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Rh19, 1830.] cumstances. The State whose interests I advocate and partly represent, has suffered too much from the delay in the sale of the public lands already, not to render this proposition of restraining them still further, a fatal one to her interest, with a population of one hundred and sixty thousand inhabitants, to bear all the charges of Government: her increase has been checked for twenty-five years: during which, according to the natural course of things, that population ought to have been at least doubled. The lands of the United States, amounting to thirty-one milCons, are not only exempt irom taxes, but the inhabitants are forced, if they wish to keep up a communication between themselves in some of the settlements, and to protect their property from inundations, to make roads, bridges, and embankments, on the public lands. A law to restrict the sales of public lands to those already surveyed, would be equivalent to a law to stop them altogether: for although, of the thirty-one millions of acres owned by the United States, two millions seven hundred thousand hare been surveyed, yet not a tenth part of that quantity has been sold, and of what remains, not a tenth part will ever sell; it is morass or pino barren. Therefore, a law to stop the surveys would be equivalent to a law to put a stop to the further increase of the State, and entailing upon its present inhabitants and their descendants, the burthen of all the taxes and all the services required for defending and improving the lands of the United States. There are two views in which the subject may be considered; that in which the pecuniary interest of the United States is alone considered—the other, that in which the infinitely more important political interest of the new States is concerned.

In the first view, considering the United States simply as a great landholder, what are its interests' To sell as speedily and for as good a price as they can; but the greater choice you give to settlers, the more speedily it is evident; that yon can sell; and the better land you throw into the market, as evidentlythe better price you can command. This can only be done by continuing your surveys. The political view of the question is one that would require an investigation not now necessary to be gone into. The strength of the Union depends on the population, wealth, resources, and industry, of the States, its component parts. Whatever cramps them, restrains the general welfare, and reduces its strength. The money to be drawn from the sale of the lands is but a feather in the scale of great national policy; and if the population of the States would be increased by disposing of them, even for nominal price, we ought not to hesitate. In another point of view, the surveys are highly important. They give us an accurate knowledge, not only of the situation, but the quality and value of our land. Its facilities for improvement by roads, canals, and proximity to market; and even if the sales were stopped, the surveys ought to go on. What great landed proprietor who does not begin by this operation? And shall the greatest of all landholders, from a fear of expense, neglect it? These are some of the advantages resulting from a perseverance in the judicious plan which has been adopted in relation to our public lands. These are some of the injurious effects which would result from abandoning it. Whatare the benefits expected from a change? I have not heard a single one suggested. My votewill be governed by these considerations.

Mr. SPRAGUE suggested the propriety of combining both the propositions before the Senate in one resolution. He said he was willing to vote for an inquiry, whether the surveys of the public lands ought, on the one hand, to be stopped, or on the other hand, whether they ought to be extended. If the gentleman would consent to adopt both propositions, he [Mr. S.] said he would support the resolution. Both objects contended for by gentlemen would be thus attained. He would therefore suggest a modification of the resolution, in the following form:

Resolved, That the Committee on the Public Lands be instructed to inquire whether it be expedient to limit for a certain period the sales of the public lands to such lands only as have heretofore been offered for sale, and are subject to entry at the minimum price. And also whether the office of Surveyor General may not be abolished without detriment to the public interest, or whether it be expedient to adopt measures to hasten the sales, and extend more rapidly the surveys of the public lands.

Mr. S. said, if the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. Foot] and the gentleman from New Hampshire, [Mr. Woodbdht] would consent to this modification, he would now, if in order, move Has an amendment. If it was not now in order, he said he would make the motion at another time.

The PRESIDENT said the motion was not in order.

Mr. FOOT made a few observations in reply to Mr. Bkxtox and Mr. Woodbcrt. He repelled the imputation that it was through any hostile motives to the West he proposed the resolution. He said the question here involved was one of great and increasing importance and interest, and added, that if the resolution and amendment, in the modified form, were adopted, he'should move to add to the whole, the words "propriety of making donations to actual settlers."

On the motion of Mr. SMITH, of Maryland, a division of the question was ordered.

Mr. HAYNE said that, if the gentlemen who had discussed this proposition had confined themselves strictly to the resolution under consideration, he would have spared the Senate the trouble of listening to the few remarks he now proposed to offer. It has been said, and correctly said, by more than one gentleman, that resolutions of inquiry were usually suffered to pass without opposition. The parliamentary practice in this respect was certainly founded in good sense and sound policy, which regarded such resolutions as intended merely to elicit information, and therefore entitled to favor. But [said Mr. H.] I cannot give my assent to the proposition so broadly laid down by some gentlemen, that, because nobody stands committed by a vote for inquiry, that, therefore, every resolution proposing an inquiry, no matter on what subject, must pass almost as a matter of course, and that, to discuss or oppose such resolutions, is unparliamentary. The true distinction seems to be this: Where information is desired as the basis of legislation, or where the policy of any measure, or the principles it involves, are really questionable, it was always proper to send the subject to a committee for investigation; but where all the material facts are already known, and there is a fixed and settled opinion in respect to the policy to be pursued, inquiry was unnecessary, and ought to be refused. No one, he thought, could doubt the correctness of the position assumed by the gentleman from Missouri, that no inquiry ought ever to be instituted as to the expediency of doing “a great and acknowledged wrong.” I do not mean, however, to intimate an opinion that such is the character of this resolution. The application of these rules to the case before us will decide my vote, and every Senator can apply them for himself to the decision of the question, whether the inquiry now called for should be granted or refused. With that decision, whatever it may be, I shall be content.

I have not risen, however, Mr. President, for the purpose of discussing the propriety of instituting the inquiry recommended by the resolution, but to offer a few remarks on another and much more important question, to which gentlemen have alluded in the course of this debate—I mean the policy which ought to be pursued in relation to the public lands. Every gentleman who has had a seat in Congress for the last two or three years, or even for the last two or three weeks, must be convinced of the great and growing importance of this question. More than half of our time has been taken up with the discussion of


text: Portal talk:Billardiera scandens

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title: Portal talk:Billardiera scandens


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title: Portal talk:Scaevola ramosissima


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Rh20, 1830.] must be first paid. For this, these lands have been solemnly pledged to the public creditors. This done, which, if there be no interference with the Sinking Fund, will be effected in three or four years, the question will then be fairly open, to be disposed of as Congress and the country may think just and proper. Without attempting to indicate precisely what our policy ought then to be, I will, in the same spirit which has induced me to throw out the desultory thoughts which I have now presented to the Senate, suggest for consideration, whether it will not be sound policy, and true wisdom, to adopt a system of measures looking to the final relinquishment of these lands on the part of the United States, to the States in which they lie, on such terms and conditions as may fully indemnify us for the cost of the original purchase, and all the trouble and expense to which we may have been put on their account. Giving up the plan of using these lands forever as a fund either for revenue or distribution, ceasing to hug them as a great treasure, renouncing the idea of administering them with a view to regulate and control the industry and population of the States, or of keeping in subjection and dependence the States, or the people of any portion of the Union, the task will be comparatively easy of striking out a plan for the final adjustment of the land question on just and equitable principles. Perhaps, sir, the lands ought not to be entirely relinquished to any State until she shall have made considerable advances in population and settlement. Ohio has probably already reached that condition. The relinquishment may be made by a sale to the State, at a fixed price, which I will not say should be nominal; but certainly I should not be disposed to fix the amount so high as to keep the States for any length of time in debt to the United States. In short, our whole policy in relation to the public lands may perhaps be summed up in the declaration with which I set out, that they ought not to be kept and retained forever as a great treasure, but that they should be administered chiefly with a view to the creation, within reasonable periods, of great and flourishing communities, to be formed into free and independent States; to be invested in due season with the control of all the lands within their respective limits.

[Here the debate closed for this day.]

Wednesday, Jan. 20, 1830.

THE DEBATE CONTINUED.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution of Mr. FOOT, which was the subject of discussion yesterday.

Mr. F. rose and said, that, in conformity with the suggestion of Mr. SrBAouE, made yesterday, for the purpose of meeting the views of Mr. Wooubi'ht, he would modify his motion to read as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Public Lands be instructed to inquire and report the quantity of the public lands remaining unsold within each State and Territory, and whether it be expedient to limit, for a certain period, the sales of the public lands to such lands only as have heretofore been offered for sale, and are now subject to entry at the minimum price; and also, whether the office of Surveyor General, and some of the Land Offices, may not be abolished without detriment to the public interest; or whether it be expedient to adopt measures to hasten the sales, and extend more rapidly the surveys of the public lands.

