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Masters v. Barreda

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Upon the trial in the circuit court, the counsel for the plaintiffs (the Barredas) and defendants offered several prayers to the court as instructions to the jury, which the court declined to grant, and instructed the jury as follows:--

'1. Under the contract made by the letters of the 9th, 10th, and 11th of March, the amount for the cargo of The Lucy Elizabeth, and for which notes had been given, must be taken into the calculation, and charged against the defendants, in determining whether the balance against them amounted to $40,000.

'2. If, in this mode of computation, the balance against the defendants for guano previously sold and delivered amounted to $40,000 at the time when the further delivery of the cargoes of The Beatrice and The Ailsa was refused by the plaintiffs, the refusal was justifiable under the contract. They were not bound, in such a state of the account, to deliver these cargoes on credit. And, if they offered to deliver them on the payment of the money or satisfactory security, and the defendants refused to comply with these terms, the plaintiffs had a right to stop the delivery, notwithstanding the previous indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading to the defendants; and the refusal as stated in the testimony is no breach of contract on the part of the plaintiffs, and is not a bar to the recovery in this action of the amount due for the guano actually received by the defendants.'

To which instructions the counsel for the defendants excepted and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for $74,636.13, with interest from 12th of September, 1854, till paid.

The case was argued in this court by Mr. Johnson, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Bradley, with whom was Mr. F. L. Smith, for defendants.

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Masters v. Barreda


text: Talk:Masters v. Barreda

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Masters v. Barreda


text:
Masters v. Barreda/Opinion of the Court

This is an action of assumpsit brought in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, by the defendants in error, against Masters and Son, to recover from them a balance of $77,966.13, arising from the sales of guano, as stated in the bill of particulars, at pages three and four of the record.

The transactions out of which this dispute arose commenced on the 21st of January, 1854.

Barreda and Brother, residing in the city of Baltimore, were largely engaged in the importation of guano into the United States. Masters and Son were shipping and commission merchants in Alexandria, Virginia. Barreda and Brother had found it necessary in conducting their business to establish a limit of credit, both as to time and amount for purchases made by those who dealt with them. For any excess above that credit, purchasers had to pay cash, or give satisfactory paper, with their indorsement. The uncontradicted statement of the Barredas, in their letter to Masters and Son of the 15th May, 1854, corroborated by other circumstances, shows, that in the year 1852, this limit of credit was $25,000; and that their dealings with the Masters from that time, up to the sale of two cargoes of guano on the 21st January, 1854, and afterwards, until changed by the letters between them of the 9th and 10th March, 1854, had been regulated accordingly.

The sale of the two cargoes of guano, just mentioned, is as follows:--

'We have sold to Messrs. S. S. Masters and Son two cargoes of Peruvian guano-from vessels Lucy Elizabeth three hundred and thirty-five tons, and Giaour two hundred and seventy-one-both on their way from Peru. The said guano to be delivered in the port of Alexandria, in Virginia, when the vessels may arrive. Messrs. Masters and Son will act as our agents to receive the cargo and attend to the vessels, free of any charge, and to pay the value of the guano they may receive, at the price of $47.50 per ton in bulk, in notes payable in Baltimore, four months after date.

'F. BARREDA AND BROTHER.

'Baltimore, 21st January, 1854.'

Subsequently to that date, (the precise time when does not appear from the record,) Masters and Son purchased from the Barredas another cargo of the ship Princess Alice, and on the 18th February a fourth-that of the ship Ailsa.

The Lucy Elizabeth arrived with her cargo at Alexandria on the 1st February. The Giaour, with hers, about the 10th of the same month. Masters and Son attended to unlading the cargoes of both vessels, and sent to the Barredas a certificate of the cargo received from The Lucy Elizabeth, on the 2d March, namely, 485.21.4 tons of No. 1 guano, (in bulk at $47.50 per ton,) and 25.1.21 tons of No. 2 guano in bulk, for which they were charged $24,108.64; the quantity of No. 2 being charged to them at $42.50. They remitted to the Barredas on the 6th March, three notes of hand payable on the 2d and 5th of July; two of them for $8,000, and a third for $8,108.64; amounting to $24,108.64. Up to this time, the cargoe of The Giaour and The Princess Alice had not been ascertained, though both ships were then being unladed under the agency of Masters and Son, according to the arrangement in the memorandum of sale of the 21st January. And the correspondence shows that then there had not been any extension by the Barredas of the amount of credit, which had hitherto been allowed to Masters and Son upon their previous purchases. In this state of their dealing Masters and Son wrote to the Barredas on the 9th March: 'As our purchases are likely to be pretty large this year, and we noticed, some time ago, that one of our mutual friends (H. W. Fry) had arranged with you to keep an interest account with him, at six per cent., and we, for the same reason, prefer not to give notes. Further, as it is at times an advantage to have it in our power to make payments when the local exchange is most favorable, we will be obliged, if you will allow us also this accommodation, giving us an average credit of four months on these other cargoes.' To this letter Barreda and Brother reply on the 10th March. They state, we will 'keep an interest account with you, at six per cent., to facilitate your payments, provided that you will never exceed an average time of four months for the payment of each cargo; and that the balance on account against you will always be under forty thousand dollars, being the largest credit we use to allow.' The Masters' reply in a letter of the 11th March: 'Your acceptance of our proposition, made with the view of our not having to pay the whole value of our purchases in notes, &c., is also duly appreciated-and we note the conditions regarding the open account.'

At the date of this arrangement, there was charged to Masters and Son on the books of Barreda and Brother $24,108.64, the value of The Lucy Elizabeth's cargo, for which the Masters had given three notes, payable on the 2d and 5th July. Eighteen days after this arrangement the Masters send to the Barredas a certificate of Giaour's cargo, amounting to $17,094.34, and remit a payment on account of it of $6,000. The next item in the account is the value of the cargo of The Princess Alice, amounting to 38,029.92. But they had written to the Barredas on the 30th March, saying: 'The Ailsa cannot now reach this too soon for us, and we prefer not relinquishing our purchase of the said cargo; and, further, we believe we are selling by considerable the bulk of the guano applied for here, (we wish it was at a better profit,) and find the demand good. From present prospects we shall want a cargo each ensuing month. With your present unprecedentedly large importations, we suppose we can make our calculations to get this supply from you without having to look far ahead.' The Barredas answer: 'For the present, we have no cargo to offer you in the time you mention.' But on the 18th April they write: 'We will send you The Beatrice, reply immediately.' Masters and Son write on the same day: 'We will take The Beatrice;' and the Barredas rejoin: 'Ship Beatrice will be ordered to you, provided she arrives before the end of May next.' She arrived on the 24th April, and was ordered to Masters and Son. On the same day the Barredas ask in another letter: 'Will you take The Ailsa if she arrives here?' The Masters answers: 'Send The Ailsa if she comes as heretofore concluded upon.' She arrived early in May, and was ordered to Alexandria. Thus, in the whole, five cargoes were bought by the Masters from the Barredas. Each of them upon a credit of four months, notes having been given for that of The Lucy Elizabeth, with the understanding by both parties that notes were not to be given for the other purchases, the quantities of which had not been ascertained when the arrangement of the 10th March was made, and that they were to be paid for according to that arrangement. But the value of three of the cargoes had been ascertained, amounting, according to the returns of Masters and Son to Barreda and Brother, to $79,232.90. Payments had been made to the amount of $29,000. On the 12th May the Barredas wrote, calling the attention of Masters and Son to the state of the account, and requesting them to make a remittance of $10,232.90, 'as our limit in your account is $40,000, and it being then beyond the limit of the credit in the amount of the remittance asked for.' In a postscript to the letter, they say: 'Of course the value of The Beatrice and Ailsa cargoes must be paid cash. 2 P. C. off.' To this letter the Masters reply without making the remittance, and say: 'On the 9th March last, we had purchased from you four cargoes of guano, about 2,500 tons, or $120,000 worth, at four months-no other terms mentioned, (and to this moment we have never heard of any other,) three of the said cargoes were received and being received, and the fourth was daily expected. On the above-named date we asked you to allow us to keep an interest or open account with you, as we did not like to pay the whole value of our purchases in notes; to this you had no objection to the value of $40,000; the balance, as we had to infer, we must settle for agreeably to the original bill of purchase.' To this letter the Barredas reply: 'Yours of the 13th instant has been received. When we first went into business with you, we mentioned to you that our limit for credit was $25,000, we making to you the sales of three, or four, or twenty cargoes, our impression would have been, as was in that case, that we were to accept your paper for $25,000, and the balance that you might owe in satisfactory paper with your indorsement. Certainly, you could never have expected us to accept your notes for such an amount as our sales, though your responsibility may be superior to it. Afterwards, when you proposed to open with us an account, with interest, to facilitate your payments, we agreed to it; provided, that you would never exceed an average time of four months for the payment of each cargo, and that the balance on account against you will always be under $40,000-this being the largest credit we use to allow. You also understood in the same way our conditions, and took good care to make a remittance of $6,000, together with the return of The Giaour's cargo, to keep yourselves within the limits of your credit with us.' In a few days after writing their letter of the 17th, Barreda and Brother made an effort through the agency of Mr. Coyle, to have an amicable settlement with Masters and Son, offering to them either of the following propositions: That they would deliver to Mr. Coyle all the guano received from The Beatrice and Ailsa, and such a portion of the cargo of The Princess Alice as may be necessary to cover the $10,234.90 of excess of their account-or settle their values in cash, less two per cent.-or give satisfactory paper with their indorsement, payable in New York or Baltimore, at four months from the day when the offer was made, that being the 22d of May.

