text:
Washington v. District of Columbia/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia dismissing the bill of appellant. The questions presented by the appeal arise out of the execution of the act of congress of July 17, 1876, 'authorizing the repavement of Pennsylvania avenue.' That act created a commission, consisting of two officers of the engineer corps of the army, and the architect of the capitol, whose duty it was to contract for and superintend the work, and to decide upon the character of the material. It also declared in what proportion the expense of the work should be borne by the owners of property along the line of the avenue, namely, the United States, the District of Columbia, the private citizens, the Washington & Georgetown Railroad Company, whose track ran through the center of the avenue, and other railroad companies whose tracks crossed the street at several places. So much of this apportionment of expenses as relates to the appellant is in these words:

'Sec. 3. That the cost of laying down said pavement shall be     paid for in the following proportions and manner: The      Washington & Georgetown Railroad company shall bear all of      the expenses for that portion of the work lying between the      exterior rails of the tracks of the road, and for a distance      of two feet from and exterior to the track on each side      thereof, and of keeping the same in repair; but the said      railroad company, having conformed to the grade established      by the commissioners, may use cobblestone or Belgian rock in      paving their tracks, or the space between their tracks, as      the commissioners shall direct.' 19 St. at Large, 93.

This is in strict conformity to the charter of the company, passed in 1862, the fourth section of which enacts—

'That said corporation hereby created shall be bound to keep     said tracks, and for the space of two feet beyond the outer      rail thereof, and also the space between the tracks, at all      times well paved and in good order, without expense to the      United States, or to the cities of Georgetown and      Washington.'

The fifth section requires the company to conform their road to any change of the grade of the street; and the sixth, that the act may at any time be altered, amended, or repealed by congress. 12 St. at Large, 389. The act of 1876, under which the work of repaving was done, in section 4 provides 'that assessments shall be made by the commissioners of the District of Columbia upon the owners of said private property on said avenues and spaces and upon said railroad company respectively, provided in section 3 of this act,' and for the collection of the same by the collector of the District of Columbia. It is also enacted that, on failure of the railroad company or any private citizen to pay such assessment, the commissioners of the district shall issue certificates, bearing 10 per cent. interest, payable within one year, which are made a lien on the property, under which it may be sold at the end of the year, if not paid. The railroad company was assessed by the commissioners of the district in the sum of $19,886.69, whereas they charge that they are only liable for $12,207.27; and as the commissioners were about to issue a certificate for the larger amount, the company paid or tendered the sum which they acknowledged to be due, and filed their bill in chancery to obtain an injunction as to the remainder. This difference is owing to the fact that along-side of the exterior rails of the track the paving commissioners required a blue granite stone to be laid the whole length of the pavement, five inches in width and eight inches deep, and each stone about three feet long. This was charged wholly to the company, as well as the remainder of the two feet next adjoining said track on the outside of the rails. As regards this remainder the company make no objection, but they insist that the entire cost of all the paving on each side of their track to the sidewalk should be computed together, and the charge against the company should be in the proportion which those two feet bear to the entire distance from each exterior rail to the sidewalk. As this string of stone paving is more costly than the Neufchatel and Trinidad material, which constitute the main body of the pavement this would relieve the company of a part of the cost of the two feet adjacent to their track. As a matter of strict justice, no reason can be seen for this proposition, for it is quite clear that the requirement of this string or curb of blue granite is wholly due to the existence of the tracks of the railroad in the middle of the street, and is also mainly, if not wholly, for the protection of the track along-side of which it is laid.

Nothing can be more just than that the company should pay for the work which its track alone makes necessary. Nor is there any question that if this stone was necessary, in laying down this new pavement, for the security and durability of the track itself, or of the pavement near the track, the company was bound, by the fourth section of its charter, to pay the expense. That it was a judicious and proper thing to be done is scarcely controverted, and if it were, the testimony shows very clearly that it was.

The only question, therefore, that remains, is whether congress, in the distribution of the expense of this work of repaving the avenue, intended that this should be borne by the company. The language of congress on that subject would seem to admit of no other construction. The third section, already cited, says: 'The Washington & Georgetown Railroad Company shall bear all the expense for that portion of the work lying between the exterior rails of the tracks of the road, and for a distance of two feet from and exterior to the track on each side thereof, and of keeping the same in repair.' So far from relieving the company of the duty which it accepted by its charter, the language re-enforces that obligation and makes its application to the repavement clear. The statute goes on to prescribe what the United States shall pay, and what the District of Columbia shall pay, and what individual owners shall pay; and the proportions in which these parties are to be charged have no relation to the part to be paid for by the railroad company, which is, in no case, a proportionate part of the street along which it runs, but all the expense of the work inside its rails, and for two feet exterior to this on each side. There is no room for apportionment here, and if, for so much of this two feet as is of the same material as the main surface of the street, which is separated from it by no visible line, the easiest mode of ascertaining its cost is to calculate its relation to the remainder of the pavement, that is no reason why this extra and separable expense of blue stone should not be assessed, as the law requires, exclusively to the company.

But it is said that the paving commissioners adopted the rule of a general apportionment of all the expense, and reported to the commissioners of the district on that basis, as due from the company, the smaller sum of $12,207.27, and that their report is conclusive. The report thus made is nowhere in the statute made their special duty, nor are they anywhere authorized to make the final assessment. The report was merely a suggestion of their views for the action of the district commissioners. On the other hand, by the express language of the act, these latter commissioners are directed to make the assessment on which the parties are to pay, and on which, if they do not pay, a certificate shall be issued which becomes an interest-bearing lien on their property. Another source of complaint is that in making the necessary excavations for the new pavement, it became necessary to support the track of the company by underpinning, which cost $1,052.12, and was paid for by the paving commissioners. This work was wholly for the benefit of the railroad company. It was to prevent the track from falling or caving in while used during the progress of the work, and the city authorities might have left the company to take care of itself. But as this might have delayed the work, or led to litigation, they wisely protected it while they worked. It seems to us a proper charge against the company alone, as they alone were benefited, and their track made it necessary.

