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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Advanced Research Projects Agency 32, I Air Force Department 32, VII Army Department 32, V; 33, II; 36, III, 48, 51 Defense Acquisition Regulations System 48, II Defense Intelligence Agency 32, I Defense Logistics Agency 32, I, XII; 48, 54 Engineers, Corps of 33, II; 36, III National hnagery and Mapping Agency 32, I Navy Department 32, VI; 48, 52 Secretary of Defense, Office of 2, XI; 32, I Defense Contract Audit Agency 32, I Defense Intelligence Agency 32, I Defense Logistics Agency 32, XII; 48, 54 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 10, XVII Delaware River Basin Commission 18, III District of Columbia, Court Services and Offender Supervision 28, VIII Agency for the Drug Enforcement Administration 21, II East-West Foreign Trade Board 15, XIII Economic Affairs, Under Secretary 37, V Economic Analysis, Bureau of 15, VIII Economic Development Administration 13, III Economic Research Service 7, XXXVII Education, Department of 5, LIII Bilingual Education and Minority Languages Affairs, Office 34, V of Civil Rights, Office for 34, I Educational Research and hnprovement, Office of 34, VII Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of 34, II Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 34 Postsecondary Education, Office of 34, VI Secretary of Education, Office of 34, Subtitle A Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Office of 34, III Vocational and Adult Education, Office of 34, IV Educational Research and hnprovement, Office of 34, VII Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of 34, II Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Board 13, V Emergency Steel Guarantee Loan Board 13, IV Employee Benefits Security Administration 29, XXV Employees' Compensation Appeals Board 20, IV Employees Loyalty Board 5, V Employment and Training Administration 20, V Employment Standards Administration 20, VI Endangered Species Committee 50, IV Energy, Department of 5, XXIII; 10, II, III, X Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 9 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 5, XXIV; 18, I Property Management Regulations 41, 109 Energy, Office of 7, XXIX Engineers, Corps of 33, II; 36, III Engraving and Printing, Bureau of 31, VI Environmental Protection Agency 2, XV; 5, LIV; 40, I, IV, VII Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 15 Property Management Regulations 41, 115 Environmental Quality, Office of 7, XXXI Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 5, LXII; 29, XIV Equal Opportunity, Office of Assistant Secretary for 24, I Executive Office of the President 3, I Administration, Office of 5, XV Environmental Quality, Council on 40, V Management and Budget, Office of 5, III, LXXVII; 14, VI; 48, 99 National Drug Control Policy, Office of 21, III National Security Council 32, XXI; 47, 2 Presidential Documents 3 433

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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Science and Technology Policy, Office of 32, XXIV; 47, II Trade Representative, Office of the United States 15, XX Export-hnport Bank of the United States 2, XXXV; 5, LII; 12, IV Family Assistance, Office of 45, II Farm Credit Administration 5, XXXI; 12, VI Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation 5, XXX; 12, XIV Farm Service Agency 7, VII, XVIII Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 1 Federal Aviation Administration 14, I Commercial Space Transportation 14, III Federal Claims Collection Standards 31, IX Federal Communications Commission 5, XXIX; 47, I Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Office of 41, 60 Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 7, IV Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 5, XXII; 12, III Federal Election Commission 11, I Federal Emergency Management Agency 44, I Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Federal Acquisition 48, 21 Regulation Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation 48, 16 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 5, XXIV; 18, I Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 12, XI Federal Financing Bank 12, VIII Federal Highway Administration 23, I, II Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 1, IV Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Office 12, XVII Federal Housing Finance Board 12, IX Federal Labor Relations Authority, and General Counsel of 5, XIV; 22, XIV the Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 31, VII Federal Management Regulation 41, 102 Federal Mar/time Commission 46, IV Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 29, XII Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 5, LXXIV; 29, XXVII Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 49, III Federal Prison Industries, Inc. 28, III Federal Procurement Policy Office 48, 99 Federal Property Management Regulations 41, 101 Federal Railroad Administration 49, II Federal Register, Administrative Committee of 1, I Federal Register, Office of 1, II Federal Reserve System 12, II Board of Governors 5, LVIII Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 5, VI, LXXVI Federal Service Impasses Panel 5, XIV Federal Trade Commission 5, XLVII; 16, I Federal Transit Administration 49, VI Federal Travel Regulation System 41, Subtitle F Fine Arts, Commission on 45, XXI Fiscal Service 31, II Fish and Wildlife Service, United States 50, I, IV Fishery Conservation and Management 50, VI Food and Drug Administration 21, I Food and Nutrition Service 7, II Food Safety and Inspection Service 9, III Foreign Agricultural Service 7, XV Foreign Assets Control, Office of 31, V Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States 45, V Foreign Service Grievance Board 22, IX Foreign Service hnpasse Disputes Panel 22, XIV Foreign Service Labor Relations Board 22, XIV Foreign-Trade Zones Board 15, IV Forest Service 36, II General Services Administration 5, LVII; 41, 105 Contract Appeals, Board of 48, 61 Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 5 Federal Management Regulation 41, 102 434

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license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Federal Property Management Regulations 41, 101 Federal Travel Regulation System 41, Subtitle F General 41, 300 Payment From a Non-Federal Source for Travel Expenses 41, 304 Payment of Expenses Connected With the Death of Certain 41, 303 Employees Relocation Allowances 41, 302 Temporary Duty (TDY) Travel Allowances 41, 301 Geological Survey 30, IV Government Accountability Office 4, I Government Ethics, Office of 5, XVI Government National Mortgage Association 24, III Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 7, VIII; 9, II Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation 45, XVIII Health and Human Services, Department of 2, III; 5, XLV;45, Subtitle A, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 42, IV Child Support Enforcement, Office of 45, III Children and Families, Administration for 45, II, III, IV, X Community Services, Office of 45, X Family Assistance, Office of 45, II Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 3 Food and Drug Administration 21, I Human Development Services, Office of 45, XIII Indian Health Service 25, V Inspector General (Health Care), Office of 42, V Public Health Service 42, I Refugee Resettlement, Office of 45, IV Homeland Security, Department of 6, I Coast Guard 33, I; 46, I; 49, IV Coast Guard (Great Lakes Pilotage) 46, III Customs and Border Protection Bureau 19, I Federal Emergency Management Agency 44, I hnmigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau 19, IV hnmigration and Naturalization 8, I Transportation Security Administration 49, XII Housing and Urban Development, Department of 5, LXV; 24, Subtitle B, 2, XXIV; 2424 Community Planning and Development, Office of Assistant 24, V, VI Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Office of Assistant Secretary for 24, I Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 24 Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Office of 12, XVII Government National Mortgage Association 24, III Housing Federal Housing Commissioner, Office of 24, II, VIII, X, XX Assistant Secretary for Housing, Office of, and Multifamily Housing Assistance 24, IV Restructuring, Office of Inspector General, Office of 24, XII Public and Indian Housing, Office of Assistant Secretary for 24, IX Secretary, Office of 24, Subtitle A, VII Housing\177ederal Housing Commissioner, Office of Assistant 24, II, VIII, X, XX Secretary for Housing, Office of, and Multifamily Housing Assistance 24, IV Restructuring, Office of Human Development Services, Office of 45, XIII hnmigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau 19, IV hnmigration and Naturalization 8, I hnmigration Review, Executive Office for 8, V Independent Counsel, Office of 28, VII Indian Affairs, Bureau of 25, I, V Indian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary 25, VI Indian Arts and Crafts Board 25, II Indian Health Service 25, V Industry and Security, Bureau of 15, VII Information Resources Management, Office of 7, XXVII Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and 32, XX Records Administration 435

