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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1546

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cxs. 508, 509 . 1929 . 1495 prevent her from departing from her loading port or place when loading in violation of section 4, or if any person shall kn owingly permit or cause or attempt to cause a foreign vessel exempted pursu- Appl icati onto forei gn ant to section 5 to depart, or if, being the owner, manager, agent or vessels. master of such vessel, he shall fail to take reasonable care to prevent her from departing from her loading port or place when loaded more deeply than permitted by the laws and regulations of the country to which she belongs, he shall, in respect of each offense, be guilty Penalty for. of a misdemeanor, unless her going to sea in such condition wa s, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable, and shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500. d If the master of any vessel or any other person shall know- Punishment for pe r- t' y mit tin g, etc. . detained ingly permit or cause or attempt to cause any vessel to depart from vessel to depart. any port or place in the United States or its possessions in violation of any order of detention made pursuant to section 7, he shall, in respect of eac h offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor and s hall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500 or by imprisonment not to exceed three months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the dis- cretion of the court. (e) If any person shall conceal, remove, alter, deface, or obliter- Concealing, oblitera- ting, et c ., marks ona ate or shall suffer any person under his control to conceal, remove, vess el, a mis demea nor. alter, deface, or obliterat e any mark or marks placed on a vessel pursuant to this Act or to the regulations established thereunder, except in the event of lawful change of said marks, or to prevent cap- ture by an enemy, he shall in respect of each offense be guilty of a misdemeanor an d shall be pu nished by a f ine not to exc eed $1,000, or by imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Liability of vessel (f) Whenever the owner, manager, agent, or master of a vessel when owner, etc., sub. shall become s ubject to a f ine or penalt y by way of mo ney payment sect to fine, etc ° pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the vessel shall also be liable therefor and may be seized and proceeded against in the district court of the United States in any district in which such vessel may be found. SEC. 9. This Act shall take effect eighteen months from and after months. in Is the date of the appr oval the reof. Approved, March 2, 1929. CHAP. 509 .-An Act To provide for the repatriation of certain insane American citizens. Be it ena ct ed by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the application of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to transfer to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, in the District of Columbia, for treatment, all American citizens legally adjudged insane in the Dominion of C anada, whose legal residenc e in one of the States, Territories, or the District of Columbia, it has been impossible to establish. Upon the ascertainment of the legal residence of persons so transferred to the hospital, the superintendent of the hospital shall thereupon transfer such persons to their respect ive places of residence, and the expenses attendant thereon shal l be paid from the appropriation for the support of the hospital. Upon the request of any such patient, his relatives or friends, he shall have a hearing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia . upon his mental condition and the right of the superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital to hold him for treatment. Approved, March 2, 1929. Punishment for . March 2, 1929. [H. R. 16436.1 [Public, No. 935 .] Insane Americans in Cana da. Transfers to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, for treatment, etc. when lega l res iden ce ascertained, to be trans- ferred from th e hospital thereto. Hearing in District Supre me C ourt as to mental condition, etc ., upon request .

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1547

 1496 March 2, 1929. [H. R. 16393.] [Public, No. 936 .] Internal Revenue. Store keeper-gauge rs, de sign ation given to storekeepers, etc . To be full-time em- ploye es. Compensation estab- lished. Cumulative leave of absence allowance re- pealed and general law applicable. Vol. 36, p. 592, re- peale d. Effective pr es ent year. Principal station to be designated for each storekeeper-gauger . Vol.44,p. 688. Subsistence when de- tai led in emerg ency cases, etc. Re gulations to be prescribed by Commis- sio ner of Prohib ition. Effective date . Inconsistent laws re- pea led. SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Ciis. 510, 511 . 1929 . CHAP. 510 .-An Act To include hencefort h, under the designa tion "store- keeper-gaugers," all positions which have heretofore been designated as those of storekeepers, gaugers, and storekeeper-gaugers ; to make storekeeper-gaugers full- time employees, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United States of America in Congress assembled, That henceforth all storekeepers, gaugers, and storekeeper-gaugers shall be designated as storekeeper-gaugers ; and henceforth all storekeeper-gaugers shall not be per diem employees, but shall be full-time employees, paid upon a per annum basis, and, when not employed upon their regular duties, may be assigned to such duties as the Commissioner of Prohibition shall designate. No person who is employed as a storekeeper-gauger at the time this Act takes effect shall be paid at a rate less than the rate upon which his per diem compensation is based at such time ; and no person entering upon such employment after such time shall be paid at a rate less than the minimum rate upon which per diem compensation of storekeeper-gaugers is based at the time this Act takes effect. SEC. 2. The Act entitled "An Act granting cumulative annual leave of absence to storekeepers, gaugers, and storekeeper-gaugers, with pay," approved June 23, 1910, is hereby repealed, and the general provisions of law relating to annual leave of absence and sick leave of emplo yees in th e ex ecuti ve de part ments shal l hen cefo rth a pply to storekeeper-gaugers. For the purpose of computing leave of absence to which storekeeper-gaugers are entitled during the calendar year in which this Act is enacted, this section shall be held and considered to take effect as of January 1 of such calendar year. SEC. 3 . The Commissioner of Prohibition shall designate for each storekeeper-gauger a principal station, which shall be held to be the designated post of duty of such employee for the purposes of the Subsi stenc e Exp ense Act of 19 26, and w hich shall, wh ereve r pra c- ticable, be at or near the place of bona fide residence of such employee. Such principal station may be changed from time to time by the commissioner, as circumstances may require. A storekeeper-gauger, when on detail in emergency cases or assignments in the administra- tive di strict where in he is reg ularly commis sioned, shal l be a llowed subsistence, as well as when detailed for special duty in any other or outside district. SEC. 4 . The Commissioner of Prohibition, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may prescribe such rules and regula- tions as may be necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this Act. SEC. 5 . This Act shall take effect on the first day of the month following the month during which it is enacted. SEC. 6 . All laws, or parts of laws, in consisten t or in conflict here- with, are he reby r epeale d. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. [H. R. 15723.] CHAP. 511 .-An Act Authorizing an appropriation of Crow tribal funds for [Public, No. 937 .] payment of council and delegate expenses, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Crow from funds of, United States o f America in Congress assembled, That there is a uthor ized meetings for of tribal '~ expenses of hereby authorized to be appropriated, from funds to the credit of council, etc ° the Crow Tribe of Indians, the sum of $5,000, to be available for the payment of the expenses of the tribal council in holding meet- ings on the Crow Reservation, and for the expenses of delegates which such council may send to the city of Washington on tribal

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Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. It was a chancery case, but correctly brought up by writ of error. See preceding case of Verden v. Coleman.

It was before this court at a preceding term, and is reported in 9 Howard, 314. It will be perceived, by referring to that case, that this court decided that the pre-emption act of 1830 conferred certain rights upon settlers upon public lands, upon proof of settlement or improvement being made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver, agreeably to the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. And their decision must be considered final, unless impeached on the ground of fraud or unfairness. 9 Howard, 333. The principal point now decided was, that the entry then recognised was obtained by false affidavits as to residence and cultivation.

The cause, as decided in 9 Howard, having gone back to Arkansas, the bill was amended, and various new parties, both complainants and defendants, were introduced. Most of the defendants answered; decrees were taken against some of those who did not answer, and the bills dismissed as to other.

The State court decided many questions upon which their decision was final, and not subject to be reviewed by this court under the 25th section of the judiciary act. The principal one before this court was, whether or not Cloyes imposed on the register and receiver by false affidavits as to cultivation and residence.

The case was argued in this court by Mr. Bradley, upon a brief filed by Mr. Stilwell and himself, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Watkins and Mr. Pike for the defendants in error, upon which side there was also filed a written argument by Mr. Hempstead.

The arguments which were filed were very voluminous, and the record contained nearly a thousand printed pages. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas was, that, from the proof in the cause, the pre-emption claim set up in the bill was and is fraudulent in fact and in law; and this was the judgment sought to be reversed by this court. The evidence upon the question constituted a large part of the record. The opinion of this court refers to a portion of it, and the residue of it the reporter does not intend to touch. The counsel for the plaintiff in error contended that the decree of the land officers, whilst it stands, is conclusive as to the title of the pre-emptioner and those claiming under him; that it could not be impeached collaterally, but could be impeached for fraud only in a direct proceeding, by either an original or cross bill; and that, as the defendants had not so impeached or attempted to impeach it, they cannot be permitted to speak about fraud as a mere matter of defence.

18 Howard, 43, and authorities there cited.

The views of the counsel on both sides, upon the question of the jurisdiction of this court in this case, were as follows:

The counsel for the plaintiff in error said:

It may be insisted that this court has no jurisdiction of the case.

Had the Supreme Court of Arkansas simply affirmed the decree of the court of original jurisdiction, there would appear more plausibility in this; though, then, we think the jurisdiction clear.

The right set up by the plaintiffs in error arises under an act of Congress, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas was against that right; consequently, this court has jurisdiction of the case, without regard to the particular ground upon which the decree of the State court is based.

14 Howard's Rep., 389.

Cunningham v. Ashley et al., ib., 98.

