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Field v. Seabury/Opinion of the Court

This case has been brought to this court by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of California.

The circumstances disclosed by the record, and the documentary evidence introduced by the parties in support of their respective rights to the land in controversy, make an extended statement necessary, in order that the points decided may be understood.

The defendant in error brought into the Circuit Court an action of ejectment against Wyman and others, tenants of the plaintiff in error, to recover the possession of lot No. 464, it being a subdivision of a lot of one hundred varas square, numbered 456, of the San Francisco beach and water lots. Field, the plaintiff in error, was admitted to defend, and a verdict having been given for the plaintiffs below, it was agreed by a stipulation in the record that this writ of error should be prosecuted by Field alone, without joining the other defendants.

Both parties claimed title under an act of the Legislature of California, passed the 26th March, 1851, entitled 'An act to provide for the disposition of certain property of the State of California,' the provisions of which, so far as they relate to this cause, are as follows: The first section of the act describes the land to be disposed of; and the second section is, that 'the use and occupation of all the land described in the first section of the act is hereby granted to the city of San Francisco for the term of ninety-nine years from the date of this act, except as hereinafter provided; all the lands mentioned in the first section of this act, which have been sold by authority of the ayuntamiento, or town or city council, or by any alcalde of the said town or city, at public auction, in accordance with the terms of the grant known as Kearney's grant to the city of San Francisco, or which have been sold or granted by any alcalde of the said city of San Francisco, and confirmed by the ayuntamiento, or town or city council thereof; and also registered or recorded in some book of record now in the office or custody or control of the recorder of the county of San Francisco, on or before the third day of April, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and fifty, shall be and the same are hereby granted and confirmed to the purchaser or purchasers or grantees aforesaid, by the State relinquishing the use and occupation of the same and her interests therein to the said purchasers or grantees, and each of them, their heirs and assigns, or any person or persons holding under them, for the term of ninety-nine years from and after the passage of this act.'

SEC. 3. 'That the original deed, or other written or printed instrument of conveyance, by which any of the lands mentioned in the first section of this act were conveyed or granted by such common council, ayuntamiento, or alcalde, and in case of its loss, or not being within the control of the party, then a record copy thereof, or a record copy of the material portion thereof, properly authenticated, may be read in evidence in any court of justice in this State, upon the trial of any cause in which the contents may be important to be proved, and shall be prima facie evidence of title and possession, to enable the plaintiff to recover the possession of the land so granted.'

Kearney's grant mentioned in the act was read in evidence at the trial by the plaintiffs in the action; it is dated March 10th, 1847, and is as follows:

'I, Brigadier General S. W. Kearney, Governor of California, by virtue of authority in me vested by the President of the United States of America, do hereby grant, convey, and release, unto the town of San Francisco, the people or corporate authorities thereof, all the right, title, and interest thereof, of the Government of the United States, and of the Territory of California, in and to the beach and water lots on the east front of said town of San Francisco, including between the points known as the Rincon and Fort Montgomery, excepting such lots as may be selected for the use of the General Government by the senior officers of the army and navy now there, provided the said ground hereby ceded shall be divided into lots, and sold by public auction to the highest bidders, after three months' notice previously given. The proceeds of said sale to be for the benefit of the town of San Francisco.'

It was agreed by the parties at the trial that the lot sued for is included in the first section of the act of March 26, 1851, already cited, and also within the locality of the Kearney grant; that it is no part of any Government reservation; and that on the 9th of September, 1850, when California was admitted as a State into the Union, the lot was below high-water mark.

In order to show themselves entitled to the lot in question under the second section of the act cited, the plaintiffs below produced the following documents:

1. A grant by John W. Geary, first alcalde of San Francisco, to Thomas Sprague, dated January 3d, 1850, reciting the Kearney grant, calling it a 'decree,' and that by virtue thereof, and by direction of the ayuntamiento, a certain portion of said ground, duly divided into lots as aforesaid, after notice, as required by the 'decree' or grant, had been exposed to sale at public auction, in conformity with it, on the 3d day of January, 1850; and that one of the lots, numbered on the map 464, had been sold to Thomas Sprague for $1,700, for which he had paid in cash $425, and had obliged himself to pay the sum of $1,275 in three equal instalments, on the 3d of April, 3d of July, and the 3d of October; that Sprague then received a grant for the lot to him, his heirs and assigns, forever, of all the estate that the town of San Francisco had in the same, as fully as the same was held and possessed by it, subject to a proviso that the grant was to be void for failure to pay the instalments.

The foregoing document or grant was not recorded or registered, nor was any evidence given that three months' notice of the sale had been given, other than the recitals in the grant.

2. The plaintiff introduced a deed from Sprague to Seabury, Gifford, and one Horace Gushee, dated May 17, 1850, conveying to them in fee all his right and title to the lot sued for, and also another lot, No. 450, for the sum of $4,000, with a provision that they should pay $1,560 of the instalments payable to the town.

The plaintiffs then introduced a deed from Horace Gushee to the plaintiff Parker, conveying to Parker in fee all his right and title to the water lot No. 464, for the consideration of $100, which was dated April 20th, 1855.

Receipts by the city officers for three of the instalments of the purchase-money, dated the 3d April, 3d July, and 3d October, were endorsed upon the grant.

The plaintiffs then rested their case upon the foregoing evidence.

Two grounds of defence were relied upon by the defendants: First, that the Geary grant was not within the act of March 26, 1851, for want of the notice of sale required by the Kearney grant; and also that it had never been registered and recorded, as the act required, in some book of record now in the office now in the custody or control of the recorder of the county of San Francisco, on or before the third day of April, one thousand eight hundred and fifty. Second, that the defendants and those under whom they claimed had a good title to the premises under the provisions of the act of March 26, 1851. They also relied upon a possession of the premises for more than five years prior to the institution of the suit. To prove their title, the defendants gave in evidence the following documents:

1st. A grant of the lot one hundred varas square, (of which the lot in question was a subdivision,) dated September 25th, 1848, by Leavenworth, alcalde of San Francisco, to Parker, upon the petition of the latter, both written on the same sheet, as follows:

'To T. N. Levenworth, Alcalde and Chief Magistrate, district San Francisco:

'Your petitioner, the undersigned, a citizen of California, respectfully prays the grant of a title to a certain lot of land in the vicinity of the town of San Francisco, containing one hundred varas square, and bounded on the north by Washington street, on the west by a street dividing said lot from the beach and water survey, on the south by Clay street, and on the east by unsurveyed land, and numbered on the plan marked on page one (1) of district records as four hundred and fifty-six (456.)

WILLIAM C. PARKER.'

On the same day the grant was made, as follows:

'TERRITORY OF CALIFORNIA,

'District of San Francisco, Sept. 25, A. D. 1848.

'Know all men by these presents, that William C. Parker has presented the foregoing petition for a grant of land in the vicinity of the town of San Francisco, as therein described; therefore I, the undersigned, alcalde and magistrate of the district of San Francisco, in Upper California, do hereby give, and grant, and convey, unto the said William C. Parker, his heirs and assigns, forever, the lot of ground as set forth in the petition, by a good and sufficient title, in consonance with the established customs and regulations, being one hundred varas square, lying and being situated in the eastern vicinity of San Francisco, and outside the limits of the water-lot survey.

'In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, as alcalde and chief magistrate of the district aforesaid.

'Done at San Francisco, the day and year above written.

'T. M. LEAVENWORTH.

'Recorded in the alcalde's office, in book F of land titles, on page number 18, at 10 1/2 o'clock, A. M., November 28, 1849.

'Office First Alcalde.

A. BOWMAN, ''Reg. Cl'k.'''

Then the defendants called Parker as a witness, to prove the execution of the grant in the manner and at the time as has been just stated, producing at the same time a deed from Parker to Leavenworth, dated the 26th September, 1848, and Parker certified it had been executed by him.

It was also proved that Leavenworth conveyed the premises to George W. Wright, by deed dated the 1st December, 1849. Wright conveyed one undivided half of the lot in fee to Charles T. Botts, and the other undivided half of the same to Edward Field, the now plaintiff in error, except two lots or subdivisions of the same, numbered 467 and 468. A deed from Botts, dated 1st October, 1852, to Joseph C. Palmer and Wright, conveying to them in fee the one undivided half of said lot, except the subdivisions of it 467 and 468, for the consideration of $40,000, reciting the premises conveyed to be ten water lots, and that Botts derived title through the deed from Wright to him; and Palmer then conveyed the last-mentioned premises as they held them to Field, the plaintiff in error, for $75,000, without any recital of the preceding conveyances, and the same was recorded on the 12th January, 1853, the day of the execution of the deed. It is as well to remark, that all of the deeds just mentioned were in the county recorder's office. It was also agreed by the parties, in writing, that the original defendants in the action were in possession of the premises under leases from Field, the plaintiff in error, the production of the leases being dispensed with.