There is no error in the record, and the decree of the supreme court of the district is affirmed.


text: Talk:Washington v. District of Columbia/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Ruggles v. People of the State of Illinois

[Syllabus from pages 526-527 intentionally omitted]

[Statement of Case from pages 527-528 intentionally omitted]

Wirt Dexter and Sidney Bartlett, for plaintiff in error.

J. K. Edsall and ''Jas. McCartney'', for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.


text: Talk:Ruggles v. People of the State of Illinois


text:
Ruggles v. People of the State of Illinois/Opinion of the Court

In the view we take of this case the only question that need by considered is whether the charter of the Central Military Tract Railroad Company, one of the Illinois corporations which, through agreements of consolidation, are now represented by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, purports on its face to grant to the company the right to fix the rates of fare and freight to be charged for the conveyance of persons and property on its railroad free of all control by the state. If, on examination, we find that no such grant was intended, it will be unnecessary to decide whether one legislature has the power to bind succeeding legislatures by a contract to that effect.

The provisions of the charter relied on to establish such a grant may be stated as follows:

On the fifth of November, 1849, an act was passed by the general assembly of Illinois 'to provide for a general system of railroad incorporation.' That act contained the following provisions:

'Sec. 12. The directors of such company shall have power to     make by-laws for the management and disposition of stock,      property, and business affairs of such company, not      inconsistent with the laws of this state, and prescribing the      duties of officers, artificers, and servants that may be      employed, for the appointment of all officers for carrying on      all the business within the object and purposes of such      company.

'Sec. 21. Every such corporation shall possess the general     powers, and be subject to the general liabilities and      restrictions, expressed in the special powers following; that      is to say:

*    *     *

'(8) To take, transport, carry, and convey persons and     property on their railroad, by the force and power of steam,      of animals, or any mechanical powers, or by any combination      of them, and receive tolls or compensation therefor.

*    *     *

'(10) To regulate the time and manner in which passengers and     property shall be transported, and the tolls and compensation      to be paid therefor; but such compensation for any passenger      and his ordinary baggage shall not exceed three cents a mile,      unless by special act of the legislature, and shall be      subject to alteration as hereinafter provided.

*    *     *

'Sec. 32. The legislature may, when any such railroad shall     be opened for use, from time to time, alter or reduce the      rates of toll, fare, freight, or other profits upon such      road; but the same shall not, without the consent of the      corporation, be so reduced as to produce with said profits      less than 15 per cent. per annum on the capital actually paid     in; nor unless, on an examination of the amounts received and      expended, to be made by the secretary of state, he shall      ascertain that the net income divided by the company from all sources for the year then last past shall have      exceeded an annual income of 15 per cent. upon the capital of     the corporation actually paid in.'

On the fifteenth of February, 1851, another act was passed to incorporate the Central Military Tract Railroad Company, for the purpose of building and using a railroad between certain designated points. Section 3 of that act is as follows:

'Sec. 3. The said company is hereby created and incorporated     for the purpose of organizing under an act entitled 'An act      to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations,'      in force November 5, 1849, and in all things shall be      governed by the provisions thereof, and shall be entitled to      have and exercise the powers and privileges and be subject to      the liabilities therein enumerated: provided, that the      foregoing corporation may attach themselves to and form a      part of the Northern Cross Railroad Company, in such manner      or on such terms as said companies shall agree.'

On the nineteenth of June, 1852, another act was passed 'to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Central Military Tract Railroad Company." The following are the parts of this amending act on which, in our opinion, the case depends:

'Sec. 5. All the corporate powers of said company shall be     vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such      officers and agents as they shall appoint. * *  *

'Sec. 6. The said company shall have power to make, ordain,     and establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations as may      be deemed expedient and necessary to fulfill the purposes and      carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the      well-ordering, regulating, and securing the affairs,      business, and interest of the company: provided, that the      same be not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the      United States or of this state, or repugnant to this act. The     board of directors shall have power to establish such rates      of toll for the conveyance of persons or property upon the      same, as they shall from time to time, by their by-laws,      determine, and to levy and collect the same for the use of      the said company. The transportation of persons and property,     the width of track, and all other matters and things respecting the use of said road, shall be in conformity to such      rules and rgulations as the said board of directors shall      from time to time determine.'

It is contended on the part of the company that this amending act repeals clause 10 of section 21 as well as section 32 of the general railroad law, so far as they are applicable to the Central Military Tract Company, and that under section 6 of the amending act the directors have absolute control of rates of fare and freight free of legislative interference. We deem it unnecessary to determine the question of repeal, because on full consideration we are satisfied that section 6 does not have the effect that is claimed for it.

Grants of immunity from legitimate governmental control are never to be presumed. On the contrary, the presumptions are all the other way, and unless an exemption is clearly established the legislature is free to act on all subjects within its general jurisdiction, as the public interest may seem to require. As was said by Chief Justice TANEY, speaking for the court, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 547: 'It can never be assumed that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created.' This is an elementary principle.

In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155; Peik v. ''Chicago %& n. w. r/y. Co.'' Id. 176; and Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Blake, Id. 180, it was determined that 'a state may limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for fares and freights, unless restrained by some contract in the charter.' The right to a reversal of the present judgment rests on the question whether this company has any such restraining contract, and that depends on the effect to be given the amending section 6.

