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6 Pierre glide toward maturity, thoughtless of that period of remorseless insight, when all these delicate warmths should seem frigid to him, and he should madly demand more ardent fires.

Nor had that pride and love which had so bountifully provided for the youthful nurture of Pierre, neglected his culture in the deepest element of all. It had been a maxim with the father of Pierre, that all gentlemanhood was vain; all claims to it preposterous and absurd, unless the primeval gentleness and golden humanities of religion had been so thoroughly wrought into the complete texture of the character, that he who pronounced himself gentleman, could also rightfully assume the meek, but kingly style of Christian. At the age of sixteen, Pierre partook with his mother of the Holy Sacraments.

It were needless, and more difficult, perhaps, to trace out precisely the absolute motives which prompted these youthful vows. Enough, that as to Pierre had descended the numerous other noble qualities of his ancestors; and as he now stood heir to their forests and farms; so by the same insensible sliding process, he seemed to have inherited their docile homage to a venerable Faith, which the first Glendinning had brought over sea, from beneath the shadow of an English minster. Thus in Pierre was the complete polished steel of the gentleman, girded with Religion's silken sash; and his great-grandfather's soldierly fate had taught him that the generous sash should, in the last bitter trial, furnish its wearer with Glory's shroud; so that what through life had been worn for Grace's sake, in death might safely hold the man. But while thus all alive to the beauty and poesy of his father's faith, Pierre little foresaw that this world hath a secret deeper than beauty, and Life some burdens heavier than death.

So perfect to Pierre had long seemed the illuminated

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Rh scroll of his life thus far, that only one hiatus was discoverable by him in that sweetly-writ manuscript. A sister had been omitted from the text. He mourned that so delicious a feeling as fraternal love had been denied him. Nor could the fictitious title, which he so often lavished upon his mother, at all supply the absent reality. This emotion was most natural; and the full cause and reason of it even Pierre did not at that time entirely appreciate. For surely a gentle sister is the second best gift to a man; and it is first in point of occurrence; for the wife comes after. He who is sister-less, is as a bachelor before his time. For much that goes to make up the deliciousness of a wife, already lies in the sister.

'Oh, had my father but had a daughter!' cried Pierre; 'someone whom I might love, and protect, and fight for, if need be. It must be a glorious thing to engage in a mortal quarrel on a sweet sister's behalf! Now, of all things, would to heaven, I had a sister!'

Thus, ere entranced in the gentler bonds of a lover; thus often would Pierre invoke heaven for a sister; but Pierre did not then know, that if there be anything a man might well pray against, that thing is the responsive gratification of some of the devoutest prayers of his youth.

It may have been that this strange yearning of Pierre for a sister, had part of its origin in that still stranger feeling of loneliness he sometimes experienced, as not only the solitary head of his family, but the only surnamed male Glendinning extant. A powerful and populous family had by degrees run off into the female branches; so that Pierre found himself surrounded by numerous kinsmen and kinswomen, yet companioned by no surnamed male Glendinning, but the duplicate one reflected to him in the mirror. But in his more wonted natural mood, this thought was not wholly sad to him. Nay,

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8 sometimes it mounted into an exultant swell. For in the ruddiness, and flushfulness, and vaingloriousness of his youthful soul, he fondly hoped to have a monopoly of glory in capping the fame-column, whose tall shaft had been erected by his noble sires.

In all this, how unadmonished was our Pierre by that foreboding and prophetic lesson taught, not less by Palmyra's quarries, than by Palmyra's ruins. Among those ruins is a crumbling, uncompleted shaft, and some leagues off, ages ago left in the quarry, is the crumbling corresponding capital, also incomplete. These Time seized and spoiled; these Time crushed in the egg; and the proud stone that should have stood among the clouds, Time left abased beneath the soil. Oh, what quenchless feud is this, that Time hath with the sons of Men!

It has been said that the beautiful country round about Pierre appealed to very proud memories. But not only through the mere chances of things, had that fine country become ennobled by the deeds of his sires, but in Pierre's eyes, all its hills and swales seemed as sanctified through their very long uninterrupted possession by his race.

That fond ideality which, in the eyes of affection, hallows the least trinket once familiar to the person of a departed love; with Pierre that talisman touched the whole earthly landscape about him; for remembering that on those hills his own fine fathers had gazed; through those woods, over these lawns, by that stream, along these tangled paths, many a grand-dame of his had merrily strolled when a girl; vividly recalling these things, Pierre deemed all that part of the earth a

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Rh ; so that his very horizon was to him as a memorial ring.

The monarchical world very generally imagines, that in demagoguical America the sacred Past hath no fixed statues erected to it, but all things irreverently seethe and boil in the vulgar cauldron of an everlasting uncrystallising Present. This conceit would seem peculiarly applicable to the social condition. With no chartered aristocracy, and no law of entail, how can any family in America imposingly perpetuate itself? Certainly that common saying among us, which declares, that be a family conspicuous as it may, a single half-century shall see it abased; that maxim undoubtedly holds true with the commonalty. In our cities families rise and burst like bubbles in a vat. For indeed the democratic element operates as a subtile acid among us; forever producing new things by corroding the old; as in the south of France verdigris, the primitive material of one kind of green paint, is produced by grape vinegar poured upon copper plates. Now in general nothing can be more significant of decay than the idea of corrosion; yet on the other hand, nothing can more vividly suggest luxuriance of life, than the idea of green as a colour; for green is the peculiar signet of all-fertile Nature herself. Herein by apt analogy we behold the marked anomalousness of America; whose character abroad, we need not be surprised, is misconceived, when we consider how strangely she contradicts all prior notions of human things; and how wonderfully to her, Death itself becomes transmuted into Life. So that political institutions, which in other lands seem above all things intensely artificial, with America seem to possess the divine virtue of a natural law; for the most mighty of Nature's laws is this, that out of Death she brings Life.

Still, are there things in the visible world, over which

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10 ever-shifting Nature hath not so unbounded a sway. The grass is annually changed; but the limbs of the oak, for a long term of years, defy that annual decree. And if in America the vast mass of families be as the blades of grass, yet some few there are that stand as the oak; which, instead of decaying, annually puts forth new branches; whereby Time, instead of subtracting, is made to capitulate into a multiple virtue.

In this matter we will—not superciliously, but in fair spirit—compare pedigrees with England, and strange as it may seem at the first blush, not without some claim to equality. I dare say, that in this thing the Peerage Book is a good statistical standard whereby to judge her; since the compilers of that work cannot be entirely insensible on whose patronage they most rely; and the common intelligence of our own people shall suffice to judge us. But the magnificence of names must not mislead us as to the humility of things. For as the breath in all our lungs is hereditary, and my present breath at this moment, is further descended than the body of the present High Priest of the Jews, so far as he can assuredly trace it; so mere names, which are also but air, do likewise revel in this endless descendedness. But if Richmond, and St. Albans, and Grafton, and Portland, and Buccleuch, be names almost old as England herself, the present Dukes of those names stop in their own genuine pedigrees at Charles ., and there find no very fine fountain; since what we would deem the least glorious parentage under the sun, is precisely the parentage of a Buccleuch, for example; whose ancestress could not well avoid being a mother, it is true, but had accidentally omitted the preliminary rite. Yet a king was the sire. Then only so much the worse; for if it be small insult to be struck by a pauper, but mortal offence to receive a blow from a gentleman, then of all things, the

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Rh bye-blows of kings must be signally unflattering. In England the Peerage is kept alive by incessant restorations and creations. One man, George ., manufactured five hundred and twenty-two peers. An earldom, in abeyance for five centuries, has suddenly been assumed by some commoner, to whom it had not so much descended as through the art of the lawyers been made flexibly to bend in that direction. For not Thames is so sinuous in his natural course, not the Bridgwater Canal more artificially conducted, than blood in the veins of that winding or manufactured nobility. Perishable as stubble, and fungous as the fungi, those grafted families successively live and die on the eternal soil of a name. In England this day, twenty-five hundred peerages are extinct; but the names survive. So that the empty air of a name is more endurable than a man, or than dynasties of men; the air fills man's lungs and puts life into a man, but man fills not the air, nor puts life into that.

All honour to the names then, and all courtesy to the men; but if St. Albans tell me he is all-honourable and all-eternal, I must still politely refer him to Nell Gwynne.

Beyond Charles. very few indeed—hardly worthy of note—are the present titled English families which can trace anything like a direct unvitiated blood-descent from the thief knights of the Norman. Beyond Charles. their direct genealogies seem vain as though some Jew clothesman, with a tea-canister on his head, turned over the first chapter of St. Matthew to make out his unmingled participation in the blood of King Saul, who had long died ere the career of the Cæsar began.