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text:
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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Inspector General Agriculture Department 7, XXVI Health and Human Services Department 42, V Housing and Urban Development Department 24, XII Institute of Peace, United States 22, XVII Inter-American Foundation 5, LXIII; 22, X Interior Department American Indians, Office of the Special Trustee 25, VII Endangered Species Committee 50, IV Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 14 Federal Property Management Regulations System 41, 114 Fish and Wildlife Service, United States 50, I, IV Geological Survey 30, IV Indian Affairs, Bureau of 25, I, V Indian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary 25, VI Indian Arts and Crafts Board 25, II Land Management, Bureau of 43, II Minerals Management Service 30, II National Indian Gaming Commission 25, III National Park Service 36, I Reclamation, Bureau of 43, I Secretary of the Interior, Office of 2, XIV;43, Subtitle A Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals, Board of 30, III Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Office of 30, VII Internal Revenue Service 26, I International Boundary and Water Commission, United States 22, XI and Mexico, United States Section International Development, United States Agency for 22, II Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 7 International Development Cooperation Agency, United 22, XII States International Fishing and Related Activities 50, III International Investment, Office of 31, VIII International Joint Commission, United States and Canada 22, IV International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board 5, V International Trade Administration 15, III; 19, III International Trade Commission, United States 19, II Interstate Commerce Commission 5, XL James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation 45, XXIV Japan United States Friendship Commission 22, XVI Joint Board for the Enrolhnent of Actuaries 20, VIII Justice Department 2, XXVII; 5, XXVIII; 28, I, XI; 40, IV Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Bureau of 27, II Drug Enforcement Administration 21, II Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 28 Federal Claims Collection Standards 31, IX Federal Prison Industries, Inc. 28, III Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United 45, V States hnmigration Review, Executive Office for 8, V Offices of Independent Counsel 28, VI Prisons, Bureau of 28, V Property Management Regulations 41, 128 Labor Department 5, XLII Benefits Review Board 20, VII Employee Benefits Security Administration 29, XXV Employees' Compensation Appeals Board 20, IV Employment and Training Administration 20, V Employment Standards Administration 20, VI Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 29 Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Office of 41, 60 Federal Procurement Regulations System 41, 50 Labor-Management Standards, Office of 29, II, IV Mine Safety and Health Administration 30, I Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29, XVII Public Contracts 41, 50 436

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text:
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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Secretary of Labor, Office of 29, Subtitle A Veterans' Employment and Training Service, Office of the 41, 61; 20, IX Assistant Secretary for Wage and Hour Division 29, V Workers' Compensation Programs, Office of 20, I Labor-Management Standards, Office of 29, II, IV Land Management, Bureau of 43, II Legal Services Corporation 45, XVI Library of Congress 36, VII Copyright Office 37, II Copyright Royalty Board 37, III Local Television Loan Guarantee Board 7, XX Management and Budget, Office of 5, III, LXXVII; 14, VI; 48, 99 Marine Mammal Commission 50, V Maritime Administration 46, II Merit Systems Protection Board 5, II, LXIV Micronesian Status Negotiations, Office for 32, XXVII Millenium Challenge Corporation 22, XIII Mine Safety and Health Administration 30, I Minerals Management Service 30, II Minority Business Development Agency 15, XIV Miscellaneous Agencies 1, IV Monetary Offices 31, I Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National 36, XVI Environmental Policy Foundation National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2, XVIII; 5, LIX; 14, V Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 18 National Agricultural Library 7, XLI National Agricultural Statistics Service 7, XXXVI National and Community Service, Corporation for 45, XII, XXV National Archives and Records Administration 2, XXVI; 5, LXVI; 36, XII Information Security Oversight Office 32, XX National Capital Planning Commission 1, IV National Commission for Employment Policy 1, IV National Commission on Libraries and Information Science 45, XVII National Council on Disability 34, XII National Counterintelligence Center 32, XVIII National Credit Union Administration 12, VII National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council 28, IX National Drug Control Policy, Office of 21, III National Endowment for the Arts 2, XXXII National Endowment for the Human/t/es 2, XXXIII National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 45, XI National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 23, II, III; 49, V National hnagery and Mapping Agency 32, I National Indian Gaming Commission 25, III National Institute for Literacy 34, XI National Institute of Standards and Technology 15, II National Intelligence, Office of Director of 32, XVII National Labor Relations Board 5, LXI; 29, I National Marine Fisheries Service 50, II, IV, VI National Mediation Board 29, X National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 15, IX; 50, II, III, IV, VI National Park Service 36, I National Railroad Adjustment Board 29, III National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) 49, VII National Science Foundation 2, XXV; 5, XLIII;45, VI Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 25 National Security Council 32, XXI National Security Council and Office of Science and 47, II Technology Policy National Telecommunications and Information 15, XXIII;47, III Administration National Transportation Safety Board 49, VIII Natural Resources Conservation Service 7, VI 437

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text:
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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation, Office of 25, IV Navy Department 32, VI Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 52 Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation 24, XXV Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste 10, XVIII Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5, XLVIII; 10, I Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 20 Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29, XVII Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 29, XX Offices of Independent Counsel 28, VI Oklahoma City National Memorial Trust 36, XV Operations Office 7, XXVIII Overseas Private Investment Corporation 5, XXXIII; 22, VII Patent and Trademark Office, United States 37, I Payment From a Non-Federal Source for Travel Expenses 41, 304 Payment of Expenses Connected With the Death of Certain 41, 303 Employees Peace Corps 22, III Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation 36, IX Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 29, XL Personnel Management, Office of 5, I, XXXV; 45, VIII Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 17 Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Federal 48, 21 Acquisition Regulation Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation 48, 16 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49, I Postal Regulatory Commission 5, XLVI; 39, III Postal Service, United States 5, LX; 39, I Postsecondary Education, Office of 34, VI President's Commission on White House Fellowships 1, IV Presidential Documents 3 Presidio Trust 36, X Prisons, Bureau of 28, V Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 6, X Procurement and Property Management, Office of 7, XXXII Productivity, Technology and Innovation, Assistant 37, IV Secretary Public Contracts, Department of Labor 41, 50 Public and Indian Housing, Office of Assistant Secretary for 24, IX Public Health Service 42, I Railroad Retirement Board 20, II Reclamation, Bureau of 43, I Refugee Resettlement, Office of 45, IV Relocation Allowances 41, 302 Research and Innovative Technology Administration 49, XI Rural Business-Cooperative Service 7, XVIII, XLII Rural Development Administration 7, XLII Rural Housing Service 7, XVIII, XXXV Rural Telephone Bank 7, XVI Rural Utilities Service 7, XVII, XVIII, XLII Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation 33, IV Science and Technology Policy, Office of 32, XXIV Science and Technology Policy, Office of, and National 47, II Security Council Secret Service 31, IV Securities and Exchange Commission 17, II Selective Service System 32, XVI Small Business Administration 2, XXVII; 13, I Smithsonian Institution 36, V Social Security Administration 20, III;48, 23 Soldiers' and Airmen's Home, United States 5, XI Special Counsel, Office of 5, VIII Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Office of 34, III State Department 2, VI; 22, I; 28, XI Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 6 Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals, Board of 30, III 438

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text:
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 CFR Title, Subtitle or Agency Chapter Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Office of 30, VII Surface Transportation Board 49, X Susquehanna River Basin Commission 18, VIII Technology Administration 15, XI Technology Policy, Assistant Secretary for 37, IV Technology, Under Secretary for 37, V Tennessee Valley Authority 5, LXIX; 18, XIII Thrift Supervision Office, Department of the Treasury 12, V Trade Representative, United States, Office of 15, XX Transportation, Department of 5, L Commercial Space Transportation 14, III Contract Appeals, Board of 48, 63 Emergency Management and Assistance 44, IV Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 12 Federal Aviation Administration 14, I Federal Highway Administration 23, I, II Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 49, III Federal Railroad Administration 49, II Federal Transit Administration 49, VI Mar/time Administration 46, II National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 23, II, III; 49, V Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49, I Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation 33, IV Secretary of Transportation, Office of 14, II;49, Subtitle A Surface Transportation Board 49, X Transportation Statistics Bureau 49, XI Transportation, Office of 7, XXXIII Transportation Security Administration 49, XII Transportation Statistics Bureau 49, XI Travel Allowances, Temporary Duty (TDY) 41, 301 Treasury Department 5, XXI; 12, XV; 17, IV; 31, IX Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 27, I Community Development Financial Institutions Fund 12, XVIII Comptroller of the Currency 12, I Customs and Border Protection Bureau 19, I Engraving and Printing, Bureau of 31, VI Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 10 Federal Claims Collection Standards 31, IX Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 31, VII Fiscal Service 31, II Foreign Assets Control, Office of 31, V Internal Revenue Service 26, I International Investment, Office of 31, VIII Monetary Offices 31, I Secret Service 31, IV Secretary of the Treasury, Office of 31, Subtitle A Thrift Supervision, Office of 12, V Truman, Harry S. Scholarship Foundation 45, XVIII United States and Canada, International Joint Commission 22, IV United States and Mexico, International Boundary and Water 22, XI Commission, United States Section Utah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Commission 43, III Veterans Affairs Department 2, VIII; 38, I Federal Acquisition Regulation 48, 8 Veterans' Employment and Training Service, Office of the 41, 61; 20, IX Assistant Secretary for Vice President of the United States, Office of 32, XXVIII Vocational and Adult Education, Office of 34, IV Wage and Hour Division 29, V Water Resources Council 18, VI Workers' Compensation Programs, Office of 20, I World Agricultural Outlook Board 7, XXXVIII 439

