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Rector v. Ashley/Opinion of the Court

The first question presented grows out of a denial of the jurisdiction of this court by defendants in error.

It is conceded that one of the points decided in the Supreme Court of that State against the plaintiff in error would be a sufficient ground for the jurisdiction, if it were the only one on which that court decided the case; but it is claimed that the decree is also based on another and distinct ground, over which this court has no jurisdiction, and that, therefore, we cannot examine the first point. If there is this second ground on which the decree may still be supported, although the first were decided in favor of the plaintiff in error, it would be a useless labor to inquire into the correctness of the point which is of Federal cognizance; because, as the ruling of the State court must be assumed to be correct on the other proposition, no reversal could follow if that proposition was sufficiently broad to sustain the decree.

It is claimed that the statute of limitations of the State of Arkansas in made by the Supreme Court a distinct ground for dismissing the cross-bill of Rector. If this be found by the record to be true, it is undoubtedly sufficient in itself to sustain the decree, and is beyond the revisory power of this court. But a careful examination of the pleadings in the case has not enabled us to discover that any of the parties, in whose favor the decree was rendered, have distinctly set up the bar of that statute, as a defence to the relief claimed by Rector. It is true that there is a casual reference in the original bill of Ashley's executrix and Beebe, to their actual and constructive possession, but it seems used rather argumentatively in favor of their title than as setting forth a distinct ground of relief; and in their answer, and in all the other answers to Rector's cross-bill-the bill which sets up the main title in controversy-nothing is said of the possession of defendants.

We cannot see, then, either from the pleadings or from any decree in the case, that this question was raised or considered by the court.

But the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is produced, and in that it is stated that the defendants are protected by the statute, and this is given as one of the reasons for the decree rendered.

We have of late been frequently urged, in this class of cases, to look into the opinions delivered in the State courts, to ascertain on what grounds their judgments were based; and the point has been one of some controversy. It is not, however, an open question. More than forty years ago the same question arose in the case of Williams v. Norris, reported in 12 Wheaton. The proposition was pressed upon the court for the same reason that it is in this case, namely, that by the statute of the State the opinions of the court are required to be filed in writing among the papers of the case. Marshall, C. J., speaking for the court, held that, notwithstanding this act, the opinion of the State court constituted no part of the record, and could not be looked to as the foundation on which this court would take or refuse jurisdiction.

Leaving out the opinion of the State court, there is nothing in the record before us to show that its decree decided any other controverted proposition than the validity of the title set up by complainant, Rector. This title was dependent upon the act of Congress of February 17th, 1815, for the relief of the inhabitants of New Madrid, who had suffered by earthquakes, and the decision was against the claim set up by him under that statute. It is, therefore, a proper case for a writ of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.

2. As respects then the claim of Rector, who seeks to have his title quieted by the cross-bill which he has filed. The validity of this claim is the point to be decided by this court.

[His honor here stated the facts and proceedings on which the claim of Rector rested, as already given, and proceeded:]

The questions to be considered on these facts are, did these proceedings establish a right in the parties who represent Cockerham, to the land covered by the survey, which would withdraw it from the category of unappropriated lands on which the Arkansas grant could be located? And if they did, at what point in the proceeding did this right become fixed?

It seems to us that this court has already settled these questions in a manner which leaves nothing more to be said, unless we overrule its decisions.

In the case of Bagnell v. Broderick, which raised a question concerning a title derived under the New Madrid act, the court, after describing the proceeding necessary to secure its benefit, says: 'The United States never deemed the land appropriated until the survey was returned' (to the recorder of land titles), 'for the reason that there were many titles and claims, perfect and incipient, emanating from the provincial governments of France and Spain, and others from the United States, in the land district where the New Madrid claims were subject to be located. So there were lead mines and salt springs excluded from entry.' Again, speaking of an act of the legislature of Missouri, which authorized an action of ejectment on a New Madrid location, it is further said: 'Our opinion is, first, that the location referred to in the act, is the plat and certificate of survey returned to the recorder of land titles, because by the laws of the United States this is deemed the first appropriation of the land, and the legislature of Missouri had no power, had it made the attempt, to declare the notice of location filed with the surveyor-general, an appropriation contrary to the laws of the United States.'

