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 due to the attacks on the expenditure of the secret-service fund, with regard to which George II was particularly sensitive. These were led by Shippen (3 July 1727) and Pulteney (21 Feb. 1727 and 29 Feb. 1728). The result was that Atterbury's son-in-law Morice wrote to him on 24 June 1728, ‘Walpole gains ground and governs more absolutely than in the latter reign. Mr. Pulteney's removal from the lieutenancy of one of the Yorkshire Ridings is one instance of his power.’ The influence of the ministry with the king was strengthened by the success of the negotiations for the treaty of Seville [see, (1690?–1756)], signed on 9 Nov. 1729, which for the time deprived the Jacobites of their last hope of aid from a foreign power.

The opposition now conceived the project of undermining Walpole's power by depriving him of the customary means of securing it in the House of Commons. On 16 Feb. 1730 Sandys [see ] introduced the pension bill to disable persons in receipt of pensions from sitting in parliament. The king ordered Walpole to oppose it in the House of Commons, but he refused, leaving it on this occasion, and in 1734 and 1740, to be thrown out by the lords (, Const. Hist. iii. 352). Meanwhile his relations with Townshend increased in difficulty. In 1729 an altercation between them ended in a scuffle and drawn swords. In December there were rumours of Townshend's retirement (Lady Mary Howard to Lord Carlisle, Carlisle MSS. p. 62). The tories, sensible that the direction of foreign policy was passing into Walpole's hands, now violently attacked him on the score of the French alliance, of which he was known to be a warm advocate. They inflamed the public mind with pretences that the Walpoles were betraying the interests of England by neglecting to insist on the provision of the treaty of Utrecht, and of that of 1717 for the demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk. At the instance of Bolingbroke, Sir W. Wyndham brought on a debate with the object of proving that Dunkirk was becoming an increasing menace to the south coast, and indirectly of breaking the French alliance by insisting on its complete dismantlement. In the debate which followed (27 Feb. 1729–30) Walpole made a vigorous attack on Bolingbroke, and carried an address approving the action of the ministry by 274 to 149. So brilliant was Walpole's defence that the debate was currently spoken of as ‘the Dunkirk day’ (see, ii. 676, 687), ‘the greatest day,’ said Horatio Walpole, ‘that ever I knew.’ In the course of this session Walpole broke with the accepted policy of controlling the commercial interests of the colonies by exclusive reference to the advantage of the mother country. He passed an act (the Rice Act, 3 Geo. II, c. 28) the preamble of which affirms the then novel principle that the prosperity of the mother country is aided by care for the prosperity of the colony. By this act Carolina was no longer compelled to export rice exclusively to England. In 1735 he extended the same privilege to Georgia (8 Geo. II, c. 19). On the other hand, he renewed the charter of the East India Company till 1766, despite the protests of the opposition, for the payment of 200,000l. and the reduction by one per cent. of the interest due on account of its loans to government.

On 15 May 1730 Townshend resigned. His ‘irascible and domineering and jealous’ temper (, Memoirs, i. 108) had long rendered him distasteful to the queen. The death of Walpole's sister Dorothy, lady Townshend, on 29 March 1726, had weakened the link that bound the two ministers together. But it was the queen who, as Horace Walpole said, ‘blew into a flame the ill-blood’ between the two by her exclusive reliance upon Walpole. ‘As long,’ said Walpole, ‘as the firm was Townshend and Walpole, the utmost harmony prevailed; but it no sooner became Walpole and Townshend than things went wrong and a separation ensued.’ Walpole, alive to the growth of the opposition and of the dangers attending a monopoly of power, now made overtures to some of its leaders. Wilmington [see ], the king's favourite, he succeeded in detaching and made him lord privy seal. To Pulteney he offered Townshend's place with a peerage. The intermediary was the queen. But Pulteney refused all advances. Chesterfield, who had earned encouragement by betraying the plans of the opposition to the queen, was made lord steward. Foreign affairs, nominally in the hands of Newcastle and Harrington, were entirely controlled by Walpole.

The strength of Walpole's position and his well-known toleration gave the dissenters hope that their claims as steady supporters of his government might at last be recognised. In 1727 he had passed the first (1 Geo. II, st. 2, c. 23) of a series of indemnity acts exempting from the test those who had not duly qualified themselves for the offices they held. They now agitated for a repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. The Sacheverell affair had taught Walpole caution in ecclesiastical matters. He did not think their request ‘unreasonable,’ but for a


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 202 "That we'll soon know," said his wife; "see, there's the key in the lock, just turn it."

So they turned the key, and opened the chest, and lo! there lay the prettiest child you ever set eyes on. So they were both glad, and were ready to keep the child, for they had no children of their own, and were so old they could now hope for none.

Now, after a little while, Peter the Pedlar began to wonder how it was no one came to woo his daughter, who was so rich in land, and had so much ready money. At last, when no one came, off he went again to the Stargazers, and offered them a heap of money if they could tell him whom his daughter was to have for a husband.

"Why, we have told you already, that she is to have the miller's son down yonder," said the Stargazers.

"All very true, I daresay," said Peter the Pedlar; "but it so happens he's dead; but if you can tell me whom she's to have, I'll give you two hundred dollars, and welcome."

So the Stargazers looked at the stars again, but they got quite cross, and said,—

"We told you before, and we tell you now, she is to have the miller's son, whom you threw into the river, and wished to make an end of; for he is alive, safe and sound, in such and such a mill, far down the stream."

So Peter the Pedlar gave them two hundred dollars for this news, and thought how he could best be rid of the miller's son. The first thing Peter did when he got home was to set off for the mill. By that time the boy was so big that he had been confirmed, and went about the mill, and helped the miller. Such a pretty boy you never saw.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 In 1831 it appears that another edition, probably the thirteenth in book-form, was published in Hallowell; but, like that which was last referred to, a copy has not been found.

The catalogue of the library of the American Institute, in New York, mentions it as one of the editions in that collection; but it appears that it was taken from the library, many years since, by a member who has since deceased, and was never recovered.

In 1831, an edition of The Fœderalist, probably the fourteenth, was published at Washington, D. C., with the following title:— "The | Federalist, | on | The New Constitution, | written in | the year 1788, | by |, | with an appendix, | containing the original articles of confederation; the | letter of General , as President of the | Convention, to the President of Congress; the Consti- | tution of the United States, and the amendments to | the Constitution. | A new edition, | with a table of contents, | and | a copious alphabetical index. | The numbers written by Mr. corrected by himself. | Washington: | Published by . | , Printers, | 1831."

It forms a duodecimo volume of four hundred and twenty-six pages, which are thus arranged: Title-page, as above; verso to the title-page, notice of copyright entered in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Columbia by ,—both unpaged; iii. to vii., "Contents"; viii., blank; 3 to 5, "Prefatory Remarks"; 6 to 380, "The Federalist"; 381 to 404, "Appendix"; 405 to 420, "Index."

It is printed in signatures of twelve pages, with brevier type, solid,—the "Prefatory Remarks" being in minion, solid,—on paper of poor quality and rather dingy in appearance; and it is not illustrated.


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 minister confronted by a mixed opposition which the proposal would unite he thought it ‘unseasonable’ (, Memoirs, i. 154). On the other hand, both in 1731 and again in 1733 he promoted a measure in favour of the dissenters in Ireland which he was obliged to abandon as impracticable.

The popularity which now fell to Walpole from his extraordinary success at home and abroad provoked the opposition to scandalous personal attacks. The ‘Craftsman’ of 7 Nov. 1730 affirmed that the housekeeping bills at Houghton amounted to 1,500l. a week. In ballads and broadsides he was represented as plundering the treasury and as selling the country to France. Walpole himself was serenely indifferent, but on 7 July 1731 the grand jury of Middlesex presented ‘Robin's Reign’ and others of the libels circulated in the streets, together with some numbers of the ‘Craftsman.’ This was followed by a number of successful prosecutions. Pulteney having published a pamphlet styled ‘An Answer to one Part of an Infamous Libel,’ &c., in which he disclosed a conversation with Walpole on the reconciliation of the Prince of Wales with his father, so incensed the king that he struck him off the roll of the privy council with his own hand. The year 1733 witnessed the introduction by Walpole of two important financial measures. Of these the first was his proposal to take 500,000l. from the sinking fund. The objections to such a precedent were obvious, but Walpole's reasons deserve examination. The alternative, he told the country gentlemen, was raising the land tax, which in the previous session he had cut down by a shilling, once more to two shillings in the pound. But a principal point of his policy was the reconciliation of the country gentlemen to the whig government. Had he to make choice between them and ‘the moneyed interest,’ he would certainly have sacrificed the country gentry. ‘A minister,’ he once remarked, ‘might shear the country gentlemen when he would, and the landed interest would always produce him a rich fleece in silence; but the trading interest resembled a hog, whom if you attempted to touch … he would certainly cry out loud enough to alarm all the neighbourhood’ (D. Pulteney to the Duke of Rutland, Rutland MSS. p. 202). In this case the moneyed interest approved because, as Walpole explained, the credit of the government had now risen to such a height that they ‘apprehended nothing more than being obliged to receive their principals too fast.’ This combination of interests triumphed over the opposition, and the proposal was carried by 245 to 135 votes (23 Feb. 1733). It was a triumph of political exigency over fiscal principle.

