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Hall v. Decuir/Concurrence Clifford

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD concurred in the judgment, and delivered the following opinion:--

Power to regulate commerce is, by the Constitution, vested in Congress; and it is well-settled law that the word 'commerce' as used in the Constitution comprehends navigation, which extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, and to all commerce in the several States, except such as is completely internal, and which does not extend to or affect the other States. Tonnage Cases, 12 Wall. 204.

Beyond all doubt, the power as conferred includes navigation as well as traffic, and it is equally well settled that it extends to ships and vessels exclusively employed in conveying passengers as well as to those engaged in transporting goods and merchandise. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

Equality of right and privilege is guaranteed by the thirteenth article of the State Constitution to every person in the State transported in the vehicles or water-craft of a common carrier of passengers, in the words following, to wit: 'All persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any conveyance of a public character.' Rules and regulations to enforce that provision have been enacted by the State legislature, as fully set forth in the transcript. Sess. Laws La. (1869), 37.

Common carriers of the kind, it is conceded, may adopt rules and regulations for the management of their business, not inconsistent with the State Constitution and the enactment of the State legislature. By the terms of that enactment they may refuse to admit persons to such conveyance when the vehicle or water-craft does not contain room or suitable accommodations for the purpose, and they may refuse to admit an applicant, or expel him or her after admission, if the applicant refuses to pay fare, or is of infamous character, or is guilty, in the conveyance, of gross, vulgar, or disorderly conduct, or shall commit any act in violation of the known rules and regulations of such carrier tending to injure his business, provided such rules and regulations make no discrimination on account of race or color. Such rules and regulations as are there authorized must be duly made known to the public in order to be operative, and they must not deny to the applicant any right or privilege on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Sufficient appears to show that the plaintiff is a person of color, and that the defendant is the master and owner of the steamer, which is a packet vessel duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and that the vessel was engaged in carrying passengers and cargo between the port of New Orleans in the State of Louisiana and the port of Vicksburg in the State of Mississippi; that the steamer has two cabins for the accommodation of passengers, conveniently arranged one above the other; that the upper is assigned to white persons and that the lower is assigned to persons of color, both being constructed with state-rooms, cabin, and a hall used as a dining-room where meals are furnished; that the plaintiff, being at the time in New Orleans and desiring to visit her plantation in another parish of the same State, went on board the steamer to secure her passage to the proper landing near her plantation; that the clerk of the steamer, to whom she applied for a passage in the upper cabin, having previously informed her agent that he could not give her a passage in that cabin, refused her request, telling her at the same time that he would give her a passage in the lower cabin; that the plaintiff declined to accept a berth in the lower cabin, and that she passed the night during which she remained on board sitting in a chair in what is known as the recess back of the upper cabin.

Both parties concede that the steamer was engaged in one of her regular trips from New Orleans to Vicksburg, and it appears that the plaintiff took passage for the landing called the Hermitage, and that on arriving there she paid five dollars fare, which is the regular fare to that landing for persons whose passage is in the lower cabin, and that it was two dollars less than the regular fare for persons whose passage is in the upper cabin.

Proof of a decisive character is exhibited that the plaintiff applied for a berth in the upper cabin, which was refused, and that she declined to accept one in the lower cabin, which by the rules and regulations of the steamer is assigned for persons of color. Based upon these undisputed facts, the charge of the declaration is that the plaintiff was denied the equal rights and privileges guaranteed and secured to all persons by the State Constitution and the aforesaid act of the State legislature. Superadded to that is also the charge that such equal rights and privileges were denied to her on account of her race and color, for which she claims actual and exemplary damages in the sum of $75,000.

Service was made, and the defendant appeared and set up, among others, the defences following: 1. That the steamer, being enrolled and licensed according to the act of Congress to pursue the coasting trade, is governed by the laws of the United States, and may make all reasonable rules and regulations for the prosecution of her business. 2. That the State Constitution and law set up are in violation of the provision of the Federal Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. 3. That the steamer at the time alleged was engaged in prosecuting commerce between the port of New Orleans in the State of Louisiana, and the port of Vicksburg in the State of Mississippi, and consequently was not subject to the State regulations set up in the declaration.

Under the State practice these defences were pleaded as an exception to the alleged cause of action. Hearing was had, and the exception was overruled, the court giving leave to the defendant to plead the same in his answer.

Pursuant t that leave, the defendant set up the same defences in the answer, adding thereto the following: 1. That he as owner had by law the right to prescribe rules and regulations for the accommodation of passengers in his steamer. 2. That all such steamers engaged in commerce and navigation in those waters have a well-known regulation that persons of color are not placed in the same cabin with white persons. 3. That the regulation is reasonable, usual, and customary, and was made for the protection of their business, and had been well known to the plaintiff for many years.

Evidence was subsequently taken, the cause submitted to the court without a jury, the parties heard, and judgment entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000 with interest and cost; and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where the parties were again heard, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.

Provision is made by the fourth section of the State statute in question, that the plaintiff in such a case may recover exemplary as well as actual damages for a violation of the equal rights and privileges guaranteed to all persons in the State by the State Constitution. Suppose this is so, still the defendant insists that errors were committed by the court in the trial of the case, for which the judgment should be reversed; and the transcript shows that he sued out a writ of error, and removed the case into this court.

Three of the errors assigned are still the subject of complaint: 1. That the court erred in holding that the State Constitution and statute in question are valid. 2. That the court erred in deciding that those two provisions are not regulations of commerce. 3. That the court erred in deciding that those provisions are not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.

Congress, it is conceded, possesses the exclusive power to regulate commerce; and it is everywhere admitted that both traffic and navigation are included in its ordinary signification, and that it embraces ships and vessels as the instruments of intercourse and trade as well as the officers and seamen employed in their navigation. People v. Brooks, 4 Den. (N.Y.) 469.

Steamboats as well as sailing ships and vessels are required to be enrolled and licensed; and the record shows that the steamer in question had conformed in all respects to the regulations of Congress in that regard, and that she was duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and that she was then and there engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight between the port of New Orleans and the port of Vicksburg.

None, it is supposed, will deny the power of Congress to enroll and license ships and vessels to sail from a port of one State to the ports of another; and it is equally clear that such ships and vessels are deemed ships and vessels of the United States, and that they are entitled as such to all the privileges of ships and vessels employed in the coasting trade. 1 Stat. 287, 305; 3 Kent, Com. (12th ed.) 145.

Ships and vessels enrolled and licensed as required by that act are fully authorized to carry on that trade, the act of Congress in direct terms providing that such ships and vessels and no others shall be deemed ships and vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships and vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra; 1 Stat. 288; White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646.

Language more explicit could not well be chosen to express the intention of Congress, and in my judgment it fully warrants the conclusion reached by Marshall, C.J., in that case, that the section contains a positive enactment that the ships and vessels it describes shall be entitled to the privileges of ships and vessels employed in the coasting trade.

Undisputed proof is exhibited in the record that the steamer was duly enrolled and licensed, and that she was engaged in one of her regular trips between the port of New Orleans and the port of Vicksburg, transpor ing passengers and freight. Grant that, and it follows that she must be deemed to have been a ship or vessel of the United States entitled to all the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade, pursuant to the act of Congress providing for the enrollment and license of such ships and vessels and the regulation of such trade.

Attempt was made in the leading case to maintain that the license gave no right to trade, that its sole purpose was to confer the American character on the ship or vessel; but the court promptly rejected the proposition, and held that, where the legislature attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the exercise of a right over which its control is absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right; and the court remarked, that it would be contrary to all reason and to the course of human affairs to say that a State is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself. Instead of that, it is the enrolment that proves the national character of the ship or vessel; and the court decided in that case that the license could only be granted to vessels of twenty or more tons burden which had already been enrolled, and that the license to do a particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and, if granted by a person having authority to grant it, transfers to the grantee whatever it purports to authorize.

Packets which ply along the coast, say the court, as well as those making foreign voyages, consider the transportation of passengers as an important part of their business; and the court adjudged directly that a coasting vessel employed in that business is as much a portion of the national marine as one employed in the transportation of cargo, and that no reason exists for holding that such a vessel is withdrawn from the regulating power of the national government.

Without more, these references to the opinion in that great case are sufficient to show that the court there decided that the enrolment act is of itself a sufficient regulation of the navigation of all the public navigable rivers of the United States to secure to ships and vessels of the United States sailing under a coasting license the free navigation of all such public highways.

Confirmation of that proposition, even more decisive than the opinion of the court, is found in the decree rendered in the case, where the court adjudge that the licenses set up by the appellant gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States for the purpose of carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, and that so much of the law of the State as prohibited vessels so licensed from navigating the waters of the State by means of fire or steam is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void.

