text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/69

Rh of the federalist in the primeval aristocrats of that renowned empire! He traced the flow of federal blood down through successive ages and centuries, till he got into the veins of the American tories, (of whom, by the way, there were twenty in the Carolinas for one in Massachusetts.) From the tories, he followed it to the federalists; and as the federal party was broken up, and there was no possibility of transmitting it farther on this side of the Atlantic, he seems to have discovered that it has gone off, collaterally, though against all the canons of descent, into the ultras of France, and finally became extinguished, like exploded gas, among the adherents of Don Miguel.

This, sir, is an abstract of the gentleman’s history of federalism. I am not about to controvert it. It is not, at present, worth the pains of refutation, because, sir, if at this day one feels the sin of federalism lying heavily on his conscience, he can easily obtain remission. He may even have an indulgence, if he is desirous of repeating the transgression. It is an affair of no difficulty to get into this same right line of patriotic descent. A man, nowadays, is at liberty to choose his political parentage. He may elect his own father. Federalist or not, he may, if he choose, claim to belong to the favored stock, and his claim will be allowed. He may carry back his pretensions just as far as the honorable gentleman himself; nay, he may make himself out the honorable gentleman’s cousin, and prove satisfactorily that he is descended from the same political great-grandfather. All this is allowable. We all know a process, sir, by which the whole Essex Junto could, in one hour, be all washed white from their ancient federalism, and come out, every one of them, an original democrat, dyed in the wool! Some of them have actually undergone the operation, and they say it is quite easy. The only inconvenience it occasions, as they tell us, is a slight tendency of the blood to the face, a soft suffusion, which, however, is very transient, since nothing is said calculated to deepen the red on the cheek, but a prudent silence observed in regard to all the past. Indeed, sir, some smiles of approbation have been bestowed, and some crums of comfort have fallen, not a thousand miles from the door of the Hartford Convention itself. And if the author of the ordinance of 1787 possessed the other requisite qualifications, there is no knowing, notwithstanding his federalism, to what heights of favor he might not yet attain.

Mr. President, in carrying his warfare, such as it was, into New England, the honorable gentleman all along professes to be acting on the defensive. He desires to consider me as having assailed South Carolina, and insists that he comes forth only as her champion, and in her defence. Sir, I do not admit that I made any attack whatever on South Carolina. Nothing like it. The honorable member, in his first speech, expressed opinions, in regard to revenue, and some other topics, which I heard both with pain and surprise. I told the gentleman that I was aware that such sentiments were entertained of the government, but had not expected to find them advanced in it; that I knew there were persons in the south who speak of our Union with indifference, or doubt, taking pains to magnify its evils, and to say nothing of its benefits; that the honorable member himself, I was sure, could never be one of these; and I regretted the expression of such opinions as he had avowed, because I thought their obvious tendency was to encourage feelings of disrespect to the Union, and to weaken its connection. This, sir, is the sum and substance of all I said on the subject. And this constitutes the attack which called on


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/70

66 the chivalry of the gentleman, in his opinion, to harry us with such a forage among the party pamphlets and party proceedings of Massachusetts. If he means that I spoke with dissatisfaction or disrespect of the ebullitions of individuals in South Carolina, it is true. But, if he means that I had assailed the character of the state, her honor, or patriotism, that I had reflected on her history or her conduct, he had not the slightest ground for any such assumption. I did not even refer, I think, in my observations, to any collection of individuals. I said nothing of the recent conventions. I spoke in the most guarded and careful manner, and only expressed my regret for the publication of opinions which I presumed the honorable member disapproved as much as myself. In this, it seems, I was mistaken.

I do not remember that the gentleman has disclaimed any sentiment, or any opinion, of a supposed anti-Union tendency, which on all or any of the recent occasions has been expressed. The whole drift of his speech has been rather to prove, that, in divers times and manners, sentiments equally liable to objection have been promulgated in New England. And one would suppose that his object, in this reference to Massachusetts, was to find a precedent to justify proceedings in the south, were it not for the reproach and contumely with which he labors, all along, to load his precedents.

By way of defending South Carolina from what he chooses to think an attack on her, he first quotes the example of Massachusetts, and then denounces that example, in good set terms. This twofold purpose, not very consistent with itself, one would think, was exhibited more than once in the course of his speech. He referred, for instance, to the Hartford Convention. Did he do this for authority, or for a topic of reproach? Apparently for both; for he told us that he should find no fault with the mere fact of holding such a convention, and considering and discussing such questions as he supposes were then and there discussed; but what rendered it obnoxious was the time it was holden, and the circumstances of the country then existing. We were in a war, he said, and the country needed all our aid; the hand of government required to be strengthened, not weakened; and patriotism should have postponed such proceedings to another day. The thing itself, then, is a precedent; the time and manner of it, only, subject of censure.

Now, sir, I go much farther, on this point, than the honorable member. Supposing, as the gentleman seems to, that the Hartford Convention assembled for any such purpose as breaking up the Union, because they thought unconstitutional laws had been passed, or to concert on that subject, or to calculate the value of the Union; supposing this to be their purpose, or any part of it, then I say the meeting itself was disloyal, and obnoxious to censure, whether held in time of peace, or time of war, or under whatever circumstances. The material matter is the object. Is dissolution the object? If it be, external circumstances may make it a more or less aggravated case, but cannot affect the principle. I do not hold, therefore, that the Hartford Convention was pardonable, even to the extent of the gentleman’s admission, if its objects were really such as have been imputed to it. Sir, there never was a time, under any degree of excitement, in which the Hartford Convention, or any other convention, could maintain itself one moment in New England, if assembled for any such purpose as the gentleman says would have been an allowable purpose. To hold conventions to decide questions of constitutional

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/71

Rh try the binding validity of statutes, by votes in a convention! Sir, the Hartford Convention, I presume, would not desire that the honorable gentleman should be their defender or advocate, if he puts their case upon such untenable and extravagant grounds.

Then, sir, the gentleman has no fault to find with these recently-promulgated South Carolina opinions. And, certainly, he need have none; for his own sentiments, as now advanced, and advanced on reflection, as far as I have been able to comprehend them, go the full length of all these opinions. I propose, sir, to say something on these, and to consider how far they are just and constitutional. Before doing that, however, let me observe, that the eulogium pronounced on the character of the state of South Carolina, by the honorable gentleman, for her revolutionary and other merits, meets my hearty concurrence. I shall not acknowledge that the honorable member goes before me in regard for whatever of distinguished talent or distinguished character South Carolina has produced. I claim part of the honor, I partake in the pride, of her great names. I claim them for countrymen, one and all. The Laurenses, the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Marions—Americans all—whose fame is no more to be hemmed in by state lines than their talents and patriotism were capable of being circumscribed within the same narrow limits. In their day and generation, they served and honored the country, and the whole country; and their renown is of the treasures of the whole country. Him whose honored name the gentleman himself bears—does he suppose me less capable of gratitude for his patriotism, or sympathy for his sufferings, than if his eyes had first opened upon the light in Massachusetts instead of South Carolina? Sir, does he suppose it is in his power to exhibit a Carolina name so bright as to produce envy in my bosom? No, sir, increased gratification and delight, rather.