The defendants also gave in evidence book B of the district records, page 1, kept in the alcalde's office, and as such turned over to the recorder of the county of San Francisco, upon the organization of that office in May, 1850, to prove from it that there had been a certificate of the Leavenworth conveyance of the land to Parker, contemporary with the execution of it. The authenticity of the book B was proved by the testimony of witnesses who had been connected with the office of the alcalde, and afterwards with the office of the recorder of the county. Other testimony was also introduced by the defendants, of another book, F, kept by Alcalde Geary, the predecessor of Leavenworth, in which grants issued by his predecessor were recorded at length, which was turned over to the county recorder at the same time with book B, in which there was a literal transcript of Parker's original petition and Leavenworth's grant, as they have been already recited.

The defendants also gave in evidence a resolution of the ayuntamiento or town council of San Francisco, of the 11th October, 1848, confirming the grants of Leavenworth to several parcels of land adjacent to the town, on the ground that Leavenworth had made them for the purpose of raising funds to defray the necessary expenses of the town and district. A deed from the board of California land commissioners, acting under the act of May 18, 1853, by which they were authorized to sell the interest of the State in the San Francisco beach and water-lot property, was also put in evidence by the defendants, which conveyed in fee to Joseph Palmer and Edward C. Jones all the right, title, and interest, of the State of California in the aforesaid ten water lots, for the consideration of $1,425. It was also proved that Palmer, Cook, & Co., of which Palmer, Wright, and Jones, were members, commenced improving the lot in May, 1850, more than five years before the commencement of the suit, which was on the 7th June, 1855, and that they shortly afterwards leased it to one Gordon, who erected on it valuable improvements; and that they, and others claiming under them, had ever since occupied the premises.

A resolution of the town council, passed on the 5th October, 1849, requesting the alcalde to advertise the sale at the earliest moment, was also put in proof by the defendants, to show that the Geary grant of January 7, 1850, had been made without three months' notice of the sale having been given. Then, at this stage of the trial, the plaintiffs were permitted to discredit the fact that Leavenworth's grant to Parker had been recorded, as has been stated, by showing that there had been mistakes in recording grants in the book of records, and that there were several entries in the book purporting to be copies of grants by Leavenworth in 1849, after he was out of office, which the court permitted to be done-the defendants objecting-on the ground that, by reading from the book the grant to Parker, the defendants had made the entire book evidence; and that the plaintiffs might read other entries in it, without any proof that the grants had been issued, or in fact dated, in the year 1849. The court also permitted Parker, the original grantee of Leavenworth, to be examined as a witness; and also Clark, a member of the town council, to prove that there had been fraud in the issue and confirmation of the Leavenworth grant. And upon the defendants objecting to the admissibility of such evidence, the court overruled their objection, saying 'that the act of March 26, 1851, under which the plaintiffs and defendants claimed to have a title to the premises in dispute, was intended to confirm only honest titles, and that the plaintiff might impeach the Leavenworth grant to Parker, and the confirmation of it by the town council, by showing fraud.' And under this ruling of the court, the plaintiffs were permitted to read as evidence from the books of records B and F, and from other books purporting to be minutes of grants made by Leavenworth to one Clark, to Jones and Buchelin, prior to October 11, 1848, intending to show by them that the members of the council who voted for the resolution of that date held divers grants which were confirmed by it, and had therefore acted fraudulently. And that was done without any proof of identity between the supposed grantees and other members of council, and without producing any originals of the supposed grants, or proving that any such grants were made. The witnesses, however, introduced to prove fraud in the issue of the Leavenworth grant, denied positively that it existed.

We do not think a more extended statement from the record necessary for the conclusion at which we have arrived in this case. That which has been given is sufficient for the construction of the act of March 26, 1851, under which both parties claim the premises in dispute, and for the decision of the exception taken by the defendants to the ruling of the court in respect to the admissibility of witnesses to prove that Leavenworth had practised a fraud in issuing a grant to Parker for the lot 456.

It is admitted, that neither the plaintiff nor defendant could claim a title to any part of that lot under these alcalde grants, unless they can be brought within the act of March 26, 1851. (Laws of California, 764.) The court below said, in its charge to the jury, that neither of the alcaldes had any power to grant land, and that no estate passed by either of their grants. These documents are only to be considered as ear-marks to designate the legislative grantees, who were intended to take under the act of March 26, 1851. Both parties in the suit bringing themselves within the classes designated, the defendants, being in possession, as has been ascertained by the evidence, would on principles of law be entitled to a verdict. In this the court was correct; and its first obligation, when the case was submitted to the jury, was to determine, by its construction of the act, whether both parties or either of them had, by their documentary evidence, been brought within the classes of grantees designated by the act. This, however, it did not do; but leaving that question undecided, after permitting the plaintiffs to introduce witnesses to prove that the Leavenworth grant had been fraudulently issued by him, it submitted the case to the jury, making it not only competent to find the fact of fraud, but constituting the jurors judges of the legal question, whether the plaintiff who had alleged the fraud was within the classes of grantees which the Legislature meant to confirm, and that the defendant's alcalde grant was not comprehended by the legislative act-thus giving to a party who might not be able to claim a title under the act a chance, by the verdict of a jury, to dispossess another, also without a title under it, who had just been said by the court, in a controversy between them for the land, would be entitled to a verdict in virtue of his being in possession of it. If the plaintiff had no title under the act, though the defendant also was without one, the former could have no complaint against him, nor any legal right to recover in ejectment land of which the defendant was in possession. The court, in this part of its ruling, made the charge of fraud the turning-point in the case, and not the right of title to the premises, by the construction of the act under which both parties claimed a title, and by which it had said either could only claim. The result was, the jury, having been so instructed, found a verdict for the plaintiff upon the question of fraud, without any instruction in any part of its charge that he claimed a title from an alcalde's grant, which was within the act of March 26, 1851, or that the defendant was without one, unless it be the court's intimation to the jury that the defendant might be considered as having no title under the act, if they should find that there had been fraud in the issue of his alcalde grant, or in the confirmation of it. The court's construction of the rights of the parties under the act should have been independent of the question of fraud. The evidence which it allowed to be given of it was inadmissible, and the finding of the jury is of no weight in the case. Fraud, as it is sometimes said, 'vitiates every act'-correctly, too, when properly applied to the subject-matter in controversy, and to the parties in it, and in a proper forum. For instance, as when one of them charges the other with an actual fraud; or when one of them, by his omission to do an act in time, which he ought to have done, as in not having recorded a deed, the other, without any knowledge of its existence, becomes in good faith a purchaser of the same property; in such a case a claim, under the unregistered deed, is said to be fraudulent and void against a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice. But in that case, the latter gains a legal preference by the court's construction of the registry act, under which the first deed ought to have been recorded, and, as a matter of law, so instructs the jury. But these cases are not applicable to the case in hand. Those are cases where the actual or constructive fraud grows out of the conduct of parties directly to each other, or is consequential from such conduct.

This case involves directly the point whether, when a grant or patent for land, or legislative confirmation of titles to land, has been given by the sovereignty or legislative authority only having the right to make it, without any provision having been made in the patent or by the law to inquire into its fairness as between the grantor and grantee, or between third parties, a third party cannot raise in ejectment the question of fraud as between the grantor and grantee, and thus look beyond the patent or grant.

We are not aware that such a proceeding is permitted in any of the courts of law. In England, a bill in equity lies to set aside letters patent obtained from the King by fraud, (Att. Gen. v. Vernon, 277, 370; the same case, 2 Ch. Rep., 353,) and it would in the United States; but it is a question exclusively between the sovereignty making the grant and the grantee. But in neither could a patent be collaterally avoided at law for fraud. This court has never declared it could be done. Stoddard and Chambers (2 How., 284) does not do so, as has been supposed. In that case, an act of Congress confirming titles, excepted cases where the land had previously been located by any other person than the confirmee, under any law of the United States, or had been surveyed and sold by the United States; and this court held that a location made on land reserved from sale by an act of Congress, or a patent obtained for land so reserved, was made perfect by the act of and the title of the confirmee was made perfect by the act of confirmation, and without any patent, as against the prior patent, which was simply void; and this valid legal title enured at once to the benefit of an assignee of the confirmee. In this connection it must be remembered that we are speaking of patents for land, and not of transactions between individuals, in which it has been incidentally said, by this court, that deeds fraudulently obtained may be collaterally avoided at law. (Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Peters, 244; Swayzer v. Burke, 12 Peters, 11.)

But we are also of the opinion that the act of March 26, 1851, to provide for the disposition of certain property of the State of California, (Cal. Laws, 764,) makes a direct grant of all lands of the kind, and within the limits mentioned in the act, which had been sold or granted by any alcalde of the city of San Francisco, and confirmed by the ayuntamiento, or town or city council thereof, and also registered or recorded in some book of record which was at the date of the act in the office or custody or control of the recorder of the county of San Francisco, on or before the third day of April, one thousand eight hundred and fifty. The words of the statute are, 'that all the lands mentioned in the first section of it are hereby granted and confirmed to the purchaser or purchasers, or grantees aforesaid, by the State relinquishing the use and occupation of the same, and her interests therein, to the said purchasers or grantees, and each of them, their heirs and assigns, or any person or persons holding under them, for the term of ninety-nine years from and after the passage of the act.' This language cannot be misinterpreted. The intention of the Legislature is without doubt, and we cannot make it otherwise by supposing any condition than those expressed in the act; and we also think that the registry of an alcalde's grant, in the manner and within the time mentioned in the act, is essential to its confirmation under the act. In this particular, the Kearney grant, under which the plaintiff claimed, was deficient, and so the court should have instructed the jury upon the prayer of the defendant, without the qualification that the entry made of it in the district records was a registry within the meaning of the act. We do not deem it necessary to say more in this case, than that, in our view, the defendants have brought themselves, by their documentary evidence, completely within the confirming act of the 26th March, 1850, and that the court should have so instructed the jury, as it was asked to do by their counsel.

