text:
United States White v. Knox/Opinion of the Court

This was a suit for mandamus to compel the comptroller of the currency to pay a dividend on a debt of the Miners' National Bank of Georgetown, Colorado, an insolvent national bank. The question argued in this court arises on the following facts: The Miners' National Bank of Georgetown was put into insolvency by the comptroller of the currency, and a receiver appointed about the twentieth of December, 1875. It owed a large amount of debts, and among the rest about $60,000 to White, the relator, which the comptroller refused to allow. White thereupon brought suit to have his claim adjudicated, and on the twenty-third of June, 1883, he recovered a judgment against the bank for $104,523.72, that being the amount of his claim, with interest added to the date of the judgment. Between the time of the failure of the bank and the judgment, the comptroller had paid to the other creditors, under the requirements of section 5236 of the Revised Statutes, ratable dividends, amounting in the aggregate to 65 per cent. on the amounts due them, respectively, as of the date when the bank failed. As soon as the claim of White was adjudicated, the comptroller calculated the amount due him according to the judgment as of the date of the failure, and paid him 65 per cent. on that amount. The sum paid in this way was $46,560.75, which, it is conceded, was the true amount due him on the basis of distribution assumed by the comptroller. White claimed that the dividend should be paid on the face of the judgment, which would have given him $67,940.41. The difference between the amount claimed and that paid is $21,379.66. The present suit was brought to compel the payment of this difference. The court below decided in favor of the comptroller, and White sued out this writ of error for the review of a judgment to that effect.

The pleadings are somewhat inartificially drawn, but both parties ask that all matters of form may be disregarded, and their rights determined upon the facts, about which there is no disagreement.

Section 5236 of the Revised Statutes, under which the question to be decided arises, is as follows: 'From time to time * *  * the comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money *  *  * paid over to him by such receiver, on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on all claims previously proved or adjudicated.'

The comptroller decided that the payment to White should be on the basis of the amount due him on his adjudicated claim as of the date of the failure of the bank, because the dividends to the other creditors had been calculated in that way, and all he was entitled to was a share in the proceeds of the assets equal to what had been distributed to others during the pendency of his litigation. In this we think the comptroller was right. Dividends are to be paid to all creditors ratably; that is to say, proportionally. To be proportionate they must be made by some uniform rule. They are to be paid on all claims against the bank previously proved or adjudicated. All creditors are to be treated alike. The claim against the bank, therefore, must necessarily be made the basis of the apportionment. If the comptroller is satisfied with the proof which is furnished to him he can allow the claim, and when the allowance is made the creditor becomes entitled at once to participate in all dividends that may be declared. If the comptroller declines to recognize the claim as valid, it must be established by the adjudication of some competent court before it can share in the distribution of assets. When adjudicated in favor of the creditor it is established as a claim against the bank, and must be treated accordingly by the comptroller. The business of the bank must stop when insolvency is declared. Rev. St. § 5228. No new debt can be made after that. The only claims the comptroller can recognize in the settlement the affairs of the bank are those which are shown by proof satisfactory to him or by the adjudication of a competent court to have had their origin in something done before the insolvency. It is clearly his duty, therefore, in paying dividends, to take the value of the claim at that time as the basis of distribution. If interest is added on one claim after that date before the percentage of dividend is calculated, it should be upon all, otherwise the distribution would be according to different rules, and not ratably, as the law requires.

It is insisted, however, on the part of the relator, that he is entitled to dividends on his judgment, as that is the amount adjudicated to him, and the advantage he will get in this way is no more than just, because of the trouble and expense he was put to in carrying on his litigation, and the delay he has suffered in getting his money. The question here is not whether he should be paid interest on the several items of percentage which make up the aggregate of 65 per cent., from the time of the payments of dividends to other creditors until his claim was adjudicated, but whether the amount of his judgment must be taken as the sum on which his dividend is to be paid. As has already been seen, the dividends are to be paid on the adjudicated claim, not on the amount due upon the claim when adjudicated. The judgment established the claim as a claim against the bank at the time of the insolvency, and the amount due when the judgment was rendered. Thus the claim was adjudicated, and the amount due at the date of the judgment ascertained; but for the comptroller to pay the relator on the amount due him at that time, and the ther creditors on the amount due them eight years before, when the insolvency occurred, would certainly not be making ratable dividends from the assets on all claims against the bank. It was clearly right, therefore, to ascertain from the judgment how much was due on this claim at the date of the insolvency, and make the distribution accordingly. The trouble and expense which the relator has been put to for the establishment of his claim are but incidents to the business in which he was engaged. It was the duty of the comptroller, if not satisfied of the correctness of the claim when presented, to disallow it, and if an attempt was made to obtain its adjudication, to make such defense as in his judgment was proper. No provision is made by law for the payment of the expenses of the claimant in his litigation beyond the taxable costs, and necessarily that loss must fall on him, as it does on every one who has the misfortune to be driven to the courts for the judicial determination of his rights.

The court below having refused the mandamus, its judgment to that effect is affirmed.


text: Talk:United States White v. Knox/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
St Paul Railway Company v. Burton

No brief filed for plaintiff in error.

Enoch Totten, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

title: St Paul Railway Company v. Burton


text: Talk:St Paul Railway Company v. Burton

title: Talk:St Paul Railway Company v. Burton


text:
St Paul Railway Company v. Burton/Opinion of the Court

The order remanding this case is affirmed. The act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5, (18 St. 470,) makes it the duty of the circuit court to remand a suit which has been removed from a state court when it satisfactorily APPEARS THAT THE 'SUIT DOES NOT REALLY and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court.' The exemplification of the record of the naturalization of Moses Burton, which was offered in evidence, did not require, to complete its authentication, the certificate of the clerk under he seal of his office that the judge of the court was duly commissioned and qualified. The certificates may be to some extent defective in form, but we think the record as a whole could properly be considered by the judge on the question of remanding the cause. Affirmed.


text: Talk:St Paul Railway Company v. Burton/Opinion of the Court


text:
Baines v. Clarke

C. Bogges and S. A. Miller, for appellant.

''Wm. Pinckney Whyte'', for appellees.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Baines v. Clarke


text: Talk:Baines v. Clarke

title: Talk:Baines v. Clarke


text:
Baines v. Clarke/Opinion of the Court

On the second of February, 1874, John D. Lewis conveyed to George W. Norris and Henry Clarke three certain tracts of land embraced within the exterior boundaries of a survey of 40,000 acres granted by the commonwealth of Virginia to Jacob Skyles on the eleventh of July, 1798. The instrument by which the conveyance was made was signed by both parties, and contained not only a grant of the land, but an agreement on the part of the grantees for the payment of the purchase money. That agreement was as follows: 'The consideration of this deed is five dollars per acre as aforesaid, to be paid as follows: $50,000 in cash, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged; $25,000 to be paid on the first day of October, 1874; $25,000 on the first day of April, 1875; $50,000 on the first day of January, 1876; and $50,000, or whatever may be the balance due, on the first day of January, 1877, with legal interest on all the deferred payments from the third day of June, 1873, said interest to be paid semi-annually, commencing on the first day of July, 1874. And it is further understood and agreed by the parties to this deed that an accurate survey of the lands hereby granted shall be made under the direction and superintendence of S. A. Miller, of Charleston, to ascertain the true quantity of lands intended to be granted, such survey to be made by running the exterior lines embracing the said three lots made by Surveyor and Commissioner Thomas S. A. Matthews, previous to the sale, and now of record in the proceedings aforementioned, and as described and set forth in this deed, and in the deed from James M. Laidly, survey commissioner, of himself and said Matthews, under the decrees and orders in said proceedings for the sale of Jacob Skyles' survey of 40,000. And, as it is further known that there are sundry suits pending in the circuit court of Kanawha county between the said John D. Lewis, as defendant, and Hale and McMullin, George Belcher, W. A. McMullin, J. L. McMullin, and George W. Morrison, as plaintiffs, all of which are now submitted to arbitration by an order of said circuit court; it is further agreed that any recovery of ny land within the boundaries aforesaid shall be and constitute no part of the lands herein sold and granted, but be deducted therefrom at the said rate of five dollars per acre, the said John D. Lewis agreeing to use all diligence in the prosecution of said suits, so as to obtain a speedy trial; *  *  * it is further understood and agreed that the last payment, or balance of $50,000, due first of January, 1877, and interest, is reserved until the decision of said suits, and the ascertainment of quantity; and the said John D. Lewis hereby reserves a claim upon the land hereby granted for the payment of the purchase money, and the interest thereon of all the deferred installments as hereinbefore provided.'

The cash installment of $50,000 was paid, as was also the installment of $25,000 due on the first of October, 1874. Default having been made in the payment of the amount falling due on the first of April, 1875, and the interest maturing July 1, 1875, Lewis filed this bill in the circuit court of Kanawha county, West Virginia, on the seventeenth of August, 1875, to enforce his vendor's lien. The survey made pursuant to the agreement showed that there were within the exterior boundaries of the tracts conveyed 39,000 acres, but it is not claimed that payment is to be made for more than 36,244 acres, the title having failed to all the rest.