Sir, I thank God that if I am gifted with little of the spirit which is said to be able to raise mortals to the skies, I have yet none, as I trust, of that other spirit, which would drag angels down. When I shall be found, sir, in my place here in the Senate, or elsewhere, to sneer at public merit, because it happened to spring up beyond the little limits of my own state, or neighborhood; when I refuse, for any such cause, or for any cause, the homage due to American talent, to elevated patriotism, to sincere devotion to liberty and the country; or if I see an uncommon endowment of Heaven, if I see extraordinary capacity and virtue in any son of the south, and if, moved by local prejudice, or gangrened by state jealousy, I get up here to abate the tithe of a hair from his just character and just fame,—may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth! Sir, let me recur to pleasing recollections; let me indulge in refreshing remembrance of the past; let me remind you that in early times no states cherished greater harmony, both of principle and feeling, than Massachusetts and South Carolina. Would to God that harmony might again return. Shoulder to shoulder they went through the revolution; hand in hand they stood round the administration of Washington, and felt his own great arm lean on them for support. Unkind feeling, if it exist, alienation, and distrust are the growth, unnatural to such soils, of false principles since sown. They are weeds, the seeds of which that same great arm never scattered.

Mr. President, I shall enter on no encomium upon Massachusetts—she needs none. There she is—behold her, and judge for yourselves. There is her history—the world knows it by heart. The past, at least,


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/72

68 is secure. There is Boston, and Concord, and Lexington, and Bunker Hill; and there they will remain forever. The bones of her sons, fallen in the great struggle for independence, now lie mingled with the soil of every state from New England to Georgia; and there they will lie forever. And, sir, where American liberty raised its first voice, and where its youth was nurtured and sustained, there it still lives, in the strength of its manhood, and full of its original spirit. If discord and disunion shall wound it; if party strife and blind ambition shall hawk at and tear it; if folly and madness, if uneasiness under salutary and necessary restraint, shall succeed to separate it from that Union by which alone its existence is made sure,—it will stand, in the end, by the side of that cradle in which its infancy was rocked; it will stretch forth its arm, with whatever vigor it may still retain, over the friends who gather round it; and it will fall at last, if fall it must, amidst the proudest monuments of its own glory, and on the very spot of its origin.

There yet remains to be performed, Mr. President, by far the most grave and important duty which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion. It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles of the constitution under which we are here assembled. I might well have desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into other and abler hands. I could have wished that it should have been executed by those whose character and experience give weight and influence to their opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to mine. But, sir, I have met the occasion, not sought it; and I shall proceed to state my own sentiments, without challenging for them any particular regard, with studied plainness and as much precision as possible.

I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain that it is a right of the state legislatures to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, an to arrest the operation of its laws.

I understand him to maintain this right as a right existing under the constitution, not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the states, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise of power by the general government, of checking it, and of compelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its power.

I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in the general government or any branch of it; but that, on the contrary, the states may lawfully decide for themselves, and each state for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its power.

I understand him to insist that, if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any state government, require it, such state government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.

This is the sum of what I understand from him to be the South Carolina doctrine. I propose to consider it, and to compare it with the constitution. Allow me to say, as a preliminary remark, that I call this the South Carolina doctrine, only because the gentleman himself has so denominated it. I do not feel at liberty to say that South Carolina, as a state, has ever advanced these sentiments. I hope she has not, and


text:
Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/145

 CHAPTER XII

THE BABY DUCK-BILLED

PLATYPUS AND ECHIDNA

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/145


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/73

Rh never may. That a great majority of her people are opposed to the tariff laws is doubtless true. That a majority, somewhat less than that just mentioned, conscientiously believe these laws unconstitutional, may probably also be true. But that any majority holds to the right of direct state interference, at state discretion, the right of nullifying acts of Congress by acts of state legislation, is more than I know, and what I shall be slow to believe.

That there are individuals, besides the honorable gentleman, who do maintain these opinions, is quite certain. I recollect the recent expression of a sentiment which circumstances attending its utterance and publication justify us in supposing was not unpremeditated—“The sovereignty of the state: never to be controlled, construed, or decided on, but by her own feelings of honorable justice.”

[Mr. here rose, and said, that, for the purpose of being clearly understood, he would state that his proposition was in the words of the Virginia resolution, as follows:—

“That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it. views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties pertaining to them.”]

Mr. resumed:—

I am quite aware, Mr. President, of the existence of the resolution which the gentleman read, and has now repeated, and that he relies on it as his authority. I know the source, too, from which it is understood to have proceeded. I need not say, that I have much respect for the constitutional opinions of Mr. Madison: they would weigh greatly with me, always. But, before the authority of his opinion be vouched for the gentleman’s proposition, it will be proper to consider what is the fair interpretation of that resolution, to which Mr. Madison is understood to have given his sanction. As the gentleman construes it, it is an authority for him. Possibly he may not have adopted the right construction. That resolution declares, that in the case of the dangerous exercise of powers not granted by the general government, the states may interpose to arrest the progress of the evil. But how interpose? and what does this declaration purport? Does it mean no more than that there may be extreme cases in which the people, in any mode of assembling, may resist usurpation, and relieve themselves from a tyrannical government? No one will deny this. Such resistance is not only acknowledged to be just in America, but in England also. Blackstone admits as much, in the theory and practice, too, of the English constitution. We, sir, who oppose the Carolina doctrine, do not deny that the people may, if they choose, throw off any government, when it becomes oppressive and intolerable, and erect a better in its stead. We all know that civil institutions are established for the public benefit, and that, when they cease to answer the ends of their existence, they may be changed.

But I do not understand the doctrine now contended for to be that which, for the sake of distinctness, we may call the right of revolution.


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/146

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/146


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/74

70 I understand the gentleman to maintain, that without revolution, without civil commotion, without rebellion, a remedy for supposed abuse and transgression of the powers of the general government lies in a direct appeal to the interference of the state governments. [Mr. here rose: He did not contend, he said, for the mere right of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance. What he maintained was, that, in case of a plain, palpable violation of the constitution by the general government, a state may interpose; and that this interposition is constitutional.] Mr. resumed:—

So, sir, I understood the gentleman, and am happy to find that I did not misunderstand him. What he contends for is, that it is constitutional to interrupt the administration of the constitution itself, in the hands of those who are chosen and sworn to administer it, by the direct interference, in form of law, of the states, in virtue of their sovereign capacity. The inherent right in the people to reform their government I do not deny; and they have another right, and that is, to resist unconstitutional laws, without overturning the government. It is no doctrine of mine, that unconstitutional laws bind the people. The great question is, Whose prerogative is it to decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws? On that the main debate hinges. The proposition that, in case of a supposed violation of the constitution by Congress, the states have a constitutional right to interfere, and annul the law of Congress, is the proposition of the gentleman; I do not admit it. If the gentleman had intended no more than to assert the right of revolution for justifiable cause, he would have said only what all agree to. But I cannot conceive that there can be a middle course between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced constitutional, on the one hand, and open resistance, which is revolution or rebellion, on the other. I say the right of a state to annul a law of Congress cannot be maintained but on the ground of the unalienable right of man to resist oppression; that is to say, upon the ground of revolution. I admit that there is an ultimate violent remedy, above the constitution, and in defiance of the constitution, which may be resorted to, when a revolution is to be justified. But I do not admit that, under the constitution, and in conformity with it, there is any mode in which a state government, as a member of the Union, can interfere and stop the progress of the general government, by force of her own laws, under any circumstances whatever.

