text:
Hornbuckle v. Toombs

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana; the case being thus:

The seventh amendment to the Constitution ordains:

'In suits at common law, where, &c., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined than according to the rules of the common law.'

An early statute of the United States, the statute commonly known as the Process Act of 1792, an act still in force, enacts:

'That the forms of writs, executions, and other process,. . . and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits--

'In those of the common law shall be the same as are now used in the said courts, respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled 'An act to regulate processes in the courts of the United States."In those of equity and in those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law, except so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule, to prescribe to any Circuit or District Court concerning the same.'

In this state of fundamental and of statutory law, Congress, on the 26th of May, 1864, passed 'An act to provide a temporary government for the Territory of Montana.' It enacted:

'SECTION 6. The legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act.

'SECTION 9. The judicial power of said Territory shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace. . . . The jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the probate courts,. . . shall be limited by law. Provided,. . . That the said supreme and district courts, respectively, shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction.

'SECTION 13. The Constitution and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Montana as elsewhere within the United States.'

The Territory being organized, its legislative assembly, in December, 1867, passed a 'Civil Practice Act' containing these provisions:

'SECTION 1. There shall be in this Territory but one form of civil action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs.

'SECTION 2. In such action, the party complaining shall be known as the plaintiff, and the adverse party as the defendant.

'SECTION 38. The only pleadings on the part of the plaintiff shall be the complaint, demurrer, or replication to the defendant's answer; and the only pleadings on the part of the defendant shall be a demurrer to the complaint, or a demurrer to the replication, or an answer to the complaint.

'SECTION 155. An issue of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference be ordered, as provided in this act.'

In this state of things Toombs brought an action against Hornbuckle in a District Court of the Territory of Montana, for damages caused by the diversion of a stream of water, by which his farm was deprived of irrigation, and for an adjudication of his right to the stream, and an injunction against further diversion. The action was framed and conducted in accordance with the practice as established by the legislative assembly of the Territory, in the provisions last-above quoted.

The case was tried by a jury, who found for the plaintiff, assessed his damage at one dollar, and decided that he was entitled to seventy inches of the water. Upon this verdict the court gave judgment, and awarded an injunction as prayed.

The only errors assigned were based on the intermingling of legal and equitable remedies in one form of action.

Mr. Robert Leech, for the plaintiff in error:

The proceedings are erroneous in that they entirely disregard the distinction between the chancery and common-law jurisdiction conferred by Congress upon the Territorial courts, by the organic act. This court has decided in the cases of Noonan v. Lee, Orchard v. Hughes, Dunphy v. Kleinsmith, Thompson v. Railroad Companies, and other cases, that legal and equitable matters cannot be thus confused.

The case of Dunphy v. Kleinsmith was brought here from the Supreme Court of this very Territory of Montana, and this court, in passing upon this legislation and the organic law of the Territory, said:

'It is apparent that the Territorial legislature has no power to pass any law in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, or which shall deprive the Supreme and District Courts of the Territory of chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction.'

In Thompson v. Railroad Companies, the court was equally emphatic. It said:

'The Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress recognize and establish the distinction between law and equity. The remedies in the courts of the United States are, at common law, or in equity, not according to the practice of State courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of these principles. 'And although the forms of proceedings and practice in the State courts shall have been adopted in the Circuit Courts of the United States, yet the adoption of the State practice must not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equity, nor as authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended together in one suit."

Unless, therefore, this court means to disregard its own solemn precedents made, iterated and reiterated, the judgment and decree below must be reversed.

The precedents rest, too, on obvious reason. The organic act of the Territory does not speak of chancery and common-law jurisdiction otherwise than as distinct systems, and the Process Act of 1792-still in force, undoubtedly contemplating the two systems as distinct systems and to be administered separately, and which act is 'not locally inapplicable' to the Territories-has, by the thirteenth section of the organic act 'the same force and effect within the Territory of Montana as elsewhere in the United States.'

Messrs. Montgomery Blair and F. A. Dick, contra.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Hornbuckle v. Toombs


text: Talk:Hornbuckle v. Toombs

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Hornbuckle v. Toombs


text:
Hornbuckle v. Toombs/Opinion of the Court

The only errors assigned are based on the intermingling of legal and quitable remedies in one form of action.

Such an objection would be available in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States. The Process Act of 1792 expressly declared that in suits in equity, and in those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in those courts, the forms and modes of proceeding should be according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law, subject to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively should deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court should think proper to prescribe. The Supreme Court, in prescribing rules of proceeding for those courts, has always followed the general principle indicated by the law. Whether the Territorial courts are subject to the same regulation is the question which is now fairly presented.

In the case of Orchard v. Hughes a majority of this court was of opinion that the Territorial courts were subject to the same general regulations in equity cases which govern the practice in the Circuit and District Courts. That was the case of a foreclosure of a mortgage in the Territorial court of Nebraska, and the court, under a Territorial law, not only decreed a foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises, but gave a personal decree against the defendant for the deficiency. We had decided in Noonan v. Lee, that under the equity rules prescribed for the Circuit and District Courts, such a decree could not be made. The majority of the court now applied the same rule in the case of Orchard v. Hughes, although it was decided by a Territorial court. Following out the principle involved in that decision, we subsequently, in the case of Dunphy v. Kleinsmith, reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana, on the ground that the case (being in nature of a creditor's bill, filed to reach property which the debtor had fraudulently conveyed) was a clear case of equity, whilst the proceedings therein exhibited no resemblance to equity proceedings, there being a trial by jury, a verdict for damages, and a judgment, on the verdict.

On a careful review of the whole subject we are not satisfied that those decisions are founded on a correct view of the law. By the sixth section of the organic act of the Territory of Montana, with which that of Nebraska substantially agreed, it was enacted, 'that the legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act.' By the ninth section it was provided 'that the judicial power of said Territory shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace,' and that 'the jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the probate courts and justices of the peace, shall be limited by law; Provided,' that 'the said supreme and district courts respectively shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction.'

Now, here is nothing which declares, as the Process Act of 1792 did declare, that the jurisdictions of common law and chancery shall be exercised separately, and by distinct forms and modes of proceeding. The only provision is, that the courts named shall possess both jurisdictions. If the two jurisdictions had never been exercised in any other way than by distinct modes of proceeding, there would be ground for supposing that Congress intended them to be exercised in that way. But it is well known that in many States of the Union the two jurisdictions are commingled in one form of action. And there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent such a mode of proceeding. Even in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States the same court is invested with the two jurisdictions, having a law side and an equity side; and the enforced separation of the two remedies, legal and equitable, in reference to the same subject-matter of controversy, sometimes leads to interesting exhibitions of the power of mere form to retard the administration of justice. In most cases it is difficult to see any good reason why an equitable right should not be enforced or an equitable remedy administered in the same proceeding by which the legal rights of the parties are adjudicated. Be this, however, as it may, a consolidation of the two jurisdictions exists in many of the States, and must be considered as having been well known to Congress; and when the latter body, in the organic act, simply declares that certain Territorial courts shall possess both jurisdictions, without prescribing how they shall be exercised, the passage by the Territorial assembly of a code of practice which unites them in one form of action, cannot be deemed repugnant to such organic act.

A clause in the thirteenth section of the act, however, has been referred to, by which it is declared 'that the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Montana as elsewhere in the United States;' and it is argued that by virtue of this enactment, all regulations respecting judicial proceedings which are contained in any of the acts of Congress, are imported into the practice of the Territorial courts. But this proposition is not tenable. Laws regulating the proceedings of the United States courts are of specific application, and are, in truth and in fact, locally inapplicable to the courts of a Territory. There is a law authorizing this court to appoint a reporter. In one sense this law is not locally inapplicable to the Supreme Court of the Territory; but in a just sense it is so. The law has a specific application to this court, and cannot be applied to the Territorial court without an evident misconstruction of the true meaning and intent of Congress in the clause of the thirteenth section above referred to. That clause has the effect, undoubtedly, of importing into the Territory the laws passed by Congress to prevent and punish offences against the revenue, the mail service, and other laws of a general character and universal application; but not those of specific application.

The acts of Congress respecting proceedings in the United States courts are concerned with, and confined to, those courts, considered as parts of the Federal system, and as invested with the judicial power of the United States expressly conferred by the Constitution, and to be exercised in correlation with the presence and jurisdiction of the several State courts and governments. They were not intended as exertions of that plenary municipal authority which Congress has over the District of Columbia and the Territories of the United States. They do not contain a word to indicate any such intent. The fact that they require the Circuit and District Courts to follow the practice of the respective State courts in cases at law, and that they supply no other rule in such cases, shows that they cannot apply to the Territorial courts. As before said, these acts have specific application to the courts of the United States, which are courts of a peculiar character and jurisdiction.