1 Howard's Rep., City of Mobile v. Emanuel.

The right grows out of an act of Congress, and is sanctioned against all laws and judicial decisions of the States.

5 Cranch's Rep., 344, Owings v. Norwood's Lessee.

5 Peters's Rep., 257, Fisher's Lessor v. Cockerell.

It is sufficient that the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under the authority of the United States, was drawn in question, and the decision was against their validity.

1 Wheaton's Rep., 304, 322, 352, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, et seq.

3 Condensed R., 474. Same case.

The evidence for the defence was admitted, for the purpose of impeaching the right claimed under the act of Congress, and granted to them by the land officers acting under it; consequently, the decision of the State court, upon the effect of such evidence, may be fully considered here, and the decree reversed or affirmed.

4 Howard's Rep., 447, Mackay v. Dillon.

The power to revise and reverse a decision of a State court, depriving a party of his right to transfer his case from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States for trial, has been exercised.

14 Howard's Rep., 103, Gordon v. Longest.

In Neilson v. Lagow, 7 Howard's Rep., 775, the plaintiff claimed the land under an authority exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury in behalf of the United States, and the decision was against the validity of the authority thus exercised; and on motion to dismiss, Chief Justice TANEY said: 'We think it is evidently one of the cases prescribed for in the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789.'

title: Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1548

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cns. 511-513 . 1929 . 1497 busine ss wh en au thoriz ed by the Secretary of the Inter ior o r the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and under such rules and regula- tions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. Approved, March 2, 1929 . March 2, 1929. CHAP. 512 .-An Act Directing that copies of certain patent specifications [n. R.14663.] and drawings be supplied to the public library of the City of Los Angeles at the [Public, No. 938 .] re gular annual rate. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representativs o f the United States of America in Congress assembled, Th at the Commis- sioner of Patents is authorized and directed to supply to the public library of the city of Los Angeles, at the regular rate of $50 per annum prescribed by law for public libraries of the United States, uncertified printed copies of patent specifications and drawings pub- lished during the years 1915 to 1925, inclusive : Prov ided, That the public library of the city of Los Angeles shall pay to the Commis- sioner of Patents the sum of $2,500, which sum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States in accordance with the provisions of the Act of March 6, 1920 (Forty-first Statutes at Large, page 512 ; United States Code, title 35, section 79). SEC. 2 . There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for clerical serv- ices, stationery, and supplies for carrying into effect this Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, $2,500, to be expended by the Com- missioner of Patents. Approved, March 2, 1929 . Los Angeles, Calif. Uncertified copies of patent specifications, 1915 to 1925, to be fur- nished library of, at annual rate. Proviso. Payment from libra. ry to be deposited in the Treasury. Vol. 41, p. 512. U.S. Code, p. 1172. Sum authorized for expenses by Commis- sione r of Pate nts. Post, p. 1637. March 2, 1929. CHAP. 513 .-An Act Authorizing L. L. Thompsen, his heirs, legal repre- 	[H. R.16725.] sentat ives, a nd ass igns, t o const ruct, maintai n, and operat e a bri dge acr oss th e Red River at or near Montgomery, LouisianTL. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Uni ted S tates of Am erica in Co ngres s ass embled , That in order to promote interst ate comm erce, im prove th e postal service, and pr ovide for military and other purposes, L. L. Thompsen, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, be, and is hereby, authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto, across the Red River, at a point suitable to the interests of navigation at or near M ontgomer y, Louis iana, in accorda nce with the pro visions of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906, and subject to the conditions and limitations contained in this Act. SEC. 2 . After the completion of such bridge, as determined by the Secretary of War, either the State of Louisiana, any political sub- division thereof within or adjoining which any part of such bridge is located, or any two or more of th em jointly, may at any time acquire and take over all right, title, and interest in such bridge and its approaches, and any interest in re al property necessary the refo r, by pu rcha se or by con demn atio n or exp ropr iati on, in ceC nde mnation pro- accordance with the laws of such State governing the acquisition of private property for public purposes by condemnation or expropria- Compensation if ac- tion. If at any time after the expiration of five years after the quired by condemna- completion of such bridge the same is acquired by condemnation or ti on , expropriation, the amount of damages or compensation to be allowed shal l not in clude go od will, going v alue, or prospect ive reve nues or profits, but shall be ,limited to the sum of (1) the actual cost of constructing such bridge and its approaches, less a reasonable deduc- [Public, No. 939 .1 Red River. L.L. Thompsen may bridge, at Montgom- ery, La. Constru ction. Vol.34,p.84. Acquisition aut hor - ized, after completion, by Louisiana, etc. Limitations.

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If you want to get to heaven tell you what to do Gotta grease your feet with some good beef stew Slide right out of the devils hand And slide over into the promised landbut go easy go greasy

Standing in the corner by the mantel piece Up in the corner by a bucket of grease I stuck my foot in that bucket of grease And go a slipping up and down the mantel piece Hunting matches. Cigaret stubs. Shortage on.

Down in the hen house on my knees I thought I heard a chicken sneeze Nothing but a rooster saying his prayers Thanking his god for the hens upstairs Rooster preaching. Hen a singing. Henohouse shaking.

Down in the holler just a settingonna log My hand on my trigger and my eye on a hog Pulled that trigger and the gun went 'bipppp' I grab that hog with all of my grip Cain't eat hog eyesbut I love chitlins.

I got a gal just over the hill She won't kiss like her sister will Never takes a bath not even a rub 'Fraid she'll slide through the hole in the tub. Swful skinny. Bony. Cut a man like a razor.

Not a bit of use in me working so hard I got a woman in the rich folks yard When she kills a chicken she sends me the feet Thinks I'm working when I'm loafing in the street. Listening to all the back talk. Gossip.

Not no use in me working so hard I got a woman in the rich folks yard When they kill a chicken she sends me the head Thinks I'm a working when I'm laying up in bed. Dreaming about her. Two other women.

Lots of folks tell you that a preacher won't steal But I caught three down in my corn field One had a bushel and the other had a peck The other'n had a great long cotton sack. Half full or fuller. Roasting ears. He's stealing.

When I get to eating pork chops I caint stop Ain't no kind of gravy I can't sop Grab that bone in both of my hands And listen to my lips go flipppityyy floppppp Born liking it. Slicker the better. Ease on in home.

I went to church the other night See if everybody had been living right Lady got religion and waved her hands


text: Talk:Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)

title: Talk:Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1549

 1498 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 513 . 1929 . tion for actual depreciation in value ; (2) the actual cost of acquiring such interests in real property ; (3) actual financing and promotion cost, not to exceed 10 per centum of the sum of the cost of construct- ing the bridge and its approaches and acquiring such interests in real To ns unde r state, property ; and (4) actual expenditures for necessary improvements. etc ., operation. SEC. 3 . If such bridge shall at any time be taken over or acquired by the State of Louisiana, or by any municipality or other political subdivision or public agency thereof, under the provisions of section 2 of this Act, and' if tolls are thereafter charged for the use thereof, Rates applied to op- eration, sinking fund, the rates of toll shall be so adjusted as to provide a fund sufficient etc. to pay for the reasonable cost of maintaining, repairing, and operat- ing the b ridge and its approaches un der economica l management a nd to provide a sinking fund sufficient to amortize the amount paid therefor, including reasonable interest and financing cost, as soon Maintenance as free as possible under reasonable charges, but within a period of not to bridge, etc ., after amor- exceed twenty years from the date of acquiring the same. After a tizing costs, etc. sinking fund sufficient for such amortization shall have been so provided, su ch bridge sha ll thereafter be maintained and operated free of tolls, or the rates of toll shall thereafter be so adjusted as to provide a fund of not to exceed the amount necessary for the proper Record of expendi- maintenance, repair, and operation of the bridge and its approaches t ures and recei pts. under economical management. An accurate record of the amount paid for acquiring the bridge and its approaches, the actual expendi- tures for maintaining, repairing, and operating the same, and of the daily tolls collected shall be kept and shall be available for the information of all persons interested. Sworn statement of construction costs, etc ., SEo. 4. L. L. Thompsen, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns , to be lied after com- shall, within ninety days a fter th e compl etion of such bridge, file with pletion. the Secretary of War and wi th the highwa y department o f the State of Louisiana, a sworn itemized statement showing the actual original cost of constructing the bridge and its approaches, the actual cost of Examination by sec- acquiring any interest in real property necessary therefor, and the retary of war. actual financing and promotion costs. The Secretary of War may, and at the request of the highway department of the State of Louisiana shall, at any time within three years after the completion of such bridge, investigate such costs a nd determine t he accuracy and the reasonableness of the costs alleged in the statement of costs so filed, and shall make a finding of the actual and reasonable costs of constructing, financing, and promoting such bridge ; for the pur- pose of such investigation the said L. L. Thompsen, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, shall make available all of his records in connection with the construction, financing, and promotion thereof. c onc lus ive . of secretary The findings of the Secretary of War as to the reasonable costs of the construction, financing, and promotion of the bridge shall be con- clusive for the purposes mentioned in section 2 of this Act, subject conferred. to sell. etc ., only SCto review .5.Therih a court of t to sell, equity ssi f transfer or and gr oss mortgage mistake. all the rights, powers, and privilegs conferred by this Act is hereby granted to L. L. Thompsen, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns ; and any corporation to which or any person to whom such rights, powers, and privileges may be sold, assigned, or transferred, or who shall acquire the same by mortgage foreclosure or otherwise, is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise the same as fully as though Construction co n- conferred herein directly upon such corporation or person. tracts to be let to lowest SEC. 6. All contracts made in connection with the construction of bidder. the bridge authorized by this Act and which shall involve the expenditure of more than $5,000 shall be let by competitive bidding. Advertisin g, etc. Such contracts shall be advertised for a reasonable time in some newspaper of general circulation published in the State in which the bridge ,is located and in the vicinity thereof ; sealed bids shall be

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Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)/Opinion of the Court

In this case, the decision was against an authority exercised by the register and receiver, subordinates of the Secretary of the Treasury, but under the same authority.

