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 know the object as the Other of myself, and consequently know myself by means of the object as limited and finite. We find ourselves to be finite; that is the leading thought here: as to this, there seems to be nothing further to say; everywhere we find an end, the end of one thing is there where an other begins. Already, in virtue of the fact that we have an object, we are finite; where that begins I am not, and thus am finite. We know ourselves to be finite under many and various aspects. In its physical aspect, life is finite; as having life we are externally dependent upon others, we have wants, &c., and have the consciousness of this limitation. We have this feeling in common with the lower animals. Plants, minerals, too, are finite, but these have no feeling of their limitation; it is the prerogative of what is living to know its limitation, and still more is it a prerogative of the Spiritual. What has life has experience of fear, dread, hunger, thirst, &c. There is an interruption in its feeling of self, a negation; and the feeling of this is actually present. If it be said that religion is based upon this feeling of dependence, then the lower animals too must have religion. For man this limitation only exists in so far as he goes above and beyond it; the feeling, the consciousness of limit, implies that he is above and beyond it. This feeling is a comparison of his nature (Natur) with his existence (Dasein) in this moment; his actual existence does not adequately correspond to his nature.

For us who are above and beyond its mode of existence, a stone is limited; for itself, it is not so; it is immediately identical with that which it is. That which constitutes its determinate being is not for it Not-Being. An animal’s feeling of limitation is a comparison of its universality with its actual existence in this definite moment. An animal, as living, is for itself something universal; it feels its limitation as negated universality, as want. In like manner, man is essentially negative unity, identity with himself, and he has the certainty of


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 unity with himself, the feeling of himself, of his relation to himself. The feeling of a negation in himself contradicts this. The subject, too, feels itself to be a power as against its negation, and removes this accidental element, that is, satisfies its want. All impulses in man, as in the lower animals, are this affirmation of the self, and the animal thus places itself in opposition to the negation in itself. Life consists in the abolition of limitation, and in this it reconciles itself with itself. This need in itself at the same time appears as an object outside of it, over which it obtains mastery, and thus reinstates its Self.

Thus the limitation of finiteness only exists for us in so far as we are above and beyond it. This reflection is too abstract to be made from the standpoint of consciousness, which we are now considering, where consciousness, on the contrary, remains within its limitation. The object is its Not-Being. That the object is thus set down as different from the Ego, implies that it is not that which the Ego is. I am the finite. Thus the infinite is what is above and beyond the limits; it is something other than the limited; it is the unlimited, the infinite. Thus we have finite and infinite.

This already implies, however, that the two sides are in relation with one another, and it remains to be seen how this relation determines itself. This is done in quite a simple way.

This infinite, as being my object, is the Not-finite, Not-particular, Not-limited, the Universal; the finite in relation to the infinite is posited as the negative, dependent, that which melts away in relation to the infinite. When the two are brought together, a unity comes into existence through the abolition and absorption of the finite in fact, which cannot maintain itself as against the infinite. Expressed in terms of feeling, this condition is that of fear, of dependence. Such is the relation of the two, but it has another characteristic besides.

On the one hand, I determine myself as the finite; on

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 the other, I am not annihilated in the relation, I relate myself to myself. I am, I subsist; I am also the Affirmative. On the one side I know myself as having no real existence; on the other, as affirmative, as having a valid existence, so that the infinite leaves me my own life. This may be called the goodness of the infinite, as the abrogation of the finite may be called its justice, in accordance with which the finite must be manifested as finite.

Such is consciousness in this specific form, beyond and above which observation does not go. It is accordingly maintained that if we go thus far, the whole of religion is contained in what we have here. We can, however, go further; we can know that man can know God, but here we are arbitrarily, as it were, brought to a halt; or, since we wish to observe and nothing more, it is supposed that we must continue to remain in this particular phase of consciousness. Observation can only exercise itself on the subject, and cannot go further, since it purposes to go to work only empirically, to adhere to what is immediately present, to what is given, and God is not anything that permits of being made the subject of observation. Here, therefore, the object can only be what is in us as such, and what we are as finite beings. From this point of view God determines himself as the Infinite only, as the Other of the finite, as what is beyond it. In so far as He is, I am not. In so far as He touches me, the finite shrinks into nothing. God is thus characterised as involving an antithesis which seems absolute. The finite, it is said, cannot grasp, attain to, or understand the Infinite. Beyond this standpoint, it is said, we cannot go. We are told that in it we have everything that we need to know concerning God and religion, and what is beyond that, is “of evil.” It might, indeed, be stated in reply, as matter of observation, that we can know God, that we have some knowledge of a rich manifestation of His life and spiritual


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 nature. That, however, according to the view just indicated, would be “of evil.”

If a man has placed himself at the standpoint of empirical procedure, of observation, it is quite true that he cannot go further, for to observe means to keep the content of observation before one in an external way. But this externality or limitation is the finite, which is external in reference to an Other, and this Other is as the Infinite, what is beyond and above it. If I now go further, and begin to consider the matter from a spiritually higher standpoint of consciousness, I find myself no longer observing, but I forget myself in entering into the object; I bury myself in it, while I strive to know, to understand God; I yield up myself in it, and if I do this, I am no longer in the attitude of empirical consciousness, of observation. If God be no longer to me a something beyond and above me, I am no longer a pure observer. In so far, therefore, as a man intends to observe, he must remain at this standpoint. And this constitutes the entire wisdom of our time.

Men stop at the finiteness of the subject; this ranks here as what is highest, the ultimate, as what is immovable, unchangeable, hard as brass; and then over against it there is an Other, at which this subject finds its end. This Other, called God, is a something beyond the present, after which we search owing to the feeling of our finiteness, but we do nothing more, for our finiteness is fixed and absolute.

The fact of our being above and beyond the limit is, it is true, conceded; this going out of ourselves is, however, merely something attempted, a mere yearning which does not attain to that which it seeks. To reach the object, to know it, would mean, in fact, to give up my finiteness. But this is what is ultimate, and is not to be given up, and in it we are complete, satisfied, and are reconciled to it.

This entire standpoint must now be looked at more


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 narrowly, and we must see what constitutes its general character, and estimate what is essential in it.

There is in it the determinateness of my finiteness, of my relativity. The infinite stands over against it, but as something beyond. My affirmation, my determination as existing, alternates with the negation which I am essentially determined as being. We shall see that both negation and affirmation come to coincide, and the absoluteness of the Ego will be seen to issue as the result.

1. There is here on the one hand a going out of my finiteness to a Higher; on the other, I am determined as the negative of this Higher. The latter remains an Other, which cannot be determined by me, which is unattained by me, in so far as determination is to get an objective sense. What is present is only this going out on my part, this aiming to reach what is remote; I remain on this side, as it were, have a yearning after what is beyond the present and actual.

2. It is to be remarked that this reaching out towards something beyond the actual is absolutely and solely mine. It is my deed, my aiming, my emotion, my desire and endeavour. If I make use of the predicates all-good, almighty, as characterising that something beyond, they have a meaning in me only, they have a subjective and not an objective meaning, and they belong absolutely and solely to that aiming of mine. My absolute fixed finiteness hinders me from reaching that something beyond. To relinquish my finiteness and to reach it would be one and the same thing. The interest or motive not to reach that something beyond, and the interest I have in maintaining myself, are identical.

3. It becomes clear from this that the twofold negativity, that of myself as finite and that of an Infinite over against me, has its seat in the Ego itself, and is only, on the one hand, a division in myself—the fact, the determination that I am the negative; on the other hand,


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 however, the negative is determined as an “Other” in regard to me. This second determination belongs to me likewise; they represent different tendencies; one going toward myself and one toward what is outside myself—the latter of which, however, likewise belongs to me; my tendency to reach out toward what is beyond and my finiteness, are determinations in me; in them I remain self-contained or at home with myself. Thus, in this way the Ego has become affirmative in regard to itself, and it is this which constitutes the other side of this standpoint. My affirmation expresses itself thus: “I am.” This is something distinct from my finiteness, and is the annulling of my finiteness. In respect of the sense of yearning, endeavour, the feeling of obligation generally, it means, “I am what I ought to be;” that is to say, “I am good by nature;” that is to say, “I am, and that inasmuch as I am immediately good.” In this respect, my sole concern is to maintain myself in this state. There is, it is true, also a possibility in me of entering into relation to what is other than myself, a possibility of sin, of faults, &c. This, however, directly assumes the character of something which is subsequent, something external and accidental. “I am,” that is a relation to myself, an affirmation; “I am as I ought to be,” the faultiness is, what the Ego is not; and that is not in what constitutes the root of my nature, but is in fact an accidental complication.

