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 This, together with the fundamental importance of the work must be our excuse for its repetition. It may be mentioned that we have tried to obtain formulated objections to these experiments but without success. The following are the only points which have occurred to us as being susceptible of improvement.

1st. The elimination of accidental displacement of the fringes by deformation of the glass ends of the tubes, or unsymmetrical variations of density of the liquid, etc., depends on the assumption that the two pencils have traveled over identical (not merely equivalent) paths. That this is not the case was proven by experiment; for when a piece of plate glass was placed in front of one of the pencils and slightly inclined, the fringes were displaced.

2d. The arrangement for producing the motion of the medium necessitated very rapid observation — for the maximum velocity lasted but an instant.

3d. The tubes being of necessity of small diameter and only their central portion being available (since the velocity diminishes rapidly toward the walls) involved considerable loss of light — which, having to pass through a slit was already faint.

4th. The maximum velocity (in the center of the tube) should be found in terms of the mean velocity. (Fizeau confessedly but guesses at this ratio.)

These are the suggestions which determined the form of apparatus adopted, a description of which follows:

The Refractometer. — After a number of trials, the following form was devised and proved very satisfactory. Light from a source at a (fig. 5) falls on a half silvered surface b, where it divides; one part following the path b c d e f b g and the other the path b f e d c b g. This arrangement has the following advantages: 1st, it permits the use of an extended source, of light, as a gas flame; 2d, it allows any distance between the tubes which may be desired; 3d, it was tried by a preliminary experiment, by placing an inclined plate of glass at h. The only effect was either to alter the width of the fringes, or to alter their inclination; but in no case was the center of the central white fringe affected. Even holding a lighted match in the path had no effect on this point.

The tubes containing the fluid were of brass, $$28^{mm}$$ internal diameter; and, in the first series of experiments, a little over 3 meters in length, and in the second series, a little more than 6 meters. The ends of these tubes were closed with plane parallel plates of glass which were not exactly at right angles but slightly inclined so as to reflect the light below the telescope, which would otherwise be superposed on that which passed through the tubes. The tubes were mounted on a

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 wooden support entirely disconnected from the refractometer which was mounted on brick piers.

Explanation of Figures.

FIG. 1. — Vertical section through tubes. FIG. 2. — Plan of tubes. FIG. 3.— One end of tubes, allowing glass plate inclined to axis. FIG. 4. — Gauge for velocity at different points. FIG. 5. — Plan of refractometer.

The flow of water was obtained by filling a tank four feet in diameter and three feet high, placed in the attic, about 23 meters above the apparatus, with which it was connected by a three inch pipe. The latter branched into two parts, and each

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

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Rh fighting with a barrowful of turfs. Every Sunday of my childhood I used to study the Hermits of Marco Sadeler—enchanting prints, full of wood and field and mediæval landscapes, as large as a county, for the imagination to go a-travelling in; and here, sure enough, was one of Marco Sadeler's heroes. He was robed in white like any spectre, and the hood falling back, in the instancy of his contention with the barrow, disclosed a pate as bald and yellow as a skull. He might have been buried any time these thousand years, and all the lively parts of him resolved into earth and broken up with the farmer's harrow. I was troubled besides in my mind as to etiquette. Durst I address a person who was under a vow of silence? Clearly not. But drawing near, I doffed my cap to him with a far-away superstitious reverence. He nodded back, and cheerfully addressed me. Was I going to the monastery? Who was I? An Englishman? Ah, an Irishman, then? "No," I said, "a Scotsman." A Scotsman? Ah, he had never seen a


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 branch again into two; the two pairs being joined each to one of the tubes. The branches were provided with large valves, by turning which the current was made to flow in either direction through the tubes and into a large tank, from which it was afterward pumped up to the upper tank again. The flow lasted about three minutes, which gave time for a number of observations, with the flow in alternating directions.

Method of observation. — In the first series of observations a single wire micrometer was used in the eyepiece of the observing telescope, but afterward a double wire micrometer was employed. The tubes being filled with distilled water, the light from an electric lamp was directed toward the central glass of the refractometer and the latter adjusted by screws till the light passed centrally down both tubes, and then the right angled prism at the further end adjusted till the light returned and was reflected into the telescope, where generally two images were observed. These were made to coincide, and the fringes at once appeared. They could then be altered in width or direction by the screws, till the best result was obtained. A slight motion of one of the mirrors produced an inclination of the fringes, and the horizontal wire of the micrometer was placed at the portion of the fringes which remained fixed, notwithstanding the movement of the mirror. This adjustment was frequently verified, and as long as it was true, no motion of the tubes or distortion of the glasses could have any effect on the measurements. During this adjustment it was found convenient to have a slow current of water, to avoid distortions on account of unequal density.

The signal being given the current was turned on, and the micrometer lines set, one on each of the two dark bands on either side of the central bright fringe, and the readings noted. The difference between them gave the width of the fringe, and their mean, the position of the center of the central white fringe. This being verified the signal was given to reverse the current; when the fringes were displaced, and the same measurements taken; and this was continued till the water was all out of the upper tank. Following is a specimen of one such set of observations.

No. 63

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 {|align=center
 * Width of fringe||48.8|| ||60.5
 * Mean width|| ||colspan=2|54.6 + (3.0=index error)
 * Displacement||57.7|| ||46.0
 * Mean displacement|| ||51.8
 * }
 * Mean displacement|| ||51.8
 * }
 * }

$\Delta=\frac{51.8}{57.6}=.899$

(Long tube, vertical fringes, full current.)

Velocity of water. — The velocity of the water in the tubes was found by noting the time required to fill a measured volume in the tank, and multiplying by the ratio of areas of tank and tube. This gave the mean velocity. In order to find from this the maximum velocity in the axis of the tube the curve of velocities for different radii had to be determined. This was done as follows: a tight fitting piston ab (fig. 4) containing two small tubes $$tt,\ t_{\prime},\ t_{\mathit{\prime}}$$, was introduced into the tube containing the water. The ends of the tubes were bent at right angles in opposite ways, so that when the water was in motion the pressure would be greater in one than in the other. The other ends of the small tubes were connected to a U tube containing mercury, the difference in level of which measured the pressure. The pressures were transformed into velocities by measuring the velocity corresponding to a number of pressures. Following is the table of results: —

It is seen from the approximate constancy of the last column that within limits of error of reading, the square roots of the readings of the pressure gauge are proportional to the velocities.

To find the curve of velocities along a diameter of the tube, the piston was moved through measured distances, and the corresponding pressures noted. The diameter of the tube was about $$28^{mm}$$, while that of the small tubes of the gauge was but $$2^{mm}$$, so that the disturbance of the velocity by these latter was small except very close to the walls of the tube. The portion of the piston which projected into the tube was made as thin as possible, but its effect was quite noticeable in altering the symmetry of the curve.

In all, five sets of observations were taken, each with a different current. These being reduced to a common velocity all gave very concordant results, the mean being as follows: x=distance from the axis in terms of radius; v=corresponding velocity in terms of the maximum.

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 {|align=center cellpadding=4 style="text-align:right" .20 .40 .60 .80 .90 .95 1.00||style=text-align:right|1.000 .993 .974 .929 .847 .761 .671 .000
 * x.
 * v.
 * style=text-align:right|0.00
 * style=text-align:right|0.00
 * }

The curve constructed with these numbers coincides almost perfectly with the curve

$v=(1-x^{2})^{.165}$.

The total flow is therefore $$2\pi\int_{0}^{1}(1-x^{2})^{.165}=xdx=\frac{\pi}{1.165}$$. The area of the tube being $$\pi$$, the mean velocity $$=\frac{1}{1.165}$$ of the maximum; or the maximum velocity is 1.165 times the mean. This, then, is the Number by which the velocity, found by timing the flow, must be multiplied to give the actual velocity in the axis of the tube.

Formula.

Let l be the length of the part of the liquid column which is in motion.

 * $$\mu$$ = velocity of light in the stationary liquid.

 * v = velocity of light in vacuo.

 * $$\theta$$ = velocity of the liquid in the axis of tube.

 * $$\theta x$$ = acceleration of the light.

The difference in the time required for the two pencils of light to pass through the liquid will be $$\frac{l}{u-\theta x}-\frac{l}{u+\theta x}=\frac{2l\theta x}{u^{2}}$$ very nearly. If $$\Delta$$ is the double distance traveled in this time in air, in terms of $$\lambda$$, the wave-length, then

 * $$\Delta=\frac{4l\theta n^{2}x}{\lambda v}$$ whence x$$=\frac{\lambda v}{4ln^{2}\theta}\Delta$$.

