text:
Mining Company v. Boggs/Opinion of the Court

No question is raised by the pleadings, of which this court has jurisdiction upon writs of error to the Supreme Court of California, unless by the allegation of prior possession of this land for the purpose of taking out the minerals. But this allegation does not set up any authority exercised under the United States in taking such possession, nor any treaty or statute of the United States, in virtue of which it was taken. Nor does it anywhere appear from the record that the decision of the State court was against the validity of any such authority, treaty, or statute. The case brought before us is, therefore, wanting in the requirement made essential to our jurisdiction by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.

If we were at liberty to look into the opinion of the court for the purpose of ascertaining what questions were made on the argument, and decided by the court, we should find that, upon a liberal construction of the stipulations of counsel, the defendants were allowed to insist that they were warranted in their possession of the lands, for the purpose of extracting the minerals, by a license inferred from the general policy of the State or of the United States, in relation to mines of gold and silver and the lands containing them.

We doubt whether such a claim, even if made in the pleadings, would be such an allegation as would give jurisdiction to this court.

However that may be, there was no decision of the court against the validity of such a license. The decision was, that no such license existed; and this was a finding by the court of a question of fact upon the submission of the whole case by the parties, rather than a judgment upon a question of law.

It is the same case, in principle, as would be made by an allegation in defence to an action of ejectment, of a patent from the United States with an averment of its loss or destruction, and a finding by the jury that no such patent existed, and a consequent judgment for the defendant. Such a judgment would deny, not the validity, but the existence of the patent. And this court would have no jurisdiction to review it.

DISMISSED.


text: Talk:Mining Company v. Boggs/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
The Granite State

THE steamer Granite State, plying between Hartford and New York, arrived before daybreak of a December morning in the Hudson, with passengers and freight, and was in the act of entering her dock between the city piers Nos. 24 and 25. Across the end of Pier No. 23 lay an old and pretty rotten barge,-the Ranger. The barge's pier extended many feet further out in the river than the piers in the immediate vicinity above and below. The barge had no masts, and her hull lay below the top of the pier; that is to say, the pier was higher than the vessel, as she lay in front of it. She was well secured in her place, but had on board no watch or light; the laws of the port of New York, as was proved, not making it obligatory on vessels of this sort moored at wharves to have either, though vessels at the wharves not unfrequently had them both. The barge had been taking in loading from the dock; but the night coming on before she was fully laden, she lay where she was to complete her cargo in the morning. Her deck was covered with some old and dirty linen of a yellowish hue, and not unlike the color of the wharf at which she lay. By the rules of the port she had a right to be where she was. The morning was dark and rainy, and a pretty strong wind from the southeast; the tide the last of the ebb. The steamer came down on the Brooklyn side, and at about the usual point swung round towards the New York shore, and straightened up with a view to work into her berth. As she was approaching it, a Williamsburg ferry-boat came out of her slip, which was between Piers Nos. 25 and 26, the next above the berth of the steamer. The Granite State stopped and backed obliquely into the stream. At this moment, out shot from her slip, between Piers Nos. 21 and 22-below where the barge lay-a third steamer, a Fulton ferry-boat. To avoid her, the Granite State, being now clear of the other ferry-boat, went 'strong ahead,' so as to get into her slip as fast as possible. Suddenly she discovered the barge, but not until she was within sixty feet of it; too late to arrest her headway, under more or less force of which, notwithstanding an abundant use of her 'gingle-bell,' 'gong,' &c., she came upon the barge, cutting her down with every paddle, so that the old hull drifted out and sank. The steamer had a bright light upon her, and her officers and hands were on deck, attending, apparently, by their presence at least and general observation, to their duty.

The owners of the barge now libelled the Granite State in the District Court for New York. The usual conflict existed among the witnesses of the two boats; some swearing that the steamer's own light would have revealed the barge, if good observation had been kept; some that the steamer should have reversed her engine instead of pushing 'strong forward' as she did; some that she should have ported, and others that she should have starboarded her helm, &c.

The District Court, in view of the fact that the barge had a right to be where she was and was not bound to have a watch or light, decreed for the libellant and referred it to a commissioner to assess damages. The commissioner fixed the value of the barge at $850, assuming apparently that she was worth this sum to her owners; though he stated that having been built for a special and unusual purpose, and being unlike every other sort of craft used in the port of New York he had difficulty in forming any estimate. The difficulty, in truth, was obvious: some witnesses swearing that the boat was not worth having for a gift; others that she was worth eight or ten dollars; and others that in her former condition she could be made practically very useful. There was conflict in the testimony here as in the other part of the case. This report was set aside, and a new estimate directed. On new evidence the commissioner gave $150 more. This report, too, was set aside, and a third reference ordered; the court directing the commissioner to consider the actual cost of raising and repairing the barge and so putting her as near as could be into her former state. A report made on this basis was confirmed. The case was then taken to the Circuit Court.

The Circuit Court-taking into view the position of the barge at the end of the dock, undistinguishable, in a dark and rainy night, from the end of the dock itself, and with neither watch nor light on it to give notice of its position-thought that it was no fault of the Granite State that she did not discover the barge earlier than she did, and when it was too late to avoid the collision. That court did not consider that the barge was in fault, so as to subject her to a portion of the damages if the Granite State had been found also in fault; but thought that, so far as a watch or a light might have facilitated the discovery of her by the approaching vessel, the omission to have one was a matter properly entering into and influencing the judgment of the court upon the question of negligence on the part of the steamer, and that to this extent the barge was obliged to assume the responsibility of the omission.

It decreed accordingly, reversing the District Court.

The case was now here for review, and was argued by Mr. Benedict, for the owners of the barge, and by Mr. Owen, contra, for those of the steamer.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

title: The Granite State


text: Talk:The Granite State

title: Talk:The Granite State


text:
The Granite State/Opinion of the Court

It is not controverted, that the barge, which was fastened to the end of the pier, was in a place she was entitled to occupy; that she was not required to have a light suspended during the night time, as vessels anchored in the channel are required; nor to have a watch kept on board to warn off steamboats using the channel of the river. She was not on any track the steamer was required to take; and, being incapable of motion, cannot be justly charged with any participation or fault in causing the collision.

As in the case of The Louisiana, recently decided, there was no unusual convulsion of the elements or sudden hurricane which nautical men could not anticipate; no vis major, causing a collision which a proper display of nautical skill might not have prevented.

