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Fort Leavenworth Company v. Lowe/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiff, a corporation organized under the laws of Kansas, was in 1880, and has ever since been, the owner of a railroad in the reservation of the United States in that state, known as the 'Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation.' In that year its track, right of way, franchises, road-bed, telegraph line, and instruments connected therewith, on the reservation, were assessed by the board of assessors of the state, and a tax of $394.40 levied thereon, which was paid by the railroad company under protest, in order to prevent a sale of the property. The present action is brought to recover back the money thus paid, on the ground that the property, being entirely within the reservation, was exempt from assessment and taxation by the state.

The land constituting the reservation was part of the territory acquired in 1803 by cession from France, and, until the formation of the state of Kansas, and her admission into the Union, the United States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and sovereignty over it. For many years before that admission it had been reserved from sale by the properauthorities of the United States for military purposes, and occupied by them as a military post. The jurisdiction of the United States over it during this time was necessarily paramount. But in 1861 Kansas was admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original states; that is, with the same rights of political dominion and sovereignty, subject like them only to the constitution of the United States. Congress might undoubtedly, upon such admission, have stipulated for retention of the political authority, dominion, and legislative power of the United States over the reservation, so long as it should be used for military purposes by the government; that is, it could have excepted the place from the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the uses of the general government. But from some cause, inadvertence perhaps, or overconfidence that a recession of such jurisdiction could be had whenever desired, no such stipulation or exception was made. The United States, therefore, retained, after the admission of the state, only the rights of an ordinary proprietor; except as an instrument for the execution of the powers of the general government, that part of the tract, which was actually used for a fort or military post, was beyond such control of the state, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat its use for those purposes. So far as the land constituting the reservation was not used for military purposes, the possession of the United States was only that of an individual proprietor. The state could have exercised, with reference to it, the same authority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property held by private parties. This defect in the jurisdiction of the United States was called to the attention of the government in 1872. In April of that year the secretary of war addressed a communication to the attorney general, inclosing papers touching the reservation, and submitting for his official opinion the questions, whether, under the constitution, the reservation of the land for a site as a military post and for public buildings took it out of the operation of the law of March 3, 1859, (11 St. 430,) and, if so, what action would be required on the part of the executive or congress to restore the land to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The attorney general replied that the act admitting Kansas as a state into the Union had the effect to withdraw from federal jurisdiction all the territory within the boundaries of the new state, excepting only that of the Indians having treaties with the United States, which provided that without their consent such territory should not be subject to state jurisdiction, and the reservation was not within this exception; and that to restore the federal jurisdiction over the land included in the reservation, it would be necessary to obtain from the state of Kansas a cession of jurisdiction, which he had no doubt would, upon application, be readily granted by the state legislature. 14 Op. Attys. Gen. 33. It does not appear from the record before us that such application was ever made; but, on the twenty-second of February, 1875, the legislature of the state passed an act entitled 'An act to cede jurisdiction to the United States over the territory of the Fort Leavenworth military reservation,' the first section of which is as follows:

'That exclusive jurisdiction be, and the same is hereby, ceded to the United States over and within all the territory owned by the United States, and included within the limits of the United States military reservation known as the 'Fort Leavenworth Reservation' in said state, as declared from time to time by the president of the United States, saving, however, to the said state the right to serve civil or criminal process within said reservation, in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said state, but outside of said cession and reservation; and saving further to said state the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises and property, on said reservation.' Laws Kan. 1875, p. 95.

The question as to the right of the plaintiff to recover back the taxes paid depends upon the validity and effect of the last saving clause in this act. As we have said, there is no evidence before us that any application was made by the United States for this legislation, but, as it conferred a benefit, the acceptance of the act is to be presumed in the absence of any dissent on their part. The contention of the plaintiff is that the act of cession operated under the constitution to vest in the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation, and that the last saving clause, being inconsistent with that result, is to be rejected. The constitution provides that 'congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.' Article 1, § 8.

The necessity of complete jurisdiction over the place which should be selected as the seat of government was obvious to the framers of the constitution. Unless it were conferred, the deliberations of congress might, in times of excitement, be exposed to interruptions without adequate means of protection; its members, and the officers of the government, be subjected to insult and intimidation, and the public archives be in danger of destruction. The Federalist, in support of this clause in the constitution, in addition to these reasons, urged that 'a dependence of the members of the general government on the state comprehending the seat of the government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the confederacy.' No. 43.

The necessity of supreme legislative authority over the seat of government was forcibly impressed upon the members of the constitutional convention by occurrences which took place near the close of the revolutionary war. At that time, while congress was in session in Philadelphia, it was surrounded and insulted by a body of mutineers of the continental army. In giving an account of this proceeding, Mr. Rawle, in his Treatise on the Constitution, says of the action of congress: 'It applied to the executive authority of Pennsylvania for defense; but, under the ill-conceived constitution of the state at that time, the executive power was vested in a council, consisting of thirteen members, and they possessed or exhibited so little energy, and such apparent intimidation, that the congress indignantly removed to New Jersey, whose inhabitants welcomed it with promises of defending it. It remained for some time at Princeton without being again insulted, till, for the sake of greater convenience, it adjourned to Annapolis. The general dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the executive authority of Pennsylvania, and the degrading spectacle of a fugitive congress, suggested the remedial provisions now under consideration.' Rawle, 113. Of this proceeding Mr. Justice STORY remarks: 'If such a lesson could have been lost upon the people, it would have been as humiliating to their intelligence as it would have been offensive to their honor.' 2 Comm. Const. § 1219.