 * $$\lambda$$ was taken as .00057 cm.

 * v = 30000000000 cm

 * $$n^2$$ = 1.78.

The length l was obtained as follows: The stream entered each tube by two tubes a, b (figs. 1, 2) and left by two similar ones d, c. The beginning of the column was taken as the intersection, o, of the axes of a and b, and the end, as the intersection, o' , of the axes of d and c. Thus $$l=oo'$$. $$\Delta$$ is found by observing the displacement of the fringes; since a displacement of one whole fringe corresponds to a difference of path of one whole wave-length.

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 Observations of the double displacement A.

$\Delta$=double displacement; w=weight of observation.

2d Series. l=6.151, $\theta$=7.65.

3d Series. l=6.151, $\theta=5.67$.

If these results be reduced to what they would be if the tube were $$10^m$$ long and the velocity $$1^m$$ per second, they would be as follows:

The final weighted value of $$\Delta$$ for all observations is $$\Delta=.1840$$. From this, by substitution in the formula, we get

$x=.434$ with a possible error of $\pm.02$.

$\frac{n^{2}-1}{n^{2}}=.437$|undefined

The experiment was also tried with air moving with a velocity of 25 meters per second. The displacement was about $$\tfrac{1}{100}$$ of a fringe; a quantity smaller than the probable error of observation. The value calculated from $$\tfrac{n^{2}-1}{n^{2}}$$ would be .0036.

It is apparent that these results are the same for a long or short tube, or for great or moderate velocities. The result was also found to be unaffected by changing the azimuth of the fringes to 90°, 180° or 270°. It seems extremely improbable that this could be the case if there were any serious constant error due to distortions, etc.

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 The result of this work is therefore that the result announced by Fizeau is essentially correct; and that the luminiferous ether is entirely unaffected by the motion of the matter which it permeates.

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Page:Travels with a Donkey In The Cevennes.djvu/92

74 before. And he looked me all over, his good, honest, brawny countenance shining with interest, as a boy might look upon a lion or an alligator. From him I learned with disgust that I could not be received at our Lady of the Snows; I might get a meal, perhaps, but that was all. And then, as our talk ran on, and it turned out that I was not a pedlar, but a literary man, who drew landscapes and was going to write a book, he changed his manner of thinking as to my reception (for I fear they respect persons even in a Trappist monastery), and told me I must be sure to ask for the Father Prior, and state my case to him in full. On second thoughts he determined to go down with me himself; he thought he could manage for me better. Might he say that I was a geographer?

No; I thought, in the interests of truth, he positively might not. "Very well, then" (with disappointment), "an author." It appeared he had been in a seminary with six young Irishmen, all priests long since, who had


text:
United States Code/Title 42/Chapter 85/Section 7491

§ 7491. Visibility protection for Federal class I areas CAA § 169A

(a) Impairment of visibility; list of areas; study and report

 * (1) Congress hereby declares as a national goal the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment of visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas which impairment results from manmade air pollution.
 * (2) Not later than six months after August 7, 1977, the Secretary of the Interior in consultation with other Federal land managers shall review all mandatory class I Federal areas and identify those where visibility is an important value of the area. From time to time the Secretary of the Interior may revise such identifications. Not later than one year after August 7, 1977, the Administrator shall, after consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, promulgate a list of mandatory class I Federal areas in which he determines visibility is an important value.
 * (3) Not later than eighteen months after August 7, 1977, the Administrator shall complete a study and report to Congress on available methods for implementing the national goal set forth in paragraph (1). Such report shall include recommendations for—
 * (A) methods for identifying, characterizing, determining, quantifying, and measuring visibility impairment in Federal areas referred to in paragraph (1), and
 * (B) modeling techniques (or other methods) for determining the extent to which manmade air pollution may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to such impairment, and
 * (C) methods for preventing and remedying such manmade air pollution and resulting visibility impairment.
 * Such report shall also identify the classes or categories of sources and the types of air pollutants which, alone or in conjunction with other sources or pollutants, may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute significantly to impairment of visibility.
 * (4) Not later than twenty-four months after August 7, 1977, and after notice and public hearing, the Administrator shall promulgate regulations to assure (A) reasonable progress toward meeting the national goal specified in paragraph (1), and (B) compliance with the requirements of this section.

(b) Regulations
Regulations under subsection (a)(4) of this section shall—
 * (1) provide guidelines to the States, taking into account the recommendations under subsection (a)(3) of this section on appropriate techniques and methods for implementing this section (as provided in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such subsection (a)(3)), and
 * (2) require each applicable implementation plan for a State in which any area listed by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) of this section is located (or for a State the emissions from which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to any impairment of visibility in any such area) to contain such emission limits, schedules of compliance and other measures as may be necessary to make reasonable progress toward meeting the national goal specified in subsection (a) of this section, including—
 * (A) except as otherwise provided pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, a requirement that each major stationary source which is in existence on August 7, 1977, but which has not been in operation for more than fifteen years as of such date, and which, as determined by the State (or the Administrator in the case of a plan promulgated under section 7410 (c) of this title) emits any air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to any impairment of visibility in any such area, shall procure, install, and operate, as expeditiously as practicable (and maintain thereafter) the best available retrofit technology, as determined by the State (or the Administrator in the case of a plan promulgated under section 7410 (c) of this title) for controlling emissions from such source for the purpose of eliminating or reducing any such impairment, and
 * (B) a long-term (ten to fifteen years) strategy for making reasonable progress toward meeting the national goal specified in subsection (a) of this section.
 * In the case of a fossil-fuel fired generating powerplant having a total generating capacity in excess of 750 megawatts, the emission limitations required under this paragraph shall be determined pursuant to guidelines, promulgated by the Administrator under paragraph (1).

(c) Exemptions

 * (1) The Administrator may, by rule, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, exempt any major stationary source from the requirement of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section, upon his determination that such source does not or will not, by itself or in combination with other sources, emit any air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to a significant impairment of visibility in any mandatory class I Federal area.
 * (2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable to any fossil-fuel fired powerplant with total design capacity of 750 megawatts or more, unless the owner or operator of any such plant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Administrator that such powerplant is located at such distance from all areas listed by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) of this section that such powerplant does not or will not, by itself or in combination with other sources, emit any air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to significant impairment of visibility in any such area.
 * (3) An exemption under this subsection shall be effective only upon concurrence by the appropriate Federal land manager or managers with the Administrator’s determination under this subsection.

(d) Consultations with appropriate Federal land managers
Before holding the public hearing on the proposed revision of an applicable implementation plan to meet the requirements of this section, the State (or the Administrator, in the case of a plan promulgated under section 7410 (c) of this title) shall consult in person with the appropriate Federal land manager or managers and shall include a summary of the conclusions and recommendations of the Federal land managers in the notice to the public.

(e) Buffer zones
In promulgating regulations under this section, the Administrator shall not require the use of any automatic or uniform buffer zone or zones.

(f) Nondiscretionary duty
For purposes of section 7604 (a)(2) of this title, the meeting of the national goal specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section by any specific date or dates shall not be considered a “nondiscretionary duty” of the Administrator.

(g) Definitions
For the purpose of this section—
 * (1) in determining reasonable progress there shall be taken into consideration the costs of compliance, the time necessary for compliance, and the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of compliance, and the remaining useful life of any existing source subject to such requirements;
 * (2) in determining best available retrofit technology the State (or the Administrator in determining emission limitations which reflect such technology) shall take into consideration the costs of compliance, the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of compliance, any existing pollution control technology in use at the source, the remaining useful life of the source, and the degree of improvement in visibility which may reasonably be anticipated to result from the use of such technology;
 * (3) the term “manmade air pollution” means air pollution which results directly or indirectly from human activities;
 * (4) the term “as expeditiously as practicable” means as expeditiously as practicable but in no event later than five years after the date of approval of a plan revision under this section (or the date of promulgation of such a plan revision in the case of action by the Administrator under section 7410 (c) of this title for purposes of this section);
 * (5) the term “mandatory class I Federal areas” means Federal areas which may not be designated as other than class I under this part;
 * (6) the terms “visibility impairment” and “impairment of visibility” shall include reduction in visual range and atmospheric discoloration; and
 * (7) the term “major stationary source” means the following types of stationary sources with the potential to emit 250 tons or more of any pollutant: fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants of more than 250 million British thermal units per hour heat input, coal cleaning plants (thermal dryers), kraft pulp mills, Portland Cement plants, primary zinc smelters, iron and steel mill plants, primary aluminum ore reduction plants, primary copper smelters, municipal incinerators capable of charging more than 250 tons of refuse per day, hydrofluoric, sulfuric, and nitric acid plants, petroleum refineries, lime plants, phosphate rock processing plants, coke oven batteries, sulfur recovery plants, carbon black plants (furnace process), primary lead smelters, fuel conversion plants, sintering plants, secondary metal production facilities, chemical process plants, fossil-fuel boilers of more than 250 million British thermal units per hour heat input, petroleum storage and transfer facilities with a capacity exceeding 300,000 barrels, taconite ore processing facilities, glass fiber processing plants, charcoal production facilities.