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text:
Page:A short history of social life in England.djvu/127

Rh one accord the poor refused to live on "penny ale and bacon"; they demanded "fresh flesh or fish fried or baked." Measures were hastily taken against this insubordination on the part of the working classes. A Statute of Labourers recalled the survivors to a sense of their menial position, fixed a scale of wages at the same rates as they had been before the Black Death, and ordered punishment to be inflicted on those who demanded more. The result spelt friction between rich and poor, landowner and wage-earner. Up to this time the whole system of social inequality had passed "unquestioned as to the Divine order of the world." Now a smouldering discontent arose, which could not be smothered. John Ball voiced the general feeling. For the first time Englishmen listened to one who upheld natural equality and the rights of man—the words of the agitator sum up the social status of the people:—

"Things will never go well in England so long as goods be not in common and so long as there be villeins and gentlemen. By what right are they whom we call lords greater folk than we are? On what grounds have they deserved it? If we all come of the same father and mother, of Adam and Eve, how can they say or prove that they are


text:
Why the Sea is Salt

 * Lang, Andrew (1889), "Why the sea is salt" in The Blue Fairy Book.
 * Dasent, George Webbe (1912), "Why the Sea is Salt" in Popular Tales from the Norse.

title: Why the Sea is Salt


text:
Page:A short history of social life in England.djvu/128

108 better than we, if it be not that they make us gain for them by our toil what they spend in their pride? They are clothed in velvet and warm in their furs^and their ermines, while we are covered with rags. They have wine and spices and fair bread; we have oat cake and straw, and water to drink. They have leisure and fine houses; we have pain and labour, the rain and the wind in the fields."

sang the English labourer, newly roused to a sense of his natural rights—rights which no legislation could crush and no tyranny deny. Through the intervening centuries the assertion of these rights has been more and more pronounced, until to-day the time has ripened for yet vaster natural developments, and the labourer has secured that representation in Parliament which is his right in a free country.


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HE fifteenth century ushered in yet more far-reaching changes in the social condition of the people than any that had gone before. The ideas of dawning change have already been suggested, for the great fabric of the feudal system, which for over four centuries had resisted all pressure, had been hard hit by the Peasant Revolt. Now it was to fall into ruins, from which the great middle class, that "backbone of England," was to rise triumphant. And—paradoxical as it may seem—the barons themselves caused the change. At the height of their wealth, when luxury in food and dress was at its zenith and the poor were


text:
Page:A short history of social life in England.djvu/130

110 down-trodden and miserable, the heads of many great houses in England hurled themselves into a conflict, known as the Wars of the Roses, from which they never again rose to their ancient pride and splendour. While they fought, merchants and artisans, tradesmen and small landowners quietly strengthened their position, developed the industries of the country, accumulated wealth, and ushered in that new social condition that made England what she was in the Victorian era—the greatest commercial country in the world. The weary contest with France at an end, the acquirement of wealth by the middle classes tended to the comfort and improvement of the home. Beside the castle and manor-house a number of houses sprang up in town and country—houses with the addition of court and garden, with a second story containing several bedrooms instead of one, a withdrawing-room to ensure more privacy, and a parlour (parlering or speaking room) to obviate the necessity of receiving guests in the bedroom. This parlour was better furnished than the hall, which still remained somewhat bare with its plain wooden benches and long dining-table, though even here luxury was creeping in and covering the benches with cushions of damask


text:
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Rh from Damascus. A massive fireplace and chimney characterised the parlour, and a coal fire, necessitating the invention of tongs, supplemented the use of logs. Wooden benches, usually to hold three people, were attached to the walls, while the rest of the furniture included a movable wooden chair, a table on trestles, a cupboard, and curtains of "worsted," which material was now being made at the little Norfolk village of that name. This worsted supplied a substitute for the rich tapestry which still helped to keep out draughts from the large hall and added warmth and comfort to the parlour. But perhaps the most important feature of the new room was the large window recess, furnished on either side with goodly benches of stone-work, the windows glazed with small diamond-shaped panes. These recesses formed pleasant retreats for the maiden with her distaff, as also for the young squire or gallant who sought to court her, with all the romantic fervour that characterised the age. From this window, too, could be witnessed those festivities which still made the old halls ring with joyous mirth. The walls of the parlour were usually painted. For some time past it had been considered a luxury to smooth the surface of walls with cement and to panel the


text:
Page:A short history of social life in England.djvu/132

112 lower part with oak wainscoting. Above the oak were mural paintings of historical or religious subjects. From the roof, beams were suspended to hold several candles, and the floor was either paved or covered with a Spanish carpet, though rushes were still strewed in the hall as of yore.

Nevertheless, with all its obvious advantages, the parlour was looked on as an innovation by the conservatives of the fifteenth century. The growing practice of dining in "privy parlors with chimneys" is denounced by a contemporary as a degenerate luxury. "Sondrie nobil men, gentlemen, and others, doe much delighte and use to dine in corners and secret places, not repairing to the high chamber." This was the complaint of the age. Dinner was still one of the chief events of the day, though the manners at table were yet rough and ready, as may be seen by the old books of etiquette of this time. "Do not spit upon the table" is an oft repeated maxim. Among other things, we find requests "not to return back to your plate the food you have just put into your mouth; not to drink from a cup with a dirty mouth; not to offer another person the remains of your pottage; not to eat much cheese; to take only two or three nuts when they are placed


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Hood, John


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)


text: A Dictionary of Artists of the English School/A


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 1

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 1


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 2

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 2


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 3

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 3


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 4

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 4


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 5

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 5


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 6

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 6


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 7

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 7


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 8

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 8


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 9

title: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 9


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 10


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 11


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 12


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 13


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 14


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 15


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 16


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 17


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 18


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 19


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 20


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 21


text:
Executive Order 9074

, February 25, 1942.

title: Executive Order 9074


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 22


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 23


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 24


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 25


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 26


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 27


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 28


text: Talk:Executive Order 9074

title: Talk:Executive Order 9074


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 29


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 30


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 31


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 32


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Sion Llywelyn


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 33


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 34


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 35


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 36


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 37


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 38


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 39


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 40


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 41


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 42


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 43


text:
User talk:Schwede66

Thanks for your suggestion about the lead of the DNB project page. That page has evolved, and we have lost track of the fact that it should start by informing newcomers: we now mostly just talk to each other. I have twice corrected this, but we keep falling back to our old habits. I will try again some time this weekend.