The suits pending at the time the sale was made involved the title to 19,716 acres, but of this amount only 165 acres were in the actual possession of any one adversely to Lewis. On the twenty-fourth of November, 1874, the reference which had been made of the suits to arbitration, mentioned in the agreement, was set aside by order of the court, on account of the failure of the arbitrators to act. At the June term, 1875, of the court a special jury was summoned for the trial of the causes on the twenty-second of the month, but, before that day arrived, the court adjourned for the term. In January, 1876, one of the suits was tried, but the jury failing to agree, the suits were all continued. On the thirtieth of May, 1876, another agreement for submission to arbitration was entered into, and on the twenty-fourth of August, 1876, an award was filed, but for some reason it was not confirmed by the court until December, 1877, when judgments were entered in accordance with its requirements. On the twenty-third of January, 1880, the several plaintiffs in the ejectment suits applied to the court of appeals of West Virginia for the allowance of writs of error to review these judgments, but the applications were all refused on that day.

There is in the record evidence of the recovery of a judgment, in the district court of the United States for the district of West Virginia, by Coles P. Huntington, on the thirteenth of October, 1875, against John Lewis Taylor, for the recovery of the possession of 400 acres of land. The judgment was recovered by default, and it does not appear when the suit was begun, or by what right Taylor was in possession. At the next term of the court, Clarke and Norris appeared and asked that the verdict and judgment be set aside, and a new trial ordered. They alleged that the judgment might affect their rights, and that they had no notice of the suit. This motion was taken under advisement by the court, but there is no evidence showing what disposition has been made of it. The court below deducted this recovery from the land to be paid for, and rendered a decree upon the following basis: Land to be paid for, 35,575 acres; in litigation at the time of the sale, 19,716 acres.

As to the lands not in dispute, the decree was for the contract price per acre, with interest from June 3, 1973, March 2, 1881, deducting payments as they had been made. As to the lands in dispute, it was for the agreed price, and interest from January 23, 1880, the date of the refusal of the court of appeals to allow the writs of error, until March 2, 1881. The difference between the 36,244 acres claimed by the appellant, and 35,775 allowed by the court, or 469 acres, arises from the failure of the court to correct a former allowance of 200 acres for one of the parcels to which the title had failed, when, by actual survey since that time, it has been found to contain only 131 acres,-a difference of 69 acres,-and the deduction of the Huntington recovery of 400 acres from the amount to be paid for.

The questions presented here are: (1) As to the error of 69 acres; (2) as to the deduction of 400 acres recovered by Huntington; and (3) as to the time from which interest shall be charged on the price of the lands in dispute when the sale was made.

As to the 69 acres, we think the claim of the appellant, the representative of Lewis, is right. The report of the master shows the facts, and it is evident that in the original interlocutory decree the amount was fixed by the deduction of an estimated quantity contained in one of the disputed tracts, and not by an actual survey. The survey having since been made, and the true quantity ascertained, the decree ought to be made to conform to the actual facts.

As to the Huntington recovery of 400 acres, the testimony is so meager and indefinite that we are not inclined to disturb the decree below. There has been a judgment for the recovery of the possession, and it was obtained at a time when Lewis was in litigation about his titles. No notice of the suit was ever served on Clarke & Norris. It does not appear that Taylor was in possession through them, and, under the circumstances of the case, Lewis was as much bound to defend as they were.

As to the interest, we think the court was in error. The master has found, and about this there is no dispute, that Lewis was in actual possession of 34,267 acres. By this we suppose is meant that to this extent the tract was not actually held adversely to Lewis by any one. Clearly, therefore, Clark & Norris could enter at any time. The principal pending litigation was against Lewis to get him out of possession, but by to get into possession. Of the remaining 1,977 acres, Lewis had no title to 1,412 acres, and he was actually out of possession of 165. The Huntington 400 acres made up the rest. As to the price of the acres to which Lewis had title, and of which he was in possession, actual or constructive, we think he is entitled to interest on all deferred payments from June 3, 1873. As to all acres to be paid for which were held adversely, interest should be charged from the time of the judgments in the ejectment suits upon the award of the arbitrators, which was December 20, 1877. As to the lands to which title was acquired after the conveyance, interest should only be calculated from the date of the acquisition of title. No interest should be calculated on the cash payment of $50,000 at the time of the conveyance. This seems to us to be in accordance with the true construction of the contract of purchase as it was reduced to writing by the parties. We can take notice of no understandings prior to the writing as to what the contract was to be. The conveyance was of all the lands inside the exterior lines of the tracts to which Lewis had title, and for these five dollars per acre was to be paid, with interest from June 3, 1873, on the deferred payments. This language is plain and unambiguous. The fact of adverse claims to portions of the property was understood by all, and this condition of things was specially provided for in the agreement of purchase. The payments were to be at the rate of five dollars per acre for all the land the title to which was eventually secured. Lewis was to use due diligence in the prosecution of the suits so as to obtain a speedy trial. We find nothing in the record to show that he was at fault in this particular. As the original arbitrators failed to perform their duties, that submission was set aside. A trial to a jury was then had without any practical result, when a new submission was agreed on and an award promptly obtained. There was some delay in securing final judgments upon this award, but we see no evidence of such neglect on the part of Lewis in this particular as amounts to a breach of his contract. He certainly could not control the conduct of his adversaries in their applications for the allowance of writs of error, and therefore is not chargeable with damages for the delay in that particular. He secured his judgments, and the court of appeals has refused to disturb them.

We come now to consider the effect of the last clause in the agreement, which is in these words: 'It is further understood and agreed that the last payment or balance of $50,000, due January 1, 1877, and interest, is reserved until the decision of said suits, and the ascertainment of quantity.' This shows that the parties were of opinion that the lands when surveyed, and all the suits decided, would not fall more than 10,000 acres short of the estimated quantity. It also shows that it was anticipated the suits might not all be decided until after January 1, 1877, the date of the maturity of the last installment, because the payment of that installment, whatever should be its amount, was postponed until the quantity was ascertained and the suits decided. The only provision as to delay in securing title was that the suits should be prosecuted with diligence, and that the last installment was not to be demanded until the events had happened which were to settle finally its amount. When paid, however, the last installment was to carry interest from the third of June, 1873, like all the rest. If it had appeared that Lewis delayed unreasonably the prosecution of the suits, or the ascertainment of the quantity, we might have stopped the interest as compensation for his neglect in such particulars; but the only delay in the prosecution of the suits which could by any possibility be made the cause of complaint was that between the filing of the awards and the judgments thereon. On full consideration, however, we are of opinion that Lewis ought not be made responsible for this. By a failure to serve the necessary notices, the judgments were delayed one term of the court. This appears to have been by accident rather than design, and it was long after Clarke & Norris were in default for a failure to perform their agreement.

In our opinion the decree should have been in favor of the appellant in accordance with the statement of account made by the master numbered 22, save only that no interest should be charged on $50,000 of the purchase money represented by what was accepted as the cash payment. By the express terms of the agreement interest was only to be paid on the deferred installments. The decree is reversed as to the amount found due, and affirmed in all other respects, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to modify the decree as originally entered by inserting the amount ascertained to be due on the principle of accounting as indicated in this opinion, and for further proceedings according to law.

title: Baines v. Clarke/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Baines v. Clarke/Opinion of the Court


text:
Crawford v. Haller

John H. Mitchell, for motion.

S. S. Burdett, in opposition.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Crawford v. Haller


text: Talk:Crawford v. Haller

title: Talk:Crawford v. Haller


text:
Crawford v. Haller/Opinion of the Court

This motion is granted on the authority of ''Ins. Co. v. Comstock'', 16 Wall. 258, and Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507. An order of the supreme court of Washington territory dismissing a writ of error to a district court, because of the failure of the plaintiff in error to file the transcript and have the cause docketed within the time required by law, is not a final judgment or a final decision within the meaning of those terms as used in sections 702 and 1911 of the Revised Statutes, regulating writs of error and appeals to this court from the supreme court of the territory. Section 702 provides for the review of final judgments and decrees by writ of error or appeal, and scetion 1911 regulates the mode and manner of taking the writ or procuring the allowance of the appeal. The use of the term 'final decisions' in section 1911 does not enlarge the scope of the jurisdiction of this court. It is only a substitute for the words 'final judgments and decrees' in section 702, and means the same thing. The dismissal of the writ was a refusal to hear and decide the cause. The remedy in such a case, if any, is by mandamus to compel the court to entertain the case and proceed to its determination, not by writ of error to review what has been done. Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 647; Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. 165.

Dismissed.

title: Crawford v. Haller/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Crawford v. Haller/Opinion of the Court


text:
Friend v. Wise

Henry Beard and ''Chas. H. Armes'', for motion.

W. J. Johnston, in opposition.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Friend v. Wise


text: Talk:Friend v. Wise

title: Talk:Friend v. Wise


text:
Friend v. Wise/Opinion of the Court

These motions are denied. The value of the two sections of land which are in dispute is conceded to be more than $5,000. The complaint alleges a joint entry and ouster, and answer does not set up separate claims to distinct parcels of the land by the several defendants. The judgment for the recovery of the possession is against all the defendants jointly. In this respect the case is entirely different from those of Tupper v. Wise and Lynch v. Bailey, 110 U.S. 398; S.C.. ante, 26, 27. We have jurisdiction, therefore.