The jurisdiction exists wherever the laws of Congress and the acts of officers executing them in perfecting titles to public lands have been drawn in question and construed by the Supreme Court of a State, and the decision is against the title set up under the laws of Congress and the authority exercised under them.

19 Howard's Rep., 207, Cousin v. Blanc's Executors.

In McDonogh v. Millaudon, 19 Howard's Rep., 704, Mr. Justice CATRON said: 'Did this final judgment draw in question the construction of a treaty or statute of the United States, or of an authority exercised under the same, and was the decision against the validity of either or against the title or right set up under either? If these questions are answered in the negative, it follows that we have no jurisdiction to re-examine or reverse the judgment under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.'

Hence, it must follow, necessarily, if answered affirmatively any one of them, the court would have jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this case claim under the authority exercised under a statute of the United States, and a right set up under it, and the decision was against them.

Wynn v. Garland was similar to this in every respect, and the question was passed over without notice.

20 Howard's Rep., 7.

In order to give jurisdiction, it is sufficient, if the record shows, that it is clear from the facts stated, by just and necessary inference, that the question was made, and that the State court must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have decided that question as indispensable to that judgment.

10 Peters Rep., 392, Crowell v. Randell.

1 id. Rep., 250, Wilson et al. v. the Blackbird C. M. Company.

1 Wheaton's Rep., 355, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.

4 id. Rep., 311, Miller v. Nichols.

12 id. Rep., 117, Williams v. Norris.

The jurisdiction must be determined by reference to the record. And in doing so, the court will refer to the opinion of the State court, where it is made a part of the record by the laws of the State.

19 Howard's Rep., 207, Cousin v. Blanc's Executors.

In this case, there is no necessity, in the first instance, of looking behind the decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, to determine the ground of the decision; but, if need be, we may look back to the decision of the chancellor, whose decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and shall find that he overruled all the defences set up, except the invalidity of the pre-emption claim of Cloyes. (His opinion is made a part of the record-see Gould's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, p. 242, sec. 17.) Certainly the fact that the Supreme Court decided against the right of the plaintiffs, upon the ground that it was fraudulent, cannot oust the jurisdiction. If that court had refused the relief because the proof showed that Cloyes never occupied or cultivated the land, the case would be the same; because the want of possession and cultivation, in the eyes of that court, constituted the fraud. The idea of fraud cannot be disconnected from the act of Congress. If there was any fraud, it was a fraud upon the law, and upon the United States through her land officers.

The decision being against the right, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to re-examine the case, and determine, not whether the decision was right upon the particular ground, but whether the right was properly denied. The decree of the State court would not have been what it is, if there had not been a decision against the right set up by the plaintiffs; and this is all sufficient.

12 Howard Rep., 124, Williams v. Oliver et al.

3 Peters Rep., 292, 302.

And the decision of the State court need not be confined exclusively and especially to the construction of the treaty act of Congress, &c., in order to give jurisdiction.

12 Howard Rep., 124, Williams v. Oliver.

Points may arise, growing out of and connected with the general question, and so blended with it as not to be separated, and therefore falling equally within the decision contemplated by the twenty-fifth section. The case of Smith v. the State of Maryland, 6 Cranch, 281, and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 305, 355, afford illustrations of this principle.

Here the record shows affirmatively that the decision was against the right set up and the authority of the land officers, excluding the idea that the decision was made upon the other defence set up by the defendants, such as purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, statutes of limitation, lapse of time, &c. And it follows, as a matter of course, that if the decision of the State court upon that point was wrong, the decree must be reversed.

The counsel for the defendant in error, Mr. Watkins, made the following point upon the question of the jurisdiction of this court in this case:

On a writ of error from a State court, where no question of law is presented, it is not the province or duty of this court to review the decision of an issue of fact merely, made by the court below, with its superior facilities for determining the fact according to the weight or credibility of testimony.

By the judiciary act of 1789, appeals were only allowed from the District to the Circuit Courts. There was no mode of bringing up any case to this court, except by writ of error.

Blain v. Ship Carter, 4 Dallas, 22.

The terms, appeal and writ of error, though used by the act, were not confounded. An appeal is a civil-law proceeding, which removes the cause entirely, and is a rehearing on the facts as well as the law.

Wischart v. Danchy, 3 Dallas, 321.

The great object of the judiciary act of 1789 was to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this court to the examination and decision of questions of law, on errors assigned and made to appear upon the record. By section nineteen, the Circuit Courts in equity were required to cause the facts, upon which they founded their decree, to appear upon the record, either by a statement of such facts by the parties, or by the court where they could not agree, being analogous to a special verdict or case stated in trials at law. This regulation appears to have been regarded with some jealousy, according to the report of the case last cited, (Wischart v. Danchy,) as conferring a power on the Circuit Courts in chancery, which might be abused by a determination of facts contrary to or not warranted by the evidence. That feeling probably led to the passage of the act of 3d March, 1803, providing for an appeal, in chancery causes, from the Circuit Courts to this court, and that on such appeal the transcript should contain all the pleadings, depositions, and documentary evidence, in the cause.

The policy of the act of 1803, as apparent from its history, was, to enable this court to review and correct any gross error of the Circuit Courts, in determining questions of fact, against or without evidence. The principle pervading the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this court is only partially innovated upon. I apprehend that no appeal in chancery was ever decided by this court, without deference to the opinion of the Circuit Court, which tried the cause upon the facts which the evidence conduced to establish; while, on the other hand, their errors or misconstructions of law are freely examined. And considering that in theory, and usually in practice, a justice of this court presides at the circuit, he has all the opportunities afforded in equity and admiralty causes, for arriving at a just conclusion upon the facts.

In all the cases from Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 444, (where this court refused to give efficacy to the act of 26th May, 1824, as an entering wedge for the civil-law practice of Louisiana, whereby this court would be called on to re-examine facts ascertained in the court below,) to Minor v. Tillotson, 2 Howard, 392, and Fenn v. Holme, 21 Howard, 481, this court has perseveringly resisted all efforts to engraft upon the Federal Judiciary the civil-law practice, or the mongrel systems of Texas and other new States.

But, in any view of it, the act of 1803 does not apply to writs of error from a State court, under the 25th section of the judiciary act. And according to the construction repeatedly given by this court, touching the distinction between an appeal and a writ of error, where those terms are used in acts of Congress, nothing is examinable on a writ of error by this court, as one of appellate jurisdiction, except questions of error in law. In view of the tendency of modern law reforms, so called, to make law equity, to assimilate pleadings in all civil causes to the chancery forms of a complaint, answer, and reply, and bring upon the record a crude mass of testimony, it seems proper for this court to consider whether such innovations shall be suffered to impair its own usefulness. The time, the learning, and ripe experience of the judges of the highest appellate court in the world belong to the country, and need not be wasted in the investigation of paltry questions of fact, which are of no concern beyond the immediate parties to the dispute. The imposition of such a duty would not only be subversive of the theory of appellate jurisdiction, but is one which an appellate court is not competent to perform. When this cause was tried in 9 Howard, the facts confessed by the demurrer lay in a nut-shell. The decision is interesting and important as an affirmance of the doctrine, that an inchoate right of pre-emption vested under law is not defeated by a subsequent act of Congress granting the land. But on this record, suppose the court here to enter upon a re-examination of facts, and after a patient and laborious collation of the testimony, and without indeed those aids attendant upon the court which tried the cause, and breathing the atmosphere of the witnesses, could instinctively appreciate their worth or credibility, should arrive at the conclusion that the claim of Cloyes was unfounded in fact, and fraudulent, the decision, settling no question of law, would not be worthy of a place in the reports. I take it, that amid all changes and fluctuations in the jurisprudence of the States, the principle governing the appellate jurisdiction of this court should remain unchanged; so that whatever mode of trial may be provided in the local tribunals, and to which the parties have resorted, the ascertainment of a fact, according to the mode provided, is to be regarded as final and conclusive of the fact.

I venture to submit, that it is only according to a technical view of the judiciary act that this court has any jurisdiction in the premises. It is true, that because the plaintiffs in error claim under a law of Congress, and the decision is against the right claimed, they come literally within the terms of the 25th section; so that the court, according to its practice, might refuse to entertain a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and out of abundant caution reserve the question until the final argument. Doubtless, if the plaintiffs in error can put their finger on any error or misconstruction of law by the chancellor in the determination of the fact, or, in other words, can show that he regarded those acts of the claimant as fraudulent, which, in the opinion of this court, and according to its construction of the law, were not so, then the decision of the court below would be examinable for that error. But, apart from the consideration of all other elements of mala fides, one essential fact, ascertained and decided by the court below, is, that Cloyes did not cultivate in 1829. While that determination stands, there never was any right, and consequently there is no jurisdiction.

