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Bruce v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The writ of error, in this case, is brought upon a judgment obtained by the United States in the circuit court for the district of Missouri.

It appears that Bruce, one of the plaintiffs in error, was appointed agent for the Sioux tribe of Indians, in 1844, and gave the bond on which this suit is brought, for the faithful performance of his official duty. Franklin Steele, the other plaintiff in error, and John Atchison, were sureties in the bond; and Atchison having died, pending the suit in the circuit court, it abated as to him, and the judgment in favor of the United States was rendered against the plaintiffs in error. The breach assigned is, that there was a balance in Bruce's hands, on the 1st of July, 1848, of $10,191.69, which he refused to turn over and pay to the United States, when required to do so.

Bruce had held the same appointment for four years, before he received the one of which we are now speaking, and his account with government begins in May, 1840.

At the trial, the United States offered in evidence a transcript from the books of the treasury department, stating the account of Bruce from the time of his first appointment. According to this account, the balance above mentioned was due to the United States, but Bruce claimed various additional credits, amounting altogether to $6,931.68, which had been disallowed or suspended by the accounting officers, as appears by the closing account, usually called the statement of differences.

The United States further offered the transcript of a letter from the second auditor, whose duty it was to settle this account, addressed to Bruce, stating the balance due from him, according to the settlement in the auditor's office, and inclosing him the statement of differences above mentioned, and directing him to turn over to his successor in office the balance of the public money in his hands; and also offered the deposition of his successor, stating that he had made the demand, but that Bruce had failed to comply with it.

The defendants, therefore, objected to the admissibility of this evidence, but the court overruled the objection, and this constitutes the first exception in the case.

The objection is stated in general terms, and applies to the whole evidence offered by the United States, without pointing out the particular ground of the objection. But we understand from the argument here, that the defendants in the court below supposed that the transcript from the books of the treasury was not, of itself, evidence that he received the several sums of money charged against him, and that authenticated copies of his receipts ought to have accompanied the transcript.

But this objection cannot be maintained. The act of 1797 provides, that a transcript from the books and proceedings of the treasury, certified by the register, and authenticated under the seal of the department, shall be admitted in evidence. And the act of March 3, 1817, directs that all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or creditors, shall be settled and adjusted in the treasury department. The act makes the auditors and comptrollers, by whom the accounts in the war and navy departments are settled, officers of the treasury department. And the provision above mentioned in the act of 1797, in relation to transcripts from the books and proceedings in the treasury, is extended to the accounts of the war and navy departments; and the certificates of the auditors respectively charged with the settlement of these accounts, are to have the same effect as that directed in the former act of congress to be signed by the register.

The accounts in question belonged to the war department, during the period of Bruce's agency, and were adjusted and certified by the proper officers. There could, therefore, be no objection to the evidence on that score.

Nor do we see how any valid objection can be made to the items charged against Bruce in the transcript. The books of the accounting officer necessarily contain the charges against, as well as the credits of, the disbursing officer. The accounts could not be adjusted on the books in any other manner; and the transcript, or, in other words, the copy of the entire account as it stands on the books, (which must include debits as well as credits,) are made evidence by the law. Nor do we see any reason for restricting the words of the acts of congress within narrower limits than the words plainly imply. The accounts are adjusted by public sworn officers, bound to do equal justice to the government and the individual. They are records of the proper departments, and always open to the inspection of the party interested. And, after all, the transcript is only prim a facie evidence; and, if the party disputes any of the charges against him, it is in his power, by a proper application to the court, supported by sufficient evidence, to obtain the original vouchers on which he was charged, if necessary to his defence, and to show that the debit against him is erroneous.

If, indeed, it appeared on the face of the account that an item was charged against him which had not come to his hands in the regular and ordinary operations of the government, and of which, therefore, the accounting officers could have no official knowledge, the transcript would not be evidence to support that charge. But no such debit is found in this transcript; for, according to the regular and ordinary practice of the government, in cases of this description, the agent receives from his predecessor in the office the money and property remaining in his hands; and other funds, which it may be his duty to disburse, are sometimes sent through the general superintendent at St. Louis, sometimes by a treasury deaft, forwarded directly to himself, and sometimes through the agency of a military or other officer of the government. And these advances pass through the proper offices of the treasury and war departments, (now through the department of the interior,) and the agent is charged upon his own receipts and warrants, issued in his favor.

This appears to have been done in the case before us. Every payment or advance to him is separately charged, and the time when it came to his hands, as well as the name of the person from whom he received it. The copies of his receipts, or of the vouchers for the charge, would have given him no further information; and the acts of congress above referred to do not require them to be annexed to or accompany the account, but, in plain and unambiguous terms, makes the transcript itself evidence.

Cases analogous to this have, on several occasions, come before the court, and have all been decided upon the construction of the acts of congress above stated. Smith v. United States, 5 Pet. 292; Coxe and Dick v. United States, 6 Ib. 202; and Hoyt v. United States, 10 How. 109, are all in point. And the cases of the United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 29, and United States v. Jones, 8 Ib. 376, which are sometimes supposed to maintain a contrary doctrine, are perfectly consistent with the other decisions and with the one now given.

For, in the case of the United States v. Buford, (who was a deputy commissary,) the money had been placed in his hands by Morrison, who was a deputy quartermaster, without authority and contrary to his duty, and the accounting officers refused to credit it in Morrison's account. Upon application to congress, however, a law was passed authorizing the accounting officers to allow the credit, upon receiving from Morrison an assignment to the United States of all his right to the money mentioned in the receipt, which he had taken from Buford when he advanced him the money. Morrison made the assignment accordingly; and thereupon an account was stated on the books of the treasury, charging Buford as debtor to Morrison for the amount advanced to him. And a transcript from this account was offered in evidence. It is set out in the report of the case, and it is evident that this account was not within the letter or spirit of the act of congress. It certainly could not brove the receipt of Buford; for the whole transaction was outside of the regular operations of the government, and the accounting officers could not be presumed to have any official knowledge of the unauthorized transactions between the parties.

And so, again, as to the case of the United States v. Jones, who was surety in the bond of an army contractor. The transcript contained charges against the contractor for bills of exchange, drawn by him and paid to other persons. The court regarded this operation as not within the ordinary mode of proceeding in the department, and that the accounting officers could not be presumed to have any knowledge of the drawing of those bills, or of their indorsement to others, and thereupon rejected these items. It will be seen, therefore, that the cases of the United States v. Buford and United States v. Jones are distinguishable from the present case, as well as from the other cases above referred to, and stand on different ground.

Indeed, none of the debits in the transcript appear to have been disputed by the plaintiffs in error, and no exception was taken to any one of them. The statement of differences between the accounting officers and Bruce shows that there was no difference as to the amount with which he was chargeable. The difference consisted in a variety of credits which he claimed, and which had been suspended or refused at the treasury; and the testimony offered by him, after his objection to the transcript, had been overruled, and the document admitted in evidence was altogether directed to support the credits he claimed, and not to impeach and one of the debits against him.

The circuit court were therefore right in overruling his objection to the testimony offered by the United States.

We proceed to the next exception.

After the testimony on both sides was closed, the plaintiffs in error asked for the following instructions to the jury, all of which were refused, and the direction which follows them given:--

'1. That unless they believe, from the evidence, that Bruce was legally appointed and commissioned as such Indian agent, they will find for defendant, Steele; and they are further instructed that the commission, or a legally certified copy thereof, is the highest and best evidence thereof.

'2. If the jury find from the evidence that Bruce was a defaulter at the time of the execution of the bond sued on, they will find for defendant, Steele, to the extent of such preexisting default.

'3. Defendant, Steele, is not liable for any defalcation existing on the part of Bruce prior to the 29th of August, 1844.

'4. Defendant, Steele, is not liable as the surety of Bruce for any money received by Bruce before he was sub-Indian agent.

'5. The original receipts of Bruce, or certified copies of the originals on file, is the best evidence of any moneys received by him, and the jury will disregard the transcript of accounts from the books, unless they believe it was out of the power of plaintiff to produce the receipts, or certified copies thereof.'

These instructions were all refused, and 'the court directed the jury, that if, when Bruce was reappointed agent, in 1844, he had moneys in his hands of the United States which he received as agent under his previous commission, then he was bound to apply and account for such moneys under the second commission, and his sureties are bound under the bond which is sued on. But if Bruce had appropriated the moneys received under the previous commission, to his own use, when this bond was given, then the first set of sureties are responsible for the moneys thus illegally appropriated, and these defendants are not liable, and the burden of proof is on the defendants to show that Bruce had illegally appropriated the moneys before the bond sued on was given.'

We think the court were right in refusing the prayers, and in giving this instruction. In relation to the first instruction asked for, it certainly was not necessary for the government to produce the commission of Bruce, or a certified copy. The bond upon which the suit was brought recites that he was appointed Indian agent, and the obligors in the bond are therefore estopped from denying it.

And as to the 5th, it is but a repetition of the objection to the transcript, which we have already disposed of.