Now, not preliminarily to enlarge upon the fact that, while in England an immense mass of state-masonry is brought to bear as a buttress in upholding the hereditary

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12 existence of certain houses, while with us nothing of that kind can possibly be admitted; and to omit all mention of the hundreds of unobtrusive families in New England who, nevertheless, might easily trace their uninterrupted English lineage to a time before Charles the Blade: not to speak of the old and oriental-like English planter families of Virginia and the South; the Randolphs for example, one of whose ancestors, in King James' time, married Pocahontas the Indian Princess, and in whose blood therefore an underived aboriginal royalty was flowing over two hundred years ago; consider those most ancient and magnificent Dutch Manors at the North, whose perches are miles—whose meadows overspread adjacent countries—and whose haughty rent-deeds are held by their thousand farmer tenants, so long as grass grows and water runs; which hints of a surprising eternity for a deed, and seem to make lawyer's ink unobliterable as the sea. Some of those manors are two centuries old; and their present patrons or lords will show you stakes and stones on their estates put there—the stones at least—before Nell Gwynne the Duke-mother was born, and genealogies which, like their own river, Hudson, flow somewhat farther and straighter than the Serpentine brooklet in Hyde Park.

These far-descended Dutch meadows lie steeped in a Hinduish haze; an eastern patriarchalness sways its mild crook over pastures, whose tenant flocks shall there feed, long as their own grass grows, long as their own water shall run. Such estates seem to defy Time's tooth, and by conditions which take hold of the indestructible earth seem to cotemporise their fee-simples with eternity. Unimaginable audacity of a worm that but crawls through the soil he so imperially claims!

In midland counties of England they boast of old oaken dining-halls where three hundred men-at-arms could

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Rh exercise of a rainy afternoon, in the reign of the Plantagenets. But our lords, the Patroons, appeal not to the past, but they point to the present. One will show you that the public census of a county, is but part of the roll of his tenants. Ranges of mountains, high as Ben Nevis or Snowdon, are their walls; and regular armies, with staffs of officers, crossing rivers with artillery, and marching through primeval woods, and threading vast rocky defiles, have been sent out to distrain upon three thousand farmer-tenants of one landlord, at a blow. A fact most suggestive two ways; both whereof shall be nameless here.

But whatever one may think of the existence of such mighty lordships in the heart of a republic, and however we may wonder at their thus surviving, like Indian mounds, the Revolutionary flood; yet survive and exist they do, and are now owned by their present proprietors, by as good nominal title as any peasant owns his father's old hat, or any duke his great-uncle's old coronet.

For all this, then, we shall not err very widely if we humbly conceive, that—should she choose to glorify herself in that inconsiderable way—our America will make out a good general case with England in this short little matter of large estates, and long pedigrees—pedigrees, I mean, wherein is no flaw.

In general terms we have been thus decided in asserting the great genealogical and real-estate dignity of some families in America, because in so doing we poetically establish the richly aristocratic condition of Master Pierre Glendinning, for whom we have before claimed some special family distinction. And to the observant reader the sequel will not fail to show, how important is

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14 this circumstance, considered with reference to the singularly developed character and most singular life-career of our hero. Nor will any man dream that the last chapter was merely intended for a foolish bravado, and not with a solid purpose in view.

Now Pierre stands on this noble pedestal; we shall see if he keeps that fine footing; we shall see if Fate hath not just a little bit of a small word or two to say in this world. But it is not laid down here that the Glendinnings dated back beyond Pharaoh, or the deeds of Saddle Meadows to the Three Magi in the Gospels. Nevertheless, those deeds, as before hinted, did indeed date back to three kings—Indian kings—only so much the finer for that.

But if Pierre did not date back to the Pharaohs, and if the English farmer Hampdens were somewhat the seniors of even the oldest Glendinning; and if some American manors boasted a few additional years and square miles over his, yet think you that it is at all possible, that a youth of nineteen should—merely by way of trial of the thing—strew his ancestral kitchen hearth-stone with wheat in the stalk, and there standing in the chimney thresh out that grain with a flail, whose aerial evolutions had free play among all that masonry; were it not impossible for such a flailer so to thresh wheat in his own ancestral kitchen chimney without feeling just a little twinge or two of what one might call family pride? I should say not.

Or how think you it would be with this youthful Pierre, if every day descending to breakfast, he caught sight of an old tattered British banner or two, hanging over an arched window in his hall; and those banners captured by his grandfather, the general, in fair fight? Or how think you it would be if every time he heard the band of the military company of the village, he should distinctly

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Rh recognise the peculiar tap of a British kettle-drum also captured by his grandfather in fair fight, and afterwards suitably inscribed on the brass and bestowed upon the Saddle Meadows Artillery Corps? Or how think you it would be, if sometimes of a mild meditative Fourth of July morning in the country, he carried out with him into the garden by way of ceremonial cane, a long, majestic, silver-tipped staff, a Major-General's baton, once wielded on the plume-nodding and musket-flashing review by the same grandfather several times hereinbefore mentioned? I should say that considering Pierre was quite young and very unphilosophical as yet, and withal rather high-blooded; and sometimes read the History of the Revolutionary War, and possessed a mother who very frequently made remote social allusions to the epaulettes of the Major-General his grandfather;—I should say that upon all of these occasions, the way it must have been with him, was a very proud, elated sort of way. And if this seem but too fond and foolish in Pierre; and if you tell me that this sort of thing in him showed him no sterling Democrat, and that a truly noble man should never brag of any arm but his own; then I beg you to consider again that this Pierre was but a youngster as yet. And believe me you will pronounce Pierre a thorough-going Democrat in time; perhaps a little too Radical altogether to your fancy.

In conclusion, do not blame me if I here make repetition, and do verbally quote my own words in saying that it had been the choice fate of Pierre to have been born and bred in the country. For to a noble American youth this indeed—more than in any other land—this indeed is a most rare and choice lot. For it is to be observed, that while in other countries, the finest families boast of the country as their home; the more prominent among us, proudly cite the city as their seat.

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16 Too often the American that himself makes his fortune, builds him a great metropolitan house, in the most metropolitan street of the most metropolitan town. Whereas a European of the same sort would thereupon migrate into the country. That herein the European hath the better of it, no poet, no philosopher, and no aristocrat will deny. For the country is not only the most poetical and philosophical, but it is the most aristocratic part of this earth, for it is the most venerable, and numerous bards have ennobled it by many fine titles. Whereas the town is the more plebeian portion; which, besides many other things, is plainly evinced by the dirty unwashed face perpetually worn by the town; but the country, like any Queen, is ever attended by scrupulous lady's-maids in the guise of the seasons, and the town hath but one dress of brick turned up with stone; but the country hath a brave dress for every week in the year; sometimes she changes her dress twenty-four times in the twenty-four hours; and the country weareth her sun by day as a diamond on a Queen's brow; and the stars by night as necklaces of gold beads; whereas the town's sun is smoky paste, and no diamond, and the town's stars are pinchbeck and not gold.

In the country then Nature planted our Pierre; because Nature intended a rare and original development in Pierre. Never mind if hereby she proved ambiguous to him in the end; nevertheless, in the beginning she did bravely. She blew her wind-clarion from the blue hills, and Pierre neighed out lyrical thoughts, as at the trumpet-blast, a war-horse paws himself into a lyric of foam. She whispered through her deep groves at eve, and gentle whispers of humanness, and sweet whispers of love, ran through Pierre's thought-veins, musical as water over pebbles. She lifted her spangled crest of a thickly starred night, and forth at that glimpse of

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Rh their divine Captain and Lord, ten thousand mailed thoughts of heroicness started up in Pierre's soul, and glared round for some insulted good cause to defend.

So the country was a glorious benediction to young Pierre; we shall see if that blessing pass from him as did the divine blessing from the Hebrews; we shall yet see again, I say, whether Fate hath not just a little bit of a word or two to say in this world; we shall see whether this wee little bit scrap of latinity be very far out of the way—Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse.

'Sister Mary,' said Pierre, returned from his sunrise stroll, and tapping at his mother's chamber door:—'do you know, sister Mary, that the trees which have been up all night, are all abroad again this morning before you?—Do you not smell something like coffee, my sister?'

A light step moved from within toward the door; which opened, showing Mrs. Glendinning, in a resplendently cheerful morning robe, and holding a gay wide ribbon in her hand.

'Good morning, madam,' said Pierre, slowly, and with a bow, whose genuine and spontaneous reverence amusingly contrasted with the sportive manner that had preceded it. For thus sweetly and religiously was the familiarity of his affections bottomed on the profoundest filial respect.

'Good afternoon to you, Pierre, for I suppose it is afternoon. But come, you shall finish my toilet;—here, brother'—reaching the ribbon—'now acquit yourself bravely'—and seating herself away from the glass, she awaited the good offices of Pierre.

'First Lady in waiting to the Dowager Duchess Glendinning,' laughed Pierre, as bowing over before his

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18 mother, he gracefully passed the ribbon round her neck, simply crossing the ends in front.

'Well, what is to hold it there, Pierre?'

'I am going to try and tack it with a kiss, sister—there!—oh, what a pity that sort of fastening won't always hold!—where's the cameo with the fawns, I gave you last night?—Ah! on the slab—you were going to wear it, then?—Thank you, my considerate and most politic sister—there!—but stop—here's a ringlet gone romping—so now, dear sister, give that Assyrian toss to your head.'

The haughtily happy mother rose to her feet, and as she stood before the mirror to criticise her son's adornings, Pierre, noticing the straggling tie of her slipper, knelt down and secured it. 'And now for the urn,' he cried, 'madam!' and with a humorous gallantry, offering his arm to his mother, the pair descended to breakfast.

