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The Slavers(Weathergage)

THIS, like the two preceding cases, was a libel filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, against a vessel in the port of that city, under acts of Congress, prohibiting the equipment, loading, and other preparation of the vessel, for the purpose of carrying on a trade in slaves, and like fitting, &c., and causing the vessel to sail for the purpose of procuring negroes, mulattoes, and persons of color, to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, &c. The libel was served October 23, 1860. On the 30th, John Morris, 'intervening for the interest of himself as owner of the vessel and carrier of the cargo, appears before the honorable court, and makes claim to the said vessel, &c.,' and averred himself to be true and bon a fide owner, &c. The District Court condemned the vessel. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the decree. Appeal here. The facts were thus:

On the 5th of September, 1860, one J. T. Woodbury purported to sell the vessel to 'John Morris, of New York,' 'for the sum of $12,000.'

The vessel was a bark of about 365 tons, 114 feet 8 inches long, 26 feet 6 inches wide, 13 feet 3 inches deep, with two decks and three masts.

The outward foreign manifest, sworn to by Edward Mitchell, who purported to be captain, on the 12th of September, 1860, represented her as bound for Hong Kong, vi a Ambriz, with a crew of fourteen men, and a cargo valued at nearly $19,000. The captain swore that this manifest contained 'a full, just, and true account of all the goods, and then actually laden on board said vessel;' that he will report any additional cargo, and also, that 'said cargo is truly intended to be landed in the port of Hong Kong, vi  Ambriz.'

The shipper's manifest purported to report of cargo shipped by Anthony Tuero, embracing the same goods, &c., contained in the manifest sworn to by the captain, and the oath, taken on the 12th of September, 1860, was, that 'the said merchandise is truly intended to be exported to Ambriz.' Tuero himself, whose deposition was taken in the District Court, though he was not examined in the Circuit, stated the same thing, namely, that the cargo was to be discharged at Ambriz, and that he was not to have anything to do with the vessel afterwards.

The bark had a between-deck, made of rough boards, about 5 1/2 feet below the main deck; two surf-boats, besides four other small boats, which were manifested, with oars, rudders, tillers, &c. The surf-boats were covered and had hatches. A lot of lumber was stowed between decks, manifested as 100 pieces, 4 by 6 timber, and 762 pieces pine boards; 17 coils of rope, 3 bolts of sail-duck, 8 anchors, coopers' tools, nails, and a variety of things, usual in fitting a slaver, but not unusual in fitting any vessel. She had 12 swivels, and quantities of muskets and powder.

The cargo included 80 barrels of bread, 85 barrels and 100 half-barrels of rice, 57 barrels mess-beef and pork, 10 barrels of flour, beans, meal, &c., 3 barrels of vinegar, sixty fathoms of chain, 40 kegs of paint, 10 cans of linseed oil, 4 cans of spirits of turpentine, 96 bundles of white oak shucks, 4 hogsheads of shucks for heads of casks, 2 boxes of coopers' tools, 114 casks filled with water, 10 furnaces and boilers, and a large lot of firewood, and 375 sheets of copper. Other portions of the cargo were blankets, coarse cotton goods, muskets, powder, rum, wine, &c. All this cargo was perfectly suited to the slave-trade.

As respected Morris, it appeared that no man of that name was, on the 6th September, when the bill of sale was made, known to be in the shipping business of New York. No person, indeed, of the name was known by clearing clerks, some of whom were examined, or others, at the custom-house at all. Nor had he been ever heard of by one Machado, a man extensively engaged in the African trade. The vessel was appraised by the custom-house appraisers at $9000; the cargo at $11,681. The partner of Woodbury,-the alleged vendor of the vessel, and confessedly a real person, one Schmidt, a ship-broker,-did not know Morris, or what his business was, or whether he lived in New York, or whether he was 'an owner or go-between.' He had only seen him once, in the street, two months before. Woodbury was at the hearing in the District Court in town, but was not called by the claimant, nor was the witness to the execution of the bill of sale examined or produced. When appeal was taken to the Circuit Court in Morris's name, on the 7th of February, 1861, the petition was signed by his counsel, and the bond then given for appeal. It was executed by one Fogerty, surety for Morris, but not by Morris himself. Fogerty swore that he had never heard of such a person as Morris till that morning, and that he had signed the bond because the counsel requested him.

Ambriz is a Portuguese town on the west coast. It was testified that there is no regular trade to Hong Kong vi a that port; and that vessels never clear from New York for China vi a any such place, though they do sometimes from South America. It was testified, also, that the ordinary size of vessels in the trade, on the west coast of Africa, is from 200 to 400 tons; that of those trading to China, averaging from 800 to 1200.

On the other hand, it seemed, if the testimony of Schmidt was to be received as true, that the $12,000 purchase-money of the vessel was actually paid by Morris to his partner Woodbury. No manacles, nor any unusual supply of medicines, were found on the vessel, which was unladed carefully. Her size and equipments, though fitting her for a slaver, were not unfit for a lawful voyage to the region where she purported to be going. All articles found on the vessel were entered on the manifest. Both vessel and cargo were consigned to one Lievas, superintendent of the English mines at Ambriz, who it was not suggested had been concerned at any time in the slave-trade. Ambriz itself was a town of about 3000 inhabitants, having a certain amount of commerce, but not any considerable amount; the same trade as the Congo River,-palm oil, ivory, hides, pepper and gum being shipped from the district. It is about 100 miles from any point where slaves are got. It has a custom-house, and exacts duties. It appeared that one house in Salem, Massachusetts, testified to be 'respectable,' traded there; that barks of about the same size with the Weathergage, and of a structure not essentially different, made voyages to the place; that temporary decks were sometimes highly convenient, and were used accordingly in lawful voyages to Africa; and surf-boats, also; these last being useful in loading and unloading. Large quantities of water, too, is sent out in casks; 'the water being pumped out, and oil, from the region, being poured in, just as the casks stand.' The cargo, generally, would be 'as likely to go for legal as illegal purposes.' The witness, however, who testified to this, and that $20,000 would not be an excessive value for a cargo bound to Ambriz, had never known 'just such a cargo' sent there as the one on the Weathergage, nor known of any vessel sent to Hong Kong vi a Ambriz, while neither knew he of any slave-trade vi a China. He had been established for ten years trading to the western coast of Africa and Gulf of Guinea, and had sent from seventy-eight to one hundred vessels there.

Mr. Beebee, for the appellant; Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton, contra.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: The Slavers(Weathergage)


text: Talk:The Slavers(Weathergage)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:The Slavers(Weathergage)


text:
The Slavers(Weathergage)/Opinion of the Court

This was a libel of information in a cause of seizure and forfeiture, and the case is brought here by an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Substance of the charge, as contained in the libel of information, is that the bark Weathergage was fitted, equipped, loaded, and otherwise prepared in the port of New York for the purpose of carrying on a trade or traffic in slaves to some foreign country; or for the purpose of procuring negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, from some foreign country, to be transported to some other port or place, to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, or to be held to service or labor. #fn-s-s

Process was served on the 23d day of October, 1860, and on the 30th of the same month, John Morris, intervening for the interest of himself as owner of the vessel, and as the carrier of the cargo, appeared before the court and made claim to the same, and was allowed to make defence. Testimony was taken, and a decree, condemning both vessel and cargo, was entered in the District Court. Claimant appealed to the Circuit Court, and the record shows that additional testimony was taken in that court, and that the decree of the District Court was subsequently in all things affirmed. Appeal was then taken by the claimant to this court, and the parties have here been again fully heard.

1. Condemnation and forfeiture were decreed both in the District and Circuit Courts, upon the ground that the evidence shows that the vessel was fitted, equipped, and loaded, or caused to sail, for the purpose of engaging in the slavetrade. Claimant denies that the finding was warranted by the evidence, and that is the principal question in the case. Undoubtedly, it is the preparation of the vessel, and the purpose for which she is to be employed, that constitute the offence, and draw after it the penalty of forfeiture. As soon, therefore, as the preparations have progressed so far, as clearly and satisfactorily to show the purpose for which they are made, the right of seizure attaches. #fn-s-s-s

Contrary to the views of the claimant, the counsel for the United States insist that the character of the preparations for the projected voyage was such as to indicate clearly that the purpose was the same as that charged in the libel of information. They admit that the circumstances given in evidence show that the projectors of the voyage had skilfully determined to give it the appearance of an honest and lawful enterprise; but they insist that a careful scrutiny of the evidence will show that the guilty purpose is not so successfully covered up with the garb of innocence as to conceal the true features of the transaction.

2. Looking at the evidence, it is apparent that it is, in its general characteristics, substantially the same as that exhibited in the other slave-trade cases decided at the present term. Differences are seen in the details of the evidence, but the quality and general nature of the proofs are substantially similar. Title of the bark, on the 5th day of September, 1860, appears to have been in one J. T. Woodbury, and the record shows that he on that day made a bill of sale of the same to one John Morris, of New York, for the sum of twelve thousand dollars. Counsel of the claimant introduced the bill of sale of the vessel, but they did not examine the person who witnessed its execution.

