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 the cemetery of Cannes. His residence there and the interest he took in the welfare of the place raised it from a mere fishing village to its present position. The inhabitants were not ungrateful. The hundredth anniversary of his birth was kept with many marks of respect, and the foundation of a statue to him was laid on 19 Dec. 1878.

Lord Brougham's brother (born 26 Sept. 1795) succeeded to the title as second baron. He was educated at Jesus College, Cambridge (B.A. 1819), was M.P. for Southwark 1831-5, and a master in chancery 1835-52. He died 3 Jan. 1886, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Henry Charles (Times, 5 Jan. 1886).

A bibliographical list, describing 133 of Brougham's literary productions, has been drawn up by Mr. Ralph Thomas, and will be found at the end of the eleventh volume of the second collected edition of his works. Only his larger and more important books will therefore be mentioned here. His critical, historical, and miscellaneous works were published under his own direction in a collected edition, 11 vols. 8vo, 1855-61, a second edition 1872-3. His chief productions, many of which are included in the collected editions, are:
 * 1) 'An Enquiry into the Colonial Policy of European Powers,' 2 vols. 1803.
 * 2) Practical Observations on the Education of the People,' edits. 1-20, 1825, at Boston, U.S., 1826, 'Praktische Bemerkungen,' Berlin, 1827.
 * 3) 'A Discourse on Natural Theology, with an edition of Paley's work, 1835, 1845.
 * 4) 'Select Cases decided by Lord Brougham in the Court of Chancery,' edited by C. P. Cooper, 1835.
 * 5) 'Speeches upon Questions relating to Public Rights,' 4 vols. 1838, 1845, with introductions which, though written in the third person, are really Brougham's own work (, Diary, i. 190).
 * 6) 'Historical Sketches of Statesmen … in the time of George III,' 1839, second series 1839, third series 1843, in 6 vols. 12mo, 1845, 'Esquisses Historiques … traduites … par U. Legeay,' Lyon, 1847.
 * 7) 'ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΥ,' 'Demosthenes upon the Crown, translated,' with notes, 1840, a most unfortunate production, was made the subject of a severe review in the 'Times,' 21 and 28 March, and 3 and 4 April, which was reprinted in a separate form, and on which see 'Gent. Mag., March 1841, p. 265.
 * 8) 'Political Philosophy,' and other essays published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 2 vols. 1842, 3 vols. no date; to the ill-success of this publication Lord Campbell ascribes the break-up of the society; for a contradiction of this statement see 'Notes and Queries,' 4th series, ix. 489.
 * 9) 'Albert Lunel; or, the Château of Languedoc,' 3 vols. 12mo. 1844, described by Brougham as a philosophical romance, written 'as a kind of monument to her I had lost' (his daughter, who is made the heroine); it was not published, and, after a few copies had been distributed, was suppressed by the author; it is not included in the 'bibliographical list,' but the authorship is now certain (, Letters to Forsyth, 69-71, 73, 80; Notes, and Queries, 4th series, vii. 277), it was reprinted and published, 3 vols. 8vo, 1872.
 * 10) 'Lives of Men of Letters and Science … in the time of George III,' 1845, second series 1846; some of these lives are translated into French.
 * 11) 'History of England and France under the House of Lancaster,' 1852 anon., 1861 with name.
 * 12) 'Contributions to the Edinburgh Review,' 3 vols. 1856, contains merely a selection from Brougham's numerous articles.
 * 13) 'Lord Brougham and Law Reform,' acts and bills introduced by him since 1811, edited by Sir J. E. Eardley Wilmot, 1860; contains forty statutes carried and fifty bills introduced, on which, however, see Campbell's 'Life,' 587.
 * 14) 'Tracts, Mathematical and Physical,' collected edition 1860. 15. 'Life and Times of Henry, Lord Brougham,' written by himself, 3 vols. posthumous, 1871.

[References to special passages in most of the authorities here named are given in the text. Brougham's Life and Times of Henry, Lord Brougham, 3 vols., must be read with caution, and its statements compared with other authorities; it is chiefly valuable for the letters it contains; for notices of some curious misstatements in these volumes, besides those mentioned in the above article, see the Times for 12 Jan. 1871, and Notes and Queries, 4th ser. vii. 277; Brougham's Speeches, 4 vols.; Brougham's Letters to W. Forsyth, privately printed; Lord Campbell's Life of Brougham, in Lives of the Chancellors, viii. 213-596, is to be read with due allowance for its spiteful tone—compare Lord St. Leonards on Some Misrepresentations in Lord Campbell's Lives; F. A. M. Mignet has an able summary of Brougham's Life and Work in his Nouveaux Éloges Historiques, 1877, 165-237; Nicholson and Burn's History of Cumberland and Westmorland, i. 395; Hutchinson's History of Westmorland, i. 301; Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, ed. L. Horner, 2 vols. 2nd edit.; Selections from the Correspondence of Macvey Napier; Lord Cockburn's Life of Lord Jeffrey, 2 vols.; Cockburn's Journal, 2 vols.; G. Peacock's Life of Dr. Young, p. 174; Lord Holland's Memoirs of the Whig Party, 2 vols.; Return of Members of Parliament; Parliamentary Debates, xvi.—3rd ser. cxlvii. passim; Jeremy Bentham's works contain a few notices, especially in the correspondence, x. and xi.; Sir G. C. Lewis's Administrations of Great Britain 1783-1830, pp. 344, 351; Autobiography of Miss E. Cornelia


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 Knight, 2 vols.; C. D. Yonge's Life and Administration of Robert, second Lord Liverpool, 3 vols.; Report of the Speeches at the Edinburgh dinner, 5 April 1825; A. G. Stapleton's Political Life of Canning, i. 296, 377-383, iii. 348; Roebuck's History of the Whig Ministry of 1830, 2 vols., was largely inspired by Brougham, and for that and other reasons must not be implicitly trusted; Papers of J. Wilson Croker, ed. Jenings, 3 vols.; Correspondence of Earl Grey and William IV, ed. Henry Earl Grey, 2 vols.; Lord Hatherton's Memoir and Correspondence relating to June and July 1834; the Greville Memoirs, ed, H. Reeve, 1st and 2nd ser.; W. M. Torrens's Memoir of Lord Melbourne, 2 vols.; Edinburgh Review, xlvi. 225, xlvii. 35, xlviii. 34, cxxv. 546, cxxix. 583, cxxxiv. 291; Quarterly Review, xlv. 281, cxxvi. 91; Times, 11 May 1868; Law Magazine and Law Review, August 1868, new series, l. 177; Horace Retournay's Lord Brougham et le centenaire. Of the many squibs written on Brougham the most famous is T. L. Peacock's description of him in Crotchet Castle, where he figures as 'the learned friend.']

