text:
Phoenix Insurance Companies v. Boykin/Opinion of the Court

1. The exception as to the introduction of testimony relates to four affidavits, which are referred to in the bill of exceptions as 'Exhibit 4.' There is no such exhibit in the record, nor anything else which can be identified as either of these affidavits. We cannot, therefore, determine whether their admission damaged the defence or not, and the assignment of error based on this exception must be overruled.

2. The assignment which alleges error in the charge of the judge is equally unfortunate. The charge is a very full and elaborate discussion of the law and the facts of the case, and no particular part of the charge, nor any special proposition of law found in it, is excepted to. We have repeatedly held that a general exception to the whole of such a charge is insufficient.

3. The exception to the refusal of the court to charge as requested may, with a little liberality, be held sufficient.

Based on the facts of the case the defendants at the trial asked instructions, the substance of which is condensed in the proposition that they had a right to proof of loss by an intelligent being, and if plaintiff was insane no such proof had been given, and if he were sane then his affidavit showed such fraud as should defeat recovery. The last of these propositions is not denied, but was not asked as an independent instruction. But the first is too repugnant to justice and humanity to merit serious consideration. There are two obvious answers to it. First, the affidavit, whether of an insane man or not, is sufficient in the information which it conveys of the time, the nature, and amount of the loss. Second, if he was so insane as to be incapable of making an intelligent statement, this would of itself excuse that condition of the policy. It is argued that plaintiff, having averred in his declaration that he did give them this information under oath, he cannot now be permitted to show an excuse by his insanity for not doing it. But as already seen his affidavit does literally prove the allegation, and if it contains something more which was the result of insanity, that does not vitiate what is well and truly stated in the affidavit. We are of opinion that all these prayers for instruction were properly rejected.

The remaining assignment of error is that the action was sustained and judgment given against all the defendant companies jointly.

We need not stop to inquire whether the action in this form should have been sustained if objection had been made at the proper stage of the suit, for by an express written agreement found in the record, defendants, by their counsel, consented that the action should be brought jointly instead of severally. As their liability depended on the same evidence and was founded on the same policy, and as their defence rested on the same issues, to be supported by the same testimony, it was manifestly for their interest to have but one trial, and no reason is apparent to us why this could not be done by consent. But the terms of this consent did not authorize the court to render a joint judgment, by which each company would be bound for the whole loss. This was not their contract, and it may be doubted if their counsel could have bound them by such an agreement if they had intended it. The judgment of the court, therefore, which is against the defendants jointly and not severally for the full amount of the policy, with interest, is erroneous and must be reversed.