Whenever Congress has proceeded to organize a government for any of the Territories, it has merely instituted a general system of courts therefor, and has committed to the Territorial assembly full power, subject to a few specified or implied conditions, of supplying all details of legislation necessary to put the system into operation, even to the defining of the jurisdiction of the several courts. As a general thing, subject to the general scheme of local government chalked out by the organic act, and such special provisions as are contained therein, the local legislature has been intrusted with the enactment of the entire system of municipal law, subject also, however, to the right of Congress to revise, alter, and revoke at its discretion. The powers thus exercised by the Territorial legislatures are nearly as extensive as those exercised by any State legislature; and the jurisdiction of the Territorial courts is collectively coextensive with and correspondent to that of the State courts-a very different jurisdiction from that exercised by the Circuit and District Courts of the United States. In fine, the Territorial, like the State courts, are invested with plenary municipal jurisdiction.

It is true that the District Courts of the Territory are, by the organic act, invested with the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States; and a portion of each term is directed to be appropriated to the trial of causes arising under the said Constitution and laws. Whether, when acting in this capacity, the said courts are to be governed by any of the regulations affecting the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, is not now the question. A large class of cases within the jurisdiction of the latter courts would not, under this clause, come in the Territorial courts; namely, those in which the jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the parties. Cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States would be composed mostly of revenue, admiralty, patent, and bankruptcy cases, prosecutions for crimes against the United States, and prosecutions and suits for infractions of the laws relating to civil rights under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. To avoid question and controversy as to the modes of proceeding in such cases, where not already settled by law, perhaps additional legislation would be desirable.

From a review of the entire past legislation of Congress on the subject under consideration, our conclusion is, that the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding of the Territorial courts, as well as their respective jurisdictions, subject, as before said, to a few express or implied conditions in the organic act itself, were intended to be left to the legislative action of the Territorial assemblies, and to the regulations which might be adopted by the courts themselves. Of course, in case of any difficulties arising out of this state of things, Congress has it in its power at any time to establish such regulations on this, as well as on any other subject of legislation, as it shall deem expedient and proper.

AFFIRMED.

We dissent from the judgment in this case for the reason that this court has several times decided that claims at law and claims in equity cannot be united in one action even in the Territorial courts. And we think, if a change in the rule is to be made, that it should be made by Congress.


text: Talk:Hornbuckle v. Toombs/Opinion of the Court


text:
Hershfield v. Griffith

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana.

Griffith sued Starr in one of the District Territorial courts of Montana, on a mortgage on certain property; the suit being brought under the Civil Practice Act, quoted in the preceding case; an act passed under circumstances there set forth, and which it is necessary for the reader to possess himself of in order to understand at all this case. One Hershfield intervened, asserting that he had a mortgage on the property, of a date prior to that sued on by Griffith. The court gave judgment in favor of Griffith, and Hershfield took the case to the Supreme Court of the Territory, which affirmed the judgment below. Hershfield now brought the case here by appeal, assigning among other errors the blending of equity and common-law jurisdiction.

Mr. Lyman Trumbull, for the appellant, adverting to the seventh amendment to the Federal Constitution, the Process Act of 1792, the organic law of the Territory, and the Civil Practice Act all set forth in the preceding case (supra, p. 648-650),-and to the same cases as Mr. Leech referred to in the argument there, argued, that a foreclosure of a mortgage-a proceeding in its essence equitable-had been performed through common-law means, and argued further, as Mr. Leech did in the preceding case, that it was not competent for the Territorial legislature of Montana to abolish, as it had sought to do by its Civil Practice Act, the distinction between chancery and common-law proceedings, which the organic act, adopting the Process Act, had recognized; and that this court had in numerous cases so decided.

Messrs. J. Hubley Ashton and N. Wilson, contra, contended that a proceeding to obtain satisfaction of a mortgage was not necessarily a proceeding in equity, and adverted to the practice in Pennsylvania, where regarding a recorded mortgage as in the nature of a judicial record, a scire facias was by statute allowed to be issued thereon through common-law courts; the only courts which, with rare exception, the State of Pennsylvania had ever had. It was not necessary, therefore, to assume that the proceeding below had been an equitable one. Being had in courts not courts of chancery, it was to be regarded as a common-law proceeding, and proper. If, therefore, the appeal was not to be dismissed, the decree should be affirmed.

But the appeal should be dismissed. The proceeding having been, as shown above, one at law, a writ of error was the only proper means to bring it here.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Hershfield v. Griffith


text: Talk:Hershfield v. Griffith

title: Talk:Hershfield v. Griffith


text:
Hershfield v. Griffith/Opinion of the Court

The only point made in this case is, that being one of equity jurisdiction it was tried by jury as an action at law. This being so it would seem that, under the seventh article of amendments to the Constitution, it should have been removed by writ of error and not by appeal. But that aside, we have just decided in Hornbuckle v. Toombs that equitable as well as legal relief may be pursued by the form of action prescribed by the Territorial legislature. There is no complaint that this was not done, or that substantial justice was not administered between the parties.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Dissenting, Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and STRONG.


text: Talk:Hershfield v. Griffith/Opinion of the Court


text:
Davis v. Bilsland

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana.

A mechanic's lien law of the Territory, just named, enacts:

'SECTION 8. The liens for work or labor done, or things furnished, as specified in this act, shall have priority in the order of filing the accounts thereof, as aforesaid, and shall be preferred to all other liens and incumbrances which may be attached to or upon the building, erection, or other improvement, and to the land upon which the same is situated, to the extent aforesaid, or either of them, made subsequent to the commencement of said building, erection, or other improvement.'

Under this act Bilsland filed a petition in the Territorial District Court to enforce a mechanic's lien against the International Hotel in the town of Helena, Montana, and the lot on which it is situated, by a sale of the same to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to foreclose the liens and claims of all other parties. The building of the hotel was begun on May 1st, 1869, and one McKillican was employed by the owner to work upon it as foreman from the 8th of May to the 13th of November, and for this labor became entitled to the sum of $1242.50. He duly filed his lien, and afterwards assigned his claim to Bilsland. Bilsland himself was employed on the building as a carpenter from July to November, 1869, and duly filed his lien for $742.87, the amount due to him.

Bilsland's petition alleged that a certain Davis, who, with some other persons, was made a defendant in the case, pretended to have some lien on the property, which at best arose subsequently to that which he, Bilsland, had, which claim of Davis the petition prayed might be barred and foreclosed.

Davis appeared as a defendant and alleged that on the 9th of June, 1869 (after the building was commenced), he lent to the owner of the property $6792, and received as security therefor a mortgage on the property, which was duly filed for record on the same day. He contended that he was entitled to priority of payment over the claims of McKillican and Bilsland.

The court, a jury being waived, rendered a decree in favor of Bilsland for his own claim and for that which was assigned to him by McKillican, and directed a sale of the property to pay the plaintiff, in preference to other parties, Davis among the number. This decree, being taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, was substantially affirmed, and was now here on a writ of error.

The plaintiff assigned three errors:

First. That the action was a joinder in one suit of an action of assumpsit for work and labor, with a chancery proceeding to foreclose the equity of redemption.

Secondly. That the claim of a mechanic for a statutory lien cannot be enforced by an assignee by a suit in his own name.

Third. That the mortgage of Davis was entitled to priority over the claims of the plaintiff, which were not filed till November, 1869, and that Bilsland did not commence work until after the mortgage was given.

Messrs. Robert Leech and Enoch Totten, for the plaintiffs in error; Messrs. J. H. Ashton and N. Wilson, contra.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Davis v. Bilsland


text: Talk:Davis v. Bilsland

title: Talk:Davis v. Bilsland


text:
Davis v. Bilsland/Opinion of the Court

First. That the action is a joinder in one suit of an action of assumpsit for work and labor, with a chancery proceeding to foreclose the equity of redemption.

This ground of objection having been already fully considered in the case of Hornbuckle v. Toombs, needs no further discussion.

Secondly. That the claim of a mechanic for a statutory lien cannot be enforced by an assignee by a suit in his own name.

In answer to this objection it is sufficient to refer to the fourth section of the Civil Practice Act of Montana, which provides that actions shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. McKillican had completed his claim by filing his lien before assigning it to the plaintiff. It was perfectly lawful for him to assign his claim. It was not against any principle of public policy to do so. When assigned, the claim really belonged to the plaintiff, and according to the code he was the proper person to bring suit upon it.

Thirdly. That the mortgage of the defendant was entitled to priority over the claims of the plaintiff, which were not filed till November, 1869, and Bilsland did not commence work until after the mortgage was given.

The language of the eighth section of the mechanic's lien law of Montana is unambiguous. The liens secured to the mechanics and material-men have precedence over all other incumbrances put upon the property after the commencement of the building. And this is just. Why should a purchaser or lender have the benefit of the labor and materials which go into the property and give it its existence and value? At all events the law is clear, and the decree was right.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

Dissenting, Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and STRONG.

title: Davis v. Bilsland/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Davis v. Bilsland/Opinion of the Court


text: Jones v. United States (85 U.S. 662)

title: Jones v. United States (85 U.S. 662)


text: Talk:Jones v. United States (85 U.S. 662)


text:
Jones v. United States (85 U.S. 662)/Opinion of the Court

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Jones, Ramsay, and Lauterman, as sureties for one Quillian, were sued by the United States on a bond executed on 13th June, 1867, conditioned that the said Quillian should faithfully discharge the duties of postmaster at Milledgeville, Georgia, and 'faithfully, once in three months, or oftener, if thereto required, render account of his receipts and expenditures, and pay the balance of all moneys that shall come to his hands, and keep safely all the public money collected by him.'

