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 188 atoms, a new substance that is essentially a unity derived through union. To disregard the promptings and needs of this social part of the personality is to invite intellectual and moral death, whose earliest symptoms are sin and abnormality of all sorts. Just as the complete life of the individual depends upon the union of the soul and body, does the normal life of the personality demand a similar union with other personalities. The failure of theology to emphasize this fact is the outcome of a psychology that has been so much concerned with the deliverances of a single consciousness as to slight evidences of social psychical forces.

In the time of Jesus men recognized more or less distinctly the need of establishing a social unity if right living was to be attained—even when their knowledge had little effect upon social institutions. "Man," says Philo, "is a social animal by nature. Therefore he must live not only by himself, but for parents, brothers, wife, children, relatives and friends, for the members of his deme and of his tribe, for his country, for his race, for all mankind. Nay, he must live for the parts of the whole, and also for the entire world, and much more for the Father and the Creator. If he is, indeed, possessed of reason, he must be sociable, he must love the world and God, that of God he may be beloved."

The corresponding position of Jesus, though not expressed so minutely, is quite as distinct, and is far more fundamental to his philosophy. Men's capacity for union renders attainable the purpose of his teaching and his life. It is deep in the ideal which he sets before mankind.

IV. Nowhere does this conception of the necessity of union more predominate than in those teachings that are the most characteristic of the mind of Jesus and which are the most valuable and resultful of all times—the ideal relations that may exist


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190 those blessings promised God's sons. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Christianity as a system is but an unfolding of the conception of the Godward social capacities of mankind. From this point of view the cardinal doctrines of the incarnation, faith, atonement, justification, and immortality, cease to be abstract, and appear rather the formulation of actual religious experience and the description of psychical possibilities and phenomena.

In a very true sense Jesus identifies the powers of the soul that make union with God an essential of the normal man, with those that force a normal man into union with other human beings. If a man be imperfect who is apart from the divine, so is he who is apart from his fellows. Wherever Jesus holds up a picture of man's ideal, he makes this second element of the twofold extension of personality not only essential but fundamental.

(1) To begin with his conception of the kingdom. If it were allowable to anticipate somewhat the later discussion of this term, it would appear that man is to become righteous—that is, normal—through life in a normal and righteous social order. This new

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192 of the un-ideal, the abnormal, the sinful condition of mankind. In a word this may be described as one of unsocial relationships. The evil man is a dead limb, a lost sheep, a lost coin, a lost son. It is a little remarkable that although the earliest Christian writings have much to say upon the universality of such a condition, Jesus is silent as regards universal sinfulness. With him it would appear as if sin were the reverse of sociability, and a sinful race, as distinct from sinful individuals, a contradiction of terms. In failing to follow the fundamental instincts and capacities of his nature, a man becomes at once selfish, sinful, and unsocial. His punishment is the outcome of his abused nature. Destined for companionship with high spiritual beings, he necessarily turns in upon himself, grows less and less capable of opening his nature to him who seeks his love. He loses those powers by which he might become a member of God's family and of the brotherhood of man. Exclusion from the kingdom is his natural punishment—he is not fit to be one of its members. In one case at least, Jesus states this cause explicitly. At the day of judgment the ground on which exclusion from the kingdom will be based is a failure to fulfil the social duties of the present age. Hell is thus at once the opposite and the horrible caricature of heaven. It is not merely an accommodation of his thought to Jewish terminology when Jesus describes the selfish rich man as suffering alone in Gehenna, and the poor man as in the companionship of Abraham. Translated into the language of today the principle this parable illustrates would not be altogether different from this: The degeneration of the social nature that arises from the neglect of social duties, unfits a man for, or participation in, the enjoyments of the ideal life. Selfishness—that is, an over-developed individualism—must according to the laws of nature result in abnormality and consequent suffering. As long as a kingdom and a brotherhood are the goal of human effort, so long must man be capable of social life, and sociability a characteristic element of a normal man.


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 194 human life presented by his own living we gain a corroboration of his words to his followers. A man is a social being. On the one side he is joined with physical forces, but on the other lie the needed friendship with God and fellowship with men. If we waive all doctrinal formulas it is nevertheless clear that in this teaching and its exemplification by Jesus, we have a presentation of humanity that must condition all theological and sociological statements that claim to be Christian. Further than this, there is gained a point of departure for the interpretation of less obvious teachings. If the Christian conception of man is thus that of a social being that finds his complete life only in losing it in the life of others, we have as the Christian conception of society that of a necessary thing—that of an entity that is the complex not merely of physical environments but of personal as well. All unions that are the promptings of normal human instincts are therefore natural and helpful. All separations that are approved by such instincts are equally natural and necessary. And what is of especial significance, a Christian sociology becomes possible and necessary as the complement of a Christian theology.


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 196 to represent the object. They are aspects of the object, not independently existing objects. They are machinery for handling in details the things to be understood in their totality. This consideration will be further urged presently. In a portion of Professor Ward's argument he seems to neglect this fact, and to imply that there is an objective distinction between things as static or dynamic, whereas nobody understands more clearly than he that the distinction is between relations of things. The question at issue is, then, What are the most convenient divisions into which to separate the subject matter of sociology? Professor Ward argues that they are "Statics" and "Dynamics." I am in perfect agreement with him about the desirability of these divisions, but I have found it serviceable to use the preliminary category, "Descriptive Sociology." This division is certainly not precisely coordinate with the divisions "Statical Sociology" and "Dynamic Sociology." There is a qualitative difference between the material held in suspension, so to speak, in descriptive sociology and the same material partially interpreted in statical or dynamic sociology. The tripartite division does not in any way affect the definition of statics or dynamics. It does most effectively guard against the illusion of which Comte was a notorious victim, that data may be interpreted before they are collected. Professor Ward would be among the last to indulge such an illusion. My difference with him at this point is therefore a matter of detail, of emphasis, of punctuation perhaps. I find however that it is extremely important, both in research and in teaching, to keep the observing and describing stage and process abruptly distinct in thought, and, especially with immature students, distinct in time from the interpreting stage and process, in which latter the categories static and dynamic have their place.

Professor Ward's position on the main question is as follows: "There is properly no division of descriptive sociology. That which might be so designated is only the work of the collector." As intimated above, I do not understand that this proposition


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198 change is static. In dynamic phenomena the change is qualitative.

Once more, (p. 210):

The antithesis between the static and the dynamic requires to be still more incisively drawn than has yet been done. Both growth and multiplication belong to the department of statics. . . . So long as the type remains the same, the phenomena, whatever they may be, are static; there is permanence and stability. . . . The counter law that antagonizes heredity and works instability is called variation. . . . Efforts bring about a more perfect adaptation through modifications in the type. . . . This is development. . . . It is a dynamic process. Once more, (p. 218):

The test of a static phenomenon is that it shall relate to function. So long as these various institutions, no matter how diverse in different nations and ages, are considered as they actually are, or as they were at a given time, and not as in a process of transformation, the limits of socalsocial [sic] statics are not transgressed. . . . In sharp contradistinction to all this, the test of a dynamic phenomenon is that it shall relate to feeling, and shall have to do with the direct effects of action in the effort to satisfy want.

Unless I completely fail to understand this exposition, there is here a criterion quite distinct from that just proposed, viz., the tendency to change type. This seems more evident in comparison with the following (p. 215):

A dynamic action is one that affects not merely the primary agent at the particular time, but all other agents for all time. Such actions


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200 however that it was necessary to distinguish as he did not, between the material of social philosophy and the processes of collecting it on the one hand, and the various stages of interpretation on the other. So important was this discrimination that it seemed to me expedient to call it by a distinguishing name. The conceptions of method which I adopted were accordingly the following: Starting with the presumption, first, that the sciences of man's environment are at our service; second, that the sciences dealing with man the individual are kept within call for the help which they must render in explaining the constitution of the social elements, we pass into the territory of the social sciences when we cease to contemplate man as an individual, related merely by the genetic bond to his immediate progenitors and descendants; and when we begin to study men in associations distinguished generically by the phenomena of active or passive agreement. In other words, there are phenomena subsequent to and arising from the characteristics of individual men, viz., the phenomena of the accommodation of volition to volition in every form of human contact. These phenomena are the proper subject matter of a societary science or of a family of sciences dealing with facts peculiar to societies. The enlarging consensus of scholars is tending to employ the name sociology as a general designation of societary science so defined.

The first step in the procedure of any species of societary science, i. e., of sociology, in its most general form or in its particular divisions, must be an observing and a descriptive process, which we may treat as one. The appropriate description is always understood to be as really an integral portion of science as any subsequent process of discrimination, classification or interpretation. Thus in the article just quoted. Professor Le Conte says of the evolutionary hypothesis, after having shown that as a vague philosophic idea it is very old:

Again the scientific mind was awakened from its sense of security by the appearance in 1859 of Darwin's Origin of Species. This time, as we all know, the theory was almost immediately and universally accepted. The reason of this great difference in its reception now,


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202 any comprehensive scale. The work thus far done is descriptive and that only. The loudest demand of sociology today is for the addition of description to description so that, with equally accurate observations of the various elements entering into social combinations, an intelligent view of their correlation is possible. I do not forget that there have been expositions of various political constitutions, at various periods; that there have been analyses of popular life in certain eras; that there have been accounts of the economic systems of various times and nations; of the ecclesiastical structure; of the controlling ideas, etc. Each of these sections of societary description has attempted to exhibit the relations of part to part within the particular division of phenomena described. In so far they have been essays in social statics, and inestimably valuable. As samples of statical explanations of the given society in its totality however they have fallen as far short of satisfying the demands of sociological method as a carpenter's account of the structure of a house would fail to fill out the concepts of physics, or as a sailor's account of Defender's last trial would be lacking as an exposition of the science of navigation.