The company by its original charter was authorized to transport passengers and property, and to receive compensation therefor. This, if there had been nothing more, would, under the rules stated in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, and the several railroad cases decided at the same time, require the company to carry at reasonable rates, and leave the legislature at liberty to fix the maximum of what would be reasonable. So that, laying aside the limitations of the old charter, the question here is whether the amending section relied on has the effect of taking away from the state this power of legislative regulation.

The amending section provides that the company 'shall have power to make, ordain, and establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations as may be deemed expedient and necessary to fulfill the purposes and carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the well-ordering, regulating, and securing the affairs, business, and interest of the company: provided, that the same be not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, or of this state, or repugnant to this act.' By section 5, all the powers of the company were vested in and could be exercised by the directors. Clearly, under this authority, no by-law can be established by the directors that does not conform to the laws of the state, and this, whether the laws were in force when the amended charter was granted or came into operation afterwards. The power of the company for the regulation of its own affairs was thus in express terms subjected to the legislative control of the state. The corporate power was a continuing one, and intended for the ordering of the affairs of the company as circumstances might from time to time require. The reserved control by the state was also continuing in its nature, and manifestly intended for the protection of the public whenever in the judgment of the legislative department of the government the necessity should arise.

Then follows the special provision on which the claim of a contract is predicated. It is as follows:

'The board of directors shall have power to establish such     rates of toll for the conveyance of persons or property upon      the same as they shall from time, by their by-laws,      determine, and to levy and collect the same for the use of      the company.'

This is the form in which the power to charge and collect compensation for the carriage of persons and property was granted by the amended charter. The rates must be fixed by by-laws, and no by-law can be made that is at all repugnant to the laws of the state. The first paragraph of the section, with its proviso, prescribes generally what is necessary to the validity of a by-law, and the second allows the directors to fix rates by by-laws. It is undoubtedly true that the first paragraph neither adds to nor takes from the inherent power of a corporation to make by-laws for the regulation of its affairs, and that the proviso is nothing more than a legislative declararation of the principle of the common law that all by-laws must be reasonable, and not in conflict with the laws of the state. But the very fact that such a provision would have been implied, adds to the significance of its incorporation in express terms into the charter, and manifests a determination not to leave room for doubt as to the right of the state to use its legislative power, if necessary, for the regulation of the affairs of the corporation, at least by the enactment of general laws applicable to all corporations of a like character, and engaged in a like business. There is nothing which even in the remotest degree indicates that a by-law fixing rates is to be of a different character from those regulating the other business of the company. When, therefore, in a section of the charter which expressly declares that no by-law shall be made that is in conflict with the laws of the state, we find that the rates of charge to be levied and collected for the conveyance of persons and property are to be regulated by by-laws, the conclustion is irresistible that only such charges can be collected as are allowed by the laws of the state. This implies that, in the absence of direct legislation on the subject, the power of the directors over the rates is subject only to the common-law limitation of reasonableness, for in the absence of a statute, or other appropriate indication of the legislative will, the common law forms part of the laws of the state, to which the corporate by-laws must conform. But since, in the absence of some restraining contract, the state may establish a maximum of rates to be charged by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property, it follows that when a maximum is so established, the rates fixed by the directors must conform to its requirements, otherwise the by-laws will be repugnant to the laws.

It is argued, however, that this cannot be the meaning of the amending act, because if the company had, under its old charter, the absolute right of fixing rates, subject only to a limit of three cents a mile on passengers, and the state had no power to interfere, except to keep the annual profits down to 15 per cent. per annum on the paid-up capital, no one can believe it would have surrendered such a privilege and taken in lieu another so unfavorable as this. It is undoubtedly true, as was claimed in argument, and has been often said from the bench, that amendments to the charters of corporations are usually made at the solicitation of the corporations themselves, who cause the bills to be prepared and submitted to the legislatures for enactment, and that, if there is doubt as to the construction of what is enacted, this fact may be resorted to in aid of interpretation. But Vattel's first general maxim of interpretation is that 'it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,' and he continues: 'When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms,-when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion,-there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it.' Vattel, Law Nat. 244. Here the words are plain and interpret themselves. The directors may establish such by-laws as they please, provided they are not repugnant to the constitution and laws, and they may by their by-laws regulate the rates of fare and freight. As their by-laws must conform to the laws of the state, so must their rates. If the state had not the legislative power to regulate the charges of carriers for hire, the case would be different. But that question has been settled, and the amended charter which this company secured from the legislature must be construed in the light of that established power.

Without, therefore, undertaking to determine what rights as to fares and freights were secured to the company under the old charter, nor whether more was gained by the other provisions of the new charter than was lost by the acceptance of section 6 as it was enacted, we affirm the judgment.

BLATCHFORD, J., did not sit in this case.


text: Talk:Ruggles v. People of the State of Illinois/Opinion of the Court


text:
Illinois Centural v. People of the State of Illinois

John N. Jewett and John A. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.

