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Ford v. Surget/Concurrence Clifford

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD concurred in the judgment of the court, and delivered the following opinion:--

Parties belligerent in a public war are independent nations; but it is not necessary that both parties should be acknowledged as such in order to the enjoyment of belligerent rights, as war may exist where one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights against the other, the rule being, that when the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the courts of justice cannot be open, civil war exists, and hostilities may be prosecuted to the same extent as in public war. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 666; Vattel, 425.

Two hundred bales of cotton owned by the plaintiff were burned by the defendant, during the war of the rebellion, at the time and place alleged in the declaration; and the plaintiff, since the restoration of peace, instituted the present action of trespass, in the State court, to recover damages for the loss. Service was made, and the defendant appeared and pleaded the general issue and several special pleas.

Reference need only be made to two of the special pleas: 1. That the defendant burned the cotton in obedience to an order of the Confederate States, given through the commanding general of their army and the acting provost-marshal of the county. 2. That the Confederate congress passed an act that it should be the duty of all military commanders in the service of the Confederate States to destroy all cotton, tobacco, or other property that might be useful to the enemy (meaning the military forces of the United States), whenever in their judgment the same should be about to fall into their hands, and that the defendant burned the cotton in litigation in pursuance of that act and the said orders of the said military commander and provost-marshal.

Suffice it to say, in this connection, the plaintiff demurred to all the special pleas; and the subordinate court overruled the demurrers, and the parties went to trial. Hearing was had before the jury, and they returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judgment was accordingly rendered upon the verdict; and the plaintiff removed the cause to the high court of errors and appeals of the State, where the parties were again heard, and the State appellate court affirmed the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction. No exceptions were filed by the plaintiff in either of the subordinate courts, but he sued out the present writ of error, and removed the cause into this court.

Since the case was entered here, the plaintiff assigns the following errors: 1. That the Supreme Court of the State erred in sustaining the Circuit Court in overruling the demurrers of the plaintiff to the special pleas filed by the defendant. 2. That the Supreme Court of the State erred in refusing to grant certain instructions to the jury, which cannot be considered, it not appearing that there was any trial by jury in the Supreme Court; nor would either party be benefited if it were otherwise, as all the material questions presented for decision in the prayers for instruction are involved in the rulings of the court in overruling plaintiff's demurrers to the defendant's special pleas.

Insurrection may or may not culminate in an organized rebellion, and it may or may not assume such aggressive proportions as to be justly denominated territorial war, the universal rule being that rebellion becomes such, if at all, by virtue of its numbers and the organization and power of the persons who originate it and are engaged in its prosecution. But when the party in rebellion hold and occupy certain portions of the territory of the rightful sovereign, and have declared their independence, cast off their allegiance, and formed a new government, and have organized armies and raised supplies to support it, and to oppose, and if possible to destroy, the government from which they have separated, the world and the law of nations acknowledge them as belligerents engaged in civil war, because they claim to be in arms to establish their liberty and independence in order to become a sovereign State.

History furnishes many examples of war between the government de jure of a country and a government de facto of a seceding portion of the same country; and in such cases jurists hold that other powers are entitled to remain indifferent spectators of the contest, and to allow impartially to both belligerents the free exercise of those rights which war gives to pubilc enemies against each other, such as the right of search, the right of blockade, the right of capturing contraband of war and enemy's property laden in neutral vessels. Twiss, Law of Nations (2d ed.), sect. 239.

Rebellions of the kind, when they become too formidable to be suppressed by the duly constituted civil authorities, authorize the de jure government to blockade the ports within the territory occupied by the insurgents, and to notify the same to foreign powers that the same will be enforced pursuant to the law of nations. Official notice of such a proclamation makes it the duty of foreign nations to conform to the international rules of war in that regard; and the same jurist says that the foreign power must at once decide upon one of three alternative courses of action. It may assist the government de jure as an independent power, or it may assist the insurgents, in either of which cases it becomes a party to the war; or it may remain impartial, still continuing to treat the government de jure as an independent power, whilst it treats the insurgents as a community entitled to the rights of war against its adversary. Such a concession is indispensable, as the neutral power will find it impossible to recognize the character of one as a belligerent without recognizing the belligerent character of the other, unless the war is confined entirely within the territory of the contending parties and does not extend in any respect to the highway of nations. Id. p. 500.

Belligerents engaged in war may exercise the right of blockade, and they may capture contraband of war and enemies' property laden in neutral vessels; and if so, the contest, though it originated in rebellion, must in the progress of events, when it assumes such proportions as to be justly denominated civil war, be recognized as entitling both parties to the rights of war just as much as if it was waged between two independent nations.

Lawful blockade can only be established by a belligerent party, the rule being that a neutral country has a right to trade with all other countries in time of peace, and when in time of war the right is subjected to the conditions or restrictions resulting from blockade, the interruption of the untrammelled right can only be justified because the party imposing the conditions and restrictions is invested with belligerent rights under the law of nations. Ex parte Chavasse, In re Grazebrook, 4 De G., J. & S. 655; The Helen, Law Rep. 1 Ad. & Ec. 1; DeBurgh, Marine Int. Law, 123; The Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 340.

Independent powers at war may seize and confiscate all contraband goods, without any complaint the part of the neutral merchant; and that right is conceded even when one of the parties is not acknowledged as a de jure government, in case of insurrection, where the contest has assumed such proportions as justly constitute it a civil war in the international sense. 1 Kent, Com. (12th ed.) 92.

Other nations as well as the United States conceded belligerent rights to the Confederate States, as all admit, which renders it unnecessary to inquire whether the concession was rightful or premature. Matters to be taken into the account in determining such a question, it is said, are whether the insurgents present the existence of a de facto political organization, sufficient in character, population, and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations reasonably capable of discharging the duties of such an organization. Due weight should be given to the then existing character of the actual conflict, having respect to the military force on each side and the action of the parties in conducting military operations against each other; as whether or not they conduct such operations in accordance with the rules and customs of war, as by the use of flags of truce, cartels, and exchange of prisoners, and whether the parent State treats captured insurgents as prisoners of war. Inquirty may also properly arise whether the insurgents have employed commissioned cruisers at sea, and whether the rightful government has exercised the right to blockade the ports of the insurgents against neutral vessels merce, and that of stopping and searching neutral vessels engaged in maritime commerce. If all these elements exist, says Dana, the condition of things is undoubtedly war, and it may be war before they are all ripened into activity. Dana's Wheaton, p. 34, note.

Apply those rules to the case, and it is as clear as any thing in legal decision can be, that the Confederate States were belligerents in the sense attached to that word by the law of nations. During the military occupation of the territory within the Confederate lines the sovereignty of the United States was so far suspended, that the Federal laws could no longer be enforced there, and the inhabitants passed under a forced allegiance, and were bound by such laws as the usurping government saw fit to recognize and impose. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 254.

Civil war, says Vattel, breaks the bands of society and government, or at least suspends their operation and effect; for it produces in the nation two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties, therefore, must necessarily be considered as thenceforward constituting, at least for a time, two separate bodies, two distinct societies. Though one of the parties may have been to blame in breaking the unity of the State and resisting the lawful authority, they, the two parties, are not the less divided in fact. . . . They stand, therefore, in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest, and being unable to come to an agreement have recourse to arms.

Publicists and courts of justice everywhere concur in these sentiments, and in certain corollaries which the author deduces from the attending circumstances; to wit, that the common laws of war-those maxims of humanity, moderation, and justice previously pointed out-ought to be observed by both parties in such a conflict. Vattel, 425.

For the same reasons which render the observance of those maxims a matter of obligation between State and State, it becomes equally and even more necessary in the unhappy circumstance of two incensed parties in the case of civil war. Should the sovereign conceive that he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will make reprisals, as in the example given in the note, and if he does not observe the terms of the capitulations and all other conventions with his enemies, they will no longer rely on his word. Should he burn and ravage, they will follow his example, and the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day more destructive to the nation.

War, it is said, may exist without a formal declaration; and the decision of the court is, that the laws of war as established among nations have their foundation in reason, and tend to mitigate the cruelties and miseries which such conflicts produce. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 669. Hence, say the court, the parties to a civil war usually concede to each other belligerent rights, for they exchange prisoners, and adopt the other courtesies and rules common to public or national war; nor is it necessary that the independence of the revolted province or State should be acknowledged in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a war, according to the law of nations; and the reason given for the rule is one of frequent illustration, which is, that foreign nations acknowledge it as war by a declaration of neutrality, of which two examples are given in the opinion of the court from which these rules are drawn. 1. When the United States recognized the existence of civil war between Spain and her colonies. The Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 327. 2. When the Queen of England issued her proclamation of neutrality recognizing hostilities as existing between the United States and the Confederate States.

Other nations followed with a similar declaration or by silent acquiescence; and in speaking of that fact this court say, that a citizen of a foreign State, in view of such a recognition, is estopped to deny the existence of a war, with all its consequences as regards neutrals. They cannot ask a court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the government and paralyze its power.

Such a war usually operates as a temporary suspension of obedience of the revolting party to the lawful sovereign; but other nations may, until the revolution is consummated, remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, treating the government as sovereign and the new government as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy, or they may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfils all its obligations under the law of nations, and neither party has any right to complain, provided that it maintains an impartial neutrality; but in the latter case, the foreign State becomes the enemy of the party against which it declares, and the ally of the other. Lawrence's Wheaton, 40, and notes.

Belligerent rights cannot be exercised when there are no belligerents. Conquest of a foreign country, if permanent, gives absolute and unlimited right; but no nation can make such a conquest of its own territory. If a hostile power, either from without or within a nation, takes possession and holds absolute dominion over any portion of its territory, and the nation by force of arms expels or overthrows the enemy and suppresses hostilities, it acquires no new title, but merely regains the possession of what it had been temporarily deprived. Id. 605; The Amy Warwick and Cargo, 24 Law Reporter, 494.

