Acosta, id. 183; Sharp v. Knox, 2 id. 23, 25, 26; Kemp v. Kemp, 11 id. 22; O'Donogan v. Knox, id. 384; Trahen's Heirs v. Arden's Heirs, id. 393; Clark v. Christine, 12 id. 396. But, were it otherwise, State legislation could not limit the jurisdiction and remedies conferred upon the Federal tribunals by the constitution and statutes of the United States. Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118; Payne v. Hook, id. 425; Railway Company v. Whitton, 13 id. 270.

The answer to the second objection is as obvious as it is conclusive. This proceeding, by whatever name known in Louisiana, is, in its prominent characteristics, a suit in equity; and the relief thereby sought falls within a recognized head of equity jurisdiction. It might, therefore, have been brought in the Circuit Court; but, however this may be, the right to remove it there does not depend upon the question, whether its subject-matter is within the original jurisdiction of that court. No such condition or qualification is imposed by the act of 1867. Any suit in a State court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State where it is brought and a citizen of another State, if the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of $500, may be removed whenever the prescribed requirements as to the affidavit, petition, and bond, are fulfilled. This suit, therefore, was rightfully subject to removal under existing laws.

Mr. Thomas J. Durant and Mr. James McConnell, contra.

The second section of the third article of the United States Constitution declares that 'the judicial power shall extend to. . . controversies between. . . citizens of different States.'

The word 'controversies' is here evidently used in the sense of 'suits;' but does this mean all controversies?

If not, what are the exceptions?

To give jurisdiction, the Constitution and the acts of Congress which apportion the judicial power to the several courts of the United States must concur.

The eleventh section of the Judiciary Act of 28th September, 1789 (1 Stat. 78), says,--

'That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of a State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.'

No suit can be removed to the national courts which might not by the Constitution of the United States have been originally commenced in one of these courts. Conkling's Treatise, 177; Smith v. Rines, 2 Sumn. C. C. 345; Beardsley v. Torrey, 4 Wash. C. C. 288. Congress never intended to authorize the defendant to remove any suit or proceeding before a State court, unless the Circuit Court of the United States had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of such suit, and had the power to do substantial justice between the parties. Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 183.

In order, therefore, that a suit may be transferred from a State to a National court, it must be of a civil nature, either at common law or in equity, between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, or against an alien; and the matter in dispute must exceed $500.

The expressions of the Judiciary Act refer to the systems of law prevailing in the country from which the Colonies mainly derived their jurisprudence; but in England there were several laws. Goold, J., in Regina v. Paty et als., 2 Ld. Raym. 1106.

'Lex terrae is not confined to the common law, but takes in all the other laws which are in force in this realm, as the civil and canon law,' &c. Id. 1108.

Probate proceedings were not matters either of common-law or equity cognizance, but appertained to the canon or ecclesiastical law.

'The executor must prove the will of the deceased, which is done either in common form, which is only upon his own oath before the ordinary or his surrogate, or per testes, in more solemn form of law, in case the validity of the will be disputed. When the will is proved, the original must be deposited in the registry of the ordinary.' 2 Bl. Com. 508. 'The prerogative court is established for the trial of all testamentary causes where the deceased has left bona notabilia in two different dioceses; in which case the probate of the wills belongs to the archbishop of the province, by way of special prerogative,' &c. Id. 3, 65, 66.

It follows, therefore, that this proceeding is not a suit or controversy at common law or in equity, and hence not within the jurisdiction conferred upon the courts of the United States. This court has, in effect, so decided. Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering its opinion in Gaines v. New Orleans, 6 Wall. 642, uses this striking language:--

'The attempt to impeach the validity of this will shows the importance attached to it by the defence in determining the issue we are now considering. But the will cannot be attacked here. When a will is duly probated by a State court of competent jurisdiction, that probate is conclusive of the validity and contents of the will in this court.

'But why, if the will is invalid, has the probate of it rested for twelve years unrecalled, when express liberty was given by the Supreme Court of Louisiana for any one interested to contest it in a direct action with the complainant? If, with this clear indication of the proper course to be pursued, the probate of the will still remains unrevoked, the reasonable conclusion is that the will itself could not be successfully attacked.'