Under such circumstances we are not called upon to inquire wherein the steamboat was not managed with proper nautical skill; whether the bright light which the steamboat had, or ought to have had, was not sufficient to warn her in time of her proximity to the pier if careful watch had been kept; whether she should not have backed her engine instead of rushing forward; whether she should have ported or starboarded her helm. All these inquiries are superfluous where the collision was caused by a vessel having the power to move or stop at pleasure in a channel of sufficient breadth, without any superior force compelling her to the place of collision. The fact that in these circumstances the steamboat did collide with the barge is conclusive evidence that she was not properly managed, and that she should be condemned to pay the damages caused by the collision.

There seems to have been some controversy in the District Court as to the measure of damages. No less than three different reports were made by the master on the subject. The parties have no right to complain of the instructions or opinions delivered by the court. There cannot be an established market value for barges, boats, and other articles of that description, as in cases of grain, cotton, or stock. The value of such a boat depends upon the accidents of its form, age, and materials; and as these differ in each individual there could be no established market value. A person may make considerable profits by the use of an old hulk of little value in the market for vessels. His loss cannot be measured by the ratio of her profits, as he might supply himself with another at a much cheaper rate. But when the injured vessel is not a total loss, and is capable of being repaired and restored to her original situation, the cost necessary to such repair cannot be said to be an incorrect rule of damages.

We do not feel called upon to decide between the opinions of witnesses who have given their guesses on the subject of the value of this rotten hull; and we see no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the district judge on the subject.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be therefore reversed, and the judgment of the District Court affirmed with costs.

DECREE ACCORDINGLY.

title: The Granite State/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:The Granite State/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Cournot Theory of Wealth (1838).djvu/35

 Rh two points. Thus again when two violin strings have had between them a definite musical interval, and when after a certain time they cease to give this interval, the question is whether one has gone up or the other gone down, or whether both of these effects have joined to cause the variation of the interval.

We can therefore readily distinguish the relative changes of value manifested by the changes of relative values from the absolute changes of value of one or another of the commodities between which commerce has established relations.

Just as it is possible to make an indefinite number of hypotheses as to the absolute motion which causes the observed relative motion in a system of points, so it is also possible to multiply indefinitely hypotheses as to the absolute variations which cause the relative variations observed in the values of a system of commodities.

However, if all but one of the commodities preserved the same relative values, we should consider by far the most probable hypothesis, the one which would assign the absolute change to this single article; unless there should be manifest such a connection between all the others, that one cannot vary without involving proportional variations in the values of those which depend on it.

For instance, an observer who should see by inspection of a table of statistics of values from century to century, that the value of money fell about four-fifths towards the end of the sixteenth century, while other commodities preserved practically the same relative values, would consider it very probable that an absolute change had taken place in the value of money, even if he were ignorant of the


text:
The Suffolk Company v. Hayden

IN December, 1854, Hayden, being the inventor of improvement in cotton cleaners, made application to the commissioner for a patent therefor.

The improvements consisted in certain described changes made by Hayden in the interior arrangements of an elongated trunk previously in use for cleaning cotton.

While this application was still pending, Hayden made another distinct improvement, not in the interior arrangements of the elongated trunk, but in the form of the trunk. This improvement consisted in increasing, towards the rear and of the trunk, that part of its area above the screen (which divided it horizontally into two distinct parts), so that as the air moved through the trunk towards its rear, the space for its passage being enlarged, the air would gradually move more slowly.

Hayden desired, apparently, to claim this new improvement in the form of the trunk, both separately, and in combination with his other improvements in the interior arrangements of the trunk, as to which his application was then pending. Accordingly, in November, 1855, he filed his application for a patent, and on the 17th day of March, 1857, letters were issued to him, in the specification whereof he claims the improvement in the form of the trunk, both separately, and in combination with his improvements in the interior arrangements of the trunk; but he made no claim in this specification to his improvements in the interior arrangements of the trunk.

It did not appear that Hayden was guilty of any laches, or was in any default in reference to the delay of the commissioner to act on his first application for a patent for improvements in the interior arrangements of the trunk made in December, 1854. For some cause, however, the commissioner had not acted on that application down till June, 1857; and in that month Hayden made another application for a patent, for what the judge at the trial, at the request of the defendants, ruled to be the same improvements, previously applied for in December, 1854; and upon this second application a patent was granted, bearing date December 1, 1857.

[It may be here mentioned incidentally, since the matter was made a point by counsel and is referred to by the court-though the patent of December 1, 1857, was the only one in suit-that the commissioner finally acted on the original application of December 1854, and on the 11th of September, 1860, granted on it a patent and as was alleged, though not proved, for the same improvement covered by the patent of December 1, 1857.]

Hayden having sued the Suffolk Manufacturing Company, in the Massachusetts District, for infringement of this last-mentioned patent, the defendants' counsel at the trial, requested the judge to rule that the patent was void, because the improvements in the interior arrangements of the trunk, which were described and claimed in it, being also described and not claimed in the patent of the 17th of March, were by the legal operation of the last-mentioned patent surrendered to the public use.

The judge refused so to rule, and on error this refusal raised here the first question; the counsel for the Suffolk Company taking the same position here as below.

A second question was on the law as delivered to the jury on the matter of damages.

It appeared that no sales had been made of the patent-right by the plaintiff, or of licenses for the use of it, so as to establish a patent or license-fee as a criterion by which to ascertain the measure of damages. The court below accordingly permitted evidence, after objection, as to the uses and advantages of this improvement over the previous methods of cleaning cotton. And an expert testified that the results were-a more thorough cleaning of the cotton, the saving of all the good fibres, less damage to the staple, the freeing of the room from dust, and the machinery from dust, dirt, and sand; the keeping of the machinery in better order at loss cost, and dispensing with one grinder of the cards in consequence of the diminution of dirt and sand, expelling fine dust and dirt not before got out, less breakage of the yarns, &c.

There was, also, evidence of the amount of cotton that had been cleaned at the defendants' mills by the plaintiff's improvement within the period for which the damages were claimed.

The court below, in its charge to the jury, stated the rule as prescribed by the statute, which is the actual damages that the plaintiff has sustained from the infringement; and, while speaking of the patent of December, 1857, among other things, observed:

'Then you will look at the value of the thing used, and ascertain that value by all the evidence as to its character, operation, and effect. You will take into view the value of that which the defendants have used belonging to the plaintiff, to aid you in forming a judgment of the actual damage the plaintiff has sustained.'

