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Bronson v. Kinzie/Dissent McLean

Mr. Justice McLEAN dissented.

The act of Illinois of the 27th February, 1841, does not apply to the case under consideration. The rule of the Circuit Court adopting that act, limits it to executions on judgments at law. It can have no application, therefore, to any proceeding in chancery. The only rule adopted in relation to a chancery proceeding, is that which gives the mortgagor a year within which to redeem the premises sold, on the payment of the purchase-money and 10 per cent. interest, agreeably to the 8th section of the act of 19th February, 1841. And that rule was to operate only in decrees of foreclosure and sale, where a different order was not made. So that, in fact, no positive rule was adopted in Illinois by the Circuit Court, in relation to sales of mortgaged premises under a decree.

By the rules regulating chancery proceedings adopted by this court at its last term, it is supposed the above rule and all others regulating the practice in chancery was rescinded. But this is not material. The points certified would be answered by saying, that the acts of the legislature referred to can have no operation in the case; as no state law can govern the proceedings of a chancery court of the United States.

Under such circumstances, I cannot but regret that the court have deemed it necessary or proper to consider the constitutionality of the above acts, and to hold that they are unconstitutional. The decision of the matters before the court does not require this judgment. And it is the more to be regretted, as there was no argument, written or oral, to sustain these laws. Heretofore this court have not deemed it proper to act on so grave a subject as the constitutionality of a state law, unless the question were essentially involved in the decision of the case before them.

The act of the 27th of February, 1841, is held to be unconstitutional as regards all contracts or mortgages entered into prior to its enactment, because it requires real property levied on by execution to be appraised and to sell for two-thirds of its value.

As preliminary to an examination of this question, I will take a cursory review of the policy and laws of the federal government in respect to state process. By the act of the 29th September, 1789, it is provided, 'that the forms of writs and executions, except their style, in the Circuit and District Courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used, or allowed, in the Supreme Court of the same.'

Again: By the act of the 8th of May, 1792, the above provision is re-enacted, 'subject to such alterations and additions as the courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient; or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule to prescribe to any Circuit Court District Court concerning the same.'

In the 8th section of the act of the 2d March, 1793, it is provided, 'that where it is now required by the laws of any state, that goods taken in execution, on a writ of fieri facias, shall be appraised previous to the sale thereof, it shall be lawful for the appraisers appointed under the authority of the state to appraise goods taken in execution on a fieri facias issued out of any court of the United States, in the same manner as if such writ had issued out of a state court.' And it is made the duty of the marshal to summon appraisers, &c.

Under the foregoing process acts, a question was made in the state of Kentucky, whether the executions from the Circuit Court of the United States should be governed by the laws of that state. In the case of Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 2, among several points certified from the Circuit Court, for the decision of this court, were the two following:

'That, if the statutes of Kentucky, in relation to executions, are binding on this court, viz.: the statute which requires the plaintiff to endorse on the execution, that bank notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, will be received in payment, or that the defendant may replevy the debt for two years, are in violation of the Constitution of the United States.'

'That all the statutes of Kentucky, which authorize a defendant to give a replevin bond, in satisfaction of a judgment or execution are unconstitutional and void.'

This court held that the process acts of 1789, and of 1792, did not apply to states subsequently admitted into the Union; and that as the act regulating executions had not been adopted by the Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky, it could not regulate final process in that court. But the court did not deem it necessary or proper to decide on the constitutionality of the laws referred to.

In the case of the Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, a point was certified from the Circuit Court of Kentucky, involving the question, whether 'the act of Assembly of Kentucky, of the 21st December, 1821, which prohibits the sale of property taken under executions for less than three-fourths of its appraised value, was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.' And this court held, Judge Thompson giving the opinion, as in the case of Wayman v. Southard, that the law of the state did not apply to the courts of the United States, it never having been adopted. And they remark: 'This renders it unnecessary to inquire into the constitutionality of the law of Kentucky.'

These cases in principle are analogous to the one under consideration. The only rule of court affecting a proceeding in chancery having been repealed or rescinded by the general rules adopted by this court at its last term, and if not repealed does not apply; the laws of the state of Illinois, as regards the proceeding under consideration, are as inapplicable as were the laws of Kentucky in the above cases. And it is a subject of regret, that the precedent of the above cases has not been followed in the present decision.

Out of the above decisions grew the process act of the 19th May, 1828. That act declares, 'that writs of execution and other final process, issued on judgments and decrees rendered in any of the courts of the United States, and the proceedings thereupon, shall be the same as are now used in the courts of the state.' And power was given to 'the courts, if they shall see fit in their discretion, by rules of courts, so far to alter final process in said courts as to conform the same to any change which may be adopted by the legislatures of the respective states for the state courts.'

The above enactments show that the settled policy of the federal government is, to adopt the state laws regulating final process. And so far as the acts of Congress have operated, state laws have governed executions in the federal courts.

In Virginia real estate is not liable to be sold on execution. In Connecticut, and, I believe, in Massachusetts, lands are taken in satisfaction of judgments on a valuation. In Ohio, and in many of the other states, real estate must be sold for one-half or two-thirds of its valuation. In Indiana, and in some of the other states, the defendant has a right within twelve months to redeem his land sold on execution, on paying some 10 or 12 per cent. interest. In Virginia, Mississippi, and some of the other states, forthcoming bonds are given, which suspend further proceedings on executions, and in some degree changes the security under the judgment.

Now these laws prevail in some of the states, and there is no reason why, under the Constitution, they may not be adopted in all of them. If Virginia may withdraw her lands from execution, and Ohio admit them to be sold under a valuation, why may not Illinois do the same?

But I understand the objection to the Illinois statute is, its limited operation and its applicability to prior contracts.

The 2d section of the act provides, that it 'shall extend to all judgments rendered prior to the 1st of May, 1841, and to all judgments that may be rendered on any contract or cause of action, accruing prior to the 1st May, 1841.' This provision may seem to be somewhat capricious and of doubtful policy; but the inquiry must be, does it violate the Constitution of the United States? On the 27th February, 1841, this law was enacted, and although it is limited in its effects, yet it is general in its provisions. And I know of no power in the Constitution to limit the legislative discretion of the states as to the duration of their enactments. The only question under this act as to its constitutionality must be, whether it impairs the obligations of contracts entered into before it was passed. And in this view, the question arises, whether the remedy, in the sense of the Constitution, can be considered as a part of the contract.

That the law objected to is remedial, no one can controvert. It does not purport to act upon contracts, but modifies the remedy for the enforcement of contracts. But my brethren suppose, that as this remedy may be retarded by the limitation on the sale of land under judgments, the obligation of the contract is thereby impaired. This conclusion can only be sustained on the ground that the remedy is a part of the contract. On this hypothesis every contract embraces the existing remedy, and that remedy cannot be protracted by the legislature. This is a question of constitutional power, and cannot be affected by any notions of expediency. If the remedy be so modified as to protract the recovery of a debt a week, or a month, in the view now taken by the court, it impairs the obligation of the contract as clearly as any longer period of time. The question cannot, in any degree, depend upon time. What could be more preposterous than to say the legislature of a state may prolong the remedy a week, a month, or three months, but cannot prolong it beyond that period? Where shall this judicial discretion find a limit? There must be some limit. If the legislature may not modify the remedy at their discretion, in regard to existing contracts, they must be prohibited from making any change. Any departure from this rule of construction must depend upon the arbitrary decision of the courts. And each court, in this respect, may exercise its own discretion, until the question shall be settled by this tribunal.

But the question may be asked, suppose the legislature shall repeal all remedy; is the contract not thereby impaired? This question may be asked with no more propriety and effect than many others. May not a state fail to appoint judges, clerks, and other officers essential to the administration of justice?

I am aware that, in the case of Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 17, this court say: 'It is no answer, that the acts of Kentucky, now in question, are regulations of the remedy, and not of the right to lands. If these acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact as if they directly overturned his rights and interests.'

The above question arose under the compact between Virginia and Kentucky, which declared, 'that all private rights and interests of lands, within Kentucky, derived from the laws of Virginia prior to such separation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state, and shall be determined by the laws then existing in the state of Virginia.'

The above article, say the court in their opinion, 'declares in the most explicit terms that all private rights and interests of lands, derived from the laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of Kentucky, and shall be determined by the laws then existing in Virginia. It plainly imports, therefore, that these rights and interests, as to their nature and extent, shall be exclusively determined by the laws of Virginia, and that their security and validity shall not be in any way impaired by the laws of Kentucky. Whatever law, therefore, of Kentucky does narrow these rights and diminish these interests, is a violation of the compact, and is consequently unconstitutional.'

And again the court observe: 'The only question, therefore, is, whether the acts of 1797 and 1812 have this effect. It is undeniable that no acts of a similar character were in existence in Virginia at the time when the compact was made; and, therefore, no aid can be derived from the actual legislation of Virginia to support them.' These acts were held to abridge the rights of the holder under the Virginia title, and, whether remedial or otherwise, were consequently repugnant to the compact. By the compact, the rights and interests of the Virginia claimant, both as to their nature and extent, say the court, were to be exclusively determined by the laws of Virginia. In other words, where rights are to be determined by one law, another and a requgnant law can have no influence upon them. And this was the point adjudged in the case of Green v. Biddle. The question did not arise under the Constitution of the United States, but under the compact.