The conciliation of the country gentry by the reduction of the land tax was preparatory to another financial change which, had it been effected, would have anticipated the great reforms of the present century. This was the famous excise scheme of the same session. Walpole's attention had been drawn to the state of the customs' revenue. Since 1723 he had checked the smuggling of tea and coffee by applying to them a compulsory warehousing system under government supervision (see, Wealth of Nations, bk. v. ch. ii.), thereby increasing the revenue derived from them by 120,000l. in seven years. No change was made in the name of the duty, and the reform passed unnoticed. He had (14 March 1733) projected the application of the same system to tobacco and wine. By so doing there would not merely be a check put upon smuggling. Under the existing complicated system of discounts, drawbacks, and allowances, with the aid of false weights and false entries, vast frauds, as he pointed out, had been detected, especially upon re-exportation. His proposal was to levy the full tax on tobacco and wine imported only when they were removed from the warehouses for sale. Where imported for re-exportation no tax was to be levied at all. The former of these two measures would, it was thought, check smuggling, because the importer ‘would never run any risk, or be at any expense to evade the customhouse officers at the first gate, when at so many more afterwards he would be equally exposed to be catched by the excise officer’ (, Memoirs, i. 184). The second would, as Walpole explained, ‘tend to make London a free port, and by consequence the market of the world.’ The change was, in technical terms, a transfer of customs to ‘excise,’ and therein the opposition saw their opportunity. Excise had at various times been levied with vexatious incidents upon most of the necessaries of life. Its very name was odious. The ‘Craftsman’ and the pamphleteers discerned in the proposals the first approach to an excise upon all articles of food and clothing. Walpole had himself given some colour to the suggestion by reimposing in 1732 (5 Geo. II, c. 6) the salt tax, which he had repealed in 1730 (3 Geo. II, c. 20). Even then, Sir William Wyndham had argued, ‘it is one step towards a general excise’ (9 Feb. 1732), and Walpole had indignantly repudiated the suggestion (Parl. Hist. viii. 960). But the course of events strengthened the public suspicion. Petitions against the scheme poured into the House


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 of Commons. The house itself was besieged by ‘a most extraordinary concourse of people.’ The city of London prayed to be heard by counsel against the bill, and its petition was escorted by a train of coaches that extended from Temple Bar to Westminster. Discontent began to pass into disaffection. The army, it was said, could not be relied on because the soldiers believed that tobacco would be raised in price. Inside the House of Commons the ministerial majorities dwindled from sixty-one, on the introduction of the scheme on 14 March 1733, to seventeen on 10 April. On that night Walpole gave a supper to a dozen friends. ‘This dance it will no further go,’ he said, with tears in his eyes (Chatham Speeches, i. 69). On the next day he moved ‘that the bill be read a second time on 12 June’ (the recess). Frantic manifestations of delight throughout the country followed his capitulation. Walpole was burnt in effigy in the city (Carlisle MSS. p. 111), where he had incurred unpopularity by designating the formidable band of petitioners ‘sturdy beggars’ (14 March 1733). The king had taken the strongest personal interest in the bill. Its abandonment was followed by the summary dismissal of Lord Chesterfield, the lord steward, and of a group of peers in public employment who had co-operated with him in opposing it. The Duke of Bolton and Lord Cobham, both colonels of household cavalry, were cashiered. The opposition thereupon moved for leave to bring in a bill ‘for securing the constitution by preventing officers, not above the rank of colonels of regiments, from being deprived of their commissions otherwise than by judgment of a court-martial to be held for that purpose, or by address of either house of parliament’ (13 Feb. 1734). Walpole in reply warned the house of the constitutional danger of ‘stratocracy’ involved in the proposal. ‘Any minister,’ he afterwards added to Lord Hervey, ‘must be a pitiful fellow who would not show military officers that their employments were not held on a surer tenure than those of civil officers’ (, Memoirs, iii. 101). The motion was negatived without a division.

Nevertheless, Walpole's power had been shaken. It is true that he could probably have carried the excise bill through the House of Commons. The reason of its abandonment was, as he truly said, that ‘the act could not be carried into execution without an armed force, and that there would be an end of the liberties of England if supplies were to be raised by the sword.’ The reinforcements in number and vindictiveness which the recent dismissals brought about renewed the activity of the opposition. Scotland had been one of Walpole's strongholds. Its representative peers had been nothing more than the nominees of Lord Ilay, Walpole's Scottish secretary of state. Lord Stair, one of the great officers dismissed, headed a revolt of the Scots peers against this system at the general election of 1734 (Stair Annals, ii. 195; cf. Parl. Hist. ix. 608). The government, it is true, carried its list, but the allegiance of Scotland had begun to wane. Outside parliament the opposition still fanned the excitement of the populace by attributing to Walpole a design of fresh proposals for a general excise. But he knew that the opportunity even for partial reform was past. ‘I can assure this house,’ he said, ‘I am not so mad as ever again to engage in anything that looks like an excise’ (4 Feb. 1734).

A general election was now approaching. The tories proposed in the last session of the expiring parliament the repeal of the Septennial Act and the substitution of triennial parliaments. Walpole opposed the motion in a speech pronounced to be one of the best he ever made, full of brilliant though covert invective against Bolingbroke, the real inspirer of the proposal. It was not warmly supported by the opposition whigs, and was defeated by 247 to 184 votes (13 March 1734). Distrust forthwith began to set in among the opposition, Pulteney resenting Sir W. Wyndham's reliance upon Bolingbroke, whose ‘very name and presence in England did hurt’ (Bolingbroke to Wyndham, 23 July 1739). Early in 1735 Bolingbroke returned in disgust to France. The opposition whigs had thrown away the weapon which had won them their recent victory.

Meanwhile the vacancy of the crown of Poland had plunged the continent into a war, in which the emperor was rapidly succumbing before the combined forces of France, Spain, and Sardinia. His appeals for help enlisted the German sympathies of the queen at the same time that they aroused the martial ardour of the king. Walpole gratified the king so far as to press upon the expiring parliament of 1734, despite an influential protest of peers, an unconstitutional measure empowering the crown to raise sea and land forces without limit during the interval between the parliaments (28 March 1734). But he was resolute for non-intervention, except in the quality of mediator. The emperor, furious with ‘the Walpoles’ (the emperor to Count Kinski, 31 July 1734), despatched Strickland [see ], bishop of Namur, to London to intrigue against


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 With the exception of three paragraphs of the "Prefatory Remarks," which have been omitted in this edition, of the transfer of the name of its author from the head of each number to its foot, where it is inserted in Italics, enclosed in brackets, after the general signature of "," and of the addition, at the close of the volume, of a copious alphabetical index to the work, this edition is a careful reprint of that which had been issued at Washington, in 1818; indeed, so closely does it follow that edition, that it was considered a violation of the copyright of Mr., by Messrs. & Co., of Hallowell, to whom that right had been assigned, and by whom it had been exercised in the issue of at least one edition, as already noticed.

The peculiarity of this edition of The Fœderalist is the elaborate index of sixteen pages, which was prepared for it by, a member of the Washington bar,—an appendage which renders it the most useful of the fourteen collective editions which, it is probable, had then appeared.

This description is the result of a very careful examination of the copy which is in the library of the Congress of the United States, at Washington, by, Esq., its assistant librarian.

In the year 1837, and, of Hallowell, Maine, published another edition of the work, probably the fifteenth, with the following title:—

"The | Federalist, | on | the new constitution, | written in the year 1788, | by | Mr., Mr. , and Mr. : | with | an appendix, | containing | the letters of Pacificus and Helvidius | on the | proclamation of neutrality of 1793; | also, | the original articles of confederation, and the | constitution of the United States, | with the amendments made thereto. | A new edition. | The numbers written by Mr.


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 them at court. Strickland began by tampering with Harrington, the secretary of state, with whom he had a long and secret conference. He was graciously received by the king and queen. Rumour predicted Walpole's approaching fall. The queen argued her case with the minister week after week (, Memoirs, ii. 61). ‘I told the queen this morning,’ he said to Hervey, ‘Madam, there are fifty thousand men slain this year in Europe and not one Englishman.’ Alive to the intrigues around him, Walpole kept in his hand every thread of the negotiations. When in October 1734 Fleury made overtures for a peace, he succeeded in persuading the queen to support him in giving the cardinal a favourable response. He put a stop upon Harrington's attempt, made at the instance of the king himself, to involve England by guaranteeing, in conjunction with the emperor, the defence of Holland against the French. ‘My politics,’ he had written to Townshend on 3 Aug. 1723, ‘are to keep clear of all engagements.’ The plan of pacification, which was substantially that accepted by the belligerents, was the work of the two Walpoles, Sir Robert inspiring the foreign office of England, and Horatio having the ear of Fleury. Bolingbroke's comment on the peace was that ‘if the English ministers had any hand in it, they were wiser than he thought them; and if they had not, they were much luckier than they deserved to be.’

The general election had taken place in the spring of 1734, before the brilliant success of Walpole's foreign policy had operated to retrieve his defeat upon the excise bill. Despite a large expenditure on the elections, he lost some six or seven seats in Norfolk, and returned to parliament on 14 Jan. 1735 with a diminished following. The gratifying issue of his policy of peace announced in the king's speech of 15 Jan. 1736 furnished a compensating triumph. The address of congratulation was voted without the smallest opposition (17 Jan.), and the thanks of parliament, rendered by convention to the king, for ‘saving this nation from the calamities of war,’ were recognised on all hands as due to Walpole.

The dissenters judged this a favourable opportunity to solicit from Walpole a further indication of his friendly disposition to them. It was probably, as Stanhope conjectures, at this time that Dr. Chandler [see ], at the head of a deputation of dissenters, inquired of him when the moment would come for fulfilling the hopes he had held out to them. He replied that it had not yet arrived. Being pressed for a specific answer, he said, ‘I will give it you in a word—Never.’ The dissenters thereupon entrusted their case to the opposition whigs. On 12 March 1736 William Plumer moved the repeal of the Test Act. Walpole was placed in a position of great difficulty. With many considerate expressions towards the dissenters he opposed the motion, which was defeated by 251 to 123 votes. The motion for repeal was again pressed in 1739, but was again opposed by Walpole and was rejected in the House of Lords by 188 to 89 votes on 6 April. On the other hand, he zealously forwarded a bill for the relief of quakers. His interest was perhaps quickened by the circumstance that there were many quakers, his supporters, in his constituency. The bill was lost in the House of Lords chiefly through the opposition of the bishop of London [see ]. Walpole had regarded the bishop as his ‘first and sole minister in church matters,’ and intended him to succeed Wake [see ] at Canterbury. This following upon another difference between them [see ], he henceforth withdrew his confidence from Gibson and appointed Potter [see ] to Canterbury instead (1737).