The Judgment of the court below is reversed.

title: Field v. Seabury/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Field v. Seabury/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Bryan v. Forsyth

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Ballance and Mr. Johnson for the plaintiffs in error, and submitted on a printed argument by Mr. Williams for the defendant.

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Bryan v. Forsyth


text: Talk:Bryan v. Forsyth

title: Talk:Bryan v. Forsyth


text:
Bryan v. Forsyth/Opinion of the Court

Forsyth sued Bryan and Rouse in ejectment for part of lot No. 7, in the town of Peoria, in the State of Illinois. The action was founded on a patent to Forsyth, from the United States, dated the 16th day of December, 1845, which patent was given in evidence on the trial in the Circuit Court. It was admitted that the defendants were in possession when they were sued, and that they held possession within the bounds of the patent. To overcome this prima facie title, the defendants gave in evidence a patent from the United States to John L. Bogardus, containing twenty-three acres, dated January 5th, 1838, which included lot No. 7. To overreach this elder patent, the plaintiff relied on an act of Congress, passed May 15, 1820, for the relief of the inhabitants of the village of Peoria, providing that every person who claims a lot in said village shall, on or before the first day of October next, deliver to the register of the land office for the district of Edwardsville a notice in writing of his or her claim; and it was made the duty of the register to make a report to the Secretary of the Treasury of all claims filed, with the substance of the evidence in support thereof, and also his opinion, and such remarks respecting the claims as he might think proper to make; which report, together with a list of the claims which, in the opinion of the register, ought to be confirmed, shall be laid by the Secretary before Congress, for their determination.

The report was made, and laid before Congress, in January, 1821. As respected lot No. 7, (a part of which is in dispute,) the register reported that Thomas Forsyth claimed it; that it was three hundred feet square, French measure, situate in the village of Peoria, and bounded eastwardly by a street, separating it from the Illinois river; northwardly by a cross street, westwardly by a back street, and southwardly by a lot claimed by Jacques Mette. The remark of the register is: 'A part of this lot must have been embraced by the lot claimed by Augustine Rogue.' Rogue's claim (No. 2) was for a lot of about an arpent, and bounded, says the register, northwardly by a lot occupied by Maillette, eastwardly by a road separating it from Illinois river, and southwardly and westwardly by the prairie.

The register reported on seventy lots in all. A survey to designate boundaries among the claimants was indispensable, as they were in considerable confusion. Congress again legislated on the subject, by act of March 3, 1823, and provided that each of the settlers, whose names were contained in the report, who had settled a village lot prior to the first of January, 1813, should be entitled thereto; the lot so settled on and improved, not to exceed two acres; and where it exceeded two acres, such claimant should be confirmed in a quantity not exceeding ten acres. It was made the duty of the surveyor of public lands for the district, to cause a survey to be made of the several lots, and to designate on a plat thereof the lot confirmed and set apart to each claimant, and forward the same to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall (says the act) cause patents to be issued in favor of each claimant, as in other cases.

The survey was made in 1840, by order of the surveyor general of Illinois and Missouri, which was duly returned, approved, and recorded. We are of opinion that the act of 1823 conferred on the grantee an incipient title, and reserved to the executive department administering the public lands the authority to settle the boundaries by actual survey among the claimants; and until this was done, the courts of justice could not interfere and establish boundaries. It was competent for Congress to provide, that before a title should be given to a confirmee, the exact limits of his confirmation should be ascertained by a survey executed by authority of the United States. (West v. Cochran, 17 How., 415.)

When the surveys were made, and the plats returned and approved, and recorded by the surveyor general of Illinois and Missouri, and recognised as valid at the General Land Office, (as the patent to Forsyth shows it was,) it bound the parties to it, the confirmee and the United States; nor can either side be heard to deny, that the land granted by the act of 1823 is the precise lot Forsyth was entitled to; such being the settled doctrine of this court. (Menard's Heirs v. Massey, 8 How., 313.) Neither can Bogardus or his assignee deny that he was concluded by the survey. His patent grants the land to him in fee, 'subject, however, to all the rights of any and all persons claiming under the act of Congress of 3d March, 1823, entitled 'An act to confirm certain claims to lots in the village of Peoria, in the State of Illinois." This patent is the only title set up by the defendants below; by its terms, all power to perfect the title of Forsyth, according to the act of 1823, was reserved to and retained by the department of public lands, as effectually after the Bogardus patent was issued as before.

The survey having bound the United States, and concluded Bogardus, Forsyth had a title by virtue of the acts of 1820 and 1823, and the survey, which was of a legal character; and he could maintain an action of ejectment on it, even had no patent issued. This is true beyond controversy, if the action had been prosecuted in a State court, where the State laws authorized suits in ejectment on imperfect titles. (Ross v. Borland, 1 Pet., 655; Chouteau v. Eckhard, 2 How., 372.)

But it is insisted that in the courts of the United States a different rule applies, and that, as a patent carries the fee, it is the better title. The case of Robinson v. Campbell (3 Wheat., 212) is supposed to be to this effect. There, the conflicting patents were made by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the defendant attempted to prove that a settlement had been made on the land in dispute by one Fitzgerald, and which preference right had been assigned to Martin, who obtained a certificate from the commissioners for adjusting titles to unpatented lands; which certificate was of anterior date to the junior patent, and was the source of title. It was nothing more than evidence that Martin had a preference to purchase the land, if he saw proper to do so; and was not competent evidence in an action of ejectment, according to the laws of Virginia, or even of Tennessee. It was not an entry founded on consideration, but a right of abating an equity at the discretion of the settler. Neither in Virginia nor Kentucky (where the Virginia land laws prevail) is the defendant allowed to go behind the patent in a court of law, in order to give the patent a date from that of the entry on which the patent was founded.

The question here is, on the effects of acts of Congress confirming claims to lands as valid, by which legislation the Government is concluded; and as respects these, it is settled, that after a survey is duly made, approved, and recorded at the surveyor general's office, an action of ejectment may be maintained on such titles in the courts of the United States. It is a good prima facie title. (Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How., 313; Le Bois v. Bramell, 4 How., 456; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How., 317.) In Stoddard v. Chambers, this court held 'that a confirmation by act of Congress vests in the confirmee the right of the United States, and a patent, if issued, could only be evidence of this.' Other cases followed this decision. By the third section of the act of July 4, 1836, it is provided that a patent shall issue to the confirmee in cases confirmed by that act. In this respect, the provisions of the acts of 1823 and 1836 are alike.

Of course the patent in this instance can relate to a title which is valid against another title unaided by the younger patent.

This disposes of the exception taken by the defendants below to the ruling of the court, that Forsyth's title was superior to that of Bogardus.

They next ask the court to instruct the jury, that by the laws of Illinois they had such title as would bar an action of ejectment after seven years, accompanied by actual residence on the land sued for; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants have so long had said possession, the plaintiff cannot succeed in this suit. There were two other instructions asked, requiring the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiff's action was barred by the act of limitations of twenty years.

The court refused to instruct as requested; 'but, on the contrary, instructed the jury that the patent to Bogardus did not grant or convey the ground in controversy; and it being conceded that it was the only title the defendant had, there is no such title as under the statute of limitations protects the possession of the defendants.' This instruction was founded on an exception in the patent to Bogardus. It grants to him, and to his heirs and assigns, forever, 'subject, however, to all the rights of any and all persons under the act of Congress of March 3d, 1823, entitled 'An act to confirm certain claims to lots in the village of Peoria, in the State of Illinois."

When this patent was made, in 1838, the village lots had not been surveyed, and those that interfered with the land granted to Bogardus might never be claimed. Subject to this contingency he took his patent, and had a title in fee till 1840, when the village title of Forsyth was ripened into the better right. After that, those claiming under Bogardus held the position of one who claims protection by the act of limitations under a younger patent against an elder one. He has only the appearance of title. The patent to Bogardus was a fee-simple title on its face, and is such title as will afford protection to those claiming under it, either directly, or, having a title connected with it, with possession for seven years, as required by the statute of Illinois. The court below erred in cutting off this defence.

In the progress of the trial in the Circuit Court, the plaintiff offered in evidence the printed report of Edward Coles, the register of the land office at Edwardsville, as found in the American State Papers, vol. 3, from pages 421 to 431, inclusive, to which the defendant objected, because it was not, without proof of its authenticity, legal evidence. But the court overruled the objection, and the report was given in evidence to the jury, to which ruling the defendants excepted.

