text:
Library of the World's Best Literature/The Candidate Visits His Voters

Don Simon started upon his electioneering tour. In the first village of his district, at the poor inn, a group of six agents were waiting for him; their horses, caparisoned with ornamental trappings, after the fashion of the country, tied to the posts or the projecting window gratings. They received him hat in hand.

[All then passed into the dining-room, where a dozen more persons met them, and a liberal dinner was served, for which the candidate duly paid. The several days' ride through the mountain district next began.]

The cavalcade was headed by one of the six caciques [village magnates, previously mentioned]. He was a lean, dark man, with a large nose, a penetrating eye, his face almost beardless, although he was by no means young; he spoke little, but that to the point; and as to confidence in men, he would have been distrustful even of his own shadow. He knew the voters of the district, every man of them, with all his virtues, vices, minor faults, and necessities; and in consequence, he knew how to win or to compel them.

"The 'Squire'" (said he),—"for thus they call him,—whom we must see, is a rough sort of customer, but much bent on having everybody flatter and bow down to him. When we leave him, don't forget to give him a cigar; not one of the kind you furnished us at dinner, you know, but one of those you have in your cigar-case for your own particular use."

Don Simon did his best not to notice this polite little slur, and put himself at the orders of his adviser....

The party found the local great man presiding over the turning-up of a new field he had just bought on that out-of-the-way upland. He was still youthful; and he had a despicable physiognomy. He manifested no great curiosity on the approach of the little troop. He confined himself to returning coldly the very affable salute which Don Celso [the leader] directed to him, as representative of all the rest, and especially of Don Simon, whom he proceeded to introduce to the impassive elector as follows:—

"This gentleman is our candidate, Don Simon de las Penascales by name, an illustrious man, I assure you, with thirty thousand dollars income, and great talents. He comes to-day expressly to thank you for your kind co-operation in his coming election, reserving a more fitting payment till some later opportunity shall offer."

"Servant, sir," responded the "Squire," laconically, staring at his distinguished guest.

"Delighted, my dear sir. I hope I find you well," began Don Simon, uncovering his head with a grandly sweeping bow, and tendering his right hand to him of the new-plowed land.

"Me? ye-up, I'm well," replied the "Squire," without sign of a movement to take the proffered hand.

"Do you smoke?" the candidate now inquired, feeling for his cigar-case.

"Once in a while, if the tobacco is good for anything."

"Then do me the favor to accept this. It is of the choice brand of the Vuelta de Abajo.

"You sure of that?" grunted the other, taking it and biting off the end.

"And how are our affairs going around here?" inquired the candidate, trying to strike out some spark of interest from that piece of flint, that unmitigated boor.

"We'll"—puff—"see when—the time comes," he returned, using up about half a box of matches in lighting his cigar in the open air.

"No need of asking him that, Don Simon," remarked Don Celso. "When you come to see what the Squire has done, I warrant you'll be more than satisfied."

"In that case," said Don Simon, taking Don Celso's hint, "and since we still have far to go to-day, and since I have had the great honor of making your acquaintance, it only remains for me to put myself at your disposal for anything that you may demand of me, either now or henceforward and forever."

"The same thing say I," muttered the Squire, scarce touching the hand offered him anew, and turning back to the men working for him.

When they had ridden on a bit, Don Simon could not help saying to Don Celso in a crestfallen way:—

"If that fellow is one of those who support me, what can I expect of the doubtful ones? And, for heaven's sake, what sort of manners will those have who are against me?"

[Later on, they meet an inn-keeper who charges for the very rent of the ground their horses stand on while they are talking to him. This incident is developed in a long and amusing account. He promises to vote and use his influence for Don Simon, if the latter will see that a certain road is built, joining his mountain inn to the main road; but only on condition—as other candidates have promised the same thing before—that Don Simon shall put up the money for the road, about $3,000, in advance, out of his own pocket. Don Simon is disappointed, betrayed, put upon, in numberless ways, and would have lost his election except that—having started out as a Liberal candidate—he shrewdly turns Conservative, and secures his seat by the favor of the ministry.]

Los hombres de pro


text:
Summa Theologiae/First Part/Question 27

Question. 27 - THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:

Art. 1 - Whether there is procession in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.

 Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

 Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above (Question [2], Article [3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42).

 I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself do anything" (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (Question [14], Article [2]), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.

 Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed.

Art. 2 - Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.

Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (Article [1]). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.

Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting (Question [3], Article [4]), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee."

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined principle (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above (Question [14], Article [4]). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands (Question [14], Article [4]). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Question [4], Article [2]).

Art. 3 - Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (Question [11], Article [4]), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Objection 3:Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect (Question [19], Article [1]). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of love.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God (Question [3], Articles [3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.

Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.

Art. 4 - Whether the procession of love in God is generation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born.

Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.

Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."

I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply to Objection 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born.

Reply to Objection 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love.

Reply to Objection 3: We can name God only from creatures (Question [13], Article [1]). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.

Art. 5 - Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.

Objection 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions.

On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed---the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.

I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.

Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will.

Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: As above explained (Question [14], Article [5]; Question [19], Article [5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Summa Theologiae/First Part/Question 27


text: Talk:Library of the World's Best Literature/The Candidate Visits His Voters


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, James (1772-1833)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, James Robert


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, John (1774-1821)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, John (1778-1830)


text:
Library of the World's Best Literature/The Portrait of Don Gonzalo Gonzalez of Gonzalez-Town

Look at him; here he is:—A man of middling size, carefully clad in a suit of fine black, his knobby flat feet shod in refulgent patent leather; clean-shaven; his shirt-collar terminating, above his low-cut vest and glossy embroidered shirt-front, in a butterfly-shaped bow, made with the open-worked ends of his cravat. Over all this wandered in serpentine convolutions a heavy gold chain. His hair was very much frizzed, and upon two lateral rows of ringlets, rather than upon his head, lightly rested a silk hat. One of his thick, hairy hands grasped a gold-headed cane, while in the other, lying along his thigh, he held ceremoniously a pair of kid gloves.... The speech of such a man may be divined: it was over-soft, mawkish, sickening. He doted on alliterations, like huevo hilado, and he used to say frido, cercanidas, and cacado …

What name should he adopt on going back to his native village? His father, who used to be dubbed "Tony Breechclout" for short, was called "Antonio Gonzalez"; he himself "Nicholas." But if he were going to style himself simply "Nicholas Gonzalez," he might as well make it "Johnny Drumsticks" and have done with it.... What if, for example, without ceasing to sign "Gonzalez," he should add to it something like "de la Gonzalera"? Some people shorten their names, do they not? what harm, then, if some others should lengthen theirs out a little? A trifle more or less of a thing—what difference does it make?