August and September 1736 were marked by anti-Irish riots in London and by the Porteous riot at Edinburgh [see ]. The London riots were fomented by the Jacobites (, Memoirs, ii. 309), and associated with discontent on account of the Gin Act which had been passed in the previous session [see ]. Although Walpole had taken no further interest in this measure than to insure the civil list against consequent losses, it was popularly ascribed to him in concert with Jekyll, its real author (see Sir R. Walpole to Horatio Walpole, 11 Oct. 1736,, iii. 359). The Porteous riots were seized upon by the opposition in the lords, headed by Carteret, to embarrass Walpole by insistence on extreme measures, which, Lord Ilay warned him, would provoke a rebellion in Scotland (, Memoirs, iii. 103). The growing weakness of Walpole's position now became apparent. He was adverse both to the violent proposals of the opposition, and even to any inquiry upon which a justification of them might be found (ib. iii. 40). But two of his own cabinet, Hardwicke and Newcastle, were caballing against him with Sherlock and Carteret (ib. p. 102). He told Newcastle to his face ‘Your grace must take your choice between me and him [Carteret]’ (ib. p. 136). Signs of defection showed themselves in the commons, and the queen


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1901 supplement/Coventry, Andrew


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 corrected by himself. | Hallowell: | &. | 1837."

It forms a fine octavo volume of five hundred pages, which are thus arranged: Title, as above; verso, blank,—both unpaged; 3 to 6, "Prefatory Remarks"; 7 to 413, "The Federalist"; 414 to 442, "Appendix. The letters of Pacificus. By "; 443 to 472, "The letters of Helvidius. By "; 473 to 480, "The original articles of confederation"; 481 to 494, "Constitution of the United States"; 495 to 500, "Index."

It is printed in signatures of twelve pages each, with small-pica type, solid,—the "Prefatory Remarks" being in long primer, leaded, the "Appendix" in long primer, solid, and the "Index" in brevier, leaded; and it is entirely without illustrations.

Like all the Hallowell editions, it is a careful reprint of the edition published by Mr. in 1818.

This description is the result of an examination of the copy which is in the Astor Library, in the city of New York.

In 1842, another edition, probably the sixteenth, was issued by the same press, at Hallowell, which has been already so often mentioned in this work. The following is the title of the edition referred to:—

"The | Federalist, | on | the new constitution, | written in 1788, | by | Mr., Mr. , and Mr. : | with | an appendix, | containing the letters of Pacificus and Helvidius | on the | proclamation of neutrality of 1793; | also, | the original articles of confederation, | and the | constitution of the United States. | A new edition. | The numbers written by Mr. corrected by himself. | Hallowell: | . | 1842."

It forms an octavo volume of four hundred and eighty-four pages, which are thus arranged: Title-page, as


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1901 supplement/Cowden-Clarke, Mary


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 was inclined to side with the dissentients (, ii. 295). The situation was further complicated by the attitude of the tories, who secretly encouraged the disaffection in Scotland and opposed any bill whatever. In these difficult circumstances Walpole had no choice but to accept the principle of the bills of penalties and to mitigate these as far as possible (10 Geo. II, cc. 34, 35). The opposition, however, took care to identify his name with these measures, which seriously impaired his former popularity in Scotland. The position of Walpole was made the more difficult by the attitude of the Prince of Wales, whose house had for some time past been the rendezvous of the young whigs of the opposition, ‘the boys,’ as Walpole nicknamed them. The prince had long been dissatisfied with his allowance of 50,000l. a year. In 1737 he originated a proposal that it should be increased by an additional 50,000l. from the civil list. The suggestion was warmly embraced by the whole opposition (, Diary, p. 395;, Memoirs, iii. 418), who foresaw that it would irrevocably alienate the prince from the minister, since it was certain to be opposed by the king. On 22 Feb. 1737 a motion to this effect was made by Pulteney and seconded by Sir John Barnard [q. v.], the two most formidable members of the whig opposition in the House of Commons. Walpole first made secret overtures to the prince to persuade him to desist (ib. iii. 48). He next adroitly offered as a compromise a settlement of the allowance of 50,000l. and a jointure on the princess in addition. The prince rejected the proposal, as Walpole had indeed foreseen. ‘He had proposed,’ he told the king, ‘to bring the House of Commons to reason with it, not the prince’ (ib. iii. 60). He carried the house by a majority of thirty. ‘If ever any man in any cause,’ he said to Lord Hervey, ‘fought dagger out of sheath, I did so in the House of Commons the day his royal highness's affair was debated there’ (ib. p. 92). After his fall two members of this majority were found to have been bribed by him in two sums of 500l. and 400l. apiece—the only instance of parliamentary corruption ever proved against him. His own mention of the fact on two separate occasions to Lord Hervey and the queen (ib. iii. 80, 93) is some indication that this expedient for securing a majority was exceptional. The majority was really assured by the abstention of forty-five tories of Jacobite sympathies. From this time the Prince of Wales openly enrolled himself in the opposition to Walpole. Whereas Walpole's policy had always been, as Onslow says, one ‘of having everybody to be deemed a Jacobite who was not a professed whig’ (Onslow MSS. p. 465), the prince now courted the adhesion of the Hanoverian tories, led by Sir W. Wyndham. He thereby became the mainspring of an opposition which divisions had hitherto rendered ineffective.

The next move of the opposition again came from the whigs. On 24 March 1737 Barnard moved a resolution for redeeming the 24,000,000l. of the South Sea annuities at four per cent., and converting them into annuities at three per cent. Considered as a piece of parliamentary tactics, this was a dexterous move. It rallied in its support the country gentlemen, the conciliation of whom was the foundation of Walpole's financial policy; while it was opposed to the interest of the capitalists, upon whom Walpole's power really rested. On principle he could not venture to oppose it. His own brother Horatio, the Pelhams, and others of his most confidential friends were favourable to it. He apparently contented himself with the dilatory plea that the time was unsuitable. But while the bill was being prepared in conformity with the resolution, he found time ‘to go about, to talk to people, to solicit, to intimidate, to argue, to persuade, and perhaps to bribe’ (, Memoirs, iii. 130) against the proposal. When the bill came on he put up his friend Winnington [see ], a lord of the treasury, to extend the proposal to all the redeemable debts, i.e. from 24,000,000l. to 44,000,000l. This change not only increased the general hostility to the bill, but made it impracticable. Walpole then voted with the minority against the proposal, thereby re-establishing his credit with the city (30 March). When the new bill was introduced (22 April) he opposed it with a number of plausible financial arguments, and the bill was rejected by 249 to 134 votes. His conduct is ascribed by his friend Lord Hervey to jealousy of Barnard and the fear of alienating the moneyed men (Memoirs, iii. 126). It is possible, however, that the danger of war with Spain, and the prospective necessity of raising a loan on that account, coupled with the fact that the bill would have locked up the greatest part of the sinking fund for several years and compelled him to levy fresh taxes, were additional and justifiable grounds for his opposition. At the close of the session of 1737 Walpole introduced with general approval ‘the playhouse bill,’ conferring on the lord chamberlain a statutory power of licensing plays (10 Geo. II, c. 28). The occasion was


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 Rh "Can't you spare me that lad yonder?" said Peter the Pedlar to the miller.

"No, that I can't," he answered; "I've brought him up as my own son, and he has turned out so well that now he's a great help and aid to me in the mill, for I'm getting old and past work."

"It's just the same with me," said Peter the pedlar; "that's why I'd like to have some one to learn my trade. Now, if you'll give him up to me, I'll give you six hundred dollars, and then you can buy yourself a farm, and live in peace and quiet the rest of your days."

Yes, when the miller heard that, he let Peter the Pedlar have the lad.

Then the two travelled about far and wide, with their packs and wares, till they came to an inn, which lay by the edge of a great wood. From this Peter the Pedlar sent the lad home with a letter to his wife, for the way was not so long if you took the short cut across the wood, and told him to tell her she was to be sure and do what was written in the letter as quickly as she could. But it was written in the letter that she was to have a great pile made there and then, fire it, and cast the miller's son into it. If she didn't do that, he'd burn her alive himself when he came back. So the lad set off with the letter across the wood, and when evening came on he reached a house far, far away in the wood, into which he went; but inside he found no one. In one of the rooms was a bed ready made, so he threw himself across it and fell asleep. The letter he had stuck into his hat-band, and the hat he pulled over his face. So when the robbers came back—for in that house twelve robbers had their abode—and saw the lad lying on the bed, they


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 the increasing tendency of the stage to profane and political plays. Of these the mischief, indeed, immediately affected Walpole, of all men the most indifferent to attack; but the need of a restraining authority was felt by the opposition, who were already counting upon office, and had been the first to propose legislation upon the subject [see ]. In April 1738 Walpole supported the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons against the publication of its debates, upon the reasonable ground of the gross dishonesty of the reports (Parl. Hist. x. 800–11).

The sessions of 1736 and 1737 had both disclosed the growing weakness of Walpole in parliament. His influence at court had been sensibly lowered by the compromise he proposed to the Prince of Wales (, Memoirs, iii. 91, 181). The king and queen, who vied with each other in a resentment against the prince which Walpole was incapable of sharing, discussed his dismissal (ib. p. 184), affronted by his insistence that the terms offered should be observed (ib. p. 183). Hardwicke, in collusion with Newcastle and Carteret, was urging a reconciliation which it was impossible to undertake, while the prince, on the other hand, credited Walpole with every move made against him. It was a position so impossible to maintain that Walpole seriously entertained thoughts of resignation (ib. p. 185). At this juncture the queen died (20 Nov. 1737). Her transient resentments disappeared at her deathbed. Sending for Walpole, she said: ‘I recommend the king, my children, and the kingdom to your care’ (ib. p. 322). But he foresaw as clearly as the rest of the world (Correspondence of Duchess of Marlborough, iii. 221) the decline of his influence with the king, whose irritable vanity could only be managed by a woman. The dukes of Grafton and Newcastle pressed him to pay court to the Princess Emily. ‘I'll bring Madame Walmoden over,’ he answered; ‘I was for the wife against the mistress, but I will be for the mistress against the daughters.’