The questions arising on the merits are, some of them, of a character that ought not to be disposed of on a motion to affirm.

title: Friend v. Wise/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Friend v. Wise/Opinion of the Court


text:
Killian v. Ebbinghaus (111 U.S. 798)

H. W. Garnett, for motion.

P. E. Dye and F. P. Cuppy, for

WAITE, C. J.

title: Killian v. Ebbinghaus (111 U.S. 798)


text: Talk:Killian v. Ebbinghaus (111 U.S. 798)


text:
Killian v. Ebbinghaus (111 U.S. 798)/Opinion of the Court

This suit was brought against the trustees of the German Evangelical Concordia Church, then in possession of the premises in dispute. They answered by that name, setting up their title to the property and their claim to the possession. The record shows a notice by Ebbinghaus, the appellee and complainant below, to the trustees of the German Evangelical Lutheran Concordia Church. The final decree was against the 'trustees or authorities of the said Concordia Church, whether under the name of the trustees of the German Evangelical Concordia Church, or under the name of the trustees of the German Lutheran Evangelical Concordia Church.' The trustees appealed, but in their appeal bond they described themselves as trustees of the German Lutheran Evangelical Concordia Church. The case was entered here promptly, and docketed in the name of John G. Killian et al., Trustees of the German Lutheran Evangelical Concordia Church, Appellants, v. John W. Ebbinghaus, Trustee. Both parties appeared and argued the case, as presented by the record, on its merits. No objection was made to the form of the appeal. A mandate which was sent to the court below described the appeal as 'taken by John G. Killian et al., trustees of the German Lutheran Evangelical Concordia Church.' As in this there was error, the mandate has been recalled, and we now order that a new mandate issue describing the cause below as between John W. Ebbinghaus, trustee, complainant, and John G. Killian et al., trustees of the German Evangelical Concordia Church, and August Sievers et al., trustees of the First Reformed Church, defendants, (Equity, No. 5,688,) and the appeal as 'taken by John G. Killian et al., trustees of the German Evangelical Concordia Church.'


text: Talk:Killian v. Ebbinghaus (111 U.S. 798)/Opinion of the Court


text:
USAMGIK Ordinance 39

 * HEADQUARTERS

 * UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

 * Office of the Military Governor

 * Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE NUMBER 39 5 January 1945

  The transportation of all property including goods or valuables of any kind to or from Korea by air, land or by water is prohibited except by persons duly authorized to perform such function by the Military Governor or by such agency or agencies as may be designated by him as the authorized agent of the Military Government of Korea.

  The transportation of all property including goods or valuables of any kind to and from Korea by air, land or by water is prohibited where transported by any airplane, boat, cart, vehicle or mechanical conveyance of any kind except in these cases where such airplane, boat, cart, vehicle or mechanical conveyance is duly licensed for such purpose by the Military Governor or by such agency or agencies as may be designated by him as the authorized agent of the Military Government of Korea.

  The transportation of all property including goods or valuables of any kind to and from Korea is prohibited where transported on the person of the traveler or upon any animal or animals controlled by him except in those cases where such person is duly authorized to transport such goods to or from Korea by the Military Governor or by such agent or agencies as may be designated by him as the authorized agent of the Military Government of Korea.

  The transportation of all property including goods or valuables of any kind to and from Korea is prohibited except by way of such ports or airports entry as may from time to time be designated as open ports by the Military Governor or by such agent or agencies as may be designated by him for this purpose.

  All property including goods or valuables of any kind found in the course of unauthorized transportation to or from a foreign country shall be considered as contraband and shall be turned over by the apprehending authority to the custody of Military Government of Korea, to be disposed of in accordance with existing provisions relative to the sale or other disposition of government property.

  Any private vessel, airplane, cart, animal, motor, vehicle or nay other conveyance or instrumentality not owned by any government which is utilized in violation of this ordinance shall upon the conviction of the violator or violators be turned over to the custody of the Military Government to be disposed of in accordance with the existing provisions relative to the sale or other disposition of government property. such instrumentalities may be impounded by the apprehending agency pending the outcome of the trial.

  This ordinance does not apply to the transportation of the personal effects of any officer or employee of the Military Government of Korea or of the United States. It shall not be construed to apply to the transportation of the personal effects, goods or valuables of any persons subject to the military or naval laws of the United States or any of the United Nations nor shall it be construed as a prohibition of the transportation to or from Korea of the personal effects goods or valuables of persons duly authorized to enter or depart from Korea under repatriation programs approved by the Military Government of Korea or of any persons in the course of performance of official business or such such Government.

  In the ordinance "Korea" Means all of the area of Korea subject to this command.

  Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer such punishment as the court shall determine

  This ordinance is effective 2400, 12 January 1946.

 * BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

 * UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

 * A. V. ARNOLD

 * Major General, United States Army

 * Military Governor of Korea.

군정법령 제39호

title: USAMGIK Ordinance 39


text:
United States v. Morton

''Sol. Gen. Phillips'', for appellant.

S. S. Henkle and W. J. Moberly, for appellee.

Charles Morton was appointed a conditional cadet in the service of the United States on March 6, 1865, and was admitted as a conditional cadet on July 1, 1865, into the United States military academy at West Point, and received his warrant as a cadet, signed by the secretary of war, in January, 1866, stating that he had been appointed by the president a cadet of the United States military academy, to rank as such from July 1, 1865. On the first of July, 1865, when he was so admitted as a conditional cadet, he entered into an agreement, as required by law, bearing that date, and subscribed and sworn to by him, which stated that, 'having been selected for an appointment as cadet in the military academy of the United States,' he engaged, with the consent of his father, in the event of his receiving such appointment, that he would 'serve in the army of the United States' for eight years, unless sooner discharged by competent authority. The instrument embodied also the oath required by the act of July 2, 1862, (12 St. 502), to be the thereafter taken and subscribed by every person 'elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, excepting the president of the United States,' 'before entering upon the duties of such office, and before being entitled to any of the salary of other emoluments thereof.' Part of the oath was, 'that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.' He remained at the academy from July 1, 1865, until June 15, 1869, when he was duly graduated therefrom. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the third regiment of cavalry, to date from June 15, 1869, and thereafter as a first lieutenant in the same regiment, to take effect from September 25, 1876. He held the latter position down to March 31, 1883. He faithfully discharged the duties imposed on him by these various appointments, being continuously in the service of the United States, in a military capacity, from July 1, 1865, to March 31, 1883. In computing his service pay, he was not allowed credit for the time he was a cadet at West Point as part of his time of service in the army. He brought suit in the court of claims, against the United States, in July, 1883, to recover $169.07, as withheld from him in respect of time between February 24, 1881, and March 31, 1883, and, on the foregoing facts, that court rendered a judgment in his favor for that amount, from which the United States have appealed.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 2-3 intentionally omitted]

Mr. S. S. Henkle for appellee.

BLATCHFORD, J.

title: United States v. Morton


text: Talk:United States v. Morton

title: Talk:United States v. Morton


text:
United States v. Morton/Opinion of the Court

tion 1262 of the Revised Statutes: 'There shall be allowed and paid to each commissioned officer below the rank of brigadier general * *  * ten per centum of their current yearly pay for each term of five years of service.' In the acts of February 24, 1881, and June 30, 1882, making appropriations for the support of the army, (21 St. 346; 22 St. 118,) under the head, 'For pay of the army,' gross sums are appropriated for, among other things, this purpose: 'Additional pay to officers for length of service, to be paid with their current monthly pay, and the actual time of service in the army or navy, or both, shall be allowed all officers in computing their pay.' The only question for decision is whether the time of service as a cadet is to be regarded as 'actual time of service in the army.' The view acted on by the accounting officers of the government in dealing with the officer under section 1262 of the Revised Statutes, and section 24 of the act of July 15, 1870, (16 St. 320,) of which section 1262 was a re-enactment, was to allow only for length of service as a commissioned officer in the regular army. By section 7 of the act of June 18, 1878, (20 St. 150,) it was provided that officers of the army who had served 'as enlisted men in the armies of the United States, regular or volunteer,' should be credited with the fully time they had served as such enlisted men, 'in computing their service for longevity pay.' Under this statute the practice was not to regard an officer who had served as a cadet as having thereby served as an enlisted man in the army, (16 Op. Attys. Gen. 611;) and the court of claims, in Babbitt v. U.S. 16 Ct. Cl. 202, supported that view. After the passage of the act of February 24, 1881, the accounting officers of the government administered it as not requiring that the time of service as a cadet should be allowed as 'actual time of service in the army.' This was done in pursuance of the advice of Atty. Gen. McVeagh.

But an examination of the legislation of congress shows that the cadets at West Point were always a part of the army, and that service as a cadet was always actual service in the army. Cadets are first mentioned in the act of May 9, 1794, (1 St. 366,) which provided for organizing, by voluntary enlistment, a corps of artillerists and engineers, of which a part was to be 32 cadets, ranking as sergeants, but spoken of as officers. These were part of the army. By section 6 of the of July 16, 1798, (1 St. 605,) cadets are called non-commissioned officers in the army of the United States, and their pay is fixed at $10 per month and two rations per day.