Cotton was the article destroyed, which was the subject during the war of special legislation by each belligerent power. It was treated by the army, the navy, and the civil arm of each as possessing extraordinary qualities, and as different from other property, even in the hands of non-combatants. It formed the basis of the credit which the Confederates were seeking to establish abroad for the prosecution of the war. Its retention in the Southern States and withdrawal from market, except when for war purposes, were considered by the Confederate authorities as of vital importance; for it was hoped that its withdrawal from market would hasten a recognition of the independence of the States in rebellion, and the raising of the blockade which was destroying their resources and crippling their armies.

Prior to the burning of the cotton, the Confederate congress had directed by a legislative act, as a war measure, that cotton and tobacco liable to fall into the hands of the Federal forces should be destroyed; and the history of the period shows that immense quantities of these articles were accordingly destroyed. Regulations upon the subject were adopted by the authorities of the United States; and those regulations, as well as the decisions of the Federal courts, show that both the civil and military authorities deemed it of great importance, to prevent its accumulation in the hands of the Confederate authorities.

Capture of cotton, says Mr. Chief Justice Chase, seems to have been justified by the peculiar character of the property and by positive legislation. It is well known that cotton constituted the main reliance of the rebels to purchase the munitions of war in the foreign market, and it is matter of history that rather than permit it to come into the possession of the national troops, the rebel government everywhere deboted it, however owned, to destruction. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 420.

Judicial history shows that, early in 1861, the authorities of seven States, supported by popular majorities, combined for the overthrow of the national Union, and for the establishment within its boundaries of a separate and independent confederation. Pursuant thereto, a governmental organization representing those States was established at Montgomery, first under a provisional constitution, and afterwards under a constitution intended to be permanent. In the course of a few months four other States acceded to that confederation, and the seat of the central authority was transferred to Richmond. It was by the central authority thus organized and under its direction that civil war was prosecuted, upon a vast scale, against the United States for more than four years, and its power was recognized as supreme in nearly the whole of the territory of the States confederated in insurrection. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 7.

Difficulty, says the Chief Justice, would attend the effort to define the precise character of such a government; but he continues to remark to the effect that the principles relating to de facto government will conduct to a conclusion sufficiently accurate. Examples of a de facto government are given by him, where the usurpers expelled the regular authorities from their customary seats and functions, and established themselves in their places, and so became the actual government.

Such adherents to a usurping party in certain cases may not incur the penalty of treason, as the de jure government when restored usually respects their public acts; but the Confederate States were never acknowledged by the United States as a de facto government in that enlarged sense. Instead of that, it was regarded as simply the military representative of the insurrection, notwithstanding the duration and vast proportions of the revolt. Eleven States were engaged in it, and the prior existing governments were overthrown and new governments erected in their stead, in violation of the Constitution and the acts of Congress; and yet it cannot be denied but that by the use of these unlawful and unconstitutional means a government in fact was erected, greater in territory than most of the European governments, complete in the organization of all its parts, containing within its limits more than eleven millions of people, and of sufficient resources in men and money to carry on a civil war of unexampled dimensions from the period of its commencement to its final termination, during all of which time many belligerent rights were conceded to it by the United States; such as the treatment of captives both on land and sea as prisoners of war, the exchange of prisoners as in international war, their vessels captured recognized as prizes of war and dealt with accordingly, their property seized on land referred to the judicial tribunals for adjudication, their ports blockaded and the blockade maintained by a suitable force, and notified to neutral powers the same as in open and public war. Mauran v. Insurance Company, 6 Wall. 1.

Governments de facto are described by Mr. Chief Justice Chase as divided into classes; and, after having given a description of two of the classes, he remarks that there is another, called by publicists a de facto government, but which might perhaps be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics as given by that magistrate are as follows: 1. That while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed, in civil matters, by private citizens, who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible as wrong-doers for those acts, though the acts are not warranted by the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered also by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. 2. Historical examples are then given of that sort of de facto government; to wit, the temporary government at Castine during the war of 1812, and the temporary government at Tampico during the Mexican war. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 253; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 615; The Nuestra Senora, 4 Wheat. 502.

Those were cases where regular enemy governments acquired the temporary possession of territory during war with the country of which the territory so possessed was a part; and this court adverted to that difference in the case under consideration, but decided unanimously that the government of the insurgent States must be classed among the governments of which those are examples. Among the reasons assigned in support of the conclusion were the following: 1. That rights and obligations of belligerence were conceded to it in its military character very soon after the war began, from motives of humanity and expediency. 2. That the whole territory controlled by it was thereafter held to be enemies' territory, and the inhabitants of the territory were held, in most respects, as enemies; and, as a final conclusion, the court decided that to the extent of the actual supremacy maintained, however unlawfully acquired, the power of the insurgent government cannot be questioned. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 11; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 3, sect. 21, p. 74; United States v. Klintock, 3 Wheat. 150.

Attempt was made early in the war of the rebellion to maintain the theory that the officers and seamen of the Confederate cruisers were pirates, and not entitled to belligerent rights in case of capture. Ships and cargoes at sea were destroyed by such cruisers, and the owners, holding policies of insurance, brought suits to recover for the loss. Payment in certain cases was refused, the defence being that the policies did not cover the loss where the capture was by pirates. Such a case was presented to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, but the court decided that the persons who seized and burned the ship were not to be regarded as pirates, within the ordinary signification of that word as used in the law of nations, or as commonly understood and applied in maritime contracts and adventures; that they were not common robbers and plunderers on the high seas. The court admitted that the acts of the cruisers were unlawful, and that they could not be justified in the courts of justice, but it proceeded to state that the proofs offered showed that they acted under a semblance of authority which took their case out of that class which can be properly termed ordinary piracy; that the proofs offered showed that they sailed under a letter of marque issued by a government de facto, claiming to exercise sovereign powers, and to be authorized to clothe their officers and agents with the rights of belligerents and to send out armed cruisers for the purpose of taking enemy's vessels jure belli.

Nor is that all. It was also offered to be proved that at the time of the loss the de facto government had proceeded to raise armies and put them into the field, by which an actually existing state of war between it and the United States was created, which had led two of the leading nations of Europe to recognize the persons who had thus conspired together against the authority of the United States as exercising the rights and entitled to the privileges of a belligerent power. Such a seizure, under such circumstances, by an armed cruiser of such de facto government, the court held was a capture within the meaning of the policy, and that the insurers were not liable for the loss. Dole and Another v. Merchants' Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 6 Allen (Mass.), 373; Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 495.

Two cases of a similar character were pending at the same time in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, both of which were decided in favor of the insurers upon the same ground. In the first case, the facts were agreed between the parties, as will be seen by the report of the case. Dole et al. v. New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 2 Cliff. 394. Both judges sat in the case, and their united opinion is fully reported. They decided that, where a ship was taken and burned by the commander of a rebel privateer during the late rebellion, the capture was not a taking by pirates or assailing thieves, inasmuch as it appeared that the policy was executed before the rebellion broke out, and that the commander acted under a commission in due form issued by the government of the rebellious States, and it appears that both parties acquiesced in the decision of the court.

Nor could they well do otherwise, as the agreed statement showed that the rebel States before the loss occurred had organized a confederacy and a government for the same, and had established a written constitution; that such a form of government was in fact organized in all its departments,-legislative, executive, and judicial; that they had raised and organized an army and created a navy, elected a congress, and published a legislative act declaring that war existed between the United States and the Confederate States, and providing measures for its vigorous prosecution; that they were carrying on hostilities at the time the loss occurred against the United States by land and sea, and were in the exercise of all the functions of government over all the territory within their actual military limits.

Pressed with those facts, the plaintiff abandoned the further prosecution of the claim in the first suit, and sued out a writ of error in the second, which was subsequently heard and decided in this court. Mauran v. Insurance Company, 6 Wall. 1. Offers of proof in this case occupied the place of an agreed statement of facts in the other; but the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that the Confederate States were in the possession of many of the highest attributes of government, sufficiently so to be regarded as the ruling or supreme power of the country within their military dominion, and that captures made by their cruisers were excepted out of the policy by the warranty of the insured.

Questions of the same character were also presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time as those presented to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, where the questions were decided in the same way. Fifield v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 47 Pa. St. 166. Three opinions were given in the case, in addition to the opinion of the court delivered by the Chief Justice. His first effort was to show that the cruiser was not a pirate, in which he remarked, that if she was not a privateer she was a pirate, and that if she was a privateer she was made so by the commission she bore, the legal effect of which must depend upon the status of the Confederate States, in respect to which his conclusion was that any government, however violent and wrongful in its origin, must be considered a de facto government if it was in the full and actual exercise of sovereignty over a territory and people large enough for a nation; and he quotes Vattel in support of the proposition, and finally decided that the cruiser was a privateer and not a pirate, and that the loss was a capture within the excepting clause of the policy, and not a loss by pirates, rovers, or assailing thieves. Emerigon, Ins., c. 12, sects. 28, 412.

Mr. Justice Strong concurred in the judgment, and gave an elaborate opinion, in which he stated that he could not doubt that these revolting States, confederated as they had been, claiming and enforcing authority as they had done, were to be regarded as a government de facto.

Two objections to that proposition had been made at the bar: 1. That their claim of sovereignty had been constantly opposed; 2. That their boundaries were uncertain and undefined,-to both of which the judge responded to the effect that neither of the objections were satisfactory: that they were none the less a government de facto because they had had no interval of peaceful existence, nor because the geographical boundaries of the district over which their power is exclusively felt were not well defined.

Antecedent to that, the same court decided a similar case, which was also a marine risk, in the same way. Two points ruled by the court in that case are pertinent to the present investigation: 1. That the loss was covered by the policy, it being a case of capture by armed men professing to act under and by authority of the Confederate States. 2. That the government of the United States had so conducted the contest and so treated the Confederate States as to make it a war in substance as essentially as it could be between foreign powers. Monongahela Insurance Co. v. Chester, 43 Pa. St. 49; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 87.

Support to that proposition, of a decisive character, is found in the opinion of the court in the Prize Cases, in which Mr. Justice Grier says, It is no loose, unorganized insurrection, having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force. South of this line is enemies' property, because it is claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile, and belligerent power. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 674.