In Barry v. Gamble, the court says: 'By the certificate of the recorder of land titles at St. Louis, Lafleur was entitled to 640 acres of land in compensation for lands of his injured by the earthquake in New Madrid County. On this t e survey of 1815 is founded. Its return by the surveyor, with a notice of location, to the office of the recorder, was the first appropriation of the land.'

The case of Lessieur v. Price, is not distinguishable from the one before us. In that case, as in this, plaintiff claimed under a New Madrid certificate, and the defendant under an act granting to Missouri four sections of land to aid in erecting public buildings, as the defendant in this case claims under a similar act for the benefit of the State of Arkansas. The case there, as it does here, turned upon the question which party first made a valid appropriation of the land in dispute. The court there declares that, for this purpose, the location under the New Madrid act must be an appropriation of the land, and its acquisition by the locator, with corresponding right to possess and enjoy it as against the United States; and the inquiry arose, what acts were required on the part of the locator to devest the United States of title? After reciting the language of the act on which this question is declared to depend, the court proceeds: 'The notice of location in this instance was delivered to the surveyor-general, June 2d, 1821, for the land in dispute, and is claimed as the inception of title, and location in fact, within the meaning of the State law authorizing ejectments on New Madrid locations. That it was the mere act of the party, not having the assent of the government, must be admitted. The act of Congress provides 'that in every case where such location shall be made according to the provisions of this act, the title of the person or persons to the land injured shall revert to and become absolutely vested in the United States.' A concurrent vestiture of title must have occurred. The injured land must have vested in the United States at the same time that the title was taken by the new location. It was intended to be an exchange between the parties, and the question arises, when did the United States take title?' After further consideration of the relative duties of the recorder of land titles, and of the surveyor, under the act of 1815, the court again rules that the return of the survey to the office of the recorder is essential to the appropriation of the land.

We are much pressed in the present case with the argument that the title here spoken of by the court, is the legal and not the equitable title; and that inasmuch as the applicant has done all that he can do, to make good his claim to the land, when he has deposited with the surveyor his certificate of loss, with a description of the land desired in exchange, he has thus acquired an equitable interest in the land so described, which the United States cannot devest by giving it to another.

But the rights of claimant are to be measured by the act of Congress, and not exclusively by what he may or may not be able to do; and if a sound construction of that act shows that he acquires no vested interest in the land until the officers of the government have surveyed the land, and until that survey is filed in the office of the recorder, and approved by him; then as claimant's rights are created by that statute, they must be governed by its provisions, whether they be hard or lenient. It seems to us clear, from the foregoing cases, that the court intended to decide, that until this was done the claimant acquired no vested right to the land; no title, legal or equitable. It is evident that in the case of Lessieur v. Price, the court is not speaking of the legal title. The statute of 1815 required a patent to be issued on the return of the survey to the recorder's office. The strict legal title remained in the United States until the patent issued; and the court could not have referred to that.

On the contrary, it is obvious that the court was endeavoring to fix the point in the proceedings, when the right of the claimant became vested, when his equity became a fixed fact, when the land he sought was appropriated to him, and when his injured land became the property of the United States; and by each of the three decisions we have cited this is held to be when the survey is returned to the office of the recorder of land titles. The legal title conveyed by the patent may not issue for years afterward, but by the act of the legislature of Missouri, an action of ejectment could be maintained on the equitable title thus acquired. In the Federal courts, however, according to repeated decisions, this could not be done for want of the legal title.

These views must dispose of the present case. The title of Ashley became a full vested legal title on the 8th day of June, 1838.