Many men in various social sciences have done splendid work in the statics of their particular section of social reality, but as yet their contributions to general sociology should be rated rather as descriptions of elements than as properly statical results. We have as yet no single civilization so described that all its chief elements can be located. In no civilization can we demonstrate scientifically how the elements coexist and combine and cooperate, how they correct and complement and counter-balance each other. We are still in the describing stage. We no sooner get one element of the social combination, say the industrial, pretty well explained, so that we think we are ready to study its adjustments with the other elements, then we find that we have hardly studied these other elements at all, and our first observations under this latest impulse raise questions that demand more observation of the industrial element. We have done a lot of more or less brilliant guessing about statics and


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204 Professor Ward's argument assumes, that it is necessary or even possible to contemplate each societary fact, at every stage of treatment, as either static or dj'namic. On the contrary, although men who habitually reflect cannot easily rid themselves of the anticipation that any fact which they may observe will presently manifest some static or dynamic relations, it is both necessary and desirable for students of society to deal primarily with facts as facts, before trying to make out their static or dynamic relations. For example, if one were to prepare himself for sociological interpretation of American society as a whole at this moment, he would be obliged in the first instance to investigate in turn the elements of which American society is composed, and the factors by which it is conditioned. Thus anthropological and psychological study of the population is to be taken for granted on the one hand, and on the other hand study of the natural resources of the territory, and of the actual use made of them by the population. Then the institutional phenomena would have to be considered in turn, the geographical and political distribution of the population, their individual and territorial division of labor; their contrivances for social control; their educational machinery, their industrial organization, and, finally, the body of traditions, beliefs, aims, that in conjunction with the material environment fix the limitations of national action.

It would be a long time before an investigator, even if he could divide this research among many assistants, could become so familiar with the details involved in these distinct divisions of material that he could safely venture to consider them as a totality in their statical relations. During this period of preparatory research and reflection he has been dealing with innumerable facts which may have both static and dynamic relations, but he has had to study them by themselves, virtually regardless of their static or dynamic aspects, until he became sufficiently intelligent about them in detail to construct his knowledge of particulars into comprehension of the whole.

But Professor Ward will doubtless reply: "Each of these


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206 To illustrate further, on a very minute scale, let us take the case of a bicycle club. It is a societary phenomenon of a comparatively recent origin. What place has it occupied in our thoughts? We have observed that it usually rallies about a headquarters; that it appears to have a more or less uniform affinity for wheels of a particular manufacture; that it manifests a somewhat unique esprit de corps; that its appearances in public are in varying degrees picturesque, and more of the same vague sort. Our observations so far can hardly claim to be a sufficient basis for final exposition, and I presume that Professor Ward himself would hardly care to distinguish them as properly statical. They are in a category antecedent to the statical. If we proceed to form an estimate of the societary significance of the bicycle club, we shall be obliged to collect precise and exhaustive observations for some time before we may safely venture to place the club either statically or dynamically. That is, we shall have the partial products of a scientific process, and these products, together with the process, deserve a distinguishing name, as much as the more finished products or processes.

I claim therefore that the term statical cannot be reserved for application to objects that are objectively statical, because the static or the dynamic quality is not an attribute of objects as such, it is an accident of their relations. These categories apply therefore to facts and processes when considered in their static or dynamic correlations. Otherwise we cannot account for inclusion of the same fact or object, in consecutive moments, first in the category static, second in the category dynamic. But our school system, for example, is at least presumed to be a factor of progress not less than a factor of order, and so in different ratios with many other institutions.

If Professor Ward does not grant that it is the point of view of the interpreter, rather than the objective character of the thing interpreted, which determines the designation of the process concerned, he will be led into all sorts of confusion. As just suggested, neither school, nor church, nor court, nor trade nor


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208 This is what I meant when I said "sociology is the science of social ideals." The context makes it plain, of course, that the proposition referred to a second stage in sociological procedure, and was in no sense a proposed definition of sociology. I am free to confess, as admitted in the note at the beginning of this paper, that I am not now satisfied with my own statements in that connection. I am more secure of my ground, but see more clearly that I failed to define it. I not only believe with Professor Ward that sociology should aim "at the organization of happiness," but I contend that scientific conceptions of what the conditions of happiness would be are necessarily involved in the pursuit of this aim. It seems to me very anomalous that a thinker who has been so bold and original and persistent in maintaining that the only conceivable end of life is happiness, should flinch from scientific criticism of the concept happiness, and from scientific calculation of the conditions of happiness.

My contention is that if we should make such advances in statical interpretation that we could accurately formulate the equilibrium of the societies which have transmitted civilization in every epoch from the beginning to the present, we should, in consequence, be in possession of means, first for generalizations of statical laws; second, for generalizations of certain dynamic laws, i.e., of the derivation of status from status; and third, for positing certain approximate conditions of more complete happiness, or of more nearly stable social equilibrium. I contend, further, that a doctrine of the "organization of happiness" which does not posit some relatively definite conception of the social status toward which the application of the doctrine would tend, essentially resembles the other exhibitions of social hysterics by agitators who want "change" without a practical plan for a single concrete improvement. I therefore hold that it is the business of the sociologist, or of a division of the sociologists, to use descriptive material not merely as the zoölogist reconstructs extinct types from fragmentary remains, to represent the statical order of


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 232 supply that scientific training which is likely in the future to become essential as a qualification for the civil service, municipal employment, journalism or public work.

While much attention will be given to economic and political theory, the special aim of the school will be, from the first, the study and investigation of the concrete facts of industrial life and the actual working of economic and political relations as they exist or have existed, in the United Kingdom and in foreign countries. With this object in view the school will provide scientific training in methods of investigation and research, and will afford facilities to British and foreign students to undertake special studies of industrial life and original work in economics and political science. The work of the school will take the following forms: (1) Public lectures, and classes in connection with them, on the following subjects: Economics (including Economic Theory and Economic History), Statistics, Commerce, Commercial Geography, Commercial History, Commercial and Industrial Law, Banking and Currency, Finance and Taxation, and Political Science.

(2) Special classes, arranged as a three years' course of study, concluding with a research course.

(3) The promotion, by means of scholarships or otherwise of original research.

(4) The publication of books containing the results of researches in economic and political subjects conducted by the teachers of the school or under their direction.

(5) The collection of a library for the use of the students of the school, consisting of books, reports and documents illustrative of economic and political history and theory.

(6) The organization of an "information department" to assist British students and foreigners visiting England for the purpose of investigation.

It is not proposed to prepare students especially for any examination, but the lectures and classes already arranged will be found useful to candidates for the following public examinations among others, viz.. Civil Service (Class 1 and Indian), Council of Legal Education, Institute of Bankers, Institute of Actuaries, London University (Mental and Moral Science), London Chamber of Commerce (Commercial Education).

The School of Sociology of Hartford, Conn., having successfully completed its first curriculum, enters upon the work of its second year October 5, 1895. This institution offers a three years' course in


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 234
 * * Principles of Sociology, III, 12, September-December.
 * * Social Conditions and Problems, III, 21, January-June.
 * Development of Social Theory, III, 12, September-December.
 * Social Philosophy, III, 11, January-March.
 * * Anthropology, III, 10, April-June.
 * Segregation of Population, III, 10, April-June.

 * Methodology and Bibliography of Social Science, VIII, 6, July- August. Also, IV, 12, April-June.
 * Problems of Social Statics, IV, 36, October-June.
 * [Seminar. Psychology, Ethics and Sociology of Socialism, II, 36, October-June.]
 * Seminar. Problems of Social Dynamics, IV, 36, October-June.
 * * Outlines of Constructive Social Philosophy, IV, 12, October-December. Government, January-March. Municipal Action, April-June.
 * Seminar. Organization for Promoting Social Welfare, II, 36, October-June.
 * * Social Institutions, IV, 36, October-June.
 * * General Hygiene, IV, 12, April-June.
 * Seminar. Sanitary Science, II, 36, October-June.
 * * House Sanitation, IV, 12, October-December. Water, Food, Clothing, January-March. Economy of Living, April-June.
 * Laboratory Work in Anthropology, IV, 36, October-June.
 * * Physical Anthropological Lab., IV, 36, October-June.
 * * [Physical Anthropology (el.), IV, 12, October-December.]
 * * Mexico. Archæology, ethnology, IV, 12, October-December.]
 * * General Anthropology, IV, 12, October-December.
 * * Ethnology American Race, IV, 12, January-March.
 * * Prehistoric Archæology, American, IV, 12, April-June.
 * * Field Work in Anthropology, Mexico, July-September.
 * * [Prehistoric Archæology, European, IV, 12, April-June.]
 * * [General Ethnology, IV, 12, January-March.]
 * * Trades Unionism and Coöperation, IV, 6, July-August.
 * * State as Agent for Social Amelioration, IV, 6, July-August.
 * * Development of Social Structure in Great Britain, IV, 12, April-June; also, July-September, '96.
 * * Province of Sociology and Relation to Special Social Sciences, IV, 12, October-December.
 * Social Anatomy, Physiology and Psychology, IV, 24, January-June.
 * * Introduction to Study of Society, 4-12, April-June.
 * * Comparative Psychology of Human Races, IV, 36, October-June. Synopsis of same, III, 12, July-September.
 * Somatic and Psychic History of Woman, IV, 24, October-March. Synopsis of same, IV, 12, July-September.