The jury having found for the plaintiff and damages $1774, the charge as above given was assigned by the defendant for error; and made a second question in this court; the counsel for the defendants arguing that the court in the instructions quoted gave a latitude to the jury in the estimate of damages beyond that of the use or value of the improvements comprised in the patent in question; that they might take into view the improvements on the patent of the 17th March, 1857; and arguing also that the value of the improvement was not a proper matter for the jury to consider when making their estimate of damages.

Messrs. Caleb Cushing and Causten Browne, for the Suffolk Company, plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: The Suffolk Company v. Hayden


text: Talk:The Suffolk Company v. Hayden

title: Talk:The Suffolk Company v. Hayden


text:
The Suffolk Company v. Hayden/Opinion of the Court

The first point of the plaintiff in error is, that the description, in the patent of March, of the improvement patented the December following, and on which the present suit is brought, and omission to claim it on such earlier patent, operated as an abandonment or dedication of it to the public, and that for this reason the subsequent patent of 1st December was void. But the answer to this ground of defence is, that it appeared that Hayden, the patentee had pending before the commissioner of patents an application for this same improvement at the time he described it in the specification of the 17th March, which was, doubtless, the reason for not claiming it in this patent. The description in no sense affected this application thus pending before the commissioner; and, while it remained before him, repelled any inference of abandonment or dedication from the omission to again claim it.

This original application before the commissioner for a patent, among other things, for an improvement in the screen of the long trunk, not having been acted upon by that officer, a new application was made by Hayden, separately, for this improvement, and which resulted in the patent of 1st December, 1857, on which the present suit is brought.

We do not perceive any objection to this proceeding. It simplified the application, and disembarrassed it from its connection with other improvements claimed; and, doubtless, hastened the granting of the patent. The office, however, subsequently acted upon this original application, and, on the 11th September, 1860, granted a patent to the plaintiff, and, as is alleged, for the same improvement embraced in the patent of the 1st December, 1857, the one in question. And it is insisted that, for this reason, this prior patent for the same improvement is void. This is, obviously, a misapprehension. The last, not the first, is void.

We may add, on looking at the patent of 11th September, 1860, it does not appear that it was granted for the same improvement. It is a patent for a combination of this improvement with other devices.

As to the question of damages. It is supposed by the counsel for the defendants that the court, in the instructions quoted on preceding pages, gave a latitude to the jury in the estimate of damages beyond that of the use or value of the improvements embraced in the patent in question; that they might take into consideration the improvements on the patent of the 17th March, 1857, for widening one end of the trunk. But it is quite apparent that the court was speaking all the time with reference to the improvement in the patent in suit, and the only one in contestation. It is, also, urged that the value of the improvement was not a proper subject for the consideration of the jury in estimating the damages. This may be admitted. But looking at the term value, in the connection in which it was used, it is quite clear that it had reference only to the utility and advantages, or value of the use of the improvement over the old mode of cleaning cotton; not the value of the patent itself.

This question of damages, under the rule given in the statute, is always attended with difficulty and embarrassment both to the court and jury. There being no established patent or license fee in the case, in order to get at a fair measure of damages, or even an approximation to it, general evidence must necessarily be resorted to. And what evidence could be more appropriate and pertinent than that of the utility and advantage of the invention over the old modes or devices that had been used for working out similar results? With a knowledge of these benefits to the persons who have used the invention, and the extent of the use by the infringer, a jury will be in possession of material and controlling facts that may enable them, in the exercise of a sound judgment, to ascertain the damages, or, in other words, the loss to the patentee or owner, by the piracy, instead of the purchase of the use of the invention.

It is proper to say, as was said in the court below, that the jury, in ascertaining the damages upon this evidence, is not to estimate them for the whole term of the patent, but only for the period of the infringement. A recovery does not vest the infringer with the right to continue the use, as the consequence of it may be an injunction restraining the defendant from the further use of it.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:The Suffolk Company v. Hayden/Opinion of the Court


text:
Cheang-Kee v. United States

A STATUTE of the United States, relating to the Circuit Court for California, enacts that, by consent of parties, 'issues of fact in civil cases may be tried and determined by the said Circuit Court without the intervention of a jury.'

Under this statute the court, in giving its decision, is to state the facts found and the conclusions of law separately; and a review by this court is to be limited to a determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment, and to the rulings of the court in admitting or rejecting evidence, and in the construction of written documents.

With this act in force, the United States sued Sun Cheang-Kee, by claim in the nature of debt for duties for goods imported by him into the port of San Francisco, on the 13th of August, 1862; and after the passage of the statute of 25th February, 1862, which enacted, that Treasury notes of the United States should be lawful money, and a tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except duties on imports, &c. Kee put in his answer according to the practice customary in the State of California. Its defence was, payment of the duties, as ascertained by the collector of the port under a statute in force prior to the 14th July, 1862, in ignorance on his part, and on the part of the importer, of an enactment which was made of that date imposing higher rates. It alleged that the existence of the act of July was unknown in California until after the duties had been assessed and paid, and the goods delivered to the importer and sold; and insisted that, under the circumstances, the government was concluded by the act of the collector in assessing and receiving the duties under the act previously in force.

In this state of things, the parties having consented that the case should be tried and determined by the court, the counsel for the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings and according to the claim, which order the court made. For some reason not stated on the record-but which the reporter supposes was a difference of opinion discovered subsequently to the date of the order, to exist between the counsel of the parties as to whether, if judgment were rendered on the pleadings, the facts set forth in the answer would on error be assumed as true-the same counsel subsequently moved the court to set aside the order; which motion the court granted.

The cause was then tried by the court. Witnesses were examined and counsel heard, and the court found:

1. That the defendant imported the goods as alleged.

2. That the duties on the importation, under the law then in force, amounted to $1432.55.

3. That the defendant paid on account of said duties, $211.70, leaving due $1240.85; and,

4. As a conclusion of law, that the United States were entitled to judgment for the balance due, with interest, amounting to $1388.10, payable in gold coin, for duties, with costs.

These findings excluded the defence set up by the answer upon the facts.

In the course of the trial, exceptions to what had been done were presented thus:

1. That the counsel of the plaintiffs had moved for judgment on the pleadings, and that the court had ordered judgment accordingly.

2. That with this order in force the same counsel had afterwards moved the court to vacate and set aside the same; which the court had also done.

3. That on the trial subsequently had, the court had heard evidence upon the issue, notwithstanding (as the reporter understood the point of the objection to be) the previous judgment on the pleadings. This proceeding the counsel for the defendant objected to as irregular.

