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City of Opelika v. Daniel/Opinion of the Court

The action below was brought originally upon 119 interest coupons cut from 24 bonds of the city of Opelika. The bonds were in the aggregate for $24,000, and the amount claimed to be due on the coupons was more than $5,000. At first a demurrer was filed to the complaint. This being overruled, the validity of the bonds was put in issue by various pleas. Before trial, the plaintiff, Daniel, asked and obtained leave to amend his complaint so as to include only 90 of the coupons originally sued for. After the amendment a jury was impaneled, and on the trial the 90 coupons only were put in evidence. The verdict was for $4,755.64, and a judgment was entered thereon for that amount and no more. To reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought. At a former term Daniel moved to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute did not exceed $5,000. That motion was continued for hearing with the case on its merits.

We decided at the last term in Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 579, [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 484], that our jurisdiction depends on 'the matter which is directly in dispute in the particular cause in which the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed has been rendered,' and that we are not permitted, 'for the purpose of determining its sum or value, to estimate its collateral effect in a subsequent suit between the same or other parties.' That, like this, was a suit on coupons, and the judgment was for less than $5,000, although the bonds from which they were cut amounted to much more, and the validity of the bonds was one of the questions in dispute. The two cases cannot be distinguished in this particular.

It was clearly within the discretion of the court to permit the amendment of the complaint before trial. In Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694, we declined to take jurisdiction where the verdict was for more than $5,000, but the plaintiff before judgment, with leave of the court, remitted the excess, and actually took judgment for $5,000 and no more. In that case it was said, page 696:

'Undoubtedly, the trial court may refuse to permit a verdict     to be reduced by a plaintiff on his own motion; and if the      object of the reduction is to deprive the appellate court of      jurisdiction in a meritorious case, it is to be presumed the      trial court will not allow it to be done. If, however, the     reduction is permitted, the errors in the record will be shut      out from our re-examination in cases where our jurisdiction      depends upon the amount in controversy.'

That case was stronger in favor of jurisdiction than this. There the reduction was made after verdict; here, before trial. The plaintiff, in effect, discontinued his suit as to part of the coupons. He certainly could have discontinued as to all, and it is difficult to see why he might not as to a part.

The writ is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text: Talk:City of Opelika v. Daniel/Opinion of the Court

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text:
Good Intent Tow-Boat Company v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York

These were three libels of intervention filed in the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana against the ship Tornado, her cargo and freight, and the proceeds thereof in the registry of that court, to recover for salvage services rendered by three steam-tugs, the Rio Grande, the Norman, and the Harry Wright.

The libel in the case of the Rio Grande alleges an employment of her owners on the twenty-seventh of February, 1878, by the master and agents of the Tornado, 'to pump out and raise said ship and her cargo,' with the pumps and appliances of the Rio Grande, for a compensation of $50 per hour, and claims $14,900, for 298 hours, from 6 o'clock P. M. on February 27th till 4 o'clock A. M. on March 12th. It alleges that the marshal of the United States seized the ship while the work was going on, and directed the libelants to proceed under the contract to finish the work.

The libel in the case of the Norman alleges an employment of her owners on the twenty-seventh of February, by the master and agents of the Tornado, 'to assist in pumping out and raising said ship and cargo,' by the use of the Norman and her appliances, for a compensation of $50 per hour, and claims $13,900, for 278 hours, from 6 o'clock P. M. on February 27th till 8 o'clock A. M. on March 11th. The libel alleges that the ship was under seizure by the marshal when the work was commenced, and that the marshal continued the services of the Norman till the saving of the ship and cargo was fully assured.

The libel in the case of the Rio Grande alleges an employment of her owners, on February 27th, to pump water out of the ship, and to remain near her afterwards, ready to render service, for a compensation of $50 per hour, and claims $11,200, for 224 hours, from 10 o'clock P. M. on February 27th till 6 o'clock A. M. on March 9th. The libel alleges that the ship was raised and saved, with her cargo, late in the afternoon of February 28th, and that the marshal, after he seized the ship and cargo, continued the employment of the tug under said contract.

The resistance to these claims is made by the underwriters on the cargo, to whom the cargo was abandoned. Their answer alleges that the ship and cargo and her freight were seized by the marshal about midday of February 27th; that the three tugs came about sundown on the 27th, but performed no effective service in pumping during that night; that effective pumping began the next morning; and that by noon on the 28th the ship was raised out of the water, and was free from all danger of sinking or again taking in water.

The district court awarded $1,000 to each tug, one-half to her owners and the other half to her crew. The owners of the three tugs appealed to the circuit court, and that court awarded to the owners of each tug $1,000, and they have appealed to this court. The circuit court found the facts and the conclusions of law on which it rendered its decree. There is no bill of exceptions, and our review of the decree must be limited to a determination of the questions of law arising on the record. The material findings of fact of the circuit court were as follows:

'The ship Tornado was a vessel of 1,720 tons burden, and had     come to the port of New Orleans for a cargo of cotton, which      she had shipped and stowed away, to the amount of 5,195      bales. She was almost ready for sea, and was lying along-side     the wharf in the third district of the city of New Orleans,      at the foot of Marigny street, when, on Sunday, the      twenty-fourth of February, 1878, at six o'clock A. M., smoke      was found coming out of the main hatch, and a number of the      crew were at once sent to the nearest fire-alarm box, and the      fire department of the city of New Orleans were quickly on      the spot. The main hatch having been opened, the fire-engines     immediately commenced to throw water down the main hatch,      which they continued to do until nine o'clock A. M., when the      main hatch was closed, and the steam gasboat Protector, being      provided with apparatus for the manufacture of carbonic acid      gas, commenced to attempt to extinguish the fire, which at      that time was raging quite violently in the hold, by      attempting to fill the vessel with carbonic acid gas. This     continued until nine o'clock P. M., when the main hatch was      opened, and it was found that there was less smoke than there      had been before the experiment with the gas had commenced. The engineer of the Protector went down the main hatch, and     having hooked onto some bales of the cotton they were hoisted      up and landed on the levee greatly charred. In the mean time the     firee-engines were pumping in water through the hatch hole,      and the smoke was increasing. A hole was then cut in the deck     abreast the main rigging on the starboard side, and some      fourteen bales of cotton were got out of this hole. At six     o'clock P. M. smoke was greatly increasing and the hatches      were again put on, and the hole in the deck covered, and the      Protector again commenced pouring carbonic acid gas into the      hold of the vessel, and continued doing so during the night. While these things were going on the harbor tug-boats, the     Continental, the N. M. Jones, the Belle Darlington, the Fern,      the Aspinwall, the Charlie Wood, the Ida, the Ella Wood No. 2, the Joseph Cooper, Jr., and the Wasp, had all got there,     hearing that the vessel was in peril, and were, with the fire      department, engaged in pouring water, with their more or less      powerful pumps, upon the fire, at all times when the gas      experiments were not going on. Arriving at the scene of the     disaster, some earlier than others, they were all there      during the whole of the first day.