Cases have arisen in which it is held that the States may rightfully adopt certain regulations touching the subject, which are local in their operation, where none have been ordained by Congress; but it will not be necessary to enter that field of inquiry, or to attempt to reconcile those decisions with the conclusion in this case, as it is clear from the remarks already made that Congress has prescribed the conditions which entitle ships and vessels belonging to the national marine to pursue the coasting trade without being subjected to burdensome and inconsistent State regulations. Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 U.S. 275.

Repeated decisions of this court have determined that the power to regulate commerce embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted; and it is settled law that where the subject to which the power applies is national in its character, or of such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of all State authority. Whatever subjects of this power, says Mr. Justice Curtis, are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system or p an of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299.

Difficulty may attend the effort to prescribe any definition which will guide to a correct result in every case; but it is clear that a regulation which imposes burdensome or impossible conditions on those engaged in commerce, whether with foreign nations or among the several States, must of necessity be national in its character. Henderson et al. v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259.

Apply that rule to the case, and it is clear, even if there be a class of State regulations which may be valid until the same ground is occupied by an act of Congress or by a treaty, that the State regulation in question is not one of that class.

Such a subject is in its nature national, and admits of only one uniform system or plan of regulation. Unless the system or plan of regulation is uniform, it is impossible of fulfilment. Mississippi may require the steamer carrying passengers to provide two cabins and tables for passengers, and may make it a penal offence for white and colored persons to be mixed in the same cabin or at the same table. If Louisiana may pass a law forbidding such steamer from having two cabins and two tables,-one for white and the other for colored persons,-it must be admitted that Mississippi may pass a law requiring all passenger steamers entering her ports to have separate cabins and tables, and make it penal for white and colored persons to be accommodated in the same cabin or to be furnished with meals at the same table. Should State legislation in that regard conflict, then the steamer must cease to navigate between ports of the States having such conflicting legislation, or must be exposed to penalties at every trip.

Those who framed the Constitution never intended that navigation, whether foreign or among the States, should be exposed to such conflicting legislation; and it was to save those who follow that pursuit from such exposure and embarrassment that the power to regulate such commerce was vested exclusively in Congress.

Few or none will deny that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is vested exclusively in Congress; and it is equally well settled that Congress has, in many instances and to a wide extent, legislated upon the subject. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99; Rev. Stat., sect. 4311.

Support to that proposition, of the most persuasive and convincing character, is found in the act of Congress entitled 'An Act to provide for the better security of life on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for other purposes,' the forty-first section of which provides that all steamers navigating the lakes, bays, inlets, sounds, rivers, harbors, or other navigable waters of the United States, when such waters are common highways of commerce or open to general or competitive navigation, shall be subject to the provisions of that act. 16 Stat. 453; Rev. Stat., sect. 4400.

Vessels have always been employed to a greater or less extent in the transportation of passengers, and have never been supposed to be on that account withdrawn from the control or protection of Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.

Differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and operation of the national law regulating commerce among the several States, but none, it is presumed, will venture to deny that it is regulated very largely by congressional legislation. Admit that, and it follows that the legislation of Congress, if constitutional, must supersede all State legislation upon the same, and, by necessary implication, prohibit it, except in cases where the legislation of Congress manifests an intention to leave some particular matter to be regulated by the several States. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra.

Decisive authority for that proposition is found in the unquestioned decisions of this court. Such were the views of Judge Story more than thirty-five y ars ago, when he said, if Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do actually regulate it in a given manner and in a certain form, it cannot be that the State legislatures have a right to interfere, and, as it were, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. The Chusan, 2 Story, 466; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227.

In such a case, the legislation of Congress in what it does prescribe manifestly indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any further legislation to act upon the subject-matter. Its silence as to what it does not do is as expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by it. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539; Gibbons v. Ogden, supra; White's Bank v. Smith, supra.

Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the State legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to exercise the power. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Brown v. Maryland, 12 id. 419.

Irrespective of the decisions of the State court, it might well be doubted whether the State statute in question does prohibit a steamer carrying passengers from having and maintaining separate cabins and eating-saloons for white and colored passengers, and whether the denial to a colored female of a passage in the cabin assigned to white female passengers is a denial of equal rights and privileges, within the meaning of the State Constitution or the first section of the State statute in question, provided the applicant was offered a passage in the lower cabin, with equally convenient accommodation. Much discussion of that topic, however, is unnecessary, as two decisions of the State court conclusively determine the point that the State statute does contain such a prohibition, and that the facts of the case do bring the conduct of the defendant within that prohibition. DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1; Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 22 id. 517; Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 id. 14.

Even suppose the meaning of the statute is doubtful, still the rule of construction adopted by the highest court of a State, in construing their own Constitution and one of their own statutes, in a case not involving any question re-examinable in this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, must be regarded as conclusive in this court. Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Randall v. Brigham, 7 id. 523; Gut v. The State, 9 id. 35.

Where a State court gives such a construction to a State statute as to make it conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, and sustains its validity after giving it such construction, and thereby deprives a party of his rights under the said Constitution or law, it is settled law that a Federal question does arise in such a case, and that this court can review the decision of the State court as to the validity of such a statute. Insurance Company v. Treasurer, 11 id. 204. Were it not so, it is clear that the constitutional provision could always be evaded by the State courts giving such a construction to the contract or the statute as to render the appellate power of this court of no avail in such cases to uphold the contract against unfriendly State legislation. Delmas v. Insurance Company, 14 id. 661.

State courts certainly have a right to expound the statutes of the State; and, having done so, those statutes, with the interpretation given to them by the highest court of the State, become the rule of decision in the Federal courts. Richmond v. Smith, 15 id. 429; Jones & Co. v. The City of Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 517; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599.

Argument to show that the question whether or not the State cou t erred in the construction of their own Constitution and statute is not re-examinable in this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act is unnecessary, as the negative of the proposition is self-evident.

Governed by the laws of Congress, it is clear that a steamer carrying passengers may have separate cabins and dining saloons for white persons and persons of color, for the plain reason that the laws of Congress contain nothing to prohibit such an arrangement. Steamers carrying passengers for hire are bound, if they have suitable accommodation, to take all who apply, unless there is objection to the character or conduct of the applicant. Applicants to whom there is no such valid objection have a right to a passage, but it is not an unlimited right. On the contrary, it is subject to such reasonable regulations as the proprietors may prescribe for the due accommodation of passengers and the due arrangement of the business of the carrier.

Such proprietors have not only that right, but the farther right to consult and provide for their own interests in the management of the vessel as a common incident to their right of property. They are not bound to admit passengers on board who refuse to obey the reasonable regulations of the vessel, or who are guilty of gross and vulgar habits of conduct, or who make disturbances on board, or whose characters are doubtful, dissolute, suspicious, or unequivocally bad. Nor are they bound to admit passengers on board whose object it is to interfere with the interests of the patronage of the proprietors, so as to make their business less lucrative or their management less acceptable to the public. Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221.

Corresponding views are expressed by the Supreme Court of Michigan in an analogous case, in which the distinction between the right of an applicant to be admitted on board, and his claim to dictate what part of the vessel he shall occupy, is clearly pointed out. Referring to that subject, the court says the right to be carried is one thing, and the privilege of a passenger on board as to what part of the vessel may be occupied by him is another and a very different thing; and they add, that it is the latter and not the former which is subject to reasonable rules and regulations, and is, where such rules and regulations exist, to be determined by the proprietors. Damages were claimed in that case for refusing the plaintiff the privilege of the cabin; but the court held that the refusal was nothing more or less than denying him certain accommodations from which he was excluded by the rules and regulations of the steamer. Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520.

Proprietors of the kind may make rules and regulations, but they must be reasonable; and the court held in that case that to be so they should have for their object the accommodation of the passengers, including every thing to render the transportation most comfortable and least annoying, not to one or two or any given number carried at any particular time, but to the great majority ordinarily transported; and they also held that such rules and regulations should be of a permanent nature, and not be made for a particular occasion or emergency.

Special and important duties indubitably are imposed upon carriers of passengers for the benefit of the travelling public; but it must not be forgotten that the vehicles and vessels which such carriers use do not belong to the public. They are private property, the use and enjoyment of which belong to the proprietors. Angell, Carriers (5th ed.), sect. 525.

Concede what is undoubtedly true, that the use and employment of such vehicles and vessels, during the time they are allowed the privileges of common carriers, may be subjected to such conditions and obligations as the nature of their employment requires for the comfort, security, and safety of passengers, still the settled rules of constitutional law forbid that a State legislature may invade the dominion of private right by arbitrary restrictions requirements, or limitations, by which the property of the owners or possessors would be virtually stripped of all utility or value if bound to comply with the regulations. Jencks v. Coleman, supra.

Both steamboats and railways are modern modes of conveyance; but Shaw, C.J., decided that the rules of the common law were applicable to them, as they take the place of other modes of carrying passengers, and he held that they have authority to make reasonable and suitable regulations as regards passengers intending to pass and repass in their vehicles or vessels. Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 601; Hibbard v. New York & Erie Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 455; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420. They are, said the Chief Justice in that case, in a condition somewhat similar to that of an innkeeper, whose premises are open to all guests. Yet he is not only empowered to make such proper arrangements as will promote his own interests, but he is bound to regulate his house so as to preserve order, and, if practicable, prevent breaches of the peace. Vinton v. Middlesex Railroad Co., 11 Allen (Mass.), 304.