No sooner planned than decided. He ordered a thousand lithographed visiting-cards of various tinted pasteboards; and upon these was placed, in fantastic characters and in vivid colors, the name "Gonzalo Gonzalez de la Gonzalera."

Don Gonzalo González de la Gonzalera


text: Talk:Library of the World's Best Literature/The Portrait of Don Gonzalo Gonzalez of Gonzalez-Town


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, Thomas


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballantyne, William


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/563

 A PROGRAMME OF MUNICIPAL REFORM.

the Civil War the deterioration of city government in America has kept pace with several marked phenomena of the nation which may be taken as explanation of this deterioration. The first of these phenomena is the sudden vast growth of city populations. The second is the greatly increased diversity of American city populations, due partly to the rapid drain of rural communities and partly to the great increase in immigration from widening foreign origins. The third phenomenon is the almost wild scramble for wealth-producing occupations, which set in before the war was quite over, and quickly grew into a great national movement as the new and varied business opportunities opened wide. It was like the fever created by the discovery of gold in California, but on a national scale; so that men turned from an interest in public affairs to new and more intense interest in private affairs.

It is a mistake, however, to consider bad city government the only bad government which grew up after the war. As could not fail to be the case, when public interest became centered in private fortunes, all government deteriorated and the average man in all spheres of public life gradually lowered, and the standards of public life of course went down. National government fell off—state government fell off—county government fell off. City government fell off more than any other, however; but that was because there were more reasons against it—including the reason that there is less personal distinction to be gained in city politics than in national or in state politics, so that city politics were more easily abandoned and neglected. Many writers and speakers treat bad city government not only as a wholly isolated, abnormal development but as the most hopeless of all our political or social conditions. It is more true to say, however, that, while it is only one feature of a


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, Edward George


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/564

 552 political deterioration, it is, in fact, perhaps the least hopeless of our political problems; for the reason that its direful state has come to be almost fully and quite generally realized, and is giving rise to the most earnest, eager, and patriotic political movements of the time. In these movements, so widespread and so interesting, we are all having a word to say; and it seems to me worth while to sum up, in what I have called a programme, a statement of what it seems to me is the work to be done; and which will possibly furnish to some readers a clearer conception of the obstacles that municipal reform has to encounter.

These obstacles divide themselves into two classes: first, defects in charters and other legal equipment—in laws or constitutions; and, secondly,deficiencies in volunteer support by the people—support which cannot be supplied by laws or constitutions.

The first class of obstacles I shall treat as summarily as possible, because I am more anxious to accent the other; and because it seems to me that so much is habitually said about reforms in the mechanism and laws of city government that far too much trust is placed in them.

I shall, then, in the form of a summary, and with little or no discussion or comment, enumerate those features of a city charter which, being most favorable to the introduction of business methods, most discouraging to those who would use the government for their own ends and most encouraging to the other sort of citizens, are necessary in a programme of reform.

First: Executive Independence—the independence of the mayor, and, under the mayor, the independence of each head of a department.

To insure this independence the executive work of the government must be wholly in the hands of the mayor; and all appointments to office, in the executive departments, must be made by the mayor without confirmation by the council.

Second: Executive Responsibility.

Just as the mayoralty is filled by one man, not only for the


text:
Summa Theologiae/First Part/Question 28

Question. 28 - THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are real relations in God?

(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it?

(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other?

(4) The number of these relations.

Art. 1 - Whether there are real relations in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God.

Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.

On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.

I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.

Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.

Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (Q[14], AA[3],4; Q[19], A[8]). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.

Art. 2 - Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.

Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.

On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."

I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.

To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.

Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus (Q[4], A[2]).

Art. 3 - Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.

I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (A[1]), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another.

Art. 4 - Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.

Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.

Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q[15], A[1]); and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.

Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named.

Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained (Q[27], A[5]), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word.

Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He understands all things by one act alone.

Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God; but that God knows these many relations.

Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations (Q[42], A[3], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of something absolute, if there were such between them.

title: Summa Theologiae/First Part/Question 28


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, George


text:
Library of the World's Best Literature/Tuerto's Family Life

La leva

"The money?—the money?—It's in my pocket."

"You thieving jade, if you've been drinking again, I swear I'll let daylight through you," roared the enraged Tuerto, on observing the continually increasing confusion of his wife. "Let me see that money, and be quick about it, I say."

The woman pulled forth tremblingly a few small coins from her pocket, and held them out to her husband, without fully opening her hand.

"Its only eight coppers you've got there, and I gave you twenty-one. Where's the rest?"

"I must have lost—have lost them. I had twenty-one this morning."

"Don't tell me such a thing as that: the two reals I gave you were in silver."

"Yes, but I changed them at the market."

"What has your mother done this morning?" quickly demands Tuerto, clutching his eldest child by the arm.

The child trembles in affright, looks alternately at father and mother, and remains silent.

"Speak out, I say."

"Mother will go and beat me if I do," replied the poor little brat, sniveling.

"And if you don't answer me, I'll give you a crack that will spoil your face."