3. Proofs show that the Weathergage is a bark with two decks and three masts, and that she is of the burden of three hundred and fifty-five tons. Her outward foreign manifest, sworn to by the master, Edward Mitchell, on the 12th of September, 1860, represents her as bound to Hong Kong vi a Ambriz, with a crew of fourteen men, and a cargo valued at nearly nineteen thousand dollars. Statements of the manifest are, that it contains 'a full, just, and true amount of all the goods then actually laden on board the vessel,' and that the 'cargo is truly intended to be landed in the port of Hong Kong vi a Ambriz;' but the shipper's manifest states that the merchandise is truly intended to be exported to Ambriz, which is a place on the coast of Africa.

4. Suspicion attaches strongly to the equipment of the vessel. She had a temporary between-deck, made of rough boards, about five and a half feet below the main deck, and which was not necessary to carry the cargo laden on board; and she had a large quantity of lumber stowed between decks, and manifested as lumber, and eight thousand three hundred and eighty-two feet of pine boards. She had two surf-boats, besides four other small boats, together with rudders and tillers and 'oars for the same.' In addition to the articles mentioned, she also had seventeen coils of rope, three bolts of sail duck, eight anchors, coopers' tools, nails, and almost every variety of article which is essential in the fitment of a slaver. Mention should also be made, that she had as part of her fitment, though included as cargo, twelve swivels and a large quantity of muskets and powder.

5. Portions of the cargo proper should also be noticed, as affording strong grounds of presumption that the purpose of the voyage was such as is charged in the information. Among other articles, it contains eighty barrels of bread, eighty-five barrels and one hundred half barrels of rice, fifty-seven barrels of beef and pork, besides four barrels of flour, and six barrels of beans and meal, and three barrels of vinegar. Besides the articles mentioned, the manifest also shows that she had one hundred and fourteen casks filled with water, and shooks and headings to make ninety-six more, together with forty bundles of iron for hoops, such as is used on such casks. She had also ten furnaces and boilers, with a large quantity of fire-wood, and three hundred and seventy-five sheets of copper. Argument for the claimants is, that the cargo was as suitable for a lawful voyage to the supposed port of destination, as for the purpose charged in the libel of information; but it is not possible to accede to that proposition. On the contrary, it seems to us, in view of the evidence in the case, that the manifest is a 'more complete one, in every respect, for engaging in the slave trade,' than any one heretofore presented to the court.

6. Although the master testified that the cargo was intended to be landed at Hong Kong, the great weight of the evidence shows that it was destined for Ambriz, or some other port on the coast of Africa. The shipper was not called as a witness in the District Court, but he was examined in the Circuit Court. He testified that he owned and shipped the cargo, and that it was to be discharged at Ambriz, and that he was not to have anything to do with the vessel, after the cargo was discharged. Libellants prove that there is no trade from New York to Hong Kong, or any other port in China, by the way of Ambriz, or any other port on that coast, and that no vessel ever cleared from the port of New York for such a voyage.

7. None of the witnesses, on the one side or the other, know the alleged owner and claimant of the vessel. Satisfactory proofs were introduced, showing that there was not then and has not been since, to the time of the hearing, any person by that name engaged in the shipping business in the port of New York. Two or more clearance clerks were examined, and they testify that they never heard of a business man there of that name. Persons who have for years been engaged in the China and African trades were also examined, and they testify to the same effect. Even Schmidt, the ship-broker and partner of the person who sold the vessel for twelve thousand dollars, testifies that he never saw him but once, and that was in the street, and that he did not know whether he was the actual owner, or merely the agent of the real purchaser of the vessel. Woodbury, the grantor of the vessel, was not called by the claimant. When the appeal was taken in the Circuit Court, the petition was signed by his counsel, and the bond given on the appeal, although drawn for the signature and seal of the claimant, was executed only by a surety, and the surety testifies that he never heard of such person until the morning of the day when his examination as a witness took place. Neither the master nor any of the crew are called to explain any of these inculpatory circumstances, nor is there any attempt to afford any explanation upon the subject. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the finding in the court below was clearly correct. The decree of the Circuit Court is, therefore,

AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:The Slavers(Weathergage)/Opinion of the Court


text:
The Slavers(Reindeer)

THE bark Reindeer, Cunningham, master, was forced by stress of weather into Newport, R. I., July 11, 1862, where the collector of the port immediately placed her in custody of a revenue officer. On the 1st of August he made a formal seizure of her for violating the laws relating to the slavetrade. On the 7th of August following, the United States filed a libel and information in the District Court for Rhode Island, against the bark, her tackle, cargo, &c., in a case of seizure and forfeiture, alleging,

First. The fitting and other preparation of the vessel within, and causing her to sail from, the port of New York, by a citizen or resident, &c., of the United States, for the purpose of carrying on a trade in slaves, contrary to the provisions of the first section of the act of Congress of 22d March, 1794, &c.

Second. The employment and making use of the said vessel by a citizen or persons, &c., residing in the United States, in the transportation or carrying of slaves, &c., contrary to the provisions of the first section of the act of 10th May, 1800; and,

Third. The fitting, &c., of said vessel within, and causing her to sail from, the port of New York, by a citizen or citizens of the United States, or other person or persons, for the purpose of procuring negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, &c., to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, &c., contrary to the provisions of the second section of the act of 20th April, 1818, &c.

On the 28th of August, 1861, one Gregorio Tejedor, said to be a Spanish subject, residing at Havana, and alleging himself to be owner of the cargo and charterer of the bark, intervened, averring that he was the bon a fide owner of the cargo and charterer of the vessel.

On the 2d of September, 1861, D. M. Coggeshall, sheriff of the county of Newport, and H. P. Booth, J. E. Ward, and Samuel Shephard, alleging themselves to be attaching creditors of one Pearce of New York, owner of the vessel, filed a claim and answer, denying the allegation of the libel that the vessel was a slaver. They also averred that Coggeshall, as sheriff, on the 20th July, 1861, again on the 26th July, 1861, seized and attached the bark, by virtue of attachments duly issued out of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island; that, by virtue thereof, he then became possessed of her, and ever since has held, and, by reason thereof, that this court has no jurisdiction of the vessel, &c. They also averred that the acts charged were stated to have been done at New York, and not within the district of Rhode Island, and therefore denies jurisdiction.

During the progress of the cause, the vice-consul of the Queen of Spain, at Boston, filed a claim, professing to intervene 'for the Government of her Catholic Majesty,' and claiming the bark and cargo as the property of Gregorio Tejedor, a Spanish citizen. But there was no sufficient evidence that he was authorized to do this by the Government of Spain, or that the Government participated in the controversy in the court below.

The District Court condemned the vessel, cargo, &c., from which decree, Coggeshall, sheriff, and Booth, Ward, and Shephard, appealed to the Circuit Court. Tejedor also prayed an appeal, but did not take it.

So far, therefore, as the interests and rights of Tejedor were concerned, the decree of the District Court was final, and could not be here disturbed.

The Circuit Court ordered a sale of the vessel, &c., and cargo; and, on the 20th of January, 1862, the marshal sold her for $3000, and the cargo for $7756.52.

The Circuit Court heard the case on the appeal of Coggeshall, Ward, Booth, and Shephard, and affirmed the decree of the District Court, from which decree the said Coggeshall, Ward, Booth, and Shephard appealed to this court.

This case, therefore, came before this court neither on the claim or appeal of the alleged owner of the vessel, nor on the claim or appeal of the alleged owner of the cargo, but on the appeal of persons who had attached-legally or otherwise-the vessel, &c., and cargo, at Newport, as judgment creditors of P. L. Pearce, of New York, by virtue of process of attachment issued out of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island against Pearce.

The facts on which their claim arose, as derived from a full and accurate printed statement prepared by Mr. Coffey, late Assistant Attorney-General, and now special counsel of the United States in the matter, were essentially as follow:

The bark, then on a voyage somewhere, was forced by weather, as already mentioned, into Newport, July 11th, 1861.

On the 27th of June, 1861, Pearce, of New York, confessed judgment to H. P. Booth, in the Supreme Court, City and County of New York, for $11,128.56.

On the 19th of July, 1861, after the arrival of the bark at Newport, Ward, Shephard, and Booth, partners, trading as Ward & Co., of New York, the appellants in this case, issued a writ out of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, at Newport, against Pearce, also of New York, for his arrest, and, for want of his body, for the attachment of his goods, &c., to the value of $500. On the 20th of July, 1861, the sheriff returned that on that day he had attached the bark and cargo, the goods and chattels of Pearce. The account for which this suit was brought was for $300 cash furnished Captain Cunningham, of bark Reindeer, to pay off rew, on 13th July, 1861, and $50 cash to Captain Cunningham, on 15th July, 1861, in all $350, advanced after the arrival of the vessel at Newport. On the third day of August Term, 1861, the plaintiffs obtained judgment by default for $350 debt, and costs, taxed at $9.90.

The Reindeer was a vessel of 248 tons, with one deck and three masts, 100 feet long, 35 feet 3 inches broad, and 11 feet deep. She was owned by Pearce, of New York, and was commanded by W. H. Cunningham, of the same place. Pearce was a ship chandler and commission merchant in New York during the winter of 1860-' 61, and had the vessel stripped, calked, resheathed, and refitted previous to her departure on a projected voyage. She was also built with a rider, an arrangement for laying an extra deck. Pearce employed J. E. Ward & Co., of New York (the claimants in this case, by virtue of their attachment of the vessel and cargo as above stated), to advertise and despatch her. Under these auspices she cleared and sailed for Havana on the 26th of January, 1861, where she arrived about the 20th of February following, consigned to Perez & Martinez, of that place.