The court gave judgment for the United States for the balance already mentioned, of $1388.10, 'payable in gold coin,' the judgment being amended during the term so as to read payable 'in gold and silver coin.' (The record of the judgment recited the findings, thus showing that the amount for which the judgment was entered was 'for duties.' ) The exceptions were now brought here; error being also assigned in the rendering of judgment for the United States payable in gold coin of the United States 'for duties;' as the counsel put it in their assignment of errors; so arguing it also. Objection was also made to the amendment, which made the judgment read, in gold (and silver) coin, &c.

Mr. Gould, for Kee, the plaintiff in error:

1 and 2. The first two exceptions, although apparently inconsistent with each other, are not really so. The motion of the plaintiff was for judgment on the pleadings. The motion admitted, impliedly and in effect, that the answer was true. This was an important admission for us. When made, we had a right to it. It gave as in effect a 'case stated,' for this court. We could, indeed, have proved the truth of our answer by witnesses, when the court below, under the statute, would have found the same thing. But it was unjust to set aside the finding at the plaintiff's request, and to require us to summon witnesses anew, and pay the fees for their attendance, to say nothing of time or trouble. We did not see fit to do so; relying rather on our writ of error.

3. [On this third exception nothing was said or explained.]

4. This assignment of errors is to the peculiar form of the judgment. We object, also, to the amendment.

The Federal courts have uniformly held that 'debt' is the proper action to recover what is due by an importer to the government, after he has received his goods. The present action is in the form of that action. When the goods are delivered to the importer, duties are converted into debts. We do not pretend that duties are originally merely a debt. They are also a species of tax. In their capacity of tax, they operate in invitum, and are a lien upon property; and the property, before delivery to the importer, may be sold by the government, as provided by law, to satisfy the duties; and as government may declare in what coin or species of property taxes shall be paid, so, if they are unpaid, it may at a sale thereof receive nothing in payment but the particular currency or species of property in which taxes may be reserved.

The government is thus armed with two remedies, each distinct from the other:

1st. The right to enforce the lien on the goods by an ex parte sale, and at such sale to require payment in the specific coin in which the duty is payable; and

2d. To sue the importer in an action of debt, to recover the pecuniary value of the duty.

The power of the government (provided it has not lost its lien on the goods) is complete to require and compel payment in the specific coin. It has the power, in the language of the Constitution, 'to lay and collect duties.' But if then there is a mere debt due by the importer to the government for the amount of the duties, such debt may be discharged by any lawful money of the United States. The form of the judgment is therefore erroneous; and the fact that it is an unusual form of judgment is itself a great argument against its being a right form. 'A universal silence, in Westminster Hall, on a subject which frequently gives occasion for litigation,' is spoken of by Buller, J., in a great case, as 'a strong argument,' to prove that a matter now first spoken of does not exist. 'By Littleton it appeareth,' says Lord Coke, 'that the formes of judgments, pleas, and other legal proceedings, doe much conduce to the right understanding of the law.' The 'formes' of the law are indeed both the indices and conservatories of its principles, and the form of judgments for money, ever since courts of common law began to exist, has been simply for money, without specifying the commodity from which it may chance to be manufactured.

It has moreover been expressly decided that even where a contract is, in terms, payable in gold coin, courts of law have no power to render a judgment payable in such coin, or otherwise than for current money.

If it was error to make the judgment 'payable in gold [and silver] coin of the United States,' what shall we say of the statement 'for duties?' If there be one principle of law more elementary than another, it is that a judgment is a merger of the plaintiff's demand. If the judgment is for so much current money, then the effect of these words, so far as they have any, is practically to prevent a merger of the plaintiff's demand, and to keep alive its original cause of action. It has not hitherto been the custom of courts, in their judgments, to inform the public what the extent of the original cause of action was. What would be thought of a judgment in these words: 'That the plaintiff recover from the defendant the sum of one thousand dollars for a note, payable in gold coin?' We have a right to a judgment absolute on its face. The court must tell us categorically what we must do, and not leave our liabilities to the construction of the marshal.

Mr. Speed, A. G., and Mr. Lake, D. A. for California, contra.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Cheang-Kee v. United States


text: Talk:Cheang-Kee v. United States

title: Talk:Cheang-Kee v. United States


text:
Cheang-Kee v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The first two exceptions-those relating to the motion and order for judgment, and to the motion and order to set aside what had been directed-relate to matters wholly within the discretion of the Circuit Court, and are not reviewable here. This is not merely settled by repeated decisions, but is expressly directed by an act of Congress prescribing the limits of this court's jurisdiction upon writs of error to the Circuit Court of California.

The third exception related to the examination of witnesses on the trial. This exception must rest on the assumption that inasmuch as the pleadings consisted only of claim and answer, the answer must be taken as true, and could not be contradicted by witnesses.

But the statute of the State, which has been adopted as a rule by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, expressly declares that new matter in an answer shall, on trial, be deemed controverted by the adverse party. Under that statute the answer of the defendant below could not be taken as true. Witnesses, therefore, were properly examined.

The only other exception is to the form of the judgment, which was originally for the amount due, payable in gold coin, for duties; and afterwards, during the term, amended by order of the court so as to make it 'payable in gold and silver coin, for duties.' The objection is to the amendment and to the statement in the judgment that it is 'payable in gold and silver coin, for duties.' The amendment, made during the term, was clearly within the power of the court. The statement merely declared the legal effect of the judgment. The whole case shows that the judgment was for duties on imports, and nothing but gold and silver coin has been made a legal tender for this description of indebtedness to the government. This statement, therefore, is strictly correct, and though unnecessary, could not affect the validity of the judgment.

AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.


text: Talk:Cheang-Kee v. United States/Opinion of the Court


text:
Thomson v. Lee County

THE constitution of Iowa, made in 1846, and which invested the General Assembly with all the legislative power of the State, ordained thus:

'The General Assembly shall not in any manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities, which shall singly or in the aggregate, with any previous debts or liabilities, exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, except in the case of war, &c., unless the same shall be authorized by some law for some single object or work to be distinctly specified therein, &c. No such law shall take effect until at a general election it shall have been submitted to the people and have a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such election.'With this constitution in force and after certain statutes had been passed by the General Assembly relative to the corporate powers of counties, their right to execute bonds for railroads, &c., it was decided, or so said to be, at an election held in Lee County, Iowa, in 1856, to take stock and issue bonds to three different railroads; one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to each.