These State Papers were published by order of Congress, and selected and edited by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House. They contain copies of legislative and executive documents, and are as valid evidence as the originals are from which they were copied; and it cannot be denied that a record of the report of Edward Coles, as found in the printed journals of Congress, could be read on mere inspection as evidence that it was the report sent in by the Secretary of the Treasury. The competency of these documents as evidence in the investigation of claims to lands in the courts of justice has not been controverted for twenty years, and is not open to controversy.

It is ordered that the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.

title: Bryan v. Forsyth/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Bryan v. Forsyth/Opinion of the Court


text:
Ballance v. Papin

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.

It was similar in most of its features to the preceding case, and was argued by Mr. Ballance for the plaintiff in error, and submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Williams and Mr. Gamble for the defendants.

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Ballance v. Papin


text: Talk:Ballance v. Papin

title: Talk:Ballance v. Papin


text:
Ballance v. Papin/Opinion of the Court

In the case of Charles Ballance against Papin and Atchison, the same title was relied on by the defendant below (Ballance) that was set up in defence in the preceding case of Forsyth v. Brien and Rouse. The plaintiff sued to recover a village lot in Peoria, No. 42, confirmed to Fontaine, in right of his wife, Josette Cassarau, dit Fontaine. A plat of lot No. 42 was given in evidence, and is found in the record, but no certificate of the surveyor accompanies this plat, and without such certificate there is no evidence that lot No. 42 was lawfully surveyed. The act of 1823 (sec. 2) required that a survey should be made of each lot confirmed to the claimant, and a plat thereof forwarded to the Secretary. The evidence of a legal United States survey is not a mere plat, without any written description of the land by metes and bounds; neither the plat, nor less proof than a written description, will make a record on which a patent can issue. That most accurate evidence of separate surveys of the village lots of Peoria exists, we know; but as none is found in this record of lot No. 42, it follows, from the reasons given in the previous case, that no title was adduced in the Circuit Court that authorized it to reject the instructions demanded by the defendant; that, comparing the titles of the parties by their face, the defendant's was the better one. But as the same question of the application of the act of limitations arises in this case as it did in the former one, it must of course have been reversed, had the certificate of survey been found in the record. We therefore order that the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial to be had therein.

Mr. Justice McLEAN dissented.

title: Ballance v. Papin/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Ballance v. Papin/Opinion of the Court


text:
United States v. Peralta

THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the southern district of California.

The nature of the claim, and a list of the documents in support of it, are given in the opinion of the court.

The decree of the District Court was as follows, viz:

That the claim presented in the petition filed in this case, for the place called San Antonio, is valid to the whole extent of its bounds, to wit: having for its northern boundary a line commencing on the bay of San Francisco, at a point where there are close to the said bay the two cerritos, as described in the first possession given by Martinez to Louis Peralta, on the 16th of August, 1820, running from the said bay eastwardly along by the southern base of the cerritos of San Antonio up a ravine, at the head of which there is a large rock or monument looking to the north, described in evidence as the Sugarloaf Rock; thence by the southern base of said rock to the comb or crest of the coast range of mountains, or the Sierra; thence for the western boundary a line running along the comb of the said Sierra, until it reaches the eastern extremity of a line, beginning on the said bay of San Francisco at the mouth of the deep creek of San Leandro, and running eastwardly up the said creek to its head or source in the Sierra, and to the comb or crest thereof, which last line is the southern boundary of the land of San Antonio; and by the said bay of San Francisco, from the mouth of the said deep creek of San Leandro up to the beginning of the said line, which has been described as the northern boundary of said tract, which line along the bay constitutes its western boundary.

And it is hereby further adjudged, ordered, and decreed, that there be confirmed to the said Domingo and Vicente Peralta, the northern portion of said land of San Antonio, bounded as follows: On the north by the northern boundary of said tract of San Antonio as above described, on the east by the comb of the said Sierra, on the west by the bay of San Francisco, and on the south by a ravine a short distance south of the buildings in the town of Oakland, on the north of which ravine there is a small house in sight of the public road, being the line of division between this land and the land of Antonio Peralta, which line extends from the said bay to the most eastern boundary of the rancho of San Antonio.

The United States appealed from this decree.

It was argued by Mr. Gillet for the United States, and by Mr. Rose and Mr. Bibb for the appellees.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: United States v. Peralta


text: Talk:United States v. Peralta

title: Talk:United States v. Peralta


text:
United States v. Peralta/Opinion of the Court

This case originated before the commissioners for ascertaining and settling private land claims in California.

Domingo and Vicente Peralta claimed as grantees and devisees of their father, Luis Peralta.

The documentary evidence filed in support of the claim consists of a true copy from the archives in the office of the surveyor general of California, containing, so far as they are material in the present inquiry, the following averments:

1. The petition of Luis Peralta to the Governor for a grant of land, extending from the creek of San Leandro to a small mountain adjoining the sea beach, at the distance of four or five leagues, for the purpose of establishing a rancho, dated June 20, 1820.

2. The decree of Governor Sola, therein directing Captain Luis Antonio Arguello to appoint an officer to place the petitioner in possession of the lands petitioned for, dated August 3, 1820.

3. Order of Captain Arguello, dated August 10, 1820, detailing Lieut. Don Ignacio Martinez for that purpose.

4. The relinquishment of Father Narciso Duran, on behalf of the mission of San Jose, of any claim to the land, and reserving the privilege of cutting wood on the same, which, he says, should remain in common, dated August 16, 1820.

5. Under the same date, the return of Lieut. Martinez, upon the order to give the possession, describing the boundaries, &c.

6. The decree of the Governor, directing a portion of the lands assigned to Luis Peralta, by the foregoing act of possession, to be withdrawn, upon the reclamation of the mission of San Francisco, who claimed that the said portion of the lands was then in the occupancy of the mission as a sheep ranch.

7. The consent of Father Juan Cabot and Paloz Ordez, ministers of the mission, that the boundaries of the land solicited by Luis Peralta should be established at the rivulet, at the distance of three and a half to four leagues from the rancho-house of the mission.

8. The return of Maximo Martinez upon Governor Sola's second decree for the delivery of possession, filing the boundaries in accordance with the claim of the mission, at a rivulet which runs down from the mountains to the beach, where there is a grove of willows, and about a league and a half from the cerito (little mountain) of San Antonio, in the direction of San Leandro.

9. A document dated October, 1822, and signed Sola, setting out, that on that day was issued in favor of Sergeant Luis Peralta, by the Governor of the province, the certifying document for the land which has been granted him, as appears by the writ of possession which was given him by the lieutenant of his company, Don Ignacio Martinez, in conformity with the orders of the Government.

10. A letter from Luis Peralta, protesting against the claim of the mission, dated October 14th, 1820.

11. A representation from Captain Don Luis Arguello to the Governor, dated June 23, 1821, advocating the rights of Sergeant Peralta, in opposition to those of the mission, to the land in controversy; and, lastly, the description of the land returned by Luis Peralta, in obedience to the Government, of the 7th of October, 1827.

The claimants gave in evidence, also, the original grant from Governor Sola to Luis Peralta, dated 18th of August, 1822; the petition of Luis Peralta to Governor Arguello, praying the restitution of the lands which had been taken from him on the demand of the mission; and the decree of Arguello, making such restitution, and directing him to be again put in possession by the same officer who had executed the former act of possession. To this order, Maximo Martinez made a return, duly executed, certifying that the grantee had been newly put in possession of the place called 'Cerito de St. Antonio, and the rivulet which crosses the place, to the coast, where is a rock looking to the north.'

It was further shown, from the public records, that on the 9th of April, 1822, the civil and military authorities of California formally recognised and gave in their adhesion to the new Government of Mexico, according to the plan of Iguala and treaty of Cordova. Also, that in 1844, Ignacio Peralta, one of the heirs of Luis Peralta, petitioned the Government for a new title to the land claimed, in consequence of the original titlepapers having been lost or mislaid. The archives show, also, that on the 13th of February, 1844, an order was made by Micheltorena, that a title be issued. Of the same date, there is the usual formal document 'declaring DonLuis Peralta owner in fee of said land, which is bounded as follows:

'On the southeast by the creek of San Leandro; on the northwest by the creek of Los Ceritos de San Antonio, (the small hills of San Antonio;) on the southwest by the sea; and on the northeast by the tops of hills range, without prohibiting the inhabitants of Contra Costa from cutting wood for their own use, they not to sell the same.' This document contains an order that 'this espediente be transmitted to the dupartmental assembly for their approval,' but nothing further appears to have been done, nor is the signature of Micheltorena attached to the record.

The authenticity of these documents is admitted. The objections urged against their sufficiency to establish the claim are: first, that the officers had no power to make grants of land; and, second, that the northern boundary of the land described does not extend beyond a certain creek or stream, known by the name of San Antonio. This would exclude about one half of the claim.

We are of opinion that neither of these objections is supported by the evidence in the case.