J. E. Ward & Co. shipped on her to Havana, among other things, 14,700 lbs. of tasajo, or dried beef, and a box of hardware. Her outward manifest exhibited, besides, twenty-two packages of hardware.

The shipping articles, signed at New York, dated 26th of January, 1861, described the bark Reindeer as 'now bound from the port of New York to one or more ports in Cuba; from thence to one or more ports in Europe, if required, and back to a port of discharge in the United States, or from Cuba back to the United States.' The crew-list appended showed the captain, two mates, and seven men, of whom four deserted in Cuba, whose places were there filled. The captain and the rest of the crew remained all the time with the vessel, and were on her when she arrived at Newport.

The four sailors shipped in Cuba were shipped 'to go a voyage to Falmouth, from thence to one or more ports of Europe, and back to a port of discharge in the United States.'

Pearce, the owner of the vessel, arrived in Havana about the middle of March, and remained there until the 6th of May following.

The history of the vessel at Havana was thus: She laid at Havana from the 20th of February to the 22d of June, 1861. One of the consignees, Martinez, stated that Pearce went there to sell the vessel; that he made a contract to sell her to Tejedor for $7000, which Tejedor did not carry out; but that on the 10th of May Tejedor chartered the vessel, by charter-party, from Perez & Martinez, after Pearce had left Havana, for the sum of $8500, of which Tejedor paid $4000. Of this, Martinez testified that $1500 was for detention of the vessel from 23d of March until 10th of May. A charter-party was produced, dated 23d March, 1861, signed by Captain Cunningham, 'on behalf of P. L. Pearce, owner of the said vessel, and Perez & Martinez, according to instructions handed to them by said owners,' chartering the vessel to Gregorio Tejedor for three years, for which Cunningham acknowledges 'to have received this day from Gregorio Tejedor' $8500, giving Tejedor exclusive disposal of vessel, master, and crew, and right to place his own supercargo on board, he to bear all expenses and pay repairs.

On the 22d of June, 1861, the Reindeer cleared at Havana 'for Falmouth, England, and for orders.'

Having set sail from Havana on that day, the captain, in his protest, swore, 'that on Tuesday, the 2d day of July, 1861, at sea, in about latitude 31°, longitude 69°, during a squall, the ship was caught aback, and, having gained sternway, wrenched the rudder-head and carried away the foreyard, when, finding the ship unfit to perform the voyage, squared away for Newport, Rhode Island, where we arrived July 11.'

The location of the vessel, as above stated, when the captain was thus compelled to put into Newport, showed her, according to Maury's Geography of the Sea, to have been on the route to the west coast of Africa.

On the day after her arrival at Newport, the captain borrowed of T. & J. Coggeshall $30 to pay the crew; on the 15th July, $60, and on the 18th, $50, for the same purpose; making a bill, with other advances, of $186.83. The crew were then discharged, and all disappeared, none of them being produced as witnesses by claimant, or otherwise accounted for. The captain drew a sight draft on Pearce, to reimburse T. & J. Coggeshall, which Pearce paid.

On the arrival of the vessel at Newport, Pearce wrote the captain (23d July, 1861), directing the bills of lading to be forwarded to him; and he paid the wages and expenses of the voyage.

Martinez testified that on her arrival at Havana, 20th of February, 1861, all her cargo from New York was delivered. He also says his house (Perez & Martinez) loaded her afterwards for Tejedor; that everything was put on board with permits from the custom-house; that he got the permits himself from the custom-house in every instance; and that he was on the wharf when the goods were shipped to the vessel in the lighter, and saw every package put on board.

The list of cargo taken from the vessel showed a quantity of articles not on the manifest. These were casks of high-colored paint, pickled fish, coarse salt, two barrels of lime, and four jars of chloride of lime, cases of medicines, medicinal herbs and lint, coarse sponges, one demijohn of disinfecting fluid, sixty-five water-pipes, part full and part empty, which appeared to have been used as fresh-water pipes, and a quantity of flag matting.

Her manifested cargo was of 117 pipes of rum, 65 half pipes of rum, 16 pipes of biscuit, 8740 lbs. of tasajo, or dried beef, a large quantity of which she had brought from New York, one box of hardware, and 19 packages of the same, wine, brandy, gin, candles, cigars, and 200 oars. Part of the cargo consisted of casks and packages of saucepans, cooking-pans with covers, iron spoons, thirty mess or campkettles, three casks, each containing iron chains from 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch in diameter, of such length that one or two chains occupied a cask, padlocks, and machats, or war-knives. On the ship's manifest these were described as 'one bale hardware,' 'nineteen packages hardware.'

The marshal of the United States, Sanford, found on board the vessel, when he seized her at Newport, a package purporting to be a sealed letter, containing several papers, among them a paper issued from the custom-house at Havana upon what is called a 'sea letter;' a letter used for the protection of vessels against the examination of a man-of-war at sea, not to be opened by the captain, but only by an officer of the customs, or an officer of a man-of-war. This 'sea letter,' dated 22d of June, 1861, the day of the bark's departure from Havana, declared the destination of the Reindeer to be St. Antonio. St. Antonio is an unimportant island in the Cape de Verd Group, in a line from Havana to the western coast of Africa. The other papers were custom-house permits for embarking certain articles on the vessel, one dated 22d of May, and the other 19th of June. Both declared her to be bound for St. Antonio, and both were obtained by Perez & Martinez, who loaded the vessel for Tejedor.

The manifest of cargo from Havana to Falmouth reported 'two passengers, cabin,' Don Pedro Garcia and Don H. A. Pinto. These persons came whth the vessel to Newport. Garcia had been captain of a coasting vessel in Cuba, and said that he had been to the coast of Africa after slaves, but was now a passenger. Pinto first said that he was on board as supercargo, which he afterwards repeated; but after he was arrested and put in jail, he denied that he was anything but a passenger.

Mr. Gillet, for the appellant: We admit that Tejedor, by not appealing, acquiesced in the decision of the Circuit Court, and that his claims must be laid out of view on this hearing. He conceded, so far as the present appellants are concerned, that the vessel and cargo belonged to Pearce, and was lawfully attached, and that he has no claim upon either.

The questions are, therefore, now between the United States, claiming through the marshal's seizure under the libel, and that of the sheriff and creditors upon their prior seizure under the attachments.

1. We contend upon these that there was no sufficient evidence to show a fitting out, &c., of the vessel in New York. Whatever fitting out and clearance there was by any one for any place, was at Havana by Perez & Martinez for Tejedor, a Spanish subject, residing at Havana. It is not even certain that the voyage was for the slave-trade at all. The history of objects and motives in Cuba is not well proved. [The counsel here exfoliated and enforced these views, commenting on and interpreting, as he conceived it, the evidence.]

2. The vessel and cargo were in possession of the State Court of Rhode Island, and that court had a right to retain the custody. The principle that the court, whose process first seizes property, cannot be interfered with by another jurisdiction, was settled by Taylor v. Carryl in this court. For this reason there is no jurisdiction.

3. The offence, such as it is, so far as Pearce is concerned, is charged to have been committed in New York. Yet the vessel is seized in Rhode Island, where no offence is committed at all, nor is alleged to have been. Jurisdiction fails here, too.

Mr. Coffey, special counsel of the United States, contra: No doubt, Havana was the place where most of the fitting out was done. This, however, was to evade detection. The voyage was begun in New York. Much of that same '14,700 pounds of tasajo,' or dried beef, that same 'box,' and those same, or very nearly those same 'twenty-two packages of hardware,' which were shipped to Havana from New York, were found on the vessel at Newport, and after they had been shipped from Havana to some other place; what other place we shall consider directly. Further than that, the same sailors (four excepted), who left New York January 26, 1861, for Havana, are found on board at Newport (on July 11th), after the voyage to Havana had been ended, and the vessel at rest there for four months. This shows the continuity of the voyage.

To what place was this voyage? Maury's Geography of the Sea shows that the vessel was in the direct course to Africa when compelled to put into Newport. The cargo was all of it suited to the slave-trade. Much of it was scarce suited to anything else. Machats, or war-knives, innocently described as 'hardware;' 'sponges,' an article used to wash slaves after being packed under the hatches; 'vinegar,' given to them to rinse their mouths; 'medicines,' for these poor beings; disinfecting fluids, chloride of lime, mess-kettles, casks of long iron chains, with padlocks, as indicative of the purpose of the voyage as manacles or handcuffs would be, are for the slave-trade specially. How can such articles be vindicated as a cargo to Falmouth, England, especially as coming from Cuba? Tasajo is imported from Buenos Ayres, and is a food specially for slaves. St. Antonio was more truly described as a destination, since it was in the direct line of the true destination; but it was not itself that destination. St. Antonio is a poor port of the Cape de Verds; insignificant and insecure at once; a place for which such a cargo would have been wholly too large, and as much unsuited. The extent of the repairs show a long voyage. Garcia and Pinto, though entered as passengers, confessed that they were not so; though they afterwards tried to lie themselves out of the confession, when the vessel was seized. Undoubtedly they were managers of the voyage.