Cases of like import are quite numerous, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided directly that a public carrier may separate passengers in his conveyance; and they deduce his power to do so from his right of private property in the means of conveyance, and the necessity which arises for such a regulation to promote the public interest. Speaking to that point, they say that the private means the carrier uses belong wholly to himself; and they held the right of control in that regard as necessary to enable the carrier to protect his own interests, and to perform his duty to the travelling public. His authority in that regard, as that court holds, arises from his ownership of the property, and his public duty to promote the comfort and enjoyment of those travelling in his conveyance. Guided by those views, the court held that it is not an unreasonable regulation to seat passengers so as to preserve order and decorum, and to prevent contacts and collisions arising from natural or well-known customary repugnancies which are likely to breed disturbances, where white and colored persons are huddled together without their consent. The West Chester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209.

Where the passenger embarks without making any special contract, and without knowledge as to what accommodations will be afforded, the law implies a contract which obliges the carrier to furnish suitable accommodations according to the room at his disposal; but the passenger in such a case is not entitled to any particular apartments or special accommodations. Substantial equality of right is the law of the State and of the United States; but equality does not mean identity, as in the nature of things identity in the accommodation afforded to passengers, whether colored or white, is impossible, unless our commercial marine shall undergo an entire change. Adult male passengers are never allowed a passage in the ladies' cabin, nor can all be accommodated, if the company is large, in the state-rooms. Passengers are entitled to proper diet and lodging; but the laws of the United States do not require the master of a steamer to put persons in the same apartment who would be repulsive or disagreeable to each other.

Steamers carrying passengers as a material part of their employment are common carriers, and as such enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties and obligations of such carriers; but there was and is not any law of Congress which forbids such a carrier from providing separate apartments for his passengers. What the passenger has a right to require is such accommodation as he has contracted for, or, in the absence of any special contract, such suitable accommodations as the room and means at the disposal of the carrier enable him to supply; and in locating his passengers in apartments and at their meals it is not on y the right of the master, but his duty, to exercise such reasonable discretion and control as will promote, as far as practicable, the comfort and convenience of his whole company.

Questions of a kindred character have arisen in several of the States, which support these views in a course of reasoning entirely satisfactory and conclusive. Boards of education were created by a law of the State of Ohio, and they were authorized to establish within their respective jurisdictions one or more separate schools for colored children when the whole number by enumeration exceeds twenty, and when such schools will afford them, as far as practicable, the advantages and privileges of a common-school education. Under that law, colored children were not admitted as a matter of right into the schools for white children, which gave rise to contest, in which the attempt was made to set aside the law as unconstitutional: but the Supreme Court of the State held that it worked no substantial inequality of school privileges between the children of the two classes in the locality of the parties; that equality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating white and colored persons in the same school any more than it does that of educating children of both sexes in the same school, or that different grades of scholars must be kept in the same school; and that any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by either the State or Federal Constitution, nor would it contravene the provisions of either. State v. McCann et al., 21 Ohio St. 198.

Separate primary schools for colored and for white children were maintained in the city of Boston. Children in the State who are unlawfully excluded from public-school instruction may recover damages therefor against the city or town by which such public instruction is supported. It appears that the plaintiff was denied admission to the primary school for white children, and she by her next friend claimed damages for the exclusion; but the Supreme Court, Shaw, C.J., giving the opinion, held that the law vested the power in the committee to regulate the system of distribution and classification, and that when the power was reasonably exercised their decision must be deemed conclusive. Distinguished counsel insisted that the separation tended to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction of caste; but the court responded, that they were not able to say that the decision was not founded on just grounds of reason and experience, and in the results of a discriminating and honest judgment. Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198.

Age and sex have always been marks of classification in public schools throughout the history of our country, and the Supreme Court of Nevada well held that the trustees of the public schools in that State might send colored children to one school and white children to another, or they might make any such classification as they should deem best, whether based on age, sex, race, or any other reasonable existent condition. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342.

Directors of schools in Iowa have no discretion under the existing law of the State to deny a youth of proper age admission to any particular school on account of nationality, color, or religion. Former statutes of the State invested the directors with such discretion, and it is impliedly conceded that it would be competent for the legislature again to confer that authority. Clark v. The Board of Directors, 24 Iowa, 266.

School privileges are usually conferred by statute, and, as such, are subject to such regulations as the legislature may prescribe. Such statutes generally provide for equal school advantages for all children, classifying the scholars as the legislature in its wisdom may direct or authorize; and the Supreme Court of New York decided that the legislature of the State may from time to time make such limitations and alterations in that regard as they may see fit. Dallas v. Fosdick 40 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 249.

Public instruction of the kind is regulated in that State by official boards created for the purpose; and it is settled law there that the board may assign a particular school for colored children, and exclude them from schools assigned for white children, and that such a regulation is not in violation of the [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XIV|Fourteenth Amendment]]. People v. Gaston, 13 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. N. S. 160.

Ships and vessels duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade may lawfully touch at intermediate ports, to receive or discharge passengers or cargo; but the fact that they do so does not in the least change or alter the character of the trip, or diminish the right of the vessel to enjoy all the privileges of a vessel engaged in commerce between ports in different States; nor does the fact that the plaintiff expected to leave the steamer at a landing in the same State enlarge her right of accommodation, or augment in any respect the obligations of the steamer as a public carrier, for the reason that the steamer sailed throughout the whole trip under her coasting license, and her rights and privileges, duties and obligations, must be ascertained and defined by the regulations prescribed by the acts of Congress.

Commercial regulations of the kind cannot be effectual to accomplish the object for which they were required and designed to effect, unless it be held that they extend to the entire voyage, as well that portion of it which is in the State where the voyage began as that which extends into another State, as the whole is performed under the coasting license founded in the acts of Congress passed to regulate such commerce and navigation.

Throughout our history the acts of Congress have regulated the enrolment and license of vessels to be engaged in the coasting trade, and this court expressly determined that a State law which imposed another and an additional condition to the privilege of carrying on that trade within her waters is inoperative and void. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Foster v. Davenport, 22 id. 244; Wheeling Bridge Company v. Pennsylvania, 18 id. 432.

Alabama passed an act to the effect that vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or in the coasting trade, shall not navigate her waters without complying with a condition not prescribed by the act of Congress. By the State law, they are required, before leaving the described port, to file in the office of the judge of probate a statement in writing, setting forth as follows: 1. The name of the vessel. 2. The name of the owner or owners. 3. His or their place or places of residence. 4. The interest each has in the vessel.

Speaking of that condition, the court say, if the interpretation of the court as to the force and effect of the privileges afforded to the vessel by the enrolment and license act in the leading case are to be maintained, it can require no argument to show a direct conflict between this act and the act of Congress regulating the coasting trade Sinnot v. Davenport, supra.

Nor does it require any argument to show that the State law before the court is exactly analogous in principle to the State law declared void in that case. Like the former, the latter imposes an additional condition to the privilege of carrying on the coasting trade within the waters of the State, not prescribed by any act of Congress. Enrolled and licensed vessels have the constitutional right to pursue the coasting trade on the terms and conditions which Congress has seen fit to prescribe, and no State legislature can interfere with that right, either to abridge or enlarge it, or to subject it to any terms and conditions whatsoever.

Commerce among the several States as well as commerce with foreign nations requires uniformity of regulation; and that power is by the Constitution vested exclusively in Congress, as appears by the Constitution itself, and by an unbroken course of the decisions of this court, covering a period of more than half a century.

Judicial authority to sup ort the theory of the court below is entirely wanting, except what may be derived from the case of Coger v. Packet Company, 37 Iowa, 145, decided by the Supreme Court of the State. Special damage was claimed by the plaintiff in that case, of the master of a steamer navigating the Mississippi River, for removing her, she being a colored woman, from the dining-room of the steamer without just cause. Regulations had previously been adopted by the steamer excluding colored persons from the state-rooms and other first-class privileges and accommodations. Service was made, and the defendant appeared and pleaded those regulations as a defence. Hearing was had, and the court decided that persons of color were entitled to the same rights and privileges, when travelling, as white persons, and that they cannot be required by any rule or custom based on distinction of color or race to accept other or different accommodations than those furnished to white persons.

Abundant reasons exist to show that the decision in that case is not an authority in the case before the court, a few of which will be stated: 1. Because the report of the case does not show that the steamer was navigating under a coasting license. 2. Because the constitutional question involved in the case before the court was neither involved, presented, nor considered in that case, either by the bar or the court. 3. Because the decision was rested entirely upon other and different grounds. 4. Because the facts of the two cases are widely and substantially different.