This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government, and the source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the state legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government of the United States be the agent of the state governments, then they may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if it is the agent of the people, then the people alone can control it, restrain it, modify or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the creature of the states, but that it is the creature of each of the states severally; so that each may assert the power, for itself, of determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It is the servant of four and twenty masters, of different wills and different purposes; and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government, and its true character. It is, sir, the people’s constitution, the people’s government; made for the people;


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/75

Rh made by the people; and answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared that this constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The states are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. The state legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given power to the general government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of the state governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people. The general government and the state governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary.

The national government possesses those powers which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest belongs to the state governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the people have restrained state sovereignty by the expression of their will, in the constitution of the United States, so far, it must be admitted, state sovereignty is effectually controlled. I do not contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled further. The sentiment to which I have referred propounds that state sovereignty is only td be controlled by its own “feeling of justice;” that is to say, it is not to be controlled at all; for one who is to follow his feelings, is under no legal control. Now, however men may think this ought to be, the fact is, that the people of the United States have chosen to impose control on state sovereignties. The constitution has ordered the matter differently from what this opinion announces. To make war, for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the constitution declares that no state shall make war. To coin money is another exercise of sovereign power; but no state is at liberty to coin money. Again: the constitution says, that no sovereign state shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the state sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other states, which does not arise “from her own feelings of honorable justice.” Such an opinion, therefore, is in defiance of the plainest provisions of the constitution.

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been alluded to, and to which I refer again for the purpose of ascertaining more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine, denominated the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood up on this floor to maintain.

In one of them I find it resolved that “the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of others, is contrary to the meaning and intention of the federal compact; and as such, a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, by a determined majority, wielding the general government beyond the limits of its delegated powers, as calls upon the states which compose the suffering minority, in their sovereign capacity, to exercise the powers which, as sovereigns, necessarily devolve ae them, when their compact is violated.”

Observe, sir, that this resolution holds the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff, designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of another, to be such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, as calls upon the states, in their sovereign capacity, to interfere by


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/150

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/150


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/76

72 their own power. This denunciation, Mr. President, you, will please to observe, includes our old tariff of 1816, as well as all others; because, that was established to promote the interest of the manufactures of cotton, to the manifest and admitted injury of the Calcutta cotton trade. Observe, again, that all the qualifications are here rehearsed, and charged upon the tariff, which are necessary to bring the case within the gentleman’s proposition. The tariff is a usurpation; it is a dangerous usurpation; it is a palpable usurpation; it is a deliberate usurpation. It is such a usurpation as calls upon the states to exercise their right of interference. Here is a case, then, within the gentleman’s principles, and all his qualifications of his principles. It is a case for action. The constitution is plainly, dangerously, palpably, and deliberately violated; and the states must interpose their own authority to arrest the law. Let us suppose the state of South Carolina to express this same opinion, by the voice of her legislature. That would be very imposing; but what then? Is the voice of one state conclusive? It so happens that, at the very moment when South Carolina resolves that the tariff laws, are unconstitutional, Pennsylvania and Kentucky resolve exactly the reverse. They hold those laws to be both highly proper and strictly constitutional. And now, sir, how does the honorable member propose to deal with this case? How does he get out of this difficulty, upon any principle of his? His construction gets us into it; how does he propose to get us out?

In Carolina, the tariff is a palpable, deliberate usurpation; Carolina, therefore, may nullify it, and refuse to pay the duties. In Pennsylvania, it is both clearly constitutional and highly expedient; and there the duties are to be paid. And yet we live under a government of uniform laws, and under a constitution, too, which contains an express provision, as it happens, that all duties shall be equal in all the states! Does not this approach absurdity?

If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of the states, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not thrown back again precisely upon the old confederation?

It is too plain to be argued. Four and twenty interpreters of constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none with authority to bind any body else, and this constitutional law the only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere connection during pleasure, or, to use the phraseology of the times, during feeling? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people who established the constitution, but the feeling of the state governments.

In another of the South Carolina addresses, having premised that the crisis requires “all the concentrated energy of passion,” an attitude of open resistance to the laws of the Union is advised. Open resistance to the laws, then, is the constitutional remedy, the conservative power of the state, which the South Carolina doctrines teach for the redress of political evils, real or imaginary. And its authors further say that, appealing with confidence to the constitution itself to justify their opinions, they cannot consent to try their accuracy by the courts of justice. In one sense, indeed, sir, this is assuming an attitude of open resistance in favor of liberty. But what sort of liberty? The liberty of establishing their own opinions, in defiance of the opinions of all others; the liberty of judging and of deciding exclusively themselves, in a matter in which others have as much right to judge and decide as they; the liberty of placing their opinions above the judgment of all others, above the laws, and above


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/77

Rh the constitution. This is their liberty, and this is the fair result of the proposition contended for by the honorable gentleman. Or it may be more properly said, it is identical with it, rather than a result from it. In the same publication we find the following: “Previously to our revolution, when the arm of oppression was stretched over New England, where did our northern brethren meet with a braver sympathy than that which sprung from the bosom of Carolinians? We had no extortion, no oppression, no collision with the king’s ministers, no navigation interests springing up, in envious rivalry of England.”

This seems extraordinary language. South Carolina no collision with the king’s ministers in 1775! no extortion! no oppression! But, sir, it is also most significant language. Does any man doubt the purpose for which it was penned? Can any one fail to see that it was designed to raise in the reader’s mind the question, whether, at this time,—that is to say, in 1828,—South Carolina has any collision with the king’s ministers, any oppression, or extortion, to fear from England? whether, in short, England is not as naturally the friend of South Carolina, as New England, with her navigation interests springing up in envious rivalry of England?

Is it not strange, sir, that an intelligent man in South Carolina, in 1828, should thus labor to prove, that, in 1775, there was no hostility, no cause of war, between South Carolina and England? that she had no occasion, in reference to her own interest, or from a regard to her own welfare, to take up arms in the revolutionary contest? Can any one account for the expression of such strange sentiments, and their circulation through the state, otherwise than by supposing the object to be, what I have already intimated, to raise the question, if they had no “collision” (mark the expression) with the ministers of King George the Third, in 1775, what collision have they, in 1828, with the ministers of King George the Fourth? What is there now, in the existing state of things, to separate Carolina from Old, more, or rather less, than from New England?

Resolutions, sir, have been recently passed by the legislature of South Carolina. I need not refer to them; they go no further than the honorable gentleman himself has gone—and I hope not so far. I content myself, therefore, with debating the matter with him.

And now, sir, what I have first to say on this subject is, that at no time, and under no circumstances, has New England, or any state in New England, or any respectable body of persons in New England, or any public man of standing in New England, put forth such a doctrine as this Carolina doctrine.

The gentleman has found no case—he can find none—to support his own opinions by New England authority. New England has studied the constitution in other schools, and under other teachers. She looks upon it with other regards, and deems more highly and reverently, both of its just authority and its utility and excellence. The history of her legislative proceedings may be traced—the ephemeral effusions of temporary bodies, called together by the excitement of the occasion, may be hunted up—they have been hunted up. The opinions and votes of her public men, in and out of Congress, may be explored—it will all be in vain. The Carolina doctrine can derive from her neither countenance nor support. She rejects it now; she always did reject it; and till she loses her senses, she always will reject it. The honorable member has referred to expressions on the subject of the embargo law, made in this place by an honorable and venerable gentleman (Mr. )


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/78

74 now favoring us with his presence. He quotes that distinguished senator as saying, that in his judgment the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that, therefore, in his opinion, the people were not bound to obey it.