To the default under this bond the defendants put in the plea:

'That as to any default of the said Quillian, their principal in said bond in the declaration mentioned as postmaster aforesaid, within two years before the commencement of this action, they are not liable in law therefor, but have been and are fully discharged and released, by the acts and conduct of the plaintiff, through their agent, the Auditor of the Treasury of the Post Office Department, of the said plaintiff, who had full notice of the defalcation and embezzlement of funds of the plaintiff before them; and yet neglectfully permitted said Quillian to remain in office as such postmaster, whereby he was enabled to commit all the default and embezzlement aforesaid, within two years before the commencement of this action.'

To this plea (a plea of the Statute of Limitations having been withdrawn) the plaintiff demurred, and his demurrer was sustained.

The overruling of the plea, and sustaining the demurrer, was now assigned for error.

Mr. P. Phillips, for the plaintiff in error:

Assuming that the government is subject to the same legal obligation as would be imposed on an individual occupying the like position, it ought not to be allowed to recover. If A. becomes liable for the faithful discharge of duties by B., as clerk for C., and it should come to the knowledge of C., that B. had embezzled his funds, but notwithstanding C. continues him in his employment, it would be a fraud on A., ignorant of this embezzlement, to hold him responsible for any subsequent act of dishonesty. So we say, in this case, that the knowledge of the government that Quillian had embezzled its funds, should have caused his immediate dismissal. This would have terminated the liability of his sureties, and limited it to the amount then due. But when the government chooses to continue in office an officer known to have committed such an act, it takes upon itself the trust of his future honesty.

Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-General, contra.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court, to the effect that it was quite evident that the facts pleaded did not constitute any defence to the action, and that such being the settled law of the court it was not necessary to enter into any discussion of the question.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Jones v. United States (85 U.S. 662)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Shrewsbury v. United States

APPEAL from the Court of Claims; the case as found by that court being thus:

On the 27th of March, 1865, one Shrewsbury entered, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, into a contract with Colonel Potter, a quartermaster of the army there, by which it was agreed that he, Shrewsbury, should 'receive' at any time from May to September, 1865, from the officers of the quartermaster's department, at Forts Leavenworth and Riley, and town of Kansas, all such military stores and supplies, as might 'be turned over to him for transportation by the officer or agent of the quartermaster's department at any or all of the above-named places, and transport the same' to the officer of the quartermaster's department on duty at Fort Union, in the Territory of New Mexico, or any other depot that may be designated in that Territory.

In a subsequent article of the contract, Shrewsbury contracted to 'transport all the military stores and supplies for which the quartermaster's department may require transportation by contract, during the year 1865, provided that the weight of such military stores and supplies should not exceed in the aggregate 15,000,000 pounds.' The article contained a clause thus:

'Nothing herein shall be so construed as to forbid or prevent the United States from using its own means of transportation for such service, whenever it may be deemed advisable to do so.'

Under this agreement stores were furnished to Shrewsbury by the quartermaster's department to the amount of 14,200,000 pounds, for the transportation of which he was paid. He was prepared with the means of transportation, and ready to transport the remainder of the 15,000,000 pounds, which, under the contract, he was bound to carry; but it was not furnished to him for transportation.

On the 29th of September, 1865, Colonel Morgan, commissary of subsistence at Fort Leavenworth, entered into a contract with Fuller & Tiernan to deliver 'to the officer of the subsistence department' at this same Fort Union, 18,000 bushels (or about 1,000,000 pounds), of shelled corn, on or before the 20th of December, 1865, the same to be 'of the best quality, well sacked in new gunny-sacks, securely sewed with linen twine; free from dirt, cobs, or other foreign matter, and to be either yellow or white, but not mixed in the sacks.' The contract proceeded:

'The parties of the second part agree that said corn shall be subject to the inspection, acceptance, or rejection of the officer receiving the same, and that if default shall be made by the said parties of the second part, or either of them, in the time of delivery, or any of the terms of this contract, the party of the first part, or any person acting for him on behalf of the United States, shall have power to purchase the corn in open market, and the said parties of the second part, and their sureties, shall be charged with the difference between the cost thereof and the price hereinafter stipulated to be paid to the said parties of the second part.

'For and in consideration of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this contract the said party of the first part agrees to pay, or cause to be paid, to the parties of the second part, at the office of the commissary of subsistence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the sum of $8.54 for each and every bushel of corn delivered and accepted in accordance with the terms thereof, payment to be made on vouchers issued and certified by the officer receiving said corn.'

This contract was entered into by Morgan with Fuller & Tiernan, in pursuance of an order received by the former from the commissary of subsistence at St. Louis, Missouri, requiring Morgan to send corn to New Mexico to the amount of about 1,000,000 pounds. It being too late in the season for Morgan to advertise for proposals for the corn, and to purchase it under advertisement in time to send it out by the government freighter, and, having an offer from Fuller & Tiernan, who were then furnishing corn to the quartermaster's department at Fort Leavenworth, to deliver the corn required for the subsistence department at Fort Union, he entered into the said contract with them. This corn was to be sent to the said fort, not for the army, but to feed Mexicans or Indians. Morgan urging Fuller & Tiernan to send the corn off, they borrowed from the quartermaster of Fort Leavenworth some corn which they were delivering to him; the said quartermaster lending it to Fuller & Tiernan, to accommodate the subsistence department, and to enable Fuller & Tiernan to begin on their contract sooner than they could do if they had to wait to get the corn from St. Louis.

The quantity of corn so lent by the quartermaster's department to Fuller & Tiernan was about one-half of the million pounds which they contracted to deliver at Fort Union; and the amount lent to them was afterwards returned by them, in kind, to the quartermaster's department at Fort Leavenworth. Fuller & Tiernan delivered at Fort Union 858,000 pounds of corn, all of which was received by the government on their contract. About 120,000 pounds of the corn they shipped for Fort Union was stopped and taken by the government at Fort Dodge.

Shrewsbury insisting that the making of this contract by an officer of the United States, in September, 1865, and its performance, constituted a breach of his contract made with Colonel Potter in March of the same year, filed a petition in the court below, claiming as damages the profit on the transportation of about 800,000 pounds of corn, which, he insisted, should have been furnished for transportation on his contract, instead of being purchased and delivered under the contract with Fuller & Tiernan.

The Court of Claims held adversely to the petitioner and dismissed his claim. He now appealed to this court.

Mr. Durant, for the appellant, contended that Shrewsbury, by his contract, had an exclusive right to carry whatever corn, up to 15,000,000 pounds, the military department of the government sent from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Union; and that in making the new contract, by which the right to deliver the same article at Fort Union was conceded to Fuller & Tiernan (he, Shrewsbury, not having yet carried the 15,000,000 pounds, nor so exhausted his right), the government had violated its contract with him; that the arrangement with these parties just named was but a device to evade the performance of their contract with him.

The learned counsel argued further, that any loan of supplies owned by the government to a private contractor, was a matter against public policy and illegal; and that the fact of such a loan in this case was a further proof of the truth of the position already taken, that the contract with Fuller & Tiernan was but a scheme to avoid the performance of the contract made with Shrewsbury.

Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Shrewsbury v. United States


text: Talk:Shrewsbury v. United States

title: Talk:Shrewsbury v. United States


text:
Shrewsbury v. United States/Opinion of the Court

It can hardly be denied by the most zealous advocate that the two contracts before us differ essentially in their nature and form. The contract made with the claimant is a contract for the transportation of corn, at a price fixed, and in quantity not to exceed 15,000,000 pounds. The sole duty of the claimant under this contract was to carry and deliver the corn. He did not purchase it nor own it; he had nothing to do with its value or quality, and could neither make nor lose by a fluctuation in the value of the corn.

The later contract with Fuller & Tiernan, on the other hand, is strictly a contract for the purchase of 18,000 bushels of corn, to be delivered at a place and within a time named, and at a price specified, to be paid on the delivery and acceptance of the corn. In this case the corn is the property of Fuller & Tiernan until delivered. They purchase it; they own it. If the price of corn in the market varies essentially they will make a profit or be losers, according as the direction of the variation shall be. Their contract is to furnish the corn at Fort Union, New Mexico, and they are at liberty to obtain it from any source they choose. They have no claim for payment until delivery, and the United States have no ownership of the corn until delivery and payment.

The foundation, however, of the claimant's demand rests upon the identity of these dissimilar contracts. Having contracted to deliver to him for transportation all the corn of which the quartermaster's department required transportation from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Union, he insists that this contract is violated by a purchase by the subsistence department of the United States, made at Fort Leavenworth, of corn to be delivered by the seller of the same at Fort Union. This view cannot be sustained. There is not only not an identity, but there is not a similarity between the contracts. The making of the latter contract, and its performance, was not a breach of the former.