Corresponding litigation arose about the same time in other courts, and among the number in the Supreme Court of Maine, where the case was argued by the same eminent counsel as in that cited from the Massachusetts reports. Dole et al. v. Merchants' Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 51 Me. 465. Somewhat different views are expressed by the court, but it admits in conclusion that the decision might have been placed on a different ground, and proceeds to remark that war in fact existed at the time of the loss; that hostile forces, each representing a de facto government, were arrayed against each other in actual conflict. Its existence, says the court, would not have been more palpable or real if it had been recognized by legislative action, and though it was a civil war, it was not the less a capture for that reason. 51 id. 478; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 55.

During the late rebellion the Confederate States and the States composing it, say the Supreme Court of North Carolina, were to all intents and purposes governments de facto with reference to citizens who continued to reside within the Confederate lines; hence the Confederate States and the Constitution of the State and the acts of their congress constituted, as to such citizens, during the rebellion, the law of the land. Franklin v. Vannoy et al., 66 N. C. 145; Reynolds v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 420.

Where cotton was destroyed during the late war between the Confederate States and the United States by order of the county provost-marshal, acting in obedience to the orders of the Confederate commanding general, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the agent who obeyed these orders is not liable in an action by the owner to recover the value of the property, the court holding that the Confederate States had the rights of a belligerent power, and that it is a legitimate belligerent right to destory whatever property is the subject of seizure and condemnation, in order to prevent its falling into the hands and coming to the use of the enemy. Ford v. Surget, 46 Miss. 130. Exceptional cases supporting the opposite view may be found in the State reports; but they are not in accord with the decisions of this court, and are in direct conflict with the great weight of authority derived from the same source.

Without due examination, it may be supposed that support to the opposite theory is derived from the recent decision of this court, in which it is held that certain confiscation proceedings prosecuted under an act passed by the Confederate congress are void; but it requires no argument to show that the remarks upon the subject in the opinion of the court were wholly unnecessary to the decision, as the proceedings were obviously in aid of the rebellion, the intent and purpose of the prosecution having been to raise means to prosecute war against the United States. Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279. Authorities to show that all such acts are void are too numerous for citation, no matter what may have been the status of the Confederate States.

Certain decisions of this court hold that the acts of a body exercising an authority in an insurgent State as a legislature must be regarded as valid or invalid, according to the subjectmatter of legislation; but the Chief Justice decided in the case hereafter referred to that the governor, legislature, and judges of the State of Virginia, during the war, constituted a de facto government, giving as a reason for the conclusion that they exercised complete control over the greater part of the State, proceeding in all the forms of regular organized government, and occupying the capital of the State. Evans v. City of Richmond, Chase, Dec. 551.

Beyond all doubt, the Confederate government at the period of the alleged wrong was the supreme controlling power of the territory and people within the limits of their military dominion, and it is equally certain that the citizens resident within those limits were utterly destitute of means to resist compliance with military orders emanating from the commanding general, especially when given in obedience to an act of the Confederate congress. United States v. Grossmayger, 9 Wall. 75; Sprott v. United States, 20 id. 459.

Cotton during the war was regarded by both belligerents as the subject of seizure and condemnation, and as falling within that class of property which a belligerent might destroy to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy and augmenting his resources. Proof that the orders were given as alleged is sufficient, as that is fully admitted by the demurrer.

Unless the Confederate States may be regarded as having constituted a de facto government for the time or as the supreme controlling power within the limits of their exclusive military sway, then the officers and seamen of their privateers and the officers and soldiers of their army were mere pirates and insurgents, and every officer, seaman, or soldier who killed a Federal officer or soldier in battle, whether on land or the high seas, is liable to indictment, conviction, and sentence for the crime of murder, subject of course to the right to plead amnesty or pardon, if they can make good that defence. Once enter that domain of strife, and countless litigations of endless duration may arise to review old animosities and to renew and inflame domestic discord, without any public necessity or individual advantage. Wisdom suggests caution, and the counsels of caution forbid any such rash experiment.

Viewed in the light of these suggestions, I am of the opinion that there is no error in the record, and that the decree of the Supreme Court of the State should be affirmed.

title: Ford v. Surget/Concurrence Clifford


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Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park/Concurrence Miller

MR. JUSTICE MILLER.

I concur in the judgment of the court, but cannot agree to the principal argument by which it is supported in the opinion. As the question turns upon the existence of a contract and its nature, and not upon the power of the legislature to pass laws affecting the health and comfort of the community, a reference to them and to the power to repeal and modify them, where no contract is in question, is irrelevant. It is said that such contract as may be found in the present case was made subject to the police power of the legislature over the class of subjects to which it relates. The extent to which this is true depends upon the specific character of the contract and not upon the general doctrine. This court has repeatedly decided that a State may by contract bargain away her right of taxation. I have not concurred in that view, but it is the settled law of this court. If a State may make a contract on that subject which it cannot abrogate or repeal, it may, with far more reason, make a contract for a limited time for the removal of a continuing nuisance from a populous city.

The nuisance in the case before us was the very subject-matter of the contract. The consideration of the contract was that the company might and should do certain things which affected the health and comfort of the community; and the State can no more impair the obligation of that contract than it can resume the right of taxation which it has on valid consideration agreed not to exercise, because in either case the wisdom of its legislation has become doubtful.

If the good of the entire community requires the destruction of the company's rights under this contract, let the entire community pay therefore, by condemning the same for public use.

But I agree that contracts like this must be clearly established, and the powers of the legislature can only be limited by the express terms of the contract, or by what is necessarily implied. In the case before us, the company has two correlative rights in regard to the offal at the slaughter-houses in Chicago. One is to have within the limit of that city depots for receiving it, and the other is to carry it to a place in Cook County south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38. The city or the State legislature is not forbidden by the contract to locate such depots within the city, where the health of the city requires; in other words, the company has not the choice of location within the city. So, in regard to the chemical works. The company, by its contract, is entitled to have them in Cook County south of the line mentioned; but the precise locality within that large space is a fair subject of regulation by the police power of the State, or of any town to which it has been delegated. If within the limits of Hyde Park, that town may pass such laws concerning its health and comfort as may require the company to seek another location south of the designated line, without impairing the terms of the contract.

It is said that the only railroad by which the company can carry offal passes through Hyde Park, and that the ordinance is fatal to the use of the road. But the State did not contract that the company might carry by railroad, still less by that road. In short, in my opinion, there is within the limits of the original designation of boundary ample space where the company may exercise the power granted by the contract, without violating the ordinances of Hyde Park, and they, as a police regulation of health and comfort, are therefore valid, as not infringing that contract.

For this reason alone, I think the decree should be affirmed.

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Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park/Dissent Strong

MR. JUSTICE STRONG.

I cannot concur in the judgment directed by the court in this case. That the charter granted by the legislature, March 8, 1867, and accepted by the company, is a contract protected by the Constitution of the United States, cannot be denied, in the face of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), and the long line of decisions that have followed in its wake and reasserted its doctrines. And if the company holds its rights under and by force of the contract, those rights cannot be taken away or impaired, either directly or indirectly, by any subsequent legislation. This I believe to be incontrovertible, though the opinion just delivered may seem to express a doubt of it.

What, then, was the contract created by the charter and its acceptance? The first, second, and third sections constituted certain persons named, and their successors, associates, and assigns, a body politic and corporate, to have continued succession and existence for the term of fifty years, and declared that its capital stock should be $50,000, but gave the company power to increase the same to any sum not exceeding $250,000.

The fourth and fifth sections are as follows:--

'SECT. 4. Said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to establish and maintain chemical and other works at the place designated herein, for the purpose of manufacturing and converting dead animals and other animal matter into an agricultural fertilizer and into other chemical products, by means of chemical, mechanical, and other processes.

'SECT. 5. Said chemical works shall be established in Cook County, Illinois, at any point south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38. Said corporation may establish and maintain depots in the city of Chicago, in said county, for the purpose of receiving and carrying off from and out of the said city any and all offal, dead animals, and other animal matter which they may buy or own, or which may be delivered to them by the city authorities and other persons.'

In order to have a clear apprehension of the rights and privileges which this charter was intended to secure to the company, and of the purposes which the legislature that granted it had in view, it is both admissible and important to take notice of the circumstances that existed at the time of its grant, so far as they are shown by the record. Chicago was then a populous city, built upon a level plain, where drainage and sewerage are exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The slaughtering of animals and packing the flesh for markets in other places were conducted there upon a stupendous scale. The business had been growing in magnitude for years, and bid fair to be what it has become,-larger than that of any city in the United States, if not in the world. Of necessity, the amount of blood and offal produced was correspondingly large. It could not be disposed of or allowed to accumulate there without manifestly endangering the health and injuriously affecting the comfort of the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the city. It was, therefore, a matter of public importance to provide for its removal elsewhere. Such would have been the case had the business of slaughtering extended no further than to supply the domestic market. At that time there was in the county of Cook, about thirteen miles south of the city, a marshy region in the midst of swamps, and much of it at all seasons covered with shallow ponds and bayous. It was very thinly inhabited, and it held out few, if any, invitations for additional settlement. Obviously it was a thing of public interest to relieve the city from accumulations of the blood and offal, and have them transported to a place where they would cause no injury, or so much less than they would cause if remaining in the midst of a dense population. It cannot be supposed that the legislature was unmindful of these considerations. The charter itself furnishes evidence that its motive and purpose were to furnish relief to the city, doing the least possible harm to residents in other localities. It offered to the grantees certain privileges as the consideration for large expenditures by them for removing from the city the matter so injurious to its inhabitants. It expressly authorized the establishment and maintenance by the corporation of chemical and other works for the purpose of manufacturing and converting dead animals and other animal matter into an agricultural fertilizer and into other chemical products. It designated the place where the works might be located as 'in Cook County, at any point south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38.' It also granted to the corporation the right to establish and maintain depots in the city 'for the purpose of receiving and carrying off from and out of the city any and all offal, dead animals, and other animal matter which they (the company) may buy or own, or which may be delivered to them by the city authorities or other persons.'