In the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200, the late chief justice says: 'The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.' This is the true principle laid down in explicit terms.

The doctrine that the remedy constitutes a part of the contract is a mere abstraction, which cannot be carried into practical operation. If the doctrine be sound, it secures the means for the enforcement of the contract at its date.

Now does any one doubt that a state legislature may abolish imprisonment for debt, as well on past as future contracts? Here is a modification of the remedy, which takes away a means, and often a principal means, of enforcing the payment of the debt. And yet this is admitted by all to be a constitutional law. Nor does any one doubt the constitutionality of a statute of limitations. This operates upon contracts entered into before its enactment, and bars the right of action.

Now, if the remedy existing at the time of the contract is a part of the contract, the state legislature cannot modify the remedy, much less, as by the above statute, take it away. It is no answer to this argument to say, that the statutory bar is only interposed where the obligee has been grossly negligent. There was no such condition of vigilance at the date of the contract, and if the above argument be sound, not subsequent action of the legislature can impair its obligation by materially retarding its enforcement, much less by barring the remedy.

The argument in favour of the statute is, that it does not act upon the contract, but withdraws the remedy. Now if this be a constitutional exercise of power by a state legislature, surely the exercise of the lesser power, by modifying the remedy at discretion, must also be constitutional. Does not the greater power include the lesser? The power, whether exercised in passing a statute of limitations, or in modifying the laws in relation to judgments and executions, acts upon the remedy. In both instances the enactments constitute the laws of the forum. And in my judgment, they depend upon the same power over the remedy.

But if the remedy be a part of the contract, how must it be applied? Instead of looking to the laws regulating judicial proceedings at the time the action is brought, the court must look to the date of the contract and the laws then in force. The contract, in this view, gives vitality to laws annulled by the legislature, and the law of the remedy becomes as diversified as the contracts to which it is applied. Can such a rule of construction be enforced?

How is a contract made in one state to enforced in another? If the remedy in the state where the contract is made enter into it, does it carry this remedy into another jurisdiction? This will not be contended; and why not? If the contract within the state include the law of the remedy, why does it not carry into a foreign jurisdiction the same conditions? Every contract does this, which is governed by the local law. A contract for the payment of money, made and to be performed in the state of New York, bears 7 per cent. interest. And this rate of interest is recovered on the contract, in a state where 7 per cent. would be usurious. And so of every other contract made under a local law, however repugnant may be its conditions to the laws and policy of the jurisdiction where the remedy is sought. This is emphatically the law of the contract. And if the remedy be also the law of the contract, it must follow the contract wherever it shall be prosecuted. If this be not the case, the argument falls; the remedy exists independently of the contract, and does not constitute a part of it.

A contract void by the local law on the ground of usury, or because it is against the policy of the law, can be enforced nowhere. There is no exception to the principle that where a contract is entered into under the sanctions of a state law, that law governs the contract in whatever jurisdiction suit may be brought on it. And so where a contract is made in one state to be performed in another, the place of performance gives the law of the contract. But in no case does the remedy attach itself to the contract, so as to constitute a part of it. Such an idea is too abstract for practical operations. At most, it could only affect contracts sued on in the state where they were made. Such a principle could not be carried out. It would diversify the remedy to an impracticable extent.

Every contract is entered into with a supposed knowledge by the parties, that the law-making power may modify the remedy. And this it may do, at its discretion, so far as it acts only on the remedy. It may regulate the mode in which process shall be issued and served; how the pleadings shall be filed, and at what term judgment shall or may be entered. And it may also regulate final process. It may require that the personal property of the defendant shall be levied on and sold, before land shall be taken in execution. It may say what notice shall be given on the sale of real estate on execution; and also require that it shall sell for one-half or two-thirds of its value. A valuation law in those states where it has been adopted has been found salutary in guarding the rights of debtor and creditor. A debtor, under this law, cannot defeat the claim of his creditor, by purchasing the real estate levied on, through the agency of a friend, at a nominal price; and this protects the rights of the creditors of the defendant generally. There may be some cases of hardship to creditors under such a law, but they must be few and unimportant in comparison with the benefits secured by the law both to creditors and debtors. Some restriction on the sale of land on execution is required by a sound policy, especially in new and rising states, where real property can scarcely be said to have a final value.

But this law is supposed to be unconstitutional from its retrospective effect. I had supposed that such a supposition could not be raised, under the decision of this court.

In the case of Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 407, 'the plaintiff, at the trial, set up a title under a warrant dated the 10th January, 1812, founded upon an improvement in the year 1785, which it was admitted was under a Connecticut title, and a patent dated 19th February, 1813.

'The defendant claimed title under a patent issued to John Wharton in the year 1781, and a conveyance by him to Satterlee in 1812.' Some time in the year 1790, the defendant had come into possession as tenant to the plaintiff, and it was insisted that the defendant was estopped from setting up his title. The Court of Common Pleas decided in favour of the plaintiff; but on a writ of error, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, that 'by the settled law of that state, the relation of landlord and tenant could not subsist under a Connecticut title.' Upon which ground the judgment was reversed, and a venire facias de novo was awarded.

On the 8th day of April, 1826, and before the second trial of the cause took place, the legislature of that state passed a law, declaring, 'that the relation of landlord and tenant shall exist, and be held as fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants, as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on the trial of any cause now pending or hereafter to be brought within this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.' Under the instruction of the court in accordance with that statute, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, on which judgment was entered. This judgment on being removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, was affirmed. On the ground that the above statute impaired the obligation of the contract between Satterlee and Matthewson, the cause was removed to this court from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, by a writ of error.

In their opinion this court say, 'If the effect of the statute in question be not to impair the obligation of the contract, is there any other part of the Constitution of the United States to which it is repugnant? It is said to be retrospective. Be it so; but retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are not condemned or forbidden by any part of that instrument.'

And again, 'The objection is urged that the effect of this act was to divest rights which were vested by law in Satterlee. There is certainly no part of the Constitution of the United States which applies to a state law of this description; nor are we aware of any decision of this, or of any Circuit Court, which condemned such a law upon this ground.'

Here was a direct legislation not only on existing rights growing out of contracts, but such an effect was given to the law as to divest vested rights. And yet this act was held not to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

What vested right is there or can there be, in the nature of things, in the holder of a contract to the particular remedy for its enforcement which existed at its date? But if there were such a vested right as to the remedy, which there is not, it may, under the above authority, be divested by law. If the decision do not mean this, it means nothing.

A state legislature cannot impair the contract by changing the time or manner of its performance. By the contract, the parties have fixed their rights and obligations; and these are guarded by the Constitution. But the remedy for the enforcement of the contract being established by the law-making power, may be modified at its discretion. This is admitted as regards subsequent contracts, but the same rule applies to prior ones. So far as the mere remedy is concerned, in may judgment, no sound and practical distinction can be drawn between prior and future contracts.

I think, in the case under consideration, that the laws of Illinois referred to do not apply, and, therefore, I agree to the answers given by the court to the points certified.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Illinois, and on the points and questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court, 1st. That the decree should direct the premises to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, without regard to the law of February 19th, 1841, which gives the right of redemption to the mortgagor for twelve months, and to the judgment creditor for fifteen. 2d. That the decree should direct the sale of the mortgaged premises without being first valued by three householders, and without requiring two-thirds of the amount of the said valuation to be bid according to the law of February 27th, 1841; and that the decision of these two questions disposes of the third. It is thereupon now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.

title: Bronson v. Kinzie/Dissent McLean


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McNutt v. Bland/Dissent Daniel

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented.

From the opinion just pronounced on the part of the court in this cause, I am constrained to differ. Although it ever must be with unaffected diffidence that I shall find myself opposed to a majority of my brethren, still a feeling like that just adverted to, should not, and properly cannot, induce in me a relinquishment of conclusions formed from examinations carefully made, and upon decisions which appear to be distinctly, as they have been repeatedly announced. My opinion is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court against the plaintiff below ought to be affirmed, for the reason that the court could not properly take cognizance of his cause. Under systems of polity compounded as are the federal and state governments of this Union, instances of conflicting power and jurisdiction, real or apparent, will frequently arise, and will sometimes run into niceties calculated to perplex the most astute and practised expositors. For myself, I must believe that the surest preventive of such instances, their safest and most effectual remedy when they shall occur, will be found in an adherence to limits which language in its generally received acceptation prescribes, and in shunning not merely that which such acceptation may palpably forbid; but, as far as possible, whatever is ambiguous or artificial. In adopting or commending the rule thus indicated, I undertake to propound no new principle of construction to this court, to essay no innovation upon its doctrines. I plant myself, on the contrary, upon its oft repeated decisions, and invoke their protection for the interpretation now insisted upon.

The action in the Circuit Court was instituted in the name of Alexander McNutt, governor of the state of Mississippi, (who was the successor of Charles Lynch,) who sues for the use of Thomas Leggett and others, citizens of the state of New York, against Bland, Humphreys, and Geissen, citizens of the state of Mississippi. It was founded on a bond executed by Bland, as sheriff of the county of Claiborne in the state above mentioned. The pleadings, so far as they relate to the conduct of the sheriff in fulfilment of his duties, or in dereliction thereof, are irrelevant to the question here raised, and need not therefore be examined. The proper question for consideration here is this whether upon the case as presented upon the declaration, the Circuit Court of Mississippi could take jurisdiction. McNutt is the party plaintiff upon the record, in whom is the legal right of action. Leggett and others, who are said to be the beneficiaries in the suit, and in whom is the equitable interest, are not the legal parties to the suit at law, and could not maintain an action upon the bond to which they were not parties.