Mr. WEBSTER said, on rising, that nothing had been further from his intention than to take any part in the discussion of this resolution. It proposed only an inquiry, on a subject of much importance, and one in regard to which it might strike the mind of the mover, and of other gentlemen, that inquiry and investigation would be useful. Although [said Mr. W.] I am one of those who do not perceive any particular utility in instituting the inquiry, I have, nevertheless, not seen that harm would be likely to result from adopting the resolution. Indeed, it gives no new powers, and hardly imposes any new duty on the Committee. All that the resolution proposes should be done, the Committee is quite competent, without the resolution, to do, by virtue of its ordinary powers. But, sir, although I have felt quite indifferent about the passing of the resolution, yet opinions were expressed yesterday on the general subject of the public lands, and on some other subjects, by the gentleman from South Carolina, so widely different from my own, that I am not willing to let the occasion pass without some reply. If I deemed the resolution, as originally proposed, hardly necessary, still less do I think it either necessary or expedient to adopt it, since a second branch has been added to it to-day. By this second branch, the Committee is to be instructed to inquire whether it be expedient to adopt measures to hasten the sales, and extend more rapidly the surveys of the public lands. Now, it appears that, in forty years, we have sold no more than about twenty millions of acres of public lands. The annual sales do not now exceed, and never have exceeded, one million of acres. A million a year is, according to our experience, as much as the increase of population can bring into settlement. And it appears also, that we have, at this moment, sir, surveyed and in the market, ready for sale, two hundred and ten millions of acres, or thereabouts. All this vast mass, at this moment, lies on our hands, for mere want of purchasers. Can any man, looking to the real interests of the country and the people, seriously think of inquiring whether we ought not still faster to hasten the public surveys, and to bring, still more and more rapidly, other vast quantities into the market? The truth is, that, rapidly as population has increased, the surveys have, nevertheless, outran our wants. There are more lands than purchasers. They are now sold at low prices, and taken up as fast as the increase of people furnishes hands to take them up. It is obvious, that no artificial regulation, no forcing of sales, no giving away of the lands even, can produce any great and sudden augmentation of population. The ratio of increase, though great, has yet its bounds. Hands for labor are multiplied only at a certain rate. The lands cannot be settled but by settlers; nor faster than settlers can be found. A system, if now adopted, of forcing sales at whatever prices, may have the effect of throwing large quantities into the hands of individuals, who would, in this way, in time, become themselves competitors with the Government in the sale of land. My own opinion has uniformly been, that the public lands should be offered freely, and at low prices; so as to encourage settlement and cultivation as rapidly as the increasing population of the country is competent to extend settlement and cultivation. Every actual settler should be able to buy good land, at a cheap rate; but, on the other hand, speculation by individuals, on a large scale, should not be encouraged, nor should the value of all lands, sold and un-sold, be reduced to nothing, by throwing new and vast quantities into the market at prices merely nominal.

I now proceed, sir, to some of the opinions expressed by the gentleman from South Carolina. Two or three topics were touched by him, in regard to which he expressed sentiments in which I do not at all concur.

In the first place, sir, the honorable gentleman spoke of the whole course and policy of the Government towards those who have purchased and settled the public lands and seemed to think this policy wrong. He held it to have been, from the first, hard and rigorous; he was of opinion that the United States had acted towards those who had subdued the Western wilderness, in the spirit of a step-mother; that the public domain had been improperly regarded as a source of revenue; and that we had rigidly compelled payment for that which ought to have been given away. He said we ought to have followed the analogy of other Governments, which had acted on a


text: Far from the Maddening Girls

title: Far from the Maddening Girls


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 1

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 1


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 2

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 2


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 3

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 3


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 4

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 4


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 5

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 5


text: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 6

title: Far from the Maddening Girls/Chapter 6


text: Talk:Far from the Maddening Girls

title: Talk:Far from the Maddening Girls


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CORNER OF NASSAU AND BEEKMAN STS.,

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text: United States Statutes at Large/Volume 1/3rd Congress/2nd Session/Chapter 3


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 supplied the motive for many a deadly duel and many a doughty deed. "If you would know who were the good men of that day," says the Chronicler, describing a tilt at arms with the misbelievers, "it behoves one to tell you, for though they are departed, it is not fitting that the names of those who have done well should die, nor would they who have done well themselves, or who hope so to do, think it right; for good men would not be so bound to do well if their feats should be kept silent." During the siege of Granada single combats became so numerous that Ferdinand, fearing to lose his best warriors, forbade his knights to accept a Moorish challenge. But to listen tamely to the taunts of the Moors who galloped insultingly across the plain which separated the city from the Christian camp, was more than the high-mettled Spaniards could endure. The story is told of a knight surnamed "He of the Exploits," who resolved on vengeance despite the orders of the king. In the dead of night he rode to a postern gate in the city walls, surprised the guards, galloped to the chief mosque, and nailed on the door a label inscribed, Ave Maria. Ere he could return Granada awoke. From every side mustered Moorish soldiers, and it was only by prodigious deeds of valour that "He of the Exploits" fought his way out alive. Ever after his descendants held the right to sit in the choir of the mosque church during the celebration of High Mass.

To the Christian knights in their camp without the walls of fair Granada the days and months went swiftly and gaily by. Tilt and tourney, fierce fray and wily stratagem rejoiced their hearts, while the 11

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 rich booty won by their keen Castilian blades fired still further their natural avarice. But on the Moors within the great gates the slow, cold hand of famine was closing its deadly grip, and a day came at last when word was sent to his Catholic Majesty, King Ferdinand, that Granada could hold out no longer.

Across the plain ride in triumph the exultant Spanish cavaliers. Through the open gates they pass and enter the Alhambra, the glory of the Moors, a palace rich and beautiful beyond compare. And now from a battlemented tower shines forth the silver cross, while beside it waves the banner of St. James and the emblazoned flag of Castile and Aragon. "Santiago! Santiago!" cry the Christians, gazing spell-bound in the plain beneath the walls, and the king and queen fall to their knees in devout thanks-giving, while the whole army kneels behind them chanting in unison a solemn Te Deum.

The Moorish king fleeing to the mountains turned to gaze back upon the glistening towers of his lost city. "Allahu Akbar!" he exclaimed with tears, "God is most great!" and ever since the spot whence he bade farewell has been called "The Last Sigh of the Moor."

Granada conquered, the young nation after centuries of ceaseless conflict found herself suddenly at peace. The infidel foe so long within her bounds was utterly destroyed, but the passion for adventure, for warlike renown, for plunder, still burned in the Spanish blood. If an outlet were not found for these fierce energies there was danger that united Christian 12

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 Spain would erelong be racked by lawless brigandage or civil strife.

At this moment came Columbus pointing to a new path by which the Spaniard might win glory and riches, and find scope for his valour, his violence, his fiery religious zeal. Tradition pictures the great navigator, grave and dignified, with the rapt eyes of a seer, pleading with the wise and kindly Isabella in one of the beautiful halls of the Alhambra. The Queen was seated on the throne of the Khalifs. Slender columns, walls cut into tracery exquisite as lace, a dome-ceiling azure and white like the midday heaven, but bright with golden stars and moons, formed a strange Arabic setting to the audience which was to bring to the persecutors of the Moors the gift of a New World. Amid such surroundings, the gentle Isabella, with the Moors lying broken beneath her feet, sent forth across the ocean the stern and merciless people whom constant warfare had bred in the sunny land of Spain. 13

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Executive Order 13561

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the laws cited herein, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Barack Obama The White House, December 22, 2010. [FR Doc. 2010–32960 Filed 12–28–10; 8:45 am] Billing Code 3195–W1–PBilling Code 6325–01–C

title: Executive Order 13561


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 the Spaniards, and loud were their curses when they found it not.

In one of the islands, which he named Hispaniola, now St. Domingo, Columbus founded a colony, but with such turbulent, discontented settlers it was indeed a hard and thankless task. In vain did he seek to protect the unhappy natives from the insolence and cruel exactions of his followers. The soil must be tilled, and hard manual work was little to the taste of the lordly conquerors, so the Indians were perforce pressed into service and virtually enslaved.

Columbus on his third voyage discovered the mainland of the continent, but the glory of this achievement was stolen from the great Admiral by a wily Florentine who followed in his track. This man, Amerigo by name, wrote on his return so artful and vainglorious an account of his voyage that he reaped all the honour of the discovery of the continent, and in time the New World actually came to be called by his name.