The earliest evidence we have of the return of the survey, under Cockerham's certificate, to the recorder of land titles, is the certificate of that officer of the 16th of June, 1838. The land, therefore, was unappropriated within the meaning of the act for the benefit of the State of Arkansas, when Ashley acquired title according to its provisions.

It is said that the Congressional surveys had been extended over the land in dispute when they were claimed by O'Hara, and described in his application to the surveyor, and that, therefore, no other survey was necessary. It is not important to decide here whether this would obviate the necessity of a survey, or of some equivalent return to the recorder's office, to show what land was intended to be appropriated under the certificate of loss, which emanated from that officer; for the description of O'Hara, while it refers to certain legal subdivisions of the public lands, refes also to other claims located in the same subdivisions, in such a manner that it can be ascertained only by a survey, how much and what parts of these legal subdivisions are necessary to make up his six hundred and forty acres. Such seems to have been his own opinion, when he prayed for an order of survey. It was undoubtedly necessary to an identification of the land.

The decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, having been made in conformity to these principles, is

AFFIRMED.

title: Rector v. Ashley/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Rector v. Ashley/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Rubber Company v. Goodyear (73 U.S. 153)

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island. On motions.

Two motions were made in this cause. The first by the appellees, to dismiss the appeal, the other by the appellants to reduce the amount of the bond given on appeal. This had been required in double the amount of the decree; one for $310,752.72.

The first motion was founded on the allegation that the final decree of the Circuit Court was entered on the 28th of November, 1866, while the appeal was taken to the December Term, 1867, of this court. And if the decree was, in fact, entered on the day alleged, it was obvious that the appeal should have been taken to the next term of this court, which commenced on the first Monday that is to say, on the 3d day of December, 1866, and that the appeal actually taken would have to be dismissed as not authorized by law.

The important question then was, on what day the decree of the Circuit Court was actually made.

It appeared from the return of the clerk of that court to a certiorari issued from this court, that on the 28th day of November, 1866, the following order was entered on the minutebook:

'1. In the cause in equity, Goodyear, Executor, et al. v. Providence Rubber Company. ORDERED, That the exceptions of the complainants to the master's report be, and the same are hereby, overruled.

'2. That the several exceptions of the respondents to the master's report be, and the same are hereby, overruled.

'3. That the report of the master in the case be, and the same is hereby, confirmed.

'4. That the profits made by the respondents, in violation of the rights of the complainants, under the patents in this case, are the sum of $310,757.72.

'5. That the complainants do recover of the respondents in this case the sum of $310,757.72 and costs, taxed at _____.

'Respon ents enter an appeal in open court. If appeal is to act as a supersedeas, a bond is to be filed in ten days in double the amount of the judgment. If not, execution to issue for judgment and costs, and a bond for costs on appeal to be filed in the sum of $500.

'The district judge to decide upon the sufficiency of the sureties.'

Afterwards, on the 5th of December, 1866, two days after the commencement of the December Term of this court, a final decree was filed and entered as follows:

'Final decree. November Term, 1866. This cause came on to be heard at this term, upon exceptions to the final report made therein by Charles Hart, Esq., one of the masters of this court, bearing date _____, and was argued by counsel, and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows.'

Then followed three clauses identical with the first three of the previous order; and the two concluding clauses in these words:

'Fourth. That the profits made by the respondents in violation of the rights of the complainants under the letters-patent number 1084, granted to Charles Goodyear, June 15, 1844, reissued December 25, 1849, extended June 14, 1858, and again reissued to Charles Goodyear, Jr., executor, November 20, 1860, in this case, are the sum of three hundred and ten thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven dollars and seventy-two cents.

'Fifth. That the complainants do recover of the respondents, the Providence Rubber Company, in this case, the sum of three hundred and ten thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven dollars and seventy-two cents, and costs, taxed at seven thousand four hundred and twenty-nine dollars and ninety-one cents.'

This decree was 'entered as of November 28, 1866,' and signed, 'J. R. BULLOCK, District Judge.'