And as relates to the 2d, 3d, and 4th, we think the court was right in refusing them, and giving the instruction as above stated. When Bruce received his second commission, if any money or property which he received in his former term of office still remained in his hands, he was bound to apply and account for it, under the appointment he then received.

The terms of the bond clearly require it, and his sureties are bound for it. It was so much money in his hands to be disbursed and applied upon his second appointment. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the government would have no security for it. For, if it was not wasted or misapplied during his first official term, but still remained in his hands to be applied according to his official duty, the sureties in his first bond would not be liable. For there would in that case be no default or breach of duty in that term of office; and if afterwards wasted or misapplied, it would be a breach of duty in that official term for which Steele was one of his sureties.

Undoubtedly the sureties in the second term of office are not responsible for a default committed in his first. But if any part of the balance now claimed from him was misapplied during that period, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs in error to prove it. No officer, without proof, will be presumed to have violated his duty; and if Bruce had done so, Steele had a right, under the opinion of the circuit court, to show it and exonerate himself to that amount; but it could not be presumed, merely because there appears by the accounts to have been a balance in his hands at the expiration of his first term.

We see no error in the opinions of the circuit court, and the judgment must therefore be affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Missouri, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with interest at the same rate per annum that similar judgments bear in the courts of the State of Missouri.


text: Talk:Bruce v. United States/Opinion of the Court

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text:
Hendrickson v. Hinckley

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio.

On the 26th of October, 1851, Hendrickson, as survivor of Hendrickson and Campbell, filed a bill in the United States circuit court, for the district of Ohio, alleging that on the 21st day of April, 1848, Hinckley brought a suit on the law side of said court, on three promissory notes against said Hendrickson and one Andrew Campbell. That said Hendrickson and Campbell set up in their pleadings, and on the trial, for defences, the want of consideration, fraud in obtaining the notes, and payment. That the case was tried on these issues, by a jury, and thereupon a judgment was recovered against said defendants for $2,386.11, and costs of suit. That afterwards said Campbell and Hendrickson moved for a new trial, which, on consideration, was refused. That Campbell has since died insolvent. That before, and after said suit was brought, said Campbell and Hendrickson had a good set-off against said Hinckley, amounting to $3,337.85. That before the trial they consulted their counsel respecting it, and that both counsel and client concluded not to set it up on that trial. That, on the trial, said defendants were surprised, by the introduction, on the part of the plaintiff, of letters written by said Campbell, and to which the jury gave undue weight. That Hinckley is a non-resident of the State of Ohio, and has no property besides said judgment, in said State.

The bill then prays for a full discovery from the defendant, as to all the facts alleged, and on the grounds of fraud, surprise, non-residence of the defendant, Hinckley, and the equitable jurisdiction of courts of chancery over claims of only set-off, prays that the judgment be enjoined, and his claim be liquidated-and he offers to pay any balance which may be found to be due said Hinckley, on such final adjustment.

September 26, 1851, the writ of injunction issued. On the 7th of May, 1852, the defendant, Henckley, filed his answer, denying, seriatim, all the material allegations in the bill, and, under the rule of court, denied all equity therein, and prayed to have the same benefit from his answer as if he had demurred to the bill.

At the October term, 1852, the case was heard on the demurrer, the injunction dissolved, and the bill dismissed. From this decree said complainant appealed to this court.

The case was submitted, on printed arguments, by Mr. Hart, for the appellant, and Mr. Mills, for the appellee.

In order to explain the points made by counsel, it would be necessary to enter into a particular statement of the facts in the case. They are therefore omitted.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Hendrickson v. Hinckley


text: Talk:Hendrickson v. Hinckley

title: Talk:Hendrickson v. Hinckley


text:
Hendrickson v. Hinckley/Opinion of the Court

The complainant filed his bill in the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Ohio; and that court having ordered the bill to be dismissed, on a demurrer, for want of equity, the complainant appealed.

The object of the bill is to obtain relief against a judgment at law, founded on three promissory notes, signed by the complainant, and one Campbell, since deceased.

A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law, unless the complainant has an equitable defence, of which he could not avail himself at law, because it did not amount to a legal defence, or had a good defence at law, which he was prevented from availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of himself or his agents. ''Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 333; Creath v. Sims,'' 5 How. 192; Walker v. Robbins et al. 14 How. 584.

The application of this rule to the case stated in the bill, leaves the complainant no equity whatever.

The contract under which these notes were taken was made in December, 1841. One of the notes is dated in December, 1841, and the others in January, 1842. In April, 1848, suit was brought on the notes. In October, 1850, the trial was had and judgment recovered. The reasons alleged by the bill for enjoining the judgment are:--

1. That the consideration of the notes was the sale of certain property, and the complainant and Campbell were defrauded in that sale. But this alleged fraud was pleaded, in the action at law, as a defence to the notes, and the jury found against the defendants. Moreover, upwards of six years elapsed after the sale, an before the suit was brought; and the vendees, who do not pretend to have been ignorant of the alleged fraud during any considerable part of that period of time, did not offer to rescind the contract, nor did they, at any time, either return or offer to return the property sold.

2. This bill alleges certain promises to have been made by an agent of the defendant, concerning the time and mode of payment of the notes when they were given. These promises could not be availed of in any court, as a defence to the notes; for, to allow them such effect, would be to alter written contracts by parol evidence, which cannot be done in equity any more than at law, in the absence of fraud or mistake. Sprigg v. The Bank of Mount Pleasant, 14 Pet. 201.

But whatever substance there was in this defence, it was set up, at law, and upon this, also, the verdict was against the defendants; and the same is true of the alleged partial failure of consideration.

3. The next ground is, that on the trial at law, letters from the joint defendant, Campbell, containing admissions adverse to the defence, were read in evidence to the jury; and the bill avers that Campbell was not truly informed concerning the subjects on which he wrote, and that, until the letters were produced at the trial, the complainant was not aware of their existence, and so was surprised.

To this there are two answers, either of which is sufficient. The first is, that the complainant and Campbell being jointly interested in the purchase and ownership of the property for which these notes were given, and joint defendants in the action at law, and there being no allegation of any collusion between Campbell and the plaintiff in that action, the complainant cannot be allowed to allege this surprise. If he did not know what admissions Campbell had made, he might, and with the use of due diligence, would have known them; and he must be treated, in equity as well as at law, as if he had himself made the admissions.

Another answer is, that if there was surprise at the trial, motion for delay, as is practised in some circuits, or a motion for a new trial, according to the practice in others, afforded a complete remedy at law.

4. The complainant asserts that he has claims against the defendant, and he prays that, inasmuch as the defendant resides out of the jurisdiction of the court, these claims may be set off against the judgment recovered at law by the decree of the court upon this bill. But upon this subject the bill states, speaking of the action at law: 'Your orator frequently conferred with L. D. Campbell, one of his attorneys, in reference to the said cause, and frequently spoke to him of the claims which your orator and said Andrew Campbell had against the said Hinckley, as hereinafter specifically set forth; but the said Campbell, attorney, regarded the defence pleaded as so amply sufficient as that neither he nor your orator ever thought it necessary to exhibit said demands against said Henckley as matter of defence, could it even have been done consistently with the defence made as aforesaid.'

He purposely omitted to set off these alleged claims in the action at law, and now asks a court of equity to try these unliquidated claims and ascertain their amount, and enable him to have the same advantage which he has once waived, when it was directly presented to him in the regular course of legal proceedings. Courts of equity do not assist those whose condition is attributable only to want of due diligence, nor lend their aid to parties, who, having had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, have purposely omitted to avail themselves of it.

It is suggested that courts of equity have an original jurisdiction in cases of set-off, and that this jurisdiction is not taken away by the statutes of set-off, which have given the right at law. This may be admitted, though it has been found exceedingly difficult to determine what was the original jurisdiction in equity over this subject. 2 Story's Eq. 656, 664. But whatever may have been its exact limits, there can be no doubt that a party sued at law has his election to set off his claim, or resort to his separate action. And if he deliberately elects the last, he cannot come into a court of equity and ask to be allowed to make a different determination, and to be restored to the right which he has once voluntarily waived. Barker v. Elkins, 1 John. Ch. R. 465; Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason, 201.

Similar considerations are fatal to the plaintiff's claim for relief, on the ground that the defendant resides out of the State, and that therefore he should have the aid of a court of equity, to subject the judgment at law to the payment of the complainant's claim. When the complainant elected not to file these claims in set-off in the action at law, he knew that defendant, who was the plaintiff in that action, resided out of the State. If that fact was deemed by the complainant insufficient to induce him to avail himself of his complete legal remedy, it can hardly be supposed that it can induce a court of equity to interpose to create one for him. The question is not merely whether he now has a legal remedy, but whether he has had one and waived it. And as this clearly appears, equity will not interfere.

The decree of the court below is affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.


text: Talk:Hendrickson v. Hinckley/Opinion of the Court


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Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.

It was a branch of the case of Stevens v. Cady, reported in 14 How. 528, and the difference between the two cases is stated in the opinion of the court.