It is suggested in the claimant's brief that the proceeding of the United States in making the contract with Fuller & Tiernan was a device unfairly to evade the performance of the claimant's contract. No such fact is found by the Court of Claims, and their findings of fact are taken by us to be the facts in the case. We discover nothing in the case that would have justified the Court of Claims in coming to such conclusion. We should, at all times, be slow to sustain such an imputation upon the good faith of the government.

The claimant makes complaint that the quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth lent to Fuller & Tiernan a quantity of corn to be used by them in performance of their contract of sale with the commissary of subsistence; that the loan of corn was illegal, the title still remaining in the United States, and that this fact furnishes evidence that the second contract was a device and a pretence only. We have only to say on this branch of the case that the claimant is not invested with authority to supervise the transactions of the different departments of the government. Whether the commissary of subsistence had authority to make the contract with Fuller, whether there was an irregularity in the loan of corn to Fuller, and what was the motive of these dealings, are matters to be investigated by the War Department. They cannot be challenged by the claimant. He rests his claim for damages upon the making and performance of Fuller's contract. That contract has not been repudiated or objected to, so far as we know, by the proper authority. The record contains no evidence that any of the transactions are the subject of censure by the government.

The supplies contracted to be transported by the claimant were those of the quartermaster's department, that is, the supplies to be used for and by the army. The corn purchased by the commissary of subsistence was sent to New Mexico, not for the army, but to feed the Mexicans or Indians. The duties of the quartermaster's department, and of the department of subsistence, are separate and distinct. The departments are managed by different officers, whose authority is confined to the matters connected with their departments.

The contract to transport, in the case before us, relates to supplies for the quartermaster's department. The arrangement which is set forth as a violation of that contract related to supplies needed by the commissary of subsistence, a different subject entirely.

The duty of the commissary department, in general terms, is to feed the army, to provide supplies for its subsistence. Transportation is not understood to be among its duties. That office belongs to the quartermaster's department. What the commissary provides to feed the army it is the duty of the quartermaster to transport to such points as may be needed. Hence, in the case before us, it was in the ordinary course of business, the contract for transportation being already made, and further supplies being needed, that the purchase of the same should devolve on the commissary department.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Shrewsbury v. United States/Opinion of the Court


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Hicks v. Kelsey

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois; the case being this:

Hicks obtained a patent for an improved wagon-reach, and filed a bill against Kelsey, charging infringement and praying the usual relief. The defendant answered, denying the novelty of the alleged invention, and also denying infringement.

The thing called a 'wagon-reach'-that is to say, a pole or shaft connecting the front and rear axles of wagons or carriages, and having an upward crook or curve in it, so as to allow the front wheel, which, when a carriage is turned, goes against the reach if straight, to pass under it-had confessedly long been made, and was public property. These had been made of wood, necessarily for the sake of strength of a certain thickness, and consisted of one piece, strengthened by straps of iron attached to each side of the reach. The supposed improvement of the plaintiff consisted precisely and only in leaving out the wood in the curve and bolting the iron straps together, whereby the curve became all iron and less bulky, but in all other respects having the same shape and performing the same office as before. About all this there was no dispute whatever. Instead of being bolted together, the straps might be welded so as to make the curve consist of solid iron.

The question was whether this change of material-making the curve of iron instead of wood and iron-was a sufficient change to constitute invention,-the purpose being the same (namely, to turn the wheel under the body of the wagon), the means of accomplishing it being the same (namely, by a curved reach), and the form of the reach and mode of operation being the same.

Witnesses were examined, whose testimony went to show that the iron reach had advantages over those of mere wood, or of wood and iron. One said that of thirty-five, which he had made in about two years, none had come back broken, or needing repairs; that this was not the case with the old sort.

Another said:

'My experience is that, in those made of wood and iron, the wood between the iron plates in summer contracts and loosens the bolts.'

Another said:

'Hicks's reach being iron, the two plates come together as one whole substantially soldered. In the wooden one, the moment the shrinkage becomes such that the bolts become loose, each has to take its own part, and the transit of the trucks, moving from the right to the left, turning the friction from that, takes each separate strain from one and throws it on to the other, so it makes only the thickness of the one side-the one piece of iron where otherwise it would be two plates together. The crooked part, right at the crook, would break, according to that arrangement, because the other part is stronger. It will break whenever it gets so it will vibrate, at the weakest point.'

The court below decided that plainly there was nothing but a change of material, and that this-the purpose, means of accomplishment, form of the instrument, mode of operation, being all as in the old reach-was not a sufficient change to constitute invention. It accordingly dismissed the bill. From its action herein this appeal was taken.

Mr. S. A. Goodwin, for the appellant:

This invention does not consist in the mere substitution of a particular material for other material which had been previously used for the same purpose and in the same way. The invention consists in the production of a certain described article by a certain described mechanical process, which process, viewed as a whole, is new in itself. That process is, the making an ordinary wooden reach of two separate parts, in splicing those parts at the front and rear ends by a particular and new mechanical arrangement to a curved metallic intermediary splice, made substantially solid in two plates, or one casting, so that a new article is produced by a new mechanical arrangement or device,-a new curved reach. This article has added advantages and increased utility over the old wooden curved reach improved upon. They are shown in the proofs. Indeed, the matter is intelligible without proofs. The curved reach is indispensable, to prevent the wheel, when the carriage is turned and one of the front wheels put under it, from rubbing against the reach, lifting it up, and upsetting the carriage. But a curved reach must be made. One is rarely found in the natural growth of a tree. The curved part, when made, is necessarily weak, being usually made of wood sawed across the grain. To give strength the whole wooden reach has iron plates along it, fastened on both its sides with spikes or bolts. The wood and the iron shrink unequally, and the bolts all become loose. But when the central part is all made of iron alone, leaving the ends, for the sake of lightness, to be of wood alone, all this is obviated.

We say, then, that this new material in the crook or curve; with the new method of attachment at each end (the splice) to the two wooden parts; with the new construction of the reach as a whole; with the new operation in consequence of the change; with the increased utility and beneficial results, thus incontestably proved, bring this patent within the principle of all the cases as a patentable invention.

There are many cases in which the materiality of an invention, whether it be a machine or a process, can be judged of only by its effect on the result, and this effect is tested by the actual improvement in the process of producing an article, or in the article itself introduced by the alleged invention.

No opposing counsel.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Hicks v. Kelsey


text: Talk:Hicks v. Kelsey

title: Talk:Hicks v. Kelsey


text:
Hicks v. Kelsey/Opinion of the Court

The question is whether the mere change of material-making the curve of iron instead of wood and iron-was a sufficient change to constitute invention; the purpose being the same, the means of accomplishing it being the same, and the form of the reach and mode of operation being the same.

It is certainly difficult to bring the case within any recognized rule of novelty by which the patent can be sustained. The use of one material instead of another in constructing a known machine is, in most cases, so obviously a matter of mere mechanical judgment, and not of invention, that it cannot be called an invention, unless some new and useful result, an increase of efficiency, or a decided saving in the operation, is clearly attained. Some evidence was given to show that the wagon-reach of the plaintiff is a better reach, requiring less repair, and having greater solidity than the wooden reach. But it is not sufficient to bring the case out of the category of more or less excellence of construction. The machine is the same. Axe-helves made of hickory may be more durable and more cheap in the end than those made of beech or pine, but the first application of hickory to the purpose would not be, therefore, patentable.

Cases have frequently arisen in which substantially the question now presented has been discussed. Perhaps, however, none can be cited more directly in point than that of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, in which it was held that the substitution of porcelain for metal in making door-knobs of a particular construction was not patentable, though the new material was better adapted to the purpose and made a better and cheaper knob having been used for door-knobs, however, before. So, in a case at the circuit, referred to by Justice Nelson in the last-named case, the substitution of wood for bone as the basis of a button covered with tin was held not patentable.

In Crane v. Price, it is true, the use of anthracite instead of bituminous coal with the hot-blast in smelting iron ore was held to be a good invention, inasmuch as it produced a better article of iron at a less expense. But that was a process of manufacture, and in such processes a different article replacing another article in the combination often produces different results. The latter case is more analogous to the cases of compositions of matter than it is to those of machinery; and in compositions of matter a different ingredient changes the indentity of the compound, whereas an iron bar in place of a wooden one, and subserving the same purpose, does not change the identity of a machine.

But the plaintiff's counsel alleges that his invention does not consist of the mere substitution of a particular material for another material which had been previously used for the same purpose in the same way, but consists in the production of a certain described article by a certain described mechanical process, which process, viewed as a whole, is new and useful; and then he describes what he supposes to be such new mechanical process. This is his argument; but the facts do not bear out such a view of the case.

In our judgment, the patent in this case is void for want of novelty in the alleged invention.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

title: Hicks v. Kelsey/Opinion of the Court


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 Chancery, against a dramatization of "Little Lord Fauntleroy" which copied from the novel beyond the limits of fair use and was therefore considered a "copy" from the work.