When accepted, it was, therefore, a contract by which the State authorized the company to establish works and carry on a business which, without the authority, would be a nuisance to a few persons, in order to relieve a very large community from a greater nuisance. It was, therefore, a grant of a right to maintain a local nuisance.

In the exercise of the rights thus granted, the company established their works at a place in Cook County, south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38, in what is now the village of Hyde Park, but quite remote from the thickly inhabited part of the village. The point at which they are located is within the limits designated by the legislature. The selection of the place within those limits was confided by the charter to the company, and when the selection was made and the works were erected, the charter conferred the right to maintain them and carry on the business where they were located. I concede that the company could not exercise their discretion wantonly or in negligent disregard of the rights of others. But there is nothing in the case tending to show such disregard or wantonness. There is nothing to show, and it is not claimed, that the works are not at a place where they were authorized to be erected. On the contrary, there is every thing to show that the neighborhood where they were located was swampy and nearly uninhabited, giving, as I have said, little promise of further improvement.

The company also, at large expense, erected receiving depots, as authorized by the charter, for the purpose of receiving and carrying from the city matter consisting of dead animals and offal, and engaged in having it transported to the only railroad upon which it could be transported to the chemical works located within the limits of the municipal division known as Hyde Park Village. That by the charter they were authorized to transport it thither, I regard as beyond any reasonable doubt. I admit to the fullest extent the rule that all charters of private corporations are to be construed most strongly against the corporations. Nothing is granted that is not expressly or clearly implied. But this rule is quite consistent with another, equally settled, that charters are to receive a reasonable interpretation in view of the purposes for which they were made. An express grant of power must include whatever is indispensably necessary to its enjoyment. No man can reasonably deny that a grant of power to establish works at a certain place to convert animal matter into an agricultural fertilizer, coupled with power to establish depots for receiving and carrying it from the city, does authorize its transportation to the converting works. It is not denied in the present case. One of the rights, then, which the company obtained by their charter was to carry the offal, dead animals, and other animal matter into and through the village of Hyde Park to the works authorized for its conversion.

To recapitulate: The company obtained by their contract with the State, among others, three rights: One, a right to establish and maintain at a place in Cook County, south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38, works for converting animal matter. The works have been established there at a cost of more than $200,000; second, they obtained the right to establish receiving depots for receiving and carrying such matter from Chicago; and, third, they obtained the right to carry such matter from their receiving depots to their converting works in Hyde Park. I do not understand any of these propositions to be questioned, either by the defendants in error or by the majority of this court.

The only serious question, therefore, is whether by any law of the State this contract has been impaired, and the rights assured by it have been taken away. On the 26th of March, 1869, nearly two years after the charter had been granted and accepted, the legislature of the State passed an act, entitled 'An Act to revise the charter of the town of Hyde Park, in Cook County,' giving therein full sanitary and police powers to the municipal authorities, but containing the following proviso: 'The sanitary powers conferred by this act shall not be exercised by said board of trustees as against the Northwestern Fertilizing Company or the Union Rendering Company, located at or near the Calumet River, in said town, until the full expiration of two years after the passage of this act.' Under this act the board of trustees, on the 14th of February, 1870, adopted an ordinances declaring all establishments for rendering offal, &c., nuisances, and imposing penalties upon any person who shall own, keep, or use them. The ordinance also prohibited the deposit of any dead animals or other filthy, nauseous, or offensive substance on any lot, street, alley, or other place in the town, and imposed penalties for any violation of the ordinance. On the 10th of April, 1872, the village of Hyde Park was incorporated, and succeeded to the rights and duties of the town of the same name; and on twenty-ninth day of November, of that year, another ordinance of the village was made, reiterating in substance the provisions of the ordinance of Feb. 14, 1870. It went further, and its provisions make it impossible for the company to enjoy the rights accorded to them by their charter. It declared to be nuisances all places within the village kept, occupied, or used for the purpose of rendering offal or animal substances, when the same is or may be kept in such a manner as to occasion any offensive smell, and all places where any nauseous, unwholesome, or offensive business may be carried on, and it imposes penalties upon offenders. It prohibited the establishment, maintenance, or carrying on of any offensive or unwholesome business or establishment without the limits of the village, or within one mile of the limits thereof, and it ordained that 'no person shall transfer, carry, haul, or convey any offal, dead animals, or other offensive matter or material into or through the village of Hyde Park.' All these provisions are sanctioned by prescribed penalties, and the village authorities are enforcing them against the company. If they are enforced, it cannot carry on the business which its charter authorized. The offal from Chicago or elsewhere cannot be brought to the works; and if it could, the company could not render it into a fertilizer. The ordinance is in direct conflict with the legislative grant, a grant which was for a consideration returned, and which, therefore, has the force of a contract. It is, in my judgment, a palpable violation of the constitution provision that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract.

It has been suggested that the charter did not precisely designate the place where the rendering works might be established, and to which the city offal might be carried; and hence it is argued that, notwithstanding the contract, it is within the power of the legislature to order the removal of the works to another locality, and that this may be done mediately by a municipal corporation empowered by the State. The inference I emphatically deny. It is true the charter empowered the company to select a location within certain geographical limits, and did not itself define the exact point; but when under this power a location was made by the company, and hundreds of thousands of dollars were expended upon it, it was beyond the power of the other contracting party to change it. The location was lawful when made, and, if lawful then, it cannot be made unlawful afterwards. If it could be, it would be in the power of the legislature to change it a second, a third, a fiftieth time, and fix it at last at a place where none of the rights of the company could be enjoyed. No one has ever doubted that when a railroad company has been authorized, as is often the case, to construct a railroad beginning at some point within a township or a county, and has constructed its road from some point in that township or county, its right to maintain it from that terminus is indefeasible. That which was left uncertain has become certain. So, if a warrant be granted for a tract of land in a specified district without describing it, when the warrantee has selected a tract, the contract is closed, and his right to that tract is absolute. It must be, therefore, that the location of the company's works at the places where they were located, recognized as a proper location in the act of the legislature of 1869, is one which cannot be changed without the consent of both parties to the contract, or without compensation made.

But it is said the ordinance complained of is only an exercise of the police power of the State, and that the charter must be assumed to have been granted and accepted subject to that police power. I admit that the police power of a State extends generally to the prevention and removal of things injurious to the comfort of the public. I admit also that the works of the company may have been and probably were offensive, and were a nuisance, unless their character was changed by the law. So, also, carrying offal, or animal matter, into or through the village may have been and probably was more or less offensive. But the question now is, were the works or the transportation things illegal? In view of the contract contained in the charter, was it a legitimate exercise of the State's police power to declare them illegal, abate them, and inflict penalties for doing what the State had declared that the company might do? I am confident it was not. Had the charter been a mere license, instead of a contract, the case would be different. But the legislature may legalize acts which, without such legislation, would be obnoxious to criminal law. It may legalize that which, without such action, would be a nuisance. It may do this either by law or by contract. It may limit the extent to which its police power shall be exerted. And it often does. The charter of a railroad company is a familiar illustration. Crossing highways and running locomotives, were they not authorized by law, would be nuisances. Who will contend that, when a charter has been granted for building a railway and running locomotives thereon, the company or its agents can be punished criminally for maintaining a nuisance? Why not? Because there is no nuisance in the eye of the law, and the State has contracted away a portion of its police power. So, also, an illustration may be found in the case of gas companies. If a legislature charter a gas company, and locate its works at a designated place, authorizing the manufacture of gas there, it would be marvellous indeed if the agents of the company could be indicted for a nuisance, or if the legislature could without compensation deny the exercise of the powers granted, because manufacturing gas is offensive. The police power of a State is no more sacred than its taxing power. We have held again and again that a State may by contract with one of its corporations bind itself not to tax the property of that corporation. If so, why may it not bind itself not to exercise its police power over certain employments. It would be a monstrous stretch of credulity to conclude that the legislature of Illinois did not intend such a relinquishment of police power when it granted the charter to the plaintiff in error. Its members must be assumed to have had common knowledge. They knew the offensiveness of animal offal. The plain object of the charter was to relieve the citizens of Chicago from it. The legislature knew that the transportation of the offal to a point south of the designated line, and its deposit there, would inevitably be offensive to the much less numerous inhabitants of the vicinity. With this knowledge they authorized what the plaintiff in error has been doing. They invited the investment of $250,000 to enable it to be done, and they entered into a contract that the company should have a right to do it for fifty years. To say now, as the judgment in this case does, there was a tacit reservation, that under the pretence of exercising the police power of the State the rights of the company may all be taken away, and their investments destroyed without compensation, is, in my opinion, not only unjust, but unwarranted by any judicial decision heretofore made. While saying this, I freely admit that the police power of the State may remain to regulate the conduct of the company's business, provided the regulation does not extend to the destruction of the chartered rights. It may prescribe that the offal shall be transported to the appellants' works in closed cars or wagons. It may impose reasonable regulations upon the disposition of the offal when received at the rendering works, but under the cover of regulation it cannot destroy.

Nothing, I admit, is more indefinite than the extent or limits of what is called police power. I will not undertake to define them. Certainly it has limits. I refer to what Judge Cooley has said in reference to the exercise of the power over private corporations. Cooley, Const. Lim. 577. He says, 'The exercise of the police power in these cases must be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any of the provisions of the charter, and they must not, under the pretence of regulations, take from the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in curtailment of the corporate franchise.' This I understand to be entirely correct. In support of it he refers to numerous decisions, which I will not cite, but to which I also refer. There are many others fully sustaining the text as I have quoted it.

There is no authority to the contrary. The cases relied upon to uphold the exercise of the power which the defendants in error assert are all clearly distinguishable. They are not cases where the police power was exerted for the destruction of a chartered right distinctly granted by a contract.