Neither of these propositions were accepted, and this suit was brought to recover the balance on account against Masters and Son, including the value of all the guano they had received from The Lucy Elizabeth, The Giaour, Princess Alice, Beatrice, and Ailsa, after having given to them credit for payments made. There is no dispute concerning either the debit or credit side of the account, but the controversey arose from the different view entertained by the parties as to their respective rights under the arrangement made for an interest account and the limit of credit mentioned in it, and whether, in the actual state of the account and under the course pursued by the Barredas, they were justified in arresting the delivery of the undischarged portions of the cargoes of The Beatrice and Ailsa, on account of the neglect and refusal of Masters and Son to make the required remittance to reduce the account against them to $40,000.

Our first objection to the construction of that arrangement as given by Masters and Son, is its variance from the terms used by them in their letter of the 9th of March, asking for the substitution of an interest account, instead of giving notes for their purchases, and from their language in their letter of the 11th March, in reply to the letter of the Barredas of the 10th, granting their request upon the conditions mentioned in it. They preface their application by saying, 'as our purchases will be very large this year, we prefer not to give notes, and will be obliged if you will allow us an interest account, giving us an average credit of four months on these other cargoes; and in their letter of the 11th say, your acceptance of our proposition, made with the view of our not having to pay the whole value of our purchases in notes, &c., is also duly appreciated, and we note the conditions regarding the open account.' If from the first an application may be made that it was their intention that the favor asked by them was to be applied to future purchases, and not to include purchases which they had made and which had not been paid for, there can be no doubt that their understanding of the arrangement was, that it was to include both, when in thanking the Barredas for their acceptance of their proposition, they state it was made with the view of their not having to pay the whole value of their purchases in notes. Besides having applied the arrangement to their purchases of the cargoes of The Giaour and Princess Alice, both of which had been bought, but neither of which had been ascertained when they asked for an interest account, and when it was granted, they could not afterwards give to the arrangement an exclusive application to cargoes to be thereafter bought; and when they say their request for an interest or open account had been made with the view of not having to pay the whole value of their purchases in notes, and afterwards say, 'we note the conditions regarding the open account,' one of them being that the balance on account against them shall never be larger than $40,000, it is conclusive that they then understood that amount to be the extent of their credit for all of their purchases, according to the account as it then stood on the books of the Barredas, or as it might be enlarged.

But it was urged that the limit of the amount of their credit was not to exceed at the time when the Barredas wrote their letter of the 12th May. It was said that the amount then still due for the cargo of The Lucy Elizabeth should not have been taken into the computation in ascertaining whether the balance due by the Masters amounted to more than $40,000, because that cargo had been sold under a different contract, in no way connected with the other purchases. Such, however, was not the fact, for The Giaour's cargo was bought under the same memorandum of sale; and the cargo of The Princess Alice had been bought before the cargo of The Giaour had been ascertained; and the Masters, after the arrangement had been made for an interest account, applied it to both, when their cargoes were ascertained, by not giving notes for either, and transmitting their certificates of the quantity of each, without any direction that a new and separate account of their cost should be made of them distinct from the debit against them in the books of the Barredas for the cargo of The Lucy Elizabeth. Had it been intended otherwise, they should have given such a direction; and not have said, we note the conditions regarding the open account, the limitation of the credit to be allowed being one of them, expressed in language so plain that it cannot be doubted that the Barredas never meant to give to Masters and Son a larger credit upon their purchases than $40,000; and that, when their account exceeded it, they were to have the right to call for payments to reduce it to that amount. When they called for the remittance of $10,232.90, the account against Masters and Son exceeded it by that amount. They failed to make the payment, and continuing to refuse to do so, we are of the opinion that the Barredas had a right to arrest the delivery of the cargoes of The Beatrice and Ailsa, notwithstanding the indorsement and delivery of the bills of lading to Masters and Son, and that their refusal to deliver the same, as stated in the testimony, is no breach of contract, and is not a bar to the recovery in this action of the amount due for the guano actually received by Masters and Son. Such was the instruction given by the court upon the trial of the case in the circuit court; and, having expressed our concurrence with that view, we will only add, that when there is a dealing between merchants for successive cargoes of merchandise upon time, for which notes of hand were to be given, payable from the date of the ascertainment of the quantity of each cargo, and an arrangement is afterwards made for the substitution of an interest account for the notes which were to be given; and, in that arrangement, the seller stipulates that the allowance of the interest account should depend upon the continuance of the original time of credit; and that the buyer's balance on account should always be under a certain sum; and the buyer exceeds that amount, and refuses to make a remittance or payment, upon the call of the seller, to bring the account within that sum, the seller may arrest the further delivery of any cargo or cargoes, though the same was in the course of being delivered to the buyer upon the seller's indorsement of the invoices and bills of lading of such cargoes.

In the absence of all understanding between the buyer and seller that any cargo which had been delivered and not actually paid for, though notes of hand had been given for the same, was not to be considered within the new arrangement, such cargo must be taken into the computation in ascertaining whether the balance due by the buyer exceeds the amount of credit allowed to him.

Judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

title: Masters v. Barreda/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Masters v. Barreda/Opinion of the Court


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Beauregard v. City of New Orleans

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States, for the eastern district of Louisiana.

It was a bill filed by Madame Emilie Poultney, in her lifetime, against the city of New Olreans, and about eight hundred and fifty other parties, some of whom included a number of persons, such as the Presbyterian Church, Bank of the United States, &c. &c.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

In November, 1854, the circuit court dismissed the bill, and the complainant appealed to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Henderson, for the appellants, and Mr. Taylor, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Beauregard v. City of New Orleans


text: Talk:Beauregard v. City of New Orleans

title: Talk:Beauregard v. City of New Orleans


text:
Beauregard v. City of New Orleans/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiff's testatrix filed this bill in the circuit court to annul a sale of a portion of the succession of John Poultney, deceased, which had been made under the authority of decrees in the first district court of New Orleans, and of the court of probate of that city, alleging a defect of jurisdiction in the courts, and fraud and irregularity in the proceedings.

Her title to the succession is as heir at law of the children, and heirs of John Poultney, of whom she was the mother.

