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Chicago v. Union Rolling-Mill Company/Opinion of the Court

The appellants assign for error: (1) The refusal of the circuit court to dismiss the original bill, and the rendition of the final decree in favor of the rolling-mill company, and the ordering of the sale of the property of the company to satisfy the same. (2) The finding that the rolling-mill company had a lien upon the railroad and property of the Illinois River Railroad Company for the amount found to be due it, and that such lien was paramount to the lien of the bonds secured by the trust deed to Straut. (3) The rendition of a personal decree against the Alton Railroad Company for $29,796.30, and the awarding of execution thereon. We shall consider these assignments of error in the order in which they are stated.

The appellants contend that Dumont, the original complainant, had the right at any stage of the case to dismiss his bill, and that its dismissal would carry with it the cross-bill, and that having made the motion to dismiss, which was erroneously overruled, all the subsequent proceedings and decrees are erroneous. It may be conceded that when an original bill is dismissed before final hearing a cross-bill filed by a defendant falls with it. It may also be conceded that, as a general rule, a complainant in an original bill has the right, at any time upon payment of costs, to dismiss his bill. But this latter rule is subject to a distinct and well-settled exception, namely, that after a decree, whether final or interlocutory, has been made, by which the rights of a party defendant have been adjudicated, or such proceedings have been taken as entitle the defendant to a decree, the complainant will not be allowed to dismiss his bill without the consent of defendant. The rule is stated as follows, in Daniell, Ch. P. (5th Amer. Ed. 793: 'After a decree or decretal order the court will not allow a plaintiff to dismiss his own bill unless upon consent, for all parties are interested in a decree, and any party may take such steps as he may be advised to have the effect of it.' The same writer (page 794) says that 'after a decree has been ade, of such a kind that other persons besides the parties on the record are interested in the prosecution of it, neither the plaintiff nor defendant, on the consent of the other, can obtain an order for the dismissal of the bill.' The rule, as we have stated it, is sustained by many adjudicated cases. It was laid down by the lord chancellor, in Cooper v. Lewis, 2 Phil. Ch. 131, as follows:

'The plaintiff is allowed to dismiss his bill on the     assumption that it leaves the defendant in the same position      as he would have stood if the suit had not been instituted;      it is not so where there has been a proceeding in the cause      which has given the defendant a right against the plaintiff.'

In Bank v. Rose, 1 Rich. Eq. (S.C..) 294, it was said:

'But whenever, in the progress of a cause, the defendant     entitles himself to a decree, either against a complainant or      a co-defendant, and the dismissal would put him to the      expense and trouble of bringing a new suit or making new      proofs, such dismissal will not be permitted.'

So in the case of Connor v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 167, the supreme court of Ohio declared:

'The propriety of permitting a complainant to dismiss his     bill is a matter within the sound discretion of the court,      which discretion is to be exercised with reference to the      rights of both parties, as well the defendant as the      complainant. After a defendant has been put to trouble in     making his defense, if in the progress of the case rights      have been manifested that he is entitled to claim and which      are valuable to him, it would be unjust to deprive him of      them merely because the complainant might come to the      conclusion that it would be for his interests to dismiss his      bill. Such a mode of proceeding would be trifling with the     court as well as with the rights of defendants. We think the     court did not err in its ruling in refusing to permit      complainant to dismiss his bill.'

Chancellor WALWORTH, in the case of Watt v. Crawford, 11 Paige, 472, laid down the rule in these words:

'Before any decree or decretal order has been made in a suit     in chancery, by which a defendant therein has acquired      rights, the complainant is at liberty to dismiss his bill      upon payment of costs; but after a decree has been made by      which a defendant has acquired rights, either as against a complainant or      against a co-defendant in the suit, the complainant's bill      cannot be dismissed without destroying those rights. The     complainant in such a case cannot dismiss without the consent      of all parties interested in the decree, nor even with such      consent, without a rehearing, or upon a special order to be      made by the court.'

See, also, Gilbert v. Hawles, 1 Ch. Cas. 40; Bluck v. Colnaghi, 9 Sim. Ch. 411; Lashley v. Hogg, 11 Ves. Jr. 602; Booth v. Leycester, 1 Keene, Ch. 255; Biscoe v. Brett, 2 Ves. & B. 377; Collins v. Greaves, 5 Hare, 596; Gregory v. Spencer, 11 Beav. 143; Carrington v. Holly, 1 Dick. 280; Anon. 11 Ves. Jr. 169; Cozzens v. Sisson, 5 R. I. 490; Updyke v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 461; Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank, 23 Pick. 491; Bethia v. McKay, Cheves, Eq. (S.C..) 96; Saylor's Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 495; Seymour v. Jerome, Walk. (Mich.) Ch. 356.

The authorities cited sustain the refusal of the circuit court to allow Dumont to dismiss his bill. The only really contested issue in the case was between Dumont, representing the bondholders, and the rolling-mill company. The answers of all the other defendants simply required proof of the averments of the bill, neither admitting nor denying them. The issue raised by the averments of the original bill and the answer of the rolling-mill company, and by the cross-bill of the rolling-mill company and the answer of Dumont, the complaint in the original bill, was whether the rolling-mill company had a lien upon the road and property of the Illinois River Railroad Company, and whether such lien was superior to that of the trust deed executed to Straut, which the original bill was filed to foreclose. The issues thus raised involved the right of all the parties to the suit. This issue was referred to a master to take testimony and report. He filed a report which was entitled both of the original and cross-cause. The record shows that, 'by agreement of counsel, the report of the master in said bill and cross-bill was referred back to him,' with leave to the parties to take further proofs; that after taking a large mass of additional evidence, covering several hundred printed pages, the master reported that the rolling-mill company had a statutory lien upon the property covered by the trust deed executed to Straut, and that the same was consequently the first lien upon the property. Joint exceptions were filed to this report by Dumont, the original complainant, and the Alton Railroad Company and the Illinois River Railroad Company, all of which were entitled both of the original and cross-cause. After full argument, the court overruled the exceptions and rendered an interlocutory decree in both the original and cross-cause, establishing the lien of the rolling-mill company as claimed in its answer to the original bill and in its cross-bill. After all these proceedings, and when the controversy between the parties was practically ended by the interlocutory decree of the court, the motion to dismiss his original bill was made by Dumont, the complainant therein. The rolling-mill company insisted that if the original bill, carrying with it the cross-bill, were dismissed, its claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. It would be hard to conceive of a clearer case for the application of the rule laid down by the authorities we have cited. If the court, under these circumstances, had allowed the original bill to be dismissed without the consent of the rolling-mill company, it would have inflicted a palpable wrong on that company, and trifled with the administration of justice. The fact that the rolling-mill company had been compelled to file a cross-bill in order to secure complete relief, only strengthens the case against the dismissal of the original bill. Several of the authorities cited to show that an original bill cannot be dismissed after decree, apply to cases where a cross-bill has been filed. Bank v. Rose, 1 Rich. Eq., and Watt v. Crawford, ubi supra.