Is McNutt to be considered as suing in his private individual character, and the addition 'governor of the state of Mississippi,' to be regarded as merely a phrase of description? Or is he to be viewed as the representative of the state of Mississippi, or rather as identified with the sovereignty of that state, and having vested in him the exercise of her executive authority? Let both branches of this inquiry be cursorily pursued. If McNutt is to be regarded as a private party to the action, whether in his own interest, or as the private agent of the state for certain purposes, it would indeed seem to be too late, and entirely supererogatory, to construct an argument to prove, that to warrant either the commencement or prosecution of a suit in his name in a Circuit Court of the United States, his citizenship must be averred and shown upon the record. Decisions to this effect may be said to have been piled upon the question, for they may be traced from a period coeval almost with the passage of the judicial act, down to a comparatively recent day; ranging through at least ten volumes of the decisions of this court: and ruling, it is believed without an exception, that wherever jurisdiction is to be claimed from the citizenship or alienage of parties, such citizenship or alienage must be expressly set forth: ruling moreover, that wherever jurisdiction is claimed from the character of parties, it must be understood as meaning the parties to the record.

The first case in support of these positions, is that of Bingham v. Cabot et al., from 3 Dall., 382, instituted in 1797, in which the plaintiffs were styled in nar. as John Cabot, (with the co-plaintiffs,) described as being 'all of our said district of Massachusetts,' and as complaining that 'said William at Boston being indebted, &c.' Lee, attorney-general, insisted 'that there was not a sufficient allegation in the record of the citizenship of the parties to maintain the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, which is of limited jurisdiction.' Dexter, on the other hand, urged 'that stating in the declaration the party to be of a particular place, designates his home, and of course his citizenship.' The court were clearly of opinion, 'that it was necessary to set forth the citizenship (or alienage where a foreigner was concerned) of the respective parties, in order to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.' In the year 1797, were decided in the Supreme Court the cases of Turner v. Eurille, and of Turner, admin., &c. v. The Bank of North America, reported in 4 Dall., the former at pp. 7 and 8, the latter on pp. 8, 9, 10 and 11. The declaration in the former case set out a demand by the Marquis de Casa Eurille, of _____, in the island of _____, against Stanley and the intestate of Turner & Greene, merchants and partners at Newbern in the said district. Upon objection to the jurisdiction for want of a proper description of parties-By the court-'The decision in the case of Bingham v. Cabot et al. must govern the present case; let the judgment be reversed with costs.' ''Turner, admin. of Stanley v. The Bank of North America'' was an action upon a promissory note drawn at Philadelphia by Stanley, endorsed by Biddle & Company to the Bank of North America. The nar. stated that the president and directors were citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, that Turner the administrator, and Stanley the intestate, were citizens of the state of North Carolina; but of Biddle & Company, the payers and endorsers, there was no other description than 'that they used trade and merchandise at Philadelphia or North Carolina.' Ellsworth, chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, after remarking that the Bank of North America, as well as the drawer of the note, was properly described, proceeds thus: 'The error assigned is, that it does not appear from the record that Biddle & Company, the promisees, or any of them, are citizens of a state other than that of North Carolina. The Circuit Court, though an inferior court in the language of the Con stitution, is not so in the language of the common law. A Circuit Court, however, is of limited jurisdiction, and has cognizance not of cases generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced; and a fair presumption is, not (as with regard to a court of general jurisdiction) that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, but rather that a cause is without its jurisdiction till the contrary appears. This renders it necessary to set forth, upon the record of a Circuit Court, the facts and circumstances which give jurisdiction, either expressly or in such manner as to render them certain by legal intendment. Among those circumstances, it is necessary, where the defendant is a citizen of one state, to show that the plaintiff is a citizen of some other state, or an alien. Here the description of the promisee only is, that he used trade at Philadelphia or North Carolina, which contains no averment that he was a citizen of a state other than North Carolina, or an alien. We must therefore say there was error.' In Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall., 14, the same doctrine is affirmed, and the court conclude their opinion with the following explicit language: 'Neither the Constitution, nor the act of Congress, regards, on this point, the subject of the suit, but the parties. A description of the parties is therefore indispensable to the exercise of jurisdiction. There is here no such description.' The case of Course et al. v. Stead et ux., 4 Dall., p. 22, is marked by one trait which peculiarly illustrates and enforces the principle ruled in the cases previously cited. In this last case, a supplemental bill was filed making a new party to a suit previously pending, but in the supplemental bill no description of the citizenship of this new defendant was given: the absence of such description having been assigned for error, it was contended that such a description was not necessary in the supplemental suit, which is merely an incident of the original bill brought in the same court; but the Supreme Court sustained the objection, and reversed the decree of the Circuit Court on the ground of jurisdiction. Next in the order of time is the case of Wood v. Wagnon, 2 Cranch, 9. Where the statement in the pleadings was that Wagnon, a citizen of Pennsylvania, showeth, that James Wood, of Georgia, &c. The judgment was reversed for the defect that the plaintiff and defendant were not shown by the pleadings to be citizens of different states.

In Hepburn and Dundas v. Elzey, 2 Cranch, 445, the decision turned upon a defect in the description of a party necessary to give jurisdiction. Winchester v. Jackson, 3 Cranch, 515. The writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the parties not appearing upon the record to be citizens of different states. In In Kemp's Lessee v. Kennedy, this court declare, that 'the courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them.' 5 Cranch, 185. The same in effect, the same indeed in terms, is the decision of this court in Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 46. Again, the principle that the character which authorizes access to the Circuit Court must be apparent upon the record, is strikingly exemplified in Chappedelaine et al. v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 306. It this case the plaintiffs were trustees, not suing in their own interest; yet as they were aliens and as such entitled to sue in the Circuit Courts of the United States, this court, in virtue of that character, and their title flowing therefrom apparent on the record, sustained the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Passing, with a mere mention of them, the cases of The Hope Insurance Company v. Boardman et al., 5 Cranch, 57; Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank et al., 5 Cranch, 303; Skillern's Ex'rs, v. May's Ex'rs., 6 Cranch, 267; The Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat., 91, all full to the point; I will quote an emphatic and more comprehensive affirmation of Judge Washington in reference to the powers of the Circuit Courts, expressed in the opinion of that judge in McCormick and Sullivant, 10 Wheat., 199: 'They are all (says he) of limited jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction be not alleged in the proceedings, their judgments and decrees are erroneous, and may upon a writ of error or appeal be reversed for that cause.' But the fullest and clearest exposition and vindication of the doctrine contended for in this opinion, will be found in the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the decision in the case of Osborn v. The Bank of the United States. The portion of the reasoning particularly referred to commences on the 856th page of the 9th volume of Wheaton: 'The judicial power of the Union,' says the chief justice, 'is also extended to controversies between citizens of different states; and it has been decided that the character of the parties must be shown on the record. Does this provision depend on the character of those whose interest is litigated, or of those who are parties on the record? In a suit, for example, brought by or against an executor, the creditors or legatees of his testator are the persons really concerned in interest: but it has never been suspected that, if the executor be a resident of another state, the jurisdiction of the federal courts could be ousted by the fact that the creditors or legatees were citizens of the same state with the opposite party. The universally received construction in this case is, that the jurisdiction is neither given nor ousted by the relative situation of the parties concerned in interest, but by the relative situation of the parties named on the record. Why is this construction universal? No case can be imagined in which the existence of an interest out of the party on the record is more unequivocal than in that which has been stated. Why then is it universally admitted, that this interest in no manner affects the jurisdiction of the court? The plain and obvious answer is, because the jurisdiction of the court depends not upon this interest, but upon the actual party on the record.' Again he remarks, p. 857, 'It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record. Consequently, the 11th amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits against states, is of necessity limited to those suits in which a state is a party on the record.'

This reasoning of the late chief justice seems to meet the present case in every aspect of which it is susceptible, and to dispel every shade of doubt that could possibly be cast upon it. The doctrine this reasoning so well sustains, is reaffirmed by the same judge, in the still later case of The State of Georgia v. Juan Madrazo, 1 Pet., 122; and amongst other authorities there cited, the principles ruled as above mentioned in Osborne v. The Bank of the United States, are referred to and approved. Vide also Keary et al. v. The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Memphis, 16 Pet., 90.