Where in dramatizing a novel, the dramatic author invents and introduces new scenes, situations or other features, the copying of such added features into another dramatic version of the novel, otherwise independent, constitutes an infringement of the original play. In the case of Nethersole v. Bell in 1903, with respect to rival English dramatic versions of Daudet's "Sapho," it was held that while there might lawfully be independent dramatizations of the novel, the circumstances indicated that the Espinasse version of the defendant, said to have been written in Australia, had been so modified consequent to representation of Clyde Fitch's version, as to constitute an infringement of the plaintiff's rights. In Tree v. Bowkett in 1896, plaintiff obtained an injunction against the use by the defendant in a rival dramatic version of "Trilby" because of two scenes introduced by the plaintiff into his drama which were not in the novel or in the American dramatization. On the other hand, in Chatterton v. Cave in 1876, where the plaintiff had dramatized Eugene Sue's "The wandering Jew" and added two scenes not in the novel, an injunction was denied by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge against an independent dramatization, though it had included similar scenes, on the ground that these were not sufficiently substantial and material in the play to constitute an infringement. And this application of the principle of de minimis non curat lex was affirmed by the House of Lords in 1878.

As to what is a dramatic composition or representation, no definition is given in the American law, and the English laws of 1833 and 1842, quoted beyond,


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84, where de Graudin and Towbridge wanted his word on translating certain old Dutch documents better left untranslated. Heading west and south toward his home, he passed Scott's Meadows. And, though it was nearly dark and snowy, he could not resist the opportunity to visit Criley's Mill then and there.

A druggist on the little main street gave him directions. The judge drove up a steep ill-paved road, then between hills crowned with naked trees. Eventually he came to an old quarry road and followed it to here, across a rapid brown brook, a creaky bridge led to the place.

By the last rays of the sun, he decided he had either come the wrong way or come too late.

He had heard of a tall, gaunt building, the ruins of a mill house—a place two hundred years old. that looked two thousand. This was almost the opposite—quite new, of brown shingles, low and rambling, with a screened porch and wide windows. The place should have been cheerful, but it was not.

Pursuivant drove across, got out and knocked at the door. Snow began to shimmer down. Lights went on in the front room, and a man opened the door. He was small and slim, with a gray forelock and a lined, shrewd face, reminiscent of the late Will Rogers. He wore a smoking jacket and slippers.

"Yes?" he half challenged.

"Excuse me," replied Pursuivant, hunching his massive shoulders, "but is this Criley's Mill? The haunted house?"

"Haunted?" echoed the man on the threshold. "Why, I—I don't know."

There seemed to be only one thing to say. Pursuivant shook snowflakes from his tawny mustache and said it. "I'm sorry to have troubled you. I seem to have made a mistake."

At once the other changed his manner "Oh, no, sir. No mistake. This was the place. You see, I built where Criley's Mill was—just finished and moved in on Thanksgiving—look here, won't you come in? I'm sorry if I was abrupt. Just nerves. I didn't know who might be coming to my door—so far away from everything—"

His gaunt little hand caught at Pursuivant's big one. "Come in, sir. Or—wait. It's putting on to snow. I've got a double garage around back. Want to slide your car in with mine? Then we'll have a drink. Maybe a bite to eat."

He wanted Pursuivant to stay. The judge gazed at him with big blue eyes, deceptively innocent. Then he nodded and said, "Thanks. I'll be very glad to stay."

stowing the car, he returned through the snow. The little man still waited at the door to usher him in. "What did you say your name was?"

The judge had not said, but he replied, "Pursuivant. Judge Keith Pursuivant. I'm interested in haunted houses."

"And I'm Alvin Scrope—country editor, retired, bachelor." They were in the front room now, a room designed to answer a man's prayer for comfort. It had cushioned furniture, thick rugs, bright pictures, plenty of light, a shelf of books. But, as outside, the cheer was somehow lacking. "You'll have to pardon me," said Alvin Scrope. "My house boy left here New Year's eve, and I'm running the place alone for a day or so."

From a side table he lifted a bottle of scotch and a syphon. Mixing two high-balls, he gave one to Pursuivant. "Snow's coming down harder. You'd better plan to stay the night."

Pursuivant laid aside overcoat and black hat. "You are very kind," he said. wondering why he had been half-rebuffed at first, then almost wheedled into entering. Alvin Scrope dabbed at his forelock.

"Yes, sir," he said, trying to sound


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80 had been exposed to the sea, were excavated into arches, &c., similar to some of our chalk formations. The base of the point, named by Vancouver Point Riou, probably remains; but being free, for some distance, of the greater bergs, it presented only a low sand or muddy spit, with ragged dirty-coloured ice grounded. No island could be traced, and our interest was too deeply excited in seeking for it, to overlook such a desirable object.

On our inshore tack we had five fathoms and three quarters, and were therefore quite close enough to make certain of our remarks, short of actual contact, which the favourable breeze would not admit of without some more important results.

We edged along, keeping within a mile and a half of the shore, carrying from ten to fifteen fathoms, until night, when we bore away to cross Beering's Bay, and rejoin our consort in Port Mulgrave.

I perceive in Vancouver, (vol. iii. p. 204,) twenty-three fathoms was his nearest approach, and within one league. He also terms it " low, well-wooded, with a small detached islet, a little to the westward." Also, " Eastward from the steep cliffs that terminate this bay, and from whence the ice descends into the sea." It is very probable there has been a misreading of his manuscript, or that severer weather had covered his trees with ice, for we saw none, and that portion of the coast was examined with his voyage constantly before me, and the discrepancies discussed with our spy-glasses on the objects.


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1837.] Our observations and speculations, on the motion of the ice now before us, led us to suspect that the whole of the lower body is subject to slide, and that the whole of the substratum, as frequently found within the Arctic Circle, is a slippery mud. I am satisfied that this is the case in Icy Bay, as one berg, which was well up on the shore, moved off to seaward; grounding again near what I took for Point Riou.

This leads me back to our observations on the mathematical forms observed on the 3rd, after passing Bingham Island, and I perceive that Vancouver notices not only the ice, but (at p. 209, 210, vol. iii.) attempts to account for its formation, remarking that the ice observed (before reaching Point Riou and to the southward) was not so clean, "most of them appearing to be dirty." How came they so?

If the dark, "dirty" ice had been near the beach, it could readily be accounted for, by having been agitated with the beach mud, and forced up by gales. But the reverse is the fact. The darker ice was on the high ridges, and the bright near the sea. Only the theory of a slip would allow of its moving down the inclined plane without disturbing its mathematical arrangement. Vancouver's visit occurred in the latter end of June, ours in the early part of September.

In Icy Bay, the apparently descending ice from the mountains to the base was in irregular, broken I.


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82 masses, tumbling in confusion, similar to ice forced in upon the beach by gales of Mind. They were doubtless detached masses from the mountains. But near Cape Suckling the inclination of the steps was very slight, and apparently had subsided perpendicularly for many miles in gradation.

The forms observed will best be illustrated by the sketch. ( plate and woodcut.)

By night we had a confirmed fair wind, a relief of no small moment bodily, as well as mentally, for anxiety most decidedly deadens the faculties; and I was anything but easy respecting the Starling, as from Kellett's sanguine temperament he might think our protracted absence imported accident, and starting to seek us, might miss us for some time.

On the morning of the 7th we had sighted the land near Cape Phipps, and found that we had been driven much to the westward by the current. Fortunately I was prepared for this, and hauled up until I brought Mount Fairweather over Cape Turner, which the chart showed to be a good leading mark (or N. 88° E.) for the entrance.

We were even in doubt on opening the mouth of the port, which appeared like a cluster of islands. However, I knew, if she was within, that a gun would soon bring some signal in return, and Mas not deceived, as the smoke of the Starling's reply soon curled over the points. Being sure of our mark, we bore up for the anchorage, passing from soundings at sixty fathoms suddenly into thirteen and


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1837.] eight, and as suddenly deepening again to forty, until reaching the ledge off Cape Turner, when it exceeded the length of our handlines.

The observations in Vancouver were sufficient to have taken us in, but we picked up Kellett off Cape Turner, and instantly availed ourselves of his later examination of the port. We took up our berth close round the low gravelly point of the island, in thirteen fathoms, within three hundred yards of the beach.

The Starling had only arrived three days before us, having been, like ourselves, delayed nine days by currents and baffling winds. The day was sufficiently fine to enable me to secure all the requisite observations for latitude, time, astronomical bearings, and altitudes of St. Elias and Fairweather, as well as magnetic details.

The principal chief of this tribe, Anoutchy, paid his visit of ceremony, accompanied by his lady. Better specimens of the improved state of the Indians I have not seen. Both were clean, and well-dressed; the chief by the aid of an old coat and trowserstrousers [sic] bestowed on him by Kellett; and his lady in a dark-coloured cotton gown with blue and scarlet cloak, á la robe, over all. He had assumed the name of Iwan Iwatsky, probably in compliment to one of the Russian traders, who frequently visit this port.