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Rh received newspapers and kept him informed of the state of ecclesiastical affairs in England. And he asked me eagerly after Dr. Pusey, for whose conversion the good man had continued ever since to pray night and morning. "I thought he was very near the truth," he said; "and he will reach it yet; there is so much virtue in prayer." He must be a stiff ungodly Protestant who can take anything but pleasure in this kind and hopeful story. While he was thus near the subject, the good father asked me if I were a Christian; and when he found I was not, or not after his way, he glossed it over with great good-will. The road which we were following, and which this stalwart father had made with his own two hands within the space of a year, came to a corner, and showed us some white buildings a little further on beyond the wood. At the same time, the bell once more sounded abroad. We were hard upon the monastery. Father Apollinaris (for that was my companion's name) stopped me.

"I must not speak to you down there," he said.


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Page:VCH Suffolk 1.djvu/5

 The Victoria History of the Counties of England

EDITED BY WILLIAM PAGE, F.S.A.

A HISTORY OF SUFFOLK

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOLUME I

title: Page:VCH Suffolk 1.djvu/5


text:
United States Code/Title 42/Chapter 85/Section 7492

§ 7492. Visibility CAA § 169B

(a) Studies

 * (1) The Administrator, in conjunction with the National Park Service and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall conduct research to identify and evaluate sources and source regions of both visibility impairment and regions that provide predominantly clean air in class I areas. A total of $8,000,000 per year for 5 years is authorized to be appropriated for the Environmental Protection Agency and the other Federal agencies to conduct this research. The research shall include—
 * (A) expansion of current visibility related monitoring in class I areas;
 * (B) assessment of current sources of visibility impairing pollution and clean air corridors;
 * (C) adaptation of regional air quality models for the assessment of visibility;
 * (D) studies of atmospheric chemistry and physics of visibility.
 * (2) Based on the findings available from the research required in subsection (a)(1) of this section as well as other available scientific and technical data, studies, and other available information pertaining to visibility source-receptor relationships, the Administrator shall conduct an assessment and evaluation that identifies, to the extent possible, sources and source regions of visibility impairment including natural sources as well as source regions of clear air for class I areas. The Administrator shall produce interim findings from this study within 3 years after November 15, 1990.

(b) Impacts of other provisions
Within 24 months after November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall conduct an assessment of the progress and improvements in visibility in class I areas that are likely to result from the implementation of the provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 other than the provisions of this section. Every 5 years thereafter the Administrator shall conduct an assessment of actual progress and improvement in visibility in class I areas. The Administrator shall prepare a written report on each assessment and transmit copies of these reports to the appropriate committees of Congress.

(1) Authority to establish visibility transport regions

 * Whenever, upon the Administrator’s motion or by petition from the Governors of at least two affected States, the Administrator has reason to believe that the current or projected interstate transport of air pollutants from one or more States contributes significantly to visibility impairment in class I areas located in the affected States, the Administrator may establish a transport region for such pollutants that includes such States. The Administrator, upon the Administrator’s own motion or upon petition from the Governor of any affected State, or upon the recommendations of a transport commission established under subsection (b) of this section may—
 * (A) add any State or portion of a State to a visibility transport region when the Administrator determines that the interstate transport of air pollutants from such State significantly contributes to visibility impairment in a class I area located within the transport region, or
 * (B) remove any State or portion of a State from the region whenever the Administrator has reason to believe that the control of emissions in that State or portion of the State pursuant to this section will not significantly contribute to the protection or enhancement of visibility in any class I area in the region.

(2) Visibility transport commissions

 * Whenever the Administrator establishes a transport region under subsection (c)(1) of this section, the Administrator shall establish a transport commission comprised of (as a minimum) each of the following members:
 * (A) the Governor of each State in the Visibility Transport Region, or the Governor’s designee;
 * (B) The Administrator or the Administrator’s designee; and
 * (C) A representative of each Federal agency charged with the direct management of each class I area or areas within the Visibility Transport Region.

(3) Ex officio members

 * All representatives of the Federal Government shall be ex officio members.

(4) Federal Advisory Committee Act

 * The visibility transport commissions shall be exempt from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act [5 U.S.C. App.].

(d) Duties of visibility transport commissions
A Visibility Transport Commission—
 * (1) shall assess the scientific and technical data, studies, and other currently available information, including studies conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section, pertaining to adverse impacts on visibility from potential or projected growth in emissions from sources located in the Visibility Transport Region; and
 * (2) shall, within 4 years of establishment, issue a report to the Administrator recommending what measures, if any, should be taken under this chapter to remedy such adverse impacts. The report required by this subsection shall address at least the following measures:
 * (A) the establishment of clean air corridors, in which additional restrictions on increases in emissions may be appropriate to protect visibility in affected class I areas;
 * (B) the imposition of the requirements of part D of this subchapter affecting the construction of new major stationary sources or major modifications to existing sources in such clean air corridors specifically including the alternative siting analysis provisions of section 7503 (a)(5) of this title; and
 * (C) the promulgation of regulations under section 7491 of this title to address long range strategies for addressing regional haze which impairs visibility in affected class I areas.

(e) Duties of Administrator

 * (1) The Administrator shall, taking into account the studies pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section and the reports pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of this section and any other relevant information, within eighteen months of receipt of the report referred to in subsection (d)(2) of this section, carry out the Administrator’s regulatory responsibilities under section 7491 of this title, including criteria for measuring “reasonable progress” toward the national goal.
 * (2) Any regulations promulgated under section 7491 of this title pursuant to this subsection shall require affected States to revise within 12 months their implementation plans under section 7410 of this title to contain such emission limits, schedules of compliance, and other measures as may be necessary to carry out regulations promulgated pursuant to this subsection.

(f) Grand Canyon visibility transport commission
The Administrator pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section shall, within 12 months, establish a visibility transport commission for the region affecting the visibility of the Grand Canyon National Park.


text: Category:Moroccan authors

title: Category:Moroccan authors


text:
Cole v. City of La Grange

This was an action to recover the amount of coupons for interest from January 1, 1873, to January 1, 1880, attached to 25 bonds, all exactly alike, except in their serial numbers, and one of which was as follows:

'UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF MISSOURI, CITY OF LA     GRANGE.

'No. 23.

$1,000.

'Know all men by these presents, that the city of La Grange     doth, for a good, sufficient, and valuable consideration,      promise to pay to the La Grange Iron and Steel Company, or bearer, the sum of one thousand dollars, in current funds, thirty years after the date hereof, at the Third National Bank, city of New York, together with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable annually in current funds, on the first day of each January and July ensuing the date hereof, on presentation and surrender of the annexed interest coupons at said Third National Bank.

'This bond is issued under an ordinance of the city council of the said city of La Grange, passed and approved September 22, 1871, under and in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Missouri, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled an act to incorporate the city of La Grange,' approved March 9, 1871, which became a law and went into force and effect from and after its said approval.

'This bond to be negotiable and transferable by delivery thereof.

'In testimony whereof, the city council of the city of LaGrange hath hereunto caused to be affixed the corporate seal of said city, and these presents to be signed by the mayor, and countersigned by the clerk, of the city council of said city, this fourteenth day of December, 1871.

[Seal.]

'J. A. HAY, Mayor.

'R. McChesney, Clerk.'

The petition alleged that the city of La Grange, on December 14, 1871, executed the 25 bonds, and delivered them to the La Grange Iron & Steel Company, under and by virtue of the authority contained in section 1 of article 6 of the city charter, as amended by an act of the legislature of Missouri, approved March 9, 1871, (which section, as thus amended, was set forth in the petition, and is copied in the margin, ) and under and by virtue of an ordinance of the city, dated September 22, 1871, by which an election was authorized to be held in the city on October 4, 1871, to test the sense of the people of the city upon the question of issuing the bonds; that, in compliance with the ordinance and with the city charter, an election was held at which the proposition was adopted by a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters; and that on September 1, 1872, the plaintiff bought the 25 bonds, for value, relying upon the recitals on their face, without knowledge of any irregularity or defect in their issue,-of all which the defendant had notice, by means whereof the defendant became liable and promised to pay to the plaintiff the sums specified in the coupons, according to their tenor and effect.