BROUGHAM, JOHN (1814–1880), actor and dramatist, was born in Dublin on 9 May 1814, and, after having for some time attended Trinity College, began life as a student of surgery, and for several months walked the Peter Street Hospital; but an uncle from whom he had prospects falling into adversity, he was thrown upon his own resources, and thereupon went to London. A chance encounter with an old acquaintance led to his engagement at the Tottenham Street Theatre (a house long afterwards known as the Prince of Wales's), and there, in July 1830, acting six characters in the old play of 'Tom and Jerry,' he made his first appearance on the public stage. In 1831 he was a member of the company organised by Madame Vestris for the Olympic Theatre. His first play was written at this time, and was a burlesque, prepared for William Evans Burton, who was then acting at the Pavilion Theatre. When Madame Vestris removed from the Olympic to Covent Garden, Brougham followed her thither, and there remained as long as she and Charles Mathews were at the head of the theatre, and it was while there that he wrote 'London Assurance' in conjunction with Dion Boucicault. There has been much discussion about the authorship of this popular piece. Brougham stated in 1868 that he brought an action against Boucicault, whose legal adviser suggested the payment of half the purchase-money in preference to proceeding with the case. In 1840 he became manager of the Lyceum Theatre, which he conducted during summer seasons, and for which he wrote 'Life in the Clouds,' 'Love's Livery,' 'Enthusiasm,' 'Tom Thumb the Second,' and, in connection with Mark Lemon, 'The Demon Gift.'

Leaving England he arrived in America in October 1842, and opened at the Park Theatre, New York, as O'Callaghan in the farce 'His Last Legs.' A little later he was in the employment of W. E. Burton in New York, and wrote for him 'Bunsby's Wedding,' 'The Confidence Man,' 'Don Cæsar de Bassoon,' 'Vanity Fair,' and other pieces. Still later he managed Niblo's Garden, producing there his fairy tale called 'Home,' and the play of 'Ambrose Germain.' He opened a new theatre in Broadway, near the south-west corner of Broome Street, called Brougham's Lyceum, 15 Oct. 1850, and while there he wrote 'The World's Fair,' 'Faustus,' 'The Spirit of Air,' a dramatisation of 'David Copperfield,' and a new version of 'The Actress of Padua.' The Lyceum was at first a success, but the demolition of the building next to it made it appear to be unsafe, and the business gradually declined, leaving him burdened with debts, all of which, however, he subsequently paid. His next speculation was at the Bowery Theatre, of which he became lessee on 7 July 1856, and produced 'King John' with superb scenery and a fine company, but this not proving to be to the taste of his audiences, he wrote and brought out a series of sensational dramas, among which were 'The Pirates of the Mississippi,' 'Tom and Jerry in America,' and 'The Miller of New Jersey.' In September 1860 he returned to London, where he remained five years. While playing at the Lyceum he adapted from the French, for Charles A. Fechter, 'The Duke's Motto' and 'Bel Demonio,' and wrote for Miss Louisa Herbert dramatic versions of 'Lady Audley's Secret' and 'Only a Clod.' He also wrote the words of three operas, 'Blanche de Nevers,' 'The Demon Lovers,' and 'The Bride of Venice.' His reappearance in America took place on 10 Oct. 1865 at the Winter Garden Theatre, and he never afterwards left America. He opened Brougham's Theatre on 25 Jan. 1869, with a comedy by himself, called 'Better Late than Never,' but this theatre was taken out of his hands by James Fisk, junior, under circumstances which caused much sympathy on his behalf. On 4 April a banquet in his honour was given at the Astor House, and on 18 May he received a farewell benefit. The attempt to establish Brougham's Theatre was his final effort in management. After that time he was connected with various stock companies, but chiefly with Daly's Theatre and with Wallack's. In 1852 he edited a bright comic paper in New York, called 'The Lantern,' and he published two collections of his

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 and eventually rendered amputation necessary. The operation was performed by the eminent surgeon Listen, but terminated fatally on the tenth day. The circumstances are related in fuller detail in 'Gent. Mag.' N.S. viii. 432. Broughton's death occurred at Regent's Park barracks on 20 Aug. 1837. He was interred at Kensal Green cemetery.

 BROUGHTON, THOMAS (1704–1774), divine, biographer, and miscellaneous writer, born in London on 5 July 1704, was the son of the rector of St. Andrew's, Holborn. He was educated at Eton, and, being superannuated on that foundation, went about 1772 to Cambridge, where 'for the sake of a scholarship he entered himself of Gonville and Caius College.' In 1727, after taking B.A., he was admitted to deacon's orders, and in 1728 he was ordained priest, and proceeded to the M.A. He served for several years as curate of Offley, Hertfordshire, and in 1739 became rector of Stepington, Huntingdonshire; the patron, the Duke of Bedford, also appointing him one of his chaplains. As reader to the Temple, to which he was chosen soon afterwards, he won the favour of the master, Bishop Sherlock, who in 1744 presented him to the vicarage of Bedminster, near Bristol, with the chapels of St. Mary Redcliffe, St. Thomas, and Abbot's Leigh annexed. To the same influence he owed a prebend in Salisbury Cathedral, and on receiving this he removed from London to Bristol, where he died on 21 Dec. 1774. He was an industrious writer in many kinds of composition. He published (1742) an 'Historical Dictionary of all Religions from the Creation of the World to the Present Times,' a huge work in two volumes folio; he translated Voltaire's 'Temple of Taste,' and part of Bayle's 'Dictionary;' vindicated orthodox Christianity against Tindal; converted a Roman catholic book ('Dorrel on the Epistles and Gospels') to protestant uses; edited Dryden; wrote in defence of the immortality of the soul; and contributed the lives marked 'T' in the original edition of the 'Biographia Britannica.' Hawkins, in his 'Life of Johnson,' credits Broughton with being the real translator of Jarvis's 'Don Quixote.' 'The fact is that Jarvis laboured at it many years, but could make but little progress, for being a painter by profession, he had not been accustomed to write, and had no style. Mr. Tonson, the bookseller, seeing this, suggested the thought of employing Mr. Broughton. . . who sat himself down to study the Spanish language, and in a few months acquired, as was pretended, sufficient knowledge thereof to give to the world a translation of "Don Quixote" in the true spirit of the original, and to which is prefixed the name of Jarvis.' Broughton was a lover of music, and acquainted with Handel, whom he furnished with words for some of his compositions, including the drama of 'Hercules,' first given at the Haymarket in 1745. In private life he was of a mild and amiable disposition, but in controversy, though not discourteous according to the standard of his time, he was very economical in his concessions to his opponents, and he has been characterised in some respects as a weak and credulous writer.