'On Monday, the twenty-fifth of February, at six o'clock in     the morning, the main hatch was opened, and the hole that had      been made in the deck was uncovered, and the smoke was found      to be greatly increased; some thirty-two bales of cotton were      at this time taken out by the stevedores. The fire department     was hard at work pumping water, and several holes were cut in      the decks, trying to get at the seat of the fire. The main     pumps were taken up to allow the hose suction to be put down,      and the Protector and the steamengines were pumping out the      water part of the day, but the smoke kept on increasing. At     six o'clock P. M. there were twelve feet six inches of water      in the hold, and the draft of water aft was twenty-three feet      eight inches, and forward twenty-five feet six inches. At     eleven and a half P. M. the smoke was still increasing and      appearing, and the crew were employed in landing the sails      and new ropes, sizing stuff, and all that could be got at, on      the wharf. On Tuesday, the twenty-sixth of February, at six     o'clock A. M., Canby, the regular stevedore of the vessel,      and his men, came on board and landed the boats and      water-casks on the wharf, tore up the forward deck and      carlings, and commenced to save cargo. By noon the stevedore     Drysdale had 181 bales landed and Mr. Canby 100. The fire     department were pouring in water during the night and all the      forenoon, and still the smoke increased, and by noon the men were forced to      come up from the hold, and the fire brigade were set to work      to fill the ship with water, it having been determined by the      captain that the only chance of saving any part of the ship      or cargo was to fill her with water and sink her, it being      deemed impossible to stop the fire otherwise; and about 7      o'clock P. M. of Tuesday, February 26th, the ship sank, the      water being two or three feet above the main deck.

'On Wednesday, February 27th, Ellis, the master, and Schultz,     the agent, of the Tornado made a contract with the tow-boat      association to which the Norman, Rio Grande, and Harry Wright      belonged, to pump out the Tornado for a compensation of $50      per hour for each boat, to be continued until the boats were      discharged. After the making of said contract, and while the     Tornado still lay upon the bottom of the river, the Protector      filed a libel for salvage against the Tornado and cargo, and      by virtue of a warrant issued on said libel the United States      marshal seized the Tornado and cargo, when the said tow-boats      were about to begin pumping her out. After the seizure the     marshal took possession of the Tornado and displaced the      authority of the master, but permitted the said tow-boats to      proceed and pump out the Tornado. The said tow-boats     commenced pumping out the Tornado early in the evening of      February 27th, assisted by other tugs and the fire department      of the city of New Orleans, and succeeded with said      assistance, at 12 o'clock M. of Thursday, February 28th, in      raising the Tornado and placing her in a position of safety. The efficient work of pumping out the Tornado was done     between 6 A. M. and 12 M. of February 28th. The said pumping     service was done without serious danger to the tow-boats by      which it was rendered. The total valuation of the property     saved was $140,090.75. The value of the tow-boats in the     aggregate was $75,000; and their daily expenses were each      $100, when actually at work. The usual charge made by tugs in     the port of New Orleans is from $6 to $12 per hour for      pumping. The said tow-boats remained along-side the Tornado     after she was raised, ready to render her assistance in case      it was needed, for the period of about 12 days, but such      attendance was unnecessary and not required by any peril of      the Tornado and cargo, and the fire department of the city      was also at hand ready to extinguish a fire in the Tornado      should it again break out. The three tow-boats of the appellants, at     the time of making the contract, were out of service, laid up      on the other side of the river, without crews or provisions,      but were immediately manned and victualed and brought over      and laid along-side of the Tornado in the afternoon of      Wednesday, the twenty-seventh of February. At that time there     were no other tow-boats along-side of the Tornado. The said     tow-boats were provided with machinery and pumps for      extinguishing fires and pumping out sunken ships.'

The circuit court found the following conclusions of law from these facts: (1) The contract made by the master and agent of the Tornado for pumping her out was inequitable, and ought not, under the facts of the case, to be enforced; (2) the service rendered by the three tow-boats was a salvage service, but one of low grade; (3) each of them should be allowed $1,000; (4) the costs of the appeal should be paid out of the fund in the registry. The decree was that the owners of each tug recover $1,000 from the fund in the registry, and that the costs of appeal be paid out of that fund.

''Jos. P. Hornor and W. S. Benedict'', for Good Intent Tow-boat company.

P. Phillips, W. Hallett Phillips, and James McConnell, for Insurance Company.

BLATCHFORD, J.


text: Talk:Good Intent Tow-Boat Company v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York


text:
Good Intent Tow-Boat Company v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York/Opinion of the Court

The sole question to be considered on the appeal of the appellants is whether the amounts which the circuit court awarded to them severally, as owners of the three steam-tugs, should be increased. The errors assigned by the appellants are (1) that the circuit court held that the contract for pumping out the ship was inequitable, and ought not, under the facts of the case, to be enforced; (2) that it held that the salvage service was of a low grade; (3) that it allowed to each boat only $1,000. These are all assigned as errors in conclusions of law. There is no complaint made by the libelants of the conclusion of law that the service was a salvage service.

In the case of The Connemara, at the last term, [2 SUP. CT. REP. 754,] this court said: 'The services performed being salvage services, the  amount of salvage to be awarded, although stated by the   circuit court in the form of a conclusion of law, is   largely a matter of fact and discretion, which cannot be   reduced to precise rules, but depends upon a   consideration of all the circumstances of each case.'

We are of opinion that no ground is shown, on the facts found, for awarding a larger sum to the appellants than the circuit court allowed them. The contract, as found, was a contract made by the master and the agent of the ship with the association to which the three tugs belonged, 'to pump out' the ship, for a compensation of $50 per hour for each boat, 'to be continued until the boats were discharged.' This does not give a very clear idea as to what the contract was. If the pumping out should be completed there could be no continuance of the service of pumping out the ship, or of the contract, as a contract to pump out the ship. If the contract was that the compensation named should continue, in any event, and whether the ship was pumped out or not, until the boats should be discharged, the attendance of the boats along-side of the ship after she was pumped out and raised and placed in a position of safety, the boats being ready to render assistance, in case it was needed, for a period of about 12 days, is found to have been unnecessary, and not required by any peril of the Tornado and cargo. It is not found, as a fact, that the boats were formally discharged by the master or agent of the ship. But it is found that after the contract was made, and while the ship still lay at the bottom of the river, and when the boats were about to begin to pump her out, the marshal seized the ship and cargo under a warrant on a libel for salvage filed against the ship and cargo, and took possession of the ship, and displaced the authority of the master, but permitted the boats to proceed and pump out the ship; and that they, with other assistance, pumped out the ship, and raised her and placed her in a position of safety by a pumping service of about 18 hours. It is not found that the marshal requested or sanctioned in any way the continued presence of the tugs after the ship was raised and made safe. The authority of the master was displaced by the marshal. On these facts we are of opinion that to enforce the contract as one continuing during the time claimed by the libelants would be highly inequitable; and that, as against the insurers of the cargo, the right of the boats to compensation must be regarded as having terminated when the ship and cargo were raised, and the boats must be regarded as having been then discharged, within any fair interpretation which can be given to the contract. A compensation of $50 per hour for the 18 hours of actual pumping would amount to $900. Every agreement for salvage compensation is subject, as to amount, to the judgment of the court as to its being equitable and conformable to the merits of the case. Pars. Shipp. 306; The Helen and George, Swab. 368; Jones, Salv. 94 et seq.

The final decree of the circuit court was entered on the twenty-fourth of May, 1880. On the twenty-sixth of June following, the underwriters on the cargo filed a petition in the circuit court, praying a cross-appeal to this court from the decree, and it was allowed, returnable at the October term, 1880. On the fifth of July following, the bond on the cross-appeal was filed in circuit court. But the appellants, in the cross-appeal, did not docket it, or enter their appearance on it, in this court, until September 27, 1883; and the appellees in it are entitled to have it dismissed. Grigsby v. Purcell, 99 U.S. 505; The S. S. Osborne, 105 U.S. 447.