J. K. Edsall and ''Jas. McCartney,'' for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.


text: Talk:Illinois Centural v. People of the State of Illinois


text:
Illinois Centural v. People of the State of Illinois/Opinion of the Court

This case, like that of Ruggles v. Illinois, just [ante, 832,] presents the question whether the state of Illinois has entered into a contract with a railroad corporation not to exercise the legislative power to regulate charges for the carriage of persons and property upon the railroad of the corporation. It is not necessary in this case, any more than it was in the other, to inquire whether the power of legislative regulation, in this particular, is one that can be bargained away, because here, as there, we are of opinion that no such thing was intended. The provision of the charter of the Illinois Central Railroad Company relied on, as showing a contract, is almost identical with that of the Central Military Tract Company considered in the Ruggles Case, and in the following words:

'Sec. 8. The said company shall have power to make, ordain,     and establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations as may      be deemed expedient and necessary to fulfill the purposes and      carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the      well-ordering, regulating, and securing the affairs,      business, and interests of the company: provided, that the      same be not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the      United States or of this state, or repugnant to this act. The     board of directors shall have power to establish such rates      of toll for the conveyance of persons and property upon the      same as they shall from time to time by their by-laws direct      and determine, and to levy and collect the same for the use      of said company. The transportation of persons and property,     the width of track, the construction of wheels, the form and      size of cars, the weight of loads, and all other matters and      things respecting the use of said road and the conveyance of      passengers and property, shall be in conformity to such rules      and regulations as said board of directors shall from time to      time determine. Nothing in this act contained shall authorize     said corporation to make a location of their track within any      city without the consent of common council of said city.' What was said in the other case as to the construction of section 6 of that charter is applicable to this, and, referring to the opinion in that case for the reasons, we affirm this judgment.

BLATCHFORD, J., took no part in the decision of this case.


text: Talk:Illinois Centural v. People of the State of Illinois/Opinion of the Court


text:
Hawley v. United States

J. K. Edsall and John B. Hawley, for plaintiff in error.

''Thos. S. McClelland'', for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Hawley v. United States


text: Talk:Hawley v. United States

title: Talk:Hawley v. United States


text:
Hawley v. United States/Opinion of the Court

On the fifth of April, 1872, the town of Amboy, Lee county, Illinois, issued a series of bonds in payment of a subscription voted by the voters of the town to the capital stock of the Chicago & Rock River Railroad Company. Both the subscription and bonds were authorized by the charter of the railroad company, approved March 24, 1869.

Sections 12 and 13 of this charter, which alone need be considered, are as follows:

'Sec. 12. It shall be the duty of the clerk of any such city,     town, or township, in which a vote shall be given in favor of      subscription, within 10 days thereafter, to transmit to the      county clerk of their counties a transcript or statement of      the vote given, and the amount so voted to be subscribed, and      the rate of interest to be paid: provided, that when      elections shall be held and bonds issued, as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the clerk of      such town or township to file with the county clerk of their      respective counties, within 10 days after the issuing of said      bonds, certificates of the amount of bonds issued, and the      rate of interest payable thereon, and number of each bond.'

'Sec. 13. It shall be the duty of the county clerk of said     county, annually, after the execution and delivering of such      bonds aforesaid, to compute and assess upon all the taxable      property returned by the assessor of such city, town, or      township, a sum sufficient to pay the interest and costs of      collection and disbursements upon all bonds so issued by the      respective cities, towns, or townships; which tax shall be      extended upon the collector's books as other taxes are, and,      when collected, shall be paid to the treasurer of the county;      and such city, town, or township shall, when providing for      the levying and collecting of other taxes, also assess upon      the property of such city, town, or township any rate not      exceeding 3 per cent. in any one year upon the assessment, to     provide a fund for the redemption of the principal and      interest of such bonds as or when they become due-said taxes      to be levied and collected as other taxes are; but no tax      shall be computed, assessed, or collected, or any interest      paid, to be applied upon said bonds, unless such bonds have      been executed and delivered.'

By an act of the general assembly of Illinois 'to fund and provide for paying the railroad debts of counties, townships, cities, and towns,' passed and in force April 16, 1869, the holders of that class of securities were authorized to register them in the office of the auditor of public accounts of the state. Sections 4 and 5 of that act are as follows:

'Sec. 4. When the bonds of any county, township, city, or     town shall be so registered, the state auditor shall annually      ascertain the amount of interest for the current year due and      accrued and to accrue upon such bonds, and from the amount so      ascertained he shall deduct the amount in the state treasury      placed to the credit of such county, township, city or town,      as herein provided and directed; and from the basis of the      certificate of valuation of property heretofore provided to      be transmitted to him, or, in case no such certificate shall      be filed in his office, then, upon the basis of the total      assessment of such county, township, city, or town for the year next preceding, he shall estimate and      determine the rate per centum on the valuation of property      within such county, township, city, or town requisite to meet      and satisfy the amount of interest unprovided for, together      with the ordinary cost to the state of collection and      disbursement of the same, to be estimated by the auditor and      treasurer, and shall make and transmit to the county clerk of      such county, or to the proper officer or authority whose duty      it is or shall be to prepare the estimates and books for the      collection of state taxes in such county, township, city, or      town, a certificate stating such estimated requisite per      centum for such purpose, to be filed in his office, and the      same per centum shall thereupon be deemed added to and a part      of the per centum which is or may be levied or provided by      law for purposes of state revenue, and shall be so treated by      such clerk, officer, or authority in making such estimates      and books for the collection of taxes; and the said tax shall      be collected with the state revenue, and all laws relating to      the state revenue shall apply thereto, except as herein      otherwise provided.

'Sec. 5. The state shall be deemed the custodian only of the     several taxes so collected and credited to such county,      township, city, or town, and shall not be deemed in any      manner liable on account of any such bonds; but the tax and      fund so collected shall be deemed pledged and appropriated to      the payment of the interest and principal of the registered      bonds herein provided for, until fully satisfied.'

When the bonds of the town of Amboy were issued, the town clerk did not transmit to the county clerk the statement required by section 12 of the charter of the railroad company, but the president of the company caused them to be registered in the office of the auditor of public accounts in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1869. During the years 1872 and 1873 the auditor made the proper certificate under the registry law for the taxes to meet the interest for those years, and the taxes were extended by the county clerk in due form on the tax-collector's books, but before the collections were made certain tax-payers of the town obtained from the circuit court of Lee county an injunction against the county clerk, the county collector, and the town collector, restraining them from collecting the taxes that had already been assessed, and also restraining the same parties and the auditor of public accounts of the state from taking any steps for the levy or collection of any other taxes to pay either the principal or the interest of the bonds.