Finally, if it be the pleasure of the court to go into a re-examination of the entire testimony, the defendants in error, whom I represent, confidently invite it, and are content to refer to the exposition of the evidence contained in the decisions of the chancellor and Supreme Court of Arkansas, and in the argument of Mr. Hempstead.

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

The first question presented on the record is, whether this court has jurisdiction to examine and revise the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas by writ of error, under the 25th section of the judiciary act? The question arises on the following facts:

Nathan Cloyes, ancestor of the principal complainants, entered as an occupant, at a land office in Arkansas, a fractional quarter section of land, in 1834, under the pre-emption acts of 1830 and 1832. The fraction adjoined the village of Little Rock on its eastern side, and was for twenty-nine acres. The same land had been patented in 1833 by the United States to John Pope, Governor of the Territory of Arkansas, to be appropriated to the erection of public buildings for said Territory. The heirs of Cloyes claimed to have an earlier equity, by force of their pre-emption right, than that of the Governor of Arkansas.

They filed their bill in equity in the proper State court, to enforce this equity. That bill contained appropriate allegations to exhibit an equitable title in the plaintiffs, and the opposing right of the patentee, and thus to enable the courts to compare them. Some of the defendants demurred to the bill; others answered, denying the facts of the settlement and cultivation, and pleading the bona fides of their purchase and the statute of limitations.

The courts of Arkansas dismissed the bill on the demurrer; which judgment was reversed in this court, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How., 314. It was prepared for hearing a second time, and the courts of Arkansas have again dismissed the bill, and the cause is a second time before us.

The cause was fully heard on its merits below; and the claim of Cloyes rejected, on the ground that he obtained his entry by fraud in fact and fraud in law; and the question is, can we take jurisdiction, and reform this general decree? It rejected the title of Cloyes; and, in our opinion, it is not material whether the invalidity of the title was decreed in the Supreme Court of Arkansas upon a question of fact or of law. The fact that the title was rejected in that court authorizes this court to re-examine the decree. 14 Peters, 360.

The decision in the Supreme Court of Arkansas drew in question an authority exercised under the United States, to wit: that of admitting Cloyes to make his entry; and the decision was against its validity, and overthrew his title, and is therefore subject to be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in this court, on all the pleadings and proofs which immediately respect the question of the proper exercise of authority by the officers administering the sale of the public lands on the part of the United States.

In the case of Martin against Hunter's Lessee, (1 Whea., 352,) the foregoing construction of the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789 was recognised, and has been followed since, in the cases of Choteau against Eckhart, (2 How., 372,) Cunningham against Ashley, (14 How., 377,) Garland against Wynn, (20 How., 6,) and other cases.

Another preliminary question is presented on this record, namely: whether the adjudication of the register and receiver, which authorized Cloyes's heirs to enter the land, is subject to revision in the courts of justice, on proof, showing that the entry was obtained by fraud and the imposition of false testimony on those officers, as to settlement and cultivation. We deem this question too well settled in the affirmative for discussion. It was so treated in the case of Cunningham against Ashley, (14 How., 377;) again, in Bernard against Ashley, (18 How., 43;) and conclusively, in the case of Garland against Wynn, (20 How., 8.)

The next question is, how far we can re-examine the proceedings in the State courts.

In their answers, the respondents rely on the act of limitations of the State of Arkansas for protection. As this is a defence having no connection with the title of Cloyes, this court cannot revise the decree below in this respect, under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

Many of the defendants also relied in their answers on the fact that they were bona fide purchasers of the lots of land they are sued for, and therefore no decree can be made here to oust them of their possessions. The State courts found that a number of the respondents were purchasers without notice of Cloyes's claim, and entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers, according to the rules acted on by courts of equity. With this portion of the decree we have no power to interfere, as the defence set up is within the restriction found in the concluding part of the 25th section, which declares 'that no other error shall be assigned or regarded by this court as a ground of reversal, than such as immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities, in dispute.' Mr. Justice Story comments on the foregoing restraining clause, in the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1 Whea., 358,) which construction we need not repeat.

Whether Cloyes imposed on the register and receiver by false affidavits, when he made proof of cultivation in 1829, and residence on the land in dispute on the 29th of May, 1830, is the remaining question to be examined. He made oath (23d April, 1831) that he did live on said tract of land in the year 1829, and had done so since the year 1826. Being interrogated by the register, he stated: I had a vegetable garden, perhaps to the extent of an acre, and raised vegetables of different kinds, and corn for roasting-ears; and I lived in a comfortable dwelling, east of the Quapaw line on the before-mentioned fraction. Being asked, did you continue to reside, and cultivate your garden aforesaid, on the before-named fraction, until the 29th of May, 1830? he answers: 'I did; and have continued to do so until this time.'

John Saylor deposed on behalf of Cloyes in effect to the same facts, but in general terms. Nathan W. Maynor and Elliott Bursey swore that the affidavit of Saylor was true. On the truth or falsehood of these depositions the cause depends.

In opposition to these affidavits, it is proved, beyond dispute, that Cloyes and his family resided at a house, for a part of the year 1828, occupied afterwards by Doctor Liser. In the latter part of 1828, they removed from that place to some log cabins, situate on the lots afterwards occupied by John Hutt, and where the Governor of Arkansas resided in 1851, when the witnesses deposed. Both places were west of the Quapaw line-the cabins standing probably one hundred yards west of the line, and which line was the western boundary of the fractional quarter section in dispute. Cloyes resided at these cabins when he swore at Batesville, before the register; and continued to reside there till the time of his death, which occurred shortly after his return from Batesville, say in May or June, 1831, and his widow and children continued to reside at the same cabins for several years after his death.

Cloyes was by trade a tinner, and in December, 1826, rented of William Russell a small house, constructed of slabs set upright, in which he carried on his business of a tin-plate worker. He covenanted to keep and retain possession for Russell of this shop against all persons, and not to leave the house unoccupied, and to pay Russell two dollars per month rent, and surrender the house to Russell or his authorized agent at any time required by the lessor.

Under this lease, Cloyes occupied the house until the 19th day of June, 1828, when he took a lease from Chester Ashley for the same, and also for a garden. He covenanted to pay Ashley one dollar per month rent; to put and keep the building in repair; to keep and retain possession of the same, until delivered back to said Ashley by mutual consent, either party having a right to terminate the lease on one month's notice. The house and garden were rented by the month.

Under this lease, Cloyes occupied the house, as a tin-shop, to the time of his death. Both the leases state that the shop was east of the Quapaw line, and on the public lands.

This slab tenement was built by Moses Austin, about 1820. On leaving Little Rock, he sold it to Doctor Mathew Cunningham; it passed through several hands, till it was finally owned by Col. Ashley. Buildings and cultivated portions of the public lands were protected by the local laws of the Arkansas Territory; either ejectment or trespass could have been maintained by Ashley against Cloyes to recover the premises, nor could an objection be raised by any one, except the United States, to these transfers of possession-neither could Cloyes be heard to disavow his landlord's title. He held possession for Ashley, and was subject to be turned out on a month's notice to quit.

Cunningham and other witnesses depose that the shop rented to Cloyes stood west of the Quapaw line. It however appears, from actual survey, that it was on the section line, which ran through the house, taking its southeast corner on the east side, but leaving the greater part of the shop west of the line.

Another pertinent circumstance is, that when Cloyes heard the pre-emption law of 1830 was about to pass, or had passed, (it is uncertain which, from the evidence,) he removed his wife and children, with some articles of necessary furniture, to the tinner's shop, from his residence at the Hutt place, and kept his family at the shop for a few months, and then they returned to their established home. This contrivance was probably resorted to at the instance of Benjamin Desha, who had agreed with Cloyes to pay into the land office the purchase money, and all incidental expenses, to obtain a title from the Government for an interest of one-half of the land. These evasions were mere attempts to defraud the law, and to furnish some foundation for the necessary affidavits to support his pre-emption claim at the land office.

On this aspect of the case, the question arises, whether Cloyes's possession as lessee and tenant of Ashley, occupying a shop as a mechanic, the corner of which accidentally obtruded over the section line, upon the public land, and who was subject to removal by his landlord each month, was 'a settlement' on the public lands, within the true intent and meaning of the act of May, 1830?

That Cloyes never contemplated seeking a home on the public lands as a cultivator of the soil, is manifest from the proof; he worked at his trade, when he worked at all, (say the witnesses,) and followed no other avocation. Our opinion is, that the affidavits, on which the occupant entry was founded, were untrue in fact, and a fraud on the register and receiver; and that Cloyes had no bona fide possession as tenant of the tinner's shop, within the true meaning of the act of 1830.