The cross-appeal is dismissed, and, on the appeal of the libelants, the decree of the circuit court is affirmed.


text: Talk:Good Intent Tow-Boat Company v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York/Opinion of the Court


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Double-Pointed Tack Co v. Two Rivers Manufacturing Company

This is a suit in equity brought in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Wisconsin, for the infringement of letters patent No. 147, 343, granted February 10, 1874, to the plaintiff, the Double-pointed Tack Company, as assignees of Purches Miles, the inventor, for an 'improvement in bail-ears.' The circuit court dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The specification of the patent says:

'Wire staples have been employed to form the fastening eyes     for bails, and these have been driven into the wood with the      penetrating points nearly at right angles to the surface, and      in use they are liable to pull out by the weight. My     invention consists in a bail-fastening staple made of wire,      with the penetrating ends cut at such an angle that, in      driving them into the wood, they will assume an upward      inclination, so that the weight will tend to force such      points inwardly rather than to draw them out, and the bending      of the ends in clinching will always be upwardly, thus making      a better and more reliable article than heretofore; and I      combine with such fastening a convex metallic washer to keep      the bail from contact with the wood or the paint thereon. In     the drawing, figure 1 is a section of the fastening,      complete;     figure 2 shows the compound staple-fastening separately; and      figure 3 is an elevation of the washer. The wood-work, a,     represents part of a bail or tub, and the bail, b, is of      wire, having eyes, c, at the ends, which are bent so as to      stand parallel, or nearly so, to each other. The compound     staple-fastening, d, is made with the penetrating points, 2,      3, loop, 4, for the eye, c, and the body, 5. The ends, 2, 3,     of the wire are cut diagonally, so that, in driving them into      the wood, the tendency is to bend upwardly and clinch, and      they will usually be long enough to pass through the wood and      be clinched. The body of the fastening stands vertically, or     nearly so, and will usually be partially embedded in the      wood. The sheet-metal washer, e, prevents the eye, c, coming     against the wood. The points of the staple penetrate the wood     upwardly, so as effectually to prevent the staple pulling out      under the ordinary strain to which it is subjected.'

The claims of the patent are these:

'(1) The compound staple-fastening, d, for bails, made with     the diagonally cut penetrating points, 2 and 3, loop, 4, and      body, 5, said diagonally cut points being positioned as set      forth, so as to bend upwardly in driving into the wood, as      set forth. (2) The convex metallic washer, e, in combination     with the compound bail-fastening staple, d, having upwardly      penetrating points, 2, 3, and loop, 4, as and for the      purposes specified.'

A. v. Briesen, for appellant.

''Wm. P. Lynde'', for appellee.

BLATCHFORD, J.


text: Talk:Double-Pointed Tack Co v. Two Rivers Manufacturing Company


text:
Double-Pointed Tack Co v. Two Rivers Manufacturing Company/Opinion of the Court

The gist of the invention set forth in the descriptive part of the specification, so far as the first claim is concerned, is to cut the two penetrating ends of the wire diagonally, and in such a way that, while the staple is being driven, the cut faces will both of them be on the lower side, and the two penetrating ends will both of them incline upwardly. It is shown to have been commonly known that the effect of a bevel or a diagonal cut on a penetrating point was to force the point, in being driven, in a direction away from the bevel or cut. Double-pointed staples, with a diagonal cut on each point, but the diagonal cut on one point on the upper and outer side, and on the other point on the lower and outer side, as the staple was driven, were old. They were used to secure wire screens as guards for windows. The effect in driving them was to bring the two points together, by throwing them towards each other, through their movements in opposite directions. The mechanical action embodied was the forcing each point, in being driven, in a direction away from its bevel or cut. The result was that the legs of the staple were bent and came together, and were thus clinched in the driving, and it was more difficult to pull out the staple than if the legs had gone in without bending. In view of this state of the art, there was no patentable invention, and nothing more than mechanical skill, in putting the diagonal cuts or bevels on the same side of each leg of the staple, so as to give both points, in driving, an inclination in the same direction, that direction being one away from both bevels, and in using the device to fasten a bail. This was the view taken by the circuit court. There is no suggestion in the specification or claims as to any invention or novelty in the form of the loop, or of the body, or in the relative lengths of the two penetrating points, or as to the angles formed by such points with the loop, or the body, before driving. The so cutting the penetrating ends that they will both of them incline upwardly, in driving, is the only feature of invention set forth, and to this the patent must be limited, so far as the first claim is concerned.

The second claim is for the washer in combination with the staple of the first claim. This is not a patentable combination. There is only an aggregation of parts when the staple is used with the washer. The use of the washer is stated in the specification to be to keep the eye at the end of the bail from contact with the wood or the paint thereon. The upper point or leg of the staple goes through the eye and through the center of the washer; but the presence of the washer does not modify or affect the action of the staple, nor does the staple modify or affect the action of the washer. The washer keeps the eye of the bail from rubbing the wood of the pail. It would have the same effect if it were fastened in some other way than by having the leg of the staple pass through it, and the staple would in such case have the same operation which it now has.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.


text: Talk:Double-Pointed Tack Co v. Two Rivers Manufacturing Company/Opinion of the Court


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Manhattan Life Insurance Company v. Broughton

James Otis Hoyt, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 122 intentionally omitted]

Erastus F. Brown, for defendant in error.

GRAY, J.


text:
Author:Alexander Robert Fulton

Works

 * Red Men of Iowa

title: Author:Alexander Robert Fulton


text: Talk:Manhattan Life Insurance Company v. Broughton


text:
Manhattan Life Insurance Company v. Broughton/Opinion of the Court

This is an action brought on the ninth of June, 1879, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by John G. Broughton, a citizen of Bloomfield, in the state of New Jersey, against a corporation established in the city and state of New York, upon a policy of insurance in the sum of $10,000, on the life of Israel Ferguson, of New York, dated the fifteenth of June, 1864, made and payable to his wife, and containing a condition that it should be null and void 'in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law of these states, or of the United States,' or of any other country which he might be permitted by this policy to visit or reside in. At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that Ferguson died in the city of New York on the fourteenth of August, 1876, and that presently afterwards his widow and family removed to Redbank, in the state of New Jersey, and had since had their home there. He also introduced a deed dated the tenth of February, 1877, by which Mrs. Ferguson assigned the policy to John G. Nestell, of New York, in trust, to pay a claim for $2,000, and the necessary expenses of collecting the amount of the policy, and to invest the surplus for her benefit; and a record of the supreme court of New York, showing that in May, 1879, in a suit brought by Nestell against Mrs. Ferguson to be relieved of his trust, Broughton, the plaintiff, was, upon her request, substituted as trustee in Nestell's stead. There was evidence tending to show that one object in having Broughton appointed was that a suit could be brought in his name in the United States court.