The answer denied all the allegations of the petition; and for further answer averred that the act of the legislature mentioned in the petition, approved March 9, 1871, attempted to give, and by terms did give, to the city authority to make gifts and donations to private manufacturing associations and corporations; that the city council, purporting to act under such authority, by an ordinance adopted September 22, 1871, (which was referred to in the answer and is copied in the margin, ) did submit to a vote of the citizens a proposition to give or donate to the La Grange Iron & Steel Company, a private manufacturing company, formed and established for the purpose of carrying on and operating a rolling-mill, the sum of $200,000; that, in accordance with that ordinance, the bonds of the city were issued, with interest coupons attached, a part of which were those sued on; and that the bonds and coupons were issued to said manufacturing company, which was a strictly private enterprise, formed and prosecuted for the purpose of private gain, and which had nothing whatever of a public character, and it was incompetent for the legislature to grant authority to cities or towns to make donations and issue bonds to mere private companies or associations having no public functions to perform, and the act of the legislature and the ordinance of the city were void; wherefore the bonds and coupons were issued without any legal authority, and were wholly void.

To this answer the plaintiff filed a general demurrer, which was overruled by the court, and, the plaintiff electing to stand by his demurrer, judgment was entered for the defendant. 19 Fed. Rep. 871. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.

''Geo. A. Sanders'' for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 4-6 intentionally omitted]

David Wagner, for defendant in error.

GRAY, J.

title: Cole v. City of La Grange


text: Talk:Cole v. City of La Grange

title: Talk:Cole v. City of La Grange


text:
Cole v. City of La Grange/Opinion of the Court

The general grant of legislative power in the constitution of a state does not enable the legislature, in the exercise either of the right of eminent domain or of the right of taxation, to take private property, without the owner's consent, for any but a public object. Nor can the legislature authorize counties, cities, or towns to contract, for private objects, debts which must be paid by taxes. It cannot, therefore, authorize them to issue bonds to assist merchants or manufacturers, whether natural persons or corporations, in their private business. These limits of the legislative power are now too firmly established by judicial decisions to require extended argument upon the subject.

In Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, bonds of a city, issued, as appeared on their face, pursuant to an act of the legislature of Kansas, to a manufacturing corporation, to aid it in establishing shops in the city for the manufacture of iron bridges, were held by this court to be void, even in the hands of a purchaser in good faith and for value. A like decision was made in Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487; S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 442. The decisions in the courts of the states are to the same effect. Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; In re Eureka Co. 96 N. Y. 42; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249; English v. People, 96 Ill. 566; ''Central Branch U. Pac. R. Co. v. Smith'', 23 Kan. 745. We have been referred to no opposing decision. The cases of Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U.S. 86, and Ottawa v. National Bank, 105 U.S. 342, were decided, as the chief justice pointed out in Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.S. 110, 118, S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 361, upon the ground that the bonds in suit appeared on their face to have been issued for municipal purposes, and were therefore valid in the hands of bona fide holders. In Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U.S. 407, the town subscription was towards the establishment of a state reform school, which was undoubtedly a public purpose, and the question in controversy was whether it was a corporate purpose within the meaning of the constitution of Illinois. In Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310, the grist-mill, held to be a work of internal improvement, to aid in constructing which a town might issue bonds under the statutes of Kansas, was a public mill which ground for toll for all customers. See Osborne v. Adams Co. 106 U.S. 181; S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 168; and 109 U.S. 1; S.C.. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 150; Blair v. Cuming Co. 111 U.S. 363; S.C.. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 449. Subscriptions and bonds of towns and cities, under legislative authority, to aid in establishing railroads, have been sustained on the same ground on which the delegation to railroad corporations of the sovereign right of eminent domain has been justified,-the accommodation of public travel. Regers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 661, 662; Taylor v. Tpsilanti, 105 U.S. 60. Statutes authorizing towns and cities to pay bounties to soldiers have been upheld, because the raising of soldiers is a public duty. Middleton v. Township of Mullica, 112 U.S. 433; S.C.., ante, 198; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154; State v. Richland Tp. 20 Ohio St. 362; Agawam v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528, 534.

The express provisions of the constitution of Missouri tend to the same conclusion. It begins with a declaration of rights, the sixteenth article of which declares that 'no private property ought to be taken or applied to public use without just compensation.' This clearly presupposes that private property cannot be taken for private use. St. Louis Co. Ct. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, 193; 2 Kent, Comm. 339 note, 340. Otherwise, as it makes no provision for compensation except when the use is public, it would permit private property to be taken or appropriated for private use without any compensation whatever. It is true that this article regards the right of eminent domain, and not the power to tax; for the taking of property by taxation requires no other compensation than the tax-payer receives in being protected by the government to the support of which he contributes. But, so far as respects the use, the taking of private property by taxation is subject to the same limit as the taking by the right of eminent domain. Each is a taking by the state for the public use, and not to promote private ends.

The only other provisions of the constitution of Missouri, having any relation to the subject, are the following sections of the eleventh article: 'Sec. 13. The credit of the state shall not be given or loaned in aid of any person, association, or corporation; nor shall the state hereafter become a stockholder in any corporation or association, except for the purpose of securing loans heretofore extended to certain railroad corporations by the state. Sec. 14. The general assembly shall not authorize any county, city, or town to become a stockholder in, or loan its credit to, any company, association, or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city, or town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall assent thereto.' Both these sections are restrictive, and not enabling. The thirteenth section peremptorily denies to the state the power of giving or lending its credit to, or becoming a stockholder in, any corporation whatever. The aim of the fourteenth section is to forbid the legislature to authorize counties, cities, or towns, without the assent of the tax-payers, to become stockholders in, or to lend their credit to, any corporation, however public its object, (State v. Curators State Univ. 57 Mo. 178;) not to permit them to be authorized, under any circumstances, to raise or spend money for private purposes.

It is averred in the answer, and admitted by the demurrer, that the La Grange Iron & Steel Company, to which the bonds were issued, was 'a private manufacturing company, formed for the purpose of carrying on and operating a rolling-mill,' and 'was a strictly private enterprise, formed and prosecuted for the purpose of private gain, and which had nothing whatever of a public character.' The ordinance referred to shows that the mill was to manufacture railroad iron; but that is no more a public use than the manufacture of iron bridges, as in the Topeka Case, or the making of blocks of stone or wood for paving streets. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the act of the legislature of Missouri is unconstitutional, and that the bonds, expressed to be issued in pursuance of that act, are void upon their face. As for this reason the action cannot be maintained, it is needless to dwell upon the point that the answer demurred to, besides the special defense of the unconstitutionality of the act, contains a general denial of the allegations in the petition. That point was mentioned and passed over in the opinion of the circuit court, and was not alluded to in argument here, the parties in effect assuming the general denial in the answer to have been withdrawn or waived, and the case submitted for decision upon the validity of the special defense.

Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Cole v. City of La Grange/Opinion of the Court


text:
Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing

This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the supreme court of the state of New Hampshire against the plaintiff in error, upon a petition filed by the defendant in error (a corporation established by the laws of New Hampshire for the manufacture of cotton, woolen, iron, and other materials) for the assessment of damages for the flowing of his land by its mill-dam at Amoskeag falls on the Merrimack river, under the general mill act of that state of 1868, c. 20, which is copied in the margin.

In the petition filed in the state court, the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company alleged that it had been authorized by its charter to purchase and hold real estate, and to erect thereon such dams, canals, mills, buildings, machines, and works as it might deem necessary or useful in carrying on its manufactures and business; that it had purchased the land on both sides of the Merrimack river at Amoskeag falls, including the river and falls, and had there built mills, dug canals, and established works, at the cost of several millions of dollars, and, for the purpose of making the whole power of the river at the falls available for the use of those mills, had constructed a dam across the river; that the construction of the mills and dam, to raise the water for working the mills, for creating a reservoir of water, and for equalizing its flow, was of public use and benefit to the people of the state, and necessary for the use of the mills for which it was designed; and that Head, the owner of a tract of land described in the petition, and bounded by the river, claimed damages for the overflowing thereof by the dam, which the corporation had been unable satisfactorily to adjust; and prayed that it might be determined whether the construction of the mills and dam, and the flowing, if any, of Head's land to the depth and extent that it might or could be flowed thereby, were or might be of public use or benefit to the people of the state, and whether they were necessary for the mills, and that damages, past or future, to the land by the construction of the dam might be assessed according to the statute.