The charter-party was a fraud. The testimony of Martinez brought to sustain it, shows that Tejedor paid $1500 more for the use of the vessel for three years, than Pearce asked for the whole title; and nearly three times as much as the vessel brought when sold at Newport. Martinez testifies that Pearce 'made a contract to sell her to Tejedor.' No doubt this was the scheme; but when the vessel was compelled to put into Rhode Island, and was seized, it became plain that this plan would not stand; a sale being a nearly invariable badge of a slaver voyage. A charter-party was resorted to, and an attachment by creditors.

It is not worth while to discuss the law of priority between State and Federal liens; for the marshal of the United States took the vessel as soon as she entered Newport; and,

2. The attachment, as we have signified, is as much fraudulent as every other part of the scheme. The case comes here confessedly on the appeal of the attaching creditors. The attachment was for a sum of $350, and $9.90 costs. Is it to vindicate a right to this sum that an appeal is taken from the Circuit Court of Rhode Island to this high tribunal? that counsel are made to wait the 'law's delay,' for half a winter in the Federal metropolis? Will counsel assert this? Pearce was plainly owner.

But if the attachment were not fraudulent, the United States would have priority; for a forfeiture made absolute by statute, relates back to the time of the commission of the offence. This is ancient and settled law.

It is settled as well, that the district where the seizure is made has jurisdiction of a proceeding in rem.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: The Slavers(Reindeer)


text: Talk:The Slavers(Reindeer)

title: Talk:The Slavers(Reindeer)


text:
The Slavers(Reindeer)/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, in a cause of seizure and forfeiture.

The libel of information against the bark Reindeer and her cargo, was filed in the District Court on the seventh day of August, 1861, and the transcript shows that it contains twenty counts, founded upon various provisions contained in the several acts of Congress, prohibiting the slave-trade. But the material charges to be considered in this investigation are the following:

1. That the vessel was, on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1861, by some person, being a citizen of the United States, or residing within the same, for himself or for some other person, either as master, factor or owner, fitted, equipped, and prepared within the port of New York, for the purpose of carrying on trade or traffic in slaves to some foreign country, or for the purpose of procuring from some foreign kingdom, place or country, the inhabitants thereof to be transported to some foreign country, port or place, to be sold and disposed of as slaves.

2. That the vessel being owned by a citizen of the United States, was by him at the time aforesaid, for himself as owner, fitted, equipped, loaded, and prepared in the port of New York, for the purpose of procuring negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, from some foreign kingdom, place, or country, to be transported to some other port or place, to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

Process was forthwith issued and duly served on the same day, and on the twenty-eighth day of the same month, Gregorio Tejedor appeared as claimant. Referring to the claim as exhibited in the record, it will be seen that he averred under oath that he was the true and bon a fide owner of the cargo and the charterer of the vessel, and the record also shows that he was allowed to make defence. Claim was also duly filed by the appellants. They allege in substance and effect, that the vessel was owned by the Pierre L. Pearce, and they base their claim to the vessel and cargo upon the ground that the first-named appellant, as the sheriff of the county of Newport, held the same, at the time of the seizure by the marshal, under certain writs of attachment issued in favor of the other appellants against the owner of the vessel from the State court, and consequently, they insist that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the case.

No claim was ever filed by the owner of the vessel or by any other person in his behalf. Testimony was taken on both sides in the District Court, and after the hearing, a decree was entered condemning both the vessel and cargo as forfeited to the United States. Claimant of the cargo and the present appellants appealed to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district.

Subsequently, they were heard in the Circuit Court upon the same evidence, and after the hearing, a decree was entered affirming the decree of the District Court. Whereupon, the claimants under the attachment suits appealed to this court, and now seek to reverse the decree, upon the ground that the possession of the sheriff was prior to that of the marshal, and that such prior possession has the effect to defeat the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

I.-1. Parties who have not appealed, are not entitled to be heard in this court, except in support of the decree in the court below. They cannot ask for a reversal in the appellate court, and consequently the only questions really before the court are those presented by the appellants as attaching creditors of the owner of the vessel. Appeal not having been taken by the claimant of the cargo, he must be understood as having acquiesced in the correctness of the decree entered by the Circuit Court; and it has already been stated that the owner of the vessel never made any claim. Remark should be made, that during the hearing in the District Court, the Vice-consul of the Queen of Spain, resident at Boston, professing to intervene 'for the Government of her Catholic Majesty,' filed a claim for the vessel and cargo as the property of Gregorio Tejedor, but it does not appear that the claim was ever prosecuted, and inasmuch as no appeal was taken, either to the Circuit Court or to this court, it is unnecessary to comment further upon that subject.

2. Appellants allege that Pierre L. Pearce, of the city of New York, was the owner of the vessel, and the proofs fully sustain the allegation. Proofs also show that the bark was a vessel of two hundred and forty-eight tons, with one deck and three masts. Her register shows that she was a hundred feet in length, and thirty-five feet in breadth, and that she was eleven feet in depth; and the proofs also show that her construction and arrangement were well suited for the illegal traffic in which it is alleged she was engaged. Prior to the sailing of the vessel, she was placed on the dry-dock and calked, resheathed, and otherwise repaired and fitted for the projected voyage. After being fully repaired, she was advertised for a voyage to Havana by James E. Ward & Co., shipping and commission merchants, acting as the agents of the owner. Under these auspices she cleared from the port of New York, and sailed for Havana, on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1861, where she arrived on the twentieth of February following.

Her shipping articles describe the voyage as one from the port of New York to one or more ports in Cuba, from thence to one or more ports in Europe, if required, and back to a port of discharge in the United States, or from Cuba back to the United States. Ship's company, as appears by the crew-list, consisted of the master, William H. Cunningham, two mates and seven seamen, all of whom were on board at the time of the seizure, except four of the seamen who deserted in Cuba, and whose places were immediately supplied by the master. They were shipped for a voyage from Havana to Falmouth, from thence to one or more ports of Europe and back to a port of discharge in the United States.

Counsel of the United States contend that the vessel was evidently fitted, equipped, and otherwise prepared and caused to sail from the port of New York to Havana, with the ultimate purpose that she should proceed to the west coast of Africa to engage in the slave-trade. As supporting that theory, they refer to the construction and arrangement of the vessel, and to the fact that the crew were shipped not for Havana, but for a voyage from New York to one or more ports in Cuba, and from thence to one or more ports in Europe, and back to a port of discharge in the United States, or from Cuba back to the United States; and they also refer to the repairs put upon the ship, as tending to show that she was intended for a long voyage.

Reference is also made to the fact that the owner, although in the shipping business himself, employed J. E. Ward & Co. to put the vessel up, and also to the fact that they advertised and despatched her as his agents. They shipped part of the cargo, and the manifest shows that their shipment included one box and twenty-two packages of hardware, and fourteen thousand seven hundred pounds of tasajo, or dried beef, which it is proved comes from Buenos Ayres, and is not an article of shipment from New York to Havana, but is an article imported into Cuba from South America, and is largely used for feeding negroes.

The vessel laid at Havana over four months before she received her cargo. She was consigned to the house of Perez & Martinez, and the latter testifies that all her cargo from New York was duly unladen and delivered. During all that time the master and the crew remained on board, drawing full wages, except the four who deserted, and their places were immediately supplied. Pearce, the owner of the vessel, arrived at Havana on the fifth of March, 1861, and the proofs show that he remained there until the sixth day of May following.

3. Theory of the claimant of the cargo in the court below, was that the owner went there to sell the vessel, and that he actually made a contract to sell her to the claimant for the sum of seven thousand dollars, which was not carried into effect; that the claimant failing to make the purchase, subsequently chartered the vessel for the term of three years, for the sum of eight thousand five hundred dollars. He produced a charter-party, which is to that effect, bearing date on the twenty-third day of March, 1861, executed while the vessel was laying at Havana.

Expenses for repairs, wages of the master and crew, and expenses for provisions and all other expenses, were to be borne by the charterer, but there was no change in the shipping articles, or in the crew-list, or in any of the ship's papers. On the contrary, the voyage went on as it was begun at New York, and the same officers and crew remained on board till the vessel was seized as hereinafter explained. One of the consignees of the vessel testifies that his firm, Perez & Martinez, afterwards loaded the vessel for the alleged charterer, and he states that the entire cargo was put on board under permits from the custom-house, but the list of the cargo taken from the vessel, shows that a large quantity of articles, specially suited to the slave-trade, were not on the manifest, and consequently it is highly improbable that they were put on board under the sanction of public authority.

Articles not on the manifest embrace sixty-five water-pipes, casks of high-colored paint, pickled fish, coarse salt, two barrels of lime, four jars of chloride of lime, cases of medicines, medicinal herbs and lint, coarse sponges, and one demijohn of disinfecting fluid. Her manifested cargo, also, is of the same criminating character. Among the articles are, one hundred and seventeen pipes of rum, and sixty-five half pipes, sixteen pipes of biscuit, eight thousand seven hundred and forty pounds of tasajo, and one bale and nineteen packages of hardware, besides wine, brandy, gin, and two hundred oars. Part of the cargo, innocently described in the manifest as hardware, consisted of saucepans, cooking-pans, casks containing iron chains, padlocks, and war-knives.

All of these articles are proved to be used in the slave-trade, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion, that they were all exported from the port of New York.