To his colony of Hispaniola, seething with mutiny and misery, Columbus strove meanwhile to restore order; but all in vain, for the proud Spanish hidalgos scorned the upstart foreigner and bitterly resented his efforts to protect the Indians. It was only at great cost that he succeeded at last in restoring the semblance of peace and order. A tract of land with an allotted number of natives was granted to each rebel. Thus originated the terrible system of repartimientos, or distributions of Indian slaves to the settlers, which made Spanish colonisation so deadly a curse. 16

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 Dogged continually by the spite and jealousy of his enemies, Columbus met with the most shameful insults, and judged guilty by an ignorant commissioner deputed by the Crown to try his case, was actually sent back to Spain loaded with cruel fetters. Not with the will of the monarchs of Spain was the great Admiral thus dishonoured; Isabella wept tears of bitter regret as she heard how her agent had treated this man who, as an old writer says, "had he lived in the days of ancient Greece or Rome, would have had statues raised and temples and divine honours dedicated to him as to a divinity." Yet though the generous Queen lavished "especial kindness and good-will" on the discoverer, he was not restored to his position of authority in Hispaniola, where under the new and horrible system of repartimientos the Indians were wasting away by hundreds. The tender soul of Isabella bled at the story of their sufferings. Resolving at once to supersede the commissioner, she appointed a new governor named Ovando, and decreed that all Indians were free as her own subjects, and to be treated as true and faithful vassals of the Crown. Deprived of his command in Hispaniola, Columbus turned his thoughts to schemes for fresh discovery. To find in the New World, which he still supposed to be part of Asia, a strait joining the Atlantic to the Indian ocean was his all-consuming desire. What a glorious achievement to open a water-way to the jewelled East where art and commerce reigned supreme! His New World had been dubbed by treasure-seekers "a land of vanity and delusion," a grievous disappointment to the monarchs 17

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 he served, and Ferdinand looked with jealous eyes on the success of the Portuguese who had reached the Indies by rounding the Cape of Good Hope, and were already gleaning a golden harvest. Surely if Columbus could find a road to these rich coffers, shorter and safer than the perilous voyage round Africa, even the rapacious Spaniards must owe him at last some meed of gratitude.

For near two years the great Admiral importuned in vain for ships wherewith to carry out his bold designs. From Ferdinand, to whose nature his passionate enthusiasm was absolutely alien, he met with cold civility and veiled neglect. Weary and worn he was, and old before his time, when, in March 1502, he at length set forth on his last voyage. His fleet, consisting only of four small ships, was paltry enough for an undertaking of such magnitude, but he received, ere he sailed, a cheering letter from Queen Isabella whom he was never again to see.

This quest of a phantom strait was doomed, of course, to failure, but as Columbus touched the shores of Central America he heard rumours from natives there of a dazzling empire far away in the interior of the continent. With so scanty an equipment he could not hope, however, to explore further. "I have but opened the gates for others to enter," he exclaimed bitterly, as he returned home unsuccessful and well-nigh broken-hearted, only to learn that Isabella his steadfast friend was dead. Henceforth he despaired of reward or gratitude from the court of Spain, and in 1506 he ended his strenuous life in poverty and disappointment. 18

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 Ere Columbus left for the last time the shores of the New World there had arrived in Hispaniola a bold and resolute youth who was destined to enter the magic gate thrown open by the great discoverer, and to win the golden empire of his dreams.

Hernando Cortés, to whom this good fortune befell, was born in 1485 at the little town of Medellin, in Estremadura, in the south of Spain. Two old chroniclers indeed fix the date of his birth in 1483. They are both zealous supporters of Holy Church, and one of them declares "that Cortés came into the world the same day that that infernal beast, the false heretic Luther, entered it,—by way of compensation, no doubt, since the labours of the one to pull down the true faith were counterbalanced by those of the other to maintain and extend it!" "The same year that Luther was born in Eisleben," says the other, "Hernando Cortés was born in Medellin, the first to disturb the world and put under the devil's banner many faithful ones whose fathers and grandfathers for long years were Catholics, and the second to bring into the pale of the Church infinite multitudes who for numberless years had been under the power of Satan, wrapped up in vice and blind with idolatry."

All unconscious of this high destiny, Hernando Cortés indulged in a frankly misspent youth. His father, Martin Cortés, a captain of infantry, poor, though of honourable stock, had planned for his son a calling more profitable than his own. "It is the lawyers with their endless lawsuits who pile ducat upon ducat," thought the old soldier, "Hernando shall go to Salamanca and study law." To Salamanca, 19

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 the great Spanish university, Hernando went, but he did not study law. Glib of tongue and quick of brain he could, probably, have spun out a lawsuit, and have amassed the coveted ducats as well as any lawyer of his day, but he chose a less arduous course and speedily became the bane of his tutors. Two years of turbulent idleness, and then, gay and unruffled as ever, the youth suddenly reappeared in his home at Medellin to the intense annoyance of his father.

To the quiet household of old Martin Cortés the wild spirits, overbearing temper, and mad pranks of young Hernando were a continual outrage. Just at this time, 1502, the finest fleet hitherto fitted out for the New World was about to sail. It was under the command of Don Nicolas de Ovando, who was to succeed Columbus as Governor of Hispaniola, and it was to transport to that troubled isle two thousand five hundred Spanish colonists. To the relief of all his friends Hernando elected to join the expedition. But one night as, on mischief bent, he scaled a high wall, a loose stone turned under his foot and he was flung heavily to the ground. While he lay at home, bruised and disabled, the fleet sailed.

Two long profitless years went by before the boy had another chance. He was nineteen when at last, in 1504, the year of Queen Isabella's death, he set sail in a very small ship for the Western Indies. So stormy was the voyage that at one time courage failed, and all on board gave themselves up as lost, when suddenly on the topsail yard perched a white dove! "The saints are with us!" cried the sailors, 20

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Doe v. Bush

John C. Bonifaz, with whom Cristobal Bonifaz, Law Offices of Cristobal Bonifaz, Margaret Burnham, Max D. Stern, and Stern Shapiro Weissberg & Garin were on the brief, for appellants.

Michael Avery on the brief for seventy-four concerned law professors, amici curiae.

D. Lindley Young on the brief amicus curiae in propria persona.

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, with whom Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Attorney, Civil Division, Scott R. McIntosh, Attorney, Civil Division, and Teal Luthy, Attorney, Civil Division, were on the brief, for appellees.

Before Lynch, Circuit Judge, Cyr and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.

title: Doe v. Bush


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 and following the bird's flight, they soon reached the friendly shores of Hispaniola.

Hardly was Isabella cold in her grave ere her humane decrees for the protection of the Indians were annulled. "Her death," says a missionary priest, "was the signal for their destruction." The hateful system of repartimientos was at once re-established. Ovando, the Governor, had found it impossible to make the colony pay without forced Indian labour, for the Spaniards would not themselves work the mines or till the soil. A strong, capable man, though hard and cruel, he was not slow to seize the opportunity afforded by Isabella's death. Ferdinand's scruples were easily overcome, and soon every Spanish colonist boasted his share of slaves.

Hernando Cortés, as became a young Spanish hidalgo, set foot in the New World with a lordly contempt for work, and a firm resolve to gain, at the sword's point if need be, the gold for which he lusted. To Ovando's offer of land and slaves he replied with fitting scorn, "I came to get gold, not to till the soil like a peasant!" But gold lay not to everyone's hand. The youth had perforce to pocket his pride and take up the work which he so much despised.

Goaded to despair by starvation and labour far beyond their strength, the Indians strove at intervals to throw off the intolerable yoke, and Cortés varied the monotony of his life by joining in the suppression of these revolts. This struggle between ignorant, timid, naked savages and mail-clad Spanish soldiers with cavalry and cannon, cannot be dignified by 21

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 the name of warfare, for the natives were, without compunction, brutally and treacherously hounded to death by thousands. The rules of European chivalry, always neglectful of the low born and the poor, were utterly regardless of these pagan, dark-skinned peoples, held to be mere beasts of burden, not entitled to the rights and privileges of men. In a few years after Isabella's death it was computed that more than six-sevenths of the population of Hispaniola had disappeared from the fair isle of their birth.