This point of view of affirmation may therefore be considered, doubtless, as implying that I stand related to an external element, and that my goodness may be tarnished. My affirmation in relation to such wrongdoing as is here implied, then, becomes a mediated one too. It becomes affirmation which recovers itself out of such isolation, being mediated through the removal of a faultiness which in itself is only accidental. The goodness of my nature has returned to identity with itself. This reconciliation eliminates nothing intrinsic, it does not touch what belongs to my inmost nature, but only does away with what


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 is external. The world, the finite, reconciles itself in this way with itself. If the truth has hitherto been expressed by saying that God has reconciled the world with Himself, this reconciliation is now seen to take place in me as finite. I, as an individual, am good; when I have fallen into error I only need to cast what is accidental from me and I am reconciled with myself. The inner life is only disturbed on the surface; this disturbance does not reach to its foundation; the spirit has not formed any relation with it; it keeps outside of it, and is not implicated in it. The inner life, the spirit, is what is originally good, and the negative does not get its specific character within the nature of the spirit itself.

In the older theology, on the contrary, you had the idea of eternal damnation. This presupposed that the will was absolutely free. According to this, what I am depends not upon my nature, but upon my self-conscious will: I am guilty through the will. Thus my nature, what I originally am, is not goodness; I can attribute no goodness to myself outside of my will: that quality pertains only to my self-conscious spirit. Here, on the other hand, it is the goodness of the original state only which is assumed, and the effects produced on it by what is other than itself are done away with through the restoration of what is original. To this goodness of the original state nothing further can be added than the knowledge of it—the conviction of the belief in one’s goodness; and that reconciling mediation consists merely in this consciousness, this knowledge that I am by nature good, and is consequently a worthless and empty see-saw system. I swing myself, so to speak, over into a longing for and in the direction of the “Beyond,” or, it may be, into a recognition of the faults I have committed; and again I swing myself within the limits of this longing and emotion which have their place purely within me, back to myself, and in all this I never travel beyond myself.

This is the abstract characterisation of this attitude.


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 Were it further developed, all the views characteristic of the present time would coincide with it, as, for example, that goodness exists only in my conviction, and that upon this conviction my morality is based; and again, that what is good rests or depends entirely upon my nature. My conviction is sufficient so far as I am concerned. That I know the action to be good is enough, so far as I am concerned. There is no need for having a further consciousness of the substantial or essential nature of the action. If, however, it depend upon that consciousness alone, I can, strictly speaking, commit no fault at all, for to myself I am only affirmative, while the division or dualism remains formal, a semblance of division, which does not disturb my essential inner life. My yearning, my emotion, is what is substantial. This point of view embraces all the opinions of recent times since the Kantian philosophy, which was the first to advance this belief in goodness.

Such is the standpoint of subjective consciousness. This consciousness develops the antitheses which concern consciousness, but which remain in it, and which it holds under its control, because it is the Affirmative.

We have now to consider what finiteness itself is, and what true relation the finite has to the infinite. That the human spirit is finite we hear daily affirmed. We shall speak of finiteness in the popular sense first, the sense suggested when it is said that man is finite, and then we shall use it in the true sense, which represents the rational view of it.

There are three forms in which finiteness appears, namely, in sensuous existence, in reflection, and in the mode in which it exists in Spirit and for Spirit,

($$\alpha$$.) Finiteness in Sensuous Existence.

That man is finite means, in the first place, that I as man stand in relation to what is other than myself. There is actually present an Other, the negative of myself, with which I am in connection, and that constitutes my


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. We are mutually exclusive, and are independent in relation to each other. Such I am in virtue of my having sensuous experience; all that is living is thus exclusive. In hearing and seeing I have only what is individual before me, and in my practical relation to things I have always to do with what is only single or individual; the objects which give me satisfaction are in like manner individual. This is the standpoint of natural Being, of natural existence. According to this I exist in manifold relations, in external Being of a manifold kind, in the region of experiences, needs, practical and theoretical relations, all of which, according to their content, are limited and dependent, finite, in short. The annulling of what is finite is already found to have its place within this finiteness; every impulse as subjective relates itself to what is Other than itself, is finite; but in satisfying itself it annuls this relation, this finite character. This return into its affirmation is its satisfaction. On the other hand, however, it remains finite, for the satisfied impulse reawakens, and the annulling of the negation again becomes a sense of need. Satisfaction, this infinitely recurring feeling, is only an infinitude of form, and therefore is not a truly concrete infinitude. The content remains finite, and thus the satisfaction remains finite too, just as the need as such involves defect and is finite. According to the former side, however, the need annuls its finiteness when it satisfies itself. The satisfaction of hunger is an annulling of the separation between me and my object, it is an annulling of finiteness, yet only a formal annulling.

Nature is not complete and independent, does not exist in and for itself; on the contrary, it is just this fact of its being something which is not self-posited which constitutes its finiteness. Our sensuous consciousness, too, in so far as we have to do in it with singulars or particulars, belongs to this natural finiteness, and this latter has to manifest itself. The finite is determined as


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 the negative, it must free itself from itself. This first natural, simple self-emancipation of the finite from its finiteness is death. This is the renunciation of the finite, and here what natural life is itself implicitly is made explicit really and actually. The sensuous life of what is individual or particular has its end in death. Particular experiences or sensations as particular are transient; one supplants the other, one impulse or passion drives away another. In its annihilation, this sensuous element makes its true nature actually explicit. In death the finite is shown to be annulled and absorbed. But death is only the abstract negation of what is implicitly negative; it is itself a nullity, it is revealed nullity. But explicit nullity is at the same time nullity which has been done away with, and is the return to the Positive. Here cessation, liberation from finiteness comes in. Death does not present itself to consciousness as this emancipation from finiteness, but this higher view of death is found in thought, and indeed even in popular conceptions, in so far as thought is active in them.

($$\beta$$.) Finiteness from the point of view of Reflection.

We now rise out of immediate consciousness to the level of Reflection—and here we have again to do with a finitude which appears in definite contrast to infinitude.

This antithesis has different forms, and the question is what these are. There is an emancipation from finiteness here, but in this sphere the true infinity is as yet only abrogated or annulled finiteness. And, therefore, the question arises, Does reflection get the length of positing the finite as something which is in itself null, or does reflection accomplish as much as nature? Can reflection make that die which is mortal, or is that which is null immortal to it? Since it is null we ought to cause it to vanish, for what is possible to nature must be yet more possible to infinite spirit. Thus reflection, like nature, exhibits the finite as null. But nature always falls back again into the finite, and in like manner what constitutes


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 the standpoint of reflection is that it persists in holding fast the antithesis, the finiteness, as against infinitude. It is just the mutual relation of these two which constitutes the standpoint of reflection; both of them belong to the antithesis which characterises this standpoint. That is to say, advance is made to the infinite only as the abstract negation of the finite, as the not-finite, which, however, as not containing the finite in itself as part of itself, remains over against the finite as an Other, and so itself a finite, which finite again advances to an infinite, and so on ad infinitum.

($$\alpha$$.$$\alpha$$.) The externality or mutual exclusion of finiteness and universality.

If we consider the first antithesis of finite and infinite in Reflection, finiteness is a varied, manifold externality, of which each component part is particular or limited. In contrast to this, the manifoldness determines itself in its universality, its unlimitedness, as the Universal in this multiplicity. This form presents itself thus in a concrete shape in our consciousness.

We have knowledge of many things, but always of single things only. As desiring or willing, the spirit is determined in accordance with particular ends and interests. But in both relations, whether forming ideas or willing, the spirit behaves as exclusive particularity, and, therefore, stands in connection with other independent things. Here, too, the element of contrast comes in, for the spirit compares its actually existing singularity with its singularity as universally determined or conceived. I compare the stores of knowledge which I actually possess with the mass of knowledge of which I form an idea. I find that these two, namely my actuality, and the universality of which I form a conception, do not correspond with each other, and it is made imperative that the actual quantity of knowledge should be further advanced and perfected, made exhaustive, and brought to universality In like manner, it is possible in


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 life to plan to reach a universality of satisfaction, completeness of impulse and of enjoyment, and then to name this felicity. The one totality is called universality of knowledge, the other totality that of possession, of satisfaction, of desire, of enjoyment. But here the totality is thought of as multiplicity and allness only, and it, therefore, remains in contrast with the finiteness, which cannot possess all. Thus the Ego is still something exclusive over against something exclusive, and, therefore, the many is absolutely exclusive in relation to another many; and all is merely an abstraction which we apply to much or the many, but which remains external to it. Thus it is found that the range of knowledge has no limits, and that the flight from star to star is limitless. It may indeed be supposed that natural science may get to know all animals, yet not so as to be able to penetrate into their most subtle characteristics. It is the same with the satisfaction of impulses: man may attain to many interests and ends, but not to all or not to happiness itself; allness is an ideal which cannot be reached. This finiteness remains, just because it is a something that is true. The untrue is the unity or universality; the multiplicity would have to yield up its character, in order to be posited under unity. The ideal is, therefore, unattainable, just because it is untrue in itself, a unity of many, which are at the same time to remain manifold and separate. Further, the end, the ideal, on this side of which a man stops short, is itself something essentially finite, and for this very reason I must stop short on this side of it, for in reaching it I should still only reach what is finite.