Upon the second part of the clause in question, giving power to 'exercise like authority,'-that is, of exclusive legislation 'over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings,'-the Federalist observes that the necessity of this authority is not less evident. 'The public money expended on such places,' it adds, 'and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular state. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the states concerned in every such establishment.' 'The power,' says Mr. Justice STORY, repeating the substance of Mr. Madison's language, 'is wholly unexceptionable, since it can only be exercised at the will of the state, and therefore it is placed beyond all reasonable scruple.' This power of exclusive legislation is to be exercised, as thus seen, over places purchased, by consent of the legislatures of the states in which they are situated, for the specific purposes enumerated. It would seem to have been the opinion of the framers of the constitution that, without the consent of the states, the new government would not be able to acquire lands within them; and therefore it was provided that when it might require such lands for the erection of forts and other buildings for the defense of the country, or the discharge of other duties devolving upon it, and the consent of the states in which they were situated was obtained for their acquisition, such consent should carry with it political dominion and legislative authority over them. Purchase with such consent was the only mode then thought of for the acquisition by the general government of title to lands in the states. Since the adoption of the constitution this view has not generally prevailed. Such consent has not always been obtained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase by the general government of lands within the states. If any doubt has ever existed as to its power thus to acquire lands within the states, it has not had sufficient strength to create any effective dissent from the general opinion. The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the states equally with the property of private individuals.

But not only by direct purchase have the United States been able to acquire lands they needed without the consent of the states, but it has been held that they possess the right of eminent domain within the states, using those terms, not as expressing the ultimate dominion, or title to property, but as indicating the right to take private property for public uses when needed to execute the powers conferred by the constitution; and that the general government is not dependent upon the caprice of individuals, or the will of state legislatures, in the acquisition of such lands as may be required for the full and effective exercise of its powers. This doctrine was authoritatively declared in Kohl v. U.S. 91 U.S. 367. All the judges of the court agreed in the possession by the general government of this right, although there was a difference of opinion whether provision for the exercise of the right had been made in that case. The court, after observing that lands in the states are needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and light-houses, for custom-houses and court-houses, and for other public uses, said: 'If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property holders to sell, or by the action of a state, prohibiting a sale to the federal government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a state, or even upon that of a private citizen.' The right to acquire property in this way, by condemnation, may be exerted either through tribunals expressly designated by congress, or by resort to tribunals of the state in which the property is situated, with her consent for that purpose. Such consent will always be presumed in the absence of express prohibition. U.S. v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519; S.C.. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 346; Matter of Petition of U.S. 96 N. Y. 227.

Besides these modes of acquisition, the United States possessed, on the adoption of the constitution, an immense domain lying north and west of the Ohio river, acquired as the result of the revolutionary war, from Great Britain, or by cessions from Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut; and, since the adoption of the constitution, they have, by cession from foreign countries, come into the ownership of a territory still larger, lying between the Mississippi river and the Pacific ocean, and out of these territories several states have been formed and admitted into the Union. The proprietorship of the United States in large tracts of land within these states has remained after their admission. There has been, therefore, no necessity for them to purchase or to condemn lands within those states, for forts, arsenals, and other public buildings, unless they had disposed of what they afterwards needed. Having the title, they have usually reserved certain portions of their lands from sale or other disposition, for the uses of the government.

This brief statement as to the different modes in which the United States have acquired title to lands upon which public buildings have been erected, will serve to explain the nature of their jurisdiction over such places, and the consistency with each other of decisions on the subject by federal and state tribunals, and of opinions of the attorneys general. When the title is acquired by purchase by consent of the legislatures of the states, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority. This follows from the declaration of the constitution that congress shall have 'like authority' over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power of 'exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that of congress; and that no other authority can be exercised over them has been the uniform opinion of federal and state tribunals, and of the attorneys general. The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the states that civil and criminal process of the state courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them, but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. And congress, by statute passed in 1795, declared that cessions from the states of the jurisdiction of places where light-houses, beacons, buoys, or public piers were or might be erected, with such reservations, should be deemed sufficient for the support and erection of such structures, and if no such reservation had been made, or in future cessions for those purposes should be omitted, civil and criminal process issued under the authority of the state or of the United States might be served and executed within them. 1 St. 426, c. 40.

Thus, in U.S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60, it was held by Mr. Justice STORY that the purchase of land by the U ited States for public purposes, within the limits of a state, did not of itself oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the stae over the lands purchased; but that the purchase must be by consent of the legislature of the state, and then the jurisdiction of the United States under the constitution became exclusive. In that case the defendant was indicted for murder committed in Fort Adams, in Newport harbor, Rhode Island. The place had been purchased by the United States with the consent of the state, to which was added the reservation mentioned, as to the service of civil and criminal process within it. The main questions presented for decision were, whether the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the place vested in the United States without a formal act of cession, and whether the reservation as to service of process made the jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state. The first question was answered, as above, that the purchase by consent gave the exclusive jurisdiction; and, as to the second question, the court said: 'In its terms, it certainly does not contain any reservation of concurrent jurisdiction or legislation. It provides only that civil and criminal process issued under the authority of the state, which must, of course, be for acts done within and cognizable by the state, may be executed within the ceded lands, notwithstanding the cession. Not a word is said from which we can infer that it was intended that the state should have a right to punish for acts done within the ceded lands. The whole apparent object is answered by considering the clause as meant to prevent these lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state. Now, there is nothing incompatible with the exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one state that it should permit another state in such cases to execute its process within its limits. And a cession of exclusive jurisdiction may well be made with a reservation of a right of this nature, which then operates only as a condition annexed to the cession, and as an agreement of the new sovereign to permit its free exercise, as quoad hoc his own process. This is the light in which clauses of this nature (which are very frequent in grants made by the states to the United States) have been received by this court on various occasions on which the subject has been heretofore brought before it for consideration, and it is the same light in which it has also been received by a very learned state court. In our judgment it comports entirely with the apparent intention of the parties, and gives effect to acts which might otherwise, perhaps, be construed entirely nugatory. For it may well be doubted whether congress is, by the terms of the constitution, at liberty to purchase lands for forts, dock-yards, etc., with the consent of the state legislature, where such consent is so qualified that it will not justify the exclusive legislation of congress there. It may well be doubted if such consent be not utterly void. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, we are bound to give the present act a different construction if it may reasonably be done; and we have not the least hesitation in declaring that the true interpretation of the present proviso leaves the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of Fort Adams in the United States.'