The decree of the circuit court was as follows:-- Decree.

This cause came on to be heard on the bill, answer, replication, depositions, and other papers in the case, and after the hearing, it is ordered by the court that the following entry be made on the minutes in relation to the same:--

'The court differ in opinion as to the effect of the sale of the copperplate, but agree that injunction cannot issue without a return of the money paid for the plate.'

And afterwards, at the same term, Mr. Stevens having the election to return the price of the plate or not, elected not to return the same, upon which the respondents move that the bill be dismissed, which is dismissed as follows:--

This cause having been heard on the bill, answer, and other pleadings therein, and the complainant having refused to return the price of the plate of the map in question as required by the court:

It is now, on motion of the respondents, and by the consideration of the court, ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said bill be and the same is hereby dismissed, with costs.

November term, A. D. 1849.

From this decree, Stevens appealed to this court.

It was submitted on a printed argument by the appellant, and argued by Mr. Ames, for the appellees.

Mr. Ames made the following points:--

1. The 7th section of the act of congress, approved February 3, 1831, entitled 'An act to amend the several acts respecting copyrights,' (4 Stats. at Large, 438,) inflicting forfeiture and penalties upon those who shall sell any map, &c., 'without the consent of the proprietor or proprietors of the copyright thereof, first obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two credible witnesses,' applies only to persons claiming the right of sale by act of party, and not to those claiming and proving such right by act or operation of law. 4 Stats. at Large, 435, § 1; Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 Bos. and Pul. 565, 578; Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 C. and P. 578; S.C.. 11 Eng. C. L. R. 468; S.C.. in Error, 6 B. and C. 69; S.C.. 13 Eng. C. L. R. 133; Cartwright v. Amatt, 2 Bos. and Pul. 43; Sawin et al. v. Guild, 1 Gallison, 485; Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646; Webster on Patents, 21-23, 82, n. n.; Godson on Patents and Copyright, 2d ed. 219, 221, 377, 430; 2 Renouard Trait e des Droits d'Auteurs, ch. 3, § 4, arts. 204, 205, p. 348, and onwards.

2. Copyrights and patent-rights are, by the law of England, and in conformity to the principles of justice and policy prevailing there, as well as in contries of the civil law, liable, as goods and chattels, to the payment of the debts of the authors or inventors who may hold them. As goods and chattels they pass to assignees in bankruptcy, and to provisional assignees in insolvency, as 'the assignees' or 'representatives' of the bankrupt or insolvent author or inventor; and, both in England and in France, may be seized and sold on execution or decrees of seizure issued against him. Hesse v. Stevenson, supra; Bloxam v. Elsee, supra; Cartwright v. Amatt, supra; Mary York v. Twine, Cro. Jac. 78; Sewall, Office of Sheriff, 225, 46 Law Lib.; Webster on Patents, 21-23; Godson on Patents and Copyright, 219, 221, incl. 430; Renouard Trait e des Droits d'Auteurs, 348, 349, &c., ch. 3, § 4, arts. 204, 205.

3. After an author has printed his book, or map, in performance of the contract of copyright with the public, and it has thus passed from the condition of a thought or conception still under deliberation, as well as after a patented machine has been completed and sold by the inventor, in fulfilment of the contract of his letters-patent, and he has, in any manifest form, clothed his incorporeal right with a valuable corporeal substance, and, abstracting other values for the purpose, has brought it into the condition of property, in the nature of a personal, tangible good or chattel, he thereby has made the right to use and sell the same, appurtenant thereto; and public policy, common honesty, attention to the true interests of the author or proprietor of the copyright, as well as of his creditors, and every legal analogy, require that the two should not be dissevered for the purpose of enabling him to defeat the rights of his creditors, sought through the remedies provided by law. Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 682, 684; ''Bloomer v. McQuewan et al. 14 Ib. 549,'' 550, 553, 554; 2 Renouard Trait e des Droits d'Auteurs, 348, and onwards, ch. 3, § 4, arts. 204, 205.

4. That the engraving of a map upon copperplate brings it fairly within the principle and policy, that the proprietor having made the right to use the plate appurtenant to the same, and to the right of property therein, such right will pass with the right of property in the plate, whenever that right passes by act or operation of law in forms appropriate to such act or operation.

5. That, at least, the condition of relief annexed by the court below was, under the circumstances of this case, a perfectly equitable one, and, upon non-compliance therewith by the complainant, the bill ought to have been, as it was, dismissed with costs. Origin of rule imposing terms of relief on complainant. 1 Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction of Chancery, 216, 422, 423, and notes. Though equity cannot relieve against common law or statute penalties and forfeitures, (Peacy v. Duke of Somerset, 1 Stra. 447; Keating v. Sparrow, 1 Ball and Beatty, 372, 373, 374,) yet it does, in the case of usurious bonds and instruments, grant relief against them only on condition of payment of the principal and legal interest of the amount borrowed; in other words, only upon waiver of the statute forfeitures. 1 Story's Eq. Jurisp. 64 c. and cases cited; Rogers v. Rathbone, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 365; Tupper v. Powell, Ib. 439; Morgan v. Schermerhorn, 1 Paige, 544; Livingston v. Harris, 3 Ib. 528; Campbell v. Morrison, 7 Ib. 158; Judd v. Seaver, 8 Ib. 548; Cole v. Savage, 10 Ib. 583.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)


text: Talk:Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)

title: Talk:Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)


text:
Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)/Opinion of the Court

The appellant filed his bill in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, to restrain the defendants from printing and publishing a map of that State, whereof he claimed to be the exclusive proprietor, under the act of congress of February 3, 1831, concerning copyrights of maps, &c. The defendants admit that they have sold such maps, but allege that a copperplate, owned by the plaintiff, was duly sold on an execution which issued on a judgment recovered against the plaintiff, in the court of common pleas for the county of Bristol, the in State of Massachusetts, and that one Isaac H. Cady was the purchaser of the plate under that sale; that Cady has used the plate to print the said maps, and the defendants have sold them; and they insist that, by the purchase of the correrplate, Cady acquired the right to print maps therewith, and to publish and sell them; and that, therefore, the defendants have not infringed on any exclusive right of the complainants.

By reference to the case of Stevens v. Cady, reported in 14 How. 528, it will be seen that the same title, now asserted by these defendants, was tried on that case, between the complainant and Cady. But, as is stated in the report of that case, no counsel then appeared or was heard in support of Cady's title; and Mr. Justice Woodbury, who sat in the cause in the circuit court, having deceased, this court was not apprised of the grounds and reasons on which the decree of that court dismissing the bill rested; and when this cause was called, counsel having appeared and desired to be heard, though he frankly avowed that the question passed on in the former case was the only one which could be raised, the court readily assented, and, having now considered the argument of the respondent's counsel, the court directs me to state its opinion in the cause.

The positions assumed by the respondent's counsel are, that copy and patent-rights are subject to seizure and sale on execution; and that, whenever the owner of a copyright of a map causes a plate to be made which is capable of no beneficial use except to print his map, he thereby annexes to the plate the right to use it for printing that map, and also the right to publish and sell the copies when printed; and that when the plate is sold on execution, these rights pass with the plate, and as incidents or accessories thereto, though no mention is made of them in the sale.

There would certainly be great difficulty in asseting to the proposition that patent and copyrights, held under the laws of the United States, are subject to seizure and sale on execution. Not to repeat what is said on this subject, in 14 How. 531, it may be added, that these incorporeal rights do not exist in any particular State or district; they are coextensive with the United States. There is nothing in any act of congress, or in the nature of the rights themselves, to give them locality anywhere so as to subject them to the process of courts having jurisdiction limited by the lines of States and districts. That an execution out of the court of common pleas for the county of Bristol, in the State of Massachusetts, can be levied on an incorporeal right subsisting in Rhode Island, or New York, will hardly be pretended. That by the levy of such an execution, the entire right could be divided, and so much of it as might be exercised within the county of Bristol, sold, would be a position subject to much difficulty.

These are important questions, on which we do not find it necessary to express an opinion, because, in this case, neither the copyright, as such, nor any part of it, was attempted to be sold. The return of the officer on the execution is, that he seized and sold 'one copperplate for the map of the State of Rhode Island.' The defendants must, therefore, stand upon the second position assumed by their counsel, that the right to print and publish the map passed by the execution sale with the plate.

There are no special facts in this case to distinguish it from any case of a sale on execution of copper or stereotype plates. It appears that the plaintiff owned the plate; whether he made it, or caused it to be made, or purchased it after it had been made, does not appear.

Nor should the case be confounded with one where the owner of copper or stereotype plate sells them. What rights would pass by such a sale would depend on the intentions of its parties, to be gathered from their contract and its attendant circumstances. In this case, the owner of the copyright made no contract of sale, and necessarily had no intention respecting its subject-matter.

The sole question is, whether the mere fact that the plaintiff owned the plate, attached to it the right to print and publish the map, so that this right passed with the plate by a sale on execution.