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 236
 * * Principles of Sociology, III, 17, October-February. Problems, February-June.
 * * Sociology (advanced), II, 17, February-June.
 * Historical Development of Sociological Thought, III, 6, January-February.
 * [Relation of Sociology to Other Branches of Research, III, 6, January-February.]
 * [Aims and Methods in the Study of Society, III, 6, January-February.]
 * Town and Country. Distribution of Population, III, 6, May-June.
 * [Current Changes in the Social Organization of the United States, III, 6, May-June.]
 * [Theory of Population, III, 6, May-June.]

 * Individual Research Directed.

 * Introduction to Sociology, II, 30.
 * Principles of Sociology, II, 30.

 * Practical Sociology, III, 30.
 * History and Theory of Modern Socialism, II, fort., 30.
 * Conference in Social Theory, II., fort., 30.
 * Methods of Archæological Exploration, II, 30.
 * Remains in Archæological Provinces of North and South America, II, 30,
 * Relation of Archæology to Ethnology, II, 30.

 * * Principles of Sociological Development of Modern State and its Social functions, II, 31.
 * * Social and Economic Condition of Workingmen, III, 31.
 * * Public Finance. Tariff and Financial History of the United States.
 * Taxation and Management of Public Debts —, —?

 * The Family as an Historical and Social Institution, —, September-June.
 * Anthropology, III, September-January.
 * Psychology of Society, III, September-January.
 * Social Economics, II, September-June.

 * Beginnings of Industrial Organizations, II, 32.
 * [Anthropology, II, 32.]
 * * Science of Society, II; 32.
 * Social Science, II, 32.
 * History of Marriage and Family, I, 32.


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1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Diffraction of Light

Sections

 * 1. Article Introduction.
 * 2. Shadows.
 * 3. Fraunhofer’s Diffraction Phenomena.
 * 4. Theory of Circular Aperture.
 * 5. Resolving Power of Telescopes.
 * 6. Coronas or Glories.
 * 7. Influence of Aberration. Optical Power of Instruments.
 * 8. Diffraction Gratings.
 * 9. Talbot’s Bands.
 * 10. Diffraction when the Source of Light is not seen in Focus.
 * 11. Dynamical Theory of Diffraction.


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 238 in Mr. Spencer's writings, many of the numerous obiter dicta are as inconclusive as they are entertaining. There is a substance of sound wisdom in the book which entitles it to the careful attention of all.

2. Small and Vincent, Introduction to the Study of Society. Books II-V inclusive.

This manual also is a preparation for sociology, and distinctly disclaims the intention of offering a system of sociology. It is a laboratory guide to observation of social facts in some of their most obvious—even if not most commonly observed—relations. The habit of observation and explanation of concrete facts which the manual is designed to form, must be the constant means of getting the material of sociology, unless one is to be contented with book science rather than objective science. Before there is primary fitness for dealing with sociology proper the practice of observing, analyzing and correlating concrete social facts must have become fixed habit.

It would be well if students would devote the time assigned to study of society for a year to observation of their own community, and to arrangement of results, after the method illustrated in the parts of the manual indicated, before venturing into the field of systematic sociology. Assuming that students have thus had an adequate introduction to a valid method of studying society—which in our opinion bears about the same relation to the science of sociology that the first ten experiments performed by beginners in the laboratory have to the science of chemistry—they may then begin to ask how men have succeeded in systematizing social facts, i. e., they are now ready for an introduction to sociology. The most available literature for that purpose, to students who have followed our advice thus far, will be:

3. Small and Vincent, Introduction. Book I. These five chapters survey the origin and scope of sociology in the most elementary and general way, and suggest some of the important questions which the sociologists have at present under discussion.

4. Professor Franklin H. Giddings, The Theory of Sociology. A brief monograph, the promise of a larger work to be issued at once. Many differences of view are apparent between 3 and 4. These simply illustrate our second preliminary remark, which amounted to the caution that sociology is in a very early stage of formative process. Study of facts and criticism of explanations is at present our business.

5. J. S. Mackenzie, Introduction to Social Philosophy. 2d ed. This


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 240 These two works are practically one, or rather (b) is an extended appendix to (a). The earlier work has been a stumbling-block to many, first, because its science—including psychology—roused opposition; second, because its philosophy was understood to be materialism, and it was needlessly rough in its references to religion. With all allowances, the work must always occupy a distinguished position in the history of American sociology. Nobody can understand contemporary sociological thought unless he has made himself familiar with the main argument of this work.

We have thus indicated the necessary preliminaries of study in today's social science. This general survey is necessary if one is to know his bearings, and to choose intelligently a particular department of social science or group of social problems for further study. Each of these has its own methodology and its own literature, to which special reference will be made in subsequent numbers.


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Rh connotes anything from which I would dissent with respect to the necessary relation between descriptive data and sociological treatment of the data. The collected facts are equal in importance to Professor Ward and myself. I prefer to provide for a distinct division or department of the sociological process, that department, namely, which is devoted to the collection and description of facts, with such classification as is possible by the use of superficial traits. The material so arranged is then the lawful booty of interpretation—first static, then dynamic.

As already remarked, this is, of course, a methodological division, or distinction of process, not a division of subject-matter. The collected facts, to be interpreted in their static and dynamic relations, pertain to both past and present. Thinking now of the material of general sociology in the widest sense, the pertinent facts to be included in the category "descriptive sociology" will consist of all obtainable significant particulars about the phenomena which human associations present for interpretation. These phenomena are largely the subject-matter of special social sciences, and observations of these have been and perhaps always will be made chiefly by persons who do not proceed to the last syntheses of sociology. This fact does not constitute a reason why the initial processes, and the sciences to which they are immediately tributary, should not be grouped together for the purpose with which we are now concerned, under the general designation descriptive sociology. This grouping serves to make and keep clear the relation of these preliminary processes and results to the larger synthesis and interpretation which statical and dynamic sociology propose. I repeat, that agreement on this point need not affect the question in hand as to the relations of statical and dynamic sociology.

Professor Ward's views should be stated more fully before the argument goes farther. He continues:

Social dynamics (according to Comte) studies the laws of succession, while social statics seeks those of coexistence; or the former furnishes the theory of progress, the latter of order. Again (pp. 207-8): All considerations of structure and function are static. Merely


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Rh are sometimes called "fructifying causes." They are pregnant with future consequences. Static actions leave matters in the same state after as before their performance. Dynamic actions create a new state. Charity work is chiefly static, and supplies only temporary and ever-recurring wants. The highest philanthrophyphilanthropy [sic] consists in such deeds as tend to diminish the number of indigent persons and thus to render charity unnecessary. Professor Joseph Le Conte formulated the relations in question in the following language, which expresses in general the things upon which I think I am in agreement with Professor Ward. He said: Society may be studied as a complex system of interrelated parts, acting and reacting on one another by mutual dependence and mutual help; perfectly adjusted to produce eternal peace, prosperity, social order, and good government. This is social statics, or we may study it in its onward movement, and the laws of that movement. From this point of view we perceive that the equilibrium is never perfect; peace, contentment and rest is never complete, nor ought to be; for society is ever struggling to reach a higher plane with wider outlook. The equilibrium is continually disturbed a little in order to be readjusted on a higher plane, with more complex interrelation of all its parts. This is social dynamics, social development, social progress. It is social evolution.

With this explanation of Professor Ward's position, let us return to the previous question which he so summarily dismisses. My own work in studying and teaching societary relations was guided at the outset by Comte's classification. I soon found


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Rh  was (I) that now for the first time it came in the form of a true scientific theory, based on an immense array of accurately observed facts and cautious reasoning. Darwin was a perfect type of a cautious, inductive reasoner. He had collected and observed facts and pondered on them: he had organized and systematized his thoughts and verified his conclusions for twenty years in silence before he published. Nobody who has followed Professor Ward's writings will imagine that he needs to be taught the value of the collector's work. My contention as against him is rather an ad hominem argument. Himself being the judge, the work involved in precise description of fact is important enough to be separately designated. My impression is that in other inductive sciences the disposition to use some designation of this sort—descriptive astronomy, descriptive geology, descriptive botany, descriptive anatomy—has been strongest in the period during which there was the greatest conscious discrepancy between the amount of accurately observed material and the demands of the inductive method. It may be that there will come a time when sociology can dispense with this designation, as some of the other sciences have done. At present men old and young who are dealing with sociology are so unpracticed in the necessary methods, they are so prone to interpret when they have a right only to observe, and they are with such dif^ficulty convinced that the basis of their alleged inductions is insufficient, that the maintenance for technical purposes of the logical division of descriptive sociology is dictated by prudence.