The validity of the subscription was contested in the proper court, soon afterwards, as having been the exercise of a power not given to the county, or as so irregular an exercise of it, if given, as to be void. The court, in December, 1856, decided that the election was irregular, and conferred no power to issue the bonds. The legislature of the State, on the 29th of July, 1857, accordingly passed an act entitled 'An act legalizing the issue of county, city, and town corporation bonds in the counties of Lee and Davis.' This act declared 'that all votes heretofore taken in the counties of Lee and Davis in the form of a joint or several proposition whether said counties will aid in the construction of one or more railroads, specifying the amount to be given to each. . . and the bonds of said counties issued in pursuance of said votes and subscriptions shall be a valid lien upon the taxable property of said county.' After this the county judge, the proper officer, if the act was valid, proceeded to take the stock and issue bonds. The bonds were in the ordinary form of what are called coupon bonds; payable to 'bearer.' The coupons attached were in a like negotiable shape; 'promises to pay to the bearer at the Continental Bank, in the city of New York, forty dollars interest on bond No. 1.'

Soon after the bonds were issued the county laid a tax to meet the interest due on the coupons. The legality of the tax was denied by some tax-payers of the county, but the court of last resort in the State having declared it lawful, the money was collected and the coupons paid for a short time. The court, however, subsequently reviewed and reversed its former decision; and the tax being no longer levied the coupons were no longer paid. A number of them being now in the hands of Mr. Edgar Thomson, of Philadelphia, cut off from the bonds to which they had been originally attached, he brought suit in the Federal courts of Iowa to recover them; not producing, however, the bonds to which they had originally belonged.

The court charged:

1st. That the bonds or coupons sued on, were issued without authority of law, and were void.

2d. That the 'Curative Act,' of January, 1857, gave no validity to the bonds.

3d. That the plaintiff could not recover on the coupons unless he showed that he also owned at the time the several bonds from which they were cut.

4th. And refused to charge that if all branches of the State government of Iowa had held such railroad bonds to be valid at the time they were issued, no question could afterwards be made as to their validity.

The county having had judgment, the matter was now on error here, where the same kind of questions that have been so abundantly discussed in this court, of late, in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque; Meyer v. Muscatine; Mercer County v. Hackett; Seybert v. City of Pittsburgh; Van Hostrup v. Madison City; Murray v. Lardner; Sheboygan Co. v. Parker; Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., were raised and discussed by briefs anew; Mr. Allison, for Lee County, who sought to distinguish this case from any of those, contending that the constitution of Iowa restricted the legislature from authorizing the bonds; that this was now the construction given to the constitution by the Supreme Court of Iowa; that the vote and proceedings by which the bonds were authorized were irregular; that the 'Curative Act' of 1857 was inoperative, and that if this were all otherwise yet that Thomson, who appeared to own nothing but the coupons, could not recover on them, without producing the bonds themselves.

Messrs. Howell and Grant, contra.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Thomson v. Lee County


text: Talk:Thomson v. Lee County

title: Talk:Thomson v. Lee County


text:
Thomson v. Lee County/Opinion of the Court

There is hardly any question, connected with the species of securities on which this suit was brought, that has not been discussed and decided by this court; and it is unnecessary to do more in this opinion than reaffirm the general doctrines of the court on the subject, so far as they apply to the case in hand, without attempting to restate the reasons which were given for our decisions.

A county, or other municipal corporation, has no inherent right of legislation, and cannot subscribe for stock in a public improvement, unless authorized to do so by the legislature. Such a corporation acts wholly under a delegated authority, and can exercise no power which is not in express terms, or by fair implication, conferred upon it. But the legislature of a State, unless restrained by the organic law, has the right to authorize a municipal corporation to take stock in a railroad or other work of internal improvement, to borrow money to pay for it, and to levy a tax to repay the loan. And this authority can be conferred in such a manner, that the objects can be attained, either with or without the sanction of the popular vote.

It is insisted that the constitution of Iowa did lay a restraint on the legislature, and that consequently the county of Lee could have no right, under the constitution and laws of the State, to execute and issue the bonds in controversy. And we understand that the highest court of the State of Iowa, at the present time, adopt that view of the question; but when these bonds were issued, the courts of that State held that there was no defect of constitutional power, and that the legislature could lawfully authorize municipal corporations to subscribe to the capital stock of railroad companies. If the bonds in suit had been executed since the last decision in Iowa, they would be controlled by it; but the change in judicial decision cannot be allowed to render invalid contracts which, when made, were held to be lawful. The courts of Iowa having, when these bonds were issued, construed their constitution and laws so as to give them force and vitality, cannot, by a subsequent and contrary construction, destroy them.

But it is argued that when the county of Lee voted to take the stock for which these bonds were given, they attempted the exercise of a power which had not been delegated to them, or executed it so defectively, that their proceedings were without authority of law, and void.

It is not instructive to inquire into the different laws of Iowa under which this power is claimed to exist, because the legislature of that State, on the 28th day of January, 1857, by an act of confirmation, legalized the issue of these bonds. If the legislature could authorize this ratification, the bonds are valid, notwithstanding the submission of the question to the vote of the people, or the manner of taking the vote may have been informal and irregular. This act of confirmation, very soon after its passage, underwent an examination in the courts of Iowa, and it was held that the legislature possessed the power to pass it, and that the bonds were valid and binding on the county. It is difficult to see how this power could be questioned, after the Supreme Court of the State had decided that there was no written limitation which inhibited the legislature from conferring on cities and counties, the right to take stock in a company organized to build a railroad, or other work of public improvement. If the legislature possessed the power to authorize the act to be done, it could, by a retrospective act, cure the evils which existed, because the power thus conferred had been irregularly executed. The question with the legislature was one of policy, and the determination made by it was conclusive.

Bonds with coupons, payable to bearer, are negotiable securities, and pass by delivery, and, in fact, have all the qualities and incidents of commercial paper.

It is not necessary that the holder of coupons, in order to recover on them, should own the bonds from which they are detached. The coupons are drawn so that they can be separated from the bonds, and like the bonds, are negotiable; and the owner of them can sue without the production of the bonds to which they were attached, or without being interested in them.

The foregoing views dispose of all the questions presented in this record, and it is unnecessary to refer in detail to the charge of the Circuit Court.