Alexander McNutt, in the case under examination, must be regarded as a private person acting in a private capacity; at most as a mere agent under a law of Mississippi, in whom the interests of other individuals may to a particular extent have been vested, and through whom they were authorized to sue. He represented or was identified with no political or fiscal rights or interests of the state of Mississippi. That state had no interest involved in the conducting of that suit by McNutt, and much less was she a party to the record in that suit. Standing then in the relation of a mere agent in the transaction, and there being no law of the United States investing the federal courts with jurisdiction as incident to such agency, he could have access to those courts, and the courts themselves could have jurisdiction, solely in virtue of his character of citizen of a state different from that in which the defendants resided, and that character it was indispensable should appear upon the record. These are positions which it has seemed to me impossible successfully to assail; positions encompassed with a chain of authorities comprehending the entire existence and duration of the government itself. This, however, is said to have been broken by the act of this court, and by that act an opening made for farther power and jurisdiction in the Circuit Courts. The mean by which such important consequences are supposed to have been effected, is the decision of the case of Brown at al. v. Strode, to be found in 5 Cranch, 303. In this case, which was submitted without argument, and in which the certificate directed to the Circuit Court is comprised in two lines, no reason whatever is assigned for the conclusion at which the court appear to have arrived The facts of the case, as presented in the short abstract of it, are thus stated: 'It was an action upon an executor's bond given in conformity with the laws of Virginia. The object of the suit was to recover a debt due from the testator in his lifetime to a British subject. The defendant was a citizen of Virginia. The persons named in the declaration as plaintiffs, were the justices of the peace for the county of Stafford, and were all citizens of Virginia.' The court ordered it to be certified as their opinion 'that the court below has jurisdiction in the case.' This is the whole case, and it is confidently believed to stand entirely solitary; without support, and without a likeness in the whole history of our jurisprudence: and, in commenting upon this case, it may be safely asserted, that if the court in their certificate have intended to affirm, that the holders of equitable interests, cestuis que trust, who are not the holders of the legal interests, or rights of action at law, are in actions at law the regular and proper parties to the record, then, indeed, they have not merely overturned the series of decisions in this court, from the case of Bingham v. Cabot, in 3 Dall., decided in 1798, down to the case of The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet., 110;-they have reversed, moreover, what is believed has been regarded as a canon of the law, wherever the principles of the common law have been adopted; and this they have accomplished by one short sentence, and without a single word to explain this mighty revolution. But can it be reasonably presumed that this court have in so cursory a mode intended to reverse its own well-considered, well-reasoned, and oft-repeated decisions; and this, too, without professing to review them-nay, without one word of reference to them of any kind? A presumption like this seems scarcely compatible with that cautious reluctance with which innovation on settled principles is always admitted by the courts. Is it not far more probable, that the short and isolated abstract in question, exhibits an imperfect picture of the action and purposes of the court as applicable to some particular state of case which may not be fully and accurately given, for the record of the case in the court below is not set out in extenso. But let it be supposed that the objects and the language of the court, in the case of Browne and Strode, are accurately given; still the inquiry recurs, does that case establish the law of this cause at the present day? Broune and Strode was decided in 1809. Turning, for the moment, from the decisions of this court prior to 1809, supposed (strong and explicit, and numerous as they are) to have been silently demolished by Broune and Strode, what must be understood with respect to the decisions of Skillern's Ex'rs v. May's Ex'rs, 6 Cranch, 267; of Osborne v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat., 733; of McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat., 199, and of The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet., 110-all posterior in date to 1809? If these cases are to be received upon the import solely of their own terms, uninfluenced by any reference to prior decisions, still as they are posterior in time to Browne and Strode, and are wholly irreconcilable therewith, they should be understood as controlling and reversing that decision. How much stronger, then, nay, how irresistible appears this conclusion, when it is ascertained that the several decisions subsequent to 1809 refer expressly to those of previous date, rely upon them as forming their own foundation, and reaffirm them as the law of the federal courts.

The only decision in this court which would appear, upon a superficial view of it, to give color to the decision of Broune et al. v. Strode, is the case of Irvine v. Lowry, reported in 14 Pet., 293. An attentive examination of the latter case, however, will show that, so far from resembling Browne and Strode, the facts of the two cases differ essentially; and that the former does not sustain, but, in effect, contradicts the latter. In Irvine v. Lowry the action was in the name of Irvine the payee of the note, for the benefit of the Lumberman's Bank. On behalf of Lowry the defendant, exception was taken to the jurisdiction upon the ground that the Lumberman's Bank, the beneficiaries in the suit, consisted, in part, of persons who were citizens of the same state to which the defendant belonged. The case of Browne et al. v. Strode was relied on to show that these beneficiaries and not the nominal parties or those who held the legal interest, should be considered the true parties on the record. This exception was overruled, and the jurisdiction sustained in the name of the party holding the legal right, in conformity with the current of authorities before cited. 'Tis true that, in the opinion delivered in this case, the decision in Browne et al. v. Strode is mentioned, and accounted for upon an hypothesis which by no means divests it of its anomalous character, any more than it rests the case of Irvine v. Lowry upon any real similitude with it. The argument is this, that although in Broune et al. v. Strode the plaintiffs and defendant were citizens of the same state, yet the statute of Virginia, which requires the executor's bond for the protection of creditors and legatees, passes the legal right to those whose interests the bond is designed to protect. To this reasoning several answers at once present themselves, either of which appears to be sufficient. 1. If this could be so understood, it would leave the objection precisely where it stood before. The parties to the action would still be all citizens to the same state, whereas the judicial act declares they shall be (that is the plaintiffs and defendants) of different states. 2. The Virginia statute professes to effect no such transmutation of legal rights. 3. It confers no right of action on the beneficiaries under the bond. 4. It orders the prosecution of the suit in the names of the justices the obligees, and by consequence, forbids such proceeding in the names of any other persons. 5. In point of fact, in the case commented on, (as doubtless would be found to be the fact in every suit ever instituted under the statute,) the action was brought in the names of the justices, so that those whose interests were designed to be protected by the bond, were never parties to the suit at all, much less the real or only parties representing the right of action under the bond.

My mind, then, is impelled, by considerations like these, to the deductions, that Browne v. Strode does not furnish the rule for the decision of this cause; and that, if it ever was a rule for the federal courts, it has been clearly and emphatically annulled. As a corollary from the above reasoning and the cases adduced in support thereof, it follows, that Alexander McNutt, without appearing as the party plaintiff upon the record to be a citizen of some state other than that to which the defendants belong, could have no standing in the Circuit Court; and that failing so to appear, the Circuit Court could have no jurisdiction over the cause.

It cannot be requisite here to meet any argument, should any be attempted, designed to maintain the right of McNutt to sue in virtue of his character of governor of Mississippi, and as such representing the sovereign or supreme executive power of that state. In that aspect, the suit would be virtually by the state herself, and not be the suit of Alexander McNutt; such a suit, too, could take place only where some direct right or interest of the state should be involved. Of such a controversy, the Circuit Court could unquestionably have no jurisdiction; this having been settled as one of those instances, the cognizance whereof belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. See The State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall., 402, and The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet., 110; Fowler et al. v. Lindsay et al., 3 Dall., 411.

To any argument, ab inconvenienti, which may be urged in support of the jurisdiction in this case, I would simply oppose the observations of two distinguished members of this bench, in reply to a similar argument addressed to them in the case of Turner, admin., &c. v. The Bank of North America, 4 Dall., 10; in which Chief Justice Ellsworth inquired: 'How far is it intended to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed that, in every case to which the judicial power of the United States extends, the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction without the intervention of the legislature to distribute and regulate the power?' And Chase, justice, remarked: 'If Congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise; and if Congress has not given the power to this or any other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal.' Est boni judicis ampliare jurisdictionem was once quoted as a wise judicial maxim; how far this may accord with systems differently constituted from ours, and having their foundations in a large and almost undefinable discretion, it is, perhaps, unnecessary here to inquire; it seems, however, scarcely compatible with institutions under which the political and civil state is referred, almost exclusively, to legislative or express regulation.

Upon the views above given, I conclude that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to that court, to enter judgment in this case for the plaintiff in that court.

The decree of the Circuit Court in this case was reversed on the 30th of January, 1844, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff. On the 31st of January, Jones, for the plaintiff in error, suggested the death of Bland, and moved that the writ of error stand against the survivor, Humphreys, and that judgment be entered against him alone.

Mr. Justice STORY, in delivering the opinion of the court said, that if Bland died since the commencement of the term, the judgment might be entered against both defendants, on a day prior to the death of Bland, nunc pro tunc. If he died before the commencement of the term, then upon the suggestion of his death before the term being entered of record, the cause of action surviving, the judgment might be entered against the surviving defendant, Humphreys. There certainly is no objection in this case, under all the circumstances, to granting the application as asked for by the plaintiff's counsel; that is, to enter the suggestion of Bland's death upon the record, and then entering judgment against Humphreys alone, as the survivor; and it is accordingly so ordered by the court.

Alexander McNutt, Gov., &c., plaintiff in error,

v.

Richard J. Bland et al.

Mr. Jones, of Counsel for the plaintiff in error, having suggested the death of Richard J. Bland, one of the co-defendants, since the last continuance of this cause, now here moved the court that his writ of error stand as against the surviving defendant. Whereupon this court not being now here sufficiently advised of and concerning what order to render in the premises, took time to consider.

January 31, 1844.

Alexander McNutt, Gov., &c., plaintiff in error,

v.

Richard J. Bland et al.

On consideration of the motion made in this case on a prior day of the present term of this court, to wit: on Wednesday, the 31st day of January, it is now here ordered by this court that the suggestion of Bland's death be entered on the record, and that then judgment be entered against Humphreys alone as the survivor, and that the mandate of this court direct the Circuit Court to enter judgment for the plaintiff against Benjamin G. Humphreys alone as the survivor.

March 12th, 1844.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

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Gwin v. Breedlove (43 U.S. 29)/Dissent Daniel

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented.

I am unable to concur with the majority of the court in their opinion just announced. 'Tis my opinion, that the judgment of the Circuit Court should have been wholly reversed.