By the act of March 16, 1802, entitled 'An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States,' (2 St. 132,) it was provided (section 1) that the military peace establishment of the United States should embrace a regiment of artillerists, of which a part should be 40 cadets. By sections 4 and 5 the pay and rations of the cadets were fixed. By section 26 provision was made for organizing a corps of emgineers, consisting of officers and 10 cadets, whose pay was fixed; and by section 27 the corps was to be stationed at West Point, New York, and to constitute 'a military academy,' and the officers and cadets were to be 'subject at all times to do duty in such places and on such service' as the president should direct. Clearly, all these cadets were a part of the army.

By sections 1 and 2 of the act of April 12, 1808, (2 St. 481,) additional military forces were to be raised, comprising, in infantry, riflemen, artillery, and dragoons, 156 cadets, the cadets (section 4) to receive the like pay, etc., with the cadets of the then existing military establishment, and being classed by themselves, and not as either officers or non-commissioned officers, and (section 5) to be subject, with the then existing cadets, to the rules and articles of war which had been establish or might thereafter, by law, be established.

By section 2 of the act of April 29, 1812, (2 St. 720,) entitled 'An act making further provision for the corps of engineers,' it was provided that the military academy should consist of the corps of engineers and certain professors. By section 3 it was enacted that the cadets theretofore 'appointed in the service of the United States, whether of artillerly, cavalry, riflemen, or infantry,' or that might in future be appointed, as thereinafter provided, should not exceed 250, and might be attached by the president, as students, to the military academy, and be subject to the established regulations thereof; 'that they shall be arranged into companies of non-commissioned officers and privates, according to the directions of the commandant of engineers, and be officered from the said corps, for the purposes of military instruction; that there shall be added to each company of cadets four musicians; and the said corps shall be trained and taught all the duties of a private, non-commissioned officer, and officer, by encamped at least three months of each year, and taught all the duties incident to a regular camp; that the candidates for cadets be not under the age of 14 nor above the age of 21 years; that each cadet * *  * shall sign articles, with the consent of his parent or guardian, by which he shall engage to serve five years, unless sooner discharged; and all such cadets shall be entitled to and receive the pay and emoluments now allowed by law to cadets in the corps of engineers.' This was the organization of the military academy, substantially, as it has since continued.

By section 1 of the act of March 3, 1815, (3 St. 224), entitled, 'An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States,' it is directed that the corps of engineers, as then established, be retained; by section 4 that the compensation, etc., of the cadets and others 'composing the military peace establishment' should be the same as prescribed by the before-mentioned acts of 1802 and 1808; and, by section 7, that the several corps authorized by the act 'shall be subject to the rules and articles of war.'

By section 28 of the act of July 5, 1838, (5 St. 260,) it was enacted that 'the term for which cadets hereafter admitted into the military academy at West Point shall engage to serve, be, and the same is hereby, increased to eight years, unless sooner discharged.'

By section 1 of the act of July 28, 1866, (14 St. 332,) it was provided that the military peace establishment of the United States should thereafter consist of so many regiments of artillery, of cavalry, and of infantry, 'the professors and corps of cadets of the United States military academy,' and such other forces as should be provided for by that act, 'to be known as the army of the United States.' This enactment remained in force, and is reproduced in section 1094 of the Revised Statutes, which says that 'the army of the United States shall consist of,' with other constituents, 'the professors and corps of cadets of the United States military academy.' From this review of the statutes, it cannot be doubted that, before the passage of the act of July 28, 1866, as well as afterwards, the corps of cadets of the military academy was a part of the army of the United States, and a person serving as a cadet was serving in the army; and that the time during which the plaintiff in the present case was serving as a cadet was, therefore, actual time of service by him in the army. The practical construction of the requirement of the act of 1838, that the cadet should engage to serve for eight years, shown by the fact that the form of the engagement in this case was to 'serve in the army of the United States for eight years,' is a circumstance of weight to show that the government, from the beginning, treated the plaintiff as serving in the army. The service for which he engaged began on the first of July, 1865, and the eight years ran from that time. That being his status, the acts of 1881 and 1882, in speaking of 'actual time of service in the army,' cover the time of his service as a cadet.

In U.S. v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, it was held that an officer retired from active service who was declared by statute to be a part of the army, who could wear its uniform, whose name was required to be borne on its register, who might be detailed by his superior officers to perform specified duties, and who was subject to the rules and articles of war, was in the military service; and that the increase of pay given for each term of five years of service, by section 1262 of the Revised Statutes, and by section 24 of the act of July 15, 1870, (16 St. 320,) from which that section was taken, applied to the years so passed in the service after as well as before retirement. Under the statutes involved in the present case, a cadet at West Point in serving in the army as fully as an officer retired from active service is serving in the army, under the statutes which apply to him, so far as the question of longevity pay is concerned.

The judgment of the court of claims is affirmed.


text: Talk:United States v. Morton/Opinion of the Court


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Woodworth v. Blair

Henry Crawford, for appellant.

E. Walker, for appellee.

This is an appeal by a prior mortgagee of a tract of land occupied by the Chicago & Pacific Railroad Company, from decrees in a suit in equity to foreclose two mortgages of its whole railroad. The material facts appearing by the record are as follows:

On October 1, 1872, and on November 6, 1874, the corporation made to a trustee, to secure the payment of its bonds, two mortgages of all its railroad, right of way, franchise, road-bed, stations and station-houses, depot grounds, and other property, already or thereafter owned, possessed, or acquired through or by reason of the construction of its railroad. After breach of the conditions of those mortgages, the bondholders filed bills in equity for the appointment of a receiver and for the foreclosure of the mortgages, which were by order of court consolidated as one suit. Pending that suit, and after a receiver had been appointed and had taken possession, the appellant filed an intervening petition, alleging that on February 1, 1872, at the request of the corporation and for its benefit, she sold and conveyed to Thomas S. Dobbins, its president, a tract of land in Chicago, in consideration of a certain sum in money, and of 10 promissory notes made by Dobbins, payable in 10 successive years, and secured by a mortgage from him of the land, which was duly recorded on September 5, 1872; that the corporation entered upon the land and laid tracks upon it, and continued to use and occupy it until the appointment of the receiver, and the receiver since continued to use it for the benefit of the railroad, and neglected to pay the notes and interest, and praying that the amount thereof might be paid out of any funds in the hands of the receiver, or out of the proceeds of sale under any decree to be rendered in the cause. This petition was referred to a master, who reported that the amount due to the appellant was $59,910.10. The court declined to order the payment of the appellant's claim, and dismissed her petition without prejudice; and in the principal suit entered a decree for the foreclosure by sale of the whole railroad, including the road-bed, stations and station-houses, depot grounds, and other property, without prejudice to her mortgage. From that decree the appellant prayed an appeal to this court, and offered a bond in order to make the appeal a supersedeas. The court allowed the appeal and approved the bond, and ordered that the appeal should not operate as a supersedeas or delay of the sale, but only delay the distribution of so much of the proceeds of the sale as was necessary to fully secure the amount due on her mortgage. The master afterwards reported that a sale had been made, in accordance with the decree of foreclosure, for the sum of $916,100, and the court overruled exceptions taken by the appellant to the master's report and confirmed the sale. The corporation afterwards paid into court the amount of the bid, interest, and commissions, as required by the decree and by the statute of Illinois; and the court found that the corporation had done what was needful to effect a redemption, and reserved for further consideration the time and terms on which a delivery of the property to the corporation should be directed.

Mr. Henry Crawford for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 9-11 intentionally omitted]

Mr. E. Walker for appellees.

GRAY, J.

title: Woodworth v. Blair


text: Talk:Woodworth v. Blair

title: Talk:Woodworth v. Blair


text:
Woodworth v. Blair/Opinion of the Court

Assuming, as the appellant contends, that her conveyance to Dobbins, and the mortgage back by him, should be considered in equity as if made to and by the railroad corporation, no ground is shown for reversing the decree below. The appellant's mortgage covered only the tract of land specifically described therein, and did not affect the title of the corporation in other lands and in so much of its road as was not laid over the land mortgaged to her. The case differs in this respect from the cases cited by her counsel, in which a mechanic's lien given by statute for work done on part of a railroad was held to extend to the whole road. Brooks v. Railway Co. 101 U.S. 443; Meyer v. Hornby, 101 U.S. 728. As a general rule, a prior mortgagee is not a necessary party to a bill to foreclose a junior mortgage, where the decree sought is only for a foreclosure of the equity of redemption from the prior mortgage, and not of the entire property or estate. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U.S. 734. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage of the whole railroad, franchise, and property of a railroad corporation, it would often produce great delay and embarrassment to undertake to determine the validity and extent of all prior liens and incumbrances on specific parts of the corporate property before entering a final decree. The course pursued by the circuit court in the present case, dismissing the intervening petition of the appellant, without prejudice, and ordering a foreclosure by sale, subject to her mortgage, of the entire railroad and other property included in the railroad mortgages, to foreclose which the principal suit had been brought, judiciously and effectively secured the rights of all parties. The price obtained by the sale of the railroad and other property, subject to her mortgage, must have been less than if they had been sold free of that mortgage; and to order the amount of that mortgage to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale would pro tanto benefit the purchaser if the sale was carried out, or the railroad corporation in case of redemption, to the corresponding detriment of the holders of bonds secured by the railroad mortgages.