Messrs. Curtis, Ackerman, and C. S. Bradley, in support of the first motion; 1 Messrs. Cushing, Payne, and Parsons, in support of the second,

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Rubber Company v. Goodyear (73 U.S. 153)


text:
Rubber Company v. Goodyear (73 U.S. 153)/Opinion of the Court

The final decree, filed and entered on the 5th of December, 1866, it will be seen, is for the most part in the very language of the order; but uses the introductory words appropriate to a decree, and describes particularly the patents in controversy, and ascertains the amount of costs taxed. It omits the explanatory directions of the order as to the bond to be given on appeal; but the entry of the decree is followed immediately by another entry stating that an appeal was prayed for by respondents in open court, and was allowed, upon filing a bond within ten days with sureties to the satisfaction of the district judge.

Upon these facts we cannot doubt that the entry of the 28th of November was intended as an order settling the terms of the decree to be entered thereafter; and that the entry made on the 5th of December was regarded both by the court and the counsel as the final decree in the cause.

We do not question that the first entry had all the essential elements of a final decree, and if it had been followed by no other action of the court, might very properly have been treated as such. But we must be governed by the obvious intent of the Circuit Court, apparent on the face of the proceedings. We must hold, therefore, the decree of the 5th of December to be the final decree.

It appears to have been entered 'as of the 28th of November.' But this circumstance did not affect the rights of parties in respect to appeal. Those rights are determined by the date of the actual entry, or of the signing and filing of the final decree. That test ascertains, for the purpose of appeal, the time of rendering the decree, as the 5th of December, 1866. The appeal in this case, therefore, was rightly taken to the present term.

The motion to dismiss must therefore be denied.

We have also considered the motion of appellants for the reduction of the amount of the bond for supersedeas.

In equity cases the appellate jurisdiction of this court attaches upon the allowance of the appeal. In order to make the appeal operate as a supersedeas, it is necessary for the appellant to give good and sufficient security for the prosecution of the appeal, and for all costs and damages that may be adjudged against him. This security is usually given by bond, with one or more sureties, and the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act requires that it be taken by the judge who signs the citation on appeal. It is not required that the security shall be in any fixed proportion to the decree. What is necessary is, that it be sufficient, and when it is desired to make the appeal a supersedeas, that it be given within ten days from the rendering of the decree. The question of sufficiency must be determined in the first instance by the judge who signs the citation, but after the allowance of the appeal, this question, as well as every other in the cause, becomes cognizable here.

It is, therefore, matter of discretion with this court to increase or diminish the amount of the bond, and to require additional sureties or otherwise as justice may require.

In this case the decree was for $310,757.72 damages, and $7429.91 costs; and, following a usual practice, the judge required a bond in double the amount of the decree. We are satisfied that a bond in a much less amount will be entirely sufficient, and inasmuch as it appears that security in part, for the amount they might be decreed to pay, had been given by the present appellants before the bond on appeal was required, by a deposit of bonds of the United States, and other private bonds, amounting in all to a sum not less than $200,000, we will order that the appellants have leave to withdraw the appeal bond now on file upon filing a bond in lieu thereof in the sum of $225,000, with good and sufficient sureties, to the satisfaction of the clerk of this court.

FIRST MOTION DENIED; SECOND ONE GRANTED.


text: Talk:Rubber Company v. Goodyear (73 U.S. 153)/Opinion of the Court


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Savery v. Sypher

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa.

Keene having conveyed to Savery a piece of land, Savery gave him a mortgage on the same to secure the purchase-money. Keene died before receiving payment of this money; and the administratrix of his estate, Mrs. Sypher, filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage. Answers and replications were put in, but no proofs were taken, and when the cause was called for hearing, the parties, by their attorneys, in open court agreed on the amount that was due, and a regular decree of foreclosure in the usual form was entered by the court. The money not having been paid by the day appointed, the property was advertised and struck off by the master at the instance of White, the attorney of record, to Mrs. Sypher, the administratrix, in satisfaction of the decree. A controversy now arose between Savery and Mrs. Sypher, the administratrix, as to whether this sale thus made to her by order of her attorney White, should be confirmed.