The defendant, having pleaded in bar a former judgment in an action brought against it upon the policy by Mrs. Ferguson, in October, 1876, in the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, offered evidence by which it appeared that in such an action the death of Ferguson by hanging himself was proved, and the only question in controversy was whether, and how far, he was insane at the time of his death; and that upon the defendant's motion the court, in December, 1878, granted a nonsuit, because he was not shown to have been so insane as not to know the physical consequences of his act, and the decision was entered of record in this form: 'Motion for nonsuit granted, and complaint dismissed; allowance, one hundred and fifty dollars to defendant, if further litigation be carried on by plaintiff.'

The defendant requested the circuit court to direct a verdict for the defendant, because the former judgment was a bar, and afterwards objected to the introduction by the plaintiff of evidence of the condition of Ferguson's mind at the time of his death, because that question had been tried and determined in the former action. The court rightly denied the request, and overruled the objection. A judgment of nonsuit does not determine the rights of the parties, and is no bar to a new action. Homer v. Brown, 16 How. 354. A trial upon which nothing was determined cannot support a plea of res adjudicata, or have any weight as evidence at another trial.

The defendant, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, and again at the close of all of the evidence in the case, moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, because Broughton had only a nominal interest, and the real controversy was between citizens of New York; and the at the argument in this court contended that the action should be dismissed because the evidence showed that the plaintiff was made trustee for the purpose of bringing an action in the United States court, after Mrs. Ferguson had failed to recover in the state court, under the rule established by the recent decisions of the court of appeals in Van Zandt v. ''Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169, and Weed v. Same'', 70 N. Y. 561.

But the case does not fall within the prohibition of the first section of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, that no circuit court shall have cognizance of any suit founded on contract, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made; nor within the provision of the fifth section of the same act, authorizing the circuit court to dismiss a suit, upon being satisfied that it does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, or that parties have been improperly or collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by that court. 18 St. 470, 472; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209. Mrs. Ferguson, the assured and payee named in the policy, was herself a citizen of New Jersey, and as such, if no assignment had been made, might have sued the company in the circuit court of the United States; and Bromfield, a citizen of the same state, was appointed in the stead of the former trustee, a citizen of New York, not by Mrs. Ferguson's deed in pais, but by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the mere fact that one object in having him appointed was to enable a suit to be brought in the circuit court is not sufficient to require or justify the construction that he was improperly, and it cannot be pretended that he was collusively, made a plaintiff for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by that court. The question involved was not a question of local law, but of general jurisprudence, upon which Mrs. Ferguson, and Broughton, as her trustee, had a right to seek the independent judgment of a federal court. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; ''Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Myrick'', 107 U.S. 102; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 425;] Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20; [S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 10.]

Several minor points suggested at the argument hardly present any question of law. The interrogatories put by the counsel for the plaintiff to the expert called by the defendants were clearly admissible on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge and accuracy of the witness, and require no special consideration. The instruction requested, that 'the only legal test of insanity is delusion,' was in direct contradiction of the testimony of the experts called on each side, and could not properly be given as a rule of law. The court rightly refused to direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to show that Ferguson was insane, or to render the defendant liable upon its contract. Without undertaking to recapitulate the evidence, it is sufficient to say that members of his family, and persons well acquainted with him in his business, testified that he was naturally of a lively, cheerful, sanguine disposition; that in 1874 he met with heavy losses in business, and his son died suddenly by falling from a window; that from that time forward there was a marked change in his demeanor; 'he was always walking with his head bowed down, and a gloomy expression, and the entire vitality and cheerfulness which the man had before was gone;' 'he was gloomy, dull, mopish;' 'he sat down in the office and moaned and would be gloomy there;' 'he always complained of his head; he would say, 'The trouble is here; it is all in my head, my head;" that shortly before his death he had 'a vacant expression in his face;' 'he had a queer expression about his eyes; it was a sort of wild, unnatural expression;' 'that kind of expression which the human face takes on when one is frightened; a far-off, glassy look, as though the mind was dwelling on nothing;' that 'he was very much changed, and was very excitable; he looked different, and had a wild expression; he staid a great deal by himself when he came home from business; he would go to his room and lie on his bed with his hat and overcoat on, and not come out to his meals.' The experts called for the plaintiff testified that Ferguson was suffering from that kind of unsoundness of mind which they termed melancholia. There was clearly some evidence of insanity for the jury, and the question of its weight was for them, and not for the court. ''Ins. Co. v. Rodel'', 95 U.S. 232.

The remaining, and the most important, question in the case is whether a self-killing by an insane person, having sufficient mental capacity to understand the deadly nature and consequences of his act, but not its moral aspect and character, is a death by suicide, within the meaning of the policy. This is the very question that was presented to this court in 1872 in the case of ''Life Ins. Co. v. Terry'', 15 Wall. 580. At that time there was a remarkable conflict of opinion in the courts of England, in the courts of the several states, and in the circuit courts of the United States, as to the true interpretation of such a condition. All the authorities agreed that the words 'die by suicide' or 'die by his own hand' did not cover every possible case in which a man took his own life, and could not be held to include the case of self-destruction in a blind frenzy or under an overwhelming insane impulse. Some courts and judges held that they included every case in which a man, sane or insane, voluntarily took his own life. Others were of opinion that any insane self-destruction was not within the condition.

In Terry's Case, (the trial of which in the circuit court before Mr. Justice MILLER and Judge DILLON is reported in 1 Dill. 403,) it was admitted that the person whose life was insured died by poison, self-administered; and the insurance company requested the court to instruct the jury-First, that if he destroyed his own life, and at the time of self-destruction had sufficient capacity to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it, the plaintiff could not recover on the policy; and, secondly, that if the self-destruction was intended by him, he having sufficient capacity at the time to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it, it was wholly immaterial that he was impelled thereto by insanity, which impaired his sense of moral responsibility, and rendered him to a certain extent irresponsible for his action. 15 Wall. 581. The circuit court declined to give either of the instructions requested, and instructed the jury in substantial accordance with the first of them only, saying:

'It devolves on the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the     part of the decedent, existing at the time he took the      poison, as will relieve the act of taking his own life from      the effect which, by the general terms used in the policy,      self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid the policy. It     is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far      excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company      insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must     have been the consequence of the insanity, and the mind of      the decedent must have been so far deranged as to have made      him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the      act which he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by     an insane impulse, which the reason that was left him did not      enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far      overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exercise      his reasoning faculties on the act he was about to do, the      company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption     of law, prima facie or otherwise, that self-destruction      arises from insanity; and if you believe from the evidence      that the decedent, although excited, or angry, or distressed      in mind, formed the determination to take his own life, because, in the exercise of      his usual reasoning faculties, he preferred death to life,      then the company is not liable, because he died by his own      hand within the meaning of the policy.' 15 Wall. 582.

The necessary effect of giving these instructions, after refusing to give the second instruction requested, was to rule that if the deceased intentionally took his own life, having sufficient mental capacity to understand the physical nature and consequences of his act, yet if he was impelled to the act by insanity, which impaired his sense of moral responsibility, the company was liable. That the ruling was so understood by this court is apparent by the opening sentences of its opinion on page 583, as well as by its conclusion, which, after a review of the conflicting authorities on the subject, was announced in these words: 'We hold the rule on the question before us to be this: If the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches and there can be no recovery. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impared that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable.' Pages 590, 591.