That, sir, is perfectly constitutional language. An unconstitutional law is not binding; but then it does not rest with a resolution or a law of a state legislature to decide whether an act of Congress be or be not constitutional. An unconstitutional act of Congress would not bind the people of this District, although they have no legislature to interfere in their behalf; and, on the other hand, a constitutional law of Congress does bind the citizens of every state, although all their legislatures should undertake to annul it, by act or resolution. The venerable Connecticut senator is a constitutional lawyer, of sound principles and enlarged knowledge; a statesman practised and experienced, bred in the company of Washington, and holding just views upon the nature of our governments. He believed the embargo unconstitutional, and so did others; but what then? Who did he suppose was to decide that question? The state legislatures? Certainly not. No such sentiment ever escaped his lips. Let us follow up, sir, this New England opposition to the embargo laws; let us trace it, till we discern the principle which controlled and governed New England throughout the whole course of that opposition. We shall then see what similarity there is between the New England school of constitutional opinions and this modern Carolina school. The gentleman, I think, read a petition from some single individual, addressed to the legislature of Massachusetts, asserting the Carolina doctrine—that is, the right of state interference to arrest the laws of the Union. The fate of that petition shows the sentiment of the legislature. It met no favor. The opinions of Massachusetts were otherwise. They had been expressed in 1798, in answer to the resolutions of Virginia, and she did not depart from them, nor bend them to the times. Misgoverned, wronged, oppressed, as she felt herself to be, she still held fast her integrity to the Union. The gentleman may find in her proceedings much evidence of dissatisfaction with the measures of government, and great and deep dislike to the embargo; all this makes the case so much the stronger for her; for, notwithstanding all this dissatisfaction and dislike, she claimed no right still to sever asunder the bonds of the Union. There was heat and there was anger in her political feeling. Be it so. Her heat or her anger did not, nevertheless, betray her into infidelity to the government. The gentleman labors to prove that she disliked the embargo as much as South Carolina dislikes the tariff, and expressed her dislike as strongly. Be it so; ''but did she propose the Carolina remedy? Did she threaten to interfere, by state authority, to annul the laws of the Union?'' That is the question for the gentleman’s consideration.

No doubt, sir, a great majority of the people of New England conscientiously believed the embargo law of 1807 unconstitutional—as conscientiously, certainly, as the people of South Carolina hold that opinion of the tariff. They reasoned thus: Congress has power to regulate commerce; but here is a law, they said, stopping all commerce, and stopping it indefinitely. The law is perpetual; that is, it is not limited in point of time, and must of course continue till it shall be repealed by some other law. It is as perpetual, therefore, as the law against treason or murder. Now, is this regulating commerce, or destroying it? Is it guiding, controlling, giving the rule to commerce, as a subsisting thing, or is it putting an end to it altogether? Nothing is more certain than that a majority in


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/153

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/153


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/79

Rh New England deemed this law a violation of the constitution. The very case required by the gentleman to justify state interference had then arisen. Massachusetts believed this law to be “a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted by the constitution.” Deliberate it was, for it was long continued; palpable she thought it, as no words in the constitution gave the power, and only a construction, in her opinion most violent, raised it; dangerous it was, since it threatened utter ruin to her most important interests. Here, then, was a Carolina case. How did Massachusetts deal with it? It was, as she thought, a plain, manifest, palpable violation of the constitution; and it brought ruin to her doors. Thousands of families, and hundreds of thousands of individuals, were beggared by it. While she saw and felt all this, she saw and felt, also, that as a measure of national policy, it was perfectly futile; that the country was no way benefited by that which caused so much individual distress; that it was efficient only for the production of evil, and all that evil inflicted on ourselves. In such a case, under such circumstances, how did Massachusetts demean herself? Sir, she remonstrated, she memorialized, she addressed herself to the general government, not exactly “with the concentrated energy of passion,” but with her strong sense, and the energy of sober conviction. But she did not interpose the arm of her power to arrest the law, and break the embargo. Far from it. Her principles bound her to two things; and she followed her principles, lead where they might. First, to submit to every constitutional law of Congress; and secondly, if the constitutional validity of the law be doubted, to refer that question to the decision of the proper tribunals. The first principle is vain and ineffectual without the second. A majority of us in New England believed the embargo law unconstitutional; but the great question was, and always will be, in such cases, Who is to decide this? Who is to judge between the people and the government? And, sir, it is quite plain, that the constitution of the United States confers on the government itself, to be exercised by its appropriate department, this power of deciding, ultimately and conclusively, upon the just extent of its own authority. If this had not been done, we should not have advanced a single step beyond the old confederation.

Being fully of opinion that the embargo law was unconstitutional, the people of New England were yet equally clear in the opinion—it was a matter they did not doubt upon—that the question, after all, must be decided by the judicial tribunals of the United States. Before those tribunals, therefore, they brought the question. Under the provisions of the law, they had given bonds, to millions in amount, and which were alleged to be forfeited. They suffered the bonds to be sued, and thus raised the question. In the old-fashioned way of settling disputes, they went to law. The case came to hearing and solemn argument; and he who espoused their cause and stood up for them against the validity of the act, was none other than that great man, of whom the gentleman has made honorable mention,. He was then, sir, in the fulness of his knowledge and the maturity of his strength. He had retired from long and distinguished public service here, to the renewed pursuit of professional duties; carrying with him all that enlargement and expansion, all the new strength and force, which an acquaintance with the more general subjects discussed in the national councils is capable of adding to professional attainment, in a mind of true greatness and comprehension.


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/154

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/154


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/80

76 He was a lawyer, and he was also a statesman. He had studied the constitution, when he filled public station, that he might defend it; he had examined its principles, that he might maintain them. More than all men, or at least as much as any man, he was attached to the general government, and to the union of the states. His feelings and opinions all ran in that direction. A question of constitutional law, too, was, of all subjects, that one which was best suited to his talents and learning. Aloof from technicality, and unfettered by artificial rule, such a question gave opportunity for that deep and clear analysis, that mighty grasp of principle, which so much distinguished his higher efforts. His very statement was argument; his inference seemed demonstration. The earnestness of his own conviction wrought conviction in others. One was convinced, and believed, and assented, because it was gratifying, delightful, to think, and feel, and believe, in unison with an intellect of such evident superiority.

Mr. Dexter, sir, such as I have described him, argued the New England cause. He put into his effort his whole heart, as well as all the powers of his understanding; for he had avowed, in the most public manner, his entire concurrence with his neighbors, on the point in dispute. He argued the cause; it was lost, and New England submitted. The established tribunals pronounced the law constitutional, and New England acquiesced. Now, sir, is not this the exact opposite of the doctrine of the gentleman from South Carolina? According to him, instead of referring to the judicial tribunals, we should have broken up the embargo, by laws of our own; we should have repealed it, quoad New England; for we had a strong, palpable, and oppressive case. Sir, we believed the embargo unconstitutional; but still, that was matter of opinion, and who was to decide it? We thought it a clear case; but, nevertheless, we did not take the laws into our hands, because we did not wish to bring about a revolution, nor to break up the Union; for I maintain, that, between submission to the decision of the constituted tribunals, and revolution, or disunion, there is no middle ground—there is no ambiguous condition, half allegiance and half rebellion. There is no treason, madcosy. And, sir, how futile, how very futile it is, to admit the right of state interference, and then to attempt to save it from the character of unlawful resistance, by adding terms of qualification to the causes and occasions, leaving all the qualifications, like the case itself, in the discretion of the state governments. It must be a clear case, it is said; a deliberate case; a palpable case; a dangerous case. But, then, the State is still left at liberty to decide for herself what is clear, what is deliberate, what is palpable, what is dangerous.