Their manners were good, even in some degree polished; and although not particularly well-bred G 2


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Dasent, Sir George Webbe


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Rh 1848. The President of the Republic was to be elected by the vote of the people for a term of four years. At the election which took place on the 10th of December, 1848, Louis Napoleon defeated General Cavaignac. The new President took the oath of office on the 20th of December, and before long was at odds with the Legislative Assembly. His term was to expire in 1852; and, according to the Constitution, he was not eligible for reelection. But Louis Napoleon, who had no intention of giving up the power he held, tried to have the Constitution altered so as to enable him to remain in authority; upon his plans being frustrated he resorted to violent measures. On the night of December 2, 1851, several Deputies were arrested and locked up in the prison of Mazas; Generals Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Changarnier, Bedeau, and Leflo were also imprisoned. The President ordered the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, which he styled "a centre of conspiracies." On the 4th of December the streets of Paris once more ran with blood; the provinces also took up arms in protest against that which they considered the first step toward the establishment of absolute power. Thirty-two Departments were declared in a state of siege. Louis Napoleon succeeded in restoring peace and order, but the repression was very severe; extraordinary courts were organized, which rendered over a thousand sentences of banishment; sixty-six Deputies were sent into exile. On the 20th of December, 1851, a plebiscite ratified the high-handed proceedings of Louis Napoleon and intrusted to him the enacting of a new Constitution; thus conferring on him dictatorial power. He availed himself of this opportunity to attain his desire, and on the 20th of January, 1852, he proclaimed the new Constitution conferring on the President of the Republic, who was to be elected for ten years, the exclusive right of introducing laws. The legislative body was not permitted to alter the laws submitted for its approval without the consent of a Council of State whose members were appointed by the President. The days of the


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1837.] my intention of adding to them at my departure, he was well pleased, and retired to the shore.

On the first arrival of the Starling, but few canoes had appeared; these nearly doubled daily, until his position called for a vigilance which was unpleasant, and made them comparatively prisoners.

Our presents having allayed every unpleasant feeling, the utmost security was felt, so as to admit of full range to sportsmen and naturalists.

One peculiarity which I noticed in this tribe, is the manner in which they receive presents—as a due, not as a gift; and consequently no return is made for civility. They have probably had a lesson from their friends the fur-dealers, whose maxim is "nothing for nothing." Excepting in traffic, at which they are very keen, nothing could be obtained.

Fish, halibut and salmon of two kinds, were abundant and moderate, of which the crews purchased and cured great quantities. Game very scarce; one goose and a small blue-winged duck were all the birds that were brought for sale. The remains of Russian establishments were observed; a blockhouse perched on a cliff on the east side; and on the low point, where our astronomical observations were taken, the ruins of another; also a staff, with a vane and cross over a grave.

Strawberry plants were very numerous, but the ladies had cleared them of fruit, and were busied during the day procuring supplies of these and other


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86 berries from the main, which, with salmon, appear to constitute their chief food.

Although many seal-skins were noticed, I did not observe this or animal food amongst them. Deer is said to abound, but on asking for it, they pointed to and named Sitka (in Norfolk Sound) and Nootka. Their implements of chase are far inferior to those in use amongst the Esquimaux or Aleutians.

WOMAN WITH MOUTH-PIECE.

The men are wretchedly clothed, in mats woven with the inner bark of the cypress, which is tough, flexible, and very soft. The women are very similar to the Esquimaux, differing however in the mouth-ornament, which is here worn in an aperture under


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Rh splendor. By importing beet sugar into England it became impossible for them to continue with advantage to themselves the cultivation of the sugar-cane. The preponderance of the English in these colonies, or in other words and to use an expression familiar to the calumniators of Haiti, the supremacy of the white man, was unable to preserve the former prosperity of the British possessions in the West Indies. It is therefore more than unjust to impute to the laziness of the Haitians or to their so-called incapacity for governing themselves the abandonment of the cultivation of many products which for economic reasons are no longer profitable. Will the English writers of the school of St. John now admit that more than one century was necessary to their country in order to attain political stability, to conquer its liberty and achieve its full development? From her many severe trials England has emerged stronger and more powerful; and she is the more justly proud of her present condition in that it has been acquired at the cost of great effort and the lives of a great number of her sons.

Haiti, which has comparatively come into life but yesterday, need not be disheartened; she knows that the struggle for progress is a hard one and that success is not easy to be obtained. Were she inclined to ignore this fact, the tribulations through which France has passed would have been sufficient to make her realize the difficulty of the task. This nation, which was and still is one of the greatest exponents of civilization, should have long ago been struck off the maps of the world if intestine dissensions and civil wars were to prove the incapacity of a people to govern itself. With France, as with Germany and Great Britain, almost every step on the thorny road of progress has been paid for with the blood of her children. Her history, to go no farther back than 1789, is at least as agitated and surely more bloody than that of Haiti. It took this people, who rank to-day as one of the leading nations of the world, more than eighteen centuries to obtain


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1837.] the lower lip. It is of wood, and retains its place by the elasticity of the flesh contracting in the groove, substituting larger ornaments as they grow up, or as the aperture elongates. They are as filthy as such tribes usually are, beyond description, and use vermillion, and any paint they can get. I must, however, except the chief's lady and daughters, as not wearing these ornaments, or paint, and exhibiting a dislike to it. The latter I had not the pleasure of seeing, but I am told one is very pretty,—I suppose we may add, "for the tribe."

On the 8th October, after completing our astronomical observations, and swinging the ship for local attraction, we took leave of our friends, and with great difficulty got up our anchor, owing to the tough clay in which it had hooked. Light airs prevented our getting out, although towed by the canoes as well as our own boats; I therefore turned her head to her old anchorage for the night. The chief and his lady, who had come to secure the assistance of their tribe, as soon as they perceived my determination, were quite delighted,—the only time I had seen them relax their features,—and haranguing the canoes, particularly her ladyship, they not only increased in numbers, but also in efforts, which had they applied earlier, we should have gained an offing. We were very soon at anchor. I think they gained a saw and hatchet for this manoeuvre. They well knew every hour of delay would enrich them.


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322 true political cohesion, civil equality, the right to choose its own government and the liberty which seems to be now firmly established. It is unnecessary here to recall the horrible massacres caused by religious strife, the disturbance occasioned by the rivalry of political factions and by various struggles for the possession of power. The history of France contains many glorious pages as well as some most deplorable ones. She has undergone many trials, great suffering and humiliations; yet she has always risen from her ashes, preserving intact her supremacy in letters, arts, and sciences. For more than eighteen centuries absolute monarchy prevailed in France. The authority of the monarch was boundless, in him were vested all the functions now allotted almost universally to different people; he possessed at the same time all executive, legislative and judiciary power. His Ministers were as so many irresponsible clerks. His decrees and ordinances were laws and he levied taxes according to his will. By his orders (lettres de cachet) he could cause to be imprisoned for life or for an indefinite time any one who gained his displeasure. In 1789 this despotism received its first blow; but a series of revolutions was necessary in order to free the country of it and to obtain political freedom. During the whole of the nineteenth century France strove to secure the form of government most suited to her requirements. The crisis began with the fall of the Bastille (July 14, 1789), and for ten years thereafter the country was in a constant state of convulsion, each party plotting the downfall of the other. There was safety for no one; the guillotine perpetually at work threatened all alike. From the 14th of July, 1789, the most violent passions were unbridled, causing the most refined people in the world to become guilty of all manner of atrocities; scores of persons were put to death and their heads paraded through the streets, these ghastly sights exciting the people to fresh carnage. In 1791 strenuous efforts were made to do away with the doctrine of the divine right of kings in favor of that


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Rh of national sovereignty. The Constitution adopted in that year caused severe friction between the King and the masses; and Louis XVI was defeated in the struggle which ensued. He was suspended from office by the Legislative Assembly on the 10th of August, 1792, and the authority was vested in a provisional Executive Council. The horrible massacres of September were the forerunner of the establishment of the Republic. The National Convention soon assumed supreme authority, chiefly through its famous Committee on Public Safety. By the Reign of Terror which he inaugurated, Robespierre in 1793 became the master of France. In the mean time, in order to assert the complete severance between them and the long-established monarchy which had held sway in their country, the people caused the unfortunate King Louis XVI, who had been formally deposed in September, 1792, to be guillotined on the 21st of January, 1793. The province of Vendée rose up in arms; and the atrocities of a civil war were added to the horrors of the foreign war which at the time was being waged against France. In their mad frenzy the French mercilessly slaughtered one another. The inhabitants of Vendée hunted down the Republicans like wild beasts, women being often seen giving the finishing stroke to the victims. The Republicans, in their turn,, gave no quarter to their enemies. Carrier, at Nantes, ordered many innocent people to be drowned; at Lyon the prisoners were mowed down with grape-shot. Threatened from abroad by the coalition of Europe and at home by the insurgents, the new government regarded as its enemies all those who did not profess their admiration of it, the slightest act of opposition being considered treasonable. And, according to the law adopted in September, 1793 (Loi des Suspects), "all of those who had done nothing for the cause of liberty" were liable to be held as foes whom it was well to be rid of. This was a year of unequalled bloodshed; the prisons were overcrowded and the guillotine never ceased in its ghastly function. Men and women alike fell victims to it. Marie-Antoinette, the ill-fated Queen