In the mean time, Welcome! The DNB is a massive collection of short biobraphies of "the British people, from earliest times up to the present" where "present" is the time it was written i.e, 1885-1900, and "british" means the biritish empire and its antecedents. Many of these biographies are still the best secondary sources for their subjects, which is why the DNB is so important. If you would like to help us, please do. Our articles are the most useful when they are paired with articles on Wikipedia. -Arch dude (talk) 03:12, 1 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I just added a temporary new lead. Please review and comment, or edit it as needed. -Arch dude (talk) 03:23, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

FitzGerald, James Edward D.A.B. entry
I've now edited — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Dictionary_of_Australasian_Biography.djvu/179 — with SIC templates for "Lyttleton" so it will now show “ [sic] 'Lyttelton'” when you hover over the word. This shows up now in the article for. Nice pickup by the way! I do remember seeing word spelt incorrectly when editing and left it in (as it should so we are faithful to the printed work). I learnt about the SIC template later on. Usage in this case was: LyttletonLyttelton [sic] Diverman (talk) 06:45, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Good to know how it's done. Thanks for fixing it. Over time, I have eliminated "Lyttleton" from Wikimedia Commons. Schwede66 (talk) 07:00, 2 March 2015 (UTC)

title: User talk:Schwede66


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 44


text: The Confidence-Man (Melville)/Chapter 45


text: Template:American Journal of Sociology

title: Template:American Journal of Sociology


text:
Executive Order 9102

, March 18, 1942.

title: Executive Order 9102


text: The American Journal of Sociology/Volume 01


text: Talk:Executive Order 9102

title: Talk:Executive Order 9102


text:
Author:Hannah Mary Rathbone

Works

 * The Diary of Lady Willoughby,
 * So much of the diary of Lady Willoughby as relates to her domestic history: to the eventful period of the reign of Charles the First, 1844 external scan
 * Some further portions of the diary of Lady Willoughby which do relate to her domestic history and to the events of the latter years of the reign of King Charles the First, the protectorate, and the restoration, 1848 external scan
 * Letters of Richard Reynolds: with a memoir of his life, 1852 external scan

title: Author:Hannah Mary Rathbone


text:
Boston Evening Transcript

 * The Boston Evening Transcript, a poem from T. S. Eliot's book Prufrock and Other Observations
 * Boston Evening Transcript (newspaper)

title: Boston Evening Transcript


text: Portal:Supreme Court of the United States/Chase Court


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/89

THE SPIRIT OF OLYMPIA continues until bedtime. Then at last, tired and sleepy and voiceless, the college settles down to a long rest, after the best field-day that has ever been held in the Turkish Empire. [ 59 ]


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/88

SYRIA, THE LAND OF LEBANON of humor and a knowledge of team-work which he probably inherited from his American mother. One of the full-backs is a very sturdy fellow who was born in Cyprus of a French mother and speaks Greek as his native tongue; but there is a canny twinkle in his eye and a burr in his speech which make it seem quite natural that his name should begin with "Mac." Many brilliant plays are made by the son of an Egyptian millionaire, the Druse sheikh who won the jareed throw, and an American from Jerusalem. The collegiate eleven is composed of four Syrians, three Egyptians, an Armenian, a Scotchman, an American and an Austrian; but racial and religious differences are forgotten as they play together for the honor of their side. It is a hard game, yet a very fair one, and when the "Medics" win by a score of two goals to one, even the college men lustily cheer the victors.

As the gay-colored crowd breaks over the field, his fellow-students seize the captain of the winning team and carry him around on their shoulders, singing and shouting all the while. Medical banners wave, medical hats and fezes are thrown into the air and medical men cheer until they can cheer no more. Soon the other students join in, and department rivalries are forgotten in a loud enthusiasm for alma mater. At the dinner hour the usual rules of decorum are for once relaxed, and the happy [ 58 ]


text:
The Collector v. Hubbard

ERROR to the Supreme Court of Connecticut; the case being thus:

The 117th section of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30th, 1864, which laid what was known as the income tax, after providing for the collection of an income tax from certain classes of companies specified, and enacting that 'in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person,' revenue from such and such sources 'shall be included and assessed as part of the income of such person.' proceeds:

'And the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.'

With this enactment in force, one Hubbard owned, A.D. 1864, certain shares in two manufacturing companies (being companies other than those previously specified in the section), which in that year made large profits and made dividends of part of them, though not of the whole of them. The excess was not divided, nor had it been in any way set apart from the general assets of the respective corporations, or appropriated for the use of the stockholders, otherwise than as the law would imply from the existence of them. On the contrary, it was part of the case as settled and admitted by the parties:

'That from time to time during said year, and without any intention to defraud the government, unless the investment hereinafter named constituted such fraud by implication of law, said corporations invested said profits in part in real estate, machinery, and raw material, proper for carrying on their business, and in part for the payment of debts incurred in previous years, and the same remained so invested in 1865.'

Hubbard, when making in the year just named his return of income for the preceding year, returned as part of his income the dividends which had been made on his stock, but would not return the undivided profits. The assessor insisted on his returning his proportion of these also, settling the proportion by a reference to the number of shares which he held in the company compared with the whole number into which its capital stock was divided. Under compulsion from the assessor he then did make such return, and under like compulsion did pay, on the 19th August, 1865, the tax accordingly, protesting in due form against the collection. The assessor had given Hubbard due notice of where appeals from the assessment would be held, but Hubbard did not make any appeal, either to the assessor or to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard, which allowed him to do so, though it did not make his having done so a condition of his bringing suit. On the contrary, relying on his simple payment under protest he brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States to recover the tax. It was not denied that at the time when he brought that action such a suit could be maintained to recover such a tax illegally paid under protest though no such appeal had been made. However, after Hubbard had thus brought his suit in the Circuit Court, Congress, on the 13th July, 1866, passed an act whose 19th section was thus:

'That no suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury established in pursuance thereof, and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, unless such suit shall be brought within six months from the time of said decision, or within six months from the time this act takes effect,' &c.

The suit was called for trial in June, 1867, and in consequence of this enactment and the admitted want of appeal to the commissioner, the Circuit Court dismissed the case.

The plaintiff then, on the 9th of August, 1867, sued the collector in indebitatus assumpsit in one of the State courts of Connecticut, a case as above stated being agreed on, and it being further admitted that the collector had, prior to the bringing of the suit, paid over to the Treasury of the United States the whole amount of the tax collected; a payment over which was made in pursuance of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1865, by which collectors were required to pay daily into the treasury the gross amount of all duties, taxes, and revenue received or collected in virtue of the internal revenue acts, without any abatement or deduction on account of compensation, &c., or claims of any description whatever; the act, however, or other acts containing provisions authorizing a person from whom a tax has been collected to sue the collector for its recovery, and provisions for repayment by the treasurer to the collector of whatever should be thus recovered against him.

In the suit in the State court, the collector set up the fact of his payment over, and more particularly the act of 1866 as a bar to the suit; maintaining, also, as a second ground, that if the suit was not thus barred the tax had been rightly assessed and levied.

The court in which this second suit was brought gave judgment for the plaintiff, and on error to the Supreme Court that judgment was affirmed. The case was now brought here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The questions being:

I. Did the act of Congress of 1866 incapacitate Hubbard from bringing the second suit?

II. If not, were the undivided profits, applied as they had been, 'income' within the meaning of the act of 1864?

Mr. C. E. Perkins, in support of the judgment below:

I. The fact of payment over is plainly no bar to our suit, Congress authorizing suits against collectors to recover taxes illegally paid, and making abundant provision for repayment to the collector if judgment go against him.

Neither is the act of 1866, requiring a previous appeal to the commissioner, a bar.

1. The act was prospective only. It was not intended to affect the rights of parties already vested. Courts refuse to give statutes a retroactive construction, unless the intention is so clear and positive as by no possibility to admit of any other construction. It would be grossly unjust to us to apply this rule. At the time when the act was passed we had a suit pending in the Circuit Court. It was not reached for trial till June, 1867, more than six months after the act took effect. The court then dismissed the case because the act took away its jurisdiction, and we were deprived of any redress. A construction which would bring about such a result should be avoided.

2. The act only refers to proceedings in courts of the United States.

3. It is a kind of statute of limitations, and it is set up as a bar to an action in a State court arising at common law. But Congress has no power to pass acts barring such suits. It is only when causes of action arise under laws of the United States that that body can prohibit or limit proceedings in State courts. This case does not so arise. One citizen of Connecticut has here money belonging to another citizen, for which, by the laws of Connecticut, an action of indebitatus assumpsit will lie. Congress cannot affect this right of action. As soon as the money was illegally collected and paid under duress, a right to recover it vested in the plaintiff with which Congress could not interfere.

II. As to the merits. The internal revenue enactment says expressly that only the gains and profits to which a stockholder is 'entitled' shall be returned. In no possible sense of the word is a stockholder entitled as income to moneys spent by the corporation during the year in paying its debts and preparing for its future business. This is a Connecticut corporation, and the question of the right of a stockholder to their property should be and is fixed by Connecticut law. In Phelps v. Farmers' Bank, the court say:

'The profits of a bank, no matter when made, until separated from the stock by declaring a dividend, are mere increment and augmentation of the stock. They are properly stock themselves, composing a part of the stock of the bank, and will pass with the stock under that name either by contract, bequest, or levy of execution.'

The rule is the same in other States.