The case referred to in which the subject was considered by a learned state court is that of Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72. There the supreme court of Massachusetts held that the courts of the commonwealth could not take cognizance of offenses committed upon lands in the town of Springfield, purchased with the consent of the commonwealth by the United States, for the purpose of erecting arsenals upon them. That was the case of a prosecution against the defendant for selling spirituous liquors on the land without a license, contrary to a statute of the state. But the But the court held that the law had no operation within the lands mentioned. 'The territory,' it said, 'on which the offense charged is agreed to have been committed, is the territory of the United States, over which the congress have exclusive power of legislation.' It added, that 'the assent of the commonwealth to the purchase of this territory by the United States had this condition annexed to it: that civil and criminal process might be served therein by the officers of the commonwealth. This condition was made with a view to prevent the territory from becoming a sanctuary for debtors and criminals; and from the subsequent assent of the United States to the said condition, evidenced by their making the purchase, it results that the officers of the commonwealth, in executing such process, act under the authority of the United States. No offenses committed within that territory are committed against the laws of this commonwealth, nor can such offenses by punishable by the courts of the commonwealth, unless the congress of the United States should give to the said courts jurisdiction thereof.' In Mitchell v. Tibbits, before the same court, years afterwards, (17 Pick. 298,) it was held that a vessel employed in transporting stone from Maine to the navy-yard in Charlestown, Massachusetts, a place purchased by the United States, with the consent of the state, was not employed in transporting stone within the common wealth, and therefore committed no offense in disregarding a statute making certain requirements of vessels thus employed. The court said that to bring a vessel within the description of the statute, she must be employed in landing stone at, or taking stone from, some place in the commonwealth, and that the law of Massachusetts did not extend to and operate within the territory ceded; adopting the principle of its previous decision in 8 Mass. In March, 1841, the house of representatives of Massachusetts requested of the justices of the supreme judicial court of that state their opinion whether persons residing on lands in that state purchased by or ceded to the United States for navy-yards, arsenals, dock-yards, forts, light-houses, hospitals, and armories, were entitled to the benefits of the state common schools for their children in the towns where such lands were located; and the justices replied that, 'where the general consent of the commonwealth is given to the purchase of territory by the United States for forts and dock-yards, and where there is no other condition or reservation in the act granting such consent, but that of a concurrent jurisdiction of the state for the service of civil process and criminal process against persons charged with crimes committed out of such territory, the government of the United States has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over such territory for all purposes of legislation and jurisprudence with the single exception expressed; and consequently that no persons are amenable to the laws of the commonwealth for crimes and offenses committed within said territory; and that persons residing within the same do not acquire the civil and political privileges, nor do they become subject to the civil duties and obligations, of inhabitants of the towns within which such territory is situated.' And accordingly they were of opinion that persons residing on such lands were not entitled to the benefits of the common schools for their children in the towns in which such lands were situated. 1 Metc. 580.

In Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, the question came before the supreme court of Ohio as to the effect of a proviso in the act of that state, ceding to the United States its jurisdiction over lands within her limits for the purposes of a national asylum for disabled volunteer soldiers, which was that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent the officers, employes, and inmates of the asylum, who were qualified voters of the state, from exercising the right of suffrage at all township, county, and state elections in the township in which the national asylum should be located. nd it was held that, upon the purchase of the territory by the United States, with the consent of the legislature of the state, the general government became invested with exclusive jurisdiction over it and its appurtenances in all cases whatsoever; and that the inmates of such asylum resident within the territory, being within such exclusive jurisdiction, were not residents of the state so as to entitle them to vote, within the meaning of the constitution, which conferred the elective franchise upon its residents alone.

To the same effect have been the opinions of the attorney general, when called for by the head of one of the departments. Thus, in the case of Armory at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, the question arose whether officers of the army, or other persons, residing in the limits of the armory, the lands composing which had been purchased by consent of the state, were liable to taxation by her. The consent had been accompanied by a cession of jurisdiction, with a declaration that the state retained concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over the place, so far as it could consistently with the acts giving consent to the purchase and ceding jurisdiction; and that its courts, magistrates, and officers might take such cognizance, execute such processes, and discharge such other legal functions within it as might not be incompatible with the true intent and meaning of those acts. The question having been submitted to the attorney general, he replied that the sole object and effect of the reservation was to prevent the place from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice, for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state, and that in all other respects the exterritoriality of the armory at Harper's Ferry was complete, in so far as regards the state; that the persons in the employment of the United States, actually residing in the limits of the armory, did not possess the civil and political rights of citizens of the state, nor were they subject to the tax and other obligations of such citizens. 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 577. See, also, the case of The New York Post-office Site, 10 Op. Attys. Gen. 35. These authorities are sufficient to support the proposition, which follows naturally from the language of the constitution, that no other legislative power than that of congress can be exercised over lands, within a state, purchased by the United States, with her consent, for one of the purposes designated; and that such consent, under the constitution, operates to exclude all other legislative authority.

But with reference to lands owned by the United States, acquired by purchase without the consent of the state, or by cessions from other governments, the case is different. STORY, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, says: 'If there has been no cession by the state of the place, although it has been constantly occupied and used under purchase, or otherwise, by the United States for a fort or arsenal, or other constitutional purpose, the state jurisdiction still remains complete and perfect;' and in support of this statement he refers to People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225. In that case the land on which Fort Niagara was erected, in New York, never having been ceded by the state to the United States, it was adjudged that the courts of the state had jurisdiction of crimes or offenses against the laws of the state committed within the fort or its precincts, although it had been garrisoned by the troops of the United States, and held by them since its surrender by Great Britain, pursuant to the treaties of 1793 and 1794. In deciding the case the court said that the possession of the post by the United States must be considered as a possession for the state, not in derogation of her rights, observing that it regarded it as a fundamental principle that the rights of sovereignty were not to be taken away by implication. 'If the United States,' the court added, 'had the right of exclusive legislation over the fortress of Niagara, they would have also exclusive jurisdiction; but we are of opinion that the right of exclusive legislation within the territorial limits of any state, can be acquired by the United States only in the mode pointed out in the constitution,-by purchase, by consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings. The essence of that provision is that the state shall freely cede the particular place to the United States for one of the specific and enumerated objects. This jurisdiction cannot be acquired tortiously or by disseizin of the state; much less can it be acquired by mere occupancy, with the implied or tacit consent of the state, when such occupancy is for the purpose of protection.'

