text:
Page:Examiner, Journal of Political Economy, v2n12.djvu/6

 evident from that very power having been denied him in the Convention which formed the Constitution: for we find in the Journals of the Convention (page 68) that it was proposed to clothe the Congress with a power "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil his duty under its articles." but the Convention refused to listen to the proposition—so, again, at page 126, it was proposed that "if any State, or body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such Acts, &c. the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the Confederated States, or as much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts." But the Committee who drafted the Constitution unhesitatingly rejected it as repugnant to the spirit of our Institutions and in derogation of the Sovereignty of the States.

Ineed the entire scheme of our government, on its very face, and from its very nature, is simply one of mutual benefits, and separate advantages. The idea of Force is utterly abhorrent to its character. Has it ever been pretended that the States which have entered into the Union and adopted the General Compact, were compelled by coercion to do so? Were they no, on the contrary, induced voluntarily to unite by the proffered advantages of great security and protection from foreign dangers? Has it not always been held out to the Territories that they will be allowed to join the Confederacy and enjoy its advantages upon certain specified conditions? Have we ever heard of a Territory, even though the soil belonged, by purchase, to the Country, being compelled to come into the Union and to yield up its entire Right of self Government? Most absurdly not! How then can it be pretended that the Executive Department of the Federal Government has a right to employ force against the Sovereignty of a State?

No, indeed, it is neither the Duty, nor the Right, of the President to attempt to use of force in these cases of disputed Right. It is, on the contrary, his solemn duty to recommend, either the abandonment of the usurpation or the call of the Convention of the States—And hence, if the Executive perform his duty, [and he has no power to do otherwise] there can be neither violence nor any risk of Disunion. It is, in fact, the very repugnance and aversion which we entertain to the idea of Disunion that causes us to revolt at the remedy of which has been maintained by Col. Drayton to be the only rightful Remedy of the States, on the failure of reason and remonstrance. We desire no Secession—for that is of itself and "ex vi termini" Disunion. Our great end and aim is to preserve the Union —the Union according to the compact of the Constitution—by arresting every perverse and wilful violation of its sanctity—and this, we contend, is to be effected by the exertion of a legitimate and rightful Injunction without departing from the pale of that Union, to which, in its state of purity, we are too much attached to bear with patience its continued violation and abuse.

But it is object by Col. Drayton that, this Doctrine of Nullification asserts the right of a State's being in the Union and out of it at the same time. Let us allow this to be so; it assuredly, even then, is but half as dangerous and extreme a measure as Col. Drayton's Right of Secession, which professedly goes the whole length of Disunion—and if that gentleman contends that a State possesses the ultra right of Secession, why should he express such horror at the half way measure of Nullification? Sure here is an utter inconsistency. For whilst he advocates a Right of direct Disunion, he yet denounces what he thinks will lead to that result through the lawless despotism and perverse aggression of the original oppression. But it will be said that Col. Drayton would only resort to the remedy of Secession when argument and remonstrance have been utterly exhausted.—And what more, we will ask, has been claimed, for the Remedy of Nullification? No period but that has ever been fixed for its adoption—We have been contending solely for the —Our object has been the establishment of the. It will be for our State, through her appropriate Representatives, in her Legislature, or in Convention, to determine, in their sound discretion, upon the fit time for its application. let all doubts but be satisfied as to the, and the question of expediency will be of lesser moment and easier solution. Though we cannot for ourselves see aught to be gained by continued delay, save the steady increase and permanent fixture of the usurpation and the gradual destruction of our powers and our spirit of resistance. We surely can have no hope of Relief from our oppressors, after the Declaration in the last message of the Federal Executive that "The Tariff is Constitution, and the abandonment of the policy in which it originated can neither be expected nor desired"—and the concurrent report of the committee on Manufactures, that "they perfectly agree with the president as to the constitutionality of the Tariff—that the States have delegated to Congress the whole power over imposts—and that it may be used either for the purposes of Revenue, or Protection, and that the happiness and prosperity of the United States depend upon its continuance."

We are told by our opponents, that the Northern States, with few exceptions, are equally opposed to the Tariff with ourselves, and that they equally suffer from its oppressions; as Consumers alone are the subjects of the Tax. To these assertions we have briefly, and [as we consider] conclusively, to reply that those States [with the exception of the importing Merchants in their cities] are eternally clamouring aloud whilst we are clamouring against them—That even if it be the consumer alone who pays the Tax, those States receive back in the Bounty upon their Manufactures infinitely more than the tax paid upon the amount of their purchases; whilst the Southern States sustain the unmitigated burthen of this Tax in their extensive purchases. But we deny in toto this theory of the Consumer alone being the sufferer from this system, and aver it to be our perfect conviction that the tax upon the Consumer is comparatively insignificant, whilst the almost entire burthen falls upon the Southern Planter in the diminished value of his produce, resulting from this restriction upon its exchangeable values. In this respect we concur most fully with our distinguished Representative Mr. M'Duffie. For no sophistry [however ingenious] can blind our eyes to the simple and self-evident proposition that as much of the European Articles with which our produce is purchased, as is taken in Duty from the Merchant, so much the less can he pay the planter for that produce; nor can he, at pleasure, [as is asserted] repay this loss by enhancing his prices on the consumer, for he must necessarily sell at the market price, and that (though inevitably increased by the restriction,) is yet entirely regulated by the domestic competition.