 BROUGHTON, THOMAS (1712–1777), divine, the son of Thomas Broughton, who is said to have been at one time commissioner of excise at Edinburgh, was born at Oxford. When he matriculated at University College, Oxford, on 13 Dec. 1731, his father was described as of 'Carfax in Oxford.' He was elected Petreian fellow at Exeter College 30 June 1733, and became full fellow on 14 July 1734, taking his degree of B.A. on 22 March 1737. Soon after becoming an undergraduate he joined the little band of young men who were known as 'Methodists,' and remained a sympathiser with the Wesleys for several years, until differences of opinion on the Moravian doctrines led to their separation. Broughton's first clerical duty was at Cowley, near Uxbridge, and he was curate at the Tower of London in 1736. Through Whitefield's influence he obtained the lectureship at St. Helen's, Bishopsgate Within, but as some of the parishioners objected to Whitefield's preaching from its pulpit he withdrew from the post. He visited the prisoners in Newgate and was indefatigable in doing good. In 1741 he was appointed lecturer at Allhallows, Lombard Street, and two years later was elected secretary to the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, a position which he retained until his death. His only other preferment was the living of Wotton in Surrey, which he held from 1752 to 1777. He died at the society's house in Hatton Garden, London, 21 Dec. 1777. He held his fellowship at Exeter College until July 1741. In 1742 he married Miss Capel, by whom he had fifteen children, five of them dying young.


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86 CHAPTER VIII.

SEPARATION AND REUNION.

day at last came for our march of five hundred miles to terminate. A rickety old ferryboat that took us over the river made a halt near Fort Rice, and there we established ourselves. Strange to say, the river was no narrower there than it was so many hundred miles below, where we started. Muddy and full of sand-bars as it was, we began bravely to drink the water, when the glass had been filled long enough for the sediment partially to settle, and to take our bath in what at first seemed liquid mud. We learned after a time to settle the water with alum, and we finally became accustomed to the taste.

The commandant at Fort Rice was most hospitable, and his wife charming. The quarters were very ordinary frame buildings, with no modern improvements. They were painted a funereal tint, but one warranted to last. The interior showed the presence of a tasteful woman. She met us as cheerfully as if she were in the luxurious home from which we knew she had gone as a girl to follow a soldier's life. Contrast often helps us to endure, and Dakota was not so bad as their last station in Arizona. The dinner was excellent, and our entertainers were the happy possessors of a good cook.

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 A portrait of Broughton hangs in the board-room of the S. P. C. K. Two very outspoken sermons of his attained great popularity: 'The Christian Soldier, or the Duties of a Religious Life recommended to the Army,' which was preached in 1737, printed in 1738, and reached its twelfth edition in 1818, a Welsh translation having appeared in 1797; and 'A Serious and Affectionate Warning to Servants,' occasioned by the brutal murder of a mistress by her male servant aged only 19, and issued in 1746, ninth edition 1818.

BROUGHTON, THOMAS DUER (1778–1835), writer on India, was son of the Rev. Thomas Broughton, rector of St. Peter's, Bristol. He was educated at Eton, and went to India in 1795 as a cadet on the Bengal establishment. He was actively engaged at the siege of Seringapatam in 1799, and was afterwards appointed commandant of the cadet corps, and in 1802 military resident with the Mahrattas. For a short time previous to the restoration of Java to the Dutch he held the command of that island. He became a lieutenant on the Madras establishment in 1797, and, passing through the intermediate grades, became colonel in 1829. His death took place in Dorset Square, London, on 16 Nov. 1835. He published:
 * 1) 'Edward and Laura,' a novel, freely translated from the French.
 * 2) 'Letters written in a Mahratta Camp during the year 1809, descriptive of the character, manners, domestic habits, and religious ceremonies of the Mahrattas,' London, 1813, 4to.
 * 3) 'Selections from the Popular Poetry of the Hindoos,' London, 1814, 8vo.

 BROUGHTON, WILLIAM GRANT, D.D. (1788–1853), metropolitan of Australasia, was the eldest son of Grant Broughton, by His wife Phoebe Ann, daughter of John Rumball of Barnet, Hertfordshire. He was born in Bridge Street, Westminster, on 22 May 1788, and educated at Barnet grammar school, but was removed in January 1797 to the King's School, Canterbury, where in the following December he was admitted to a King's scholarship. From 1807 to 1812 he was clerk in the East India House. At last being able to follow the bent of his own inclinations, he became a resident member of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, in October 1814, was sixth wrangler and B. A. in January 1818, proceeded M.A. in 1823, and B.D. and D.D. per saltum in 1836. He was ordained deacon in 1818 and admitted to priest's orders during the same year. The curacy to which he was ordained was that of Hartley Wespall, Hampshire, where he remained from 1818 to 1827. While here he published in 1823 'An Examination of the Hypothesis advanced in a Recent Publication entitled "Palæoromaica," by J. Black, that the text of the Elzevir Greek Testament is not a Translation from the Latin.' This work was dedicated by Broughton to his diocesan, Bishop Tomline, who in 1827 removed him to the curacy of Farnham. The vicinity of his first curacy to Strathfieldsaye led to his introduction to the Duke of Wellington, by whom he was appointed to the chaplaincy of the Tower of London on 6 Oct. 1828.

Subsequently, on 7 Dec. 1828, at the express desire of his grace, he was induced to accept the arduous office of archdeacon of New South Wales. He arrived in Sydney on 13 Sept. 1829. His jurisdiction extended over the whole of Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and the adjoining islands. He visited all the settlements in these latitudes connected with his archdeaconry, and endeavoured to excite the settlers and the government to the erection of churches and schools; but by 1834 he had come to the conclusion that the only way to succeed was to appeal to the mother country for the urgently needed assistance. In answer to his application to the Societies for Promoting Christian Knowledge and for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and to private individuals, a sum of about 13,000l. was placed at his disposal, and the number of clergy was forthwith doubled. Arrangements were also made for establishing a bishopric, and on 14 Feb. 1836 Archdeacon Broughton was consecrated bishop of Australia in the chapel of Lambeth Palace. On his return to Australia on 2 June he found himself involved in controversy respecting the education of the people, and his efforts were to a great extent successful in insuring a church education for the children belonging to the church establishment. It was not long before he visited, for the purposes of confirmation and ordination, New Zealand, Van Diemen's Land, Norfolk Island, and Port Phillip (since known as Victoria), as well as the settlements in New South Wales. Interesting accounts of his missionary tours are to be found in the second and third volumes of 'The Church in the Colonies' published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. On 16 March 1837 the corner-stone of St. Andrew's Cathedral, Sydney, was laid by Sir Richard Bourke, K.C.B., the governor. The subdivision of the


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 kept the dead petals to remind them both of the lesson it had

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 Brocklesby Heptinstall, his printer, and William Turner, schoolmaster of Stamford.