At successive stages of the proceedings, by demurrer, by request to the court after the introduction of the evidence upon a trial by jury, and by motion in arrest of judgment, Head objected that the statute was unconstitutional, and that the petition could not be maintained, because they contemplated the taking of his property for private use, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; as well as in violation of the constitution of the state, the bill of rights of which declares that all men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights, among which are the acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and that every member of the community has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of his property. His objections were overruled by the highest court of New Hampshire, and final judgment was entered, adjudging that the facts alleged in the petition were true, and that, upon payment or tender of the damages assessed by the verdict, with interest, and 50 per cent. added, making in all the sum of $572.43, the company have the right to erect and maintain the dam, and to flow his land forever to the depth and extent to which it might or could be flowed or injured thereby. 56 N. H. 386, and 59 N. H. 332, 563.

C. R. Morrison, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 12-14 intentionally omitted]

''Geo. F. Hoar and B. Wadleigh'', for defendant in error.

GRAY, J.

title: Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing


text: Talk:Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing

title: Talk:Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing


text:
Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing/Opinion of the Court

The position that the plaintiff in error has been denied the equal protection of the laws, was not insisted upon at the argument. The single question presented for decision is whether he has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. It is only as bearing upon that question that this court, upon a writ of error to a state court, has jurisdiction to consider whether the statute conforms to the constitution of the state. The charter of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, which authorized it to erect and maintain its mills and dam, gave it no right to flow the lands of others. Eastman v. Amoskeag Manuf'g Co. 44 N. H. 143. The proceedings in the state court were had under the general mill act of New Hampshire, which enacts that any person, or any corporation authorized by its charter so to do, may erect or maintain on his or its own land a water mill and mill-dam upon any stream not navigable, paying to the owners of lands flowed the damages which, upon a petition filed in court by either party, may be assessed, by a committee or by a jury, for the flowing of the lands to the depth and extent to which they may or can be flowed by the dam. N. H. St. 1868, c. 20.

The plaintiff in error contends that his property has been taken by the state of New Hampshire for private use, and that any taking of private property for private use is without due process of law. The defendant in error contends that the raising of a water-power upon a running stream for manufacturing purposes is a public use; that the statute is a constitutional regulation of the rights of riparian owners; and that the remedy given by the statute is due process of law. General mill acts exist in a great majority of the states of the union. Such acts, authorizing lands to be taken or flowed in invitum, for the erection and maintenance of mills, existed in Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and North Carolina, as well as in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, before the declaration of independence; and exist at this day in each of these states, except Maryland, where they were repealed in 1832. One passed in North Carolina, in 1777, has remained upon the statute book of Tennessee. They were enacted in Maine, Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas soon after their admission into the union. They were passed in Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida while they were yet territories, and re-enacted after they became states. They were also enacted in Pennsylvania in 1803, in Connecticut in 1864, and more recently in Vermont, Kansas, Oregon, West Virginia, and Georgia, but were afterwards repealed in Georgia. The principal statutes of the several states are collected in the margin.

In most of those states their validity has been assumed without dispute, and they were never adjudged to be invalid anywhere until since 1870, and then in three states only, and for incompatibility with their respective constitutions. Loughbridge v. Harris, (1871,) 42 Ga. 500; Tyler v. Beacher, (1871,) 44 Vt. 648; Ryerson v. Brown, (1877,) 35 Mich. 333. The earlier cases in Tennessee, Alabama, and New York, containing dicta to the same effect, were decided upon other grounds. Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 40; Memphis City R. Co. v. Memphis, 4 Cold. 406; Moore v. Wright, 34 ala. 311, 333; bottoms v. Brewer, 54 Ala. 288; Hay v. Cohoes Co.3 Barb. 42, 47, and 2 N. Y. 159. The principle objects, no doubt, of the earlier acts were grist-mills, and it has been generally admitted, even by those courts which have entertained the mo st restricted view of the legislative power, that a grist-mill which grinds for all comers, at tolls fixed by law, is for a public use. See, also, Blair v. Cuming Co. 111 U.S. 363; S.C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 449. But the statutes of many states are not so limited, either in terms or in the usage under them. In Massachusetts, for more than half a century, the mill acts have been extended to mills for any manufacturing purpose. Mass. St. 1824, c. 153; Wolcott Woollen Manu f'g Co. v. Upham, 5 Pick. 292; Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58, 65. And throughout New England, as well as in Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and many of the western states, the statutes are equally comprehensive.

It has been held, in many cases of high authority, that special acts of incorporation, granted by the legislature for the establishment of dams to increase and improve the water-power of rivers and navigable waters, for mechanical and manufacturing purposes, are for a public use. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co. Saxt. 694, 728, 729; Boston & R. Mill Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467; Hazen v. Essex Co. 12 Cush. 475; Com. v. Essex Co. 13 Gray, 239, 251, 252; Hankins v. Lawrence, 8 Blackf. 266; Great Falls Manuf'g Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. In some of those cases, the authority conferred by general mill acts upon any owner of land upon a stream to erect and maintain a mill on his own land and to flow the land of others, for manufacturing purposes, has been considered as resting on the right of eminent domain, by reason of the advantages inuring to the public from the improvement of water-power and the promotion of manufactures. See, also, Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 506, 507; Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co. 3 Paige, 45, 73; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 426. And the validity of general mill acts, when directly controverted, has often been upheld upon that ground, confirmed by long usage or prior decisions. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Todd v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78; Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 248; Harding v. Funk, Id. 315; Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 282, (Gil. 282;) Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71, (2 Pin. 131;) Fisher v. Horicon Co. 10 Wis. 351; Babb v. Mackey, Id. 371; Burnham v. Thompson, 35 Iowa, 421.

In New Hampshire, from which the present case comes, the legislature of the province, in 1718, passed an act (for the most part copied from the Massachusetts act of 1714) authorizing the owners of mills to flow lands of others, paying damages assessed by a jury. The act of 1718 continued in force until the adoption of the first constitution of the state in 1784, and afterwards until June 20, 1792, and was then repealed, upon a general revision of the statutes, shortly before the state constitution of 1792 took effect. The provisions of the bill of rights, on which the plaintiff in error relied in the court below, were exactly alike in the two constitutions. Special acts, authorizing the flowing of lands upon the payment of damages, were passed afterwards from time to time; among others, the statute of July 8, 1862, authorizing the Great Falls Manufacturing Company to erect a dam upon Salmon Falls river, which was adjudged by the supreme judicial court of New Hampshire, in 1867, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice PERLEY, to be consistent with the constitution of that state, because the taking authorized was for a public use. Great Falls Manuf'g Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. The statute now in question, the first general mill act passed by the legislature of the state, was passed and took effect on July 3, 1868; was held in Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591, after elaborate argument against it, to be constitutional, upon the ground of the decision in Great Falls Manuf'g Co. v. Fernald; and was enforced without question in Pollard v. Moore, 51 N. H. 188, and in Town v. Faulkner, 56 N. H. 255. In the case at bar, and in another case since, the state court held its constitutionality to be settled by the former decisions. Amoskeag Manuf'g Co. v. Head, 56 N. H. 386, and 59 N. H. 332, 563; Same v. Worcester, 60 N. H. 522.

The question whether the erection and maintenance of mills for manufacturing purposes under a general mill act, of which any owner of land upon a stream not navigable may avail himself at will, can be upheld as a taking, by delegation of the right of eminent domain, of private property for public use, in the constitutional sense, is so important and far reaching, that it does not become this court to express an opinion upon it, when not required for the determination of the rights of the parties before it. We prefer to rest the decision of this case upon the ground that such a statute, considered as regulating the manner in which the rights of proprietors of lands adjacent to a stream may be asserted and enjoyed, with a due regard to the interests of all, and to the public good, is within the constitutional power of the legislature. When property, in which several persons have a common interest, cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition, the law often provides a way in which they may compel one another to submit to measures necessary to secure its beneficial enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose control of or interest in the property is thereby modified.

In the familiar case of land held by several tenants in common, or even by joint tenants with right of survivorship, any one of them may compel a partition, upon which the court, if the land cannot be equally divided, will order owelty to be paid, or, in many states, under statutes the constitutionality of which has never been denied, will, if the estate is such that it cannot be divided, either set it off to one and order him to compensate the others in money, or else order the whole estate to be sold. King v. Reed, 11 Gray, 490; Bentley v. Long Dock Co. 1 McCart. 480; S.C.. on appeal, ''nom. Manners v. Bentley'', 2 McCart. 501; Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210; Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94. Water rights held in common, incapable of partition at law, may be the subject of partition in equity, either by apportioning the time and extent of use, or by a sale of the right and a division of the proceeds. Smith v. Smith, 10 Paige, 470; DeWitt v. Harvey, 4 Gray, 486; McGillivray v. Evans, 27 Cal. 92.