But counsel for appellants insist on the right of Dumont to dismiss his original bill, because a supplemental bill had been filed, to which, as well as to the original bill, the Illinois River Railroad Company had filed a plea denying the jurisdiction of the court; that the truth and sufficiency of this plea were admitted by the complainant, because he failed to reply thereto, or set it down for argument by the next succeeding rule day, or to obtain further time for that purpose from the court; and that therefore, under the thirty-eighth equity rule, the bill should have been dismissed 'as of course' by the court. It is to be observed that the plea referred to was filed by the Illinois River Railroad Company, which is not a party to this appeal, and which never asked the dismissal of the original bill, because its plea had not been put at issue or set down for argument. Under these circumstances it would be a strange application of the thirty-eighth rule to hold that the complainant had the right to dismiss his bill after the cause had been decided against him. It plainly appears from the record that after such plea was filed by the Illinois Railroad Company, no notice was taken of it by any of the parties, the cause was allowed to proceed as if it had never been filed, and was decided upon the issues raised by the answer and cross-bill of the rolling-mill company. The complainant now insists that his bill should have been dismissed, carrying with it the decree of the court in favor of the rolling-mill company, the cross-bill, and the issues raised upon it, and the grea mass of testimony in the case, in the taking of which he had participated, because of his own neglect to reply to a plea filed by another party, which itself never insisted upon the dismissal of the bill by reason of that neglect. The only party which could assign for error the refusal of the court to dismiss the bill on account of the default of the original complainant in not replying to or setting down the plea, is the Illinois River Railroad Company, by which the plea was filed. But it has never taken any exception to the refusal of the court to dismiss the bill, and is not a party to this appeal. For the reason stated we think the circuit did right in overruling the application of Dumont for leave to dismiss his bill.

It is next insisted that the court erred in entering a final decree in favor of the rolling-mill company, and ordering a sale of the property of the railroad company to satisfy the same. The ground of this contention is that the final decree was rendered upon the cross-bill only, and not upon the original bill, and that if the cross-bill only were considered the court had no jurisdiction thereof by reason of want of the requisite citizenship of the parties thereto, and that no decree could be rendered upon the cross-bill, except as consequent upon a decree in the original cause. This objection proceeds upon an assumption not sustained by the record. The cause was heard at the same time upon both the original and cross-bills. The issue was whether or not the lien of the rolling-mill company was prior to the bonds secured by the deed of trust. This was raised both by the original and cross-bills. The prayer of the original bill was that an account might be taken of the sums due for principal and interest on the bonds secured by the trust deed to Straut, and of the sums due as liens upon the railroad, and that it might be sold for the payment of the same. The issues raised by the original bill and the answer of the rolling-mill company, and upon the cross-bill of the rolling-mill company, were found by the court in favor of the company upon a hearing of both the original and cross-bills. The court decided in favor of the rolling-mill company, granting it the relief prayed in its cross-bill. It is true the complainant, in his original bill, did not ask for a decree upon the final hearing in his favor. But the cause heaving been heard on both the original and cross-bills, he could not prevent the granting of the relief prayed by the cross-bill, either by dismissing his bill or by not asking for a decree. The original bill was not dismissed, but is still pending, and the complainant in that bill may still apply in behalf of the holders of bonds secured by the trust deed to Straut for such part of the proceeds of the sale as the final decree orders to be paid to the clerk of the court. Our conclusion is, therefore, that it was competent for the court to render the final decree made in this case.

The next question presented by the assignments of error is whether the rolling-mill company had a lien upon the railroad and other property of the Illinois River Railroad Company superior to the deed of trust to Straut and the lease to the Alton Railroad Company. The matter of liens upon railroads is regulated by the Revised Statutes of Illinois, c. 82, § 51, in force when the contract of August 7, 1874, for the delivery of iron rails was made, and on March 1, 1875, when the trust deed to Straut was executed, which declares: 'That all persons who may have furnished, or who shall  hereafter furnish, to any railroad corporation now   existing or hereafter to be organized under the laws of   this state, any fuel, ties, materials, supplies, or any   other articles or thing necessary for the construction,   maintenance, operation, or repair of such roads by   contract with said corporation, or who shall have done   and performed, or shall hereafter do and perorm, any   work or labor for such construment, maintenance,   operation, or repair by like contract, shall be entitled   to be paid for the same as part of the current expenses   of said road; and in order to secure the same shall have   a lien upon all the property, real, personal, and mixed,   of said railroad corporation as against such railroad,   and as against all mortgages or other liens which shall   accrue after the commencement of the delivery of said   articles, or the commencement of said work or labor:   provided suit shall be commenced within six months after   such contractor or laborer shall have completed his   contract with said railroad corporation, or after such   labor shall have been performed, or material furnished.'