Where now would the ruthless invaders find slaves whose agonising labour should sate their avarice? Realising that the prosperity of his colony was once more at stake, Ovando, resourceful and unprincipled, planned a speedy remedy. There dwelt in the Lucayo Islands a simple, unsuspicious folk who could doubtless be enticed by Spanish guile to board the ships of the white men; and then transported to swell the thinned ranks of slaves in Hispaniola. It was not difficult to gain Ferdinand's assent to this infamous proposal, for which Ovando advanced a specious excuse. In their own free land the Lucayans lived and died in heathen darkness. Would it not then be an act of grace, most pleasing to the saints, to carry them to a Spanish colony where they might learn from their masters the doctrines of the Christian faith?

To the shores of the Lucayos came one day mighty ships bearing beautiful white-skinned men who spoke with winning accents to the wondering natives in their own tongue. "We have sailed," 22

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 they declared, "from a delicious land where roam the happy spirits of your departed ancestors. They send us to invite you to come and share their bliss." Eagerly the confiding people listened to the fairy tale, and forty thousand gladly followed the beneficent strangers. Poor deluded creatures! They hoped for heaven: in Hispaniola they found a veritable hell.

Amid such scenes of treachery and violence matured the character of Hernando Cortés. Who can wonder that with courage and self-reliance he learnt also something of the unscrupulous greed and callous cruelty so characteristic of his race and age. He was, however, of too gallant and enterprising a spirit to find satisfaction in mere slave-driving, and he only awaited an opportunity to exchange his monotonous life for one of glory and adventure. A new governor, eager to promote all schemes of discovery and conquest, now ruled in Hispaniola, for Diego Columbus, the son of the great Admiral, had succeeded, after years of striving, in ousting his father's old enemy, Ovando. In 1511, when he called for volunteers to aid in the conquest of the neighbouring isle of Cuba, Hernando Cortés, with many other restless youths, at once offered his services.

Don Diego Velasquez, a soldier of rank and fortune, was given command of the expedition. An old chronicler describes this captain, who was to set young Cortés on the path to glory, as "possessed of considerable experience in military affairs, having served seventeen years in the European wars; as honest, illustrious by his lineage and reputation, 23

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 covetous of fame, and somewhat more covetous of wealth."

The conquest of Cuba proved an easy task, and, thanks to a good Dominican friar, was effected without much wanton cruelty, though, as in the case of all Spanish settlements, some red crimes stain its story. All the Dominican missionaries protested against the repartimientos, and did much to curb the brutality of their countrymen, but this one, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas by name, stands forth supreme as the noblest man of his time. With heroic courage he waged a truceless war against the dark bigotry and selfish cruelty amid which his lot was cast. The fire and genius of the man, coupled with his absolute sincerity, gave him an extraordinary influence over wily, unscrupulous princes, rapacious adventurers, broken-spirited Indians, and even gained the grudging respect of fanatic ecclesiastics, lost themselves to the ordinary instincts of humanity. It is wonderful that so enlightened and courageous a man should have escaped the fires of the Inquisition, but doubtless it was to this very quality of utter fearlessness he owed his safety. In

Las Casas,

won for himself a title more illustrious than any which monarch could bestow—"Protector of the Indians." 24

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 Realising that he could do little for these poor tortured creatures while slavery was sanctioned by government, Las Casas in 1515 reluctantly left his work in Cuba where he had been much helped by the friendship of the Governor Velasquez, and returned to Spain to plead the cause of liberty and mercy. Ferdinand's long reign was soon to close. He had outlived his good genius, Queen Isabella, and the most promising of his children. Now suspicious to the last of all around him, he was dying, lonely and unloved. At heart he was superstitiously anxious to make his peace with Heaven, and Las Casas came at the right moment "when the strong man shall bow himself," and "God requireth that which is past."

In words which were "as goads" to the monarch on whom the shadow of death was falling, the Dominican spoke of the awful desolation and misery which Spanish rule had brought to the Western World. He pictured the wronged and wretched Indians, writhing under the driver's whip, tortured and slain at will by their merciless masters, and dying of hunger in the fertile land of their own inheritance. Boldly the priest declared that on Ferdinand's soul rested the guilt of their blood. A nation enslaved cried to Heaven for vengeance on their oppressor. With growing fear the king listened. In vain he protested that it was in the service of God he had sanctioned slavery, since multitudes of heathens were thus driven into the fold of Christ. In that solemn hour, and before the searing sincerity of the friar's words, "God forbids us to do evil that 25

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 good may come of it," such specious excuses melted away.

Smitten with remorse, Ferdinand promised to redress the terrible wrong, and Las Casas turned away rejoicing. Bitter was the blow when this hard-won victory proved too late! Death stepped in ere the king had fulfilled his good intentions, and the friar was left to mourn the ruin of his high hopes.

A poor imbecile daughter, Joanna, the widow of the Archduke of Austria, was Ferdinand's nominal successor, but as she was quite incapable of ruling, her son Charles was proclaimed King of Spain. This boy of sixteen, who soon afterwards became the Emperor Charles the Fifth, the greatest monarch in Europe, had been born and brought up in his father's dominions in the Netherlands. Flemish in speech, manners, and sympathy, he cared little for Spain, and left its government for a time to a regent Cardinal Ximenes. Before this man, courageous and honourable, but both bigoted and politic, Las Casas now pleaded for his Indian flock. Ximenes listened, and at once sent out to Hispaniola a commission to inquire into and if possible redress the condition of the natives. But the commissioners, 26

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 while they did all they could by many careful regulations to protect and relieve the Indians, pronounced that the hateful system of repartimientos was absolutely necessary for the welfare of the colony, which would without forced native labour inevitably fail.

Not for a moment would Las Casas accept this attempt at compromise. No regulations, no conditions could justify the accursed evil of slavery. Doomed to continual disappointment he battled on all through the strenuous years of his long life, in the New World and the Old, for this glorious cause of liberty. His great history of the Indies is a passionate plea for the enslaved people. He did not live to realise his high ideal, but who shall say that his attempted projects, his deeds of patient heroism, his words of thunder were in vain. Even in his own day public opinion in Spain as to the rights of humanity began insensibly to change, and Cervantes wrote, "Liberty is one of the most valuable blessings that Heaven has bestowed upon mankind." 27

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Doe v. Bush/Opinion of the Court

[p134] LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs are active-duty members of the military, parents of military personnel, and members of the U.S. House of Representatives. They filed a complaint in district court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants, President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from initiating a war against Iraq. They assert that such an action would violate the Constitution. The district court dismissed the suit, and plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the dismissal.

In October 2002, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (the "October Resolution"), Pub L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. Plaintiffs argue that the October Resolution is constitutionally inadequate to authorize the military offensive that defendants are now planning against Iraq. See U.S.C.onst. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power "to declare war"). They base this argument on two theories. They argue that Congress and the President are in collision -- that the President is about to act in violation of the October Resolution. They also argue that Congress and the President are in collusion -- that Congress has handed over to the President its exclusive power to declare war.

In either case, plaintiffs argue, judicial intervention is necessary to preserve the [p135]  principle of separation of powers which undergirds our constitutional structure. Only the judiciary, they argue, has the constitutionally assigned role and the institutional competence to police the boundaries of the constitutional mandates given to the other branches: Congress alone has the authority to declare war and the President alone has the authority to make war.

The plaintiffs argue that important and increasingly vital interests are served by the requirement that it be Congress which decides whether to declare war. Quoting Thomas Jefferson, they argue that congressional involvement will slow the "dogs of war"; that Congress, the voice of the people, should make this momentous decision, one which will cost lives; and that congressional support is needed to ensure that the country is behind the war, a key element in any victory. They also argue that, absent an attack on this country or our allies, congressional involvement must come prior to war, because once war has started, Congress is in an uncomfortable default position where the use of its appropriations powers to cut short any war is an inadequate remedy.

The defendants are equally eloquent about the impropriety of judicial intrusion into the "extraordinarily delicate foreign affairs and military calculus, one that could be fatally upset by judicial interference." Such intervention would be all the worse here, defendants say, because Congress and the President are in accord as to the threat to the nation and the legitimacy of a military response to that threat.