Public attention now began to turn to England's relations with Spain. A deputation of merchants petitioned the king in the autumn of 1737, complaining of depredations by Spanish officials upon English traders to the West Indies. In March 1738 the country was ablaze with the story of Jenkins's ear [see ]. Walpole stood almost alone for peace. His own colleagues in the lords passed resolutions (2 May 1738) against the Spanish claim to search vessels for contraband, which he had succeeded in excluding from the resolutions of the House of Commons. During the autumn of 1738 the war fever, stimulated by the opposition, was steadily rising. Walpole, through Sir Benjamin Keene [q. v.], the minister at Madrid, effected a convention with Spain in time for the meeting of parliament, which had been prorogued for this purpose till 1 Feb. 1739. The convention provided for a settlement of disputes within eight months between plenipotentiaries to be appointed. But ‘No search’ was the popular cry, and upon this the convention was silent. Pitt thundered against it as ‘an insecure, unsatisfactory, dishonourable convention.’ Walpole himself spoke ‘in a more masterly, dexterous, and able manner than I ever heard him, to the satisfaction and applause of the whole house, and even of his enemies’ (Trevor MSS. p. 26, Horatio Walpole to R. Trevor, 27 March 1739). Nevertheless the address of approval was only carried by a majority of twenty-eight (8 March 1739). ‘The patriots,’ as the opposition styled themselves, now took the rash resolve to secede from the House of Commons (9 March). Walpole's answer to the declaration of this intention by Sir W. Wyndham was, said Chatham, one of the finest speeches he had ever heard (see Parl. Hist. x. 1323). This decision was highly advantageous to Walpole. He had been seriously ill in the previous September with some form of fever, and had never recovered his strength (Hare MSS. pp. 245, 248). He now enjoyed an interval of three months' freedom from harassing attack (ib.) The opportunity was utilised by him in pushing through bills appealing to commercial interests. He carried his colonial policy a step further by extending to molasses and sugar from the West Indian colonies the principle of free exportation already accorded to rice (12 Geo. II, c. 30). He also gratified the manufacturers of cloth by taking off the duties from wool and woollen yarn imported from Ireland, and preventing their exportation elsewhere than to Great Britain (12 Geo. II, c. 21). This was pursuant to the principle of commercial policy formulated by him in the king's speech of 1721, ‘to make the exportation of our own manufactures and the importation of the commodities used in the manufacturing of them as practicable and as easy as may be.’

In May 1739 the English and Spanish plenipotentiaries met for the ratification of the convention. Walpole had foreseen that the stumbling-block to peace was the Spanish claim of search for contraband. But the king was eager for war. So were Walpole's


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 204 began to wonder who he could be, and one of them took the letter and broke it open, and read it.

"Ho! ho!" said he; "this comes from Peter the Pedlar, does it? Now we'll play him a trick. It would be a pity if the old niggard made an end of such a pretty lad."

So the robbers wrote another letter to Peter the Pedlar's wife, and fastened it under his hat-band while he slept; and in that they wrote that as soon as ever she got it she was to make a wedding for her daughter and the miller's boy, and give them horses and cattle, and household stuff, and set them up for themselves in the farm which he had under the hill; and if he didn't find all this done by the time he came back she'd smart for it—that was all.

Next day the robbers let the lad go, and when he came home and delivered the letter, he said he was to greet her kindly from Peter the Pedlar, and to say that she was to carry out what was written in the letter as soon as ever she could.

"You must have behaved very well then," said Peter the Pedlar's wife to the miller's boy, "if he can write so about you now, for when you set off, he was so mad against you he didn't know how to put you out of the way." So she married them on the spot, and set them up for themselves, with horses, and cattle, and household stuff, in the farm up under the hill.

No long time after Peter the Pedlar came home, and the first thing he asked was, if she had done what he had written in his letter.

"Ay! ay!" she said; "I thought it rather odd, but I dared not do anything else;" and so Peter asked where his daughter was.


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 colleagues, Newcastle and Hardwicke, and indeed the entire nation. He consented to a despatch instructing Keene, the English plenipotentiary, to demand the surrender of the right of search. Spain refused; and on 19 Oct., amid a burst of popular enthusiasm, war was declared. ‘They now ring the bells,’ said Walpole bitterly; ‘they will soon wring their hands.’ It has been observed by Burke that Walpole's conduct was stamped with weakness, that ‘he temporised, he managed, and, adopting very nearly the sentiments of his adversaries, he opposed their inferences’ (‘First Letter on a Regicide Peace,’ Works, v. 288). But Walpole was the prey of two harassing diseases, gout and the stone, which left him but intermittent vigour and disturbed the balance of his naturally placid temper. ‘And all agree Sir Robert cannot live,’ wrote Pope in 1740 (Works, iii. 497). He might, it is said, have resigned. As a matter of fact he did twice tender his resignation, but was appealed to by the king ‘not to desert him in his greatest difficulties’ (, i. 625). And behind resignation loomed impeachment, which, in the popular fury against the sole advocate of peace, was certain. He lost his hold alike of parliament, where nobody believed he could stand another session (Marchmont Papers, ii. 113), and of the cabinet, where Newcastle, whose ‘name is “Perfidy,”’ as he justly said, was intriguing for his place. One rebuff followed another. In November 1739 Pulteney, in the face of his opposition, carried a bill ‘for the encouragement of seamen’ (13 Geo. II, c. 3). Against the place bill, limiting the number of officials in the House of Commons, his majority, which had been thirty-nine in 1734, sank to sixteen in 1739. In the lords the bishops were wavering in favour of the prospective dispensers of patronage (Pulteney to Swift,, Works, iii. 120). His altercations with Newcastle were incessant. ‘The war is yours,’ he exclaimed; ‘you have had the conduct of it—I wish you joy of it.’ But a rupture with the greatest borough-monger in England would have ruined him, for Scotland was all but lost when, in March 1740, Argyll went over to the opposition (Stair Annals, ii. 260). During an extraordinary series of years, from 1715 to 1740, with two slight exceptions in 1727 and 1728, there had been abundant harvests (, Hist. of Prices, i. 43). The winter of 1739–40 was one of long and severe frost and of consequent distress. Bread rose in price, riots followed, and of all this Walpole bore the odium.

By the death of the emperor Charles VI in October 1740 foreign affairs, of which Walpole still retained the direction, increased in complication. After a successful invasion of Silesia, Frederick the Great signed a treaty with France in June 1741. The queen of Hungary had called upon England to enforce its guarantee of the pragmatic sanction. Again Walpole was for peace; the king and the cabinet for intervention. Again Walpole had to give way. On 8 April 1741 the king's speech invited parliament to support him in the maintenance of the pragmatic sanction, and 300,000l. was voted as a subsidy to the queen of Hungary. In May the king, despite Walpole's remonstrances, went over to Hanover to organise the defence of the electorate. On 28 Oct., without consulting Walpole, he hastily concluded a treaty with France, pledging Hanover to neutrality for a year, and leaving England to confront the storm alone. As in the war with Spain, so in this, upon the minister who had from the first opposed fell the opprobrium of the misconduct.

In view of the approaching expiration of parliament, the opposition determined early in 1741 to place their case before the country by a motion for an address to the king for the removal of Walpole. On 13 Feb. the motion was introduced by Sandys, with a long review of the minister's policy both in home and foreign affairs. But the death of Sir W. Wyndham (17 June 1740) had dissolved the bond between the tories and their whig allies. It is just to say too that there were tories who objected on principle to trying a minister upon general allegations. It was urged against Walpole that he had made himself ‘sole and prime minister,’ an unconstitutional invasion of the responsibilities of his colleagues justifying the imputation to him exclusively of the difficulties in which the nation was placed (see Protest of the Lords, 13 Feb. 1741). It was a serious accusation at that epoch of constitutional development, for his accusers likened him to Strafford. In a defence of consummate ability Walpole repudiated the charge, but declared himself accountable for the conduct of the ministry. An extraordinary effect was produced by a short speech against the motion by Edward Harley, nephew to the minister whom Walpole himself had impeached. He was followed by ‘the country gentlemen to a man’ (, Memoirs, p. 94). To the general amazement, Shippen, followed by thirty-four Jacobites, walked out of the house, and the threatened minister found himself in a majority of 290 to 106 votes. On the same day Carteret made the same motion in the House of Lords, and was defeated by


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 108 to 59. But it was significant that Lord Wilmington, who hoped to be Walpole's reversioner, and some other peers belonging to the government abstained from voting. Shippen's secession was afterwards explained as an act of gratitude to Walpole for having saved one of his friends from a prosecution for treasonable correspondence. Its more probable cause discloses one of the most curious episodes of Walpole's political career. A letter has recently been printed from the old pretender at Rome to his agent, Colonel O'Brien, at Paris, dated 1 Sept. 1734 (Hodgkin MSS. p. 235). From this it appears that a friendly overture having been made on behalf of Walpole to O'Brien, the pretender directed a cautious reply to be made by O'Brien to Walpole's friend Winnington, then a lord of the admiralty. Among Walpole's papers was found an original letter from the pretender at Rome, dated 10 July 1739, written to the Jacobite Thomas Carte [q. v.] for delivery to the agent of some important personage in England who had demanded pledges as to the church and the safety of the reigning sovereign in the event of a restoration (, vol. iii. p. xxxiii, App. p. xlviii). Mr. Morley has summed up the probabilities against the identification of this personage with Walpole; but the discovery of the letter of 1734 inclines the balance the other way. It appears also to have been well known to a few persons that Walpole at critical moments was in the habit of buying off the Jacobite section of the opposition by encouraging hopes in the pretender. Sunderland had, with George I's consent, done the same thing before him (, ii. 41). George II himself one day mentioned the fact that Walpole knew the pretender's hand (, Letters, i. 182). Lord Orrery, the pretender's secretary, is said to have received a pension of 2,000l. a year from the government (see Walpoliana, i. 63). His successor, Colonel Cecil, was quite persuaded that Walpole contemplated a restoration, and by this means he received early information of the Jacobite schemes (, Anecdotes, p. 37). Another intermediary was the Duchess of Buckingham [see ]. ‘Sir Robert always carried them (the pretender's letters) to George II, who endorsed and returned them’ (, Reminiscences, vol. i. p. cxlii). That this correspondence was simply a piece of parliamentary tactics there cannot be the shadow of a doubt. The secession of the Jacobites in 1741 ‘broke the opposition to pieces’ (Lord Chesterfield to Lord Stair, Stair Annals, ii. 268). There was no doubt in the minds of the defeated party as to the real cause of the defection, and ‘Chesterfield was despatched to Avignon to solicit by the Duke of Ormonde's means an order from the pretender to the Jacobites to concur roundly in any measures for Sir Robert's destruction’ (, Memoirs, i. 52). The pretender, chagrined at having been hoodwinked, despatched ‘at least a hundred letters’ which were transmitted to his friends, in November 1741, in this sense (Etough in, i. 687 n.)

