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Caldwell's Case

APPEALS from the Court of Claims.

Caldwell sued the United States to recover damages for the breach of a transportation contract, dated March 12th, 1866; the government then being at war with Western Indians. The articles on which the points in dispute arose were thus:

'ARTICLE I. The said Caldwell shall receive at any time, in any of the months from April to September, inclusive, during the year 1866, from the officers or agents of the quartermaster's department at Forts Leavenworth and Riley, in Kansas; at Fort Kearney, Nebraska Territory; Fort Sedgwick, Colorado Territory; Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory; and at any points or places at which posts or depots shall be established during the continuance of this contract, ON the west bank of the Missouri River, north of Fort Leavenworth and south of latitude 42 degrees north, all such military stores and supplies as may be offered to him for transportation. . . by the officer of the quartermaster's department, at any or all of the above points or places, and transport the same with dispatch, and deliver them. . . to the officer of the quartermaster's department on duty at any of the posts or depots which are now or may be hereafter established in the Territory of Colorado north of 40 degrees north, and at Denver City, and in the Territories of Nebraska, Dakota, Idaho, and Utah, south of latitude 44 degrees north, including Fort Reno, and east of longitude 114 degrees west of Greenwich.

'ARTICLE II. The said Caldwell agrees. . . to transport under this agreement, from the posts, depots, or stations named in Article I, or from and to any other posts, depots, or stations that may be established within the district named in said article, any number of pounds of military stores and supplies, from and between 100,000 lbs. and 10,000,000 lbs. in the aggregate.

'ARTICLE XI. The said Caldwell shall transport all the military stores and supplies for which the quartermaster's department may require wagon transportation by contract, on the route specified by this agreement, during the year 1866, provided the weight of such military stores and supplies shall not exceed, in the aggregate, 10,000,000 lbs.; yet nothing herein shall be so construed as to forbid or prevent the United States from using its own means of transportation for such service, whenever it may be deemed advisable to do so.'

The case, as found by the Court of Claims, was thus:

At the date of the contract the only military posts ON the west bank of the Missouri River, within the said district, were Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas, and Omaha, in Nebraska Territory.

On or before the 30th day of March, 1866, the president of the Union Pacific Railroad advised the Quartermaster-General that the company had sixty miles of their line completed west of Omaha, and that the company expected to complete the first hundred miles by the 10th of June.

In the summer and autumn of 1866 the railroad company had extended their line westward to Columbus, Lone Tree, and Kearney's Station, and it offered to the United States a more expeditious and cheaper mode of transportation than wagon transportation.

In the summer of 1866 the United States had collected at Omaha military stores and supplies, intended for the supply of posts west of the Missouri River, and within the district covered by the contract with Caldwell, and in the year 1866 they sent by the said railroad quantities of the said stores and supplies from Omaha to Columbus, Lone Tree, and Kearney's Station, the successive termini of the railroad as it was extended westward.

In the month of June, 1866, the United States contracted with one Kountze for the transportation of the said stores and supplies from Columbus, Lone Tree, and Kearney's Station to Fort McPherson, Fort Laramie, and Fort Kearney, and Kountze, under the said contract, and in the year 1866, performed the transportation; that is to say, from April to September, 1866, he transported 2,945,484 lbs., and in October transported 693,964 lbs.

Previous to the delivery of the said military stores and supplies to the railroad company, and before the making of the said contracts with Kountze, Caldwell was prepared, and gave notice to the United States of his readiness to transport them, under and according to his contract.

Previous to the delivery of the stores and supplies to Koutze, but after the making of the said contracts with him, Caldwell was prepared and claimed of the United States the right, under his contract, to transport them from the termini of said railroad to such places, within his contract, as the United States might designate.

No notice was given by the United States to Caldwell, under his contract, to transport the military stores and supplies transported by said Kountze. But on the 11th of June, 1866, he received notice from the United States that transportation, under his contract, would not be needed.

The cost of the transportation of the said stores and supplies delivered to Kountze in any of the months from April to September, inclusive, would have been to Caldwell $1.45 per 100 lbs. per hundred miles.