In May, 1818, John Poultney, a merchant of New Orleans, purchased of Mad. Rousseau, her plantation lying on the Mississippi River, a short distance above New Orleans, and which is now included within the corporate limits.

The price agreed to was $100,000, one fifth of which was paid at the time, and notes with the indorsement of Harrod and Ogdens, (a firm composed of Charles Harrod, Peter V. Ogden, and George M. Ogden,) payable in five annual instalments, and secured by a mortgage on the property, were given for the remainder. The mortgage contains a stipulation that, in the event the indorsers should pay either of the notes, they should be subrogated to the rights of the vendor and holder of the mortgage for indemnity. In April, 1819, Poultney acknowledged in a petition to the first district court that his affairs were embarrassed, and that he could not meet his engagements; he made a statement of his property and debts, showing a surplus in his favor, and prayed the court to convene his creditors that they might deliberate upon his proposition for a respite of one, two, and three years.

The court made the order, the creditors were convened, the requisite number agreed to the proposition, and an order was accordingly entered the 28th June, 1819, for a respite of one, two, and three years.

Harrod and Ogdens appeared at this meeting-claimed to have paid the first instalment on the purchase of the Rousseau plantation, and assented to the action of the creditors, reserving their mortgage security.

In October, 1819, John Poultney died. His widow, the plaintiff's testatrix, in January thereafter renounced her right as partner in community, and failed to qualify as tutrix of her two children, one aged five, and the other seven years, who were the heirs at law of John Poultney, and did not until eight years after the sales referred to, take any concern about the succession.

The representation made by John Poultney of his affairs at the time his petition for a respite was exhibited, implies a hopeless state of insolvency. His debts are acknowledged to be $235,000, while his property is rated at $266,000-but from its nature affording but little prospect that such an amount could be realized. By the renunciation of his widow of her title as partner in community, and her failure to interpose on behalf of her children, the succession was unrepresented, and was what is termed in the Louisiana code a vacant estate. In February, 1820, a portion of the creditors of Poultney informed the district court that this succession was insolvent-had no representative, nor claimant-and prayed that measures might be taken for the appointment of a syndic to represent and administer it for the benefit of all concerned. A meeting of the creditors was ordered by the court-and took place-resulting in the appointment of three syndics, (one of whom was Peter V. Ogden,) who were recognized by the court. On the 9th of May, 1820, Harrod and Ogden represented in a petition to the district court the facts of the purchase by Poultney of the Rousseau plantation, their payment of the first instalment of the purchase-money, and their liability to pay another then shortly after to become due; that the succession of Poultney was insolvent, and was in the hands of syndics; and prayed that the plantation might be seized and sold for the satisfaction of their debt and the instalments yet unpaid on the mortgage, and for a citation to the syndics. The usual order of seizure was made by the district judge, and a citation was served on one of the syndics. On the 29th May the syndics agreed in court to the terms of sale and waived the appraisement, and the property was sold on the 13th June by the sheriff on the writ of seizure for the payment of the money then due, the purchaser agreeing to assume the mortgage.

At this sale, George M. Ogden, one of the firm of Harrod and Ogden, was the purchaser, and a deed was subsequently executed to him by the sheriff under the order of the court.

Some time after the close of these transactions, a conviction seems to have been impressed on the minds of Harrod and Ogden that the proceedings in the district court were inoperative; and in 1824, Harrod and the representative of Ogden commenced a suit in the court of probate, having for its object to obtain a satisfaction of the same debt, by the sale of the same property. They sought a seizure and sale of the property, without taking any notice of what had been done in the district court, and prayed a citation to Mad. Poultney as tutrix of her children. No citation appears in the record, but there is evidence of a seizure, judgment, and sale.

The purchasers were Charles Harrod and Francis B. Ogden, who are charged to be the representatives of the first purchaser, G. M. Ogden. These purchasers afterwards, in 1824, represented to the district court that the debt to Mad. Rousseau had been paid, and that the mortgage of George M. Ogden, given, in 1820, to secure the unpaid instalments, was not operative, for that the district court had no jurisdiction to make the sale, and asked that it might be raised from the property. The sheriff admitted all the facts, and the court granted the petition.

These were the last proceedings which had any relation to the case.

The defendants, by plea and answer, affirm that these proceedings were conformable to law, and vested the purchasers with all the title which John Poultney ever acquired in the property, and that the plaintiff never had any right therein; that they had no participation in, nor knowledge of, any fraud, but that they have translative titles from these purchasers, and rely upon their sufficiency.

In 1832, Mad. Poultney assumed the office of tutrix of her minor children, and commenced, immediately after, suits in the state courts of Louisiana for the recovery of portions of this plantation. Three of these suits were decided in the supreme court in 1835, after elaborate and learned arguments, and a patient investigation by the court. Poultney's Heirs v. Cecil, 8th La. R. 322; v. Ogden, 8 La. 428; v. Barrett, 8 La. 441. These decisions were made upon a state of facts similar to that presented in this record; and the discussion in those cases has diminished the care and responsibility of this court. For it is apparent that the questions presented to us relate exclusively to the local jurisprudence of Louisiana. When the controversy arose all the parties were citizens of that State, while the subject of the suit is the validity of titles passed under decrees of its courts, and in the course of duty, by their executive officers.

The material inquiries are, whether the first district court had a jurisdiction competent to the legal transfer of the succession of a debtor, who was enjoying a respite from the claims of his creditors for an unexpired term, at the time of his death and before any default had arisen in the fulfilment of the conditions of the respite as to payment. 2. Whether this jurisdiction could be exerted without any citation to the natural heirs, or any measures taken to secure their interests in the succession? 3. Were the modes prescribed for the disposal of the estates of insolvent debtors, or of minors, essential constituents of a valid exercise of the jurisdiction, and for the neglect of these may the sale be collaterally attacked? 4. Did the death of Poultney determine the jurisdiction of the district court, and remove to the court of probate the administration and settlement of the succession, and were all the proceedings in the district court coram non judice? 5. Was a citation to the heirs necessary to a valid decree of sale in the court of probate? An important share of the attention of all courts of a limited jurisdiction is engrossed in ascertaining the causes over which they may legitimately claim cognizance, and the administration of an involved or insolvent succession, from the number of the parties in interest, and the variety of conflicting and complicated claims that are oftentimes exhibited, frequently affords difficult questions of this description.

The supreme court of Louisiana treat the questions arising upon the records now before us, as difficult and embarrassing, calling for undivided and anxious attention, and much care was employed in deciding them, so as to maintain in that State an accordant system of jurisprudence. The claim of an embarrassed debtor to exhibit the condition of his affairs to a court with a view to obtain its assistance to convoke his creditors, that they may deliberate upon a proposition to grant him a delay or respite, and to bind the minority to the conclusions of a consenting majority, is one which has no recognition in the common law. It was derived in Louisiana from the continental codes of Europe, upon which the legal institutions of that State are founded. The supreme court of Louisiana upon an investigation of those codes, determined that the death of Poultney in a state of insolvency without heirs who were willing to accept his succession unconditionally, and thereby to afford security for the fulfilment of the conditions of the decree of respite which the debtor had assumed, relieved his creditors from their obligations to respect it, and empowered them to proceed, in rem, against the estate of their debtor in the hands of a syndic.