With Mrs. Glendinning it was one of those spontaneous maxims, which women sometimes act upon without ever thinking of, never to appear in the presence of her son in any dishabille that was not eminently becoming. Her own independent observation of things, had revealed to her many very common maxims, which often become operatively lifeless from a vicarious reception of them. She was vividly aware how immense was that influence, which, even in the closest ties of the heart, the merest appearances make upon the mind. And as in the admiring love and graceful devotion of Pierre lay now her highest joy in life; so she omitted no slightest trifle which could possibly contribute to the preservation of so sweet and flattering a thing.

Besides all this, Mary Glendinning was a woman, and with more than the ordinary vanity of women—if vanity it can be called—which in a life of nearly fifty years had never betrayed her into a single published impropriety,

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Rh or caused her one known pang at the heart. Moreover, she had never yearned for admiration; because that was her birthright by the eternal privilege of beauty; she had always possessed it; she had not to turn her head for it, since spontaneously it always encompassed her. Vanity, which in so many women approaches to a spiritual vice, and therefore to a visible blemish; in her peculiar case—and though possessed in a transcendent degree—was still the token of the highest health; inasmuch as never knowing what it was to yearn for its gratification, she was almost entirely unconscious of possessing it at all. Many women carry this light of their lives flaming on their foreheads; but Mary Glendinning unknowingly bore hers within. Through all the infinite traceries of feminine art, she evenly glowed like a vase which, internally illuminated, gives no outward sign of the lighting flame, but seems to shine by the very virtue of the exquisite marble itself. But that bluff corporeal admiration, with which some ball-room women are content, was no admiration to the mother of Pierre. Not the general homage of men, but the selected homage of the noblest men, was what she felt to be her appropriate right. And as her own maternal partialities were added to, and glorified the rare and absolute merits of Pierre; she considered the voluntary allegiance of his affectionate soul, the representative fealty of the choicest guild of his race. Thus, though replenished through all her veins with the subtlest vanity, with the homage of Pierre alone she was content.

But as to a woman of sense and spirit, the admiration of even the noblest and most gifted man, is esteemed as nothing, so long as she remains conscious of possessing no directly influencing and practical sorcery over his soul; and as notwithstanding all his intellectual superiority to his mother, Pierre, through the unavoidable

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20 weakness of inexperienced and unexpanded youth, was strangely docile to the maternal tuitions in nearly all the things which thus far had any ways interested or affected him; therefore it was, that to Mary Glendinning this reverence of Pierre was invested with all the proudest delights and witcheries of self-complacency, which it is possible for the most conquering virgin to feel. Still more. That nameless and infinitely delicate aroma of inexpressible tenderness and attentiveness which, in every refined and honourable attachment, is cotemporary with the courtship, and precedes the final banns and the rite; but which, like the bouquet of the costliest German wines, too often evaporates upon pouring love out to drink, in the disenchanting glasses of the matrimonial days and nights; this highest and airiest thing in the whole compass of the experience of our mortal life; this heavenly evanescence—still further etherealised in the filial breast—was for Mary Glendinning, now not very far from her grand climacteric, miraculously revived in the courteous lover-like adoration of Pierre.

Altogether having its origin in a wonderful but purely fortuitous combination of the happiest and rarest accidents of earth; and not to be limited in duration by that climax which is so fatal to ordinary love; this softened spell which still wheeled the mother and son in one orbit of joy, seemed a glimpse of the glorious possibility, that the divinest of those emotions, which are incident to the sweetest season of love, is capable of an indefinite translation into many of the less signal relations of our many chequered life. In a detached and individual way, it seemed almost to realise here below the sweet dreams of those religious enthusiasts, who paint to us a Paradise to come, when etherealised from all drosses and stains, the holiest passion of man shall unite all kindreds and climes in one circle of pure and unimpairable delight.

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Rh VI

There was one little uncelestial trait, which, in the opinion of some, may mar the romantic merits of the gentlemanly Pierre Glendinning. He always had an excellent appetite, and especially for his breakfast. But when we consider that though Pierre's hands were small, and his ruffles white, yet his arm was by no means dainty, and his complexion inclined to brown; and that he generally rose with the sun, and could not sleep without riding his twenty, or walking his twelve miles a day, or felling a fair-sized hemlock in the forest, or boxing, or fencing, or boating, or performing some other gymnastical feat; when we consider these athletic habitudes of Pierre, and the great fulness of brawn and muscle they built round about him; all of which manly brawn and muscle, three times a day loudly clamoured for attention; we shall very soon perceive that to have a bountiful appetite, was not only no vulgar reproach, but a right royal grace and honour to Pierre; attesting him a man and a gentleman; for a thoroughly developed gentleman is always robust and healthy; and Robustness and Health are great trencher-men.

So when Pierre and his mother descended to breakfast, and Pierre had scrupulously seen her supplied with whatever little things were convenient to her; and had twice or thrice ordered the respectable and immemorial Dates, the servitor, to adjust and re-adjust the window-sashes, so that no unkind current of air should take undue liberties with his mother's neck; after seeing to all this, but in a very quiet and inconspicuous way; and also after directing the unruffled Dates, to swing out, horizontally into a particular light, a fine joyous painting, in the good-fellow Flemish style (which painting was so attached to the wall as to be capable of that mode of adjusting),

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22 and furthermore after darting from where he sat a few invigorating glances over the river-meadows to the blue mountains beyond; Pierre made a masonic sort of mysterious motion to the excellent Dates, who in automaton obedience thereto, brought from a certain agreeable little side-stand, a very prominent-looking cold pasty; which, on careful inspection with the knife, proved to be the embossed savoury nest of a few uncommonly tender pigeons of Pierre's own shooting.

'Sister Mary,' said he, lifting on his silver trident one of the choicest of the many fine pigeon morsels; 'Sister Mary,' said he, 'in shooting these pigeons, I was very careful to bring down one in such a manner that the breast is entirely unmarred. It was intended for you! and here it is. Now, Sergeant Dates, help hither your mistress' plate. No?—nothing but the crumbs of French rolls, and a few peeps into a coffee-cup—is that a breakfast for the daughter of yonder bold General?'—pointing to a full-length of his gold-laced grandfather on the opposite wall. 'Well, pitiable is my case when I have to breakfast for two. Dates!'

'Sir.'

'Remove that toast-rack, Dates; and this plate of tongue, and bring the rolls nearer, and wheel the stand farther off, good Dates.'

Having thus made generous room for himself, Pierre commenced operations, interrupting his mouthfuls by many sallies of mirthfulness.

'You seem to be in prodigious fine spirits this morning, brother Pierre,' said his mother.

'Yes, very tolerable; at least I can't say, that I am low-spirited exactly, sister Mary;—Dates, my fine fellow, bring me three bowls of milk.'

'One bowl, sir, you mean,' said Dates, gravely and imperturbably.

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Rh As the servitor left the room, Mrs. Glendinning spoke. 'My dear Pierre, how often have I begged you never to permit your hilariousness to betray you into overstepping the exact line of propriety in your intercourse with servants. Dates' look was a respectful reproof to you just now. You must not call Dates, My fine fellow. He is a fine fellow, a very fine fellow, indeed; but there is no need of telling him so at my table. It is very easy to be entirely kind and pleasant to servants, without the least touch of any shade of transient good-fellowship with them.'

'Well, sister, no doubt you are altogether right; after this I shall drop the fine, and call Dates nothing but fellow;—Fellow, come here!—how will that answer?'

'Not at all, Pierre—but you are a Romeo, you know, and so for the present I pass over your nonsense.'

'Romeo! oh, no. I am far from being Romeo,' sighed Pierre. 'I laugh, but he cried; poor Romeo! alas, Romeo! woe is me, Romeo! he came to a very deplorable end, did Romeo, sister Mary.'

'It was his own fault, though.'

'Poor Romeo!'

'He was disobedient to his parents.'

'Alas, Romeo!'

'He married against their particular wishes.'

'Woe is me, Romeo!'

'But you, Pierre, are going to be married before long, I trust, not to a Capulet, but to one of our own Montagues; and so Romeo's evil fortune will hardly be yours. You will be happy.'

'The more miserable Romeo!'

'Don't be so ridiculous, brother Pierre; so you are going to take Lucy that long ride among the hills this morning? She is a sweet girl; a most lovely girl.'

'Yes, that is rather my opinion, sister Mary.—By

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24 heavens, mother, the five zones hold not such another! She is—yes—though I say it—Dates!—he's a precious long time getting that milk!'

'Let him stay.—Don't be a milk-sop, Pierre!'

'Ha! my sister is a little satirical this morning. I comprehend.'

'Never rave, Pierre; and never rant. Your father never did either; nor is it written of Socrates; and both were very wise men. Your father was profoundly in love—that I know to my certain knowledge—but I never heard him rant about it. He was always exceedingly gentlemanly: and gentlemen never rant. Milk-sops and Muggletonians rant, but gentlemen never.'

'Thank you, sister.—There, put it down, Dates; are the horses ready?'

'Just driving round, sir, I believe.'

'Why, Pierre,' said his mother, glancing out at the window, 'are you going to Santa Fe De Bogota with that enormous old phaeton;—what do you take that Juggernaut out for?'