The defendants in error, being thus advised, brought this direct proceeding for revocation in the Probate Court. No other State court had jurisdiction. McCombs v. Dunbar, 1 La. 21; Graham's Heirs v. Gibson, 14 id. 150; Aden v. Cabouret, 1 La. Ann. 171. The right of removal cannot apply. Notwithstanding the decree admitting the will to probate authorized any person to contest the will and its probate as a means of defence by way of answer or exception, whenever it should be set up as a muniment of title, yet, when the case actually arose, the courts of the United States, for want of jurisdiction, denied the parties a hearing upon such a defence by way of answer, and declared that we must resort to a proceeding which could be only maintained in a State court of a peculiar and limited jurisdiction. When this opinion was given, the act of March 2, 1867, was in force, and it does not authorize the removal of any suits not provided for by former legislation. This court would not have declined to allow us to contest the validity of this pretended will in a Federal court, if jurisdiction over such a matter could have been subsequently acquired by removing under that act a case involving the identical questions. If the Federal courts have no original jurisdiction whatever in matters of probate, can it be exercised by them in a suit removed thereto from a State court merely on account of alleged local influence and prejudice? Such jurisdiction must be derived from express grant, and not from implication or inference. Before it can be wrested from the courts of probate, and be thus indirectly conferred upon the courts of the United States, the jurisprudence established by the following decisions of this and of other tribunals must be overthrown. Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Gaines v. New Orleans, 6 id. 642; Gaines v. Chew & Relf, 2 How. 619; Fonvergne v. City of New Orleans, 18 id. 473; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 179; Adams v. Preston, 22 How. 488; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 216; Thompson v. Tolmin, 2 Pet. 166; Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 533; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 316; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 Story, 552; Armstrong v. Lear, 12 Wheat. 175; Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. 541; Inhabitants of Dublin v. Chadbourne, 16 Mass. 441; Lalanne Heirs v. Moreau, 13 La. 436; Lewis's Heirs v. His Executors, 5 id. 394; Derbigny v. Pierce, 18 id. 551; Graham Heirs v. Gibson, 14 id. 149; Box v. Lawrence, 14 Tex. 545; Tibbatts v. Berry et al., 10 B. Mon. 490.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Gaines v. Fuentes


text: Talk:Gaines v. Fuentes

title: Talk:Gaines v. Fuentes


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Gaines v. Fuentes/Opinion of the Court

In the view we take of the application of the plaintiff in error to remove the cause to the Federal court, no other question than the one raised upon that application is open for our consideration. If the application should have been granted, the subsequent proceedings were without validity; and no useful purpose would be subserved by an examination of the merits of the defence, upon the supposition that the State court rightfully retained its original jurisdiction.

The action is in form to annul the alleged will of 1813 of Daniel Clark, and to recall the decree by which it was probated; but as the petitioners are not heirs of Clark, nor legatees, nor next of kin, and do not ask to be substituted in place of the plaintiff in error, the action cannot be treated as properly instituted for the revocation of the probate, but must be treated as brought against the devisee by strangers to the estate to annul the will as a muniment of title, and to restrain the enforcement of the decree by which its validity was established, so far as it affects their property. It is, in fact, an action between parties; and the question for determination is, whether the Federal court can take jurisdiction of an action brought for the object mentioned between citizens of different States, upon its removal from a State court. The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to 'controversies between citizens of different States,' as well as to cases arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States; but the conditions upon which the power shall be exercised, except so far as the original or appellate character of the jurisdiction is designated in the Constitution, are matters of legislative direction. Some cases there are, it is true, in which, from their nature, the judicial power of the United States, when invoked, is exclusive of all State authority. Such are cases in which the United States are parties,-cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and cases for the enforcement of rights of inventors and authors under the laws of Congress. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 429; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 id. 288. But, in cases where the judicial power of the United States can be applied only because they involve controversies between citizens of different States, it rests entirely with Congress to determine at what time the power may be invoked, and upon what conditions, whether originally in the Federal court, or after suit brought in the State court; and, in the latter case, at what stage of the proceedings,-whether before issue or trial by removal to a Federal court, or after judgment upon appeal or writ of error. The Judiciary Act of 1789, in the distribution of jurisdiction to the Federal courts, proceeded upon this theory. It declared that the circuit courts should have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, involving a specified sum or value, where the suits were between citizens of the State in which they were brought and citizens of other States; and it provided that suits of that character by citizens of the State in which they were brought might be transferred, upon application of the defendants, made at the time of entering their appearance, if accompanied with sufficient security for subsequent proceedings in the Federal court. The validity of this legislation is not open to serious question, and the provisions adopted have been recognized and followed with scarcely an exception by the Federal and State courts since the establishment of the government. But the limitation of the original jurisdiction of the Federal court, and of the right of removal from a State court, to a class of cases between citizens of different States involving a designated amount, and brought by or against resident citizens of the State, was only a matter of legislative discretion. The Constitution imposes no limitation upon the class of cases involving controversies between citizens of different States, to which the judicial power of the United States may be extended; and Congress may, therefore, lawfully provide for bringing, at the option of either of the parties, all such controversies within the jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary.

