text:
Dows v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

We have no jurisdiction in this case. The suit was brought by Dows & Co. to recover damages for the unlawful conversion of 10,000 bushels of corn, the value of which, according to the findings, did not exceed $6,000. With interest added to this sum from the date of the alleged conversion until the judgment, the most that could have been recovered, upon the special finding, was $6,360. A judgment was in fact rendered for $2,430. The matter in dispute in this court is the difference between these two sums, or only $3,930. In Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.S. --, [S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 424,] it was settled that our jurisdiction depends on the value of the matter in dispute here, and as that in the present case is less than $5,000, it follows that the suit must be dismissed; and it is so ordered dismissed.

title: Dows v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Dows v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
First National Bank of Omaha v. Redick

J. M. Woolworth, for plaintiff in error.

John I. Redick, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

title: First National Bank of Omaha v. Redick


text: Talk:First National Bank of Omaha v. Redick


text:
First National Bank of Omaha v. Redick/Opinion of the Court

This motion is granted on the authority of Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694, and ''Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, ante'', 120. Dismissed.


text: Talk:First National Bank of Omaha v. Redick/Opinion of the Court


text:
USAMGIK Ordinance 36

 * HEADQUARTERS

 * UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

 * Office of the Military Governor

 * Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE NUMBER 36 20 December 1945

  The Provincial Affairs Section of the Secretariat of the Government of Korea is hereby established.

 All duties, functions, records, property and civilian personnel of the Local Administration sub-section of the Planning Section of the Secretariat are hereby transferred to the Provincial Affairs Section of the Secretariat.

 This order is effective upon publication in the Official Cazette.

 * BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

 * UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

 * A. V. ARNOLD

 * Major General, United States Army

 * Military Governor of Korea.

Date of publication : 28 December 1945.

군정법령 제36호

title: USAMGIK Ordinance 36


text:
United States v. Grant

''Sol. Gen. Phillips and Thomas Simons'', for appellant.

P. Phillips, W. Hallen Phillips, and R. P. Lowe, for appellees.

WAITE, C. J.

title: United States v. Grant


text: Talk:United States v. Grant

title: Talk:United States v. Grant


text:
United States v. Grant/Opinion of the Court

Grant & Co. sued the United States in the court of claims on the second of December, 1868, and on the sixth of December, 1869, recovered a judgment for $34,225.14. On the fifth of January, 1883, the following act was passed by congress:

'Be it enacted * *  * that the court of claims be and it is      hereby directed to reopen and readjudicate the case of Albert      Grant and Darius Jackson *  *  * upon the evidence heretofore      submitted to the said court in said cause, *  *  * and if said      court, in such readjudication, shall find from such evidence      that the court gave judgment for a different sum than the      evidence sustains, or the court intended, it shall correct      such error, and adjudge to the said Albert Grant such      additional sum, in said cause, as the evidence shall justify,      not to exceed fourteen thousand and sixteen dollars and      twenty-nine cents; and the amount by readjudication in favor      of the said Albert Grant shall be a part of the original      judgment in the cause recorded in the fifth court of claims      report, page eighty.'

Under this act Grant, on the thirteenth of January, 1883, applied to the court to re-examine the case and to render a judgment nunc pro tunc for the additional sum of $14,016.29. Upon this application the court, on due consideration, found that the original judgment was given for a different sum than was intended, and that, 'in order to correct such error and adjudge to said Albert Grant such additional sum in this cause as the evidence justifies, he should receive a further sum of $14,016.29;' and on the eleventh of June, 1883, a judgment for that amount was rendered. From this judgment the United States took an appeal, which Grant now moves to dismiss on the ground that no appeal lies from an order or judgment entertained in such a proceeding. In our opinion this motion should be granted. The act of congress, in its legal effect, is nothing more than a direction to the court of claims to entertain an application to correct an error in the entry of one of its former judgments. The readjudication ordered is to be upon the old evidence, and, if an error is found, the correction is to be made, not by rendering a new judgment, but by amending the old one. The language is, 'and the amount by readjudication in favor of the said Albert Grant shall be a part of the original judgment.' As, when the act was passed, an appeal from the original judgment was barred by lapse of time, we are satisfied it was the intention of congress to make the action of the court of claims upon this readjudication final. Certainly, the old judgment is not opened to an appeal by the readjudication, and there is nothing to indicate that the new part of the judgment can be separated from the old for the purposes of review here. By the correction the new judgment was merged in the old.

The motion to dismiss is granted.


text: Talk:United States v. Grant/Opinion of the Court


text:
Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)

T. T. Crittenden and M. T. Morris, for appellant.

A. G. Riddle, for appellee.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)


text: Talk:Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)

title: Talk:Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)


text:
Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, rendered on the thirtieth of October, 1882. At the foot of the decree as entered is the following: 'And from this decree the complainant, 'And form this decree the complainant, Samuel A. Peugh, prays an appeal to the supreme court of the United States, which is allowed.' No bond of any kind was executed under this allowance until the tenth of May, 1883, when Mr. Justice MILLER granted a supersedeas and took the necessary security for that purpose. He at the same time signed a citation. On the same day another citation was signed by the chief justice of the supreme court of the district. Davis, the appellee, now moves to vacate the supersedeas, because no appeal was perfected within 60 days after the rendition of the decree appealed from, and also to dismiss the appeal.

In Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 U.S. 92, it was held that 'the service of a writ of error or the perfection of an appeal within sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the rendering of the judgment or the passing of the decree complained of, is an indispensable prerequisite to a supersedeas, and that it is not within the power of a justice or judge of the appellate court to grant a stay on the judgment or decree, if this has not been done.' In referring to this case at the same term in Sage v. Central R. Co. Id. 416, it was spoken of as holding that, unless the writ of error was sued out and served, or the appeal taken within the 60 days, no supersedeas could be allowed. It thus appears that the words 'perfected' and 'taken' were used interchangeably, and were evidently intended to mean the same thing as 'allowed.' The rule established by these cases, when accurately stated, is therefore no more than to give a justice or judge of the appellate court authority to grant a supersedeas after the expiration of the 60 days, and a writ of error must have been issued and served, or an appeal allowed within that time.

In Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 307, it was decided that a prayer for an appeal made in open court, and an order allowing it, constituted a valid appeal. Under such circumstances the allowance becomes the judicial act of the court in session, and the bond is not essential to the taking of the appeal, though it may be to its prosecution. As was said in the case last cited: 'It could have been given here, and cases have been brought here where no bond was approved by the court below, and the court has permitted the appellant to give bond in this court.' Anson v. Blue Ridge R. R. 23 How. 1; Brobst v. Brobst, 2 Wall. 96; Seymour v. Freer, 5 Wall. 822, are cases of that character. And in The Dos Hermanos, 10 Wheat. 306, where an appeal was prayed within the five years' limitation, and was actually allowed by the court within that period, although the bond was not given until afterwards, Chief Justice MARSHALL said: 'It is true the security required by law was not given until after the lapse of the five years; and under such circumstances the court might have disallowed the appeal and refused the security. But as the court accepted it, it must be considered as a sufficient compliance with the order of the court, and that it had relation back to the time of the allowance of the appeal.

We decided in Railroad Co. v. Blair, 100 U.S. 662, that if an appeal was allowed by the court during the term at which the decree was entered, and the bond was not executed until after the term, a citation was necessary, but that related only to procedure under the appeal and is not in conflict with the former decisions as to the effect of an allowance of an appeal by the judicial act of the court in session.

In view of these rulings we hold that if a court in session, and acting judicially, allows an appeal, which is entered of record without taking a bond, within 60 days after rendering a decree, a justice or judge of the appellate court may, in his discretion, grant a supersedeas after the expiration of that time under the provisions of section 1007 of the Revised Statutes. Nothing here said is to be construed as affecting appeals other than such as are allowed by the court acting judicially and in term time.

The motion is denied.


text: Talk:Peugh v. Davis (110 U.S. 227)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Lake Shore Ry Company v. National Car-Brake Shoe Company

''Geo. Payson'', for appellant.

Ephraim Banning and ''Thos. A. Banning'', for appellee.