And upon this question of the annexation of the copyright to the plate it is to be observed, first, that there is no necessary connection between them. They are distinct subjects of property, each capable of existing, and being owned and transferred, independent of the other. It was lawful for any one to make, own, and sell this copperplate. The manufacture of stereotype plates is an established business, and the ownership of the plates of a book under copyright may be, and doubtless in practice is, separated from the ownership of the copyright. If an execution against a stereotype founder were levied on such plates, which he had made for an author and not delivered, the title to those plates would be passed by the execution sale, and the purchaser might sell them, but clearly he could not print and publish the book for which they were made. The right to print and publish is therefore not necessarily annexed to the plate, nor parcel of it.

Neither is the plate the principal thing, and the right to print and publish an incident or accessory thereof. It might be more plausibly said that the plate is an incident or accessory of the right; because the sole object of the existence of the plate is as a means to exercise and enjoy the right to print and publish.

Nor does the rule that he who grants a thing, grants impliedly what is essential to the beneficial use of that thing, apply to this case. A press, and paper, and ink, are essential to the beneficial use of a copperplate. But it would hardly be contended that the sale of a copperplate passed a press, and paper, and ink, as incidents of the plate, because necessary to its enjoyment.

The sale of a copperplate passes the right to such lawful use thereof as the purchaser can make, by reason of the ownership of the thing he has bought; but not the right to a use thereof, by reason of the ownership of something else which he has not bought, and which belongs to a third person. If he has not acquired a press, or paper, or ink, he cannot use his plate for printing, because each of these kinds of property is necessary to enable him to use it for that purpose. So, if he has not acquired the right to print the map, he cannot use his plate for that purpose, because he has not made himself the owner of something as necessary to printing as paper and ink, or as clearly a distinct species of property as either of those articles. He may make any other use of the plate of which it is susceptible. He may keep it till the limited time, during which the exclusive right exists, shall have expired, and then use it to print maps. He may sell it to another, who has the right to print and publish, but he can no more use that right of property than he can use a press, or paper, which belongs to a third person.

The cases mentioned at the bar, in which incorporeal rights have been held to pass with corporeal property, do not apply.

By the levy of an execution on a mill, the incorporeal rights actually annexed to the mill, and necessary to its use, pass with the mill. So does what is parcel of the mill, though temporarily removed from it-as a mill-stone, which has been taken from its place to be picked. These, and many other such cases, are collected in Broome's Legal Maxims, 198, 205.

But the right in question is not parcel of the plate levied on, nor a right merely appendant or appurtenant thereto; but a distinct and independent property, subsisting in grant from the government of the United States, not annexed to any other thing, either by the act of its owner or by operation of law.

For these reasons, as well as those stated in 14 How., our conclusion is, that the mere ownership of a copperplate of a map, by the owner of the copyright, does not attach to the plate the exclusive right of printing and publishing the map, held under the act of congress, or any part thereof; but the incorporeal right subsists wholly separate from and independent of the plate, and does not pass with it by a sale thereof on execution.

The next question is, whether the complainant can have a decree in accordance with the prayer of his bill, for the penalties imposed by the 7th section of the act of February 3, 1831. The bill prays specifically for a decree for these penalties. We speak of the forfeiture of the printed copies, as well as of the sum of one dollar for each sheet unlawfully printed, as penalties; for, under the laws of the United States, it is clear that the complainant can have no title to either of them, except by way of penalty.

There being no common law of copyright in this country, whatever rights are possessed by the proprietor of the copyright must be derived from some grant thereof, in some act of congress, either nominatim or by a satisfactory implication; and, looking to the act of congress applicable to this subject-matter, it appears that the rights claimed by this bill are expressly conferred by way of forfeiture. Its language is: 'Then such offender shall forfeit the plate or plates on which such map, &c., shall be copied, and also all and every sheet thereof so copied or printed as aforesaid, to the proprietor or proprietors of the copyright thereof; and shall further forfeit one dollar for every sheet of such map, &c., which may be found in his or their possession, printed, &c., contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act; the one moiety thereof to the proprietor or proprietors, and the other moiety to the use of the United States, to be recovered in any court having competent jurisdiction thereof.'

In the case of Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 554, Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram came to the conclusion, that since the decision of the house of lords in the case of Miller v. Taylor, the right to a decree for the delivery up of copies must be rested by the complainant upon some statute provision; and that inasmuch as courts of equity do not enforce forfeitures by an exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, such a jurisdiction also must be derived from an act of parliament. And though the 8th section of the act of 1 and 2 Vict. c. 59, as well as the preceding act of 54 Geo. III., c. 156, § 4, allows the forfeited copies to be recovered in 'any court of record in which an action at law, or a suit in equity, shall be commenced by such author or authors, or other proprietor or proprietors,' &c.; yet it was admitted, in Colburn v. Simms, that no such order had ever been made, in invitum, in a court of equity. It is a significant fact that congress, in legislating on this subject, though manifestly acquainted with the phraseology of the act of Geo. III., and though in some particulars it adopted that phraseology, yet omitted to confer upon courts of equity power to enforce either of the forfeitures provided for, but left them to be recovered 'in any court having competent jurisdiction thereof.' And the only equitable jurisdiction, as to copyright, conferred upon the courts of the United States, is by the act of February 15, 1819, which gives original cognizance to the courts of the United States, as well in equity as at law, of cases arising under any law of the United States granting to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings, inventions, and discoveries; and, upon any bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved in any such case, shall have authority to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of the rights of any authors or inventors secured to them by any laws of the United States, on such terms as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable. Though the substance of this enactment is incorporated into the 17th section of the patent act of July 4, 1836, so far as it related to inventors, and so far as it related to the subject of patent-rights, is no longer in force, proprio vigore, yet, so far as it gave cognizance to the courts of the United States of cases of copyright, it still remains in force, and is the only law conferring equitable jurisdiction on those courts in such cases; for the 9th section of the act of February 3, 1831, protects manuseripts only.

There is nothing in this act of 1819, which extends the equity powers of the courts to the adjudication of forfeitures; it being manifestly intended, that the jurisdiction therein conferred should be the usual and known jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity for the protection of analogous rights. The prayer of this bill for the penalties must therefore be rejected.

The remaining question is, whether there ought to be a decree for an account of the profits. The complainant has not prayed for such an account, nor have the defendants stated one in their answer; but the bill does pray for general relief.

The right to an account of profits is incident to the right to an injunction in copy and patent-right cases. Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 554; 3 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1797. And this court has held, in Watts et al. v. Waddle et al., 6 Pet. 389, that where the bill states a case proper for an account, one may be ordered under the prayer for general relief. See also 2 Pet. 612; 14 Ib. 156; 16 Ib. 195; 9 How. 405.

The decree of the circuit court must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to award a perpetual injunction as prayed for in the bill, and to take an account of the profits received by the defendants from the sales of the map.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court, with directions to award a perpetual injunction, as prayed for in the bill filed in this case, and to take an account of the profits received by the defendants from the sales of the map, and for such further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of this court, as to law and justice shall appertain.


text: Talk:Stevens v. Gladding (58 U.S. 447)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania

THIS case was brought up from the supreme court of Pennsylvania by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Ewing, and Mr. Hart, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Hood, and Mr. Scott, for the defendant.

The following notice of these points on behalf of the plaintiffs in error, upon which the decision of this court turned, is taken from the brief of Mr. Ewing:--

2. That the act of 1850, professes to be explanatory of the act of 1826, does not help it in the least. If a direct act, levying a tax or penalty on past cases of collateral inheritance, would be ex post facto within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, so is this; as if the act of 1826 provided for the punishment of crimes, a declaratory law of 1850 could not extend its provisions to acts committed prior to the declaratory law, no more than an original law could punish a past fact as a crime.

3. We have here then a retroactive law, which takes the property of an individual to the use of the State, because of a fact which had occurred prior to the passage of the law. And we suppose it quite immaterial whether it is seized to the use of the State, by the name of tax, fine, penalty, or forfeiture, so that it is seized by virtue of a lex post factum.

This court has decided, in cases which raised the question, that the clause in the 10th section, 1st article of the constitution of the United States, which provides that no State shall pass any 'ex post facto law,' does not prohibit the States from passing laws which shall transfer the property of A to B, for reasons, ex post facto, that their power in this respect, between persons, is unlimited and unrestrained. But that it does prohibit the States from making past acts penal, which, when performed, were attended with no punishment or penalty; and it equally prohibits them from increasing any punishment or penalty by laws passed after the fact; the scope and intent of the restriction, as construed and explained by the court, being to prohibit the States from punishing the persons or seizing upon the property of individuals, by reason of acts committed or perforned previous to the enactment of the law. It is to protect the individual from the direct action of the State against his person or property for any past cause, but not to limit the power of the State in adjusting or distributing property among individuals for like cause.