It appeared that Savery had been desirous of returning the land to Keene's estate, and of having the mortgage cancelled. Negotiations were accordingly had between the parties. Whether, as converting personalty into realty, they resulted in an agreement obligatory on the administratrix, was one question raised; the validity of it being denied by the counsel here of the appellee. In any case, there was conflict in the testimony as to the terms of the agreement. Mrs. Sypher swore that she consented to receive the property, provided it was returned to her in the same condition as when it was conveyed to Savery, and that she positively refused to sign written stipulations concerning the sale and purchase which were presented to her for her signature before the sale by her attorney, White, and afterwards by Seeley, his clerk, because the stipulations did not provide for a payment of the taxes that had become due on the property, about $300, since the sale or conveyance. Savery, who was also sworn, contradicted this statement in material points, and he was sustained by White, while Seeley and another witness, Mrs. Price, directly supported Mrs. Sypher. Upon this case-which on each side was made wholly by ex parte affidavits-the court below refused to confirm the master's sale, and ordered a resale of the property. Savery appealed to this court to have those proceedings reviewed.

Mr. Ashton, for the appellant:

1. On the facts. The court below was not justified, upon the affidavits before it, in finding that the appellant had ever promised to pay the taxes due on the land.

2. On the law. The court below erred in attempting to determine the issue, raised by the motions, upon these ex parte affidavits. The question of fact, as to the existence of the agreement set up by the appellee, should have been determined only after a full opportunity had been given to the appellant to cross-examine her witnesses before an examiner or master in chancery, and to contradict them by counter evidence. No other form or method of investigation, was adequate to the real purpose in view, to wit: the ascertainment by the court of the fact alleged by the appellee, in avoidance of her purchase.

Mr. P. Phillips, who filed a brief for Messrs. Mason, Polk, and Hubbell, contra.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Savery v. Sypher


text: Talk:Savery v. Sypher

title: Talk:Savery v. Sypher


text:
Savery v. Sypher/Opinion of the Court

On the issue of fact the court heard evidence and decided the case adversely to the appellant, and we think correctly. The burden of proof was imposed on Savery, who seeks to confirm the sale, to show the authority of White; for an attorney, virtue officii, has no authority to purchase property in the name of his client. If the negotiations between Savery, the appellant, and the administratrix, Mrs. Sypher, resulted in a valid agreement, binding on the administratrix, there is direct conflict in the testimony as to the terms of it. In numbver of witnesses, the case is in favor of the decree, and there is nothing in the record to enable this court to pass either upon the veracity or intelligence of the several parties. Doubtless, the court below placed great reliance on the evidence of Mrs. Price and Mr. Seeley, who were unconnected with the transaction, and wholly disinterested.

As this whole controversy turns on the payment of taxes-not involving a large amount-it seems extraordinary that the appellant did not end it, by paying the taxes, and thus secure the confirmation of a sale, in which he had such a great personal interest.

The power of Mrs. Sypher as administratrix, to make such an agreement as it is alleged she did, was denied at the bar, but it is unnecessary to discuss the point, as we find, that the purchase by White for her was unauthorized, and in violation of the real agreement under which she was willing to take back the mortgaged property.

It is argued, that the Circuit Court erred in determining the issue raised by the motion upon ex parte affidavits. Not so; for courts of equity must be able to act in a summary manner upon motions of this kind, and any other mode of investigation than the one adopted in this case, would have failed to give the speedy relief necessary under the circumstances. The practice pursued by the court was the usual and proper practice, and we see no good reasons to depart from it.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

title: Savery v. Sypher/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Savery v. Sypher/Opinion of the Court


text:
Reichart v. Felps

ERROR to the Supreme Court of Illinois; the case, which was one of ejectment, being thus:

In 1784, after the War of the Revol tion, the State of Virginia then claiming the Northwest Territory, a part of which makes the now State of Illinois-and in which, from early times, inhabitants of Canada, while Canada was yet a French province, had settled-yielded her claim and title in the territory to the United States, on condition 'that the French and Canadian inhabitants, and other settlers of the Kaskaskias, St. Vincent's, and the neighboring villages, who have professed themselves citizens of Virginia, shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them, and be protected in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties.'