'Humour, sister, humour; I like it because it's old-fashioned, and because the seat is such a wide sofa of a seat, and finally because a young lady by the name of Lucy Tartan cherishes a high regard for it. She vows she would like to be married in it.'

'Well, Pierre, all I have to say, is, be sure that Christopher puts the coach-hammer and nails, and plenty of cords and screws into the box. And you had better let him follow you in one of the farm wagons, with a spare axle and some boards.'

'No fear, sister; no fear;—I shall take the best of care of the old phaeton. The quaint old arms on the panel, always remind me who it was that first rode in it.'

'I am glad you have that memory, brother Pierre.'

'And who it was that next rode in it.'

title: Page:Pierre.djvu/38


text:
Page:Pierre.djvu/39

Rh 'Bless you!—God bless you, my dear son! always think of him and you can never err; yes, always think of your dear perfect father, Pierre.'

'Well, kiss me now, dear sister, for I must go.'

'There; this is my cheek, and the other is Lucy's; though now that I look at them both, I think that hers is getting to be the most blooming; sweeter dews fall on that one, I suppose.'

Pierre laughed, and ran out of the room, for old Christopher was getting impatient. His mother went to the window and stood there.

'A noble boy, and docile'—she murmured—'he has all the frolicsomeness of youth, with little of its giddiness. And he does not grow vain-glorious in sophomorean wisdom. I thank heaven I sent him not to college. A noble boy, and docile. A fine, proud, loving, docile, vigorous boy. Pray God, he never becomes otherwise to me. His little wife, that is to be, will not estrange him from me; for she too is docile—beautiful, and reverential, and most docile. Seldom yet have I known such blue eyes as hers, that were not docile, and would not follow a bold black one, as two meek blue-ribboned ewes, follow their martial leader. How glad am I that Pierre loves her so, and not some dark-eyed haughtiness, with whom I could never live in peace; but who would be ever setting her young married state before my elderly widowed one, and claiming all the homage of my dear boy—the fine, proud, loving, docile, vigorous boy!—the lofty-minded, well-born, noble boy; and with such sweet docilities! See his hair! His does in truth illustrate that fine saying of his father's, that as the noblest colts, in three points—abundant hair, swelling chest, and sweet docility—should resemble a fine woman, so should a noble youth. Well, good-bye, Pierre, and a merry morning to ye!'

title: Page:Pierre.djvu/39


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1901 supplement/Crawley, Richard


text:
Page:The Celtic Review volume 4.djvu/358

Rh dh slender.

Slender dh, pronounced slender gh initially, is silent in other positions in many districts. When final in monosyllables it sometimes sounds like y in North Argyll. In several of the islands, including far St. Kilda, it has the sound, when final, of slender gh, rising in cases to slender ch. MacAlpine represents it sometimes by yh, as in fàidh, prophet, cruaidh, hard, and sometimes by y, as in laoidh, a lay, luaidh, lead. In nasgaidh, gratis, slabhraidh, chain, and tuilidh, more, he pronounces, and, in the two latter words, even writes in alternative forms ch for dh. ‘Slabhraich,’ chain, has been noted also from Kintyre.

s

Initial sv is represented usually in Gaelic by s, but sometimes by t, p, or f; as piuthar, sister, Early Irish siur and fiur, Sanskrit svâsar. Thus seal, a while; fiolan, an earwig, and fealan, itch; pill, till, and fill, return, and seillean, a bee, are all apparently from the same root. Various pronunciations of seillean as teillean in Perth and Lewis; tainnleag, etc., in Sutherland, have been given already in the Review (vol. ii. p. 35). Other instances of t for s, or vice versa, are sabaid and tabaid, a brawl; and tìde and sìde, time, weather. Séist or séis and téis, melody, air, are both from the root of seinn, whence Latin sonare, sonus, English sound.

Iosal, low, which has broad s in Perth, Badenoch and Strathspey, West Ross and Sutherland, has slender s ‘ìseal’ in Arran, Argyll, and Skye. So also treasa, stronger, ‘treise’; dìleas, faithful, ‘dìlis,’ and others in Arran and Argyll.

The insertion of the sound of s in the group rt in accented syllables prevails both in the northern and in the greater part of the southern area: as mart, a cow, ‘marst’; ceart, right, ‘cearst’; ort, on you; furtachd, help; cairt, bark, ‘cairst’; beairt, loom; goirt, sour, etc. In unaccented


text:
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346 syllables the group rt is sounded rst, when not changed as it so often is to rd, as comhartaich, barking, ‘comharstaich’ (but also ‘comhardaich’); luchairt, palace, ‘luchairst’; but anart, linen, ‘anard,’ and so ascart, tow; cunnart, danger, etc. Both pronunciations occur in the same word in different compounds; cuilbheart, a wile, from cùil-beart, is ‘cuilbhearst,’ while caisbheart, or caiseart, foot-gear, from cas-beart, is ‘caiseard.’

It is a feature of Arran Gaelic that s is not heard in the group rt there, e.g. ‘mart,’ not ‘marst.’

In the case of rd an insertion of s is not general, but is heard in North Argyll mainland and islands. In Sunart ard, high, is ‘arsd’; ceard, tinker, ‘cearsd’; ord, hammer, ‘orsd’; and so also ardan, pride; bard, poet; card, a card, to card; bord, table; cord, agree; ordag, thumb, etc. Where rd is slender, s is heard in at least the following instances: ceàird, a trade, ‘ciao’rsd’; ceaird, tinkers, ‘cèrsd’; feaird, the better, ‘fèrsd.’

In Colonsay also s is heard, e.g. in ‘borsd,’ table. In Tiree s appears even to have displaced r both before d and t; bord is commonly said to be pronounced ‘bòsd,’ mart ‘mast,’ and cairt ‘caist,’ in that island.

When rt is combined with l as in ceirtle, a clew, Old Irish certle, and in fairtlich, baffle, t often disappears and leaves this intrusive s in its place. The commonest forms of the two words, at all events in Southern Gaelic, are ceirsle and fairslich. Both words have evidently proved troublesome phonetically, and the former also orthographically. The orthographic difficulty has arisen from the change of sound from e to a (ea) before slender consonants. This change of vowel is usual before broad consonants as in ceart, right, Old Irish cert, ceard, craftsman, Early Irish cerd, and is exemplified before slender consonants also, as in beairt, loom, etc.; ceaird, tinkers; Peairt, the place-name ‘Perth,’ etc. A better spelling than ceirsle accordingly would be ceairsle, which is MacAlpine’s, and is found also in the Highland Society’s Dictionary; but the logical, and, on the


text:
Page:The Celtic Review volume 4.djvu/360

 of Gaelic orthography, strictly phonetic trigraph eai has somehow often been avoided, and the phonetically incorrect digraph ei has been employed in this and other instances, such as beirt for beairt, feirt for feairt, attention, cèird for ceàird, etc. Besides those forms of ceirtle, others, of which some are attempts to spell, and some show differences of pronunciation, are ceartla, ceirsleadh, cearsla, and, under ‘bottom’ of yarn, cearsail given by Armstrong, cearsle and cearla by Shaw, and ceirthle, ceathairle, and, as obsolete from MSS., cearla also in the Highland Society’s Dictionary. Cearla is nearly the pronunciation—‘ceairlle’—in Shaw’s native island of Arran. It is cearta in Gairloch according to MacDonald’s Faclair Gàidhlig le Dealbhan. In Irish ceirtle, ceirsle, ceircle (influenced probably by cearcuil, circle), ceirtlín and ceartlinn are found (Dinneen), and in Donegal ceirtlin has three pronunciations (Quiggin), which we should write ceairllín, ceairtlín, and ceirllín.

Fairtlich is not quite so variable. In Southern Gaelic generally it is pronounced and often written fairslich (‘fa’rsllich,’ in Glenlyon ‘fau’rsllich,’ with au diphthong, as noticed in vol. iii. p. 225). Artlaich is given in the Highland Society’s Dictionary. In Badenoch and Strathspey the word is pronounced faltraich, in Lochcarron fartaich—cf. cearta, Gairloch, supra—and in Arran fairlich, ‘fairlli,’ Shaw farlaicam, for which read farlaicham, while in MacDonald’s Faclair Gàidhlig failich and falaich are given as Lewis forms.

Airtneal, weariness, also is often written airsneal, and is quoted as airteal from both Alexander and Ronald MacDonald (H.S.D.). The Irish is given by Dinneen as aisnéall. Variations of feursann, a warble, have been dealt with in the second volume of the Review. In addition to the forms given there, fèurtan is used in Glenlyon, féurtann and féirsinn (all three singular in number) in North Argyll (Sunart), and feursag, feursdag, and, from Lewis, fiarsnan, occur in MacDonald’s Faclair Gàidhlig.


text:
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 sh

In two instances sh has become ch in Arran. Car mu chlios, upside down (of clothes), is obviously for car mu shlios. ‘All Fools’ Day' is there La chealg na cuthaige, sometimes La cheal’ na cuthaige, and is to be explained as La shealg na cuthaige, lit. Hunting of the cuckoo day, or in broad Scots ‘Hunt-the-gowk day.’