The boy, who knows by hard experience that his father never deals in vain threats, now, despite the signals his mother makes him to keep still, shuts his eyes, and speaking as rapidly as if he feared the words would burn his mouth, says:—

"Mother brought home a pint of brandy this morning, and has the bottle hidden in the straw mattress."

Tuerto no sooner hears these words than he fells his culprit spouse to the floor with a resounding whack, rushes to the bed, rummages amid the contents of the poor mattress, pulls out from it a small bottle which contains the remainder of the contraband liquor, and returning with it towards his wife, hurls it at her head at the moment when she is just getting up from the floor. It knocks her down anew, and the children are sprinkled with the flying spirits. The wretched woman, sorely hurt, laments and groans; the frightened children weep; and the irate mariner sallies forth to the balcony, cursing his wife and the day that he was ever born.

Uncle Tremontorio, who arrived from the sea at the same time with his mates Bolina [Billy Bowline] and Tuerto, had been in his balcony knitting away at his fishing-nets (his customary occupation when at home) from the beginning of the dispute between his neighbors. From time to time he would take a bite out of a hunk of bread, and another of dried codfish, the provision that constituted his usual dinner. Though he is perfectly well posted about what has just taken place [across the narrow street], it is not his way to mix himself up in what does not concern him. But the furious husband, who needs an outlet for venomous rage that still half chokes him, calls up his neighbor, and the pair shout from one balcony to the other the following dialogue:—

"Uncle Tremontorio, I can't stand this devil of a woman any longer. One of these days you'll hear of some desperate deed on my part; I suppose that's the way it will all end."

"I have told you that it was your own fault, from the beginning. She tacked your way a little, and you let go your whole cable and thought your voyage was over."

"What could I do? I thought then she was one of heaven's own saints."

"What could you do? Do? why, what I've always told you: haul her taut, and make fast with a double turn. Rough wind astern? all right, ahead you go."

"But there's not a bone in her body I haven't already tinkered at with a cudgel, as you might mend the ribs of a boat."

"You waited till the wood was rotten, my friend."

"As God is my witness she's the worst villain unhung. What is going to become of those poor brats of mine when I am taken away from them? for the devil will never take that woman: he has no place to put her. Last week I handed her twenty-four reals to dress the children with. Have you laid eyes on that money? Well, neither have I. The drunkard spent them for drink. I gave her a walloping that left her for dead, and yet what does she do? Three days after that she sells a sheet from our bed for a quart of rum. Yesterday I gave her twenty-one cents for meat, and she drank them also. And with all this the young ones are naked, I haven't a shirt to my back, and I never dare think of treating myself to an honest glass of wine of a fete-day."

"Why don't you get an exorcism said over her? Maybe she's bewitched by evil spirits, and that's the cause of it."

"I've spent a small fortune in those very tomfooleries, Tremontorio. I took her to more than three leagues from here, to get a parson that they said had the gift of such things, to chuck the gospels at her. Well, he did; then he gave me a little card he had said a prayer over, and a sprig of rue, sewed it all up in a bag, hung it round her neck, charged me nearly four dollars for it, and that was all the good it did—not the first blessed thing. The very next day she had a jag on worse than ever, and wanted to paint the town red. I've given her brandy with gunpower in it,—a thing, they say, that creates a distaste for liquor,—but that beast, did it affect her that way? Not much! she seemed to like the drink after that better than ever. I've laid out a treasure in candles alone, setting them up before the Holy Martyrs, to see if they'd rid her of the vice; and it was just the same as if I had not spent a farthing. I swear to you, I don't know what to do, Uncle Tremontorio, unless it is to kill her: there are no bounds to this vice of hers. Just tell me what you say of this: When I gave her the brandy with powder in it, she was taken with such a colic I thought she'd burst. I had heard that flannels soaked in spirits, applied good and hot, was a cure for that sort of pains in the stomach; so I heated up about half a pint of liquor in a saucepan. When it was blazing hot, I took it over to the bedside, where the thief of the world was writhing about in contortions. I had to leave the saucepan with her a minute while I went to the chest to get out some rags; I turned around, and, man, what do you think I saw? she was just swallowing down the last drops of the spirits from the saucepan, almost ablaze as it was. Man, man, was there ever a worse curse of God?"

"Well, friend—in regard to that—ahem! what can I say to you? When a woman chooses to take the crooked path, like yours, give her the stick, and plenty of it. If with that she doesn't mend her ways and float off in good style, then either sink her to the bottom, once for all, or string yourself up to a yard-arm."

"I've told you already—what's the matter with you?—that I've covered every inch of her body with the welts of a stick, and I've decorated her face all over with bruises till there's hardlv room for another."

"Then go hang yourself, and leave me in peace to finish these meshes. And you may as well know that the reason I never married is to keep out of the devil's own scrape that you are in."


text: Talk:Library of the World's Best Literature/Tuerto's Family Life


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/311

 MR. KIDD'S "SOCIAL EVOLUTION." central problem of social evolution as it presents itself to Mr. Kidd may be thus briefly summarized. Modern physiological science establishes as the first condition of all progress the maintenance of that struggle among the individuals of a race which continually eliminates the less efficient and enables the more efficient to survive and multiply. Any successful attempt to suspend the struggle and to secure the survival of the unfit members will not merely check further progress but will inevitably cause a deterioration of the race. Among the lower animals, nature, acting blindly and instinctively, insures the maintenance of the struggle. But when man emerges it is different. "Now at last, science stands confronted with a creature differing in this important respect from all that have gone before him. He is endowed with reason."