In Minot v. Paine, a Massachusetts case, the court say:

'The net earnings of a railroad corporation remain the property of the company as fully as its other property till the directors declare a dividend. A shareholder has no title to them prior to the dividend being declared. . . . The money in the hands of the directors may be income to the corporation, but it is not so to a stockholder till a dividend is made; and where the company invest it in buildings and machinery, or in railroad tracks, depots, rolling stock, or any other permanent improvements for enlarging or carrying on their legitimate business, it never becomes income to the shareholder.'

In Goodwin v. Hardy, a case in Maine, the court say:

'The stockholders have no claim to a dividend until it is declared. Until that time it belongs to the corporation precisely as any other property it may own.'

If these cases are good law they are decisive.

Apart from decisions, this is the only reasonable construction. How can a stockholder be entitled to money which the corporation has used in paying off its debts? The same principle applies to replacing wornout machinery, buying new, and purchasing raw material to carry on the business.

Mr. Akerman, Attorney-General, and Mr. Bristow, Solicitor-General, contra:

I. As to the bar.

1. The act of 1866 does not act retrospectively in barring this suit, for the suit was not brought until after it was passed.

2. It bars, by its terms, suits in 'any court,' and interpreted in accordance with its purposed meaning it is constitutional.

3. The plaintiff had no vested right to recover by the principles of the common law the money illegally taken by the collector; for acts of Congress compelled the collector to pay the money immediately to the government. No promise can be implied to refund in such a case. The whole right to sue came by necessary implication from the revenue laws, and the authirity to sue could at any time be qualified or even taken away by Congress, which gave it.

II. As to the merits. It was the design of Congress to tax the undivided gains and profits made by all corporations, as well as those which are divided among the stockholders. This appears by considering the 117th section of the act of 1864 in connection with the 120th and 122d of the same act. The corporations mentioned in the 120th section are banks, trust companies, and insurance companies, and the tax is thereby made to cover not only 'dividends,' but also 'all undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds.' Those mentioned in the 122d section are railroad, canal, turnpike, canal-navigation, and slack-water companies; and the tax is thereby made to cover, not only gains and profits divided, but, in addition, 'all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund or used for construction.' All other corporations not specified in those sections are covered by the 117th section, which expressly declares that the gains and profits thereof shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.

The purpose is the same in each of these sections, the only difference being in the mode of offectuating it. Where the gains and profits are those made by a corporation specified in either the 120th or the 122d sections, the tax thereon is collected directly from the corporation, whether such gains and profits are divided or not. Where they are the gains and profits made by any corporation included in the 117th section, the tax thereon is collected directly from the stockholders, or persons entitled thereto, whether the same are divided or otherwise. In all cases the entire annual gains and profits of every corporation, divided or undivided, seem to be within the aim and purview of the statute as objects of taxation.

The decisions cited on the other side, if pertinent at all to the question of an income tax, which they are not, are not strong enough to control an enactment which includes 'all gains and profits,' 'whether divided or otherwise;' that is to say, whether divided or undivided.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: The Collector v. Hubbard


text: Talk:The Collector v. Hubbard

title: Talk:The Collector v. Hubbard


text:
The Collector v. Hubbard/Opinion of the Court

Suits to recover back moneys illegally exacted as internal revenue duties cannot, under existing laws, be commenced in the Circuit Courts, except in cases where the taxpayer and the defendant, whether the assessor or collector, are citizens of different States. Such suits under any other circumstances must be commenced in the State courts, as the Circuit Courts have no jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, except when they are removed from a State court into the Circuit Court for the same district, on motion of the defendant. Where the parties are citizens of the same State the action must be brought in the State court, but the defendant, if he sees fit, and seasonably takes the proper steps, may remove the case into the Circuit Court for trial. Both parties in this case were citizens of the same State, and the action was accordingly commenced by the plaintiff in the State court, and the collector, as the defendant, not having taken any steps to remove the suit into the Circuit Court, the same was heard and determined in the State court in which it was commenced.

Taxes were assessed against the plaintiff, under the internal revenue laws, in the sum of one thousand five hundred and ninety-seven dollars, and the findings of the court show that the assessor duly returned his assessment list to the collector; that the collector demanded of the plaintiff the amount of the tax assessed, and that he threatened if the plaintiff refused to pay the same that he would coerce the collection of the whole amount; that the assessor gave due notice to the plaintiff when and where appeals from the assessment would be heard, but that the plaintiff did not appeal from the same, either to the assessor or to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that he paid the whole amount of the assessment under protest.

Pursuant to the practice in that jurisdiction, the Superior Court reserved the questions of law arising upon the facts found, and the question what judgment ought to be rendered in the case, for the opinion and advice of the Supreme Court of Errors, and the record shows that the Supreme Court of Errors advised the Superior Court to render judgment for the plaintiff, as exhibited in the transcript of the record removed here by the writ of error for re-examination.

1. Remarks respecting the jurisdiction of the court to reexamine the judgment rendered by the State court may well be omitted, as the claim of the plaintiff as set forth in the declaration necessarily draws in question the acts of Congress imposing internal revenue duties and the authority exercised by the defendant in collecting the same, and the decision of the State court was against the validity of both, if the acts of Congress be construed as authorizing the assessment and collection of the duties.

2. Tried as the case was by the judge of the Superior Court, as a substitute for a jury, the Supreme Court of Errors was bound to take the facts as found by that court, and this court in re-examining the judgment must proceed upon the same basis, as the finding of facts is made a part of the record.

By the finding, it appears that at the time of the assessment the plaintiff owned a majority of the stock in two certain manufacturing corporations, whose affairs respectively were managed by three or more directors, of which the plaintiff was one; that the profits realized by the respective companies the year preceding the assessment was greater than the dividends which they made within the same period; that the profits at the time of the assessment had not been divided nor had they been in any way set apart from the general assets of the respective corporations, nor had they been appropriated for the use of the stockholders, otherwise than the law will imply from the fact of the existence of such profits; that the profits made by the respective corporations during that year were to such an amount that if the interest of the plaintiff therein was legally subject to the assessment the amount assessed and collected was the proper amount; that the plaintiff delivered, under oath, his list to the assistant assessor on the day of its date, omitting the amount now in controversy from the list; that the assessor required him to add the same to the list, which he declined to do, and that the same was then added to the list by the assessor; and the court also found that the assessment was legally made, if such profits were in law liable to such an assessment.

3. Such an amount of profits was made by the two corporations during that year that if the interest of the plaintiff therein was legally subject to any assessment it is conceded that the amount assessed and collected was correct, but the proposition is that the interest of the plaintiff in such profits was not legally subject to any such assessment, as it appears that the corporations invested the profits in part in real estate, machinery, and raw material proper for carrying on their business, and in part for the payment of debts incurred in previous years, and that the same remained so invested at the time the duties were assessed and collected. Part only of the profits of that year was so invested, and it was that part of the same which was not included in the dividends of the year, and which the plaintiff refused to add to the list he delivered to the assistant assessor, and which is now the subject of controversy.

4. Intention to defraud the government is not imputed, either to the corporations or to the plaintiff, unless the investment, in view of the circumstances, and the refusal of the plaintiff to add the proportional amount of the same to his list of annual gains and profits, constitute such fraud by implication of law; but the defendant contends that the plaintiff was required by law to pay the regular income tax on such proportion of the entire net profits made by the two companies as his stock bore to the whole stock of the corporations.

Apart from the defence to the merits of the claim, that the tax was lawfully assessed and collected, the defendant also set up in his notice of special matters to be given in evidence under the general issue that he paid over the amount to the Treasury of the United States before the suit was brought, and that the suit was barred by the nineteenth section of the act of Congress, entitled an act to reduce internal taxation, which provides, among other things, that no suit except under certain conditions not existing in the case before the court, shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and a decision shall be had thereon, except in certain cases not material to be noticed in this investigation, as the case, if affected at all by the provision, falls within the rule and not within either of the exceptions.