But, as we have said, before it is not the precise extent of our oppressions, [great as we esteem them] that we regard; it is the principle, for which we contend—the principle of —and of resistance to usurpation. For, strip this question of all


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Crestadoro, Andrea

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text: Index:Kosovo Ombudsperson of Kosovo Third Annual report 2002 – 2003.pdf


text: Index:Kosovo OSCE Legal System Monitoring Section Monthly Report - August 2008.djvu


text:
Page:Examiner, Journal of Political Economy, v2n12.djvu/7

 its technicalities—all its minor considerations; reduce it at once to its elements and substance; and what is the contest in which we are engaged? It is simply and essentially a Contest on the one side  for the, and on the other, for the !

And how great would be the crowning of our beloved State, were she not crippled by the obstructions of the, which now clog her noble efforts, to succeed by arresting Federal usurpation [whilst yet it can be arrested,] in restoring the violated charter of our Rights to its hallowed purity; and thus to reap the enviable and exalted Distinction of being the , and, for all time to come, the ! HAMPDEN.

CHAPTER I.

VIRGINIA NULLIFICATION.

We commence with the examples of Virginia and Kentucky in 1798—as well because they are amongst the earliest instances of the recognition of this State Remedy under the present Union—as because they constitute the authorities by which we justify ourselves, and sustain our cause—the Authorities to wit, of Madison and Jefferson in '98; exemplifying as they do, the original and authentic school of Republicanism, or in other words, of State Rights—for we hold these terms to be perfectly correlative and synonymous.

The parent however of the principle of Nullification is good old Pennsylvania—for that veteran State instituted and enforced this doctrine under the ancient Confederation, in 1779, by a positive and peremptory Act of her State Legislature. Yet the most approved and esteemed specimens of Nullification, are those exhibited by Virginia and Kentucky, as recommended by Madison and Jefferson, viz.—:

1st. by the Resolutions of December 1798—On the 21st day of December, 1798—the Legislature of Virginia, having determined to oppose and resist the Alien and Sedition Laws of Congress—passed the following (among other) Resolutions:

"Resolved, That the General Assembly of Virginia doth unequivocally express a firm resolution to maintain and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of this State, against every aggression, either foreign or domestic—and that they will support the Government of the United States in all measures warranted by the former.

Resolved, "That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it view the Powers of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties—as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constitution that compact—as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact—and that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose for the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights and liberties, appertaining to them."

"The General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions," (towards the Constitution of the Union,) "in the other States, in confidence that they will concur with this Commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the Acts aforesaid are unconstitutional and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each, for co-operating with this State, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, Rights, and Liberties, reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

2''dly. By the Act of 1798, protecting the members of her Legislature—The Act passed by Virginia to Nullify'' the Sedition Law as to her Legislature, is in the following words:

"Whereas, the freedom of speech and proceedings appertaineth of right to the General Assembly, and the preservation thereof is necessary to secure the Liberty of the people.

,—That if any person shall arrest or prosecute, or be aiding or abetting in arresting or prosecuting a Member or Members of the Senate or House of Delegates for, or on account of, any words spoken or written, any propositions made, or proceeding had, in the said Senate or house of Delegates, every such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be apprehended, commmitted and tried therefor, as in other cases of misdemeanors, before the General Court, or Superior Court of Law of this Commonwealth, and being thereof convicted, by the verdict of a Jury, shall be adjudged to suffer for a term not exceeding one year and shall pay a fine not exceeding ; which imprisonment and fine shall be assessed by a Jury.

And if any member or members of the said Senate or House of Delegates, shall be arrested or imprisoned, for or on account of any words spoken or written, or for any proposition made, or proceedings had, in the said Senate or House of Delegates, such member or members may apply to the General Court, or to a superior court of law, or any Judge thereof, in vacation, for a writ of Habeas Corpus, who are hereby empowered and required to issue the same, returnable before the said Court or said Judge, and upon the return thereof, to liberate and discharge such member or members.