But this error does not extend to the verdict. The amended declaration sets forth very distinctly the promises of the defendants as several and not joint, and the verdict of the jury is, 'that the said defendants did promise and assume, as the said plaintiff hath alleged, and they assess the damages of the said plaintiff at ten thousand dollars, with interest from the 20th of March, 1867.' The verdict of the jury, therefore, finds the amount of plaintiff's damages or loss, and that each of the defendants had promised and assumed to pay one-fourth thereof, which is manifestly a good verdict, responsive to the issues and to the contract of the defendants. The Circuit Court ought to have rendered a judgment that plaintiff recover of each of said defendants, severally, a sum which would have been the one-fourth part of the $10,000, and interest from the time mentioned in the verdict, and a joint judgment against all the defendants for costs. While we are bound, therefore, to reverse the judgment of that court the foregoing statement indicates very clearly the judgment which this court must render under the twenty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act. That section enacts that where a judgment or decree shall be reversed in a Circuit Court, such court shall proceed to render such judgment or pass such decree as the District Court should have rendered or passed; and the Supreme Court shall do the same in reversals therein, except when the reversal is in favor of the plaintiff or petitioner in the original suit, and the damages to be assessed, or matter to be decreed, are uncertain; in which case they shall remand the cause for final decision. As the case before us does not come within the exception above mentioned, it is our duty to render the judgment which we have shown that the Circuit Court should have rendered. The process, the pleadings, the trial, and the verdict are without error, and it surely cannot be necessary to set aside this verdict and award a new trial because the judgment which was rendered on that verdict was erroneous. And this was also the rule by which courts of error were governed at the common law. Indeed, it was for a long time denied that a court of error could award a venire facias de novo. In the case of Philips v. Bury, reported at great length in Skinner, which was an action in the King's Bench and writ of error to the Peers, who reversed the judgment below, the case was carried back and forward several times between the Peers and the King's Bench on the question of which court should render the judgment on the verdict, and it was finally settled that the House of Lords should give the judgment which the King's Bench ought to have given, Eyre, C. J., saying that where judgment is upon a verdict, if they reverse a judgment they ought to give the same judgment that ought to have been given at first, and that judgment ought to be sent to the court below. So in Slocomb's Case, Cro. Car., on a general verdict where judgment was reversed in the King's Bench, it was, in the language of the reporter, 'agreed by all the court, if the declaration and verdict be good, then judgment ought to be given for plaintiff, whereof Jones at first doubted, but at last agreed thereto, for we are to give such judgment as they ought to have given there.' In 1 Salkeld, it is said: 'If judgment be below for plaintiff and error is brought and that judgment reversed, yet if the record will warrant it the court ought to give a new judgment for the plaintiff,' which is precisely the case before us. And in Mellor v. Moore, on the authority of these and other cases, the court of Exchequer Chamber held that when a judgment is reversed on demurrer in favor of plaintiff, the case is sent down and a writ of inquirty goes, but when it is upon a verdict they should give the same judgment that ought to have been given at first, and that judgment ought to be sent below. In Gildart v. Gladstone, on a case from the Common Pleas having been reversed on a special verdict, Lord Ellenborough said: 'The court are bound, ex officio, to give a perfect judgment upon the record before them.'

The provisions of our statute of 1789, already cited, show that the lawyers who framed it were familiar with the doubts which seemed at that time to beset the courts in England as to the precise judgment to be rendered in a court of errors on reversing a judgment, and they in plain language prescribed the rule which has since become the settled law of the English courts on the same subject.

The judgment will be REVERSED and a judgment certified to the Circuit Court for plaintiff against each of the defendants for the one-fourth of amount of the plaintiff's damages, including interest, as ascertained by the verdict, and for a joint judgment against them all for the costs in that court.

Mr. Justice STRONG concurred in the judgment of reversal, but thought there should be a venire de novo. He stated his opinion to be that the verdict did not warrant the entry of such judgments as had just been directed.


text: Talk:Phoenix Insurance Companies v. Boykin/Opinion of the Court

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Hennessy v. Sheldon

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana.

Madame Dreville filed her petition in the court below against one Walker, in which she alleged that he, Walker, was indebted to her in the sum of $5492, and she showed how this debt originated; how the note on which it was founded came into her possession; how much of it has been paid, and how much remained due. She further set forth that a mortgage was given by him on certain real estate, which she described, to secure the payment of the note, and she filed as exhibits, with her petition, copies of the note and the credits indorsed on it, and of the mortgage with its acknowledgment and certificate of its record.

She prayed that Walker might be cited to appear before the court, and that after legal proceedings had, be condemned to pay the sum which she claimed with interest and costs and five per cent. lawyers' fees, as stipulated in the mortgage; and that the plantation mentioned in the mortgage be adjudged and decreed to be subject to the payment of said debt, interests, and costs. Then followed a separate prayer for general relief.

There was for answer, first a short general denial of all the allegations of the petition; and afterwards a long supplemental answer, as it was called, in the nature of a cross-bill, setting up usury, and a cross demand, which was called by the court 'a reconvention.' This latter pleading was by order of the court, afterwards stricken out, apparently on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. This, however, was done after a distinct hearing on that subject.

The final judgment or decree of the court was:

'That plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum claimed, with interest, costs, and lawyers' fees; with privilege and mortgage on the property described in the notarial act, passed before Ad. Mazurean, notary, a certified copy of which is made part hereof.'

Walker brought the case here on error.

The question considered by the court was, whether the case was properly brought here by that means, and whether it should not have come by appeal?