Colored persons, it is admitted, are citizens, and that citizens, without distinction of race or color or previous condition of servitude, have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of personal property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. 14 Stat. 27. States are also forbidden to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Enforcement Act, 16 id. 140; [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XIV|Fourteenth Amendment]] to the Constitution.

Vague reference is made to the Civil Rights Act and to the preceding amendment to the Constitution, as if that act or the said amendment may supersede the operation and legal effect of the coasting license as applied to the case before the court; but it is clear that neither of those provisions, nor both combined, were intended to accomplish any such purpose. Enough appears in the language employed in those provisions to show that their principal object was to confer citizenship, and the rights which belong to citizens as such, upon the colored people, and in that manner to abrogate the rule previously adopted by this court in the Dred Scott Case. By the Civil Rights Act, the rule adopted in that case is entirely superseded, and all the substantial rights of citizens are conferred upon the colored people, as more fully appears by the enumeration contained in the first section of the act. Under no view, therefore, that can properly be taken of that act can it be held to supersede, repeal, modify, or affect the act of Congress, providing for the enrolment and licensing of ships and vessels for the coasting trade. Dallas v. Fosdick, supra.

Certain phases of the question were also presented to the District Court of Philadelphia, in the case of Goines v. M'Candless, 4 Phila. C. P. 255, in which the court admitted that a corporation created for the carriage of passengers cannot arbitrarily refuse to carry any man or class of men without laying itself open to an action for damages; but the court held in the same case that such a corporation may establish reasonable rules for the comfort and convenience of those whom it is bound t carry, even though the effect may be to exclude particular individuals falling within those rules.

Evidence of a decisive character that Congress has regulated inter-state commerce is also found in the act supplemental to the act providing for the enrolment and licensing of ships and vessels for the coasting trade, the first section of which divides the sea-coasts and navigable rivers into three great districts, and provides as follows: 1. That the first shall include all the collection districts on the sea-coast and navigable rivers between the limits of the United States and the southern limits of Georgia. 2. That the second shall include all the collection districts and navigable rivers between the river Perdido and the Rio Grande. 3. That the third shall include all the collection districts on the sea-coast and navigable rivers between the southern limits of Georgia and the river Perdido, Rev. Stat., sect. 4348; 3 Stat. 493.

Congress having legislated upon the subject, it cannot be that the State legislatures have a right to interfere and prescribe additional regulations, as the legislation of Congress clearly indicates that the national law-makers never intended to leave any thing open upon the subject to the discretion of the State legislatures.

Two opposing theories, sometimes advanced in such controversies, deserve some brief comments before concluding the examination of the case. They are in substance and effect as follows: 1. That the effect of the coasting license issued under the enrolment act is merely to evidence the national character of the vessel; that the acts of Congress requiring the register and enrolment of vessels was never intended as the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States, and that the States still possess the concurrent power to prescribe such regulations until Congress shall ordain express provisions to control and restrict the regulations enacted by the States. 2. That the Supreme Court, by a decision made subsequent to the decree in the great leading case in which it is held that the power to regulate commerce is vested exclusively in Congress, qualified, if they did not positively overrule, that generally acknowledged rule upon the subject.

1. Enough, it would seem, has already been remarked to refute the first opposing theory; but, if more be needed, it will be found in the fact that it is the exact theory maintained by the courts of the State where the controversy arose, and whose final decree was removed into this court for re-examination. None will attempt to deny that proposition who ever read the opinions delivered in the subordinate courts. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 150; S.C.. 17 Johns. 488; 1 Kent Com. (12th ed.) 435.

Explanations respecting that historical controversy, of a more satisfactory character, are given by Chancellor Kent than by any other legal writer who has undertaken to state the constitutional questions which it involved, and which were finally determined by the unanimous judgment of this court. His statement of the case is as follows: That the respondent set up, by way of right and title to navigate the waters of the State in opposition to the grant of the complainant, that his steamboats were duly enrolled and licensed under the enrolment act, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade; that the question in the case was whether such a coasting license conferred the power to interfere with the grant of the State under which the complainant claimed the exclusive right to navigate the waters of the State which made the grant.

Eminent counsel represented both sides of the question, and we are informed by the learned commentator that the courts of the State in the two cases referred to decided against the defence set up in the answer of the respondent, and held that the coasting license merely gave to the steamboats of the respondent the character of American vessels; that the license was not intended to decide a question of property, or to confer a ri ht of property or a right of navigation or commerce; that the courts of that State during that period never regarded the act regulating the coasting trade as intended to assert any supremacy over State regulations in respect to internal waters or commerce, for the reason that those courts did not consider that act as the exercise of the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the States.

Competent evidence to show that the courts of that State in those two cases took the exact same ground as that involved in the theory in question is very abundant and conclusive, without looking elsewhere than to the lecture of the Chancellor under consideration. Decisive support to that conclusion is also found in what follows in the same connection in the same lecture, in which he says that the courts of the State did not, either in the case of Ogden v. Gibbons or in any of the cases which preceded it, deny to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States by express and direct provision, so as to control and restrict the exercise of the State grant; that they only insisted that without some such explicit provision the State jurisdiction over the subject was in full force, which is exactly what is claimed by those who seek to undermine the doctrines of the great leading case.

Beyond all question, the views of the Chancellor as to what was decided by the courts of the State in that great controversy are correct, and it will be equally instructing to ascertain what his views are as to what followed in this court. Speaking upon that subject, he says the cause was afterwards carried up by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the decree was reversed on the ground that the grant to the complainant was repugnant to the rights and privileges conferred upon the steamboats of the respondent navigating under a coasting license; that in the construction of the power to regulate commerce the Supreme Court held that the term meant not only traffic but intercourse, and that it included navigation, and that the power to regulate commerce was a power to regulate navigation; that commerce among the several States meant commerce intermingled with the States, and which might pass the external boundary line of each State, and be introduced into the interior; that the power conferred comprehended navigation within the limits of every State, and that it may pass the jurisdictional line of a State and be exercised within its territory, so far as the navigation is connected with foreign commerce or with commerce among the several States; and that the power, like all the other powers of Congress, is plenary and absolute within its acknowledged limits.

Three limitations or restrictions, as the Chancellor states, were admitted by the Supreme Court in that case to exist to the limits of that power as conferred: 1. That the power does not extend to that commerce which is completely internal, and is carried on between different parts of the same State, not extending to or affecting other States. 2. That the power is restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one, the completely internal commerce of a State being reserved for the State itself. 3. That the power conferred does not prohibit the States from passing inspection laws or quarantine or health laws and laws for regulating highways and ferries, nor does it include the power to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State, or to act directly on its system of police. 1 Kent Com. (12th ed.) 437.

Many efforts have been made to analyze and expound the opinion delivered by the great magistrate in that case, but none, it is believed, were ever attended with such complete success as that of the commentator to which reference is made. He was the chancellor of the State court, and gave the original opinion; and, when he found that his decree was reversed by the Supreme Court, he was influenced by the highest motive to ascertain the true grounds assumed in the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Judge Story § ys, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, that it has been settled, upon the most solemn deliberation, that the power to regulate commerce is exclusive in the government of the United States; and he adds in another section of the Commentaries, that the reasoning by which the power given to Congress to regulate commerce is maintained to be exclusive has not of late been seriously controverted, and that it seems to have the cheerful acquiescence of the learned tribunals of a particular State, one of whose acts brought it first under judicial examination. 2 Story, Const. (3d ed.), sects. 1067, 1071; Steamboat Company v. Livingston, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 13; The People v. Brooks, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 469; Pomeroy, Const. (3d ed.), sect. 371; Sergeant, Const. (2d ed.) 308; Rawle, Const. (2d ed.) 82; Railroad Company v. Husen, supra, p. 465.

Repeated decisions of this court, including the one at the present term, have established that rule as the settled law of the court; nor is there any case in the reported decisions of the court, when properly understood, which gives any countenance or support to the theory under examination, unless it be the case of Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, which it is not admitted, when taken as a whole, falls within that category.

Certain admissions are contained in the opinion in that case which are certainly in conflict with the theory which it is the purpose of these observations to refute. Mr. Justice Swayne very properly admits that the enrolment act authorizes vessels enrolled and licensed according to its provisions to engage in the coasting trade; that commerce includes navigation; and that the power to regulate commerce comprehends the control, for that purpose and to the extent necessary, of the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For that purpose, says the same learned judge, they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 371.

These are the authorities cited to support the proposition; and the learned Justice adds, that this necessarily includes the power to keep such waters open and free from any obstruction to their navigation interposed by the States or otherwise, to remove such obstructions when they exist, and to provide by such sanctions as they, the Congress, may deem proper against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders For these purposes, Congress, says the judge, possesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and which have always been vested in the Parliament of England: and he further added, that commerce among the States does not stop at a State line; that, coming from abroad, it penetrates wherever it can find navigable waters reaching from without into the interior, and may follow them up as far as navigation is practicable. Wherever commerce among the States goes, the power of the nation goes with it, to protect and enforce its rights. Nothing more surely can be needed to show that the theory under discussion is erroneous and fallacious.