I urge this with the more insistence because it seems to me that even Professor Ward misrepresents the scientific situation. He says (p. 205): "Nearly all the scientific work thus far done in sociology has been in that (the statical) field." I reply that on the contrary it would be difficult to find a piece of thoroughly good inductive statical work upon any considerable section of societary material. There is philosophical speculation in abundance, and there is extremely fragmentary descriptive work, but I have tried in vain to think of a typical piece of statical work on


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Colour

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Colour


text:
Talk:1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Colour

Sources:
 * http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=User:Tim_Starling/ScanSet_PNG_demo&vol=06&page=EB6A750


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Rh dynamics, but the work which gives the most promise of being permanent is, from the sociologist's point of view, practically all descriptive. In the interest of careful, methodical, responsible science this condition ought to be advertised both to young students and to the oldest investigators. We shall lose nothing in the end by a frank showing of the situation.

This descriptive work being fundamental in all science, and especially since it is the order of the day, whether we will or no, in sociology, our designations ought to correspond with our processes. Tentative interpretation is always in order, but the heaviest constructive work in sociology for a long time to come must necessarily be in accumulation of material. Thus it is perfectly competent for sociologists, if they please, to devote themselves to description and corresponding arrangement of all the forms of human association discoverable in all lands, ages and nations, e. g., the patriarchal groups, the hordes, the tribes, the nationalities, the federations; the arrangements of persons within nationalities, according to race or occupation; the different forms assumed in different times and nations by groups originating in the same principle of composition, as, for instance, the various forms of the legislative element in political groups; the varieties of religious hierarchies, of industrial orders, etc. It is possible of course to conduct such studies with constant reference of the particulars investigated to the containing whole, and thus to pursue the form of a statical inquiry. I contend that it is in the majority of cases an empty form, until description has gone farther than at present. In any event, the logical distinction between the preliminary descriptive work and the subsequent work of interpretation is at least as important in sociology as it has ever been in any stage of the development of another science, and it deserves prominence rather than concealment.

Passing now to more direct consideration of statics and dynamics, there should be no difficulty in agreeing that every fact with which sociology has to deal is static or dynamic or both, according to that consensus of definition in which Comte, Ward, and Le Conte join. It is by no means true, however, as


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Rh institutions, or societary elements, is, itself, a static fact; it has a structure of its own, which is capable of statical formulation." The reply is obviously just, but it does not affect the case. The question in point is not whether a given social fact is a statical factor, or a product of statical factors, but whether in a given mental process it is contemplated in statical relations.

In other words, the distinction between static and dynamic phenomena upon which Professor Ward insists is one which I consider no less important than he, but I think he is wrong in assuming that social or other phenomena must always be represented in consciousness either as static or as dynamic.

Representing a fact as part of a static condition, or of a dynamic process is a procedure much more complex than mere perception of the fact; it is interpretation of the fact in relation to other facts. We neither do nor can nor should so summarily interpret all social facts that immediately following perception we refer them to the category "static" or "dynamic." On the contrary, we keep them for longer or shorter periods under observation, without necessarily committing ourselves to interpretation. During this time they are objectively either static or dynamic factors to be sure, but to our thought they are neither. There is then a raw material of social science, not yet worked into statical or dynamic interpretation; and I find no better term for the sociological process while the material is in this state than "descriptive sociology."

Thus thousands of phenomena occur daily in society which the people who observe them do not know how to explain. They do not know whether to interpret them as incidents in the natural order of society, or as impulses making a different order, or as accidental and exceptional happenings. The most astute social philosophers are frequently in similar doubt. These considerations do not tend to show that the distinction between static and dynamic facts is impractical or insignificant, but simply that the two categories are not sufficient to cover all our ways of contemplating facts. We actually use facts that at the moment are considered neither as static nor as dynamic.


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Rh is sure to be at a given moment any more truly static than it is dynamic.

The most important difference between Professor Ward's view and my own in this connection is only hinted at in his paper. It is that I regard the discovery of the outline of an improved social order as the most important concern of the statical division of sociology, while Professor Ward has no toleration for that idea.

On this point three propositions will be at present sufficient: First, there are but two strata of statical condition which have any considerable interest in themselves for social beings. These are, in the first place, the actual order of the present time; and, in the second place, the future order about which everybody speculates as "the good time coming." Sociologists are as a rule interested in past status, not as archaeologists, but as surveyors of preliminaries to social dynamics. The men who have made most strenuous attempts to formulate the social order of past civilizations have had in view the derivation of conclusions not merely about the statics of past times, but about dynamic principles effective in all times.

Second, the theory of a social order not yet realized is as properly statical as the theory of a past order. I am not now referring to the plans proposed for realizing the conception, but to the conception itself as a self-consistent arrangement of social elements. Thus the members of the assembly that drew up the Constitution of the United States were dealing with statical theory just as truly as are men who today lecture upon the theory of the Roman state, or the principles of the English constitution. Third, provided that it is a construction of known facts and demonstrated principles, a doctrine of an unrealized statical condition may be just as scientific as a theory of an existing or a formerly existing condition. The theory of the Ferris wheel is no more and no less a statical theory, no more and no less scientific today than when it was merely on paper as plans and specifications of an unrealized ideal. It is as competent for the sociologist as for the engineer to discover and organize in idea unused possibilities of combination.


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 Rh Sociology and confers the degree, Bachelor of Sociology, upon those who successfully complete the course. It is open to men and women alike. For admission regular students are required to have a college diploma or its equivalent. The objects of the school, as expressed in its announcement, are as follows: (1) To make the institution a center of investigation, gathering material illustrative of past and present social conditions with a view to the discovery of the underlying formative laws producing the growth and decay, the health and the disease of the social organism.

(2) To provide instruction in all branches of social science, implanting a knowledge of facts and theories; to train in methods of research; to give a practical acquaintance with the existing social states, or, in other words, to train a body of competent teachers and reformers.

(3) To provide for the publication of social literature which shall be both scientific and popular; and,

(4) To carry out ascertained principles of sociology into society for the elevation of its aims and ideals, and for the right direction of its progress.

The cost of tuition for the full course of a year is $50. Chester D. Hartranft is the president.

The handbook of graduate courses recently issued by Macmillan & Co. gives the following outline of courses in Social Science, Anthropology and Ethnology, offered in twenty-one of our leading educational institutions. We give the outline without comment further than the suggestion that we have here an indication of the necessity of agreement among scientific workers, as to the limits and the nomenclature of the sciences indicated.

Brackets indicate that the courses are not given in 1895-6. Courses open to undergraduates are marked with an asterisk. Following the title of the course are the number of hours per week (in small Roman) and the number of weeks of appointment with the instructor (in numerals).

 * History and Recent Development of Sociological Theory, II, October-January.
 * * Sociology, II, 30.
 * [Crime and Penology, II, 15, February-May.]
 * Evolution of Family, II, 15, February-May.
 * [Pauperism and Charities, II, October-January.]
 * Seminar. Sociology, I, 30.


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 Rh : * Historical Sociologies, IV, 24, July-September, and January-March.
 * * Primitive Art, IV, 12, April-June.
 * * [Animism, IV, 24.]
 * * Settlement Movement, IV, 6, July-August.
 * * Origin and Evolution of Society, Professor Giddings' System, IV, 6, August-September.
 * * Social Aspects of Taxation, IV, 12, April-June.

 * General Anthropology, II, 35.
 * * General Sociology, II, October-January.

 * * General Sociology, II, October-January.
 * * Evolution of Family, II, February-May.
 * * Pauperism, Poor Laws, and Charities, II, October-January.
 * * Crime and Penology, II, February-May.
 * Seminar in Sociology, II, fort., 30.
 * * Theory and Practice of Statistics, II, 30.
 * Seminar in Statistics, III, 30.
 * * Social Effects of Taxation, II, 30.
 * * Railroad Problems, economical, social and legal, II, February-May.
 * Communistic and Socialistic Theories, II, October-January.
 * * Anthropology, II, February-May.
 * * Physical Geography and Anthropology, II, October-January.

 * * Social Science (el.), II, 32.
 * * [Condition of Labor, II, 32.]
 * * Seminary. Social Science (theoretical), II, 32.
 * * Social Statistics, II, 32.
 * * Socialism and Communism, II, 12, October-December,

 * * Ethics of Social Questions, II, 31.
 * Sociological Seminar. Christian Doctrine of the Social Order, II, 31.
 * * Social and Economical Condition of the Workingmen, III, 31.
 * * Principles of Sociological Development of Modern State and its Social Functions, II-III, 31.
 * * Communism and Socialism, Utopias, Ancient and Modern, II-III, 15, February-May.
 * Three years' course in ArchæoIogical and Ethnological (research). General Anthropology, with specific reference to American Archæology and Ethnology. (Preliminary to above.) III, lab., 31.

 * * Sociology, II, 32.
 * * Cities, II, 14.