Congress, by express enactment, have defined the duties and responsibilities of the marshals, and prescribed the modes in which they shall be enforced. These express regulations, designed for the government of the peculiar officers of the federal courts, cannot, I think be varied or controlled by rules established by the states for the conduct of their respective ministerial agents; but must be of paramount authority.

The laws of Mississippi, therefore, denouncing penalties against the misconduct of sheriffs, and directing the manner of enforcing them, cannot govern this case. Should it be conceded, however, that the laws of Mississippi concerning sheriffs could have effect in this motion against the marshal, it seems obvious, to my mind, that the appropriate remedy under the state law for an act like that complained of, has not, in this case, been adopted. The alleged delinquency in the marshal, made the foundation of this motion-a delinquency identically the same for which a like proceeding is authorized against a sheriff-is the refusal to pay over money actually made and in his hands, and collected in satisfaction of an execution. For such a refusal, a peculiar penalty, the very same sought and adjudged by the court in this instance, is provided. By the return of the marshal, relied on in proof by the plaintiff, it is conclusively shown, that the money which the officer was commanded to make, had never been received; but that he had received, in part, that which was not money, and which had never been converted into money, and which the plaintiff in the execution, would never have received in lieu of money. Nay, the oral evidence introduced by the plaintiff was brought in to prove that the marshal, in opposition to the plaintiff's positive instructions, had received that which was not money, excluding, upon this proof as well as upon the return, every inference that money had been actually received in satisfaction of the proccss in his hands. A refusal or an omission to levy or to return an execution, the statutes of Mississippi designate as different and distinct offences, and the conduct of the marshal as shown in the proofs, approaches more nearly to either of these than it does to the misfeasance alleged in the notice, and, for which, the court has awarded a penalty against him, although the fact charged is positively disproved by all the testimony, as it is also by the plaintiff's replications to the defendant's 3d and 4th pleas. But whether or not the conduct of the marshal can in literal strictness be denominated a failure or refusal to levy or to return an execution, it is surely not a failure or refusal to pay over money actually levied, and, therefore, the proceeding, under color of the statute of Mississippi, is not the proceeding appropriate to the act of the officer, however that act may be characterized. This is, too, a statutory proceeding, and should strictly conform to the power which authorizes it. It cannot be extended either to modes or objects not clearly embraced within the terms of that authority. It cannot, therefore, in any event, warrant the judgment now proposed, as that is clearly for a penalty wholly different from the one imposed by the law of Mississippi, for an offence such as is assumed by the court to have been committed in this instance. Surely the law of Mississippi either should or should not govern this case.

Again, I do not think that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is made out as between the parties to the judgment. The motion on which it is founded is neither process nor a mode of proceeding in the suit between Breedlove and Marsh and Company, nor can it be deemed an execution or process or proceeding upon or regularly incident to the judgment between those parties. It is a distinct and substantive and original proceeding against a third person no party to the controversy. A right of action is claimed against this third person for his own acts or delinquencies, independently of the contract or controversy between the parties to the judgment. In his character of officer of the court, he would, doubtless, be amenable to the authority it possesses to supervise the conduct of its own officer, and to secure the enforcement of its own judgments; an attachment would, therefore, lie against him, to effect these ends of justice. He would, also, be liable upon his official bond as marshal; because the judicial act confers a right of action thereon, without restriction as to citizenship, on all persons who may be injured by a breach of the condition of that bond. But if a farther or different recourse is sought against the marshal, one which may be supposed to arise neither from the inherent power of the court over its peculiar officer, or its judgments; then it is presumed that those who seek such recourse, must show their right as arising out of their character to sue in the federal courts; they must show themselves by regular averment to be citizens of a state other than that of him whom they seek to implead. The present case closely resembles that of Course et al. v. Stead et ux., 4 Dall., 22, in which it was ruled that the want of a proper description of parties in a supplemental suit was not cured by a reference to the original suit.

The judgment should, I think, be reversed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that so much of the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause as adjudges William M. Gwin, the plaintiff in error, to pay 25 per cent. damages thereon be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the residue of the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause, be in all respects, and the same is hereby affirmed.


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title: User talk:Sanjaytiwari


text: Index:Catholicism in Queensland.djvu

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 Catholicism

in

Queensland

Fifty Years of Progress.

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IN

By VICTOR L. GRAY.

FIRST EDITION,

BRISBANE:

Printed and Published by Roberts & Russell, 106 Elizabeth Street.

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Captain—afterwards Governor—Phillip proclaims Australia a British possession. The purpose of the Government to establish the Church of England as the dominant Church. The transfer of land to Church of England. Catholic population. Colonial document petitioning for religious liberty. Its fate. Social conditions obtaining. The "Rum Selling Corps." Expulsion of military authorities. Arrival of three exiled Catholic priests. Assembling of first Catholic congregation in Australia. Government action in connection with priests. Regulation regarding compulsory attendance of prison population at Church of England services. Penalty for failure so to do. Prosperity of English Church. Deplorable condition of Catholics. Arrival of Father O'Flynn. His subsequent imprisonment and deportation. His arrival in England. Excitement over his disclosures. Home Government orders selection of two priests for colony. Salary to be paid them. Father Therry volunteers for duty in Australia. Arrival of Fathers Therry and Connelly at Sydney. Hampering restrictions placed upon them. No Catholic church. Acquirement of site. Corner stone of St. Mary's Chapel laid by Governor Macquarie. Governor Macquarie recalled to England. His promise to assist in erection of Church on reaching Home. Summary of the character of Governor Macquarie. Sir Thomas Brisbane appointed as Governor, &c. Catholics and others petition for assistance in building St. Mary's. Governor agrees to assist. Father Therry's letter to "Gazette." Error in printing causes trouble. Father Therry suspended from his duties by Government. Offered money to leave colony. His refusal to do so. Father Therry transferred to Van Dieman's Land. Governor Burke's arrival in Sydney.

Arrival in Australia of the Rev. Dr. Ullathorne. Details concerning his early life and education. Youthful hopes of coming to the Colony. Appointment of Eight Rev. Dr. Morris as Apostolic Visitor to the Mauritius. Dr. Ullathorne requested by him to come to Australia. Change of plans. Home Government consents to Dr. Ullathorne's appointment as Vicar-General. Stipend allowed by Government. His title from Government. Sails from London for Sydney. Arrives at Sydney to find dissension rife among Catholics—Quells same. Answer to Dr. Therry. Pamphlet written and published by him upon the condition of convicts. Terrible arraignment of Government methods. Task of Catholics priests. Visit of Dr. Ullathorne to Norfolk Island. Sad scenes which there transpired. Only seven missionaries in New South Wales. Treatment of Irish convicts subsequent to 1803. Dr. Ullathorne visits England. Irish language banned in Colony. Punishment for speaking it. Inability of Government or Church of England to induce a Protestant chaplain to remain at Norfolk Island. Efforts

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 of Dr. Ullathorne to have a Catholic priest gent there. The Dr. 's return to the Colony. Antagonism aroused by his drastic remarks upon transportation. Called the "Agitator" General. Father Therry removed to Van Dieman's Land. Change of Dr. Ullathorne's field of missionary labours. His death.

The period embraced by the Episcopate of the Rev. John Bede Folding, O.S.B.., first Bishop of Australia. Position of affairs at the time of his arrival. Deep feeling existing against Catholics. His birth and previous career. Calls public attention to the want of priests in the Colony. Catholic population more than 25,000. Areas of New South Wales and Van Dieman 's Land. Sailed from Liver- pool with, nine priests. Delight of Catholics on hearing of the appointment of a Bishop for Australia. Petition presented to Governor Bourke asking assignment of a becoming salary to the new Bishop — Prayer of the petition granted. Protestant feeling opposed to Governor's action. Accusations made against him because of his action. Land- ing of Dr. Folding at Hobart Town. Remained a month. Rev. Father Cotham, O.S.B., stayed at Hobart to assist resident priest. School teacher appointed. Dr. Folding reaches Sydney. Installed in St. Mary's. Division of territory among the priests for duty. Dr. Folding receives permission to personally visit newly arrived convicts — Number which passed through his hands. His good influence recognised by the Government officials. Governor Bourke recalled. Feeling of Catholics towards him. Bitterness displayed by Protestant Bishop. His proclamation anent Bishop Polding. Denied the right of the Governor to receive Bishop Folding at Official levees. His successor Dr. Barker. Uncharitable vapourings. Home Government declared Dr. Broughton's stand to be unfounded and untenable. Unkind remarks of the "Government Gazette" on arrival of eight new priests. Judge Willis expressions. Resolution passed to exclude Irish Catholics from participating in the general benefit of the, land fund for immigration.' First Communion in Australia. Dr. Folding and others sail for Europe. Presented with a purse of sovereigns. Visited Rome and received the, Sacred Pallium as Archbishop, &c. Appointment of Suffragan Bishops. Returned to Sydney with large ecclesi- astical party. Comments upon Dr. Polding's life. Ap- pointment of the Most Rev. Roger Bede Vaughan, O.S.B. as Coadjutor Archbishop — His consecration by Cardinal Man- ning. Death of Dr. Polding.