The provisions of this Act shall be extended to the arresting and prosecuting any person or persons for words spoken in the said Senate or House of Delegates, or for any proposition made, or proceedings had in the said Senate or House of Delegates, and to the discharging and liberating any person or persons by Habeas Corpus as aforesaid, although such persons shall, by disqualification, or from any other cause; have ceased to be a member of the said Senate, or House of Delegates, at the time of such arrest or prosecution, or of the trial, judgment, or imprisonment, in consequence thereof—provided that nothing herein contained, shall, in any respect extend to the power which either House of the General Assembly now hath, or may exercise over their respective members." [See revised Code, vol. 1, p. 164.]

Thus we find that Virginia, in 1798, under the sanction of such men as Jefferson and Madison, not only recognized the principle, but actually passed an Act, enforcing the practice of the doctrine of Nullification. This Act, it is true, only extended to the members of her Legislature. But theirthere [sic] can be no doubt that a general act would have soon followed, extending to all citizens of Virginia, if the Alien and Sedition Laws had been re-enacted or continued in force.

3dly. The principle is again fully recognized by the report of the Committee, and the Resolutions, of the Legislature of Virginia in February, 1827, on the subject of Internal Improvements and the Tariff; which Report and Resolutions were drawn up, (and adopted,) in obedience to previous instructions from the Legislature, concluding with these words, "If the Committee should find all or any of these unauthorized assumptions of power, on the part of the


text: Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/43


text: MediaWiki:Sharedupload-desc-here

title: MediaWiki:Sharedupload-desc-here


text:
Goodbye, Dolly Gray

I have come to say goodbye, Dolly Gray It's no use to ask me why, Dolly Gray There's a murmur in the air, you can hear it everywhere It is the time to do and dare, Dolly Gray

Don't you hear the tramp of feet, Dolly Gray Sounding through the village street, Dolly Gray 'Tis the tramp of soldiers' true in their uniforms so blue I must say goodbye to you, Dolly Gray

Goodbye Dolly I must leave you, though it breaks my heart to go Something tells me I am needed at the front to fight the foe See, the boys in blue are marching and I can no longer stay Hark, I hear the bugle calling, Goodbye Dolly Gray

Hear the rolling of the drums, Dolly Gray Back from war the regiment comes, Dolly Gray On your lovely face so fair, I can see a look of fear For your soldier boy's not there, Dolly Gray

For the one you love so well, Dolly Gray In the midst of battle fell, Dolly Gray With his face toward the foe, as he died he murmured low "I must say goodbye and go, Dolly Gray"

Goodbye Dolly I must leave you, though it breaks my heart to go Something tells me I am needed at the front to fight the foe See, the boys in blue are marching and I can no longer stay Hark, I hear the bugle calling, Goodbye Dolly Gray

NOTE: In Britain, the lines

"'Tis the tramp of soldiers' true in their uniforms so blue I must say goodbye to you, Dolly Gray"

became

"'Tis the tramp of soldiers' feet In their uniforms so neat So goodbye until we meet, Dolly Grey"

title: Goodbye, Dolly Gray


text:
Talk:Goodbye, Dolly Gray

Taken from this web site.--Longfellow (talk) 16:45, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

title: Talk:Goodbye, Dolly Gray


text:
User talk:Jacusz

--Eliyak T · C 16:47, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

title: User talk:Jacusz


text:
Author:William Denight Cobb

Works

 * Goodbye, Dolly Gray (1898)
 * Good-Bye Little Girl, Good-Bye (1904)
 * I Lost My Heart in Honolulu (1914)
 * If I Came Back to You and Said "I'm Sorry" (1908)
 * In Zanzibar (1904)
 * Laddie Boy (1917)
 * Take Me Back to My Louisiana Home (1904)

title: Author:William Denight Cobb


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/14

 {| style="vertical-align: top;"
 * The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book pg 14 S top.PNG
 * The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book pg 14 S side.PNG
 * [[File:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book pg 14 S bottom.PNG]]
 * ing a song of sixpence
 * }
 * ing a song of sixpence
 * }

ing a song of sixpence, A pocket full of rye,


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/15

 Four and twenty blackbirds, Baked in a pie


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/18

 When the pie was open'd The birds began to sing


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/20

 Was'nt that a dainty dish To set before the King?


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/21

 The King was in his counting-house, Counting out his money.


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/23

 The Queen was in the parlow, Eating bread and honey.


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/26

 The maid was in the garden, hanging out the clothes;


text:
Page:The Song of Sixpence Pocket Book.djvu/27

 There came a little blackbird, And nipp'd off her nose.