The Court of Claims, holding that the expression 'posts and depots ON the west bank of the Missouri River,' &c., was not confined to posts and depots 'on the water-line of the river,' but was used 'merely to denote the most easterly line of the district covered by the contract,' and that the terms 'posts, depots, or stations' did not, of necessity, mean military posts, depots, or stations, awarded to Caldwell $35,689.01, as damages for the failure to deliver 2,945,484 lbs. of supplies, which were transported from Omaha to Columbus, to Lone Tree, and to Kearney Station by rail, and thence to Fort MePherson, Fort Laramie, and Fort Reno by wagon, between the months of April and September, 1866. But holding that the clause in Article XI, by which it was agreed that Caldwell should transport all the military stores and supplies for which the quartermaster's department might require wagon transportation, &c., 'during the year 1866,' was only a provision for additional transportation that might be required in other months than those from April to September, previously specified, and under another contract than this to be made, the court limited the recovery to transportation during the months from April to September, 1866, inclusive, and refused to allow damages for the failure to deliver for transportation the supplies which were carried in October, 1866. The United States appealed from the first branch of the judgment, and Caldwell from the latter part.

Messrs. Durant and Horner, for the claimant, Caldwell; Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Caldwell's Case


text: Talk:Caldwell's Case

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title: Talk:Caldwell's Case


text:
Caldwell's Case/Opinion of the Court

In the view we have taken of the case, it is unnecessary to consider a question largely discussed in the court below, and in the briefs of counsel here, to wit, whether the contract, although not in terms containing a stipulation binding the United States to deliver to the claimant all the stores and supplies it desired to transport between the points mentioned, was to be construed as having that effect. Our decision of the case rests upon other grounds, which are reached upon the assumption that the claimant is right in his construction of the contract, in that respect, but do not at all depend upon it.

By the second article of the contract of Caldwell, the claimant, he undertakes to transport 'from the posts, depots, or stations named in Article I,' or from 'any other posts, depots, or stations that may be established' on the west bank of the Missouri River, any number of pounds of supplies not exceeding 10,000,000 lbs. in the aggregate. The posts named in Article I are, Forts Leavenworth and Riley, in Kansas; Fort Kearney, Nebraska; Fort Sedgwick, Colorado; Fort Laramie, Dakota. The district named in said article within which other posts may be established is, the west bank of the Missouri River, north of Leavenworth and south of 42 degrees north latitude.

The posts from which the supplies were sent, which, it is said, should have been delivered to the claimant, were not those named in Article I, or either of them. They were Omaha at the outset, or starting-point, and Columbus, Lone Tree, and Kearney Station (not Fort Kearney), as the intermediate points from which wagon transportation was taken. These three points were railroad stations on the Union Pacific Railroad, and they were points to which the road was, from time to time, sufficiently completed for the purposes of railroad travel or transportation.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is based upon the theory that the expression in the contract, 'posts, depots, or stations,' includes railway depots or stations; that when a depot or station was established upon the Pacific road, as its construction advanced westwardly, such point became a post or station within the meaning of the contract. We are of the opinion that this was not the intention of the parties, but that military posts or stations alone were intended by them.

The contract was intended to aid the government in the transfer of its stores and supplies from one military post, station, or depot to another. While the same words in a contract, the subject-matter of which respected goods to be transported for individuals, and in time of peace, might be construed as claimed, such is not their fair and natural meaning in the contract we are considering. The term 'post,' in this instrument, means a military establishment where a body of troops is permanently fixed; 'station' means a place or department where a military duty is to be discharged, or the synonym of 'depot,' a place where military stores or supplies are kept, or troops assembled. To apply them otherwise would, we think, be giving a forced construction to language used in the presence of actual war, in reference to military stores, and in reference to their transportation from one military position to another, as the necessities of the army should require.