Arrival, of Passionist Fathers. Territory allotted to them in Moreton Bay. Visit of Archbishop Folding and Father Snell to Brisbane. First baptisms in Queensland. His welcome. Money subscribed for Church aid. Labours of the missionaries. Religious beliefs of the Aboriginals. Failure of the mission and the causes. Departure of the missionaries from Queensland. The Rev. Duncan McNab essays the task of teaching the blacks. Meeting with

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110 you kept them for yourself, and Hermes received nothing."

"You're a clever man. I've often said so. I kept only three of my ten oaths, and I didn't deal differently with the other gods. If the same is the case with you, isn't that the reason, possibly, why we are now abandoned by the gods? To be sure, I ordered Larissa to sacrifice a whole hecatomb after my death."

"But that is Larissa's affair, whereas it was you, friend Elpidias, who made the promises."

"That's true, that's true. But you, good Socrates, could you, godless as you are, deal better with the gods than I who was a god-fearing tanner?"

"My friend, I know not whether I dealt better or worse. At first I brought offerings without having made vows. Later I offered neither calves nor vows."

"What, not a single calf, you unfortunate man?"

"Yes, friend, if Hermes had had to live by my gifts, I am afraid he would have grown very thin."

"I understand. You did not traffic in cattle, so you offered articles of some other trade—probably a mina or so of what the pupils paid you."

"You know, my friend, I didn't ask pay of my pupils, and my trade scarcely sufficed to support me. If the gods reckoned on the sorry remnants of my meals they miscalculated."

"Oh, blasphemer, in comparison with you I can be proud of my piety. Ye gods, look upon this man! I did deceive you at times, but now and then I shared with you the surplus of some fortunate deal. He who gives at all gives much in comparison with a blasphemer who gives nothing. Socrates, I think you had better go on alone! I fear that your company, godless one, damages me in the eyes of the gods."

"As you will, good Elpidias. I swear by the dog no one shall force his company on another. Unhand the fold of my mantle, and farewell. I will go on alone."

And Socrates walked forward with a sure tread, feeling the ground, however, at every step.

But Elpidias behind him instantly cried out:


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Page:Catholicism in Queensland.djvu/15

 Father Bucas. His experiences. Debarred from teaching Station blacks. His return to Brisbane. Father McNab's second attempt, and failure. Vicariate of North Queens- land iutrusted to the priests of S.8. Peter and Paul. Their want of success. Mission taken in hand by the Augustinian Fathers. Their whole time needed in ministering to wants of white population. Signal failure of German mission. Characteristics of the blacks. Dampier's opinion of them.

Queensland under the Episcopate of the Right Rev. James O'Quinn, D.D. Birth and parentage. Attended school in Dublin. Acquired the education necessary for candidates for ecclesiastical profession. Went to Rome, becoming a student in the Irish College. Rome the "Holy City." Received the degree of Doctor of Divinity, upon graduating, and a gold medal from the Pope. Afflicted with a delicate constitution. Was selected to remain in Rome to prepare a thesis in Universal Theology. High opinion in which he was held by his in- structors and others. Ordained priest. Sent on account of ill health to Blackrock, near Dublin. Did occasional duty in parish of Booterstown and Blackrock. His heroic conduct during a visitation of smallpox. Prophecy made concerning his future. Education question in Ireland. Condemnation by the Pope of Secular Colleges. Their failure as regarded Catholics. Founding of the "Catholic University." Appointment of the Rev. Dr. John Henry Newman as its first Rector. Necessity for University schools. Founding of St. Laurence O'Toole's Seminary. Dr. O'Quinn appointed its first president. Official opening. Length of Dr. O'Quinn's presidency. Appointment of Dr. O'Quinn as confessor to the nuns. Genesis of the Mater Misericordiae Hospital. Dr. O'Quinn's part in same. Preconization of Dr. O 'Quinn as Bishop of Brisbane. Visits the Continent and Rome to secure priests and nuns for his , diocese. Sailed from Gravesend. Arrival at Brisbane. Accompanying Fathers and Sisters. First priests stationed for ordinary work in Moreton Bay territory. First chapel in Brisbane. Old St. Stephen's. Bishop Polding's friend- ship with Pugin. Bishop's library. Stone church began in Ipswich by Father McGinnerty. Incidents of Dean Hanly's life in Queensland. Diocesan Visitation by the Bishop and priests. Second Diocesan Visitation. Dr. O'Quinn a fine horseman. Immigration policy of the Bishop. Government aid to same. Formation of the Queensland Immigration Society. Their labours and results. Antagonistic feeling of Protestants to the coming of Irish Catholics, Withdrawal by Government of concession in aid. Dissolution of Catholic Immigration Society. Educational system in Queensland. Assumption by the State of entire control of the secular system. Establishment of Catholic schools. Grand results attending their creation. Nun's schools assisted by Govern- ment. Public bazaar opened by Nuns to raise funds. Be- poit of Dr. O'Quinn suggesting a division of the Diocese of Brisbane. His reasons for such suggestion. The Bishops objection to foreigners as Bishops in Queensland. Table showing progress made by the Church. Consecration of St.

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 Stephen's Cathedral. Unwarranted aspersions cast upon the Bishop's character. Meeting hold in Brisbane as a mark of confidence in him. Presented with an address of con- gratulation upon the splendid work he had accomplished. His complete vindication. Copy of Bishop O'Quinn's will. The establishment of the Christian Brothers in Queens- land. Further educational matters. Table of educational statistics of the Diocese at the time of the Archbishop's death. Cause of the adding of the "O" to the Arch- bishop's name. Instances of his personal bravery. Death of Dr. O'Quinn. Body lying in state and burial ceremonies. Short review of his career.

His Eminence and Most Reverend Patrick Francis Cardinal Moran, Archbishop of Sydney, Metropolitan, etc. Bishop of Ossory in Ireland. Translated to Sydney, by brief dated March 21st, 1884. Accorded an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival. Summoned to Borne. Received the Cardinalitial dignity. First Australian Cardinal. Meeting of Plenary Synod of Bishops of Australia at Sydney. Cardinal Arch- bishop the President. Solemn religious scene at St. Mary's Cathedral. 6000 people present. Invocation of God's Spirit upon Synod's deliberations. Close of Synod. Results of. the Plenary Synod. Apostolic Letter addressed by Cardinal to the Clergy and faithful.

The Episcopate of the Very Reverend Dr. Dunne, D.D. The division of Queensland into Sees. Territory embraced by each. Consecration of Dr. Dunne as Bishop. Place of birth. Educated in Irish College, Rome. A teacher in St. Laurence O'Toole's school, Dublin. Chose Queensland as his missionary field. Arrived at Brisbane in 1863. Made Pastor of Toowoomba. Offices held by him in Queensland. Active in efforts to induce Irish immigrants to settle on the land. Left Toowoomba, to take up his duties in Bris- bane. Made the recipient of an address and purse of sovereigns on leaving Toowoomba. Acted as Secretary of the Plenary Council of Australia. Rendered important services. Dr. Dunne received the Sacred Pallium, as Arch- bishop. Churches and clergy in the Diocese. Colleges, schools, and charitable institutions.

The Diocese of Rockhampton. Appointment of first Bishop. His life. Second Bishop. Translated ts Ballarat. Third Bishop of Rockhampton, the Right Rev. James Duhig, D.D. Birth and early instruction by Christian Brothers. Spent a short term in a mercantile office. Returned to the Christian Brothers. Sailed for Europe. Entered Irish College, Rome. Ordained Priest. Returned to Queensland. Appointed to the Parish of Ipswich as assistant. Trans- ferred to Brisbane. Consecrated Bishop of Rockhampton. First ad limina visit to Rome. Received with marked meeting with the Venerable Pontiff. Received with marked kindness in Ireland. Visited the United States. Young- est Bishop in the Church. Tables of Churches, clergy list schools, and charitable institutions in the Rockhampton Diocese.

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Page:Catholicism in Queensland.djvu/17

The Vicariate Apostolic of Cooktown. Original purpose of erection of Vicariate. Italian priests first in charge. In 1882 Italian Fathers transferred. Erection into a Vicariate Apostolic. Consecration of Vicar. Sketch of life of Dr. Hutchenson. His death. His successor. Churches and clergy in the Vicariate.

Grammar School scholarships. Announcement of resolution. Scholarships. Bursaries. Number of scholarships. Number of bursaries. Bursary allowance. Remarks. Former reso- lution. Feeling in community in relation thereto. Motion of Mr, McDonnell. Date of passage of new resolution. 'Points argued by its supporters. How received by public. Deputation to Minister for Instruction by representatives of the Council of Churches. Their views and threats. Beneficial results of new resolution to the State and Catholic community.

The Order of Mercy. Opening of House of Mercy. Life of foundress. Necessity for definite form of organisation. Visits of Miss McAuley to Dublin Hospitals. Her desire to erect a hospital in Dublin. Other causes which actuated her. Foundation of the Order of Mercy. Sister Catherine McAuley, appointed Superioress. Remarks. Recognition of the work of the Sisters. Founding of other convents. Her visit to England. Returned to Ireland. Her death. Beginning of the Order in Queensland. Opening of Order's first home in Brisbane — In Ipswich. Transfer of orphans from Diamantina Orphanage to Sisters' care. Arrival of second contingent of Sisters from Ireland. Opening of Convent and school in Roma. Sisters took charge of Con- vent and Orphanage in Mackay. Opening of Convent and school at Maryborough. Opening of school at Red Hill. Sisters took charge of schools in South Brisbane and Kan- garoo Point. Magdalen Asylum established at Wooloowin. Parochial day school opened at same time. Convents and schools opened at Sandgate, Bundaberg, Southport, Beau- desert, Toowong, and Bed Hill. School at Monkland, Toowoomba, Rosalie. Children in Sisters' schools. Dublin Mater Misericordiae Hospital. Money raised for its erection. Dr. Bristow's report. Lord O'Hagan's remarks. Mother Mary Vincent Whitty. Sister Mary Elizabeth Hercy. Brisbane Mater Misericordiae Hospital. All Hallow's Convent School. The St. Vincent's Orphanage, Nudgee. The Magdalen Asylum. St. Anne's Industrial School. The House of Mercy. The Night Refuge or Servant's Home. Middle Class Girls' Schools.