Do adjectives and epithets avail any thing? Sir, the human mind is so constituted, that the merits of both sides of a controversy appear very clear, and very palpable, to those who respectively espouse them, and both sides usually grow clearer, as the controversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstitutionality in the tariff—she sees oppression there, also, and she sees danger. Pennsylvania, with a vision not less sharp, looks at the same tariff, and sees no such thing in it—she sees it all constitutional, all useful, all safe. The faith of South Carolina is strengthened by opposition, and she now not only sees, but resolves, that the tariff is palpably unconstitutional, oppressive, and dangerous: but Pennsylvania, not to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing to strengthen her own faith by a confident asseveration, resolves also, and gives to every


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/81

Rh warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain, downright Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength and unity of her opinions, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within seven votes; Pennsylvania, not to be outdone in this respect more than others, reduces her dissentient fraction to five votes. Now, sir, again I ask the gentleman, what is to be done? Are these states both right? Is he bound to consider them both right? If not, which is in the wrong? or, rather, which has the best right to decide?

And if he, and if I, are not to know what the constitution means, and what it is, till those two state legislatures, and the twenty-two others, shall agree in its construction, what have we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain it? I was forcibly struck, sir, with one reflection, as the gentleman went on with his speech. He quoted Mr. Madison’s resolutions to prove that a state may interfere, in a case of deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted. The honorable member supposes the tariff law to be such an exercise of power, and that, consequently, a case has arisen in which the state may, if it see fit, interfere by its own law. Now, it so happens, nevertheless, that Mr. Madison himself deems this same tariff law quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and palpable violation, it is, in his judgment, no violation at all. So that, while they use his authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it in the very case before them. All this, sir, shows the inherent futility—I had almost used a stronger word—of conceding this power of interference to the states, and then attempting to secure it from abuse by imposing qualifications of which the states themselves are to judge. One of two things is true: either the laws of the Union are beyond the control of the states, or else we have no constitution of general government, and are thrust back again to the days of the confederacy.

Let me here say, sir, that if the gentleman’s doctrine had been received and acted upon in New England, in the times of the embargo and non-intercourse, we should probably not now have been here. The government would very likely have gone to pieces and crumbled into dust. No stronger case can ever arise than existed under those laws; no states can ever entertain a clearer conviction than the New England States then entertained; and if they had been under the influence of that heresy of opinion, as I must call it, which the honorable member espouses, this Union would, in all probability, have been scattered to the four winds. I ask the gentleman, therefore, to apply his principles to that case; I ask him to come forth and declare whether, in his opinion, the New England States would have been justified in interfering to break up the embargo system, under the conscientious opinions which they held upon it. Had they a right to annul that law? Does he admit, or deny? If that which is thought palpably unconstitutional in South Carolina justifies that state in arresting the progress of the law, tell me whether that which was thought palpably unconstitutional also in Massachusetts would have justified her in doing the same thing. Sir, I deny the whole doctrine. It has not a foot of ground in the constitution to stand on. No public man of reputation ever advanced it in Massachusetts, in the warmest times, or could maintain himself upon it there at any time.

I wish now, sir, to make a remark upon the Virginia resolutions of 1798. I cannot undertake to say how these resolutions were understood by those who passed them. Their language is not a little indefinite. In the case of the exercise, by Congress, of a dangerous power, not granted


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/158

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/158


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/82

78 to them, the resolutions assert the right, on the part of the state, to interfere, and arrest the progress of the evil. This is susceptible of more than one interpretation. It may mean no more than that the states may interfere by complaint and remonstrance, or by proposing to the people an alteration of the federal constitution. This would all be quite unobjectionable; or it may be that no more is meant than to assert the general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable oppression. This no one doubts; and this, in my opinion, is all that he who framed these resolutions could have meant by it; for I shall not readily believe that he was ever of opinion that a state, under the constitution, and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it should operate on herself, by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, sir, Whence is this supposed right of the states derived? Where do they get the power to interfere with the laws of the Union? Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a notion founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the people, those who administer it responsible to the people, and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the state governments. It is created for one purpose; the state governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the state governments. It is of no moment to the argument that certain acts of the state legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not one of their original state powers, a part of the sovereignty of the state. It is a duty which the people, by the constitution itself, have imposed on the state legislatures, and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice of president with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition that this whole government—president, Senate, and House of Representatives—is a popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The governor of a state (in some of the states) is chosen not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the people for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of electing a governor. Is the government of the state on that account not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of state legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on state sovereignties. The states cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of state legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volitions of its creators.

The people then, sir, erected this government. They gave it a


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/83

Rh, and in that constitution they have enumerated the powers which they bestow on it. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved to the states or the people. But, sir, they have not stopped here. If they had, they would have accomplished but half their work. No definition can be so clear as to avoid possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall construe this grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, where it may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do they leave this ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the government? Sir, they have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it with the government itself, in its appropriate branches. Sir, the very chief end, the main design for which the whole constitution was framed and adopted, was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act through state agency, or depend on state opinion and discretion. The people had had quite enough of that kind of government under the confederacy. Under that system, the legal action—the application of law to individuals—belonged exclusively to the states. Congress could only recommend—their acts were not of binding force till the states had adopted and sanctioned them. Are we in that condition still? Are we yet at the mercy of state discretion and state construction? Sir, if we are, then vain will be our attempt to maintain the constitution under which we sit.

But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers to Congress, and restrictions on those powers. There are also prohibitions on the states. Some authority must therefore necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring, sir, that “the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”

This, sir, was the first great step. By this, the supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No state law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States. But who shall decide this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This, sir, the constitution itself decides also, by declaring “that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States.” These two provisions, sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the arch. With these it is a constitution; without them it is a confederacy. In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, Congress established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions of constitutional power to the final decision of the Supreme Court. It then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have been now among things which are passed. Having constituted the government, and declared its powers, the people have further said, that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the government shall itself decide—subject


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/162

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/162


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/84

80 always, like other popular governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I repeat, how is it that a state legislature acquires any right to interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people, “We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide, that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them”? The reply would be, I think, not impertinent, “Who made you a judge over another’s servants? To their own masters they stand or fall.”

Sir, I deny this power of state legislatures alogetheraltogether [sic]. It cannot stand the test of examination. Gentlemen may say, that, in an extreme case, a state government might protect the people from intolerable oppression. Sir, in such a case the people might protect themselves, without the aid of the state governments. Such a case warrants revolution. It must make, when it comes, a law for itself. A nullifying act of a state legislature cannot alter the case, nor make resistance any more lawful. In maintaining these sentiments, sir, I am but asserting the rights of the people. I state what they have declared, and insist on their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it, like other constitutional powers.