BLATCHFORD, J.


text: Talk:Lake Shore Ry Company v. National Car-Brake Shoe Company


text:
Lake Shore Ry Company v. National Car-Brake Shoe Company/Opinion of the Court

This is a suit in equity, brought by the National Car-brake Shoe Company, a corporation, against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, in the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, for the infringement of letters patent No. 40,156, granted to James Bing, as inventor, October 6, 1863, for 17 years, for an 'improved shoe for car-brakes.' The bill was filed June 7, 1880,-less than four months before the expiration of the patent. The answer which was filed October 4, 1880, two days before the patent expired, denies infringement, and alleges that the thing patented had been in public use or on sale, with the consent and allowance of Bing, for more than two years prior to his application for the patent, and that the invention had been abandoned by him to the public. There is no defense of want of novelty or patentability set up in the answer. The replication was filed on the same day with the answer. No proofs were taken, but five days after the filing of the replication, and three days after the patent expired, the parties entered into the following written stipulation:

'It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties to the above-entitled suit, for the purposes of said suit and no other, as follows, to-wit: (1) That the patent sued on, No. 40,156, issued to James Bing, October 6, 1863, may be considered as formally offered in evidence, and that complainant is the exclusive owner thereof; (2) that the small brass model offered by complainant, and marked 'Complainant's Exhibit, Bing's Brake-shoe,' is a correct representation of the invention described in said patent, except that defendant claims that said model has not enough rocking motion; (3) that the small wooden model offered by defendant, and marked 'Defendant's Exhibit A,' is also a correct representation of the said invention, except that complainant claims that said model has too much rocking motion; (4) that defendant has used two different kinds of brake-shoes, both of which are claimed by complainant to be infringements of the second claim of said patent, but as to both of which infringement is denied by defendant; (5) that the first of said brake-shoes is constructed in all respects like that described in said patent, except that the two parts, viz., the shoe and the sole, are fitted on each other so snugly as to have no rocking motion; (6) that the second of said shoes is correctly represented by the small wooden model marked 'Defendant's Exhibit B,' and that it also has no rocking motion; (7) that brake-shoes having a detachable sole attached to the shoe by bolts passing through the shoe and sole at right angles to the face of the sole, one at the top and one at the bottom, and secured by nuts screwed on to the inner ends of said bolts, so that the sole could be taken off upon the removal of said bolts, had been known and used in the United States for some years prior to the said invention of said Bing, and that the small wooden model marked 'Defendant's Exhibit C' is a correct representation of said brake-shoes; (8) that said shoe last mentioned was suspended from the truck by a hanger or clevis attached to a bolt passing through a hole at the top of said shoe, as shown in said model; (9) that neither of said brake-shoes used by defendant has the lateral rocking motion described in said patent, or infringes the first claim of said patent; (10) that if the court be of the opinion that said lateral rocking motion forms no part of the second claim of said patent, then the first of said defendant's brake-shoes above mentioned is admitted to be an infringement of said claim, and the decision as to that shoe shall be in favor of complainant, provided the court shall also be of the opinion that there is, on that construction, any patentable novelty in said claim. But, if the court be of the opinion that said lateral rocking motion does form a part of said second claim, or that there is no patentable novelty in said claim if so construed as to exclude said rocking motion, then, in either of these cases, the decision shall be in favor of defendant as to said first shoe; (11) that if the court shall be of the opinion that said lateral rocking motion forms no part of the second claim, and that defendant's second brake-shoe, viz., that the defendant's Exhibit B is, in its mechanical construction, substantially the same as the combination described in said claim, then the decision as to that shoe also shall be in favor of complainant, provided the court shall be of opinion that there is any patentable novelty in said claim when so construed. But if the court shall be of opinion either that said lateral rocking motion does form a part of said second claim, or that the mechanical construction of said shoe-brake is not substantially the same as that shown in said claim, or that there is no patentable novelty in said claim if so construed as to exclude said rocking motion, then, in either of said cases, the decision as to that shoe shall be in favor of defendant; (12) that in case the court finds the issues in favor of the complainant, both parties waive a reference to the master, and agree that complainant's damages may be assessed at the sum of two hundred dollars; (13) that all the evidence in this case is comprised in this stipulation, the models therein referred to, and the said letters patent.'

On that stipulation, and the models referred to in it, and the patent, the case was heard in the circuit court. That court filed a written opinion on the twenty-sixth of October following, ''Nat. Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co.'' 9 Biss. 503, [S.C.. 4 Fed. Rep. 219,]-upon which a decree was entered on the same day, as of the preceding ninth of October, declaring the patent to be good and valid in law, so far as regards the second claim thereof, and to be owned by the plaintiff; that the defendant had infringed the patent by using the invention secured by the second claim; and that the plaintiff recover $200 damages, in accordance with the stipulation, the same to be in full satisfaction of all claims of the plaintiff against the defendant on account of the defendant's infringement of the patent. The defendant has appealed.

The specification of the patent is in these words: 'My invention relates to the contruction of shoes or rubbers for car-wheels, and consists-Firstly, in constructing the shoe of two parts, in the peculiar manner described hereafter, so that the part in contact with the wheel can accommodate itself to the same; secondly, in the peculiar combination, described hereafter, of the two parts of the shoe, the clevis by which the shoe is suspended to the truck, and the bolt which secures the clevis to the shoe, and the two parts of the shoe to each other. In order to enable others skilled in this class of mechanism to make and apply my invention, I will now proceed to describe its construction and operation. On reference to the accompanying drawing, which forms a part of this specification, figure 1 is a vertical section of my improved shoe for railway car-brakes; figure 2, a sectional plan on the line 1, 2, figure 1; and figure 3, a front view of the shoe. Similar letters refer to similar parts throughout the several views.

A is the shoe, and B the sole, the latter being formed to fit the periphery of the car-wheel, (part of which is shown by the line, x,) and having a lug, a, which fits between the lugs, b, b1, on the shoe. D is a clevis, the upper end of which is suspended to the truck of the railway car, the lower end being arranged to embrace the lugs, b and b1, of the shoe, a bolt, G, passing through the lower end of the clevis, through the lugs b, and b1, of the shoe, and through the lug, a, of the shoe, B. It will be observed, on reference to figure 2, that the lug, a, is made tapering, and that the bolt, G, fits loosely in the said lug, as well as in the lugs, b and b1, so that the sole is self-adjustable laterally, for a purpose described hereafter. A projection, d, on the sole, B, fits into a socket in the shoe, in such a manner that the sole can vibrate laterally in the said socket, while the projection serves to maintain the shoe and sole in their proper relative positions. H is the usual brake-beam, one end of which fits into a recess in, and is secured to, the shoe, A, the other end of the beam being secured to a similar shoe on the opposite side of the car track. The peripheries of car-wheels are always beveled or inclined, so that it becomes necessary to make the soles of the ordinary shoes or rubbers of a corresponding bevel, one shoe at one end of the beam being beveled in one direction, and the other shoe at the opposite end of the beam being beveled in a contrary direction. Even when the usual shoes are properly fitted to the beveled peripheries of the wheels, the lateral movement of the axles, as the wheels traverse curves of the track, is such that the ordinary shoes cannot fit accurately at all times. Another evil attending the use of ordinary shoes or rubbers is, that, as the lateral movement of the axles takes place, an undue strain is imparted to the brake-beam. These difficulties are avoided by my invention, inasmuch as the sole, B, is permitted to have a lateral rocking motion on the shoe, and can at once accommodate itself to the bevel of the wheel, or to any variation caused in that bevel by the lateral movement of the axle. Another improvement in my invention is the peculiarly simple arrangement of the clevis which supports the shoe, the bolt, G, serving the purpose of connecting the clevis to the shoe and the latter to the sole.'

The claims of the patent are as follows: 'Firstly, the shoe, A, and sole, B, both being constructed and adapted to each other substantially as described, so that the sole can have a lateral rocking movement on the shoe, for the purposes specified; secondly, the combination of shoe, A, sole, B, clevis, D, and bolt, G, the whole being constructed and arranged substantially as specified.'

It is stipulated that neither of the two brake-shoes of the defendant infringes the first claim of the patent, for the reason assigned in the stipulation, that neither of them has the lateral rocking motion described in the patent, although it is stipulated, as to one of them, that it is constructed in all respects like that described in the patent, except that the shoe and the sole are fitted to each other so strongly as to have no rocking motion.

1. The first question presented for decision, on the stipulation, is as to whether the lateral rocking motion forms a part of the second claim of the patent. The circuit court held that the second claim did not embody, as an essential element, the lateral rocking motion, and that such element need not be found in a car-brake shoe in order to make it an infringement of the second claim. The view urged on the part of the defendant is that the combination of the shoe, the sole, the clevis, and the bolt cannot, as a whole, be 'constructed and arranged substantially as specified,' if the whole is not so constructed and arranged as to admit of the lateral rocking motion, and that there is no suggestion in the specification of any construction or arrangement in which the sole has not a lateral rocking motion on the shoe. We think that the circuit court was correct in its construction of the second claim, on the record before it. The first part of the invention is stated in the specification to be the peculiar manner of constructing the shoe proper and the sole in two parts, in such a way that the sole can accommodate itself to the wheel by reason of its having a lateral rocking motion on the shoe proper. That is the subject-matter of the first claim. The second part of the invention, or, as the specification says, the second improvement in the invention, is stated to consist in the peculiar combination of the shoe proper, the sole, the clevis, and the bolt, the clevis suspending the shoe and its sole to the truck, and the bolt securing the clevis to the shoe proper and that to the sole. The combination of the mode of suspending by the clevis with the mode of securing by the bolt is the same, whether the sole has a lateral rocking motion or not. That combination, as a whole, is constructed and arranged substantially as specified, even where there is no lateral rocking motion to the sole. The words 'substantially as specified' mean 'substantially as specified in regard to the combination which is the subject of the claim.' The adaptation of the shoe proper and the sole to each other in such way as to produce or allow of the lateral rocking motion was the subject of the first claim. The combination formed by the peculiar arrangement of the clevis and the bolt in reference to the shoe proper and the sole is a combination which has no effect to produce or prevent the lateral rocking motion; and the stipulation states that this combination can be used and constructed exactly as described in the patent when the shoe proper and the sole are so snugly fitted together that the sole has no rocking motion. In consonance with this view, the specification and the claims maintain a distinction between the arrangement for the rocking motion and the manner of combining together the shoe proper, the sole, the clevis, and the bolt. The stipulation declares that when the combination of the second claim is made there may be a lateral rocking motion in the sole or there may not, for it states that the exact structure of the patent may be copied and yet the fitting of the sole to the shoe proper may be so snug that there may be no lateral rocking motion in the sole, and so no infringement of the first claim. Hence, a loose fitting of the same parts in the same structure would produce a lateral rocking motion and an infringement of the first claim. There is no suggestion that the combination of the second claim was not new; and there being nothing shown in the state of the art which requires any such construction of the second claim as that contended for by the defendant, and it being fairly susceptible of the opposite construction, and the latter being one which is commensurate with the real in invention embraced in the second claim, and one which prevents the real substance of that invention from being bodily appropriated by an infringer, it is proper to give the claim such a construction.