We have frequently decided that 'the public acts of public officers, purporting to be exercised in an official capacity, and by public authority, shall not be presumed to be usurped, but that a legitimate authority had been previously given or subsequently ratified.' To adopt a contrary rule would lead to infinite confusion and uncertainty of titles. The presumption arising from the grant itself makes it prima facie evidence of the power of the officer making it, and throws the burden of proof on the party denying it. The general powers of the Governors and other Spanish officers to grant lands within the colonies in full property, and without restriction as to quantity, and in reward for important services, were fully considered by this court in the case of United States v. Clarke, (8 Peters, 436.)

The appellants, on whom the burden of proof is cast, to show want of authority, have produced no evidence, either documentary or historical, that the Spanish officers who usually acted as Governors of the distant provinces of California were restricted in their powers, and could not make grants of land. The necessity for the exercise of such a power by the Governors, if the Crown desired these distant provinces to be settled, is the greater, because of their distance from the source of power. By the royal order of August 22, 1776, the northern and northwestern provinces of Mexico were formed into a new and distinct organization, called the Internal Provinces of New Spain. This organization included California. It conferred ample powers, civil, military, and political, on the Commandant General. The archives of the former Government also show, that as early as 1786, the Governors of California had authority from the Commandant General to make grants, limiting the number of sitios which should be granted. In 1792, California was annexed to the viceroyalty of Mexico, and so continued till the Spanish authority ceased. An attempt to trace the obscure history of the various decrees, orders, and regulations of the Spanish Government on this subject, would be tedious and unprofitable. It is sufficient for the case, that the archives of the Mexican Government show that such power has been exercised by the Governors under Spain, and continued to be so exercised under Mexico; and that such grants, made by the Spanish officers, have been confirmed and held valid by the Mexican authorities. Sola styles himself political and military Governor of California. He continued to exercise the same powers after his adhesion to the Mexican Government, under the provisions of the plan of Iguala, and the twelfth section of the treaty of Cordova. The grant in fee, given by Sola, was after the revolution.

The Government of Mexico, since that time, has always respected and confirmed such concessions, when any equitable or inchoate right, followed by possession and cultivation, had been conferred by the Governors under Spain. The case of Arguello (18 How., 540) was that of a permit by Governor Sola, afterwards confirmed by the Mexican Government and by this court. The plaintiff in error has not been able to produce anything from historical documents or the archives of California, tending to show a want of power in the respective officers in this case. On the contrary, the presumption of law is confirmed by both. The order of Micheltorena, in 1844, for the granting the new title to Peralta, is itself evidence of the usage and custom, and that the acts of Sola and Arguello were considered valid, and that the title, whether equitable or legal, conferred to them, should be respected and confirmed by the Government.

As the validity of the petitioner's title has been assailed on the ground of want of authority alone, it is unnecessary to notice more particularly the various documents exhibited in support of it. The grant by Sola of a portion of the tract of which Peralta had been originally put in possession, is a complete grant in fee for that portion. The restoration by Arguello of the original boundaries, by decree and act of the public officer, may not have the character of a complete grant; but it is of little importance to the decision of the case, whether it conferred only an inchoate or equitable title, connected with an undisputed possession of thirty years, and confirmed again in 1844, by the order of the Governor of California; its claim for protection under the treaty with Mexico cannot be doubted, notwithstanding its want of confirmation by the departmental assembly.

The only remaining question is the position of the northern boundary line.

Peralta's original petition, in June, 1820, described the land desired, as beginning at a creek called San Leandro, 'and from this to a white hill, adjoining the sea beach, in the same direction, and along the coast four or five leagues.'

The return of Ignacio Martinez, the officer who executed the order for delivery of possession on the 16th of August, 1820, describes 'the boundaries which separate the land of Peralta, to be marked out as follows: The deep creek called San Leandro, and at a distance from this, (say five leagues,) there are two small mountains, (cerritos;) the first is close to the beach; next to it follows the San Antonio, serving as boundaries, the rivulet which issues from the mountain range, and runs along the foot of said cerrito of San Antonio, and at the entrance of a little gulch there is a rock elevating itself in the form of a monument, and looking towards the north.' This is the description of the northern boundary. It refers to stable monuments-two hills, a rivulet passing at their foot, and a monumental rock. In other documents, Peralta speaks of this line 'as the dividing boundary with my neighbor, Francisco Castro.' Again, in the return of Ignacio Martinez to the order of the Governor, Arguello, in 1823, to redeliver the possession to Peralta, up to his original boundary, he describes this within boundary by the same monument, 'the cerrito San Antonio, the arroyito or rivulet which crosses the place to the coast, where is a rock looking to the north.'

Lastly, the title of confirmation by Micheltorena in 1844, as quoted above, though not in the very words of the above documents, clearly describes the same monuments. These hills, rivulet, and rock, are well-known monuments, and their position is satisfactorily proved.

The testimony of the opinions of witnesses who have but lately arrived in the country, who are ignorant of the language and traditions of the neighborhood, and who are all interested in defeating the claim of the petitioners, can have little weight against the knowledge of others who were present when the lines were established, some thirty years ago, and have known these boundaries till the present time.

The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented.


text: Talk:United States v. Peralta/Opinion of the Court


text:
McCullough v. Roots

Roots & Coe, having made the contracts, and having an interest to the extent of their commissions, had a right to maintain the suit.

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

The nature of the case is fully explained in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Schley for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Dobbin and Mr. Johnson for the defendants.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

title: McCullough v. Roots


text: Talk:McCullough v. Roots

title: Talk:McCullough v. Roots


text:
McCullough v. Roots/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiffs below (Roots & Coe) sued the defendants (McCullough et al.) in general indebitatus assumpsit, in the Circuit Court, for the price of a quantity of hams in tierces which they claim to have sold and delivered to them. The plaintiffs are merchants in Cincinnati, Ohio, who, on their own account, and as agents for Adams & Buckingham, of New York, in November, 1853, contracted with Henry Lewis, of the same city, to make advances upon his consignments of bacon, pork, and similar articles of provisions, which these consignees were to dispose of, and, after reimbursing the advances and expenses, were to appropriate the net profits in part to the payment of a pre-existing debt due to those firms. The course of business was, to suffer Henry Lewis to prepare the articles for the market, and to superintend the sales, under a condition of accounting for their proceeds to the consignees. The advances were usually made upon the warehouse receipts of a firm of which Lewis was a partner, generally before the property specified in them was in the warehouse. The receipts expressed articles which the warehouseman expected either to prepare or to procure otherwise, and the money advanced was generally intended to aid that object. To secure themselves from the contingency of any failure in these anticipations, the plaintiffs (Roots & Coe) sometimes exacted the guaranty of Samuel Lewis, a brother of Henry Lewis. This generally took the form of a warehouse receipt made by him, corresponding to the others. The articles designated in the receipts of Samuel Lewis, it was understood, would be supplied by Henry-Samuel being unconnected with any business of this description on his own account.

In April, 1854, Roots & Coe were the holders of a number of receipts of Samuel Lewis for provisions, which Henry Lewis was unable to supply. The plaintiffs (Roots & Coe) agreed, that if Samuel Lewis would secure the consignment of a quantity of hams, by executing a new receipt therefor, they would extend their advances to Henry Lewis until he could make the best disposition of them. This was assented to, and the contract hereafter mentioned was made.

Samuel Lewis had not interfered with the business of Henry; nor did he control the property which his receipts from time to time specified. The property was left in the charge of Henry Lewis, to be appropriated according to his contract with the plaintiffs, (Roots & Coe,) of which the receipt was treated as a guaranty. The receipts executed at this settlement bear date the 4th of April, 1854, and are as follows:

'Received in store of Henry Lewis, and subject to the order of Roots & Coe, but not accountable for damages by fire, four hundred and fifteen hogsheads sugar-cured hams in pickle, containing nine hundred pounds net weight; said hams to be smoked and canvassed within thirty days, and delivered to said Roots & Coe, or their order, said Roots & Coe being responsible for the smoking and canvassing the same; and it is further agreed between the parties, that when the above hams are delivered to said Roots & Coe, then and in that case my former warehouse receipts for two thousand five hundred barrels of mess pork, four hundred barrels of lard, and one hundred thousand pounds of shoulders from the block, shall be given up and cancelled; but I am not responsible for smoking or canvassing the same, that being a matter between said Henry Lewis and Roots & Coe.

(Signed) SAMUEL LEWIS.'

At the same time, Henry Lewis gave the following receipt:

'Whereas Roots & Coe hold Samuel Lewis's warehouse receipt of this date for four hundred and fifteen hogsheads sugar-cured hams in pickle, each hogshead containing nine hundred pounds net weight, to be delivered within thirty days: Now, I do hereby agree to smoke, canvass, yellow-wash, and pack the same, free of charge to Roots & Coe; and also agree not to require Roots & Coe to refund to me the freight on the same from Indianapolis to this place, being one hundred and fifty cents per hogshead, which I have paid, in consideration of having received an advance on the above-mentioned hams from Adams & Buckingham, through said Roots & Coe. But in case I should purchase and pay for the same within thirty days from this date, then Roots & Coe agree to refund the freight from Indianapolis to this point, being one dollar and fifty cents per hogshead.

HENRY LEWIS.'