At the common law, as Lord COKE tells us, 'if two tenants in common, or joint tenants, be of an house or mill, and it fall in decay, and the one is willing to repair the same, and the other will not, he that is willing shall have a writ de reparatione facienda; and the writ saith, ad reparationem et sustentationem ejusdem domus teneantur; whereby it appeareth that owners are in that case bound pro bono publico to maintain houses and mills which are for habitation and use of men.' Co. Litt. 200 b; 4 Kent, Comm. 370. In the same spirit, the statutes of Massachusetts, for 175 years, have provided that any tenant in common, of a mill in need of repair, may notify a general meeting of all the owners for consultation, and that, if any one refuses to attend, or to agree with the majority, or to pay his share, the majority may cause the repairs to be made, and recover his share of the expenses out of the mill or its profits or earnings. Mass. Prov. St. 1709, c. 3, 1 Prov. Laws (State Ed.) 641, and Anc. Chart. 388; St. 1795, c. 74, §§ 5-7; Rev. St. 1836, c. 116, §§ 44-58; Gen. St. 1860, c. 149, §§ 53-64; Pub. St. 1882, c. 190, §§ 59-70. And the statutes of New Hampshire, for more than 80 years, have made provision for compelling the repair of mills in such cases. Roberts v. Peavey, 7 Fost. 477, 493.

The statutes which have long existed in many states, authorizing the majority of the owners in severalty of adjacent meadow or swamp lands to have commissioners appointed to drain and improve the whole tract, by cutting ditches, or otherwise, and to assess and levy the amount of the expense upon all the proprietors in proportion to the benefits received, have been often upheld, independently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are treated for this purpose as owners of a common property. Coomes v. Burt, 22 Pick. 422; Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush. 233, 241; Sherman v. Tobey, 3 Allen, 7; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 469; French v. Kirkland, 1 Paige, 117; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 438; Coster v. Tide-water Co. 3 C. E. Green, 54, 68, 518, 531; O'Reiley v. Kankakee Valley Draining Co. 32 Ind. 169.

By the maritime law, based, as Lord TENTERDEN observed, on the consideration that the actual employment of ships is 'a matter, not merely of private advantage to the owners, but of public benefit to the state,' and recognized in the decisions and the rules of this court, courts of admiralty may, when the part owners of a ship cannot agree upon her employment, authorize the majority to send her to sea, on giving security to the dissenting minority to bring back and restore the ship, or, if she be lost, to pay them the value of their shares; and in such case the minority can neither recover part of the profits of the voyage nor compensation for the use of the ship. Abb. Shipp. pt. 1, c. 3, §§ 2, 3; The Orleans, 11 Pet. 175, 183; Rule 20, in admiralty, 3 How. 7; The Marengo, 1 Low. 52. If the part owners are equally divided in opinion upon the manner of employing the ship, then, according to the general maritime law, recognized and applied by Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, the ship may be ordered to be sold and the proceeds distributed among them. The Seneca, 18 Amer. Jur. 486; S.C.. 3 Wall. Jr. 395. See, also, Story, Partn. § 439; The Nelly Schneider, L. R. 3 Prob. Div. 152.

But none of the cases, thus put by way of illustration, so strongly call for the interposition of the law as the case before us.

The right to the use of running water is publici juris, and common to all the proprietors of the bed and banks of the stream from its source to its outlet. Each has a right to the reasonable use of the water as it flows past his land, not interfering with a like reasonable use by those above or below him. One reasonable use of the water is the use of the power, inherent in the fall of the stream and the force of the current, to drive mills. That power cannot be used without damming up the water, and thereby causing it to flow back. If the water thus dammed up by one riparian proprietor spread over the lands of others, they could at common law bring successive actions against him for the injury so done them, or even have the dam abated. Before the mill acts, therefore, it was often impossible for a riparian proprietor to use the water-power at all, without the consent of those above him. The purpose of these statutes is to enable any riparian proprietor to erect a mill and use the water-power of the stream, provided he does not interfere with an earlier exercise by another of a like right or with any right of the public; and to substitute, for the common-law remedies of repeated actions for damages and prostration of the dam, a new form of remedy, by which any one whose land is flowed can have assessed, once for all, either in a gross sum or by way of annual damages, adequate compensation for the injury.

This view of the principle upon which general mill acts rest has been fully and clearly expounded in the judgments delivered by Chief Justice SHAW in the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts.

In delivering the opinion of the court in a case decided in 1832, he said: 'The statute of 1796 is but a revision of a former law, and the origin of these regulations is to be found in the provincial statute of 1714. They are somewhat at variance with that absolute right of dominion and enjoyment which every proprietor is supposed by law to have in his own soil; and in ascertaining their extent it will be useful to inquire into the principle upon which they are founded. We think they will be found to rest for their justification partly upon the interest which the community at large has in the use and employment of mills, and partly upon the nature of the property, which is often so situated that it could not be beneficially used without the aid of this power. A stream of water often runs through the lands of several proprietors. One may have a sufficient mill-site on his own land, with ample space on his own land for a mill-pond or reservoir, but yet, from the operation of the well-known physical law that fluids will seek and find a level, he cannot use his own property without flowing the water back more or less on the lands of some other proprietor. We think the power given by statute was intended to apply to such cases, and that the legislature meant to provide that, as the public interest in such case coincides with that of the mill-owner, and as the mill-owner and the owner of lands to be flowed cannot both enjoy their full rights, without some interference, the latter shall yield to the former, so far that the former may keep up his mill and head of water, notwithstanding the damage done to the latter, upon payment of an equitable compensation for the real damage sustained, to be ascertained in the mode provided by the statute.' 'From this view of the object and purpose of the statute, we think it quitemanifest that it was designed to provide for the most useful and beneficial occupation and enjoyment of natural streams and water-courses, where the absolute right of each proprietor to use his own land and water privileges, at his own pleasure, cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of necessity, in some degree, yield to the other.' Fiske v. Framingham Manuf'g Co. 12 Pick. 68, 70-72.

In another case, decided almost 20 years later, he said: 'The relative rights of land-owners and mill-owners are founded on the established rule of the common law that every proprietor, through whose territory a current of water flows in its course towards the sea, has an equal right to the use of it, for all reasonable and beneficial purposes, including the power of such stream for driving mills, subject to a like reasonable and beneficial use by the proprietors above him and below him on the same stream. Consequently, no one can deprive another of his equal right and beneficial use by corrupting the stream, by wholly diverting it, or stopping it from the proprietor below him, or raise it artificially, so as to cause it to flow back on the land of the proprietor above. This rule, in this commonwealth, is slightly modified by the mill acts, by the well-known provision that when a proprietor erects a dam on his own land, and the effect is, by the necessary operation of natural laws, that the water sets back upon some land of the proprietor above,-a consequence which he may not propose as a distinct purpose, but cannot prevent,-he shall not thereby be regarded as committing a tort, and obliged to prostrate his dam, but may keep up his dam, paying annual or gross damages, the equitable assessment of which is provided for by the acts. It is not a right to take and use the land of the proprietor above against his will, but it is an authority to use his own land and water privilege to his own advantage and for the benefit of the community. It is a provision by law for regulating the rights of proprietors on one and the same stream, from its rise to its outlet, in a manner best calculated, on the whole, to promote and secure their common rights in it.' Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co. 8 Cush. 548, 552, 553.

Other opinions of Chief Justice SHAW illustrate the same view. Williams v. Nelson, 23 Pick. 141, 143; French v. Braintree Manuf'g Co. 23 Pick. 216, 218-221; Cary v. Daniels, 8 Metc. 466, 476, 477; Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 113, 116; Gould v. Boston Duck Co. 13 Gray, 442, 450. It finds more or less distinct expression in other authorities. Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 464-466; U.S. v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76, 88; Waddy v. Johnson, 5 Ired. Law, 333, 339; Jones v. Skinner, 61 Me. 25, 28; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 547, 550; Chief Justice REDFIELD, in 12 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 498-500. And no case has been cited in which it has been considered and rejected.