Columbus, Lone Tree, and Kearney are not 'on the west bank of the Missouri River,' and the contract limits the other posts, stations, or depots that may be established to that locality. The record shows that from Omaha to Columbus is ninety-two miles, to Lone Tree is one hundred and thirty-two miles, and to Kearney Station is one hundred and ninety-one miles, and there is no evidence that the Missouri River is, at any other point, nearer to the places named than is thus indicated. It would be quite a latitudinarian construction that would hold that these places are 'on the Missouri River.' The specifications of the points of departure are minutely described in Article I, and cannot be enlarged by the looser language used in Article III, where another subject is provided for, and the points of departure are mentioned in an incidental manner only.

The supplies now under consideration, it will be observed, were shipped from Omaha as the first or original point of departure. Omaha is situated on the west bank of the Missouri River, and was a station, or depot, where military stores and supplies were collected, and where troops were assembled at the time the claimant's contract was made. It is, nevertheless, not a point from which the supplies that were to be forwarded, were by the contract to be delivered to the claimant. Those points were the places named, to wit: Forts Leavenworth, Riley, Kearney, Sedgwick, and Laramie; the station, or depot, of Omaha not being named. Nor can it come under the words 'at such points or places at which posts or depots shall be established during the continuance of this contract, on the west bank of the Missouri River,' as it was a post, or depot, established long before the making of the contract, and was in full operation as a post or station when the contract was made.

The reason for this careful omission of Omaha, both from the expressed points of departure and those afterwards to be formed, is found in the fact that it was the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad. The building of this road was then going on. It was well known to the United States anthorities that it would be rapidly extended westwardly, and that it would be a speedy and cheap means of transporting its supplies. The contract with the claimant required the supplies to be transported at the rate of ten miles a day with mule trains and fourteen miles a day with ox trains, and at the expense of $1.45 per 100 lbs. for every hundred miles. The train upon the railroad would carry the supplies the same distance in an hour, and the expense would be diminished nearly as much as the speed would be increased. All this was well known to both parties. Hence when the road was completed to Columbus it was used by the government for that distance, and when successively completed to Lone Tree and Kearney, it was used to those places. That the United States under such circumstances intended to deprive itself of the power to use this new and more useful mode of transportation can scarcely be credited. It has not done so in terms, and, we think, that there is no fair reason to suppose that it has done so by implication.

The whole matter results in this: The government is responsible in damages if it has sent its supplies through other parties than the claimant from the posts of Leavenworth, Riley, Kearney, Sedgwick, or Laramie, or from other stations or posts thereafter established on the west bank of the Missouri River. The points from which it is proved to have sent supplies by other means than through the claimant are not among those named, nor are they military posts, nor are they on the west bank of the Missouri River. Omaha is not among the posts named, nor is it one established after the making of the contract. Hence there has been no breach of the contract, and there is no liability in damages.

The judgment awarding damages in the sum of $35,689.01 is REVERSED, and the case is remitted to the Court of Claims, with directions to

DISMISS THE PETITION.

title: Caldwell's Case/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Caldwell's Case/Opinion of the Court


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Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)

ERROR to the Supreme Court of Tennessee; the case being thus:

Jordan, on the 1st of November, 1866, sold a tract of land to Hall & Conley, the consideration as expressed in the deed being $13,000; the deed not stating, however, whether this $13,000 was gold and silver coin, or notes of the United States; a kind of notes, always up to this time, from the time of their issue, less valuable than such coin; but which in February, 1862, and afterwards had been made by act of Congress a legal tender in the payment of debts, and which in point of fact at the time of the sale were the universal currency, to the exclusion of gold and silver as currency, of all parts of the United States except parts on the Pacific Coast.

In point of fact the consideration of this deed was one of gold coin, or based on the value of coin; that is to say, $6500 were paid in gold coin when the deed was made, and an agreement given to pay 'on the 25th of December, 1867, an amount of legal currency of the United States sufficient to purchase $6890 of the present gold coin of the United States;' this $6890 being the balance ($6500) of the $13,000 consideration-money, with interest added to the day of payment.

An act of Congress in force at the date of the deed. enacted that on deeds of land there should be a stamp of '$1 for each $1000 of consideration-money,' and fifty cents for every fraction of the sum last named; and that no deed not properly stamped should be received in evidence. The act makes a provision, however, for the correction of unintentional error by application to the collector, and purchase of the proper stamp. This deed was stamped with a stamp for $13, the stamp confessedly proper for one when the consideration was $13,000 in notes of the United States.