The rolling-mill company began to deliver to the Illinois River Railroad Company on September 1, 1874, iron rails and other material to be used in the construction of its road, and continued such delivery until November 11, 1874. The material so furnished, of the value of $107,785.09, was used in the the construction of the railroad. Within less than six months from November 12, 1874, the date when the last material was delivered, the rolling-mill company filed in the proper court its bill of complaint to enforce its lien under said statute. The lease of its road made by the Illinois River Railroad Company to the Alton Railroad Company and its deed of trust to George Straut were not executed until March 1, 1875, long after the delivery of said material had been commenced. The lien of the rolling-mill company under the statute would therefore seem to be complete and superior to that of the trust deed and lease.

The appellants, however, contend that the rolling-mill company waived its lien by the contract between it and the construction company and the Alton Railroad Company of August 7, 1874, by which it was stipulated that the rails and other materials furnished by the rolling-mill company should be used in the construction of the railroad of the Illinois River Railroad Company, and that until fully paid for the rolling-mill company should have a lien thereon, and that the possession thereof by the railroad company should be the possession of the rolling-mill company. We do not think that this stipulation shows any purpose on the part of the rolling-mill company to waive its statutory lien. When the contract was made, the railroad for which the materials were to be furnished was in contemplation only. The survey of its route had not been completed, nor had the right of way been obtained. The evident purpose of the stipulation was to secure a specific lien on the materials furnished, and to require them to be used in the construction of the railroad where they would be subject to the statutory lien, and the facts of this case show that this was a wise precaution. The contract therefore, so far from showing a waiver of the statutory lien, shows a purpose on the part of the rolling-mill company to retain it. The statutory lien was therefore not lost. On this question the case of Clark v. Moore, 64 Ill. 279, is in point. In that case the supreme court of Illinois says:

'It is also insisted that appellees waived their rights when     they sold the property, by reserving a lien upon it in a      written contract; that they thereby received and held      additional security that operated to destroy any lien that      would otherwise have attached. It is true that where a     laborer or material-man receives security collateral to the      property improved, whether the security be personal or a      mortgage on or a pledge of other property or chose in action,      the law presumes that it was intended to waive or release the      lien upon the premises. In their effort to retain a lien on     the machinery furnished by appellees, they took no collateral      or independent security. It was but a futile effort to retain     a superior lien on the property furnished over and above      other lienholders. Had these parties taken a mortgage on     these lots and the building, which the law would have      adjudged void, would any one claim that they could not assert      their lien? The lien attaches to and i cumbers the property,     to improve which the material is furnished, and the effort to      acquire a more specified and exclusive lien in nowise      manifests intention to release the property from all liens and look to other security for payment, but it shows      the very opposite intention, and intention to hold, if      possible, the property liable for the payment of their      claim.'

This authority decides the question in hand against the appellants, and is entitled to great, if not conclusive, weight in this court.

The appellants further contend that the rolling-mill company, by the contract of August 7, 1874, gave credit for the materials to be purchased by it, which extended beyond the time within which suit would have to be brought to fix and enforce the statutory lien, and that this fact shows conclusively that the statutory lien was waived. It is well settled that an agreement for the extension of credit by receiving a note of the party, or the independent security of a third person, falling due at a day beyond the period within which the lien must be asserted, will be no waiver when the agreement to give the note or security has not been performed by the promisor. To hold otherwise would be to say that the builder or material-man must have intended to waive his lien in the event of a refusal to comply with the agreement. On the debtor's refusal to keep the agreement, the builder or material-man ought not to be bound by it, but should be remitted to his rights, independently of the contract. The Highlander, 4 Blatchf. 55. It is clear from the terms of the contract that the rolling-mill company never agreed to extend credit for the materials furnished unless notes were given therefor, with the stockholders of the construction company as indorsers, and with the bonds of the construction company secured by the deed of trust to Norton as collateral secuity. The contract to give credit was clearly conditional upon the delivery of the notes and bonds. It would be absurd to hold that on the failure to deliver them the rolling-mill company had nothing to show for its iron rails and other materials but the promise of an insolvent railroad company and an insolvent construction company to deliver the notes and bonds. They were as impotent to deliver the notes and bonds as they were to pay cash. Such could not have been the intention of the parties to the contract. On the failure of the companies to deliver the notes and bonds according to the contract, the rolling-mill company was entitled to immediate payment and to its statutory lien to secure it, because the credit was conditioned upon the giving of security, and the security was not given. It has been so held by the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Gardner v. Hall, 29 Ill. 277. Gardner filed his petition to enforce a mechanic's lien on a contract for doing certain work. The contract provided that payment of a certain installment, due upon a day named, should be postponed for a period extending more than a year after the completion of the work, in case a mortgage in the premises should be given to secure said installment. The petition was demurred to, and the demurrer was sustained. On appeal this decree was reversed, and the supreme court said: 'An agreement was made to give a mortgage which would have destroyed the lien, but no mortgage was given, and hence the lien remained. So was an agreement made to extend the time of payment which would destroy the lien. But the mortgage was not executed, hence the time was never extended and the lien never waived thereby.' See, also, The Highander, ubi supra. We are of opinion, therefore, that as the purchasing companies did not perform the condition upon which credit was to be given, no credit at all was given, much less a credit extending beyond the time for the enforcement of the statutory lien.

It follows from these views that the contention of appellant that the suit begun May 10, 1875, by the rolling-mill company to fix and foreclose its statu ory lien, was brought before the cause of action accred, and cannot, therefore, be treated as a compliance with the statute, cannot be sustained, for at that date the debt was due and the lien in force. In our opinion the rolling-mill company had, under the statute of Illinois, a lien upon the railroad and its appurtenances, of the Illinois River Railroad Company, for the value of the materials furnished by it and used in the construction of the railroad, superior to the lien of the trust deed executed to George Straut on March 1, 1875, and to the lease of said railroad, executed on the same day, to the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and that the decree of the circuit court ordering the railroad to be sold to pay the sum due for said materials so used was just and right.