The only decision referred to which has been made by this court is Beer Company v. Massachusetts, supra, p. 25. In my judgment, it furnishes no support for the present ruling. The case was this: In 1828, the legislature granted a charter to the Boston Beer Company, by which they were made a corporation, 'for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties,' and made the corporation subject to all the duties and requirements of an act passed on the 3d of March, 1809, entitled 'An Act defining the general powers and duties of manufacturing companies,' and the several acts in addition thereto. The general manufacturing act of 1809 contained a provision that the legislature might from time to time, upon due notice to any corporation, make further provisions and regulations for the management of the business of the corporation and for the government thereof, or wholly to repeal any act or part thereof establishing any corporation, as should be deemed expedient. In 1829, the act of 1809 was repealed, with the following qualification, however: 'But this repeal shall not affect the existing rights of any person or the existing or future liabilities of any corporation, or any members of any corporation now established, until such corporation shall have adopted this act and complied with the provisions herein contained.' The legislature of the State, in 1869, passed an act restricting the sale within the Commonwealth of any malt liquors, and prohibiting it except in certain specified cases.

The Supreme Court Judicial Court of the State adjudged: first, that the act of 1869 did not impair the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the beer company, so far as it related to the sale of malt liquors, but was binding upon the company to the same extent as on individuals. The sale was not expressly authorized, nor authorized by necessary implication. And, secondly, the court held that the act was in the nature of a police regulation in regard to the sale of a certain article of property, and is applicable to the sale of such property by individuals and corporations, even when the charter of the corporation cannot be altered or repealed by the legislature.

We affirmed the decision of the State court. But there was nothing in the charter that authorized, either expressly or by necessary intendment, the company to sell their product within the Commonwealth. It was not a contract to authorize what was a nuisance when it was granted, or what might thereafter become one. It was not a contract respecting any thing that was illegal when the contract was made. The contract under consideration in the present case was. It was made with reference to the exercise of the State's police power, and in restraint of it. It is obvious, therefore, the beer company's case has no applicability to the one we have now in hand.

I have said enough to indicate the reasons for my dissent. To me they appear very grave. In my judgment, the decision of the court denies the power of a State legislature to legalize, during a limited period, that which without its action would be a nuisance. It enables a subsequent legislature to take away, without compensation, rights which a former one has accorded, in the most positive terms, and for which a valuable consideration has been paid. And, in its application to the present case, it renders it impossible to remove from Chicago the vast bodies of animal offal there accumulated; for if the ordinance of Hyde Park can stand, every other municipality around the city can enforce similar ordinances.


text:
Author:Archibald John Stuart-Wortley

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 * The Grouse: Natural History

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Author:Arthur William à Beckett

Works

 * Comic Guide to the Royal Academy (1863–64), co-authored with Gilbert Arthur À Beckett
 * 1864 version
 * Fallen Amongst Thieves: A Novel of "Interest (1870), in 3 vols.
 * The Comic Blackstone (1869) 1887
 * Our Holiday in the Highlands (1874)
 * The Doom of St. Querec (1875), co-authored with Francis Cowley Burnand
 * The Shadow Witness (1876),, co-authored with Francis Cowley Burnand
 * The Ghost of Greystone Grange (1878)
 * The Mystery of Mostyn Manor (1878)
 * Modern Arabian Nights (1885)
 * Tracked Out: A Secret of the Guillotine (1888)
 * Papers from Pump Handle Court (1889)
 * Hard Luck: or, A Murder at Monte Carlo (1890)
 * The Fate of Fenella (1892, with 23 other authors)
 * The Member for Wrottenborough: Passages from his Life in Parliament (1892)
 * Greenroom Recollections (1896)
 * The Modern Adam (1899)
 * London at the End of the Century (1900)
 * John Bull (1903)
 * The à Becketts of "Punch": Memories of Father and Sons (1903)
 * Recollections of a Humorist, Grave and Gay (1907)

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 * L.S.D. (1872);
 * About Town (1873)
 * On Strike (1873)
 * From Father to Son (1881, with John Palgrave Simpson)
 * Long Ago (1882)
 * Faded Flowers (unknown)

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 * , this article about his father contains a brief summary about Arthur

title: Author:Arthur William à Beckett


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Page:History of West Australia.djvu/535

 and subsequently visited Yalgoo, Mount Magnet, Cue, and Day Dawn. The Doctor reported very favourably on the fields, but drew the attention of his principals to the fact that, although there were many rich properties, great discretion would have to be exercised in purchasing tempting-looking shows. The outcome of his report was the formation of the New Austral Company, with a capital of 10,000,000 francs (£400,000), to acquire properties in Western Australia. Dr. Simon was entrusted with the onerous task of investing part of this money in mining properties, which he has done in the most judicious manner. The best properties, he considers, that the syndicate has secured are the Norseman mines, near Dundas; the Hill-End, for which £25,000 was paid; the New Victoria, seven miles from Coolgardie, £40,000; and the Australasian, one and a half miles from Coolgardie, £8,000. Dr. Simon has imported three dry-crushing plants (with pan-amalgamation), which have been erected at the mines.

During his association with Western Australian goldfields he has proved himself an enterprising, shrewd, and far-seeing capitalist. In all his investments he has followed the golden rule that the first loss is the best loss; after acquiring a property he at once thoroughly tests its resources, and if the results are not equal to expectations, he does not waste any more money on its development. The result is that the properties on which he spends money are known to be promising investments. In the business and commercial life of the colony Dr. Simon takes a prominent part, and his straightforward manly conduct is well known. In Coolgardie he holds (1896) the important office of president of the Chamber of Mines.

In the public affairs of Coolgardie Dr. Simon has shown a sympathetic and sustained interest, and when the much debated starting-point for the Menzies Railway was before Parliament, he took a leading part in urging the claims of Coolgardie. He has been a consistent advocate for railway extension, and in this connection has brought the Esperance-Norseman-Coolgardie line under Government notice on more than one occasion.

Whether in city or mining town West Australian residents have a good word in favour of the vivacious, courteous gentleman who represents the New Austral Company, whose prosperity he has materially aided.

DR. CHARLES CHEWINGS, Ph.D., F.R.G.S., F.G.S., M.D.G.G., M.I.M., M.E.

OMETIMES, in a moment of deep reflection on the strangeness and inexplicabilities of the various functions and forms of animal life, we are driven, as Huxley was, to regard man as an automaton—a high-class mechanism—with a running scale of degrees of power, efficiency, and work. Yet mind so reduced to the unthinkable state of unconsciousness does not satisfy our fuller psychological enquiries when "we get behind ourselves to view ourselves." That consciousness, which is the Ego, may exist in the prison of the body with appreciable differences in the quantity held by its many leaseholders; and so, too, mind, which begets that consciousness has varying degrees of strength, force, and productivity.

Disputable, perhaps, as these points are to philosophic combatants, they yet have their measure of truth, and that truth will serve to form a correct basis for our estimate of the worth of Dr. Charles Chewings. Within the narrow period of five times five of workable years he has completed works of considerable labour and magnitude. His career is unusually interesting, not only as the reflex of his capabilities, but also from the romantic and spirited nature of the acts themselves. Dr. Charles Chewings was born at Woorkongoree, a sheepstation in South Australia, in 1859. He was educated at Prince Alfred College, in Adelaide. His father being a squatter, it was but natural that the young Charles should have, voluntarily or involuntarily, taken an interest in pastoral pursuits. Perhaps his solitary wanderings on the paternal estate may have created in him that love of travel which has made his name known in Australian history. In 1881, in his desire for exploration, he provided himself with two camels, and set out alone on a perilous and dreary journey to the Macdonnell Ranges. A description of this notable trip was published in the South Australian Register under the title—"A Trip to the Macdonnell Ranges." The sunny parts were graphically depicted, but little attention was paid to the adventure's trials and difficulties. So hard pushed was he at times that energy alone served to keep him alive. During his journey he discovered a river, which he christened the Walker River. Some time in 1882 he arrived in Adelaide—his former starting point—and soon after took a lengthy trip round the world. He visited various parts of Europe and America, and finished the circle in Adelaide. Every

title: Page:History of West Australia.djvu/535


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Page:Alumni Oxoniensis (1715-1886) volume 4.djvu/120

 Stafford, William, s. Francis, of Flintham, Notts, pleb. , matric. 5 Feb., 1800, aged 19; B.A. 1804, M.A. 1810, vicar of Overbury, co. Worcester, 1810.  Stainer, (Sir) John, 2s. William, of St. Thomas's, Southwark, Surrey, arm. , matric. 26 May, 1859, aged 18, B.Mus. 10 June, 1859; organist 1860-72, B.A. 1864, D.Mus. 1865, M.A. 1866, organist St. Paul's Cathedral 1872-88, knighted at Windsor Castle, 10 July, 1888, father of the next named.  Stainer, John Frederick Randall, 1s. John, of Oxford, arm. (after a knight). , matric. 23 Oct., 1885, aged 19; exhibitioner 1885.  Stainer, Rev. William, 1s. William, of St. Thomas, Southwark, Surrey, gent. , matric. 1 Nov., 1866, aged 38.  Stainforth, Rev. Frederick Baring, 2s. Frederick, of Chittagong, Bengal, East Indies, arm. , matric. 27 Jan., 1864, aged 19; B.A. from 1868, M.A. 1873, died 3 Jan., 1875.  [5] Stains, Robert, 1s. Edwin, of Patrixbourne, Kent, arm. , matric. 4 June, 1863, aged 18; B.A. 1868, a student of the Inner Temple 1867.  Stainton, John, s. Francis, of St. Bees, Cumberland, pleb. , matric. 18 June, 1718, aged 15; B.A. 1722.  Stainton, John, 2s. John, of St. Martin's, Westminster, gent. , matric. 11 May, 1838, aged 19; B.A. 1846.

Stainton, John Prout, 1s. Nathaniel, of London, arm. , matric. 31 May, 1873, aged 18; B.A. 1878, M.A. 1882, bar.-at-law, Lincoln's Inn, 1884. See Foster's Men at the Bar.

Stainton, Nathaniel, 1s. John, of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, London, gent. , matric. 17 May, 1832, aged 17; B.A. 1836, M.A. 1841, bar.-at-law, Lincoln's Inn, 1843, died 11 Jan., 1868.
 [10]
Stainton, Nathaniel Evelyn, of London. , matric. 4 June, 1881.