The Order of the Christian Brotherhood. Founded by Edmond Ignatius Rice. Steps taken by him in founding the Order. First school. Laying of foundation stone of first Monas- tery. Naming of hill on which the Monastery was built. Motto of Order, First establishments in Australia in

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User talk:Boleyn

—cygnis insignis 08:10, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

Thanks for the welcome, Boleyn (talk) 08:54, 18 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I sometimes find the wikipedia is lacking facts found in DNB articles, there are a couple of templates that you can use to link back here. If there is no article there, you might be interested in starting one with a copy of the DNB text. If anything is puzzling you, it is often easier to ask somebody than dig around for answer. cygnis insignis 09:39, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

title: User talk:Boleyn


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Page:Catholicism in Queensland.djvu/19

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 1842. Their return to Ireland. Opening of other Houses in Australia. Invited by Dr. O'Quinn to Brisbane. Pate of arrival. School opened. Inception of College and Monastery. Laying of foundation stone. Premises en- larged. Boarding school begun. Boarders transferred to St. Jobeph's, Nudgee. Public examination results in 1880. In 1882. In 1909. College grounds on Gregory Terrace. Clear and pure well water. Gymnasium. Singing education. Assumed charge St. James' Primary School. Number of pupils in, same. The Brothers' College at Nudgee. Description of buildings and grounds. Built without Government aid. Curriculum. Scope of education afforded. Remarks of William Redmund, M.P. Enjoys distinction of having prepared many students for universities. Rhodes scholar.

The Society of St. Vincent de Paul. General remarks. Founding of Central Council of Brisbane. Officers chosen. Par- ticular Council Of Brisbane. Date of foundation. Spiritual Director and officers. Conferences. Isolated conferences. Dates of formation. Report of C. P. Buchanan. Develop- ment of the Society in Queensland. Considerations by him under headings. Difficulties experienced. Conference established at St. Stephen's Cathedral. Very Rev. Father O'Rielly. Number of original members. Increase of membership. Success attributable to. Association of the Sacred Heart; Suitability of members; Spirit of co- operation. All Hallow's Sewing Guild. Assistance given by same to the Society. St. Bridget's, Red Hill, Conference. The outlook. General ignorance of Society's aims. Friendly rivalry of other societies. Australian character. Present membership of Society. Indigent persons aided.

The Hibernian Australian Catholic Benefit Society. Its begin- nings. Change of name of St. Francis Benefit Society. Amalgamation of benefit societies into the H.A.C.B. Society. Officers of same. Branches opened. First annual meeting Brisbane Branch. Officers elected. Tabulated reports. Progress made. Affiliation with A.O.H. of America. Re- marks. Officers for 1909-1910.

Association of the Sacred Heart. Objects of Association. Obligations of Associates. Days appointed for Holy Communion and Evening Devotions. Subscription. Advice.

The Catholic Young Men's Society. Federation, re-established in Queensland in 1908. First meeting. Delegates and officers. Affiliated societies. Debates and lectures. Resig- nation of first Federation President. Members who have in the past been prominent in the Society.

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 today looking down with love on this assembly, and they share in the joy of the scene. May they and all the saints pray for us 'to fight the good fight, and keep the Faith.' When another century will have passed you and I shall be gathered to our fathers. May we be among the sainted sons of our sainted isle, which has a high and honoured place in Heaven. May the good Christian Brothers thrive and prosper in the future as they have done in the past; may they continue to send forth, year after year and century after century on your ancient and ever faithful city, on or beloved Ireland, and on the Church of God in every land, pupils armed with sanctity and science, charity and chastity, truth and justice— sons worthy of our immortal Nation and imperishable Faith.— _ Amen."

After Solemn Benediction was given by his Lordship, that masterpiece of all choruses, the "Alleluia" (from the "Creation," an oratorio by Haydn), was sung by a chorus of 70 voices, which concluded the sacred ceremony.

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User talk:Aaabbbvvvqqq

Hi, welcome to Wikisource.

The pages you have added do not appear to be public domain or redistributable under a 'free' license. John Vandenberg (chat) 08:51, 18 December 2010 (UTC)
 * The author of the work I am myself. The paper is published in the journal. Here, I placed it abstract. Please, help identify the license. Aaabbbvvvqqq (talk) 12:01, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

 * Currently Wikisource does not allow pages for abstracts only. We need the entire work to be freely redistributable under a free license, such as Creative Commons, or as public domain.  You may not be able to do this if you signed contracts with the journal that prevent you from giving your paper away for free. John Vandenberg (chat) 19:59, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

 * I see the license(s) have been added but that is only part of the issue. Posting abstracts or, in this case, just the external links to the subject matter is not acceptable for WS hosting.
 * As it stands now, these "articles" seem to me as little more than attempts to promote traffic elsewhere rather than good faith (& WS policy compliant) contributions. Actions to remove such advertising will soon follow if not resolved. -- George Orwell III (talk) 21:57, 20 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Please, help identify the license. Aaabbbvvvqqq (talk) 22:03, 20 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Please upload the entire content for review and then hopefully we can better "see" if it can be hosted here (and the appropriate license to do so) or not. If you wish to to simply paraphrase or summarize parts (i.e. excerpts ot abstracts) of the subject matter - try creating an article on our sister site Wikipedia instead. -- George Orwell III (talk) 22:51, 20 December 2010 (UTC)

Hello,

These papers have been published here and here - in Russian. And also on my personal website. Has been discussed here. Translate all the work is not in force - just as I do not speak English well. Friends have helped to translate summary only.

At the expense of - Wikipedia, do not know they will or not. Please give detailed advice - in ru.vikipedia summary not accept. Aaabbbvvvqqq (talk) 05:12, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

 * Any  Summary , in English or Russian (or even Navaho Indian) not acceptable for hotsting on en.WikiSource.org.  Advertising  ('linking' to other sites in this case) not an acceptable article for hosting on en.WikiSource.org.
 * Any  Complete  English translation (by you or your friend[s]) of entire published work, un-restricted by Russian and/or American copyright laws, is acceptable for hosting on en.WikiSource.org.

 * You may have a better chance & more answers by visiting Русский (http://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/)

 * As they stand now, your articles will be deleted from the mainspace shortly. -- George Orwell III (talk) 08:27, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

title: User talk:Aaabbbvvvqqq


text:
Page:TheHaunterOfTheRing.djvu/4

 There was no reply to that. I glanced helplessly at John Kirowan. He sat in his customary position, chin resting on his strong, slim hands; his white face was immobile, but his dark eyes gleamed with interest. In the silence I heard a clock ticking like a death-watch.

"Tell us the full story, Gordon," suggested Kirowan, and his calm, even voice was like a knife that cut a strangling, relieving the unreal tension.

"You know we've been married less than a year," Gordon began, plunging into the tale as though he were bursting for utterance; his words stumbled and tripped over one another. "All couples have spats, of course, but we've never had any real quarrels. Evelyn is the best-natured girl in the world.

"The first thing out of the ordinary occurred about a week ago. We had driven up in the mountains, left the car, and were wandering around picking wild flowers. At last we came to a steep slope, some thirty feet in height, and Evelyn called my attention to the flowers which grew thickly at the foot. I was looking over the edge and wondering if I could climb down without tearing my clothes to ribbons, when I felt a violent shove from behind that toppled me over.

"If it had been a sheer cliff, I'd have broken my neck. As it was, I went tumbling down, rolling and sliding, and brought up at the bottom scratched and bruised, with my garments in rags. I looked up and saw Evelyn staring down, apparently frightened half out of her wits.

"'Oh Jim!' she cried. 'Are you hurt? How came you to fall?'

"It was on the tip of my tongue to tell her that there was such a thing as carrying a joke too far, but these words checked me. I decided that she must have stumbled against me unintentionally, and actually didn't know it was she who precipitated me down the slope.

"So I laughed it off, and went home. She made a great fuss over me, insisted on swabbing my scratches with iodine, and lectured me for my carelessness! I hadn't the heart to tell her it was her fault.

"But four days later, the next thing happened. I was walking along our driveway, when I saw her coming up it

title: Page:TheHaunterOfTheRing.djvu/4


text:
User:Boleyn

User:Boleyn on WS is the same as User:Boleyn on WP.

title: User:Boleyn


text: English Folk-Carols/The truth sent from above


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Page:Decisive Battles Since Waterloo.djvu/11

  DECISIVE BATTLES

SINCE

WATERLOO

BY

THOMAS W. KNOX

AUTHOR OF "Marco Polo for Boys and Girls," "Life of Robert Fulton and a History of Steam Navigation," "The Boy Travellers in the Far East," five vols.; "The Boy Travellers in South America," "The Boy Travellers in the Russian Empire," "The Young Nimrods," two vols.; "The Voyage of the Vivian," "Overland through Asia," "Backsheesh," "Underground," "John," "Camp-Fire and Cotton Field," "How to Travel," "The Pocket Guide around the World," etc., etc.