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 SEMINAR NOTES.

of sociology are frequently asked to tell how students who are confined to the use of English may begin to study sociology. A previous question, upon which information is seldom furnished, is whether it is desirable that the person concerned should begin to study sociology at all. It is by no means certain that everybody who wishes to be a better citizen, and to help make others better citizens, should try to study sociology. It is possible to learn many things of immediate value about citizenship, not merely about politics in the ordinary sense, but about many ways of cooperation in society outside of politics, without going very deeply into the material or the method of sociology. We shall hereafter illustrate this remark in various ways.

Assuming now that we are advising persons of mature minds who are totally unacquainted with the literature of sociology; we have to say, first, that the things most important to the sociologist are not in books. In order to understand society, the facts of society must be studied face to face, not merely through the medium of print. Second, it is worse than useless for persons to study existing sociological literature who are not accustomed to weigh and use conflicting opinions and irreconcilable systems. It is difficult to find sociological writers who agree with each other throughout, and those who are entirely consistent with themselves are rare. There must be extremely cautious discrimination, the discovery of a few pearls in much rubbish, and appreciation of wisdom obscured by glaring faults. Persons who cannot preserve evenness and independence of judgment under such requirements would better leave sociological study to others.

In order to use such books as we have to the best advantage in preparation for first-hand study either of concrete social problems, or of sociological doctrine, we recommend the following:

1. Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology.

This is not sociology proper but an argument that it is sorely needed, and an account of the mental preparation necessary. As usual


text:
Author:John Stuart Mackenzie

Works

 * An Introduction to Social Philosophy: The Shaw Fellowship Lectures at Glasgow (1890; second edition, 1895)  external scan
 * A Manual of Ethics (1893; seventh edition, 1910) external scan
 * Outlines of Metaphysics (1902, second edition, 1906)  external scan
 * Lectures on Humanism (1907) external scan
 * The International crisis: the theory of the state;, 1916 (contributor) external scan
 * Elements of constructive philosophy, 1917 external scan
 * Arrows of desire: essays on our national character and outlook, 1920 external scan

title: Author:John Stuart Mackenzie


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 Rh book surveys the whole field of social philosophy in a masterly manner. No one should attempt to read it who is not practiced in philosophical thinking, and familiar with some of the most influential ancient and modern systems of philosophy. Clergymen will especially appreciate the correlation of sociology with many phases of religious philosophy.

Titles 3-5 inclusive are virtually in the department of methodology. To these should be added:

6. The series of papers now appearing in this by Professor Lester F. Ward. They will constitute a most valuable introduction to sociology. Professor Ward does not present these papers strictly as fresh contributions to sociology, but he desires to have them regarded as restatements of familiar positions, or as elaborations of views which have been taken for granted. We may be permitted to say that his own estimate of the importance of the series is much below that which other competent critics will reach.

It would seem that a science about the methodology of which so much has been written must be comparatively advanced. On the contrary there are in English only two published attempts, on a somewhat comprehensive scale, to formulate a sociology. First in order of time was:

7. Herbert Spencer—
 * (a) First Principles.
 * (b) Principles of Sociology, 2 vols.
 * (c) Principles of Ethics, 2 vols.

Although the second of these titles (2 vols.) are alone designated sociology, Mr. Spencer's system has to be gathered from the five volumes named, not to mention his important essays.

It is not now in place to point out the peculiarities or the limitations of Mr. Spencer's system. We content ourselves with the single remark that even if we find it necessary to revise all his specific conclusions; and even if his anthropological data prove to be entirely insufficient for the sort of induction which he has attempted, he deserves to be studied as an index of the work which must be done by collectors before we shall be in possession of the material of one most essential sort for the construction of sociology. In logical and chronological succession we name:

8. Professor Lester F. Ward—
 * (a) Dynamic Sociology.
 * (b) The Psychic Factors of Civilization.


text: The American Journal of Sociology/Volume 01/Number 2/Seminar Notes


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Author:Chester David Hartranft

Works about Hartranft

 * "Chester D. Hartranft President; Career of the Head of the Hartford Theological Seminary and School of Sociology." in The New York Times January 5, 1896

title: Author:Chester David Hartranft


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 Bedfordshire, a large and populous parish, which he began dividing into districts. But as the task proved too great for his strength, he removed in October 1860 to the newly formed parish of St. Paul, South Hampstead. This he held till 1873, when he resigned. He resided in the district till his death on 29 Nov. 1882.

Peile was a sound scholar, and his knowledge of the classics, especially Thucydides and the Greek Testament, was remarkable. His principal works were: 1. Editions of the ‘Agamemnon of Æschylus’ 1839, ‘Choephori,’ 1840. 2. ‘Annotations on the Apostolical Epistles,’ 4 vols. 1851–2. 3. ‘Sermons, doctrinal and didactic,’ 1868. 4. ‘Three Sermons on the Holy Communion,’ 1871.

In 1831 he married Mary, daughter of James Braithwaite, esq. (who died in 1806), and by her, who survived him till 1890, he left a numerous family. A portrait of Dr. Peile is in the hall of Repton school.

[Article in the Guardian, 6 Dec. 1882; information from the Rev. T. W. Peile, rector of Ashmore, Dorset; personal acquaintance.]

PEIRCE. [See also and .]

PEIRCE, JAMES (1674?–1726), dissenting divine, son of John Peirce, was born at Wapping about 1674. His parents, who were in easy circumstances, were members of the congregational church at Stepney, under Matthew Mead [q. v.] Left an orphan about 1680, he was placed, with a brother and sister, in charge of Mead as guardian. Mead took him into his own house, and educated him with his son, Richard Mead, M.D. [q. v.], under John Nesbitt [q. v.] and Thomas Singleton, also at Utrecht (from 1689) and Leyden (from 1692). At Utrecht he formed a lasting friendship with his fellow-student, Adrian Reland, the orientalist; and he made valuable friendships among his class-mates at Leyden, then the resort of the aristocracy of English dissent. He travelled a little in Flanders and Germany before returning home in 1695.

After spending some time in Oxford, for the purpose of study at the Bodleian Library, he returned to London, was admitted (11 Feb. 1697) a member of Mead's church, and preached the evening lecture at Miles Lane congregational church, of which Matthew Clarke the younger [q. v.] was minister. He, however, ‘did not interest himself in the disputes then on foot between presbyterians and independents,’ and was ordained in 1699 by four London presbyterians, headed by Matthew Sylvester, the literary executor of Baxter. His own ideal of church government was based on Baxter's rectoral theory; he had no theoretical objection to a modified episcopacy. Early in 1701 Peirce's presbyterian friends urged his acceptance of a charge in Green Street, Cambridge, where there was a mixed congregation of independents and presbyterians. Agreeing to take it for three years, he was duly ‘dismissed’ to it by the Stepney church. He held it for six years (probably 1701–6), and received ‘a handsome allowance.’ He evidently still ranked as an independent, for he was made a trustee of the Hog Hill chapel on 23 Jan. 1702. At Cambridge he was intimate with William Whiston, who describes him as ‘the most learned of all the dissenting teachers I have known.’ He read much, especially in the topics of nonconformist controversy. John Fox (1693–1763) [q. v.] says that when he began to write in vindication of dissent, he usually sat in his study from nine at night till four or five next morning.

His removal to the presbyterian congregation at Toomer's Court, Newbury, Berkshire, was probably coincident with his first controversial publication (end of 1706) in defence of nonconformist positions against Edward Wells, D.D. [q. v.] The appearance of his ‘Vindiciæ’ (1710) in reply to the ‘Defensio’ (1707) of William Nicholls, D.D. [q. v.] brought him into prominence as a polemic; ‘he was looked upon as the first man of the party’. Latin was employed on both sides, to gain the ear of the foreign protestants. According to Fox the latinity of the ‘Vindiciæ’ was ‘corrected very accurately by the then master of Westminster School,’ Thomas Knipe [q. v.] The work, which is dedicated to the clergy of the church of Scotland, contains a very able digest of nonconformist history and nonconformist argument, marked by acuteness and dignity. The theology of the ‘second part’ is strongly calvinistic. Peirce was sensible of the distinction which his book brought him, and this gained him enemies.

Early in 1713 he received a unanimous call to succeed George Trosse [q. v.] as one of the ministers of James's Meeting, Exeter, having to preach also in rotation at the Little Meeting. Against his removal his Newbury flock appealed to the ‘Exeter Assembly,’ a coalition of presbyterian and independent divines of Devonshire and Cornwall, on the model of the London Union of 1690 [see, (1630–1705)]. Peirce was not sure of his health at Newbury; an opinion was asked of Dr. Mead, who said that if he ‘did study less and divert himself more, and had more help, he might have his health tolerably well.’ The Newbury people were


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 willing to provide an assistant, and Peirce was willing to stay on these terms. The ‘Exeter Assembly’ sought advice from the Salters' Hall lecturers, who were equally divided; their report was presented to the assembly on 6 May 1713 by Edmund Calamy, D.D. [q. v.], who describes the excessive eagerness of the Exeter dissenters to secure Peirce; Calamy thought the circumstance ominous of future trouble. The assembly decided for the removal, and Peirce settled in Exeter before the end of 1713; his congregation numbered eleven hundred hearers.