Now, when reason begins to look into this "struggle," it can find no justification for the pain and misery and brutality of such a mode of progress. "To the great mass of the people, the so-called lower classes, in the advanced civilizations of today, the conditions under which they live and work are still without any rational sanction." (67) So long as the masses are kept down under strong class government, their intelligence uneducated, they remain impotent. But modern conditions of progress demand that a larger and larger proportion of the race shall be brought into the keenest rivalry of life—this keen rivalry demands equality of opportunity for all individuals. Hence the modern democratic movement making for equalization of opportunity intensifies the "struggle," the rivalry of life, and improves the pace of progress. But this equalization of opportunity, by educating the intelligence of the masses and by placing an increased portion of political and social power in their hands, raises up an enemy of social progress.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, John (d.1586)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, John Archibald


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/525

  when sociology outgrows the stage of vealiness, so that the question "What is society?" can be relegated from the beginning of a text-book to the end, we shall still feel the need of expressing in a few words the characteristics that mark off a true society from all manner of aggregates and combinations of men. This compels us to look for these marks, and having found them to arrange them in order of importance, the essential features first, the non-essential last. In seeking that which is most distinctive in society, it is not necessary to pause at the threshold, finger on lip, and contemplate the outlines of a colossal Something, Leviathan, Superorganism, Social Organism, Social Body or other amorphous monster, composed of millions of human beings, and having distinct parts, motions, activities and aims. Society there certainly is, but it is better to begin the study of the human complex by surveying its work, rather than by describing a half-mythical entity.

We observe two broadly contrasted types of human life—the isolated, admitting only of the family, and the associated. Between these types of life, and between the men and women who lead them, are certain great contrasts that must be due to the presence or absence of association. By the difference between the lone man and the social man, between the associated state and the life of single units or pairs, we can gauge the sociologic problem. The changes that attend association afford the best


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, Samuel James


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/769

 SOCIAL CONTROL II. LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION.

LAW. Legal sanctions are aimed at the acts of men rather than their neglects, because it is more important to prevent interference than to enforce coöperation. Our laws thus appear to restrain from acts rather than to incite to them. Still, when people trust their lives to a combination of men, say a train crew, in the confidence that each will do his duty, failure to coöperate becomes disastrous, and is punished as criminal negligence. In the army, where failure to do appointed tasks may bring ruin, physical punishments are used to stimulate as well as to restrain. The punishments of the civil and the military courts comprise most of the control directly exercised over the individual by the state.

While conceivably the state might secure obedience to its laws by punishment, by reward, or by both, punishment is the chief instrumentality used. Nor is this strange when we remember how easy is the infliction of great pains and how difficult the affording of great satisfactions. However preferable a scale of prizes to a scale of dooms, the latter will be used so long as it is so cheap to give pain and so expensive to confer pleasure. In dealing with a disturber, society seeks to guard itself not only against future acts of this particular offender, but against would-be offenders as well.

The first object might be gained by killing, disabling, confining or reforming him. The first three make further wrong-doing impossible, but as they succeed by power over the body rather than by power over the mind, they are not cases of control at all. Reformation, on the other hand, does aim at psychic control rather than physical constraint, but it employs religion,


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballard, Volant Vashon


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballenden, William


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballingall, George


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balliol


text:
Library of the World's Best Literature/Cleto's Proposal to Sotileza

[Sotileza is a poor waif, adopted by a worthy family, and has turned out to be a charming and admirable character. The name is derived from a very fine, strong cord, used in the apparatus of the fishermen. Cleto belongs to a family of sardine-sellers, the terror and scandal of the street; but he himself aspires to higher things.]

Sotileza continued her sewing on the garment of Pachuca, by the light of the candle which she had just set in its socket on the wall. Cleto, now in her presence, actually felt the tremendous difficulty which he had trusted to conjure away by his boldness and resolution. The gift of speech—the confounded gift of gab, that was always denied him—was lacking to him at this moment more than ever.

"I was passing by," he began to stammer, trembling with his diffidence, "I—happened to be passing along this way, and so—er—as I was passing this way, I says to myself, says I, 'I'll just stop into the shop a minute.' So that's the way I happened to come—My! but that's a good skirt you're sewing there, Sotileza. Yours, is it?"

Sotileza told him it was not; and out of politeness, asked him to sit down.

Cleto took a seat a good distance away from her; then, looking and looking at her a long while, as if he were trying to intoxicate himself through the medium of his eyesight to a sufficient extent to break the trammels that held his tongue, he at length succeeded in saying:—

"Sotileza, once you sewed on a button for me. Do you recollect about it?"

"I'm afraid too many other things have happened since," she returned smilingly, without looking up from her work.

"Well, for me, it's just the same thing as if it took place yesterday."

"Well, what of it, supposing it was so?"

"Why—er—why, you see, after that button—It was like a jewel to me; and I've got it yet, right here on the waistband of these breeches. Look at it; do you see it? After that button, I kept coming back and coming back to this house, for there's no staying in mine; and by gracious! well, you know that, Sotileza, that isn't what you might call a habitation at all, nor are those female kin of mine women like other women, nor is that man there a man. Well, then, I had never known anything better than that kind of folks, and for want of knowing better, I gave you a slap in the face one day; you remember about that. Holy jinks! if you only knew how sorry I've been for that slap, ever since."

Sotileza began to be overcome with astonishment at the discourse she was listening to; for never had anything even remotely like to this proceeded from Cleto's lips. She fixed her eyes with interest upon his; but the effect of this was, that she cut short not only the poor fellow's words but the very breath of his body.

"But why are you saying these things to me now?" she demanded.