Where, therefore, lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a state than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the land subject to this qualification: that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected for the uses of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the general government. Their exemption from state control is essential to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated powers. But, when not used as such instrumentalities, the legislative power of the state over the places acquired will be as full and complete as over any other places within her limits.

As already stated, the land constituting the Fort Leavenworth military reservation was not purchased, but was owned by the United States by cession from France many years before Kansas became a state; and whatever political sovereignty and dominion the United States had over the place comes from the cession of the state since her admission into the Union. It not being a case where exclusive legislative authority is vested by the constitution of the United States, that cession could be accompanied with such conditions as the state might see fit to annex, not inconsistent with the free and effective use of the fort as a military post.

In the recent case of The Fort Porter Military Reservation, the opinion of the attorney general was in conformity with this view of the law. On the twenty-eighth of February, 1842, the legislature of New York authorized the commissioners of its land-office to cede to the United States the title to certain land belonging to the state within her limits, 'for military purposes, reserving a free and uninterrupted use and control in the canal commissioners of all that may be necessary for canal and harbor purposes.' Under this act the title was conveyed to the United States. The act also ceded to them jurisdiction over the land. In 1880 the superintendent of public works of New York, upon whom the duties of canal commissioner were devolved, informed the secretary of war that the interests of the state required that the land, or a portion of it, should be occupied by her for canal purposes, claiming the right to thus occupy it under the reservation in the act of cession. The opinion of the attorney general was, therefore, requested as to the authority of the secretary of war to permit the state, under these considerations, to use so much of the land as would not interfere with its use for military purposes. The attorney general replied that the United States, under the grant, held the land for military purposes, and that the reservation in favor of the state could be deemed valid only so far as it was not repugnant to the grant; that, hence, the right of the state to occupy and use the premises for canal or harbor purposes must be regarded as limited or restricted by the purposes of the grant; that, when such use and occupation would defeat or interfere with those purposes, the right of the state did not exist; but, when they would not interfere with those purposes, the state was entitled to use so much of the land as might be necessary for her canal and harbor purposes. 16 Op. Attys. Gen. 592.

We are here met with the objection that the legislature of a state has no power to cede away her jurisdiction and legislative power over any portion of her territory, except as such cession follows under the constitution from her consent to a purchase by the United States for some one of the purposes mentioned. If this were so it would not aid the railroad company; the jurisdiction of the state would then remain as it previously existed. But, aside from this consideration, it is undoubtedly true that the state, whether represented by her legislature, or through a convention specially called for that purpose, is incompetent to cede her political jurisdiction and legislative authority over any part of her territory to a foreign country, without the concurrence of the general government. The jurisdiction of the United States extends over all the territory within the states, and therefore their authority must be obtained, as well as that of the state within which the territory is situated, before any cession of sovereignty or political jurisdiction can be made to a foreign country. And so when questions arose as to the north-eastern boundary, in Maine, between Great Britain and the United States, and negotiations were in progress for a treaty to settle the boundary, it was deemed necessary on the part of our government to secure the co-operation and concurrence of Maine, so far as such settlement might involve a cession of her sovereignty and jurisdiction as well as title to territory claimed by her, and of Massachusetts, so far as it might involve a cession of title to lands held by her. Both Maine and Massachusetts appointed commissioners to act with the secretary of state, and after much negotiation the claims of the two states were adjusted, and the disputed questions of boundary settled. The commissioners on Maine were appointed by her legislature; and those of Massachusetts by her governer, under authority of an act of the her legislature. It was not deemed necessary to call a convention of the people in either of them to give to the commissioners the requsite authority to act effectively for their respective states. 5 Webst. Works, 99; 6 Webst. 273.

In their relation to the general government, the states of the Union stand in a very different position from that which they hold to foreign governments. Though the jurisdiction and authority of the general government are essentially different from those of the state, they are not those of a different country; and the two, the state and general government, may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to carry out the purposes of the constitution. It is for the protection and interests of the states, their people and property, as well as for the protection and interests of the people generally of the United States, that forts, arsenals, and other buildings for public uses are constructed within the states. As instrumentalities for the execution of the powers of the general government, they are, as already said, exempt from such control of the states as would defeat or impair their use for those purposes; and if, to their more effective use, a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction by the state would be desirable, we do not perceive any objection to its * grant by the legislature of the state. Such cession is really as much for the benefit of the state as it is for the benefit of the United States. It is necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as the places continue to be used for the public purposes for which the property was acquired or reserved from sale. When they cease to be thus used, the jurisdiction reverts to the state

The military reservation of Fort Leaven worth was not, as already said, acquired by purchase with the consent of Kansas. And her cession of jurisdiction is not of exclusive legislative authority over the land, except so far as that may be necessary for its use as a military post; and it is not contended that the saving clause in the act of cession interferes with such use. There is, therefore, no constitutional prohibition against the enforcement of that clause. The right of the state to subject the railroad property to taxation exists as before the cession. The invalidity of the tax levied not being asserted on any other ground than the supposed exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the reservation, notwithstanding the saving clause, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

Ordered accordingly.


text: Talk:Fort Leavenworth Company v. Lowe/Opinion of the Court

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text:
Chicago Railway Company v. McGlinn

''Thos. F. Withrow, M. A Low, and E. E. Cook'', for plaintiff in error.

W. Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error.

FIELD, J.

title: Chicago Railway Company v. McGlinn


text: Talk:Chicago Railway Company v. McGlinn

title: Talk:Chicago Railway Company v. McGlinn


text:
Chicago Railway Company v. McGlinn/Opinion of the Court

This case comes here from the supreme court of the state of Kansas. It is an action for the value of a cow, alleged to have been killed by the engine and cars of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation doing business in the county of Leavenworth, in that state. It was brought in a state district court, and submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, in substance as follows: That on the tenth of February, 1881, a cow, the property of the plaintiff, of the value of $25, strayed upon the railroad of the defendant, at a point within the limits of the Fort Leavenworth military reservation, in that county and state, where the road was not inclosed with a fence, and was there struck and killed by a train passing along the road; that the reservation is the one referred to in the act of the legislature of the state of February 22, 1875; that a demand upon the defendant for the $25 was made by the plaintiff more than 30 days before the action was brought; and that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's fees, $20 would be a reasonable fee.

The action was founded upon a statute of Kansas of March 9, 1874, entitled 'An act relating to killing or wounding stock by railroads,' which makes every railway company in the state liable to the owner for the full value of cattle killed, and in damages for cattle wounded, by its engine or cars, or in any other manner in operating its railway. It provides that, in case the railway company fails for 30 days after demand by the owner to pay to him the full value of the animal killed, or damages for the animal wounded, he may sue and recover the same, together with a reasonable attorney's fee for the prosecution of the action. It further provides that it shall not apply to any railway company, the road of which is inclosed with a good and lawful fence to prevent the animal from being on the road. Laws Kan. 1874, c. 94.

On the twenty-second of February, 1875, the legislature of Kansas passed an act ceding to the United States jurisdiction over the reservation, the first section of which is as follows: 'That exclusive jurisdiction be, and the same is hereby, ceded to the United States over and within all the territory owned by the United States, and included within the limits of the United States military reservation, known as the 'Fort Leavenworth Reservation,' in said state, as declared from time to time by the president of the United States; saving, however, to the said state the right to serve civil or criminal process within said reservation, in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said state, but outside of such cession and reservation; and saving further to said state the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises and property, on said reservation.' Laws Kan. 1875, c. 66.

The district co rt gave judgment for the plaintiff, assessing his damages at $45, an amount which was made by estimating the value of the cow killed at $25, and the attorney's fee at $20, these sums having been agreed upon by the parties. The case was carried to the supreme court of the state, where the judgment was affirmed, that court holding that the act of Kansas, relating to the killing or wounding of stock by railroads, continued to be operative within the limits of the reservation, as it had not been abrogated by congress, and was not inconsistent with existing laws of the United States. In so holding the court assumed, for the purposes of the case, without, however, admitting the fact, that the act ceding jurisdiction to the United States over the reservation was valid, and that the United States had legally accepted the cession. To review this judgment the case is brought here.

Two questions are presented for our determination: one, whether the act of Kansas purporting to cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation is a valid cession within the requirements of the constitution; the other, if such cession of jurisdiction is valid, did the act of Kansas relating to the killing or wounding of stock by railroads continue in force afterwards within the limits of the reservation? It can hardly be the design of counsel for the railroad company to contend that the act of cession to the United States is wholly invalid, for, in that event, the jurisdiction of the state would remain unimpaired, and her statute would be enforceable within the limits of the reservation equally as in any other part of the state. What we suppose counsel desires to maintain is that the act of cession confers exclusive jurisdiction over the territory, and that any limitations upon it in the act must therefore be rejected as repugnant to the grant. This point was involved in the case of Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, ante, 995. We there held that a building on a tract of land owned by the United States, used as a fort, or for other public purposes of the federal government, is exempted, as an instrumentality of the government, from any such control or interference by the state as will defeat or embarrass its effective use for those purposes. But, in order that the United States may possess exclusive legislative power over the tract, except as may be necessary to the use of the building thereon as such instrumentality, they must have acquired the tract by purchase, with the consent of the state. This is the only mode prescribed by the federal constitution for their acquisition of exclusive legislative power over it. When such legislative power is acquired in any other way, as by an express act ceding it, its cession may be accompanied with any conditions not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the public purposes intended. We also held that it is competent for the legislature of a state to cede exclusive jurisdiction over places needed by the general government in the execution of its powers, the use of the places being, in fact, as much for the people of the state as for the people of the United States generally, and such jurisdiction necessarily ending when the places cease to be used for those purposes.

Upon the second question the contention of the railroad company is that the act of Kansas became inoperative within the reservation upon the cession to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over it. We are clear that this contention cannot be maintained. It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country-that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights-continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. ''American Ins. Co. v. Canter'', 1 Pet. 542; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 34, § 14.

The counsel for the railroad company does not controvert this general rule in cases of cession of political jurisdiction by one nation to another, but contends that it has no application to a mere cession of jurisdiction over a small piece of territory having no organized government or municipality within its limits; and argues upon the assumption that there was no organized government within the limits of Fort Leaven worth. In this assumption he is mistaken. The government of the state of Kansas extended over the reservation, and its legislation was operative therein, except so far as the use of the land as an instrumentality of the general government may have excepted it from such legislation. In other respects, the law of the state prevailed. There was a railroad running through it when the state ceded jurisdiction to the United States. The law of the state, making the railroad liable for killing or wounding cattle by its cars and engines where it had no fence to keep such cattle off the road, was as necessary to the safety of cattle after the cession as before, and was no more abrogated by the mere fact of cession than regulations as to the crossing of highways by the railroad cars, and the ringing of bells as a warning to others of their approach.