 BROCKLESBY, RICHARD (1722–1797), physician, was born at Minehead in Somersetshire, and was the only son of Richard Brocklesby of Cork. His mother was Mary Alloway of Minehead, and both families belonged to the Society of Friends. On 29 March 1734 Brocklesby entered the school of Abraham Shackleton, at Ballitore, co. Kildare, so that he was one of the senior boys when Burke went there in May 1741. They were contemporaries at school for less than a year, but this early acquaintance was continued when both came to live in London, and they were friendly throughout life. After some studies at Edinburgh, in 1742 Brocklesby went to Leyden and graduated M.D. there on 28 June 1745. His graduation thesis on this occasion (Dissertatio Medico, inauguralis de Saliva sana et morbosa, 4to, Leyden, 1745) seems to have been suggested by a case which he had seen at Edinburgh, in which the administration of five grains of mercury was followed by the secretion of one hundred pounds of saliva. He describes clearly the expectoration of pneumonia and that of hydrophobia, and throughout the essay shows extensive reading and a power of lively expression. He attacks Pitcairn and the intromechanicians in general, and speaks with gratitude of his own teacher Gaubius. During the next twelve months Brocklesby settled in London, and in 1751 became a licentiate of the College of Physicians. In 1754 he received a degree from the university of Dublin, and was incorporated M.D. at Cambridge in the same year. His election as a fellow of the College of Physicians followed in 1756 (, Coll. of Phys. ii. 202). In 1758 he was appointed physician to the army, and served in Germany. In 1763 he settled in Norfolk Street, Strand, where he soon obtained a large practice. He enjoyed the friendship of Burke and of Johnson, and showed that he deserved to be loved by both. In a kind letter to Burke on 2 July 1788 (Burke Correspondence, 1844, iii. 78), Brocklesby makes him a present of 1,000l., and says that he would be happy to repeat the gift 'every year until your merit is rewarded as it ought to be at court.' Brocklesby attended Dr. Johnson on many occasions, and in his last illness (, Johnson, ii. 481). Boswell describes a dinner at Brocklesby's (ii. 489), at which Johnson was present with Valiancy, the antiquarian, Murphy, and Mr. Devaynes, the king's apothecary, on 15 May 1784. In June 1784, when Johnson's going to Italy was discussed, Boswell (ii. 527) records another instance of Brocklesby's generosity: 'As an instance of extraordinary liberality of friendship, he told us that Dr. Brocklesby had upon this occasion offered him a hundred a year for his life. A grateful tear started into his eye as he spoke this in a faltering tone.' Many instances of this physician's kindness to less distinguished persons are recorded (Burke Correspondence, 21 July 1777 ;, Coll. of Phys. ii. 203). The early distinction of Dr. Thomas Young was largely due to the kindness with which Brocklesby, who was his great-uncle, encouraged his studies (Memoir of Thomas Young, London, 1831), and Young dedicated his inaugural dissertation for M.D. to him. Brocklesby's first publication after he settled in London was 'An Essay concerning the Mortality among Horned Cattle,' 8vo, 1746. The chief new suggestion contained in it is that the infected bodies should be properly buried in deep graves. In 1749 he published 'Reflections on Antient and Modern Music, with the application to the cure of diseases, to which is subjoined an essay to solve the question wherein consisted the difference of antient music from that of modern times.' The author's name does not appear upon the title-page. The essay contains much learning and many interesting remarks. It was probably suggested by a story the author had heard in Edinburgh of a gentleman who had been engaged for the Pretender in 1715, had been himself wounded, and had lost two sons in the battle of Dunblane. He fell into a nervous fever from melancholy, and no treatment did him good till his physician caused a harper to play to him day after day, when he revived, and at last regained his health. Brocklesby seriously recommends the more regular use of music as a means of treatment. In 1760 he delivered the Harveian oration at the College of Physicians, and it was printed in quarto. Its most memorable passage is a fine panegyric upon the Dr. Hodges the account of whose death in poverty after he had stayed in attendance on the sick throughout the plague brought tears to the eyes of Dr. Johnson. In 1764 Brocklesby published his most important work, 'Œconomical and Medical


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 sight of the flower seemed to make her get stronger, and by the time it had faded she was able to go out again and sit in her own little arbour.

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 immense diocese of Australia took place in 1847. At the same time Sydney was made a metropolitical see, and the Bishop of Australia thenceforth bore the title of Bishop of Sydney and Metropolitan of Australasia. On 9 March 1843 the Rev. John Bede Polding arrived in Sydney bearing an appointment from the pope with the title of Archbishop of Sydney. Broughton thought it his duty to make a public and solemn protest against the assumption of this title. Desiring once more to confer with the church at home on the state of the churches in the colonies, he, after a most trying voyage in a fever ship, arrived in England on 20 Nov. 1852. The fatigues and anxieties of that voyage, however, weakened his constitution, and he succumbed to an attack of bronchitis while staying at 11 Chester Street, Belgrave Square, London, the residence of Lady Gipps, the relict of his old friend and schoolfellow and a late governor of New South Wales, on 20 Feb. 1853, and was buried in the south aisle of Canterbury Cathedral on 26 Feb. He had married in the same cathedral, on 13 July 1818, Sarah, eldest daughter of the Rev. John Francis, rector of St. Mildred's, Canterbury; she died at Sydney on 16 Sept. 1849. Broughton was warmly attached to the principles of the English reformation and to the doctrines contained in the liturgy and articles of the church of England. A residence of twenty-five years in the Antipodes had withdrawn him from observation at home; but from time to time came tidings of his noble labours and exemplary fulfilment of the lofty functions of a Christian bishop. Some of his publications were:
 * 1) 'A Letter to a Friend touching the question, who was the Author of "Εἰκὼν Βασιλική" ascribing it to J. Gauden, Bishop of Worcester,' 1826.
 * 2) 'Additional Reasons in Confirmation of the Opinion that Dr. Gauden was the Author,' 1829.
 * 3) 'A Letter to H. Osborn on the Propriety and Necessity of Collecting at the Offertory,' 1848.
 * 4) 'A Letter to N. Wiseman by the Bishop of Sydney, together with the Bishop's Protest, 25 March 1843, against the assumptions of the Church of Rome,' 1852. Other works comprised printed charges, sermons, and speeches.