On a question in the court below whether the deed was properly stamped, or whether the stamp ought not to be such as the amount of notes which the $13,000 of gold coin, the actual consideration of the deed, would have bought-if the amount represented by them had been set forth in the deed-required, that court held the stamp sufficient, and on the 29th of June, 1871, the present writ of error was taken to its judgment. The case came on to be heard here December 16th, 1873.

Messrs. R. Johnson and J. H. Imbree, for the plaintiff in error:

It is a matter of universal knowledge that there has always been a difference between the value of what are called 'legal tender notes' and of coin. At times, as in the summer of 1864, one day in which it required $285 of notes to buy $100 of gold, this difference has been immense; and it has been frequently great. Now, the question is, may parties at a time when gold and silver have in fact no currency-when the notes of the government are the sole currency of the country, or certainly of all that part of it where the parties to this transaction lived-may parties put in their deeds the value, in gold, of the property sold, and then pay stamps on that value? the real thing which passes between them being, all the while, not gold, but paper; not $13,000 in coin, but a greater amount in notes; more or less greater according as the discount on paper in the market may be higher or lower. We submit that they cannot, because a contrary rule will tend directly to frauds upon the revenue. In cases of large deeds or of large mortgages the temptation will be prevailing.

Mr. F. P. Stanton, contra:

No man could tell on the 1st of November, 1866, how much currency would be required to purchase gold on the 25th of December, 1867, or even that legal tenders would not be equivalent to gold at that time.

But there has never been any law requiring the stamps on deeds or other instruments to be regulated by the currency values, when the transactions were for gold coin. The stamp affixed to the deed was then exactly what the law required. Supposing the plaintiffs in error honestly doubted this, they had it in their power to correct the supposed error by applying to the collector; and as it is evident no fraud was intended, the correction would have cost them fifty cents. It is apparent then, that the writ of error in this case, which has delayed the proceedings in the court below for two years and a half, was sued out 'merely for delay,' and comes strictly within the letter and spirit of the Twenty-third Rule of this court, which declares that 'in all cases where a writ of error. . . shall appear to have been sued out merely for delay, damages shall be awarded at the rate of ten per cent. per annum on the amount of the judgment.'

In addition, by the practice in Tennessee, a vendee must furnish deeds and stamps. In this proceeding, therefore, the plaintiffs in error are endeavoring to take advantage of their own wrong, as it was their duty to affix the proper stamp to the deed. For this reason, as well as for those already stated, the defendant in error asks for damages at the rate of ten per cent., in addition to interest, in accordance with the rule aforesaid.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD announced the judgment of this court, affirming the judgment of the court below with costs, interest,

title: Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)


text: Talk:Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)

title: Talk:Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)


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Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)/Opinion of the Court

AND TEN PER CENT. DAMAGES.


text: Talk:Hall v. Jordan (86 U.S. 271)/Opinion of the Court


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Coit v. Robinson

ON motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, affirming a decree of the District Court in bankruptcy, forever discharging, in the usual way, two persons, partners in trade, from payment of all debts and claims against them, &c., including a debt of one Coit, to a greater amount than $2000.

The case was thus:

Robinson & Chamberlain, partners in trade, applied to the District Court for the Southern District of New York for a discharge under the Bankrupt Act of March 2d, 1867. Coit opposed their discharge, notwithstanding which the court held them entitled to be discharged, and by its decree discharged them accordingly. Thereupon Coit petitioned the Circuit Court for a reversal of the decree of the District Court, and on the same day filed a bond with surety for costs, and pursuant to the notice given, filed in the Circuit Court a paper entitled 'petition of appeal,' in which he referred to the petition in bankruptcy of Robinson & Chamberlain, and stated that he was a creditor; that he had proved a part of his claim and filed his proof; that the bankrupts were examined at his instance, that he made opposition to their discharge, and that he filed the grounds of his opposition with the District Court; that he was heard in support of his opposition before that court, and that the court overruled his opposition and granted a discharge with costs against him, the opposing creditor. The petition concluded thus:

'Your petitioner, feeling aggrieved thereby, prays the Circuit Court for a reversal of the said several orders of the said District Court as being contrary to law and to the evidence.'