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/John XI (pope)


text:
Page:Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 1995 from Government Gazette.djvu/2

To amend the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, so as to provide for the appointment and duties of a Deputy President of the Constitutional Court; to determine the quorum of the Constitutional Court; to make further provision with respect to the orders which the divisions of the Supreme Court may make; to provide anew for the appointment of a Secretary and other members of staff of a provincial legislature; to empower the President to determine the remuneration and allowances of the Premier and members of the Executive Council of the various provinces; to further regulate local government elections and to provide that a person holding any office of profit under the Republic may take part as a candidate in the forthcoming local government elections; to make further provision in respect of the ex officio membership of traditional leaders of an elected local government; to make further provision in respect of the referral of parliamentary Bills to the Council of Traditional Leaders; to provide for the appointment of a Secretary for Defence; to provide that all the debts and liabilities which vested in certain authorities immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, shall be assumed by the national government; to further regulate the restructuring of local government; to substitute certain expressions; and to provide for matters incidental thereto.

(English text signed by the President.) (Assented to 20 September 1995.)

E IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as follows:—

Amendment of section 99 of Act 200 of 1993, as amended by section 3 of Act 29 of 1994

1. Section 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), is hereby amended by the addition of the following subsection: “ (12)(a) The President shall, at the request of the President of the Constitutional Court, appoint a Deputy President of the Constitutional Court from among the judges of that Court.

(b) A Deputy President of the Constitutional Court may be appointed for the duration of his or her term of office as a judge of the Constitutional Court or for such shorter period as the President may determine.


text:
Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/15

 THE

BLOODY BANQVET,

A

TRAGEDIE.

INDVCTIO.

 * Enter Florish.

At one doore the old King of Lydia, Tymethes his Sonne, Lapyrus his Nephew, and Souldiers. At the other the old King of Lycia, Zantippus his Son, Eurymone his Daughter, and Souldiers. The two pyrus is given to the Lycian, and Zantippus to the Lydian. The Lycian seemes to offer his daughter Eurymone to Lapyrus to fall from his uncle, and joyne with him; he accepts her drawing his sword against his Country and Uncle. The Lydian sends his sonne Tymethes for ayd; he enters againe with Armatrites King of Cilicia, Zenarchus his sonne, and Mazeres a young Prince the Cilician Kings follower. All they draw against the Lycians party, whereat they all with Lapyris flye; the two other Kings pursuing them. Then enter the old Queene of Lydia flying from her Nephew Lapyrus, with two Babes in her armes; he pursuing her with his drawne sword.

Enter

title: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/15


text:
Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist

For CHICAGO LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant: Stephen D. Libowsky, HOWREY LLP, Chicago, IL USA.

For CRAIGSLIST INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee: Eric D. Brandfonbrener, PERKINS COIE, Chicago, IL USA; Patrick J. Carome, WILMER HALE, LLP, Washington, DC.

For NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, Amici Curiae: John P. Relman, RELMAN & DANE, Washington, DC.

For AMAZON.COM, INCORPORATED, AOL, LLC, CABLE NEWS NETWORKS, INCORPORATED, EBAY INCORPORATED, GOOGLE INCORPORATED, Amici Curiae: Marc Zwillinger, SONNENSHEIN, NATH & ROSENTHAL, Washington, DC USA.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD and EVANS, Circuit Judges.


text:
Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist/Opinion of the Court

[p668] EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge.

Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act forbids discrimination on account of race, religion, sex, or family status when selling or renting housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). This prohibition is accompanied by a ban on ads that state a preference with respect to any of the protected classes. It is illegal

"[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination."

42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, on behalf of its members, contends in this suit that craigslist, which provides an electronic meeting place for those who want to buy, sell, or rent housing (and many other goods and services), is violating this statute.

Some notices on craigslist proclaim "NO MINORITIES" and "No children", along with multiple variations, bald or subtle. Many who offer housing for sale or rent satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1), which exempts "any single-family house sold or rented by an owner . . . [who] does not own more than three such single-family houses". Although this exemption does not take single-family homes outside the scope of § 3604(c), any rule that forbids truthful advertising of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters serious problems under the first amendment. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 119 S.C.t. 1923, 144 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1999); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 115 S.C.t. 1585, 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103 S.C.t. 2875, 77 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983); Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.C.t. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976). But lots of notices posted on craigslist concern apartment buildings, condominiums, and single-family homes owned by someone who has a portfolio of four or more rental properties. Section 3604(c) applies to these ads without constitutional cavil. Courts regularly enforce the statute against newspapers and other publishers. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1972); Mayers v. Ridley, 151 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 465 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1972); ''cf. Ragin v. New York Times Co.'', 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).

Online services are in some respects like the classified pages of newspapers, but in others they operate like common carriers such as telephone services, which are unaffected by § 3604(c) because they neither make nor publish any discriminatory advertisement, text message, or conversation that may pass over their networks. Ditto courier services such as FedEx and UPS, which do not read the documents inside packages and do not make or publish any of the customers' material. Web sites are not common carriers, but screening, though lawful, is hard. Simple filters along the lines of "postings may not contain the words 'white' " can't work. Statements such as "red brick house with white trim" do not violate any law, and prospective buyers and renters would be worse off if craigslist blocked descriptive statements.