Thus a State may say by a law of to-day, that A shall have the lands and goods of B, because of some fact done between A and B yesterday, which did not then transfer or pledge or incumber either lands or goods; the protection of property, as between individuals, being left to the constitution and laws of the State, except only where a contract intervenes, the validity of which they may not impair. But the State cannot by a law of to-day forfeit to itself the lands or goods of B, be ause of some fact done or suffered by B yesterday, and which did not then by law work a forfeiture or make his lands or goods the property of the State. This would be, according to the construction of the court ex post facto, within the prohibition of the constitution of the United States. And I suppose it to be quite immaterial whether the past fact, by reason of which the property of an individual is seized to the use of the State by a subsequent law, lex post factum, be called a crime or not, or whether the seizure be denominated fine, levy, or forfeiture. This is mere form-'words, words'-haeret in cortice. The substance is, the seizure of the lands or funds of an individual to the use of the State by a law operating on a past fact. If the property of an individual cannot be seized to the use of the State, because of a fact which an after law declares criminal, may it be so for the same fact if the law do not at all characterize the fact, or if it pronounce it meritorious? This would be absurd. One State legislature enacts: That every member of the immediately preceding legislature who voted against the passage of the act to establish common schools shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall forfeit to the State, to be applied to said common schools, one twentieth part of his lands and goods. Such a law would be ex post facto within the meaning of the constitution, as expounded by this court.

The legislature of another State enacts: That every member of the immediately preceding legislature who voted against the act for the establishment of common schools shall be, and he is hereby, declared to be free from all blame or censure therefor, and there shall be assessed upon the property of every such person one twentieth part of its value, as a public tax to be applied to the use of schools. If the first be unconstitutional, so is this likewise. It does not, it is true, make the fact criminal by an affer law, but it attaches to it a penalty, the same in its consequence as if it had called it a crime. In substance and effect the provisions are the same, and equally within the prohibition of the constitution.

If I be correct in this, the constitution of the United States does not apply alone in cases where an act, innocent when done, is by a subsequent law declared to be a crime, and punished as such, put also, to cases where a past fact, giving no right to the State to the property of the individual, is by an after law made the occasion of burdening him with fine, forfeiture, or assessment. This case, then, comes literally within the prohibitory clause of the constitution. It is lex post factum, and it is the State acting upon and against individuals by reason of the past fact. I all cases heretofore decided under this clause of the constitution, and in which the retroactive law has been sustained, the State pronounced by law between individuals, and transferred property from one to the other, by reason of some past fact, but not to itself. This, it appears to me, is the great line of distinction; and if it be once passed,-if it be held that the State may take property of an individual, because of a past fact, the constitution affords no protection against confiscation and forfeiture; all that is necessary is to give it a softer name.

Suppose a statute, having the the same effect precisely, to run thus:--

If any person shall heretofore have died within this State, leaving personal property within it, and also in other States, and leaving no lineal heirs; and if the collateral heir or devisee of such decedent shall have heretofore claimed and received such part of the estate of decedent as was situated without this State, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall forfeit therefor, and pay to the use of common schools, one half the assets of the decedent which remain within the State at the time of the passage of this act.

No one can doubt that this would be an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the constitution.

Strike out of the act the word 'misdemeanor,' it does not vary the case except in words. You retain the forfeiture, but fail to characterize the fact. Strike out the word 'forfeit,' and insert 'tax,' in its stead, the effect is still the same; you retain the penalty, the usual consequence of crime, by another name, and attach it as a consequence to a past fact, not pronounced criminal. The very part of the supposed criminal law against which the constitution of the United States would protect the individual, namely, the penalty, remains after the two suggested amendments. The parts stricken out, had they remained without the penalty, would be nugatory, and this court could not consider them.

It seems to me very clear, that the intent and the just effect of this constitutional provision is to protect the individual in his person and property against punishment or confiscation by the State, under a law operating upon a past fact.

4. We contend, also, that this law, in its retroactive effect, impairs the obligation of a contract.

When Carpenter, the executor, took upon himself the execution of the will, he entered into a contract, implied in law, to pay over to the legatees what should remain in his hands after paying debts and such charges as the law attached to the estate and its administration. That sum was about $43,000. The act of March 11, 1850, intervenes, and requires the executor to pay $25,000 of that sum to the State, and but $18,000 to the legatees in discharge of his implied contract.

This law, therefore, greatly impairs the obligation of this contract. For, if the law be obligatory, it at once absolves the executor from the obligation of his contract to the legatees, just to the extent that it requires him to pay to the State, and it is because of a fact which occurred before the passage of the law.

Suppose the law to have been enacted in these words:--

'That every agent, executor, administrator, factor, and attorney, who has in his hands, at the time of the passage of this act, moneys heretofore received or collected for his principal, &c., shall pay one half thereof into the treasury of the State for the use of schools, and the other half to his principal, &c., which shall be in full discharge of his legal liability to such principal.'

If a State can do this, the constitution of the United States does not protect contracts; if a State can take half as a retroactive tax, she can take the whole, and she can name any past fact she chooses as the cause of the tax. And it is quite immaterial to the creditor whether his contract is annulled absolutely, if it be so as to him, and remains valid only for the benefit of the State.

A State may seize the property of an individual directly to her own use, but this were an act of arbitrary power not likely to occur. She may take his property for any future fact or act, whether innocent or criminal, either as a forfeiture or levy, but not for a past act or fact, by a retroactive law. She may take from A his property and give it to B, but she cannot impair the validity, or at all lessen the obligation, of a contract between them.

The following points, on behalf of the defendant, relate to that branch of the case upon which the opinion of this court rested:--

1. It does not appear, by the said document or record, that the supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of the cause.

2. It does not appear thereby that there was drawn in question, in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and of the causes or grounds alleged in the said writ of error.

3. It does not appear thereby that the validity of the Pennsylvania act of assembly of 11th March, 1850, was called in question in the cause in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, on the ground of its repugnancy to the constitution of the United States.

4. Nor that any such question was decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in said cause.

It is only where there is drawn in question in the state court the validity (not merely the construction) of a state law, that the supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction to review the question by writ of error; and even then only where the validity of the state law is questioned, on the ground that it is requgnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. The Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 64; Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149, 152; Crowell v. Randall, 10 Pet. 368, in which Mr. Justice Story reviews the previous cases, &c. See, also, Ohio Life Insurance v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, Taney, C. J., 428, &c.; State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, Ib. 369, McLean, J., 384, &c.

To give jurisdiction to the supreme court of the United States, under the 25th section of the judiciary act, it must appear on the record itself to be one of the cases enumerated in that section; and nothing out of the record can be taken into consideration. Armstrong v. The Treasurer of Athens County, 16 Pet. 281, 285; 1 Curtis's Com. § 279.

Retrospective laws are forbidden to the States only when, in civil cases, they impair the obligation of contracts; or, in criminal cases, where they are ex post facto. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.

Where a retrospective law of a State affects vested rights, the supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction only where such rights are grounded on contract. The Charles River, Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 536, 547; 1 Curtis's Com. §§ 244, 253, note 1; The Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 558, 561.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Carpenter v. Pennsylvania


text: Talk:Carpenter v. Pennsylvania

title: Talk:Carpenter v. Pennsylvania


text:
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania/Opinion of the Court

The legislature of Pennsylvania, in 1826, adopted a law by which all inheritances, 'being within this commonwealth,' which, by the intestacy or the will of any decedent, should devolve 'upon any other than the father, mother, wife, children, or lineal descendants' of such person, should be subject to the payment of a tax, now fixed at five per cent. Purd. Dig. 138, § 1.

The assessments under this act were confined to the property which might be within the commonwealth. The Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 Barr. 142.

In March, 1850, by an explanatory act, it was declared that the words 'being within this commonwealth, shall be so construed as to relate to all persons who have been at the time of their decease, or now may be, domiciled within this commonwealth, as well as to estates; and this is declared to be the true intent and meaning of this act.'

William Short, a citizen of Pennsylvania, died within the State a few months previously to the passage of this act, leaving his property to friends and collateral relations, the principal of whom, the residuary legatees, reside beyond the limits of the State. The will was proven, by a resident executor, in December, 1849, before the register's court in Philadelphia, and a settlement was made with that court in June of the following year. In that settlement, the executor represented that a portion of the estate, consisting of securities, stocks, loans, and evidences of debt and property, was not within the commonwealth, and offered to pay the tax for the property within, under the act of 1826, and denied the validity of the assessment under the act of 1850. The tax was assessed upon the entire personal estate, without reference to its locality, by the court, and its judgment upon this subject was affirmed by the supreme court, to which it was removed by certiorari. That court says: 'More pointed words to make the act (of 1850) retrospective could not be chosen; and it will scarce be said the legislature had not power to make it so, at least while the assets remain in the hands of the executor as administrator. No clause of the constitution forbids it to extend a tax already laid, or to tax assets not taxed before; and, in establishing its peculiar interpretation, it has only done indirectly what it was competent to do directly.' The supreme court thus interprets the act of 1850 as if it read: 'That assets in the hands of an executor, for distribution among the collateral relations of or strangers to the decedent, shall be subject to a tax of five per cent.'

This court has no authority to revise the act of Pennsylvania, upon any grounds of justice, policy, or consistency to its own constitution. These are concluded by the decision of the public authorities of the State. The only inquiry for this court is, does the act violate the constitution of the United States, or the treaties and laws made under it?