In ''Ins. Co. v. Rodel'', 95 U.S. 232, the same rule was expressly reaffirmed. In that case the circuit court declined to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if the assured knew that the act which he committed would result in death, and deliberately did it for that purpose; and instead thereof, repeated to the jury the instructions of the circuit court in Terry's Case, and the conclusion of the opinion of this court in that case, as above quoted. This court, in affirming the judgment, said: 'This charge is in the very words of the charge sanctioned and approved by this court in the case of ''Life Ins. Co. v. Terry'', 15 Wall. 580, Including an explanatory clause of the opinion of the court in that case. We see no reason to modify the views expressed by us on that occasion.' 95 U.S. 241.

The policies in the cases of Terry and of Rodel used the words 'die by his own hand,' instead of which the policy before us has the words 'die by suicide.' But, for the purposes of this contract, as was observed in Terry's Case, 15 Wall. 591, the two expressions are equivalent.

In the present case, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury 'that if Israel Ferguson died by suicide the plaintiff cannot recover, unless he has proved to your satisfaction that such act of self-destruction was not Ferguson's voluntary and willful act; that he had not at the time sufficient power of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and did not have, at the time, a purpose and intention to cause his own death by the act;' 'that unless the evidence established that Israel Ferguson did not commit suicide consciously and voluntarily, the plaintiff cannot recover;' and 'that if he thus committed it, it is immaterial whether he was capable of understanding its moral aspects, or of distinguishing between right and wrong.'

The court declined to give these instructions, and read to the jury the second instruction refused in Terry's Case, and the instructions given therein, as above quoted, and stated that the refusal of the former and the giving of the latter had been approved by this court, and that its decision contained a full exposition of the law, so far as it was necessary to be understood for the purposes of this case, and laid down the rule which would determine them in the application of the evidence which had been introduced; and further instructed them as follows:

'Upon the part of the defendant, all argument based upon the     peculiar circumstances surrounding the suicide has been      addressed to you, which is deserving of consideration; the      various circumstances, showing premeditation. plan, thought,     which, it is very fairly urged, afford quite strong evidence that at the      time of his death he was in the full possession of his mental      faculties. A serious question, gentlemen, which you will ask     yourselves in this case, it seems to me, is this: Had he, in      view of his misfortunes, and of the probable future that      awaited him, deliberately come to the conclusion that it was      better to die them to live, and did he in that view commit      suicide; or was he so far mentally unsound that he could not      exercise a rational judgment upon the question of life and      death? Did he become oblivious to the duties which he owed to     his family, to his friends, and to himself? Was he impelled     by a morbid impulse which he had not sufficient strength of      will to resist, and, acting under the influence of this      insane impulse, did he determine to take his own life? Because, if his reasoning faculties were so far impaired that     he could not fairly estimate the moral consequences, the      moral complexion of the act, even though he could reason      sufficiently well to prepare with great deliberation, and to      execute his design with success, nevertheless, within the      authority which I have read, he was so far insane that the      plaintiff is entitled to recover on this policy.'

These instructions are in exact accordance with the adjudications in the cases of Terry and Rodel; and upon consideration we are unanimously of opinion that the rule so established is sounder in principle, as well as simpler in application, than that which makes the effect of the act of self-destruction, upon the interests of those for whose benefit the policy was made, to depend upon the very subtle and difficult question, how far any exercise of the will can be attributed to a man who is so unsound of mind that, while he foresees the physical consequences which will directly result from his act, he cannot understand its moral nature and character, or in any just sense be said to know what it is that he is doing.

If a man's reason is so clouded or disturbed by insanity as to prevent his understanding the real nature of his act, as regards either its physical consequences or its moral aspect, the case appears to us to come within the forcible words uttered by the late Mr. Justice NELSON, when chief justice of New York, in the earliest American case upon the subject: 'Speaking legally, also, (and the policy should be subjected to this test,) self-destruction by a fellow-being bereft of reason can with no more propriety be ascribed to his own hand than to the deadly instrument that may have been used for the purpose;' and, whether it was by drowning, or poisoning, or hanging, or in any other manner, 'was no more his act, in the sense of the law, than if he had been impelled by irresistible physical power.' Breasted v. Farmers' Trust & Loan Co. 4 Hill, 73, 75.

Judgment affirmed.


text: Talk:Manhattan Life Insurance Company v. Broughton/Opinion of the Court


text: Newman v. Arthur

title: Newman v. Arthur


text: Talk:Newman v. Arthur

title: Talk:Newman v. Arthur


text:
Newman v. Arthur/Opinion of the Court

This action was brought to recover money alleged to have been illegally exacted by the collector of customs at the port of New York, and paid under protest. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant below, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted. The importations were made in 1875 and consisted of cotton goods, upon which the collector assessed a duty of 5 1/2 cents a square yard, and 20 per centum ad valorem. The plaintiff at the time of the liquidation claimed that the goods were liable to a duty of only 35 per cent. ad valorem as manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for. It was proven on the trial that goods like those in question were first manufactured in Manchester, England, in 1868 or 1869, they being then a new article of manufacture, and were first introduced into this country in 1869 or 1870. They have been known since their first introduction into this country in trade and commerce by the name of cotton Italians, and used exclusively for coat linings. The importations in question were wholly of cotton, and dyed black in the piece, after being woven, and were made in imitation of a well-known article called Italian cloth, made of wool, and used for lining woolen coats. The surface of the cotton Italians was by some process of weaving and calendering made smooth and glossy like that of the real Italians. Plain woolen goods are those in which the warp and woof threads cross each other at right angles.

Cotton Italians are not plain woven, but are twilled goods, and had upon them figures of different designs made in weaving. The cotton Italians in question had more than 100 threads, and less than 200 threads, to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, and were less in weight than five ounces to the square yard, and did not exceed in value 25 cents to a square yard. Plaintiff's counsel gave evidence tending to show that the number of threads to the square inch in plaintiff's importations could not be counted without unraveling the goods.

The plaintiff's counsel asked the plaintiff, who was duly sworn as a witness in the cause, the following question: 'Are the goods bought and sold of the count of the number of threads?' The defendant's counsel objected to the question as immaterial. The court sustained the objection, and plaintiff's counsel duly excepted. The plaintiff's counsel then offered to prove by the witness that goods like those in question were never known in trade and commerce in this country as countable goods, or so bought and sold. The defendant's counsel objected to the evidence as immaterial. The court sustained the objection, and plaintiff's counsel duly excepted. Plaintiff's counsel then offered to show that prior to 1861, and ever since, there have been in trade and commerce in this country a great variety of cotton cloths known as countable goods, and which were bought and sold by the number of threads in the warp and filling, which number of threads were ascertainable by a glass and without taking the fabric to pieces. The defendant's counsel objected to the question as immaterial. The court sustained the objection, and plaintiff's counsel duly excepted. The plaintiff's counsel then asked the witness the following question: 'Was the value of cotton Italians partially or wholly determined, between the manufacturer and the purchaser, according to the number of threads to the square inch?' To this question defendant's counsel objected as immaterial. The court sustained the objection, and plaintiff's counsel duly excepted.

It was conceded that plaintiff's goods were neither cotton jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings, ginghams, plaids, cottonades, nor pantaloon stuff, nor goods of like description to them or either of them, nor for similar use.

Among others, not necessary here to refer to, the following instruments were requested by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, which the court refused to give, and to which exception was duly taken, viz.:

'(3) That if the number of threads to the square inch in     plaintiff's goods, counting the warp and filling, cannot be      counted without taking the goods to pieces, then the      plaintiff is entitled to recover.'