It, is lastly, assigned for error, that the circuit court rendered a personal decree against the Alton Railroad Company in favor of the rolling-mill company, and awarded execution thereon. The personal decree complained of was for $29,796.30. This sum was the value, with interest, of certain iron rails, etc., sold and delivered by the rolling-mill company to the Illinois River Railroad Company and the construction company, under the the contract of August 7, 1874, which were not used in the construction of the railroad, but were sold by the purchasing companies to the Alton Railroad Company, and by it converted to its own use. The circuit court court found that the rolling-mill company had a lien upon said materials; that the Alton Railroad Company bought said materials with notice thereof, and had never paid for the same, and had alleged, as a reason for its failure to pay, the want of title in the companies from which it purchased. The facts so found are clearly shown by the record, and do not seem to be disputed. The Alton Railroad Company, however, insists that there was no lien on said materials under the contract of August 7, 1874, because the contract was not acknowledged and recorded as required by the law of Illinois relating to chattel mortgages. That act provided as follows:

'That no mortgage, trust deed, or other conveyance of     personal property, having the effect of a mortgage or lien      upon such property, shall be valid as against the rights and      interests of any third person, unless possession thereof      shall be delivered to and remain with the grantee, or the      instrument shall provide for the possession of the property      property to remain with the grantor, and the instrument is      acknowledged and recorded, as hereinafter directed; and every      such instrument shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed a chattel mortgage.' Rev. St. Ill. c. 95, § 1.

The theory of the appellants is that the Illinois River Railroad Company and the construction company, being the owners by purchase of the iron rails, retained possession of the same, and by the contract of August 7, 1874, gave to the rolling-mill company a chattel mortgage thereon, which was never acknowledged and recorded, and that consequently the lien fails. But the facts of the case are not in accord with this theory. When the contract referred to was made the iron rails were not the property of the purchasing companies. It does not appear that the rails were at that time in existence, and they were certainly not in possession of the purchasing companies. So that this is not the case contemplated by the Illinois statute, which clearly refers to a mortgage on personal property, of which the mortgagor is owner, and of which he is in possession, and of which he wishes to retain possession. The case is that of the owner, namely, the rolling-mill company, of personal property, who sells it and delivers the physical possession to to its vendee, and by the bill of sale retains a contract lien thereon. In such a case it is clear that the original vendor can enforce the lien against a subsequent purchaser who had actual notice of the lien and had not paid for the property, and refuse to pay for it on the ground that the fir t vendee from whom he bought had no title thereto. The chattel mortgage law above quoted can have no reference to such a case. Such an application of it would be unjust, inequitable, and unreasonable. The law has never been so applied by the courts of Illinois.

We find no error in the proceedings and decrees of the circuit court. They are therefore affirmed.

''Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Rolling-mill Co.'' is an appeal from the same decree affirmed in the preceding case. The insurance company, by leave, filed an intervening petition, claiming to be the owner of 45 of the bonds secured by the trust deed to George Straut. It has never proved its possession or ownership of any of said bonds, either before the master or the court. If it had it would be in the same position as any other holder of said bonds, all of whom, so far as the questions raised by this appeal are concerned, were represented by Dumont, the complainant in the original bill. These questions have all been decided in the preceding case.

In this case also the decree appealed from must therefore be affirmed.


text: Talk:Chicago v. Union Rolling-Mill Company/Opinion of the Court

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text:
Howard v. Carusi

'I further hope, trust, and desire that in the event either one of my said nieces, daughters of the said Samuel Carusi, shall not survive my said brother Samuel, that the share she might become entitled to had she survived him may be conferred and fall to the surviving niece or nieces. In no event shall any portion of my estate be subject to the control or interference of any husband either one of my said nieces may have at the time of my decease or at any time thereafter.

'I give and devise to my three nieces, daughters of my brother Nathaniel Carusi, the sum of two thousand dollars, ($2,000.)'

By the third and last item of the will the testator appointed his brother Samuel Carusi the sole executor thereof.

Afterwards, on July 18, 1872, the said Lewis Carusi, as party of the first part, executed a deed of that date, which purported to convey to his brother Samuel Carusi party of the second part, in fee-simple, all his real estate in the city of Washington, upon trusts which were thus expressed:

'In trust, nevertheless, to, for, and upon the following uses and trusts, that is to say, in trust to sell and convey the whole or any part of the said piece or parcels of ground and premises, at the discretion of the said party of the second part, and to invest the moneys arising out of such sale or sales in other property or securities, for the use and benefit of the said party of the first part; and in event of the death of the said party of the first part, so much of said pieces or parcels of ground as may remain unsold, or such other property as may be purchased, or such securities as may be acquired, in manner aforesaid, to convey to such person or persons as the said party of the first part may, by his last will and testament, or other paper writing, under his hand and seal, by two persons witnessed, designate and direct.'

The appellant averred, and the defendants denied, that this deed had been delivered by the grantor to the grantee therein named. Subsequently, on October 17, 1872, Lewis Carusi executed and delivered to his brother Samuel Carusi another deed, conveying to him absolutely in fee-simple the same lands described in said will and in the deed of July 18, reserving to himself the rents and profits thereof during his life. On October 25, 1872, Lewis Carusi died, having made no will other than that of March 18, 1872, above mentioned. After the death of Lewis, Samuel Carusi took possession of the real estate described in said will and deeds, claiming an absolute title in fee-simple thereto, by virtue of said will and the deed of October 17, 1872, and continued in possession until his death. On March 23, 1877, he duly executed his last will and testament, by which he devised to his wife, Adelaide S.C.arusi, for her natural life, all his real estate, with remainder in fee at her death to his children, John McLean Carusi, Samuel P. Carusi, Thornton Carusi, Estelle Caulfield, Genevieve Carusi, and Isolina E. Howard, share and share and share alike, and appointed his wife, the said Adelaide S., and his son, the said John McLean Carusi, the executors thereof. Afterwards, on December 22, 1877, Samuel Carusi died, and on January 8, 1878, his will was admitted to probate and record in the orphans' court of the District of Columbia.