He had subscribed (1697) the doctrinal part of the Anglican articles as the condition of toleration. But the theology in which he had been bred was really Sabellian, as he afterwards discovered when introduced to the ‘odd notions’ of orthodoxy by reading St. Basil. In fact, the theological tone of the less cultivated dissenters was, in his judgment, largely patripassian. On hearing of Whiston's change of views, he wrote to him from Newbury (10 July 1708) expressing amazement that he should ‘fall in with the unitarians,’ and referring to the ‘very melancholy instance’ of Thomas Emlyn [q. v.]. Whiston's books, and the more important ‘Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity’ (1712) by Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) [q. v.], he did not read till 1713, moved by Whiston's importunity. He became convinced that error on this topic was not fundamental, and that it was ‘the safest way’ to adhere closely to the letter of scripture. Hence, before going to Exeter, he disused the ordinary doxology. Whiston claims him as a unitarian; he held (with Clarke) a subordination of the Son, but he constantly emphasises his rejection of ‘the distinctive opinion of Arius,’ and defends himself (as Clarke had done) by citing the authority of Bull and Pearson. The difficulties of theology impressed him greatly, and made him an advocate of latitude; but his own views were critical to a fault rather than positively heterodox.

Peirce's first controversy at Exeter was on the question of ordination. On 5 May 1714 he preached to the ‘united ministers’ a sermon with the title ‘An Useful Ministry a Valid One.’ It was at once supposed that he abandoned the defence of dissenting ordination. Preaching again at the ordination (19 Oct. 1715) of John Lavington [q. v.], as one of the ministers of Bow Meeting, Exeter, he distinguished between a valid and a regular ministry, asserting the irregularity of existing episcopal ordination, and maintaining, against the independents, that not the people, but the ministers, and they only, may judge the qualifications of candidates and ordain. This he defined, improperly, as ‘presbyterian ordination,’ for he excluded, with Baxter, the function of the lay eldership. His high views of the ministerial office were consonant with his character, and were acceptable to a section of his brethren; his positions were criticised by Samuel Chandler [q. v.], as well as by Anglican writers.

The controversy which wrecked Peirce's reputation, and severed the doctrinal accord of the old dissent, began at the end of 1716, when Lavington impugned the orthodoxy of Hubert Stogdon [q. v.] In April or May 1717 Henry Atkins of Puddington, Devonshire, preaching for Peirce during his absence in London, sounded an alarm of heresy. Peirce was asked (30 May) to preach on the atonement, and did so (2 June) in a somewhat guarded strain, and on principles which differed from those of Trosse, his predecessor. On 15 July he joined Joseph Hallett (1656–1722) [q. v.] and John Withers in giving a testimonial to Stogdon. At the ‘assembly’ in September he piloted Fox through his examination for license, refusing to require ‘explications’ of scriptural terms. An expression in his Christmas sermon renewed the doubts of his soundness. In fact the danger of Arianism was a burning topic at the time. Sir Robert Price [q. v.] ‘had spent most of his charge at the Exeter assizes against those errors.’

At Exeter a self-elected body of thirteen laymen managed the finance of the three congregations. Early in 1718 a deputation from this body waited on Peirce and his colleagues, asking them to ‘assert the eternity of the Son of God.’ Peirce complied; for a time complaint ceased, but it was revived during his absence in London (July and August). In September the ‘Exeter assembly’ resolved, after much debate, that each minister should make a personal declaration on the subject of the Trinity. All complied except Samuel Carkeet [q. v.] and two others, and all the declarations were accepted except that of John Parr of Okehampton, who merely quoted Eph. iv. 4–6. Lavington then drew up, as ‘the general sense’ of the assembly, a short formula, which was carried by a very large majority.

The body of thirteen, not satisfied with a ‘general sense,’ appealed to the Exeter ministers for individual assurances. Failing in this, they sought advice from five London ministers, including Calamy, who deprecated London interference, and suggested a consultation with neighbouring divines. Seven Devonshire ministers, headed by John Ball (1665?–1745) [q. v.], were called in (19 Jan.


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Diffraction of Light/2


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 The ideal surface of resolution may be there regarded as a flexible lamina; and we know that, if by forces locally applied every element of the lamina be made to move normally to itself exactly as the air at that place does, the external aerial motion is fully determined. By the principle of superposition the whole effect may be found by integration of the partial effects due to each element of the surface, the other elements remaining at rest.

We will now consider in detail the important case in which uniform plane waves are resolved at a surface coincident with a wave-front (OQ). We imagine a wave-front divided into elementary rings or zones—often named after Huygens, but better after Fresnel—by spheres described round P (the point at which the aggregate effect is to be estimated), the first sphere, touching the plane at O, with a radius equal to PO, and the succeeding spheres with radii increasing at each step by. There are thus marked out a series of circles, whose radii x are given by x2 + r 2 = (r + n)2, or x2 = nr nearly; so that the rings are at first of nearly equal area. Now the effect upon P of each element of the plane is proportional to its area; but it depends also upon the distance from P, and possibly upon the inclination of the secondary ray to the direction of vibration and to the wave-front.

The latter question can only be treated in connexion with the dynamical theory (see below, § 11); but under all ordinary circumstances the result is independent of the precise answer that may be given. All that it is necessary to assume is that the effects of the successive zones gradually diminish, whether from the increasing obliquity of the secondary ray or because (on account of the limitation of the region of integration) the zones become at last more and more incomplete. The component vibrations at P due to the successive zones are thus nearly equal in amplitude and opposite in phase (the phase of each corresponding to that of the infinitesimal circle midway between the boundaries), and the series which we have to sum is one in which the terms are alternately opposite in sign and, while at first nearly constant in numerical magnitude, gradually diminish to zero. In such a series each term may be regarded as very nearly indeed destroyed by the halves of its immediate neighbours, and thus the sum of the whole series is represented by half the first term, which stands over uncompensated. The question is thus reduced to that of finding the effect of the first zone, or central circle, of which the area is r.

We have seen that the problem before us is independent of the law of the secondary wave as regards obliquity; but the result of the integration necessarily involves the law of the intensity and phase of a secondary wave as a function of r, the distance from the origin. And we may in fact, as was done by A. Smith (Camb. Math. Journ., 1843, 3, p. 46), determine the law of the secondary wave, by comparing the result of the integration with that obtained by supposing the primary wave to pass on to P without resolution.

Now as to the phase of the secondary wave, it might appear natural to suppose that it starts from any point Q with the phase of the primary wave, so that on arrival at P, it is retarded by the amount corresponding to QP. But a little consideration will prove that in that case the series of secondary waves could not reconstitute the primary wave. For the aggregate effect of the secondary waves is the half of that of the first Fresnel zone, and it is the central element only of that zone for which the distance to be travelled is equal to r. Let us conceive the zone in question to be divided into infinitesimal rings of equal area. The effects due to each of these rings are equal in amplitude and of phase ranging uniformly over half a complete period. The phase of the resultant is midway between those of the extreme elements, that is to say, a quarter of a period behind that due to the element at the centre of the circle. It is accordingly necessary to suppose that the secondary waves start with a phase one-quarter of a period in advance of that of the primary wave at the surface of resolution.

Further, it is evident that account must be taken of the variation of phase in estimating the magnitude of the effect at P of the first zone. The middle element alone contributes without deduction; the effect of every other must be found by introduction of a resolving factor, equal to cos, if represent the difference of phase between this element and the resultant. Accordingly, the amplitude of the resultant will be less than if all its components had the same phase, in the ratio $\int^{+\frac{1}{2}\pi }_{-\frac{1}{2}\pi }\cos \theta d\theta: \pi,$ or 2:. Now 2 area / = 2r; so that, in order to reconcile the amplitude of the primary wave (taken as unity) with the half effect of the first zone, the amplitude, at distance r, of the secondary wave emitted from the element of area dS must be taken to be

By this expression, in conjunction with the quarter-period acceleration of phase, the law of the secondary wave is determined.

That the amplitude of the secondary wave should vary as r −1 was to be expected from considerations respecting energy; but the occurrence of the factor −1, and the acceleration of phase, have sometimes been regarded as mysterious. It may be well therefore to remember that precisely these laws apply to a secondary wave of sound, which can be investigated upon the strictest mechanical principles.

The recomposition of the secondary waves may also be treated analytically. If the primary wave at O be cos kat, the effect of the secondary wave proceeding from the element dS at Q is $ \frac{d\mathrm{S}}{\lambda \rho }\cos k(at - \rho + \frac{1}{4}\lambda ) = - \frac{d\mathrm{S}}{\lambda \rho }\sin k(at - \rho ).$|undefined If dS = 2xdx, we have for the whole effect $- \frac{2\pi }{\lambda }\int^{\infty }_{0}\frac{\sin k(at - \rho )x dx}{\rho },$ or, since xdx = d, k = 2/, $- k \int^{\infty }_{r} \sin k(at - \rho )d\rho = \bigg[ - \cos k(at - \rho ) \bigg]^{\infty }_{r}.$ In order to obtain the effect of the primary wave, as retarded by traversing the distance r, viz. cos k(at − r ), it is necessary to suppose that the integrated term vanishes at the upper limit. And it is important to notice that without some further understanding the integral is really ambiguous. According to the assumed law of the secondary wave, the result must actually depend upon the precise radius of the outer boundary of the region of integration, supposed to be exactly circular. This case is, however, at most very special and exceptional. We may usually suppose that a large number of the outer rings are incomplete, so that the integrated term at the upper limit may properly be taken to vanish. If a formal proof be desired, it may be obtained by introducing into the integral a factor such as e−h, in which h is ultimately made to diminish without limit.