At the time this contract was made, the property specified in it was not in store at Cincinnati, but a portion was delivered to the plaintiffs (Roots & Coe) the day after its date. The remainder came consigned to their order during that and the following month, and was deposited in the warehouse of Henry Lewis, under their directions; and Henry Lewis was employed to canvass, yellow-wash, brand, and pack in tierces the hams, ready for the market; for this, Roots & Coe were to pay Lewis his bill of charges as a further advance. While the property was in this condition, a disagreement arose between Henry Lewis and Roots & Coe, relative to a deficiency in the weight of the hogsheads, and whether the warehouse receipt of Samuel Lewis amounted to a warranty of the weights.

In May and June, 1854, the defendants below purchased two hundred and twelve tierces of these hams, at a specific price. Roots & Coe and Henry Lewis respectively claim to have made this sale, and both were present when it was made.

The money arising from the sale was designed for the former, and the sale was entered on their books, and there is strong evidence to the fact that the defendants promised to pay their bill for the hams in June, 1854. But before the payment, Henry Lewis insisted upon a surrender of the warehouse receipts of Samuel Lewis; and that being refused, he directed the defendants to appropriate the price as a credit on the joint debt of Samuel Lewis and himself to them; and this was done by them accordingly.

Upon the trial in the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs in error moved for fourteen distinct instructions to the jury, which the court declined to give, but gave in their stead the following charge:

'1. If the jury shall find, from the evidence in this case, that the said two hundred and twelve tierces were part of the hams contained in the four hundred and fifteen hogsheads mentioned in the receipt of April 4, 1854; that they were sold by the said plaintiffs, in their own name, to the said defendants; that at the time of the said sale the said hams belonged to the said plaintiffs, or that they had an interest in the same for advances or commissions, and authority as the agents of Adams & Buckingham to dispose of the same; and that said hams were delivered to, and received by, said defendants, in pursuance of said sale, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full amount or price of the said hams.

'2. That although the jury may find from the evidence that the said hams were sold to defendants by Henry Lewis, yet if they also find that at the date of said sale the said hams belonged to plaintiffs, or to Adams & Buckingham, for whom the plaintiffs acted as agents; and if the latter, that the plaintiffs had an interest in and control over the said hams, to cover advances and commissions; that defendants subsequently promised to pay plaintiffs the same, and that this suit was instituted before the price of said hams had been paid by defendants to Henry Lewis, then and in that event the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.'

To this charge McCullough and Culbertson excepted, as well as to the refusal of the instructions moved for, and assign these decisions as errors in this court. The written contract, of November, 1853, which arranged the terms and course of business between the plaintiffs below (Roots & Coe) and Adams & Buckingham, their principal, with Henry Lewis, for the year 1854, confers on the former a plenary power to dispose of the consignments to be made, for advances under that contract. The contract of April did not alter or modify this term in the engagement. Henry Lewis was then in arrears to them. He had involved his brother Samuel in engagements, as his surety, which he could not fulfil. This contract of April was a relief and an accommodation to the brothers. The license to Henry Lewis to prepare the provisions for market, and to select the markets and purchasers, was an indulgence to him, and did not diminish the rights of Roots & Coe in the property or their powers under the contract. Whatever sales were made by him, were made as the agent of Roots & Coe, and they were entitled to control the price. He was not in a condition to dispute their title, and his authority to the plaintiffs in error to appropriate the price as a credit upon another demand was a fraud upon the rights of Roots & Coe and Adams & Buckingham. (Zulueta v. Vincent, 12 L. and Eq., 145; Bott v. McCoy, 20 Ala., 578; Walcott v. Keith, 2 Fost. N. H. R., 196.) We think the cause was fairly submitted to the jury in the charge of the court. The instructions prayed for by the plaintiffs in error present several questions which will now be considered.

They affirm, that if Samuel Lewis did not assent to the sale, nor waive his right to detain the property until his warehouse receipts were surrendered, and that Roots & Coe from time to time refused to surrender those receipts, and still control them, they cannot maintain an action for this money.

But the existence of these facts does not authorize the defendants (McCullough et al.) to resist the payment of the price of property they had purchased, and their possession of which had not been disturbed. Samuel Lewis had no title to the property, nor any power to sell it, nor any claim on the price. At most, he had only a lien, which he might never claim to exert, and from which the purchasers have experienced no injury. (Holly v. Huggerford, 8 Pick., 73; Vibbard v. Johnson, 19 John., 77; Wanzer v. Truly, 17 How., 584.)

Nor can the purchasers aver that Henry Lewis had no intention to act as the agent of Roots & Coe in making the sale, and in doing so he did not waive any right of Samuel Lewis, nor enlarge or impair the claim of Roots & Coe upon the property; but that he, and those claiming from him, are simply tort feasors, and that Roots & Coe cannot claim the entire purchase-money, because their title does not embrace the entire property and right to possession. The relations of Roots & Coe to Henry Lewis were such that he cannot be deemed a tort feasor, except by their election. They are authorized to adopt his acts, and to claim the benefit of his contracts. He was their bailee, and is estopped to deny their title in any form. It is further insisted that the suit should have been instituted in the names of Adams & Buckingham, and not in those of Roots & Coe. But the contracts for the consignment of the hams, as well as for their preparation for the market and their sale, were made in the names of those persons. They are interested in their result to the extent of their commissions, and their principals reside in another States from themselves. The authorities cited sustain their title to maintain this suit.

Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:McCullough v. Roots/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/165

THE RICHES OF DAMASCUS world. They would gladly die for the faith of Islam, and nothing but the strong restraint of European armaments holds them back from again raising the standard of the Prophet and setting forth on a new jahâd, or holy war, in obedience to the sacred mandate, "When ye encounter the unbelievers, strike off their heads until ye have made a great slaughter among them. … As for the infidels, let them perish, and their works shall God bring to nought. … And their dwelling the hell fire! … Be not faint-hearted then, and invite not the infidels to peace!"

Be he preacher or statesman, that man is a fool and blind who does not realize the tremendous vitality and undiminished strength of Mohammedanism, the power instinct in its half-truths, and the unsleeping menace of its essential antagonism to all the "infidel" world. Politically Islam is being rapidly shorn of its power; but as a religion—a religion for which men will cheerfully give their lives—it has lost no whit of its potency. As the cry of the muezzin echoes across the earth to-day from Japan to Gibraltar, there are, not fewer, but many millions more who obey its call than there were four centuries ago when Mohammed II. hurled his Turkish regiments against the ramparts of a then Christian Constantinople.

The Omayyade Mosque, as has been said, was once [ 125 ]


text:
Walton v. Cotton

THIS case was brought up, from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.

The history of the case is given in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Baxter for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Lawrence for the defendants.

Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Walton v. Cotton


text: Talk:Walton v. Cotton

title: Talk:Walton v. Cotton


text:
Walton v. Cotton/Opinion of the Court

This case comes before us by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

It was commenced by filing a bill, in Sumner county, before Chancellor Ridley, in which the complainants state they are the children of Priscilla Cotton and Thomas Cotton, who was a captain in the revolutionary war; that after his death, his widow, Priscilla, filed her declaration for a pension, on account of her husband. Josiah Walton made the application; but she died before the pension was granted. Walton administered on the estate, and he renewed the application, at great trouble and expense. The Pension department allowed about one-half the amount claimed. Out of the money drawn by the administrator, he retained what was agreed for his services and the services of counsel, and paid over the residue, in equal shares, to all the children of Priscilla Cotton, and the representatives of her children who were dead.

The bill further represents that William E. Jones, who acts as an agent for pension claims, and Allen Cotton, with the view of getting the business and money into their hands, applied to the County Court of Davidson county, and suppressed from said court the fact that an administration on said estate had been granted in the county of Sumner, and procured Allen Cotton to be appointed as administrator, which was done with the view of depriving the complainants and others of a legal portion of said pension fund.

The new administrator made application for the extension of the pension, so as to cover the whole time from the allowance of the pension to the death of the pensioner, only one-half of which had been granted. The application was successful; and Jones, under a power of attorney from the administrator, received the sum of $3,500 from the Government, which the defendants retain in their hands, and refuse to pay over; three-fifths of the amount of which the complainants are entitled to, if the children who died before the decease of their mother be not entitled to any share, and three-eighths, should they be entitled.

The answer admits many of the allegations of the bill, but denies that the defendants acted improperly in procuring administration in Davidson county. They admit that they applied for and obtained the above sum, with a full knowledge by the Pension Office of the prior administration. The money was paid to them as the only living children of Priscilla Cotton at the time of her death; and they allege that, this being the construction of the Government, it is conclusive.

The chancellor, on the final hearing, decreed that the representatives of Arthur Cotton, John Cotton, and Polly Foxall, were entitled to three-fifths of said $3,500, and interest, to be paid over to said children; and that said defendants, Noah Cotton, Allen Cotton, and William E. Jones, who have received said fund, are liable to pay over said three-fifths of $3,500, amounting to $2,100, with interest as aforesaid, to be paid over to the children of Polly Foxall, one-third; to the children of Arthur Cotton, one-third; and to the children of John Cotton, one-third, after paying the costs and expenses of their suit, the costs to be paid out of the fund in the hands of the defendants.