It is true there is a wide difference between a cession of political jurisdiction from one nation to another, and a cession to the United States by a state of legislative power over a particular tract, for a special purpose of the general government, but the principle which controls as to laws in existence at the time is the same in both. The liability of the railroad company for the killing of the cow did not depend upon the place where the animal was killed, but upon the neglect of the company to inclose the road with a fence, which would have prevented the cow from straying upon it. The law of Kansas on the subject, in our opinion, remained in force after the cession, it being in no respect inconsistent with any law of the United States, and never having been changed or abrogated. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.


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 Rh and told their mother all that had happened, and his sisters loved him, and they lived very happily together ever afterwards, and do so still if they are not dead.

THE GIRL AND THE FISH.

was once a girl who used to go to the river to fetch water, but when she went she was never in a hurry to come back, but stayed so long, that they made up their minds to watch her. So one day they followed her to the river, and found when she got there she said something (the reciter forgets the words), and a fish came up and talked to her; and she did not like to leave it, for it was her sweetheart. So they went next day to the river to see if the fish would come up, for they remembered what the girl said, and used the same words. Then up came the fish immediately, and they caught it, and took it home, and cooked it for dinner,—and a part they set by, and gave it to the girl when she came in. Whilst she was eating, a voice said, "Do you know what you are eating? I am he you have so often talked with. If you look in the pig's tub you will see my heart." Then the voice told her to take the heart, and wrap it up in a handkerchief, and carry it to the river. When she got to the river she would see three stones in the water; she was to stand on the middle stone and dip the handkerchief three times into the water. All this she did, and then she sank suddenly, and was carried down to a beautiful place, where she found her lover changed from a fish into his proper form, and there she lived happily with him for ever. And this is the reason why there are mermaids in the water.


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 use of his pupils. On 11 June 1734 he preached what his brother Charles calls ‘his Jacobite sermon,’ before the university, having taken the precaution to submit it to the vice-chancellor for approval before preaching.

Between August 1730 and July 1734 he corresponded as ‘Cyrus’ with ‘Aspasia,’ i.e. Mary Pendarves (formerly Granville, and better known as Mary Delany [q. v.]); she was a friend of his ‘Varanese.’ The correspondence shows warmth of interest on both sides (, i. 75). In November 1734 his father was anxious to see him appointed as his successor at Epworth. His brother Samuel, who had himself declined the post, wrote strongly, almost angrily, to urge compliance upon John. But Wesley was moved neither by his father's entreaty nor by his brother's arguments. He thought there was more good to be done at Oxford, and that he could do it. The correspondence extended to February 1734–5 (, Original Letters, 1791, pp. 17–50). Yet it appears from a letter of 15 April (when his father was dying) that he had then applied for the succession to Epworth; Edmund Gibson [q. v.], bishop of London, was ‘the obstacle’ to his promotion (, i. 102). Ten days later he attended his father's deathbed. What altered his view of the Oxford situation is not known; but his judgment as to the right field for his powers must have undergone a revolution, since by 18 Sept. he was ready to undertake the Georgia mission, promoted by John Burton [q. v.], one of the Georgia trustees, most of whom, however, were dissenters. Wesley, with his brother Charles, was on a visit to James Hutton (1715–1795) [q. v.] at Westminster, when he met Burton, who introduced him to James Edward Oglethorpe [q. v.] His first extemporary sermon was preached at this time in Allhallows, Lombard Street, on the failure of John Heylyn [q. v.]

The Wesleys, with Ingham and Charles Delamotte (1714–1790), son of a Middlesex magistrate (he went as John Wesley's famulus), embarked for Georgia in the Simmonds at Gravesend on 14 Oct. 1735, though the vessel did not actually begin her voyage from Cowes till 10 Dec. On board were twenty-six German Moravians, with David Nitschmann (1696–1772), their new-made (13 March 1734–5) bishop. Wesley at once (17 Oct.) began to learn German (he was already master of French, ‘the poorest, meanest language in Europe;’ he learned Spanish in 1737 to converse with Jews in Georgia). Savannah was reached on 6 Feb. 1735–6. Next day Oglethorpe introduced Wesley to August Gottlieb Spangenberg (1704–1792), afterwards (1744) Moravian bishop, whose interrogations gave Wesley a new view of the importance of evangelical doctrine. For a month he lodged with Spangenberg and his friends. The ordination of Anton Seiffart as Moravian bishop for Georgia, on 28 Feb., greatly impressed him by its ‘simplicity, as well as solemnity.’ His first letter to Zinzendorf was on 15 March 1736–7.

Wesley's Georgia mission lasted less than two years, the latter part broken by squabbles. Savannah was his headquarters, but after his brother's departure he spent much time at Frederica and other places. The whole of Georgia he considered his parish; he was accused of calling himself (10 Aug. 1737) ‘ordinary of Savannah’ (, i. 157). Ingham left for England on 26 Feb. 1736–7, with the object of bringing over further help, without which there was no prospect of evangelising the Indians. On this side the aims of the mission were not fulfilled, though Wesley made some attempt in this direction; in other respects it was unsuccessful in detail. Wesley's preaching was regarded as too personal, and his pastoral visitation as censorious. His punctilious insistence on points of primitive usage (e.g. immersion of infants at baptism and use of the mixed chalice), his taking the ‘morning service’ at five, and ‘the communion office (with the sermon) at eleven,’ his introduction of unauthorised hymns, his strictness in the matter of communicants, excluding dissenters as unbaptised, his holding a private religious ‘society,’ provoked the retort ‘We are protestants’ (Journal, 22 June 1736). With Oglethorpe himself Wesley had no quarrel, and it must be admitted that, as a whole, Wesley's Georgia mission, brief and troubled as it was, impressed men's minds with a new sense of the reality of religion. His first hymn-book was published at Charlestown in 1737.