When the primary wave is plane, the area of the first Fresnel zone is r, and, since the secondary waves vary as r −1, the intensity is independent of r, as of course it should be. If, however, the primary wave be spherical, and of radius a at the wave-front of resolution, then we know that at a distance r further on the amplitude of the primary wave will be diminished in the ratio a : (r + a). This may be regarded as a consequence of the altered area of the first Fresnel zone. For, if x be its radius, we have {(r + )2 − x2} + √ {a2 − x2}＝r + a, so that x2＝ar /(a + r ) nearly. Since the distance to be travelled by the secondary waves is still r, we see how the effect of the first zone, and therefore of the whole series is proportional to a/(a + r ). In like manner may be treated other cases, such as that of a primary wave-front of unequal principal curvatures.

The general explanation of the formation of shadows may also be conveniently based upon Fresnel’s zones. If the point under consideration be so far away from the geometrical shadow that a large number of the earlier zones are complete, then the illumination, determined sensibly by the first zone, is the same as if there were no obstruction at all. If, on the other hand, the point be well immersed in the geometrical shadow, the earlier zones are altogether missing, and, instead of a series of terms beginning with finite numerical magnitude and gradually diminishing to zero, we have now to deal with one of which the terms diminish to zero at both ends. The sum of such a series is very approximately zero, each term being neutralized by the halves of its immediate neighbours, which are of the opposite sign. The question of light or darkness then depends upon whether the series begins or ends abruptly. With few exceptions, abruptness can occur only in the presence of the first term, viz. when the secondary wave of least retardation is unobstructed, or when a ray passes through the point under consideration. According to the undulatory theory the light cannot be regarded strictly as travelling along a ray; but the existence of an unobstructed ray implies that the system of Fresnel’s zones can be commenced, and, if a large number of these zones are fully developed and do not terminate abruptly, the illumination is unaffected by the neighbourhood of obstacles. Intermediate cases in which a few zones only are formed belong especially to the province of diffraction.

An interesting exception to the general rule that full brightness requires the existence of the first zone occurs when the obstacle assumes the form of a small circular disk parallel to the plane of the incident waves. In the earlier half of the 18th century R. Delisle found that the centre of the circular shadow was occupied by a bright point of light, but the observation passed into oblivion until S. D. Poisson brought forward as an objection to Fresnel’s theory that it required at the centre of a circular shadow a point as bright as if no obstacle were intervening. If we conceive the primary wave to be broken up at the plane of the disk, a system of Fresnel’s zones can be constructed which begin from the circumference; and the first zone external to the disk plays the part ordinarily taken by the centre of the entire system. The whole effect is the

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text:
The New York Times/1896/01/05/Chester D. Hartranft President

Career of the Head of the Hartford Theological Seminary and School of Sociology.

HARTFORD, Conn., Jan. 4. President Chester D. Hartranft of the Hartford Theological Seminary, and founder of the Hartford School of Sociology, is a native of Pennsylvania, and a cousin of ex-Gov. John F. Hartranft of that State. He was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1861 and from the New-Brunswick Seminary in 1864. He was ordained as a clergyman in

The Rev. Dr. Hartranft, of the Hartford Theological Seminary.

the Dutch Reformed Church July 10 of that year. Prof. Hartranft has spent a number of years in German universities, and is one of the ablest Biblical scholars in the New-England theological schools. He was installed as a professor in the Hartford Theological Seminary in September, 1878, and became President ten years later, succeeding the Rev. Dr. William Thompson.

President Hartranft has received the degree of D. D. from Rutgers College. His work in this city has been of great importance, both from theological and sociological points of view. The Hartford School of Sociology was founded by him two years ago. During the first year the curriculum embraced lectureship in thirty different fields, and there are sixty lecturers, who have been assigned to work in this year's course. The list includes Prof. John Bascom of Williams College, Prof. William Z. Ripleyof Columbia College, Prof. Austin Abbott, Dean of the New-York University Law School; Prof. William Libbey, Jr., of Princeton, Prof. Roland P. Falkner of the University of Pennsylvania, Prof. Henry B. Gardner of Brown University, Prof. Lucy M. Salmon of Vassar, and Prof. W. J. Ashley of Harvard.

President Hartranft is the guiding spirit of the school, and his work, which has received attention from abroad not less than in progressive institutions in this country, is exciting wide interest. A social settlement has been established in this city in connection with the school. The President is deeply interested in the religious and social development of the masses. He is connected with the First Congregational Church in Hartford, of which the Rev. Dr. C. M. Lamson is the pastor, and is a regular attendant at its services. the Rev. Dr. Wickoff, pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church at Pine Plains, N. Y., is a classmate of Prof. Hartranft.


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Page:EB1911 - Volume 08.djvu/257

 half of that of the first existing zone, and this is sensibly the same as if there were no obstruction.

When light passes through a small circular or annular aperture, the illumination at any point along the axis depends upon the precise relation between the aperture and the distance from it at which the point is taken. If, as in the last paragraph, we imagine a system of zones to be drawn commencing from the inner circular boundary of the aperture, the question turns upon the manner in which the series terminates at the outer boundary. If the aperture be such as to fit exactly an integral number of zones, the aggregate effect may be regarded as the half of those due to the first and last zones. If the number of zones be even, the action of the first and last zones are antagonistic, and there is complete darkness at the point. If on the other hand the number of zones be odd, the effects conspire; and the illumination (proportional to the square of the amplitude) is four times as great as if there were no obstruction at all.

The process of augmenting the resultant illumination at a particular point by stopping some of the secondary rays may be carried much further (Soret, Pogg. Ann., 1875, 156, p. 99). By the aid of photography it is easy to prepare a plate, transparent where the zones of odd order fall, and opaque where those of even order fall. Such a plate has the power of a condensing lens, and gives an illumination out of all proportion to what could be obtained without it. An even greater effect (fourfold) can be attained by providing that the stoppage of the light from the alternate zones is replaced by a phase-reversal without loss of amplitude. R. W. Wood (Phil. Mag., 1898, 45, p. 513) has succeeded in constructing zone plates upon this principle.

In such experiments the narrowness of the zones renders necessary a pretty close approximation to the geometrical conditions. Thus in the case of the circular disk, equidistant (r ) from the source of light and from the screen upon which the shadow is observed, the width of the first exterior zone is given by dx＝(2r )/4(2x),

2x being the diameter of the disk. If 2r＝1000 cm., 2x＝1 cm., ＝6 × 10−5 cm., then dx＝·0015 cm. Hence, in order that this zone may be perfectly formed, there should be no error in the circumference of the order of ·001 cm. (It is easy to see that the radius of the bright spot is of the same order of magnitude.) The experiment succeeds in a dark room of the length above mentioned, with a threepenny bit (supported by three threads) as obstacle, the origin of light being a small needle hole in a plate of tin, through which the sun’s rays shine horizontally after reflection from an external mirror. In the absence of a heliostat it is more convenient to obtain a point of light with the aid of a lens of short focus.

The amplitude of the light at any point in the axis, when plane waves are incident perpendicularly upon an annular aperture, is, as above, cos k(at − r 1) − cos k(at − r 2)＝2 sin kat sin k(r1 − r 2), r 2, r 1 being the distances of the outer and inner boundaries from the point in question. It is scarcely necessary to remark that in all such cases the calculation applies in the first instance to homogeneous light, and that, in accordance with Fourier’s theorem, each homogeneous component of a mixture may be treated separately. When the original light is white, the presence of some components and the absence of others will usually give rise to coloured effects, variable with the precise circumstances of the case.

Although the matter can be fully treated only upon the basis of a dynamical theory, it is proper to point out at once that there is an element of assumption in the application of Huygens’s principle to the calculation of the effects produced by opaque screens of limited extent. Properly applied, the principle could not fail; but, as may readily be proved in the case of sonorous waves, it is not in strictness sufficient to assume the expression for a secondary wave suitable when the primary wave is undisturbed, with mere limitation of the integration to the transparent parts of the screen. But, except perhaps in the case of very fine gratings, it is probable that the error thus caused is insignificant; for the incorrect estimation of the secondary waves will be limited to distances of a few wave-lengths only from the boundary of opaque and transparent parts.

  3. Fraunhofer’s Diffraction Phenomena.—A very general problem in diffraction is the investigation of the distribution of light over a screen upon which impinge divergent or convergent spherical waves after passage through various diffracting apertures. When the waves are convergent and the recipient screen is placed so as to contain the centre of convergency—the image of the original radiant point, the calculation assumes a less complicated form. This class of phenomena was investigated by J. von Fraunhofer (upon principles laid down by Fresnel), and are sometimes called after his name. We may conveniently commence with them on account of their simplicity and great importance in respect to the theory of optical instruments.