From this decree, there was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which, on a hearing, reversed the decree of the chancellor, holding that the fund should be distributed among the living children at the time of the pensioner's death, and that no part of it should go to the representatives of deceased children.

As the complainants claim a right under an act of Congress, which by the decree of the Supreme Court has been rejected, the case is brought within the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, which gives us jurisdiction.

The first section of the act entitled 'An act supplementary to the 'Act for the relief of certain surviving officers of the Revolution," dated June 4th, 1832, gave pensions to surviving officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, soldiers, and Indian spies, who had served in the Continental line, or State troops, volunteers, or militia, at one or more terms-a period of two years-during the war of the Revolution, &c., and Cotton was entitled to receive his full pay, not exceeding the pay of a captain in the line, from the 4th of March, 1831, during his natural life. The fourth section of the same act provided that the amount of pay which accrued under the act before its date should be paid to the person entitled to the same as soon as may be; and in case of the death of any person embraced by the act, or of the act to which it is supplementary, during the period intervening between the semiannual payments directed to be made and the death of such person, shall be paid to his widow, or, if he leave no widow, to his children.

The act of July 4th, 1836, in the first section, gives five years' half-pay to widows, or children not sixteen years of age, under certain circumstances. If the soldier had died since the 4th March, 1931, and before the passage of that act, the pension which had accrued during these periods is given by the second section to the widow, and if no widow, to the children. The act of the 7th July, 1838, extends the benefits of the third section of the act of 1836 to widows whose husbands have died since the passage of the act. The act of 19th July, 1840, enacts, in the first section, that any male pensioner dying, leaving children and no widow, the pension due shall be paid to his children, and that it shall not be considered assets of said estate.

The second section provides, when a female pensioner shall die, leaving children, the amount due at the time of her death shall be paid to her representatives, for the benefit of her children. And the third section declares, 'that on the death of any pensioner, male or female, leaving children, the amount due may be paid to any one or each of them, as they may prefer, without the intervention of an administrator.'

The question in the case turns upon the construction of these statutes. Does a right construction of them give the pension due to the grandchildren of the deceased pensioner; and if so, does the bounty extend to the representatives of his children who died before his decease; or, do the acts restrict the bounty to his children living at the time of his death? This last construction has been adopted and acted upon by the Government.

This view is mainly founded on the considerations, that on the death of the pensioner, the bounty is given to his widow, and, if he leave no widow, to his children; that it was a bounty of the Government, arising from personal considerations of gratitude for services rendered, is not liable to the claims of creditors, and should not be extended, by construction, to persons not named in the act.

The pension is undoubtedly a bounty of the Government, and in the hands of an administrator of a deceased pensioner it would not be liable to the claims of creditors, had the acts of Congress omitted such a provision. But the legislative intent is shown to be in accordance, in this respect, with the law. But should the word children, as used in these statutes, be more restricted than when used in a will? In the construction of wills, unless there is something to control a different meaning, the word children is often held to mean grandchildren. There is no argument which can be drawn from human sympathy, to exclude grandchildren from the bounty, whether we look to the donors or to the chief recipient.

Congress, from high motives of policy, by granting pensions, alleviate, as far as they may, a class of men who suffered in the military service by the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered. But to withhold any arrearage of this bounty from his grandchildren, who had the misfortune to be left orphans, and give it to his living children, on his decease, would not seem to be a fit discrimination of national gratitude.

Under the construction given by the Department, if a male pensioner die, leaving no widow or children, but grandchildren, the pension cannot be drawn from the Treasury. This would seem to stop short of carrying out the humane motive of Congress. They have not named grandchildren in the acts; but they are included in the equity of the statutes. And the argument that the pension is a gratuity, and was intended to be personal, will apply as well to grandchildren as to children.

There can be no doubt that Congress had a right to distribute this bounty at their pleasure, and to declare it should not be liable to the debts of the beneficiaries. But they will be presumed to have acted under the ordinary influences which lead to an equitable and not a capricious result. And where the language used may be so construed as to carry out a benign policy, within the reasonable intent of Congress, it should be pone.

On a deliberate consideration of the above statutes, we have come to the conclusion that the word children, in the acts, embrace the grandchildren of the deceased pensioner, whether their parents died before or after his decease. And we think they are entitled, per stirpes, to a distributive share of the deceased parent.

This construction does not correspond with the decree of the chancellor, nor with that which was expressed by the Supreme Court in reversing his decree. The decree of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is therefore reversed, and the case is directed to be transmitted to that court, that the views here given may be carried into effect, in the ordinary mode of proceeding by that court.

Mr. Justice DANIEL, Mr. Justice CURTIS, and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, dissented.

title: Walton v. Cotton/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Walton v. Cotton/Opinion of the Court


text:
Pratt v. Reed

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York, sitting in admiralty.

The case is explained in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Rogers for the appellants, and by Mr. Ganson for the appellee.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Pratt v. Reed


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/167

THE RICHES OF DAMASCUS the wall of the greatest mosque of fanatical Moslem Damascus. But you have to get up on the housetops before you can read the promise that is written there. [ 127 ]


text: Talk:Pratt v. Reed

title: Talk:Pratt v. Reed


text:
Pratt v. Reed/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York, in admiralty.

The libel was filed by Reed, the respondent, against the steamboat Sultana, to recover for supplies furnished said boat.

The claimants in the court below set up, by way of defence, a mortgage executed to them, by the master and owner, upon the Sultana, dated the 31st October, 1853, to secure the sum of five thousand three hundred and fifty-four dollars and ninety-eight cents. The mortgage was duly recorded in the office of the customs at Buffalo, the place of the enrollment of the vessel, and was also filed in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie. The demand claimed in the libel was a running account for the supply of coal at Erie, in the State of Pennsylvania, extending from June, 1852, to May, 1854. The claimants admitted, in their answer, the supply set up in the libel, and also that it was represented to be necessary at the times delivered, to enable the vessel to pursue her business upon Erie and other Western lakes.

The answer denies that the supplies were furnished upon the credit of the boat; but, on the contrary, avers they were furnished on the credit of the master.

The agreed facts in the case admit that there was no representation of the necessity of the supplies, other than that they were directed by the master at the times when furnished, and that the libellant knew, at these several times, that Appleby, the master, was the sole owner of the Sultana; that he usually navigated the boat, as master, and was present when the supplies were furnished. When not present, they were furnished at the request of the person in command.

Although it does not distinctly appear in the case, yet it is fairly to be inferred, that this vessel was engaged in making regular trips upon the Western lakes, in the business of carrying passengers and freight, and procured her supplies of coal at places of convenient distance, according to her necessities, by a previous understanding with the parties furnishing the article. The bill rendered by the libellant contains a running account of debit and credit, through a period of nearly two years.

There is no great doubt in the case, but that the article was necessary for the navigation of the vessel at the times when furnished, though the proof is very loose and indefinite.

It seems to have been taken for granted, that a supply of coal was essential to the propelling of a steamboat, and, in a general sense, this is doubtless true; but then, to make out a necessity within the admiralty rule, the supply must be really or apparently necessary at the time when it is furnished. But the more serious difficulty in the case, on the part of the libellant, is the entire absence of any proof, to show that there was also a necessity, at the time of procuring the supplies, for a credit upon the vessel. This proof is as essential as that of the necessity of the article itself. The vessel is not subject to a lien for a common debt of the master or owner. It is only under very special circumstances, and in an unforeseen and unexpected emergency, that an implied maritime hypothecation can be created. It seems, also, to be supposed that circumstances of less pressing necessity, for supplies or repairs, and an implied hypothecation of the vessel to procure them, will satisfy the rule, than in a case of a necessity, sufficient to justify a loan of money on bottomry, for the like purpose. We think this a misapprehension.

The only difference is, that before a bottomry bond can be given, an additional fact must appear, namely, that the master could not procure the money, without giving the extraordinary interest incident to that species of security. This distinction was attempted in the case of The Alexander, (1 Wm. Rob., 336,) but was rejected by Dr. Lushington. A principle, also excluding any such distinction, has been laid down at this term, in the case of William Thomas and others v. J. W. Osborn.

Now, the supplies having been furnished at a fixed place, according to the account current, and apparently under some general understanding and arrangement, the presumption is, that there could be no necessity for the implied hypothecation of the vessel-there could be no unexpected or unforeseen exigency to require it. For aught that appears, the supplies could have been procured on the personal credit of the master, and in this case especially, as he was also the owner.

We do not say that the mere fact of the master being owner, of itself, excludes the possibility of a case of necessity that would justify an implied hypothecation; but it is undoubtedly a circumstance that should be attended to, in ascertaining whether any such necessity existed in the particular case. (1 Wm. Rob., 369, The Sophie.)

These maritime liens, in the coasting business, and in the business upon the lakes and rivers, are greatly increasing; and, as they are tacit and secret, are not to be encouraged, but should be strictly limited to the necessities of commerce which created them. Any relaxation of the law, in this respect, will tend to perplex and embarrass business, rather than furnish facilities to carry it forward.

After the fullest consideration, we think the decree below was erroneous, and should be reversed, and that the mortgagees are entitled to the proceeds in the registry.