On the 22d day of June, 1861, the vessel cleared at Havana for Falmouth, England, and for orders. Protest of the master, dated at Newport, R. I., on the 12th day of July 1861, states, 'that on Tuesday, the second day of that month, at sea, in about latitude thirty one degrees, longitude sixty-nine degrees, during a squall, the ship was caught aback, and having gained sternway, wrenched the rudderhead and carried away the foreyard, when, finding the ship unfit to perform the voyage, squared away for Newport,' where the vessel arrived on the eleventh of the same month.

Suggestion on the part of the United States is, that the location of the vessel, as described in the protest at the time when she was obliged to abandon the voyage and sail for a port of refuge, shows that she was on the direct route to the coast of Africa; and it must be admitted that there is great force in the suggestion.

4. Libellants deny that the charter is a bon a fide instrument, and as showing that it cannot be so regarded, they refer to the fact that the alleged charterer agreed to give fifteen hundred dollars more for the charter than the owner asked for a full title of the vessel. Theory of the libellants is that the whole transaction is a simulated one, and that the charter was manufactured to conceal the real fact that the owner had sent his vessel to Havana for the purpose of completing her fitment for the contemplated slave-trading voyage. They insist that his original design was to set up the theory of a sale, but that he was obliged to abandon that theory, lest he should destroy the claim of the appellants under their attachments.

Support to the theory that the charter-party is not a bon a fide instrument is certainly derived from the evidence in the case, that fourteen packages of stores for the vessel were shipped at New York, on the 10th of May, 1861, by the order of the owner, and consigned to the master. None of the packages were manifested, and the directions were that they should not be, and they were not landed at Havana, but were transhipped directly on board the Reindeer. Strong confirmation of that theory is also derived from the subsequent conduct of the owner after the seizure of the vessel. Irrespective of any or all previous theories, he at once, on the arrival of the vessel at Newport, assumed to treat the vessel and cargo and the whole enterprise as his own, as appears by his letter to the master, and by his conduct in the payment of the wages and expenses of the voyage.

When the vessel was seized, there was found on board by the marshal a sealed package, containing what is called by the witnesses a sea letter. Such a letter is designed, as represented by one of the witnesses, for the protection of the vessel in case she should be boared by an officer of the customs, or an officer of a man-of-war. This sea letter was dated the 22d day of June, 1861, and stated that the destination of the vessel was not to Falmouth but to St. Antonio, one of the Cape de Verd islands, and the custom-house permits found on board contained the same representation.

On the other hand, the voyage in the manifest is described as one from Havana to Falmouth, and it reports two 'passengers, cabin, Pedro Garcia and Hato A. Pinto.' They were on board the vessel at the time of the seizure, and the one first named admitted that he had once been to the coast of Africa for slaves, but insisted that he was a mere passenger. Pinto at first admitted that he was supercargo; but afterwards, when he was arrested, denied that he was anything but a passenger. Neither of these persons was produced as a witness by the claimants, and no satisfactory explanation is given why they were not called.

Claimants not only failed to call either of the supposed passengers who were on board, but they have neglected to call the master or any one of the crew, and the evidence shows that the master has absconded. They have introduced no one who knew what the real destination of the vessel was except one of the consignees, and his testimony in unsatisfactory, and, in many respects, utterly incredible.

5. Unusual as was the conduct of the owner of the vessel, in omitting to present any claim for the same, it was even more so in the course adopted by him to enable the attaching creditors to obtain judgment against him for a debt contracted only four days before he was sued. On the day after the arrival of the vessel, the master borrowed thirty dollars of Messrs. T. & J. Coggeshall to pay the crew; and on the fifteenth of July following, he borrowed of the same parties the sum of eighty dollars; and on the eighteenth of the same month the further sum of fifty dollars for the same purpose. He paid the crew, and they were discharged; and thereupon he drew a sight-draft on the owner to reimburse the lenders, and the amount was promptly paid. Attaching creditors, James E. Ward & Co., sued out a writ of attachment against the owner of the vessel, on the 19th day of July, 1861, alleging the damages in the sum of five hundred dollars; but the amount for which the suit was brought is only for the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars, and consists of two items, one dated July the thirteenth, and the other July the fifteenth, and both are for cash advanced to the master of the vessel to pay off the crew.

Plaintiffs in that suit, it will be remembered, were the agents of the owner in putting up and despatching the vessel at the inception of the voyage, and they were the shippers of the hardware and the tasajo, as appears by the manifest. Return was made upon the attachment suit on the 20th day of July, 1861, and the proofs show that the defendant in the suit refused to allow counsel to continue the case, and consented that the plaintiffs should have judgment. Taken as a whole, the circumstances attending that suit and its prosecution afford strong grounds to infer that the purpose of the suit was to furnish the means of defeating the jurisdiction of the District Court.

Both the District and the Circuit Courts were of the opinion, that the facts and circumstances to which reference has been made afford a clear presumption that the allegations of the libel are true, and in that view of the case we entirely concur. Doubt cannot be entertained that the evidence of guilty purpose, from the inception of the voyage to the time when the vessel was compelled by stress of weather to sail for Newport, is abundantly sufficient to overcome every presumption of innocence to which any such voyage can be entitled, and to establish the truth of the charges under consideration as contained in the libel.

Suits of this description necessarily give rise to a wide range of investigation, for the reason, that the purpose of the voyage is directly involved in the issue. Experience shows that positive proof in such cases is not generally to be expected, and for that reason among others the law allows a resort to circumstances as the means of ascertaining the truth. Circumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately considered, may, be their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof. Applying that rule to the present case, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the finding in the court below was correct.

II. Appellants contend, in the second place, that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the case. 1. Because the vessel and cargo, as they insist, were in the custody of an officer of a State court at the time the monition was served by the marshal. 2. Because the wrongful acts, if committed at all, were committed in the District of New York, and not in the district where the libel was filed.

Three answers are made by the United States to the first objection to the jurisdiction of the court.

First. They deny the fact, that either the vessel or cargo was ever in the exclusive possession of the officer of the State court.

Secondly. They insist that the attachment suit was a collusive one between the appellants and the owner of the vessel, and that the same was only prosecuted as the means of defeating the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

Thirdly. They contend that the possession of the sheriff under civil process from a State court, as supposed by the appellants, will not prevent the operation of the laws of the United States in suits of forfeiture, or oust the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts in a case like the present, where the forfeiture is made absolute by statute, because in such a case the forfeiture relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and takes date therefrom, and not from the date of the decree.

1. Undoubtedly it was decided by this court in the case of Taylor et al. v. Carryl, that where a vessel had been seized under a process of foreign attachment issuing from a State court, the marshal, under process from the admiralty, issued from the District Court of the United States, in a libel for seamen's wages, could not take the property out of the custody of the sheriff; but in that case the sheriff had the prior and exclusive possession of the property.

The undisputed facts, however, in this case are otherwise. Immediately on the arrival of the vessel at Newport the collector placed a custom-house officer on board of her, and that officer was in the actual possession of the vessel and cargo when the attachment was made. Both vessel and cargo were then in the custody of the United States, and so in fact remained until the same were sold by the marshal by the order of the Circuit Court. By order of the district attorney, the collector, some days before the libel was filed, made a formal seizure of the vessel for a violation of the slave-trade acts; and at that time the revenue officer who had taken possession of the vessel before she was attached, still had her in custody, and he remained in possession of her until the sale, when the proceeds were paid into the registry of the court. Under these circumstances it is clear, we think, that the case of Taylor et al. v. Carryl does not apply, and that the seizure was rightfully made.

2. Our conclusion also is, from the evidence, that the suit of the appellants was a collusive one; and upon that ground, also we are inclined to hold that the objection of the appellants must be overruled. Having come to that conclusion, it is unnecessary to examine the third answer presented by the United States to this objection.

III. Remaining objection of the appellants to the jurisdiction is, that the wrongful acts, if any, were committed out of the district where the libel was filed. But there is no merit in the objection, as the rule is well settled, that libels in rem may be prosecuted in any district where the property is found. Such was the rule laid down by this court in the case of The Propeller Commerce; and it is clear, beyond controversy, that the present case is governed by the rule there laid down.

The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore

AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:The Slavers(Reindeer)/Opinion of the Court


text: Albany Bridge Case

title: Albany Bridge Case


text: Talk:Albany Bridge Case

title: Talk:Albany Bridge Case


text:
Albany Bridge Case/Opinion of the Court

COLEMAN filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, to enjoin the Hudson River Bridge Company from building a bridge over the Hudson River at Albany, under an authority which had been granted by the Legislature of the State of New York. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill. On appeal here the whole matter-as well the general question of the constitutional right of a State to pass a law authorizing the erection of bridges over navigable rivers of the United States, as the more special question, whether the navigation of the Hudson would be practically obstructed by this bridge, as it was proposed to erect the same-was fully and most ably argued by Mr. Secretary of State Seward, and the Honorable Mr. J. V. L. Pruyn, M. C., in favor of the right to build, and by Messrs. Carlisle Senator Reverdy Johnson, contra. But the court being equally divided, no opinion on any point was given, and the decree so stood a

DECREE AFFIRMED OF NECESSITY.