All the proceedings, including the evidence, had in the District Court were filed with this petition.

The petition of appeal was heard in the Circuit Court, and a decree made, which, after reciting, that 'at a stated term of the said court,' 'the petition of W. A. Coit, one of the creditors, &c., praying for a review and reversal of the decree of the District Court, &c., granting a discharge to the bankrupts, and the appeal thereon had been brought to a hearing before the said Circuit Court,' concluded:

'Now, on all the papers and proceedings herein, and after hearing, Mr. Charles Tracy, of counsel for said creditor and appellant Coit, on behalf of said petition and Mr. G. A. Seixas of counsel for said bankrupts and respondents, in opposition thereto. It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said decree said District Court be and the same is hereby affirmed.'

Coit thereupon filed in the Circuit Court a petition, addressed to this court, giving a statement of the proceedings already referred to, both in the District Court and in the Circuit Court, and concluding as follows:

'Your petitioner, therefore, prays that all and singular the records and proceedings of said Circuit Court upon the said case and the appeal thereon may be removed to the Supreme Court, and that the said decree of the Circuit Court may be reversed, and that your petitioner may have such other and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper.'

Before filing this petition he filed in the same office where he had filed it a bond in $1000, conditioned to prosecute the appeal with effect, and approved by the circuit judge 'as to form and sufficiency of sureties.'

The appeal being entered in this court the bankrupts moved to dismiss it, on the ground that no appeal would lie in such a case from the Circuit Court. And whether one would or would not, was the question before this court.

The question depended largely upon certain enactments of Congress, including specially clauses of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and of the Bankrupt Act of March 2d, 1867, under which the discharge took place. The sections referred to or relied on in the opinion of the court run thus: Judiciary Act.

'SECTION 11. The Circuit Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction from the District Courts under the regulations and restrictions hereinafter provided.

'SECTION 22. Final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a District Court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $50, exclusive of costs, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in a Circuit Court upon a writ of error.

'And upon a like process may final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in a Circuit Court. . . removed there by appeal from a District Court, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court.'

[By act of March, 1803, an appeal is given to the Supreme Court from all final judgments or decrees rendered in any Circuit Court in any cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, of prize or no prize, under the same conditions as to the sum or value of the matter in dispute as before existed in regard to writs of error.] Bankrupt Act.

This act, after constituting the several District Courts of the United States, 'courts of bankruptcy,' and after giving to them 'original jurisdiction in their respective districts in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy,' enacts by its second section (the same, for the convenience of the reader of the court's opinion, being here broken into clauses), as follows:

'SECTION 2. The several courts of the United States, within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under this act; and except when special provision in otherwise made may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a court of equity.

'The powers and jurisdiction hereby granted may be exercised either by said court or by any justice thereof, in term time or in vacation.

title: Coit v. Robinson


text: Talk:Coit v. Robinson

title: Talk:Coit v. Robinson


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Coit v. Robinson/Opinion of the Court

'Said Circuit Courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the same district of all suits at law or equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee touching any property or rights of property of said bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such assignee, &c.

'SECTION 8. Appeals may be taken from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts in all cases in equity, and writs of error may be allowed to said Circuit Courts from said District Courts, in cases at law, under the jurisdiction created by this act, when the debt or damages claimed amount to more than $500.

'And any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or an assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the District Court to the Circuit Court for the same district &c., &c.

'SECTION 9. In cases arising under this act no appeal or writ of error shall be allowed, in any case, from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, unless the matter in dispute in such case shall exceed $2000.'

The twenty-ninth seetion authorizes a discharge by the District Court of the petitioning debtor when there has been no fraud on the act. The act goes on:

'SECTION 31. Any creditor opposing the discharge of any bankrupt, may file a specification in writing of the grounds of his opposition, and the court may, in its discretion, order any question of fact so presented to be tried at a stated session of the District Court.'