JUDGMENT REVERSED, with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the court.


text: Talk:Thomson v. Lee County/Opinion of the Court


text: Minnesota Company v. National Company

title: Minnesota Company v. National Company


text: Talk:Minnesota Company v. National Company


text:
Minnesota Company v. National Company/Opinion of the Court

THIS case came here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, and under the name of The Minnesota Mining Company, plaintiff in error, versus The National Mining Company and J. M. Cooper, defendants in error, the action below being for the recovery of real property. Though nominally different the parties were in fact the same parties who litigated the case of Cooper v. Roberts, adjudged by this court at December Term, 1855. The same title was again, as the court declared, brought in issue, and the same question again agitated. When the question was heard at December Term, 1855, it was elaborately discussed by counsel and deliberately considered by the court, and a unanimous decision given in favor of the party claiming, as the present defendant in error now in fact claimed. Nevertheless, the losing party, unwilling to acquiesce in a single decision, brought the case again before the court by a second writ of error. This second writ was heard at December Term, 1857. The counsel on that occasion labored with great zeal and ability to convince the court that its first decision was erroneous, but were unsuccessful.

In both the cases last referred to, the controversy came before this court on writs of error in ejectment to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan.

Veiled under the new forms stated at the beginning of the case, to wit, the forms of a writ of error to the highest State court of Michigan, and with the names of mining companies for parties, and with some other unimportant variations, the matter was now brought for a third time before this tribunal; no counsel presenting himself to argue the case for the plaintiff in error, and the argument on that side being by brief of non-appearing counsel only.

Mr. Buel, for the defendants in error, after protesting against what he declared to be an abuse of the suitor's privilege and of this court's well-known longanimity, was beginning to argue the case on merits, when certain of the older associates who recognized the case as an old one, interposing, he was stopped by the Chief Justice, with an intimation that the court, as at present advised, thought argument on them unnecessary; and that he might consider himself as relieved.

The court having examined the case, Mr. Justice GRIER now delivered its opinion, and after stating the identity of the present case with the former, what was decided in the former and involved in this, and the history as above given, expressed himself in behalf of the Bench as follows:

This is another, and it is to be hoped the last attempt to persuade this court to reverse their decision in this case.

Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change. Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the future only; but where courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions on the construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change. Parties should not be encouraged to speculate on a change of the law when the administrators of it is changed. Courts ought not to be compelled to bear the infliction of repeated arguments by obstinate litigants, challenging the justice of their well-considered and solemn judgments.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in conformity with the opinion of this court twice pronounced on the same title, is hereupon

AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.


text: Talk:Minnesota Company v. National Company/Opinion of the Court


text:
Buck v. Colbath

COLBATH sued Buck in one of the State courts of Minnesota, in an action of trespass for taking goods. Buck pleaded in defence, that he was marshal of the United States for the District of Minnesota, and that having in his hands a writ of attachment against certain parties whom he named, he levied the same upon the goods, for taking which he was now sued by Colbath. But he did not aver that they were the goods of the defendants in the writ of attachment.

On the trial Colbath made proof of his ownership of the goods, and Buck relied solely on the fact that he was marshal and held the goods under the writ in the attachment suit.

The court refused to instruct the jury that the defence thus set up was a sufficient one; and the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment. This judgment was affirmed on error in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the defendant brought the case here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; an act which, as most readers will remember, provides that a final judgment in any suit in the highest court of a State where is drawn in question 'the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against its validity,' may be reviewed in this court.

Mr. Peckham, for the marshal, plaintiff in error, contended that the question whether the fact of his office, set up by the marshal, was or was not a sufficient defence to the suit brought against him, had been settled in the affirmative by the case of Freeman v. Howe in this court. In that case White sued a railway company in the Federal court and the marshal attached a number of rail-cars: seizing and taking them into his own possession. While thus in his custody, the sheriff, under process from one of the State courts, sought to take them out of his possession under a writ of replevin. The marshal, in the replevin suit, set up by way of defence the authority under the Federal court by which he held the property; in other words, that he held it as marshal of the United States. And this court held that a sufficient defence.

If the present action were replevin instead of trespass it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff below would fail. The fact that the suit is one of trespass makes no difference. The thing has nothing to do with forms of action. The court, we may almost say, so declared in Freeman v. Howe. Quoting a former case in this court, and declaring specifically that they agree to it, they say:

'It is a doctrine of law too long established to require citation of authorities, that where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to settle every question which occurs in the case. . . and that where the jurisdiction of a court and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court.'

Now, this question whether the property which the marshal seized, was or was not liable to the attachment, does occur 'in the case.' It springs immediately out of it. A suit against him in a State court for a trespass in taking the property does, moreover, in effect 'arrest'-for it obstructs and hinders-the proceedings in the Federal court. It subjects the marshal and those under whose directions he acts to the annoyance of a multiplicity of actions in various jurisdictions for things springing out of the same 'question.'

Independently of which, trespass and replevin are universally concurrent remedies for taking goods as these have been taken. To hold that this action was properly brought and not overrule Freeman v. Howe, would be to hold that the marshal had the right to take these goods and was yet liable for a trespass; was bound to hold them, and yet should suffer for the detention.

The principles, we suppose, upon which Freeman v. Howe went were these:

1. That where the officers of a court, State or national, have taken possession of a res, under process of attachment or execution, as the property of the defendant in such process, such res is in the custody of the law, and the possession of such officers or court is exclusive.

2. That the question, whether such res, so seized as the property of the defendant in the process, is rightfully seized by the marshal as the property of the defendant in the process, or otherwise subject to the exigency of the writ, is one of jurisdiction, the authority to decide which belongs exclusively to the court issuing the process; or, in the language of this court, the 'question is one of right and title to the property under the Federal process, and which belongs to the Federal, not the State courts to determine.'

There was nothing new in these principles. Hogan v. Lucas, and Taylor v. Caryl, asserted the first; and other cases assert in effect the second.

The last principle was thus stated by Marshall, C. J., in Slocum v. Mayberry:

title: Buck v. Colbath


text: Talk:Buck v. Colbath

title: Talk:Buck v. Colbath


text:
Buck v. Colbath/Opinion of the Court

'If the officer has a right under the United States to seize for a supposed forfeiture, the question, whether that forfeiture has been actually incurred, belongs exclusively to the Federal courts, and cannot be drawn to another forum.'

It was argued, in Day v. Gallup, that a State court would have jurisdiction to try the question after the case in the Federal court was concluded, and thus no longer pending, and the question had not therein been raised or decided. But the argument is not sound. If a court has 'exclusive' jurisdiction to decide 'every question which occurs in the case,' other courts cannot be trying these questions either at the same time or at any other.