This is the case of a foreign ship, the vessel belonging at Buffalo as her home port, and the debt contracted at Erie, in the State of Pennsylvania. We do not intend to express any opinion as to the necessity required to create liens upon vessels, under the local law of the States.

Decree reversed, and proceeds ordered to be paid to the mortgagees.

title: Pratt v. Reed/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Pratt v. Reed/Opinion of the Court

title: Talk:Pratt v. Reed/Opinion of the Court


text:
Tod v. Pratt

THIS case was similar to the preceding one of Pratt, &c., claimants, v. Reed, and was argued by the same counsel.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Tod v. Pratt


text: Talk:Tod v. Pratt

title: Talk:Tod v. Pratt


text:
Tod v. Pratt/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York, in admiralty.

The libel was filed by the appellants in the court below, to recover for supplies furnished the steamboat Sultana, at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio. The supplies furnished were coal, which, according to the account current, began in April, 1853, and continued from time to time till April, 1854.

The defence set up was the mortgage which has been referred to in the case of Pratt and others v. Reed, just decided. there was also a second ground of defence, which it is not material to notice. The District Court decreed in favor of the defendants, except as it respects some five hundred dollars, which item has not been appealed from. The Circuit Court affirmed the decree.

The case falls within the principles stated in that above referred to, and which determined that the mortgagees were entitled to the proceeds of the vessel in the registry. This was the result of the decision of the court below, and the decree is therefore affirmed.

title: Tod v. Pratt/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Tod v. Pratt/Opinion of the Court

title: Talk:Tod v. Pratt/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Syria, the land of Lebanon (1914).djvu/164

SYRIA, THE LAND OF LEBANON and mother-of-pearl make it a marvel of chaste richness. Unlike all Oriental churches and most other mosques, there is comparatively little gold used in the decoration of this great building. The prevailing colors are cool white and blue and silver, and the really immense amount of mosaic and inlaid work seems hardly more than delicate tracery upon the broad, unbroken surfaces.

Such is the Great Mosque when it is empty, a fitting place for quiet communion and solemn contemplation of the vastness and unhurried power of the Almighty. But when you behold this same building thronged with strangely garbed, proud, intellectual-looking and intensely devout men—women are seldom seen in mosques—you feel the grip of something portentous, irresistible, relentless. Long lines of turbaned figures facing toward the holy city of Arabia, now bending low together like a field of wheat swept by the summer breeze, now standing erect with arms outstretched toward Allah the Merciful and Compassionate, reciting their confession of faith in shrill, quick tones which lose their individuality in a tremendous momentum of sound like the wave-beat of the sea—these thousands of worshipers [sic] have firm hold on a great truth, though it be but a half-truth; they believe in their religion with an impregnable, unquestioning confidence, and they render to its precepts an implicit obedience such as is not enforced by any Christian sect in the [ 124 ]


text:
United States v. Sutherland

THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the southern district of California.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Cushing (Attorney General) for the United States, and by Mr. Rose for the appellees.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: United States v. Sutherland


text: Talk:United States v. Sutherland

title: Talk:United States v. Sutherland


text:
United States v. Sutherland/Opinion of the Court

The defendants in error filed their petition before the board of commissioners for ascertaining and settling private land claims in California, claiming 'a tract of land called El Cahon, containing eleven sitios de ganado mayor, situated in the county of San Diego, by virtue of a grant in fee made to their mother, Dona Maria Antonio Estudillo de Pedrorena, by Pio Pico, Governor of California, bearing date 23d of September, 1845, and approved by the territorial deputation on the 3d of October, 1845.'

The only question arising in this case, which has not been disposed of in former decisions of this court, is the objection 'that the grant is void for uncertainty,' because it defines neither boundaries nor quantity. The authenticity of the grant and confirmation are proved, and do not appear to have been disputed before the commissioners. It is in evidence, also, that Dona Maria and her husband went into possession of the place called 'El Cahon' in the year 1845, and have made it 'the best-cultivated rancho in the country about San Diego.' It had formerly belonged to the mission of San Diego. The mission was in debt to the husband of Dona Maria, and agreed to transfer their right of occupancy on this rancho to her, in satisfaction of her husband's debt.

Judicial possession was not delivered till September, 1846, after the establishment of the American authority, which was in July of that year. And whether void or valid, the espediente of possession made by the officer, Santiago E. Arguello, (who could not get the assistance of a surveyor,) seems to throw little light on the subject of precise boundary.

But, under the circumstances, the want of such juridical delivery of possession will not affect the title of the petitioners, unless the grant be absolutely void for uncertainty. The description of the land granted is to be found in the following language in the patent or espediente: 'A tract of land known by the name of El Cahon, near the mission of San Diego.' And again: 'The land of which grant is made is that which the map (dise no) attached to the respective espediente expresses,' &c. 'The judge who may give the possession shall inform the Government of the number of sitios de ganado mayor it contains.'

In construing grants of land in California, made under the Spanish or Mexican authorities, we must take into view the state of the country and the policy of the Government. The population of California before its transfer to the United States was very sparse, consisting chiefly of a few military posts and some inconsiderable villages. The millions of acres of land around them, with the exception of a mission or a rancho on some favored spot, were uninhabited and uncultivated. It was the interest and the policy of the King of Spain, and afterwards of the Mexican Government, to make liberal grants of these lands to those who would engage to colonize or settle upon them. Where land is plenty and labor scarce, pasturage and raising of cattle promised the greatest reward with the least labor. Hence, persons who established ranchos required and readily received grants of large tracts of country as a range for pasturage for their numerous herds. Under such circumstances, land was not estimated by acres or arpens. A square league, or 'sitio de ganado mayor,' appears to have been the only unit in estimating the superficies of land. Eleven of these leagues was the usual extent for a rancho grant. If more or less was intended in the grant, it was carefully stated. Surveying instruments or surveyors were seldom to be obtained in distant locations. The applicant for land usually accompanied his petition with a dise no, or map, showing the natural boundaries or monuments of the tract desired. These were usually rivers, creeks, rivulets, hills, and mountian ranges. The distances between these monuments were often estimated at about so many leagues, and fractions of this unit little regarded. To those who deal out land by the acre, such monuments as hills, mountains, &c., though fixed, would appear rather as vague and uncertain boundary lines. But where land had no value, and the unit of measurement was a league, such monuments were considered to be sufficiently certain. Since this country has become a part of the United States, these extensive rancho grants, which then had little value, have now become very large and very valuable estates. They have been denounced as 'enormous monopolies, princedoms,' &c., and this court have been urged to deny to the grantees what it is assumed the former Governments have too liberally and lavishly granted. This rhetoric might have a just influence, when urged to those who have a right to give or refuse. But the United States have bound themselves by a treaty to acknowledge and protect all bona fide titles granted by the previous Government; and this court have no discretion to enlarge or curtail such grants, to suit our own sense of property, or defeat just claims, however extensive, by stringent technical rules of construction, to which they were not originally subjected.

The patent to the claimant's mother confers a title in fee to an estate 'known by the name of El Cahon,' or 'The Chest.' It describes it as lying 'near the mission of San Diego.' It therefore assumes, that there is an estate or rancho having such a name, and having some known boundaries.

It is prima facie evidence of such a fact. Those who allege that it is void for uncertainty, must prove either that there are two estates called 'El Cahon,' near the mission of San Diego, to which the description in the patent would equally apply; in such case it would be void for ambiguity; or they must prove that there is no estate or property known by that name about San Diego. But there is not a particle of such evidence to be found on the record, nor was such a defence set up before the commissioners. For anything that appears, the 'El Cahon' was as well known as San Diego itself. But the description of the patent does not end here; it is further described as 'that which the dise no attached to the espediente expresses.' This map or survey is thus made a part of the patent for the purpose of description. It exhibits a circular valley surrounded by hills or mountains, except at a narrow outlet on the eastern boundary, where a stream of water passes out. The course of the stream through the valley is traced, as also are the roads. The position of corrals, ranchos, cottages, &c., are carefully noted; on the east, a hill or mountain bounds the valley called 'El Cahon;' on the west, 'Cerro del Porsuele' and 'Cerro de la Mesa;' the northern boundary, as a continuous circular hill or mountain without a name; the southern are broken hills, called 'Lomas Altas.' The cardinal points of the compass are given, and a scale of measurement, a single glance at which would show that the valley traced according to that scale would contain about ten leagues, or possibly eleven, the usual allowance for such estates. There is no evidence whatever, tending to show that, with the assistance of this map, a surveyor would find any difficulty in locating it according to its calls.

In the cases of Fr emont and of Larkin, the grants were much more vague than the present, and the same remark which was made in the latter case will equally apply to this. 'No question appears to have been made as to the practicability of locating the grant in the tribunals below, nor do we see any ground upon which such a question could have been properly raised in the case.'

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented.


text: Talk:United States v. Sutherland/Opinion of the Court


text:
Fellows v. Blacksmith

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Gillet and Mr. Brown for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Martindale for the defendants.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Fellows v. Blacksmith


text: Talk:Fellows v. Blacksmith

title: Talk:Fellows v. Blacksmith