Mr. G. A. Seixas, for the bankrupts, and in support of the motion to dismiss, contended that the only mode of review at the circuit was by petition, under the first clause of the second section of the act, which Coit, the opposing creditor, had in fact followed, and that in such case no appeal lies to this court; and that this was settled by Morgan v. Thornhill, Hall v. Allen, Smith v. Mason, Mead v. Thompson.

Mr. Charles Tracey, contra, argued that none of the cases cited governed this; that they were all upon interlocutory orders; and so no precedent in a case like this, where the debtor was discharged and the debt of the opposing creditor annihilated; a case where he certainly ought to have the privilege of being heard in a superior court.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

District Courts have original jurisdiction, in their respective districts, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, and are authorized to hear and adjudicate the same according to the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. Circuit Courts have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under that act, within and for the districts where the proceedings under the act are, pending; and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process, of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as in a court of equity; the provision also being that the Circuit Court, or any justice thereof, may exercise the powers and jurisdiction granted by that clause, 'in term time or vacation.'

On the 29th of February, 1868, the respondents filed their petition in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, representing that they owed debts within the judicial district exceeding $300, and that they were unable tp pay all their debts in full; that they were willing to surrender all their estate and effects for the benefit of their creditors, and stating that they desired to obtain the benefit of the Bankrupt Act; and prayed that, after due proceedings had, they might, by a decree of the court, be adjudged to be bankrupts, and that, upon complying with all the requirements of that act, they may severally be decreed to have a certificate of discharge from all their debts provable under the said act. By the record it also appears that the petitioners, on the 12th of June in the same year, were adjudged to be bankrupts within the true intent and meaning of the Bankrupt Act.

Complete jurisdiction of the case was by those means acquired by the District Court, and it further appears that such proceedings were had that the respondents, on the 17th of July following, were, by the decree of the District Court, discharged from all debts and claims provable under that act against them on the day their petition to be adjudged bankrupts was filed.

Opposition to their discharge was made by the present appellant, and the District Court, on the 24th of the same month, heard the parties and passed an order that the bankrupts recover of him, as such opposing creditor, the costs incurred by them in resisting such opposition, amounting to the sum of $129.50. Three days later the appellant, as such opposing creditor, gave notice that he intended to petition the Circuit Court for the same district for a reversal of the aforesaid decree of the district judge, and on the same day he filed a bond for costs, executed by himself and a surety, and pursuant to the notice given, on the 6th of August following he filed in the Circuit Court a certain paper called the 'petition of appeal,' in which he refers to the petition in bankruptcy of the respondents and states that he is a creditor of their estate; that he proved a part of his claim in that proceeding, and that he filed proof of the same with the register; that the bankrupts were examined at his instance, and that he made opposition to their discharge, and that he filed the grounds of his opposition in that behalf with the District Court; that he was heard in support of his opposition before the district judge, and that the district judge overruled his opposition and granted the respective certificates of discharge to the alleged bankrupts, and awarded such costs to them as they incurred in resisting his opposition, and concludes as follows: 'Your petitioner, feeling aggrieved thereby, prays the Circuit Court for a reversal of the said several orders of the said District Court as being contrary to law and to the evidence,' as more fully set forth in the petition, to which he made oath before the register and caused notice thereof to be served on the solicitor of the bankrupts.

Duly certified copies of the proceedings in bankruptcy, as well those that took place before the register as those before the district judge, whether in term time or vacation, were, on the 17th of September in the following year, filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court for the same district, together with a copy of the minutes of the testimony taken before the register, filling more than three hundred and sixty closely printed pages of the transcript, without including the numerous exhibits which are annexed to the certificate of the clerk. Hearing was had in the Circuit Court on the petition for review, and the Circuit Court, on the 28th of March last, adjudged and decreed that the decree of the District Court be in all things affirmed, and that the bankrupts recover such costs of the petitioner as they incurred in resisting his opposition, amounting to the sum of $94.25.