The bill in this case was filed by Isolina E. Howard, one of the children and heirs at law of Samuel Carusi, against the defendants, who were her brothers and sisters and devisees under their said father's will. It averred the making by Lewis Carusi of his said will and of the deeds of July 18 and October 17, 1872, and specially averred the delivery by Lewis Carusi to his brother Samuel of the first-mentioned deed. It averred that the deed of October 17, 1872, was made by Lewis Carusi when he was physically so feeble as to be unable to sign his name 'and when he was mentally incompetent to execute a deed; that at the time said deed was made by him he had no legal title to the real estate therein described, having divested himself thereof by the deed of trust of July 18, 1872; and that he was procured to make said deed of October 17th by Samuel Carusi, for whose benefit it was made.' The bill further alleged that the will of Lewis Carusi was propounded for probate and record in the proper court, but a caveat having been filed against the probate thereof, no proceedings were taken or decree made in reference thereto. The bill charged that the will of Lewis Carusi fully designated the beneficiaries of the trusts created by the deed of trust of July 18, 1872, and that Samuel Carusi had no estate in the property belonging to Lewis Carusi which he could dispose of by his last will so as to divest the plaintiff and her sisters of their rights under the last will and testament of Lewis Carusi, and that Samuel Carusi was only a trustee to hold the property during the life-time of Lewis Carusi, and upon trust to convey the same upon the death of Lewis to the complainant and her sisters in mannerset forth in Lewis Carusi's last will and in said deed of trust. The bill further alleged that Samuel Carusi, with the purpose of defeating the provisions of the will and deed of trust executed by Lewis arusi, did during his own life-time suppress the deed of trust and claimed an absolute title in fee-simple to all the estate of Lewis Carusi under the will of the latter and the deed of October 17, 1872. Finally, the bill alleged that Lewis Carusi, during his life-time, repeatedly 'declared, in the most unmistakable terms, that it was his intention to leave his estate, by any testamentary disposition he should make thereof, to his nieces, to the exclusion entirely of any nephews that might survive him, and to the exclusion of the wife of the said Samuel Carusi, should she survive him; * * * and that it was the intention of Lewis Carusi to make provision at all events for his said several nieces in preference to all persons and to every person who might, by reason of affinity, have any claim upon him or his estate.' The bill prayed for a decree declaring the deed of trust dated July 18, 1872, to be in full force and effect, and that the will of Lewis Carusi was operative as designating the beneficiaries under the deed of trust, and its terms and conditions; that the will of Samuel Carusi, so far as it devises any part of the estate of which Lewis Carusi died seized, might be declared null and void; that a receiver might be appointed to take charge of and manage the estate; and that the defendants, Adelaide S.C.arusi and John McLean Carusi, named as executors of the will of Samuel Carusi, might be enjoined from interfering in any way with the estate of Samuel Carusi, and for general relief.

Separate answers were filed to the bill by each of the defendants, to which the complainant filed replications. Upon final hearing on the pleadings and evidence, in special term, the supreme court of the District of Columbia dismissed the bill. Upon appeal to the general term the decree of dismissal was affirmed. From the decree of affirmance the present appeal is taken.

''Wm. B. Webb and Robertson Howard'', for appellant.

L. G. Hine, for appellee.

WOODS, J.

title: Howard v. Carusi


text: Talk:Howard v. Carusi

title: Talk:Howard v. Carusi


text:
Howard v. Carusi/Opinion of the Court

The case made by the bill of complaint is based on the will of Samuel Carusi and upon the deed of trust alleged to have been executed and delivered July 18, 1872. The contention of complainant is that, by the deed, Lewis Carusi conveyed to Samuel Carusi all his real estate in trust to convey the same to such person or persons as the said Lewis Carusi might 'by his last will and testament, or other paper writing under his hand and seal, by two persons witnessed, designate and direct;' and that, although the will was revoked by the trust deed, it was nevertheless effectual as a designation of the persons to whom said real estate was to be conveyed by Samuel Carusi, the trustee; and that the complainant and her sister, Genevieve Carusi, were the persons who were so designated by the will. It is clear, therefore, that complainant's case can derive no aid from the declarations of the testator, Lewis Carusi, alleged to have been made before and after the execution of his will, in relation to the disposition which he intended to make of his property. It must stand or fall upon the designation made in the will. It is clear, also, that the will is to receive precisely the same construction, as an instrument designating the beneficiaries of the trust deed, as it would have received as a last will duly proven and recorded. The question is, therefore, what estate did the testator intend to give the complainant by his will of March 18, 1872? This will gives-First, an estate in fee-simple to Samuel Carusi; it contains, second, the expression of a hope and trust that he will not unnecessarily diminish the estate; and, third, it gives to the nieces of the testator so much of his estate as Samuel Carusi shall not at his death have disposed of by sale of devise. We have, then, devised to Samuel Carusi an estate in fee-simple, with an absolute power of disposition either by sale or devise, clearly and unmistakably implied. Therefore, according to the adjudged cases, the limitation over to the niece of the testator is void. The rule is well established that, although generally an estate may be devised to one in fee-simple or fee-tail, with a limitation over by way of executory devise, yet when the will shows a clear purpose of the testator to give an absolute power of disposition to the first taker, the limitation over is void.

Thus, in the case of Atty. Gen. v. Hall, Fitz G. 314, there was a devise of real and personal estate to the testator's son and to the heirs of his body, and that if he should die leaving no heirs of his body, then so much of the real and personal estate as he should be possessed of at his death was devised over to the complainants in trust. The son in his life-time suffered a common recovery of the real estate, and made a will as to the personal estate, and died without issue, and a bill was filed against his executor to account. It was held by Lord Chancellor KING, aided by the master of the rolls and the chief baron of the exchequer, that the devisee was tenant in tail of the real estate, and had barred the plaintiffs by the common recovery, and that the executrix was not to account for the personal estate to the persons claiming under the limitation, for that was void as repugnant to the absolute ownership and power of disposal given by the will.