Upon principle and authority, therefore, independently of any weight due to the opinions of the courts of New Hampshire and other states, maintaining the validity of general mill acts as taking private property for public use, in the strict constitutional meaning of that phrase, the statute under which the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company has flowed the land in question is clearly valid as a just and reasonable exercise of the power of the legislature, having regard to the public good, in a more general sense, as well as to the rights of the riparian proprietors, to regulate the use of the water-power of running streams, which without some such regulation could not be beneficially used. The statute does not authorize new mills to be erected to the detriment of existing mills and mill privileges. And by providing for an assessment of full compensation to the owners of lands flowed, it avoids the difficulty which arose in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 13 Wall. 166. Being a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and providing a suitable remedy, by trial in the regular course of justice, to recover compensation for the injury to the land of the plaintiff in error, it has not deprived him of his property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516; S.C.. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 111; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U.S. 701; S.C.. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 663.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD did not sit in this case, or take any part in its decision.


text: Talk:Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing/Opinion of the Court


text:
Barbier v. Connolly

On the eighth of April, 1884, the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco, the legislative authority of that municipality, passed an ordinance reciting that the indiscriminate establishment of public laundries and wash-houses, where clothes and other articles were cleansed for hire, endangered the public health and the public safety, prejudiced the well-being and comfort of the community, and depreciated the value of property in their neighborhood; and then ordaining, pursuant to authority alleged to be vested in the board under provisions of the state constitution, and of the act of April 19, 1856, consolidating the government of the city and county, that after its passage it should be unlawful for any person to establish, maintain, or carry on the business of a public laundry or of a public wash-house within certain designated limits of the city and county without first having obtained a certificate, signed by the health officer of the municipality, that the premises were properly and sufficiently drained, and that all proper arrangements were made to carry on the business without injury to the sanitary condition of the neighborhood; also a certificate, signed by the board of fire-wardens of the municipality, that the stoves, washing and drying apparatus, and the appliances for heating smoothing-irons were in good condition, and that their use was not dangerous to the surrounding property from fire, and that all proper precautions were taken to comply with the provisions of the ordinance defining the fire limits of the city and county, and making regulations concerning the erection and use of buildings therein.

The ordinance requires the health officer and board of fire-wardens, upon application of any one to open or conduct the business of a public laundry, to inspect the premises in which it is proposed to carry on the business, in order to ascertain whether they are provided with proper drainage and sanitary appliances, and whether the provisions of the fire ordinance have been complied with; and, if found satisfactory in all respects, to issue to the applicant the required certificates without charge for the services rendered. Its fourth section declares that no person owning or employed in a public laundry or a public wash-house, within the prescribed limits, shall wash or iron clothes between the hours of 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning, or upon any portion of Sunday; and its fifth section, that no person engaged in the laundry business within those limits shall permit any one suffering from an infectious or contagious disease to lodge, sleep, or remain upon the premises. The violation of any of these several provisions is declared to be a misdemeanor, and penalties are prescribed differing in degree according to the nature of the offense. The establishing, maintaining, or carrying on the business, without obtaining the certificates, is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both. Carrying on the business outside of the hours prescribed, or permitting persons with contagious diseases on the premises, is punishable by a fine of not less than $5 or more than $50, or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

The petitioner in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, was convicted in the police judge's court of the city and county of San Francisco, under the fourth section of the ordinance, of washing and ironing clothes in a public laundry, within the prescribed limits, between the hours of 10 o'clock in the evening of May 1, 1884, and 6 o'clock in the morning of the following day, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for five days, and was accordingly committed, in execution of the sentence, to the custody of the sheriff of the city and county, who was keeper of the county jail. That court had jurisdiction to try him for the alleged offense if the ordinance was valid and binding. But alleging that his arrest and imprisonment were illegal, he obtained from the superior court of the city and county a writ of habeas corpus, in obedience to which his body was brought before the court by the sheriff, who returned that he was held under the commitment of the police judge upon a conviction of a misdemeanor, the commitment and sentence being produced. The petitioner thereupon moved for his discharge on the ground that the fourth section of the ordinance violates the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and certain sections of the constitution of the state. The particulars stated in which such alleged violation consists were substantially these,-omitting the repetition of the same position: That the section discriminates between the class of laborers engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other kinds of business; that it discriminates between laborers beyond the designated limits and those within them; that it deprives the petitioner of the right to labor, and, as a necessary consequence, of the right to acquire property; that it is not within the power of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco; and that it is unreasonable in its requirements. The superior court overruled the positions and dismissed the writ, and the petitioner brought this writ of error.

A. C. Searle, for plaintiff in error.

H. G. Sieberst, for defendant in error

FIELD, J.

title: Barbier v. Connolly


text: Talk:Barbier v. Connolly

title: Talk:Barbier v. Connolly


text:
Barbier v. Connolly/Opinion of the Court

In this case we can only consider whether the fourth section of the ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco is in conflict with the constitution or laws of the United States. We cannot pass upon the conformity of that section with the requirements of the constitution of the state. Our jurisdiction is confined to a consideration of the federal question involved, which arises upon an alleged conflict of the fourth section in question with the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. No other part of the amendment has any possible application. That fourth section, so far as it is involved in the case before the police judge, was simply a prohibition to carry on the washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash-houses, within certain prescribed limits of the city and county, from 10 o'clock at night until 6 o'clock in the morning of the following day. The prohibition against labor on Sunday is not involved. The provision is purely a police regulation within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies. And it would be an extraordinary usurpation of the authority of a municipality, if a federal tribunal should undertake to supervise such regulations. It may be a necessary measure of precaution in a city composed largely of wooden buildings like San Francisco, that occupations, in which fires are constantly required, should cease after certain hours at night until the following morning; and of the necessity of such regulations the municipal bodies are the exclusive judges; at least, any correction of their action in such matters can come only from state legislation or state tribunals. The same municipal authority which directs the cessation of labor must necessarily prescribe the limits within which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits in a city within which wooden buildings cannot be constructed. There is no invidious discrimination against any one within the prescribed limits by such regulations. There is none in the regulation under consideration. The specification of the limits within which the business cannot be carried on without the certificates of the health officer and board of fire-wardens is merely a designation of the portion of the city in which the precautionary measures against fire and to secure proper drainage must be taken for the public health and safety. It is not legislation discriminating against any one. All persons engaged in the same business within it are treated alike; are subject to the same restrictions, and are entitled to the same privileges under similar conditions.

The fourteenth amendment, in declaring that no state 'shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness, and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one, except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses.

But neither the amendment-broad and comprehensive as it is nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits,-for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting district, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment. In the execution of admitted powers unnecessary proceedings are often required which are cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive; yet, if no discrimination against any one be made, and no substantial right be impaired by them, they are not obnoxious to any constitutional objection. The inconveniences arising in the administration of the laws from this cause are matters entirely for the consideration of the state; they can be remedied only by the state. The case before us the provisions requiring certificates from the health officer and the board of fire-wardens may, in some instances, be unnecessary, and the changes to be made to meet the conditions prescribed may be burdensome; but, as we have said, this is a matter for the determination of the municipality in the execution of its police powers, and not a violation of any substantial right of the individual. Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Barbier v. Connolly/Opinion of the Court


text:
Liverpool New York Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company v. Commissioners of Emigration

Ashbel Green, for plaintiff in error.

Louis Sanders and ''Geo. N. Sanders'', for defendant in error.

MATTHEWS, J.


text: Talk:Liverpool New York Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company v. Commissioners of Emigration


text:
Liverpool New York Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company v. Commissioners of Emigration/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiff in error was plaintiff below, and, being a corporation under the laws of Great Britain, and an alien, brought this action in the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York, the defendant being a corporation of that state.

The action was in form indebitatus assumpsit, and the substance of the declaration was as follows: '(3) And the said plaintiff, by its said attorneys, complains of the said defendant in a plea of assumpsit upon implied promise for that, whereas, the said defendant, on the tenth day of February, 1875, at the city of New York, in the Southern district of New York, aforesaid, was indebted to the said plaintiff in the sum of one million and ninety-three thousand dollars and upwards, lawful money of the United States of America, for certain commutation moneys from the plaintiff unlawfully demanded, exacted, and received at the city of New York by the said defendant under color of certain laws in the state of New York, concerning passengers in vessels coming to the state of New York, and concerning the powers and duties of commissioners of emigration, and for the regulation of marine hospitals, and paid by the said plaintiff under the inducement of certain representations of the defendant, this plaintiff being an alien and not knowing the laws of the state of New York, and under protest at various times preceding the said tenth day of February, 1875, and in various sums, and to and for the use of the plaintiff. (4) And being so indebted, the said defendant, in consideration thereof, afterwards, to-wit, on the same day and year last aforesaid, at the place aforesaid, undertook and then and there faithfully promised the said plaintiff, well and truly to pay unto the said plaintiff, the said sum of money when,' etc., and alleging a breach thereof.