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 324 of France, as well as the famous Republican, Madame Roland, were beheaded by it. Numbers of innocent persons were put to death. France seemed on the verge of being dismembered: Toulon had placed itself under the dominion of the English; Paoli had made them masters of Corsica; Roussillon and Béarn were occupied by the Spaniards; the Prussians were at Mayence; the Austrians at Conde and Valenciennes. Still France would not allow herself to lose heart in the face of the fearful odds against her; her dogged energy saved her from the many perils by which she was surrounded. The blood of her children flowed freely: The Girondists, Hebertists, and Dantonists, the extremists as well as those of more moderate inclinations, were by turns guillotined. In order to put an end to the carnage it was necessary to overthrow the leading spirit of it all; and Robespierre, the man who was feared by all, was eventually dragged to the guillotine, half dead, his jaw broken by a pistol-shot (Thermidor 9, 1794). The Reign of Terror had lasted but 420 days, and during this comparatively short space of time the executions alone amounted to 2,596! The Constitution of the first year of the Republic (1793), which the National Convention had immediately adopted, was never carried into effect; it was replaced by the Constitution of the year III (1795). The Directory failed to restore quiet; in the reaction which followed Robespierre's death, the Reign of Terror continued, the Republicans becoming this time its principal victims; they were massacred in the South, at Toulon, Marseilles, Aix, and Lyons; armed bands scoured the country, plundering, murdering, and setting fire everywhere. In Paris the mob broke into the National Convention and killed Deputy Ferrand, whose head they placed on a pole and presented to Boissy d'Anglas, the president of the Assembly. On the 13th of Vendémiaire, year III (October 4, 1795), the troops of General Bonaparte had to subdue the riots of the royalists at the mouth of the cannon.

When the Directory was established (October 25,


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Rh 1795) the situation was not a very promising one; the people were on the brink of starvation and the treasury was entirely depleted. "The Generals did not even receive every month the eight francs in metallic money to which amount their pay had been reduced besides the assignats." Measures of extraordinary severity had to be taken to maintain order; and numerous conspiracies were being plotted. Babeuf and the Jacobins were guillotined. The army interfered in political affairs; the soldiers surrounded the Council of the Five Hundred and that of the Ancients, whose royalist members were arrested. Two members of the Directory, Carnot and Barthélemy, were deported. Barras's corruption, the bad morals of the time, and the general state of insecurity increased the discontent of the people. The nation was at the disposal of the first daring man possessed of sufficient energy and courage to undertake its salvation. General Bonaparte, who had just arrived from Egypt, constituted himself the savior of France. As soon as he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Paris (November 9, 1799) he caused the Council of the Five Hundred to be invaded by his soldiers; the Deputies were forcibly dragged from their seats. This high-handed proceeding met with the approval of the people; and in the evening of Brumaire the 19th the Council of the Ancients and what was left of the Council of the Five Hundred passed a resolution abolishing the Directory. The new government which was organized consisted of three provisional Consuls: Bonaparte, Siéyès, and Roger-Ducos. The Constitution of the year VIII (1800) afterward decided that the three Consuls should remain in office for ten years; Bonaparte, Cambacérès, and Lebrun being appointed. The first Consul had all the powers of a king; his two colleagues being there only to give advice. In spite of the absolute power vested in him, Bonaparte's ambition was to obtain still more unlimited


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326 authority. In virtue therefore of the services he had rendered France and of the prestige he had acquired by his victories, he caused himself to be appointed Consul for life on the 4th of August, 1802, with the right of selecting his successor. In this way the authority became once more vested in one man, and the semblance of republican government which still obtained was before long abolished. On the 18th of May, 1804, a Senatus-Consultum established the Empire. The Constitution which was enacted (year XII) tried to save appearances by stating that the "government of the Republic was intrusted to an Emperor"; but Napoleon's will became supreme and knew no restraint. For more than ten years France was in a state of constant warfare with Europe. Defeated in 1814, Napoleon resigned his office and withdrew to Elba, of which he became the sovereign. A provisional government was organized under the presidency of Talleyrand and held authority until the arrival of the Bourbons. On the 4th of May Louis XVIII entered Paris and soon after granted the Charter of 1814. The new monarch was no sooner installed than he found himself compelled to fly to Gand; Napoleon had landed at Golfe Jouan on the 1st of March, 1815; and on the 20th he was in Paris. A new Constitution, entitled the "Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire," was enacted, a sort of constitutional monarchy being decreed. But Napoleon's liberalism did not have the opportunity of a fair test; for, upon his defeat at Waterloo on the 18th of June, 1815, he abdicated his sovereignty forever, and was banished to St. Helena, where he died. A Commission presided over by Fouché was in authority until Louis XVIII, brought back for the second time by the foreign troops, was able to retake possession of the throne of his ancestors (July 8, 1815); upon which a series of reprisals commenced. Marshal Brune was assassinated. Murder and plunder terrorized Nimes and Uzes; prisons were invaded and Protestants, Republicans, and Bonapartists were dragged from them


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Rh into the streets and massacred. Ney and Lebédoyère were shot, and the death sentences of the military courts were carried into effect within twenty-four hours. The Charter of 1814 which was reenacted was unable to protect Charles X, who succeeded Louis XVIII in 1824, from the thirst for liberty of the French masses. The tendency of the new monarch to assume absolute power created great discontent among them. On the 28th of July, 1830, the inhabitants of Paris took up arms and fierce encounters took place at the barricades which were erected in the streets. At last Charles X was compelled to fly to England (August 16, 1830). The Charter of 1814 was altered and Louis Philippe became King of the French (August 9, 1830).

There was fresh shedding of blood in order that the new dynasty might maintain its authority. The following year, 1831, a riot occurred in Paris, in the course of which the archbishop's palace was invaded and pillaged; an insurrection broke out also at Lyons. In 1832 and 1834 fresh riots broke out in Paris, grave disturbances taking place also at Luneville, Grenoble, Saint-Etienne, and Marseilles. Another insurrection which broke out at Lyons was quelled after four days of bloody fighting. The opponents of the Government demanded certain electoral and parliamentary reforms; their demands were very moderate and did not include universal suffrage; they would have been satisfied with having the electoral qualification reduced from 200 to 100 francs, and with the "adjonction des capacités," i. e., the right of the participation in the elections of a certain class such as university graduates, public functionaries, etc. The refusal of Louis Philippe's government to grant these two reforms for which the public was so eager, provoked what Lamartine termed "the revolution of contempt." On the 22d of February, 1848, Paris was in a great state of agitation. On the evening of the 23d a group of citizens who were parading through the streets was fired upon by the soldiers. This was the signal for the insurrection. Next morning found Paris


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328 covered with barricades; the city was once more in a state of war. Louis Philippe, like Charles X, had to seek safety in flight. The victorious mob invaded the Tuileries and hacked the throne to pieces. The House of Representatives organized a provisional government, as did the municipality. A compromise was at last effected; a provisional government was established and universal suffrage adopted. The National Assembly met on the 4th of May, proclaimed the Republic, and decreed a new provisional government consisting of five members. This Assembly, which seemingly possessed the full confidence of the citizens of Paris, was nevertheless invaded by the mob which, on the 15th of May, demanded its immediate dissolution. They were about to form a new provisional government when the militia arrived in time to frustrate their plans and rescue the representatives of the nation. The riot was put down, but broke out again before long. The Assembly was not favorable to the socialistic experiments which were being carried on; and the "ateliers nationaux," organized for the sole purpose of procuring work for men without employment, did not meet with its approval. On the 21st of June it decreed the abolition of these "ateliers." When, on the 23d, the news of this decision reached the workingmen, they at once resorted to violence. Fighting started once more in the streets and during four days Paris was one vast battlefield where blood flowed in torrents. The Archbishop of Paris, Monseigneur Affré, was shot whilst endeavoring to pacify the fighters on both sides. In order to suppress this insurrection the Assembly was obliged to invest General Eugène Cavaignac, the Secretary of War, with dictatorial power (June 25); and the Executive Commission which was in authority had to resign. Generals Duvivier and Négrier were killed; General Bréda was murdered by the insurgents, who suffered a complete defeat on the 26th of June. On the 28th General Cavaignac relinquished his absolute authority; but the Assembly maintained him at the head of the executive power and enacted the Constitution of


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HE grandest stories ever written were the stories of two men. That holds good up to our times, from Sidney Carton and Charles Darnay to Tennessee's Partner and Tennessee.

I can always see Sidney Carton mounting the scaffold to the guillotine, his hands tied behind, a dreamy, far-away expression in his eyes; his hair bound back in its ribband, much more carefully than was usual with him; himself clothed more tidily than was usual with him, because he was supposed to be the man for the sake of whose wife and little girl he was about to die. Poor Sidney was a drunkard, and perhaps that is why some of us are drawn to him all the more.

And Tennessee's Partner at the Court of Judge Lynch: "An' I answers you fair and square, Jedge, as between man and man, 'What should a man know about his partner?'" And Tennessee's Partner knew all.