An online service could hire a staff to vet the postings, but that would be expensive [p669]  and may well be futile: if postings had to be reviewed before being put online, long delay could make the service much less useful, and if the vetting came only after the material was online the buyers and sellers might already have made their deals. Every month more than 30 million notices are posted to the craigslist system. Fewer than 30 people, all based in California, operate the system, which offers classifieds and forums for 450 cities. It would be necessary to increase that staff (and the expense that users must bear) substantially to conduct the sort of editorial review that the Lawyers' Committee demands--and even then errors would be frequent.

One of the ads to which the Lawyers' Committee objects contains the phrase "Catholic Church and beautiful Buddhist Temple within one block". The Committee sees this as a signal of religious preference; craigslist sees it as a description of the neighborhood, helping people zero in on properties most attractive to their preferences and no more implying exclusion than "elementary school within five minutes' walk" implies that the landlord won't rent to childless couples. Automated filters and human reviewers may be equally poor at sifting good from bad postings unless the discrimination is blatant; both false positives and false negatives are inevitable.

According to craigslist, the effort is unnecessary. It relies on 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), a part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. This subsection provides:

Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material.

 * (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

 * (2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

As craigslist understands this statute, § 230(c)(1) provides "broad immunity from liability for unlawful third-party content." That view has support in other circuits. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007). We have questioned whether § 230(a)(1) creates any form of "immunity," see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003), and the Lawyers' Committee takes Doe as its cue. The caption of subsection (c) as a whole refers to "blocking and screening"; the Lawyers' Committee insists that unless an information content provider uses some form of filtering (a brief way to refer to "blocking and screening"), all of § 230(c) is irrelevant.

Neither side's argument finds much support in the statutory text. Subsection (c)(1) does not mention "immunity" or any synonym. Our opinion in Doe explains why § 230(c) as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts:

Section 230(c)(2) tackles this problem [of potential liability for hosting pornographic [p670]  pictures] not with a sword but with a safety net. A web host that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer. Removing the risk of civil liability may induce web hosts and other informational intermediaries to take more care to protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties. The district court held that subsection (c)(1), though phrased as a definition rather than as an immunity, also blocks civil liability when web hosts and other Internet service providers (ISPs) refrain from filtering or censoring the information on their sites. . ..

If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit: whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability under either state or federal law. As precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 230(c)--which is, recall, part of the "Communications Decency Act"--bears the title "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material", hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their services. Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs' liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?

True, a statute's caption must yield to its text when the two conflict, see Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 67 S.C.t. 1387, 91 L. Ed. 1646 (1947), but whether there is a conflict is the question on the table. Why not read § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability, and thus harmonize the text with the caption? See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421, 116 S.C.t. 1460, 134 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1996). On this reading, an entity would remain a "provider or user"--and thus be eligible for the immunity under § 230(c)(2)--as long as the information came from someone else; but it would become a "publisher or speaker" and lose the benefit of § 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable information. The difference between this reading and the district court's is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs to filter offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third parties,. . . for such laws would not be "inconsistent with" this understanding of § 230(c)(1). There is yet another possibility: perhaps § 230(c)(1) forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a "publisher"--defamation law would be a good example of such liability--while permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries.

347 F.3d at 659-60 (emphasis in original). To appreciate the limited role of § 230(c)(1), remember that "information content providers" may be liable for contributory infringement if their system is designed to help people steal music or other material in copyright. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.C.t. 2764, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). Grokster is incompatible with treating § 230(c)(1) as a grant of comprehensive immunity from civil liability for content provided by a third party.

While craigslist wants to expand § 230(c)(1) beyond its language, the Lawyers' Committee proposes to limit its scope to screening under subsection (c)(2). Yet [p671] subsection (c)(2) does not deal with the liability of speakers and publishers, the subject of subsection (c)(1). We read each to do exactly what it says. So did the district court. A natural reading of § 230(c)(1) in conjunction with § 3604(c) led that court to grant summary judgment for craigslist. 461 F. Supp.2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

What § 230(c)(1) says is that an online information system must not "be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by" someone else. Yet only in a capacity as publisher could craigslist be liable under § 3604(c). It is not the author of the ads and could not be treated as the "speaker" of the posters' words, given § 230(c)(1). The Lawyers' Committee responds that "nothing in § 230's text or history suggests that Congress meant to immunize an ISP from liability under the Fair Housing Act. In fact, Congress did not even remotely contemplate discriminatory housing advertisements when it passed § 230." That's true enough, but the reason a legislature writes a general statute is to avoid any need to traipse through the United States Code and consider all potential sources of liability, one at a time. The question is not whether Congress gave any thought to the Fair Housing Act, but whether it excluded § 3604(c) from the reach of § 230(c)(1). ''Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,'' 419 U.S. 102, 126-27, 95 S.C.t. 335, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974) (Congress need not think about a subject for a law to affect it; effect of general rules continues unless limited by superseding enactments).