The validity of the act, as affecting successions to open after its enactment, is not contested; nor is the authority of the State to levy taxes upon personal property belonging to its citizens, but situated beyond its limits, denied. But the complaint is, that the application of the act of 1826, by that of 1850, to a succession already in the course of settlement, and which had been appropriated by the last will of the decedent, involved an arbitrary change of the existing laws of inheritance to the extent of this tax, in the sequestration of that amount for the uses of the State. That the rights of the residuary legatees were vested at the death of the testator, and from that time those persons were non-residents, and the property taxed was also beyond the State; and that the State has employed its power over the executor and the property within its borders, to accomplish a measure of wrong and injustice. That the act contains the imposition of a forfeiture or penalty, and is ex post facto. It is, in some sense, true, that the rights of donees under a will are vested at the death of the testator; and that the acts of administration which follow are conservatory means, directed by the State to ascertain those rights, and to accomplish an effective translation of the dominion of the decedent to the objects of his bounty; and the legislation adopted with any other aim than this would justify criticism, and perhaps censure. But, until the period for distribution arrives, the law of the decedent's domicile attaches to the property, and all other jurisdictions refer to the place of the domicile, as that where the distribution should be made. The will of the testator is proven there, and his executor receives his authority to collect the property, by the recognition of the legal tribunals of that place. The personal estate, so far as it has a determinate owner, belongs to the executor thus constituted. The rights of the donee are subordinate to the conditions, formalities, and administrative control, prescribed by the State in the interests of its public order, and are only irrevocably established upon its abdication of this control, at the period of distribution. If the State, during this period of administration and control by its tribunals and their appointees, thinks fit to impose a tax upon the property, there is no obstacle in the constitution and laws of the United States to prevent it. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; In re Ewin, 1 Cr. and Jer. 151; 1 Barb. Ch. R. 180; 6 W. H. and G. Cy. R. 217; 21 Conn. R. 577.

The act of 1850, in enlarging the operation of the act of 1826, and by extending the language of that act beyond its legal import, is retrospective in its form; but its practical agency is to subject to assessment property liable to taxation, to answer an existing exigency of the State, and to be collected in the course of future administration; and the language retrospective is of no importance, except to describe the property to be included in the assessment. And, as the supreme court has well said, 'in establishing its peculiar interpretation, it (the legislature) has only done indirectly what it was competent to do directly.'

But if the act of 1850 involved a change in the law of succession, and could be regarded as a civil regulation for the division of the estates of unmarried persons having no lineal heirs, and not as a fiscal imposition, this court could not pronounce it to be an ex post facto law, within the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution. The debates in the federal convention upon the constitution show that the terms 'ex post facto laws' were understood in a restricted sense, relating to criminal cases only, and that the description of Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their meaning. 3 Mad. Pap. 1399, 1450, 1579.

This signification was adopted in this court shortly after its organization, in opinions carefully prepared, and has been repeatedly announced since that time. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; 8 Pet. 88; 11 Ib. 421.

The same words are used in the constitutions of many of the States, and in the opinions of their courts, and by writers upon public law, and are uniformly understood in this restricted sense. 3 N. H. 375; 5 Mon. 133; 9 Mass. 363; 6 Binn. 271; 4 Geor. 208.

The plaintiff's argument concedes that his case is not within the scope of this clause of the constitution, unless its limits are enlarged to embrace civil as well as criminal cases; and he insists that the court should depart from the adjudications heretofore made upon this subject. But this cannot be done. There is no error in the record, and the judgment of the supreme court is affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said supreme court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.


text: Talk:Carpenter v. Pennsylvania/Opinion of the Court


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Rhodes v. Farmer

THIS was an appeal from the district court of the United States, for the northern district of Mississippi.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Phillips, for the appellant, and by Mr. Bibb, for the appellee.

Mr. Phillips made the following points:--

A judgment creditor is entitled in equity to attach a debt due to the debtor. Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 John. C. 453; Egberts v. Pemberton, 7 Ib. 209; Hudson v. Plets, 11 Paige, 182; Candler v. Petit, 1 Ib. 170.

Parol evidence was inadmissible to contradict the assignment. It is conceded that the design was to invest the party with a 'legal title.' 1 Story's Eq. §§ 113-115; 6 Ves. 332; 1 Pet. 16; 3 Greenleaf's Ev. 368.

The evidence offered by defendant that his object was to enable Farmer to use the judgment as a set-off, while he remained the owner thereof, shows an attempt to commit a fraud upon the law. 1 Poth. on Obl. 415; Barb. on Set-off, 37, 58; 7 Cow. 469, 481; 1 Paige, 289.

The agreement set up is equally obnoxious to the charge of champerty. 2 Sims and Stu. 244; 15 Ves. 156; 2 Story's Eq. 1049.

The new agreement offered to be set up being in itself illegal, will not be admitted as an answer to the prayer of the bill. 7 Ves. 470; 2 Story's Eq. §§ 298, 305, 697.

As to costs, courts of equity are governed by 'general rules and former precedents;' and when a question of costs is connected with a substantial ground of appeal, the party may succeed with the former question though he fail with the latter. 2 Hagg. Ecc. Rep. 374; 4 Russel, 180.

Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Rhodes v. Farmer


text: Talk:Rhodes v. Farmer

title: Talk:Rhodes v. Farmer


text:
Rhodes v. Farmer/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal in chancery, from the district court of the United States for the northern district of Mississippi.

Rhodes, the complainant, recovered two judgments, in 1850, against Sneed, Wright, James E. Farmer, and William B. Farmer, in the district court-one for the sum of $1,308.68, the other for $3,179.19-on which executions were issued and returned, nulla bona. Prior to this, W. and C. Fellows, in the name of McKewen, King, and Company, had recovered a judgment against James Strong and others, for $3,937.75, in the same court; and Strong, with the view of placing his property beyond the reach of the judgment, conveyed it to his wife. This conveyance, on an issue being made, under the practice of Mississippi, was set aside.

In the trial of the above issue, the complainant states it appeared in proof that William B. Farmer was the owner of the judgment against Strong and others, it having been assigned to him by W. and C. Fellows; and the complainant alleged that his judgment against Farmer, being unsatisfied, was a lien in equity upon the interest and claim of William B. Farmer, to the judgment assigned to him. And the complainant prayed that said judgment might be held by Farmer and W. and C. Fellows, subject to his judgments, and that they might be enjoined from paying it over, &c.

William B. Farmer, in his answer, admits that the judgments against him had been obtained, and that executions on them had been returned, nulla bona. He denies that the judgment against Strong was ever sold to him; but he states that, in 1848, being sued for a large debt, which he supposed to belong to Strong, and wishing to procure a set-off, he applied to W. and C. Fellows for the control of said judgment, offering to any them three fourths of the amount that he might realize of the judgment, should he be able to use it as a set-off, which was agreed to by them; and that he executed a penal bond, to pay to the said W. and C. Fellows three fourths of the amount so recovered on their judgment.

Defendant also states that the complainant received from James E. Farmer, a co-defendant, a sum of money, on the receipt of which he released the judgments; and the defendant submits, whether such release does not exonerate the other defendants.

He also states that he had made a verbal assignment of the judgment to William Cathron, as an attorney, for collection; and he submits whether the judgment can be made liable by the complainant to the satisfaction of his judgments. Other matters are set up in the answer, and he prays that the answer may be considered a cross-bill, &c.

The condition of the penal bond, given to W. and C. Fellows, stated that they had transferred to Farmer the judgment against Strong et al., for the sum $3,937, subject to credits of about $763. Now, if the said obligors shall pay to W. and C. Fellows, or their assigns, in two equal instalments, on the 27th of January, 1849, and on the 27th of January, 1850, three fourths of the amount which may be secured or realized by said Farmer out of said judgment, bearing interest at six per cent., deducting costs and attorney's fees which may be incurred, &c., then the obligation to be void.

In their answers, W. and C. Fellows deny that their co-defendant, William B. Farmer, is the owner of the whole of their judgment against Strong and others, but admit that he has an interest of one fourth part, &c.

During the pendency of this suit, the following receipt was given by John S. Topp, counsel for the complainant:--

'June 9, 1852. Received of Messrs. Boston and Stearns, $1,052.59, being the one fourth part of the balance left in the marshal's hands, in the case of W. and C. Fellows v. Strong and wife, after deducting $700 for fees, as provided for in the within agreement.'

The district court, in its decree, says: 'It appearing to the court that from the written admissions of Mr. Topp, solicitor for the complainant, since his filing the bill in this cause, recovered one fourth of the amount of the judgment of W. and C. Fellows v. James Strong and Mary A. Strong, his wife, which is enjoined in this cause, and that the complainant is entitled to no further relief in the premises, the injunction was dissolved, and the bill dismissed at the complainant's costs.

The judgment of W. and C. Fellows v. Strong was assigned to Farmer without condition, and it is contended that parol evidence was not admissible to alter the terms of the assignment.