2. The next question raised by the stipulation is as to whether there is any patentable novelty in the second claim, on such a construction. No question of novelty is raised in the answer, and nothing is introduced in evidence on that subject, or on the state of the art, except what is found in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the stipulation. The opinion of the circuit court, which is set forth in the record, speaks of 'the various patents that have been put in evidence,' but none such are before us; and the brief of the appellee states that the model marked 'Defendant's Exhibit C,' (mentioned in paragraph 7 of the stipulation,) 'has been selected, as the nearest approach to the patented invention, from a large number used in the court below.' This would indicate that the full case presented to the court below is not presented here. As, however, the parties to this suit have stipulated as to what the record is, so far as anything in the controversy between them in this suit is concerned, and the stipulation states that it is a stipulation for the purposes of this suit and no other; and the clerk of the circuit court certifies the transcript to be 'a true, correct, and complete transcript of the record of all the proceedings' had in the circuit court in this suit, 'as appears from the files and records of' the court remaining in his custody and control, what is furnished to us must be accepted as sufficient for the purposes of this suit, leaving our decision in the case stand, in its bearing in respect to other suits on the same patent, with only that weight which is due to it in view of the manner in which the case is presented in the record. The brake-shoe described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the stipulation, and shown in defendant's Exhibit C, it is very clear does not contain what is covered by the second claim of the patent, as we have defined it, or destroy its patentable novelty. Bing accomplishes by one bolt what required three bolts in the prior structure. His whole structure can be taken off from the clevis by removing the one bolt, while in the prior structure it required the removal of two bolts to take of the sole from the shoe proper, and the removal of a third bolt to take off the shoe proper from the clevis.

3. On the foregoing views, it is admitted by paragraph 10 of the stipulation that the first of defendant's brake-shoes infringes the second claim, and there must be a decision, as to that shoe, in favor of the plaintiff.

4. The only remaining question is as to whether the defendant's other brake-shoe, Exhibit B, is, in its mechanical construction, substantially the same as the combination described or shown in the second claim. In the Bing shoe-brake, the clevis is a three-sided structure, the two lower ends of which embrace the two lugs of the shoe proper, and the bolt passes through the lower end of one arm of the clevis, then through one of the lugs on the shoe proper, then through the lugs on the sole, then through the other lug on the shoe proper, and then through the lower end of the other arm of the clevis, and the sole cannot be removed without first removing the bolt, because the lug on the sole fits in between the lugs on the shoe proper. In the defendant's structure there is no bolt-hole through the lug on the sole, but there is a curved depression made in its top, in which the curved lower end of the clevis rests. The clevis does not have two arms, the lower ends of which embrace the lugs of the shoe proper, and the bolt goes through one of those lugs, then through a hole in the lower end of the clevis, (the clevis being a vertical piece without arms, and not three-sided,) and then through the other one of those lugs, but the bolt does not go through the lug on the sole. That lug is kept in place by the pressure on it of the curved lower end of the clevis, which cannot move out of position, because the bolt goes through it and holds it. The bolt alone, without the clevis, will not confine the lug on the sole. The lug on the sole cannot be removed until the bolt is removed and the clevis is detached. The shoe proper, the sole, and the clevis are combined by the single bolt which secures together the clevis, the shoe proper, and the sole. The bolt and the clevis perform the same office in the two structures, and the mechanical differences are merely formal and not substantial. The combination consists of the same four parts, differing only in form.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.


text: Talk:Lake Shore Ry Company v. National Car-Brake Shoe Company/Opinion of the Court


text:
Chouteau v. Barlow

Melville C. Day and Roscoe Conkling, for appellants.

W. P. Clough and ''Wm. D. Shipman'', for appellees.

BLATCHFORD, J.

title: Chouteau v. Barlow


text: Talk:Chouteau v. Barlow

title: Talk:Chouteau v. Barlow


text:
Chouteau v. Barlow/Opinion of the Court

The bill of complaint in this case was filed in January, 1876, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, by Samuel L. M. Barlow, sole surviving executor of the last will, and trustee of the estate, of John F. A. Sanford, deceased, (his co-executor and co-trustee, Frederick C. Gebhard, hav ng died in 1867), and the widow and two of the three children of Sanford, as plaintiffs, against the following defendants: Charles P. Chouteau and Julia Maffitt, the heirs at law and legatees and devisees of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., deceased; the executors of the will of said Pierre Chouteau, Jr.; the heirs at law and legatees and devisees of John B. Sarpy, deceased; the executors of the will of said Sarpy; the widow and residuary legatee and devisee of Joseph A. Sire, deceased; the sole surviving executor of the will of said Sire; Benjamin C. Sanford, the other child of Sanford; and numerous persons alleged to claim an interest in some of the land which is the principal subject of the suit. The averments of the bill, so far as they are material, are as follows: Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Sarpy, Sire, and Sanford, in 1842, formed a copartnership under the firm name of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., for the purpose of dealing in real and personal property at St. Louis, Missouri, and in the region of country lying to the northward of that city. The capital was to be furnished, and the profits and losses were to be shared by the several copartners in the following proportions: Chouteau, 58 per cent.; Sarpy, 16; Sanford, 16; Sire, 10. In 1849 a change was made, whereby the assets were to be owned, and the profits and losses to be shared, in the following proportions: Chouteau, 48; Sarpy, 17 1/3; Sanford, 17 1/3; Sire, 17 1/3. In 1852 the copartnership was dissolved by mutual consent. During its existence it bought and paid for with copartnership funds acre lands and town lots in Wisconsin and Minnesota, to hold and sell for the profit and benefit of the copartnership, and among them certain lots named in schedules to the bills. As to some of the lots the title was taken in the name of one Borup, and in September, 1855, he and his wife conveyed the same to said copartnership with other lands belonging to it, which he held in the same way. As to others of the lots the title was taken in the name of one Sibley, and in September, 1855, and February, 1856, he and his wife conveyed the same to said copartnership with other lands belonging to it, which he held in the same way. In March, 1857, one Robert conveyed to said copartnership other land in St. Paul, Minnesota, which it then possessed and paid for with copartnership funds. Besides the land named in schedules to the bill, town lots in various town and villages, and acre lands in various counties in Minnesota, were purchased and paid for by said copartnership, and conveyed to it by deeds. The property so conveyed to it was the property of its said members in the proportions last mentioned. Sire died in 1854, and Sarpy and Sanford died in 1857. In December, 1859, Benjamin C. Sanford released to the widow and the other two children of his father all his interest in the estate of his father. Pierre Chouteau, Jr., died in 1865.

The bill then contains the following averments, which set forth the particular question in controversy:

'The said copartnership was dissolved by the said John F. A.     Sanford, deceased, retiring therefrom, and removing from St. Louis, where he then resided, to the city of New York, to     there reside and carry on business in co-partnership with the      said Pierre Chouteau, Jr.; and, as your orators are informed      and believe, it was agreed upon between the said Sanford and      the other three copartners, and particularly the said Pierre      Chouteau, Jr., as one of the conditions of the withdrawal of      the said Sanford from the copartnership, that he, the said      Sanford, should release to the said Chouteau all his interest      in and to the assets of the said copartnership, except the      lands and town lots thereof in Minnesota; and that in      consideration thereof, and of his withdrawal from the said      copartnership, the said Chouteau should save him, the said      Sanford, harmless, on account of the debts of the said      copartnership, and should assure to him, free from any debt      or liability growing out of the copartnership affairs, t e share of him, the said      Sanford, in and to the said lands and town lots, being      seventeen and one-third one-hundredth (17 1/3-100) parts      thereof. In pursuance of such agreement the said Sanford did,     as your orators are informed and believe, upon the      dissolution of the said copartnership, and as part of the      arrangement between the copartners for such dissolution,      released to the said Pierre Chouteau, Jr., all his interest      in the assets of said copartnership, except in the said lands      and town lots; and the said Chouteau afterwards, and in his      life-time, realized all said assets so released, and applied      them to his own use.'