Stainton, Thomas, 3s. John, of Clerkenwell, Middlesex, gent. , matric. 26 Jan., 1843, aged 17; B.A. 1846.

Staker, John, s. Edward, of 'Che' (sic), gent. , matric. 14 Dec., 1751, aged 20, B.A. 1755; B.C.L. from 1760, D.C.L. 1765, licensed to practise medicine 27 June, 1765, created D.Med. by diploma 19 Dec., 1774.

Stallard, Arthur Gordon Bury, o.s. George, of Bath, Somerset, cler. , matric; 14 Oct., 1861, aged 18; B.A. 1864, M.A. 1868, has held various curacies since 1866.
 [14]
Stallard, George, 1s. George, of Walcot, Bath, gent. , matric. 14 June, 1839, aged 25.

Stallard, George, 1s. George, of Havant, Hants, gent. , matric. 13 Oct., 1873, aged 19; B.A. 1876, M.A. 1883; a master at Rugby School.

Stallard, Henry Frampton, 1s. William Henry, of Norwood, Surrey, gent. , matric. 13 Oct., 1883, aged 20; B.A. from 1887.

Stallard, Joseph Orlando, 5s. of William, of St. Andrew's, Worcester (city), arm. , matric. 14 Feb., 1845, aged 18; B.A. 1848, M.A. 1851, perp. curate Brockhampton, co. Hereford, 1851, vicar of Heath, Beds, 1863.

Stalman, William, s. William, of Newby, Yorks, gent. , matric. 18 March, 1769, aged 18; B.A. 1772, M.A. 1775, fellow 1776, and tutor, proctor 1784, rector of Stoke Bruerne, Northants, 1828. until his death 10 Feb., 1828.

Stalman, Rev. William, s. William, of Stoke Bruerne, Northants, cler. , matric. 28 June, 1814, aged 18, exhibitioner 1814-15; demy 1815-19, B.A. 1818, fellow  1819-21, M.A. 1820, math. lecturer 1821, died 8 April, 1821. See Robinson, 182; & Bloxam, vii. 262.
 [20]
Stambury, Henry, s. Willoughby, of Bridgewater, Somerset, cler. , matric. 6 July, 1776, aged 14; B.A. 1780, fellow 1780-9, rector of Bridgewater, Hinton St. George, and of Seavington St. Michael with Dunnington, Somerset, 1789, until his death 25 Oct., 1837.

Stamer, William, D.D., Dublin; adm. 'ad eundem' 7 July, 1838, B.A. 1823, M.A. & B.D. 1833, D.D. 1838 (2s. Sir William Stamer, Bart.), of Ingoldsthorpe, Norfolk, officiating minister of Seal and Kemsing, Kent, 1829-38, rector (and patron) of Walcot St. Saviour's, Bath, 1840, until his death 20 Nov., 1866. See Foster's Baronetage.

Stammers, Frederick Halliley, 1s. Joseph, of St. Mary's, Islington, arm. matric. 20 Oct., 1855, aged 23; taberdar 1856-9, B.A. 1865, M.A. 1869, vicar of All Saints, Clapton Park, 1869-80.

Stammers, Maurice, 1s. Frederick, of Hastings, cler. , matric. 25 Jan., 1882, aged 18.

Stamper, Thomas, of, Cambridge (B.A. 1711, M.A. 1715); incorp. 8 July, 1732, preb. of St. Paul's 1729, until his death 17 Oct., 1733.
 [25]
Stamper, Rev. William, s. Joseph, of Workington, Cumberland, gent. , matric. 12 Oct., 1798, aged 17; B.A. 1802, M.A. 1806, died in 1811.

Stamps, Frederick, 2s. John, of West Bromwich, co. Stafford, gent. , matric. 4 Feb., 1884, aged 33.

Stanbridge, John William, 1s. John William, of Hoxton, Middlesex, gent. , matric. 20 Oct., 1865, aged 18; scholar 1865-70, B.A. 1870; fellow 1870-82, M.A. 1872, B.D. 1876, lecturer 1871, tutor 1873-82, dean of arts 1874, vice-president 1878, rector of Bainton, Yorks, 1883.

Stanbury, Ernest, 2s. Alfred Horace, of Handsworth, co. Stafford, arm. , matric. 26 Jan., 1878, aged 23; a student of the Inner Temple 1880.

Stancomb, William, o.s. William, of Trowbridge, Wilts, arm. , matric. 16 Oct., 1869, aged 19; S.C.L. & B.A. 1872, M.A. 1876, a student of the Inner Temple 1870. See Eton School Lists.
 [30]
Standen, Edward, s. Edward, of Arborfield, Berks, arm. , matric. 12 Nov., 1719, aged 17.

Standen, James Edward, o.s. James William, of London, gent. , matric. 11 Oct., 1884, aged 19; scholar 1884, B.A. 1888.

Standert, Rev. George Hanway, s. Osborne, of St. Andrew's, Holborn, London, arm. , matric. 11 Dec., 1802, aged 17; B.A. 1806, fellow, M.A. 1810, died 12 Jan., 1814.

Standish, Cecil Marie Roger, 2s. Lionel, of St. Jean, Germain, France, arm. , matric. 22 Jan., 1877, aged 24.

Standish, (Sir) Frank (Bart.), s. Thomas, of Preston, Lancashire. , matric. 31 Jan., 1763, aged 17; 3rd baronet, died 18 May, 1812. See Foster's Lancashire Collection.
 [35]
Standish, Turner, s. Thomas, of Duxbury, Lancashire, baronet. , matric. 29 Oct., 1735, aged 19; B.A. 1739, brother of the next named.

Standish, William, s. Thomas, of Duxbury, Lancashire, baronet. , matric. 28 April, 1737, aged 19; B.A. 27 Feb., 1740-1, M.A. 1743, brother of the last named. See Foster's Lancashire Collection.

Standley, Alfred Pearce, 2s. Henry, of Emscote, co. Warwick, gent. , matric. 18 Oct., 1875, aged 25.

Standley, Richard, s. Richard, of Wolverhampton, co. Stafford, pleb. , matric. 26 March, 1729, aged 18; B.A. 1732.


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 Spottiswoode, Cyril Andrew, 2s. William, of London, arm. , matric. 23 Oct., 1886, aged 19.  Spottiswoode, George Andrew, 2s. Andrew, of St. George's, Bloomsbury, London, arm. , matric. 10 May, 1845, aged 17; of Chatton, Devon, and of London, Queen's printer, brother of the next named.  Spottiswoode, William, 1s. Andrew, of St. George's, Bloomsbury, London, arm. , matric. 14 May, 1842, aged 17; B.A. 1846, M.A. 1848, created D.C.L. 26 June, 1878. F.R.S., F.R.A.S., F.R.G.S., created LL.D. Cambridge 1879, president British Association, and of Royal Society 1879, Queen's printer, died 27 June, 1883, buried in Westminster Abbey. See Eton School Lists.  Spottiswoode, William Hugh, 1s. William, of London, arm. , matric. 17 Oct., 1872, aged 18; of Combe Bank, Kent, and of London, Queen's printer. See Eton School Lists.  Spowart, Rev. James, 1s. Thomas, of Dunfermline, co. Fife, arm. , matric. 12 Oct., 1878, aged 26; B.A. 1882. M.A. 1885.  [5] Spragg, Rev. Charles Henry, 1s. Francis Roche, of Brighton, Sussex, cler. , matric. 17 June, 1831, aged 18; scholar 1831-7, B.A. 1836, died 3 July, 1837, See ''Coll. Reg.'', 151.  Spranger, Robert, s. John, of London (city), arm. , matric. 17 Dec., 1799, aged 23.  Spranger, Robert, of, Cambridge (LL.B. 1809), 3s. John, of London, (city), arm. , incorp. 7 June, 1834, aged 58; D.C.L. 19 June, 1834, rector of Low Toynton and Creeton, co. Lincoln, 1820, until his death 13 Feb., 1850.

Spranger, Rev. Robert Jeffries, 1s. Robert, of Tamerton Foliot, Devon, cler. , matric. 10 March, 1830, aged 18; scholar 1831-2, fellow 1832-41, B.A. 1835, M.A. 1836, Hebrew lecturer 1837, tutor 1839-45, a student of Gray's Inn 1832, died 29 Aug., 1888. See ''Coll. Reg.'', 130 & 151.

Spranger, Stephen, 3s. Robert, of Tamerton, Devon, cler. , matric. 1 Dec., 1831, aged 18.
 [10]
Spranger, William Francis, 2s. Robert, of Tamerton, Devon, doctor. , matric. 28 April, 1836, aged 18; a student of Gray's Inn 1837. See Eton School Lists.

Spranger, William Francis Gummer, 2s. Stephen Henry, of Bridport, Dorset, gent. , matric. 3 June, 1868, aged 20.

Spratt, Frederick, 1s. Nehemiah, of Fisherton-Anger, Wilts, gent. , matric. 9 April, 1875, aged 23.

Spratt, John, 1s. Alexander Hanna, of St. Margaret's, Canterbury (clty), arm. , matric. 14 May, 1819, aged 19; B.A. 1823.

Spring, Frederick, s. James, of St. Marylebone, London, pleb. , matric. 22 June, 1808, aged 18; B.A. 1813, M.A. 1824, chaplain Madras establishment 1816, until his death 7 Jan., 1843.
 [15]
Spring, Frederick James, 1s. Frederick, of St. Martins-in-Fields, London, cler. , matric. 28 May, 1830, aged 17; B.A. 1834, M.A. 1838, senior chaplain Bombay 1844-70, vicar of Corton, Norfolk, 1871, until his death 26 Nov., 1881.

Spring, George Thomas, 2s. Frederick, of Tillicherry, East Indies, cler. , matric. 9 July, 1836, aged 17; B.A. 1840, M.A. 1843, perp. curate Hampton Gay, Oxon, 1851, until his death 23 May, 1855.

Spring, Herbert, 3s. Thomas, of St. Bartholomew's, London, gent. , matric. 30 May, 1846, aged 38.