Neither is there any hardship or inconvenience in the law as we assert it. The fact-if it be a fact, as is probable-may be objected, that the marshal and Colbath, the two parties to this suit, are citizens of the same State; that the question, whether these goods belonged to Colbath or not, and whether Buck, the marshal, was or was not a trespasser, was not in issue in the attachment suit, out of which the suit below sprung; and that, being citizens of the same State, Colbath could not sue the marshal in the Federal court, nor ever have the question of trespass decided in that jurisdiction to which we say that the question exclusively belongs. The same sort of objection was made in Freeman v. Howe. It was there argued by counsel for the defendant in error that the plaintiffs in the replevin suit were remediless in the Federal courts, both parties being citizens of the same State. But the court says 'that this is a misapprehension, and that a bill in equity may be filed to restrain or regulate the suit at law, and to prevent injustice or an inequitable advantage; such bill being supplementary to the original suit, and maintainable without reference to the citizenship of the parties.' It says, moreover, 'In a proceeding in rem, any person claiming an interest in the property paramount to that of the libellant, may intervene by way of defence for the protection of his interest;' and adds, that 'the same is equally true of a proceeding by attachment.'

Colbath had, therefore, a complete means of righting himself in the Federal court; which was first seized of the case; which knew its history from the beginning; and which, from the extent of its knowledge in the matter, and from having all parties before it, was best able to do full and complete justice to all concerned.

Mr. Carlisle, contra, for Colbath, defendant in error, replied ably to these positions. The full and very luminous manner in which the whole subject is handled by the court, deciding in favor of the cause maintained by Mr. Carlisle, dispenses, however, with the necessity of presenting this gentleman's arguments, or of remarking more than that along with them he suggested, not pressing it strongly, a point of jurisdiction. On that point he observed that the pleadings presented a single issue: whether the goods taken were the goods which the marshal was authorized to take under the process which he held? The pleadings did not admit that the Federal process in the hands of the marshal authorized or purported to authorize him to take the goods of Colbath. Nor did they question or deny his authority to take the goods of the defendants named in the writ. On the contrary, they plainly admitted this authority, and limited the plaintiff's ground of action to the abuse of that authority, and to the misapplication of it to subjects not purporting to be comprehended or affected by it. It was nothing to the purpose, Mr. Carlisle observed, that the marshal did the act complained of by color of his office and of process in his hands, if that process did not purport to authorize the act.

Here, then, was not drawn in question 'the validity of an authority exercised under the United States.' The Federal process was admitted to be valid in the case in which it was issued. It was, therefore, not a case within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.

Day v. Gallup, which closely resembled this case (being an action of trespass under like circumstances), was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; although the taking complained of plainly appeared to have been upon process of execution, issued out of the Federal court, it being held that no case under the 25th section necessarily presented itself upon the record.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

There seems to be no reason to doubt that the case comes within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The defendant claimed the protection of 'an authority exercised under the United States,' and the decision was against the protection thus claimed; or, in other words, against the validity of that authority, as a protection to him in that action. Whether the authority which he thus set up was valid to protect him, is a question for this court to decide finally, and is properly before us under the writ of error to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Upon the merits of the case, the plaintiff in error relies mainly on the case of Freeman v. Howe, decided by this court, and upon the opinion by which the court sustained the decision.

That was a case like this in every particular, with the single exception, that when the marshal had levied the writ of attachment on certain property, a writ of replevin was instituted against him in the State court, and the property taken out of his possession; while in the present case the officer is sued in trespass for the wrongful seizure.

In that case it was held, that although the writ of attachment had been wrongfully levied upon the property of a party not named in the writ, the rightful owner could not obtain possession of it by resort to the courts of another jurisdiction.

It must be confessed that this decision took the profession generally by surprise, overruling, as it did, the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts-a court whose opinions are always entitled to great consideration-as well as the opinion of Chancellor Kent, as expressed in his Commentaries.

We are, however, entirely satisfied with it, and with the principle upon which it is founded; a principle which is essential to the dignity and just authority of every court, and to the comity which should regulate the relations between all courts of concurrent jurisdiction. That principle is, that whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which may have a direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken possession, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises. This is the principle upon which the decision of this court rested in Taylor v. Caryl, and Hogan v. Lucas, both of which assert substantially the same doctrine.

A departure from this rule would lead to the utmost confusion, and to endless strife between courts of concurrent jurisdiction deriving their powers from the some source; but how much more disastrous would be the consequences of such a course, in the conflict of jurisdiction between courts whose powers are derived from entirely different sources, while their jurisdiction is concurrent as to the parties and the subject-matter of the suit.

This principle, however, has its limitations; or rather its just definition is to be attended to. It is only while the property is in possession of the court, either actually or constructively, that the court is bound, or professes to protect that possession from the process of other courts. Whenever the litigation is ended, or the possession of the officer or court is discharged, other courts are at liberty to deal with it according to the rights of the parties before them, whether those rights require them to take possession of the property or not. The effect to be given in such cases to the adjudications of the court first possessed of the property, depends upon principles familiar to the law; but no contest arises about the mere possession, and no conflict but such as may be decided without unseemly and discreditable collisions.

It is upon this ground that the court, in Day v. Gallup, held that this court had no jurisdiction of that case. The property attached had been sold, and the attachment suit ended, when the attaching officer and his assistants were sued, and we held that such a suit in the State court, commenced after the proceedings in the Federal court had been concluded, raised no question for the jurisdiction of this court.

It is obvious that the action of trespass against the marshal in the case before us, does not interfere with the principle thus laid down and limited. The Federal court could proceed to render its judgment in the attachment suit, could sell and deliver the property attached, and have its execution satisfied, without any disturbance of its proceedings, or any contempt of its process. While at the same time, the State court could proceed to determine the questions before it involved in the suit against the marshal, without interfering with the possession of the property in dispute.

How far the courts are bound to interfere for the protection of their own officers, is a question not discussed in the case of Freeman v. Howe, but which demands a passing notice here. In its consideration, however, we are reminded at the outset, that property may be seized by an officer of the court under a variety of writs, orders, or processes of the court For our present purpose, these may be divided into two classes:

1. Those in which the process or order of the court describes the property to be seized, and which contain a direct command to the officer to take possession of that particular property. Of this class are the writ of replevin at common law, orders of sequestration in chancery, and nearly all the processes of the admiralty courts, by which the res is brought before it for its action.

2. Those in which the officer is directed to levy the process upon property of one of the parties to the litigation, sufficient to satisfy the demand against him, without describing any specific property to be thus taken. Of this class are the writ of attachment, or other mesne process, by which property is seized before judgment to answer to such judgment when rendered, and the final process of execution, elegit, or other writ, by which an ordinary judgment is carried into effect.