The same tribunal, (supreme court of Louisiana,) after tracing the sources of the jurisdiction of the district court, extending, as it did, to 'all civil cases,' determined that it was not without jurisdiction ratione materiae of a suit against such an estate, and that judgments rendered in that court, were not radically null. They say, 'the undisputed exercise of such a jurisdiction for a long series of years, the general acquiescence of the legal profession, the universal understanding among the people, as well as the courts and bar, form together such contemporaneous interpretations of the laws relating to conflicting jurisdictions, that, however doubtful it may appear on a close analysis, it cannot now be disturbed without the greatest injustice, and inflicting incalculable mischiefs on the country.' And in Robinett v. Compton, 2 Ann, R. 847, 855, the same court says, 'That, previous to the passage of the act of the 18th March, 1820, fixing the jurisdiction of the courts of probate in this State, it seems to have been settled by various decisions of this court that the district courts were not deprived of jurisdiction ratione materiae in such cases. The practice was universal to bring suits against successions in the district court, and we are not prepared to say it was erroneous.' And, since the act of 1820, (which, however, was not promulgated so as to be in force when this sale was made,) the court say, 'that such judgments in that court might be erroneous, but were not mere nullities.' The jurisdiction of the district court to render the judgment being admitted, the further question arises, was the jurisdiction so exercised as to be operative? The supreme court, in the case of Cecil above cited, determine 'that the rules which apply to the sale of minors' property as such, when the title is fully vested in them, are not strictly applicable to a case like the present, where the rights of minors were contingent and residuary, subject to the undoubted claims of creditors deducto are alieno, and who, in this very case, appear as beneficiary heirs claiming property already alienated for the payment of debts,' &c. And in McCullough v. Minor, 2 Ann, 466, the same court affirm 'that in cases like this, the purchaser is not bound to look beyond the decree.'

The jurisdiction of the court was undoubted, and the jurisprudence of the State has long since been settled that a bon a fide purchaser at a judicial sale is protected by the decree. 11 Louisa. 68; 13 Louisia. 432; 16 Louisa. 440; 3 Rob. 122. The judgments of the supreme court of Louisiana upon the validity of the sales impugned in this bill were given more than twenty years ago. They have formed the foundation upon which the expectations and conduct of the inhabitants of that State have been regulated. They have quieted apprehensions and doubts respecting a title to an important portion of a large and growing city. They have invited a multitude of transactions and engagements in which the well-being of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the citizens of that State depend. In this bill there are several hundreds of defendants.

The constitution of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several States as rules of decision wherever they properly apply. And the habit of the court has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribunals upon questions arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title of lands.

No other course could be adopted with any regard to propriety. Upon cases like the present the relation of the courts of the United States to a State is the same as that of its own tribunals. They administer the laws of the State, and to fulfil that duty, they must find them as they exist in the habits of the people, and in the exposition of their constituted authorities. Without this, the peculiar organization of the judicial tribunals of the States and the Union would be productive of the greatest mischief and confusion. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153.

But, if we were required to depart from that jurisprudence to find a solution of these difficult and embarrassing questions, we should not have to leave the precedents afforded by this court for the support of many of their conclusions. This court has contributed its share to that stability which results from a respect for things adjudicated: Status reipublicae maxim e judicatis rebus continetur.' It is the settled doctrine of the court, that when the proceedings of a court of justice are collaterally drawn in question, and it appears upon the face of them that the subject matter was within its jurisdiction, they cannot be impeached for error or irregularity; that, if a court has jurisdiction, its decision upon all the questions that arise regularly in the cause are binding upon all other courts until they are reversed. 2 Pet. 157; 1 Ib. 340. And when the object is to sell the real estate of an insolvent or embarrassed succession, the settled doctrine is, there are no adversary parties-the proceeding is in rem-the administrator represents the land. They are analogous to proceedings in admiralty, where the only question of jurisdiction is the power of the court over the thing-the subject-mater before them-without regard to the parties who may have an interest in it. All the world are parties. In the orphans' court, and all the courts which have power to sell the estates of decedents, their action operates on the estate, not on the heirs of the intestate. A purchaser claims not their title, but one paramount. The estate passes by operation of law. 2 How. 319; 11 S. & R. 426; 6 Port. 219, 249.

The identity of the principles applied by the supreme court of Louisiana, in ascertaining the effect of the judgments of their courts, and those accepted as true by this court, leaves no question resting upon the authority of the state tribunals, except that of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of their courts under the organic law of the State. And no principle would authorize this court to dissent from their conclusions on that subject, when the land disposed of was within their borders, and the parties in interest were citizens belonging to their community.

Our opinion is, that the pleas of the defendants afford a complete answer to the bill; and that the decree of the circuit court must be affirmed.


text: Talk:Beauregard v. City of New Orleans/Opinion of the Court


text:
Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden

THIS was an appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of Mississippi.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Coxe, for the appellants, and Mr. Stanton, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden


text: Talk:Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden

title: Talk:Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden


text:
Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from the district court for the northern district of Mississippi.

The appellants filed a bill in December on the equity side of the district court against the appellees.

'The bill charges that in November, 1846, the bank instituted a suit on the law side of the same district court against William Jolly, as indorser of a bill of exchange held by plaintiffs. Jolly appeared to the suit, and filed his plea. He died in March, 1847, and appellees were appointed his administrators by the Panola court of probate, in Mississippi. The suit against Jolly was revived against his administrators, the appellees, and in June, 1851, the same came on for trial on the issue joined on the single plea of non assumpsit, and a judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $5,041.33 with costs. Upon this judgment execution was issued, which was returned by the marshal nulla bona. The judgment remains wholly unpaid, and there is no visible property in the hands of the administrators upon which a levy could be made.

The bill proceeds to charge, that pending the said suit against the administrators in April, 1848, they represented to the said probate court of Panola county, that the estate of their intestate was insolvent, and procured a declaration to be made by said court to that effect, whereas the bill charges that said estate was not and is not insolvent, and that the assets in the hands of the administrators are more than sufficient to pay all the liabilities of the estate. That the administrators have converted the assets into cash to the amount of upwards of $20,000, and have fully paid all the debts of intestate, with the single exception of that due to complainant. The debts they have paid amount to about $11,000, and the administrators have upwards of $9,000 in cash or available assets belonging to the estate, which is not required for the payment of any other debt, but refuse to apply any part thereof to the payment of complainant's debt, and will shortly pay the same over to the heirs at law of Jolly, unless prevented by the interposition of the court.

The defendants pretend that complainants have no right to require payment of their judgment out of said assets, because they have not established the claims upon which the judgment is founded before the probate court of Panola county, and had the same allowed by said court, but complainants are advised and insist that such allowance by said probate court is not necessary.

Sundry special interrogatories are appended to the bill.

In June, 1852, defendants filed their answer. The principal averments in the bill are admitted-it is admitted that they have received assets to the amount of $20,000; that they have paid all the debts which have been legally established against the estate to the amount of more than $13,000, and have in their hands assets to the value of $6,500, and that if complainant's claim is disallowed, the estate will be worth to the heirs about $6,000. They are advised that complainant's judgment is barred, and if they were to pay it, they would pay it in their own wrong.

They deny that they did illegally or fraudulently procure the estate to be declared insolvent. When they took charge of the estate as administrators, it was appraised at $18,090.76 1/2, and debts or claims against it were brought to the notice of respondents $18,597.40. Respondents, looking to probable results, believed it might prove and would probably prove insolvent; under these circumstances they procured the declaration. The clerk was appointed commissioner of insolvency, and publication was made for the period of twelve months, warning all creditors of Jolly to present their claims to the commissioner for allowance. In April, 1849, the commissioner made his report, and an order was passed requiring all persons interested to appear and except to the report at July term, 1849-at July term respondents alone excepted to the report, they excepted to two claims which had been allowed, one of these claims was allowed, the other disallowed; and in October term, 1849, the report was approved and confirmed-p. 8. Respondents append a transcript to these proceedings, and rely upon the same as a bar to complainant's claim.'

To the answer of the defendants a general replication was filed, and, on the hearing of the cause, the court decreed a dismissal of the complainant's bill.

In the argument of the case in this court, the counsel of the defendants urged the following grounds against the right of the complainants to recover:--

'If the complainant's demand is not barred by their failure to present it in the probate court, their remedy is at law, and not in equity. The defendants admit that they have $6,000 in their hands, belonging to the estate of their intestate. If they are bound to pay this to the complainants, and refuse to do so, they are guilty of a devastavit, and are liable to an action on their bond. In their answer, they expressly deny that complainant (the bank) has made out a cause entitling it to relief in the premises, and that this court has jurisdiction thereof.