Mr. T. J. Durant, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Miles Taylor, contra:

Mr. Justice MILLER, having stated the case in the way above given, delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Hennessy v. Sheldon


text: Talk:Hennessy v. Sheldon

title: Talk:Hennessy v. Sheldon


text:
Hennessy v. Sheldon/Opinion of the Court

The pleading, the orders, and the decree of the court, show, we think, so as to need no further argument to a mind familiar with the principles of equity jurisprudence, that the procedure is in its essential nature a foreclosure of a mortgage in chancery. It has all the essential qualities of such a suit, and it has none which is not usual and appropriate in such a proceeding. It is true that there is a personal judgment against defendant, but the ninety-second rule of equity practice prescribed by this court clearly authorizes such a judgment in forclosure cases. It is the precise mode of foreclosing mortgages adopted in many of the States under their codes, and in all of them, when there is a separate chancery docket, such proceedings are classed among the chancery causes.

We have so often decided that notwithstanding the peculiarities of the Civil Code of Louisiana, the distinctions between law and equity must be preserved in the Federal courts, and that equity causes from that circuit must come here by appeal, and common law causes by writ of error, that we cannot now depart from that rule without overruling numerous decisions and a well-settled course of practice.

The present case being a proceeding in equity brought here by writ of error, and not by appeal, the writ must be

DISMISSED.

SWAYNE and BRADLEY, JJ, dissented.


text: Talk:Hennessy v. Sheldon/Opinion of the Court


text: Walker v. Dreville

title: Walker v. Dreville


text: Talk:Walker v. Dreville

title: Talk:Walker v. Dreville


text:
Walker v. Dreville/Opinion of the Court

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Sheldon, a citizen of New York, sued Hennessy, a citizen of Texas, on two notes. The defendant pleaded the general issue and payment. Judgment was given for the plaintiff, and the defendant took this writ of error and gave bond to cause the writ to operate as a supersedeas. There was no bill of exceptions.

Messrs. Albert Pike and R. W. Johnson, for the defendants in error, asserting that the writ of error was manifestly frivolous, vexatious, and for delay, asked affirmance and damages at the rate of ten per centum under the 23d Rule of court.

No opposing counsel.

The CHIEF JUSTICE.

There is nothing in the record which tends to show error in this judgment, or to repel the conclusion that the writ is prosecuted merely for delay. The judgment must, therefore, be

AFFIRMED WITH TEN PER CENT. DAMAGES.

title: Walker v. Dreville/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Walker v. Dreville/Opinion of the Court


text:
Scott v. United States (79 U.S. 443)

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

Messrs. A. H. Garland, N. P. Chipman, and E. L. Stanton, for the appellant; Mr. B. H. Bristow, Solicitor-General, and Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Scott v. United States (79 U.S. 443)


text: Talk:Scott v. United States (79 U.S. 443)


text:
Scott v. United States (79 U.S. 443)/Opinion of the Court

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Claims. The facts of the case, as far as it is necessary to consider them, are as follows:

On the 13th of February, 1866, Henry T. Noble, assistant quartermaster in the volunteer military service of the United States, entered into a contract with the appellant, Scott, whereby the quartermaster 'agrees to furnish all the transportation the United States may require from Little Rock, Arkansas, to Fort Smith, Arkansas, and of and from all points between Little Rock, Arkansas, and Fort Smith, Arkansas, when the same is to be furnished by river.' Transportation was called for by the United States between Little Rock and Fort Smith, furnished by Scott, and duly paid for by the government. Upon that subject there is no controversy between the parties. But the United States also shipped troops and stores from St. Louis to Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. The vessels, on their way, touched at Little Rock, but did not discharge there. While they were at Little Rock, Scott, in a written communication to the quartermaster, claimed the right, under his contract, to transport the troops and stores in question from that point to Fort Smith, and had boats ready to perform that service. None of the lading was delivered to him. Had he transported it, the freight, according to his contract, would have amounted to $17,605.66. The Court of Claims held that the transportation thus claimed was not within the contract, and dismissed his petition. Hence this appeal.