The gravamen of these allegations is that Pierre Chouteau, Jr., took from Sanford a release of all his interest in the copartnership assets, except the lands and lots in Minnesota, and was to save Sanford harmless from all debts of the copartnership, and Sanford was to have his 17 1/3 per cent. of the said lands and lots, free from any debts or liability growing out of the copartnership affairs; and that Pierre Chouteau, Jr., realized all the assets so released and applied them to his own use. It is to enforce this claim to the proceeds of the Minnesota lands and lots, free from the debts of the copartnership, that this suit is especially brought.

The bill then sets forth the following matters: On the dissolution of the St. Louis copartnership Sanford removed to the city of New York, and there engaged in business in copartnership with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., under the firm names of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., & Co., and Chouteau, Sanford & Co., in which copartnership he continued to carry on business until his death. After the death of Sanford, and after the issuing to Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow of letters testamentary on his will, and in November, 1859, Pierre Chouteau, Jr., and Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow, as such executors and trustees, entered into an agreement or compromise concerning all the mutual dealings between Chouteau and Sanford in relation to the business of the New York firms, and concerning all indebtedness and liability of every nature and kind of Sanford to Chouteau. By the terms of said agreement or compromise Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow were to release to Chouteau all the interest of Sanford in the assets of the New York firms, and in consideration thereof, Chouteau was to release to Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow, and to the heirs and legal representatives of Sanford, all claims and liabilities against Sanford or his estate, due or owing, or to become due or owing, to Chouteau, on account of any prior transactions between them. Upon the making of such agreement or compromise, Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow submitted the same to the surrogate of the county of New York, and he, on November 25, 1850, made an order allowing the agreement or compromise to be entered into and carried out. Afterwards, and on December 1, 1859, Messrs. Gebhard and Barlow, to carry out said agreement or compromise, signed, sealed, and delivered to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., their deed, whereby they, as executors and trustees, released to him all the right, title, and interest which Sanford, at the time of his death, had in or to the assets of the New York firms; and Chouteau, on the same day, in pursuance of said agreement or compromise, and to carry it out on his part, signed, sealed, and delivered to Messrs Gebhard and Barlow his deed, releasing the heirs next of kin, legatees, devisees, and legal representatives of Sanford from all causes of action, claims, and demands, in law or equity, which he, Chouteau, ever had, or which he, his heirs, executors, or administrators thereafter could or might have, against Sanford or against his heirs, next of kin, devisees, legatees, executors, or administrators, by reason of any matter whatsoever.

The bill further avers that no accounting or settlement of the affairs and business of the said St. Louis copartnership had ever been had except as was thereinbefore stated. It further alleges as follows: Since the de th of the four copartners, the defendants C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffitt, claiming, as the heirs at law and devisees of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., to own all the said real estate of the copartnership, sold and conveyed to various persons certain of said lots and lands, and received therefor large sums of money, without the knowledge, or consent of the heirs, devisees, or legal representatives of Sanford, and in fraud of their rights, and for less than one-half of the actual value at the time of sale, of the property sold, and for the purpose of defeating the rights of the plaintiffs in the property, leaving certain lands and lots unsold; and that those made defendants, as claiming an interest in some of the lots of land, took such interest through conveyances from the defendants C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffitt, with notice that the lots belonged to the heirs, devisees, and legal representatives of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Sire, Sarpy, and Sanford, and not merely to their grantors, and with notice that the plaintiffs, as the successors in interest of Sanford, were the owners in fee-simple of an undivided 17 1/3-100th parts of said lots.

An answer on oath is waived. The prayer of the bill is (1) that the defendants may account touching the affairs and property of said copartnership and touching the proceeds of any of such property; (2) that there may be set off to the plaintiffs, as of the estate of Sanford, 17 1/3-100th parts of the unsold lots described in the schedules to the bill, and of any other real property owned by the St. Louis copartnership that had not been sold and conveyed by C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffitt to parties other than the heirs, legatees, and legal representatives of Sire and Sarpy, or to other parties for their use and benefit; (3) that the plaintiffs recover from C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffitt, as part of the estate of Sanford, 17 1/3-100th parts of the sums, whether in money or securities, received by them as the prices of the lands and lots so sold and conveyed by them, other than the lots and lands described in said schedules; that for the amount of the plaintiffs' share of said money and securities, they be adjudged to have a lien on the interests of C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffitt in and to the lots and lands described in said schedules; and that such interests be sold to satisfy such lien.

C. P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffit, and the executors of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., the executors of Sarpy, the widow of Sire, his surviving executor, and Benjamin C. Sanford, put in a joint and several answer to the bill, not on oath. It denies that the copartnership bought or paid for with copartnership funds the lands referred to in the bill, for the purpose of holding or selling the same for its profit or benefit; but avers that all lots or lands, whether described or not in the bill or its schedules, which were held or owned by said copartnership at its dissolution, were taken in payment of, or in settlement or compromise of, indebtedness due to it from persons then indebted to it, and not otherwise; and that all lots and lands held by it at the date of its dissolution were a part of its assets at that date, and were chargeable with the payment of its debts. It denies that the property mentioned in the bill as acquired by Borup was acquired by him for the benefit of said copartnership, and avers that he purchased said property and took the conveyance thereof in his own name, without the consent or knowledge of said copartnership, and conveyed the same to the new copartnership, formed after the dissolution, in settlement of his indebtedness owing to said new copartnership. It denies that the title to the property mentioned in the bill as acquired by Sibley was taken in his name for the benefit of said copartnership, and avers that the property was received from Sibley in settlement of indebtedness owing to the new copartnership formed after the dissolution. As to the town lots and acre lands mentioned in the bill as being additional to the l nd named in the schedules to the bill, and owned by said copartnership prior to its dissolution, the answer avers that all those lots and lands were firm assets, taken, in the ordinary business of the firm, in payment or settlement of indebtedness theretofore owing to it. It denies that any part of the lots or lands referred to in the bill as having been conveyed after the dissolution of the firm was intended to be conveyed to any firm in which said Sanford was a member or interested. It then alleges as follows:

'On the contrary thereof, these defendants say, that, on the     thirty-first day of December, 1852, said copartnership in      said bill of complaint named was duly dissolved, and said      John F. A. Sanford withdrew therefrom, and then and there,      for a valuable consideration to him paid by said Pierre      Chouteau, Jr., did sell, assign, transfer, and set over unto      the said Pierre Chouteau, Jr., all and singular his share and      interest in and to the assets of said partnership, of all and      every kind and description whatsoever, including his      interest, (if any he had,) as a member of said firm, in and      to the said lots and lands in said bill of complaint      described, and all and every part and parcel thereof, and      from thenceforth said Sanford never had or claimed to have any interest in, or right to a      share in, the proceeds of said lands or lots; and that, after      the withdrawal of said Sanford from said copartnership, the      business theretofore transacted by said copartnership at St. Louis and in Minnesota was continued by said Pierre Chouteau,     Jr., John B. Sarpy, and Joseph A. Sire, under the same firm      name of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., & Co., and all conveyances of      land taken in such firm name, from and after the dissolution      aforesaid, in any manner or for any purpose, were taken      solely and exclusively for the benefit of said three      last-named parties, as such firm, and not otherwise.'

It denies that the agreement between Sanford and the other members of said copartnership, on its dissolution, is correctly stated in the bill, and aver that such agreement was, that, in consideration that Chouteau should save Sanford harmless on account of the debts of the St. Louis copartnership, Sanford would and did release and transfer to Chouteau all his interest in the assets and property of said copartnership, including his interest, if any, in said lands and town lots in Minnesota. It denies that Chouteau at any time agreed to assure to Sanford, free from any debts or liabilities growing out of said copartnership affairs, 17 1/3-100ths, or any part of said lands or lots in Minnesota. It avers that, by the deed of December 1, 1859, named in the bill, executed by Chouteau to the plaintiffs, he expressly reserved his rights to collect and dispose of, for his own use and benefit, all the assets of the dissolved St. Louis copartnership, in accordance with the transfer thereof to him by Sanford, before set forth in the answer. It avers that the copartnership, at the time of its dissolution, was indebted in the sum of $438,176.28; that the assets of the firm, exclusive of the interest, if any, of the copartnership in lands and lots in Minnesota and elsewhere, was insufficient to liquidate said indebtedness; that on May 1, 1860, there still remainded an indebtedness of more than $212,000, which was advanced and paid by Pierre Chouteau, Jr., in his life-time, with the assent of the executors of Sarpy and Sire; that it was agreed by those executors that the amount of such indebtedness for which their estates were severally liable should be refunded to Chouteau from the proceeds of the sale of the unsold lands and lots in Minnesota; that this arrangement was not carried into effect during Chouteau's life-time; that Charles P. Chouteau and Mrs. Maffit subsequently sold and disposed of the remaining lands and lots and used the entire proceeds thereof to pay to themselves, as the heirs at law and sole legatees of Pierre Choutou, Jr., the amount remaining due to them by reason of his payment f said copartnership indebtedness; that the sales so made are the same sales mentioned in the bill; and that they were made at public auction, in good faith, for the full value of the lands and lots at the time, after having been duly advertised, and with the full knowledge of the plaintiffs. The answer further avers, by way of defense, that more than six years have elapsed since the sccruing of any of the alleged causes of action set out in the bill.