'But the complainants are entitled to no relief, either in equity or at law.

'The defendants cannot be prejudiced by suffering judgment to go against them on the plea of non assumpsit. Hutchison's Code, 657, § 57. Hemphill v. Fortner, 11 Sm. & Mar. 344.

'The decrees of probate courts, in case of estates reported insolvent, cannot be questioned or set aside, unless by a regular appeal taken, or on account of fraud. Hutchison's Code, 667, 668, 673, 683, 684. Chewning v. Peck, 6 How. Mi. Rep. 524. Smith v. Berry, 1 Sm. & Mar. 321. Addison v. Eldridge, 1 Ib. 510. Herrings v. Wellons, 5 Ib. 354. Dalgren v. Duncan et al. 7 Ib. 280.

'Insolvency may be declared when the debts appear to be greater than the probable value of all the real and personal property. The court has a discretion, which, when exercised, is conclusive, unless a direct appeal be taken. Saunder's Adm'r v. Planter's Bank, 2 Sm. & Mar. 304.

'As to the responsibility of an administrator who pays debts, when the estate subsequently becomes insolvent, see Woodward v. Fisher et al. 11 Sm. & Mar. 304. Bramblet v. Webb et al. 11 Ib. 438.

'Creditors whose claims have not been presented to the commissioner, are forever barred, even when the estate proves not to be insolvent. Allen and Apperson, v. Keith and Vaiden, 26 Miss. Rep. 232. Anderson v. Tindall, 26 Miss. Rep. 332.

'The creditor must present his claim to the commissioner of insolvency, though he have a suit pending against the administrator. Trezevant et al. v. McQueen, 13 Sm. & Mar. 311.

'And when a commission of insolvency has been regularly opened and closed, it will not be reopened, even at the instance of a judgment creditor, whose judgment bears date since the closing of the commission. Harrison v. Motz et al. 5 Sm. & Mar. 578.

'The foregoing authorities must be deemed conclusive against the appellants, unless the rendition of a judgment by a federal court can be held to take away from the probate courts their exclusive jurisdiction, in the administration of the assets of deceased insolvents. But there can be no doubt that the laws of the State, from which the executor or administrator derives his authority to act, must prevail, as well in the federal as in the state tribunals. Citizens of other States, possibly, cannot be prevented from suing in the federal courts in order to establish their demands; yet the effect of the judgment, its lien, or other operation upon the assets of the deceased, must be absolutely controlled by the local law; otherwise the conflict of jurisdictions would be irreconcilable and disastrous. And such, it is believed, is the well-established doctrine of this and all other courts. Story's Conflict of Laws, 3d ed. § 521. Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. Sup. C. R. 107. McGill v. Armour, 11 How. Sup. C. R. 142.'

But we do not deem it necessary to discuss them in detail, for the law of a State limiting the remedies of its citizens in its own courts, cannot be applied to prevent the citizens of other States from suing in the courts of the United States in that State for the recovery of any property or money there, to which they may be legally or equitably entitled. This principle was fully discussed, and decided by this court in the case of Suydam v. Brodnax, and others, 14 Pet. 67. We refer to the reasoning in support of it given in that case without repeating it, or thinking it necessary to add anything on this occasion. It concludes this case.

And it is our opinion, under the circumstances and the testimony in this case, that the surplus in the hands of the defendants must be applied to the payment of the judgment of the complainant in preference to any claim which has been asserted to it for the heirs at law or distributees of the intestate, Jolly. We reverse the decree of the court below, and shall remand the case with directions to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.


text: Talk:Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden/Opinion of the Court


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Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/151

THE RICHES OF DAMASCUS astonishing what splendid effects are evolved by their architects from the limited elements of Arabic script, geometric designs, foliage, fruits and flowers. In the liwân this arabesque ornamentation is profuse and elegant. The lower walls are built of alternate layers of differently colored stones, into which are set mosaic panels as intricate in design as the priceless rugs which lie upon the marble pavement. The woodwork of the room is all minutely carved, and inlaid with bits of glass and mother-of-pearl and sometimes even with jewels. The upper walls are frescoed in blue and green and gold, and from the gilded beams of the ceiling hang chandeliers of silver and beaten brass.

This half out-of-doors alcove gives access to the rooms which we should think of as being really in the house. Some of these may be even more lavishly decorated than the liwân, and all are comfortably furnished—according to the Syrian idea of comfort. Into the apartments of the ladies, however, no male guest may enter. These are hareem—"forbidden." Indeed, it is very likely that they are in a separate building, which opens on an inner court whose existence the casual visitor does not even suspect. No men save her nearest relatives are supposed ever to look upon the unveiled face of a Moslem woman. This prohibition, however, is of  [ 113 ]


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McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)

This was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Henderson, for the appellant, and Mr. Smiley, for the appellee.

Mr. Henderson made the following points:--

1. That the decree validates a void purchase of a litigious right.

2. That the complainant's alleged title was void by the Louisiana statute of champerty.

3. That no loan of money and no resulting trust is shown.

4. There is no express trust in writing shown, though such trust is averred.

5. That the amount admitted by the bill and exhibits to be due to the defendant on the purchase was not allowed him in the decree.

6. That Mary Perin was not made a party to the bill, though her interest in one half of the property in controversy was shown.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

title: McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)


text: Talk:McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)

title: Talk:McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)


text:
McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)/Opinion of the Court

The appellee (Perin) filed his bill in the circuit court, alleging that he had been employed to institute suits in the courts of Louisiana, on behalf of certain persons claiming to be the heirs of James Fletcher, for which service he was to receive fifty percent on the money value, or a fee equal to one half the net value of the property, real or personal, in controversy. Pending the suits his clients offered to sell their interest to him for $5,000, or to other persons for $10,000. There were some negotiations upon this subject, but nothing seems to have been concluded until after the final judgment had been rendered; after that time, the bill proceeds to state as follows:--

'That, upon the said proposition being renewed, the complainant addressed divers letters to the defendant, asking for a loan of $5,000 for the purpose of purchasing the said interest of the Fletchers in and to the said property; and that, in reply to the complainant's said letters, the defendant answered in writing, giving a promise of said loan,' as will appear by the exhibits C and D; one of which was written by the defendant on the 8th of September, 1848, nearly three months after the judgment for the land had become final and executory.

'And your orator further shows unto your honors that, relying on the promises and the honesty of the defendant, and upon the understanding and agreement with him, the complainant purchased the said property of the said Fletcher, on the 19th of October, 1848, while the defendant was absent in Cincinnati; and in order to secure the said McMicken in the loan of the said $5,000, the complainant caused the title of the said property to be made out in the name of the defendant, with the express condition that the purchase was made in the name of the defendant for the use and benefit of the complainant, all of which will appear by reference to the act of sale, marked exhibit F; to the letter of the complainant to the defendant, dated on the 19th of October, 1848, accompanying a copy of the act of sale sent to the defendant, marked exhibit G, and other proofs to be hereafter exhibited. That said defendant accepted the said sale, &c., took the said property, &c., and held the same in trust for the use of complainant, and upon no other condition or understanding, subject only to the repayment of the money advanced for the purchased thereof.'

The bill avers that the plaintiff being thus invested with all the legal and equitable rights of the heirs of Fletcher, he tendered to the defendant (McMicken) immediately after his ratification of the sale, the sum of five thousand and fifty dollars, with the proper interest due thereon, and demanded a conveyance of all the said property and rights so purchased and held in trust, which the defendant refused.

The bill charges certain fraudulent pretexts on the part of McMicken for withholding the deed according to his agreement, denies their validity, and affirms that the plaintiff has been forced into a court of chancery in consequence of the repeated refusals of the defendant to deliver up his property and convey the same to him.

The bill prays that the defendant may by the order and decree of the court, be required to convey the said property to the plaintiff upon the payment or tender to the said defendant of the amount of his advances, and for general relief.