As we have had occasion to observe in previous cases, the provision of the Constitution, extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States, had its existence in the impression that State attachments and State prejudices might affect injuriously the regular administration of justice in the State courts. It was originally supposed that adequate protection against such influences was secured by allowing to the plaintiff an election of courts before suit; and, when the suit was brought in a State court, a like election to the defendant afterwards. Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 289. But the experience of parties immediately after the late war, which powerfully excited the people of different States, and in many instances engendered bitter enmities, satisfied Congress that further legislation was required fully to protect litigants against influences of that character. It therefore provided, by the act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 558), greater facilities for the removal of cases involving controversies between citizens of different States from a State court to a Federal court, when it appeared that such influences existed. That act declared, that where a suit was then pending, or should afterwards be brought in any State court, in which there was a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit was brought and a citizen of another State, and the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $500, exclusive of costs, such citizen of another State, whether plaintiff or defendant, upon making and filing in the State court an affidavit that he had reason to believe, and did believe, that from prejudice or local influence he would not be able to obtain justice in the State court, might, at any time before final hearing or trial of the suit, obtain a removal of the case into the Circuit Court of the United States, upon petition for that purpose, and the production of sufficient security for subsequent proceedings in the Federal court. This act covered every possible case involving controversies between citizens of the State where the suit was brought and citizens of other States, if the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum of $500. It mattered not whether the suit was brought in a State court of limited or general jurisdiction. The only test was, did it involve a controversy between citizens of the State and citizens of other States? and did the matter in dispute exceed a specified amount? And a controversy was involved in the sense of the statute whenever any property or claim of the parties, capable of pecuniary estimation, was the subject of the litigation, and was presented by the pleadings for judicial determination.

With these provisions in force, we are clearly of opinion that the State court of Louisiana erred in refusing to transfer the case to the Circuit Court of the United States upon the application of the plaintiff in error. If the Federal court had, by no previous act, jurisdiction to pass upon and determine the controversy existing between the parties in the parish court of Orleans, it was invested with the necessary jurisdiction by this act itself so soon as the case was transferred. In authorizing and requiring the transfer of cases involving particular controversies from a State court to a Federal court, the statute thereby clothed the latter court with all the authority essential for the complete adjudication of the controversies, even though it should be admitted that that court could not have taken original cognizance of the cases. The language used in Smith v. Rines, cited from the 2d of Sumner's Reports, in support of the position that such cases are only liable to removal from the State to the Circuit Court as might have been brought before the Circuit Court by original process, applied only to the law as it then stood. No case could then be transferred from a State court to a Federal court, on account of the citizenship of the parties, which could not originally have been brought in the Circuit Court.

But the admission supposed is not required in this case. The suit in the parish court is not a proceeding to establish a will, but to annul it as a muniment of title, and to limit the operation of the decree admitting it to probate. It is, in all essential particulars, a suit for equitable relief,-to cancel an instrument alleged to be void, and to restrain the enforcement of a decree alleged to have been obtained upon false and insufficient testimony. There are no separate equity courts in Louisiana, and suits for special relief of the nature here sought are not there designated suits in equity. But they are none the less essentially such suits; and if by the law obtaining in the State, customary or statutory, they can be maintained in a State court, whatever designation that court may bear, we think they may be maintained by original process in a Federal court, where the parties are, on the one side, citizens of Louisiana, and, on the other, citizens of other States.

Nor is there any thing in the decisions of this court in the case of Gaines v. New Orleans, reported in the 6th of Wallace, or in the case of Broderick's Will, reported in the 21st of Wallace, which militates against these views. In Gaines v. New Orleans, this court only held that the probate could not be collaterally attacked; and that, until revoked, it was conclusive of the existence of the will and its contents. There is no intimation given that a direct action to annul the will and restrain a decree admitting it to probate might not be maintained in a Federal as well as in a State court, if jurisdiction of the parties was once rightfully obtained.

In the case of Broderick's Will, the doctrine is approved, which is established both in England and in this country, that by the general jurisdiction of courts of equity, independent of statutes, a bill will not lie to set aside a will or its probate; and, whatever the cause of the establishment of this doctrine originally, there is ample reason for its maintenance in this country, from the full jurisdiction over the subject of wills vested in the probate courts, and the revisory power over their adjudications in the appellate courts. But that such jurisdiction may be vested in the State courts of equity by statute is there recognized, and that, when so vested, the Federal courts, sitting in the States where such statutes exist, will also entertain concurrent jurisdiction in a case between proper parties.

There are, it is true, in several decisions of this court, expressions of opinion that the Federal courts have no probate jurisdiction, referring particularly to the establishment of wills; and such is undoubtedly the case under the existing legislation of Congress. The reason lies in the nature of the proceeding to probate a will as one in rem, which does not necessarily involve any controversy between parties: indeed, in the majority of instances, no such controversy exists. In its initiation all persons are cited to appear, whether of the State where the will is offered, or of other States. From its nature, and from the want of parties, or the fact that all the world are parties, the proceeding is not within the designation of cases at law or in equity between parties of different States, of which the Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the State courts under the Judiciary Act; but whenever a controversy in a suit between such parties arises respecting the validity or construction of a will, or the enforcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there is no more reason why the Federal courts should not take jurisdiction of the case than there is that they should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy between the parties.

But, as already observed, it is sufficient for the disposition of this case that the statute of 1867, in authorizing a transfer of the cause to the Federal court, does, in our judgment, by that fact, invest that court with all needed jurisdiction to adjudicate finally and settle the controversy involved.

It follows from the views thus expressed that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana must be reversed, with directions to reverse the judgment of the parish court of Orleans, and to direct a transfer of the cause from that court to the Circuit Court of the United States, pursuant to the application of the plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, dissenting.

title: Gaines v. Fuentes/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Gaines v. Fuentes/Opinion of the Court