"Because I've got to, Sotileza," Cleto plucked up heart to respond; "that's the reason:—and because nobody else would be willing to come to you and say them for me. I hope it's no offense. Now, see here, Sotileza, just see what's happening to me. I did not know till lately, myself, what was the matter with me; and I let them go on,—that kind of griping feeling in my insides and that dizzy feeling in my head, that got hold of me when I came in here. And you kept on growing up and getting prettier every day: heavens, what new rail you kept whipping on nearly every time I saw you! No offense in looking on at it, was there? at least I hope not; and no more was there, either, in warming up my heart with a glimpse of this shop now and then. Over there in our tenement there was nothing of the kind, by a long chalk: filth and brutishness, the good name of every person they spoke of pitched head first out of the balcony, not a scrap of decency about anything they did. By thunder! it's enough to give a fellow a bad temper, even if he was born with one like sugar. That's the way I came to give you that slap, Sotileza; if it wasn't, I would tell you so, honestly. Why, if any one was to say to me, right here and how, 'Cleto, you go and jump off the ramparts for Sotileza,' I would do it. Sotileza, if it could be of the slightest service to you, even if I got nothing out of it but my broken neck. I never had any of this kind of feeling before. Here you have a full account of it without asking for it—and without offense, I hope. You see how it was; it wasn't my fault. I liked those feelings too, in spite of the pain,—I liked them immensely; they made my disposition of the purest honey, as if I had never had any other. I was filled up, filled full with them, till it seemed as if my body wouldn't hold any more. Then afterwards a tumble here and a stumble there—a heavy surf, as it were, rolling round inside of me; little sleep of nights, and a lump in my throat all the time. Look you, Sotileza, I used to think there were no more troubles than those I had at home; but now I can see that I slept better, twice over, than since all this trouble began about you. I—I—don't offend anybody, do I, in talking this way, Sotileza? And then—er, while all that was going on that I was telling you just now, I got to getting fonder and fonder of you every day, and I got to having more and more respect for you; and I tried harder every day to see if I couldn't read your wishes in your eyes, so that I could go and serve you somehow without your having to tell me.

"And so all that was going on month in and month out, and year after year; I was slowly foundering, and there was no way of getting afloat again. For you see, Sotileza, it's one thing for a man to be chock full of feelings like this, and another thing for him to speak up and tell his girl about them, if he's tongue-tied like me and can't put two words together. It knocks me all out when I think what you are, and then what I am,—the very mud of the gutter, in comparison. Well, I just couldn't hold it all in any longer, and I went to some folks that understand how to talk about this kind of thing, to get them to come and see you for me. But what do you think? they wouldn't do it. There's a nice charitable lot of parties, isn't it, to lend a hand when a man was in such sore straits as I was? You are attending, aren't you, Sotileza, to all this I'm telling you? Well, the upshot of it was, that since nobody would come and speak to you for me, I had to come and speak to you myself, and—and—now I'm doing it."

It was no news to Sotileza that Cleto was in love with her; for she had read it clearly in all his looks and actions for some time past. She was not surprised, therefore, at his avowal; but she was surprised, and not a little, that he should have mustered the courage to make it. Looking at him with her serene gaze, she said to him:—

"Of course there's no offense in what you say to me, Cleto; but in the name of all the saints, what possesses you to make you say it to me just now?"

"My stars! what always possesses people to tell such things? So they can be known."

"Well, I know them, Cleto, I know them: now are you satisfied?"

"Hum—er—why, no, not altogether. That is not enough, Sotileza."

"And what do you wish more?"

"What do I wish more? Gracious goodness! I wish to be a man like another; I want to live a different kind of life from what I've been living: you yourself have been the light that has shown me what another kind of life could be. I want to live the way life goes on in this little shop of yours; I am dying to work for you, and to be neat and clean and decent-spoken, like you. I would kiss the ground you walk on, and try and get you the very mermaids from the sea, whom no one has ever set eyes on, if you wanted them. Is it too little that I offer?"

He was veritably transfigured at this moment; and Sotileza could not but marvel at the change.

"I have never seen you so lively and so talkative as to-day," was her answer.

"The mounting wave has burst," he rejoined, getting bolder still; "and I myself believe I am not what I was before. I've set myself down sometimes for a regular idiot; but by the living gracious! I swear I am so no longer, with this that is going on inside of me, and that makes me talk in spite of myself. If you can work such a miracle as this without even knowing it, what miracles could you not work with me when you really put your mind on it? Now just look at me, Sotileza: I've got no vices; I never was afraid of work; I haven't a grudge against a person in the world; I am accustomed to do with little; and picking out the very best I've had in my life, it has never been anything but pain and trouble. Seeing here, about you, something so entirely different, you know what a value I set on it—and whose fault it is that I do. There's a man needed in this house. Are you taking in what I am telling you, Sotileza?"

Sotileza was giving heed to it only too well. For that very reason she replied with a certain curtness:—

"Yes, I am; but what of it?"

"Again? Confound it! you make me that answer again," cried Cleto angrily. "Or is this your way of saying no, without saying it directly?"

"Come, Cleto," said Sotileza coldly, "I am not under obligations to answer all the questions you choose to put me on such particulars, or any others. I live quietly here in my house without speaking ill of anybody. I have none but the kindest wishes towards you, and I know your value full well; nevertheless I have my own way of thinking and feeling, and I wish to make no change in my life at present."

"What have you said, Sotileza?" exclaimed Cleto in dismay. "Oh, this is boring a big auger-hole into the hull. I am wrecked, I am lost."

"Don't put it in that way; it is not so bad as that. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that if, instead of the no, Cleto, which you dread to hear, I should say the yes you ask of me, how would you be the gainer by that? You have to steal into this house, carefully hiding your movements from your family over in yours, even if you come here but for an instant, just to pass the time of day. If such is the case now, what would it be if—if the plan you are so anxious for came to pass?"

"You've hit it, Sotileza: that's just what the other folks told me. But is there any sense and right in such a state of things? I didn't choose the family that I belong to."

"Who are the other folks that told you the same thing that I have?" now inquired Sotileza quickly, ignoring the woe-begone lamentations of the poor young fellow.

"Father Polinar, in the first place" [the parish schoolmaster].

"Father Polinar? And who next?"

"Don Andres" [a young man of the upper class, in love with Sotileza himself].

"And you went to—to that person, with this pretty tale? What did he say to you, pray?"

"He abused me like a pickpocket. He left me for dead, as you might say, when he got through with me."