For myself, sir, I doubt the jurisdiction of South Carolina, or any other state, to prescribe my constitutional duty, or to settle, between me and the people, the validity of laws of Congress for which I have voted. I decline her umpirage. I have not sworn to support the constitution according to her construction of its clauses. I have not stipulated, by my oath of office or otherwise, to come under any responsibility, except to the people and those whom they have appointed to pass upon the question, whether the laws, supported by my votes, conform to the constitution of the country. And, sir, if we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have been more preposterous than to have made a government for the whole Union, and yet left its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a new construction, on every new election of its own members? Would any thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should not be denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any country to live under. To avoid all possibility of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat again, in the fullest manner, that I claim no powers for the government by forced or unfair construction. I admit that it is a government of strictly limited powers; of enumerated, specified, and particularized powers; and that whatsoever is not granted is withheld. But, notwithstanding all this, and however the grant of powers may be expressed, its limits and extent may yet, in some cases, admit of doubt; and the general government would be good for nothing, it would be incapable of long existence, if some mode had not been provided in which those doubts, as they should arise, might be peaceably, but authoritatively, solved.

And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman’s


text:
Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)

PETITION for a mandamus against the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

Upon the showing made by French in his petition, it appears that he brought a suit in ejectment in the court below against Lincoln, O'Ness, Onesti, DeSilva, and others, to recover the possession of a large tract of land. On the trial the court found, among other things, that Lincoln was in the separate possession of a specific portion of the tract, and that O'Ness, Onesti, and DeSilva were in the possession of another portion. Judgment was rendered, Oct. 7, 1878, in favor of French against all the defendants jointly for the recovery of the entire tract and the costs of suit, amounting to $959.25; and against Lincoln separately for $330, damages for withholding possession; and against O'Ness, Onesti, and DeSilva for $225, for like cause. Other separate judgments for damages were rendered against the other defendants, the aggregate of all the money judgments being $6,091.

On the 28th of October a writ of error from this court was sued out in the name of all the defendants, and the Circuit Court on the same day made the following order:--

'And now, on motion of the defendants' attorneys, it is ordered that the amount of the bond to stay the execution of the judgment in this case, as to the possession of the land found by the findings filed herein to be in the separate possession of the defendant Lincoln, and also as to the judgment against him for damages and costs, be and the same is hereby fixed at $3,000. And it is further ordered that the amount of the bond to stay the execution of the judgment as to the land found by the findings filed herein to be in the separate possession of the defendants O'Ness, Onesti, and DeSilva, and also to stay the execution of the judgment against them for costs and damages, be and the same is hereby fixed at $3,000.'

On the following day separate bonds were filed by the defendants named in this order for the designated amounts, and conditioned as required by law for the stay of execution, which were approved and accepted in due form by the circuit judge, and on the 31st of October the following order was made by the Circuit Court:--

'A writ of error having been sued out and perfected by the defendants in said action, and defendant L. M. Lincoln having given the proper bond to operate as a supersedeas as to the judgment against him, and the defendants Onesti, O'Ness, and DeSilva having given a similar bond as to the judgment against them: ordered, that proceedings be stayed as to the moneys recovered against said Lincoln, and as to the sixty acres of land found by the court to be in his possession, as described in the findings in said cause; and also that the proceedings be stayed as to the judgment for damages and costs against said O'Ness, Onesti, and DeSilva, and as to the land found to be in their possession, as described in the findings of the court in this cause; and that a writ of restitution and execution issue as to the remaining defendants, and the remainder of the land recovered in the action.'

Afterwards, French applied to the clerk of the Circuit Court to issue execution against all the defendants, as well those who had filed supersedeas bonds as the others; and this being refused, he moved the court to vacate its order of October 31, and direct the complete execution of the judgment. This also being refused, he now prays 'that a writ of mandamus issue from this court to the Circuit Court,. . . directing said Circuit Court to proceed and completely execute its said judgment, notwithstanding said writ of error and said orders of said Circuit Court.'

Mr. John Reynolds for the petitioner.

Rule 29 of this court, following the requirements of sect. 1000 of the Revised Statutes, provides that in real actions the bond must be for an amount sufficient to secure the sum recovered, and 'just damages for delay,' and costs and interest.

In Stafford v. Union Bank of Louisiana (17 How. 275), this court held that, twhen the bond was not equal to the whole amount recovered, the writ did not operate as a supersedeas, and that a writ of mandamus would be awarded directing the Circuit Court to execute the judgment.

It is no answer to say that the judgment in question is in effect a separate one against each defendant, for the land in his possession, and for damages for his withholding the same; for it is the writ of error which operates as a supersedeas, and coextensive with its operation must be the stay.

If the judgment be such that each defendant is, indepen dently of the others, entitled to a stay, each must sue out his separate writ. The defendants, against whom several judgments have been entered, cannot join in the writ for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on this court, and then sever for any other purpose. All of them may be required to join in order to make the jurisdictional amount; and the writ cannot be upheld by the joinder, and operate severally.

Mr. Walter H. Smith, contra.

In California each defendant in ejectment may answer severally, and each demand findings and a judgment upon his possession of a separate parcel of the demanded premises Winans v. Christy, 4 Cal. 70; Anderson v. Parker, 6 id. 200; Curtis v. Sutter, 15 id. 264; Ellis v. Janes, 26 id. 276; Luse v. Clark, 28 id. 35. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant against whom a separate judgment has been entered may stay proceedings without giving a bond rendering him responsible for the judgments against his co-defendants.

The amount of the bond and the sufficiency of the surety are matters of discretion in the judge below. An error committed in that regard is not ground for a mandamus. Rev. Stat., sect. 1000; Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17. And a writ directing the execution of the judgment below will be refused, unless the record shows that on his part there has been mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty. United States v. Trigg, 11 Pet. 173. Stafford v. Union Bank of Louisiana, cited by counsel for the relator, is not applicable to this case.

MR. JUSTICE WAITE stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/85

Rh a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable modus operandi. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell how it is to be done. Now, I wish to be informed how this state interference is to be put in practice. We will take the existing case of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not repeal it, (as we probably shall not,) she will then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of Congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws—he, therefore, must be stopped. The collector will seize the goods if the tariff duties are not paid. The state authorities will undertake their rescue: the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector’s aid; and here the contest begins. The militia of the state will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the state. He will raise the on his standard, and spread it out as his banner. It will have a preamble, bearing that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the constitution. He will proceed, with his banner flying, to the custom house in Charleston,—

Arrived at the custom house, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. Here would ensue a pause; for they say, that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. Before this military array should fall on the custom house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have doubtless a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law was constitutional. He would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John Fries, he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? “Look at my floating banner,” he would reply; “see there the nullifying law!” Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted tor treason, that same floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar? “South Carolina is a sovereign state,” he would reply. That is true; but would the judge admit our plea? “These tariff laws,” he would repeat, “are


text: Talk:Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)

title: Talk:Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/163

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/163


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/86

82, palpably, deliberately, dangerously.” That all may be so; but if the tribunals should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of hemp-tax, worse than any part of the tariff.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, Defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is war—civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which the gentleman contends for. It must happen in the very first case to which it is applied. Is not this the plain result? To resist, by force, the execution of a law, generally, is treason. Can the courts of the United States take notice of the indulgence of a state to commit treason? The common saying, that a state cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can it authorize others to do it? If John Fries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these doctrines go the length of revolution. They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion; and therefore it is, that at the commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my public protest against them all.

The honorable gentleman argues, that if this government be the sole judge of the extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be in Congress or the Supreme Court, it equally subverts state sovereignty. This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot perceive how the right of judging, in this matter, if left to the exercise of state legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union. The gentleman’s opinion may be that the right ought not to have been lodged with the general government; he may like better such a constitution as we should have under the right of state interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact—I ask him to meet me on the constitution itself—I ask him if the power is not found there—clearly and visibly found there.