We are also of opinion, that the affidavits are disproved, as respects the fact of cultivation in 1829. There was no garden cultivated in that year, adjoining or near to the shop. To say the least, it is quite doubtful whether there was such cultivation east of the Quapaw line; and the State courts, having found that there was none, it is our duty to abide by their finding, unless we could ascertain, from the proof, that they were mistaken, which we cannot do; our impressions being to the contrary.

The question of cultivation in May, 1830, depended on parol evidence of witnesses. The judges below knew them; they decided on the spot, with all the localities before them; and as the evidence is contradictory, it would be contrary to precedent for this court to overrule the finding of a mere fact by the courts below.

On the several grounds stated, we order that the decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas be affirmed, with costs.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1550

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Cas. 513, 514 . 1.929 . 1499 required, and the contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Verified copies or abstracts of all bids received and of the bid or bids accepted shall be promptly furnished to the highway department of the State in which such bridge is located. A failure vio onr cts void for to comply in good faith with the provisions of this section shall render null and void any contract made in violation thereof ; and the Secretary of War may, after hearings, order the suspension of all work upon such bridge until the provisions of this section shall have been fully com plied with. SEC. 7 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amendment. expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. CHAP. 5 1 4 . - An Act Granting the consent of Congre ss to the city of Chat- [H. R .16719 .] tan oog a and the county of Hamilton, Tennessee, to con str uc t, maintain, and [Public, No . 940.] operate a bridge across the Tennessee River, at or near Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That in order to Tennessee River. Chat tanoo ga an d prom ote inte rsta te c omme rce, imp rove the pos tal serv ice, and pro vide H nn i lton budget at for military and other purposes, the city of Chattanooga and the Chattanooga. county of Hamilton, Tennessee, or any board or commission of the said city and county which may be duly created or established for the purpose, their successors or assigns, be, and are hereby, authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto across the Tennessee River, at a point suitable to the interests of navigation, ex tending from some point in the city of C hattanooga, Tennessee, across said river to a point on the opposite shore thereof, Co nstr ue ion in accordance with the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906, and subject to the conditions and limita- tions contained in said Act. SEC. 2 . The said city of Chattanooga and the county of Hamilton, Character of bridge. or such board or commission, their successors and assigns, are authorized to construct, maintain, and operate such bridge and the necessary approaches thereto as a railroad bridge for the passage of railway trains or street cars, or both, or as a highway bridge for the passage of pedestrians, animals, and vehicles, adapted to travel on public highw ays, or as a combined rail road and highw ay bridge for all s uch ur oses ; and there is hereb conferred u on said cit of Right to acq uire r eal h h 7 y h y estate,etc.,farlocation, Chat tanoog a and the c ounty of Ham ilton, or s uch bo ard or Com- approaches, etc . mission, their successors and assigns, all such rights and powers to enter upon lands and to acquire, condemn, occupy, possess, and use real estate and other property needed for the location, construction, operation, and maintenance of such bridge and its approaches as are possessed by railroad corporations for railroad purposes or by bridge corporations for bridge purposes in the State in which such real estate or other property is situated, upon making just comperlsation therefor, to be ascertained and paid according to the laws of such Condemnation pro. State, and the proceedings therefor shall be the same as in condemna- oeedings. tion or expropriation of property for public purposes in such State. SEC. 3. The said city of Chattanooga and county of Hamilton, Tolls authorized. or such board or commission and the successors thereof, are hereby authorized to fix and charge tolls for transit over such bridge, and the rates of tolls so fixed shall be the legal rates until changed by the Secretary of War under the authority contained in the Act of Vol.34 p .85. March 23, 1906. 54835•-29-sT 1--98

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1551

 1500 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHs. 514, 515. 1929 . Rates of toll for high- SEC. 4. If such bridge is constructed as a highway bridge alone, in way bridge applied to operation, sinkin g fixing the rates of toll to be charged for the use of such bridge the fund, ecc. same shall be so adjusted as to provide a fund sufficient to pay for the reasonable cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the bridge and its approaches under economical management, to pay an adequate return on the cost thereof, and to provide a sinking fund sufficient to amortize the cost of such bridge and its approaches, including reasonable interest and financing cost, as soon as possible under reasonable charges, but within a period of not to exceed If comb ined railroa d and highway bridge, twenty-five years from the completion thereof. If such bridge is rates to provide, with c onstr ucted as a com bined rail road and highw ay b ridge, in fixi ng other revenue, for oper- ating highway bridge, the rates of toll to be charged for the use of the highway part thereof sin king fund, et c. the same shall be so adjusted as to provide a fund sufficient (with the other revenues received from the bridge) to pay for the reasonable cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the bridge and its ap proac hes under econ omica l ma nagem ent, to p ay an adeq uate retu rn on the cost thereof, and to provide a sinking fund sufficient to amortize the cost of such bridge and its approaches, including reasonable interest and financing cost, as soon as possible under re asonab le cha rges, but wi thin a perio d of no t to e xceed twenty -five Maintenance as free years from the completion thereof. After a sinking fund sufficient bridge, etc ., after amor- tizin g costs, etc. for such amortization shall have been so provided, that portion of such bridge used for highway purposes shall thereafter be main- tained and operated free of tolls, or the rates of tolls shall thereafter be so adjusted as to provide a fund of not to exceed the amount necessary for the proper maintenance, repair, and operation of the Re cord of e xpen di- bridge and its approaches under economical management. An tares and receipts. accurate record of the cost of the bridge and its approaches, the e xpend iture s fo r mai ntain ing, repa iring, and ope ratin g the sam e, and of daily tolls collected, shall be kept and shall be available for the information of all persons interested. Right to sell, etc ., SEC. 5. The right to sell, assign, transfer, and mortgage all the conferred. rights, powers, and privileges conferred by this Act is hereby granted to the city of Chattanooga, and the county of Hamilton, Tennessee, or any board of the said city and county which may be duly created or established for the purpose, their successors and assigns corporation to which, or any person to whom, such rights, powers, and privileges may be sold, assigned, or transferred, or who shall acquire the same by mortgage foreclosure or otherwise, is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise the same as fully as though conferred herein directly upon such corporation or person. Amen dment . SEC. 6 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby ex pressl y rese rved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. fi3. R.16604.] [Publ ic, No.941.] Cumberland River. Time extended for bridging, at Center Point, Ky. Ante,p. 614. Amendment . CHAP. 515.-An Act To extend the times for commencing and completing the construction of a bridge across the Cumberland River at or near Center Point, in Monroe County, Kentucky. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United State s o f Americ a in C ongres s assem bled, That the times for commencing and completing the construction of the bridge across the Cumberland River, at or near Center Point, in Monroe County, Kentucky, authorized to be built by the State Highway Commission, Commonwealth of Kentucky, by the Act of Congress approved May 18, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from May 18, 1929. SEC. 2. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929.
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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1552

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CHs. 516-519 . 1929. 1501 CHAP. 516 .-An Act To extend the times for commencing and completing March 2,1929. the construction of a bridge across the Cumberland River at or near Smithland, [H .R . 16386 .1 Kentucky. [Public, No. 942.] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Re pres enta tive s of the Cumberland River. United States of America in Congress assembled, That the times for Time extended for commencing and completing the construction of the bridge across the bridging, at Smith- Cumberland River, at or near Smithland, Kentucky, authorized to be built by the State Highway Commission, Commonwealth of Ken- tucky, by the Act of Congress approved May 18, 1928, are hereby Ante, p.sos. extended one and three years, respectively, from May 18, 1929. SEC. 2. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amendment. expressly reserved. Approv ed, Ma rch 2, 1929. CHAP. 517 .-An Act To extend the times for commencing and completing March eh 2, 1929. g	[H. R. 16385.] the construction of a bridge across the Cumberland River at or near Canton, [Public, No. 943.] Kentucky. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the times for Cumberland River. f Time extended far commencing and completing the construction of the bridge across bridging, ging, at Canton, the Cumberland River, at or near Canton, Kentucky, authorized to be built by the State Highway Commission, Commonwealth of Ante, p. 607. Kentucky, by the Act of Congress approved May 18, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from May 18, 1929. SEC. 2. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amendment. expressly reserved. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativ es of the Cumberland River, United States of America in Congress assembled, That the times for south Fork of, commencing and completing the construction of the bridge across Time extended for the South Fork of the Cumberland River, at or near Burnside, xy gi•g' at llurnside, Pulaski County, Kentucky, authorized to be built by the State High- Ante, p. 612. way Commission, Commonwealth of Kentucky, by the Act of Con- gress approved May 18, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from May 18, 1929. SEC. 2 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amen dment ' expressly reserved. Approv ed, Ma rch 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. CHAP. 519 .-An Act To authorize the Secretary of war to accept title to a [H. R. 16169.] certain tract of land adjacent to the Indiana Harbor Ship Canal at East Chicago, [Public, No. 945 .] Indiana. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Indiana Harbor Ship United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary Canal, of War, on behalf of the United States, is authorized and directed Acceptance of title of to accept from the East Chicago Company title, free and clear of a,, Chicago, Ind. at all encumbrances and without cost to the United States, to a tract of land adjacent to the Indiana Harbor Ship Canal at East Chicago, Indiana, and described as follows Part of the southeast quarter section 20, township 37 north, range Description. 9 west of the second principal meridian, in the city of East Chicago, Approv ed, Ma rch 2, 1929. CHAP. 518 .-An Act To extend the times for the March 2, 1929. commencing and completing g [H. R. 16383.] construction o f a bridge across th e South Fork of the Cumberland River at or [Public, No. 944.] near Burnside, Pulaski County, Kentucky.