If ƒ be the radius of the spherical wave at the place of resolution, where the vibration is represented by cos kat, then at any point M (fig. 2) in the recipient screen the vibration due to an element dS of the wave-front is (§ 2) $- \frac{d\mathrm{S}}{\lambda \rho }\sin k(at - \rho ),$|undefined being the distance between M and the element dS.

Taking co-ordinates in the plane of the screen with the centre of the wave as origin, let us represent M by and P (where dS is situated) by x, y, z. Then 2＝(x − )2 + (y − )2 + z2, ƒ2＝x2 + y2 + z2; so that 2＝ƒ2 − 2x − 2y + 2 + 2. In the applications with which we are concerned, are very small quantities; and we may take $\rho = f\left\{ 1 - \frac{x\xi + y\eta }{f^2}\right\}.$ At the same time dS may be identified with dxdy, and in the denominator may be treated as constant and equal to ƒ. Thus the expression for the vibration at M becomes

and for the intensity, represented by the square of the amplitude,

This expression for the intensity becomes rigorously applicable when ƒ is indefinitely great, so that ordinary optical aberration disappears. The incident waves are thus plane, and are limited to a plane aperture coincident with a wave-front. The integrals are then properly functions of the direction in which the light is to be estimated.

In experiment under ordinary circumstances it makes no difference whether the collecting lens is in front of or behind the diffracting aperture. It is usually most convenient to employ a telescope focused upon the radiant point, and to place the diffracting apertures immediately in front of the object-glass. What is seen through the eye-piece in any case is the same as would be depicted upon a screen in the focal plane.

Before proceeding to special cases it may be well to call attention to some general properties of the solution expressed by (2) (see Bridge, Phil. Mag., 1858).

If when the aperture is given, the wave-length (proportional to k−1) varies, the composition of the integrals is unaltered, provided and  are taken universely proportional to. A diminution of thus leads to a simple proportional shrinkage of the diffraction pattern, attended by an augmentation of brilliancy in proportion to −2.

If the wave-length remains unchanged, similar effects are produced by an increase in the scale of the aperture. The linear dimension of the diffraction pattern is inversely as that of the aperture, and the brightness at corresponding points is as the square of the area of aperture.

If the aperture and wave-length increase in the same proportion, the size and shape of the diffraction pattern undergo no change.

We will now apply the integrals (2) to the case of a rectangular aperture of width a parallel to x and of width b parallel to y. The limits of integration for x may thus be taken to be −a and +a, and for y to be −b, +b. We readily find (with substitution for k of 2)

as representing the distribution of light in the image of a mathematical point when the aperture is rectangular, as is often the case in spectroscopes.

The second and third factors of (3) being each of the form sin2u/u2, we have to examine the character of this function. It vanishes when u＝m, m being any whole number other than zero. When u＝0, it takes the value unity. The maxima occur when

and then

To calculate the roots of (5) we may assume u＝(m + ) − y＝U − y,

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text: Talk:The New York Times/1896/01/05/Chester D. Hartranft President


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Robinson, Edward Van Dyke

ROBINSON, Edward Van Dyke, American economist: b. Bloomington, Ill., 20 Dec. 1867; d. 10 Dec. 1915. He was graduated at the University of Michigan in 1891 and took his Ph.D. at Leipzig in 1895. He was engaged in teaching and lecturing on commercial geography, physiography, economics and political science in 1895-1907; was appointed professor of economics at the University of Minnesota in 1907, and in 1915 accepted that chair at Columbia University. He was a contributor to scientific periodicals and was author of ‘Nature of the Federal State’ (1893); ‘War and Economics’ (1900); ‘Text Book on Commercial Geography’ (1909); ‘Cost of Government, National, State and Local’ (1912); ‘Economic Conditions and the Development of Agriculture in Minnesota’ (1915), etc.


text:
User talk:74.138.217.121

Welcome

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title: User talk:74.138.217.121


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User talk:90.200.241.71

Welcome

Hello, and welcome to Wikisource! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

 * Help pages
 * Style Guide
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You are welcome to continue editing articles without logging in, but you may wish to  [ create an account] . Doing so is free, requires no personal information, and provides several benefits. For one thing, if you continue to edit without a username, your IP address is used to publicly identify you.

In any case, I hope you enjoy donating your time to grow the Wikisource library that is free for everyone to use! In discussions, please sign your comments using four tildes ( ~ ); this will automatically produce your IP address (or username if you're logged in) and the date. If you need help, ask me on my talk page, or ask your question here (click  [ edit] ) and place  before your question. Again, welcome! — billinghurst  sDrewth  13:57, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

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Rh

Actus secundus: Scæna Prima.

bolder


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Robinson, Edwin Arlington

ROBINSON, Edwin Arlington, American poet: b. Head Tide, Me., 22 Dec. 1869. He was educated at Gardiner, Me., and at Harvard University in 1891-93. His poetic work has been very well received by discriminating critics who have pronounced it thoroughly American

in tone and free of the meaningless twaddle all too common among our poets. His works are ‘The Torrent and the Night Before’ (1896); ‘The Children of the Night’ (1897); ‘Captain Craig’ (1902); ‘The Town Down the River’ (1910); ‘Van Zorn,’ a play (1914); ‘The Porcupine,’ a play (1915); ‘The Man Against the Sky,’ poems (1916); ‘Merlin,’ a poem (1917). See ../Merlin (poem);.


text: The American Journal of Sociology/Volume 01/Number 2/Sociological Miscellany


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Some rows of ancient greek to review, thanks to any user willing to fix! --Alex brollo (talk) 14:08, 30 January 2011 (UTC)


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28 Scæna septima.

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Scena Secunda.

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Actus Quartus. Scæna Prima.

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The names of all the Actors.

FINIS.

THE


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The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Rolland, Romaine

ROLLAND, rōl'lạṅ, Romaine, French author: b. Clamecy, 29 Jan. 1866. He studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, and in 1889-91 was a member of the Ecole Française

de Rome. He was for a time professor of the history of art at the Ecole Normale Superieure, and was later called to the chair of history and music at the Sorbonne. He was awarded one-fourth of the Nobel Prise for literature in 1915 for the completion of his ‘Jean Christophe,’ a species of rambling novel, written in 10 volumes and carrying much philosophic discussion of life, the sub-titles being ‘L'Aube’; ‘Le Matin ’; ‘L'Adolescent’; ‘La Revolte’; ‘La Toire sur la place’; ‘Antoinette’; ‘Dans la Maison’; ‘Les amies’; ‘Le Buisson Ardente’; and ‘Le Nouvelle Journee.’ It was translated into English by Cannan, G. (1911-13). His other works include ‘Les origines du théatre lyrique moderne’; ‘Les Loups,’ drama; ‘Le Temps,’ drama; ‘Vie de Michel Auge’; ‘Vie de Beethoven’; ‘Haendel’; ‘Vie de Tolstoi’, etc. Consult Stephens, W., ‘French Novelists of To-day, Second Series’ (1915).


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Playboy of the Western World, The

PLAYBOY OF THE WESTERN WORLD, The, in three acts, by John Millington Synge, is a singularly arresting play by reason of its extraordinary combination of qualities that are ordinarily deemed contradictory. It is a comedy of Irish peasant life, extravagant, even boisterous at moments, yet based on the tragic theme of the murder of a father by his son; it is illuminated not only by the richest of humor but by poetic touches of poignant beauty, and all told in language so vivid and picturesque, so full of the zest and color of life, as to make ordinary English seem pale and tame, — “that vivid speech which has been shaped through some generations of English speaking by those who still think in Gælic” (W. B. Yeats).

Christy Mahon comes to a lonely public house foot-weary, a stranger and a fugitive. The kindly curiosity of the tavern keeper, his daughter, Pegeen, and others, wrings from him the confession that he has killed his overbearing father in a fit of anger with a blow from a spade. This evidence of courage and overmastering passion in a seemingly gentle lad so impresses his hearers that they talk themselves, and him, into the conviction that he is a hero. Inspired by his new-found confidence he makes love to Pegeen in one of the most delightful love scenes ever written, and Pegeen is quite prepared to throw over her prosaic husband-elect for Christy. When Christy's old father turns up, at this juncture, not much the worse for his broken pate, it is quite natural that there should be a sudden revulsion of feeling against Christy. He has lost his hold on their imaginations, and poor Pegeen, her romance shattered, leads the pack against him. The ultra-Nationalists professed to regard the play as an attack on Irish morals and character and organized hostile demonstrations when ‘The Playboy’ was first produced at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin in 1907, and later in London, and in the United States. In reality Synge has done the highest service to the Irish cause by creating dramas of artistic distinction and originality from purely Irish material. In his preface to the play Synge says, “I have used only one or two words that I have not heard among the country people of Ireland or spoken in my nursery.” Another quotation from Synge furnishes a most significant commentary on ‘The Playboy.’ “On the stage one must have reality and one must have joy;. . . the rich joy found only in what is superb and wild in reality. . . . In a good play every speech should be as fully flavored as nut or apple, and such speeches cannot be written by any one who works among people who have shut their lips on poetry.” ‘The Playboy’ is based on a story Synge heard in the Aran Islands; its language, its humor, its poetry, its flavor, its “reality,” its “joy,” are all drawn from Irish country folk and transmuted by the hand of the artist into an enduring work of art that is very human and very beautiful. For special references see article, .