2. Whatever support exists to the second theory mentioned is found in a single case, which has sometimes been strangely misunderstood at the bar. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. Proper attention to the facts of the case will show that the creek in question was one of those many creeks passing through a deep level marsh adjoining the river Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance; that the property on the bank of the creek was of little or no value unless it was reclaimed by excluding the water from the marsh; and that the health of the residents of the neighborhood required that such improvement should be made. Measures calculated to effect those objects had been adopted; and the court held that the State legislature might lawfully authorize the necessary erections to accompl sh those important objects.

Judgment was rendered by the same court which gave the judgment in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden; and no one has ever been able to assign any reason to conclude that the constitutional views of the court had at that time undergone any change. Instead of overruling that great case, it will be seen that the Chief Justice who gave the opinion did not even allude to it; though, as a sound exposition of the Federal Constitution, it is not second in point of importance to any one that great magistrate ever delivered. Evidently he had no occasion to refer to it or to any of its doctrines, as he properly described the creek over which the dam was erected as a low, sluggish water, of little or no importance, and treated the erection of the dam as one adapted to reclaim the adjacent marshes, and as essential to the preservation of the public health, and sustained the constitutionality of the law authorizing the erection, upon the ground that it was within the reserved police powers of the State.

Congressional regulations, as embodied in the enrolment act and other acts of Congress, apply to all public navigable waters of the United States; but every navigator employed in the coasting trade knows that there are many small creeks, channels, and indentations along our Atlantic coast, especially in the marshes, which are never classed in the category of public navigable waters, though they are capable of being navigated by small vessels when the tide is full. Hundreds of such creeks, said Mr. Justice McLean, are similarly situated. In such cases, involving doubt whether the jurisdiction may not be exclusively exercised by the State, it is politic and proper in the judicial tribunals of the nation to follow the action of Congress.

Over the navigable waters of a State Congress can exercise no commercial power, except as regards the intercourse with other States or foreign countries; and he adds, that doubtless there are many creeks made navigable by the flowing of the tide or by the back water from large rivers which the general phraseology of an act to regulate commerce may not embrace; that in all such cases, and many others that may be found to exist, this court could not safely exercise a jurisdiction not expressly sanctioned by Congress.

When the language of the court in that case is applied to the facts of the case, said Justice McLean, no such principle as that assumed in argument is sanctioned; that the construction of the dam was not complained of as a regulation of commerce, but as an obstruction to commerce; that the court held, that, inasmuch as Congress had not assumed to control State legislation over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows, the judicial power could not do so; that the act of the State was an internal and a police power to guard the health of its citizens, and that nothing more was found in the case than a forbearance to exercise power over a doubtful object, which should ever characterize the judicial branch of the government. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.

Mr. Hamilton, in the thirty-first number of the Federalist, says that there is an exclusive delegation or alienation of State sovereignty in three cases: first, where the exclusive power is in terms given to Congress; second, where an authority is granted to the Union, and the States are prohibited from exercising a like authority; third, where an authority is granted to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and wholly contradictory and repugnant.

Even suppose that the power to regulate commerce falls within the third designation, still it is believed that sufficient has already been remarked to show that the nature of the power is such that it shows that the power should be exclusively exercised by Congress. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; State v. The Wheeling Bridge Company, 13 How. 518; s. c. 18 id. 421.

Both of the decisions in the Wheeling Bridge case are subsequent in point of time o the case of Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., and so are the Commentaries of Judge Story upon the Constitution; and yet not an intimation is found in either that the doctrines of the great case referred to were ever modified or questioned. That such an intimation is not to be found anywhere is clearly demonstrated by a recent commentator, who has carefully reviewed every opinion given by this court upon that subject. Pomeroy, Const. (3d ed.), pp. 207-248.

Waters lying wholly within a single State may be such as to be regarded as public navigable waters of the United States, because they are properly denominated as arms of the sea. Examples of the kind are numerous, of which it will be sufficient to mention the Hudson, from Albany to the sound; the Penobscot, from Bangor to the bay; the Kennebec, from the capital of the State to its mouth; and the Saco, from below the falls to the ocean; and many others, equally well known even to the pupils in the common schools. All such public navigable waters, being arms of the sea, are within the acts of Congress passed to regulate commerce. The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black, 574; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 id. 713.

title: Hall v. Decuir/Concurrence Clifford


text:
User talk:Adrignola

Import from b:
Do you have transwiki import set up from English Wikibooks? I didn't see a page for requesting imports when searching. It is possible that consensus will be found to have Investiture of the Gods, a translation of Fengshen Yanyi, seen at Chinese Wikisource brought here. If not allowed here, a transwiki result would become a deletion; Wikibooks is not a repository for source texts and so it is out of scope there.
 * Absolutely. You can do it yourself from Special:Import, or you can get one of us to do it at our pace. If you do it, just bring it in as is, as the chapters, and I will run my bot over it to put the requisite headers in place, and do a tidy up afterwards. Note here or my talk page are okay. — billinghurst  sDrewth  14:23, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

 * Well, upon visiting that page the restriction is the same as it is at Wikibooks: "The action you have requested is limited to users in one of the groups: Administrators, Importers, Transwiki importers." At Wikibooks we had the developers make it so administrators can grant the transwiki importer flag, but I know I'm not a major contributor here and it would be a bit of an imposition to request the flag even if you could grant it for only a single book.  I will wait to see if we get some further support on the request for deletion page and then probably leave a note in the Scriptorium when it's time.  The administrators' noticeboard seems to me to be for more urgent situations, though it will fall to an admin to do the import.  In the meantime I'll work to get the chapters numbered correctly at Wikibooks so that there's not further work to be done beyond the arduous importing of 100+ pages. Adrignola (talk) 15:24, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Yep, I see that I was mistaken, though would happily ask a 'crat to have it turned on for you, though as said, we can do it. — billinghurst  sDrewth  15:31, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

 * Our (only?) resident speaker of Chinese, Kayau, agrees with the transwiki and I've not seen any opposition. Darklama, an admin, agrees and he's very thorough in his analyses of nominations.  (Participation is really low for deletion requests and in community forums in general, so I don't expect many other responses).  I'm thinking it will be safe to import it now.  I consolidated the chapters that were split over two pages for some reason.  That brings it down to 78 pages.  Now it becomes clear that the original contributor didn't finish translation of all 100 chapters.  75% isn't bad, though. Adrignola (talk) 15:07, 14 January 2011 (UTC)
 * ✅ Portal:Investiture_of_the_Gods — billinghurst  sDrewth  23:12, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

Hope you didn't get those painful errors and timeouts that are so common importing from Wikipedia. Thanks a bunch! Adrignola (talk) 23:59, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

Seeking your opinion
Gday Adrignola. I would value your WB hat opinion on the conversation Scriptorium. It falls into the grey area between the two sisters, and we want to minimise overlap, but ensure that there is no gaping hole either. Thanks, if you can. — billinghurst  sDrewth  01:10, 15 February 2013 (UTC)
 * Thanks. Good to hear a reasoned voice not at the coal face. — billinghurst  sDrewth  10:18, 15 February 2013 (UTC)

Annotations and derivative works
Hi. Further to the last talk section, and as you commented on Scriptorium, I invite you to also comment on the second stage: Request for comment on annotations and derivative works. This should work out some of the details about what falls within Wikisource's scope. I apologise for the over detailed page (this is actually Wikisource's first RfC of this kind) but this has been a problem on this project in the past and I want to get this resolved as fully as possible. - AdamBMorgan (talk) 22:36, 6 March 2013 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: User talk:Adrignola


text:
User talk:Monty67

Content posted on this page has been deleted as out of scope for Wikisource. Jeepday (talk) 17:49, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

title: User talk:Monty67


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Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/43

Rh Orang, try to open the door of his cage. His keeper had just fed him. He had unlocked the cage with his keys, put the food within, relocked the door and departed. "Baldy" watched him intently during these operations. After the keeper had disappeared he took two straws, twisted them into the crude likeness of a key, inserted them in the lock and turned them several times. Then he tried the door and seemed surprised that it did not open. He repeated the performance and was disappointed because it would not work. This big fellow was full of mimicry.

A learned gentleman paused before his cage, adjusted his eyeglasses and carefully observed him. "Baldy" quickly snatched a nearby newspaper, tore a strip from its pages and with his finger punched two holes in it. He held it across his eyes, peering quizzically at the gentleman, who beat a hasty exit.

In disposition they are gentle and affectionate, exceedingly fond of human beings and take to training like a duck to water. It is a pity the anthropoid (man-like) apes do not live long in captivity. Rarely an Orang is seen 4 feet tall,

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/43


text: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/45

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/45


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Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/47

Rh male Orang is about 250 pounds." (Hornaday.)