In the case of Ross v. Ross, 1 Jacob & W. 154, a limitation over was declared void because it was limited upon the contingency that the first taker did not dispose of the property by will or otherwise. See, also, Cuthbert v. Purrier, Jacob, 415; Bourn v. Gibbs, 1 Russ. & M. 615; Holmes v. Godson, 8 DeGex, M. & G. 152.

The American cases are to the same effect. Thus, in Jackson v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19, Charles Bull died seized of the premises in question. By his last will, after devising a certain lot of land to his son Moses, he declared: 'In case my son Moses should die without lawful issue, the said property he died possessed of I will to my son Young, his lawful issue,' etc. It was held that the limitation over was void, as being repugnant to the absolute control over the estate which the testator intended to give.

In Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, the devise was to the testator's son Peleg, his heirs and assigns, with the following provision: 'And further, it is my will that if my son Peleg shall die and leave no lawful heirs, what estate he shall leave to be equally divided between my son John Ide and my grandson Nathaniel Ide, to them and their heirs forever.' Held, that his limitation over to John and Nathaniel Ide were void because inconsistent with the absolute, unqualified interest in the first devisee.

To the same effect is the case of Bowen v. Dean, 110 Mass. 438, where a man devised all his estate, real and personal, to his wife, 'to hold to her and her assigns,' but should she 'die intestate and seized of any portion of said estate at the time of her death,' then over. The wife took possession of the land and died, having made a will, by which she devised and bequeathed all her estate, real and personal. It was held that the will of the husband gave the wife, by necessary implication, an absolute power of disposal, either by deed or will, and this power having been fully executed by her will, nothing remained upon which the devise over in the will of her husband could operate.

In Melson v. Copper, 4 Leigh, 408, the case was this: John Cooper died in 1813 seized of the messuage and land in controversy, having, by his last will duly executed, devised, inter alia, as follows: 'I give to my son William Cooper the plantation I live on, to him and his heirs forever. In case he should die without a son and not sell the land, I give the land to my son George,' etc. The plantation on which the testator lived was the land in controversy. George Cooper, the lessee of the plaintiff, was the testator's son George mentioned in the devise, who claimed the land under the lititation over to him therein contained. The testator's son William, to whom the land was devised in the first instance, attained to full age, married, and died, leaving issue one daughter, but without leaving or ever having had a son, and without having sold the land. The question referred to the court was whether, upon this state of facts, George Cooper was entitled to the land. The court held that a general, absolute, unlimited power to sell the land was given to William Cooper by the devise, that he took a fee-simple, and that George Cooper was not entitled to recover. See, also, Gifford v. Choate, 100 Mass. 343; Hale v. Marsh, Id. 468; Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288.

The rule is thus stated by Chancellor KENT:

'If there be an absolute power of disposition given by the     will to the first taker, as if an estate be devised to A., in      fee, and if he dies possessed of the property without lawful      issue, the remainder over the property which he, dying      without heirs, shall leave, or without selling or devising      the same; in all such cases the remainder over is void,      because of his preceding fee; and it is void by way of      executory devise, because the limitation is inconsistent with      the absolute estate expressly given, or necessarily implied,      by the will.' 4 Kent, Comm. 271.

If the will of Lewis Carusi had remained unrevoked and had been duly proven and recorded, and Samuel Carusi, had died intestate, with all the property devised to him by Lewis Carusi undisposed of, the complainant would be entitled to no relief, for she would have taken nothing by the will. If the will can be held the designate any beneficiary under the trust deed of July 18, 1872, it designated Samuel Carusi, and not the complainant and her sisters. But by the terms of Lewis Carusi's will, the complainant and her sisters were only entitled to so much of the estate of Lewis as Samuel should 'not have disposed of by devise or sale.' The bill of complaint charges that Samuel Carusi, by his last will and testament, had devised to certain persons therein named, among them the complainant, all the property devised to him by the last will of Lewis Carusi. There was therefore no property of the estate of Lewis Carusi to which the supposed devise to complainant and her sisters could apply.

The case of complainant receives no support from the precatory words of the will of Lewis Carusi. These words express 'the hope and trust that Samuel Carusi will not diminish the same (viz., the property devised to him by the will) to a greater extent than may answer for his comfortable support,' and the testator then devises to complainant and her sisters what Samuel shall not have disposed of by devise or sale. The words do not raise any trust in Samuel. He is not made a trustee for any purpose, and no duty in respect to the disposition of the estate is imposed upon him. But even if the will had contained an express request that Samuel should convey to the complainant so much of the estate as he did not dispose of by sale or devise, there would be no trust, for the will, as we have seen, gives Samuel Carusi the absolute power of disposal.

In Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148, it was said by the master of the rolls (Lord LANGDALE:)

'If the giver accompanies his expression of wish or request     by other words, from which it is to be collected that he did      not intend the wish to be imperative, or if it appears from      the context that the first taker was to have a discretionary      power to withdraw any part of the subject from the wish or      request, *  *  * it has been held that no trust was created.' And see S.C.. ''nom. Knight v. Boughton'', 11 Clark & F. 513.

The rule is thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 1070:

'Whenever the objects of the supposed recommendatory trust     are not certain or definite, whenever the property to which      it is to attach is not certain or definite, whenever a clear      discretion or choice to act or not to act is given, whenever      the prior dispositions of the property import absolute and      uncontrollable ownership, in all such cases courts of equity      will not create a trust from words of this character.'

See, also, Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; Wright v. Atkyns, Turn. & R. 157; Stead v. Mellor, 5 Ch. Div. 225; Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267; S.C.. L. R. 6 Ch. 597; Hess v. Singler, 114 Mass. 56; Bennocks' Estate, 20 Pa. St. 268; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 1 McCart. 397; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, and notes.