For the nature and effect of a decree of this sort, see Krebbs v. Carlisle Bank, 2 Wallace, Jr. 49, note.

title: Albany Bridge Case/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Albany Bridge Case/Opinion of the Court


text:
Mrs. Alexander's Cotton

In the spring of 1864, a conjoint expedition of forces of the United States, consisting of the Ouachita and other gunboats, with their officers and crews, under Rear Admiral Porter, and a body of troops under Major-General Banks, proceeded up the Red River, a tributary of the Mississippi, and which empties into that river three hundred and thirty-four miles above its mouth, as far as Shreveport, in the northwestern corner of Louisiana. The Southern insurgents were, at this time, in complete occupation of the district. About the 15th of March these Government forces captured Fort De Russy, a strong fort, which the insurgents had built, about half way between Alexandria and the mouth of Red Rever. The insurgents now evacuated the district in such a way that most of that part of it on the river fell under the control of the Union arms. This control, however, did not become permanent. The insurgents rallied; and returning, reinstated themselves. The Union troops fell back, leaving the district occupied as it had been before they came. The actual presence and control of the Government forces lasted from the middle of March to near the end of April,-something less than eight weeks. During it, an election of delegates to a Union Convention, appeared to have been held in or about Alexandria, under the orders and protection of General Banks, though the evidence of what was done in the matter was not clear. 'The community,' one witness testified, 'was almost unanimous against secession when it commenced, and have so continued.' But of this they gave no overt proofs; none at least that reached this court.

During the advance of the Federal forces, and about the 26th of March, a party from the Ouachita-acting under orders from the naval commander-landed on the plantation of Mrs. Elizabeth Alexander, in the Parish of Avoyelles, a part of the region thus temporarily occupied, and upon the river. They here took possession of seventy-two bales of cotton which had been raised by Mrs. Alexander on the plantation, and which, having escaped a conflagration which the rebels, on the advance of the Government forces, had made of the crop of the preceding year, were stored in a cotton-gin house, about a mile from the river. The cotton was hauled by teams to the river bank, and shipped to Cairo, in Illinois. Being libelled there, as prize of war, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, and sold pendente lite, Mrs. Alexander put in a claim for the proceeds, and the court made a decree giving them to her. This decree being confirmed in the Circuit Court, the United States appealed here.

The question raised before this court was, whether this cotton was or was not properly to be considered as maritime prize, subject to the prize jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

As respected the nature of the Red River and the character of the vessels used in the conjoint expedition, it appeared that seagoing vessels do not navigate it, the same not affording sufficient water for them; that no other vessels than steamboats of light draft, engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight, usually navigate it; that the gunboats so called, used on this expedition, were of light draft, similar, in many particulars, to steamboats, many of them having been steamboats altered to carry guns and munitions of war generally, though not previously used, nor well capable of being used at sea for any purpose; that guns were mounted on them in order that such guns might be used in connection with and in subordination to the army in its active operations against the enemy in the small streams of the West and Southwest, away from the seaboard.

As regarded Mrs. Alexander's personal loyalth the evidence was not very full. She had assisted somewhat to build Fort De Russy, which was within a few miles of her own plantation, but, according to the testimony, did this only on compulsion. She was equally kind, it was testified, to loyal persons and to rebels, when either were sick or wounded. She had particular friends among persons of known loyalth; but there were one or two Confederate officers who came to her house,-the testimony being, however, that they were perhaps attracted thither neither by Mrs. Alexander's politics nor by her cotton, but by the beauty of some 'young ladies' who resided with her, and whom they went to 'visit.'

Three weeks after the cotton had been seized, Mrs. Alexander took the oath required by the President's proclamation of amnesty, of December 8, 1863; a proclamation which gives to persons who took the oath 'full pardon,' 'with restoration of all rights,' except as to slaves and 'property, cases where rights of third persons shall have intervened.' But it was upon the condition that persons should thenceforward 'keep their oath inviolate.' Mrs. Alexander never left the territory on which her plantation was situated, nor it. The estate was her own, and she had resided on it since 1835. She was about sixty-five years old at the time of these events.

Such were the facts. In order, however, perfectly to comprehend the case as it stood before the court, it is necessary to make mention of certain acts of Congress bearing on it.

Congress, by act of August 6th, 1861, to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, declared, that if any person should use or employ any property in aiding, abetting or promoting the insurrection, or consent to such use or employment, such property should 'be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found.'

And by act of July 17th, 1862, to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, &c., it declared (§ 6), that 'all the estate and property' of persons in rebellion, and who, after sixty days public warning [which warning the President gave by proclamation], did not return to their allegiance, liable to seizure; and made it the duty of the President to Seize it; prescribing the mode in which it should be condemned.

And by a third act, that of March 12th, 1863, 'to provide for the collection of abandoned property, and for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts,' &c., made it the duty, under penalty of dismission, &c. (§ 6), of 'every officer or private of the regular or volunteer forces of the United States, or any officer, sailor or marine in the naval service of the United States, who may take or receive any such abandoned property, or cotton, sugar, rice or tobacco from persons in such insurrectionary districts, or have it under his control, to turn the same over to an agent' to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, under whose charge the matter is put by the act, and who accordingly issued regulations in regard to such property. The act provides, however, that none of its provisions shall apply 'to any lawful maritime prize by the naval force of the United States.' This act, it may be added (§ 3), provides that 'any person claiming to have been the owner of such abandoned or captured property may, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and on proof to the satisfaction of the said court of his ownership, &c., and that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, receive the residue of such proceeds after the deduction of any purchase-money which may have been paid, together with the expense of transportation and sale.'

With these acts there may, perhaps, for the sake of absolute completeness, be presented the act of July 17th, 1862, for the better government of the navy, enacting (§ 2), 'that the proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken on them, which shall be adjudged good prize, shall, when of equal or superior force to the vessel making the capture, be the sole property of the captors, and when of inferior force be divided equally between the United States and the officers and men making the capture;' and also that of 2d July, 1864, passed after this capture, declaring 'that no property, seized or taken upon any of the inland waters of the United States by the naval forces thereof, shall be deemed maritime prize,' but shall be turned over, as provided in the already mentioned act of March 12th, 1863.

Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton, and Mr. Eames, for the United states:

1. At the time when the combined expedition entered this region, in March, 1864, and when it left it in May, eight weeks afterwards, it was completely in enemy possession and control. Rebel power, civil and military, held it. The region was, therefore, enemies' country, and the people were enemies, irrespectively of the loyalty or disloyalty of individuals. The Prize Cases in this court, and among them The Amy Warwick, adjudge this. The fact that there was momentary military occupation of the region in part by the co-operating army of the United States on the day of this capture, did not change this enemy character; for the possession of the United States was unfirm, as shown by the event. After constant military activity, the rebel power was reinstated. Independently of all this, insurrectionary and hostile character was fixed upon the region and property by different acts of Congress, including the 'Abandoned and Captured Property Act' of March 12, 1863, which made the property of all people in the region 'liable to seizure;' and made it the duty of the President to 'seize' and have it condemned.

2. The property, though private property, was liable to seizure and confiscation, it being a great commercial staple of the enemy, the product of his own soil, grown and gathered in time of war; in peace his greatest, and in rebellion his only resource. It is matter of common knowledge that cotton has been the means by which the rebel confederation-'this government' of Davis-has procured money or munitions of war from England and France at all.

3. It is lawful prize of war, though made by the navy on land. The prize jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in England has always been exercised in cases of belligerent naval capture on land, as much as in cases of naval capture on the high seas; and this, too, whether such capture on land be made by the naval force acting alone or in co-operation with the army. Enemy property so captured has always, in England, been condemned as prize of war.

This jurisdiction was declared by the Court of King's Bench, A.D. 1781, in the two great cases of Le Caux v. Eden and Lindo v. Rodney; Lord Mansfield delivering the judgment of the court in the latter case. The earliest British authorities are there cited and reviewed. Since these two judgments, no part of the law laid down in them has been disputed in England; but, on the contrary, it has been affirmed by the courts of common law, as in Lord Camden v. Home, and Smart v. Wolff, and has been accepted and applied to naval captures on land by Lord Stowell and other judges in the High Court of Admiralty in a series of cases. We may refer, also, to the case of Alexander v. The Duke of Wellington, in the Chancery of England.

In the United States, this British view of the prize jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty in England over such naval captures on land, has been recognized by this court in Brown v. United States, and in Jennings v. Carson, where Marshall, C. J., delivered the opinion.

title: Mrs. Alexander's Cotton


text: Talk:Mrs. Alexander's Cotton

title: Talk:Mrs. Alexander's Cotton


text:
Mrs. Alexander's Cotton/Opinion of the Court

But the District Courts of the United States have all the jurisdiction of the British courts of admiralty, both in prize and on the instance side. The case of Glass v. Sloop Betsy, decided by this court A. D. 1794, put this point at rest. Its authority, never seriously questioned as to this point, has been recognized in Talbot v. Jansen, and in The Brig Allerta. Judge Story, who is known to have been the author of the note in the Appendix to 2d Wheaton on 'The Principles and Practice in Prize Cases,' apparently takes the view which we here maintain.

1. Fort De Russy was captured by the Government forces about the middle of March, and our forces held complete possession though temporary-for about eight weeks. During this time, an election took place for delegates to a State Convention; which Convention was afterwards held, and a new Constitution formed for that State. Coming after the army had driven the enemy from all that part of Louisiana, and had taken possession of it,-so that her loyal citizens could hold a civil election at which they expressed their constitutional voice for delegates to a State Convention,-the flotilla, commanded by Commodore Porter, which came there to assist General Banks in clearing out the rebel army, seized the cotton in question. Is it possible to affirm of it that it was seized in a country then enemies'?