The case before us is a somber and weighty one. We have considered these important concerns carefully, and we have concluded that the circumstances call for judicial restraint. The theory of collision between the legislative and executive branches is not suitable for judicial review, because there is not a ripe dispute concerning the President's acts and the requirements of the October Resolution passed by Congress. By contrast, the theory of collusion, by its nature, assumes no conflict between the political branches, but rather a willing abdication of congressional power to an emboldened and enlarged presidency. That theory is not fit for judicial review for a different, but related, reason: Plaintiffs' claim that Congress and the President have transgressed the boundaries of their shared war powers, as demarcated by the Constitution, is presently insufficient to present a justiciable issue. Common to both is our assessment that, before courts adjudicate a case involving the war powers allocated to the two political branches, they must be presented with a case or controversy that clearly raises the specter of undermining the constitutional structure.

I.
Tensions between the United States and Iraq have been high at least since Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990. In 1991, the United States led an international coalition in the Persian Gulf War, which drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Before that conflict, Congress passed a resolution quite similar to the October Resolution. See Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991). As part of the ceasefire ending the Gulf War, Iraq agreed to United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which required that Iraq end the development of [p136]  nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, destroy all existing weapons of this sort and their delivery systems, and allow United Nations weapons inspections to confirm its compliance with these terms. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (1991). Since that time, Iraq has repeatedly been in breach of this agreement by, among other things, blocking inspections and hiding banned weapons. Iraq ended cooperation with the weapons inspection program in 1998. Since 1991, the United States and other nations have enforced a no-fly zone near the Kuwaiti border and on several occasions have launched missile strikes against Iraq.

Congress has been engaged in the American response to Iraqi noncompliance throughout this period. It was well-informed about ongoing American military activities, enforcement of the no-fly zone, and the missile strikes. In 1998, Congress passed a joint resolution which chronicled Iraqi noncompliance and declared that "the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations, and therefore the President is urged to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations." Pub. L. No. 105-235, 112 Stat. 1538, 1541 (1998). Later that year, Congress also passed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178. This statute authorized assistance, including military equipment and training, for "Iraqi democratic opposition organizations," and declared that it should be United States policy to remove Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power. Id. §§ 3, 4, 112 Stat. at 3179.

The United Nations has also remained engaged in the dispute ever since the Persian Gulf War. It supervised weapons inspections, supported economic sanctions against Iraq, and, through the Security Council, repeatedly passed resolutions declaring that Iraq was not fulfilling the conditions of Resolution 687. On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly. There he called for a renewed effort to demand Iraqi disarmament and indicated that he thought military force would be necessary if diplomacy continued to fail. In response, Iraq agreed to allow inspectors back into the country, but it has failed to comply fully with the earlier Security Council resolutions.

The week after his September 12 speech at the United Nations, President Bush proposed language for a congressional resolution supporting the use of force against Iraq. Detailed and lengthy negotiations between and among congressional leaders and the Administration hammered out a revised and much narrower version of the resolution. The House of Representatives passed this measure by a vote of 296 to 133 on October 10, 2002; the Senate followed suit on October 11 by a vote of 77 to 23. The full text of the October Resolution is attached as an appendix to this opinion.

On November 8, 2002, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which declared that Iraq remained in material breach of its obligations and offered "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations." S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. [p137]  Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). It also noted that "the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations." Id. In diplomatic parlance, the phrase "serious consequences" generally refers to military action. More than 200,000 United States troops are now deployed around Iraq, preparing for the possibility of an invasion.

The complaint was filed, along with motions for preliminary injunction and expedited hearing, on February 13, 2003. The district court heard oral argument on February 24 and denied the motion in an order issued that day. The court released a more detailed written opinion on February 27. See Doe v. Bush, No. 03-10284, 257 F. Supp.2d 436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2003). Plaintiffs appealed and this court expedited consideration, hearing oral argument on March 4, 2003 and receiving additional briefing on March 11. Because the case was dismissed on a pretrial motion, we independently review the claims afresh.

II.
The Constitution reserves the war powers to the legislative and executive branches. This court has declined the invitation to become involved in such matters once before. Over thirty years ago, the First Circuit addressed a war powers case challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam War on the basis that Congress had not declared war. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). The court found that other actions by Congress, such as continued appropriations to fund the war over the course of six years, id. at 34, provided enough indication of congressional approval to put the question beyond the reach of judicial review:

"The war in Vietnam is a product of the jointly supportive actions of the two branches to whom the congeries of the war powers have been committed. Because the branches are not in opposition, there is no necessity of determining boundaries. Should either branch be opposed to the continuance of hostilities, however, and present the issue in clear terms, a court might well take a different view. This question we do not face."

Id. Applying this precedent to the case at hand today, the district court concluded, "There is a day to day fluidity in the situation that does not amount to resolute conflict between the branches -- but that does argue against an uninformed judicial intervention," Doe, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773, at *11. See Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Mass. 1973); see also DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1157 (2d Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971); ''cf. United States v. Kin-Hong'', 110 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 1997) (drawing support from political question doctrine in case where "questions involve an evaluation of contingent political events").

The lack of a fully developed dispute between the two elected branches, and the consequent lack of a clearly defined issue, is exactly the type of concern which causes courts to find a case unripe. In his concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 62 L. Ed. 2d 428, 100 S.C.t. 533 (1979), Justice Powell stated that courts should decline, on ripeness grounds, to decide "issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse." Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). A number of courts have adopted Justice Powell's ripeness reasoning in cases involving military powers. See Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 & nn.23-25 (D.D.C. 1990); see also [p138] Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 248 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 770 F.2d 202, 210-11 ( D.C. Cir. 1985) (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring).

Ripeness doctrine involves more than simply the timing of the case. It mixes various mutually reinforcing constitutional and prudential considerations. See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2003). One such consideration is the need "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." ''Abbott Labs. v. Gardner'', 387 U.S. 136, 148, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 87 S.C.t. 1507 (1967). Another is to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320, 95 S.C.t. 335 (1974). A third is the recognition that, by waiting until a case is fully developed before deciding it, courts benefit from a focus sharpened by particular facts. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 736, 140 L. Ed. 2d 921, 118 S.C.t. 1665 (1998). The case before us raises all three of these concerns.

These rationales spring, in part, from the recognition that the scope of judicial power is bounded by the Constitution. "It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." C.A. Wright & M.K. Kane, Law of Federal Courts 27 (6th ed. 2002). Article III of the Constitution limits jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies," and prudential doctrines may counsel additional restraint.

The ripeness of a dispute is determined de novo. Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 2000). Ripeness is dependent on the circumstances of a particular case. ''See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp.,'' 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The various integers that enter into the ripeness equation play out quite differently from case to case . . . ."). Two factors are used to evaluate ripeness: "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. Ordinarily, both factors must be present. Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 535.

The hardship prong of this test is most likely satisfied here; the current mobilization already imposes difficulties on the plaintiff soldiers and family members, so that they suffer "present injury from a future contemplated event." McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs also lack a realistic opportunity to secure comparable relief by bringing the action at a later time. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734.

The fitness inquiry here presents a greater obstacle. Fitness "typically involves subsidiary queries concerning finality, definiteness, and the extent to which resolution of the challenge depends upon facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed." Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 535. The baseline question is whether allowing more time for development of events would "significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented [or] aid us in their resolution." [p139] ''Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,'' 438 U.S. 59, 82, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595, 98 S.C.t. 2620 (1978); see Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737; Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 144-45; Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198, 208-09 (1st Cir. 2002); R.I. Ass'n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). "The question of fitness does not pivot solely on whether a court is capable of resolving a claim intelligently, but also involves an assessment of whether it is appropriate for the court to undertake the task." Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 537. These prudential considerations are particularly strong in this case, which presents a politically-charged controversy involving momentous issues, both substantively (war and peace) and constitutionally (the powers of coequal branches). See Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149.

One thrust of the plaintiffs' argument is that the October Resolution only permits actions sanctioned by the Security Council. In plaintiffs' view, the Resolution's authorization is so narrow that, even with Security Council approval of military force, Congress would need to pass a new resolution before United States participation in an attack on Iraq would be constitutional. At a minimum, according to plaintiffs, the October Resolution authorizes no military action "outside of a United Nations coalition."

For various reasons, this issue is not fit now for judicial review. For example, should there be an attack, Congress may take some action immediately. The purported conflict between the political branches may disappear. "That the future event may never come to pass augurs against a finding of fitness." McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 72.