Meanwhile, at midsummer 1741, the general election had taken place. The Scottish boroughs followed the Duke of Argyll, encouraged, it was suspected, by the treachery of Islay. The Cornish boroughs fell away to Lord Falmouth and to Thomas Pitt of Boconnoc, the electioneering agent employed by their duke, the Prince of Wales (, Parl. Hist. of Cornwall, p. xvi). Walpole foresaw the end of his political career. He, who had been distinguished by his boisterous spirits and hearty laughter, now sat ‘without speaking and with his eyes fixed for an hour together’ (Horace Walpole to H. Mann, 19 Oct. 1741). On 1 Dec. 1741 the new parliament met. It was known that the ministerialists and the opposition were, as Pulteney said, near equilibrium. A long attack having been made by Pulteney on the conduct of the war, Walpole accepted his challenge by fixing 21 Jan. for the consideration of the state of the nation (8 Dec.) In the meanwhile the state of parties would be determined by the results of the trials of contested election returns, which were fought out on political grounds. The first of these was a division on the Bossiney election on 9 Dec. 1741, in which ministers had a majority of six (Commons' Journals, xxiv. 17). On 16 Dec. Walpole's candidate for the chairmanship of the committee on elections [see ] was defeated by four votes (Parl. Hist. xii. 323). On 17 Dec. the ministerialist members for Bossiney were unseated by six votes (ib. p. 322 n.), and five days later (22 Dec.) those for Westminster by four votes. This last defeat produced an immense moral effect. Upon 24 Dec. the house adjourned till 18 Jan. Walpole, still unwilling to resign, employed the recess in an attempt to detach the Prince of Wales from the opposition by an offer from the king of an additional 50,000l. a year to his income (5 Jan. 1742). The prince returned a refusal to entertain the proposal so long as the minister remained in power. But the failure of the negotiations inspired Walpole with the hope that the king would refuse to consult the leaders of the whig opposition, while the tories


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 Rh "Why, you know well enough where she is," said his wife. "Where should she be but up at the farm under the hill, as you wrote in the letter."

So when Peter the Pedlar came to hear the whole story, and came to see the letter, he got so angry he was ready to burst with rage, and off he ran up to the farm to the young couple.

"It's all very well, my son, to say you have got my daughter," he said to the miller's lad; " but if you wish to keep her, you must go to the Dragon of Deepferry, and get me three feathers out of his tail; for he who has them may get anything he chooses."

"But where shall I find him?" said his son-in-law.

"I'm sure I can't tell," said Peter the Pedlar; "that's your look-out, not mine."

So the lad set off with a stout heart, and after he had walked some way he came to a king's palace.

"Here I'll just step in and ask," he said to himself, "for such great folk know more about the world than others, and perhaps I may here learn the way to the Dragon."

Then the king asked him whence he came, and whither he was going?

"Oh!" said the lad, "I'm going to the Dragon of Deepferry to pluck three feathers out of his tail, if I only knew where to find him."

"You must take luck with you, then," said the King, "for I never heard of any one who came back from that search. But if you find him, just ask him from me why I can't get clear water in my well; for I've dug it out time after time, and still I can't 'get a drop of clear water."

"Yes, I'll be sure to ask him," said the lad. So he


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 would be unable to form a ministry (Sir R. Wilmot to the Duke of Devonshire, 12 Jan. 1742,, iii. 586). Apparently this was also the fear of ‘the boys,’ represented by Lyttelton [see ], Pitt, and the Grenvilles [see ; ], who secretly approached Walpole, offering to make terms with him unknown to the Prince of Wales (, Memoirs, p. 3). Walpole was thus encouraged to resistance, and astonished his friends by his ‘spirit, intrepidity, and cheerfulness’ (Culloden Papers, p. 172). On 21 Jan. 1742 Pulteney moved for referring to a secret committee the papers relating to the war—in effect a vote of want of confidence in the government. Walpole roused his flagging powers. ‘He exceeded himself; he particularly entered into foreign affairs, and convinced even his enemies that he was thoroughly master of them. He actually dissected Mr. Pulteney’ (Sir R. Wilmot to the Duke of Devonshire, 12 Jan. 1742,, iii. 588). He carried the division by three votes. But the opposition had united again, and on 28 Jan. its triumph came. In a division on the Chippenham election government was beaten by one vote. The effect of this defeat was a panic among the place-hunters, and Walpole's own family urged him to resign (, Memoirs, i. 123). On 2 Feb. the opposition members returned for Chippenham were declared by a majority of sixteen to have been duly elected. This result was only achieved by lavish bribery on the part of ‘the patriots,’ the constant declaimers against ministerial corruption. The Westminster and Chippenham election divisions cost the Prince of Wales alone 12,000l., as he himself confessed, ‘in corruption, particularly among the tories’ (, Memoirs, p. 1). On the same day Walpole made up his mind that further resistance was impossible. He had that morning sent notice to the virtual head of the opposition, the Prince of Wales, upon whom he subsequently called, and received from him the strongest assurances that he should not be molested, for the Jacobites were already clamouring for his head. On the other hand, he promised to give a general support to a whig administration. Parliament was adjourned on 3 Feb. The king ‘burst into a flood of tears’ upon his announcing his retirement. On 9 Feb. he was created Earl of Orford, and on the 11th he resigned all his employments, receiving a promise of a pension of 4,000l. a year. ‘The great and undaunted spirit and tranquillity almost more than human’ with which, as a witness tells us, he met his reverses, revived the personal affection so widely felt for him, and his levees were more crowded than at the height of his power.

The king offered the premiership to Pulteney ‘with the condition only that Sir Robert should be screened from all future resentments’ (Life of Dr. Z. Pearce, p. 3). Pulteney refused any further assurance than that he was ‘not a man of blood’ (Life of Bishop Newton, p. 49). On 9 March, when Lord Limerick moved for the appointment of a committee to inquire into Walpole's administration during the preceding twenty years, Pulteney absented himself with an intimation that he was averse from it, and the motion was defeated by two votes. But on 23 March he supported another motion by Lord Limerick, limiting the inquiry to ten years, which was carried by a majority of seven only. A secret committee of twenty-one members was nominated, of whom nineteen were Walpole's political opponents. The first subject of inquiry was into the distribution of the secret-service money. But Scrope [see ], the secretary, and Paxton, the solicitor to the treasury, refused to make answer on the plea that they were accountable only to the king, all the money for secret service being paid by the king's special warrant (P. Yorke to J. Yorke, 17 June 1742, Life of Hardwicke, ii. 10; Parl. Hist. xii. 625, 824). This refusal was justified by a precedent in 1679 (Hist. MSS. Comm. 14th Rep. App. pt. ix.; Lindsay MSS. p. 407). The committee reported their inability to collect evidence on 13 May, Paxton having in the interval been committed to Newgate for his contumacy (15 April). The report was followed on the same day by a bill to indemnify witnesses who would bring evidence of any kind against the Earl of Orford. This was carried on the second reading by only 228 to 216 votes. When the bill reached the lords it was opposed by Lord-chancellor Hardwicke, in a brilliant speech, upon the constitutional ground that ‘a general advertisement for evidence against a person would be a high misdemeanour, and it would be illegal in the crown’ (Parl. Hist. xii. 652 n.) It was accordingly thrown out by the striking majority of fifty-two (25 May). on 13 July Pulteney was created Earl of Bath. On the first occasion of meeting him in the House of Lords, Walpole remarked, ‘My Lord Bath, you and I are now two as insignificant men as any in England,’ in which, says the narrator with truth, ‘he spoke the truth of my Lord Bath, but not of himself’ (, Anecd. p. 43). The distractions of the new ministry further turned the tide in Orford's


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Logic and Meaning in Conceptual Models: Implications for Information System Design

Publishing History: This paper was first published as Warwick Business School Research Paper No 62. University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, May 31, 1992. It was reprinted, with the addition of a preface, in Systemist Vol. 15 (1), Feb 1993.

Note on Figures. Figures 1 and 4 have been abstracted from the the figures that appeared in the original publication. This is to avoid any possibility of international copyright infringement.

Abstract
A number of logical problems in conceptual modelling can be solved by expressing the models in the form of universal statements. This leads to distinguishing two type of conceptual model, those used in main stream SSM and those used in Multiview, on the basis of whether the universals are definitions or inductive hypotheses. The models can be formulated in the predicate calculus and these formulations can be converted into the rules of Knowledge Based Systems.

Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about how Conceptual Models can be used in the process of information systems analysis and design (see Mingers 1992). Much of this debate can be characterized by its extreme generality. It has not been accompanied by a detailed analysis of Wilson's Information Requirements Analysis (1984, 1990) or Avison & Wood-Harper's Multiview (1990). Both methods use Conceptual Models in information system design, and the proponents of both claim that these methods are well tried in practice.

In a separate development Probert (1990) has challenged the fundamental basis of Conceptual Modelling. Wilson (1990) and Checkland & Scholes (1990) claim that their Conceptual Models show logical dependencies. Probert argues that their models cannot be logical in any sense of the word. This argument can is answered in the first section of the paper which also reveals two important facts about Conceptual Models. The first fact is that the Conceptual Models produced by Wilson and Checkland in their Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) are "logical" in a quite different way from the way in which the Multiview models are "logical". The second fact is that an analysis of SSM Conceptual Models reveals hidden premises. The elements in the models can be understood as corresponding to particular statements. The hidden premises correspond to universal statements. In the predicate calculus Conceptual Models can be expressed entirely in universal form.

The universal/particular distinction has implications for information system design. The rules for Knowledge Based Systems can derived directly from universals. The argument, therefore, turns full circle. Objections to the logic of Conceptual Models prompts a deeper analysis, the deeper analysis shows how the models can reveal a logical structure suitable for information system design.

In spite of this, there are ambiguities about the status of SSM models. This is brought out in the second section of the paper which considers the origins of universals. Three types of universal are identified: inductive hypotheses, value statements and definitions. It is argued that the SSM models are definitional. This creates problems in determining that a given model has any relation to the real world because this would seem to involve an inductive hypothesis.

Multiview models, by contrast, are collections of inductive hypotheses. The third section argues that Multiview is faced with a problem that is the opposite of SSM: a hypothesis can only be formulated in a language, a language requires definitions and the Multiview model building does not generate definitions.

The paper concludes by suggesting that a new type of model could be constructed. The new models would include definitions and inductive hypotheses thereby combining the advantages of the SSM method with those of Multiview. A further feature could be the inclusion of value statements. This would make the models logically comprehensive as well as adding a new dimension to the model building process.

The logical problem
The word "logic" has come to mean a variety of things. The Collins English Dictionary gives seven definitions, only two of these will be relevant here: 1. the branch of philosophy concerned with analyzing the patterns of reasoning by which a conclusion is drawn from a set of premises, without reference to meaning or context. ... 6. the relationship and interdependency of a series of events, facts etc.

The conceptual models in SSM are represented as words contained in bubbles which are joined by arrows. The arrows are intended to show a relationships of "logical contingency". Thus in figure 1 a bubble containing the words "Discharge patient" is connected by an arrow to another bubble containing the words "Apply treatment". A vital point here is that this could function on one of, at least, two levels. The arrows could be intended to show logical contingency between the expressions in the bubbles (first level) or logical contingency between real world events that correspond to these expressions (second level).

If the logical contingency is intended to be at the second level then this will be consistent with the definition of logic in sense 6. This is exactly what "logic" means in the Multiview Conceptual Models: "use arrows to join the activities that are logically connected to each other by information, energy, material or other dependency..." (Avison & Wood-Harper, p.60). This is quite different from the account of Conceptual Models given by Wilson and Checkland. They make it quite clear that their models are not intended to be models of real states of affairs.

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that what the analyst is doing, in developing a HAS [Human Activity System conceptual] model, is not trying to describe what exists but is modeling a view of what exists." (Wilson 1984).

In an earlier paper (Gregory 1992a) a distinction was made between a model that is conceptual and a model of a concept. It was argued that SSM models are models of concepts and, therefore, the logical contingency should be understood as being at the first level. This interpretation not only fits well with main stream writing but also allows us to describe the models as being "logical" in sense 1. This in turn allows the models to be expressed in standard symbolic logic which is useful in relation to information system design (Gregory 1991, 1992b, Merali 1992). Therefore, provisionally at least, we can take it that the SSM models are not logical in sense 6. and that the Multiview Conceptual Models are a different type of thing.

Probert's argues that the arrows in the SSM models cannot be logical in sense 1. because the contents of the bubbles are imperatives, and logical relationships in sense 1. can only hold between declaratives. "Discharge patient" is a command and standard logics only operate on statements or propositions. This point was anticipated (Gregory 1991) by the suggestion that the commands could be converted into parallel statements. Thus, "Discharge patient" could be converted into "The command Discharge the patient has been obeyed" or simply "The patient has been discharged". Similarly we can substitute "Treatment has been applied" for "Apply treatment", and "Treatment has been prescribed" for "Prescribe treatment". This gives Figure 2 which can be expressed in the propositional calculus as: $$(p \to q) \And (q \to r)$$.

But Probert still does not find this satisfactory. His argument (1991, p. 147) can be paraphrased as follows "the patient has been discharged does not logically entail treatment has been applied." His point depends on what we take $$ p \to q $$ to mean. There is a certain ambiguity here that can only be resolved by using predicate logic.

The hidden premise
If we add a universal statement to the two statements given above, the problem is resolved: Major Premise: All cases where a patient has been discharged are cases where treatment has been applied. Minor Premise: A patient has been discharged Conclusion: Treatment has been applied (by Modus Ponens) Here we have the classic syllogism in which the major premise is a universal, the minor premise is a particular, and the particular conclusion follows by Modus Ponens. Probert's argument is that the conclusion here cannot logically follow from the minor premise without the major premise. This means that the model shown in figure 2 is a logically contingent argument. It is not, as it stands, a logically valid argument. The universal given above is a hidden premise in the argument that the figure represents. It can be noted that this will usually be the case with figures such as figure 2. The statements in these types of figure are always particulars. It it is unusual that a particular conclusion can be drawn from particular premises. Normally a particular will be deduced from a particular premise and a universal premise. An exception is simple conjunction, we can deduce "Socrates is a tall man" from the particular premises "Socrates is a man" and "Socrates is tall". Although figure 2 is not logically valid it is not false, and it can be made into a logically valid argument by adding universals. This can be done using the predicate calculus:

Domain: Hospital patients Fx: x has been discharged Gx: x has had treatment Hx: x has a treatment prescribed

1 Prem $$(\forall x) (Fx \to Gx)$$

2 Prem $$(\exists x) (Fx) $$

3 $$(\exists x) (Gx) $$ From 1 and 2 by Modus Ponens

4 Prem $$(\forall x) (Gx \to Hx)$$

5 $$(\exists x) (Gx) $$ From 3

6 $$(\exists x) (Hx) $$ From 4 and 5 by Modus Ponens

This can be rendered in English as follows: 1 For all patients, if a patient has been discharged then that patient has had treatment. 2 At least one patient has been discharged. 3 At least one patient has had treatment. 4 For all patients, if a patient has had treatment then that patient has had a treatment prescribed. 5 At least one patient has had treatment. 6 At least one patient has had treatment prescribed. The first three lines here repeat the syllogism given above. To this is added, at 4, another universal premise. Given this we can deduce 4. This is illustrated in figure 3 where the elements from figure 2 have been expressed in the predicate calculus and the two universals have been added; the arrows have been included only to show the general flow of the argument. The example given here is a simple one because the domain contains only one type of object and the predicates are all one placed predicates. However, this does not effect the argument as the numerous distinct objects and n-placed predicates can be dealt with in essentially the same way. It is significant that with the universals included in this way, the arrows from figure 2 are no longer necessary. The universals replace the arrows. It is no longer necessary to state $$ (p \to q) \And (q \to r) $$ because this is contained in the two universals. The whole of figure 1, and any other conceptual model, can be expressed entirely in terms of universals.

SSM models as universals
An interesting fact about universals is that they do not, in themselves, commit us to the existence of anything. $$(\forall x) (Fx \to Gx) $$ does not imply that anything exists. It could just as easily represent "All unicorns eat ambrosia", which does not imply the existence of unicorns or ambrosia. It is not until we add a particular statement that there is any commitment to existence. That is why $$(\exists x) $$ is called the existential quantifier. In the argument above, existential commitment begins with $$(\exists x) (Fx) $$, the fact that there has been at least one patient who has been discharged. Once existence has been introduced existential consequences follow, such as $$(\exists x) (Gx) $$, the fact that at least one patient has had treatment. Expressing SSM Conceptual Models in universals ties in well with the idea discussed above: that the models are models of concepts not models of what exists, necessarily, in the real world. The predicate calculus highlights this distinction and shows that the model will only map on to the real world if a set of particular statements are true. This prompts epistemological questions that will be fully addressed in a later section.

Knowledge Based Systems
A direct information systems application is now apparent. The type of formula given above has an immediate counterpart in Prolog programming. The universals correspond directly to Prolog "rules". Lines 1 and 4, above, would be:

has_treatment (X) :- is_discharged (X).

has_treatment_prescribed (X) :- has_treatment (X).

the particulars would correspond to Prolog "facts". However, there could not be a direct counterpart to the existential quantifier. A Prolog program requires a value for the x in $$(\exists x)$$; to put it more precisely, there must be an instantiation instead of the object variable in a Prolog program.

In the example, this would be satisfied by naming a person, say Socrates, who is discharged:

is_discharged (socrates).

Given this Prolog "fact", the program will return the answer "socrates" when asked who has had treatment prescribed. This, therefore, is a rudimentary Knowledge Based System. Such systems would become much more elaborate, and useful, if based on larger models. For example, some of Wilson's models contain over a hundred elements. They would also be more useful if they embodied models that contained more complex logical relations such as the logico-linguistic conceptual models proposed in an earlier paper (Gregory 1992b).

It can also be noted that there are parallels between universals and field structure, and between particulars and records, in traditional data base design. There are, therefore, good indications that a relational data base design can be derived from these predicate calculus formulas or from the Prolog rules.