The railroad corporation, after having redeemed its property from the railroad mortgages, will hold it subject to any valid lien of the appellant, just as it did before the proceedings for foreclosure were instituted. Decree affirmed.

title: Woodworth v. Blair/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Woodworth v. Blair/Opinion of the Court


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New Orleans Company v. State of Mississippi District Attorney

Also the following clauses in an act of the legislature of Louisiana, approved August 19, 1868, in reference to the same company: 'And it is also provided that said company is authorized and empowered to construct and maintain its said railroad over and across the waters of the state of Louisiana, known as the Pass Chef Menteur, Little Rigolet, Great Rigolet, or that part of Lake Pontchartrain east of the west line of Point aux Herbs, and the West Pearl river, and other streams and bayous between Lake Pontchartrain and Pearl river, and Pearl river, by bridges: Provided, however, that in the channel of that part of Lake Pontchartrain hereinbefore named, there shall be constructed and maintained by said company a draw-bridge, which, when open, shall give a clear space for the passage of vessels, of not less than one hundred feet in width; and in the channel of the Pearl river the said company shall construct and maintain a draw-bridge, which, when open, shall give clear space for the passage of vessels, of not less than sixty feet in width, except in case the company shall locate their road across the Great Rigolet at a point south of (or below) the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, when the company shall only be required to construct one drawbridge, which shall be in the channel of the Great Rigolet, as hereinbefore named; and said company, after the construction of the said draw-bridges or draw-bridge, shall, at all times thereafter, provide that said draw-bridges or draw-bridge shall be opened for the passage of any and all vessels through the same without unnecessary delay. It is also provided that said part of this section as relates to Pearl river, if the line of the road shall be located across the said river at a point where it constitutes the boundary line between the state of Louisiana and the state of Mississippi, shall not take effect until the state of Mississippi has consented to and authorized the same, or said company has built such a bridge across said Pearl river for its said railroad as shall be in accordance with this section, and also with any authority or power granted to said company by the state of Mississippi in the premises; and such draw-bridge may be built in the center of the channel of said Pearl river, or in that portion of the same within the territory of the state of Mississippi, or of this state, as most convenient for public use.' Acts La. 1868, No. 28, p. 32.

[Statement of Case from pages 15-16 intentionally omitted]

Gaylord B. Clark and ''Thos. L. Bayne'', for plaintiff in error. J. Z. George, for defendant in error.

HARLAN, J.


text: Talk:New Orleans Company v. State of Mississippi District Attorney


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New Orleans Company v. State of Mississippi District Attorney/Opinion of the Court

ase has been heretofore in this court upon a question of jurisdiction, and is reported as Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135. The supreme court of Mississippi, in accordance with our decision, reversed the judgment of the inferior state court, with directions to set aside all orders made subsequent to the presentation of the company's petition and bond for the removal of the cause, and to proceed no further. The case was thereafter tried in the circuit court of the United States. The object of the suit is, by mandamus, to compel the railroad company, whose line extends from Mobile to New Orleans, to construct and maintain in the channel of Pearl river, where that stream is crossed by the company's road, on the line between Mississippi and Louisiana, a draw-bridge, which, when open, will give a clear space of not less than 60 feet in width for the passage of vessels. It would seem from the uncontroverted allegations of the petition that the bridge originally constructed by the company across Pearl river had no draw, although the channel, at that point, according to the coast chart, has about 45 feet depth of water, and the river is nearly 300 yards in width. But, in the answer filed in the circuit court, it was averred, and the demurrer to it admitted, that there was, at that time, a draw which gave a clear space for the passage of vessels of 34 to 36 feet in width. By the final judgment, a peremptory mandamus was awarded requiring the company to remove the present bridge, and in lieu thereof construct and maintain one giving a clear space of not less than 60 feet in width. It is provided in the judgment that such draw-bridge may be built 'either in the center of the channel of Pearl river, or in that portion of the same within the territory of the state of Louisiana,' or of Mississippi, as 'may be most convenient for public use.' The controlling question is whether the railroad company is under any legal obligation to construct and maintain a draw-bridge of the kind specified in the judgment of the circuit court.

The company was incorporated by an act of the general assembly of Alabama, approved November 24, 1866, with authority to construct a railroad from the city of Mobile to any point on the line between Alabama and Mississippi; and also, in continuation thereof, a railroad through Mississippi and Louisiana, with such rights, privileges, and franchises as might be granted to the corporation by the latter states. Laws Ala. 1866-67, p. 6. Its existence as a corporation was recognized and approved by an act of the legislature of Mississippi, approved February 7, 1867, by which it was permitted to have, exercise, and enjoy, within that state, the rights, powers, privileges, and franchises granted to it by the state of Alabama, subject to the conditions, provisions, and restrictions presented in said act, and by the general laws of Mississippi. By the same act the company was authorized to construct and maintain a railroad from any point on the line between Mississippi and Louisiana, thence towards and to any point on the line between Mississippi and Alabama, and extend the same, as contemplated in its act of incorporation, from the western boundary of the state to New Orleans, and from its eastern boundary to Mobile. It was given a right of way across any waters, watercourses, rivers, bay, inlet, street, highway, turnpike, or canal within Mississippi, subject, however, to the condition that 'the said company shall preserve any water-course, street, highway, turnpike, or canal which its said railroad may so pass upon, along, intersect, touch, or cross, so as not to impair its usefulness to the public unnecessarily; or, if temporarily impaired in and during the construction of said railroad, the said company shall restore the same to its former state, or to such state that its usefulness and convenience to the public shall not be unnecessarily or materially impaired or injured.'

But that part of the act which has special reference to the issues in this case, and upon the construction and effect of which depend the rights of the parties, is given in the statement preceding this opinion. It will be observed that reference is made to 'the central portion of the channel of the Pearl river,' and also to the 'principal entrance of Pearl river into the Rigolet.' It was not disputed in argument that two distinct localities are here described. Pearl river is about 375 miles in length. It rises in the center of Mississippi, and is navigable by small craft, in good stages of water, as far as Jackson, the capital of the state. Running southwardly, it empties by one of its mouths into Lake Borgne, and by other mouths into the Rigolet-commonly called the Great Rigolet. The main or eastern branch of the Pearl, emptying into Lake Borgne, constitutes, for about 100 miles above its mouth to the 31st deg. of north latitude, the dividing line between Mississippi and Louisiana. 3 St. 348. The other branch, constituting a water-way between the main river and the Great Rigolet, is wholly within the state of Louisiana. It is clear that the words 'in the central portion of the channel of the Pearl river' have reference to the main or eastern branch, which constitutes the dividing line between Mississippi and Louisiana, and consequently that it was in the channel of that branch (if the road was located across it) that the company was required to construct and maintain a draw-bridge, giving a clear space of not less than 60 feet in width.

But the company's contention is that the legislature of Mississippi intended to relieve it from all obligation to construct a draw-bridge in that branch of Pearl river, upon its locating the road at some point 'south of or below the principal entrance of Pearl river' into the Great Rigolet; this, because, in that contingency, the act expressly declares that the company 'shall not be required to construct a draw-bridge across any bayou leading into Pearl river, or across any small pass or mouth of said river.' This construction of the statute necessarily implies that the legislature of Mississippi-although carefully providing that the water-courses and other highways of the state, across which the road was constructed, should be preserved against material or permanent impairment of their usefulness to the public was willing, in consideration merely of the road being located in Louisiana south of or below the principal entrance of the Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, to have the mouth of the main or eastern branch of that river closed entirely against vessels engaged in commerce. We say 'closed entirely,' because the position of the company is that the present draw-bridge was constructed by it voluntarily, and without any legal obligation whatever to do so; and that it has the right, consistently with the restrictions imposed upon it by the Mississippi act, to span Pearl river with a bridge having no draw, and, consequently, with a bridge that would wholly prevent vessels passing from Lake Borgne into Pearl river, or from Pearl river into Lake Borgne.

There is just enough in the peculiar and confused wording of the Mississippi statute to furnish plausible ground for such a construction of its provisions. But we are satisfied that the state did not intend to put it in the power of the railroad company to destroy, for all purposes of navigation, that branch of Pearl river which empties into Lake Borgne. There is no ground to infer from the words of the act that a draw-bridge of the kind indicated 'in the central portion of the channel of Pearl river' was deemed of any less consequence than like draw-bridges in the Bay of St. Louis, the Bay of Bilox, and East Pascagoula river. By language almost too clear to require construction, it was made a condition of the exercise within Mississippi of the corporate privileges and franchises of the company that it should construct and maintain in each of those water-ways across which its road might be located, a draw-bridge which when open would give a clear space of not less than 60 feet in width. This construction finds strong support in the clause immediately succeeding that which refers to the possible location of the road at a point south of the principal entrance of the Pearl river into the Great Rigolet. If the line of the road was located across the Pearl river at a point where it constitutes the dividing line between Mississippi and Louisiana, then the section, so far as it related to Pearl river, was not to take effect until Louisiana gave its assent, or the company built such a bridge across the Pearl river as was in accordance as well with that section as with the authority granted to the company by Louisiana; in which event 'such drawbridge may be built in the center of the channel of said Pearl river, or in that portion of the same within the territory of the state of Louisiana, or of this state, as may be most convenient for public use.' So far from the legislature being willing to dispense with a draw 60 feet in width across the channel of Pearl river upon the location of the road south of the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, it would seem that great care was taken to secure the assent of Louisiana to just such a bridge across Pearl river as the Mississippi act contemplated.