These animals live wholly in the tree tops and seldom descend to the ground except for water. They cannot leap from bough to bough as do monkeys, because of their great weight; but swing underneath the branches with their long powerful arms in much the same manner as Seminole Indians travel through the Everglades.

When the Orangs are home in the jungles of Sumatra and Borneo they make a nest to sleep upon by breaking the leafy branches of trees, and laying them cross-wise in the top of a forked sapling. In this big nest it lies flat on its back and is rocked to sleep in its leafy cradle while in repose it grasps a branch in each hand and foot.

Unless attacked at close range in the forest the great apes are not dangerous to man. When attacked they fight like human toughs, by biting and scratching. They do not fight with clubs, as has been reported. When fighting each other the old males bite chunks out of the faces and the fingers and toes of their adversaries.

The Orang-Utan, Chimpanzee and Gorilla

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/47


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Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/44

34 weighing 150 pounds. Homesickness is the chief cause of their early deaths. The big apes require a variety of food as do human beings. Flesh, fish and fowl, with liberal portions of eggs, milk, fruits and vegetables, make up their diet. They are very fond of soups and nuts. The Orangs are easily taught to take soup from a spoon. They feed themselves readily, man-fashion, and can use a knife and fork with ease.

In the wild state they eat all kinds of wild fruit, leaves, nuts, birds and birds' eggs. Orangs are easily taught to wear the clothing of humans, to drink from cups and bottles, to smoke cigars, drink intoxicating liquor, skate on roller skates, ride bicycles, walk a tight rope or slack wire. They learn these things in two or three weeks' time.

"The largest specimen on record stood 4 feet 6 inches in height, measured 42 inches around the chest, and between finger tips stretched 8 feet. The hand is 11½ inches long, the foot 13½ inches, but the width across the palm is only 3¾ inches. The weight of a large, full grown

title: Page:Babyhood of Wild Beasts.djvu/44


text: The Babyhood of Wild Beasts/Chapter 2

title: The Babyhood of Wild Beasts/Chapter 2


text:
User:Annaw

Holistic Approach in Medicine A Holistic View

A holistic approach in medicine is intended to be a process of healing that takes into consideration the mind, body, and spirit of the patient. Holistic practitioners seek to incorporate not only traditional medical treatments, but also complementary and alternative therapies. These practitioners feel that by so doing, they not only treat the medical condition or disease but also contributing factors such as state of mind and spiritual beliefs. The idea is that the patient is more than their diagnosis, but instead is a unique individual.

A holistic approach resembles more of a team approach or partnership between the physician and the patient. Each has equal say in therapies chosen and bears responsibility for their participation in developing a treatment plan. However, most holistic physicians place responsibility for the patients own well-being squarely on their own shoulders.

In developing a treatment plan, the doctor and patient consider not only current health conditions but also lifestyle, personal beliefs, and preferred habits of the patient. The overriding goal behind holistic medicine is respect for the individual and their approach to their own healing.

One of the founding principles behind a holistic approach in medicine is unconditional love. It is believed that one must first love oneself unconditionally, and only then can you truly love and support the health and well-being of another. It is this loving support for which holistic medicine is best known. The loving, supporting nature of this kind of medical care is not swayed by attitude, behavior, or poor choices of the individual, but rather offers support for the growth of a person even if that sometimes requires a stern hand.

The American Holistic Medical Association exists to provide support to physicians who utilize a holistic approach in medicine. The AHMA holds both national and regional conferences to help connect physicians in a relaxed friendly atmosphere. Here these physicians can share knowledge and offer each other encouragement in professional self-actualization.

However, they also invite other professionals such as nurses and clinicians who wish to help propel the medical community back to its original purpose of healing the whole person. Many members feel that the current health system no longer advocates adequate prevention and health monitoring, but rather serves a specific business model and profit margin. While holistic medicine promotes loving support, a holistic physician is merely a guide and patients are ultimately responsible for their good health.

Reference: http://www.all-natural-cancer-cures.com

title: User:Annaw


text:
1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Roué

ROUÉ, a dissipated debauche. The word is French, and its original meaning was "broken on the wheel." Breaking on the wheel was a form of execution reserved in France, and some other countries, for crimes of peculiar atrocity. A roué, therefore, came by a natural process to be understood to mean a man morally worse than a pendard or gallows-bird, who only deserved hanging for common crimes. He was also a leader in wickedness, since the chief of a gang of brigands (for instance) would be broken on the wheel, while his obscure followers were merely hanged. Philip, duke of Orleans, who was regent of France from 1715 to 1723, gave the term the sense of impious and callous debauchee, which it has borne since his time, by habitually applying it to the very bad male company who amused his privacy and his leisure. The locus classicus for the origin of this use of the epithet is in the Memoirs of Saint-Simon (vol. xii. pp. 441-46, ed. Chéruel and Regnier, Paris, 1873-86).

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Roué


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Page:A Thousand-Mile Walk To The Gulf.djvu/236

Rh my ears could not hear wave-dashing at that distance. Yet every bit of spray was sounding in my ears.

The subject brings to mind a few recollections of the winds I heard in my late journey. In my walk from Indiana to the Gulf, earth and sky, plants and people, and all things changeable were constantly changing. Even in Kentucky nature and art have many a characteristic shibboleth. The people differ in language and in customs. Their architecture is generically different from that of their immediate neighbors on the north, not only in planters mansions, but in barns and granaries and the cabins of the poor. But thousands of familiar flower faces looked from every hill and valley. I noted no difference in the sky, and the winds spoke the same things. I did not feel myself in a strange land.

In Tennessee my eyes rested upon the first mountain scenery I ever beheld. I was rising higher than ever before; strange trees were beginning to appear; alpine flowers and shrubs


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Rh were meeting me at every step. But these Cumberland Mountains were timbered with oak, and were not unlike Wisconsin hills piled upon each other, and the strange plants were like those that were not strange. The sky was changed only a little, and the winds not by a single detectible note. Therefore, neither was Tennessee a strange land.

But soon came changes thick and fast. After passing the mountainous corner of North Carolina and a little way into Georgia, I beheld from one of the last ridge-summits of the Alleghanies that vast, smooth, sandy slope that reaches from the mountains to the sea. It is wooded with dark, branchy pines which were all strangers to me. Here the grasses, which are an earth-covering at the North, grow wide apart in tall clumps and tufts like saplings. My known flower companions were leaving me now, not one by one as in Kentucky and Tennessee, but in whole tribes and genera, and companies of shining strangers came trooping upon me in countless ranks. The sky, too, was


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Page:A Thousand-Mile Walk To The Gulf.djvu/238

Rh changed, and I could detect strange sounds in the winds. Now I began to feel myself "a stranger in a strange land."

But in Florida came the greatest change of all, for here grows the palmetto, and here blow the winds so strangely toned by them. These palms and these winds severed the last strands of the cord that united me with home. Now I was a stranger, indeed. I was delighted, astonished, confounded, and gazed in wonderment blank and overwhelming as if I had fallen upon another star. But in all of this long, complex series of changes, one of the greatest, and the last of all, was the change I found in the tone and language of the winds. They no longer came with the old home music gathered from open prairies and waving fields of oak, but they passed over many a strange string. The leaves of magnolia, smooth like polished steel, the immense inverted forests of tillandsia banks, and the princely crowns of palms—upon these the winds made strange music, and at the coming-on of night had


text:
Translation talk:The Evolution of Space and Time

Subtleties of translation
- Le monde" vs "l'univers": Langevin makes a distinction between "le monde", apparently the material world or universe, and "l'univers", which term he uses exclusively for Minkowski's "world of events", as it is typically called in English. And "laws of the universe" would make more sense than "laws of the world", since "universe" is more commonly used for the material world. I already translated "univers" by "world" and I think that it is consistent and clarifying to also translate "monde" by "universe", although it's the opposite of what an apparently literal translation would give. I'll now make this consistent throughout the text (incl. "laws of the universe"). -> Two exceptions came up, which I kept "world": "outside world" (=the universe, "outside universe" isn't English), and "our world"(=the Earth). And I reversed to "conception of the world" in the introduction, as "conception of the universe" sounds weird and it doesn't really matter.

I also noted the subtle difference between "d'univers" and "de l'univers", and followed that difference in translation.

- velocity vs speed Any preferences? I would advice to translate consistently with "velocity" as is common in old English translations.

- "sense" or "meaning" I think that it makes sense (pun intended) to translate "sens" everywhere with "sense"; I noticed no place where this would be inappropriate. Any other opinions?

Harald88 (talk) 20:24, 7 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks, I have no objections. --D.H (talk) 10:37, 8 November 2010 (UTC)

Once "proofread"
I now finished going through it once, verifying with a photocopy of the original (which also led to a correction in the French); but there were so many corrections, that probably someone else should do a true "proofreading" of the resulting English text. Harald88 (talk) 22:34, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

 * Ok, I put the template "proof-eng" in the article. Thanks for your corrections. --D.H (talk) 09:07, 2 December 2010 (UTC)


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Rh power to present the distance from friends and home, and the completeness of my isolation from all things familiar.