 BROUGHTON, WILLIAM ROBERT (1762–1821), captain in the royal navy, after serving as a midshipman on the coast of North America and in the East Indies, and as lieutenant in the Burford, in the several engagements between Hughes and Suffren, was in 1790 appointed to command the Chatham brig, to accompany Vancouver in his voyage of discovery. He was for some time employed on the survey of the Columbia river and the coasts adjacent. In 1793, he travelled to Vera Cruz, overland from San Blas, on his way to England with despatches. On his arrival in this country he was made commander, 3 Oct., of the Providence, a small vessel of 400 tons burden, and was again sent out to the north-west coast of North America. On arriving on the station he found Vancouver gone ; and crossing over to the other side, he commenced, and during the next four years carried out, a close survey of the coast of Asia, from lat. 52° N. to 35° N., in encouragement of which important work he was advanced to post rank on 28 Jan. 1797. On 16 May 1797 the Providence struck on a coral reef near the coast of Formosa, and was totally lost. The men, however, were all saved and taken to Macao in the tender, in which Broughton afterwards continued the survey till May 1798, when he was discharged at Trincomalee for a passage to England, where he arrived in the following February. The history of this voyage and the geographical results he published in 1804, under the title, which is itself a summary of the work of the expedition, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, in which the coast of Asia from the latitude of 35° N. to the latitude of 52° N., the island of Insu (commonly known under the name of the land of Jesso), the north, south, and east coasts of Japan, the Lieuxchieux and the adjacent isles, as well as the coast of Corea, have been examined and surveyed, performed in H.M. sloop Providence and her tender in the years 1795-6-7-8.' The original journals from which this work was elaborated, as well as that of the journey from San Blas to Vera Cruz, are now in the library of the Royal United Service Institution, and contain many interesting personal notices. After holding some other commands Broughton, in 1809, commanded the Illustrious in the expedition under Lord Gambier, and at the court-martial gave evidence which, so far as it went, implied a general agreement with the charges made by Lord Cochrane [see ]. In 1810, still in the Illustrious, he went out to the East Indies, and was present at the reduction of the Mauritius in December [see ]. In the following spring he had charge of the expedition against Java, which assembled at Malacca and sailed thence on 11 June. The passage was long


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 and repeated it's story, which greatly interested her.

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 next day Gertie cut the wonderful blossom from the Sunflower and took it away with her doll to Alice, and put it in a vase with some water She stood it beside her

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 made her quite happy when she promised to go again, and take her one of her dolls and some books to read.

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 face brightened when she saw Gertie, for the poor child felt very lonely with no little friends to come and see her, and sometimes she was rather discontented too.

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 Lausanne, then at Stuttgart, devoted his entire energies to preparing for publication the copious materials at his disposal. His sole recreation was an hour's music with his family in the evenings ; for he played the violin well, and was as an ardent admirer of Beethoven. His insufficient private resources were meantime supplemented by a small pension from the Rajah of Travancore, in whose service he had been a loser in point of interest upon sums advanced for scientific purposes. In 1873 he came to live in London, where in the year following he issued a quarto volume entitled 'Observations of Magnetic Declination made at Trevandrum and Agustia Malley in the Observatories of his Highness the Maharajah of Travancore in the years 1852 to 1869.' It contains an exhaustive and highly valuable discussion of the various modes of solar and lunar action on magnetic declination, of which element alone upwards of 300,000 reduced observations were available from the thirteen years of his administration. The publication, however, went no further, and Broun had the mortification of seeing his life's work left incomplete, and the fruits of his anxious toils lying, for the most part, useless. He had never been a prosperous, and he was henceforth a disappointed man. A devoted adherent of the Free church of Scotland, his scruples about subscription had debarred him from professional employment in his native country, and his deafness hindered his promotion in the branch he had made peculiarly his own. He did not, however, sink into inaction. Aided by a grant from the Royal Society, he undertook to complete the reduction of the magnetic observations made at the various colonial stations. The task was one of vast and undefined extent, and his sense of responsibility for quarterly payments added anxiety to his labour. His health began to give way, and in 1878 he had a nervous attack, from which he never satisfactorily recovered. A trip to Switzerland produced a partial rally, but on 22 Nov. 1879 he died suddenly, at the age of sixty-two.

His character was a peculiarly estimable one. He united amiability and social charm with rigid integrity and a sensitiveness of conscience ill fitted to advance his material interests. His scientific merits did not receive the cordial recognition they deserved. He took a prominent part in ascertaining the laws of terrestrial magnetism. The discovery is entirely due to him that the earth loses or gains magnetic intensity as a whole in other words, that the changes in the daily mean horizontal force are nearly the same all over the globe. This conclusion, arrived at through a laborious investigation, was first published in a letter to Sir David Brewster, written from Trevandrum on 21 Dec. 1857 (Phil. Mag. xvi. 81, August 1858). In the same communication the existence of a magnetic period of twenty-six days, attributed to the sun's rotation, was announced, and the evidence on both points was detailed in a paper read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh on 4 Feb. 1861 (Trans. R. Soc. Ed. xxii. pt. iii. 511). Independently of, though subsequently to Kreil, Broun deduced from the Makerstoun observations the fact of a lunar-diurnal influence on the declination-needle (Report Brit. Assoc. 1846, ii. 32), a prolonged study of which showed him that it varied in character with the position of the sun (Proc. R. Soc. x. 484, xvi. 59), and in. amount inversely as the cube of the distance of the moon (Trans. R. Soc. Ed. xxvi. 750). He early defined the annual period of magnetic intensity as consisting of a maximum near each solstice, with minima at the equinoxes (Report Brit. Assoc. 1845, ii. 15) ; gave the first complete account of the daily variations of the needle at the magnetic equator (ib. 1860, ii. 21), and reached, in the course of these discussions, the remarkable conclusion that great magnetic disturbances proceed from particular solar meridians.

His researches contributed largely to establish meteorology on a scientific basis. He discovered the 26-day period of atmospheric pressure, showed the wide range of simultaneous barometrical fluctuations, initiated the systematic study of variously elevated cloud-strata, and indicated the connection between atmospheric movements and isobaric lines (Proc. R. Soc. xxv. 515). But he lacked the power of placing his ideas in a striking light, and the independence of his character did not permit him to purchase applause for himself by flattering the opinions of others. The Royal Society admitted him as a member in 1853, and awarded him a royal medal in 1878. His communications to the Royal Society of Edinburgh were honoured with the Keith prize in 1861.

The Royal Society's 'Catalogue of Scientific Papers' enumerates (vols. i. and vii.) fifty-one of his productions, besides which he contributed to the 'Philosophical Transactions' a paper 'On the Variations of the Daily Mean Horizontal Force of the Earth's Magnetism produced by the Sun's Rotation, and the Moon's Synodical and Tropical Eevolutions' (clxvi. 387, 1876) ; to the 'Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh' an elaborate treatise 'On the Decennial Period in the Range and Disturbance of the Diurnal Oscillations of the Magnetic Needle,


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 as she had not been there for two or three days Gertie went to see her, and found her too ill to go out. Gertie thought of what the Sunflower had said, and did all she could to please Alice. "How wicked I have been!" she said to herself.