The views we have expressed render it unnecessary to consider other questions argued by counsel. It is quite immaterial whether or not Lewis Carusi had mental capacity to execute the deed of October 17, 1872, or whether he had any title to the property described therein. If that deed had never been executed the fact would not aid the complainant's case.

The result is that the decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in general term, by which the decree of the special term dismissing the complainant's bill was affirmed, was right, and must itself be affirmed.

title: Howard v. Carusi/Opinion of the Court


text: Talk:Howard v. Carusi/Opinion of the Court


text:
County of Sherman v. Simonds

'Provided, that no more of the bonds authorized to be issued by virtue of this act shall be issued than is necessary to pay off and redeem such warrants so outstanding; and provided, further, that the said commissioners shall not issue of said bonds to exceed in value the amount of said indebtedness up to January 1, 1875, nor shall said bonds be negotiated at a less price than eighty-five cents on the dollar.'

The bonds recited on their face that they were issued by authority of said act. The answer averred that bonds were issued under said act by the commissioners of said county of Sherman to the amount of $45,000 and that on January 1, 1875, the debts of said county did not exceed the sum of $16,000, and that the said bonds were negotiated for less than 85 cents on the dollar. On this answer the plaintiff below took issue. The parties waived a trial by jury, and submitted the cause to the court, which made findings, from which the following facts appear: On January 1, 1876, the commissioners of Sherman county, in pursuance of the act of February 18, 1875, issued, among others, the bonds and coupons described in the petition, and the same came into the possession of the plaintiff, who was a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of defects other than appear on the face of the bonds, and was still the holder and owner of said bonds and coupons. The record of the commissioners of Sherman county showed the allowance of $15,000 in claims against the county from the organization of the county to January 1, 1875, for which warrants were drawn on the treasury, and no more, but they also showed that the commissioners at one of their meetings estimated the amount of the county indebtedness which might be funded at the sum of $36,874.95, for which it would be necessary to issue bonds to the amount of $43,400, and that bonds were issued pursuant to such estimate, but it was not shown what the actual indebtedness of the county was at the time the bonds were issued. Upon this finding the circuit court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff below for $5,671.60. To reverse that judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.

C. S. Montgomery, for plaintiff in error.

Nathan S. Harwood and John H. Ames, for defendant in error.

WOODS, J.

title: County of Sherman v. Simonds


text: Talk:County of Sherman v. Simonds

title: Talk:County of Sherman v. Simonds


text:
County of Sherman v. Simonds/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiff in error insists that the facts found by the court show an issue of bonds by the county in excess of the amount authorized by the statute, and that they are therefore void. The defendant in error is found by the circuit court to be a bona fide holder for value. According to repeated decisions of this court, being such, he was not bound to go behind the law and the recital of the bonds to inquire into the amount of the county indebtedness. Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 92 U.S. 637; Humboldt Tp. v. Long, Id. 642; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U.S. 499. But if it be conceded that a purchaser of the bonds was required to inspect the records of the county to ascertain the amount of its indebtedness, and whether there had its indebtedness, and whether there had been an over-issue of bonds, it appears from the findings of fact that the records of the commissioners contained an estimate of the indebtedness of the county made by them for the express purpose of fixing the amount of bonds to be issued, and in pursuance of which they were issued, which showed that there was no over-issue. This was a decision by the very officers whose duty it was under the law to fix the amount of bonds which could be lawfully issued. A purchaser of bonds was not required to make further inquiry, and if the finding of the commissioners was untrue, he could not be affected by its falsity. See cases above cited; also, Lynde v. The County, 16 Wall. 6; Com'rs v. January, 94 U.S. 202; County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U.S. 96; Com'rs v. Bolles, 94 U.S. 104; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U.S. 529; [S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 704.]

The next contention of the plaintiffs in error is that the act by which the issue of the bonds in suit was authorized was forbidden by section 1, art. 8, of the constitution of Nebraska, which was in force at the date of the passage of the act. That section declares 'the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.'

In the case of Com'rs Jefferson Co. v. People, 5 Neb. 127, decided at the July term, 1876, the supreme court of Nebraska has conclusively settled this point against the plaintiff in error. In that case an act of the legislature, in all material respects similar to the act in question in this case, except that it related to but one county, was brought under consideration. The answer averred that the act was unconstitutional and void. Upon this point the court said:

'That Jefferson county is justly indebted to the relator for     the amount of the warrants in question will not be      controverted; and when such is the case, there is no doubt of      the power of the legislature to require the county to issue      its bonds for the amount of its indebtedness.'

The question raised by this contention was also considered by this court in the case of Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. 574; [S.C.. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 208.] In that case an act of the legislature of Nebraska, approved February 18, 1873, was brought under review. The preamble of the act recited that the city council of the city of Plattsmouth had issued and sold certain bonds, and with the proceeds thereof had proceeded to let the contract for the erection of a school-house, and had appointed two persons, naming them, superintendents of the construction of the same, and that the work on said building had commenced. The first section then declared that all the acts and proceedings of the city council in relation to issuing said bonds and letting said contract and the appointment of said superintendents, and all matters and proceedings connected therewith which might in any way affect the validity of said bonds, should be, and the same were, thereby legalized, confirmed, and made valid in law. This act was attacked as in violation of the same section of the constitution which the plaintiff in error invokes in this case. It was contended that the act in question, by legalizing bonds of the city, was void because it had no power to issue them, was legally equivalent to an act conferring upon the city power to issue bonds, which was conferring corporate power, and being a special act, was therefore unconstitutional. But this court, speaking by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS, said:

'As the city of Plattsmouth was bound by force of the     transaction to repay to the purchaser of its void bonds the      it, or a legal equivalent, the statute it, or a legal      equivalent, the state which recognized the existence of that      obligation, and, by confirming the bonds themselves, provided      a medium for enforcing it according to the original intention      and promises, cannot be said to be a special act conferring      upon the city any new corporate powers. No addition is made     to its enumerated or implied corporate faculties; no new      obligation is, in fact, crea ed.'