SEA-POEMS

(Continued from p. 249)

VII

TEACHD LEÒID

In the Macleod country, Skye, there lived for many generations a family locally known as Clann a’ Chomhairlich, ‘the Counsellor’s Family,’ whose boast it was that ‘they had never lost any poetry or tradition, but were ever adding to the cairn’—cha do chaill iad bàrdachd no beul-aithris riamh, ach a’ sior-chur ria a’ chàrn. Early in the nineteenth century this family began to break up; several of its members removed to other parts of the Hebrides, many emigrated to the Colonies, and hardly any of the old stock were left in the Macleod country. In the dispersion and in the struggle for existence amid new surroundings, the old ballads and the folklore were mostly forgotten—a sad falling-away from the wisdom which had earned for the founder of the family the name of ‘counsellor’! Fortunately, however, the whole of their interesting literary heritage has not been lost; some ninety years ago, one of the family, Kenneth Macleod, carried a good deal of it to Trotternish, in the north end of Skye, and his children in their turn (especially his daughter Janet) handed down many fragments to a


text: Talk:Smith v. Gaines/Opinion of the Court


text:
Cockle v. Flack

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

Mr. Robert G. Ingersoll for the plaintiffs in error.

Mr. S. T. Wallis, contra.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Cockle v. Flack


text: Talk:Cockle v. Flack

title: Talk:Cockle v. Flack


text:
Cockle v. Flack/Opinion of the Court

Plaintiffs in error were engaged in the business of packing pork in Peoria, Ill., and the defendants were commission-merchants at Baltimore, in the fall of 1872, when the contract was made which is the foundation of this suit. There had been transactions between the parties the previous year in the line of their business, and, with reference to the packing business of the approaching season, this agreement was made by letter. The substance of it is, that defendants should advance to plaintiffs, as it was needed, the sum of $100,000, which they were to invest in the hog product, at the rate of eighty per cent of the money so advanced, and twenty per cent of the money put into the purchase by plaintiffs. Defendants were to have interest on the money advanced at the rate of ten per cent per annum. The product was to be shipped to them for sale, and they were to have two and a half per cent commission on the amount, if sold within sixty days, and one per cent commission for every theirty days it was carried thereafter. The contract gave to plaintiffs the right to sell for themselves, without sending to defendants, but the latter were to have their commissions all the same.

When the product had all been sold out and an account rendered, a balance was found to be due defendants, for which they brought this suit, and recovered a judgment of $7,054.48.

It appears by the bill of exceptions that this balance was mainly if not wholly made up of the commissions charged on sales not made by defendants, of products which never came to their possession; and the recovery was resisted on the sole ground that these commissions were a device to cover usurious interest.

The charge of the court to the jury on this point was to the effect that the transaction was not necessarily usurious; that defendants, being engaged in the commission business, which required the use of money, might loan their money at lawful rates of interest to such parties and on such terms that it would bring to them also the business which would grow out of the investment of it; that, if the contract was made only with the honest purpose of securing, in addition to interest, the profits incidental to handling the product as commission-merchants, it was not usurious; that, on the other hand, such a contract might be used as a mere evasive device to cover usurious interest, and it left it to the jury to say from all the circumstances whether this were so.

There can be no question, that, on the general doctrine as to the line which marks the division between an honest transaction and a usurious cover, the charge of the court was correct; and that it is in this class of cases the province of the jury, in jury trials, and of the chancellor, in suits in equity, to determine, on a full consideration of all the facts, whether it be the one or the other.

But counsel for plaintiffs argue, that as to these commissions, which defendants never earned by sale of the property or by handling it, and as to which they were put to no cost or inconvenience, there can be no other consideration but the use of the money, and they are necessarily usurious.

It must be confessed that the argument has much force. But we are of opinion that it is not so conclusive that the court ought to have held as matter of law that it was usury.

It is to be considered that defendants were engaged in a business which was legitimate, and in which both custom and sound principle authorized the joint use of their money and their personal service, increased in value by their character for integrity and experience. To both these sources they looked for their profits, and they were necessarily united.

It was a necessity of their trade, and it was lawful for them, while loaning their money at a specified rate of interest, to stipulate with the parties to whom it was loaned for the incidental advantages of acting as commission-merchants for the sale of the property in which the money was to be invested by the borrower. They had the right also to require, as a condition of the loan, that it should be invested in such property as would require their services in selling and handling it. All this is admitted.

We see no reason why the parties could not go a step further, and stipulate, that if for any reason operating in the interest of the borrower he should prefer to become his own broker or commission-merchant, or to sell at home, he should pay the commission which the other had a right to contract for and receive. Like the port pilot, and other instances, they were ready and willing to perform. They had a place of business, clerks, and their own time and skill ready to devote to the plaintiffs' business. In that business they had a large pecuniary interest. They had loaned their money without requiring any other security than the obligation of the other party, except that which might arise from the property coming to their hands. To make this property a sufficient security, the contract required of the plaintiffs that they should invest in the same property twenty dollars of their own money to every eighty dollars borrowed of defendants. The relinquishment of this right to control the sale of the property was a good consideration for the commissions which they would have made if they had sold it.

While it was possible to make such a transaction a mere cover for usury, it was at the same time possible that the contract was a fair one, in aid of defendants' business,-a business in which they were actually and largely engaged, and in which lending money was the mere incident and not the main pursuit.

It was, therefore, properly left to the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances, it was or was not a usurious transaction, under instruction to which we can see no objection.

We do not think the express reservation of ten per cent interest makes the contract usurious because the law of Maryland forbids more than six. The contract was quite as much an Illinois contract, where ten per cent is lawful, as a Maryland contract, and the former is the law of the forum. The ruling of the court below was in accord with what this court had held in Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

Judgment affirmed.

title: Cockle v. Flack/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Cockle v. Flack/Opinion of the Court


text:
Wiswall v. Campbell

MOTION to dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

Mr. Lawrence Proudfoot in support of the motion.

Mr. John H. Thompson in opposition thereto.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Wiswall v. Campbell


text: Talk:Wiswall v. Campbell

title: Talk:Wiswall v. Campbell


text:
Wiswall v. Campbell/Opinion of the Court

This writ of error brings here a record of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in a proceeding upon an appeal taken under sect. 4984, Rev. Stat., from an order of the District Court rejecting a claim presented by a supposed creditor against the estate of a bankrupt. A motion is now made to dismiss, upon the ground that judgments of the circuit courts in such cases are not reviewable here upon error.

By sect. 691, Rev. Stat., 'all final judgments of any circuit court. . . in civil actions, brought there by original process, or. . . removed there from any district court by appeal or writ of error, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000 [now $5,000], may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error.'

If we have jurisdiction of this case, it is by virtue of this statute.

The cases are numerous in which it has been decided that we cannot review the action of the circuit courts in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction under the bankrupt law. Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 74; Hall v. Allen, 12 id. 454; Mead v. Thompson, 15 id. 638; Marshall v. Knox, 16 id. 555; Coit v. Robinson, 19 id. 274; Stickney v. Wilt, 23 id. 150; Sandusky v. National Bank, id. 293. The principle upon which these decisions rests is, that a proceeding in bankruptcy, from its commencement to its close upon the final settlement of the estate, is but one suit. The several motions made and acts done in the bankrupt court in the progress of the cause are not distinct suits at law or in equity, but parts of one suit in bankruptcy, from which they cannot be separated. As our jurisdiction extends only to a re-examination of final judgments or decrees in suits at law or in equity, it follows that we have no control over judgments and orders made by the courts below in mere bankruptcy proceedings.

The circuit and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction of 'all suits at law or in equity brought by an assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by any such person against an assignee touching any property or rights of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in such assignee' (Rev. Stat. sect. 4979); but such suits, when prosecuted, are no part of the bankruptcy proceeding. They are in aid of such a proceeding, but, while progressing, are entirely separate from and independent of it. They are used by the bankrupt court to settle the rights of parties who are not subject to its jurisdiction in the suit in bankruptcy, and who, therefore, cannot be affected by any judgment or decree that may be made in that cause. Appeals and writs of error to this court in such suits are allowed, and these are the appeals and writs of error referred to in sect. 4989.

The question, then, to be determined in this case is, whether proceedings by creditors to prove their demands against the estate of a bankrupt are part of the suit in bankruptcy, or separate and independent suits at law or in equity.

To entitle a creditor to have his demand allowed, he must verify it in the manner provided by sect. 5077; and, when so verified, it must be delivered to the register having charge of the case. Sect. 5079. If the proof is satisfactory to the register, he is required to deliver it to the assignee, who must examine and compare it with the books and accounts of the bankrupt. It is the duty of the assignee, also, to register, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, the names of the creditors who have proved their claims, in the order in which the proof is received, stating the time of the receipt of the proof, and the nature and amount of the debts. This book is open to the inspection of all creditors. Sect. 5080. The court may, on the application of the assignee, or of any creditor, or of the bankrupt, or without any application, examine upon oath the bankrupt or any person tendering or who has made proof of a claim, and may summon any person capable of giving evidence concerning such proof, or concerning the debt sought to be proved, and shall reject all claims not duly proved, or when the proof shows the claim to be founded in fraud, illegality, or mistake. Sect. 5081. The court must allow all debts duly proved, and cause a list thereof to be made and certified to one of the registers. Sect. 5085.