Section 230(c)(1) is general. Although the impetus for the enactment of § 230(c) as a whole was a court's opinion holding an information content provider liable, as a publisher, because it had exercised some selectivity with respect to the sexually oriented material it would host for customers, a law's scope often differs from its genesis. Once the legislative process gets rolling, interest groups seek (and often obtain) other provisions.

Congress could have written something like: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any sexually oriented material provided by another information content provider." That is not, however, what it enacted. Where the phrase "sexually oriented material" appears in our rephrasing, the actual statute has the word "information." That covers ads for housing, auctions of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis, biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth of politicians' promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a web site; "information" is the stock in trade of online service providers.

Almost in passing, the Lawyers' Committee insists that craigslist can be liable as one who "cause[d] to be made, printed, or published any [discriminatory] notice, statement, or advertisement". Doubtless craigslist plays a causal role in the sense that no one could post a discriminatory ad if craigslist did not offer a forum. That is not, however, a useful definition of cause. One might as well say that people who save money "cause" bank robbery, because if there were no banks there could be no bank robberies. An interactive computer service "causes" postings only in the sense of providing a place where people can post. Causation in a statute such as § 3604(c) must refer to causing a particular statement to be made, or perhaps the discriminatory content of a statement. That's the sense in which a non-publisher can cause a discriminatory ad, while one who causes the forbidden content may not be a publisher. Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination; for [p672]  example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to people who include discriminatory statements in their postings. If craigslist "causes" the discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services (and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that owners use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for "causing" discriminatory advertisements.

Using the remarkably candid postings on craigslist, the Lawyers' Committee can identify many targets to investigate. It can dispatch testers and collect damages from any landlord or owner who engages in discrimination. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.C.t. 1114, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S.C.t. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979). It can assemble a list of names to send to the Attorney General for prosecution. But given § 230(c)(1) it cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a third party's plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.

AFFIRMED


text: Talk:Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist


text: Category:United States court decisions on housing discrimination


text: Category:United States court decisions on Internet law


text:
The Examiner, and Journal of Political Economy

Number 4

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. I

Number 5

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. II

Number 6

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. III

Number 7

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. IV

Number 8

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. V

Number 9

 * An Exposition of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, No. VI

Number 12

 * The Genuine Book of Nullification
 * Title and advertisement
 * Quotes
 * Introduction
 * Chapter I: Virginia Nullification
 * Chapter II: Kentucky Nullification

Number 13

 * The Genuine Book of Nullification
 * Chapter III: Pennsylvania Nullification
 * Chapter IV: Massachusetts Nullification
 * Chapter V: Connecticut Nullification
 * Chapter VI: Ohio Nullification


text:
Page:Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 1995 from Government Gazette.djvu/3

(c) A Deputy President of the Constitutional Court shall—

in the absence of the President of the Constitutional Court, and if an Acting President of the Constitutional Court has not been appointed in terms of subsection (8), perform the functions of the President of the Constitutional Court; and

perform such other functions of the President of the Constitutional Court as he or she may assign to him or her. ”.

Amendment of section 100 of Act 200 of 1993

2. Section 100 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the addition of the following subsection: “ (3) (a) Subject to the provisions of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995 (Act No. 13 of 1995), and the rules of the Constitutional Court, matters which come before the Court shall be heard and determined by the President of the Constitutional Court and all the judges of the Court.

(b) Whenever a member of the Constitutional Court is absent or unable to perform his or her functions, or if a vacancy among the members of the Court arises, the remaining members of the Court may hear and determine any matter: Provided that no matter shall be heard and determined by less than eight members of the Court.

(c) If, at any stage of a hearing, a member of the Constitutional Court is absent or unable to perform his or her functions, or if a vacancy among the members of the Court arises—

and the remaining members of the Court are not less than eight in number—

such hearing shall continue before the remaining members of the Court; and

the decision of the majority of the remaining members of the Court shall, if that majority is also a majority of the members of the Court before whom the hearing commenced, be the decision of the Court; or

and the remaining members of the Court are less than eight, or if the majority of the remaining members of the Court is not also a majority of the members of the Court before whom the hearing commenced, the proceedings shall be stopped and commenced de novo. ”.

Amendment of section 101 of Act 200 of 1993, as amended by section 4 of Act 13 of 1994

3. Section 101 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the addition of the following subsection: “ (7) Any division of the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to grant an interim interdict or similar relief, pending the determination by the Constitutional Court of any matter referred to in section 98(2), notwithstanding that such interdict or relief might have the effect of suspending or otherwise interfering with the application of the provisions of an Act of Parliament. ”.