Many important questions remain unanswered about whether there will be a war, and, if so, under what conditions. Diplomatic negotiations, in particular, fluctuate daily. The President has emphasized repeatedly that hostilities still may be averted if Iraq takes certain actions. The Security Council is now debating the possibility of passing a new resolution that sets a final deadline for Iraqi compliance. United Nations weapons inspectors continue their investigations inside Iraq. Other countries ranging from Canada to Cameroon have reportedly pursued their own proposals to broker a compromise. As events unfold, it may become clear that diplomacy has either succeeded or failed decisively. The Security Council, now divided on the issue, may reach a consensus. To evaluate this claim now, the court would need to pile one hypothesis on top of another. We would need to assume that the Security Council will not authorize war, and that the President will proceed nonetheless. See id. at 72-73 (outlining chain of uncertain events necessary to make case ripe); Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 538 (same).

Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs correctly interpret the commands of the legislative branch, it is impossible to say yet whether or not those commands will be obeyed. As was the situation in Goldwater, "in the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there will ever be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches." 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).

Our analysis is based on ripeness rather [p140]  than the political question doctrine. The political question doctrine -- that courts should not intervene in questions that are the province of the legislative and executive branches -- is a famously murky one. See E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.6, at 144 (3d ed. 1999) ("In many ways, the political question doctrine is the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines."). It has also been used fairly infrequently to block judicial review. The modern definition of the doctrine was established in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S.C.t. 691 (1962). In the forty years since that case, the Supreme Court has found a case nonjusticiable on the basis of the political question doctrine only twice. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1, 113 S.C.t. 732 (1993) (Senate procedures for impeachment of a federal judge); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 12, 37 L. Ed. 2d 407, 93 S.C.t. 2440 (1973) (training, weaponry, and orders of Ohio National Guard). Our court has been similarly sparing in its reliance on the political question doctrine.

Ultimately, however, the classification matters less than the principle. If courts may ever decide whether military action contravenes congressional authority, they surely cannot do so unless and until the available facts make it possible to define [p141]  the issues with clarity.

III.
Plaintiffs' collusion theory presents different concerns. We understand plaintiffs to make two distinct arguments as to why an attack under the October Resolution would be unlawful. The first argument, discussed above, is that the October Resolution placed conditions on the President's authority to order action in Iraq, and that he is preparing to disregard those conditions. The other argument, our focus now, is that the October Resolution delegates excessive authority to the President, rendering it constitutionally inadequate as a vehicle for Congress to "declare war."

According to this second argument, the Constitution deliberately vested power to declare war in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and Congress is not free to upset this careful balance by giving power to the President. This claim of collusion does not align precisely with the test that the political branches have yet to reach a "constitutional impasse"; the claim is that the branches have agreed to an unconstitutional transfer of the "war declaration" powers from Congress to the President. Some initial review of the merits of the claim is "inherent when the constitutional issue is posed in terms of scope of authority." Laird, 451 F.2d at 33-34.

The Supreme Court has been willing to adjudicate other cases concerning the distribution of constitutional authority between the legislative and executive branches, notwithstanding the call for restraint embodied in the political question doctrine. Sometimes it rejects the application of the political question doctrine explicitly. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96, 109 L. Ed. 2d 384, 110 S.C.t. 1964 (1990); ''Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha'', 462 U.S. 919, 942-43, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S.C.t. 2764 (1983). Other times the Court has merely proceeded to the merits without explicitly rejecting the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421, 141 L. Ed. 2d 393, 118 S.C.t. 2091 (1998); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569, 108 S.C.t. 2597 (1988); cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388, 121 S.C.t. 525 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (considering separation of powers between state legislature and state judiciary under U.S.C.onst. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).

The Supreme Court has recognized a role for judicial review of these types of separation of powers claims even when Congress appears to have agreed to the challenged arrangement. In Clinton v. [p142]  City of New York, supra, a claim was brought by citizens deprived of the benefits of an appropriation that the President cancelled under the procedures in the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (2000). These citizens argued that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated to the President its authority under the Presentment Clause, U.S.C.onst. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Act despite apparent support for it from both of the other branches, which had jointly enacted the statute and used its procedures. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428-36 (reviewing jurisdiction extensively without consideration of political question doctrine); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941 (judicial review of legislative veto that had similarly been enacted and used).

In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive. See 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. . . . Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design."); ''cf. New York v. United States,'' 505 U.S. 144, 182, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112 S.C.t. 2408 (1992) ("The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.").

There are also, however, significant differences between Clinton and the case before us. For one, in Clinton the President had fully exercised the power that was at issue, which "removed any concern" about ripeness. 524 U.S. at 430. For another, the Line Item Veto Act contained specific provisions, accepted by both Congress and the President when they enacted the law, which not only permitted judicial review of the statute's validity but created a special expedited process for it. 2 U.S.C. § 692; see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428-30; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815-16, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849, 117 S.C.t. 2312 (1997). There was less danger of courts invading the province of these other branches, because specific statutory authority directed them to consider the case. A third difference is the scale of the purported delegation. The Line Item Veto Act gave the President wide discretion to cancel items of discretionary budget authority, direct spending, or limited tax benefits. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a). The determinations required of the President in the October Resolution are much more narrowly focused.

Perhaps the most important difference is the shared nature of the powers in question here. The Constitution explicitly divides the various war powers between the political branches. To the Congress goes the power to "declare war," U.S.C.onst. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11; to "raise and support armies" through appropriations of up to two years, cl. 12; to "provide and maintain a navy," cl. 13; and to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," cl. 14. The President's role as commander-in-chief is one of the few executive powers enumerated by the Constitution. U.S.C.onst. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

Given this "amalgam of powers," the Constitution overall "envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities." Laird, 451 F.2d at 31-32 (emphasis added). "'The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.'" [p143]  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S.C.t. 863, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209, 72 L. Ed. 845, 48 S.C.t. 480 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Rather, there is sometimes a "zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

In this zone of shared congressional and presidential responsibility, courts should intervene only when the dispute is clearly framed. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. An extreme case might arise, for example, if Congress gave absolute discretion to the President to start a war at his or her will. ''Cf. Clinton,'' 524 U.S. at 423, 425 (describing President's broad explanations for use of cancellation authority). Plaintiffs' objection to the October Resolution does not, of course, involve any such claim. Nor does it involve a situation where the President acts without any apparent congressional authorization, or against congressional opposition.

The mere fact that the October Resolution grants some discretion to the President fails to raise a sufficiently clear constitutional issue. The plaintiffs argue that Congress is constitutionally forbidden from deciding that certain conditions are necessary to lead to war and then yielding to the President the authority to make the determination of whether those conditions exist. The President, in this view, has power to make such determinations only in the context of repelling sudden attacks on this country or its allies. See Mitchell v. Laird, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court recently and forcefully reiterated that, notwithstanding the Constitution's vesting of "all legislative power" in Congress, U.S.C.onst. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added), enactments which leave discretion to the executive branch are permissible as long as they offer some "intelligible principle" to guide that discretion. ''See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns'', 531 U.S. 457, 472-76, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1, 121 S.C.t. 903 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 72 L. Ed. 624, 48 S.C.t. 348, Treas. Dec. 42706 (1928)). War powers, in contrast to "all legislative power," are shared between the political branches. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also suggested that the nondelegation doctrine has even less applicability to foreign affairs. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 85 S.C.t. 1271 (1965) (when delegating authority over foreign [p144]  relations, Congress may leave more details to the President than in domestic affairs, short of granting "totally unrestricted freedom of choice"). The reference to nondelegation is thus of little help to plaintiffs in trying to present the type of serious issue necessary to overcome judicial restraint in the adjudication of war powers cases.

Nor is there clear evidence of congressional abandonment of the authority to declare war to the President. To the contrary, Congress has been deeply involved in significant debate, activity, and authorization connected to our relations with Iraq for over a decade, under three different presidents of both major political parties, and during periods when each party has controlled Congress. It has enacted several relevant pieces of legislation expressing support for an aggressive posture toward Iraq, including authorization of the prior war against Iraq and of military assistance for groups that would overthrow Saddam Hussein. It has also accepted continued American participation in military activities in and around Iraq, including flight patrols and missile strikes. Finally, the text of the October Resolution itself spells out justifications for a war and frames itself as an "authorization" of such a war.

It is true that "courts possess power to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual limits" on constitutional power. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238. Questions about the structure of congressional power can be justiciable under the proper circumstances. See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428-36; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941-44. But courts are rightly hesitant to second-guess the form or means by which the coequal political branches choose to exercise their textually committed constitutional powers. See Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043. As the circumstances presented here do not warrant judicial intervention, the appropriate recourse for those who oppose war with Iraq lies with the political branches.

Dismissal of the complaint is affirmed.