We think the decision of the Court of Claims was correct. The soundness of this view of the subject is too clear to require or admit of much discussion. The contract was for transportation between Little Rock and Fort Smith. Transportation from Little Rock to Fort Smith was not the same thing by any means as transportation from St. Louis to Fort Smith or Fort Gibson. Transportation from St. Louis to those places necessarily involved transportation by Little Rock, and thence over a common river route to the higher points of destination, but the voyages were wholly distinct and independent of each other. The greater includes the less, but that does not make them identical. In their totality they are as different as if the partial sameness did not exist. In the transportation between St. Louis and the other points named the part performed above Little Rock was but an ingredient in the mass. There is nothing which requires us to disintegrate it and give to Scott one part more than another. Such elongated transportation is neither within the letter nor the meaning of his contract.

In cases like this it is the duty of the court to assume the standpoint occupied by the parties when the contract was made-to let in the light of the surrounding circumstances-to see as the parties saw, and to think as they must have thought, in assenting to the stipulations by which they are bound. This process is always effective. When the terms employed are doubtful or obscure there is no surrer guide to their intent and meaning. It must have been known to both Scott and the quartermaster that such transportation would be required as that under consideration. It is incredible that they intended to subject the United States to the delay, inconvenience, and expense of the unlivery and reloading of every cargo which came up the river to Little Rock only to feed Scott's contract and meet its demands. He claims a monopoly, without regard to circumstances, of all the government transportation upon the water-way where his contract was to be fulfilled. Fort Gibson is above Fort Smith. As respects all lading to be shipped beyond Fort Smith the same unloading and reloading would be necessary there which had before occurred at Little Rock. A proposition, from which flow consequences so unreasonable, must itself be regarded as of that character. Where parties intend to contract by parol, and there is a misunderstanding as to the terms, neither is bound, because their minds have not met. Where there is a written contract, and a like misunderstanding is developed, a court of equity will refuse to execute it. If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to. But it is unnecessary to invoke the aid of anything outside of the contract itself. Its interpretation presents no question for our consideration. That the proper construction has been given to it, we think is equally clear.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Scott v. United States (79 U.S. 443)/Opinion of the Court


text:
Edwards v. Tanneret

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana.

In 1862, during the late rebellion, the courts of the United States were broken up within the limits of Louisiana. New Orleans, however, being retaken by the army of the United States, and the national authority partially re-established in the State, though still liable to be overthrown by successes of the rebels, President Lincoln, in October, 1862, established by proclamation what was known as a 'Provisional Court,' with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty; and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit Courts of the United States; conforming proceedings as far as possible to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana.

In this Provisional Court, one Daniel Edwards sued Emile Tanneret. The plaintiff's petition began thus:

'The petition of Daniel Edwards, a loyal citizen, residing in the city of New Orleans, with respect shows, that Emile Tanneret, residing on False River, in the parish of Pointe Coupee, is justly and truly indebted unto your petitioner for balance of account in the sum of $4995.'

The writ or citation was thus:

'THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED STATES PROVISIONAL MARSHAL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, GREETING:

'You are hereby commanded to summon Emile Tanneret, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, to comply with the demand of Daniel Edwards, citizen of the State of Louisiana.'

Judgment was given for the plaintiff. However, in July, 1865, Tanneret, describing himself as 'a resident of Pointe Coupee, Louisiana,' and Edwards as 'a resident of New Orleans,' filed a petition, and got an injunction from the same court against the issue of any execution; the order being simply, 'Let the injunction issue as prayed for.'

On the 20th of July, 1866, the authority of the United States being now completely re-established in Louisiana, Congress passed an act, by the first section of which all 'suits, causes, prosecutions, or proceedings,' then in the Provisional Court, with the records thereof, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and authority was given to the Circuit Court to hear and determine such of the suits or proceedings thus transferred 'as the Circuit Court could take jurisdiction of under the laws of the United States.'

The second section enacted, that in case suits or proceedings were then pending in the Provisional Court which could not have been instituted in the Circuit Court, or the District Court for that district, the records, when removed into the District Court, should 'remain in said District Court without further action.'