After this injunction was obtained, the relators, Fairbanks, Skinner, Thomas, and Wetmore, being severally holders and owners of certain of the bonds and coupons of the town, began separate suits against the town in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, to recover the amounts due them, respectively, on their coupons. These suits resulted in a judgment on the thirteenth of March, 1878, in favor of Fairbanks, for $2,449 damages and $36.12 costs; another, on the twenty-fourth of January, 1878, in favor of Skinner, for $2,018.50 damages and $47.10 costs; another, on the twenty-ninth of November, 1875, in favor of Thomas, for $866 damages and $43.90 costs; and two others in favor of Wetmore,-one on the seventeenth of December, 1875, for $3,836.14 and $50.40 costs, and the other, on the twentieth of June, 1876, for $1,058.33 damages and $31.50 costs.

These several judgments remain unpaid, and have all been duly audited and allowed by the auditing board of the town; but the town clerk, whose duty it is to certify to the county clerk, on or before the second Tuesday in August in each year, the amount of taxes to be levied and collected to pay the charges against the town for the current year, refused to certify the judgments, and kept himself concealed so as to avoid the process of the courts. The several plaintiffs then presented their respective judgments to the county clerk, and demanded that he 'compute and assess upon all the taxable property in said town of Amboy a sum sufficient to pay said judgments, and each and every of them, and interest on the same to the date of payment, and costs of suit in each case, together with the costs of collecting and disbursing such taxes, and to extend such taxes upon the collector's books of said town of Amboy for the year 1879.' This the county clerk refused to do, and thereupon the several judgment plaintiffs united as relators in an application to the circuit court of the United States for a mandamus requiring him to comply with their demands.

To this application the county clerk answered, setting up defenses, as follows:

(1) That the town clerk had never transmitted to the county     clerk the statement required by section 12 of the charter of      the railroad company; (2) that the town clerk had never      certified to the county clerk the allowance of the judgment      by the board of auditors of the town; (3) that all taxes to      pay principal and interest on the bonds covered by the      several judgments of the relators, certified by the auditor      of public accounts, under the registry law, had been duly      extended on the tax-collector's books, and their collection      enjoined by the circuit court of the county; and (4) that he      had himself been enjoined by the circuit court of the county      from extending any taxes whatever on the tax-books to pay the      principal or interest of the bonds held by the relators.

Upon demurrer to this answer, judgment was given in the court below awarding a writ of mandamus directed to the county clerk and commanding him to extend upon the tax-collector's books of the town, for the year 1879, a sum sufficient to pay each of the several judgments held by the relators, particularly describing the judgments separately. To reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought.

We are met at the outset with a motion of the defendants in error to dismiss the writ in this case on the ground that the several judgments proceeded upon below cannot be united to give us jurisdiction, and the amount due on any one of them does not exceed $5,000. The rule is settled, as stated more than once at the present term, that when distinct causes of action, in favor of distinct parties, are united in one suit, and distinct judgments are rendered for or against the several parties, their judgments cannot be joined to give us jurisdiction. Ex parte Baltimore & O. R. Co. 106 U.S. 5; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 35;] Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Waterman, Id. 265; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 131;] Adams v. Crittenden, Id. 576; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 92;] Schwed v. Smith, Id. 188; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 221.] In the present case distinct causes of action, in favor of distinct parties, were united, for convenience and to save expense, in one suit, and distinct orders were made in favor of each one of the several judgment creditors. The proceeding was analogous to a crediter's bill brought by distinct creditors upon distinct judgments to reach the property of their common debtor. That was the case of Schwed v. Smith, supra, in which we held, following Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208, that the amount due the several creditors could not be joined to give jurisdiction on an appeal by the defendants. In the present case, the amount due the relators Fairbanks, Skinner, and Thomas, respectively, does not exceed $5,000. As to them, consequently, the writ must be dismissed. But as to the relator Wetmore the case is different. She has two judgments, and the aggregate amount due her, including interest to the time the mandamus was awarded, exceeds $5,000. The matter in dispute with her, therefore, is sufficient for our jurisdiction, and the cause must be retained for adjudication in respect to her rights. This was the form of proceeding adopted in Farmers$h Loan & Trust Co. v. Waterman, supra.

Proceeding, then, to the consideration of the case on its merits, we will take up the defenses relied on by the county clerk in the order in which they have been stated.

1. As to the omission of the town clerk to certify the statement required by the twelfth section of the charter. By the judgment of the circuit court, for the enforcement of which the mandamus is asked, the fact of the issue of the bonds and the liability of the town for the payment of the coupons held by the judgment creditor was judicially dedetermined. Section 13 of the charter of the railroad company made it the duty of the county clerk annually, after the issue of the bonds, to compute and assess on the taxable property in the town a sum sufficient to meet the interest as it matured, and provide a sum for the redemption of the principal. The statement of the town clerk under section 12 was not a condition precedent to the computation and assessment of the tax by the county clerk. It was one way of informing the county clerk of his duty, but not necessarily the only way. The law obliged him to make the assessment in due course of business after the bonds were put out, and until they were paid in full. When, therefore, the judgments of the circuit court of the United States were presented to him, he was officially informed that the liability of the town for the payment of the coupons sued for had been judicially established, and it became his duty, under section 13, to compute the tax necessary to pay them, and put it in the way of collection. No further certificate from any town officer was necessary. The issue of the bonds, under which the judgment creditor claimed the right to a tax, was conclusively proven, and that was enough. There is nothing in ''Springfield & Ill. S. E. Ry. Co''. v. County Clerk of Wayne Co. 74 Ill. 27, to the contrary of this. In that case the vote was for a donation by the town to be paid by a tax, and there was no other evidence of the obligation to levy the tax than the vote of the electors. Under such circumstances, there was reason for holding that the only legitimate evidence that could be produced to the county clerk of the fact of the vote was the certificate, which had been specially provided for in the act authorizing the donation to be made. Here, however, the bond carried on its face the declaration of the town that the holder was entitled to have the tax assessed and collected for its payment, and whatever was legitmate evidence of the issue of the bond was legitimate evidence of the duty of the clerk to act. The fact of the issue having been conclusively established by the judgment, the presentation of the exemplification of judgment to the county clerk was all that was in law necessary to make it his duty to proceed.