After a replication to the answer, proofs were taken, and, after a hearing, the court made the following interlocutory decree, on August 13, 1878:

'(1) I find that, in 1852, the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., &     Co., No. 2, consisted of four persons, and the assets of the      copartnership were owned, and the profits and losses were to      be shared, in the following proportions: Pierre Chouteau,      Jr., 48 per cent.; John B. Sarpy, 17 1/3 per cent.; John F.      A. Sanford, 17 1/3 per cent.; Joseph A. Sire, 17 1/3 per      cent. (2) That the copartnership was dissolved in 1852, by     the mutual agreement of all the parties. (3) That a large     amount of real property was owned by the copartnership in the      territory (now state) of Minnesota, at the time of the      dissolution, having been purchased with copartnership funds. (4) That the legal title to the property was at that time in     Charles W. Borup and H. H. Sibley, persons acting for said      copartnership, and was by them, in 1855, conveyed to the firm      of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., & Co., composed of Chouteau, Sire,      Sarpy, and Sanford; and, also, in 1857, other real property,      mentioned in the bill of complaint, was purchased for the      benefit of the copartnership. (5) That, at the time of the     dissolution of said copartnership, it was agreed between John      F. A. Sanford and the other partners, inter alia, that he,      the said Sanford, should release to Chouteau all his interest      in and to the assets of the copartnership, except the real property in Minnesota, and that, in consideration thereof and      of his withdrawal from the said partnership, the said      Chouteau should save him, the said Sanford, harmless on      account of the debts of the said copartnership, and should      assure to him, free from any debt or liability growing out of      said copartnership affairs, the share of him, the said      Sanford, in and to said real property, lands and town lots,      being 17 1/3-100th parts thereof. (6) That, in pursuance of     the agreement, Sanford released his interest in the assets to      Chouteau, except the lands and town lots, and during his      life-time Chouteau realized all the said assets. (7) That     Sire died in 1854, Sarpy in 1857, Sanford in 1857, and Pierre      Chouteau, Jr., in 1865, all leaving heirs, devisees, and      legal representatives, and there never has been any      accounting of the business of the copartnership, except as      stated in the bill of complaint, which is referred to. (8)     That since the deaths of the said Sire, Sarpy, Sanford, and      Chouteau, and in the years 1866 and 1867, and since then, the      defendants Charles P. Chouteau and Julia Maffitt, claiming as      the heirs at law and devisees of the said P. Chouteau, Jr.,      to be owners of said real property in Minnesota, town lots      and lands, have sold property outside of the city of St. Paul, in Minnesota, and have received large sums in money and     securities, and have also sold and conveyed to various      persons, including the several defendants mentioned specially      in the bill of complaint as purchasers, a large amount of      property situated in the city of St. Paul aforesaid, and      received therefor a large amount of money and securities,      without the consent of the heirs or representatives of said      Sanford, and without paying or tendering to them any part or      portion thereof. (9) That the amount of real property     remaining unsold, which was conveyed by said Borup and Sibley      to the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., and purchased for the      benefit of the partnership, is large and of sufficient value      to meet any and all claims made by complainants on account of      the sale and conveyance of the property to the defendan §      named as purchasers in the bill of complaint and admitted in      the answer.

'CONCLUSIONS.

'By the terms of the dissolution of the copartnership of P.     Chouteau, Jr., & Co., No. 2, Sanford was to retain his      interest in the Minnesota real estate, being 17 1/3-100th      parts thereof; and the complainants, as the representatives      of the estate of John F. A. Sanford, are entitled: (1) To 17      1/3-100th parts of all the real estate mentioned in the bill      of complaint, or in the schedules attached thereto, not sold to parties other      than the representatives of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Sarpy, and      Sire. (2) It is ordered that an account be taken of all the     real estate sold since the dissolution of the firm of P.      Chouteau, Jr., & Co., by the retirement of J. F. A. Sanford,      to parties other than the representatives of the said      partners. (3) That, in stating said account, the lands and     town lots sold to third parties in 1866 and 1867 be valued at      their present value, less improvements made by the      purchasers. (4) That in said account shall be stated the     amount of all the taxes paid by Charles P. Chouteau and Julia      Maffit upon the property sold, at the time of the conveyance,      and also the amount of taxes paid upon the property unsold to      date, and such sum as may be necessarily expended in the care      and custody of the property. (5) That, after the deduction of     the taxes and he amount necessarily expended for the      management of the property, and on confirmation of the      master's report. (6) It is ordered and adjudged that a decree     be entered in favor of complainants, against the said      defendants Charles P. Chouteau and Julia Maffitt, for the      amount of 17 1/3-100th parts of the remainder, which shall be      enforced and satisfied out of the interest of said defendants      in the real property described in the bill of complaint or      schedules, unsold. (7) That the bill of complaint against all     parties defendants other than the representatives of P.      Chouteau, Jr., Sarpy, and Sire, be dismissed, but without      costs. (8) That H. E. Mann, Esq., is appointed to take the     account and report.'

In pursuance of the interlocutory decree a hearing was had before the master, whose report was filed August 2, 1880. Exceptions were taken by the defendants to the report of the master, as had also been done in reference to the interlocutory decree; and, on September 21, 1880, the court made a final decree, in which it was decreed that the plaintiffs are the owners in fee-simple, and are entitled to the possession, as tenants in common, of an undivided 17 1/3-100ths of certain lands in Minnesota described in the decree, and that partition be made of said lands between the plaintiffs and the defendants; that Charles P. Chouteau and Julia Maffit pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $36,646.56, being 17 1/3-100ths of the value of the lands sold by them in 1866 and in 1867; that Charles P. Chouteau individually pay to the plaintiffs $7,793.87, being 17 1/3-100ths of the balance of the income of lands claimed to be held by him in severalty, and of the proceeds of land sold by him since 1867; that Julia Maffitt pay to the plaintiff the sum of $8,178.57, being 17 1/3-100ths of the balance of the income of lands claimed to be held by her in severalty, and of the proceeds of lands sold by her since 1867; that the widow of Sire pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $1,214.08, being 17 1/3-100ths of the income of that portion of the lands claimed to be held by her in severalty, and of the proceeds of land sold by her since 1867; that the plaintiffs pay to the heirs and representatives of Sarpy the sum of $772.16, being 17 1/3-100ths of the balance of expenditures over receipts on account of lands claimed to be held by the heirs of Sarpy in severalty. These different sums adjudged against the defendants, amounting to $53,833.08, are declared to constitute liens upon the property owned by them respectively. The decree further declares that the rights of the several parties in the said real estate, so far as rents, issues, and prof ts and expenditures are concerned, are to be regarded as having been determined by the decree only up to January 1, 1879.

The dispute between the parties, as shown by the pleadings, is as to the terms of the agreement of dissolution of the copartnership in 1852. The plaintiffs allege in the bill that Sanford released to Chouteau all his interest in the assets of the firm, except its lands and town lots in Minnesota, and that Chouteau agreed to relieve Sanford from the debts of the firm, and to assure him his 17 1/3-100ths of said lands and town lots, free from any debt or liability growing out of the copartnership affairs. The answer alleges that Chouteau agreed to relieve Sanford from the debts of the firm, and Sanford released to Chouteau all his interest in the assets of the firm, including his interest, if any, in the lands and town lots of Minnesota. The circuit court found the terms of the dissolution to be those alleged in the bill. The question is wholly one of fact. We are unable to concur with the decision arrived at by the circuit court on that question. The evidence is voluminous, and a minute discussion of it would be unprofitable. It consists of correspondence and documents and oral evidence, and we must content ourselves with indicating generally the grounds of our conclusion.

The agreement alleged in the bill is said to have been contained in two letters, one from the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., No. 2, the firm which was being dissolved, to Sanford, and the other from Sanford to the firm, in reply, both written in 1852, at the time of the dissolution. Those letters are not produced, nor are copies of them furnished. The only witness for the plaintiffs who testifies to having seen them, or who states their contents, is Mr. Barlow, one of the plaintiffs. On his direct examination, he says that he saw them in 1858 and 1859, at the time when negotiations for compromise were going on between Pierre Chouteau, Jr., and the executors of Sanford, in regard to the claims of Chouteau against the estate of Sanford for his share of the losses of their New York firm; and that the last time he saw them was in 1861, when the answer of the executors of Sanford was being prepared in a suit brought against them by Chouteau in a state court in Minnesota, seeking a sale of the lands in question. He states that he was cognizant for many years before Mr. Sanford's death of the existence of the contract shown by the letters, though he did not see the letters till after Sanford's death, when they were found among Sanford's papers, and were in the possession of Mr. Gebhard and the witness. That contract he states thus, on his direct examination:

'It was in the shape of a letter signed in the firm name of     Pierre Chouteau, Junior, & Co., addressed to Mr. John F. A.      Sanford, and responded to by him as of the same date,      assenting to the terms proposed in the letter. These terms     were that from that date Mr. John F. A. Sanford should retire      from all connection with the St. Louis house, with the view      of establishing a house in New York in connection with Mr. Chouteau, in which neither Sarpy nor Sire would have any     interest; and it was agreed that the remaining partners in      the St. Louis house should be entitled to all the assets and      property of that firm; should have sole power to settle its business; that they would relieve Mr. Sanford from all liabilities and obligations connected with     the St. Louis firm; and that his interest in the Minnesota      lands owned by the said St. Louis firm should be retained by      him absolutely.'