($$\beta$$.$$\beta$$.) The antithesis of the finite and the infinite.

We have now to consider the form of the antithesis of the finite and infinite, as it is seen in Reflection as such. This is finitude in contrast to infinitude, each being posited for itself, posited independently, not merely as predicate, but as an essential antithesis, and in such


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 a way that the one is determined as the other of the other. And here, too, finiteness remains, and just for this reason, that the infinite which stands over against it is itself a finite, and a finite in fact which is posited as the other of the first or finite. Only the true infinite, which posits itself as finite, overlaps itself so to speak as its Other, and remains in it, because it is its own other in unity with itself. But if the one, the infinite, be only defined as the not-many, not-finite, it remains on the other side beyond the many and the finite; and thus the many of the finite itself is likewise left standing on its own account without being able to attain to its something beyond.

It is now time to inquire whether this antithesis has truth in it, that is to say, whether these two sides drop apart, and exist as mutually exclusive. With regard to this it has been said already that when we posit the finite as finite, we are above and beyond it. In the limitation we have a limit but only inasmuch as we are above and beyond it, it is no longer the affirmative. Just because we are at it, conscious of it, we are no longer at it.

The finite relates itself to the infinite; each is exclusive with regard to the other. Considered more closely, the finite is regarded as that which is limited, its limit being the infinite.

Under the first form one Particular gave limits to an other; here the finite has its limit in the infinite itself. Now if the finite is limited by the infinite and stands on one side, the infinite itself is something limited too; it has its boundary in the finite; it is that which the finite is not; it has something which is on the yonder side of it and is thus finite, limited. Thus we have, instead of the Highest, something which is a Finite. We have not what we desire, we have in this infinite only a finite. Or if it be said, on the other hand, that the infinite is not limited, then the finite, too, is not


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 limited. And if it be not limited, then it is not different from the infinite, but merges in it, is identical with it in infinitude, as it was before in finitude. Such is the abstract nature of this antithesis. It is necessary to retain this in the mind; to hold it fast is of absolute importance all through in regard to all forms of reflective consciousness and of philosophy. The antithesis itself vanishes when the two sides are absolutely opposed; both sides of the relation vanish into empty moments and that which is and remains is the unity of the two, in which they are abrogated and preserved.

The finite conceived of in its more concrete form is the Ego, and the infinite is at first what is beyond this finite, its negative. As the negative of the negative, however, the infinite is the affirmative. Consequently it is to the infinite that we ascribe affirmation, that which has being, what is beyond in relation to the Ego, to my self-consciousness, to my consciousness, as power, as will. But it has been remarked that it is the Ego itself which has here to begin with defined what is beyond as the affirmative; with this, however, that Ego is placed in contrast, the Ego, that is, which we before defined as the affirmative, in short, “I am immediate; I am one with myself.”

If consciousness determines itself as finite, and if beyond it is the infinite, this Ego makes the same reflection which we have made, namely, that that infinite is only a vanishing infinite, only a thought posited by myself. I am the one who produces that something beyond, and I determine myself by means of it as finite. Both are my product, in me they vanish; I am lord and master of this determination, and thus the second fact is posited, namely, that I am the affirmative which is placed beyond, I am the negation of the negation, I am that in which the antithesis vanishes, I am the act of reflection which annihilates both. The Ego thus, by means of its own act of reflection, destroys those self-dissolving antitheses.


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 ($$\gamma$$.$$\gamma$$.) The absolute maintenance of the finite in reflection.

Having now reached this point, we desire to see how it fares with the finite, whether it is possible to get away from it in a real and actual way, and whether it secures its right, the right, namely, to become truly abrogated and absorbed, to divest itself of finiteness, or whether it remains in its finiteness, and gets the form of the infinite merely because the infinite is a finite as contrasted with it. It would seem here as if reflection did not mean to leave standing what is for it a nonentity, and as if self-consciousness meant to deal seriously with its finiteness, and really to divest itself of it. That, however, is precisely what does not happen here. It makes a mere show of doing this. What occurs here is rather that the finite maintains itself; I cling to myself, I do not give up my nullity, but make myself infinite therein, constitute myself an active operative infinite. What we have therefore here is that the finite Ego, inasmuch as it is the positing of an infinite beyond itself, has posited the infinite itself as a finite, and is therein identical with itself as that which is in like manner finite, and now as being identical with the infinite becomes infinite itself. This is the culminating point of subjectivity, which clings fast to itself, the finiteness which remains and renders itself infinite in its very finiteness, the infinite subjectivity, which has done with all content. But this very subjectivity, this culmination of finiteness still maintains itself; in it all content evaporates, and is rendered vain; the only thing that does not vanish, however, is this vanity. This culmination has the appearance of being a renunciation of the finite, but it is just in it that finiteness, as such still maintains itself. Speaking more definitely, abstract self-consciousness, pure thought, is as it were the absolute power of negativity to make short work with everything, but the power which still maintains itself as this definite Ego, while it yields up the


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 whole of finitude, and yet expresses this finite as infinitude, as the universal affirmative. What is wanting here is objectivity. In true renunciation all depends on whether this culmination of subjectivity still has an object.

The standpoint which has been considered is reflection in its completeness, the abstract subjectivity, the Ego, the absolute idealiser, that for which all distinction, determination, content is annulled, or exists only as posited by it. I am that which determines, and I alone, and I am this as the individual unit, as the immediate self, as I, who am immediate.

In all content I am immediate relation or reference to myself, that is to say, I am Being, and this I am as particularity, as the relation of negativity to itself. That which is posited by me is posited as distinct from me—as the negative, and thus as negated, as only posited. I am, consequently, immediate negativity. Thus I, this exclusive Ego, in my state of immediacy, that is to say, in my feelings, opinions, in the caprice and contingency of my feeling and willing, am the affirmative in general, am good. All objective content, law, truth, duty vanish for me. I recognise nothing, nothing that is objective, no truth. God, the Infinite, is for me something beyond this world, something held aloof from me. I alone am the Positive, and no content has value on its own account, it has no longer affirmation in itself, but only in so far as I lay it down. The True and the Good exist in my conviction only, and all that is needful in order that a thing be good is this conviction, this recognition of mine. In this ideality of all determinations or categories I alone am the Real. This attitude at first gives itself out to be that of humility, and what such humility consists in is this, that the Ego shuts out from itself the Infinite, the knowledge and rational apprehension of God, renounces it, and characterises itself in reference to it as finite. But in so doing this humility contradicts itself; it is pride rather, for I shut out the


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 truth from myself, and take up the position that I as this particular unit actually here, am alone the affirmative, and am what has absolute Being, in presence of which all else vanishes away. True humility, on the contrary, renounces itself, renounces its particular existence and its claim to be the affirmative, and recognises the True, that which has absolute Being, as alone the affirmative. In contrast to this, that false humility, while it recognises the finite as the negative, the limited, makes it at the same time the only Affirmative, Infinite, and Absolute. I, this particular unit, alone am the sole essentiality, that is to say, I, this finite, am the infinite. The infinite, declared to be what is beyond the present and actual, is posited only through me. In this determination the unity of the finite and infinite is contained, but a unity of such a kind that the finite is not merged in it, but has become what is fixed, absolute, perennial. This unity being posited by means of the finite Ego, the unity itself becomes a finite unity. The Ego simulates humility, while in fact it is inflated beyond measure with vain and empty pride. On the other hand, since the knowledge of something higher disappears, and only subjective emotion, mere good pleasure is left, there is no objective common element to bind individuals together, and in presence of the unlimited diversity in their feeling, their mutual attitude is one of enmity, hatred, and contempt.

The difficulty of getting a grasp of this point of view is owing to the fact that in this aspect of it, the extreme, culminating point of finite subjectivity, which is devoid of all content, posits itself as absolute.

The first difficulty which presents itself is, that it is just such an abstraction as has been described; the second lies in the fact of its approximation to the philosophical Notion. It borders on the philosophical standpoint, for it is the highest point of reflection. It contains expressions which, regarded superficially, appear to be the same


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 as those which belong to philosophy. It contains ideality, negativity, subjectivity, and all this is, considered in itself, a true and essential moment of freedom and of the Idea. Further, it contains the unity of the finite and infinite; and this is true also of the Idea. It is undoubtedly subjectivity, which develops all objectivity out of itself, and consequently transmutes itself as form into content, and only becomes true form by means of its true content. Notwithstanding this, what thus seems to approach most nearly to the Idea is furthest off from it. This ideality, this fire in which all determinations consume themselves, is at this point of view still uncompleted negativity. “I,” as immediate, as this unit, am the sole reality; all remaining determinations are posited as ideal, are burnt up. I alone maintain myself, and all determinations are valid, only if I will it so. The only determination which possesses validity is that of myself, and that everything is posited and exists only through me. The Ideality is not thoroughly carried through; this last culminating point still contains what must be negated; it must be shown that I, as this unit, am not possessed of truth, of reality. I myself alone remain positive, notwithstanding that everything is to become affirmative through negation only. And thus this position contradicts itself, for it posits ideality as a principle, and that which brings about the ideality is itself not ideal.