The circumstances of the United States and these insurgent States are peculiar, and different from any presented in the books. In the first place, bands of men have formed combinations to resist the authority of the United States in portions of its territory. They deny and will not recognize the laws and authorities of the United States, and have taken up arms to enable them to hold our territory forcibly, to the exclusion of our law officers. We are opposing this rebelious force by armed force, in order that we may reassert our Government's constitutional authority over this territory. As fast as we can repossess ourselves of this territory, which we are constantly doing in greater or less quantity, we invite the people to resume their political and civil rights, and we extend to them the protection of law, supported by our military power. We have done this in West Virginia and in many other places, and those countries are now in the full enjoyment of their political and civil rights. Yet those territories and their people were as much under rebel rule and dominion at one time as is now that part of Louisiana under consideration. The enemy has been has been frequently in the territory of West Virginia-at this date, February, 1865, the best secured of any-in as strong force as he now is in Louisiana. The duration of his possession has nothing to do with the rights of the people restored to them by the act of our Government in resuming its lawful authority over the country. The moment the people were relieved from rebel military rule, the political and civil power of the usurpers was broken, and the jurisdiction and authority of the United States was supreme. It gave to the loyal citizen that dominion over his property, accompanied with rights of property, such as he enjoyed before this rebel rule intervened.

We have, therefore, only to inquire whether we held that part of Louisiana as reconquered territory for the time we were in possession? Was rebel rule at an end for that time? While we maintained the exclusive possession, we held it by a valid title; and it does not matter whether there was a full legal resumption of political and civil authority. It was such conquest and such possession as have been held by all authorities, and by our own Government, valid, and as entitling the loyal citizen to the enjoyment of his rights of citizenship and property. No act of the sovereign afterwards, whether the country is lost again by force of the enemies' reconquest, or by treaty and cession, can change it. The rights which accrued to the citizen by the resumption of this authority by his sovereign have become fixed; and if the subject-matter is within the reach of our courts, he may successfully assert them. The legal disabilities which were cast upon him and his property by the forcible and fraudulent occupancy of the country by insurgents, were removed the moment the United States wrested the territory from them and reasserted its authority. It is a matter of common knowledge that vast amounts of property, reaching in value millions of dollars, were released by this single months's possession of our authorities, and that it found its way into the loyal portions of the United States by the simple volition of its owners. The legality of the title thus acquired has never been questioned. This case does not differ from those cases in any respect, except that these naval boats, instead of Government transports, took out this claimant's cotton. Both were taken out while we held this exclusive possession, and there was no enemy there to oppose. The navy might as well have captured that cotton of citizens while afloat, or after it reached its destination in the loyal States, as to have taken Mrs. Alexander's cotton. The legal status of the cotton when it reached the loyal States was no better than it was while on Red River, within our lines and jurisdiction. The principle which made the title valid in one place lost none of its power, in that respect, in the other place. It was the occupancy and resumption of authority by the United States, in that country, which made the title in the loyal citizen valid. There was no 'illegal traffic,' such as this court referred to in The Amy Warwick, cited by Mr. Assistant Attorney Ashton, which stamped this cotton as 'enemies' property.' It was not at that time within the control of the enemy, so that he could use it for war purposes. It is wholly freed from that difficulty.

The rule being that the test is the predicament of the property, not the sentiment or acts of the owner, the court will look at such predicament only. If the owner is not under the jurisdiction and control of the enemy, then his property, being at the time of the alleged capture free from that control, is not in the predicament which makes it ex necessitati rei, ememy property.

If there were no positive law authorizing the court to recognize and enforce these rights with respect to the territory of which we are daily repossessing ourselves, the rule which we are contending for should be declared by this court as a matter of public policy, growing out of the necessities of our peculiar political situation. As one consequence of this rebellion, rules of property and of personal rights have been and must be declared by the courts, for which there is no clear judicial or legislative precedents. As there should be no right without a remedy, so the courts will not suffer our loyal people, who have been, themselves and their property also, placed in peril by this unfortunate conjunction of political circumstances, for which they are in nowise responsible, to go away without redress. When delivered from these perils by the act of the Government, they and their property should be subjects of fostering care by all departments of the Government, where no rights are to be violated and no well-defined principles ignored. The frequency with which these cases must recur, and the vast magnitude of the interests involved, will not fail to commend them all to the favorable consideration of the court. In Mitchell v. Harmony this court said: 'Where the owner (of property) has done nothing to forfeit his rights, every public officer is bound to respect them, whether he finds the property in a foreign or hostile country or in his own.'

It is impossible to fix disloyalty on Mrs. Alexander. She took the oath of allegiance at the earliest practicable date. There was no one to administer it to her before the date when she actually took it. Her loyalty saves her property from the operation of the act of 6th of August, 1861, confiscating property used for insurrectionary purposes; and from that also of July 17, 1862, authorizing the President to seize and confiscate the property of rebels. It would be unreasonable to ask, that a widow, sixty-five years old, of infirm health, probably, who has lived in one spot-a plantation, in a rural parish-for thirty years, should leave the only home she has on earth, and follow the army of the United States, under penalty of being declared judicially a 'rebel,' and of having her estate confiscated. In such a case, the question of loyalty is to be tested by animus and acts. Here all establish loyalty.

Neither does her case come within the Abandoned Property Act of March 12, 1863. It is no part of this case that Mrs. Alexander ever abandoned her plantation. On the contrary, much of the argument of the other side proceeds on a supposition-a true one that she remained on it; and so remained in an enemy's country.

2. If the property is not enemy's property at all, it matters not whether it be one sort of product or another. It is to be protected, being private. 'Private property on land is now,' says Halleck, 'as a general rule of war, exempt from seizure or confiscation; and this general exemption extends even to cases of absolute and unqualified conquest.'

There are exceptions to this rule, it is true. 1st. Confiscations, or seizures by way of penalty for military offenses; 2d. Forced contributions for the support of the invading armies, or as an indemnity for the expenses of maintaining order, and affording protection to the conquered inhabitants; and, 3d. Property taken on the field of battle, or in storming a fortress or town. But there is no pretence that the seizure here is on any such grounds.

If the property were on general grounds liable to seizure, Mrs. Alexander's having taken the oath, should save it. The good faith of the Government is involved. She took the oath of allegiance, in accordance with the invitation of the President's proclamation, December 8, 1863. She is entitled to an honest and faithful compliance on the part of the Government, with all the terms of pardon and exemption as to herself and her property of that proclamation. It is not acting in good faith with her to take her property and treat it as enemy property, when she so promptly responded to this Executive invitation. That proclamation, having been issued by the President of the United States, in so far forth as it held out inducements and made promises, and persons acted under and in pursuance with it, constitutes a legal contract, which shall be alike binding on the Government and such persons. The moment she took the oath prescribed by that proclamation, she was entitled to the full benefit of the 'restration of all rights of property,' as therein promised, so far as this cotton is concerned.

3. There can be no valid capture by the navy of enemy property on land. What, in the first place, is this Red River? It is a wholly inland stream. Its mouth is more than three hundred miles from the ocean. But this cotton was not on the river even. It was a mile away from it, stored in a cottongin house. There is no decision of this court recognizing right of capture by the navy in such cases. The act of July 2, 1864, forbids it. There are some decisions of courts other than this, which, it is contended, go to the necessary extent. But none of them, we think, really do. Jennings v. Carson simply decides, that the District Court has admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and makes no reference to the jurisdiction in captures made on land. The same observation is true of The Brig Allerta, of Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, and of Talbot v. Jansen, cited on the other side.

Counsel argue that the general jurisdiction in maritime and admiralty, which these cases decide as belonging to the District Court, draws after it the jurisdiction of land captures, because it has been recognized in the Prize Courts of England. But the Prize Courts of England derive this peculiar jurisdiction from municipal statutes. To give the court jurisdiction of captures on land, in any other case, it must appear that the property so captured belonged in some way to a capture made on the sea, as in the case of Lindo v. Rodney. And what sort of a 'navy' were these inland boats?

As to the English cases cited by Judge Story in his Essay in 2 Wheaton, it is enough to say, that the case of Le Caux v. Eden, is the leading one, and that finally went off on the proposition that the treaties, laws of England, and the orders of the Admiral, justified the seizure of the property on land. Lord Mansfield, who decided the case, in the note to it, put his decision on that ground; the facts of the case did not require him to go further. He also held that when property is once captured on the high seas, and it is unlawfully carried ashore, the captors may recapture it on the land.

It is worthy of remark that Lindo v. Rodney, and Alexander v. The Duke of Wellington, cited to sustain the position that lawful captures may be made on land by naval forces, both disclose the important fact that that jurisdiction is derived from municipal law. Lord Mansfield cites and relies upon treaties, acts of Parliament, &c., to sustain this jurisdiction. The statutes are 17 Geo. II, c. 34, § 2, and 29 Geo. II, c. 34, § 2, in which power is given to the Lords of the Admiralty, to grant commissions, &c., 'for attacking or taking with such ship, or with the crew thereof, any place or fortress upon the land,' &c. Having cited them, Lord Mansfield says, 'Upon these authorities, there can be no doubt of the right to make land captures.' And so in the case of Alexander v. The Duke of Wellington, it appears that the proceedings sought to be reviewed, were in pursuance to the statute 54 Geo. III, c. 86, § 2, where land captures by the army are provided for, and prize-money awarded the officers and men engaged in the capture as booty.