The third section enacted that all judgments, orders, decrees, and decisions of the Provisional Court, relating to the causes transferred by the act to the District Court or to the Circuit Court held in the Eastern District of Louisiana, should at once become the judgments, orders, decrees, and decisions of the District Court or the Circuit Court, unless the same were inconsistent with the rules and proceedings thereof; and that they might be enforced as the judgments, orders, and decrees of the District Court or the Circuit Court.

In this condition of things, Edwards appeared in the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana, and suggesting the recovery of his judgment, and that the defendant was 'an alien, and a citizen of the French Empire,' and himself 'a citizen of the State of Louisiana,' moved a transfer of his case into the Circuit Court. He made no allusion to the injunction, and having got a transfer of the case, issued execution.

The defendant's counsel then filed their own petition, alleging the injunction and denying the alienage of the defendant, asserting contrariwise that he was a citizen of Louisiana.

The court dismissed the case, as being a proceeding which, under the act of Congress, must remain in the archives of the District Court.

From this order of dismissal the present writ of error was taken.

Messrs. Weed and Clarke, for the plaintiff in error:

There were no State courts nor any Federal courts in Louisiana when the Provisional Court was established. This court was the creature of a social and civil necessity, temporary only. Any one might sue any one there. No allegation whatever of citizenship was necessary to give the court jurisdiction. Any allegation was therefore improper. The allegation of citizenship then that was made, was thus neither pertinent nor issuable, and was to be regarded as naught. It was only to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction and on the transfer that it became necessary that the alienage of one of the parties should appear; and the alienage did then appear in the motion and suggestion to the Circuit Court, on which a transfer of the case into that court was made. It was time enough to make it appear when its appearance was first wanted. It would have been more than senseless to have made it earlier. The unnecessary and unmeaning reference to citizenship in the proceedings in the Provisional Court don't affect the case. All things become new in the Circuit Court; and we have then a case where jurisdiction appears on the face of the pleadings. In such a case, if the alienage and consequent want of jurisdiction be denied, it should be taken advantage of by plea in abatement. We have nothing here but a motion. That is insufficient.

Mr. Durant, contra:

The radical defect of the opposite argument is, in supposing that the case when it appeared in the Circuit Court, was a new suit. It was the old 'suit, cause, prosecution, or proceeding,' 'transferred with the records thereof,' and these records showed a case not cognizable in the Circuit Court 'under the laws of the United States.' The subsequent averment in the Circuit Court of alienage of one party, was thus as ineffective as if the case had been begun in the Circuit Court on the same pleadings on which it was begun in the Provisional one.

A plea of an abatement is necessary only when the citizenship averred is such as to support the jurisdiction of the court, and defendant desires to controvert it. That is not this case, and the want of jurisdiction can be taken advantage of on motion.

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

title: Edwards v. Tanneret


text: Talk:Edwards v. Tanneret

title: Talk:Edwards v. Tanneret


text:
Edwards v. Tanneret/Opinion of the Court

It is manifest that by the act of Congress of July 28, 1866, no proceeding of any description was intended to be transferred into the Circuit Court, unless it was one of which the Circuit Court could take jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, as they were prior to the passage of the act. All suits and proceedings were transferred into the District Court, but only those could be acted upon by either the District or Circuit Court which might have been instituted in those courts, or one of them. All others were directed to remain in the District Court without further action. It was not the design of Congress to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in the Louisiana district, but rather or enable them to take up and dispose of cases which were within their jurisdiction, but which had been commenced in the Provisional Court, and, either not carried to judgment when that court was abolished, or, if carried to judgment, not completed by execution.

Such being the purpose and meaning of the act, it becomes necessary to inquire whether this was a case of which the Circuit Court could entertain jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, for if it was not, it never was legally transferred into that court, but it remained, by force of the statute, in the District Court. The record discloses that the suit was brought in the Provisional Court by the plaintiff, who is described in the petition as a citizen, residing in the city of New Orleans, against the defendant, described as residing on False River, in the parish of Pointe Coupee. There is no other description of the citizenship of the parties contained in the petition. The citation, however, describes both the plaintiff and the defendant as citizens of Louisiana, and these are all the averments of citizenship which can be found in the record. As the suit was brought for a balance of an account, its subject-matter did not bring it within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and hence, if it was a case of which that court could entertain jurisdiction, it must be because of the citizenship of the parties. But when the plaintiff in an action invokes the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court because of the citizenship of the parties, it must appear upon the record that the citizenship is such as to justify the court in taking cognizance of the case. And certainly the pleadings here exhibit nothing from which the court can see that both parties are not citizens of Louisiana. As already noticed, the petition makes no averment respecting the citizenship of the defendant, and simply describes the plaintiff as a citizen, without asserting of what state or kingdom. And the citation describes both parties as citizens of Louisiana.