The unity of the finite and infinite, which is made explicit in reflection, is undoubtedly a definition of the Idea, but of such a kind that the infinite is the positing of itself as what is finite, while the finite is the finite of itself, and is owing to this abrogation, the negation of its negation. Consequently, it is the infinite, but it is this infinite only as the positing of itself within itself as the finite, and the abrogation of this finiteness as such. From the subjective point of view, on the contrary, this unity is still posited in one-sidedness, for it is posited by the finite itself, and is still under the form of finiteness. I, this finite unit, am the


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 infinite. Consequently this infinitude is itself finitude. This particularity of my finite being—my immediate personality—has yet to be separated from this affirmation, from this infinite. It is Reflection itself which is par excellence what separates; but here it neglects its function of separating and distinguishing, and arrives at a unity which is, however, only a finite unity. Reflection here fails to disjoin the immediate particularity of the Ego, of the individual unit, from the Infinite and Affirmative. And instead of merging the individual, which in itself is without support, in universality and getting a grasp of affirmation in its absolute universality in which it includes the individual, it conceives of particularity itself as being in an immediate way the universal. Here lies the deficiency of this point of view. Contradictions can only be criticised if we trace them back to the ultimate thought on which they rest.

Such is the standpoint of the present time, and philosophy enters into a peculiar relation with it. If we compare this point of view with the religious ideas of earlier times, we easily observe that this religious consciousness had formerly a content existing on its own account, a content which defined the nature of God. It was the point of view of truth and of dignity. The highest duty was to know God, to worship Him in spirit and in truth; and the salvation or perdition, the absolute worth or worthlessness of man was bound up with his knowledge of this content, and his acceptance of it as true. At the present day to know truth, to know God, is not regarded as man’s highest endeavour, and consequently right and duty are unknown. All objective content has evaporated, and all that is left is this pure, formal subjectivity. This point of view expressly implies that I am by nature good; not that I am good by means of my own act, or by means of my will, but that I am good in being unconscious. The opposite position implies on the contrary that I am only good by means of my self-conscious spiritual activity, by my


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. It is not originally and by nature that I am good; on the contrary, my goodness must arise in my consciousness; it belongs to my spiritual world; the grace of God has its work here, but my co-operation as consciousness as my exercise of will is also necessarily involved. According to the prevalent view, my being good is a matter of my caprice and pleasure, for everything is posited through me.

In contemplating this remarkable contradiction in religious opinion, we have to recognise the fact that a tremendous revolution has taken place in the Christian world. An entirely new self-consciousness in reference to the True has appeared. All duty, all that is right, depends upon the innermost consciousness, upon the point of view of religious self-consciousness, springs from the root of the spirit, and this is the basis of all actuality. Yet it is only when it is the form for an objective content that the self-conscious spirit has truth. From this point of view, on the contrary, which has no content in it, no religion whatever is possible, for it is I who am the affirmative, while the Idea which has absolute Being must in religion be established purely through itself and not through me. Here, therefore, there can be no religion, any more than from the standpoint of sensuous consciousness.

Philosophy is in this connection regarded as something special. If general culture is given a place in consciousness, then philosophy is a special calling or business, a manner of regarding things which is outside of ordinary interests, it is a calling which has a special place of its own. And thus the Philosophy of Religion too, according to the prevalent view, is something which cannot have a meaning for society in general, but must rather expect to meet with opposition and enmity from every side.

If accordingly the first relation of the finite to the infinite was the natural and untrue one, because the multitude and multiplicity of particularity were held fast


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 as against universality, and if we have seen, further, that the second relation is that found in reflection, where finiteness lies in the wholly completed abstraction of pure thought, which does not really get to conceive of itself as universal, but remains as “I,” as “this unit;” we have now to consider that relation as it reveals itself in reason.

($$\gamma$$.) The rational way of looking at finiteness.

This position is to be considered in the first place in its relation to the form of Reflection at its climax. The transition from that standpoint must by its very nature be dialectical, and must be so made. This, however, belongs to logic. We shall proceed to present it in a concrete manner, and as regards the necessity of the transition shall only appeal to the consequences which follow from this standpoint. According to it, I as finite am a nullity, which is to be annulled, but yet this annulling is all the same not effected or completed if this immediate individuality at the same time remains, and remains in such a way that this alone becomes the affirmative, in the form given to it by the standpoint of Reflection. The finite, which exalts itself to the infinite, is mere abstract identity, inherently empty, the supreme form of untruth, falsehood, and evil. A standpoint must therefore be shown where the Ego in this individuality renounces itself in deed and in truth. I must be particular subjectivity which is in very truth annulled, and thus something objective must be recognised by me which is actually regarded by me as true, and which I recognise as the Affirmative, posited for me, in which I am negated as this particular Ego, but in which my freedom is at the same time maintained. The freedom of reflection is of such a kind that it permits of nothing originating in it, and since it must allow of origination, it proceeds when it posits anything, without law and order; that is to say, permits nothing objective to originate. If something objective is to be really recognised, it is requisite that I should be


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 determined as universal, and should maintain myself, reckon myself as universal only. Now this is none other than the point of view of thinking reason, and religion itself is this action, this activity of the thinking reason, and of the man who thinks rationally,—who as individual posits himself as the Universal, and annulling himself as individual, finds his true self to be the Universal. Philosophy is in like manner thinking reason, only that this action in which religion consists appears in philosophy in the form of thought, while religion as, so to speak, reason thinking naively, stops short in the sphere of general ideas or ordinary thought.

The general characteristics, the more precise forms of thought belonging to this point of view, have now to be noticed.

It is said first of all that subjectivity relinquishes its individuality in the object in recognising an Objective in general. This object cannot be anything sensuous. I know the sensuous object; no doubt in sense the thing is for me something which persists objectively, but my freedom is not in it as yet. The untrue nature of the sensuous consciousness must be taken for granted here. The necessary determination is that this Objective as true, and affirmative, is determined as an universal. In this recognition of an Object, of an Universal, I renounce my finiteness, I renounce myself as this individual unit. What is valid for me is the Universal, and a universal would not exist if I were maintained as this individual unit. This is apparent, too, in immediate knowledge of God; I have a knowledge of the objectively universal, which has an absolute essential existence; but since there is only an immediate relation here, and reflection does not yet enter in, this Universal, this object of the Universal, is itself something merely subjective, to which that essential and independent objectivity is wanting. The reflection finally arrived at accordingly is only this, that these determinations are planted in feeling alone, and are locked up in


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 the subjective consciousness, which has not as yet renounced its immediate particularity, so that this determination of the objective Universal, as such, is not as yet adequate. In order to this, it is requisite that the abstract Universal should have a content as well, should have determinations or attributes in itself. Not till then can it be present to me as essentially existing. If it be empty, the determinateness exists only in my supposition; it belongs to me, all content, all activity, all vitality remain in myself, the determining and the objectifying are mine alone. I have only a dead, an empty God, a so-called Highest Being, and this emptiness, this idea, remains subjective only, and does not attain to true objectivity. At this last standpoint we get certainty only, there is no truth; and I may perfectly well remain here characterised as this unit, as the finite. The objectivity in that case is a mere semblance of objectivity.

It is not for philosophy alone that the object is full of content. This feature is common to both philosophy and religion; here there is as yet no difference in their point of view.

Closely connected with this is the question: How is the subject determined here? The subject is characterised, in relation to the recognised object, as thinking. Thought is the activity of the Universal, having an Universal as its object. By the Universal here is meant the purely absolute Universal. The relation to such an object is therefore the thought of the subject; the object is the Essence, that which exists for the subject. The thought is not merely subjective, but also objective.

In thinking, reflecting about the true object, I am subjective, I have my thoughts about it. But equally in thinking the object, thinking the thought of it, the relation of my personality towards it as something particular is got rid of, and I assume an objective attitude; I have renounced myself as an individual, renounced my particularity, and am universal. To do this and to think that


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 the Universal is my object, are one and the same. Here I renounce myself actually and really. Working and living in objectivity is the true confession of finiteness, is real humility.