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 flowers in the garden.

when she was strong enough, she used to walk past Gertie's to look at the flowers, especially the wonderful Sunflower.

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 was a great friend of Gertie's. She was a very delicate child, and the cottage where she lived had no nice

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Rh Rarely do army people have two good servants at the same time on the frontier. Our host and hostess made no apologies, but quietly waited on the table themselves, and a merry time we had over the blunders of the head of the house, who was a distinguished general, in his endeavors to find necessary dishes in the china closet.

A steamer that arrived a day or two after we had reached Fort Rice brought the regimental property, consisting of everything that was not used on the march. Our household effects and trunks were delivered to us in a very sorry condition. They had been carelessly stored on the wharf at Yankton, near the government warehouse, without any covering, during all the storms that drenched us coming up the river. Almost everything was mildewed and ruined. We tried to dry our clothing in the sun. Many a little bit of silken finery that we had cherished since our marriage days, feeling sure that we should never attain to such grandeur again, was suspended from the tent-ropes, stained and dull. Our sister's husband helped her to unpack her clothes and his own soaked uniform. He was dignified and reserved by nature, but on that occasion the barriers were broken. I heard him ask Margaret to excuse him while he went outside the tent to make some remarks to himself that he felt the occasion demanded. There were furious people on all sides, and savage speeches about the thoughtlessness of those who had left our property exposed to snow and rain, when we were no longer there to care for it. I endured everything until my pretty wedding-dress was taken out, crushed and spotted

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 blossom.

felt very much ashamed of myself, and made up my mind not to be discontented again, and in a few days I found everybody noticing me instead of passing me by.

that is just what you must do, continued the blossom, "and you will soon find that people will love instead of disliking you."

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 garden with the beautiful warm sun shining on you, making you look so lovely. How would you like to be put down on the ground to grow like a daisy, or be as I was, where you could hardly feel the sun, and where you had no companions to talk to, and stood the chance of being trodden on and having all your petals crushed? You are not in danger of anything, and, by-and-by, think what a pleasure you will be to everyone when you get into full

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 and in the Sunspot Area,' assigning as the length of that period 10.45 years (xxvii. 563, 1876), with a 'Note on the Bifilar Magnetometer' (xxviiii. 41). He wrote frequently in 'Nature.' His 'Reports' on the Makerstoun and Travancore observatories were published respectively at Edinburgh in 1850, and at Trevandrum in 1857. He exhibited at the Loan Exhibition of Scientific Instruments in 1876 a 'gravimeter' of his own invention, described by Major J. Herschel in 'Proceedings of the Royal Society,' xxxii. 507.

 BROUN, RICHARD (1801–1858), miscellaneous writer, was the eldest son of Sir James Broun of Coalston Park, Lochmaben, Dumfriesshire, who resumed the baronetcy in 1826 ('s Peerage, Baronetage, &c., title 'Broun.' Doubts have been thrown on the correctness of parts of this pedigree, see British American Association and Nova Scotia Baronets, Edinburgh, 1846, and Notes and Queries, various notes under title 'Broun' in 3rd and 5th series). He was born at Lochmaben 22 April 1801, and succeeded to the title on the death of his father 30 Nov. 1844. Before 1834 he was resident in London, and there, till his death at Sphinx Lodge, Chelsea, 10 Dec. 1858, he was busily engaged in the projection of a number of schemes, most of them of a somewhat fantastic nature, and in the compilation of various pamphlets, articles, and letters regarding them. He describes himself in 1856 as 'The Honourable Sir Richard Broun, Knight, and (eighth baronet) of Scotland and Nova Scotia, feudal baron of Colstoun, Haddingtonshire, and chief of his race in North Britain; author of various works on heraldry, agriculture, colonisation, sanitation, &c.' His chief schemes were a plan for a 'line of direct elemental intercourse between Europe and Asia by route of the British North American possessions, and the systematic colonisation of the vacant crown territories over which it will pass' (1833); a plan for an 'Anglo-Canadian Company, which should outrival in the west the East India Company' (British and American Intercourse, London, 1852); attempts to revive certain supposed privileges of the baronets, in connection with which he was from 1835 honorary secretary of the Committee of the Baronetage for Privileges, and wrote the following works: 'Dignity, Precedence, &c., of the Honourable the Baronettesses of the Realm' (1839); and 'The Baronetage' for 1841, 1842, 1843, and 1844. He was also engaged in an effort to revive the 'illustrious and sovereign order of Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem and of the Venerable Langue of England,' and he held various offices in the reconstituted 'langue' (synoptical sketch of the order, London, 1856). He rendered, however, real service by his projection in 1849 of 'The London Necropolis and National Mausoleum at Woking.' In connection with this scheme and with the general question of extramural interments he wrote 'Extramural Burial,' 1850; 'Extramural Sepulture,' 1850; 'Extramural Sepulture, Synopsis of the London Necropolis,' 1851; 'Extramural Interment and the Metropolitan Sanitary Association,' 1852; 'Metropolitan Interments,' 1852; 'Metropolitan Extramural Interments, Memorial to the Lord Mayor,' &c., 1852; 'Statement as to Progress of Necropolis Undertaking,' 1853; various Letters on the Necropolis Undertaking, 1853-5.

 BROUNCKER or BROUNKER, WILLIAM, second, of Castle Lyons, in the Irish peerage (1620?–1684), first president of the Royal Society, was born about 1620. His father, Sir William Brouncker (born in 1585), was commissary-general of the musters in the expedition against the Scots in 1639; was afterwards one of the privy chamber to Charles I, and vice-chamberlain to Prince Charles; was created doctor of civil law at Oxford on 1 Nov. 1642; was made Viscount Brouncker, of Castle Lyons, in the Irish peerage, 12 Sept. 1645; died at Wadham College, Oxford, in November 1646, and was buried on 20 Nov. in Christ Church Cathedral. Pepys says that he gave 1,200l. to be made an Irish lord, and swore the same day that he had not 12d. left to pay for his dinner. Brouncker's mother was Winifred, daughter of William Leigh of Newenham, Warwickshire, who died on 20 July 1649, and was buried by her husband. An elaborate monument was afterwards erected above their grave. Brouncker's grandfather was Sir Henry Brouncker, president of Munster, who died on 3 June 1607, and was buried at St. Mary's, Cork, having married Anne, daughter of Parker, lord Morley. The family is traced back to a Henry Brouncker, at one time M.P. for Devizes, and the purchaser of the estate of Melksham, Wiltshire, in 1544. A younger branch changed the family name to Brancker [see ]. The original


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 branch is also known as Bronkard, Brounkard, and Brunkard.