No case has ever arisen in this country which has made it necessary to decide the question broadly. This court, in Brown v. United States, cited on the other side, rather disclaims the doctrine that captures, as prizes of war, could be made on land, without further legislation by Congress.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.

This controversy concerns seventy-two bales of cotton captured in May, 1864, on the plantation of Mrs. Elizabeth Alexander, on the Red River, by a party sent from the Ouachita, a gunboat belonging to Admiral Porter's expedition. The United States insist on the condemnation of the cotton as lawful maritime prize. Mrs. Alexander claims it as her private property. The facts may be briefly stated.

In the spring of 1864, a naval force of the United States, under Rear Admiral Porter, co-operating with a military force on land, under Major-General Banks, proceeded up Red River towards Shreveport, in Louisiana. The whole region at the time was in rebel occupation, and under rebel rule. Fort De Russy, about midway between the mouth of the river and Alexandria, was captured by the Union troops about the middle of March. The insurgent troops gradually retired until a considerable district of country on Red River came under the control of the national forces. This control, however, was of brief continuance. An unexpected reverse befell the expedition. The army under General Banks was defeated, and was soon after entirely withdrawn from the Red River country. The naval force, under Admiral Porter, necessarily followed, and rebel rule and ascendency were again complete and absolute. The military occupation by the Union troops lasted rather less than eight weeks. Its duration was measured by the time required for the advance and retreat of the army and navy. The Parish of Avoyelles was a part of the district thus temporarily occupied; and the plantation of Mrs. Alexander was in this parish, and upon the river. The seventy-two bales of cotton in controversy were raised on the plantation, and were stored in a warehouse about a mile from the river bank. A party from the Ouachita, under orders from the naval commander, landed on the plantation about the 26th of March, and took possession of the cotton. It was sent to Cairo; libelled as prize of war in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois; claimed by Mrs. Alexander; and, by decree of the District Court, restored to her. The United States now ask for the reversal of this decree, and the condemnation of the property as maritime prize.

After the seizure of the cotton, Mrs. Alexander took the oath required by the President's proclamation of amnesty. The evidence in relation to her previous personal loyalty is somewhat conflicting. She had furnished mules and slaves, involuntarily as alleged, to aid in the construction of the rebel Fort De Russy. She now remains in the rebel territory. Before the retreat of the Union troops, elections are stated to have been held, under military auspices, for delegates to a constitutional convention about to meet in New Orleans.

These facts present the question: Was this cotton lawful maritime prize, subject to the prize jurisdiction of the courts of the United States?

There can be no doubt, we think, that it was enemies' property. The military occupation by the national military forces was too limited, too imperfect, too brief, and too precarious to change the enemy relation created for the country and its inhabitants by three years of continuous rebellion; interrupted, at last, for a few weeks; but immediately renewed, and ever since maintained. The Parish of Avoyelles, which included the cotton plantation of Mrs. Alexander, included also Fort De Russy, constructed in part by labor from the plantation. The rebels reoccupied the fort as soon as it was evacuated by the Union troops, and have since kept possession.

It is said, that though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs. Alexander has no personal sympathy with the rebel cause, and that her property therefore cannot be regarded as enemy property; but this court cannot inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the principle of public law, so often announced from this bench as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until by the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed.

We attach no importance, under the circumstances, to the elections said to have been held for delegates to the constitutional convention.

Being enemies' property, the cotton was liable to capture and confiscation by the adverse party. It is true that this rule, as to property on land, has received very important qualifications from usage, from the reasonings of enlightened publicists and from judicial decisions. It may now be regarded as substantially restricted 'to special cases dictated by the necessary operation of the war,' and as excluding, in general, 'the seizure of the private property of pacific persons for the sake of gain.' The commanding general may determine in what special cases its more stringent application is required by military emergencies; while considerations of public policy and positive provisions of law, and the general spirit of legislation, must indicate the cases in which it application may be properly denied to the property of non-combatant enemies.

In the case before us, the capture seems to have been justified by the peculiar character of the property and by legislation. It is well known that cotton has constituted the chief reliance of the rebels for means to purchase the munitions of war in Europe. It is matter of history, that rather than permit it to come into the possession of the national troops, the rebel government has everywhere devoted it, however owned, to destruction. The value of that destroyed at New Orleans, just before its capture, has been estimated at eighty millions of dollars. It is in the record before us, that on this very plantation of Mrs. Alexander, one year's crop was destroyed in apprehension of an advance of the Union forces. The rebels regard it as one of their main sinews of war; and no principle of equity or just policy required, when the national occupation was itself precarious, that it should be spared from capture and allowed to remain, in case of the withdrawal of the Union troops, an element of strength to the rebellion.

And the capture was justified by legislation as well as by public policy. The act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6th, 1861, declares all property employed in aid of the rebellion, with consent of the owners, to be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found. And it further provided, by the act to suppress insurrection, and for other purposes, approved July 17, 1862, that the property of persons who had aided the rebellion, and should not return to allegiance after the President's warning, should be seized and confiscated. It is in evidence that Mrs. Alexander was a rebel enemy at the time of the enactment of this act; that she contributed to the erection of Fort De Russy, after the passage of the act of July, 1862, and so comes within the spirit, if not within the letter, of the provisions of both.

If, in connection with these acts, the provisions of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March 12, 1863, be considered, it will be difficult to conclude that the capture under consideration was not warranted by law. This last-named act evidently contemplated captures by the naval forces distinct from maritime prize; for the Secretary of the Navy, by his order of March 31, 1863, directed all officers and sailors to turn over to the agents of the Treasury Department all property captured or seized in any insurrectionary district, excepting lawful maritime prize.

Were this otherwise, the result would not be different, for Mrs. Alexander, being now a resident in enemy territory, and in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court of the United States so long as that relation shall exist. Whatever might have been the effect of the amnesty, had she removed to a loyal State after taking the oath, it can have none on her relation as enemy voluntarily resumed by continued residence and interest.

But this reasoning, while it supports the lawfulness of the capture, by no means warrants the conclusion that the property captured was maritime prize. We have carefully considered all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the captors, and are satisfied that neither of them is an authority for that conclusion. In no one of these cases does it appear that private property on land was held to be maritime prize; and on the other hand, we have met with no case in which the capture of such private property was held unlawful except that of Thorshaven. In this case such a capture was held unlawful, not because the property was private, but because it was protected by the terms of a capitulation. The rule in the British Court of Admiralty seems to have been that the court would take jurisdiction of the capture, whether of public or private property; and condemn the former for the benefit of the captors, under the prize acts of Parliament, but retain the latter till claimed, or condemn it to the Crown, to be disposed of as justice might require. But it is hardly necessary to go into the examination of these English adjudications, as our own legislation supplies all needed guidance in the decision of this case.

There is certainly no authority to condemn any property as prize for the benefit of the captors, except under the law of the country in whose service the capture is made; and the whole authority found in our legislation is contained in the act for the better government of the navy, approved July 17th, 1862. By the second section of the act, it is provided that the proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken on board of them, which shall be adjudged good prize, shall be the sole property of the captors, or, in certain cases, divided equally between the captors and the United States. By the twentieth section, all provisions of previous acts inconsistent with this act are repealed. This act excludes property on land from the category of prize for the benefit of captors; and seems to be decisive of the case so far as the claims of captors are concerned.

As a case of lawfully captured property, not for the benefit of captors, its disposition is controlled by the laws relating to such property. By these laws and the orders under them, all officers, military and naval, and all soldiers and sailors, are strictly enjoined, under severe penalties, to turn over any such property which may come to their possession to the agents of the Treasury Department, and these agents are required to sell all such property to the best advantage, and pay the proceeds into the National Treasury. Any claimant of the property may, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, bring suit in the Court of Claims, and on proof of ownership of the property, or of title to the proceeds, and that the claimant has never given aid or comfort to the rebellion, have a decree for the proceeds, deducting lawful charges. In this war, by this liberal and beneficent legislation, a distinction is made between those whom the rule of international law classes as enemies. All, who have in fact maintained a loyal adhesion to the Union, are protected in their rights to captured as well as abandoned property.

It seems that, in further pursuance of the same views, by an act of the next session, Congress abolished maritime prize on inland waters, and required captured vessels and goods on board, as well as all other captured property, to be turned over to the Treasury agents, or to the proper officers of the courts. This act became a law a few weeks after the capture now under consideration, and does not apply to it. It is cited only in illustration of the general policy of legislation, to mitigate, as far as practicable, the harshness of the rules of war, and preserve for loyal owners, obliged by circumstances to remain in rebel States, all property, or its proceeds, to which they have just claims, and which may in any way come to the possession of the Government or its officers.

We think it clear that the cotton in controversy was not maritime prize, but should have been turned over to the agents of the Treasury Department, to be disposed of under the act of March 12th, 1863. Not having been so turned over, but having been sold by order of the District Court, its proceeds should now be paid into the Treasury of the United States, in order that the claimant, when the rebellion is suppressed, or she has been able to leave the rebel region, may have the opportunity to bring her suit in the Court of Claims, and, on making the proof required by the act, have the proper decree.

The decree of the District Court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to

DISMISS THE LIBEL.


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