'(5) That cotton Italians, being a new manufacture, and     unknown here and abroad when the act of 1864 was passed, they      were not specifically enumerated, and the presumption, until      rebutted, is that they come under the general provision of      manufactures not otherwise provided for.' The provisions of the law which govern the case are contained in section 2504, Rev. St., being Schedule A, cotton and cotton goods, and are as follows:

'(1) Sec. 2504. On all manufactures of cotton, (except jeans,     denims, drillings, bed-tickings, ginghams, plaids,      cottonades, pantaloon stuff, and goods of like description,)      not bleached, colored, stained, painted, or printed, and not      exceeding one hundred threads to the square inch, counting      the warp and filling, and exceeding in weight five ounces per      square yard, five cents per square yard; if bleached, five      cents and a half per square yard; if colored, stained,      painted, or printed, five cents and a half per square yard,      and, in addition thereto, 10 per centum ad valorem.

'(2) On finer and lighter goods of like description, not     exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting      the warp and filling, unbleached, five cents per square yard;      if bleached, five and a half cents per square yard; if      colored, stained, painted, or printed, five and a half cents      per square yard, and, in addition thereto, twenty per centum      ad valorem.

'(3) On goods of like description, exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, unbleached, five cents per square yard; if bleached, five and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, five and a half cents per square yard, and, in addition thereto, twenty per centum ad valorem.

'(4) On cotton jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings,     ginghams, plaids, cottonades, pantaloon stuffs, and goods of      like description, or for similar use, if unbleached, and not      exceeding one hundred threads to the square inch, counting      the warp and filling, and exceeding five ounces to the square      yard, six cents per square yard; if bleached, six cents and a      half per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or      printed, six cents and a half per square yard, and, in      addition thereto, ten per centum ad valorem.

'(5) On finer or lighter goods of like description, not     exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting      the warp and filling, if unbleached, six cents per square      yard; if bleached, six and a half cents per square yard; if      colored, stained, painted, or printed, six and a half cents      per square yard, and, in addition thereto, fifteen per centum      ad valorem.

'(6) On goods of lighter description, exceeding two hundred     threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, if      unbleached, seven cents per square yard; if bleached, seven      and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained,      painted, or printed, seven and a half cents per square yard,      and, in addition thereto, fifteen per centum ad valorem:      provided, that upon all plain woven cotton goods, not      included in the foregoing schedule, unbleached, valued at      over sixteen cents per square yard; bleached, valued at over      twenty cents per square yard; colored, valued at over      twenty-five cents per square yard; and cotton jeans, denims,      and drillings, unbleached, valued at over twenty cents per      square yard; and all other cotton goods of every description,      the value of which shall exceed twenty-five cents per square      yard, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of      thirty-five per centum ad belorem: and provided, further,      that no cotton goods having more than two hundred threads to      the square inch, counting the warp and filling, shall be      admitted to a less rate of duty than is provided for goods      which are of that number of threads.' '(12) *  *  * and all other manufactures of cotton, not   otherwise provided for, thirty-five per centum ad   valorem.'

The contention of the plaintiff in error now relied on is, in substance, that the goods in question are not embraced in the provisions of the statute, applicable to 'manufactures of cotton,' described and classed by the number of threads to the square inch, because that description had reference only to goods so described and classed by mercantile usage in dealings between buyers and sellers, where the threads could be counted by the aid of a glass, whereas, the goods in question, as it must be assumed from the offers of proof which were rejected, were not dealt in by manufacturers and merchants according to any such usage, and could not be, because the threads in a square inch could not be counted, except by unraveling the fabric for that purpose; and it is therefore argued that, as the goods in question were of a new manufacture, not known at the date of the passage of the act, they cannot be considered as within the specified enumeration of the statute, and the appropriate duty must be determined by the final clause, embracing 'all other manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for.' The claim is, in the language of counsel making it, that 'congress did not mean to subject to this 'countable' clause every article of cotton manufacture of which, by cutting out a square inch, the number of threads constituting the warp and woof of that area could be counted, but only those articles in which the threads were counted in ordinary mercantile transactions therein, and which could be counted by methods practiced by the trade.'

It is sought to support this argument by invoking the rule of construing the statute applied in Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U.S. 108, and the numerous cases there cited, that where words are used in an act imposing duties upon imports which have acquired, by commercial use, a meaning different from their ordinary meaning, the latter may be controlled by the former if such be the apparent intent of the statute; but the application fails in the present instance because the language used is unequivocal. There is no reference in the statute, either expressly or by implication, to any commercial usage, and there is no language in it which requires for its interpretation the aid of any extrinsic circumstances. The rejected proof of the custom of merchants to rate certain descriptions of goods, as to values, by the number of threads to the square inch, as ascertained by inspection by means of a glass, throws no light whatever on the meaning of the law, because the law fixes the rate of duty by a classification based on the number of the threads in a square inch, without reference to the mode in which the count is to be made. It might be quite convenient for dealers not to count the threads, except when they could do so without unraveling, but it is pure conjecture that congress intended to stop the count by collectors at the same limit. There appears to be no difficulty in counting the threads, no matter how fine the fabric, as long as the goods are plain woven, and the necessity of unraveling for the purpose of counting seems to exist only in case of twilled goods; and yet this very act requires a count of threads in the case of jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings, etc., which are twilled, and bases a difference of duty upon them according to the number of threads to the square inch so ascertained.

The fact that at the date of the passage of the act goods of the kind in question had not been manufactured, cannot withdraw them from the class to which they belong, as described in the statute, where, as in the present case, the language fairly and clearly includes them.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.

title: Newman v. Arthur/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Newman v. Arthur/Opinion of the Court


text:
Arthur v. Pastor

This action was brought by the defendants in error to recover from the defendant below, now plaintiff in error, money alleged to have been illegally exacted and paid under protest as customs duties upon an importation of wool. Upon the facts set out in a bill of exceptions, and in respect to which there is no dispute, there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff below, upon a charge of the court to that effect, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted; the error alleged being that, upon the law of the case, the verdict and judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiff in error. The importation, which took place January 3, 1876, consisted of 3,294 pounds of washed wool, of class 1, tariff schedule L, the dutiable appraised value of which in its washed condition was $1,627, or 49.49 cents per pound. Had it been imported in an unwashed condition, the dutiable appraised value thereof would have been $813.50, or 24.69 cents per pound. There were three grades or descriptions of wool known to the trade, rated as to value according to the degree to which they had been freed from impurities, by processes of cleaning, known as unwashed, washed, and scoured wool; and their cost and value were determined in a corresponding proportion, washed wool being worth twice and scoured wool three times that of unwashed wool. The same distinction, for the purposes of the law, was made in the provisions of the tariff act then in force. By the terms of that act (Rev. St. tit. 33, sched. L) foreign wools were divided into three classes,-the first clothing wools, the second combing wools, the third carpet wools and other similar wools. It was provided that 'the duty upon wool of the first class, which shall be imported washed, shall be twice the amount of the duty to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed; and the duty upon wool of all classes, which shall be imported scoured, shall be three times the duty to which it would be subject if imported unwashed.' It was then provided that the duty to be levied should be as follows:

'Wools of the first class, the value whereof at the last port     or place whence exported to the United States, excluding      charges in such port, shall be thirty-two cents or less per      pound, ten cents per pound, and in addition thereto eleven      per centum ad valorem. Wools of the same class, the value     whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the      United States, excluding charges in such port, shall exceed      thirty-two cents per pound, twelve cents per pound, and in      addition thereto ten per centum ad valorem.'