It may be remarked that it is an essential characteristic of thought that it is mediated action or activity, mediated Universality,—which as negation of negation is affirmation. It is mediation by the annulling of mediation. Universality, Substance, for instance, are thoughts which exist only through negation of the negation. Thus the mode of immediacy is contained here, but no longer it only. And hence the expression that we have immediate knowledge of God: knowledge is pure activity, and only negates the impure, the immediate. We can know God in an empirical manner; this universal Object is then immediately before me without demonstration. This immediacy in the empirical subject is itself partly a result of much mediation, and partly it is only one phase of this activity. A difficult piece of music can be played with ease after it has been gone through by frequent repetition of single passages; it is played with immediate activity as the result of so many mediatory actions. The same is the case with habit, which has become like a second nature to us. The simple result seen in the discovery of Columbus was the consequence of many detached acts and deliberations, which had preceded it.

The nature of such an activity is different from its outward appearance. Thus the nature of thought is this identity with itself, this pure transparency of the activity, which in itself is negation of the negative. Thought is the result which renders itself immediate, which appears as immediate.

I am therefore determined in relation to the object as thinking; and not in philosophy merely, but also in religion in its affirmative form, in devotion, which has its origin in thinking and in what is thought, does God exist for me. This thinking of the Universal, then, is a


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 definite mode of my existence as pure thinking. What is further to be observed is that in devotion, in this relation to the universal Substance, I am reflected upon myself. I distinguish myself from this Object, and it from myself, for I have to yield myself up. In this lies the consciousness of myself; and in so far as I merely perform the act of devotion in yielding myself up to God, I am at the same time only as it were a reflection out of God into myself. How then am I determined in this respect, “I,” who again appear? Here I am determined as finite in the true manner, finite as distinguished from this Object, as the particular over against the universal, as the accidental in reference to this Substance, as a moment, as something distinguished, which at the same time is not independent, but has renounced itself and knows itself to be finite. Thus therefore I do not go beyond the consciousness of myself, and this arises from the fact that the universal Object is now potentially thought and has the content within itself; it is substance in motion within itself, and as an inward process in which it begets its content, is not empty, but is absolute fulness. All particularity belongs to it; as universal it overlaps or includes me in itself, and thus I look upon myself as finite, as being a moment in this life, as that which has its particular being, its permanent existence in this substance only, and in its essential moments. And thus I am not only potentially but also actually and really, posited as finite. For that very reason I do not preserve myself as immediate, as affirmative.

Having hitherto considered, in a concrete way, the attitude of the Ego to the universal Substance, what now remains to be considered is the abstract relation of the finite to the infinite generally.

In Reflection, the finite stands opposed to the infinite in such a way that the finite is doubled. What is true is the indissoluble unity of the two. This it is which we have just considered in a more concrete form as the


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 relation of the subjective Ego to the Universal. The finite is but an essential moment of the infinite, the infinite is absolute negativity, that is, affirmation, which however is mediation within itself. The simple unity, identity, and abstract affirmation of the infinite is, in itself, no truth, but rather is it essential that it should differentiate or break itself up within itself. In this process it is in the first place affirmation, and then secondly, distinction; thirdly, the affirmation appears as negation of the negation, and thus for the first time as the True. Nor does the standpoint of the finite represent any more that which is true. On the contrary it must annul itself, and it is only in this act of negation that we have what is true. The finite is therefore an essential moment of the infinite in the nature of God, and thus it may be said it is God Himself who renders Himself finite, who produces determinations within Himself. Now this might at first appear to us to be something unlike a Divine process, but we already have it in the ordinary ideas about God; for we are accustomed to believe in Him as the Creator of the world. God creates a world, God determines; outside of Him there is nothing to determine. He determines Himself when He thinks Himself, places an Other over against Himself, when He and a world are two. God creates the world out of nothing; that is to say, besides the world nothing external exists, for it is itself externality. God alone is; God, however, only through mediation of Himself with Himself. He wills the finite; He Himself posits it as an Other, and thus Himself becomes an Other than Himself—a finite—for He has an Other opposed to Himself. This “otherness,” however, is the contradiction of Himself with Himself. He is thus the finite, in relation to that which is finite. But the truth is that this finiteness is only an appearance, a phenomenal shape in which He has or possesses Himself. Creation is activity. In this is involved differentiation,


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 and in this again the moment of the finite, yet this separate existence of the finite must in turn annul itself. For it is God’s; it is His Other, and exists notwithstanding in the definite form of the Other of God. It is the Other and the not Other; it dissolves or cancels its own self; it is not it itself, but an Other, it destroys itself. By this means, however, the “otherness” has wholly vanished in God, and in it God recognises Himself; and in this way He maintains Himself for Himself as His own result through His own act.

In accordance with this way of regarding the matter, the two infinites may now be distinguished, namely, the true infinite from the merely bad one of the understanding. Thus, then, the finite is a moment of the Divine life.

(c.) The transition to the speculative conception of religion.

For the logically developed and rational consideration of the finite, the simple forms of a proposition have no longer any value. God is infinite, I am finite; these are false, bad expressions, forms which do not adequately correspond to that which the Idea, the nature of the real object, is. The finite is not that which is, in like manner the infinite is not fixed; these determinations are only moments of the process. It is equally true that God exists as finite and the Ego as infinite. The “is,” or exists, which is regarded in such propositions as something firmly fixed, has, when understood in its true sense, no other meaning than that of activity, vitality, and spirituality.

Nor are predicates adequate for definition here, and least of all those which are one-sided and transient. But, on the contrary, what is true, what is the Idea, exists only as movement. Thus God is this movement within Himself, and thereby alone is He the living God. But this separate existence of the finite must not be retained; it must, on the contrary, be abrogated. God


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 is movement towards the finite, and owing to this He is, as it were, the lifting up of the finite to Himself. In the Ego, as in that which is annulling itself as finite, God returns to Himself, and only as this return is He God. Without the world God is not God.

We meet with these abstractions especially among the ancients; they are products of the beginnings of reflecting abstract thought. Plato, however, already recognises the infinite as the bad, and the determinate as what is higher—he looks on the limit limiting itself in itself as higher than the Unlimited. What is true is the unity of the infinite, in which the finite is contained.

The result of all this is, that we must get rid of this bugbear of the opposition of finite and infinite. It is customary to frighten us out of the wish to know God and to have a positive relation to Him, with the bugbear that to seek to take up any such attitude towards God is presumption, while the objections are brought forward with much unction and edifying language, and with vexatious humility. This presumption, however, is undoubtedly an essential part of philosophy as well as of religion. From this point of view it is a matter of indifference whether I know through thought the content, namely God, or accept it as true on authority, or with the heart, by inner enlightenment, or in any other way. If you take any of these ways, you are met by this bugbear that it is presumptuous to wish to know God, and to comprehend the infinite by means of the finite. We must rid ourselves completely of this opposition of finite and infinite, and do it by getting an insight into the real state of the case.

The man who does not rid himself of this phantom steeps himself in vanity, for he posits the Divine as something which is powerless to come to itself, while he clings to his own subjectivity, and, taking his stand on this, asserts the impotence of his knowledge. This is surely subjective untruth in its real form, the hypocrisy


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 which retains the finite, which acknowledges the vanity of the finite, but yet retains this which it confesses and knows to be vain, and makes it into the Absolute, while in so doing it holds aloof from rational knowledge, and from substantial objective religion and religious life, and either destroys them, or prevents them from making their influence felt.

In losing ourselves in the true object itself, we escape from this vanity of the self-maintaining subjectivity, from this Ego, and make serious work with vanity. This follows as a consequence of what was accomplished in the science of logic.

The negative relation of consciousness to the Absolute is commonly based upon observation; for consciousness, it is said, only the finite exists. The infinite, on the other hand, is devoid of determinate character (and consequently, as we have seen, is implicitly only, subjective), and consciousness has a merely negative relation to it. Because there is only this relation in observation, it is now argued that it is impossible to know the Absolute, the Truth. A few remarks must be made upon this position.

If possibility and impossibility be taken in so far as they have a definite meaning, they both have reference to the kernel, to the Notion of an object, that which it essentially is. Their meaning must therefore be decided by the nature of the Notion itself. From the point of view of consciousness as observing—from this point of view of observation—the inner nature, the Notion, cannot be discussed, for that point of view renounces the knowledge of what concerns the kernel or inner element of the object; it has only before it that which is included in the sphere of external consciousness as such. Thus possibility and impossibility have no place in this sphere of thought.

Those who occupy this position, however, assert that it is just what is, that is to say, what enters into this


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 particular perceiving consciousness, which gives the standard of possibility, and that from this we get the conception of possibility or impossibility. What contradicts experience is impossible.

In regard to this it is to be remarked that this observation limits itself arbitrarily to the sphere of the finite consciousness. There are, however, other spheres besides which may be observed; not merely those whose content is only finite in relation to what is finite, but those too where the Divine is in consciousness as something existing in and for itself. The affirmative consciousness of the Absolute in the form of simple, natural religious life, of devotion, or in the form of philosophical knowledge, may also be observed, and yield a quite different result from that supplied by the position of finite consciousness, whether the observing subject observe these higher forms of consciousness in others or in himself. For wrong as this point of view is, it may well be that religious experience is more affirmative and more full of content than consciousness; there may be more in the heart than in the consciousness, in so far as it is definite, rational, observing consciousness; the two may be distinct. All depends on the adjustment of the rational or cognitive element in consciousness to what I am in my true essential nature as Spirit.