A decree pro confesso was entered at the spring term of the circuit court, 1853, and at the same term of the court in 1854 a decree was rendered requiring the defendant to convey the property specified in the bill to the plaintiff, upon the payment to the said defendant of the debt reported to be due within six months after the date of the decree.

It is objected in this court that the arrangement between the heirs of Fletcher and his attorney, (Perin,) by which the latter became the purchaser of their interest in the subject of the litigation he had been conducting in their behalf, was illegal, and he could take no benefit from his contract. The articles of the code of Louisiana affecting this question are as follows: art. 2623, 'a right is said to be litigious whenever there exists a suit and contestation about the same'; art. 3522, No. 22, 'litigious rights are those which cannot be exercised without undergoing a lawsuit'; art. 2624, 'public officers connected with courts of justice, such as judges, advocates, attorneys, clerks, and sheriffs, cannot purchase litigious rights which fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal in which they exercise their functions, under penalty of nullity and of having to defray all costs, damages, and interest.'

The courts of Louisiana have decided 'that where a judgment has been rendered litigation has ceased.' Marshall v. McRae, 2 Ann. 79. And when the thing ceded is not contested and is not the subject of a suit at the time of cession, the thing is not litigious. Provost v. Johnson, 9 Mart. 184. The bill charges that the purchase was made after a final judgment had been rendered, declaring the property to belong to the heirs of Fletcher. The subject of the sale was ascertained, the title recognized, and consequently none of the mischiefs which occasioned these articles could then follow. Such is the conclusion of the commentators and courts of France upon the corresponding articles in the code Napoleon. Trop. de Vente, § 201; 39 Dall. part 2, 196.

But upon well-established principles the appellant is estopped from contesting the title of the appellee. The case made is that the appellee borrowed of the appellant a sum of money to complete his purchase, and that the title was placed in the name of the appellant to secure the repayment of that advance. The latter cannot be heard to object that there was illegality in the contract between Fletcher's heirs and the appellee, nor to appropriate to himself the fruit of that contract. The contract between the appellee and appellant is uninfected by any illegality.

The consideration was a loan of money upon a security. The contract between Fletcher's heirs and the appellee is completed and closed, and will not be disturbed by anything which the court may decree in this case. McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232.

The appellant further objects that his debt was not accurately ascertained by the master upon the decree of reference. In Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359, this court decided that no objections to a master's report can be made which were not taken before the master; the object being to save time, and to give him an opportunity to correct his errors and reconsider his opinion. And in Heyn v. Heyn, 4 Jacob. 47, it was decided that after a decree pro confesso, the defendant is not at liberty to go before the master without a special order, but the accounts are to be taken ex parte. This court will not review a master's report upon objections taken here for the first time.

Our conclusion is, there is no error in the final decree, rendered in the circuit court.

At a subsequent term, the appellant filed a petition in the circuit court, alleging that he had been deceived by the appellee in reference to the prosecution of the bill, and had consequently failed to make any appearance or answer, and that he had a meritorious defence.

He prayed the court to set aside the decree, and to allow him to file an answer to the bill. This petition was dismissed. We concur in the judgment of the circuit court as to the propriety of this course. This court, in Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238, determined that an appeal would not lie from the refusal of a court to open a former decree, though the petition in that case was filed during the term at which the decree was entered. In Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. 591, it decided that the circuit courts have no power to set aside their decrees in equity on motion after the term at which they were rendered.

These decisions are conclusive of the questions raised upon the order dismissing the petition.

The decrees of the circuit court are affirmed, with costs.


text: Talk:McMicken v. Perin (59 U.S. 507)/Opinion of the Court


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Maxwell v. Newbold

THIS case was brought up from the supreme court of the State of Michigan, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Haven, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Cushing, (attorney general,) for the defendants.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Maxwell v. Newbold


text: Talk:Maxwell v. Newbold

title: Talk:Maxwell v. Newbold


text:
Maxwell v. Newbold/Opinion of the Court

This case comes before the court upon a writ of error to the supreme court of the State of Michigan.

The facts in the case, so far as they are material to the decision of this court, are as follows:--

The steamboat Globe was built in the State of Michigan, and by the laws of that State the persons who furnish materials for her construction had a lien upon her, and had a right to enforce their claims by a proceeding in rem against the vessel. Before these claims were discharged she was removed to Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, where she received her machinery and was fitted out; and for the debts thus incurred the Ohio creditors, like those in Michigan, had a lien on the vessel, and were authorized to proceed against her by attachment and seizure.

Afterwards, when the steamboat was in the port of Cleveland, the Ohio creditors obtained process against her, and she was seized, condemned, and sold, according to the laws of that State, to satisfy these liens. A certain E. S. Sterling became the purchaser at this sale, and afterwards sold her to Maxwell, one of the plaintiffs in error.

After these proceedings, the steamboat returned to Michigan, and was there seized by virtue of the prior lien created by the laws of that State, as above mentioned. The party at whose instance and for whose benefit the proceeding was instituted under the Michigan lien, had filed his claim in the previous proceedings in Ohio, but was permitted by the court to withdraw it without prejudice.

The plaintiffs in error, who were the owners, or had an interest in the steamboat, appeared in the Michigan court to defend her against this claim. And the principal ground of defence appears to have been, that the sale in Ohio was not made subject to the prior liens in Michigan; that it was an absolute and unconditional sale, made by competent judicial authority, and vested the property in the purchaser, free and discharged from all previous liens and incumbrances.

The record contains the pleadings, evidence, and admissions of the parties in relation to these transactions, and the proceedings in the state courts. But it is unnecessary to state them at large, at the above summary is sufficient to show the matter in controversy in the state courts, and how the questions raised in the state courts were brought before them.

At the trial in the circuit court of Michigan, the defendants in error, who were plaintiffs in that court, prayed the court to give the following instructions to the jury:--

'1. That if the jury should find, from the evidence adduced in this cause, that the steamboat Globe, mentioned in the declaration, has been constructed and built in this State, and was used in navigating the waters thereof, and that the debt, claim, or demand, for which she was attached by the plaintiff, has been contracted in this State by the owners, joint owner, or agent thereof, on account of supplies furnished by said plaintiff for the use of said boat, or on account of work done, or materials furnished by said plaintiffs in or about the building, fitting, furnishing, or equipping of said boat in said State; that then said plaintiff acquired and had a lien on said boat for said debt, claim, or demand, under and by virtue of the law of this State.

'2. That if the jury should be of the opinion, from said evidence, that said claim or demand of said plaintiff constituted a lien on said boat, which had been acquired as aforesaid, and that the contracting paties were then citizens of this State, then that such lien had not been displaced or affected by the legal proceedings resorted to in the court of Ohio, exemplifications of which were introduced in evidence by the defendants; that if any title was acquired under the same, or the laws of Ohio, such title is subordinate to the lien acquired by the plaintiff in this State, by virtue of the laws thereof; that such proceedings do not constitute a valid defence to this action, and that said boat, on coming within the jurisdiction of this court, was subject to be attached for said claim.'

And the plaintiffs in error asked for the following instructions on their part:--

'1. That the facts contained in the notice of defendants, and which are admitted as true by the plaintiffs, constitute in law a defence to the plaintiffs' action. 2. That the sale under the laws of Ohio, if fair and bon a fide, constitutes a defence to a purchaser under such laws to a prosecution by a creditor under the laws of this State, such as the plaintiffs in this case have shown themselves to be. 3. That defendant Maxwell's title is good against the lien or claim of the plaintiff Wight in this cause, even if that of Sterling was not. 4. That the filing of the plaintiff's claim in the Ohio court precludes him from raising the objection that such court had no jurisdiction of his rights so as to devest his lien by a sale in that State. 5. That a lien under the statutes of this State, though valid in its inception, cannot be enforced against a purchaser in good faith under a sale under the laws of the State of Ohio, so given in evidence.'