Inductive hypotheses
Expressing SSM conceptual models in terms of universals escapes logical objections and thereby solves the immediate problem. Nevertheless, difficulties remain because the universals are, as they stand, contingent. All we have done is swap a contingent model in the propositional calculus for a collection of contingent universals. The status of the model will, therefore, depend upon where these universals come from. The most natural answer would be that they are "factual statements", that is, inductive hypotheses about the real world and based on real world experience. But in this case it would be the same as the Multiview model - a model that is conceptual rather than a model of a concept. However, this conclusion can be avoided because the universals in the model need not be inductive hypotheses. We can distinguish two other types of universal, these are value statements and definitions.

Value statements
Value statements include statements about personal tastes, such as "all of Shakespeare's plays are rubbish", and moral statements, such as "everyone ought to give to charity". Value statements can be distinguished from factual statements by a number of logical and epistemological properties. Evidence can be used to support or falsify factual statements but not value judgements. "All swans are white" is given supportive evidence by the observation of more and more white swans, and it falsified by the observation of one black swan. There is no evidence for "everyone ought to give to charity" nor can it be falsified empirically. Value statements connote a certain form of behavior. If Icabod believes that "everyone ought to give to charity" then Icabod will approve of charitable acts. Although they cannot be falsified empirically, two value statements can be shown to be incompatible with each other when they connote contradictory behavior. Factual statements do not connote any form of behavior.

From the logical point of view it is plausible to construct conceptual models entirely out of value statements. We can imagine what this would look like. With the universals "All people who drop litter are bad" and "All bad people should be punished", and an instantiation, "Icabod drops litter", we can draw the conclusion: "Icabod should be punished". Value statements alone, will not, of course, account for the models that are, in fact, produced in SSM. There is no way that "All cases where a patient has been discharged are cases where treatment has been " could be construed as a value statement.

SSM prides itself on being able to deal with the human aspect of a problem situation. It is, therefore, surprising to find that value statements have a very small role in the building of conceptual models. Value statements are usually implicit in the criterion for effectiveness and they can sometimes, but not always, be found in the Weltanschauung part of CATWOE. Apart from this they rarely appear. Despite the fact that the models are constructed in the language of imperatives these almost always turn out to be practical rather that value ridden imperatives. They are of the form "You should turn left if you want to get to the station" rather than "You should give to charity if you want to be good".

Another crucial difference between value and factual statements is that value statements are not reducible to factual statements and factual statements are not reducible to value statements. What this means is that we cannot derive factual statements from value statements. If we are to draw a factual conclusion we must have at least one factual premise, factual conclusions cannot be drawn from value statements alone. The same is true of value statements, a conclusion that expresses a value cannot be derived from purely factual premises. This point is summed up in the dictum "you cannot derive ought from is". Given this and SSM's anti-reductionist stance, it is even more surprising that value statement have such a small role to play in the models.

Definitions
If we accept that SSM conceptual models are not intended, in any straight forward way, to be models of things that are in the real world, then we are forced to the conclusion that the universals must be definitions. A distinction is made between definitions intended to establish an existing meaning, descriptive definitions, and definitions giving a proposed meaning for the future, stipulative or prescriptive definitions.

Taking the SSM universals to be descriptive definitions has an initial plausibility. In this case the conceptual models would not be models of the real world but models of a language used to describe the real world. This could account for a lot of what happens in practice. Organizations tend to develop their own languages. The process of SSM conceptual model building could be taken to be a process whereby the stake-holders describe how this language is used. But if this were all that was going on the process would be quite simple and there would be no need for a lengthy iterative debate about the model.

Taking the SSM universals to be stipulative definitions is much more plausible. In this case the building of conceptual model is a process whereby the stake-holders come to agreement about how to use words to describe the problem situation. The model building would, therefore, not consist just of describing an existing language, but of making one up. This would not, of course, entail that the language would be significantly different from the one already in use. It would entail that ambiguities were removed and different usages on the part of different stake-holders would be brought out and resolved.

In this way the model building process can be seen as a type of Wittgensteinian language game. Wittgenstein's later account of language draws heavily on an analogy with games such as chess. Such games get their meaning from a set of agreed rules. This principle could apply to conceptual models. Figure 1 can be interpreted as a set of rules for the use of a language within a particular organization. The universals given in section 4 could be expressed as rules:

Rule 1: Nothing is to be described as "a discharged patient" unless it is preceded by something that can be described as "an application of treatment".

Rule 2: Nothing is to be described as "an application of treatment" unless it is preceded by something that can be described as "a prescription of treatment".

This account of conceptual models in terms of stipulative definitions fits well with the main thrust of SSM which is to address unstructured problems. Unstructured problems come about not because of a lack of structure in the real world but because of a lack of structure in descriptions of the real world. The creation of a cohesive set of definitions can provide the structure. For example, if we want to find out if all Christians know the Bible, then the main methodological problem is going to be deciding what Christians are (People who say they are? People who go to church regularly?) and what is meant by "knows the Bible" (All of it? Most of it? Some of it?). Once these things have been decided, collecting the real world data will be, methodologically, fairly simple.

SSM models and the real world
If the universals that constitute the SSM models are definitions, then it follows that the models will be analytic rather than synthetic. That is, if they are true they are true by the meaning of the words alone. If this is the case, there is nothing in the conceptual model building process that guarantees that the models can refer anything that exist or could exist. There is nothing that prevents them from including references to unicorns, Greek gods and flying pigs. Obviously, models that contain these types of reference cannot be used as a basis for information system design or for organizational restructuring.

Similar problems will arise for those people who consider that the only point in building a conceptual model is to change peoples' thinking. This is because a change in thinking can only be useful if it contains a reference, directly or indirectly, to an actual or potential real world state of affairs. Pragmatic and verificationist theories of meaning hold that without such a reference a change in thinking is not just useless but is, literally, a meaningless notion (see for example Ayer 1946). The same can be said about values; if a change in values does not indicate a change in behavior in response to some actual or potential event in the real world, then it is pointless to say that there has been any change in values.

Establishing how an analytic system, such as arithmetic, maps on to the real world is the subject of complex and contentious theory. In the case of a conceptual model, such as that represented in figure 3, we would need to establish a an instantiation for the object variable $$(\exists x) (Fx) $$, i.e. that Socrates, or some other person, is discharged. Having established that Socrates is discharged, we can establish deductively that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed; this is true by definition. But if it is true by definition it cannot be true that Socrates is discharged and false that Socrates has had treatment prescribed. Therefore, in order to be sure that Socrates is, in fact, discharged we must be sure that he has had a treatment prescribed. But if we must be sure that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed before we can be sure that Socrates is discharged, then the deduction that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed tells us nothing new.

Problems of this order are the basis of the claim by some empiricists that tautologies tell us nothing about the real world. However, this would appear to be false because arithmetic is an analytic system, true by definition and a tautology, but arithmetic appears to tell us a lot about the real world. This vicious circle can be avoided if there is an independent criterion for a patient being discharged, that is, a criterion that is not a definition. Suppose the completion of Form PQ7 is such a criterion. The relation between Socrates is discharged and Form PQ7 has been completed for Socrates will be a contingent relation. Let us further suppose that there is a similar criterion for a patient having a treatment prescribed, say, the completion of Form RX5. Now, we find that Form PQ7 has been completed for Socrates from this we infer, contingently, that Socrates is discharged; from this we deduce that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed; and from this we infer, contingently, that Form RX5 has been completed for Socrates.

From this we can see how an analytic system has proven useful. It has allowed us to infer one contingent event from another, events that might otherwise not have been connected. But a stronger case than this can be made. It can be argued that definitions are not only useful for contingent inferences, they are logically necessary (see Definitions & inductive hypotheses below).

The limitations of SSM
The essential problem for SSM is that there is no logical reason why the stake-holders should come up with Conceptual Models (a set of definitions) that map on to the real world. Connected to this is the fact that SSM has no why to determine whether or not these do or do not map on. It could be argued that the real world contingency is introduced at a later stage. In Wilson's method the real world seems to begin to enter when information inputs and output between activities are identified. However, it is not altogether clear whether these are meant to be notional information input/outputs between notional activities, or real world information input/outputs between real world activities. In either case there is still a problem. If the information input/outputs are notional we still have to establish that they can map on to the real world. If they are real world information input/outputs between real world activities, where did the real world activities come from? How was it established that the notional activities from the Conceptual Model map on to real world activities?

Definitions & inductive hypotheses
The importance of establishing definitions for universals will be readily apparent when it is realized that there is no intrinsic way of distinguishing between definitions and inductive hypotheses or a fool-proof intrinsic way of distinguishing between definitions and value statements. Given that a certain universal is not a definition we can tell whether it is a value statement or an inductive hypotheses by certain key words that indicate values rather than objective facts about the real world. These include "should", "ought", "good", "bad", "nice", "nasty", etc. There is no set of words that can identify a definition.

Today "all men are mortal" would be considered an inductive hypothesis by most people. Most people would be likely to say that men are mortal because it has been observed that every man has died before, say, his 200th birthday. But for the Greeks "all men are mortal" was part of the definition of a man. The Greeks thought that some men-like beings lived for ever, but these were not "men" they were Gods. For us, "immortal men" is meaningful, it stands for a class that happens to be empty; but for the Greeks "immortal men" was a contradiction in terms.

Value statements entail certain forms of behavior. From the use of the key value words in a given utterance a certain form of behavior will normally, but not always, follow. If Icabod says "all Christian are good people" then, if his utterance was sincere, we would expect Icabod to approve of Christians and act appropriately; if this is the case then Icabod's utterance was a value statement. However, Icabod might have made the utterance sincerely yet disapprove of Christians, we can imagine that Icabod prides himself on being a bad person; in this case the utterance was not a statement of Icabod's values but part of Icabod's definition of the words "Christian" and "good". A distinction can be made between intensive and extensive definition. An intensive definition gives the sense (connotation) of the definiendum. An extensive definition gives the reference (denotation) of the definiendum. In terms of classes an intensive definition will provide a criterion of class inclusion whereas an extensive definition will list all the members of the class. Thus, an intensive definition of "a human limb" would be any jointed appendage on the human body, an extensive definition would be an arm or a leg.