Beyond all question the case in the Circuit Court was a petition for review under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which gives to the Circuit Courts within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending, a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the Bankrupt Act, except where special provision is otherwise made. Such courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, may hear and determine any such case or question upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any party aggrieved, as in a court of equity. Cases and questions of the kind may be heard and determined by the proper Circuit Court, or by any justice thereof, in term time or vacation, which of itself is quite sufficient to show that the power and jurisdiction conferred by that clause of the second section are not the same as that conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act.

Special provision is not otherwise made in the Bankrupt Act for the review or revision by the Circuit Court of either of the questions involved in the orders or decrees of the District Court which are the subject of complaint in the case, and for that reason it follows that the power and jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to hear and determine the complaint of the appellant and to review or revise the orders or decrees of the District Court in the case were decided under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act.

Said Circuit Courts also have jurisdiction, concurrent with the District Courts, of all suits at law or in equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming and adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of said bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such assignee.

Concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of all suits at law or in equity are the words of that clause, showing conclusively that the jurisdiction intended to be conferred is the regular jurisdiction between party and party, as described in the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act and the third article of the Constitution. Consequently it follows that final judgments in such civil actions, or final decrees in such suits in equity, rendered in cases where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $2000, may be re-examined in this court under the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act, when properly removed here by writ of error or appeal, as required by existing laws.

Like jurisdiction in all such suits at law or in equity is also vested in the District Courts concurrent with the Circuit Courts, but inasmuch as such controversies are made the subject of special provision, neither the judgment nor the decree of the District Court in such a suit can be reviewed or revised by the Circuit Court under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, nor in any other manner than that provided in the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act and the subsequent act regulating appeals.

Opportunity for further litigation, either in the District or Circuit Court, being closed, the appellant, on the 11th of April last, filed in the Circuit Court a petition, addressed to the justices of this court, giving a full summary statement of the aforesaid proceedings, both in the District Court and in the Circuit Court, and concluding as follows: Your petitioner therefore prays that all and singular the records and proceedings of said Circuit Court upon the said case and the appeal thereon may be removed to the Supreme Court, and that the said decree of the Circuit Court may be reversed, and that you petitioner may have such other and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper.

Before lodging that petition in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court the appellant filed in the same office a bond in the sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned to prosecute the appeal with effect, dated one day earlier, and approved by the circuit judge 'as to form and sufficiency of sureties.'

Since the case was entered in this court the respondents have appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the want of jurisdiction, which is the principal question for the consideration of the court at the present time.

Cases arising under the third clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, where the amount is sufficient, are plainly within the ninth section of the Bankrupt Act, and as such, when the case has proceeded to final judgment or decree, may be removed here for re-examination by writ of error or appeal, as the case may be, but the review and revision contemplated by the first clause of the same section is evidently the same in substance and effect as that given to the Circuit Courts in the prior Bankrupt Act, as sufficiently appears from the words, 'general superintendence,' preceding and qualifying the word 'jurisdiction;' and more clearly from the fact that the revisory jurisdiction extends to mere questions, as contradistinguished from judgments or decrees, as well as to cases; and from the further fact that the jurisdiction in that behalf may be exercised in chambers as well as in court, and in vacation as well as in term time.

Suits in equity and cases at law, under the jurisdiction created by that act, may be removed to the Circuit Court for re-examination, as provided by the eighth section of the act, but it is quite clear that the removal in such cases must be effected under the regulations prescribed in the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act and the subsequent act allowing appeals in cases of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

Mere questions are not re-examinable under the regulations prescribed in those acts, nor would any judgment or decree be regarded as a regular final judgment or decree for such a purpose, unless it was rendered in term time when the court was in session.

By that section 'all cases in equity' and 'cases at law,' when the debt or damages claimed amount to more than $500, may be removed into the Circuit Court for re-examination, and the further provision is that any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or any assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the District Court to the Circuit Court for the same district, if claimed and due notice thereof is given, as therein required, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision in the District Court. Nor can any writ of error be allowed under that section unless the party claiming it shall comply with the statutes regulating the granting of such writs, and the better opinion is that the writ of error must be sued out within the same time as that allowed for claiming an appeal in an equity suit.