2. As to the certificate of the town clerk that the judgments had been audited and allowed by the town auditors. What has already been said is equally applicable to this branch of the case. The judgment established the legal right of the judgment creditor to have the tax specially provided for by section 13 of the charter of the company computed and assessed by the county clerk without any further action of the town officers. After the issue of the bonds it became the positive duty of the county clerk to compute and assess, in the regular course of business, to the extent that was necessary, the tax that had been contracted for to meet the liability thus incurred. It became, in legal effect, a part of the contract of the town that this should be done, and the judgment of the court establishing the contract was equivalent to a judicial determination that the tax must be levied by the county clerk, unless the judgment was otherwise provided for. Whenever, therefore, it was made to appear to the county clerk in any way that no other provision had been made, it was his duty under the law to proceed with the computation and assessment of the tax. The certificate of the town clerk that the judgment had been allowed by the board of auditors for payment through the means of the annual taxation would have been one way, and, perhaps, the most appropriate way, of furnishing the information which the county clerk needed, but it has nowhere been made the only lawful way. When, therefore, the town clerk refused to make and forward such a certificate, there was no legal impediment to the employment of some other means to give the county clerk notice of what his duty required of him in the premises. The certificate of the town clerk was not in this case any more a condition precedent to the action of the county clerk than it was under the requirements of section 12.

3. As to the certificate of the auditor of public accounts. This, like the certificate of the town clerk, is only one way of informing the county clerk of what his duty under section 13 requires. It is not, any more than the certificate of the town clerk, an indispensable prerequisite to the action of the county clerk.

4. As to the injunction. The relator was not a party to the suit in which the injunction was obtained, and, consequently, is not bound by it. Having established her right to the tax by the judgment of the circuit court in a suit to which the town, in its corporate capacity, was a party, she may use the power of that court to command the assessment and collection of the tax as a means of carrying the judgment into execution, notwithstanding what the tax-payers may have caused to done in some proceeding to which the relator was not a party. The right to the computation and assessment, as well as the collection, of the tax, followed as a matter of law from the establishment of the liability of the town for the payment of the interest, which it was agreed should be made by the assessment and collection of the tax. An injunction against the officers before the judgment against the town was rendered, cannot stand in the way of the enforcement of the tax by the circuit court to carry its judgment into execution.

The writ of error is dismissed as to the relators Fairbanks, Skinner, and Thomas, and the judgment of the circuit court awarding the mandamus in favor of Caroline C. Wetmore is affirmed. The cause is remanded, with leave to modify the judgment in such a way as to adapt the command of the writ of mandamus to the circumstances consequent on the delay caused by the pendency of the writ of error in this court.


text: Talk:Hawley v. United States/Opinion of the Court


text:
Ex parte Hung Hang

''S. F. Phillips, Thos. Simons, and Hall McAllister'', for petitioner.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Ex parte Hung Hang


text: Talk:Ex parte Hung Hang

title: Talk:Ex parte Hung Hang


text:
Ex parte Hung Hang/Opinion of the Court

This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the legality of the detention of the petitioner, Hung Hang, a subject of the emperor of China, by the chief of police, under a warrant for his arrest, issued by the police judge of the city and county of San Francisco, California, for a violation of an order or ordinance of the board of supervisors of such city and county, alleged to be in contravention of the constitution and of a treaty of the United States.

It has long been settled that ordinarily this court cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus except under its appellate jurisdiction. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 101; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 572; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 99; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 165; Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 22; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 341; Ex parte Siebold, Id. 374.

Section 751 of the Revised Statutes, which re-enacts a similar provision in the judiciary act of 1789, (section 14,) gives this court authority to issue the writ, but, except in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, or consuls, and those in which a state is a party, it can only be done for a review of the judicial decision of some inferior officer or court. This petition presents no such case. The writ is consequently denied.

title: Ex parte Hung Hang/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Ex parte Hung Hang/Opinion of the Court


text:
Meath v. County of Phillips

S. P. Walker, for appellant.

No counsel for appellee.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Meath v. County of Phillips