It is alleged that the letters have been lost and cannot be found after proper search. Mr. Barlow states that the first letter was dated at St. Louis and was signed by Chouteau in the name of the firm, but was not in his handwriting; and that the other letter was signed by Sanford and may have been a signed copy of the original. On cross-examination he gives the form and language of the letters as follows:

'The first was dated at St. Louis, and addressed to Mr. John     F. A. Sanford, and recited the fact that it had been agreed      that from that date his interest in the firm of P. Chouteau,      Junior, & Co., of St. Louis, should terminate, and that the      assets and business of the firm should be continued for the      benefit of the remaining partners, who agreed to assume all      the responsibilities of the firm from that date, with a      reservation at the close of the letter that Mr. Sanford's      interest in the Minnesota property or purchase, according to      my recollection,-I won't be certain whether it was property      or lands,-should remain in him. In one of the letters (I     think the St. Louis) there was a reference to the fact that      Mr. Sanford was about to or had established a firm in New      York, in which Mr. Sanford and Mr. Chouteau alone were      interested, to the exclusion of Sarpy and Sire. The fact     appeared in the letter that a New York house was about to be      established, or was established, in which Sarpy and Sire      would have no interest. Sanford's response was exceedingly     brief and contained merely an assent to the terms proposed or      suggested in the first letter. That is as near as I can     recollect the contents of the letter.'

He further states, when asked 'whether the reference to the Minnesota property in that letter spoke of interest in the Minnesota lands or in the Minnesota 'outfit:" 'I am confident that it was not 'outfit." It was either lands or property-Minnesota lands or Minnesota property-and not 'outfit,' I am confident.' He is asked the following question: 'In reference to the agreement which you have spoken of as having been made by the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., of St. Louis, and Mr. Sanford, at the time of Mr. Sanford's retirement in 1852, had you been informed of the existence of any such agreement before the matter of the compromise was entered upon?' His reply is:

'I knew that Mr. Sanford claimed an interest in the Minnesota     lands in his life-time. I do not know that I knew of any     agreement about it at that time, or had even heard about it. The simple fact was referred to, the fact of Mr. Sanford's     interest in the Minnesota lands was referred to, by Mr. Chouteau, in the course of the negotiations which led to the     compromise after Mr. Sanford's death. I think I saw the     agreement in question at the time of the preparation of the      papers executed on this compromise, but I cannot positively      say that I did. My first distinct recollection of seeing the     agreement in question was at or about the time of the      drafting of the answer of the executors to the bill filed by      Mr. Chouteau for the partition of the lands in Minnesota, to      which I have testified.'

It may well be questioned whether sufficient evidence was given of proper search for the letters, and of their loss, to warrant the parol evidence given of their contents. The parties who searched for the letters in the places where it was supposed they might be, were not called as witnesses, and there is no testimony as to the character or extent of the search, but only evidence by Mr. Barlow of his direction to persons to search, and his statement of his understanding of the result. There is no evidence that the letter from Sanford was ever sent. It was found among his papers after his death. On search, no such letter has been found among the papers of the firm in St. Louis, nor does their letter-book show any copy of the letter to Sanford, although many letters both to and from the firm have been produced in evidence.

In the original answer, filed in June, 1861, by the executors of Sanford, and sworn to by them June 15, 1861, in the suit brought in the state court of Minnesota, by Chouteau and the executors of Sarpy and Sire, in February, 1861, for a sale of the Minnesota lands to pay the debts of the firm, alleged to have amounted on May 1, 1860, to $212,000, the claim of the executors of Sanford was stated to be 'that upon the retirement of the said John F. A. Sanford from the firm mentioned in the compla nt, he became a partner in another firm under the same name, in the city of New York, together with the said Pierre Chouteau, Jr., in which the said Sarpy and said Sire had been theretofore partners, and in which they thereupon ceased to be partners, and said John F. A. Sanford succeeded to their interests therein, and said Sarpy and Sire succeeded to his interest in said St. Louis firm, excepting his interest in siad Minnesota lands, and that, by agreement between all the parties at the time of such exchange of interests, and in consideration thereof, said John F. A. Sanford and his interest in the Minnesota lands were to be exonerated and free from all liability for the debts and liabilities of said St. Louis firm or to any of his copartners therein, and to be indemnified and saved harmless in the premises.' This allegation was explicitly denied in the reply to the answer, which reply was put in in August, 1861. In an amended answer put in by the executors of Sanford in September, 1861, not sworn to by them, but verified by their attorney in the suit, the above statement in the original answer was repeated, and these words were added: 'And that the said John F. A. Sanford was to have and to hold in fee-simple, as tenant in common, seventeen and one-third one-hundredth (17 1/3-100) parts of said land to his own sole use, freed from any claim for debts of said copartnership, or any liability for contribution in favor of any of the other partners.'

The complaint in the suit in the Minnesota state court, after setting forth the facts about the St. Louis copartnership, and its dissolution December 31, 1852, avers that during its continuance it had, at St. Paul, Minnesota, an outpost or trading-house, to which it supplied merchandise; that the business at St. Paul was conducted under the name of the 'Minnesota Outfit,' debits and credits being made to it, and it was a part of the copartnership business; that the copartnership, during its continuance, acquired lands in Minnesota, described in schedules to the complaint, and they were a part of its partnership assets, the title to them being taken in the name of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., in fee, he holding them in trust for said copartners; that at its dissolution said firm had outstanding debts or liabilities to the amount of $438,176.28; that that amount had since been reduced, and, on a full and final settlement and accounting between Chouteau and the executors of Sarpy and Sire, on May 1, 1860, it was found that the debts and liabilities of said firm then owing and unpaid, and for which said copartners, or their legal representatives, were liable, amounted to $212,000, which sum was still due and owing by them and unpaid; that the assets of said firm at its dissolution consisted of real estate and divers accounts and notes, which were of little or no value; that said real estate was the only assets belonging to said copartners with which to pay said indebtedness; that, to discharge the same, Chouteau had paid 48-100ths of said $212,000, the executors of Sarpy 17 1/3-100ths thereof, and the executors of Sire 17 1/3-100ths thereof; that neither Sanford nor his executors had paid any part of his share of said $212,000; that their neglect to pay was a violation of the terms of the copartnership agreement; and that the remaining indebtedness of the firm could not be paid without a sale of said lands and the application of the proceeds of the sale to such purpose. The prayer of the complaint was that the amount of the unpaid debts and the assets of said firm be ascertained, and a receiver of its notes, accounts, and choses in action be appointed, with power to sell the same, and that said real estate be sold and the proceeds be applied to pay the debts due and owing by said firm.

The events which immediately preceded the bringing of that suit in the state court of Minnesota were these: Pierre Chouteau, Jr., had become totally blind, and his business and correspondence were conducted by his son-in-law, William Maffitt. On the sixth of August, 1860, Maffitt wrote from St. Louis to Gebhard at New York, a letter, which is not produced, but in which, judging from Gebhard's reply to it, he appears to have informed Gebhard that there was a large indebtedness due from the firm, and to have referred to the necessity of taking steps for its payment, in reference to Sanford's proportion of it. Gebhard's reply to Maffitt, under date of New York, September 15, 1860, was as follows:

'Yours of the 6th ult. has remained unanswered, in order that     I might consult with my co-executor, with whom I have just      had an interview. We are both much surprised to hear for the     first time of the large indebtedness to which you allude, as      we understood from Mr. Chouteau's agent, at the time of our      settlement in December last, that the Minnesota property      would probably prove very valuable, sufficiently so to return      to us as executors a handsome sum, and were not advised of      any charge against the property which we should have to pay. Before determining as to our course it is necessary that we     should be fully advised of the nature of Mr. Chouteau's      claim, and you will please send us a copy of the accounts of      firm No. 2 and firm No. 3, to which you allude, and we will      examine the same with the vouchers. Please also advise us as     to the situation and present value of the Minnesota property,      to which you allude, and be kind enough to furnish us a copy      of the undertaking or agreement with Mr. Sanford, made on the      occasion of his retirement from firm No. 2, to which      reference is made in the release from Mr. Chouteau to us,      dated December, 1859.'