5. Payment of the amount into the public treasury before the suit was brought would be a good defence to the action if the right of the plaintiff depended solely upon an implied promise at common law, as the payment was made in pursuance of the requirement of an act of Congress, and the rule is well settled that the law will not imply a promise by a public officer to pay money in his hands as such officer twice, nor to pay it to a private party in a case where the law requires him to pay it into the public treasury, and he has complied with that requirement. Indebitatus assumpsit is founded upon what the law terms an implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay what in good conscience he is bound to pay to the plaintiff. Where the case shows that it is the duty of the defendant to pay, the law imputes to him a promise to fulfil that obligation. Such a promise to pay, however, will never be implied unless some duty creates such an obligation, nor will the law ever imply a promise to do an act contrary to law or in violation of a public duty. Collectors of internal revenue, as well as collectors of import duties, are required to pay all moneys by them collected into the Treasury of the United States, and where such moneys have been collected and the payment has been made into the treasury as required by the act of Congress, the law, in the absence of any other statutory regulations upon the subject, would not imply any promise on the part of the collector to pay back the amount to the taxpayer, even if it appeared that the assessment was erroneous or illegal, as he could not, in such a case, be under any obligation to pay the money twice, and to have paid it back to the taxpayer in the first place would have been contrary to his official duty as prescribed by an act of Congress. But the right of the plaintiff to recover in such a case, if the tax is illegal and he is not otherwise in fault, does not depend alone upon an implied promise as at common law, as the same act of Congress which requires the collector to collect the tax and pay the money into the public treasury, contains other provisions from which the implication necessarily arises that the taxpayer in such a case, if the tax is illegal, may maintain an action against the collector to recover back the amount. Much examination of that question, however, is unnecessary at this time, as the rule upon the subject is definitely settled by prior decisions of this court.

Such a defence, therefore, cannot avail the defendant in this cause, as the right of action, though in form an action of assumpsit, is grounded upon the act of Congress providing for the assessment and collection of taxes, which will sufficiently appear from a single suggestion. None of the internal revenue acts contemplate that the collectors shall reimburse themselves for the amount of any judgment recovered against them on account of duties illegally or erroneously assessed and collected. On the contrary, the act of Congress expressly provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall repay to collectors or deputy collectors the full amount of such sums of money as shall or may be recovered against them in any court for any internal duties or licenses collected by them, with the costs and expenses of suit.

6. Prior to the passage of the act of the 13th of July, 1866, it is quite clear that the taxpayer, if he was illegally assessed, might maintain an action of assumpsit against a collector to recover back the amount, if he paid it under protest, although he had not taken any appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Such were the views of this court in the case of Philadelphia v. The Collector, and no doubt is entertained that the decision was entirely correct, but it is a great mistake to suppose that the right to maintain the action, as there conceded, was founded in the theory that the collector held money in his hands belonging to the plaintiff which he was bound to refund, as the decision was placed expressly upon the ground that the several provisions in the internal revenue acts, before referred to, warranted the conclusion as a necessary implication that Congress intended to give the taxpayer such remedy.

Remedies of the kind, given by Congress, may be changed or modified, or they may be withdrawn altogether at the pleasure of the law-maker, as the taxpayer cannot have any vested right in the remedy granted by Congress for the correction of an error in taxation.

Suits for such causes of action are absolutely prohibited until the taxpayer shall appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and until the appeal has been decided, unless the decision is postponed longer than six months, in which case he is at liberty to sue within one year from the time when his appeal was taken.

Three answers are made by the plaintiff to that defence, as presented in the record: (1.) He contends that the provision is prospective, and that Congress did not intend that it should retroact so as to affect a vested right. (2.) That the act of Congress in question, even if it is a bar to such a suit in a Federal court, is inoperative, as such, in a State court. (3.) That the money paid for the taxes, inasmuch as it was paid under protest, must be considered as money in the hands of the defendant belonging to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff in that view of the case has a vested right at common law to his remedy to recover it back.

Pending suits, it may be conceded, are not affected by that provision, but it is impossible to say that any suit subsequently commenced for such a cause of action is not embraced within its scope and meaning, as the language is, 'No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' &c., as more fully set forth in the section. Authority was vested in the commissioner by the prior act to remit, refund, and pay back, 'on appeal to him made,' all duties erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, and all duties that appeared to be unjustly assessed or excessive in amount.

Appeals were permitted by that act, though not required as a condition to a right of action, but inasmuch as the right of appeal and the right of action were conferred by the same act, the court is of the opinion that it was entirely competent for Congress to add new conditions to the exercise of that right whenever in its discretion the public interest might require such additional regulation. Unless the meaning of the section can be restrained by construction it is quite clear that it includes the State courts as well as the Federal courts, as the language is that no suit shall be maintained in any court to recover any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, and there is not a word in the section tending to show that the words 'in any court' are not used in their ordinary sense. Unquestionably if the provision is a good bar in the Federal courts, it is a good bar in all courts acting under the same act of Congress, and furnishes the rule of decision for all.

Special reference is made to the fact that a prior suit was commenced by the plaintiff, which was pending in the Circuit Court at the time the act was passed taking away the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in all such cases, except where the parties are citizens of different States, but the only answer which need be made to that suggestion is that the present suit is wholly unaffected by that circumstance.

Regulations exist in some of the States that where the first suit is abated and a second suit is brought within a prescribed time the statute of limitations shall cease to run from the date of the first suit, but Congress has not passed any law to that effect, and it is conceded that nome such exists in the State where the suit was commenced.

Sufficient has already been remarked to show that the third proposition of the plaintiff cannot be sustained, as a party cannot have any vested right in a remedy conferred by an act of Congress to prevent Congress from modifying it or adding new conditions to its exercise.

7. Suppose, however, that the rule is otherwise, that the provision in question is not a bar to the present suit, still the court is of the opinion that the addition made to the list rendered by the plaintiff was proper, that the tax was lawfully assessed, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this case.

Assessed as the duties in this case were under the act of the thirtieth of June, 1864, attention will be called chiefly to the provisions of that act. Congress evidently intended by that act, as appears by the one hundred and sixteenth, and the six following sections, to tax all the annual gains, profits, and income of every person residing here, and of every citizen residing abroad, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interests, dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation, or from any other source whatever, except as therein mentioned, if such annual gains, profits, or income exceed six hundred dollars. Section one hundred and seventeen declares what shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person, and, among other things, expressly provides that the gains and profits, of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in that section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person, entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.

Manufacturing companies are not mentioned in that section, and of course they fall within that clause of the section which in terms applies to all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, not specified in that section. Lists or returns of the amount of income are required by section one hundred and eighteen, and section one hundred and nineteen prescribes the time of payment and defines the penalty in case of neglect and refusal.

Support to the view that the list of an individual should include undivided as well as divided profits is derived from the requirements of the one hundred and twentieth section, which levies a duty of five per centum on all dividends in scrip or money thereafter declared due, whenever the same shall be payable to stockholders, policy-holders, or depositors, as part of the earnings, income, or gains of certain described companies, not including manufacturing companies, and on all undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the year, to their surplus or contingent funds. Strong confirmation of that view is also derived from section one hundred and twenty-one of the same act, which requires banks of circulation, if they neglect to make dividends, or additions to their surplus or contingent fund, as often as once in six months, to make a list or return in duplicate of the amount of profits which have accrued or been earned within that period, and to present the list or return to the collector of the district and pay to him five per cent. on such profits.

Substantially the same requirement is made of every railroad, canal, turnpike, canal-navigation and slack-water company, and the provision is that all profits of such a company carried to the account of any fund or used for construction shall be subject to and pay a duty of five per centum on the amount of all such profits. Other references to the same effect might be made, but it is believed that these are sufficient to show that the policy of Congress in that act was to tax all gains and profits, whether divided or undivided, and that the construction that the undivided gains and profits of manufacturing companies are properly included in that rule is just and reasonable.