But the conviction that the spirit has only a negative relation to God, ruins and destroys feeling, devotion, the religious attitude, in fact. For thought is the source of the Universal, the region in which the Universal generally—in which God—is; the Universal is in thought and for thought. Spirit in its freedom only, that is, as thinking, has the content of Divine truth, and supplies it to experience; its content constitutes the worth of experience in respect of all true devotion and piety. If a man in the exercise of conscious thought holds fast to the position that no affirmative relation to God exists, then all content at once goes out of experience; as that sphere


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 makes itself empty, so experience becomes hollow too, just as I cannot see without light from outside. If the content be negated or driven away from this region, there is no longer present that which can supply the true qualities of experience. If, therefore on the one hand, it must be conceded, as above, that there may be more in devotion than in religious consciousness, it is on the other hand an evidence of caprice or clumsiness when that which is present in a man himself or in others, is not observed. Properly speaking, however, this caprice, this clumsiness or want of skill, does not make its first appearance here, for if a man is only to observe, observation thereby is limited to the field of finiteness. To observe means, to place oneself in relation to something external, which is in observation to remain external, and this is only posited in so far as it is external to oneself, and is thus finite. Therefore, if any one occupy such a standpoint, he has before him only what is worthy of this standpoint, and appropriate to it.

If observation would observe the infinite in accordance with its true nature, it must itself be infinite; that is, it must no longer be observation of the true object, but the object itself. Speculative thought may be observed too, but this observation is only for the thinker himself. In like manner, religion is only for the religious man; that is, for him who at the same time is what he observes. There is no such thing as mere observation here: the observer is, on the contrary, in such a relation to the object, that his observation is not purely external; he is not a simple observer, is not merely in a negative relation to that which he observes.

From this it follows that in order to find the true seat of religion we must relinquish the attitude of the observer; we must abandon this empirical point of view, for the very reason that it is only empirical, and because it has, as we saw, annulled itself by its own act. Reflection possesses, it is true, the relation of the finite to the infinite; this,


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 however, is only posited as a negation. Reflection proceeds, indeed, to advance a claim to posite the finite as infinite, but it has been shown that this claim must only be in relation to the affirmative; that is to say, in observation the finite is made infinite, although it still remains, and is firmly retained, as finite. And yet at the same time the demand is made that the finite shall be abrogated.

Now, however, that the finite and the standpoint of reflection have annulled themselves, we have reached the standpoint of infinite observation and of the speculative Notion, namely, the sphere in which the true notion or conception of religion will unfold itself before us.

3. The Speculative Notion or Conception of Religion.

Reason is the region in which alone religion can be at home. The fundamental conception here is the affirmative attitude of consciousness which is only possible as negation of negation, as the self-abrogation of the determinations of the antithesis, which are taken by Reflection as persistent. The basis of religion is in so far this rational, or to speak more precisely, this speculative element. Religion, however, is not merely something so abstract; it is not merely such an affirmative attitude towards the Universal, as it is at present defined to be. If it were only this, all further content would be found to be outside of religion, would come in to it from without; or if the content did actually exist, this would imply that there existed yet another reality outside of religion.

The standpoint of religion is this, that the True, to which consciousness relates itself, has all content in itself, and consequently this condition of relation is what is highest of all in it, is its absolute standpoint.

Reflection is that form of mental activity which establishes the antitheses, and which goes from the one to the other, but without effecting their combination and


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 realising their pervading unity. The true home of religion, on the contrary, is absolute consciousness, and this implies that God is Himself all content, all truth and reality. An object such as this cannot be adequately expressed by mere Reflection.

If we have hitherto made use of the expression “consciousness,” it will be understood that this only expresses the aspect of the outward manifestation of Spirit, the essential relation of knowledge and its object. am thus determined as relation, but it is the essential nature of Spirit not to be merely in relation; finitude belongs to consciousness, and the object remains in consciousness as something independent. Spirit is not merely an act of knowledge in which the existence of the object is separate from the process of knowing it, it does not merely exist as something related, it is not merely the form of consciousness. We abstract from this relation and speak of Spirit, and consciousness then comes to be included as a moment in the being of Spirit; and this at once implies an affirmative relation of the spirit to absolute Spirit. It is only when we have arrived at this identity, where knowledge posits itself for itself in its object, that we are in presence of Spirit, Reason, which exists objectively for itself. Religion is therefore a relation of the spirit to absolute Spirit: thus only is Spirit as that which knows, also that which is known. This is not merely an attitude of the spirit towards absolute Spirit, but absolute Spirit itself is that which is the self-relating element, which brings itself into relation with that which we posited on the other side as the element of difference. Thus when we rise higher, religion is the Idea of the Spirit which relates itself to its own self—it is the self-consciousness of absolute Spirit. Of this, its consciousness which was before defined as relation, forms a part. Consciousness, as such, is finite consciousness, it is the knowledge of something other than the Ego. Religion, too, is consciousness, and consequently has finite consciousness as


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 an element in it, but a consciousness which is cancelled as fiinite; for the Other, which absolute Spirit knows, it itself is, and it is only absolute Spirit in knowing itself. The finiteness of consciousness comes in here, since Spirit by its own movement differentiates itself; but this finite consciousness is a movement of Spirit itself, it itself is self-differentiation, self-determination; that is to say, positing of itself as finite consciousness. By means of this, however, it is only mediated through consciousness or finite spirit in such wise that it has to render itself finite in order to become knowledge of itself through this rendering of itself finite. Thus religion is the Divine Spirit’s knowledge of itself through the mediation of finite spirit. Accordingly, in the Idea in its highest form, religion is not a transaction of man, but is essentially the highest determination of the absolute Idea itself.

Absolute Spirit in its consciousness is knowledge of itself. If it has knowledge of what is other than itself, it then ceases to be absolute Spirit. In accordance with this description, it is here maintained that this content, which the knowledge of absolute Spirit has of itself, is the absolute truth, is all truth, so that this Idea comprehends the entire wealth of the natural and spiritual world in itself, is the only substance and truth of all that constitutes this world, while it is in the Idea alone that everything has its truth, as being a moment of its essential existence.

The proof of the necessity that this content of religion should thus be absolute truth, in so far as it starts from what is immediate, and exhibits that content as the result of another content, has been discussed, and already lies behind us. When this proof was given above in its proper place, we saw at once how the one-sidedness of its procedure by which the content appears not as absolute, but as a result, annuls itself. For that which appears as First, whether it be the logical abstraction of Being, or the finite world—this First, this Immediate, this which appears unposited, is eventually itself posited as


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 posited, and not immediate—it is degraded from being immediate to being posited, so that absolute Spirit is in reality the True, the positing of the Idea, as well as the positing of Nature and of finite Spirit; in other words, absolute Spirit self-conscious of itself is the First and the alone True, in which the finite world which is thus something posited exists as a moment.

This procedure, therefore, which, to begin with, showed itself as a procedure prior to religion, and in which the beginning was made from the immediate, without reference to God, so that God only comes into being by means of it, is now seen to be rather a moment within religion itself, but in a shape and form different from that in which it first appeared, in which its relation to God is, as it were, of a merely natural and naive kind. Here, on the other hand, God is absolutely the First, and that procedure is the active play and movement of the Idea of absolute Spirit within itself. Spirit is for itself or self-conscious, that is to say, makes itself an object, has independent existence over against the Notion, as that which we call “the world,” “Nature.” This diremption, or separation, is the first moment. The other consists in the movement of this object back to this its source, to which it continues to belong, and to which it must return. This movement constitutes the Divine life. Spirit as absolute is, in the first place, manifestation or appearance to self, the self-existent Being-for-self. Manifestation, as such, is Nature; and Spirit is not only that which appears, not only that which is for beholders, but is Being-for-itself, what exists on its own account, manifestation to itself, and the fact that it is such makes it consciousness of itself as Spirit. Thus the moment which was at first considered as necessity is seen to be within Spirit itself, and we have that necessity so far as its essence is concerned within religion too; not, however, as immediate determinate Being, but as manifestation of the Idea; not as Being, but as manifestation of the Divine.