Substitution of section 143 of Act 200 of 1993

4. The following subsection is hereby substituted for subsection (2) of section 143 of the principal Act: “(2) (a) [The Executive Council of a province] A provincial legislature shall [after consultation with the Commission on Provincial Government] appoint a Secretary and such other staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the work of such legislature.

(b) Except in so far as may be otherwise determined by resolution of the provincial legislature concerned, any person who was prior to the date of commencement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 1995, appointed to the staff, or as the Secretary, of a provincial legislature, and who is at such commencement still serving as such, shall be deemed to have been appointed in accordance with paragraph (a). ”.


text:
Author:Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Opinions of the Court

 * American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
 * Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Food Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989)
 * ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
 * BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005)
 * Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519 F. 3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008)

title: Author:Frank Hoover Easterbrook


text:
Page:Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 1995 from Government Gazette.djvu/4

5. Section 149 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for subsection (10) of the following subsection: “(10) There shall, subject to section 207(2), be paid out of and as a charge on the Provincial Revenue Fund of a province to the Premier and to a member of an Executive Council of such province such remuneration and allowances as may be [prescribed by or] determined [under a law of the provincial legislature] by the President. ”.

Amendment of section 176 of Act 200 of 1993

6. Section 176 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for the proviso to paragraph (b) of the following proviso: “: Provided that a council may delegate the power to make decisions on matters pertaining to town planning to the executive committee or to a committee appointed for this purpose or to a person in its employ : Provided further that section 177 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment and functioning of a committee appointed for this purpose.”.

Amendment of section 179 of Act 200 of 1993

7. Section 179 of the principal Act is hereby amended—

by the deletion of the proviso to subsection (1); and

by the substitution for paragraph (c) of subsection (5) of the following paragraph:

is [not qualified to become] disqualified from becoming a member of the National Assembly in terms of section 42(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) .”.

Substitution of section 182 of Act 200 of 1993

8. The following section is hereby substituted for section 182 of the principal Act: “Traditional authorities and local government

182. The traditional leader of a community observing a system of indigenous law and residing on land within the area of jurisdiction of an elected local government referred to in Chapter 10, shall ex officio be entitled to be a member of that local government, provided that he or she has been identified in a manner and according to guidelines prescribed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette after consultation with the Council of Traditional Leaders, if then in existence, or if not, with the Houses of Traditional Leaders which have then been established, and shall be eligible to be elected to any office of such local government.”.

Amendment of section 184 of Act 200 of 1993

9. Section 184 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for paragraph (a) of subsection (5) of the following paragraph: “(a) Any parliamentary Bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs of traditional communities or any other matters having a bearing thereon, shall, [after having been] if it is passed by the House in which it was introduced [but] after the Chairperson and members of the Council have been elected and the Council has commenced its functions, and if the Council is then able to function, before it is passed by the other House, be referred by the Secretary to Parliament to the Council for its comments.

(aA) If the Council is not in existence by 28 February 1996, any parliamentary Bill referred to in paragraph (a) shall, after having been passed by the House in which it was introduced, but before it is passed by the other House, be referred to those Houses contemplated in section 183 which have then been established, and the further provisions of this subsection shall then mutatis mutandis apply. ”.


text:
Author:Walter Lyon Blease

Books

 * The Emancipation of English Women (1910)
 * A Short History of English Liberalism (1913)
 * The Story of a Red Cross Unit in Serbia (1916) (with James Berry and Frances May Berry)
 * Suvorof (1920)

Pamphlets

 * The Poor Law in Liverpool, 1681-1834 (c.1909)
 * Votes for Women (1913)

title: Author:Walter Lyon Blease


text:
Page:Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 1995 from Government Gazette.djvu/5

10. The following section is hereby substituted for section 225 of the principal Act: “Chief of South African National Defence Force and Secretary for Defence

225. (1) Subject to section 236(1) and (2), the President shall appoint a Chief of the South African National Defence Force, who shall exercise military executive command of the South African National Defence Force, subject to the directions of the Minister responsible for defence and, during a state of national defence, of the President.

(2) The Minister responsible for defence may appoint a Secretary for Defence who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be provided for in any law. ”.

Amendment of section 239 of Act 200 of 1993

11. Section 239 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for subsection (3) of the following subsection: “(3) (a) All debts and liabilities which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution vested in an authority referred to in section 235(1)(a), (b) or (c), or in a government, administration or force under the control of such authority shall be assumed by the national government.

(b) The debts and liabilities referred to in paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be State debt as defined in section 1 of the Exchequer Act, 1975 (Act No. 66 of 1975). ”.

Substitution of section 245 of Act 200 of 1993

12. The following section is hereby substituted for section 245 of the principal Act: “Transitional arrangements: Local government

245. (1) Until [elections have been held in terms of the Local Government Transition Act, 1993] 31 March 1996, local government shall not be restructured otherwise than in accordance with [that] the Local Government Transition Act , 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993).