The collector, in making his assessment upon the importation in question, exacted duty as follows:

On 3,294 pounds, @ 20 cts. per pound,. $ 658 80

" $1,627, (its value washed,) @ 22 per cent.,. 357 94

Total,.......................... $1,016 74

The importers protested that they should be charged, as an ad valorem duty, only $178.97, or one-half the amount charged and collected, being 22 per cent. on the reduced value of the wool, as if unwashed, making a difference of $178.97, which is the amount in controversy. It was proven on the trial that the value of that number of pounds of such wool, unwashed, would have been $813.50. Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for plaintiff in error.

Edward Hartley and W. H. Coleman, for defendants in error.

MATTHEWS, J.

title: Arthur v. Pastor


text: Talk:Arthur v. Pastor

title: Talk:Arthur v. Pastor


text:
Arthur v. Pastor/Opinion of the Court

The construction of the statute, and the rule of computation adopted by the collector, proceeds upon the supposition that the rate of duty to be charged and collected upon washed wool is to be double that charged and collected upon the same weight and value of unwashed wool. Hence, because 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool would be chargeable with a duty of 10 cents per pound, and 11 per cent. of its appraised value as unwashed wool, it is found that the same weight of washed wool would be chargeable with 20 cents per pound, and 22 per cent. of its appraised value as washed wool.

The error in this calculation clearly is in assuming that the same number of pounds of unwashed wool would be worth as much as washed wool; a supposition which is inconsistent with the fact, as admitted, and with the evident meaning of the law. The language of the act of congress is too plain to admit of doubt. It declares that the duty upon a given quantity of washed wool shall be twice the amount of duty 'to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed.' By the terms of the comparison the weight is supposed to be the same in both cases-in the case, as actually presented, a quantity of wool weighing 3,294 pounds. Hence the duty, so far as determined by weight, is calculated upon the same number of pounds, being 11 cents per pound for the unwashed wool and 22 cents per pound for the washed wool. But when the ad valorem duty is to be determined, the relative values necessarity determine its amount; and as 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool is to be appraised at $813.50, while the same weight of washed wool would be twice that sum, or $1,627, it follows that the duty on the latter is to be double that which the law imposes upon the former, namely, 22 per cent. of $813.50, which is equal to $178.97, and not 22 per cent. on $1,627, equal to $357.94, as charged by the collector. If the rule adopted by him should prevail, the amount of the ad valorem duty collected upon equal weights of unwashed and of washed wool would be four times as great upon the latter as upon the former, for not only is the rate of duty doubled, but it is assessed upon double the value of the unwashed wool. But the statute expressly limits the duty in the case of washed wool to double the amount to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed.

It is admitted in argument that the letter of the law justifies, if it does not require, this conclusion; but it is urged that the meaning of the statute requires the construction which would impose rates of duty upon washed wool double those imposed upon unwashed, calculated upon the weight and value of each, separately considered. And this contention is maintained upon the argument that the contrary reading of the statute implies that congress has made the appraised value of wool in its unwashed state the standard for determining the amount of ad valorem duty to be collected upon washed wool, which, it is insisted upon the argument, ad inconvenienti, is not admissible. But this is not by implication merely, but expressly what the act declares; and any fancied or real objections to such a standard cannot affect the obvious meaning of the law. It is obvious, however, that the natural division of wools into the grades unwashed, washed, and scoured, carried into the act as the ground of difference in the amount of duties to be assessed accordingly, fully explains the intention of congress to tax the wool itself uniformly by varying the amount of duty according to the degree to which a given quantity has been freed, by processes of cleansing, from the dirt and foreign matter with which, in its unwashed state, it is usually found.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

title: Arthur v. Pastor/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Arthur v. Pastor/Opinion of the Court


text:
United States v. Fisher (109 U.S. 143)

Asst. Atty. Gen. Simons and J. S. Blair, for appellant.

T. H. N. McPherson and ''J. Thos. Turner'', for appellee.

WOODS, J.

title: United States v. Fisher (109 U.S. 143)


text: Talk:United States v. Fisher (109 U.S. 143)


text:
United States v. Fisher (109 U.S. 143)/Opinion of the Court

The act of June 17, 1870, entitled 'An act to regulate the salaries of chief justices and associate justices in the territories,' (16 St. p. 152; Rev. St. § 1879,) provided as follows: 'The salaries of the chief justices and assocate justices of the territories of New Mexico, Washington, Wyoming, etc., shall be three thousand dollars each per annum.'

This statute remaining in force, Congress, on March 3, 1877, passed an act entitled 'An act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government for the year ending June 30, 1878, and for other purposes.' 19 St. 294. This act declared as follows:

'That the following sums be, and the same are hereby,     appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise      appropriated, in full compensation for the service of the      fiscal year ending June 30, 1878, for the objects hereinafter      expressed.

*    *     *

'Government in the Territories.

*    *     *

'Territory of Wyoming. For salaries of governor, chief     justice, and two associate judges, at two thousand six      hundred dollars each.'

The act of June 19, 1878, making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879, contained similar provisions in the same language. 20 St. 178, 194. The act of June 21, 1879, (21 Stat. 23,) making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880, appriated 'the same sums of money and for like purpose (and continuing the same provisions relating thereto) as were appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879,' by the act above referred to, making appropriations for that year. With the exception of the words 'in full compensation,' the opening clause of these acts is substantially the same as that used in all other appropriation acts of every description since the foundation of the government.

Upon this state of the statute law the question is presented whether from June 30, 1877, up to and including November 26, 1879, the appellee was entitled to a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum, or at the rate of $2,600 per annum. The contention of appellee is that under the act of June 17, 1870, he was entitled to the salary of $3,000, notwithstanding the subsequent legislation above referred to. We cannot concur in this view. The act of June 17, 1870, fixing the annual salary of appellee at $3,000, was not a contract that the salary should not be reduced during his term of office. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. Nor was there any provision of the constitution which forbade a reduction. Clinton v. Engelbrecht, 13 Wall. 434.

Congress, therefore, could, without the violation of any contract, reduce the salary of appellee, and had the constitutional power to do so.

Certain well-settled rules of interpretation are applicable to this case. One is that a legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature apparent upon its face, (Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627;) another, that, if possible, effect must be given to every clause, section, and word of the statute, (Bac. Abr. St. I. 2; Powlter's Case, 11 Coke, 29a, 34a; Potter's Dwarris, St. 194; Op. Justices, 22 Pick. 571;) and a third, that where two acts are in irreconcilable conflict the later repeals the earlier act, even though there be no express repeal. McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; U.S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596; [S.C.. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 434;] U.S. v. Irwim, 5 McLean, 178; West v. Pine, 4 Wash. C. C. 691; Britton v. Com. 1 Cush. 302.

Applying these rules, we think that the appropriation acts above referred to, so far as they concern the question in hand, are susceptible of but one meaning. Placing side by side the two clauses of the statute which relate to this controversy, their plain effect is to appropriate $2,600 for the salary of the appellee for one year, and to declare that the sum so appropriated shall be in full compensation for his services as chief justice for the year specified. There is no ambiguity and no room for construction. We cannot adopt the view of appellee unless we eliminate from the statute the words 'in full compensation,' which congress, abandoning the long-used form of the appropriation acts has, ex industria, inserted. Our duty is to give them effect. When congress has said that the sum appropriated shall be in full compensation of the services of the appellee, we cannot say that it shall not be in full compensation, and allow him a greater sum.