The error in the argument in behalf of the company is in assuming it to be indisputably clear that the words 'mouth of said river,' in the clause or proviso relating to the location of the road south of the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Rigolet, refers to the mouth of that branch of Pearl river which empties into Lake Borgne. That construction of the words 'mouth of said river' implies that there was some provision of the Mississippi act requiring the company to construct its draw-bridge at the junction between Pearl river and Lake Borgne. But no such provision is contained in the act. Had the road not been located south of the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, the company could have constructed its draw-bridge in the channel of the main river at any point above its mouth on the line between Mississippi and Louisiana. We incline to the opinion that the words 'mouth of said river' were intended to refer to one of the mouths of that branch of the Pearl emptying into the Great Rigolet. The Pearl formed, or was supposed to form, a junction with the Great Rigolet by more than one mouth. There is a principal entrance or mouth, or the Mississippi legislature supposed there was, and there is, or there was supposed to be, a small pass or small mouth of that branch of the Pearl in the same locality. If the road was located across the channel of the Great Rigolet south of, or below, the principal entrance of the Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, the water-way connecting Pearl river and the Great Rigolet would not be materially obstructed by the railroad bridge across the latter; and it would, consequently, not be vital to the people of Mississippi, interested in the navigation of the river, that draw-bridges should be constructed across bayous leading into Pearl river, in that locality, or across any small pass or [small] mouth of said river, near the line upon which the road was located. As the location of the road south of the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Rigolet would secure unobstructed navigation between the Great Rigolet and the main river, through that branch of Pearl river which empties into the Great Rigolet, the legislature of Mississippi was willing to declare that the construction and maintenance of draw-bridges across 'any bayou leading into Pearl river, or across any small pass or [small] mouth of said river,' was not a condition precedent to the exercise by the company within her limits of its corporate franchises and privileges. Such, we think, is the more reasonable construction of the clause in the Mississippi act upon which the company rests its claim of exemption from the duty to construct and maintain such a drawbridge as is described in the final judgment.

It was claimed in argument that the provisions of an act passed August 19, 1868, by the legislature of Louisiana, in reference to this railroad company, sustains the construction of the Mississippi act for which the railroad company contends. So much of the Louisiana act as bears upon this point is also given in the statement preceding this opinion. If the provisions of the Louisiana act may be consulted in determining the construction of the statute of Mississippi, we do not perceive anything in them which should lead to a conclusion different from that already indicated. The slight difference in the phrasology of the two acts does not justify the belief that the Louisiana legislature contemplated that the railroad company might cross the Pearl river, on the boundary line between that state and Louisiana, by a bridge which contained no draw. When the Louisiana act provided that, upon the location of the road across the Great Rigolet, at a point south of the principal entrance of the Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, 'the company shall only be required to construct one draw-bridge, which shall be in the channel of the Great Rigolet,' it was not meant to dispense with the draw-bridge required to be maintained in the channel of the Pearl river at the point where the road crossed that stream on the dividing line between Louisiana and Mississippi. As already stated, the location of the road below the principal mouth by which the Pearl emptied into the Great Rigolet, secured navigation through that mouth, against obstruction; consequently, a draw-bridge would be unnecessary across other and smaller mouths by which the Pearl formed a junction with the Great Rigolet. To avoid the possibility of any one claiming that draw-bridges should be constructed over all the mouths of the Pearl, large and small, crossed by the road in the vicinity of its junction with the Great Rigolet, it was provided that in the event the road passed below the principal entrance of Pearl river into the Great Rigolet, only one draw-bridge need be maintained in that locality, and that one over the Great Rigolet.

One other point pressed upon our attention remains to be considered. By an act of congress approved March 2, 1868, (15 St. 38,) this railroad company was empowered and authorized to construct and maintain bridges over navigable waters of the United States on its route between New Orleans and Mobile. That act declared that the railroad and its bridges, when constructed, completed, and in use in accordance with that act 'and the laws of the several states through whose territory the same shall pass, shall be deemed, recognized, and known as lawful structures and a post-road, and are hereby declared as such.' The same act declares, by way of proviso, that the company, in the construction of its bridges over and across the waters known as East Pascagoula, the Bay of Biloxi, the Bay of St. Louis, and the Great Rigolet, shall construct and maintain draw-bridges in the channels thereof, which, when open, shall give a clear space for the passage of vessels of not less than 80 feet in the channels of East Pascagoula river, of the Bay of Biloxi, and of the Bay of St. Louis, and of not less than 100 feet in the channel of the Great Rigolet. There is nothing in this legislation by congress which, expressly or by implication, diminishes, in any degree, the legal obligation of the railroad company to maintain such draw-bridge in the channel of the Pearl river, on the line between Mississippi and Louisiana, as is required by the laws of those states. Nor does the act of congress affect the authority of any court of competent jurisdiction, as to the parties, to compel the discharge of that obligation. While congress provided that the draw-bridges over the East Pascagoula river, the Bay of St. Louis, and the Bay of Biloxi should give a clear space of 80 rather than 60 feet in width for the passage of vessels, it did not dispense with the requirement in the statutes of Mississippi and Louisiana of a draw-bridge in the channel of Pearl river. Presumably, congress was of opinion that a draw-bridge in that river, giving a clear space of 60 feet, was ample for all purposes of navigation. Hence, the act of March 2, 1868, made no specific reference to Pearl river. The duty imposed by the states upon the railroad company, in respect of a draw-bridge in Pearl river, was the same after, as it was before, the passage of the act of congress; for that act, in express words, declares the railroad and its bridges to be lawful structures and a post-road, 'when constructed, completed, and in use' in accordance with the act of congress 'and the laws of the several states through whose territory the same shall pass.' Mississippi gave its consent to the exercise and enjoyment by this company of its corporate powers within her limits upon the condition, among others, that it should construct and maintain a drawbridge of a particular kind in the channel of Pearl river where that stream is crossed by the company's road. That condition not having been performed, the state has a right to ask the aid of the court in compelling its performance. And, in granting the relief asked, no right belonging to the company under the constitution or laws of the United States has been violated or withheld. Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:New Orleans Company v. State of Mississippi District Attorney/Opinion of the Court


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Moffat v. United States

The two suits present substantially the same facts, differing only as to the parties concerned in the proceedings, and the land patented, and were considered together by the court. The bill in the first case alleges substantially as follows: That the register and the receiver of public moneys of the land-office at Pueblo, in Colorado, conspiring to defraud the government of a patent for the land upon the pretext that the same was due to some person, who had performed the duties required of him by the acts of congrees in that behalf, had written out, in the form prescribed by law, a declaratory statement in the fictitious name of Philip Quinlan, representing that he had declared his intention to claim the land as a pre-emptioner; and also an affidavit, purporting to be signed by him and sworn to before the register, stating that he had made a settlement upon the land, and improved it in good faith, in order to appropriate it to his exclusive use and benefit, and not for the purpose of sale or speculation; that he had not, directly or indirectly, made an agreement with any person, or in any manner, whereby the title he might acquire would inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any one except himself; that they had also prepared an affidavit, purporting to be signed and sworn to before the register by two other fictitious persons, named Michael Quinlan and Orrin R. Peasley, in which it was stated, among other things, that the supposed Philip Quinlan was a single man, over the age of 21 years, a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of the land; that no other person resided thereon entitled to the right of pre-emption; that he had made a settlement thereon on the first of May, 1872, had built a house and made other improvements, and had lived in the house and made it his exclusive home from the fifteenth of May, 1872, to that date, May 8, 1873, and had plowed, fenced, and cultivated 18 acres of the same.

The bill also alleges that at this time the receiver was the owner of a certain amount of agricultural college scrip issued by the state of Florida; and, for the purpose of locating the land with it in the name of the said Quinlan, the register and the receiver had inserted in a black indorsement his fictitious name and residence, and in that name had located the scrip on the land; and also that they had done divers other acts to cause the plaintiff to believe that the supposed Philip Quinlan was a real person, who had actually appeared before them and made the statements and proof required by law and the regulations of the land-office to entitle him to the pre-emption of the land, and had sworn to such proof before the register; that they had prepared duplicate certificates in the form prescribed by law, setting forth that the said supposed person, represented by said fictitious name, had located the agricultural college scrip, and made due proof of his right to pre-empt said land and receive a patent therefor, and forward one of them to the general land-office at Washington, and requested a patent for the land to be issued in the name of the said supposed person; that in June, 1873, an agent of the defendant, David H. Moffat, Jr., appeared before the officers of the said general land-office and presented to them the other duplicate certificate, and also requested them to issue the patent desired, and transmit the same to him, (the agent,) and that said officers, confiding in the honesty and integrity of the receiver and the register, and believing the statements contained in the supposed proof forwarded to them, had issued the patent and transmitted it to said agent.