On his arrival in Georgia Wesley had made the acquaintance (12 March 1735–6) of Sophia Christiana Hopkey, an intelligent girl, niece of the wife of Thomas Causton, chief magistrate of Savannah. Wesley taught her French; she dressed in white to please him, and tended him through a feverish attack. Delamotte asked if he meant to marry her. It is certain that he had proposed to her (, i. 149), and offered to alter his ‘way of life’ to gain her acceptance, which she apparently withheld. Wesley, acting in the spirit of a Moravian, referred the case to Nitschmann, and agreed, ‘after some hesitation,’ to abide by the deci-


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 438 THE LION, THE GOAT, AND THE BABOON.

had a Goat for his wife. One day Goat went out to market, and while she was gone, Lion went out in the wood, where he met with Baboon, who made friends with Lion, for fear he would eat him, and asked him to go home with him; but the Lion thought it would be a good chance, so he asked the Baboon to go home with him and see his little ones. When they got home, the Baboon said to the Lion,

"Why, you have got plenty of little goats here."

The Lion said, "Yes, they are my children."

So the Baboon said, "If they are, they are little goats, and they are very good meat."

So the Lion said, "Don't make a noise; their mother will come presently, and we will see."

So these little goats took no notice, but went out to meet their mother, and told her what had passed.

Their mother said to them, "Go back, take no notice, and I shall come home presently, and shall do for him."

So she went and bought some molasses, and took it home with her. The Lion said, "Are you come; what news?"

"Oh!" she said, "good news, taste here." He tasted, and said, "It's very good, it's honey."

And she said, "It's baboon's blood, they have been killing one to-day, the blood is running in the street, and every one is carrying it away."

The Lion said, "Hush, there's one in the house, and we shall have him."

At this the Baboon rushed off, and when they looked for him, he was gone, and never came near them again, which saved the little goats' lives.


text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Chapter 1


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 442 saw the girl, and then sent a band of soldiers to fetch her home, and took her for his bride.

A year after she had a baby. Soldiers were set to keep guard at the gate, and the room was full of nurses; but in the middle of the night the old woman came in a whirlwind and put them all to sleep. She stole the child, and on going away gave the mother a slap on the mouth, which made her dumb.

Next morning there was a great stir, and they said the mother had eaten the child. There was a trial, but the mother was let off that time.

Next year she had another baby, and the same thing happened again. The old woman came in the middle of the night in a whirlwind, and put them all to sleep. She stole the child, and struck the mother on the mouth, which made it bleed.

In the morning there was a stir; and the servant maid, who was jealous, said the mother had eaten the child. All believed it, as her mouth was covered with blood; and, besides, what would be expected of a girl brought out of the wood? So she was tried again, and condemned to be hanged.

Invitations were sent out to all the grand folk to come and see her hanged; so many fine carriages came driving up. At last, just before the time, there came a very grand carriage, all of gold, which glistened in the sun. In it were the old woman and two children, dressed in fine clothes, with the king's star on them. When the queen saw this grand carriage she got her speech and sung,

"Do spare me till I see that grand carriage."

The old woman came into the courtyard, and asked the people if they saw any likeness to any one in the children. They said, "they were like the prince," and asked her how she came by them, and told her she had stolen them. She said she had not stolen them; she had taken them, for they were her own; the prince had taken away her daughter without her leave, and so she had taken his children; but she was willing to give them back, if they would allow that she was right.


text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Preface

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Rh have already pointed this out (in Chapter VIII.), I will here only remind the reader of their self-sacrificing love of their neighbour and their mutual helpfulness, to which, indeed, we find no parallel in European society. These virtues, however, are not unfrequently to be found among primitive peoples, and are probably in the main due to the simpler structure of society. A more developed and consequently more complicated social order leads to the decline of many of the natural virtues of humanity.

But the Eskimo's love of his neighbour goes the length of restraining him from slandering him, and even from any sort of evil-speaking, especially in the case of a neighbour in the literal sense of the word. Scandal and malice are inconsistent with his peaceable and kindly disposition. As before remarked, the women do not seem to be quite so exemplary in this respect; but we know that such weaknesses are commonly attributed to the softer sex all the world over.

Reverence for the aged is not a prominent feature of the Eskimo character. They are honoured, indeed, so long as they are able to work, and if they have in their younger days been good hunters, and have sons, they may retain great influence and be regarded as the head of the household. A woman who has able-bodied sons may also be treated with reverence, Rh

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text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Chapter 3


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 Rh ANANZI AND BABOON.

and Baboon were disputing one day which was fattest. Ananzi said he was sure he was fat, but Baboon declared he was fatter. Then Ananzi proposed that they should prove it; so they made a fire, and agreed that they should hang up before it, and see which would drop most fat.

Then Baboon hung up Ananzi first, but no fat dropped.

Then Ananzi hung up Baboon, and very soon the fat began to drop, which smelt so good that Ananzi cut a slice out of Baboon, and said,

"Oh! brother Baboon, you're fat for true."

But Baboon didn't speak.

So Ananzi said, "Well, speak or not speak, I'll eat you every bit to-day," which he really did. But when he had eaten up all Baboon, the bits joined themselves together in his stomach, and began to pull him about so much that he had no rest, and was obliged to go to a doctor.

The doctor told him not to eat anything for some days, then he was to get a ripe banana, and hold it to his mouth; when the Baboon, who would be hungry, smelt the banana, he would be sure to run up to eat it, and so he would run out of his mouth.

So Ananzi starved himself, and got the banana, and did as the doctor told him; but when he put the banana to his mouth, he was so hungry he couldn't help eating it. So he didn't get rid of the Baboon, which went on pulling him about till he was obliged to go back to the doctor, who told him he would soon cure him; and he took the banana, and held it to Ananzi's mouth, and very soon the Baboon jumped up to catch it, and ran out of his mouth; and Ananzi was very glad to get rid of him. And Baboons to this very day like bananas.


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178 even should she attain a great age. A widow especially has often great power, governing the house as long as she lives, and having the upper hand of her daughters-in-law. But, as a rule, when people grow so old that they cannot take care of themselves, they are apt to be treated with scant consideration, especially women. Sometimes the younger generation will even go the length of making fun of them, and to this the poor old people submit with great patience, regarding it simply as the way of the world.