text: Talk:Meath v. County of Phillips

title: Talk:Meath v. County of Phillips


text:
Meath v. County of Phillips/Opinion of the Court

The first question presented by this appeal is whether the drafts drawn by levee inspectors on the levee treasurer of the county of Phillips, under the authority of the act of February 16, 1859, 'to provide for making and repairing levees in Desha and Phillips counties,' and the renewal bonds or scrip issued by the county clerk of the county under the provisions of the act of January 15, 1861, to amend the act of February 16, 1859, constitute an indebtedness of the county for which bonds of the county may be demanded under the act of April 29, 1873, 'to authorize certain counties to fund their outstanding indebtedness,' or a money judgment or decree recovered against the county. To this question we have no hesitation in giving an answer in the negative. The act of 1859 provided for the division of the overflowed lands of the counties of Desha and Phillips into levee districts for the purpose of reclaiming the lands, and for the taxation of such lands to pay the expenses incurred in that behalf. The business was to be managed by levee inspectors, at first appointed by the county court of the county, but afterwards elected by the voters of the several levee districts, and payments for work done or expenses incurred were to be made by the drafts of the levee inspectors for the district on the levee treasurer appointed by the county court of the county to receive and disburse according to law all funds raised from levee taxes in the county. Only lands benefited by protection from overflow by the levees could be taxed. These lands were to be selected by a board of three freeholders appointed by the county court of the county for each levee district, and valued for taxation by the levee inspector. The county court was then to levy a tax upon the property charged, to be collected like other taxes, and this tax, when collected, was to be paid over to the levee treasurer, to be by him disbursed on the drafts of the inspectors. The funds collected from each district were to be appropriated to the payment of the drafts of its own inspector. The bonds, scrip, or drafts issued by the county clerk under the act of 1861 were to be renewals of the inspectors' drafts and created no new obligation. Any debt incurred in the levee work was clearly the debt of the levee district, to be discharged through a tax levied by the county court for that special purpose. In this the county court acted, not as the representative of the county, but of the district. In effect the county court and the sheriff of the county were made the officers and agents of the levee district for the levee and collection of the special tax which was required. This tax was not a county tax, but a district tax, levied and assessed under the authority of law by the county court. In levying the tax the court acted for the district, not the county.

The cases of County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360, and Davenport v. Dodge Co. 105 U.S. 237, presented entirely different facts. In the case of the county of Cass, the law provided in terms for an issue of bonds in the name of the county, and in that of the county of Davenport we construed the law to be in effect the same. Consequently there were in those cases obligations of the counties payable out of special funds. Here, however, there was a manifest intention to bind the levee districts only by the obligations incurred, and not to make the county, in its political capacity, responsible for the payment of the debts that were created for levee purposes under these laws. The machinery of the county was to be used in the levy and collection of the special taxes required, but the county, as a county, was to be in no way involved. It follows that the prayer for a money decree against the county, as well as that for an exchange of the bonds authorized by the act of 1873 for the orders or warrants held by the appellants, must be denied.

The next and only remaining question is, whether the county court of the county can be required, in this suit, to levy and impose taxes on the levee districts to pay the demands. All the demands fell due on or before April 1, 1862. This suit was not brought until December 17, 1877. It was in effect conceded by the counsel for the appellant that an action at law for the enforcement of the claims would have been barred in 10 years from their maturity, adding only the time between December 1, 1862, and March 16, 1864, when the operation of the statute of limitations was suspended. This proceeding is in equity, but on sufficient reason is shown why the limitation of the statute should not be applied. Without, therefore, considering any other objection to the bill and the relief that is asked, we hold that the suit, so far as it seeks to have the tax imposed by the county court, is barred by lapse of time.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.


text: Talk:Meath v. County of Phillips/Opinion of the Court


text:
Ex parte Tom Tong

[Syllabus from page 556 intentionally omitted]

[Statement of Case from pages 556-557 intentionally omitted]

''S. F. Phillips, Thos. Simons, andHall McAllister'', for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from page 557 intentionally omitted]

L. D. Latimer, in opposition.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Ex parte Tom Tong


text: Talk:Ex parte Tom Tong

title: Talk:Ex parte Tom Tong


text:
Ex parte Tom Tong/Opinion of the Court

orpus sued out of the circuit court of the United States for the district of California by the petitioner, Tom Tong, a subject of the emperor of China, for the purpose of an inquiry into the legality of his detention by the chief of police of the city and county of San Francisco for an alleged violation of an order or ordinance of the board of supervisors of such city and county regulating the licensing, etc., of public laundries, and the case comes here, before judgment below, on a certificate of division of opinion between the judges holding the court as to certain questions which arose at the hearing. The allegation in the petition is that the order, for the violation of which the petitioner is held, is in contravention of the constitution of the United States and of a treaty between the United States and the emperor of China. A question which meets us at the outset is whether we have jurisdiction, and that depends on whether the proceeding is to be treated as civil or criminal. Section 650 of the Revised Statutes provides that whenever, in any civil suit or proceeding in a circuit court, there occurs a difference of opinion between the judges holding the court as to any matter to be decided, ruled, or ordered, the opinion of the presiding judge shall prevail and be considered the opinion of the court for the time being; and section 652, that when final judgment or decree is rendered, the points of disagreement shall be certified and entered of record under the direction of the judges. That being done, the judgment or decree may, under the provisions of section 693, be brought here for review by writ of error or appeal, as the case may be. By section 951 it is provided that whenever any question occurs on the trial or hearing of any criminal proceeding before a circuit court and the judges are divided in opinion, the point on which they disagree shall, during the same term, upon the request of either party, or of their counsel, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court to this court at its next session. It follows, from these provisions of the statutes, that, if this is a civil suit or proceeding, we have no jurisdiction, as there has been no final judgment in the circuit court, but, if it is a criminal proceeding, we have.

The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty. Resort to it sometimes becomes necessary, because of what is done to enforce laws for the punishment of crimes; but the judicial proceeding under it is not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into the right to liberty notwithstanding the act. Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for the punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings. In the present case the petitioner is held under criminal process. The prosecution against him is a criminal prosecution, but the writ of habeas corpus which he has obtained is not a proceeding in that prosecution. On the contrary, it is a new suit brought by him to enforce a civil right, which he claims, as against those who are holding him in custody, under the criminal process. If he fails to establish his right to his liberty, he may be detained for trial for the offense; but if he succeeds he must be discharged from custody. The proceeding is one instituted by himself for his liberty, not by the government to punish him for his crime. This petitioner claims that the constitution and a treaty of the United States give him the right to his liberty, notwithstanding the charge that has been made against him, and he has obtained judicial process to enforce that right. Such a proceeding on his part is, in our opinion, a civil proceeding, notwithstanding his object is, by means of it, to get released from custody under a criminal prosecution. It was said by Chief Justice MARSHALL, speaking for the court, as long ago as Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 101: 'The question whether the individual shall be imprisoned is always distinct from the question whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to be tried, and therefore these questions are separated, and may be decided in different courts.'