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Page:Devonshire Characters and Strange Events.djvu/338

the assizes held at the castle of Exeter 14 August, 1682, three poor old women from Bideford—Temperance Lloyd, aged eighty years, Mary Trembles, and Susanna Edwards—were tried for witchcraft, were found guilty, and were executed on 25 August ensuing.

They had all previously been examined before Thomas Gist, Mayor of Bideford, and John Davie, Alderman, and also by the Rector. Before these worthies they had made full confession of their misdeeds, but to what an extent they had been drawn on by leading questions appears from the proces verbal of these examinations.

The worst of the three women was Temperance Lloyd, "intemperate Temperance" as she is called in one account.

According to the information of Dorcas Coleman, she had suffered from prickings in her body. She had consulted a physician, Dr. Beare, and he had told her that he could do nothing for her, as she was bewitched. When Susanna Edwards entered the room of Dorcas, the deponent was sitting in her chair speechless, but on seeing Susanna she slid out of her seat and tried to scramble towards her so as with her nails to draw blood, for by that means alone can a spell be broken that has been cast by a witch.

Grace Thomas also complained of pricking pains 274


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Bondies v. Sherwood

THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas, sitting in admiralty.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

The District Court decreed that the libellants (Sherwood, McClelland, and McGinnis) should recover the sum of fifty per cent. salvage upon $5,150, which sum was adjudged to the libellants against said steamboat Kate, and against George Bondies, the owner thereof; the money to be raised by a sale of the steamboat, and, in case of a deficiency, execution was to issue against Bondies, to be levied and collected on the estate, real and personal, credits and effects, of the said Bondies, wherever the same may be found.

From this decree Bondies appealed to this court.

It was submitted upon a printed brief by Mr. Hale and Mr. Sherwood for the appellants, no counsel appearing for the appellees.

The counsel for the appellants, as the principal point in the case, contended that the libellants could not set up that the contract had been mutually abandoned, and their claim to be aggrieved by the refusal of Bondies to comply with its terms. They must rest upon their allegation of a rescission of the contract, of which there is no proof whatever.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Bondies v. Sherwood


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1553

 1502 March 2, 1929. [H. R. 7024.] C H A P. 52 0 .-An Act Grant ing the consent of C ongress to compacts or agree- [Public, No. 946 .] ments between the States of Colorado and New Mexico with respect to the division and apportionment of the waters of the Rio Grande, San Juan, and Las Animas Rivers and all other streams in which such States are jointly interested. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress is hereby given to the States of Colorado and New Mexico to negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements providing for an equitable division and apportionment between such States of the water supply of the Rio Grande, San Juan, and Las Animas Rivers and of the streams tributary thereto and of all other streams in which such States are jointly interested. SEc. 2 . Such conse nt is given upon c onditi on that a rep resent ative of the United States from any department of the United States Government, to be appointed by the President, shall participate in the negotiations and shall make report to Congress of the proceed- ings and of any compact or agreement entered into. Other than the compensation and expenses of such representative the United States shall not be liable for any expenses in connection with such negotia- tions, compact or agreement. The payment of such expenses of such repre senta tive are autho rized to be pa id fr om th e ap propr iatio ns for cooperative and general investigations for the Bureau of Recla- mation. SEc. 3. No such compact or agreement shall be binding or obliga- tory upon either of such States unless and until it has been approved by the legislature of each of such States and by the Congress of the United States. SEc. 4 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is herewith express ly res erved. Approved, March 2, 1929. Colorado and New Mexico. C ons ent given for compacts between, for equitable division of wate r supply of Rio Grande, etc ., rivers. Feder al representa- tive to take part in negotiations, and re- port to Congress. Expenses limited. Reclamation fund to be used . Compact subject to approval of each Legis- lature and Congress. Amen dment . March 2, 1929. [H. R.6497.) [Publ ic, No. 9 47 .1 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS . SESS. I L Cixs . 519-521 . 1929 . Lake Count y Indiana, described as follows, to wit : Begirminat the point of intersection of a line parallel to and one hundred -feet west of the east line with a line parallel to and one hundred feet south of the north line o f said south east qu arter sectio n 20; the nce west on last-described line four hundred and fifty feet; thence south- easterly on a straight line six hundred and forty-four feet to a point in a line parallel to and one hundred feet west of the east line of the southeast quarter section 20 aforesaid; and thence north on last- described line four hundred and fifty feet to the point of beginning, containing two and three thou sand two hundred and thirty-seven ten thousandths acres. Approved, March 2, 1929. C H A P . 5210 An Act Granting the con sent of Congress to c ompacts or agree- ments between the States of New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas with respect to the division and apportionment of the waters of the Rio Grande, Pecos, and Canadian or Red Rivers, and all other streams in which such States are jointly interested. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the New Mex ico , Okl a- homa, and Texas. United States o f America in Congress assembled, That the consent co ns ent given for compacts between, for of Congress is hereby given to the States of New Mexico, Oklahoma, equitable division of and Texas to negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements pro- water supply of Rio Grande, etc ., rivers. viding for an equitable division and apportionment between such States of the water supply of the Rio Grande, Pecos, and Canadian or Red Rivers, and of the streams tributary thereto, and of all other streams in which such States are jointly interested.

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text: Talk:Bondies v. Sherwood

title: Talk:Bondies v. Sherwood


text:
Bondies v. Sherwood/Opinion of the Court

The appellees, describing themselves as ship carpenters, residing in Galveston, filed their libel in the district court of Texas against the steamboat Kate, and against Bondies, late master and owner, in a 'cause of salvage, civil and maritime.'

They charge that the steamboat left the port of Galveston, for ports and places on the Trinity river, in said district of Texas, laden with merchandise. That the boat was snagged and sunk in the river near Morse's bluff, in Liberty county.

That on the 24th of April, 1856, the libellants entered into an article of agreement, under seal, with Bondies, who had become sole owner of both cargo and vessel, to raise the vessel.

In this agreement, the libellants covenant to proceed with the necessary boats, apparatus, &c., and to raise the steamboat at their own cost in fourteen days after their arrival at the place where it lay, provided they were not hindered by high water; when raised, the boat to be taken to Galveston. Bondies covenants to convey the boat to them, on their payment to him of four thousand dollars, and also to subrogate them to all his claims against the cargo. But, in the mean time, until the covenants of libellants were performed, the legal possession of the boat and cargo was to be and remain in Bondies.

The libel alleges that 'this agreement was mutually given up and abandoned.' But this averment is not sustained by the evidence. On the contrary, it appears that the libellants proceeded under their contract to raise the vessel, but did not succeed till some time in July. The boat and merchandise being much injured in the operation and by the delay, it turned out that the costs and expenses would exceed the whole value of the boat and cargo when recovered. The bargain was therefore an unprofitable one, and the libellants concluded to repudiate it, and filed this libel for salvage.

Without adverting to the numerous other facts developed in the history of this case, but which cannot affect its merits, it is very plain, that assuming the services rendered by these mechanics to be in the nature of salvage services, and that a court of admiralty had jurisdiction to enforce the contract both against the owner and the boat as a maritime contract, yet the libellants, by their own showing, cannot recover under the contract. And it is equally clear that they cannot repudiate their contract, and libel the vessel far salvage.

(See the Mulgrave, 2 Hagg. Adm., 269, and Abbot on Shipping, 706.)

For this reason alone, the libel must be dismissed.

But there are two other questions which arise on the face of this record, and which it will not be necessary to decide, but which ought not to pass without notice, lest an inference should be drawn from our silence that the court considered them of no importance, or intended to decide them in favor of libellants:

1. By the 19th rule prescribed by this court for practice in the courts of admiralty, it is ordered, that 'in all suits for salvage the suit may be in rem against the property saved, OR in personam against the party at whose request and for whose benefit the salvage service has been performed.' By reference to Mr. Conklin's treatise, page 42, it will be found that it is the prevailing opinion that both cannot be joined in the same libel. The point has not been brought before this court, and we notice it now only to show that it is not now decided.

2. The libel shows that the steamboat was engaged in the internal trade of the State of Texas, proceeding from a port in the same, up a river wholly within the same. It is not even alleged that she had a coasting license. That a court of admiralty had jurisdiction in such a case, or that the maritime law of wreck and salvage could be applied to it, are questions not made by the pleadings nor noticed in the argument, and therefore are not decided by the court.