To this declaration, treating it as a complaint according to the procedure under the New York Code, the defendant filed an answer setting up several distinct defenses, and, among others, the following: '(7) That by an act of congress, entitled 'A bill to legalize the collection of head-moneys already paid,' approved June 19, 1878, the acts of every state and municipal officer or corporation in the several states of the United States in collection of head-moneys for every passenger brought to the United States prior to the first day of January, 1877, under then existing laws of the several states, were declared valid, and the said acts were ratified, adopted, and confirmed by the United States; and it was further declared that no suits for the recovery of the moneys so paid should be maintained against any state or municipal officer or corporation. That plaintiff, in prosecuting this action, is maintaining it for the recovery of head-moneys paid prior to first January, 1877, pursuant to the then existing laws of the state of New York, for passengers, by the master, consignee, or owner of vessels bringing passengers to the United States from a foreign port, against this defendant as a state corporation of New York, against the form of the statute aforesaid, which said statute this defendant pleads in bar of plaintiff's right to maintain this action, and of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the same.'

The bill of exceptions, taken at the trial, shows the following proceedings: 'The counsel for the said plaintiff opened the cause to the jury. The defendant's counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction, and that an act of congress, entitled 'A bill to legalize the collection of head-moneys already paid,' approved June 19, 1878, was a bar to any recovery on any of the alleged causes of action set forth in the complaint. Whereupon the court, being of opinion that said bill was a bar to any recovery on any of the alleged causes of action set forth in the complaint, upon that ground refused to hear evidence, and directed a verdict for the defendants, and that the defendants have judgment against the plaintiff, with costs. Whereupon the counsel for the plaintiffs, in due time, then and there duly excepted to the ruling, opinion, decision, and direction of the said judge,' etc. Judgment was accordingly rendered for the defendant, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted.

The act of congress of June 19, 1878, referred to in the bill of exceptions by its title, is as follows, (20 St. 177:) 'Be it enacted, etc., that the acts of every state and municipal officer, or corporation, of the several states of the United States, in the collection of head-moneys, prior to the first day of January, 1877, from the master, consignee, or owner of any vessel bringing passengers to the United States from a foreign port, pursuant to the then existing laws of the several states, shall be valid, and no action shall be maintained against any such state, or municipal officer, or corporation, for the recovery of any moneys so paid of collected prior to said date.'

It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff in error that the sole question open for argument here, because the only one passed on by the circuit court, is whether this act of congress is a valid enactment, though it is admitted that this question divides itself into two: whether congress had constitutional power to make valid, by subsequent ratification, those laws of the states, which had been previously declared to be void, as regulations of commerce with foreign nations; and whether, if not, it nevertheless could forbid resort to the courts of the United States to those otherwise entitled, claiming redress for what had been done, to their damage, under such statutes of the states. On the other hand, it has been argued in support of the judgment by counsel for the defendant in error: (1) That the payments alleged to have been made in the complaint were voluntary, for which no recovery can be had on general principles of law; (2) that the defendant in error, being sued in its official capacity, is not suable, being merely the official representative of the state of New York, and that, at least, its relation to the subject is such under the laws of New York, under which it assumed to act, that it is not chargeable upon any principles of implied contract for the moneys alleged to have been paid; (3) and that the act of congress referred to is a valid enactment and a bar to the action.

These questions, particularly that which challenges the constitutionality of the act of congress, it is manifest, are of very grave importance; and, after much consideration, we feel constrained to reverse the judgment, without deciding any of them. The reasons, which seem to us to require this course, may be very briefly stated.

The bill of exceptions states that the counsel for the plaintiff below, after the jury had been sworn to try the issues, opened the cause to the jury,-that is, made a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action which he expected to prove; but it does not show what that statement was, nor what were the facts which the plaintiff relied on and expected to prove. In this respect the case differs from that of Oscanyan v. Arms Co. 103 U.S. 261, where it was held to be entirely proper for the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiff, when, as in that case, such statement is full, exact, and explicit. 'Of course,' said the court in that case, 'in all such proceedings nothing should be taken, without full consideration, against the party making the statement of admission. He should be allowed to explain and qualify it so far as the truth will permit; but if, with such explanation and qualification, it should clearly appear that there could be no recovery, the court should not hesitate to so declare, and give such direction as will dispose of the action.' The practice under that rule is not objectionable. On the contrary, it is convenient to court and parties, and not only saves time and expense in shortening trials, but has the merit of presenting the whole case in a condensed and precise form for the consideration of a court of review.

In the present case, the fact that a statement was made of the plaintiff's case, without disclosing in the bill of exceptions the facts supposed to constitute it, is referred to for the purpose of showing that the court below did not act upon that statement, and that it is not open to this court to conjecture what it was. The legal inference only is that it was any case which he was at liberty to prove under his complaint and the issues framed upon it. What the circuit court did was to refuse to hear evidence, not on the ground that the opening statement of the counsel disclosed no right of action, but because it was of opinion that the act of congress 'was a bar to any recovery on any of the alleged causes of action set forth in the complaint;' that is, that, in view of the act of congress, the complaint was substantially defective in not stating a cause of action, so that it would be bad on general demurrer; and thereupon judgment was rendered for the defendant on the pleadings alone.

The complaint, upon examination, shows the allegation of an indebtedness from the defendant to the plaintiff, for money unlawfully demanded, exacted, and received by the defendant under color of law, and paid by the plaintiff in ignorance of its rights, in consequence of representations made by the defendant, and under protest; and this indebtedness is alleged as the consideration of an implied promise to repay the same. This statement, it is quite true, is general and vague. It does not allege with particularity the laws under color of which the exactions were made, nor the circumstances attending the payment. But it is sufficient; for an actual indebtedness is alleged, and there is nothing in the complaint to contradict the fact, or to demonstrate its impossibility as matter of law. And, although the complaint states that the money was exacted 'under color of certain laws in the state of New York concerning passengers in vessels coming to the state of New York, and concerning the powers and duties of commissioners of emigration, and for the regulation of marine hospitals,' this does not necessarily identify the moneys alleged to have been thus exacted and paid with the 'head-moneys,' the collection of which it was the professed object of the act of congress to legalize. If it be said that it is matter of judicial cognizance that there were in New York at the time no other laws, under color of which such exactions and payments could have been made,-which we do not admit, nevertheless, it remains that, consistently with the allegations of the complaint, the moneys paid may have been illegally exacted in violation of the laws, under color of which, it is alleged, their payment was demanded and made. And the allegation in the answer, that the moneys sued for are, in fact, the 'head-moneys' which the act of congress prohibits the recovery of, does not cure the difficulty, for that may have been the very issue to be tried. Taking the complaint to be true, which is what we are bound to do in the present state of the record, the indebtedness alleged to exist must be admitted to exist in fact if it is possible to exist in law; and this we may affirm, even though the act of congress pleaded and adjudged to be a bar, be a valid law; for it is not apparent on the record that the money sued for was 'head-money,' nor that it was exacted and paid in accordance with the laws of the state. It will certainly not be denied that, if the moneys sued for were exacted and paid in violation of the laws of New York, under color of which, it is said, they were demanded, and the exaction and payment were made under circumstances authorizing a recovery under the laws of that state, or of the common law in force there, it was not the intention of congress to interpose a bar to the suit. It is impossible for us, on this record, to say that this is not such a case.

If, on the other hand, we should assume the plaintiff's case to be within the terms of the statute, we should have to deal with it purely as an hypothesis, and pass upon the constitutionality of an act of congress as an abstract question. That is not the mode in which this court is accustomed or willing to consider such questions. It has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered: one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other, never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. These rules are safe guides to sound judgment. It is the dictate of wisdom to follow them closely and carefully.

In the present case, the main and ultimate question is whether the defendant is legally liable to repay the moneys sued for, and, as incidental to that, whether the act of congress pleaded as a bar to the action is valid. The solution of these questions depends upon facts not apparent upon the present record. That these may be made to appear there must be a new trial. For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to award a new trial; and it is so ordered.


text: Talk:Liverpool New York Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company v. Commissioners of Emigration/Opinion of the Court


text:
The Whickham Davison v. Von Lingen

A. Sterling, Jr., for appellants.

John H. Thomas and T. Wallis Blackistone, for appellees.

BLATCHFORD, J.

title: The Whickham Davison v. Von Lingen


text: Talk:The Whickham Davison v. Von Lingen

title: Talk:The Whickham Davison v. Von Lingen