To this letter Maffitt replied by a letter to Gebhard, dated St. Louis, October 4, 1860, as follows:

'I was absent when your letter of the 15th ult. was received,     or it would otherwise have had earlier attention. I do not     see that the opinion said to have been expressed by Mr. Chouteau's agent in regard to the value of the Minnesota     property authorized the inference that there was no charge      against it. But however, this may be, Mr. Thompson, at least,     was well informed as to its situation. In a letter written     October 6, 1859, I mentioned that 'this interest (the      Minnesota) had been retained by Mr. Sanford in the transfer      between him, Mr. Sarpy, and Mr. Sire, but embarrassed by a      very heavy debt.' I don't, however, consider this important. The accounts you ask for are entirely too voluminous to furnish within any reasonable time. They embrace the     largest part of the business of the house during a long      period. The books, however, are open to your inspection, and     we will afford you every facility to enable you to make a      satisfactory examination of them. There was no written     agreement that we know of on Mr. Sanford's withdrawal from      the house. From the balance-sheet made in December, 1852, it     seems that the various outfits in the upper Mississippi were      indebted, in the aggregate, $438,176.28. As it was     impossible, even approximately, to determine the value of      this interest, for its assets consisted principally of debts      which it was very questionable at the time would ever be      realized, it was concluded by the parties that Mr. Sanford      should retain his interest therein. From that time it     required constant negotiations and great attention to save      anything. Finally, Mr. Chouteau, by his own personal     exertions, in 1855, succeeded in obtaining a settlement, the      result of which was what we now have in the Minnesota      property. Mr. Chouteau's action in this matter is by no means     voluntary. It has been forced upon him chiefly by the     settlement recently had with the executors of his late      partners. It was not to be expected that they would do more     than pay their proportion of the amount chargeable to their      property. They were all, however, jointly liable for the     whole, and in the event of Mr. Sanford's estate being unable      to pay its proportion, they would have been liable for their      respective proportion of its (the estate's) share of the      indebtedness. It became, therefore, incumbent on Mr. Chouteau, as surviving partner, to take the steps he now     proposes, or to assume the part due from Mr. Sanford's      estate. Such an alternative is out of the question, as the     debt is already very large and constantly increasing by the      interest. As regards the situation of the property at     present, it is managed by Mr. Prince and Mr. Sibley. No     income whatever is derived from it, and very little expense      incurred beyond the salaries of the agents. Hoping to hear     soon what your determination is in relation to this matter, I      remain,' etc.

The suit in the state court of Minnesota was then brought, as stated. Before answering the complaint Gebhard wrote to his co-executor, Mr. Barlow, a letter dated New York, June 3, 1861, which says:

'It seems to me quite important, in answering the bill filed against us, (1) To insist on the production of the original     papers executed at the time Sanford retired from the St. Louis firm. (2) To allege that Sanford sold out his interest     in the St. Louis firm, with all its liabilities, to Sarpy and      Sire, and assumed their positions in the New York firm,      reserving for himself, individually, his share of the St. Paul property, free of all liabilities, which was simply left     in Mr. Chouteau's name, partly so as not to complicate      matters, as well as from the implicit trust that Sanford had      in Mr. Chouteau, that everything would be properly accounted      for. (3) Allege that in the transfer each party agreed to     assume the outstanding liabilities. (4) When Mr. Chouteau     settled with the executors of Mr. Sanford, he distinctly      stated that the release covered all debts of the deceased,      except a few trifling ones in New York, which the executors      have paid or settled for; and that Mr. Sanford's interest in      the St. Paul property would be one of the assets that would      revert to the estate and to the minor children.'

The suit in the state court of Minnesota proceeded no further, but was discontinued. C. P. Chouteau states that the reason for this was that the executors of Sanford renewed propositions of settlement.

In February, 1869, Mr. Barlow, as surviving executor of Sanford, brought a suit in the supreme court of New York against the executors of Pierre Chouteau, Jr. The complaint set forth the facts as to the firm and its business and the interests of its partners and its dissolution, by consent, in 1852, and averred that the firm, during its continuance, purchased with its funds lands in Minnesota, described in a schedule to the complaint, the legal title to which was, for convenience, taken in the name of Chouteau; that Chouteau and his executors had sold portions of the lands, and other portions remained unsold and undivided; that no account respecting the said lands had been adjusted with Sanford or his executors; and that the plaintiff was entitled to his due share of the proceeds of the lands sold, and his due proportion of the lands unsold, being the proportion thereof in which Sanford was interested in the firm. The complaint prayed for an account of the lands and of the proceeds of those sold, and for payment and conveyance accordingly, and was verified by Mr. Barlow. It did not refer to any agreement as having been made between Sanford and the other partners at the time of the dissolution. The answer, verified by C. P. Chouteau, referred to the 'Minnesota Outfit' as a business carried on for the benefit of the firm, and alleged that, when it was dissolved, its assets consisted of notes and accounts and of the Minnesota lands; that its liabilities were then $438,176.28, and, on the first of May, 1860, had been reduced to $212,724.23, which amount was advanced by Pierre Chouteau, Jr., out of his individual moneys; and that the estate of Sanford was liable for its proportion thereof. It denied that the plaintiff was entitled to any of the proceeds of the lands sold, or to any part of those unsold, and prayed for an account between the parties as to the business of the firm, and that the amount owing by the plaintiff to the efendants, on account of the losses and indebtedness of the firm or otherwise, might be established and adjusted against the plaintiff. In March, 1872, a stipulation was signed by the plaintiff's attorney, agreeing to admit at the trial that the debts of the firm at the dissolution were as stated in the answer; that Pierre Chouteau, Jr., had discharged all of them with his individual moneys, and became a creditor for that amount; that before May 1, 1860, the indebtedness of the firm to him had been, by sales of the lands and from assets, reduced to $212,724.23; and that neither Sanford or his executors had contributed anything thereto; but the plaintiff was not to be precluded from requiring an account of all the assets of the firm applicable to the payment of its indebtedness, and the defendants agreed to furnish it at the trial. In September, 1872, the suit was referred to a referee for trial, and there were some meetings before him. Without any conclusion, the suit was discontinued March 30, 1876, shortly after the present suit was begun.

This history of the record evidence furnished by the correspondence and the pleadings in the suits has been given in order to show what allegations have been made in deliberate form as to any special agreement between the parties at the time the firm was dissolved. It is not unlikely that letters may have passed between the firm and Sanford at that time, which may have expressed, as stated by Maffitt in his letter of October 4, 1860, the conclusion of the members of the firm that Sanford should 'retain his interest' in the 'various outfits in the upper Mississippi,' because 'it was impossible, even approximately, to determine the value' of that interest, as 'its assets consisted principally of debts which it was very questionable at the time would ever be realized.' The language of the letters would be very material in determining the actual agreement. A slight difference in wording might change the meaning essentially. Maffitt asserted, in his letter to Gebhard of October 4, 1860, that the Minnesota interest, retained by Sanford at the dissolution, was 'embarassed by a very heavy debt.' The letters, or copies of them, were vital to the claim or Sanford's executors, after Gebhard received this letter from Maffitt. Yet we find Gebhard, in his letter of June 3, 1861, to Mr. Barlow, after the suit foreshadowed by Maffitt had been brought, making suggestions as to matters for the answer and as to requiring the production of papers, which are far from implying that Sanford's executors had letters in their possession which would show the agreement now insisted on. They having the letters, if the letters would show such agreement, we should expect copies of them to be set forth in the answer in the suit in the state court of Minnesota, as a copy was set forth, in both the original and amended answers in that suit, of the release of December 1, 1859, executed by Chouteau to the executors of Sanford, on the settlement then made between them of the affairs of the New York firms in which Chouteau and Sanford were partners. Both of the answers refer to an agreement to the effect claimed, but do not state that it was in writing, and set forth only its general purport. Mr. Barlow states that he examined the letters carefully at the time the original answer in the suit in the state court of Minnesota was drawn, and that he thinks they were in the possession of his counsel, Mr. Platt, when the amended answer in that suit was drawn. The subject would naturally be revived when the suit in New York was brought, in 1869, yet we do not find in the complaint in that suit any mention of the agreement claimed to have been evidenced by the letters. The establishing in that suit, by the testimony of Mr. Barlow, of the agreement now set up, would have disposed of the controversy. Can more weight be given to his recollection 7 years later, as to the contents of letters which he had last seen more than 15 years before e testified? There never was any suit brought distinctly based on the agreement now set up, until the prosent suit, brought more than 23 years after the agreement is alleged to have been made, and more than 15 years after the executors were fully notified by Maffitt, acting for and by the direction of Chouteau, of the claim made by Chouteau. That there were some letters which Mr. Barlow saw, and the contents of which he believes he states correctly, is not to be questioned; but, in view of all the testimony in the case, it cannot be held that the agreement set up as contained in the letters is proved with sufficient certainty to make it the foundation of the decree made by the circuit court.