Let the libel be dismissed, with costs.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1554

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHs . 521-523 . 1929 . SEC. 2. S uch cons ent is g iven upo n condit ion that a repre sentativ e of the United States fr om the Department of the Interior, to be appointed by the President, shall participate in the negotiations and shall make report to Congress of the proceedings and of any compact or agreement entered into. Other th an the compensation and expenses of such representative the United States shall not be liable for any expenses in connection with such negotiations, com- pact or agreement. The payment of such expenses of such represen- tative are auth orized t o be pai d from t he appro priation s for co oper- ative and general investigations for the Bureau of Reclamation. SEC. 3 . No such compact or agreement shall be binding or obliga- tory upon either of such States unless and until it has been approved by the legislature of each of suc h States and by the Congress of the United States. SEC. 4 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is herewith express ly reser ved. Approved, March 2, 1929. CHAP. 522.-An Act Granting the consent of Congress to compacts or agree- ments between the States of New Mexico and Oklahoma with respect to the division and apportionment of the waters of the Cimarron River and all other stream s in wh ich su ch Stat es are jointl y inter ested. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress is hereby given to the States of New Mexico and Oklahoma to negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements providing for an equitable division and apportionment between such States of the water supply of the Cimarron River and of the streams tributary thereto and of all other streams in which such States are jointly inte res ted. SEC. 2 . Such consent is given upon condition that a representative of the United States fr om the Department of the Interior, to be appointed by the President, shall participate in the negotiations and shall make report to Congress of the proceedings and of any compact or agreement en te red into. Other than the compensation and expenses of such representative the United States shall not be liable for any expenses in connection with such negotiations, compact, or agreement. The payment of such expenses of such representative are authorized to be paid from the appropriations for cooperative and general investigations for the Bureau of Reclamation . SEC. 3. No such compact or agreement shall be binding or obliga- tory upon either of such States unless and until it has been approved by the legislature of each of such States and by the Congress of the Unite d Sta tes. SEC. 4 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby express ly reser ved. Appr ove d, March 2, 1929. Amendme nt. March 2, 1929. [A. R. 6496.] [Public, No. 948 .1 New Mexico and Oklahoma. Consent given for compacts between, for equitable division of water supply of Cimar- ron, etc., rivers. Federal re presenta. tive to take part in negotiations, and re- port to Congress. Expe nses limi ted. 1503 Federal re pre sen ta- tive to take part in negotiations, and re- port to Congress. Exp enses lim ited. Reclamation fund to be used . Com pact subj ect to approval of each Legis . lature and Congress. Reclamation funds to be used . Compact subject to approval of each Legis. lature and Congress. Amendmen t. March 2, 1929 .	[S . 2366 .] [Public, No . 949.1 CHAP. 523 .-An Act To amend subchapter 1 of chapter 18 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia rel ating to degr ee-conferrin g institutio ns. Be it en act ed by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Con gress asse mbled, That subchapter 1 C District of Columbia of chapter 18 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia be Vol. 31, p. 1282, amended. amend ed by addin g the foll owing new sections : Degr ee-c onfer ring in- " SEC. 586a . The fee payable to the recorder of deeds for filing Fee . g F for filing incorpo- the certificate of incorporation under this subchapter shall be $25 . rati on ce rtifi cate.

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text: Talk:Bondies v. Sherwood/Opinion of the Court


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1555

 1504 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 523. 1929 . License required fo r "SEC . 586b. No institution heretofore or hereafter incorporated power of any institu- tion to confer a degr ee . under the provisions of this subchapter shall have the power to confer any degree in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, nor shall any institution incorporated outside of the District of Columbia or any person or persons individually or as a partnership or association Board of Education or otherwise, undertaking to confer any degree, operate in the Dis- to issue . trict of Columbia, unless under and by virtue of a license from the Ev iden ce re quir ed . Board of Education of the District of Columbia, which before grant- Reputation and qual- ing any such license may require satisfactory evidence- ifications of applicants . " 1 . That in the case of an individual or any unincorporated group of individuals he, or a majority of them, or in the case of an incorpo- rated institution, a majority of the trustees, directors, or managers of said institution are persons of good repute and qualified to conduct an institution of learning. Co nditi ons for a ward - "2 . That any such degree shall be awarded only after such quan- ing d egrees . Provisos . tit y and quality of work shal l have been co mpleted as ar e usually Correspondence, etc ., course requirement . required by reputable institutions awarding the same degree
 * Pro-

v i de d, That if more t han one-half the requiremen ts for any de gree Diplomas not issued are earned by correspondence, or extramural study, such fact shall for medicine, dentistry, be conspicuously noted upon the diploma conferred : Provided fur- etc ., wok ther, That no diploma shall be issued conferring a degree in medi- cine or any healing art, or in dentistry, for study pursued or work done by correspondence." of school app lic ant fdegqualifications "3. That applicants for said degree possess the usual high-school for degree . qualifications at the time of their candidacy therefor. Considerations of "4. That considering the number and character of the courses co urse facu lty q uali fi- cations, equipment, offered, the faculty is of reasonable number and properly quali ° etc ° fled, and that the institution is possessed of suitable classroom, laboratory, and library equipment . Ap plic ation to be " SEC. 586c. Application for the license referred to in the preced- th eBoad. secretary of ing section shall be in writing upon forms prepared under the direc- tion of the Board of Education, and shall be filed with the secre- tary of the said board, whose duty it shall be, in case the institution copy of license to so licensed is incorporated under the laws of the District of Colum- recorder of deeds to be bia, to forward a copy of said license to the recorder of deeds for e upon incorp o- ration the District of Columbia who shall indorse upon the certificate of ration certificate. incorporation the fact that said license has been issued. The pl oyed. Personnel to be em- Board of Education is hereby authorized to employ the personnel of the public-school system of the District of employ so far as the same may be necessary, for the proper performance of its duties under this Act, and it shall be the duty of all public officers and bureaus of the Federal Government concerned with educational mat ters to rende r such advice and assistanc e to the Boar d of Edu- cation as it may from time to time consider necessary or desirable for the better performance of its duties under this Act. Revocation oflicense .license . " SEC . 5 86 d . A license once issued m ay be revoked by said Board of Education for noncompliance on the part of any individual or individuals, association, or incorporated institution so licensed with de eds Copy if ao District recorder o individuals, the provisions of section 586b of this Act . Upon the revocation porat ion, and enter ed notifica- on o tion to be entered f any such license it shall be the duty of the secretary of the certificate. Board of Education, in the case of an institution incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, to forward a copy of the rev ocation to th e recorder of deeds for the District of Columbia, who shall cause a notation to be placed upon the certificate of incorporation to the effect that its authority to confer degrees has Notice Provisos' been revoked : Provided, however, That thirty days' notice shall first tice to association and r hearings earing s by the have been given to such individual or individuals, association, or to the trustees, directors, or managers of said institutions, with full opportunity to be heard by said Board of Education at either a public or nonpublic session thereof, as may be desired by such indi-

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1556

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHs. 523, 524 . 1929 . 1505 vidual or individuals, association, or the institution threatened with revocation of its license, and the evidence upon which said board li cen see . of evidence to shall act in the revocation of such license shall be co mmitte d to writing u nder the dire ction of the board, and upo n application therefor a copy thereof furnished to such individual or individuals, association, or the institution whose license has been revoked : And Review a llowed to District Supreme provided further, That any party aggrieved by the action of said Court, if license refused board in refusing to license or in revoking a license previously or revoked. granted may have the action of the said Board of Education reviewed by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia at an equity term thereof. " SEC. 586e . No institution incorporated under the provisions of Using in the title the words, United States or this subchapter shall use as its title, in whole or in part, the words others implying official Governme ntal connec- United States, Federal, American, national, or civil service, or any tion, etc ., forbidden . other words which might reasonably imply an official connection with the Government of the United States, or any of its departments, burea us, or agenc ies, or of the go vernme nt of the District of Columbia, no r shall any s uch instituti ons advertise or claim the power to issue degrees under the authority of Congress or otherwise than under the authority of the license granted to them by the Board of Education as hereinbefore provided . The prohibitio n in Appl icab le to out side this section contained shall be deemed to include and is hereby inthesDis doi ng t ict bnsiness declared applicable to any individual or individuals, association, or incorporation outside of the District of Columbia which shall undertake to do business in the Distri ct of Columbia or to confer degree s or ce rtific ates th erein, and an y such individ ual or indivi duals, Penalty for violation. association, or incorporation violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to the penalty hereinafter in section 586f provided. "SEC. 586f . Any person or persons who shall, directly or Punishment for vio- indirectly, participate in, aid, or assist in the conferring of any Act g provisions •Stn's degree by any unlicensed individual or individuals, association, or institution, o r by any indi vidual or ind ividuals, association, or institution whose license has been revoked, or shall advertise or claim any authority to confer any such degree, except in pursuance of the provisions of this Act, or who shall violate the provisions of the section of this Act immediately preceding shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia shall be punished by a fine of not more than $2,000, or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both ." Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. CHAP. 524 .-An Act For the relief of soldiers who were discharged from the 	[8 .3736 .] Army during the W orld War because of misrepresentation of age. [Public, No. 950 .] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o America in Congress assembled That in the admin- Arm y f Soldiers dis charg ed istration of any laws conferring rights, privileges, or benefits upon for fraudulently mis- representing age, serv- honorably discharged soldiers of the United States Army, their in g as enlisted men widows and dep endent childr en a soldier who served as an enlisted con son sdd ere d ho wa r, honorably man between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, both dates di sc hla gp.208 . inclusive, and who was discharged for fraudulent enlistment on account of misrepresentation of his age, shall hereafter be held and consid ered t o have been disch arged honora bly f rom th e mili tary service on the date of his actual separation therefrom if his service otherwise was such as would have entitled him to an honorable dis- charge : Provided, That no back pay or allowances shall accrue by No viso n pay, etc. reason of the passage of this Act, Approved, March 2, 1929.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1557