Decided cases are referred to, in which it is held that a stockholder has no title for certain purposes to the earnings, net or otherwise, of a railroad prior to the dividend being declared, and it cannot be doubted that those decisions are correct as applied to the respective subject-matters involved in the controversies. Grant all that, still it is true that the owner of a share of stock in a corporation holds the share with all its incidents, and that among those incidents is the right to receive all future dividends, that is, his proportional share of all profits not then divided. Profits are incident to the share to which the owner at once becomes entitled provided he remains a member of the corporation until a dividend is made. Regarded as an incident to the shares, undivided profits are property of the shareholder, and as such are the proper subject of sale, gift, or devise. Undivided profits invested in real estate, machinery, or raw material for the purpose of being manufactured are investments in which the stockholders are interested, and when such profits are actually appropriated to the payment of the debts of the corporation they serve to increase the market value of the shares, whether held by the original subscribers or by assignees. But the decisive answer to the proposition is that Congress possesses the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and it is as competent for Congress to tax annual gains and profits before they are divided among the holders of the stock as afterwards, and it is clear that Congress did direct that all such gains and profits, whether divided or otherwise, should be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income liable to taxation under the provisions of that act. Annual gains and profits, whether divided or not, are property, and, therefore, are taxable.

JUDGMENT REVERSED with costs and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

IN CONFORMITY TO THE OPINION OF THIS COURT.


text: Talk:The Collector v. Hubbard/Opinion of the Court


text:
Sturges v. The Collector

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of New York.

This was an action brought in the court below against the collector of the port of New York, to recover a sum exacted as a ten per cent. ad valorem duty upon a quantity of indigo, the product of a country east of the Cape of Good Hope, and which had been imported into New York, on the 7th of July, 1865, from England.

Whether the right to lay the duty did or did not exist, depended on the construction of the 6th section of an act of Congress of March 3d, 1865, relating to the importations of goods from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, in cases where the goods were the products of places east of it. It was not denied, apparently, that if the indigo had been imported directly from the place of its growth, the duty would not have been payable. The difficulty was under the act just mentioned and in regard to an importation not direct, but from England, a place west.

This act of March 3d, 1865, already referred to, as in force when this particular cargo was imported, had been preceded by other acts on the same subject, and by some judicial construction on one of them. That history was thus:

By section 14 of the act of July 14th, 1862, entitled an act 'increasing temporarily the duties on imports and for other purposes,' it was enacted, that:

'There shall be levied, collected, and paid on ALL goods, wares, and merchandise, of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per cent. ad valorem, AND in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.'

In the official edition of the statutes the word 'and' just above printed in large capitals, was printed in italics; a form of printing which indicated that the compiler of the edition supposed it an accidental insertion, and superfluous. An act subsequent to that above-quoted act, namely, of March 3d, 1863, enacted that the above-quoted section should be so modified as

'To allow cotton, and raw silk as reeled from the cocoon, of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, to be exempt from any additional duty when imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, for two years from and after the passage of this act.'

These two articles were exempt from duty at the time of the passage of the above-quoted act of 1862.

Soon after the passage of the act of 1862, but before the act of 1863, modifying it, one Hadden, imported into New York from England, a quantity of raw silk, the product of Persia, and which it was admitted but for the act of 1862 would have been free from duty. A duty of ten per cent. being exacted and paid under protest, Hadden brought suit in the Circuit Court for New York, against the collector, to recover what he had paid; his idea in bringing suit to recover the duty paid on the silks, being that:

1st. That the expression in the act of 1862, 'AND IN ADDITION to the duties imposed on such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or importation,' laid the ten per cent. only in cases where the product was already subject to some prior duty, large or small.

2d. That by the words 'this side of the Cape,' goods imported into the Atlantic ports were within the terms and chargeable with duty, while goods imported into the Pacific ports were not within them, and not chargeable, and so that the clause of the Constitution, which requires all duties to be uniform throughout the United States, was contravened; and the enactment itself, of course, void.

The Circuit Court, admitting that previous sections of the act did undoubtedly lend some countenance to the importer's argument that the duty was laid only where a prior duty existed, and that the 14th section itself was obscure, still considered, on the whole statute, that the silks were meant to be charged with the ten per cent. ad valorem, and that as the expression 'this side of the Cape,' was only another form of saying 'places west of the Cape,' that judgment was to be given for the United States. It was so given accordingly. That judgment was affirmed in this court on error; the Supreme Court adverting to the act of 1863, modifying that of 1862, as showing that the understanding of Congress was that the ten per cent. was imposed as an additional duty, though in fact raw silk, as already stated, was at the time exempt.

In June, 1864, seven months after the decision just mentioned of Hadden's case, on the circuit, Congress repealed section 14th of the act of 1862, and by an act like the former one, entitled 'an act to increase duties on imports,' &c., enacted:

'That on and after the day and year this act shall take effect, there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries east of the Cape or Good Hope (except raw cotton), when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per centum ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.'

The reader will observe that the words 'this side' of the Cape of Good Hope, in the act of 1862, are changed in the new act to 'west' of the Cape, and that the word 'and' disappears.

This enactment was in substance (with an extension of the exemption from duty to raw silk in certain condition), reenacted in section 6th of an act of March 3d, 1865, under the provisions of which the defendant levied and collected the duties upon the plaintiff's importations. That section enacted:

'That there shall be hereafter collected and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries [east] of the Cape of Good Hope (except raw cotton and raw silk as reeled from the cocoon, or not further advanced than tram, thrown, or organzine), when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per centum ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed on any such article when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.'

In the present suit, the court below gave judgment for the collector, and the importer brought the case here.

Mr. George Ticknor Curtis, and Mr. A. R. Culver, for the plaintiff in error:

1. The difficulty which existed, as to the proper construction of the 14th section of the act of 1862, was remedied by Congress in June, 1864, by an enactment, as a substitute for the 14th section of the act of 1862, leaving out in the latter act the word and,' substituting the word 'east for beyond,' the words west of in place of the words 'this side,' and repealing in terms the act of July 14th, 1862. This repeal and substitution took place seven months after the decision on the circuit, in the case of Hadden v. The Collector, Congress being at the time aware of the construction which had been put upon the 14th section of the act of 1862, by the courts. Why after this decision in favor of the government, did it thus legislate upon the subject, repeal the act of 1862, enact a new section, and use different language in the latter act, unless for the purpose of showing that the court had misunderstood its former intentions, and of placing them beyond doubt?

2. Laws imposing duties are never construed beyond the natural import of the language used, and duties are never imposed upon the citizen upon doubtful interpretations. If he who could, and ought to have explained himself clearly and fully has not done it, it is the worse for him. This is a maxim of the Roman law.

Mr. Akerman, Attorney-General, Mr. Bristow, Solicitor-General, and Mr. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra:

The interpretation put upon the act of July 14th, 1862, in the Circuit Court in Hadden v. The Collector, became a part of the statute itself, and if Congress, in subsequent statutes, used the same or substantially the same language, the legal presumption is that it intended that the language should bear the judicial construction previously given to it. New there is no essential difference in the language of the acts. The omission in the act of 1864, of the conjunction 'and' before the words 'in addition to,' in the act of 1862, does not indicate an intention to limit the application of this section to articles previously dutiable.

This act of 1862, was substantially re-enacted in the act of 1865, which was in force when these goods were imported, the only difference being that the exception is extended to raw silk.

The object of these duties 'in addition,' was, of course, to increase the revenue. In distributing the additional burden thus caused, it would seem proper that those favored articles, which had heretofore been admitted free of duty, should bear some portion of it. If, besides this, it was the purpose of Congress, as it doubtless was, to discriminate against the products of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places west of the Cape, no good reason can be assigned why such discrimination should not apply to articles otherwise exempt from duty as well as to dutiable articles.

Laws imposing duties and taxes are not to be construed strictly against the government, but liberally, so as to effectuate the purpose of the legislature.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion, affirming the judgment.

title: Sturges v. The Collector


text: Talk:Sturges v. The Collector

title: Talk:Sturges v. The Collector


text:
Sturges v. The Collector/Opinion of the Court

Moneys paid for import duties, when illegally levied, may be recovered back by the owner, importer, or consignee in an action of assumpsit against the collector by whom the same were exacted, if the payment was made under written protest, as required by law, and the party making the payment failed to obtain redress by appeal seasonably taken to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Forty-one chests of indigo, the product of India, were, on the seventh of July, 1865, imported by the plaintiffs from London, England, into the port of New York, and the agreed statement shows that the late collector of that port levied and exacted as duties thereon ten per centum ad valorem; that the plaintiffs paid the same under written protest, and that the decision of the collector levying the duties, on appeal duly taken to reverse the same, was affirmed by the Treasury Department.