Not only do the words of the statute make the intention of congress manifest, but that intention is plainly repugnant to the former statute, which fixes the yearly salary of the chief justice at $3,000. It is impossible that both acts should stand. No ingenuity can reconcile them. The later act must therefore prevail, and the earlier act must, for the time covered by the appropriation acts above referred to, be considered as suspended. The result of these views is that the judgment of the court of claims, which gives the appellant a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum from June 30, 1877, to November 26, 1879, must be reversed, and the case remanded to the court of claims with directions to dismiss the petition.


text: Talk:United States v. Fisher (109 U.S. 143)/Opinion of the Court


text:
United States v. Mitchell (109 U.S. 146)

This was a suit by the appellee, Charles Mitchell, to recover a balance which he claimed to be due him as Indian interpreter at the Santee agency in the state of Nebraska, under section 2070, title 23, of the Revised Statutes. That section, and section 2076, which constitutes part of the same title, and also relates to the compensation of interpreters, are as follows:

Sec. 2070. 'The salaries of interpreters lawfully employed in the service of the United States in Oregon, Utah, and New Mexico, shall be five hundred dollars a year each, and of all so employed elsewhere, four hundred dollars a year each.'

Sec. 2076. 'The several compensations prescribed by this title shall be in full of all emoluments and allowances whatsoever.'

It appears from the findings of the court of claims that the appellee was an interpreter at the Santee Indian agency in the state of Nebraska, duly appointed under section 2068 of the Revised Statutes, and that he held the office and discharged its duties for several periods between July 1, 1878, and November 22, 1882, his whole term of service amounting to three years and seven months. During all this time, instead of the salary of $400 per annum, as provided in section 2070, he was paid only at the rate of $300 per annum, for which he gave a receipt in full for his services, congress having appropriated that sum only for his yearly compensation during his term of service. The appellee, contending that he was entitled to a salary at the rate of $400 per annum, brought this suit to recover the difference between his salary at that rate and the sum which he was actually paid. The court of claims, adopting the views of the appellee, rendered a judgment in his favor for $353.33, from which the United States appealed.

 * Asst. Atty. Gen. Simons and and J. S. Blair, for appellant.

''Geo. A. King'', for appellee.

WOODS, J.


text: Talk:United States v. Mitchell (109 U.S. 146)


text:
United States v. Mitchell (109 U.S. 146)/Opinion of the Court

It is contended on behalf of the United States that, by the appropriation acts which cover the period for which the appellee claims compensation, congress expressed its purpose to suspend the operation of section 2070 of the Revised Statutes, and to reduce for that period the salaries of the appellee and other interpreters of the same class from $400 to $300 per annum. We think this contention is well founded.

The law fixing the salaries of interpreters, as found in section 2070 of the Revised Statutes, was first passed in the Indian appropriation act of February 27, 1851, (9 St. 587.) That act appropriated a gross sum for the pay of interpreters authorized by the act of June 30, 1834, (4 St. 735,) and declared that the salaries of interpreters employed in certain named territories should be $500, and in all others $400 per annum. From the passage of that act down to the passage of the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1877, (19 St. 271,) the appropriations for the salaries of interpreters were made at those rates. The act last mentioned specifically appropriated for the pay of Indian interpreters the uniform sum of $300 each. This course of legislation was continued for five consecutive years, until the passage of the Indian appropriation act of May 17, 1882, (22 St. 68,) which appropriated the gross sum of $20,000 for the payment of necessary interpreters, to be distributed in the discretion of the secretary of the interior, and repealed section 2070 of the Revised Statutes. A like appropriation was made in the same terms by the Indian appropriation act of March 1, 1883, (22 St. 433.)

An examination of this legislation, especially of the Indian appropriation acts, beginning with that of March 3, 1877, down to and including the act of March 3, 1881, which are all similar in their provisions, will clearly reveal the purpose of congress. The act of March 3, 1877, opens with this provision: 'That the following sums be, and they are hereby, appropriated * *  * for the purpose of paying the current and contingent expenses of the Indian department and fulfilling treaty stipulations with the various tribes. * *  * ' Then follow the specific appropriations, and among them the following: 'For the pay of seventy-six interpreters, as follows: *  *  * Seven for the tribes in Nebraska, to be assigned to such agencies as the secretary of the interior may direct, at three hundred dollars per annum, two thousand one hundred dollars.' After the specific appropriation for salaries of interpreters the following clause appears: 'For additional pay of said interpreters, to be distributed in the discretion of the secretary of the interior, six thousand dollars.' All the subsequent Indian appropriation acts, down to and including the act of March 3, 1881, make in the same language the same appropriation for salaries of interpreters, and contain a similar clause for their additional compensation.

We find, therefore, this state of legislation: By the Revised Statutes the salaries of interpreters were fixed, some at $400 and some at $500 per annum, with a provision that such compensation should be in full of all emoluments and allowances whatsoever. By the acts in force during the appellee's term of service the appropriation for the annual pay of interpreters was $300 each, and a large sum was set apart for their additional compensation, to be distributed by the secretary of the interior at his discretion.

This course of legislation, which was persisted in for five years, distinctly reveals a change in the policy of congress on this subject, namely, that instead of establishing a salary for interpreters at a fixed amount, and cutting off all other emoluments and allowances, congress intended to reduce the salaries and place a fund at the disposal of the secretary of the interior, from which, at his discretion, additional emoluments and allowances might be given to the interpreters. The purpose of congress to suspend the law fixing the salaries of interpreters in Nebraska at $400 per annum, is just as clear as its purpose to suspend the section forbidding any further emoluments and allowances. Our opinion is, therefore, that the intention of congress to fix, by the appropriation acts to which we have called attention, the annual salaries of interpreters for the time covered by those acts at $300 each, is plain upon the face of the statute.

The whole question depends on the intention of congress as expressed in the statutes. Whether a simple failure by congress to appropriate any or a sufficient sum to pay the salary of an officer fixed by previous law is of itself an expression of purpose by congress to reduce the salary, we do not now decide. That is not this case. On the contrary, in this case congress has in other ways expressed its purpose to reduce for the time being the salaries of the interpreters.

This purpose is of course irreconcilable with the provisions of the Revised Statutes on the same subject, and those provisions must be considered as having been suspended until they were finally repealed by the act of May 17, 1882. As the appellee has been paid in full his salary as fixed by the later acts, which were in force before and during and continued in force after his term of service, he has no cause of action against the United States. It follows that the judgment of the court of claims in his favor must be reversed, and it is so ordered.


text: Talk:United States v. Mitchell (109 U.S. 146)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Hovey v. McDonald

[Syllabus from pages 150-151 intentionally omitted]

''Chas. W. Hornor and Geo. F. Edmunds'', for appellants.

Conway Robinson, for Riggs' Executor.

BRADLEY, J.

title: Hovey v. McDonald


text: Author talk:Alexander Robert Reinagle

title: Author talk:Alexander Robert Reinagle


text: Talk:Hovey v. McDonald

title: Talk:Hovey v. McDonald