Elsewhere I have already noted that when I was a day's journey from the Gulf, a wind blew upon me from the sea—the first sea-breeze that had touched me in twenty years. I was plodding along with my satchel and plants, leaning wearily forward, a little sore from approaching fever, when suddenly I felt the salt air, and before I had time to think, a whole flood of long-dormant associations rolled in upon me. The Firth of Forth, the Bass Rock, Dunbar Castle, and the winds and rocks and hills came upon the wings of that wind, and stood in as clear and sudden light as a landscape flashed upon the view by a blaze of lightning in a dark night.

I like to cling to a small chip of a ship like ours when the sea is rough, and long, comet-tailed streamers are blowing from the curled top of every wave. A big vessel responds awkwardly with mixed gestures to several waves


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Rh at once, lumbering along like a loose floating island. But our little schooner, buoyant as a gull, glides up one side and down the other of each wave hill in delightful rhythm. As we advanced the scenery increased in grandeur and beauty. The waves heaved higher and grew wider, with corresponding motion. It was delightful to ride over this unsullied country of ever-changing water, and when looking upward from the shallow vales, or abroad over the round expanse from the tops of the wave hills, I almost forgot at times that the glassy, treeless country was forbidden to walkers. How delightful it would be to ramble over it on foot, enjoying the transparent crystal ground, and the music of its rising and falling hillocks, unmarred by the ropes and spars of a ship; to study the plants of these waving plains and their stream-currents; to sleep in wild weather in a bed of phosphorescent wave-foam, or briny scented seaweeds; to see the fishes by night in pathways of phosphorescent light; to walk the glassy plain in calm, with birds and flocks of


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Rh glittering flying fishes here and there, or by night with every star pictured in its bosom!

But even of the land only a small portion is free to man, and if he, among other journeys on forbidden paths, ventures among the ice lands and hot lands, or up in the air in balloon bubbles, or on the ocean in ships, or down into it a little way in smothering diving-bells—in all such small adventures man is admonished and often punished in ways which clearly show him that he is in places for which, to use an approved phrase, he was never designed. However, in view of the rapid advancement of our time, no one can tell how far our star may finally be subdued to man's will. At all events I enjoyed this drifting locomotion to some extent.

The tar-scented community of a ship is a study in itself—a despotism on the small territory of a few drifting planks pinned together. But as our crew consisted only of four sailors, a mate, and the captain, there were no signs of despotism. We all dined at one table,


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Rh enjoying our fine store of salt mackerel and plum duff, with endless abundance of oranges. Not only was the hold of our little ship filled with loose, unboxed oranges, but the deck also was filled up level with the rails, and we had to walk over the top of the golden fruit on boards.

Flocks of flying fishes often flew across the ship, one or two occasionally falling among the oranges. These the sailors were glad to capture to sell in New York as curiosities, or to give away to friends. But the captain had a large Newfoundland dog who got the largest share of these unfortunate fishes. He used to jump from a dozing sleep as soon as he heard the fluttering of their wings, then pounce and feast leisurely on them before the sailors could reach the spot where they fell.

In passing through the Straits of Florida the winds died away and the sea was smoothed to unruffled calm. The water here is very transparent and of delightfully pure pale-blue color, as different from ordinary dull-colored water


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Rh as town smoke from mountain air. I could see the bottom as distinctly as one sees the ground when riding over it. It seemed strange that our ship should be upborne in such an ethereal liquid as this, and that we did not run aground where the bottom seemed so near.

One morning, while among the Bahama dots of islands, we had calm sky and calm sea. The sun had risen in cloudless glory, when I observed a large flock of flying fish, a short distance from us, closely pursued by a dolphin. These fish-swallows rose in pretty good order, skimmed swiftly ahead for fifty or a hundred yards in a low arc, then dipped below the surface. Dripping and sparkling, they rose again in a few seconds and glanced back into the lucid brine with wonderful speed, but without apparent terror.

At length the dolphin, gaining on the flock, dashed into the midst of them, and now all order was at an end. They rose in scattering disorder, in all directions, like a flock of birds charged by a hawk. The pursuing dolphin also


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Rh leaped into the air, showing his splendid colors and wonderful speed. After the first scattering flight all steady pursuit was useless, and the dolphin had but to pounce about in the broken mob of its weary prey until satisfied with his meal.

We are apt to look out on the great ocean and regard it as but a half-blank part of our globe—a sort of desert, "a waste of water." But, land animals though we be, land is about as unknown to us as the sea, for the turbid glances we gain of the ocean in general through commercial eyes are comparatively worthless. Now that science is making comprehensive surveys of the life of the sea, and the forms of its basins, and similar surveys are being made into the land deserts, hot and cold, we may at length discover that the sea is as full of life as the land. None can tell how far man’s knowledge may yet reach.

After passing the Straits and sailing up the coast, when about opposite the south end of the Carolina coast, we had stiff head winds all the


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To California way to New York and our able little vessel was drenched all day long. Of course our load of oranges suffered, and since they were boarded over level with the rail, we had difficulty in walking and had many chances of being washed overboard. The flying fishes off Cape Hatteras appeared to take pleasure in shooting across from wave-top to wave-top. They avoided the ship during the day, but frequently fell among the oranges at night. The sailors caught many, but our big Newfoundland dog jumped for them faster than the sailors, and so almost monopolized the game.

When dark night fell on the stormy sea, the breaking waves of phosphorescent light were a glorious sight. On such nights I stood on the bowsprit holding on by a rope for hours in order to enjoy this phenomenon. How wonderful this light is! Developed in the sea by myriads of organized beings, it gloriously illuminates the pathways of the fishes, and every breaking wave, and in some places glows over large areas like sheet lightning. We sailed through large


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Rh fields of seaweed, of which I procured specimens. I thoroughly enjoyed life in this novel little tar-and-oakum home, and, as the end of our voyage drew nigh, I was sorry at the thought of leaving it.

We were now, on the twelfth day, approaching New York, the big ship metropolis. We were in sight of the coast all day. The leafless trees and the snow appeared wonderfully strange. It was now about the end of February and snow covered the ground nearly to the water's edge. Arriving, as we did, in this rough winter weather from the intense heat and general tropical luxuriance of Cuba, the leafless, snow-white woods of New York struck us with all the novelty and impressiveness of a new world. A frosty blast was sweeping seaward from Sandy Hook. The sailors explored their wardrobes for their long-cast-off woolens, and pulled the ropes and managed the sails while muffled in clothing to the rotundity of Eskimos. For myself, long burdened with fever, the frosty wind, as it sifted through my loosened bones,


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User:Frozen Wind

simplewiki

title: User:Frozen Wind


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Rh was more delicious and grateful than ever was a spring-scented breeze.

We now had plenty of company; fleets of vessels were on the wing from all countries. Our taut little racer outwinded without exception all who, like her, were going to the port. Toward evening we were grinding and wedging our way through the ice-field of the river delta, which we passed with difficulty. Arrived in port at nine o clock. The ship was deposited, like a cart at market, in a proper slip, and next morning we and our load of oranges, one third rotten, were landed. Thus all the purposes of our voyage were accomplished.

On our arrival the captain, knowing something of the lightness of my purse, told me that I could continue to occupy my bed on the ship until I sailed for California, getting my meals at a near-by restaurant. "This is the way we are all doing," he said. Consulting the newspapers, I found that the first ship, the Nebraska, sailed for Aspinwall in about ten days, and that the steerage passage to


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Rh San Francisco by way of the Isthmus was only forty dollars.

In the mean time I wandered about the city without knowing a single person in it. My walks extended but little beyond sight of my little schooner home. I saw the name Central Park on some of the street-cars and thought I would like to visit it, but, fearing that I might not be able to find my way back, I dared not make the adventure. I felt completely lost in the vast throngs of people, the noise of the streets, and the immense size of the buildings. Often I thought I would like to explore the city if, like a lot of wild hills and valleys, it was clear of inhabitants.

The day before the sailing of the Panama ship I bought a pocket map of California and allowed myself to be persuaded to buy a dozen large maps, mounted on rollers, with a map of the world on one side and the United States on the other. In vain I said I had no use for them. "But surely you want to make money in California, don’t you? Everything out there is very


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Rh sometime I should be able to return and enjoy and study this most glorious of forests to my heart's content. We reached San Francisco about the first of April, and I remained there only one day, before starting for Yosemite Valley.

I followed the Diablo foothills along the San Jose Valley to Gilroy, thence over the Diablo Mountains to the valley of the San Joaquin by the Pacheco Pass, thence down the valley opposite the mouth of the Merced River, thence across the San Joaquin, and up into the Sierra Nevada to the mammoth trees of Mariposa, and the glorious Yosemite, and thence down the Merced to this place. The goodness of the weather as I journeyed toward Pacheco was beyond all praise and description—fragrant, mellow, and bright. The sky was perfectly delicious, sweet enough for the breath of angels; every draught of it gave a separate and distinct


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Tolstoy on Lincoln

Tolstoi Holds Lincoln World’s Greatest Hero by Count S. Stakelberg (Written Especially for The World.)