They protested that the assessment was illegal upon the ground that the goods were entitled to be admitted to entry free of duty, and having failed to obtain redress from the Secretary of the Treasury for what they regarded as an illegal exaction, they brought an action of assumpsit against the executors of the late collector to recover back the amount so exacted and paid for the duties.

Process having been issued and served, the defendants appeared and the parties went to trial, but they ultimately submitted the case to the decision of the court upon an agreed statement of facts. Before the case was finally submitted, however, the parties were heard, and the court subsequently rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into this court.

Whether the goods imported in this case were dutiable or not depends upon the construction to be given to the sixth section of the act of the third of March, 1865, which provides that there shall be hereafter collected and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise, of the growth or produce of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope (except raw cotton and raw silk as reeled from the cocoon, or not further advanced than tram, thrown, or organzine), when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per centum ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed on any such article when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.

Strike out the last clause, commencing with the words 'in addition,' and the body of the section would be as clear as any enactment can be that all goods, wares, and merchandise (save the two excepted articles), imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, if grown or produced in any country east of the Cape of Good Hope, are by that provision subject to a duty of ten per centum ad valorem.

Argument upon that subject is unnecessary, as the proposition is as plain as anything in legislation can be, but if that clause had been omitted goods imported from London, the growth or production of India, would not have been subject to any higher rate of duty than goods of like kind imported directly here from India, the place of their growth or production, unless the goods were, by antecedent laws, subjected to a rate of duty higher than that imposed in the section under consideration, which would have defeated wholly or partially both purposes which Congress had in view in enacting the new provision.

Congress desired to raise more revenue from importations consisting of articles grown or produced in countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, and at the same time to preserve and continue the discrimination established by existing laws in favor of importations made directly from the countries where the articles imported were grown or produced.

Had the last clause of the section been omitted the new provision, in any view of the subject, would not have augmented the revenue to any considerable extent, and if construed as repealing the prior laws upon the same subject its effect would have been very largely the other way, and it would have operated as a discrimination against the direct trade and in favor of the importation of such articles from countries west of the Cape of Good Hope, or in other words, it would have reversed the policy of the government by encouraging the indirect instead of the direct trade in the articles of commerce grown or produced in those distant countries. Evidently, therefore, the clause providing that the duty levied by the section was in addition to the duty imposed on any such article when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production was an indispensable provision to carry into effect the purposes intended to be accomplished by the enactment.

All articles of the growth or product of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, except the two named as exempted, when imported from places west of the Cape are declared to be subject to the rate of duty therein prescribed, and to prevent any misconception as to the intention of Congress and to close the door against any suggestion that the new provision repealed or modified the prior law, it was provided that the new duty was in addition to the duties previously 'imposed on any such article' when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production. Ten per centum ad valorem is imposed on all such goods, wares, and merchandise, except the two articles named as exempted, whether they were or were not subject to duty as articles of direct trade under any antecedent law, if they fell within the conditions specified in the sixth section of the act imposing the duty.

Certain articles of the growth or production of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope were subject to duty, even when imported here directly from the place of their growth or production, while other articles, when so imported, were entitled to be admitted to entry free of duty. Articles of the kind described in the section, not dutiable as articles of the direct trade under any antecedent law, were to pay only the ten per centum ad valorem specified in the section, but all articles previously dutiable as articles of the direct trade, save the two exempted in the body of the section, were to be subject, in case they were imported here as articles of the indirect trade, to a duty of ten per centum ad valorem in addition to the duty imposed under any prior law, in case the articles were imported here directly from the place or places of their growth or production. Construed in that way, both of the purposes which Congress had in view were accomplished, as the provision had the effect to augment the revenue, and at the same time to preserve and continue the discrimination created by antecedent laws in favor of the direct trade, which is in accordance with the policy of our external revenue system as exhibited in all our laws upon the subject.

Raw cotton and raw silk as reeled from the cocoon, or not further advanced than tram, thrown or organzine, were exempted from the new duty, or any other, by an exception inserted in the body of the section, and it is a reasonable conclusion that if Congress had intended to exempt any other articles of the growth or production of those countries, the articles would have been enumerated and included in that exception. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Such an exception as that inserted in the body of the section was indispensable to exempt any such article from the new duty, as the introductory words of the section include, in express terms, all goods, wares, and merchandise, of the described character, when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope. Unless it can be assumed that the words 'all goods, wares, and merchandise' are not used in their ordinary sense, it must be understood that they include all such articles of importation not specifically exempted, as the exception proves the rule, and shows to a demonstration that all such articles, except those two are subject to the prescribed duty, and that the last clause was not superadded to exempt any other articles from the operation of the introductory words of the section, but to prevent the entire provision from being misunderstood and misapplied, so as to defeat one or both of the purposes which Congress had in view in passing the law. Confirmation of this view is derived from the antecedent legislation of Congress upon the same subject.

Duties on imports were temporarily increased by the act of the fourteenth of July, 1862, the fourteenth section of which levied 'on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope a duty of ten per cent. ad valorem, and in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.'

Attention need only be called to the last clause of that enactment, as it is not controverted that the legal effect of the body of the section, under which the duties in this case were levied and collected, is substantially the same as the corresponding portion of that provision, but the suggestion is that the last clause in the last act is materially different from that of the former, as it does not contain the word 'and' before the words 'in addition,' as employed in the prior act. Drop the word 'and' before the words 'in addition,' as employed in the former law, and the language of the respective clauses is the same without the variation of a single letter.

Congress having subsequently repealed that provision, found it necessary at a later period to re-enact it, and in reproducing the provision the word 'and' before the words 'in addition,' as employed in the prior law, was dropped evidently because it was a redundant word wholly unnecessary to give expression to the meaning and intention of the law-makers. When the act was transcribed for official publication the word 'and' was italicized by the compiler of the acts of Congress as expressive of his opinion that it was a redundant word, as it plainly appears to be to every one acquainted with the revenue laws and the subject-matter to which the particular provision relates.

Importations of raw silk, soon after the passage of that act, were made from Liverpool, England, into the port of New York, and it was agreed in the statement of the case that the articles imported were the products of Persia and China. Ten per cent. duty was exacted, and the merchant paid the same under protest and brought assumpsit against the collector to recover back the amount paid. He was defeated in the Circuit Court and he removed the cause into this court, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed by the unanimous opinion of this court. In disposing of the case the court say that the latter clause does not qualify the general language, 'on all goods, wares, and merchandise,' employed in the body of the section, so as to exclude from it the articles exempted from duty under prior acts of Congress. Instead of that, the court proceeds to say that it only provides that the duty laid by the body of the section 'shall be in addition to existing duties on such articles when imported directly from their places of growth or production;' that such articles as already pay a duty when imported directly from those places shall pay a further duty, as therein prescribed, if imported from countries west of the Cape, the object being to increase the duty upon the articles when not imported directly from their places of growth or production.

Based as that opinion is upon the proposition that the latter clause of the section does not qualify the first clause imposing the new duty, it is decisive of the question before the court, as it is clear that the word 'and' before the words 'in addition' was not regarded as of any importance or as contributing in any degree to that conclusion. On the contrary, the court decided on that occasion, what undoubtedly is correct, that the words 'any such articles,' in the last clause of the section, 'do not mean all the articles embraced in the first clause, but only such of them as were already subject to duty,' to which we add, leaving all the rest subject to the new duty imposed by the first clause or the body of the section.

Support to that conclusion was also drawn, in that opinion, from the second section of the act of the third of March, 1863, modifying the fourteenth section of the prior act, and providing that cotton and raw silk, as reeled from the cocoon, of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, should be exempted from any additional duty when imported from places this side of the Cape for two years from and after the passage of the act.

Unaided by one or two remarks of the circuit judge in disposing of that controversy in the Circuit Court, the defence here would be entirely without support, but it is a sufficient answer to those remarks to say that the decision of the case when removed here by writ of error was not placed upon that ground; that the ground assumed in this court was that the last clause of the section, when properly construed, did not qualify the body of the section in respect to the articles not previously dutiable; that it merely provided that the new duty was an additional one in respect to articles subject to duty under prior laws, leaving all other articles embraced in the first clause or the body of the section subject to the new duty therein prescribed; and the court as now constituted, is clearly of the same opinion.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Sturges v. The Collector/Opinion of the Court