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Rh25, 1830.] tleman from New Jersey, on this subject, may have ground to stand upon, as well as he, I move to strike out of the resolution, the words "in the possession," and to insert, in lieu thereof, the words "within the reach;" and to strike out tlic words, "the Cherokee, Creek, and Choctaw nations of Indians, east of the Mississippi," and to insert, in lieu thereof, the words, " the Indian nations within the United States;" and also, to erase the two last words of the resolution, (those nations} and in their stead to insert the word "them."

Mr. F. proceeded to state that he wanted all the information which could be procured respecting the condition of all the Indians, and that he wished to do justice not only to those who dwelt in the southwest part of the United States, but to all those residing' in any part of the country. So far as he, (who was unfortunately the only representative of Georgia now in the Senate) could undertake to say, we seek to do nothing which has not been already exercised by the majority of the States of the Union. Mr. P. concluded by saying, if the gentleman from New Jersey wished to take time for the consideration of his amendment, he would move to lay both the resolution and amendment, for the present, on the table.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN did not assent to this course, but suggested to the gentleman from Georgia to propose his amendment in the form of a new resolution. He repeated what his object was in proposing the resolution, and said, if the gentleman from Georgia would consent to the adoption of his resolution, he would not object to the adoption of a resolution embracing the same matter as the present amendment.

Mr. FORSYTH made no reply; and

The question on amending the resolution was then put, and carried in the affirmative, by the casting vote of the President, the ayes and noes being equal. The resolution, as amended, was then adopted, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested to furnish to the Senate any information within the reach of his Department, respecting the progress of civilization, for the last eight years, among the Indian nations within the United States, and the present state of education, civil government, agriculture, and the mechanic arts, among them.

MR. FOOT'S RESOLUTION.

The unfinished business of Thursday, being the order of the day, was then resumed; and the question being on the motion of Mr. WEBSTER to postpone, indefinitely, the resolution proposed by Mr. FOOT, concerning the public lands,

Mr. HAYNE rose, and, in continuation of his reply to Mr., addressed the Senate for two hours and a half.

[The following are the remarks of Mr. H. as delivered on Thursday and to-day.]

Mr. HAYNE began by saying that when he took occasion, two days ago, to throw out some ideas with respect to the policy of the Government in relation to the public lands, nothing certainly could have been further from his thoughts than that he should be compelled again to throw himself upon the indulgence of the Senate. Little did I expect [said Mr. H.] to be called upon to meet such as was yesterday urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Webster.] Sir, I questioned no man’s opinions; I impeached no man’s motives; I charged no party, or State, or section of country, with hostility to any other; but ventured, I thought in a becoming spirit, to put forth my own sentiments in relation to a great national question of public policy. Such was my course. The gentleman from Missouri, [Mr. Benton] it is true, had charged upon the Eastern States an early and continued hostility towards the West, and referred to a number of historical facts and documents in support of that charge. Now, sir, how have these different arguments been met? The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, after deliberating a whole night upon his course, comes into this chamber to vindicate New England, and; instead of making up his issue with the gentleman from Missouri, on the charges which he had preferred, chooses to consider me as the author of those charges; and, losing sight entirely of that gentleman, selects me as his adversary, and pours out all the vials of his mighty wrath upon my devoted head. Nor is he willing to stop there. He goes on to assail the institutions and policy of the South, and calls in question the principles and conduct of the State which I have the honor to represent. When I find a gentleman of mature age and experience, of acknowledged talents and profound sagacity, pursuing a course like this, declining the contest offered from the West, and making war upon the unoffending South, I must believe, I am bound to believe, he has some object in view that he has not ventured to disclose. Why is this? [asked Mr. H.] Has the gentleman discovered in former controversies with the gentleman from Missouri, that he is overmatched by that Senator? And does he hope for an easy victory over a more feeble adversary? Has the gentleman’s distempered fancy been disturbed by gloomy forebodings of “new alliances to be formed,” at which he hinted? Has the ghost of the murdered Coalition come back, like the ghost of Banquo, to “sear the eye-balls” of the gentleman, and will it not “down at his bidding?” Are dark visions of broken hopes, and honors lost forever, still floating before his heated imagination? Sir, if it be his object to thrust me between the gentleman from Missouri and himself, in order to rescue the East from the contest it has provoked with the West, he shall not be gratified. Sir, I will not be dragged into the defence of my friend from Missouri. The South shall not be forced into a conflict not its own. The gentleman from Missouri is able to fight his own battles. The gallant West needs no aid from the South to repel any attack which may be made on them from any quarter. Let the gentleman from Massachusetts controvert the facts and arguments of the gentleman from Missouri—if he can; and if he win the victory, let him wear its honors: I shall not deprive him of his laurels.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, in reply to my remarks on the injurious operation of our land system on the prosperity of the West, pronounced an extravagant eulogium on the paternal care which the Government had extended towards the West, to which he attributed all that was great and excellent in the present condition of the new States. The language of the gentleman on this topic fell upon my ears like the almost forgotten tones of the tory leaders of the British Parliament, at the commencement of the American Revolution. They, too, discovered, that the colonies had grown great under the fostering care of the mother country; and I must confess, while listening to the gentleman, I thought the appropriate reply to his argument was to be found in the remark of a celebrated orator, made on that occasion: “They have grown great in spite of your protection.”

The gentleman, in commenting on the policy of the Government, in relation to the new States, has introduced to our notice a certain Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts, to whom he attributes the celebrated ordinance of ’ 87, by which he tells us, “slavery was forever excluded from the new States north of the Ohio.” After eulogizing the wisdom of this provision, in terms of the most extravagant praise, he breaks forth in admiration of the greatness of Nathan Dane—and great, indeed, he must be, if it be true, as stated by the Senator from Massachusetts, that “he was greater than Solon and Lycurgus, Minos, Numa Pompilius, and all the legislators and philosophers of the world,” ancient and modern. Sir, to such high authority it is certainly my duty, in a becoming spirit of


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58.] the statesmen from New England were disposed to go, under similar circumstances,—no further than the Senator from Massachusetts himself once considered as within “the limits of a constitutional opposition.” The doctrine that it is the right of a State to judge of the violations of the Constitution on the part of the Federal Government, and to protect her citizens from the operations of unconstitutional laws, was held by the enlightened citizens of Boston, who assembled in Faneuil Hall on the 25th January, 1809. They state in that celebrated memorial, that “they looked only to the State Legislature, who were competent to devise relief against the unconstitutional acts of the General Government. That your power (say they) is adequate to that object, is evident from the organization of the Confederacy.”

A distinguished Senator, from one of the New England States, (Mr. Hillhouse) in a speech delivered here, on a bill for enforcing the embargo, declared “I feel myself bound in conscience to declare, (lest the blood of those who shall fall in the execution of this measure, shall be on my head) that I consider this to be an act which directs a mortal blow at the liberties of my country—an act containing unconstitutional provisions, to which the people are not bound to submit, and to which, in my opinion, they will not submit.

And the Senator from Massachusetts himself, in a speech delivered on the same subject, in the other House, said,—“This opposition is constitutional and legal; it is also conscientious. It rests on settled and sober conviction, that such policy is destructive to the interests of the people, and dangerous to the being of the government. The experience of every day confirms these sentiments. Men who act from such motives, are not to be discouraged by trifling obstacles, nor awed by any dangers. They know the limits of constitutional opposition up to that limit; at their own discretion, they will walk, and walk fearlessly.” How the “being of the Government” was to be endangered by “constitutional opposition” to the embargo, I leave to the gentleman to explain. Thus it will be seen, Mr. President, that the South Carolina doctrine is the republican doctrine of ’ 98; that it was first promulgated by the Fathers of the Faith—that it was maintained by Virginia and Kentucky, in the worst of times—that it constituted the very pivot on which the political revolution of that day turned—that it embraced the very principles the triumph of which at that time “saved the Constitution at its last gasp;” and which New England Statesmen were not unwilling to adopt, when they believed themselves to be the victims of unconstitutional legislation! Sir, as to the doctrine that the Federal Government is the exclusive judge of the extent as well as the limitations of its powers, it seems to be utterly subversive of the sovereignty and independence of the States. It makes but little difference, in my estimation, whether Congress or the Supreme Court, are invested with this power. If the Federal Government, in all or any of its departments, are to prescribe the limits of its own authority; and the States are bound to submit to the decision, and are not to be allowed to examine and decide for themselves, when the barriers of the Constitution shall be overleaped, this is practically “a Government without limitation of powers;” the States are at once reduced to mere petty corporations, and the people are entirely at your mercy. I have but one word more to add. In all the efforts that have been made by South Carolina to resist the unconstitutional laws which Congress has extended over them, she has kept steadily in view the preservation of the Union, by the only means by which she believes it can be long preserved—a firm, manly, and steady resistance against usurpation. The measures of the Federal Government have, it is true, prostrated her interests, and will soon involve the whole South in irretrievable ruin. But this evil, great as it is, is not the chief ground of our complaints. It is the principle involved in the contest, a principle which, substituting the discretion of Congress for the limitations of the Constitution, brings the States and the people to the feet of the Federal Government, and leaves them nothing they can call their own. Sir, if the measures of the Federal Government were less oppressive, we should still strive against this usurpation. The South is acting on a principle she has always held sound—resistance to unauthorized taxation. These, Sir, are the principles which induced the immortal Hampden to resist the payment of a tax of twenty shillings—“Would twenty shillings have ruined his fortune? No—but the payment of half twenty shillings, on the principle on which it was demanded, would have made him a slave.” Sir, if, in acting on these high motives—if, animated by that ardent love of liberty which has always been the most prominent trait in the Southern character, we should be hurried beyond the bounds of a cold and calculating prudence, who is there with one noble and generous sentiment in his bosom, who would not be disposed in the language of Burke, to exclaim, “You must pardon something to the spirit of liberty!”