Young Brouncker studied mathematics in his youth at Oxford, and became proficient in many languages. On 23 Feb. 1646-7 he was created doctor of medicine at Oxford. In April 1660 he subscribed the declaration acknowledging General Monk the restorer of the laws and privileges of the nation.

Brouncker chiefly employed himself during the Commonwealth in literary work. In 1653 he published, under the pseudonym of 'A Person of Honour,' a translation of Descartes's 'Musical Compendium,' with criticisms of his own (cf. Diary, 25 Dec. 1668). He prepared a new division of the 'diapason by sixteen mean proportionals into seventeen equal semitones, the method of which is exhibited by him in an algebraical process, and also in logarithms' (, History of Music, iv. 181). Descartes declined to accept this scheme. In 1657 and 1658 Brouncker was corresponding on mathematical topics with Dr. John Wallis, who printed the letters in 1658 in 'Commercium Epistolicum.' Brouncker made two mathematical discoveries of importance. He was the first to introduce continued fractions, and to give a series for the quadrature of a portion of the equilateral hyperbola.

After the Restoration Brouncker took part in the meetings of scientific students in London out of which sprang the Royal Society. The association was incorporated under royal charter, first on 15 July 1662, and again on 15 April 1663. From the date of the society's first incorporation till 30 Nov. 1677, when he resigned, and was succeeded by Sir Joseph Williamson, Brouncker held the office of president, to which he was elected annually. John Evelyn, the diarist, was his intimate friend, and the two often discussed scientific questions with Charles II. In August 1662 Brouncker built a yacht for the king, 'which Mr. Pitt,' says Pepys, 'cries up mightily ' (Diary, 14 Aug. and 3 Sept. 1662). He was president of Gresham College from 1664 to 1667. Brouncker, Boyle, and Sir R. Murray, Evelyn writes, 'were the persons to whom the world stands obliged for the promoting of that generous and real knowledge which gave the ferment that has ever since obtained and surmounted all those many discouragements which it at first encountered' (Evelyn to Mr. Wotton, 30 March 1696, in Diary, edited by Bray and Wheatley, iii. 481).

Brouncker was appointed chancellor of Queen Catherine on 18 April 1662, and was commissioner for executing the office of lord high admiral from 12 Nov. 1664 (, Relation, and Savile Correspondence, Camd. Soc. p. 256). Pepys has much to say of him in this office, and appears to have lived on terms of great intimacy with him. In 1681 Brouncker became, after much litigation with Sir Robert Atkyns, master of St. Catherine's Hospital, near the Tower of London. He died at his house, in St. James's Street, Westminster, on 5 April 1684, and was buried nine days later in the chapel of St. Catherine's Hospital.

Brouncker was the author of the following scientific papers: 'Experiments of the Recoiling of Forces' (, History of the Royal Society, 233 et seq.); 'An Algebraical Paper upon the Squaring of the Hyperbola,' and 'On the Proportion of a Curved Line of a Paraboloid to a Straight Line, and of the Finding a Straight Line equal to that of a Cycloid' (Philosophical Transactions, iii. 645, viii. 649).

A series of letters from Brouncker to Archbishop Ussher are printed at the close of Parr's 'Life of Ussher.' Sir Peter Lely painted Brouncker's portrait, which is still in the possession of the Royal Society.

Brouncker was succeeded in the peerage by his brother, cofferer to Charles II, and gentleman of the bedchamber to the Duke of York, who was created doctor of medicine at Oxford on 23 June 1646, took part in the siege of Colchester in 1648, was one of the commissioners of trade and plantations in 1671, and died on 4 Jan. 1687-8. He lived at Sheen Abbey, and was buried at Richmond, Surrey. Evelyn says of him that he 'was ever noted for a hard, covetous, vicious man; but for his worldly craft and skill in gaming few exceeded him.' Pepys's friend, Captain Cocke, described him as 'one of the shrewdest fellows for parts in England, and a dangerous man' (Diary, 17 Feb. 1667-8). It is certain that he pandered to all the Duke of York's vices. He presumed so much on his intimacy with the duke that in August 1667 he was dismissed the court, to the delight (according to Pepys) of all honest men. The Comte de Grammont describes him in his 'Mémoires' (chap, xii.) as 'le premier joueur d'échecs du royaume.' He married Rebecca Rodway, widow of Thomas Jermyn, brother to the Earl of St. Albans. With his death the title became extinct.


text: Talk:The Velveteen Rabbit

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I. Of the difference between pure and empirical knowledge.
all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight,—whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

But the expression, “a priori,” is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which


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 has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, “he might know a priori that it would have fallen;” that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of experience.

By the term “knowledge a priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition a priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

II. The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in possession of certain cognitions a priori.
question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judgment a priori; if, moreover, it is not derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a priori. Secondly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is,—so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgment carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception,


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 it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori.

Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, “All bodies are heavy.” When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgment, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition a priori. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgment, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgment is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible.

Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, “every change must have a cause,” will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes; and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgment being therefore merely subjective. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing a priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence a priori. For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use


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 of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure a priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity.

Not only in judgments, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori.

III. Philosophy stands in need of a science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge a priori
far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgments beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of Reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that even at the risk of error, we persist in following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pursuit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are (of


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 Briton was then canon of St. Paul's, was one of those denounced; and at the king's instance he was arrested by the mayor of London and committed to the Tower. The dean and chapter of St. Paul's, in the absence of the bishop of London, immediately pronounced a general excommunication against all who had any share in this outrage upon a member of their body, and placed the cathedral under an interdict. The bishop of London supported the action of the chapter, and, finding the king unmoved by his remonstrances, threatened to extend the interdict to the whole of the city The legate, the archbishop of Canterbury, and several other prelates added entreaties and menaces, and the king was- obliged to yield. He at first struggled to obtain from the chapter an undertaking that the prisoner, if released, should be ready to appear when called upon to answer the charge made against him; but they refused to entertain the demand, and Ranulph was set unconditionally at liberty. Shortly afterwards the informer confessed the falsity of the accusations which he had made, and was brought to the scaffold. Although admitting Ranulph's innocence of the crime of treason, Matthew Paris intimates that he had amassed a large fortune by various acts of extortion, the canons of Missenden being particularly mentioned as having suffered from his rapacity. He died suddenly in 1246, having been seized with apoplexy while watching a game of dice.