ILLUSTRATED THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND WITH INDEX NINTH IMPRESSION

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS NEW YORK AND LONDON The Knickerbocker Press 1902


text:
Author:Alfred Gurney

Works

 * A Christmas Faggot (1884)
 * Vision of the Eucharist and other Poems (1885)
 * Voices from the Holy Sepulchre (1892)
 * The Story of a Friendship (1892)
 * Day Dreams (1896)

title: Author:Alfred Gurney


text: English Folk-Carols/Come all you worthy gentlemen


text:
Page:Alumni Oxoniensis (1715-1886) volume 2.djvu/203

 Gwyn, Charles Dickson, 2s. David, of Cardiff, co. Glamorgan, gent. , matric. 26 Oct., 1881, aged 20; B.A. 1884.  Gwynne, Clement Thomas, 1s. Clement, of Leek, co. Stafford, gent. , matric. 19 Oct., 1875, aged 24; B.A. 1878.  Gwynne, David, s. Richard, of Taliaris, co. Carmarthen, arm. , matric. 20 Dec., 1745, aged 19.  Gwynn, Rev. Edward Tayleur, 1s. Samuel Tayleur, of Burnham, Essex, M.D., matric. 18 Oct., 1871, aged 19; B.A. 1874, M.A. 1879.  Gwynn, Edward, s. Howell, of Brecknock (town), pleb. , matric. 18 March, 1724-5, aged 18.  [5]

Gwyn, Francis, s. Francis, of Thorncombe, Devon, arm. , matric. 4 June, 1717, aged 18;, B.A. 21 Feb., 1721-2, M.A. 1727 (? M.P. Wells 1741-54).  Gwynne, Frederick, s. William, of Lewes, Sussex, cler. , matric. 27 March, 1801, aged 18.  Gwyn, Howell, s. Ed., of Brecon (town), cler. , matric. 1 March, 1716-7, aged 16; bar.-at-law, Lincoln's Inn, 1724 (? M.P. Radnorshire March, 1755-61, Old Sarum 1761-8).

Gwynne, Howel, s. Marmaduke, of Garth, co. Brecon, arm. , matric. 12 Nov., 1736, aged 17.

Gwynne, Howell, s. Thomas, of Carmarthen (town), pleb. , matric. 13 Dec., 1784, aged 20.
 [10]

Gwyn, Howel, 1s. William, of Neath, co. Glamorgan, arm. , matric. 21 April, 1825, aged 18; B.A. 1829, M.A. 1832, of Duffryn, co. Glamorgan, J.P., D.L., etc., high sheriff 1837, of co. Carmarthen 1838, and of Brecon 1866-9, M.P. Penryn 1847-57, Brecon 1866-9.

Gwyne, James, 3s. William, of Llangain, co. Carmarthen, gent. , matric. 13 June, 1825, aged 19.

Gwyn, James Bevan, 3s. William Bevan, of Llangain, Carmarthen, gent. , matric. 3 June, 1850, aged 17; B.A. 1854, M.A. 1858, curate of Cowbridge 1857-9, P.C. Monknash 1859-63, vicar of Merthyr Mawr 1863-70, and of Llanfrechta 1870-5, rector of Rockingham, Northants, 1877-86.

Gywnne, John, s. Lewis, of Llanbadarn Trefeglwis, co. Cardigan, gent. , matric. 6 March, 1720-1, aged 18; B.A. 1724.

Gwyn, John, s. Francis, of Thorncombe, Devon, arm. , matric. 8 June, 1727, aged 17; B.A. 1733. M.A. 1735. See Alumni West., 296.

Gwynne, John, s. Morgan, of Brymairon, co. Pembroke, cler. , matric. 28 March, 1765, aged 17; B.A. 1769.
 [16]

Gwynn, John, of, Dublin; scholar 1848, B.A. 1850, fellow 1853, M.A. 1854, B.D. 1861, adm. 'ad eundem' 7 July, 1860.

Gwyn, John Fraunceis, s. William Fraunceis, of Combe Florey. Somerset, arm. , matric. 11 May, 1749, aged 20; of Combe Florey aforesaid, and of Ford Abbey, Devon, and Lansannwr, co. Glamorgan, assumed the additional surname of by royal licence in 1780, died 3 Oct., 1789, father of the next named.

Gwyn, John Fraunceis, s. John Fraunceis-Gwyn, of Combe Florey, Somerset, gent. , matric. 11 April, 1780, aged 18; of Ford Abbey, Devon. died s.p. 28 Feb., 1846.

Gwynne, Luke, s. Howell, of Lanlynwell, co. Brecon, arm. , matric. 13 Dec., 1722, aged 17; B.A. 1726, M.A. 1729.
 [20]

Gwynne, Mansel, s. John, of Talley, co. Carmarthen, pleb. , matric. 10 July, 1773, aged 18.

Gwyn, Morgan, s. Daniel, of Landissilio, co. Pembroke, pleb. matric. 5 March, 1732-3, aged 20.

Gwynne, Reginald John, 1s. James Eglinton Anderson, of London, gent. , matric. 27 Oct., 1883, aged 20.

Gwynne, Richard, s. Thomas, of 'Guuempa,' co. Carmarthen, arm. , matric. 17 May, 1737, aged 17.

Gwynne, Richard, s. Richard, of Taliaris, co. Carmarthen, arm. , matric. 17 Dec., 1753, aged 20.
 [25]

Gwyn, Richard, 1s. Richard Hamond, of West Walton, Norfolk. cler. , matric. 18 Oct., 1865, aged 19; B.A. 1870, of Lincoln's Inn 1872.

Gwyn, Richard Hamond, 1s. Richard, of Long Stratton, Norfolk. arm. , matric. 28 April, 1831, aged 18; B.A. 1835, M.A. 1863, vicar of Roughton, Norfolk, 1855-62, and rector of South Repps 1862.

Gwynne, Roderick, s. Thynne How, of Glanbran, co. Carmarthen, arm. , matric. 17 Oct., 1792, aged 18; of Buckland, co. Brecon, left an only daughter.

Gwynne, Rowland, s. John, of Llanvynith, co. Carmarthen, cler. , matric. 12 July, 1716, aged 17.

Gwynn, Stephen Lucius, 1s. John, dean of Derry. , matric. 19 Oct., 1882, aged 18; scholar 1882-5, senior Hulmeian exhibitioner 1885.
 [30]

Gwyn, Tatham, 3s. Anthony, of Fakenham, Norfolk, arm. , matric. 2 June, 1857, aged 18.

Gwynne, Thomas, s. Thomas, of Treygonnon, co. Montgomery, pleb. , matric. 28 March, 1721, aged 19.

Gwynn, Thomas, s. Thomas. of Tenbury, co. Worcester, cler. , matric. 26 March, 1783, aged 16; B.A. 1787, M.A. 1790.

Gwynn, Thomas, 1s. Thomas, of Ellesmere, Salop, gent. , matric. 19 Oct., 1843, aged 16; B.A. 1847, M.A. 1850, chaplain 1849-51, assistant-master Marlborough College 1851-7, headmaster Aylesbury Grammar School 1857-61, died 3 April, 1874.

Gwyn, Thomas Bevan, 1s. William, of Llangain, co. Carmarthen, arm. , matric. 23 March, 1820, aged 18; B.A. 1824, M.A. 1829, J.P., vicar of St. Ishmael's, co. Carmarthen, 1830, until his death 18 Feb., 1855.
 [35]

Gwyn, Walter John, 2s. George Boyce, of London, gent. , matric. 22 Oct., 1885, aged 29.

Gwyn, William, s. Edward. of St. David's, co. Brecon, cler. , matric. 8 March, 1720-1, aged 19.

Gwyn, William, s. Augustine, of Prescott, Lancashire, cler. , matric. 11 April, 1751, aged 15; exhibitioner 1754, B.A. 1755, M.A. 1757, and fellow (rector of Cottingham, Northants), principal 1770, died at Brighton 19 Aug., 1770.

Gwynne, William, s. Edward, of Neath, co. Glamorgan, gent. , matric. 23 Feb., 1765, aged 19; B.A. 1768, M.A. 1784. (Memo.: W. G., rector of St. Peter's, Lewes, and of Hamsey, died 1818, father of the next named.)

Gwynne, William, s. William, of Crowhurst, Sussex, cler. , matric. 14 May, 1793, aged 19; B.A. 1799, M.A. 1812, rector of St. Michael's, Lewes, and of Denton, Sussex, died 1825.
 [40]

Gwyn, William Beechey, 1s. William, of Burgh Apton, Norfolk, gent. , matric. 11 April, 1840, aged 19. See Eton School Lists.

Gwyther, Alfred, 2s. Edwin, of London, arm. , matric. 14 Oct., 1864, aged 19; B.A. 1869, bar.-at-law, Inner Temple, 1875. See Foster's Men at the Bar.

Gwyther, Henry, s. Henry, of Bristol (city), gent. , matric. 26 March, 1814 aged 19.
 [ 580 ]