So far, clearly a proceeding to prove a debt is part of the suit in bankruptcy. It has none of the qualities of an independent suit at law or in equity. By sect. 4980, any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or an assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the District Court to the Circuit Court of the same district. Such appeal (sect. 4982) must be entered at the term of the Circuit Court which shall be held within the district next after the expiration of ten days from the time of claiming the same, and, on entering it (sect. 4984), the supposed creditor must file in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court 'a statement in writing of his claim, setting forth the same, substantially, as in a declaration for the same cause of action at law, and the assignee shall plead or answer thereto in the like manner, and like proceeding shall thereupon be had in the pleadings, trial, and determination of the cause, as in actions at law commenced and prosecuted in the usual manner in the courts of the United States, except that no execution shall be awarded against the assignee.' The final judgment of the Circuit Court rendered upon the appeal is, by sect. 4985, made conclusive, and the list of debts must, if necessary, be altered to conform thereto. Even under the operation of these provisions of the statute the proceeding originally commenced as part of the bankruptcy suit is not, as we think, separated from it, and converted into a suit at law. The form of the proceeding in the Appellate Court must conform to that of a suit at law; but that does not make the proceeding itself such a suit, any more than a proceeding in the Circuit Court under its supervisory jurisdiction is a suit in equity, because, by sect. 4986, it is provided that it shall be heard and determined 'as in a court of equity.'

Congress, in enacting the bankrupt law, had apparently in view, (1) the discharge, under some circumstances, of an honest debtor from legal liability for debts he could not pay; and (2) an early pro rata distribution, according to equity, of his available assets among his several creditors. Prompt action is everywhere required by law. In Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 346, we said, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, that 'it is obviously one of the purposes of the bankrupt law that there should be a speedy distribution of the bankrupt's assets. This is only second in importance to securing equality of distribution. The act is filled with provisions for quick and summary disposal of questions arising in the progress of the case, without regard to usual modes of trial attended by some necessary delay.' The list of debts 'entitled to share in the bankrupt's property' (sect. 5091) is an important element in the settlement of the estate. Without it there can be no dividend. Hence the necessity for as 'quick and summary' a disposal of the questions arising under this part of the case as is consistent with a reasonable protection of the rights of the parties in interest. Every person submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court in the progress of the cause, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined, makes himself a party to the suit, and is bound by what is judicially determined in the legitimate course of the proceeding. A creditor who offers proof of his claim, and demands its allowance, subjects himself to the dominion of the court, and must abide the consequences. His remedies for the purpose of this proof are prescribed by the law. As has been seen, he must first submit his case to the register. It is then examined by the assignee, who must record it in a book open to the inspection of creditors. An opportunity is then given to parties in interest to call upon the District Court to take further testimony, and pass upon the claim. That court must then decide, and from its decision an appeal may be taken to the Circuit Court, where further litigation may be had; but when that court acts, all parties are concluded. The judgment of that tribunal is final. From it no appeal lies. There is no more hardship in this than in holding that the action of the Circuit Court, under the supervisory jurisdiction provided for in sect. 4986, is conclusive, and not subject to re-examination here.

This is in accordance with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Clifford, when he delivered the opinion of the court in Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 65. As, however, the question was not then directly presented for adjudication, the same learned justice subsequently saw fit, in Coit v. Robinson, 19 Wall. 284, to leave it open for further consideration. Now, however, when the question is fairly presented, and after it has been fully argued, we are clearly of the opinion that what was thus said in Morgan v. Thornhill was correct, and that we have no jurisdiction upon error in this class of cases.

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text: Talk:Wiswall v. Campbell/Opinion of the Court


text:
Cowdrey v. Galveston Houston and Henderson Railroad Company

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas.

Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. W. P. Ballinger for the appellants, and by Mr. R. T. Merrick for the appellees.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Cowdrey v. Galveston Houston and Henderson Railroad Company


text:
Cowdrey v. Galveston Houston and Henderson Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

In February, 1867, a suit was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas, for the foreclosure of certain mortgages executed by the Galveston, Houston, and Henderson Railroad Company, a corporation created by the legislature of Texas, and the sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgages were adjudged valid by the court, and a sale of the mortgaged property was decreed. Subsequently, in 1869, by consent of the parties, Cowdrey, one of the complainants, was authorized to take the charge and management of the property, and act as receiver of the court. He accordingly qualified, and for some years acted as such receiver, superintending the management of the road of the company until it was sold, and disposing, under direction of the court, of its earnings, and of the proceeds received when the sale was made. Reports of his proceedings were rendered from time to time to the court, and received its approval. His final report was filed in 1874, showing a balance of assets in his hands of $6,963.99; and the direction of the court as to its disposition was prayed. Exceptions to the allowance of the account being taken, the matter was referred to a master for his examination and report. The master refused to allow a credit for certain expenditures, incurred to defeat a subsidy from the city of Galveston to aid the construction of a road parallel with the one in the hands of the receiver. These expenditures amounted to $14,029.15, and this sum being added to the amount of the assets admitted to be in his hands, the receiver was charged with $20,993.14.

The master allowed certain sums against the company for goods lost in transportation, and damage done to property whilst the road was under the management of the receiver, amounting to $7,565.

The master also allowed a claim of John C. Bullitt, Esq., for professional services to the trustees in a previous attempt to foreclose the mortgages, the complete execution of which was prevented by the war. The claim was for $5,000, but the court in its decree reduced the amount to $2,500. The report of the master, modified as to this amount, was confirmed, and, by the decree of the court, the receiver was directed to pay the several amounts allowed, besides certain costs incurred, out of the proceeds in his hands, in preference to the balance due the complainants. From this decree the appeal is to this court.

The expenditures to defeat the subsidy proposed from the city of Galveston were properly disallowed. It was no part of the receiver's duty to interfere with the construction of a par allel line of railway, or to attempt to defeat any contemplated aid for such an enterprise. The proposed line may have been of great importance to the public and necessary to the prosperity of the city, though it might possibly diminish the future earnings of the company whose road was in his charge. At any rate, as an officer of the court, the receiver could not be allowed to determine the question of its importance, either to the public or the company, and, acting upon such determination, to appropriate funds in his custody to aid or defeat the measure, without sanctioning a principle which would open the door to all sorts of abuses. A receiver is not authorized, without the previous direction of the court, to incur any expenses on account of property in his hands beyond what is absolutely essential to its preservation and use, as contemplated by his appointment.

The allowance for goods lost in transportation, and for damages done to property whilst the road was in the hands of the receiver, was properly made. The earnings received were as much chargeable with such loss and damage as they were chargeable with the ordinary expenses of managing the road. The bondholders were only entitled to what remained after charges of this kind, as well as the expenses incurred in their behalf, were paid.

The claim of the intervenor, Mr. Bullitt, for his professional services as an attorney and counsellor-at-law, was a meritorious one. He had been retained, in 1860, by the trustees to foreclose the first and second mortgages embraced in this suit, and was promised by them a retaining fee of $5,000. Upon his engagement he went from Philadelphia, the place of his residence, to Galveston, in the State of Texas, and there filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States to foreclose the mortgages, one of which was for $1,500,000, and the other for $750,000. Process was issued and served, and issue was taken in the suit by a demurrer to the bill. The further prosecution of the suit was prevented by the outbreak of the civil war, during which the records of the court were destroyed by fire, and the trustees died. Upon the close of the war, the intervenor took steps to continue the suit; and, while he was engaged in correspondence with the representatives of the trustees on the subject, the present suit was brought by Cowdrey and others, bondholders, without consultation with him, and without his assistance. Under these circumstances, there can be no reasonable doubt of the justice of the claim, or that it was properly allowed by the master. Of its subsequent reduction to one-half he does not complain, not having excepted to the decree in this particular, or appealed from it to this court.

The fact that the retainer was by the trustees in the mortgages, who have since died, and that the present suit was prosecuted by the bondholders, the cestuis que trust, does not affect the position of the claim. The trustees, had they lived, would have been entitled to retain out of the funds received by them sufficient to meet the claim. They would have had an equitable right not merely to be reimbursed from such funds all reasonable expenses incurred, but also to retain from the funds sufficient to meet all reasonable liability contracted in the execution of their trust. From the time of the employment of the intervenor, the funds derived from the mortgaged property were chargeable with the liability consequent upon the retainer; and it matters not whether those funds were obtained by the trustees, or, in consequence of their death or of the action of the court, by other parties having charge of the property.

Decree affirmed.


text: Talk:Cowdrey v. Galveston Houston and Henderson Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court


text:
Norton v. Switzer

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

Switzer brought suit against Mary Hein and John Hein in the Second Judicial District Court for the parish of Jefferson, which, by consent of parties, was transferred to the Fifth District Court of the parish of Orleans. During its pendency, he suggested that since the institution thereof the defendants had taken the benefit of the bankrupt law, and that Emory E. Norton had been appointed and qualified as their assignee. The court ordered that the latter, in his capacity as such assignee, be made a party to the suit in their place and stead. Process was personally served upon him; but he failed to appear. The cause coming on for trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Switzer against Norton, said assignee. The latter appealed to the Supreme Court of the State; and the judgment having been there affirmed, he sued out this writ of error.

Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. E. T. Merrick and Mr. G. W. Race for the plaintiff in error, who, upon the question as to whether an assignee in bankruptcy can, after citation in a pending suit, be substituted by a State court as a defendant in the place and stead of the bankrupt, referred to In re Cook and Gleason, 3 Biss. 119; In re Ernest Sacchi, 10 Blatchf. 29; ''In re Geo. W. Anderson'', 9 Bank. Reg. 360.

No counsel appeared for the defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Norton v. Switzer


text: Talk:Norton v. Switzer

title: Talk:Norton v. Switzer


text:
Norton v. Switzer/Opinion of the Court

State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien, nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a State court to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practised in the admiralty courts.

Causes of action which give rise to a maritime lien, whether contracts or torts, may be prosecuted in other modes of proceeding as well as in rem in the admiralty.

Wherever a maritime lien arises, the libellant or plaintiff may waive the lien in the admiralty, and pursue his remedy by a suit in personam, or he may institute an action at law, if the common law is competent to give him a remedy. Such a party may, if he sees fit, proceed in rem in the admiralty; and, if he elects to enforce the maritime lien which arises in the case, he cannot proceed in any other mode or forum, as the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to enforce a maritime lien is exclusive, and cannot be exercised in any other mode than by a proceeding in rem.

Parties in maritime cases are not restricted to that mode of proceeding, even in the admiralty, as they may waive the lien and proceed in personam against the owner or master of the vessel, in the same jurisdiction; nor are they compelled to proceed in the admiralty at all, as they may resort to their common-law remedy in the State courts, or in the Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress and the other party are citizens of different States. Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 190.

Sufficient appears to show that the plaintiff sued John and Mary Hein as owners of the steamboat 'Frolic,' in an action of assumpsit, and that he alleged in his petition that they were indebted to him in the sum of $870 with interest, for services rendered as master and superintendent in repairing the vessel, at the rate of $300 per month, for the period specified in the bill of particulars annexed to the petition. He also alleged that he was a privileged creditor, that the steamboat was about to leave the jurisdiction, and that he was apprehensive he should lose his claim if she should depart before it was satisfied; wherefore he prayed for a writ of provisional seizure, and for process to compel the appearance of the defendants.

Summonses were issued and served; and the defendants appeared and filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, in which they alleged that the suit is not a proceeding in rem, but a proceeding against the persons of the defendants, and that they reside outside of the jurisdiction of the court. They also filed an exception, that the plaintiff cannot proceed by provisional seizure, because the services for which he claims payment did not arise while the steamboat was navigating or trading within the State.

Pursuant to the order of the court, the steamboat was surrendered to the defendants, and they gave the usual bond for value; and the cause, by the consent of the parties, was transferred from the second to the fifth judicial district, where the residue of the proceedings took place.

Four days later the defendants appeared and filed an answer, in which they denied all the allegations of the petition; that John Hein was ever owner of the steamboat; that the plaintiff has any privilege on the steamboat for any work or services, or that he ever rendered services as charged; and prayed judgment in their favor.

On the same day the court granted a rule that the plaintiff show cause on a day named why the provisional seizure issued in the case should not be set aside. Reasons were also assigned by the defendants in support of the motion; but the plaintiff, before the return-day of the rule, amended his petition, and alleged that he omitted to state in his original petition that John Hein, the agent and manager of the steamboat, gave him a note for the sum of $870, as an acknowledgment for the services charged in the bill of particulars; and he prayed leave to file the note and the amended petition, and that the defendants might be cited to appear and answer.

Leave to file the petition and note was granted; and they were filed, as appears by the record. New summonses were issued to the defendants; and they appeared and filed an exception to the supplemental petition, because the same alters the demand, showing that the claim as stated in the original petition has been novated by the taking of a note. Hearing was had, and the exception was dismissed; and it also appears that the rule to show cause why the provisional seizure should not be set aside was also dismissed, by consent of the parties.

Separate answers were then filed by the defendants, as follows: The defendant first named denies that he was or is the owner of the steamboat, and says that the note was given as a novation of the prior debt, and was accepted by the plaintiff. Mary Hein also denies that she is indebted as charged, or that the note was given as evidence of the debt; but avers that it was given by John Hein as a novation and in payment of the original debt, as acknowledged by the plaintiff. Subsequently she pleaded payment of the sum of $400, as per receipt exhibited in the record.

Testimony was taken; and the defendants subsequently pleaded as a peremptory exception that the suit is against a steamboat, and that the District Court, sitting in admiralty, has exclusive jurisdiction of such cases. Both parties were heard, and the court sustained the exception. Due application was made by the plaintiff for a new trial; and, pending that motion, the plaintiff suggested to the court that the defendants had severally taken the benefit of the Bankrupt Act, and that Emory E. Norton had been appointed and qualified as their assignee; whereupon the court ordered that the assignee of the defendants be made a party to the suit, in his capacity aforesaid, in place and stead of the defendants. Regular process was accordingly issued and served in person upon the assignee.

Two continuances followed, and the cause subsequently came on for trial. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff; and the court, on the 22d of April, 1870, rendered judgment in his favor, that he recover of Emory E. Norton, assignee of the defendants John and Mary Hein, the sum of $870, with interest until paid, and with costs and privilege on the steamboat.

Within due time the assignee claimed a devolutive appeal to the Supreme Court of the State; and it was granted. Seasonable entry of the appeal was made in the Supreme Court; and that court affirmed the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction, holding, First, that the suit was a personal action against the owners, and not a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien; second, that the State court, having acquired jurisdiction before the bankrupt proceedings were commenced, was not divested of jurisdiction by the decree adjudging the defendants bankrupts, so long as the amount of the debt claimed was in dispute and remained unascertained.

Application for a new trial was made, and was refused by the court; and Emory E. Norton, as assignee of the bankrupt defendants, sued out a writ of error, and removed the cause into this court.

Since the cause was entered here the assignee has assigned two errors, to the effect as follows: 1. That the State court was without authority or jurisdiction to render the judgment against the plaintiff in error, as assignee of John and Mary Hein, adjudged bankrupts, for the sum specified in the record. 2. That the judgment is erroneous, because the claim of the plaintiff was against the steamboat for a claim thereon, as master and superintendent, which was cognizable exclusively in the admiralty, and not in the courts of the State where it was adjudicated.

Assignees in bankruptcy are appointed by the creditors, and the judge or register is required to assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto; and the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act provides to the effect that all the properties of the bankrupt of every kind, including property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, and all rights of action, shall, in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of his assignee, be at once vested in such assignee, and that the assignee may sue for and recover the said estate, debts, and effects, and may prosecute and defend all suits at law or in equity pending at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, in which such bankrupt is a party, in his own name, in the same manner and with the like effect as they might have been prosecuted or defended by such bankrupt. 14 Stat. 522, sect. 14; 14 id. 523.

Except where the amount is in dispute, no creditor of the bankrupt is allowed to prosecute his suit, whether at law or in equity, to final judgment, until the question of the debtor's discharge shall have been determined; but the provision is, that if the amount due the creditors is in dispute, the suit may, by leave of the court in bankruptcy, proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due; in which event the amount recovered may be proved in bankruptcy, but the execution must be stayed to await the determination of the question of discharge. 14 Stat. 527, sect. 21.

Argument to show that the assignee in bankruptcy may in his own name prosecute and defend suits pending in the name of the debtor at the time he, the debtor, is adjudged bankrupt, is quite unnecessary, as the act of Congress so provides in express terms; nor is it necessary in this case to determine whether the other party may, as matter of right, have process to compel the assignee to appear and prosecute or defend such a suit, where the assignee does not apply to the court to be admitted to prosecute or defend the suit in his own name. Such a question does not arise under the present writ of error, for the reason that the court of original jurisdiction passed an order that the assignee should be made a party defendant to the suit, in his capacity as such assignee, in the place and stead of the bankrupt defendants, and that he was subsequently made a party as ordered, in pursuance of a regular citation duly served, as appears by the return of the sheriff.

Judgment was rendered against him in the subordinate State court as assignee of the bankrupt defendants, and the record shows that he, as such assignee, took a devolutive appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment of the subordinate court was affirmed. What he alleged in that court as the ground for claiming an appeal was, that there was error in the judgment to his prejudice; and the judgment having been affirmed in the Supreme Court, the assignee of the bankrupt defendants sued out the writ of error, and removed the cause here for re-examination, from which it follows that it was his duty, under the rule of this court, to assign such error as he alleges occurred in the judgment. None of the proceedings prior to the judgment are specifically assigned for error; from which it may be assumed that they are correct, and they may be passed over without further remark.

Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the first error assigned is to the effect that the State court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment exhibited in the transcript, for the reason that the assignee held his office and performed the duties thereof under the Bankrupt Act. Superadded to that is the allegation that the judgment and proceedings of the court below were in violation of the acts of Congress and the rights of the defendant, which, in the judgment of the court here, is nothing more than a repetition of the charge that the court was without jurisdiction in the case.