Mr. WEBSTER here rose to reply; but as the hour was advanced, (it being then near four o'clock) he yielded the floor to

Mr. BELL, who moved an adjournment, which motion was agreed to.

26, 1830.

The Senate resumed the consideration of Mr. FOOT'S resolution, when Mr. WEBSTER addressed the Senate in reply to the last speech of Mr. HAYNE. About half past three o'clock he gave way to a request of one of the members for an adjournment.

27, 1830.

The Senate resumed the consideration of Mr. FOOT'S resolution; when

Mr. WEBSTER, in a speech of three hours' length, concluded bis argument.

[The speech, as delivered yesterday and to-day, was as follows:]

Mr. : When the mariner has been tossed, for many days, in thick weather, and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude, and ascertain how far the elements have driven him from his true course. Let us imitate this prudence, and, before we float farther, on the waves of this debate, refer to the point from which we departed, that we may, at least, be able to form some conjecture where we now are. I ask for the reading of the resolution.

[The Secretary read the resolution, as follows:

"Resolved, That the Committee on Public Lands be instructed to inquire and report the quantity of the public lands remaining unsold within each State and Territory, and whether it be expedient to limit, for a certain period, the sales of the public lands to such lands only as have heretofore been offered for sale, and arc now subject to entry at the minimum price. And, also, whether the office of Surveyor General, and some of the land offices, may not be abolished, without detriment to the public interest; or whether it be expedient to adopt measures to hasten the sales, and extend more rapidly the surveys of the public lands."]

We have thus heard, sir, what that resolution is, which is actually submitted for our consideration; and it will readily occur to every one, that it is almost the only subject about which something has not been said in the speech, running through two days, by which the Senate has been now entertained by the gentleman from South Carolina. Every topic in the wide range of our public affairs,


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82.] to the constitution of the United States, made the following report:

The Committee to whom was referred the communication of the Governor of Pennsylvania, covering certain resolutions of the Legislature of that State, proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, by the appointment of an impartial tribunal to decide disputes between the States and Federal Judiciary, have had the same under their consideration, and are of opinion, that a tribunal is already provided by the Constitution of the United States, to wit: the Supreme Court, more eminently qualified, from their habits and duties, from the mode of their selection, and from the tenure of their offices, to decide the disputes aforesaid, in an enlightened and impartial manner, than any other tribunal which could be created.

The members of the Supreme Court are selected from those in the United States who are most celebrated for virtue and legal learning, not at the will of a single individual, but by the concurrent wishes of the President and Senate of the United States: they will, therefore, have no local prejudices and partialities. The duties they have to perform lead them, necessarily, to the most enlarged and accurate acquaintance with the jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts together, and with the admirable symmetry of our Government. The tenure of their offices enables them to pronounce the sound and correct opinions they may have formed, without fear, favor, or partiality.

The amendment to the Constitution, proposed by Pennsylvania, seems to be founded upon the idea that the Federal Judiciary will, from a lust of power, enlarge their jurisdiction, to the total annihilation of the jurisdiction of the State Courts; that they will exercise their will, instead of the law and the Constitution.

This argument, if it proves any thing, would operate more strongly against the tribunal proposed to be created, which promised so little, than against the Supreme Court, which, for the reasons given before, have every thing connected with their appointment calculated to ensure confidence. What security have we, were the proposed amendment adopted, that this tribunal would not substitute their will and their pleasure in place of the law? The Judiciary are the weakest of the three Departments of Government, and least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; they hold neither the purse nor the sword; and, even to enforce their own judgments and decisions, must ultimately depend upon the Executive arm. Should the Federal Judiciary, however, unmindful of their weakness, unmindful of the duty which they owe to themselves and their country, become corrupt, and transcend the limits of their jurisdiction, would the proposed amendment oppose even a probable barrier in such an improbable state of things?

The creation of a tribunal, such as is proposed by Pennsylvania, so far as we are able to form an idea of it from the description given in the resolutions of the Legislature of that State, would, in the opinion of your Committee, tend rather to invite, than to prevent, collisions between the Federal and State Courts. It might also become, in process of time, a serious and dangerous embarrassment to the operations of the General Government.

Resolved, therefore, That the Legislature of this State do disapprove of the amendment to the constitution of the United States proposed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania.

Resolved, also, That his Excellency the Governor be, and he is hereby, requested to transmit forthwith, a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to each of the Senators and Representatives of this State in Congress, and to the Executive of the several States in the Union, with a request that the same be laid before the Legislatures thereof.

The said resolutions being read a second time, were, on motion, ordered to be referred to a Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Commonwealth.

, January 23, 1810. The House, according to the order of the day, resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Commonwealth, and, after some time spent therein, Mr. Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Stanard, of Spottsylvania, reported that the Committee had, according to order, had under consideration the preamble and resolutions of the Select Committee, to whom was referred that part of the Governor's communication which relates to the amendment proposed to the constitution of the United States by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, had gone through with the same, and directed him to report them to the House without amendment; which he handed in at the Clerk's table.

And the question being put on agreeing to the said preamble and resolutions, they were agreed to by the House unanimously.

Ordered, That the Clerk carry the said preamble and resolutions to the Senate, and desire their concurrence.

, January 24, 1810.

The preamble and resolutions on the amendment to the constitution of the United States, proposed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, by the appointment of an impartial tribunal to decide disputes between the State and Federal Judiciary, being also delivered in and twice read, on motion, was ordered to be committed to Messrs. Nelson, Currie, Campbell, Upshur, and Wolfe.

, January 26.

Mr. Nelson reported, from the Committee to whom was. committed the preamble and resolutions on the amendment proposed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, Sec. that the Committee had, according to order, taken the said preamble, &c. under their consideration, and directed him to report them without any amendment.

And on the question being put thereupon, the same was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. HAYNE, in reply to Mr. Webster, observed: I do not rise at this late hour, Mr. President, to go at large into the controverted questions between the Senator from Massachusetts and myself, but merely to correct some very gross errors into which he has fallen, and to afford explanations on some points, which, after what has fallen from that gentleman, may perhaps be considered as requiring explanation. The gentleman has attempted, through the whole course of his argument, to throw upon me the blame of having provoked this discussion. Though standing himself at the very head and source of this angry controversy, which has flowed from him down to me, he insists that I have troubled the waters. In order to give color to this charge, (wholly unfounded, Sir, as every gentleman of this body will bear witness,) he alludes to my excitement when I first rose to answer the gentleman, after he had made his attack upon the South. He charges me with having then confessed that I had something rankling in my bosom which I desired to discharge. Sir, I have no recollection of having used that word. If it did escape me, however, in the excitement of the moment, it was not indicative of any personal hostility towards that Senator—for in truth, Sir, I felt none—but proceeded from a sensibility, which could not but be excited by what I had a right to consider as an unprovoked and most unwarrantable attack upon the South, through me.

The gentleman boasts that he has escaped unhurt in the conflict. The shaft, it seems, was shot by too feeble an arm to reach its destination. Sir, I am glad to hear this. Judging from the actions of the gentleman, I had feared