And Tennessee's Partner, with his donkey Jenny and cart, and rough coffin, in the shadow of the trees, after the lynching. He didn't want to hurry the gentlemen at all. "But if yer quite done with  Rh


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330 Republic were decidedly numbered. A senatus-consultum moved that the Empire be reestablished, and the measure was ratified by a plebiscite on the 21st of November. On the 1st of December, 1852, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte became Napoleon III. The Constitution of January, 1852, was altered so as to agree with the new régime which France had adopted. At first the Imperial Government was fortunate with its military operations in Europe. But the victories won in Italy and the Crimea were unable to counterbalance the appalling disasters which resulted from the conflict with Germany. Invasion, humiliation, and dismemberment: such were for France the consequences of the second Empire. The catastrophe of Sedan (September 2, 1870) was speedily followed by the overthrow of the dynasty of the Napoleons. On the 4th of September the Republic was once more proclaimed in Paris, whose Deputies organized a provisional government called the "Government of National Defense," which was presided over by General Trochu. This revolution, which occurred whilst the enemy was marching on the capital, was the beginning of the last severe trials which remained for France to undergo during the nineteenth century before definitely securing her political liberty.

When Paris was besieged by the Germans its inhabitants gave proof of marvelous energy and courage; but well-nigh starved to death, they were compelled to capitulate and the city was occupied by the German army; an armistice was signed; and the National Assembly which was elected met at Bordeaux. Mr. Thiers was appointed chief of the executive power of the French Republic (February 17, 1871). Yet the tendency of the majority of the Assembly was monarchical—a fact not calculated to gain the confidence of the Republicans. The presence of foreign soldiers on the national territory did not prevent a terrible civil war from breaking out. The National Assembly had transferred its sittings to Versailles and decreed the abolition of the pay of the militia. This decision was followed


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, my partner thar"——And the last glimpse of Tennessee, the grave filled up the grave in the little digger's vegetable garden, I've seen them in Australia Tennessee sitting on the foot of the mound, wiping his face with his red bandana handkerchief.

They used to say I was influenced by Bret Harte. I hope so. I read "Tennessee's Partner" and the other stories when I was about thirteen, and Dickens a little later on. Bret Harte died near to where I lived in England, by the way.

Tennessee forgave his partner the greatest wrong that one man can do another; and that's one thing that mateship can do.

The man who hasn't a male mate is a lonely man indeed, or a strange man, though he have a wife and family. I believe there are few such men. If the mate isn't here, he is somewhere else in the world, or perhaps he may be dead.

Marcus Clarke speaks of a recaptured convict being asked where his mate was, in a tone as if a mate were something a convict was born with—like a mole, for instance. When I was on the track alone for a stretch, I was always asked where my mate was, or if I had a mate.

And so it is, from "Boko Bill" (bottle-ho!) and "Three-Pea Ginger," of Red Rock Lane, up or down—or up and down—to Percy and Harold who fraternize at the Union Club. Bill gets "pinched" for shifting cases from a cart, or something of that sort, and Ginger, who is "pretty swift with the three-pea," but never


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Rh by the same evil consequences as the suppression of the "ateliers nationaux" in 1848. The inhabitants of Paris, most of whom were already distrustful of the Assembly's intentions, immediately took up arms. On the 18th of March, 1871, the militia captured an artillery park encamped upon the heights of Montmartre. The insurrection began by the murder of two Generals, Clément Thomas and Lecomte. The Government gave up Paris to the Commune and withdrew to Versailles. The struggle was appalling in its cruel pitilessness. The French, in a frenzy, slaughtered one another, the Prussians remaining mere spectators of this fearful carnage. Paris was once again in a state of siege. On the 20th of May the troops from Versailles succeeded in forcing an entrance into the unfortunate city, and war was again carried on in the streets. Blood ran in torrents during the fight and again in the innumerable executions which followed. When every hope was lost, instead of submitting to the inevitable, the Communards resorted to revolting crimes; the Archbishop of Paris, the President of the Court of Accounts, and numbers of priests and friars were mercilessly butchered. The Tuileries, the Court of Accounts, and the City Hall were destroyed by fire; bands of ruffians were seen with cans of petroleum in hand setting fire to the finest houses in Paris. The Commune was subdued after a week of severe fighting; but the suppression was as terrible as the struggle had been. The soldiers shot all suspects who fell into their hands. The executions alone numbered over 6,500, and more than 7,000 persons were sentenced by court martial to be deported. This was the last bloody crisis through which France passed during the nineteenth century, though many, unsuccessful attempts were made in order to overthrow the Republic, which now seems to be firmly established. After investing Mr. Thiers with the title of President (August 31, 1871) the Assembly persisted in regarding the Republic as a provisional form of government, and assumed such an attitude that Mr. Thiers resigned his office (May 24, 1873). Marshal McMahon was then


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332 elected President of the Republic for seven years and the constitutional laws were enacted in 1875. However, intrigues for the restoration of the monarchy did not cease; they resulted first in the dissolution of the House of Representatives (1877) and then in the resignation of the President of the Republic (January 30, 1879). Jules Grévy, who succeeded Marshal McMahon, had to resign before the expiration of his second term; Sadi-Carnot, who succeeded him, was assassinated, and Casimir-Perier, who was elected on the 27th of June, 1894, resigned on the 14th of January, 1895. The foregoing events serve to prove that after nineteen centuries of existence France spent almost the whole nineteenth century seeking for the political régime best suited to her needs. In order to secure this political régime she had to change her Constitution twelve times, to go through civil wars, disorder, confusion, and such terrible crises as at times caused her best friends to despair of her future. Yet this nation still exists and is moreover still respected and powerful. By recalling the tribulations, the painful episodes of the history of Germany, Great Britain, and France before they arrived at their present political stability and at the high place they occupy in the world, it is not my intention to infer that for centuries to come Haiti must remain a prey to civil strife and discord. By relating what may be termed historical fatalities I intend simply to establish that she does not deserve the anathemas launched against her; I want principally to show that the question of race has nothing to do with the disturbances which from time to time have agitated her. Few countries have progressed without bloodshed and fierce struggles. Haiti did not escape the consequences of this fatality to which all nations seemed doomed in the beginning; she is no exception to the rule. Her detractors are aware therefore that they are acting in bad faith when they affect to believe and cause others to believe that her civil wars are due solely to the so-called incapacity of her people to govern themselves;


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Rh they intentionally forget the disturbances which have given so many anxious moments to France, whose inhabitants, however, are not black. If this powerful, rich, and highly educated people had, during nineteen centuries, to grope for the political regime best suited to their temperament, can the world refuse to make some allowance and to have a little indulgence for Haiti, whose existence dates back but a hundred years and whose sons possessed none of the advantages enjoyed by those of the older nations of Europe? The lesson taught us by the history of the Old World should make it clear that there is nothing surprising in the fact that after a century of existence Haiti has not attained the height of modern civilization; neither is there anything humiliating for her in the fact that she also had to grope for the best political régime most suited to her people. King, Emperor, and President have each in turn been tried by her; and the Republic, in spite of some temporary failures, is definitely established; the people have energetically shown their preference for this form of government, and since 1859 no ruler, however fond he may have been of absolute power, has dared to disregard the firm will of the nation on this point. The understanding, therefore, is now complete as to the form of government; all that remains to be done is to consolidate and perfect it. It is this work of consolidation and improvement which has cost such great efforts and provoked so many convulsions and disturbances. The civil wars in Haiti have not all been caused by personal rivalries or by unbridled ambition. The struggle has been more for the sake of principle than is generally thought. In order fully to understand and appreciate the causes which brought about the revolutions which have agitated Haiti, one must closely study the character of the people and endeavor so to enter into their feelings as to form a just conception of their ideals, their hopes and expectations, and of the spirit by which they were animated. The same love of liberty which rendered the yoke of slavery unbearable to them led them to sacrifice their


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334 liberator Dessalines when his rule appeared to be growing too despotic. And the conflict between Pétion and Christophe was more the outcome of a difference of opinion as to principle than a matter of personal rivalry: it was a struggle of republican against monarchical ideas. And the Haitians, as fond of equality as they are of liberty, will give their firm support against all odds to that system of government which does not establish privileges and renders public offices accessible to all citizens according to merit. The first civil war which took place in Haiti resulted in the triumph of the Republic; monarchy disappearing with Christophe in 1820. The new form of government was planned in accordance with the requirements of the day. The necessity of taking precautions against the possibility of an aggression from France, the absolute authority vested in the Governor-General still fresh in people's minds, and the natural inexperience of men just freed from slavery, all combined in deciding the people to invest the Chief Executive with extraordinary powers and prerogatives. And in order to avoid the disturbances provoked by too frequent elections, Presidency for life was established. The circumstances which had necessitated a strongly organized Executive Power underwent a change when the independence of Haiti was fully recognized by France. As soon as they were relieved of the fear of an attack from the former mother country the people began to object to the amount of power of which their ruler was possessed, and desired to have his authority curtailed and adapted to the new state of things. At that time the exclusive right to introduce laws was held by President Boyer, the members of his Cabinet being like so many clerks. The House of Representatives wished to partake in the privilege of introducing laws, requesting also that public affairs be managed by responsible Ministers forming a Council of Secretaries of State, presided over by the President of the Republic. In their youthful enthusiasm this new nation demanded reforms which the Executive Power did not