But, sir, what is this danger, and what the grounds of it? Let it be remembered, that the constitution of the United States is not unalterable. It is to continue in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power between the state governments and the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If any thing be found in the national constitution, either by original provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get rid of it. If any construction be established, unacceptable to them, so as to become, practically, a part of the constitution, they will amend it at their own sovereign pleasure. But while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can give, to the state legislatures a right to alter it, either by interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people have any


text:
Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)/Opinion of the Court

The argumnt in support of this petition is, that as when the judgment or decree is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the rule of this court (Rule 29) requires the bond for stay of execution to be for the whole amount of the judgment or decree; and as in this case the writ of error was sued out by all the defendants, and the aggregate of all the money judgments against them severally is more than $6,000, the bonds that have been executed are insufficient, and therefore no stay of execution has been lawfully perfected. The object of the rule, which was made to put into form the practice that had prevailed before its promulgation, is to secure the eventual payment or performance of the judgment or decree, the execution of which is stayed by the supersedeas, in case the appeal or writ of error is not prosecuted to effect. Here, although the writ of error has been sued out to obtain the reversal of the entire judgment, a stay of execution is sought only as to certain specified parts. The judgment is severable as between the defendants, and has actually been severed by the court below for the purposes of the stay of execution. We see no impropriety in this, as in legal effect the judgment as it stands is against each of the several defendants for the lands they respectively occupy, and the damages they are respectively liable to pay. In this view of the case the bonds are sufficient in amount and form. So far as the money parts of the judgment are concerned, they are far in excess in each instance of the amount recovered against the several defendants who seek the stay; and as to the damages on account of the detention of the property, we decided in Jerome v. McCarter (21 Wall. 17) that the amount of the bond rested in the discretion of the judge or justice who signed the citation or allowed the supersedeas, and would not be reconsidered here.

It is said, however, that if the judgment is separate, so that each defendant is entitled to a stay independently of the others, each must sue out his separate writ of error. To this we do not agree. The writ and the supersedeas are two separate things, and the writ can be sustained without a supersedeas. All the defendants want the judgment reviewed, but a part only desire to have the execution against them stayed; and we see no reason why they may not all join in the writ, and separate when they ask for a stay. There is certainly no settled practice against it, and very strong reasons can be found in its favor. The whole question is one of practice and not of statutory law. 'Good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error or the appellant. . . shall answer all damages and costs,' 'if he fail to make his plea good,' is all the statute (Rev. Stat. sect., 1000) requires; and the rules of practice are satisfied if the indemnity is commensurate with the damages that may follow from the stay which is effected. But if the writ is informal, the remedy is by motion to vacate the writ, and not by mandamus to have the judgment carried into execution.

Petition denied.


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/164

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/164


text: Talk:Ex parte French (100 U.S. 1)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/87

Rh power to do any thing for themselves; they imagine there is no safety for them any longer than they are under the close guardianship of the state legislatures. Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general constitution, to these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people of a state trust their own state governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend the constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or imperfections. And finally, the people of the United States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any state legislature to construe or interpret their instrument of government; much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation.

If, sir, the people, in these respects, had done otherwise than they have done, their constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provision shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every state, but as a poor dependant on state permission. It must borrow leave to be, and will be, no longer than state pleasure, or state discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence.

But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this, their own chosen constitution, for forty years, and have seen their happiness, prosperity, and renown grow with its growth and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally, strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault it cannot be; evaded, undermined,, it will not be, if we, and those who shall succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people, shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust—faithfully to preserve and wisely to administer it.

Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of having detained you, and the Senate, much too long. I was drawn into the debate, with no previous deliberation such as is suited to the discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it a subject of which my heart is full, and I have not been willing to suppress the utterance of its spontaneous sentiments.

I cannot, even now, persuade myself to relinquish it, without expressing, once more, my deep conviction, that since it respects nothing less than the union of the states, it is of most vital and essential importance to the public happiness. I profess, sir, in my career hitherto, to have kept steadily in view the prosperity and honor of the whole country, and the preservation of our Federal Union. It is to that Union we owe our


text:
Page:Webster and Hayne's Celebrated Speeches.djvu/88

84 safety at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that Union that we are chiefly indebted for whatever makes us most proud of our country. That Union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in the severe school of adversity. It had its origin in the necessities of disordered finance, prostrate commerce, and ruined credit. Under its benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke, as from the dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings; and although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its protection or its benefits. It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, social, personal happiness. I have not allowed myself, sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what might lie hidden in the dark recesses behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty, when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below; nor could I regard him as a safe counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be mainly bent on considering, not how the Union should be best preserved, but how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it shall be broken up and destroyed. While the Union lasts, we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that, in my day at least, that curtain may not rise. God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind. When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once-glorious Union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance, rather, behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured—bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as, What is all this worth? nor those other words of delusion and folly, Liberty first, and Union afterwards; but every where, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart—Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!


text:
Tintsman v. National Bank

MOTION to dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. D. T. Watson in support of the motion.

Mr. Welty McCullogh, contra.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

title: Tintsman v. National Bank


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/170

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/170


text: Talk:Tintsman v. National Bank

title: Talk:Tintsman v. National Bank


text:
Tintsman v. National Bank/Opinion of the Court

In Gray v. Blanchard (97 U.S. 564), we held that a case must be dismissed, if, on an examination of the whole record, it appeared that the value of the matter actually in dispute between the parties was less than our jurisdictional amount. This writ of error was brought by the defendant below to reverse a judgment against him of more than $5,000; but on looking into the record we find that the case was heard on an agreed statement of facts in the nature of a special verdict, in which it appeared that the plaintiff claimed of the defendant $8,233.79, and interest from June 4, 1876. The defendant admitted that he owed of this amount $5,099.59, for which the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment. The only controversy was as to the liability of the defendant for the difference between what he admitted to be due and what the plaintiff claimed, or $3,134.20. This, then, is the amount actually in dispute, and as it is less than $5,000, we have no jurisdiction.

Writ dismissed.


text: Talk:Tintsman v. National Bank/Opinion of the Court


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/173

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/173


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/174

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/174


text:
Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)

MOTION to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

This is an appeal taken by Garneau from a decree rendered in favor of the defendants below, partners doing business under the firm name of Dozier, Weyl, & Co. The authentication of the transcript of the record filed here is as follows:--

'UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, ss.

'I, M. M. Price, clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States in and for the Eastern District of Missouri, do hereby certify the writing hereto attached to be a true transcript of the record, proceedings, and exhibits in case No. 560 of Joseph F. Garneau, plaintiff, against Dozier, Weyl, & Co., defendants, as fully as the same remain on file and of record in said case in my office.

'In witness whereof I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of said court, at office in the city of St. Louis, in said district, this seventeenth day of July, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and seventy-seven.

[SEAL.] 'M. M. PRICE,

'Clerk of said Court.

'By T. L. CRAWFORD,

'Deputy.'

Mr. Edward Boyd in support of the motion.

Mr. Robert H. Parkinson, contra.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)


text: Talk:Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)

title: Talk:Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)


text:
Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)/Opinion of the Court

Since the act of June 8, 1872 (17 Stat. 330), Rev. Stat. 558, 624, 678, authorizing the appointment of deputies of the clerks of the courts of the United States, a transcript of the record is sufficiently authenticated for the purposes of an appeal or a writ of error to this court, if it is signed by the deputy in the name of and for the clerk of the court from which the appeal comes, or to which the writ of error is directed, and sealed with the seal of that court. The transcript sent up in this case comes within this rule.