The bill further alleges that no person by the name of Quinlan had ever settled upon the land, or appeared and presented himself before the register and the receiver at any time, or made any declaratory statement or proof of pre-emption, either as a pre-emptor or witness, and charges that said papers were made by the register and the receiver for the purpose of fraudulently depriving the United States of their title to the land, and vesting the same in the defendant Moffat; that said Moffat now has the patent and claims to hold the legal title by virtue of certain mesne conveyances, namely, one executed on the twenty-third day of May, 1873, in the name of said supposed Philip Quinlan to a fictitious person by the name of Henry H. Perry, and a conveyance by said fictitious person, dated the twenty-third day of June, 1873, to himself, that the deeds from said supposed parties and the patent have been placed on record in the office of the recorder of the county in Colorado, where the land is situated, and constitute a cloud upon the title of complainant; that on the fifteenth of September, 1883, said Moffat executed a deed conveying an undivided half of the property covered by the patent to Robert E. Carr, as trustee, and that the deed is on record. And the bill charges that the said Moffat was well aware at the time he received the conveyances and the said patent of the fraudulent means by which the patent was obtained; that no valuable consideration passed from Carr to him; and that Carr also was fully informed that the supposed pre-emption and proceedings were false and fraudulent. The plaintiff therefore prays that the patent may be set aside and declared void, and delivered up to be canceled, and that the deeds from Quinlan to Perry, and from Perry to Moffat, and from Moffat to Carr, may also be adjudged void.

In the second case, the bill, as finally amended, alleges a similar conspiracy to defraud the government of a patent for another tract of land in the name of another fictitious person upon proofs by other supposititious persons, the pretended pre-emptor being Eli Turner, and the pretended witnesses to prove compliance with the pre-emption law being Simeon D. Porter and Anson Beck. The bill also alleges a conveyance from the pretended Eli Turner to a fictitious person, by the name of Thomas Harris, in June, 1873, and a conveyance from Harris to the defendant Moffat in the same month, and that such proceedings were had that on the fourth of October, 1873, a patent was issued for the land in the name of Eli Turner. And the bill charges that Moffat was cognizant of the false and fraudulent character of the alleged pre-emption of Turner, and of the proofs offered in its support, and prays, as in the first case, that the patent be set aside and canceled, and the deeds of the supposed Turner and Harris be adjudged void.

The defendants answered the bills in both cases, denying their material allegations, and the charges of conspiracy and fraud, to which answers replications were filed. The testimony taken fully established the truth of the allegations and charges, except as to the knowledge by Moffat and Carr of the alleged frauds; and the circuit court decreed the cancellation of the patents and the mesne conveyances purporting to pass the title from the pretended patentees to Moffat, and from him to Carr. From these decrees the defendants have appealed, and seek a reversal on four grounds, which are substantially as follows: First, that the evidence that the patentees were fictitious parties was insufficient to overcome the presumption arising from the patents themselves, and the certificates of the register and the receiver; second, that as the frauds alleged were committed by public officers, the receiver and the register, the government was bound by their acts, and the court erred in not giving effect to the patents and conveyances, so as to protect the defendants claiming under them; third, that Moffat and Carr were innocent purchasers for value, and, as such, were protected against the consequences of the alleged fraudulent methods by which the patents were issued; and, fourth, that no offer was made in the bill in either case to return the scrip received by the government for the land.

L. C. Rockwell, for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from 29 intentionally omitted]

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for appellees.

FIELD, J.

title: Moffat v. United States


text: Talk:Moffat v. United States

title: Talk:Moffat v. United States


text:
Moffat v. United States/Opinion of the Court

These cases present the same questions, and may be considered together. In our judgment, none of the positions of the appellants justifies our interference with the decrees of the court below. The presumption as to the regularity of the proceedings which precede the issue of a patent of the United States for land, is founded upon the theory that every officer charged with supervising any part of them, and acting under the obligation of his oath, will do his duty, and is indulged as a protection against collateral attacks of third parties. It may be admitted, as stated by counsel, that if, upon any state of facts, the patent might have been lawfully issued, the court will presume, as against such collateral attacks, that the facts existed; but that presumption has no place in a suit by the United States directly assailing the patent, and seeking its cancellation for fraud in the conduct of their officers. In such a suit the burden of proof is undoubtedly, in the first instance, on the government to show a fatal irregularity or corrupt conduct on their part; but when a case is established, which, if unexplained, would warrant a conclusion against them, the burden of proof is shifted, and they must show such integrity of conduct and such a compliance with the law as will sustain the patent. Its validity is, then, determinable, like any other controverted fact, upon the weight of evidence produced in support of and against their action.

There was no presumption here in favor of the officers which the testimony produced by the complainant did not entirely rebut and overthrow. Numerous witnesses, living in the immediate neighborhood of the land, testified that they were well acquainted with it, had been frequently upon it; that no one resided there; and that no improvements were made as stated in the preemption papers. They also testified that they never knew nor heard of persons by the names of the alleged pre-emptors, nor of the persons whose names were used in the attempted proof of settlement and cultivation. Neither the register nor the receiver came forward to disprove the conclusions which this testimony justified, that the pretended pre-emptors and patentees were fictitious persons. The suggestion that real parties may have appeared before the register and the receiver as pre-emptors and witnesses, having the names used though usually known by different names, is far-fetched, and merits no consideration where the fact, with reasonable explanation for the use of the unusual names, was not established, nor proof adduced of the settlement on and improvement of the land. No such attempt was made, and if it had been, it would, according to the evidence received, have signally failed.

The position that, as the frauds charged were committed by officers of the United States, the court erred in not holding their acts to be binding, and in not giving to the patents the force of valid conveyances, is certainly a novel one. The government does not guaranty the integrity of its officers, nor the validity of their acts. It prescribes rules for them, requires an oath for the faithful discharge of their duties, and exacts from them a bond with stringent conditions. It also provides penalties for their misconduct or fraud, but there its responsibility ends. They are but servants of the law, and if they depart from its requirements the government is not bound. There would be a wild license to crime if their acts, in disregard of the law, were to be upheld to protect third parties, as though performed in compliance with it. The language used in the case of Polk's Lessee v. Wendell sanctions no such doctrine. 5 Wheat. 293, 304. It was there used with reference to collateral attacks upon patents, in cases where the irregularities were committed by officers in the exercise of their admitted jurisdiction, and can have no application to the acts of officers in fabricating documents in the names of persons having no real existence.

The patents being issued to fictitious parties could not transfer the title, and no one could derive any right under a conveyance in the name of the supposed patentees. A patent to a fictitious person is, in legal effect, no more than a declaration that the government thereby conveys the property to no one. There is, in such case, no room for the application of the doctrine that a subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected. A subsequent purchaser is bound to know whether there was, in fact, a patentee, a person once in being, and not a mere myth, and he will always be presumed to take his conveyance upon the knowledge of the truth in this respect. To the application of this doctrine of a bona fide purchaser there must be a genuine instrument having a legal existence, as well as one appearing on its face to pass the title. It cannot arise on a forged instrument or one executed to fictitious parties, that is, to no parties at all, however much deceived thereby the purchaser may be. Even in the case of negotiable instruments, where the doctrine is carried furthest for the protection of subsequent parties acquiring title to the paper, it cannot be invoked if the instrument be not genuine, or if it be executed without authority from its supposed maker. Floyd's Acceptances, 7 Wall. 667, 676; Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall. 683.

As to the position that no offer is made in the bills to return the scrip received for the land, only a word need be said. The pretended patentees, who are supposed to have given the scrip, being mere myths, having no actual existence, it would be idle to offer to return it to them; and for the same reason they can have no agents to act in their behalf. A strenuous effort is made by counsel to bring these cases within the doctrine declared in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, and Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, but without success. It was held in those cases that the fraud which will justify the setting aside of the judgment of a tribunal specially appointed to determine particular facts, must be such as prevented the unsuccessful party from fully presenting his case, or which operated as an imposition upon the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Mere false testimony, or forged documents, are not enough if the disputed matter has been actually presented to and considered by the tribunal. Here officers, constituting a special tribunal, entered into a conspiracy; and the frauds consist of documents which they had fabricated, and presented with their judgment to those having appellate and supervisory authority in such matters; and thus a fictitious proceeding was imposed upon the latter as one which had actually taken place. It was a fraud upon the jurisdiction of the officers of the land department at Washington, and not the mere presentation to them of doubtful and disputed testimony. Decrees affirmed.


text: Talk:Moffat v. United States/Opinion of the Court


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Skidmore v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company

''Geo. Willard and Geo. Duggs'', for plaintiffs in error.

No brief filed for defendant in error.