Springett, Arthur Richard, 2s. Robert, of Melksham, Wilts, cler. , matric. 10 Oct., 1879, aged 18.

Springett, Nathaniel, s. Nathaniel, of Bradfield, Berks, cler. , matric. 2 April, 1748, aged 18; B.A. 1751.
 [20]
Springett, William Douglas, 1s, William John, of Brightwell, Berks, cler. , matric. 4 June, 1870, aged 19; B.A. 1873, M.A. 1877. B.D. 1880, D.D. 1888, vicar of Herne Hill, Kent, 1883.

Springett, William John, 2s. Richard, of Goudhurst, Kent, gent. , matric. 13 April, 1842, aged 18; B.A. 1846, M.A. 1848, vicar of Dunkirk, Kent, 1854.

Springmann, Paul, 3s. Emilius, of Liverpool, gent. , matric. 21 April, 1877, aged 20; B.A. 1881, M.A. 1887, a student of the Inner Temple 1879.

Sproston, William Manning Sproston, 2s. Samuel Thomas, of Wolverhampton, cler. , matric. 28 Jan., 1882, aged 18; B.A. 1885.

Sprott, Samuel, s. Thomas, of Barrow, Salop, arm. , matric. 24 May, 1715. aged 18; B.A. 10 March, 1718-9, M.A. 1722, B.Med. 1729.

Sproule, Arthur St. Quentin, 1s. Thomas Patterson, of Sealdwell, Northants, cler. , matric. 18 Oct., 1871, aged 17; B.A. 1874, M.A. 1878, vicar of Plymstock, Devon, 1884.
 [26]
Sproule, Rev. James William Brodrick. 2s. James William, of Widcombe, near Bath, —. , matric. 21 Oct., 1871, aged 19; B.A. 1875.

Sproule, John Rowland, s. Andrew, of Dublin (city), arm. , matric. 12 Dec., 1777, aged 23; vicar of Great Bardfield, Essex, 1797, until his death in 1829.

Sproule, Wilfrid Cotton, 3s. Thomas Patterson, of Messingham, co. Lincoln, cler. , matric. 22 Oct., 1880, aged 17; scholar 1880-4, B.A. 1884.

Sprules, John, 2s. John, of Potterne, Wilts, gent. , matric. 9 May, 1873, aged 55.
 [30]
Spry, Arthur Brown, 4s. James Hume, of Clapton, Middlesex, arm. , matric. 10 Nov., 1831, aged 19; B.A. 1835, perp. curate Shouldham, Norfolk, 1848-51, a senior chaplain Bengal, vicar of Stanford, Norfolk, 1868, until his death 10 May, 1870.

Spry, Benjamin, s. John, of West Hendred, Berks, archdeacon of Berks. , matric. 21 Jan., 1757, aged 15; B.A. 1760, M.A. 1763, preb. of Salisbury 1773, vicar of Bedminster, Somerset, etc., and of St. Mary's, Bristol, died 1 Oct., 1806.

Spry, Christopher, s. John, of Tavistock, Devon, gent. , matric. 31 March, 1784, aged 18; B.A. 1788.

Spry, Edward, s. Edward, of Plymouth, Devon, gent. , matric. 12 Oct., 1773, aged 45.

Spry, Edward George, o.s. Edward John, of Truro, Cornwall, arm. , matric. a June, 1853, aged 18; B.A. 1857, died 7 Dec., 1887.
 [35]
Spry, Francis Richard, 2s. George, of Bath (city), D.Med. , matric. 29 June, 1857, aged 18.

Spry, Henry, 1s. Henry, of Stoke Damerel, Devon, gent. , matric. 18 Jan., 1820, aged 18; B.A. 1823.

Spry, James, y.s. Joseph, of Bath, Somerset, gent,, matric. 15 Dec., 1820, aged 35; B.A. 1824, M.A. 1828, perp. curate West Bromwich 1837, until his death 2 June, 1865, aged 80.

Spry, James Hume, s. — S., of West Hendred, Berks, cler. , matric. 12 Nov., 1761, aged 15; B.A. from 1765, M.A. 1768, D.C.L. 1773, rector of Brixton Deverell, Wilts, 1773, preb. of Salisbury 1774-80, died vicar of Potterne, Wilts, in 1780 (his son William, fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, died 29 Oct., 1815).

Spry, Rev. John, s. John, of Stoke Damerel, Devon, gent. , matric. 10 April, 1778, aged 14; B.A. from 1786, died 26 Jan., 1801, aged 36, see Gent.'s Mag., 1801, i. 187; or died 12 June, 1845, aged 81, see Gent.'s Mag., 1845, ii. 319.
 [40]


text: Alumni Oxonienses: the Members of the University of Oxford, 1715-1886/Spottiswoode, William


text: William Spottiswoode

title: William Spottiswoode


text:
Author:Charles Campbell

Works

 * The history of Virginia, in four parts (1855)
 * Genealogy of the Spotswood family in Scotland and Virginia (1868)

title: Author:Charles Campbell


text: Page:Alumni Oxoniensis (1715-1886) volume 4.djvu/116


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Author talk:William Spottiswoode

Link to add
Note about death has been added in Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 23.djvu/592 though waiting for the article to be set within the Note. — billinghurst  sDrewth  10:51, 20 November 2010 (UTC)

title: Author talk:William Spottiswoode


text: Page:Psychopathia Sexualis (tr. Chaddock, 1892).djvu/1


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Page:Robert's Rules of Order - 1915.djvu/127

 31. To Postpone to a Certain Time or Definitely* takes precedence of the motions to commit, to amend, and to postpone indefinitely, and yields to all privileged [14] and incidental [13] motions, and to the motions to lay on the table, for the previous question, and to limit or to extend the limits of debate. It allows of a limited debate which must not go into the merits of the main question any more than is necessary to enable the assembly to determine the propriety of the postponement. It may be amended as to the time, and also by making the postponed question a special order. The previous question and the motions limiting or extending the limits of debate may be applied to it. It cannot be laid on the table alone, but when it is pending the main question may be laid on the table which carries with it the motion to postpone. It cannot be committed or postponed indefinitely. It may be reconsidered. When it makes a question a special order it requires a two-thirds vote.

The time to which a question is postponed must fall within the session or the next session,† and, if it is desired to postpone it to a different time, which must not be beyond the next regular session, it is necessary first to


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 fix the time for an adjourned meeting, and then the question may be postponed to that meeting. Some societies have frequent meetings for literary or other purposes at which business may be transacted, while they hold every month or quarter a meeting especially for business. In such societies these rules apply particularly to the regular business meetings, to which questions may be postponed from the previous regular business meeting or from any of the intervening meetings. Neither the motion to postpone definitely nor an amendment to it, is in order when it has the effect of an indefinite postponement; that is, to defeat the measure, as, for instance, to postpone until tomorrow a motion to accept an invitation to a banquet tonight. If the motion to postpone indefinitely is in order at the time, the chair may treat it as such at his discretion, but it cannot be recognized as a motion to postpone definitely. It is not in order to postpone a class of business, as reports of committees; as each report is announced or called for, it may be postponed, or the rules may be suspended by a two-thirds vote and the desired question be taken up. A matter that is required by the by-laws to be attended to at a specified time or meeting as the election of officers cannot, in advance, be postponed to another time or meeting, but when that specified time or meeting arrives the assembly may postpone it to an adjourned


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meeting. This is sometimes advisable as in case of an annual meeting for the election of officers occurring on a very stormy night so that a bare quorum is present. After an order of the day or a question of privilege is before the assembly for action, its further consideration may be postponed, or any other subsidiary motion may be applied to it. When a question has been postponed to a certain time, it becomes an order of the day for that time and cannot be taken up before that time except by a reconsideration, or by suspending the rules for that purpose, which requires a two-thirds vote. [See Orders of the Day, 20, for the treatment of questions that have been postponed definitely.]

The Form of this motion depends upon the object sought. (1) If the object is simply to postpone the question to the next meeting, when it will have precedence of new business, the form of the motion is "to postpone the question [or, that the question be postponed] to the next meeting." It then becomes a general order for that meeting.

(2) If the object is to specify an hour when the question will be taken up as soon as the question then pending, if there is any, is disposed of, the form is similar to this: "I move that the question be postponed to 3 " (3) If it is desired to postpone the question until after a certain event, when it shall


text: Author talk:Arthur Augustus Tilley

title: Author talk:Arthur Augustus Tilley


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Page:Robert's Rules of Order - 1915.djvu/130

immediately come up, the form is, "To postpone the question until after the address on Economics." (4) If the object is to insure its not being crowded out by other matters there should be added to the motion to postpone as given in the first two cases above, the words, "and be made a special order." Or the motion may be made thus: "I move that the question be postponed and made a special order for the next meeting [or, for 3 tomorrow]." The motion in this form requires a two-thirds vote, as it suspends the rules that may interfere with its consideration at the time specified as explained under Orders of the Day [20]. (5) If it is desired to postpone a question to an adjourned meeting and devote the entire time, if necessary, to its consideration, as in case of revising by-laws, after providing for the adjourned meeting the motion should be made in this form: "I move that the question be postponed and made the special order for next Tuesday evening." Or, a question may be postponed and made the special order for the next regular meeting. The Effect of postponing a question is to make it an order of the day for the time to which it was postponed, and if it is not then disposed of, it becomes unfinished business. Postponing a question to a certain hour does not make it a special order unless so specified in the motion. The motion to postpone


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 may be amended by a majority vote so as to make the amended motion one to make the question a special order. If this is done the amended motion will require a two-thirds vote. [Orders of the Day, 20, should be read in connection with this section.] 32. To Commit or Refer. (All the rules in regard to this motion, except where stated to the contrary, apply equally to the motions to Go into Committee of the Whole, to Consider Informally, and to Recommit as it is called when a question is committed a second time.) This motion takes precedence of the motions to amend and to postpone indefinitely, and yields to all the other subsidiary [12] motions and to all privileged [14] and incidental [13] motions. It cannot be applied to any subsidiary motion, nor can it be laid on the table or postponed except in connection with the main question. The previous question, and motions to limit or extend the limits of debate, and to amend, may be applied to it without affecting the main question. It is debatable but only as to the propriety of committing the main question.* If the motion to