On the 20th of June, 1788, Congress enacted, that from any general sale of lands in this region there should be a reserve of so much land as should satisfy all the just claims of the ancient settlers; 'that they should be confirmed in the possession of such lands as they may have had at the beginning of the Revolution; that measures be immediately taken for confirming them in their possessions and titles, and that the governor of the Northwestern Territory be instructed to examine the titles and possessions of the settlers, as above described, in order to determine what quantity of land they may severally claim, which shall be laid off for them at their own expense.'

Under this authority, and some instructions not necessary to be mentioned, but reciting them all, the then governor of the Northwestern Territory, General St. Clair, on the 12th of February, 1799, issued a document, somewhat in the form of a land-patent, to one Jarrot, who 'laid claim' to a piece of land in the county then and now known as St. Clair, Illinois, 'confirming' to him in fee a tract described. This instrument of confirmation, signed by General St. Clair, and duly registered, October 19th, 1804, ended thus:

'In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Territory to be affixed, at Cincinnati, &c., on the 12th day of February, A.D. 1799, and of the Independence of the United States the 23d.'

The land claimed and thus described in the patent was regularly surveyed, April 10th, 1798, by one McCann, 'lawfully authorized to survey such claims.'

This title of Jarrot, thus confirmed, became afterwards vested in one Felps.

But an opposing title also came into existence. On the 20th of February, 1812, an act of Congress was passed, authorizing a board of commissioners to revise and reexamine the confirmations made by the governor of the Northwestern Territory; and the board, in pursuance of the act, made such a report to the government of the United States, that the government by its proper officers rejected this claim, and subsequently exposed the land previously confirmed to Jarrot to public sale, when a certain Reichart became the purchaser. Two patents were accordingly issued to him by the United States, one in 1838 and one in 1853.

Reichart, asserting the title conferred by these patents, now brought ejectment in a State court of Illinois against Felps, relying on his old French claim confirmed by Governor St. Clair.

The plaintiff having given his patents of 1838 and 1853 in evidence, the defendant on his part offered the survey of McCann, and a certified copy from the records of the instrument of confirmation given by Governor St. Clair. On this certified copy no evidence appeared of a seal having ever been on the original; though there was oral testimony tending to show that the original did have a seal in wax, with an emblem and letters.

The plaintiff objected to the survey, and to the copy of the instrument from Governor St. Clair, because it showed that the original had no seal.

The court overruled the exception, and gave judgment for the defendant, so deciding against the validity of the patents of the United States issued in 1838 and 1853; though deciding in effect in favor of the validity of the instrument of confirmation professing to be done under authority of Congress. The judgment having been affirmed in the Supreme Court of Illinois, th case was brought here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, giving a right to the court to re-examine the final judgments of the highest State courts, 'where is drawn in question the validity of a statute or of an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity.' Mr. Baker, for the plaintiff in error; a brief being filed for Mr. koerner:

The deed of cession, of 1784, put the title into the United States. There was no tract of which possession did not vest in the United States. No power was given by any act of Congress to the governors of the Northwestern Territory to issue patents or deeds of confirmation. Moreover, whatever confirmations those governors did issue, were not considered final either by the Executive or by Congress. The copy of the patent shows that no seal was ever affixed to the instrument of confirmation. The instrument was, therefore, never executed, and is void. Oral testimony cannot countervail the better evidence of the copy.

Mr. Lyman Trumbull, contra:

The validity of the confirmation or grant of Governor St. Clair was brought before the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1829, in an ejectment by one Hill, who had entered and obtained a patent for a portion of the premises as public land. The court held the governor's confirmation valid. After this decision, the United States, recognizing it as establishing the validity of the grant by Governor St. Clair, passed an act, August 11th, 1842, refunding the money paid by the patentee who had entered it as public land.