Whereupon the court gave the instructions asked for by the defendants in error, and refused those requested by the plaintiffs, who, thereupon, excepted to these opinions, and the verdict and judgment in that court being against them, they removed the case to the supreme court of the State, and assigned there the following errors, for which they prayed that the judgment of the circuit court might be reversed:--

'1. The court erred in charging the jury, as requested by the plaintiffs below, and upon the points and to the effect stated more fully in the bill of exceptions filed herein, and to which reference is hereby had.

'2. The court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested by the defendants below, upon the points and to the effect stated in the bill of exceptions filed herein, and to which, for fuller particularity, reference is hereby had.

'3. The charge of the court, the verdict of the jury, and the judgment below, are each against and in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore erroneous.

'4. By the record aforesaid, it appears that the judgment was given against the plaintiffs in error, whereas, by the law of the land, the said judgment should have been in favor of the plaintiffs in error, and against the defendants in error.'

But the supreme court, it appears, concurred in opinion with the circuit court and affirmed its judgment; and the plaintiffs in error have now brought the case before this court by writ of error, and have assigned here the following errors:--

'1. By the record aforesaid it appears that judgment was given against the plaintiffs in error; whereas, by the law of the land, and under the evidence appearing in the bill of exceptions, the judgment should have been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in error.

'2. There was drawn in question in this suit, as appears by the said record, a statute of the United States; and the decision and judgment of the said supreme court of the State of Michigan was against the validity of such statute.

'3. The said supreme court of the State of Michigan erred in deciding that the said proceedings, judgment, and sale had in the State of Ohio was not a bar to the claim prosecuted in this suit.

'4. The said supreme court erred, in that it did not give to the said records of judicial proceedings and sale of the steamboat Globe, had in the State of Ohio, the same faith and credit as they have by law in the said State of Ohio.'

Upon these proceedings, as they appear in the record before us, the first question to be considered is, whether any point appears to have been decided in the supreme court of the State, which will authorize this court to affirm or reverse its judgment, under the 25th section of the act of congress of 1789. The error alleged here is that it did not give to the records of the judicial proceedings and sale of the steamboat, had in Ohio, the same faith and credit that they have by law in that State. But to bring that question for decision in this court, it is not sufficient to raise the objection here, and to show that it was involved in the controversy in the state court, and might, and ought, to have been considered by it when making its decision. It must appear on the face of the record that it was in fact raised; that the judicial mind of the court was exercised upon it; and their decision against the right claimed under it.

It is true, that in some of the earlier cases, when writs of error to state courts were comparatively new in this court, a broader and more comprehensive rule was sometimes recognized. And in the case of Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, it was said to be sufficient, to give jurisdiction, that an act of congress was applicable to the case. But experience showed that this rule was not a safe one; and that it might sometimes happen, that although in one view of the subject an act of congress or a clause of the constitution might be applicable to a case, yet the state court, upon a different view of the case, might have decided upon principles of state law altogether independent of any provision in the constitution or laws of the United States, and in nowise in conflict with either. And if this court reversed the judgment, upon the assumption that a right claimed under the constitution or laws of the United States, and to which the party was entitled, had been denied to him, the reversal would sometimes be for a supposed error which the state court had not committed, and upon a point which the state court had not decided. Other cases might be referred to, in which expressions are used in the opinion of the court that might seem in some measure to sanction the doctrine in Miller v. Nicholls; but the general current of the decisions, from the earliest period of the court, will be found to maintain the rule which we have hereinbefore stated. And as this want of harmony in the decisions and language of the court was calculated to mislead and embarrass counsel in the prosecution of writs of error to state courts, this court, at the January term of 1836, when the subject was again brought before it, in the case of Crowell v. Randall, 10 Pet. 368, determined to give the subject a careful and deliberate examination, in order to remove any doubts which might have arisen from previous decisions. Accordingly, all of the preceding cases are reviewed and commented on in the opinion delivered by the court in that case, and the doctrine clearly announced, that, in order to give jurisdiction to this court, it must appear by the record that one of the questions stated in the 25th section of the act of 1789 did arise, and was decided in the state court; and that it was not sufficient that it might have arisen or been applicable-it must appear that it did arise and was applied. This rule has been uniformly adhered to since the decision of that case. We think it the true one, and the only one, consistent with the spirit and language of the section referred to, which so carefully and plainly limits the authority which it confers upon this court over the judgments of state tribunals.

Applying this principle to the case before us, the writ of error cannot be maintained. The questions raised and decided in the state circuit court, point altogether for their solution to the laws of the State, and make no reference whatever to the constitution or laws of the United States. Undoubtedly, this did not preclude the plaintiffs in error from raising the point in the supreme court of the State, if it was involved in the case as presented to that court. And whether a writ of error from this court will lie or not, depends upon the questions raised and decided in that court. But neither of the questions made there by the errors assigned refer in any manner to the constitution or laws of the United States, except the third, and the language of that is too general and indefinite to come within the provisions of the act of congress, or the decisions of this court. It alleges that the charge of the court was against, and in conflict with, the constitution and laws of the United States. But what right did he claim under the constitution of the United States which was denied him by the state court? Under what clause of the constitution did he make his claim? And what right did he claim under an act of congress? And under what act, in the wide range of our statutes, did he claim it? The record does not show-nor can this court undertake to determine that the question as to the faith and credit due to the record and judicial proceedings in Ohio, was made or determined in the state court, or that that court ever gave any opinion on the question. For aught that appears in the record, some other clause in the constitution, or some law of congress may have been relied on, and the mind of the court never called to the clause of the constitution now assigned as error in this court.

This case cannot be distinguished from the case of Lawler v. Walker and others, 14 How. 149. In that case the state court certified that there was drawn in question the validity of statutes of the State of Ohio, &c., without saying what statutes. And in the opinion of this court dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, they say: 'The statutes complained of in this case should have been stated; without that, the court cannot apply them to the subject-matter of litigation to determine whether or not they violated the constitution of the United States.' So in the case before us, the clause in the constitution and the law of congress should have been specified by the plaintiffs in error in the state court, in order that this court might see what was the right claimed by them, and whether it was denied to them by the decision of the state court.

Upon these grounds we think this writ of error cannot be maintained, and therefore dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.

title: Maxwell v. Newbold/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Maxwell v. Newbold/Opinion of the Court


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Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton

THESE two cases were appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

In the first case, the libellants were owners of the schooner Hero, of Maine, and in the second case, Lord was the owner of a cargo of corn and flour laden on board of The Hero, bound from New York to Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

The circumstances of the collision are set forth in the opinion of the court.

The district court dismissed the libels with costs, which decree was affirmed in the circuit court.

The case was argued in this court by Mr. Benedict, for the appellants, and by Mr. Cowles, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton


text: Talk:Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton

title: Talk:Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton


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Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in a cause of collision, prosecuted by the owners of the schooner Hero, against the steamer Isaac Newton.

On the sixteenth of July, 1850, the schooner Hero, of the burden of 100 tons, which had been lying at pier No. 15 on the North River, in the city of New York, hauled out of the dock, soon after sunrise got up her mainsail and both jibs, and pushed off into the stream. The tide was about half ebb, setting to the southward and eastward, and the wind was about southeast, but so light that very little way could be made. A brig was at anchor in the river, a little below pier No. 15, about one hundred and fifty yards from the piers; and immediately below the brig, at the distance of about 300 feet, two ships were also anchored. When The Hero had got within a short distance of the brig, and was nearly between the brig and the town, and while her crew were in the act of hoisting the peak of the foresail, the body of the sail being up, the steamer Isaac Newton came down the river, and seeing no clear passage to her dock at pier No. 16, except that of about 300 feet between the brig and the ships at anchor, swung round, passed between those vessels at anchor, straightened up alongside the brig for her dock, and then, for the first time, discovered The Hero directly in her course. The two ships being at anchor astern of the steamer, the latter could not back, without the certainty of injuring herself and one of the ships; she kept on her course, struck The Hero on the starboard bow, which was stove, and the schooner almost immediately filled.