The concrete filling-up of the notion or conception of


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 religion accordingly is its production by means of itself. It is it itself which renders itself concrete, and perfects itself by attaining to the totality of its distinctions, so that the Notion, since it exists only by means of these distinctions, becomes object to itself. The Notion, which we have thus put on a firm basis, is the self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit, it is the self-consciousness which implies that it exists for itself. For itself it is Spirit; that in which there is a distinction between itself and Spirit is the moment of Nature. The meaning of this in popular language is that God is the unity of the Natural and Spiritual; Spirit is, however, lord of Nature, so that the two do not occupy a position of equal dignity in this unity, the truth being rather that the unity is Spirit; Spirit is no third something in which the two are neutralised, but, on the contrary, this indifference of the two is itself Spirit. At one time Spirit represents the one side, and at another is that which overlaps, which reaches over to grasp the other side, and is thus the unity of both. It is in this further concrete determination of Spirit that the process takes place by which the notion of God perfects itself by attaining to the Idea.

The Spiritual is the absolute unity of the Spiritual and Natural, so that this last is only what is posited, sustained by Spirit. In this Idea are found the following moments:—a. The substantial, absolute, subjective unity of the two moments, the Idea in its affirmation in which it is identical with itself. b. The differentiation of Spirit within itself, so that it now posits itself as existing for what is thus differentiated, posited as the latter is by Spirit itself, c. This differentiation itself being posited in that unity of affirmation, becomes negation of the negation, affirmation as infinite, as absolute Being-for-self.

The first two moments are those of the Notion, representing the way and manner in which the relation of the Spiritual and Natural is contained in the Notion. What is further to be observed is, that they are not merely


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 moments of the Notion, but are themselves the two sides of the difference. In Spirit the moment of differentiation is that which is termed consciousness. Differentiation is the positing of two, which have no other quality attaching to their difference than just those moments themselves. The differentiation, which thereby becomes a relation, has therefore the following as its two sides: as the one side it has just that solid substantial unity of the Idea, God as existent, as unity relating itself to itself; and as the other the differentiation, which, as consciousness, is the side for which the solid unity exists, and which therefore determines itself as the finite side.

Thus is God determined as existing for consciousness, as Object, as appearing or manifesting Himself. Essentially, however, He is as spiritual unity in His substantiality, not merely determined as appearing, but as appearing to Himself, therefore so appearing to what is other than Himself, that in that appearing He manifests Himself to Himself.

This differentiation is therefore itself to be conceived of as returning into absolute affirmation, or abrogating itself, as differentiation which just as eternally abrogates itself and becomes the truth of manifestation.

We first of all distinguished the substantial unity from the differentiation itself, and then designated the return of the second moment into the first as the third moment. Now, however, those two moments themselves (in accordance with the character of the content of the relation) are only to be taken as one side of the relation, so that the two only make up the one determinate character of that relation, and the second moment becomes that which appeared as the third. It is these two moments which, from the point of view of the notion, constitute that which in a general way is to be considered as the reality of the Idea; the one as the relation, into which the notion divides itself up, the consciousness, the appearing of God; and the other as the self-abrogation of this only


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 relative attitude of opposition. In the first, that is, the attitude of relation, the finite consciousness is the one side, and the mode in which its finiteness is determined is the mode in which it itself reveals to us how its object is determined for it. Here we have the manner of the divine manifestation, that is to say, the world of general ideas, or the theoretical side. In the other relation, the practical, being that of the active process in which the division annuls itself, it is, on the contrary, in consciousness that the activity makes its appearance. To this side accordingly belongs the form of freedom, subjectivity as such, and it is here that self-consciousness is to be considered in its movement. This is manifestation as worship.

C.

WORSHIP OR CULTUS.

The separation of subject from object makes its first actual appearance in the Will. In willing I am an actual being and a free agent, and I place myself over against the object as an Other, in order to assimilate it to myself by bringing it out of that state of separation. In the theoretical relation, this immediate unity, immediate knowledge, is still present. But in worship I stand on the one side and God on the other, my purpose being to unite myself closely with God, and God with myself, and so to bring about a concrete unity. Or, if we designate that first or theoretical unity as the mode under which ordinary thought conceives the Existent, the Objective, then, in contrast with that stable relation (which, as being the consciousness of God as existent in and for Himself, in the form of idea, is theoretical), worship will now constitute the practical relation. This it does, inasmuch as it possesses in itself the antithesis of subject and object, and so far does away with the division between subject and object; so that this division might seem to exist in the first condition of


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 relation. Here, then, the aspect of freedom, of subjectivity, is to be considered, as contradistinguished from the first aspect, which is that of Being. Thus it might be said that the first is God in His Being, the second the subject in its subjective Being. God is, is present; that is to say, has a relation to consciousness. Thus worship is itself in the first place theoretical, in as far as it itself, after doing away with the antithesis, quits the region of idea or ordinary thought likewise. As determined, God is not as yet the true God. In as far as He is no longer determined and limited in His actually existing manifestation, is He Spirit, manifestation which exists in and for itself. The Being of God therefore involves a relation to consciousness; only as an abstract God does He exist for consciousness as a something beyond the present, as “Other.” Inasmuch as He is in His manifestation as He is potentially, He has an absolutely realised existence; therefore consciousness, and essentially self-consciousness, belong to His manifestation, for every form of consciousness is self-consciousness. Thus God is essentially self-consciousness. The characteristic of consciousness is included in the first aspect as well, and that which we have termed the general idea of God may likewise be called the Being of God.

Thus knowledge has its place as associated with worship, and the general form in which it appears as belonging to it is what we call Faith.

I.—Of Faith.

1. Faith belongs to this practical relation on its subjective side. It belongs to the knowing subject, in as far as in it self-consciousness not only has a knowledge of its object as theoretical, but has certain knowledge of it—a knowledge of it, in fact, as something which is absolutely Existent, and alone True. In this certainty it has relinquished its independent Being, which is the element of truth in its


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 formal knowledge of itself. Since faith must be defined as the witness of the spirit to absolute Spirit, or as a certainty of the truth, it involves relation in respect of the distinction of Object and Subject, a mediation in fact, but a mediation within itself; for in faith as it is here defined, external mediation and that particular mode of it have already vanished. This mediation therefore belongs to the essential nature of Spirit, and is the substantial unity of Spirit with itself, which infinite form likewise essentially is. To express this in more concrete language, the certainty faith has of the truth, or, this uniting of the absolute content with knowledge, is that absolute, divine connection itself, in accordance with which the knowing subject, the self-consciousness, in so far as it knows the true content, as free, as laying aside all peculiarities of its particular or individual content, has knowledge of itself, though of its essence only. In this its free, absolute certainty, it has the very certainty of the truth. As knowing, it has an object, and this as being the Essence is the absolute Object. It is at the same time no foreign object, no object which is for consciousness something other than and beyond it, but it is its own Potentiality, its Essence. For consciousness, as absolutely certain, is identical with this certainty. This content is the potentiality of self-consciousness, and in this character exists for us, having in as far as it is essential being only, objectivity for self-consciousness, or to put it otherwise, it constitutes its aspect as consciousness. This is the innermost, abstract point of personality, which can be understood in a speculative way only as this unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, or of knowledge and its essence, of infinite form and absolute content. This unity exists simply and solely as the knowledge of it in an objective form, as being the Essence which is my Essence.

In this exposition so much depends on each individual moment, and at the same time on the essential combination of these in unity, that if one only of these moments be held


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 fast while we abstract from the others, or even if they be grasped in a more complete way, yet apart from their identity, this conception may easily seem merely to result in those one-sided forms of reflection which have already been considered, and may be confounded with them. This may all the more easily appear to be the case, since those very forms of reflection are none other than the single moments of the expounded conception held fast in a one-sided manner. The explanation of this distinction will help towards a fuller elucidation of the true conception, as also of those forms of reflection.

It having thus been shown that the Truth itself is contained in the certainty of spiritual, pure self-consciousness, and is inseparably identical with it, it may easily appear as if this determination were the same with the idea of the immediate knowledge of God, in which as immediate the Being of God is just as certain for me as I myself am, as my certainty of myself. Such an assertion, however, would essentially imply a persistent adherence to the immediacy of knowledge as such, and as excluding a perception of the truth that knowledge as such is in fact mediation in itself, an immediate affirmation, which is this simply and solely as negation of the negation. This would imply, further, that the immediacy of the knowing subject does not disappear, but that the latter persists in its finite independent Being, and therefore, together with its object, remains devoid of Spirit, so that it is only the speculative nature of the two moments and of the spiritual Substance which is not grasped in thought and directly treated of. In the act of devotion which rests on faith, the individual is oblivious of self, and is filled with his object. He yields up his heart, and does not keep his immediate character. Even if the subject, in the fire and warmth of devotion, buries itself in its object, it is, all the same, itself still present. It is precisely the subject which possesses itself in this devotional exercise; it is the subject which prays,


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 speaks, forms ideas, and which has to do with this its exaltation. But in devotion the subject does not maintain itself in its particularity, but only in its movement in the Object, and only as this individual self-moving spirit. The further development of the immediacy which has not been abrogated accordingly presents us with the infinitude of the vain subject as vain, and this culmination of vanity remains. If this be taken as also the unity of the certain knowledge of itself with the content, then this unity would be one in which vanity as such would be defined as representing what is true and absolute. That subjectivity, on the contrary, is destined to be the true subjectivity only in so far as it is knowledge which is emancipated and free from immediacy, as likewise from the Being-for-self which reflects itself into itself, and holds itself fast as against Substance—that is, only in so far as it is this negative unity of infinite Form with Substance, as against its individual particularity.