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postpone indefinitely is pending when a question is referred to a committee, it is lost, and is not referred to the committee. Pending amendments go with the main motion to the committee. The motion to commit may be reconsidered, but after the committee has begun the consideration of the question referred to it, it is too late to move to reconsider the vote to commit. The committee may, however, then be discharged as shown below. The motion to commit (that is, to refer to a committee) may vary in form all the way from the simple form of, "That the question be referred to a committee," to the complete form of referring to question "to a committee of five to be appointed by the chair, with instructions to report resolutions properly covering the case, at the next regular business meeting." If the motion is made in the complete form the details may be changed by amendments, though they are usually treated not as ordinary amendments, but as in filling blanks [page 148]. If the motion is made in the simple form of merely referring the pending question to a committee there are three courses that may be pursued in completing the details, the one to be chosen depending upon the circumstances of the case. (1) The simple, or skeleton, motion may be completed by moving amendments, or making suggestions, for adding the required details as stated below. (2) The


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 Walton, Joseph, B.A. London Univ. 1865 from Stonyhurst, a member of the Northern circuit, author of Practice and Procedure of Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, a student of Lincoln's Inn 20 Nov., 1865 (then aged 20), called to the bar 17 Nov., 1868 (eldest son of Joseph Walton, of Ford, co. Lanc., merchant); born, 1845; married 12 Sept., 1871, Teresa, 4th dau. of late Nicholas d'Arcy, Esq., of Ballyforan, co. Roscommon.
 * 13, Harrington Street, and Ford, Liverpool.

Walton, Oriel Farnall, M.A. Magdalen Coll., Oxon, B.A. 1868, capt. North Somerset yeomanry since 1881, a member of the Western circuit, a student of the Inner Temple 15 Feb., 1867 (then aged 21), called to the bar 17 Nov., 1870 (eldest son of Thomas Todd Walton, postmaster Bristol); born 26 Feb., 1846; married 8 Feb., 1869, Catherine Augusta, eldest dau. of Lord Cecil James Gordon-Moore, and has issue (see Foster's Peerage, ).
 * Arundel House, Twickenham Park; Junior Carlton Club.

Wannop, Arthur Edward, M.A., B.C.L., Brasenose Coll., Oxon, 1872, a student of the Inner Temple 8 Nov., 1869 (then aged 20), called to the bar 26 Jan., 1876 (2nd son of Rev. William Wannop, of Burscough, co. Lanc.); born, 1849.
 * Equity Chambers, 9, Cook Street, Liverpool.

Waraker, Thomas, LL.D., Trin. Hall, Camb., 1859, law lecturer LL.B., Sidney Sussex Coll., 1854, examiner in jurisprudence, Roman law, and constitutional history to Inns of Court 1877, examiner in jurisprudence, law and principles of legislation, Roman law, and international law London Univ. since 1880, examiner in law tripos Camb. 1877–81, a student of Lincoln's Inn 9 June, 1849 (then aged 20), called to the bar 26 Jan., 1857 (only son of Thomas Waraker, of London, law stationer); born 10 Dec., 1829; married 28 June, 1855, Harriet, 2nd dau. of James Sadler, Esq., of Weyhill, Jamaica, and of Purton, Wilts.
 * 10, Peas Hill, and 5, Scroope Terrace, Cambridge.

Warburton, Henry Pigot Ireland, a member of the South-eastern circuit, a student of the Inner Temple 6 May, 1878 (then aged 24), called to the bar 3 May, 1882 (eldest son of Rev. Henry Warburton, of Sible Hedingham, Essex); born, 1854.
 * Hedingham, Halstead; 10, Gray's Inn Place, W.C.; 5, Crown Office Row, Temple, E.C.

Ward, Adolphus William, LL.D. Glasgow (Litt.D.), St. Peter's Coll., Camb., 1884, M.A. 1862, late fellow, chairman of Board of Studies Victoria Univ., Manchester, since 1880, professor of English literature and history (Owens Coll.) since 1866, examiner in law and history tripos Camb. Univ. 1871–3, in English and history London Univ. 1881–2, in history tripos Camb. Univ. 1884–5, a student of the Inner Temple 13 Jan., 1860 (then aged 22), called to the bar 26 Jan., 1866 (2nd son of John Ward, H.B.M.'s minister resident to the Hanse Towns); born 2 Dec., 1837; married 8 Feb., 1879, Adelaide Laura, dau. of Rev. T. B. Lancaster.
 * 7, Ladybarn Road, Fallowfield, Manchester.

Ward, Alexander, a member of the South-eastern circuit, formerly an engineer, a student of the Middle Temple 14 Nov., 1876, called to the bar 25 June, 1879 (2nd son of late Henry Ward, of London, solicitor); born,.
 * 64, Pembridge Villas, W.; 1, Hare Court, Temple, E.C.

Ward, Charles Dudley Robert, district judge (Wellington) New Zealand since 186‒, undergrad. Wadham Coll., Oxon, a student of the Inner Temple 7 June, 1848 (then aged 20), called to the bar 26 Jan., 1853 (eldest son of Sir Henry George Ward, G.C.M.G., M.P., late governor of Madras, dec.); born, 1828.
 * Wellington, New Zealand.

Ward, Daniel, B.A., LL.B. Trin. Coll., Dublin, senior moderator and gold medallist in law, history, and political science, matric. London Univ. 1876, auditor exchequer and audit department London since 1874, editor of Pratt's Income Tax, 4th edn., a student of the Middle Temple 21 Jan., 1879, called to the bar 17 Nov., 1881 (only son of Thomas Ward, of Hillsborough, co. Down); born,.
 * Ryland House, Peckham Rye; Exchequer and Audit Department, Treasury, S.W.

Ward, Edward Thomas, undergrad. Univ. Coll., Oxon, a member of the Midland circuit, a student of the Middle Temple 3 Nov., 1871, called to the bar 30 April, 1875 (only son of Thomas Ward, of Moreton Morrell, co. Warwick, J.P., late capt. 11th Prince Albert's hussars); born, 1850; reported dead 1885.
 * Moreton Morrell, Warwick.

Ward, Edwin, B.A., Caius Coll., Camb., 1851, a student of the Inner Temple 9 April, 1851 (then aged 22), called to the bar 1 May, 1854 (only son of late Thomas Ward, Esq., of Allerton House, Yorks, dec.); born, 1829.
 * Law Courts Chambers, 33, Chancery Lane, W.C.

Ward, Howard Charles, M.A., Trin. Coll., Camb., 1852, a student of the Inner Temple 25 July, 1845 (then aged 18), called to the bar 22 Nov., 1850 (only surviving son of Herbert John Ward, Esq., late of Carshalton, Surrey, dec.); born, 1827; married 26 Aug., 1858, Mary Bannister, elder dau. of late William Cotton, Esq., of the audit office.
 * Putney Park Avenue, Roehampton, S.W.; 11, Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C.

Ward, James, J.P. cos. Antrim and Dublin, hon. col. and lieut.-col. commandant 16th volunteer batt. (London Irish) the rifle brigade (the Prince Consort's own) since 1868, a student of Gray's Inn 5 May, 1843, called to the bar 18 Nov., 1867 (2nd son of James Ward, Esq., of Strawberry Hill, co. Down); born,.
 * 11a, Pall Mall East, S.W.; Junior Carlton Club, S.W.

Ward, John Henry, B.A., Trin. Hall, Camb., 1873, a student of the Inner Temple 6 May, 1870 (then aged 20), called to the bar 17 Nov., 1873 (eldest son of late Henry Ward, of London, solicitor, dec.); born, 1850.
 * Grenada, West Indies; Oriental Club, W.

title: Page:Men-at-the-Bar.djvu/526


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chair on his own initiative may call for suggestions to complete the motion, first inquiring as to what committee the question shall be referred, and continuing in the order shown hereafter. (3) The motion in its simplest form may be put to vote at once by its enemies' ordering the previous question, and where the motion to commit is almost certain to be lost this is sometimes done to save the time that would be uselessly spent in completing the details. If it should happen that the motion to commit is adopted, which is improbable, then the details are completed before any new business, except privileged matters, can be taken up. These details are taken up in the order given below, the chair calling for the several items much as if he were completing the motion before it was voted on. In completing a motion simply to refer to a committee, the first question the chair asks is, "To what committee shall the question be referred?" If different ones are suggested, the suggestions are not treated as amendments of those previously offered, but are voted on in the following order until one receives a majority vote: Committee of the whole; as if in committee of the whole; consider informally; standing committee, in the order in which they are proposed; special (select) committee (largest number voted on first). If the question has already been before a standing or special committee the motion becomes the


text: Men-at-the-Bar/Ward, Adolphus William

title: Men-at-the-Bar/Ward, Adolphus William


text:
Page:The aborigines of Australia.djvu/128

Rh a mere "blackfellow," exchange compliments with him and his companions, and, finally, as the last act of condescension, invite the aboriginal band to partake of his cheer and eat with him at the same meal.

On the appointed day Binnelong presented himself before the Governor, dressed in a suit of clothes which had been forwarded to him at his own request in order that he might present a decent and becoming appearance when he again joined the company of his old friends. An apartment was allotted to him in the Governor's residence; every attention was bestowed on his comfort and convenience, and he did not again quit the colony till he accompanied Governor Phillip to Europe. Of his career in England but little has been ascertained. Whether he was carried before the King and royal family by his protector, whether he was visited by lords and ladies, whether he was run after and cheered by the populace, whether, in fine, he was regarded as a prodigy and a hero, inasmuch as he was the first aboriginal inhabitant of the antipodes who visited England, no evidence exists to enable us to say or gainsay. Certain it is, however, that amid the wonders of civilization by which he was surrounded, amid the glare of the most gorgeous creations of art and science, and in the possession of all the comforts and luxuries which the capital of Great Britain could afford, he sighed for the sunny clime of his youth, and anxiously looked forward to the time when the