It is pleaded that The Hero was in fault, because her helm was not put hard down and kept there, when the danger was first discovered. The distance between the steamer and the schooner, when the latter straightened up and headed for the former, was only about 400 feet, as testified by the pilot in charge of the steamer. The opportunity for the schooner to make any manoeuvre, was consequently very small; and though some of the witnesses say there was breeze enough at the moment to give the schooner steerage way, others deny this. It must be remembered that the general rule is, for a sailing vessel, meeting a steamer, to keep her course, while the steamer takes the necessary measures to avoid a collision. And though this rule should not be observed when the circumstances are such that it is apparent its observance must occasion a collision, while a departure from it will prevent one, yet it must be a strong case which puts the sailing vessel in the wrong for obeying the rule. The court must clearly see, not only that a deviation from the rule would have prevented collision, but that the commander of the sailing vessel was guilty of negligence or a culpable want of seamanship, in not perceiving the necessity for a departure from the rule, and acting accordingly.

We do not think this was such a case. Besides, the master of the schooner testifies, that the helm of the schooner had been put hard down by him, and fastened there in a becket, as soon as he saw the steamer, and before hailed from the latter. In this he is corroborated by his mate and crew. Other witnesses say, they saw a man run aft, when hailed, and put the helm first up and then down. This apparent discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact mentioned by those on board the schooner; that, after the master had left the helm hard down in a becket, and just before the collision, the mate ran aft. Perhaps he went to the helm, and he may have changed it. But we do not think what he did could have influenced the result. Fault was also attributed to the schooner, in the argument at the bar, because she left her dock when the wind was so light and baffling that she was not really manageable. But we think there was no impropriety in her being where she was at the time of the collision, with her sails hoisted, waiting for a wind to get out of the harbor, any more than in her being at anchor there. It is true she would have no right to endanger other vessels by drifting afoul of them. This she was bound to avoid, by coming to anchor. But till there was danger of this, and none such appears in the case, she had a right to wait for a wind there in daylight, with her sails hoisted.

We hold the schooner to have been free from fault.

After a careful consideration of the evidence we cannot think the steamer did all that could reasonably be required to avoid the collision. After the schooner was seen from the steamer, we have no doubt a collision, either with the schooner, or with one of the ships at anchor, was inevitable; and that the steamer chose that alternative least dangerous to herself, and ran down the schooner. But the fault was, in not discerning the schooner before getting into that position. Though the brig was at anchor between the steamer and the schooner when the former was sweeping across the river and heading for the opening between the brig and the ships, yet the sails of the schooner were hoisted, and must have been visible over the hull of the brig. The steamer, therefore, made for this passage, not only without first ascertaining it to be clear, but without discovering the sails of the schooner which might and ought to have been seen, and which, if seen, would have warned those managing her that the passage there was not clear. We hold this attempt of the steamer to come to her landing between the vessels at anchor, without first ascertaining that the track was clear, to have been culpable, and, accordingly, that she must be condemned in the damages and costs.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded to be proceeded with according to law.

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented in both cases.


text: Talk:Crockett v. Steamboat Isaac Newton/Opinion of the Court


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Stairs v. Peaslee

THIS case came up, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Griswold, for the plaintiffs, and Mr. Gillet, for the defendant.

Mr. Griswold's first and fourth points were as follows:--

1. The tariff act of March 3, 1851, did not repeal so much of former laws as provided that merchandise, when imported from a country other than that of production or manufacture, should be appraised at the market value of similar articles at the principal markets of the country of production or manufacture, at the period of the exportation to the United States. But that the provision in the 16th section of the tariff act of 1842 is still in force. Act Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, § 16, 5 Stats. at Large, 564; Act March 3, 1851, c. 38, § 1, 9 Ib. 629; Act July 30, 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Ib. 43.

(a) Because congress in passing the tariff act of March 3, 1851, did not intend to repeal or modify the proviso in the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842. But only so much of the main body of the section as provided that merchandise, when imported from the country of production or manufacture, should be liable to duty on the appraised value at the time when purchased.

And the intention, if it can be ascertained, must govern in the interpretation of these statutes. Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225; Norcross v. Greely, 1 Curtis, 116; Barnard et al. v. Morton, Ib. 409.

(b) Because the act of March 3, 1851, was passed in consequence of the decision by this court, in the case of Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225, and Maxwell v. Griswold, Ib. 242, to the effect that by the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842, merchandise, when imported from the country of production or manufacture, was liable to duty on the appraised value thereof at the time when purchased, and not at the period of the exportation, as had been claimed by the secretary of the treasury.

And the intention of congress was simply to change the time with reference to which the value should be appraised, from the time when purchased, to the period of the exportation. Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225; Maxwell v. Griswold et al. 10 Ib. 242; Norcross v. Greely, 1 Curtis, 116; Barnard et al. v. Morton, Ib. 409; 1 Kent's Com. 462; Act March 3, 1851, c. 38, § 1, 9 Stats. at Large, 629; Act July 30, 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Ib. 43; Act Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, § 16, 5 Ib. 564; Act March 1, 1823, c. 21, § 5, 3 Ib. 733; Act May 19, 1828, c. 55, §§ 8, 9, 4 Ib. 274; Act July 14, 1832, c. 227, § 7, 4 Ib. 592.

(c) Because sect. 1 of the tariff act of March 3, 1851, is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the provisio in the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842, but is cumulative, and should be construed with it, in pari materia. United States v. Sixty-seven Packages of Dry Goods, 17 How. 93; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 364; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 564; Daviess et al. v. Fairbairn et al. Ib. 646; Morlot v. Lawrence, 1 Blatch, 612; Saving Institution v. Makin, 23 Maine, 360.

4. If the court shall hold that the appraisements of the cutch were legally made, still the additional duty of twenty per centum under the 8th section of the act of 1846 was wrongfully exacted by the defendant.

(a) Because the additional duty provided by the 8th section of the act of 1846 applies only in cases where the importer or consignee, on entry of merchandise, has voluntarily added to the invoice value. Act 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Stats. at Large, 43; Kreisler v. Morton, 1 Curtis, 415.

(b) Because the 17th section of the act of 1842 is still in force, and this imposes, on merchandise which has been procured by purchase, an additional duty of fifty per cent. of the duty prescribed by law, in case the appraised value thereof exceeds by ten per cent., or more, the invoice value; and this section embraces and applies to all cases of purchased goods, where the owner, importer, or consignee has not, on entry thereof, voluntarily added to the invoice value. Kreisler v. Morton, 1 Curtis, 415; Act 1846, § 8, 9 Stats. at Large, 43.

(c) Because the 8th section of the act of 1846 secures to owners, importers, and consignees of imports which have been actually purchased, the right of making such additions to the invoices on entry thereof, as shall, in their opinion, raise the same to the true market value of such imports in the principal markets, &c., &c.-(a privilege not enjoyed under the 17th section of the act of 1842;)-and it also provides that if the owner, importer, or consignee, having availed himself of this privilege, fails to make a sufficient addition to his invoice, he shall pay an additional duty of twenty per cent. on the appraised a value-a severer penalty than is inflicted by the 17th section of the act of 1842.

(d) Because the additional duty provided by the 17th section of the act of 1842 is not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, that in the 8th section of the act of 1846; because the latter is only applicable to cases of declarations of increased values voluntarily made by the owner, consignee, or agent on entry.

(e) Because the basis of appraisement by the two sections are entirely different.

By the 17th section of the act of 1842, if the appraised value exceed by ten per cent. or more, the invoice value, then fifty per cent. of the duty prescribed by law is to be added; while by the 8th section of the act of 1846, if the appraised value exceed by ten per cent. or more, the value declared in the entry, then an additional duty of twenty per cent. on the appraised value shall be assessed.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Stairs v. Peaslee


text: Talk:Stairs v. Peaslee

title: Talk:Stairs v. Peaslee