There is a good deal of testimony on the contract of assignment. Some of the statements are somewhat conflicting, but they are reconcilable; and the result of the whole is, that the assignment was made of the judgment to enable Farmer to use it by way of set-off to a demand against him which he supposed belonged to Strong. But it was understood that Farmer should have one fourth of the amount recovered from Strong, after deducting the costs for his labor and trouble in collecting the money, and for the payment of the residue of the judgment he gave bond and security.

The assignment of the judgment was good in equity, and though absolute on its face, the bond given expressed the conditions, and showed that Farmer's interest in the judgment against Strong extended only to one fourth part of it, after deducting costs.

The bill of the complainant is in the nature of a bill for a specific execution of the assignment of the judgment, and in such a case parol evidence is admissible to rebut or explain in equity. But the penal bond given to W. and C. Fellows, by Farmer, with Brown as security, sufficiently explains the transaction.

The judgments obtained by the complainant against William B. Farmer and others constituted no lien, equitable or legal, on the judgment against Strong, after it was assigned to Farmer; and no relief could be given to the complainant against the assigned judgment, beyond the equitable interest of Farmer. He is represented to have been insolvent at the time the decree was entered. As one fourth of the judgment, after paying costs, was paid to the complainant before the decree, we think that the decree of the district court dismissing the bill at the complainant's costs, was correct.

The defendants were not liable to pay more than one fourth of the judgment, and as that amount was paid, about the time it was collected on the judgment against Strong, the defendants were not in default.

There is no evidence of a payment to the complainant by James E. Farmer, a co-defendant of William B. Farmer, on which a release of the judgments was executed by the complainant, as alleged in Farmer's answer. Nor is there any ground of defence, from the alleged verbal agreement with Cathron, who, as an attorney, was employed to collect the judgment against Strong.

The complainant, both in prosecuting the suit in the district court, and also by his appeal to this court, sought to recover the whole amount of the judgment against Strong, or at least so much of it as would satisfy his two judgments against Farmer and others. But he can in this mode of proceeding reach only the equity of his judgment debtor in the assigned judgment; and having received that, he can claim nothing more. The decree of the district court is affirmed, at the costs of the complainant.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the district court of the United States for the northern district of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said district court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

title: Rhodes v. Farmer/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Rhodes v. Farmer/Opinion of the Court


text:
Wickliffe v. Eve

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Preston, for the appellant, and by Mr. Blair, for the appellees.

It would be difficult to report the arguments of counsel without giving a detailed history of the transactions between the parties. They are, therefore, omitted.

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Wickliffe v. Eve


text: Talk:Wickliffe v. Eve

title: Talk:Wickliffe v. Eve


text:
Wickliffe v. Eve/Opinion of the Court

In 1822, some of the defendants made two notes, one for $1,308.44, and one for $1,383.95, to Luke Tiernan and sons; one payable the 1st of December of that year, and the other December 1, 1823.

In 1833, suits were brought by the plaintiff, as attorney of the payees, in the United States circuit court for the Kentucky district, and judgments were obtained by default.

No executions to enforce the judgments were put into the marshal's hands till December 15, 1845; and shortly after they were stayed by injunction, at the suit of some of the defendants against Charles Tiernan, the surviving partner, on the ground of payment, and the bar of the statute of Kentucky, for failing to sue out executions within twelve months after judgment; and on the 6th day of May, 1847, the injunction was, by decree of the United States circuit court, made perpetual.

Wickliffe had, in the mean time, brought suit against Luke Tiernan, claiming an indebtedness against him to the amount of about three thousand dollars, but never obtained judgment. He had attached the debt he alleged to be due by the defendants to Tiernan and Sons, and when the injunction suit was pending against the surviving partner, Wickliffe, having obtained letters of administration on the 13th of November, 1846, petitioned to be made a defendant, but the court overruled the motion.

On the 6th of December, 1847, he moved for leave to file a bill of review on the same ground, but the court also refused; and the present suit was brought to set aside the decree enjoining execution of the two judgments, on the ground that the decree in favor of Eve and others was obtained by fraud, through the connivance of Charles Tiernan, the defendant. The bill alleges, among other things, that Charles Tiernan was largely indebted to his father, and had assigned his interest in the judgments to him, and had become bankrupt. There is no averment in the bill that the partnership debts of Luke Tiernan and Sons had been paid; nor is there any averment that the complainant and defendants were citizens of different States.

Wickliffe attempted to have himself made a defendant to the suit of John G. Eve and others against Charles Tiernan, on the assumption that Luke Tiernan was indebted to him, Wickliffe, and he claimed a right to have part of the amount due to him from Luke Tiernan satisfied out of the moneys he alleged were due to Luke Tiernan and Sons from Eve and others. Charles Ticrnan, being the surviving partner of the firm, had the sole right to defend the suit, as he represented the partnership property; in regard to which, the administrator of Luke Tiernan had a right to come into a court of equity by bill, to coerce the surviving partner to settle, and pay the debts of the firm with the joint property; and after the creditors of the partnership were satisfied, then Luke Tiernan's administrator might have come in on a bill, properly framed, for one third of the surplus, or as much more as Luke Tiernan was in advance to the firm. This familiar doctrine is well stated by Mr. Justice Story, in his work on Partnership, §§ 97, 347.

But the bill before us claims no relief in this form; the complainant asks that the decree releasing Eve and others may be set aside as fraudulent, and the balance due on Eve's debt may be decreed to him, as administrator of Luke Tiernan; and in this capacity he seeks to retain for himself, and subject the property of the firm to pay the debts of an individual partner. Charles Tiernan is no party to this proceeding, and as he was not brought before the court, there could be no jurisdiction taken of the subject-matter; he being legal owner of the chose in action claimed, if the claim had any existence.

The bill was dismissed in the circuit court, because the complainant and the defendants were citizens of Kentucky, and therefore the court declared it had no jurisdiction, for want of proper parties. To obviate this objection, it is insisted here, on the part of the appellant, that this is a bill of review of the proceeding in the cause of John G. Eve and others, against Charles Tiernan. The appellant having been refused the privilege to file a bill of review, he then filed this original bill, impeaching the decree for fraud; and to this bill none but citizens of Kentucky were parties.

It is manifestly an original bill, within the description given by Mr. Justice Story's Eq. Plead. § 404, and being so, the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the parties.

It is ordered that the decree, dismissing the bill, be affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

title: Wickliffe v. Eve/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Wickliffe v. Eve/Opinion of the Court


text:
Pulliam v. Osborne

THIS case originated in the district court of the United States, for the middle district of Alabama, between Samuel Woodward, plaintiff in execution, and Amos Albritton, (claimant,) defendant, who were afterwards represented by their administrator and executor respectively. It was a contest as to the superior validity of executions issued out of a state court and a United States court, under the following circumstances:--

United States Execution.

1842.

May term. Woodward's judgment against Pulliam in the district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama.

June 10. Execution issued.

October 26. Marshal levied on the negroes.

State Execution.

1842.

April 19. Two judgments against Pulliam in the district court of Pickens county.

May 4. Executions on these issued.

July 12. Sheriff levied on certain slaves. Bonds given for their forthcoming on first Monday in August.

August 3. Execution on these forthcoming bonds.

September 21. Execution levied on the negroes named in the issue in this case.

October 3. Sheriff sold slaves to Albritton.

Upon the trial, the court instructed the jury as follows, viz.

On the case being submitted to the jury, the court charged the jury, that if the executions which issued on the two judgments against Pulliam were levied upon sufficient property, and a bond given for the forthcoming of the property on the day of sale, in each case, which bonds were forfeited and thus returned by the sheriff, and that afterwards executions were issued on the judgments rendered on the said forthcoming bonds, against the said Pulliam and his surety in the said forthcoming bonds, which said executions did not come to the hands of the sheriff until some days after the execution in favor of the plaintiff was received by the marshal; that the said plaintiff had the priority of lien on the property of Pulliam, and that the said negroes levied upon by the marshal, in said case, were liable to satisfy the execution of the said plaintiff, notwithstanding they had been levied upon and sold by the sheriff under the execution against Pulliam and his surety in the forthcoming bonds; to which charge claimant excepts, and prays the judge of this court to sign and seal this bill of exceptions, which is accordingly done.

WM. CRAWFORD, [SEAL.]

This instruction being in favor of Woodward, the plaintiff in execution, Albritton sued out a writ of error and carried the case to the circuit court of the United States, for the fifth judicial circuit, southern district of Alabama.

In April, 1853, that court passed an order 'that the said cause be transferred to the supreme court of the United States, according to the statute in such case made and provided.'

It was argued by Mr. Badger, for the plaintiff in error, no counsel appearing for the defendant.

Mr. Badger contended that the instructions of the court below were erroneous, and that the claimant, Albritton, obtained a good title under his purchase from the sheriff.