Appellate jurisdiction may unquestionably be exercised by the Circuit Courts in four classes of cases under the Bankrupt Act: (1.) By appeal from the final decree of the District Courts, in suits in equity commenced and prosecuted in the latter courts by virtue of the jurisdiction created by the third clause of the second section of the act. (2.) By writs of error sued out to the District Courts in civil actions finally decided by such courts in the exercise of jurisdiction created by the same clause of that section. Where the amount in dispute in such cases exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $2000, the final judgment or decree in the case, as rendered in the Circuit Court, may be removed into this court for re-examination, as provided in cases originally brought in the Circuit Court. (3.) By appeal from the decision of the District Court rejecting wholly or in part the claim of a creditor, as provided in the eighth section of the act. (4.) By appeal from the decision of the District Court allowing such a claim when the same is opposed by the assignee.

Doubts are entertained whether the cases mentioned in the last two propositions are re-examinable in this court, but the question is not presented for decision in this case.

Whether the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge pursuant to the twenty-ninth section of the Bankrupt Act is always a question to be decided by the District Court under the conditions prescribed in that section. Creditors opposing the discharge may file a specification in writing of the grounds of their opposition, but the only effect of such a specification, as declared in the thirty-first section of the act, is to authorize the court, 'in its discretion,' to postpone the question of fact to be tried at a stated session of the court, as the thirty-second section provides that if it shall appear to the court that the bankrupt has, in all things, conformed to his duty under the act, the court shall grant the prescribed discharge.

Regulations of a different character are prescribed in a case where the question is whether the alleged insolvent shall be adjudged a bankrupt without his consent, as in that event the provision is that the court shall, if the debtor, on the return day of the notice, required to be given on the petition, so demand in writing, order a trial by jury as therein provided, but the Bankrupt Act contains no provision for a jury trial on the question of discharge, and in the judgment of the court the only power vested in the Circuit Court to review and revise the decision of the District Court, made in granting or refusing such a discharge, is that conferred by the first clause of the second section of that act.

Except when special provision is otherwise made the Circuit Courts under that clause have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the Bankrupt Act. Special provision is not otherwise made for the re-examination by the Circuit Court of the decision of the District Court in granting or refusing a discharge in bankruptcy, and, of course, it can only be done under the power conferred by that clause.

Nothing remains for consideration in this case except to inquire whether an appeal lies to this court from a decree of the Circuit Court rendered in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon that court by the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which is the very question that was presented to this court in the case of Morgan v. Thornhill, where this court unanimously decided the question in the negative. Since that opinion was delivered this court has decided the same question in the same way in four other cases, all of which are published in the regular series of the reports of the Supreme Court. None of these statements can be successfully contradicted, and it follows that this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal in this case.

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY, with whom concurred Mr. Justice MILLER, dissenting:

title: Coit v. Robinson/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Coit v. Robinson/Opinion of the Court


text:
Coit v. Robinson/Dissent Bradley

Mr. Justice BRADLEY, with whom concurred Mr. Justice MILLER, dissenting:

I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. The Judiciary Act gives a writ of error to this court from all final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in the Circuit Courts, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars. The act of March 3d, 1803, converts this writ of error into an appeal in cases of equity, and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and prize cases. The cases in which appeals in bankruptcy have heretofore been disallowed, were cased of interlocutory orders or decrees; and, therefore, not within the terms of the law. The decree appealed from in this case has all the elements of a final decree, and belongs to a system of proceeding which has always been regarded in England as of equitable cognizance. The fact that it depends upon statutory regulation does not divest it of that character. A bankruptcy proceeding, by which the estate of a debtor is administered, is essentially an equitable one. In a case of such importance as that which involves a man's liability or non-liability for his debts after he has given up all his property, he ought not to be deprived of the right of appeal if the law, fairly considered, gives it to him. I think it does give it to him in this case.

title: Coit v. Robinson/Dissent Bradley


text: Talk:Coit v. Robinson/Dissent Bradley

title: Talk:Coit v. Robinson/Dissent Bradley


text: Mitchell v. Tilghman

title: Mitchell v. Tilghman


text: Talk:Mitchell v. Tilghman

title: Talk:Mitchell v. Tilghman