This was an action of ejectment, and the material facts found by the court below, on which the case comes here for decision, are as follows: In the spring of 1868 the Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Railroad Company purchased the premises in dispute upon time contracts, by which the purchase money was to be fully paid within four years, and a conveyance made when the payments were completed. Immediately on making the purchase the company went into possession of the premises, 'and erected thereon its engine-houses and certain shops, structures, and side tracks necessary for the operation of its railroad.' On the first of February, 1869, the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Rail way Company 'became the lessee of the railway and property of the Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Railway Company for the term of ninety-nine years, and immediately thereafter entered into the possession of said railroad, and all its lands and property, including the property in controversy.' The lease was recorded in Cook county, Illinois, where the premises are situated, on the twenty-first of July, 1873. It does not purport to convey after-acquired property, but the premises in question are, and since the lease was made have been, occupied and used by the lessee for railway purposes, 'the same as though they were included in the lease.' On the second of February, 1872, the purchase money having been paid in full according to the terms of the contract, a deed was executed conveying the premises to the Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Company in fee-simple. On the nineteenth of April, 1873, William B. Skidmore, since deceased, recovered a judgment against the last-named company in the Cook county circuit court. Execution issued on this judgment was levied on the premises on the tenth of June, 1873. Under this execution the property was sold to William B. Skidmore on the tenth of July, and a conveyance made to Harriet Skidmore, Lemuel Skidmore, and William B. Skidmore, his heirs, in due course of proceeding, on the third of May, 1876. The heirs, who are the plaintiffs in error, claiming under this title, brought this suit against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Company, which was in possession, to recover the property. Upon these facts the court below gave judgment in favor of the railway company, and to reverse that judgment this writ of error has been brought.

Mr. George Willard and Mr. George Driggs for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 34-35 intentionally omitted]

WAITE, C. J.


text: Talk:Skidmore v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company


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Skidmore v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

The judgment below was clearly right. The Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Company was, in equity, the owner of the property when the lease was made, and when the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Company went into possession under it. The deed executed in February, 1872, pursuant to the contract of purchase, converted the equitable title of the Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Company into a legal title, which at once, by operation of law, inured to the benefit of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Company under its lease. All the rights of William B. Skidmore as against the property accrued long after those of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Company, and are subject to the title of that company. Such being the case, it is entirely unnecessary to inquire whether the Skidmores acquired a valid title to the property as against the Columbus, Chicago & Indiana Central Company The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Company is entitled to the possession, whether that title be good or bad.

The judgment is affirmed.


text: Talk:Skidmore v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company/Opinion of the Court


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Davies v. Corbin

B. C. Brown, E. W. Kimball, and C. P. Redmond, in support of motion.

A. H. Garland, in opposition.

The facts on which this motion rests are these: Each of the defendants in error recovered a separate and distinct judgment in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Arkansas against the county of Chicot. The aggregate of all the judgments was much more than $5,000; but the amount due upon each is not stated. After the judgments were recovered, the several plaintiffs commenced proceedings in the circuit court to compel the county court of the county to levy a tax for the payment of the amounts due them respectively. The result of these proceedings was that after several writs of mandamus were issued, 'by the consent of the relators, and by and with the approval and consent of the circuit court, it was agreed that if the county court * * * would levy a tax of ten mills upon the property of said county, and collect the same, said tax to be distributed pro rata among the judgments so recovered by the relators and others against said county' in the circuit court, 'that such levy, collection, and distribution would be accepted by the relators, and the other judgment creditors, as a sufficient compliance by said county court with the commands of the said writs of mandamus.' The county court carried out this agreement and levied the tax, which was in due form of law extended on the tax-books, and placed in the hands of Davies, the collector of the taxes of the county, for collection with the other taxes for that year. After the tax-book was delivered to the collector, he undertook the collection thereof, as he was bound in law to do, and proceeded until, 'on the twenty-ninth day of January, 1884, being the last day of the January term of the Chicot county court, there was filed in open court a complaint in equity, by one Alice R. Hamlet, against' him, 'setting up, among other facts, that she was the owner of certain lands in Chicot county, assessed for the year 1883 at $400; that no valid assessment had been made of said lands for various reasons therein set forth; that the board of equalization for said county, which met on the nineteenth day of June, 1883, was illegally organized, and proceeded, in violation of law, to alter and change the assessments of real and personal property turned over to it by the clerk of said county, and avowing that assessments were not legally equalized, and that there is no valid assessment of property in said county for the year 1883, and that the taxes levied on said assessments cannot be legally enforced, by sale or otherwise, against the objection of the tax-payers of said county.' The complaint further set forth 'the various assessments or rates of taxes levied by the county court for different purposes for the year 1883, including ten mills to pay the judgments against said county' in the circuit court. Under this complaint 'a temporary restraining order was made by the HON. JOHN M. BRADLEY, judge of said court, forbidding' the collector 'from collecting any portion of said ten-mill tax.' In obedience to this injunction, the collector stopped the collection of the 'ten-mill tax,' though he went on with all the rest.

Thereupon all the relators united in an application to the circuit court for a rule on the collector to show cause why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue commanding him to proceed with the collection of the 10-mill tax. The collector appeared in obedience to the rule, and for cause showed that he had been enjoined by the state court from making the collection. The parties went to a hearing on the application of the relators and the return of the collector to the rule. The circuit court, after hearing, awarded the writ, and for the reversal of an order to that effect this writ of error was brought by the collector.

Mr. B. C. Brown, Mr. E. W. Kimball and Mr. C. P. Redmond in support of the motion.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 39-40 intentionally omitted]

Mr. A. H. Garland for plaintiff in error, contra.

WAITE, C. J.

title: Davies v. Corbin


text: Talk:Davies v. Corbin

title: Talk:Davies v. Corbin


text:
Davies v. Corbin/Opinion of the Court

The relators now move to dismiss the writ, because (1) an order awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus is not a 'final judgment;' and (2) the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $5,000, inasmuch as no one of the relators will be 'entitled to receive of the tax collected so much as five thousand dollars, and no single tax-payer will be required to pay that amount of tax.' A motion to affirm, as allowed by section 5, rule 6, has not been united, as it very properly might have been, with this motion to dismiss.

As to the first objection, it is sufficient to say that the practice of the court has always been the other way. Our reports are full of cases in which jurisdiction of this kind has been entertained, and from 1867, when Riggs v. Johnson Co. 6 Wall. 166, was decided, until now, our power to review such orders as final judgments has passed substantially unchallenged. While the writ of mandamus, in cases like this, partakes of the nature of an execution to enforce the collection of a judgment, it can only be got by instituting an independent suit for that purpose. There must be-First, a showing by the relator in support of his right to the writ; and, second, process to bring in the adverse party, whose action is to be coerced, to show cause, if he can, against it. If he appears and presents a defense, the showings of the parties make up the pleadings in the case, and any issue of law or fact that may be raised must be judicially determined by the court before the writ can go out. Such a determination is, under the circumstances, a judgment in a civil action brought to secure a right; that is to say, process to enforce a judgment. The proceeding may be likened to a creditors' bill in equity, which is resorted to in aid of execution. The writ which is wanted cannot be had on application to a ministerial officer. It can only issue after a judgment of the court to that effect in an independent adversary proceeding instituted for that special purpose. Such a judgment is, in our opinion, a final judgment in a civil action, within the meaning of that term as used in the statutes regulating writs of error to this court.

The second objection is, to our minds, equally untenable. The writ which has been ordered in this case is not like that in Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U.S. 543, S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 846, to compel the levy of taxes to pay separate and distinct judgments in favor of several relators, who, for convenience and to save expense, united in one suit to enforce their respective rights, but to compel a tax collector to collect a single tax which has been levied for the joint benefit of all the relators, and in which they have a common and undivided interest. As in the cases of Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 5, and The Connemara, 103 U.S. 754, all the relators claim under one and the same title, to-wit, the levy of a tax which has been made for their benefit. They have a common interest in the tax, and it is perfectly immaterial to the tax collector how it is divided among them. He has no controversy with them on that point; and if there is any difficulty as to the proportions in which they are to share the proceeds of his collections, the dispute will be among themselves, and not with him. He cannot act upon separate instructions from the several creditors. His duty is to collect the tax for the benefit of all alike. A payment of the judgment of one creditor would not relieve him from his obligation to collect the whole tax. The object of the proceeding is not to raise the sums due the relators, but to raise the whole tax of 10 mills on the dollar. As the matter stands each relator has the right to have the whole tax collected for the purpose of distribution among all the creditors. It is apparent, therefore, that the dispute is between the tax collector on one side and all the creditors on the other, as to his duty to collect the tax as a whole for division among them, after the collection is made, according to their several shares. The value of the matter in dispute is measured by the whole amount of the tax, and not by the separate parts into which it is to be divided when collected. It is conceded that the amount of the tax is more than $5,000.

The motion to dismiss is overruled.

title: Davies v. Corbin/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Davies v. Corbin/Opinion of the Court


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Mellen v. Wallach

L. G. Hine and S. T. Thomas, for appellant.

Jesup Miller and L. H. Pike, for appellee.

BLATCHFORD, J.

title: Mellen v. Wallach


text: Talk:Mellen v. Wallach

title: Talk:Mellen v. Wallach