That the reader may form some conception of a primitive Eskimo's habits of thought on moral questions, I quote the following letter from a converted Greenlander to Paul Egede. I reproduce it here, because it in many respects bears out the views above expressed, and Egede's book 'Accounts of Greenland,' in which this translation is printed (pp. 230-236) is now not easily obtainable. The writer was a heathen who had been baptised by Paul Egede's father, Hans Egede. The letter, which was of course written in Eskimo, gives evidence not only of a peculiar moral point of view, but also of a keen understanding, and of feelings which, as Paul Egede says, one would scarcely expect 'in so stupid a

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 440 THE MAN AND THE DOUKANA TREE.

was once a man and his wife, who were very poor, and they had a great many children. The man was very lazy, and would do nothing to help his family. The poor mother did all he could. In the wood close by grew a Doukana Tree, which was full of fruit. Every day the man went and ate some of the fruit, but never took any home, so he ate and he ate, until there were only two Doukanas left on the Tree. One he ate, and left the other. Next day, when he went for that one, he was obliged to climb up the tree to reach it; but when he got up, the Doukana fell down; when he got down the Doukana jumped up; and so it went on until he was quite tired.

Then he asked all the animals that passed by to help him, but they all made some excuse. They all had something to do. The horse had his work to do, or he would have no grass to eat. The donkey brayed. Last came a dog, and the man begged him hard to help him; so the dog said he would. Then the man climbed up the tree, and the Doukana jumped to the ground again, when the dog picked it up and ran off with it. The man was very vexed, and ran after the dog, but it ran all the faster, so that the man could not overtake him. The dog, seeing the man after him, ran to the sea-shore, and scratching a hole in the ground, buried himself all but his nose, which he left sticking out.

Soon after the man came up, and seeing the nose, cried out that he had "never seen ground have nose;" and catching hold of it he tugged till he pulled out the dog, when he squeezed him with all his might to make him give up the Doukana. And that's why dogs are so small in their bodies to this very day.


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 Rh NANCY FAIRY.

was once an old woman called "Nancy Fairy." She was a witch, and used to steal all the little babies as soon as they were born, and eat them. One day she stole a little baby, who was so beautiful that she had not the heart to eat her; but she took her home and brought her up. She called her "daughter," named her "Nancy Fairy," after herself, and the girl called the old woman "Granny."

So the girl grew up, and the more she grew the more beautiful she got.

The old woman never let her daughter know of her doings; but one day when she had brought a baby home, and had locked herself in a room, her daughter peeped through a chink to see what she was about, and the old woman saw her shadow, and thought her daughter had seen what she was doing, and the daughter thought her granny had seen her, and was very much afraid.

So the old woman asked her, "Nancy Fairy, did you see what I was doing?"

"No, Granny."

She asked the girl several times, "Nancy Fairy, did you see what I was doing?" and the girl always said, "No, Granny."

So the old woman took her up to a hut in a wood, and left her there as a punishment; and she took her food every day.

One day it happened that the king's servant, going that way, saw the beautiful girl come out of the hut. Next day he went again and saw the same beautiful girl again. So he went home and told the prince that he could show him in the wood a girl more beautiful than he had ever seen. The prince went and


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Rh people as we have hitherto taken them to be.' It is, as will be seen, an answer to an epistle of Egede's, and runs as follows: —

Amiable Pauia!

You know how precious and agreeable your letter is to me; but how appalled I was when I read of the destruction of such multitudes of people in the great earthquake, inconceivable to us, which you say devoured in one moment more people than there are in all our country. I cannot tell you how this moved me, or how frightened we were, so that many fled from the place where they lived to another, which was quite as unsafe, though it was on a rock; for we see even here that rocks have been split open from the top to the very depths, though when it happened none of us know. Granite rocks, such as our land consists of, and sand-hills like your land, are equally easy for God to overthrow, in whose power the whole world stands, and we poor little animals are easily buried in the ruins. You give me to understand that with you there have been neither snow nor great cold this winter, and conclude that it must have been all the severer with us; but we, too, have had an unusually mild winter. I hear that your learned men are of opinion that this mild weather has been caused by the warm vapours emanating from the earth at the time of the earthquake, which have warmed the air and melted the snow-material. But if I had not heard that this was the opinion of the learned, I should have thought that the warmth of the earth would avail little to heat the height and breadth of the air—as little as a man's breath avails to warm a large house in which he simply breathes for a moment Rh

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text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Chapter 4


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text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Chapter 5


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180 and then goes out again. The south winds, which are always warm, and have blown all the year through with us, are the cause of the moderate cold we have had; but why the south wind blew I cannot tell, nor the learned either, perhaps. Were these wretched people killed by the heat, or did the earth swallow them up, or were they shaken to death? Skipper B. thought that their own houses must have fallen upon them and killed them. Your people do not seem to care very much about it; for they are not only cheerful and merry, but they relate that the two nations who come here whale-fishing, not your countrymen, but of the same faith as you, are fighting with and shooting each other both by land and sea, hunting each other as we hunt seals and reindeer, and stealing and taking away ships and goods from each other, from people they have never seen or known, simply because their lord and master will have it so. When I asked the skipper, through an interpreter, what could be the cause of such inhumanity, he answered that it was all about a piece of land right opposite ours, so far away that it could only be reached after three months' sailing. Then I thought that there must be great scarcity of land where these people dwell; but he said no, that it was only because of the great lords' greediness for more riches and more people to rule over. I was so astounded by this greediness, and so terrified lest it should fall upon us too, that I was almost out of my mind; but I presently took heart again, you will scarcely guess why. I thought of our snow-clad country and its poor inhabitants, and said to myself: 'Thank God! we are poor and possess nothing which these greedy Kablunaks [so they call all foreigners] can desire.

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text: First Footsteps in East Africa/Chapter 6


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text: Sophocles, the Seven Plays in English verse