"Well, you see then. When was this?"

"Yesterday afternoon."

"You deserved all you got. Why do you go to any one with that nonsense?"

"Great heavens! don't I keep telling you? My liking for you choked me; I lacked courage to tell you, and I looked around for some one else to do it for me. I shall not look any further, now that I have got the trick of speaking up for myself. But this is not to the point, Sotileza."

"What is the point?"

"Why, that because my folks across the way are a bad lot, I should have to get the mitten from the only girl I ever loved."

"I haven't given you the mitten, have I?"

"Of course it amounts to that, if you shut your door against me on account of my family over there."

"I did not even say I was going to do that; I merely put you the case as a supposition: now do you understand?"

"I'm afraid I do,—born to bad luck that I am. But tell me clearly, for that is what I came to-day to find out. Don't be afraid to speak up and say the worst."

"I beg of you not to make me speak."

"No, it will be better to speak than keep silent. See here, Sotileza,—for this is the kind of a person I am: come now, do you think me of too little account? Then tell me how you would like me to be, and I shall be only too glad to become that, cost what it may. Is there some one else who has got the inside track with you? is that the reason? I tell you I would be a dozen times as good a man as he, no matter who he is, if you would take an interest in me."

"There's a nice piece of conceit, I must say."

"My very life is bound up in this matter, Sotileza: would I dare to talk so, otherwise? Oh, I beseech you—The whole thing is to have a little kindness for me in your heart, and all the rest will follow as if upon wheels. You will only have to say to me, 'You've got to do this or do that, or go here or go there,' and I will jump and do it on the instant. I shall not disturb you the least bit; a mere corner of the house will do for me, and the farthest corner at that, even if it be worse than the one I have now. I will eat the scraps you leave over, of what I gain for you with my hardest daily toil, so that you may live at leisure like a lady. I can live on just nothing at all, Sotileza; for as sure as God is in heaven, what makes me fatter than anything is to have a little order, a grain of human kindness, a scrap or two of jolly good-nature, in the house. By the powers, how I should enjoy that kind of thing! So now you see what I beg of you, what I beseech of you. And you won't be offended, will you? And you will say yes, Sotileza? I know you will; for one cannot be allowed to beg in this way for what is impossible."

The desperate energy of the poor youth only caused Sotileza to smile. He persisted, but in vain, in trying to draw out a definite answer from her. His obstinacy in the end annoyed her; and she showed it. Then Cleto, scowling with his disappointment and wretchedness, said:—

"Will you even admit to me that what I have said to you does not merely go in at one ear and out at the other?"

"And you, animal, what difference does it make to you?" snapped out Sotileza, in a nettled, offensive manner that froze the very blood in his veins. "Who and what are you, anyway, to bring me to book in this way?"

"Nothing, nothing; the very dust under your feet," he answered with abject humility, conscious too late of the rudeness and lack of tact he had been guilty of. "The trouble I am in blinded me, and I spoke without thinking. Don't be put out with me: it was only that; I swear to you by all—"

"Leave me in peace."

"Yes, but promise not to lay up a dislike against me," pleaded Cleto.

"Get out of here, get away from here, for I can hardly endure the sight of you."

"Oh, what an unlucky wretch am I," he groaned. "And will you never pardon me?"

"No, unless you leave here instantly."

"Don't be too hard with me: I'm going; I'm gone."

And with this, Cleto, heavy and woe-begone, sallied forth from the little shop, whence he had more than half believed in advance he should sally forth triumphant and joyful.

[Cleto makes various long voyages, returns a much more accomplished and presentable person, without losing his kindly and upright nature: and in course of time, Sotileza, having the good sense to feel that this is a much better match for her than one with Andres in the higher station, marries him.]

Sotileza


text: Talk:Library of the World's Best Literature/Cleto's Proposal to Sotileza


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ballow, Henry


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmer, George


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmer, Robert


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmerino


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmford, James


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmford, Samuel


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balmyle, Nicholas de


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Balnaves, Henry


text:
Page:Miscellaneous Papers on Mechanical Subjects.djvu/84

74 the breech to the muzzle may receive a rotatory combined with a forward motion.

The system of rifling by grooves is the one that has been generally employed, and many experiments with different numbers of grooves, some of varying depths being deeper at the breech, and with different turns, some increasing towards the muzzle, have been tried and thought advantageous at various times.

The Enfield rifle has three grooves, with a pitch of 6 feet 6 inches, so that the bullet receives half a turn round its axis while moving through the barrel, the length of which is 3 feet 3 inches. The bullet, as is well known, is cylindro-conoidal, it is wrapped in paper and made of such a diameter as to pass easily down the barrel. It requires very pure lead to allow of its being properly expanded or "upset," by the explosion, and is driven partly against the original portions of the bore, called the lands, and partly in the form of raised ribs is forced into the grooves, whose spiral shape gives the required rotation. See figure A.

In the system of rifling which I have adopted the interior of the barrel is hexagonal, and, instead of consisting partly of non-effective lands and partly of grooves, consists of effective rifling surfaces. The angular corners of the hexagon are always rounded, as shewn


text: Page:Miscellaneous Papers on Mechanical Subjects.djvu/86


text:
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Rh in section by figure C. Either cylindrical of hexagonal bullets may be used. See figures B, b. Supposing a bullet of a cylindrical shape to be fired, when it begins to expand it is driven into the recesses of the hexagon, as shown in figure C. It thus adapts itself to the curves of the spiral, and the inclined sides of the hexagon offering no direct resistance, expansion is easily effected.

It is most important to observe, that with all expanding bullets proper powder must be employed. In many cases this kind of bullet has failed, owing to the use of a slowly-igniting powder, which is desirable for a hard metal projectile, as it causes less strain upon the piece but is unsuitable with a soft metal expanding projectile, for which a quickly-igniting powder is absolutely requisite to insure a complete expansion, which will fill the bore. Unless this is done the gases rush past the bullet, between it and the barrel, the latter becomes foul, the bullet is distorted, and the shooting must be bad. With regard to fouling, it may be prevented by using a proper quantity of lubricating substance, of the right kind and adapted to the temperature of the weather, and a proper charge of powder of the right quality.