 1506 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Cu. 525. 1929 . March 2, 1M. CHAP. 525 .-An Act Authorizing Jed P. Ladd, his heirs, legal representatives, [S. 5045 .]	and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across Lake Champlain [Public, loo.951.3 from East Alburg, Vermont, to west Swanton, V ermont. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the Lake Cham plain. Jed P. Ladd may United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to bridge, at East Alburg facilitate interstate commerce, improve the postal service, and to West swauton,Vt. provide for military and other purposes, Jed P. Ladd, of Burlington, Vermont, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, be, and he is hereby, authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approach es thereto ac ross Lake Cha mplain, at a p oint suitable to the interests of navigation, between a point at or near East Construction. Alburg, Vermont, and a point at or near West Swanton, Vermont, Vol.34, p. 84. in accordance with the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906, and subject to the conditions and limitations con- tained in this Act. Right to acquire real estate, etc ., for location, SE C. 2. There is hereby conferred upon Jed P. Ladd, his heirs, approaches, etc. legal representatives, and assigns all such rights and powers to enter upon lands and to acquire, condemn, occupy, possess, and use real estate and other property needed for the location, construction, operation, and maintenance of such bridge and its approaches as are possessed by railroad corporations for railroad purposes or by bridge corporations for bridge purposes in the State in which such real estate or other property is situated, upon making just compensation therefor, to be ascertained and paid according to the laws of such co ndemnation pro- ceedings . State, and the proceedings therefor shall be the same as in the condemnation or expropriation of property for public purposes in such State. Tolls authorzied. SEC. 3. The said Jed P. Ladd, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns are hereby authorized to fix and charge tolls for transit over such bridge, and the rates of toll so fixed shall be the legal rates Vol.34,p.85. until changed by the Secretary of War under the authority con- tained in the Act of March 23, 1906. Acquisition author- SEC. 4. After the completion of such bridge, as determined by the fzed, after completion, by Vermont, etc . Secretary of War, either the State of Vermont, any public agency or political subdivision of such State within or adjoining which any part of such bridge is located, or any two or more of them jointly, may at any time acquire and take over all right, title, and interest in such bridge and its approaches and any interest in real property necessary therefor, by purchase or by condemnation or expropria- tion, in accordance with the laws of such State governing the acqui- sit ion of privat e property fo r public purpo ses by condem nation or Compensation if ac- expropriation. If at any time after the expiration of five years quired by condemna- tion. afte r th e co mple tion of such bri dge the same is acqu ired by cond em- nation or expropriation, the amount of damages or compensation to be allowed shall not include good will, going value, or prospective Limitations. revenues or profits but shall be limited to the sum of (1) the actual cost of constructing such bridge and its approaches, less a reason- able deduction for actual depreciation in value ; (2) the actual cost of acquiring such interests in real property ; (3) actual financing and promotion costs, not to exceed 10 per centum of the sum of the cost of constructing the bridge and its approaches and acquiring such interests in real property ; and (4) actual expenditures for necessary improvements. To ns un der state, etc ., operation. SEC. 5. If such bridge shall at any time be taken over or acquired by the State or public agencies or political subdivision thereof, or by either of them, as provided in section 4 of this Act, and if tolls ation, Rat es sinking fund, are thereafter charged for the use thereof, the rates of toll shall be so adjudged as to provide a fund sufficient to pay for the reasonable

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text:
Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.

It was an action of trespass on the case brought by Chaffee against the Boston Belting Company, for an infringement upon a patent granted for the manufacture of India-rubber, granted to Chaffee in 1836, and extended for seven years from the 31st day of August, 1850.

The respective claims of the plaintiff and defendants are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

The presiding judge in the court below ruled that the defendants had a right to continue the same machinery for the same purposes, and in conformity with the directions contained in the specification, after the expiration and renewal of the letters patent, and, consequently, that the plaintiff could not recover.

To this ruling the plaintiff excepted, and brought the case up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Jenckes and Mr. Clarence A. Seward for the plaintiff in error, no counsel appearing for the defendants.

The case having gone off upon a single point, the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error upon that point is alone reported.

The court below erred in charging the jury, that, under their title, the defendants had a right to continue to use the same machinery for the same purposes. This charge was predicated upon an assumption of title in the defendants, which they had not proved. They had proved that Goodyear, while the owner of the original term of the patent, had granted to Edwards a license for a specific purpose. They did not prove any privity between themselves and that license. They did not prove an assignment of that license to themselves. They did not prove the assent of Edwards to their use of the plaintiff's patent in the manufacture of the articles specified in the license. The only purpose for which the license seems to have been introduced was to identify the uses to which the defendants applied the plaintiff's patent, to wit: 'for the preparation and application of India-rubber to the manufacture of the articles mentioned and described in the indenture between Goodyear and Edwards.' This identification was not a justification of the use, by the defendants, of the plaintiff's patent. It proved satisfactorily the nature and extent of that use; but it proved nothing more. It did not prove that the defendants were rightfully in the enjoyment of the thing patented, during the original term of the patent.

The defendants, therefore, having failed to establish any privity between themselves and Goodyear, the owner of the original term of the patent, failed also to establish and right, as against the plaintiff, to use his patent during its extended term. The defendants, upon the record, appear as naked infringers of the plaintiff's patent.

The charge of the court below, therefore, was erroneous in assuming the existence of a license from Goodyear to the defendants, and entitles the plaintiff to a reversal of the judgment and to a venire facias de novo.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1558

 SEVENTI ETH C ONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 525. 1929 . 1507 cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the bridge and its approaches under economical management, and to provide a sinking fund sufficient to amortize the amount paid therefor, including reasonabl e interest and financing co st, as soon a s possible und er reasonable charges, but within a period of not to exceed twenty Maintenance as free years from the date of acquiring the same. After a sinking fund bridge, etc., after amor- sufficient for such amortization shall have been so provided, such tizing costs, etc. bridge shall thereafter be maintained and operated free of tolls or the rates of toll shall thereafter be so adjusted as to provide a fund of not to exceed the am ount necessar y for the pro per maintenanc e, repair, a nd operation o f the bridge and its appro aches under ec o- Record of expendi- nomical management. An accurate record of the amount paid for tures and receipts. acquiring the bridge and its approaches, the actual expenditures for maintaining, repairing, and operating the same and of the daily tolls collected, shall be kept and shall be available for the information of all persons interested. SEC. 6 . Jed P. Ladd his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns sworn statement of 7 1 7 ) construction costs, etc ., shall wit hin ninety day s after the c ompletion of such bridge fi le t o e fi led after comp le- with the Secretary of War and with the highway department of the State of Vermont a sworn itemized statement showing the actual origi nal cos t of c onstruc ting th e brid ge and its app roache s, the actual cost of acquiring any interest in real property necessary therefor, Examination by Sec- and the actual financing and promotion costs . The Secretary of rotary of war . War may, and upon request of the highway department of such State shall, at any time within three years after the completion of such bridge, investigate such costs and determine the accuracy and the reasonableness of the costs alleged in the statement of cost so filed, and shall make a finding of the actual and reasonable costs of constructing, financing, and promoting such bridge . For the pur- pose of such investigation the said Jed P. Ladd, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, shall make available all of his records in c onnect ion wi th th e cons tructi on, fi nanci ng, an d prom otion Fin ding s of Secr etary thereof. The findings of the Secretary of War as to the reasonable conclusive. costs of construction, financing, and promotion of the bridge shall be conclusive for the purposes mentioned in section 4 of this Act, subject only to review in a court of equity for fraud or gross mistake. SEC. 7. The right to sell, assign, transfer, and mortgage all the conferred t0 sell, etc ., rights, powers, and privileges conferred by this Act is hereby ' granted to Jed P. Ladd, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns ; and any corporation to which or any person to whom such rights, powers, and privileges may be sold, assigned, or transferred, or who shall acquire the same by mortgage foreclosure or otherwise, is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise the same as fully as though conferred herein directly upon such corporation or persons. SEC. 8. All contracts made in connection with the construction of Constr uction con - tracts bridge authorized by this Act and which shall involve the expend- bdder. obelettolowest iture of more than $5,000 shall be let by competitive bidding. Such contracts shall be advertised for a reasonable time in some Advertising, etc. newspaper of general ci rculation pub lished in the States in whi ch the bridge is located and in the vicinity thereof ; sealed bids shall be required and the contracts shall be awarded to the lowest respon- sible bidder. Verified copies or abstracts of all bids received and of the bid or bids accepted shall be promptly furnished to the high- way departments of the States in which such bridge is located. A violations. s void for failure to comply in good faith with the provisions of this section shall render null and void any contract made in violation thereof, and the Secretary of War may, after hearings, order the suspen- sion of all work upon such bridge until the provisions of this section shall have been fully complied with.

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text: Talk:Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company

title: Talk:Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company