Motion denied.


text: Talk:Garneau v. Dozier (100 U.S. 7)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Soule v. United States

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

This was an action by the United States on the bond executed by Soule as collector of internal revenue for the first collection district of the State of California, and his sureties, bearing date Jan. 12, 1867, and conditioned according to law. There was a judgment in favor of the United States. The defendants sued out this writ of error.

The assignment of errors and the facts are set forth in the opinion of the court.

Mr. W. W. Morrow for the plaintiffs in error.

The Solicitor-General for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Soule v. United States


text: Talk:Soule v. United States

title: Talk:Soule v. United States


text:
Soule v. United States/Opinion of the Court

Internal-revenue collectors are required, before entering upon the duties of their office, to execute a bond for such amount as shall be prescribed by the commissioner, under the direction of the secretary, with not less than five sureties, conditioned that the collector shall faithfully perform his duties, and account for and pay over to the United States all public moneys which may come into his hands and possession. 13 Stat. 225.

Pursuant to that requirement, the defendant first named, having been appointed such collector, on the 12th of January, 1867, gave the bond described in the complaint, and the other defendants signed the same as his sureties, the charge in the complaint being that the collector failed to perform the conditions of the bond.

Service having been made, the defendants appeared and pleaded as follows: 1. That the allegations of the complaint are not true. 2. That the bond is void because executed under duress. 3. Performance.

Subsequently the parties went to trial, and the verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff. Exceptions were filed by the defendants, and they sued out the present writ of error, and removed the cause into this court.

Errors assigned here are as follows:--

1. That the court erred in admitting in evidence the transcript of accounts as audited by the fifth auditor.

2. That the court erred in instructing the jury that the sureties were liable for the item charged in the transcript as the excess collected on the amount of gauger's fees.

3. That the court erred in instructing the jury that the transcript was prima facie evidence of the correctness of the item charged therein as the amount of error by the assessor in footing lists, as per report of the supervisor.

4. That the court erred in instructing the jury that upon the evidence given the bond was a voluntary bond and was not extorted, and that the collector and his sureties were liable upon it.

5. That the court erred in instructing the jury that the direction to the collector contained in the letter of the commissioner to execute the bond, he having previously given one, must be considered as the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Five things are established by the act of Congress: 1. That it is the duty of the commissioner to pay over daily to the treasurer all public moneys which may come into his possession. 2. That the treasurer is required to give proper receipts for the money, and keep a faithful account of the same. 3. That it is also the duty of the commissioner, at the end of each month, to render true and faithful accounts of all public moneys received or paid out or paid to the treasurer, and to exhibit proper vouchers for the same. 4. That it is the duty of the fifth auditor to receive such vouchers and examine the same, and to certify the balance, if any, and to transmit the accounts with the vouchers and certificate to the first comptroller for his decision thereon. 5. That it is the duty of the commissioner, when such accounts are settled as provided in that section, to transmit a copy thereof to the Secretary of the Treasury. 13 Stat. 223.

Argument to show that by the true construction of that section the fifth auditor is the proper officer to audit such accounts is scarcely necessary, as it is clear that the act contemplates that they should be audited, and that it does not devolve the duty upon any other officer. Conclusive support to that theory, if more be needed, is also derived from the first paragraph of sect. 277 of the Revised Statutes, which, among other things, provides that the fifth auditor shall receive and examine all reports of the commissioner of internal revenue, which of course embraces such accounts as that of the collector in this case, as it includes all the accounts rendered in the department of the commissioner. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.), sect. 277, p. 46.

Authority to appoint gaugers was conferred by the fifty-third section of the act imposing taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco, and for other purposes. 15 Stat. 147. Fees for gauging and inspecting, as prescribed by the commissioner, were to be paid to the collector by the owner or producer of the articles to be gauged and inspected. Such fees were to be retained by the collector until the last day of each month, when the aggregate amount of fees so retained was, under regulation of the commissioner, to be paid to the officers performing that duty, not to exceed, however, the rate of $3,000 per annum.

Four hundred and ninety-four dollars and thirty-eight cents, money collected from that source in excess of what the collector had paid out, remained in his hands, and was charged in the accounts as settled by the accounting officers of the treasury. Due exception was taken by the sureties to the ruling of the court that they were liable for that charge. No objection was made to the charge as against the collector, but the objection was that the sureties were not liable, because the money was received under the subsequent act.

Viewed in that light, it must be assumed that the charge was a proper one as against the collector, and inasmuch as it was money collected by law of the owner or producer of the articles to be gauged and inspected, it was clearly public money in his hands to which he had no legal right. By the terms of the bond in suit the sureties are to become responsible if their principal does not justly and faithfully account for and pay over to the United States all public moneys which may come into his hands or possession. Beyond doubt the amount went into his hands and possession as public money, and in the judgment of the court here, the ruling of the court below, that the sureties are liable for it, is correct. United States v. Powell, 14 Wall. 493, 502; United States v. Singer, 15 id. 111, 121.

When suit is brought in any case of delinquency of a revenue officer or other person accountable for public money, a transcript from the books and proceedings of the Treasury Department, certified by the register, and authenticated under the seal of the department,. . . shall be submitted as evidence; and the court trying the cause shall be authorized to grant judgment and award execution accordingly. Rev. Stat., sect. 886; Bruce v. United States, 17 How. 439; Smith v. United States, 5 Pet. 292; Cox v. United States, 6 id. 172; Hoyt v. United States, 10 How. 109.

Treasury settlements of the kind are only prima facie evidence of the correctness of the balance certified; but it is as competent for the accounting officers to correct mistakes and to restate the balance as it is for a judge to change his decree during the term in which it was entered. United States v. Eckford, 1 id. 250. Errors of computation against the United States are no more vested rights in favor of sureties than in favor of the principal. All such mistakes in cases like the present may be corrected by a restatement of the account.

Sufficient appears to show that the principal defendant was appointed collector March 28, 1865, in the recess of the Senate, to hold until the expiration of the then next session of Congress, and no longer. On the 25th of July following he was appointed to the same office by the President and was confirmed by the Senate. Due notice of his appointment was given, and he was furnished with a blank form of bond, which, on Nov. 2, 1866, he executed with sureties; but the bond being several and not joint and several, as it should be, he was officially requested to execute a new bond correcting that error. In pursuance of that request, on the 12th of January of the next year he executed the bond described in the complaint, and from the date of the first bond to the date of the second his accounts were settled by the treasury officers under the first bond. When the second bond was offered in evidence, the defendant objected to its admissibility; but the court overruled the objection, the instructed the jury that it was not extorted, which instruction constitutes the fourth exception.

Evidence to support the charge of duress is entirely wanting. Instead of that, the defendant testified that he did not remember that he made any objection to executing the bond, and supposed that he did it because the commissioner had given such directions.

Exception was also taken to the instruction of the court that the direction of the commissioner to execute a new bond must be considered as the direction of the secretary, which is so obviously correct as to require no argument in its support, as it is matter of common knowledge that the commissioner is a subordinate officer of the Treasury Department. Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 id. 720; Hamilton v. Dillon, 21 Wall. 73.

Suffice it to say that in view of these suggestions it is clear that there is no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Soule v. United States/Opinion of the Court


text: Ex Parte Reed

title: Ex Parte Reed


text: Talk:Ex Parte Reed

title: Talk:Ex Parte Reed