If the projectile used be made of the same hexagonal shape externally as the bore of the


text:
Talk:Declaration by the United Kingdom on 31 December 1982 on the definition of the term “nationals”

http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/1607/response/4888/attach/3/Treaty%20Declaration.pdf – Kaihsu (talk) 07:50, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/a9-0901.pdf http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1983:023:0001:0001:EN:PDF – Kaihsu (talk) 09:08, 9 August 2012 (UTC)


text:
Declaration by the United Kingdom on 31 December 1982 on the definition of the term “nationals”

{{header | title = Note from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Government of the Italian Republic concerning a Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland replacing the Declaration on the Definition of the Term “Nationals” made at the time of signature of the Treaty of Accession of 22 January 1972 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Communities | author = | override_author=Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | section = | previous = | next = | year = 1982 | notes =A Command Paper in the Treaty Series in 1983 (reference TS No 67 1983 Cmnd. 9062)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Buchanan, George (1506-1582)


text:
Page:The Story of the Treasure Seekers.djvu/21

 THE COUNCIL OF WAYS AND MEANS

is the story of the different ways we looked for treasure, and I think when you have read it you will see that we were not lazy about the looking.

There are some things I must tell before I begin to tell about the treasure-seeking, because I have read books myself, and I know how beastly it is when a story begins, "'Alas!' said Hildegarde with a deep sigh, 'we must look our last on this ancestral home'"—and then some one else says something—and you don't know for pages and pages where the home is, or who Hildegarde is, or anything about it. Our ancestral home is in the Lewisham Road. It is semi-detached


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4 and has a garden, not a large one. We are the Bastables. There are six of us besides Father. Our Mother is dead, and if you think we don't care because I don't tell you much about her you only show that you do not understand people at all. Dora is the eldest. Then Oswald—and then Dicky. Oswald won the Latin prize at his preparatory school—and Dicky is good at sums. Alice and Noël are twins: they are ten, and Horace Octavius is my youngest brother. It is one of us that tells this story—but I shall not tell you which: only at the very end perhaps I will. While the story is going on you may be trying to guess, only I bet you don't.

It was Oswald who first thought of looking for treasure. Oswald often thinks of very interesting things. And directly he thought of it he did not keep it to himself, as some boys would have done, but he told the others, and said—

"I'll tell you what, we must go and seek for treasure: it is always what you do to restore the fallen fortunes of your House."

Dora said it was all very well. She often says that. She was trying to mend a large hole in one of Noël's stockings. He tore it on a nail when we were playing shipwrecked


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Rh mariners on top of the chicken-house the day H. O. fell off and cut his chin: he has the scar still. Dora is the only one of us who ever tries to mend anything. Alice tries to make things sometimes. Once she knitted a red scarf for Noël because his chest is delicate, but it was much wider at one end than the other, and he wouldn't wear it. So we used it as a pennon, and it did very well, because most of our things are black or grey since Mother died; and scarlet was a nice change. Father does not like you to ask for new things. That was one way we had of knowing that the fortunes of the ancient House of Bastable were really fallen. Another way was that there was no more pocket-money—except a penny now and then to the little ones, and people did not come to dinner any more, like they used to, with pretty dresses, driving up in cabs—and the carpets got holes in them—and when the legs came off things they were not sent to be mended, and we gave up having the gardener except for the front garden, and not that very often. And the silver in the big oak plate-chest that is lined with green baize all went away to the shop to have the dents and scratches taken out of it, and it never came back. We think Father


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6 hadn't enough money to pay the silver man for taking out the dents and scratches. The new spoons and forks were yellowy-white, and not so heavy as the old ones, and they never shone after the first day or two.

Father was very ill after Mother died; and while he was ill his business-partner went to Spain—and there was never much money afterwards. I don't know why. Then the servants left and there was only one, a General. A great deal of your comfort and happiness depends on having a good General. The last but one was nice: she used to make jolly good currant puddings for us, and let us have the dish on the floor and pretend it was a wild boar we were killing with our forks. But the General we have now nearly always makes sago puddings, and they are the watery kind, and you cannot pretend anything with them, not even islands, like you do with porridge.

Then we left off going to school, and Father said we should go to a good school as soon as he could manage it. He said a holiday would do us all good. We thought he was right, but we wished he had told us he couldn't afford it. For of course we knew.

Then a great many people used to come to the door with envelopes with no stamps on


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Rh them, and sometimes they got very angry, and said they were calling for the last time before putting it in other hands. I asked Eliza what that meant, and she kindly explained to me, and I was so sorry for Father.

And once a long, blue paper came; a policeman brought it, and we were so frightened. But Father said it was all right, only when he went up to kiss the girls after they were in bed they said he had been crying, though I'm sure that's not true. Because only cowards and snivellers cry, and my Father is the bravest man in the world.

So you see it was time we looked for treasure; and Oswald said so, and Dora said it was all very well. But the others agreed with Oswald. So we held a council. Dora was in the chair—the big dining-room chair, that we let the fireworks off from, the Fifth of November when we had the measles and couldn't do it in the garden. The hole has never been mended, so now we have that chair in the nursery, and I think it was cheap at the blowing-up we boys got when the hole was burnt.

"We must do something," said Alice, "because the exchequer is empty." She rattled the money-box as she spoke, and it


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8 really did rattle because we always keep the bad sixpence in it for luck.

"Yes—but what shall we do?" said Dicky. "It's so jolly easy to say let's do something." Dicky always wants everything settled exactly. Father calls him the Definite Article.