It is true that after the judgment was obtained in the Provisional Court an injunction was granted against its execution, but neither that injunction nor the bill or petition upon which it was founded can be considered any part of this record; and if they could, they would not aid the plaintiff, for in neither of them is there any averment of the citizen ship of the parties. Nor does it sufficiently appear in any other way that both parties were not citizens of Louisiana. The plaintiff, indeed, when he moved for the transfer of the case into the Circuit Court, suggested that the defendant was an alien, but the suggestion was not made in the Provisional Court. No proof of it was offered, and the alleged alienage was subsequently denied. It is clear, therefore, that the case was not one of which the Circuit Court could entertain jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, and that it was never legally transferred to that court. It follows that the order dismissing the cause was correct.

We are to be understood as deciding only what is before us. We express no opinion respecting the regularity or effect of the injunction which was obtained in the Provisional Court.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


text: Talk:Edwards v. Tanneret/Opinion of the Court


text: The Patapsco

title: The Patapsco


text: Talk:The Patapsco

title: Talk:The Patapsco


text:
The Patapsco/Opinion of the Court

BOYCE filed a libel in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, against the steamer Patapsco, claiming $1724. That court dismissed the libel; but, on appeal, the Circuit Court reversed the decree and sent the case to a master, to report the amount due. The master, on the 15th July, 1868, reported $1982. The Circuit Court confirmed the report, and on the 11th February, 1870, decreed in favor of the libellant for the amount reported, with interest from the date of the report. Adding the one year, six months, and twenty-six days' interest to the amount given by the report the sum was $2200 and upwards.

On this state of facts, Mr. Orville Horwitz, for the appellee, moved to dismiss, on the ground that the $2000 necessary to give this court jurisdiction did not exist, unless by adding interest to the amount claimed, or to that reported due.

The statute, it will be remembered, gives an appeal 'where the sum in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $2000.'

Mr. Donohue, contra.

The decree of the Circuit Court was for the amount reported due the libellant on the 15th July, 1868, $1982, and interest from the date of the report. We think that interest to the date of the decree must be computed as a part of the sum for which the decree was rendered. The sum thus computed exceeds $2000, and the motion must, therefore, be

DENIED.

title: The Patapsco/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:The Patapsco/Opinion of the Court

title: Talk:The Patapsco/Opinion of the Court


text: Hall v. Allen Assignee

title: Hall v. Allen Assignee


text: Talk:Hall v. Allen Assignee

title: Talk:Hall v. Allen Assignee


text:
Hall v. Allen Assignee/Opinion of the Court

MOTION to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, an appeal from the Circuit Court for Missouri: the case being thus:

The act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy gives to the District Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in matters of bankruptcy, including 'the adjustment of the various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties.' The act enacts, however, by its 2d section:

'That the several Circuit Courts. . . within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under this act; and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition or other process, of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a court of equity.'

The 6th section of the same act, after speaking of the District Court, provides that

'In any bankruptcy, or in any other proceedings,. . . the parties concerned may, at any stage of the proceedings, by consent, state any question or questions, in a special case, for the opinion of the court; and the judgment of the court shall be final, unless it be agreed and stated in such special case that either party may appeal, if, in such case, an appeal is allowed by this act.'

With these provisions in force, one Downing, doing both an individual and a partnership business, and having creditors of both classes, was declared a bankrupt, all Allen was appointed his assignee. The bankrupt cause having been referred to a register in bankruptcy, a question arose upon the facts of the case (not disputed) whether the separate creditors were to be paid in full before the partnership creditors should get anything; the question arising upon some motion made before the register. And a case and the question upon it and the motion being agreed on by the counsel, the register certified the whole to the District Court for its opinion, a right of appeal being reserved to all parties. That court decided that the separate creditors were to be paid in full; to which decision the assignee excepted, and the court signed a bill of exceptions. The assignee now appealed to the Circuit Court. That court reversed the decision of the District Court. An appeal was then taken to this court by the assignee from the decision-the appeal which it was now asked to have dismissed.