The name of Ranulph Brito has been erroneously inserted by Dugdale and others in the list of chancellors. This mistake arose from the word consiliarius, used by Matthew Paris, having been printed in Wats's edition as cancellarius.

 BRITON or BRETON, WILLIAM (d. 1356), theologian, is described as a Franciscan by all the literary biographers (, Comm. de Script. Brit. p. 356, &c.); according, however, to H. O. Coxe (Catal. Codd. MSS. in Coll. Aulisque Oxon. i. 4), he was a Cistercian. No fact is known of his life, but Bale (Script. Brit. Cat. v. 89), who claims him, apparently by a guess, for a Welshman, places his death in 1356 at Grimsby. Briton's works, enumerated by Bale, are principally concerned with dialectics. His fame, however, rests upon his 'Vocabularium Bibliæ,' a treatise explanatory of obscure words in the Scriptures. The prologue and some other parts are in Latin verse. These, with additional specimens, have been printed by A. M. Bandini in his 'Catal. Codd. Latin. Biblioth. Medic. Laurent.' iv. 213 et seqq., Florence, 1777. Extracts are given by Ducange, 'Glossar. Med. et Infim. Latin.' praef., cap. xlix.

 BRITTAIN, THOMAS (1806–1884), naturalist, was born at Sheffield on 2 Jan. 1806. He was educated at a private school. He was engaged during the greater part of his life as a professional accountant, but became interested in natural science, and was very skilful in the preparation of diagrams and in the mounting of objects for the microscope. He settled in Manchester about 1842, and continued to live there during the remainder of his life. In some contributions to Axon's 'Field Naturalist' (Manchester, 1882, p. 148), he has told the story of his scientific studies from the time of his first microscope, which was obtained in 1834. In December 1858 he was one of the promoters of a Manchester Microscopical Society, which ultimately became a section of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society. When a second Manchester Microscopical Society - a more popular association - was established in 1879, he repeatedly held the office of vice-president, and was afterwards president. On his retirement, from failing health and advanced years, he was presented with an address at the Manchester Athenæum, 4 Oct. 1883. Brittain was connected with other scientific societies in Manchester and London. He was a clear and animated speaker, and for many years lectured on various subjects of natural science to a great number of the mechanics' and similar institutions. He made frequent contributions to the 'Manchester City News,' 'Unitarian Herald,' and other papers on matters of scientific interest. He was also connected with the unsuccessful attempt to establish a Manchester aquarium, and had a short experience, from 1858 to 1860, of municipal work. He died at Manchester on 23 Jan. 1884. His writings are: 1. 'Half a Dozen Songs by Brittanicus,' Manchester, 1846, privately printed. 2. 'A General Description of the Manchester Aquarium,' 1874, a pamphlet guide. 3. 'Micro-Fungi, when and where to find them,' Manchester, 1882. This, in spite of some obvious defects, has been of considerable use to local students. It is arranged in the order of the months, and first appeared in the 'Northern Microcopist.' 4. 'Whist: how to play and how to win, being the result of sixty years' play,' Manchester, 1882. Brittain did not make any claim to be a discoverer, but he was a


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 will), and . The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.

Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come, and on the strength of principles, the origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the question, how the understanding can arrive at these a priori cognitions, and what is the extent, validity, and worth which they may possess? We say, this is natural enough, meaning by the word natural, that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of thinking; but if we understand by the term, that which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of mathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may be of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.

Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the said intuition can itself be given a priori, and therefore is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of


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 the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the extension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather, indeed, to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation. But what frees us during the process of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst, so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process does furnish real a priori knowledge, which has a sure progress and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge.


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IV. Of the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments.
all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgments only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical judgments. The former may be called explicative, the latter augmentative judgments; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say, “all bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgment. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, “all bodies are heavy,” the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgment.

Judgments of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgment on experience, because in forming such a judgment I need not go out of the sphere of my conceptions,


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 and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That “bodies are extended” is not an empirical judgment, but a proposition which stands firm a priori. For before addressing myself to experience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judgment, and I have only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, a necessity which I could never learn from experience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that conception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality of experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all which are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and say, “all bodies are heavy.” Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions.

But to synthetical judgments a priori, such aid is entirely wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, “everything that happens has a cause.” In the conception of something that happens, I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, and indicates something entirely different from “that which


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 happens,” and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception—“that which happens”—something entirely different from that conception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X, upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found, out of the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the principle adduced annexes the two representations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not only with universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the expression of necessity, therefore completely a priori and from pure conceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori; for although analytical judgments are indeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a real acquisition.

V. In all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgments a priori are contained as principles.
1. judgments are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact, though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. For as it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way. But the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this is possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, but never of itself.

Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgments a priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity,


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 which cannot be given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and a priori.

We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two,—our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his “Arithmetic,” five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. “A straight line between two points is the shortest,” is a synthetical proposition. For my conception of straight, contains no notion of quantity, but is merely qualitative. The conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line. Intuition


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 must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.

Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles,—for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a + b) > a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgments is already contained in our conception, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the conception.

2. The science of Natural Philosophy (Physics) contains in itself synthetical judgments a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged;” or, that, “in all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.

3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an


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 indispensable one, we find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori. It is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate the conceptions which we form a priori of things; but we seek to widen the range of our a priori knowledge. For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original conception—something not identical with, nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgments a priori, leave far behind us the limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, “the world must have a beginning,” and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori.

VI. The universal problem of pure reason.
is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question: “How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?”

That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori, depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause (principium causalitatis), insisting that such proposition a priori was impossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has given the appearance


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 of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions a priori,—an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.

In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions:

 * How is pure mathematical science possible? How is pure natural science possible?

Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible?—for that they must be possible is shown by the fact of their really existing. But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.

Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system


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 of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises—How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible? In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can?

But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgment respecting them; and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus: How is metaphysics possible as a science?

Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism.

Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity, because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her problems; problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but by her own nature. And when once Reason has previously become able completely to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines of experience.

We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto


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 made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at them; and this it is her duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason—a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose roots remain indestructible.

VII. Idea and division of a particular science, under the name of a Critique of Pure Reason.
all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori. An Organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or, if so, in what cases; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure reason; and its use,


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 in regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to enlarge the bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against error,—which alone is no little gain. I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such conceptions would be called Transcendental Philosophy. But this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical a priori, but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be sought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason; our present object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical


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 value of ancient and modern writings on this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation.

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains with reason; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.

To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself; because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge a priori.

The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of a science like this, is: that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught empirical; in other words, that


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 the knowledge a priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy; because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations, &c., (which are all of empirical origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of duty,—as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a motive,—these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition.

If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori, which form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought.


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 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.


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