It is proper here to refer to another matter. At the time of Sanford's death, in May, 1857, he was an equal partner with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., in the firm known as Chouteau, Jr., & Co., of New York; and he was also a partner, together with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., and three other persons, in the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., Sanford & Co. In October, 1858, negotiations were begun between P. Chouteau, Jr., and Messrs. Barlow and Gebhard, as executors of Sanford, for a compromise of the affairs of those two firms. The executors, at the time, claimed that they had a right to a receivership of the assets of all the firms in which Mr. Sanford had been interested. On October 13, 1858, Chouteau, being in New York, prepared and verified a petition addressed to the surrogate of New York county, wherein it was stated that the business of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., of New York, had resulted in heavy losses, owing to unfortunate operations undertaken in the life-time of Sanford; that the business of P. Chouteau, Jr., Sanford & Co. had produced large profits; that the accounts of P. Chouteau, Jr., & Co., of New York, had been made up as accurately as could be done; that, under the most favorable aspect, there would, on the winding up of the affairs of that firm, remain an indebtedness from Sanford to the petitioner of not less than $363,323.61; that the amount which Sanford's estate would receive from the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., Sanford & Co. would not exceed $198,558.06; that the petitioner was willing to accept the balance of the share of the estate of Sanford in the essets of the firm of P. Chouteau, Jr., Sanford & Co., in compromise and satisfaction of all his claims against the estate of Sanford; and that this compromise would result in an advantage to the estate of Sanford in a sum not less than $164,765.55. The petition was not presented to the surrogate, but the negotiations were continued, and, in October, 1859, the executors of Sanford presented a petition to the surrogate, verified by Mr. Barlow, containing the same statements as the Chouteau petition, and, by an order made in November, 1859, by the surrogate, the executors were authorized to carry out the compromise on the terms above mentioned, as is stated in the bill in this suit. Then Chouteau, on December 1, 1859, executed the release stated in the bill. That release contained at its close this clause:

'Nothing herein contained is to affect the rights which the     said Pierre Chouteau, Jr., now has, either as surviving      partner or by assignment, to collect all the assets of any      firm formerly existing at St. Louis, in the state of      Missouri, in which the said John F. A. Sanford was formerly a      partner, for his own sole use and benefit, according to the      terms agreed upon on the retirement of said John F. A.      Sanford from said firms, or to affect or impair the right of      the said Pierre Chouteau, Jr., to said assets.'

The executors of Sanford knew, from this reference in the release of December 1, 1859, that some terms had been agreed upon on the retirement of Sanford from the St. Louis firm. If the letters in their possession showed as distinctly as is now claimed what those terms were, it was easy to ascertain those terms from the letters. Instead of doing so, we find Gebhard, in his letter to Maffitt of September 15, 1860, asking Maffitt to furnish the executors with a copy of the agreement with Sanford referred to in Chouteau's release of December, 1859, as having been made when Sanford retired from the St. Louis firm.

As the case of the plaintiffs depends upon their affirmatively establishing the agreement set up, what most directly bears upon its existence has been especially alluded to. But the whole course of the evidence in the case fortifies the conclusion at which we have arrived. We can, however, only summarize it. Sanford at all times regarded himself as a party in interest in the winding up of the affairs of the St. Louis firm, and of the 'outfits' in the charge of Borup and Sibley. He never claimed any independent interest in the Minnesota lands. The other copartners, after 1852, sent to him accounts of the affairs of the firm, and treated him as interested in its liquidation and entitled to know about such accounts. The arrangement really was that the 'outfits' in the upper Mississippi under the charge of Borup and Sibley, and which were part of the business of the dissolved firm, should continue to be carried on as part of that business till they could be wound up. All lands of Minnesota were an outcome of those outfits, and were thus a part of the assets of the firm. Sanford's interest in those outfits was continued, but it remained subject to the debts of the outfits and to the debts of the firm. Pierre Chouteau, Jr., acted always in accordance with that view. His son, Charles P. Chouteau, always had that understanding of the arrangement. The clause before cited, at the end of the release of December 1, 1859, in saying that the release is not to affect the rights which Chouteau 'now has' to collect all the assets of the St. Louis firm for his won use and benefit, or to affect his right to those assets, may be very well satisfied by applying the word 'now' to the condition of things then existing, and to the claims set forth in the complaint in the suit in the state court of Minnesota, brought in February, 1861. He had individually advanced large sums, before that time, to pay the debts of the firm, and undoubtedly contemplated a deficiency of assets, including the real estate in Minnesota. That real estate was then held by him as part of the assets of the dissolved firm, and he always afterwards honestly and faithfully treated it as held by him in trust to liquidate the debts of that firm. It was substantially the only resource in his hands in December, 1859, to repay him his advances. If the two letters then in the possession of Sanford's executors really showed such an agreement as they now claim, it is incredible that they would have accepted the release from Chouteau, with its comprehensive reservation of assets to Chouteau, and not have insisted on excepting from the assets the Minnesota real estate, which at that time was clearly assets of the firm. The entries in the books kept at St. Louis confirm the foregoing view.

On the whole case, we are of opinion that, after the dissolution of the St. Louis firm, the members other than Sanford were entitled to collect and dispose of all its assets, including the Minnesota 'outfit' and the Minnesota lands, to liquidate its affairs, without the interference of Sanford; that all claim on their part against Sanford individually was relinquished, leaving recourse only to those assets; and that, if there should be any surplus of those assets, after paying the debts of the firm and the advances of any of the other partners therefor, Sanford's executors would be entitled to his proper proportion of such surplus.

No judicial accounting has been had on the basis of the rights of the parties as we have defined them. The bill prays that the defendants may account touching the affairs and property of the copartnership, and touching the proceeds of any such property. We think the plaintiffs are entitled to such an accounting, and are not barred from it by laches or by the operation of any statute of limitations. If necessary, the circuit court can, in its discretion, allow the pleadings to be amended, with a view to the attainment of justice, on the principles we have laid down. We do not deem it proper now to indicate any rule of accounting in respect to the lands which were not sold and conveyed by Charles P. Chouteau and Julia Maffitt to parties other than the representatives of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Sarpy, and Sire, but leave that question to be determined by the circuit court, on full consideration. As to the lands which were sold and conveyed to parties other than such representatives, the liability should be only for the sums actually realized in good faith from the sales. The accounting may include the other remaining assets of the firm, if any.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with direction to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion, and to take such further proceedings as may be in conformity therewith.

title: Chouteau v. Barlow/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Chouteau v. Barlow/Opinion of the Court


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 of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged equal to or better than our own. When we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers.

Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of different propositions which the idealist must prove. It is, I think, owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellencies which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or not. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, the whole case is won. I say this lest it should be thought that any of the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual. For my own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality is not spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it is so. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know; and I devoutly hope it is. But I take ‘Idealism’ to be a wide term and to include not only this interesting conclusion, but a number of arguments which are supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least necessary, to prove it. Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by certain arguments which they have in common. That reality is spiritual has, I believe, been the tenet of many theologians; and yet, for believing that alone, they should hardly be called Idealists. There are besides, I believe, many persons, not improperly called Idealists, who hold certain characteristic propositions, without venturing to think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion. It is, therefore, only with Idealistic arguments that I am concerned; and if any Idealist holds that no argument is necessary to prove that reality is spiritual, I shall certainly not have refuted him. I shall, however,


text:
Freeman v. Dawson

S. P. Walker and

C. W. Metcalf, for appellant.

D. H. Poston and W. K. Poston, for appellee.

GRAY, J.

title: Freeman v. Dawson


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Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/449

 at least one argument, which, to the best of my belief, is considered necessary to their position by all Idealists. And I wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives me—an advantage which justifies the assertion that, if my arguments are sound, they will have refuted Idealism. If I can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, I shall have proved that Idealists have no reason whatever for their conclusion.

Suppose we have a chain of argument which takes the form: Since A is B, and B is C, and C is D, it follows A is D. In such an argument, though ‘B is C’ and ‘C is D’ may both be perfectly true, yet if ‘A is B’ be false, we have no more reason for asserting A is D than if all three were false. It does not, indeed, follow that A is D is false; nor does it follow that no other arguments would prove it to be true. But it does follow that, so far as this argument goes, it is the barest supposition, without the least bit of evidence. I propose to attack a proposition which seems to me to stand in this relation to the conclusion ‘Reality is spiritual’. I do not propose to dispute that ‘Reality is spiritual’; I do not deny that there may be reasons for thinking that it is: but I do propose to show that one reason upon which, to the best of my judgment, all other arguments ever used by Idealists depend is false. These other arguments may, for all I shall say, be eminently ingenious and true; they are very many and various, and different Idealists use the most different arguments to prove the same most important conclusions. Some of these may be sufficient to prove that B is C and C is D; but if, as I shall try to show, their ‘A is B’ is false, the conclusion A is D remains a pleasant supposition. I do not deny that to suggest pleasant and plausible suppositions may be the proper function of philosophy: but I am assuming that the name Idealism can only be properly applied where there is a certain amount of argument, intended to be cogent.

The subject of this paper is, therefore, quite uninteresting. Even if I prove my point, I shall have proved nothing about the Universe in general. Upon the important question whether Reality is or is not spiritual my argument will not have the remotest bearing. I shall only attempt to arrive at the truth about a matter, which is in itself quite trivial and insignificant, and from which, so far as I can see and certainly so far as I shall say, no conclusions can be drawn about any of the subjects about which we most want to know. The


text: Talk:Freeman v. Dawson

title: Talk:Freeman v. Dawson