Visiting Leo Tolstoi in Yasnaya with the intention of getting him to write an article on Lincoln, I unfortunately found him not well enough to yield to my request. However, he was willing to give me his opinion of the great American statesman, and this is what he told me:

“Of all the great national heroes and statesmen of history Lincoln is the only real giant. Alexander, Frederick the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, Gladstone and even Washington stand in greatness of character, in depth of feeling and in a certain moral power far behind Lincoln. Lincoln was a man of whom a nation has a right to be proud; he was a Christ in miniature, a saint of humanity, whose name will live thousands of years in the legends of future generations. We are still too near to his greatness, and so can hardly appreciate his divine power; but after a few centuries more our posterity will find him considerably bigger than we do. His genius is still too strong and too powerful for the common understanding, just as the sun is too hot when its light beams directly on us.

“If one would know the greatness of Lincoln one should listen to the stories which are told about him in other parts of the world. I have been in wild places, where one hears the name of America uttered with such mystery as if it were some heaven or hell. I have heard various tribes of barbarians discussing the New World, but I heard this only in connection with the name of Lincoln. Lincoln as the wonderful hero of America is known by the most primitive nations of Asia. This may be illustrated through the following incident:

“Once while travelling in the Caucasus I happened to be the guest of a Caucasian chief of the Circassians, who, living far away from civilized life in the mountains, had but a fragmentary and childish comprehension of the world and its history. The fingers of civilization had never reached him nor his tribe, and all life beyond his native valleys was a dark mystery. Being a Mussulman he was naturally opposed to all ideas of progress and education.

“I was received with the usual Oriental hospitality and after our meal was asked by my host to tell him something of my life. Yielding to his request I began to tell him of my profession, of the development of our industries and inventions and of the schools. He listened to everything with indifference, but when I began to tell about the great statesmen and the great generals of the world he seemed at once to become very much interested.

“‘Wait a moment,’ he interrupted, after I had talked a few minutes. ‘I want all my neighbors and my sons to listen to you. I will call them immediately.’

“He soon returned with a score of wild looking riders and asked me politely to continue. It was indeed a solemn moment when those sons of the wilderness sat around me on the floor and gazed at me as if hungering for knowledge. I spoke at first of our Czars and of their victories; then I spoke of the foreign rulers and of some of the greatest military leaders. My talk seemed to impress them deeply. The story of Napoleon was so interesting to them that I had to tell them every detail, as, for instance, how his hands looked, how tall he was, who made his guns and pistols and the color of his horse. It was very difficult to satisfy them and to meet their point of view, but I did my best. When I declared that I had finished my talk, my host, a gray-bearded, tall rider, rose, lifted his hand and said very gravely:

“‘But you have not told us a syllable about the greatest general and greatest ruler of the world. We want to know something about him. He was a hero. He spoke with a voice of thunder; he laughed like the sunrise and his deeds were strong as the rock and as sweet as the fragrance of roses. The angels appeared to his mother and predicted that the son whom she would conceive would become the greatest the stars had ever seen. He was so great that he even forgave the crimes of his greatest enemies and shook brotherly hands with those who had plotted against his life. His name was Lincoln and the country in which he lived is called America, which is so far away that if a youth should journey to reach it he would be an old man when he arrived. Tell us of that man.’

“‘Tell us, please, and we will present you with the best horse of our stock,’ shouted the others.

“I looked at them and saw their faces all aglow, while their eyes were burning. I saw that those rude barbarians were really interested in a man whose name and deeds had already become a legend. I told them of Lincoln and his wisdom, of his home life and youth. They asked me ten questions to one which I was able to answer. They wanted to know all about his habits, his influence upon the people and his physical strength. But they were very astonished to hear that Lincoln made a sorry figure on a horse and that he lived such a simple life.

“‘Tell us why he was killed,’ one of them said.

“I had to tell everything. After all my knowledge of Lincoln was exhausted they seemed to be satisfied. I can hardly forget the great enthusiasm which they expressed in their wild thanks and desire to get a picture of the great American hero. I said that I probably could secure one from my friend in the nearest town, and this seemed to give them great pleasure.

“The next morning when I left the chief a wonderful Arabian horse was brought me as a present for my marvellous story, and our farewell was very impressive.

“One of the riders agreed to accompany me to the town and get the promised picture, which I was now bound to secure at any price. I was successful in getting a large photograph from my friend, and I handed it to the man with my greetings to his associates. It was interesting to witness the gravity of his face and the trembling of his hands when he received my present. He gazed for several minutes silently, like one in a reverent prayer; his eyes filled with tears. He was deeply touched and I asked him why he became so sad. After pondering my question for a few moments he replied:

“‘I am sad because I feel sorry that he had to die by the hand of a villain. Don’t you find, judging from his picture, that his eyes are full of tears and that his lips are sad with a secret sorrow?’

“Like all Orientals, he spoke in a poetical way and left me with many deep bows.

“This little incident proves how largely the name of Lincoln is worshipped throughout the world and how legendary his personality has become.

“Now, why was Lincoln so great that he overshadows all other national heroes? He really was not a great general like Napoleon or Washington; he was not such a skilful statesman as Gladstone or Frederick the Great; but his supremacy expresses itself altogether in his peculiar moral power and in the greatness of his character. He had come through many hardships and much experience to the realization that the greatest human achievement is love. He was what Beethoven was in music, Dante in poetry, Raphael in painting, and Christ in the philosophy of life. He aspired to be divine— and he was.

“It is natural that before he reached his goal he had to walk the highway of mistakes. But we find him, nevertheless, in every tendency true to one main motive, and that was to benefit mankind. He was one who wanted to be great through his smallness. If he had failed to become President he would be, no doubt, just as great as he is now, but only God could appreciate it. The judgment of the world is usually wrong in the beginning, and it takes centuries to correct it. But in the case of Lincoln the world was right from the start. Sooner or later Lincoln would have been seen to be a great man, even though he had never been an American President. But it would have taken a great generation to place him where he belongs.

“Lincoln died prematurely by the hand of the assassin, and naturally we condemn the criminal from our viewpoint of justice. But the question is, was his death not predestined by a divine wisdom, and was it not better for the nation and for his greatness that he died just in that way and at that particular moment? We know so little about that divine law which we call fate that no one can answer. Christ had a presentiment of His death, and there are indications that also Lincoln had strange dreams and presentiments of something tragic. If that was really the fact, can we conceive that human will could have prevented the outcome of the universal or divine will? I doubt it. I doubt also that Lincoln could have done more to prove his greatness than he did. I am convinced we are but instruments in the hands of an unknown power and that we have to follow its bidding to the end. We have a certain apparent independence, according to our moral character, wherein we may benefit our fellows, but in all eternal and universal questions we follow blindly a divine predestination. According to that eternal law the greatest of national heroes had to die, but an immortal glory still shines on his deeds.

“However, the highest heroism is that which is based on humanity, truth, justice and pity; all other forms are doomed to forgetfulness. The greatness of Aristotle or Kant is insignificant compared with the greatness of Buddha, Moses and Christ. The greatness of Napoleon, Caesar or Washington is only moonlight by the sun of Lincoln. His example is universal and will last thousands of years. Washington was a typical American, Napoleon was a typical Frenchman, but Lincoln was a humanitarian as broad as the world. He was bigger than his country— bigger than all the Presidents together. Why? Because he loved his enemies as himself and because he was a universal individualist who wanted to see himself in the world— not the world in himself. He was great through his simplicity and was noble through his charity.

“Lincoln is a strong type of those who make for truth and justice, for brotherhood and freedom. Love is the foundation of his life. That is what makes him immortal and that is the quality of a giant. I hope that his centenary birth day will create an impulse toward righteousness among the nations. Lincoln lived and died a hero, and as a great character he will live as long as the world lives. May his life long bless humanity!”

title: Tolstoy on Lincoln


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Rh dear. We'll sell you a dozen of these fine maps for two dollars each and you can easily sell them in California for ten dollars apiece." I foolishly allowed myself to be persuaded. The maps made a very large, awkward bundle, but fortunately it was the only baggage I had except my little plant press and a small bag. I laid them in my berth in the steerage, for they were too large to be stolen and concealed.

There was a savage contrast between life in the steerage and my fine home on the little ship fruiter. Never before had I seen such a barbarous mob, especially at meals. Arrived at Aspinwall-Colon, we had half a day to ramble about before starting across the Isthmus. Never shall I forget the glorious flora, especially for the first fifteen or twenty miles along the Chagres River. The riotous exuberance of great forest trees, glowing in purple, red, and yellow flowers, far surpassed anything I had ever seen, especially of flowering trees, either in Florida or Cuba. I gazed from the car-platform enchanted. I fairly cried for joy and hoped that


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