It is obvious, on a moment's consideration, that the claim of the officer executing these writs, to the protection of the courts from which they issue, stands upon very different grounds in the two classes of process just described. In the first class he has no discretion to use, no judgment to exercise, no duty to perform but to seize the property described. It follows from this, as a rule of law of universal application, that if the court issuing the process had jurisdiction in the case before it to issue that process, and it was a valid process when placed in the officer's hands, and that, in the execution of such process, he kept himself strictly within the mandatory clause of the process, then such writ or process is a complete protection to him, not only in the court which issued it, but in all other courts.

And in addition to this, in many cases the court which issued the process will interfere directly to protect its officers from being harassed or interfered with by any person, whether a party to the litigation or not. Such is the habitual course of the court of chancery, operating by injunction against persons who interfere by means of other courts. And instances are not wanting, where other courts have in a summary manner protected their officers in the execution of their mandates.

It is creditable, however, to the respect which is paid to the process of courts of competent jurisdiction in this country, that the occasion for the exercise of such a power is very rare.

In the other class of writs to which we have referred, the officer has a very large and important field for the exercise of his judgment and discretion. First, in ascertaining that the property on which he proposes to levy, is the property of the person against whom the writ is directed; secondly, that it is property which, by law, is subject to be taken under the writ; and thirdly, as to the quantity of such property necessary to be seized in the case in hand. In all these particulars he is bound to exercise his own judgment, and is legally responsible to any person for the consequences of any error or mistake in its exercise to his prejudice. He is so liable to plaintiff, to defendant, or to any third person whom his erroneous action in the premises may injure. And what is more important to our present inquiry, the court can afford him no protection against the parties so injured; for the court is in no wise responsible for the manner in which he exercises that discretion which the law reposes in him, and in no one else.

In the case before us, the writ under which the defendant justified his act and now claims our protection, belongs to this latter class. Yet the plea on which he relied contains no denial that the property seized was the property of plaintiff, nor any averment that it was the property of either of the defendants in the attachment suit, or that it was in any other manner subject to be taken under that writ.

Seizing upon some remarks in the opinion of the court in the case of Freeman v. Howe, not necessary to the decision of that case, to the effect that the court first obtaining jurisdiction of a cause has a right to decide every issue arising in the progrees of the cause, and that the Federal court could not permit the State court to withdraw from the former the decision of such issues, the counsel for plaintiff in error insists that the present case comes within the principle of those remarks.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the rule thus announced is one which has often been held by this and other courts, and which is essential to the correct administration of justice in all countries where there is more than one court having jurisdiction of the same matters. At the same time, it is to be remarked that it is confined in its operation to the parties before the court, or who may, if they wish to do so, come before the court and have a hearing on the issues so to be decided. This limitation was manifestly in the mind of the court in the case referred to, for the learned judge who delivered the opinion, goes on to show, that persons interested in the possession of the property in the custody of the court, may, by petition, make themselves so far parties to the proceedings as to have their interests protected, although the persons representing adverse interests in such case do not possess the qualification of citizenship necessary to enable them to sue each other in the Federal courts. The proceeding here alluded to is one unusual in any court, and is only to be resorted to in the Federal courts, in extraordinary cases, where it is essential to prevent injustice, by an abuse of the process of the court, which cannot otherwise be remedied. But it is not true that a court, having obtained jurisdiction of a subject-matter of a a suit, and of parties before it, thereby excludes all other courts from the right to adjudicate upon other matters having a very close connection with those before the first court, and, in some instances, requiring the decision of the same questions exactly.

In examining into the exclusive character of the jurisdiction of such cases, we must have regard to the nature of the remedies, the character of the relief sought, and the identity of the parties in the different suits. For example, a party having notes secured by a mortgage on real estate, may, unless restrained by statute, sue in a court of chancery to foreclose his mortgage, and in a court of law to recover a judgment on his notes, and in another court of law in an action of ejectment to get possession of the land. Here in all the suits the only question at issue may be the existence of the debt mentioned in the notes and mortgage; but as the relief sought is different, and the mode of proceeding is different, the jurisdiction of neither court is affected by the proceeding in the other. And this is true, notwithstanding the common object of all the suits may be the collection of the debt. The true effect of the rule in these cases is, that the court of chancery cannot render a judgment for the debt, nor judgment of ejectment, but can only proceed in its own mode, to foreclose the equity of redemption by sale or otherwise. The first court of law cannot foreclose or give a judgment of ejectment, but can render a judgment for the payment of the debt; and the third court can give the relief by ejectment, but neither of the others. And the judgment of each court in the matter properly before it is binding and conclusive on all the other courts. This is the illustration of the rule where the parties are the same in all three of the courts.

The limitation of the rule must be much stronger, and must be applicable under many more varying circumstances, when persons not parties to the first proceeding are prosecuting their own separate interests in other courts.

The case before us is an apt illustration of these remarks. The proceeding in the attachment suit did not involve the question of the title of Colbath, defendant in error, to the property attached. The whole proceeding in that court, ending as it might in a judgment for the plaintiff, an execution and sale of the property attached, and satisfaction thereby of the plaintiff's debt, may be, and in such cases usually is, carried through without once requiring the court to consider the question of title to the property. That is all the time a question between the officer, or the purchaser at his sale, on the one side, and the adverse claimant on the other. There is no pretence, nor does any one understand, that anything more is involved or concluded by such proceedings, than such title to the property as the defendant in attachment had when the levy was made.

Hence it is obvious that plaintiff in error is mistaken when he asserts that the suit in the Federal court drew to it the question of title to the property, and that the suit in the State court against the marshal could not withdraw that issue from the former court. No such issue was before it, or was likely to come before it, in the usual course of proceeding in such a suit.

It is true, that if under the intimations in Freeman v. Howe, the claimant of the property had voluntarily gone before that court and asked by petition that the property be released from the attachment and restored to his possession, he might have raised such issue, and would have been bound by its decision. But no such application was made, no such issue was in fact raised, and no such issue belonged ordinarily to the case. We see nothing therefore in the mere fact that the writ issued from the Federal court, to prevent the marshal from being sued in the State court, in trespass for his own tort, in levying it upon the property of a man against whom the writ did not run, and on property which was not liable to it.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.

title: Buck v. Colbath/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Buck v. Colbath/Opinion of the Court


text: McAndrews v. Thatcher

title: McAndrews v. Thatcher


text: Talk:McAndrews v. Thatcher

title: Talk:McAndrews v. Thatcher