The questions that may be certified to us on a division of opinion before judgment are those which occur on the trial or hearing of a criminal proceeding before a circuit court. It follows that we cannot take jurisdiction of the case in its present form, and it is consequently remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings according to law.

title: Ex parte Tom Tong/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Ex parte Tom Tong/Opinion of the Court


text:
Gibson v. Bruce

''Thos. McDougall and Hoadly, Johnson & Colston'', for appellant.

T. D. Lincoln, for appellee.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Gibson v. Bruce


text: Talk:Gibson v. Bruce

title: Talk:Gibson v. Bruce


text:
Gibson v. Bruce/Opinion of the Court

In this case the court below decided that under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, there could not be a removal to the circuit court of the United States of a suit in a state court between parties who were citizens of different states when the suit was begun, if, when the petition for removal was filed, the parties were all citizens of the same state. To reverse an order remanding a suit on that ground, this appeal was taken.

Under the judiciary act of 1789, (section 12,) it was held, in Inc. Co. v. Pechner, 95 U.S. 183, that there could not be a removal unless the necessary citizenship existed when the suit was begun. That act provided only for a removal on the application of the defendant when the plaintiff was a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought, and the defendant was required to file his petition for removal at the time of entering his appearance in the state court. Under such circumstances changes of citizenship, after the suit was begun and before the time for applying for a removal, would not often occur.

The act of 1875 is radically different from any which preceded it. Under that act either party may petition for removal, and neither party need be a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought. The material language is as follows: 'That any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any state court, * *  * in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states, *  *  * either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.'

In order to obtain the removal a petition therefor must be filed in the state court at or before the term at which the cause could be first tried, and before the trial. In the present case the petition was not filed until nearly two years after the commencement of the suit.

The construction of the act is by no means free from doubt, but on full consideration we are of opinion that the requirement of the old law, that the necessary citizenship should exist when the suit was brought, was not abolished. We cannot believe it was intended to allow a party to deprive a state court of the jurisdiction it has once rightfully acquired over him by changing his citizenship after a suit is begun, and that would be the effect of the law if the right of removal is made to depend only on the citizenship existing at the time a removal is applied for. But we are also of opinion that because of the extension of the time for applying for removal, and because neither party need be a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and either party may apply, it was the intention to provide that the controversy should be between citizens of different states at the time of the removal. In this way the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States will only attach when there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states at the time the suit is transferred, and the right to the transfer will depend on the citizenship when the suit was begun and when the petition for removal is filed.

We, therefore, hold that a suit cannot be removed from a state court under the act of 1875 unless the requisite citizenship of the parties exists both when the suit was begun and when the petition for removal is filed.

The order remanding the cause is affirmed.

title: Gibson v. Bruce/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Gibson v. Bruce/Opinion of the Court


text:
New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter

John Linn, for plaintiff in error.

Courtlandt Parker and R. Mayne Parker, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

title: New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter


text: Talk:New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter

title: Talk:New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter


text:
New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter/Opinion of the Court

This was an action of trespass brought by Trotter to recover damages of the New Jersey Zinc Company for entering on his lands and digging up and carrying away a quantity of franklinite ore. There were three counts in the declaration-two quare clausum fregit, and one de bonis asportatis. The plea was not guilty. No other issue was raised by the pleadings. Neither party set up title, so that the only matter in dispute was the liability of the zinc company to pay for the ore which it was alleged had been wrongfully taken and carried away. Trotter recovered a judgment for $3,320 damages, and $752.25 costs of suit. From that judgment the zinc company brought this writ of error, which Trotter now moves to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $5,000.

As we decided at the present term in Hilton v. Dickinson, ante, 424, our jurisdiction is determined by the value of the matter in dispute in this court, and the matter in dispute here in the present case is the judgment below for less than $5,000. It may be that the question actually litigated below related to the title of the parties to the land from which the ore in controversy was taken, and that the verdict will be conclusive on that question as an estoppel in some other case; but, as was also said at the present term, in Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 579, [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 484,] for the purpose of estimating the value on which our jurisdiction depends, reference can only be had to the matter actually in dispute in the particular cause in which the judgment to be reviewed was rendered, and we are not permitted to consider the collateral effect of the judgment in another suit between the same or other parties. It is the money value of what has been actually adjudged in the cause that is to be taken into the account, not the probative force of the judgment in some other suit. Here the thing and the only thing adjudged is that the zinc company was guilty of the particular trespass complained of, and must pay Trotter $3,320 for the ore taken away. Had the zinc company pleaded title to the land from which the ore was taken, and issue had been joined on that plea, a different question would have been presented. In that way, the land might have been made the matter for adjudication, and thus the matter in dispute on the record. But, as this case stands, only the possession of Trotter and his right to the ore are involved. It may be that, in order to find possession in Trotter, the jury were compelled to find that he had title to the land, and that in this way the verdict and the judgment may estop the parties in another suit; but that will be a collateral, not the direct, effect of the judgment.

The motion to dismiss is granted.


text: Talk:New Jersey Zinc Company v. Trotter/Opinion of the Court