This history of the government's dealing with the land in controversy, shows that it was reserved from the beginning from the public lands which were to be sold, and that the government never intended it should be sold as public land.

The patent issued by Governor St. Clair in 1799, devested the United States of any claim it might have had to the land, and its subsequent sale as public land was therefore void. It is assumed by the plaintiff that no authority was given to the governor of the Northwestern Territory to make confirmations or grants of these ancient possessions and titles. But the act of June 20th, 1788, affords an answer to this assumption; where it instructs the governor of the Northwestern Territory to 'examine the titles and possessions of the settlers, in order to determine what quantity of land they may severally claim, which shall be laid off for them at their own expense.' Who was to determine the quantity of land the claimants were to have, and to lay it off for them at their own expense, except he whose duty it was to examine the title and possessions for that purpose? When this was done, and the land laid off as the law declared it should be, the United States gave up all claim, if it ever had any, to the land thus set off. No other evidence of this would have been necessary than the survey which was made and entered upon the Land Office records; and the fact that the governor thought proper to evidence the claimant's right by a more solemn instrument, in the shape of a patent, is only confirmatory of what would have been a good title without it. All that was necessary to be done was to separate the private claims from the other lands, so that the latter might be brought into market. The United States never pretended to make claim to the lands set off to private claimants; on the contrary, it has, by numerous acts, as shown in the history of this case, recognized them as valid. The governors exercised this power of confirmation for more than twenty years, and their confirmations are styled patents in acts of Congress.

A grant, or a concession, made by that officer who is by law authorized to make it, carries with it prima facie evidence that it is within his power. No excess of or departure from them is to be presumed.

The land having been thus previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated, the patents of 1838 and 1853 are void.

The objections taken below as to the want of seal, &c., it is submitted, need no reply here. The original patent, it is testified, had a seal. None, however, was necessary.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Reichart v. Felps


text: Talk:Reichart v. Felps

title: Talk:Reichart v. Felps


text:
Reichart v. Felps/Opinion of the Court

The patents under which the plaintiff claimed in the State court were declared by that court to be void. The case, therefore, is properly cognizable in this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

He claimed under two patents of the dates of 1838 and 1853, which exhibit conclusive evidence of title if the land claimed had 'not been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated.' The only question to be decided in this case is, whether the land had been so granted, reserved, or appropriated.

The patent of Governor St. Clair, February 12th, 1799, duly registered in 1804, with the survey of McCann, April 10th, 1798, are conclusive evidence that the land in question was reserved from sale. The case of Moore v. Hill, decided nearly forty years ago in the Supreme Court of Illinois, on the same survey and grant which is now before us, should have been conclusive against the objections which have been revived on the present writ of error. 'This very able and elaborate opinion received the concurrence of the bar and the country at the time it was delivered, and has never been called in question since. There is no fact in the present case calculated to produce a result different from the one there announced.'

The objection that the patent from the governor was without a seal ought not to have been made. The act of Congress giving power to the governor did not require him to issue a patent nor to execute an instrument under seal. Any written evidence of his confirmation would have been a sufficient execution of the power. All that was necessary was an authentic declaration by the United States, through their authorized agent, that they had no claim to the land. It was not a grant by the United States, because the title was not in them.

Congress is bound to regard the public treaties, and it had no power to organize a board of revision to nullify titles confirmed many years before by the authorized agents of the government. And Congress became afterwards so well satisfied itself of this that it passed an act restoring to the purchasers the money which they had paid for titles obtained on the assumption of such a right.

title: Reichart v. Felps/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Reichart v. Felps/Opinion of the Court


text: Riggs v. Johnson County

title: Riggs v. Johnson County


text: Talk:Riggs v. Johnson County

title: Talk:Riggs v. Johnson County