Errors must be assigned in a case like the one before the court; and the rule is, that the assignment 'shall set out separately and specifically each error intended to be urged in the argument of the cause.'

Aided by the opinion given in the State appellate court, it seems to be safe to assume that the assignee urged two propositions there, deduced from the decree in bankruptcy, as a ground for reversing the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction, both of which, it may be inferred from the printed argument, were intended to be embodied here in the first assignment of errors: 1. That the decree in bankruptcy divested the subordinate court of all authority to proceed further in the case. 2. That the court had no jurisdiction, in any point of view, to render judgment against the assignee, even in the form exhibited in the record.

Much discussion of the first proposition is unnecessary, as it is directly opposed to several provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and particularly to that one which empowers the assignee to defend as well as prosecute all suits at law or in equity, pending at the time the debtor is adjudged bankrupt, in which such bankrupt is a party. Nor does the view of the plaintiff here derive any support from the fact that the Bankrupt Act contemplates that the assignee shall make defence in his own name, inasmuch as the same clause of the section provides that he may defend in the same manner and with like effect as the suit might have been defended by the bankrupt, which shows conclusively that the decree adjudging the debtor bankrupt does not ipso facto divest the court in such a case of all jurisdiction in the premises. Rev. Stat., sect. 5047.

Opposed to that, it is suggested that creditors having debts provable under the Bankrupt Act are forbidden to prosecute to judgment suits at law or in equity against the bankrupt; but it must be borne in mind that the prohibition in that regard only operates until the question of the debtor's discharge has been determined. Creditors cannot sue the bankrupt, and recover judgment against him pending the bankrupt proceedings; but the regulation in respect to suits pending when the proceedings commenced is special, and should receive careful consideration.

Pending suits are usually continued, at least during a reasonable time, for the reason that the Bankrupt Act provides that any such suit or proceeding shall, upon application of the bankrupt, be stayed, if there be no unreasonable delay, to await the decision of the bankrupt court as to the discharge of the debtor. Applications of the kind are usually granted; but the same section of the Bankrupt Act provides that if the amount due the creditor is in dispute, the suit, by leave of the court in bankruptcy, may proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, which amount may be proved in bankruptcy, the rule being, that the judgment ascertains the amount, but that execution must be stayed. 14 Stat. 527; Rev. Stat., sect. 5106.

Contradicted as the first proposition is by these several provisions of the Bankrupt Act, it is evident that it must be rejected as destitute of any proper foundation.

Taken literally and without explanation, the second proposition would be correct, as it assumes that the judgment in question is a personal judgment against the assignee, to be levied and satisfied out of his own goods and estate; which is an entire misapprehension of its true character and legal effect, whether the question is tested by the order making the assignee a party to the suit, or by the form of the judgment exhibited in the transcript. Instead of that, it is clear that the record negatives every such pretence. Evidence to that effect is found in the preliminary suggestion made on behalf of the plaintiffs, which is as follows: That since the institution of the suit the defendants have been adjudged bankrupts, and that Emory E. Norton has been appointed and qualified as their assignee, and it appears that the court passed an order that the assignee of the defendants be made a party to the suit, in his capacity aforesaid, in place and stead of the defendants.

Much difficulty must attend any effort to misunderstand the true intent and meaning of that order, as it in terms makes the person named a party to the suit in his capacity as assignee, and in place and stead of the bankrupt defendants, and in no other character whatever; nor does it make any difference that the assignee did not appear at the trial, as the record shows that he was notified in person that he had been made a party to the suit. Having been duly served with a citation in due form, he might have appeared, if he had seen fit, and objected to the further prosecution of the suit by plea or motion; but he silently acquiesced in the order of the court; and, two continuances having followed, the court proceeded to hear the evidence and render judgment for the plaintiff that he recover of the representative party, assignee of the bankrupt defendants, the sum of $870, with legal interest until paid, with costs.

Suppose the judgment in this case must be regarded as a judgment against the assignee in his individual character, it would be clearly erroneous and void, as having been rendered without jurisdiction or authority of law; but we are all of opinion that it is not to be viewed in that light; nor is it pretended by the plaintiff below that he can proceed to take judgment against the bankrupts with the ordinary right to take out execution and levy it upon the property or estate of the bankrupt defendants in the hands of the assignee. What he claims is, that the judgment is a judgment against the estate of the bankrupts under administration in the hands of the assignee, and that he might lawfully proceed in the manner in which suits are prosecuted against executors and administrators by the creditors of the decedent, in order to establish the validity and ascertain the amount of their respective claims, and that the effect of the judgment is to fix the amount of the plaintiff's demand against the bankrupts, which he will be entitled to file with the assignee as the basis of his claim for a dividend.

Certain creditors of an insolvent debtor who dies pending an action are allowed in many of the States to summon in the representative party and to prosecute the suit to final judgment, with a view of ascertaining the amount of the debt; and it is evident that the Bankrupt Act contemplates a corresponding proceeding by the creditor of a bankrupt when it provides that the creditor having a pending action against the bankrupt may, in a certain contingency, proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, and when it also provides that the amount so ascertained may be proved in bankruptcy. Execution, however, cannot be issued on such a judgment, the express provision of the same section being that the execution shall be stayed.

Adjudged cases may be found in which it is denied that such a judgment could be rendered under the prior Bankrupt Act; and those decisions are doubtless correct, for the reason that the act under which they were made contained no such provision as that enacted in the twenty-first section of the present Bankrupt Act. Minot v. Bricket, 8 Met. 560.

Persons coming in and proving their debts under the former act were prohibited from maintaining any suit at law or in equity for the same; and the provision was, that 'all proceedings already commenced, and all unsatisfied judgments already obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be surrendered thereby.' 5 Stat. 445.

Actions pending in favor of a creditor, under such circumstances, at the time the debtor is adjudged bankrupt under the present Bankrupt Act, if no objection is made by the assignee or the bankrupt court, may, due notice being first given to the assignee, be prosecuted to final judgment to ascertain the amount due to the creditor; but the judgment recovered will be effectual and operative only to establish the validity and amount of the claim.

Notice in due form having been given to the assignee, the judgment may be filed with him, as an ascertainment of the amount due to the creditor, and as a basis of dividends; but it is effectual and operative only for that purpose, the express requirement of the same section of the Bankrupt Act being that the execution shall be stayed, from which it follows that the alleged privilege on the steamboat cannot be enforced, and that the closing words of the judgment recognizing such a privilege are irregular, unauthorized, and inoperative.

Keeping in view the special nature of the judgment and the limited scope of its operation, a few additional observations will be sufficient to show that there is no merit in the second assignment of error, which assumes in effect that the libel in this case is a proceeding in rem, and that the suit as such is exclusively cognizable in the admiralty and not in the State courts.

Libels in rem to enforce a maritime lien are exclusively cognizable in the courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction; but the difficulty in the way of the present plaintiff is, that the closing words of the judgment to which he refers are wholly inoperative and incapable of being enforced for any such purpose.

Special proceedings of the kind are utterly unavailing, where the defendant is adjudged bankrupt pending the action, and the suit is allowed to proceed to judgment under the twenty-first section of the Bankrupt Act, for the mere purpose of establishing the validity of the claim and the amount due to the creditor. Nor would it benefit the present plaintiff, in the support of his second assignment of error, even if it were conceded that the effect of the judgment is to secure to the plaintiff the alleged preference, for the reason that such a claim for services rendered to a domestic vessel does not, under the recent decision of this court, give rise to a maritime lien in favor of the person rendering the services. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 571. Seamen have a maritime lien for their wages wherever the services may be rendered; but that just rule was never extended to the master, except in cases where the lien is created by statute. Smith v. Plummer, 1 B. & Ald. 575; Wilkins v. Carmichael, 1 Doug. 101; Hussey v. Christie, 9 East, 426; Maclachlan on Ship. (2d ed.) 198; Maude & P. on Ship. (3d ed.) 91; The Orleans, 11 Pet. 184.

Authority does not exist in the State courts to hear and determine a suit in rem, as in the admiralty courts to enforce a maritime lien. Doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained; but the recent decision of the court holds that such a lien does not arise in a contract for repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port, and, if not, then it follows that in respect to such contracts it is competent for the states, under the prior decisions of the court, to create such liens as their legislatures may deem just and expedient, not amounting to a regulation of commerce, and to enact reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the mode of their enforcement. The Belfast, 6 Wall. 645; The Moses Taylor, 4 id. 427; Hine v. Trevor, id. 569.

Contracts for ship-building are held not to be maritime contracts, and, of course, they fall within the same category; but in all cases where a maritime lien arises, the original jurisdiction to enforce the same by a proceeding in rem is exclusive in the district courts sitting in admiralty.

Costs cannot properly be taxed to the assignee before he became a party to the suit. It was the assignee that removed the cause here, and of course he is liable for the costs in this court. Read v. Waterhouse, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 255; S.C.. 52 N. Y. 588; Holland v. Seaver, 1 Fost. 387; Penniman v. Norton, 1 Barb. Ch. 248; Smith v. Gordon, 6 Law Rep. 314.

Judgment affirmed with costs in this court.

title: Norton v. Switzer/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Norton v. Switzer/Opinion of the Court