Mr. H. Hitchcock, in support of the motion: The matter before the Circuit Court was a mere question 'arising in the course of the administration of the bankrupt's estate,' and so within the supervisory jurisdiction given by the 2d section to the Circuit Court. It was the original jurisdiction for 'the adjustment of the various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties,' conferred on the District Courts by the Bankrupt Act, which was invoked by simple motion; which motion, together with an agreed statement of facts, was, at the request of all parties concerned, certified by the register for its opinion to the District Court. A case stated is within the terms, 'other process,' spoken of in the 2d section. Morgan v. Thornhill, decided that in such cases no appeal lies to this court.

Mr. E. Avery, contra: This case, unlike Morgan v. Thornhill, did not arise under the 2d section of the act, but under the 6th. The parties had stated a case for the District Court, as that section provides, and had reserved their right of appeal. The case being thus in the Circuit Court, in a regular way, and not in it as a merely supervisory court, an appeal would lie.

It is quite evident that the decision of the Circuit Court was made in the exercise of its superintending and revising jurisdiction, and this court decided at the last term, in Morgan v. Thornhill, that no appeal can be taken from the decision of the Circuit Court in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, is

DISMISSED.


text: Talk:Hall v. Allen Assignee/Opinion of the Court


text: People v. Central Railroad

title: People v. Central Railroad


text: Talk:People v. Central Railroad

title: Talk:People v. Central Railroad


text:
People v. Central Railroad/Opinion of the Court

THIS was a motion to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, a writ of error to the Supreme Court of New York; the case being thus:

In 1833 an agreement was made between New York and New Jersey, relative to the boundary line between the two States, to which Congress gave its assent by an act approved June 28th, 1834. The subject of the agreement was 'all the waters of the bay of New York,. . . and all the waters of the Hudson River lying west of Manhattan Island, and to the south of the mouth of Spuyten Duyvel Creek, and of the lands covered by the said waters to the low water-mark on the westerly or New Jersey side thereof.' In this condition of things suit was brought in one of the courts of New York by the People of the State of New York against the Central Railroad Company for a nuisance committed by taking possession without license from the State of about 800 acres of land and water, and erecting docks, wharves, piers, and other improvements within the alleged jurisdiction of New York, under this agreement.

The railroad company asserted that, under the agreement, the land and water were within the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey, by whose authority they committed the acts complained of, and the highest tribunal of the State of New York decided in favor of the claim of the railroad company in behalf of the State of New Jersey. To that judgment the writ of error which it was now sought to have dismissed was taken.

In support of the motion to dismiss, Mr. F. T. Frelinghuysen insisted that in this decision of the court in New York there was not drawn in question the construction of any statute of the United States, and that the decision was not against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up and claimed under any such statute. The controversy related wholly to the extent of the jurisdiction of New York over the land and water in the rivers and bay of New York, and presented nothing but a question of construction of the agreement.

On the other hand it was argued, by Messrs. J. C. Dimick and A. J. Parker, against the motion, that the decision was against the rights of New York, as defined by the agreement, and that this court had jurisdiction because of the act giving the assent of Congress to it.

We think that the statement of the case shows that the question arose under the agreement and not under any act of Congress. The assent of Congress did not make the act giving it a statute of the United States, in the sense of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The construction of the act was in no way drawn in question, nor has any title or right been set up under it and denied by the State court. It had no effect beyond giving the consent of Congress to the compact between the two States.

DISMISSED.


text: Talk:People v. Central Railroad/Opinion of the Court


text: Legal Tender Cases (79 U.S. 457)

title: Legal Tender Cases (79 U.S. 457)


text: Talk:Legal Tender Cases (79 U.S. 457)

title: Talk:Legal Tender Cases (79 U.S. 457)