(2) Restructuring of local government which takes place as a result of legislation enacted by a competent authority after [the elections referred to in subsection (1) have been held,] 31 March 1996 shall be effected in accordance with the principles embodied in Chapter 10 and the Constitution as a whole.

(3) (a) For the purposes of the first election of members of [a local government] a transitional local council or a transitional metropolitan substructure as referred to in the Local Government Transition Act, 1993, after the commencement of this Constitution, the area of jurisdiction of such [local government] transitional local council and transitional metropolitan substructure shall be divided into wards in accordance with [the] that Act [referred to in subsection (1)].

(b) Forty per cent of the members of [the local government] a transitional local council and a transitional metropolitan substructure shall be elected according to the system of proportional representation applicable to an election of the National Assembly and regulated specifically by or under the [Act referred to in subsection (1),] Local Government Transition Act, 1993, and sixty per cent of the members shall be elected [on the basis that each such member shall] to represent [a ward] wards as contemplated in paragraph (a): Provided that—

if such wards are represented by more than one member, all such wards shall be represented by the same number of members; and

notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution, where the area of jurisdiction of the [local government] transitional local council or transitional metropolitan substructure includes—


text:
A Short History of English Liberalism

 * No rational man ever did govern himself by abstractions and universals.... A statesman differs from a professor in an university; the latter has only the general view of society.... A statesman, never losing sight of principles, is to be guided by circumstances; and, judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin his country for ever.

 * , "On the Petition of the Unitarians."

Contents

 * I.
 * II.
 * III.
 * IV.
 * V.
 * VI.
 * VII.
 * VIII.
 * IX.
 * X.
 * XI.
 * /Index

title: A Short History of English Liberalism


text: Talk:A Short History of English Liberalism


text:
Page:Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 1995 from Government Gazette.djvu/6

the area of jurisdiction of any institution or body as was referred to in section 84(1)(f) of the Provincial Government Act, 1961 (Act No. 32 of 1961); and

any other area not falling within the area of jurisdiction of the institution or body referred to in [subparagraph (i)] item (aa) ,

no area referred to in [subparagraph (i) or (ii)] items (aa) or (bb) shall be allocated less than half of the total number of wards of the [local government] transitional local council or transitional metropolitan substructure concerned: Provided further that an area referred to in [subparagraph (i)] item (aa) shall be deemed not to include any area for which a local government body referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the definition of “local government body” in section 1(1) of the [Act] Local Government Transition Act, 1993 [referred to in subsection (1) of this section] (as that Act exists at the commencement of this Constitution), has been established.”.

Substitution of expressions in Act 200 of 1993

13. The principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for the expressions “National Defence Force”, “Eastern Transvaal” and “Northern Transvaal”, wherever they occur of the expressions “South African National Defence Force”, “Mpumalanga” and “Northern Province”, respectively.

Amendment of Act 13 of 1995

14. The Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995 (Act No. 13 of 1995) is hereby amended by the repeal of sections 8, 13 and 16.

Short title and commencement

15. (1) This Act shall be called the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 1995.

(2) (a) Section 7(b), and the amendment effected to subsection (3) of section 245 of the principal Act by section 12 of this Act, shall be deemed to have come into operation on 1 June 1995.

(b) Sections 9 and 10 shall be deemed to have come into operation on 1 May 1994.


text:
Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/16

 Enter Chorus. After the waste of many thousand wounds Given and receiv'd alike, in seaven set battailes Lydia's old King upon conditions sign'd For Peace and truce, enter'd confeigned league With his fierce enemy the Lycian King Gave him in Hoftage as his pledge of faith, His Nephew, Lord Lapyrus, and receiv'd Noble Zantippus from the Lycian; To make the contract full and honourable, This Lord Lapyrus entertain'd and wellcom'd But chiefely by the faire Eurymone The Kings sole daughter, who unto Lapyrus Offers her as his Bride, so he would turne A Traytor to his Country and his King: Lapyrus, to obtaine the beautions mayd Turnes Traytor to his King, and joynes his force Vnto his faire loves Fathers, Lycia's Kings; Th'old King of Lydia being so beset By his owne Nephews unexpected trecheries, Sent forth his sonne Tymethes to crave ayd From Armatrites of great Cilicia, Which he obtain'd in a disastrous houre As the event will witnesse; In this trouble The frighted Queene with her two Infants fled Into a Forrest, fearing the sad ruine Hourely expected, untill Armatrites With a fresh Army fore'd Lapyrus flye And fav'd the King, doom'd for worse treachery. What followes flicwvs it selfe; tis our full due, If we with labour give content to you. Exit.

Act.

title: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/16


text: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/17

title: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/17


text: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/18

title: Page:The Bloody Banquet.djvu/18