In connection with the conception just indicated, we may perhaps be reminded of another idea, or of the bald accusation of Pantheism which is brought against that conception even by theologians themselves. For there are theologians who, while they suppose that they have gone a long distance from the beaten track of the ordinary forms of the reflection which characterises the culture of our time, are so restricted to it that if they do not find God spoken of and defined as something absolutely supersensible, they in their thinking cannot get any further than the conception of such an affirmative relation as mere ordinary abstract identity. People do not know how to get a knowledge of God as Spirit: Spirit is an empty idea to them, having merely the same meaning as motionless abstract Substance. Pantheism sees and knows God in the sun, in a stone, a tree, an animal, in so far only as the sun as sun, the tree or animal as such, is and continues in this immediate natural existence. The sun, the air, and such like, are, it is true, universal matter,


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 and still more are plants and animals, life in fact. If we know of no higher characteristic of God than that of universal Being, of universal life, universal substance, and the like, then such forms of existence certainly contain this so-called divine Essence, and contain it as a Universal which is devoid of Spirit. In like manner, if the individual self-consciousness be defined as a natural simple Thing, which is ordinarily understood as being the definition of the soul, then from the pantheistic point of view it too is taken as a divine existence. But so too, although self-consciousness be of the true kind, understood not indeed as a natural Thing, yet as a reality so far as immediateness is concerned so that it exists as knowing immediately, just as it is in accordance with its purely original character what thinks, and even although in this sense it be thus taken as a divine reality,—it also is still conceived of from that pantheistic point of view. And from such a definition of individual self-consciousness it is not possible for the pantheistic idea to free itself. “I am: I am thinking:” this form of immediate Being is regarded from the pantheistic point of view as that which constitutes the ultimate definition and the persistent form of what thinks. Although the latter be also termed Spirit, this remains a meaningless expression, since that which was merely Being, that knowledge which is merely immediate—knowing immediately anything whatever, including even God—is nothing but Spirit devoid of Spirit. The two assertions that man can only know God in an immediate manner, and that man as he is originally and by nature is good, have their source in this conceiving of Spirit as devoid of Spirit. Or conversely, if these two assertions be made, it follows that Spirit is to be taken only as the existent “I,” and this existent as the ultimate and true determination of self-consciousness, and even as absolute eternal Being. Spirit becomes Spirit as concrete freedom only, as something which allows its naturalness or immediateness to


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 flow into its universality, or more accurately, into its essence as its object—as something which merges its natural singularity, which determines itself as finite in the essential object, that is here, in the absolute content, which determines itself as object. If in connection with the immediateness thus relinquished, what is thought of be the merely bodily immediateness, then this yielding up presents itself partly as natural death, by means of which man may be united with God—partly, however, as Thought, which abstracts from sensuous life and sensuous ideas, and is a withdrawal into the free region of the supersensuous. But if thought here adheres to its form as abstract thought, it retains the reflected vanity of simple, immediate Being-for-itself, of the cold and reserved isolation of the existent “I,” which takes up an exclusive attitude towards its Essence, and negates its own essence in itself. With justice is it said of this that God would not be in it, nor would it be in God, and that it would have to do with God in an outward fashion only, and further, that it would be the pantheistic point of view, and unworthy of God, if this  should be taken as an actual existence of God, since God must at least abstractly be defined as the absolutely universal Essence. But the relation of self-consciousness to God as Spirit is wholly different from this pantheistic mode of conceiving the relation, since in such a relation it is itself Spirit, and since by the renunciation of the exclusive character which it possesses as immediate oneness or isolation, it places itself in an affirmative relation, in a spiritually-vital attitude toward God. If theologians see Pantheism in this attitude, and consequently even count the spirit among the All, the all things among which indeed they reckon the soul and that which is reflected into its Beingfor-self, and which they then are justified in excluding from God in respect of their individual actuality in which they are finite, and if they know Spirit only as negation of God, they not only forget the doctrine that man was


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 created in the image of God, but emphatically forget the doctrine of the grace of God, of justification through Christ, and, above all, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who leads the church into all truth, and abides for ever in His church. The grand present day cry raised against this truth is—Pantheism. If, however, the be knowledge of the infinite content, in such sort that this form itself belongs to the infinite content, then the content is directly adequate to the form. It is present, not in finite existence, but in absolute manifestation of itself, and this is not Pantheism, for it has before it the existence of the divine in a particular form. If man, on the other hand, be immediately God, that is to say, if he as this individual unit knows God, that is the doctrine of Pantheism. The Church, on the contrary, declares that it is only through the abrogation of this naturalness (which abrogation, in its natural form, is seen in natural death) that man becomes united with God. If we grasp what is taught by the Church, in the Notion, in thought, the speculative determinations which have been specified will be found to be involved in it; and if there are theologians who cannot, by grasping them in thought, follow out such doctrines which undoubtedly have to do with the innermost depths of the divine Essence, they ought in that case to let them alone. Theology is the comprehension or understanding of religious content. Such theologians ought therefore to acknowledge that they cannot comprehend it, and should not seek to criticise the comprehension of it, and least of all should they apply to it such terms as Pantheism, &c.

The older theologians had the most thorough grasp of this divine depth, while among the Protestants of the present day, whose entire resources consist of criticism and history, philosophy and science have been wholly neglected. Meister Eckardt, a Dominican monk, in speaking of this innermost element, says, in one of his sermons, among other things, the following: “The eye


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 with which God sees me is the eye with which I see Him; my eye and His eye are one. By a righteous standard I am weighed in God, and God in me. If God were not, I would not be; if I were not, then He were not. It is, however, not needful to know this, for there are things which are easily misunderstood and which can only be thoroughly understood in thought.”

2. Faith must now get what is essentially the form of mediation. It itself is already this form implicitly, for it is knowledge of God and of His character, and this knowledge is in itself a process, a movement—is life, mediation. It is involved in the very nature of the freedom which is the inner characteristic of faith, that it should not be what we at first called substantial, solid unity, that it should not be idea: in freedom I exist on the contrary as that activity in affirmation which is infinite negation in itself. Now if we should wish to give to mediation the form of an external mediation as the foundation of faith, then such a form would be a wrong one. This mediation, of which the basis is something external, is false. The content of faith may indeed come to me by means of instruction, miracle, authority, &c. These may be the foundation of faith as subjective faith. But it is just in giving this position to the content whereby it assumes the character of a basis for me, that we go on a wrong track; and when faith is reached, this externality must drop away. In faith I make that my own which comes to me thus, and it ceases to be for me an Other. Immediate faith may be so defined as being the witness of the Spirit to Spirit, and this implies that no finite content has any place in it. Spirit witnesses only of Spirit, and only finite things are mediated by means of external grounds. The true foundation of faith is the Spirit, and the witness of the Spirit is inherently living. Verification may at first appear in that external formal manner, but this must drop away. It may thus happen that faith in a religion has its commencement from such testimony,


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 from miracles, that is in a finite content. Christ Himself, however, spoke against miracles, He reproached the Jews for demanding them of Him, and said to His disciples, “The Spirit will guide you into all truth.” Faith which begins in such an external manner is as yet formal, and the true faith must come in its place. It is essential to mark this distinction between the two kinds of faith, for if this is not done, men are required to believe things which at a certain level of culture they can no longer believe. Miracles, it is said, are to be believed in this way, and this belief is to be a means of faith in Christ; it may indeed be a means, but yet it is always required on its own account as well. The faith thus demanded is faith in a content which is finite and contingent, that is to say which is not the true content. For true faith has no accidental content. This requires especially to be pointed out in view of the “Aufklärung.” It has gained the mastery over this formal faith, and if orthodoxy demand faith of this kind, it becomes impossible for it, in presence of certain ways of looking at things common among men, to maintain it, because it is faith in a content which is not divine, which is not the witness of God to Himself as Spirit in the Spirit. The following is to be specially noted in regard to miracles. Whether at the marriage at Cana the guests got a little more wine or a little less is a matter of absolutely no importance; nor is it any more essential to determine whether or not the man who had the withered hand was healed; for millions of men go about with withered and crippled limbs, whose limbs no man heals. In like manner it is related in the Old Testament, that at the time of the flight out of Egypt red marks were made at the doors of the Jewish houses in order that the angel of the Lord might recognise those dwellings. Would this angel not have known them without those marks? This faith has no real interest for Spirit. Voltaire’s bitterest attacks are directed against the demands of a faith of this kind. Among other things


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