First. The lien upon the slaves created by the issue, delivery, and levy of the first executions from the state court continued, notwithstanding the giving of the forthcoming bonds; the slaves were still in custodia legis, and not liable to seizure under another execution from another court. Caperton v. Martin, 5 Ala. N. S. 217; Langdon v. Brumby, 7 Ala. 53; Doremus v. Walker, 8 Ala. 194; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400.

Secondly. If the first-issued executions upon the judgments in the state court was lost by the taking of the forthcoming bonds and surrender of the slaves to the defendant in execution, still, the title of the claimant was valid. Then the case would be this: an execution from the court of the United States was delivered to the marshal on the 10th June, but no proceedings had until the 26th October; meantime executions from the state court were delivered to the sheriff, (to wit, on the 3d of August,) and the slaves levied upon, (to wit, on the 2d of September,) and sold, (to wit, on the 3d of October.)

Now, the rule in such case, adopted because absolutely necessary to prevent collisions between different jurisdictions having a common authority over the same subject, is this: 'Where there are several authorities equally competent to bind the goods of a party, when executed by the proper officer, they (the goods) shall be considered as effectually, and for all purposes, bound by the authority which first actually attaches upon them, in point of execution, and under which an execution shall have been first executed.' Payne v. Drewe, 4 East. 523; Hagan v. Lucas, above cited.

Upon this principle, the supreme court of North Carolina, in which State the common law still obtains that executions bind the goods from their teste, laid down the rule in these terms: 'When several executions issuing from different competent courts are in the hands of different officers, then, to prevent conflicts, if the officer holding the junior execution seizes property by virtue of it, the property so seized is not subject to the execution in the hands of the other officer, although first tested.' And the court held that 'a levy attaches upon the goods in point of execution.' Jones v. Judkins, 4 Dev. and Bat. 454.

It is believed that nothing can be urged against these positions with even apparent force, except what is said by the supreme court of Alabama in the before-cited case of Langdon v. Brumby: that where goods are levied upon by a junior execution, and delivered to a third person upon his making claim, &c., according to the law of that State, these goods may be seized under an execution, the lien of which first commenced.

If this should be alleged, the following answers will be given:--1. The case stated by that court is not ours; there the execution referred to was senior to that under which the first seizure was made; here the execution of the defendant in error was junior to that under which the first seizure was made.

2. However, the rule may be a good one in cases contemplated by it where the same officer is charged with both executions, it being his duty so to arrange the processes in his hands as to apply the property to the satisfaction of that which has legal priority, it can never be just where the executions are in the hands of several officers acting under independent authorities, having a concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject.

3. The rule was applied and is applicable only where no sale has been actually made under the junior execution; for if such sale has been made, whether with or without fault of the officer holding the executions, the title of the purchaser is valid, and the goods sold are not liable to seizure under the senior execution. Smallcomb v. Buckingham, 1 Ld. Raym. 251; Hutchinson v. Johnston, 1 T. R. 729; Ryebot v. Peckham, in note, 731.

4. If this be so, where there is one officer acting under one jurisdiction, in the execution of several writs, a fortiori, and, to avoid manifold inconveniences, it must be so where there are different officers acting under jurisdictions independent of each other.

Finally. There having been no seizure under the execution from the United States court, on the 3d August, when the sheriff made his levy, nor when he made his sale, on the 3d of October, this much is certain: The sheriff had a right, and was bound to levy and sell; and, if he had returned nulla bona, he would clearly have been liable for a false return. Then the sheriff had lawful authority to seize, and lawful authority to sell, and, consequently, the purchaser obtained a good title; for how can it be maintained that the sheriff may lawfully sell what no one may lawfully buy? Yet this is the whole question in the cause; for the marshal claims to sell under his process what had been before bought under the execution of the state court, which he cannot do if the former sale was lawfully made, under sufficient authority. It is, in one word, an attempt by the marshal to transfer to another the consequences justly due to himself, for having delayed to take any steps upon the execution in his hands, from the 10th June to the 26th October, and permitting a junior process, in the mean time, to attach and apply the property to another demand.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Pulliam v. Osborne


text: Talk:Pulliam v. Osborne

title: Talk:Pulliam v. Osborne


text:
Pulliam v. Osborne/Opinion of the Court

This was an issue in the district court, under a statute of Alabama, (Clay's Digest, 213, §§ 62, 64,) for the trial of the right to property taken under an execution from that court, in favor of the appellee, and claimed by the testator of the appellant, as belonging to him, and not to the defendant in the execution.

It appeared on the trial that, at the delivery of the execution to the marshal, in favor of the appellee, the property belonged to the defendant, and that the levy was made before the return day of the writ; but that, before this levy, the property had been seized and sold to the claimant, by a sheriff in Alabama, under executions issued from the state courts, upon valid judgments, after the teste and delivery of the executions from the district court.

The district court instructed the jury, that a sale under a junior execution from the state court did not devest the lien of the execution from the district court, and that the writ might be executed notwithstanding the seizure and sale under the process from the state court.

The lien of an execution, under the laws of that State, commences from the delivery of the writ to the sheriff, and the lien in the courts of the United States depends upon the delivery of the writ to their officer. But no provision is made by the statutes of the State or United States for the determination of the priorities between the creditors of the respective courts, state and federal. They merely provide for the settlement of the priorities between creditors prosecuting their claims in the same jurisdiction.

The demands of the respective creditors, in the present instance, were reduced to judgments, and the officers of either court were invested with authority to seize the property.

The liens were, consequently, co ordinate or equal; and, in such cases, the tribunal which first acquires possession of the property, by the seziure of its officer, may dispose of it so as to vest a title in the purchaser, discharged of the claims of creditors of the same grade.

This court applied this principle (Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107) to determine between judgment creditors in a court of the United States, and an administrator holding under the orders of a probate court of a State; in Wiswall v. Simpson, 14 How. 52, in favor of a receiver holding under the appointment of a court of chancery of a State and a judgment creditor; in Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368, in favor of a trustee in possession, under the order of a county court, against such a creditor; and in Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, between execution creditors issuing from state and federal jurisdictions. The same principle has been applied, in several state courts, in favor of the purchasers at judicial sales of steamboats, and other crafts subject to liens in the nature of admiralty liens. Steamboat Rover v. Stiles, 5 Black, 483; Steamboat Raritan v. Smith, 10 Mo. 527; 19 Ala. 738; and is recognized in the courts of common law and admiralty in Great Britain. 4 East. 523; 2 Wms. Ex'rs, 888; The Saracen, 3 W. Rob.

In Alabama, the bon a fide purchaser at a judicial sale, made to enforce a statutory lien, takes the property discharged of liens of the same description, whether the subject of sale be land or personal property. Wood v. Gary, 5 Ala. 43; 12 Ib. 838; 11 Ib. 426. The propriety of the rule is fully vindicated by the statement in Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, where this court says: 'A most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be likely often to arise between the federal and state courts, if the final process of the one could be levied on property which had been taken by the process of the other. The marshal or the sheriff, as the case may be, acquires by a levy as special property in the goods, and may maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may be taken in execution at the same time, by the marshal and the sheriff, does this special property vest in the one or the other, or both of them? No such case can exist; property once levied on remains in the custody of the law, and it is not liable to be taken by another execution in the hands of a different officer, and especially an officer acting under a different jurisdiction.'

The instruction of the district court is erroneous, and its judgment is therefore reversed and cause remanded.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.

title: Pulliam v. Osborne/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Pulliam v. Osborne/Opinion of the Court


text:
Minturn v. Maynerd

THIS was an appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of California.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Brent and Mr. May, for the appellant, and by Mr. Cutting, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Minturn v. Maynerd


text: Talk:Minturn v. Maynerd

title: Talk:Minturn v. Maynerd


text:
Minturn v. Maynerd/Opinion of the Court

The respondents were sued in admiralty, by process in personam. The libel charges that they are owners of the steamboat Gold Hunter; that they had appointed the libellant their general agent or broker; and exhibits a bill, showing a balance of accounts due libellant for money paid, laid out, and expended for the use of respondents, in paying for supplies, repairs, and advertising of the steamboat, and numerous other charges, together with commissions of the disbursements, &c.

The court below very properly dismissed the libel, for want of jurisdiction. There is nothing in the nature of a maritime contract in the case. The libel shows nothing but a demand for a balance of accounts between agent and principal, for which an action of assumpsit, in a common law court, is the proper remedy. That the money advanced and paid for respondents was, in whole or in part, to pay bills due by a steamboat for repairs or supplies, will not make the transaction maritime, or give the libellant a remedy in admiralty. Nor does the local law of California, which authorizes an attachment of vessels for supplies or repairs, extend to the balance of accounts between agent and prircipal, who have never dealt on the credit, pledge, or security of the vessel.

The case is too plain for argument.

The judgment of the court of admiralty, dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction, is affirmed with costs.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said district court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

title: Minturn v. Maynerd/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Minturn v. Maynerd/Opinion of the Court


text: Florida v. Georgia (58 U.S. 478)

title: Florida v. Georgia (58 U.S. 478)


text: Talk:Florida v. Georgia (58 U.S. 478)

title: Talk:Florida v. Georgia (58 U.S. 478)