"Let's read all the books again. We shall get lots of ideas out of them." It was Noël who suggested this, but we made him shut up, because we knew well enough he only wanted to get back to his old books. Noël is a poet. He sold some of his poetry once—and it was printed, but that does not come in this part of the story.

Then Dicky said, "Look here. We'll be quite quiet for ten minutes by the clock—and each think of some way to find treasure. And when we've thought we'll try all the ways one after the other, beginning with the eldest."

"I shan't be able to think in ten minutes, make it half an hour," said H. O. His real name is Horace Octavius, but we call him H. O. because of the advertisement, and it's not so very long ago he was afraid to pass the hoarding where it says "Eat H. O." in big letters. He says it was when he was a little boy, but I remember last Christmas but one, he woke in the middle of the night crying and


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Rh howling, and they said it was the pudding. But he told me afterwards he had been dreaming that they really had come to eat H. O., and it couldn't have been the pudding, when you come to think of it, because it was so very plain.

Well, we made it half an hour—and we all sat quiet, and thought and thought. And I made up my mind before two minutes were over, and I saw the others had, all but Dora, who is always an awful time over everything. I got pins and needles in my leg from sitting still so long, and when it was seven minutes H. O. cried out—

"Oh, it must be more than half an hour!"

H. O. is eight years old, but he cannot tell the clock yet. Oswald could tell the clock when he was six.

We all stretched ourselves and began to speak at once, but Dora put up her hands to her ears and said—

"One at a time, please. We aren't playing Babel." (It is a very good game. Did you ever play it?)

So Dora made us all sit in a row on the floor, in ages, and then she pointed at us with the finger that had the brass thimble on. Her silver one got lost when the last General but


text:
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10 two went away. We think she must have forgotten it was Dora's and put it in her box by mistake. She was a very forgetful girl. She used to forget what she had spent money on, so that the change was never quite right.

Oswald spoke first. "I think we might stop people on Blackheath—with crape masks and horse-pistols—and say 'Your money or your life! Resistance is useless, we are armed to the teeth'—like Dick Turpin and Claude Duval. It wouldn't matter about not having horses, because coaches have gone out too.'

Dora screwed up her nose the way she always does when she is going to talk like the good elder sister in books, and said, "That would be very wrong: it's like pickpocketing or taking pennies out of Father's great-coat when it's hanging in the hall."

I must say I don't think she need have said that, especially before the little ones—for it was when I was only four.

But Oswald was not going to let her see he cared, so he said—

"Oh, very well. I can think of lots of other ways. We could rescue an old gentleman from deadly Highwaymen."

"There aren't any," said Dora.


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Rh "Oh, well, it's all the same—from deadly peril, then. There's plenty of that. Then he would turn out to be the Prince of Wales, and he would say, "My noble, my cherished preserver! Here is a million pounds a year. Rise up, Sir Oswald Bastable."

But the others did not seem to think so, and it was Alice's turn to say.

She said, "I think we might try the divining-rod. I'm sure I could do it. I've often read about it. You hold a stick in your hands, and when you come to where there is gold underneath the stick kicks about. So you know. And you dig."

"Oh," said Dora suddenly, "I have an idea. But I'll say last. I hope the divining-rod isn't wrong. I believe it's wrong in the Bible."

"So is eating pork and ducks," said Dicky. "You can't go by that."

"Anyhow, we'll try the other ways first," said Dora. "Now, H. O."

"Let's be Bandits," said H. O. "I dare say it's wrong but it would be fun pretending."

"I'm sure it's wrong," said Dora.

And Dicky said she thought everything wrong. She said she didn't, and Dicky was


text:
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12 very disagreeable. So Oswald had to make peace, and he said—

"Dora needn't play if she doesn't want to. Nobody asked her. And, Dicky, don't be an idiot: do dry up and let's hear what Noël's idea is."

Dora and Dicky did not look pleased, but I kicked Noël under the table to make him hurry up, and then he said he didn't think he wanted to play any more. That's the worst of it. The others are so jolly ready to quarrel. I told Noël to be a man and not a snivelling pig, and at last he said he had not made up his mind whether he would print his poetry in a book and sell it, or find a princess and marry her.

"Whichever it is," he added, "none of you shall want for anything, though Oswald did kick me, and say I was a snivelling pig."

"I didn't," said Oswald, "I told you not to be." And Alice explained to him that that was quite the opposite of what he thought. So he agreed to drop it.

Then Dicky spoke.

"You must all of you have noticed the advertisements in the papers, telling you that ladies and gentlemen can easily earn two pounds a week in their spare time, and to send


text:
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Rh two shillings for sample and instructions, carefully packed free from observation. Now that we don't go to school all our time is spare time. So I should think we could easily earn twenty pounds a week each. That would do us very well. We'll try some of the other things first, and directly we have any money we'll send for the sample and instructions. And I have another idea, but I must think about it before I say."

We all said, "Out with it—what's the other idea?"

But Dicky said, "No." That is Dicky all over. He never will show you anything he's making till it's quite finished, and the same with his inmost thoughts. But he is pleased if you seem to want to know, so Oswald said—

"Keep your silly old secret, then. Now, Dora, drive ahead. We've all said except you."

Then Dora jumped up and dropped the stocking and the thimble (it rolled away, and we did not find it for days), and said—

"Let's try my way now. Besides, I'm the eldest, so it's only fair. Let's dig for treasure. Not any tiresome divining-rod—but just plain digging. People who dig for treasure always


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14 find it. And then we shall be rich and we needn't try your ways at all. Some of them are rather difficult: and I'm certain some of them are wrong—and we must always remember that wrong things——"

But we told her to shut up and come on, and she did.

I couldn't help wondering as we went down to the garden, why Father had never thought of digging there for treasure instead of going to his beastly office every day.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Baliol, Edward de


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Baliol, Henry de


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Baliol, John de (d.1269)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Baliol, John de (1249-1315)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ball, Alexander John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ball, Andrew


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Ball, Frances