An argument that definition is logically prior to inductive hypotheses can now be put forward. Empirical evidence of class inclusion require that the class is defined independently of that evidence. For example, if we say that all panthers are black then, if this is to be an empirical statement, there must be defining criteria for panthers that are independent of their colour. If being black is one of the defining criteria for panthers then "all panthers are black" must be analytic and cannot, therefore, be empirical.

As a matter of fact, being black is a defining criterion for panthers. "Panther" is just the word for a black leopard. So, to say that "panthers are black" is just to say that "black leopards are black" and this cannot be established empirically. As it is logically impossible to observe a black leopard that is not black, observation could never falsify the statement "black leopards are black"; as observation can never falsify the statement, observation cannot provide inductive evidence for the statement either.

If a term has been given an intensive definition we can establish the extension of the term empirically. Thus, if we intensively define "human limb" as any jointed appendage on the human body, then it can be established empirically that all human limbs are arms or legs. Likewise, if a term has been given an extensive definition we can establish the intention of the term empirically. If we extensively define "human limb" as an arm or a leg then it can be established empirically that all human limbs are jointed appendages on the human body.

Constraints on the Multiview model
Having answered the immediate logical problems facing the SSM model by a somewhat tortuous route, it is appropriate to point out that the Multiview model is not as simple as it might seem. At first glance the Multiview model seems to be a generalized model based on observation and as such theoretically unproblematic. On closer examination the model involves considerable logico-linguistic difficulties.

Figure 4 is a Multiview conceptual model taken from a case study for a Distance Learning Unit. The large arrows represent flows of physical things, the small arrows represent information flows between the subsystems. If this was a model of an existing Distance Learning Unit it would not be problematic, nor would it be interesting. It would just be a generalized version of a materials flow diagram and a conventional data flow diagram. However, in this particular case the Distance Learning Unit did not yet exist. The Conceptual Model was, according to Avison & Wood-Harper, derived from a root definition. This root definition was:

"A system owned by the Manpower Services Commission and operated by the Paintmakers Association in collaboration with the Polytechnic of the South Bank's Distance Learning Unit, to provide courses to increase technical skills and knowledge for suitably qualified and interested parties, that will be of value to the industry, whilst meeting the approval of the Business and Technical Education Council, and in a manner that both efficient and financially viable." (Avison & Wood-Harper, 1990)

We can express the double headed arrow between Administration System and Course Exposition System in figure 4 as "there must be a mutual flow of information between an Administration System and a Course Exposition System". How could this be derived from the root definition?

As with the SSM model there must be a hidden premise. This would be "Whenever there are courses to increase technical skills etc. there will be an Administration System and a Course Exposition System and a mutual flow of information between them". This is, of course, a universal. We can now ask: where does it come from? As Multiview statements are at the second level, referred to in section 3, it must be an inductive hypothesis based on the observation of other courses.

As we saw above, inductive hypotheses cannot be separated from definitions. The universal here would seem to specifying part of the extension of the term "courses to increase technical skills etc." this assumes that there is an intensive definition of the term. "Technical skill" needs to be defined outside of the full extension of the term "courses to provide technical skills etc.". "Technical skill" could not be defined in terms of passing the exam, for example; because, in this case, the only thing that "technical skill" would mean would be that the exam was passed. "Technical skill" needs to be defined in terms of some external factor such as the ability to paint a fence (presuming that painting a fence is not part of the extension of the word "course").

The limitations of Multiview
There are two possible ways in which Multiview can work. One is where the stake-holders already have a well defined common language. The other is where the definition that an information system requires develop informally during Multiview systems analysis. The danger with Multiview is that in any given application the common language may fail to exist and may fail to develop. This danger is compounded by the fact that Multiview does not have the means to determine whether the common language is there or not. The Danger can be avoided if definitions were included into the Multiview model building process.

Solutions to the SSM Problem
One solution to the SSM dilemma is to take the model as consisting of a set of definitional universals which will map onto the real world if there are instantiations of certain particulars. This is the position advocated, though not in exactly the same terms, in two previous papers (Gregory 1992a, 1992b). Ideas can be put forward to indicate that this is theoretically tenable. One is that it would mean that the SSM models had the same status as other analytic or axiomatic systems and many of these, such as arithmetic, have proven very useful. The problem here is that not all axiomatic systems do map on to the real world (see Hofstadter 1979). However, by using independent criteria for the particulars we can establish whether or not the model does or does not map on to the real world. In effect this make the model one large inductive hypothesis (the question of whether arithmetic is also a large inductive hypothesis will not be addressed here!). The problem here is not theoretical but practical. The idea of an analytic model is difficult explain to many people. For example, the development of the models often requires the use of a number of extensive definitions (see Gregory 1992b). Extensive definition is quite respectable (see Copi 1971), but some people find it difficult to accept that an extension could be anything other than empirical. Another problem is a lack of flexibility. The model building process is unable to draw upon a large body of generally accepted facts. There is, however, another theoretical possibility and that is to integrate the definitions and inductive hypotheses to form a mixed model.

Possibility of a mixed model
A mixed model could expressed entirely in universals and combine the linguistic capabilities of SSM with the empirical grounding of Multiview. Care would need to be taken to distinguish between definitions and inductive hypotheses. This could be accomplished using model logic. The definitions would be flagged as necessarily true while the inductive hypotheses would be flagged as probably true. A new dimension could be added by including numerous value statements determined by a consensus of the stakeholders. These could also be flagged as necessarily true as the determination of values is not part of the role of a computerized information system. Such a model need not be limited to the passive representational form of conventional conceptual models. It could be a dynamic model - a calculus of particular statements.

Acknowledgments
The findings in this paper were the result of research funded by the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC).


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 favour. An admiring crowd followed him when he went to Ranelagh (, Letters, 29 July 1742, i. 193). The secret committee was still at work, but its failures had set its members quarrelling, and before the summer was over it was ‘already forgotten’ (Horace Walpole to Sir H. Mann, Letters, i. 189). Its second report was presented on 30 June. Its charges were threefold: the exercise of undue influence in elections, the grant of fraudulent contracts, and peculation and profusion in the expenditure of secret-service money. The proofs of the first were of a trifling character concerning the promotion of officials and the displacement of revenue officers in the borough of Weymouth; those of the second were confined to one contract for furnishing money in Jamaica, in which the contractors gained a fraction over fourteen per cent., no very undue sum considering the risks run. The case against him was therefore felt to rest on the secret-service expenditure. Of peculation there was no evidence whatever. Profusion was established by the comparison of a carefully selected decade, 1707–17, during which the secret-service money expended was no more than 338,000l., with the decade 1731–41, when it amounted to 1,440,000l. Even this result was only obtained by garbling the figures of the first decade. The account fairly taken shows that the expenditure by Walpole on secret service was about 79,000l. a year; much less, according to Coxe, than the annual expenditure before the revolution. That much of this money was well laid out we know, for Walpole was better furnished with information from the continent than any of his predecessors. It was admitted that 5,000l. a year was used to subsidise ministerial newspapers. There cannot be much question that votes had from time to time been secured by direct payments instead of by places and pensions (see, Memoirs, iii. 93, 130; , Diary, 15 March 1754). It was a system which Walpole had inherited from Sunderland, whom Onslow marks out as the corruptor of parliament (Onslow MSS. p. 509). Such indications as we have justify Burke in his statement that ‘the charge of systematic corruption is less applicable to Walpole, perhaps, than to any minister who ever served the crown for so great a length of time’ (‘Appeal from New to Old Whigs,’ Works, iv. 436). The fact that there were very few whom he gained over from the opposition is, as Burke suggests, evidence of this.

The inquiry had proved a signal failure. The ‘cant’ of corruption, as Burke calls it, had done its work, and the satisfied placemen with whom Walpole was personally on friendly terms (Horace Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 15 Nov. 1742, Letters, i. 214) had no desire to prosecute the matter further. But the weapon which had done such good service against the last ministry could now be employed to embarrass the new one. On 1 Dec. Lyttelton moved for another secret committee of inquiry (Horace Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 2 Dec. 1742, Letters, i. 216), and was supported by Pitt, but defeated by 253 to 186 votes. In 1741 the old Duchess of Marlborough had predicted that in the event of a change of ministry ‘Sir Robert will still sit behind the curtain’ (Corresp. ii. 224). During Carteret's administration the king constantly consulted Orford through intermediaries. He gave places to Cholmondeley, his son-in-law, and Henry Fox and Pelham, his adherents. Orford, on the other hand, successfully exerted his influence with his party to support the retention of the Hanoverian troops (, Letters, i. 286), though he was himself too ill to attend the debate in the lords (31 Jan. 1744). His time was chiefly spent at Houghton, whence on 24 June 1743 he wrote a pathetic letter expressing his solace in rural pleasures (the letter is printed by, i. 762 n.; , Life of Hardwicke, ii. 133). He appears to have spoken in the House of Lords on only one occasion, 24 Feb. 1744, when he spontaneously moved an address to the king upon the presentation of papers conveying intelligence of an apprehended invasion by the French on behalf of the pretender. He made, says Horace Walpole, a ‘long and fine speech,’ which led to a reconciliation with the Prince of Wales. Though ostensibly in retirement, it cannot be doubted that he was at first watching an opportunity, should his health be restored, for resuming office. He had conceived a plan for the recovery of his popularity by a proposal to separate Hanover from England (, ii. 571). Throughout 1743 and 1744 he paid the closest attention to affairs, and was the constant adviser of Pelham. His efforts were directed to thwarting Carteret's war policy, and preventing the introduction by him of the tory party into the government. ‘Whig it,’ he wrote to Pelham on 25 Aug. 1743, ‘with all opponents that will parley, but 'ware tory.’ When he was in London his house in Arlington Street was crowded with callers. But, as time went on, the exhaustion arising from his disease grew upon him. On 29 May 1744 Horace Walpole writes of him as ‘grown quite indolent,’ having abandoned