And the court added that the very proposition there involved was maintained by the supreme court of Nebraska in the case of Com'rs Jefferson Co. v. People, supra. See, also, Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667; Foster v. Com'rs Wood Co. 9 Ohio St. 540.

In the cases of Clegg v. School-dist. 8 Neb. 178, and Dundy v. Richardson Co. Id. 508, [S.C.. 1 N. W. Rep. 565,] cited by plaintiff in error, it was held that an act authorizing a school-district or a city to contract a debt for the purpose of erecting a public building, and to issue bonds therefor, was forbidden by the constitution, because it was a special act conferring corporate powers. These cases are clearly distinguishable from those we have cited. In the latter, as in the case now under review, a debt already existed, and the statute simply authorized a change in the form of the obligation by WHICH THE DEBT WAS EVIDENCED. DISTINCTION IS CLEARLY STATED IN read v. Plattsmouth, ubi supra, the court remarking: 'The statute operates upon the transaction itself, which had already been consummated, and seeks to give it a character and effect different in its legal aspect from that which it had when it was in force;' and adds that such a result 'is not affected by the supposed form of the enactment as a special or general act conferring corporate powers.' The cases cited effectually dispose of the point under consideration.

Lastly, the plaintiff in error contends that the act under which the bonds in suit were issued is repugnant to section 15, art. 3, of the present constitution of Nebraska, which went into effect November 1, 1875, after the law authorizing the issue of the bonds was passed, but before the bonds were issued. The section referred to declares:

'The legislature shall not pass any local or special laws in     any of the following cases: *  *  * Granting to any      corporation, association, or individual, any exclusive      privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever. In all other     cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special      law shall be enacted.'

It is a sufficient answer to the contention to say that the word 'corporation,' as used in this section of the constitution, does not apply to a county. If a county is a corporation at all, it is necessarily a municipal corporation. But the supreme court of Nebraska, in the case of Woods v. Colfax Co. 10 Neb. 552, [S.C.. 7 N. W. Rep. 269,] expressly held that in Nebraska a county was not considered to be a municipal corporation. And it is clear that the authority given by the act of February 18, 1875, to Sherman and other counties, to fund the indebtedness evidenced by county warrants, by giving their bonds in exchange therefor, does not of itself make them municipal corporations. But it is unnecessary further to discuss this branch of the case. The decision of the supreme court of Nebraska in Com'rs Jefferson Co. v. People, ubi supra, which, as before stated, was a case in all respects similar to this, and in which the constitutionality of a similar act of the legislature was put in issue, is precisely in point, and is conclusive of the question in hand.

We find no error in the record. The judgdment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.


text: Talk:County of Sherman v. Simonds/Opinion of the Court


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Page:Popular tales from the Norse (1912).djvu/400

 214 So she took a tiny little piece of dough and rolled it out, but as she rolled it, it grew and grew till it covered the whole griddle.

Nay, that was too big; they couldn't have that. So she took a tinier bit still; but when that was rolled out it covered the whole griddle just the same, and that bannock was too big, she said; they couldn't have that either.

The third time she took a still tinier bit—so tiny you could scarce see it; but it was the same story over again—the bannock was too big.

"Well," said Gertrude, "I can't give you anything; you must just go without, for all these bannocks are too big."

Then our Lord waxed wroth, and said,—

"Since you love me so little as to grudge me a morsel of food, you shall have this punishment,—you shall become a bird, and seek your food between bark and bole, and never get a drop to drink save when it rains."

He had scarce said the last word before she was turned into a great black woodpecker, or Gertrude's bird, and flew from her kneading-trough right up the chimney; and till this very day you may see her flying about, with her red mutch on her head, and her body all black, because of the soot in the chimney; and so she hacks and taps away at the trees for her food, and whistles when rain is coming, for she is ever athirst, and then she looks for a drop to cool her tongue.


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 Rh BOOTS AND THE TROLL.

on a time there was a poor man who had three sons. When he died, the two elder set off into the world to try their luck, but the youngest they wouldn't have with them at any price.

"As for you," they said, "you're fit for nothing but to sit and poke about in the ashes."

So the two went off and got places at a palace—the one under the coachman, and the other under the gardener. But Boots, he set off too, and took with him a great kneading-trough, which was the only thing his parents left behind them, but which the other two would not bother themselves with. It was heavy to carry, but he did not like to leave it behind, and so, after he had trudged a bit, he too came to the palace, and asked for a place. So they told him they did not want him, but he begged so prettily that at last he got leave to be in the kitchen, and carry in wood and water for the kitchen maid. He was quick and ready, and in a little while every one liked him; but the two others were dull, and so they got more kicks than halfpence, and grew quite envious of Boots, when they saw how much better he got on.

Just opposite the palace, across a lake, lived a Troll, who had seven silver ducks which swam on the lake, so that they could be seen from the palace. These the king had often longed for; and so the two elder brothers told the coachman,—


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 216 "If our brother only chose, he has said he could easily get the king those seven silver ducks."

You may fancy it wasn't long before the coachman told this to the king; and the king called Boots before him, and said,—

"Your brothers say you can get me the silver ducks; so now go and fetch them."

"I'm sure I never thought or said anything of the kind," said the lad.

"You did say so, and you shall fetch them," said the king, who would hold his own.

"Well, well," said the lad; "needs must, I suppose; but give me a bushel of rye and a bushel of wheat, and I'll try what I can do."

So he got the rye and the wheat, and put them into the kneading-trough he had brought with him from home, got in, and rowed across the lake. When he reached the other side he began to walk along the shore, and to sprinkle and strew the grain, and at last he coaxed the ducks into his kneading-trough, and rowed back as fast as ever he could.

When he got half over, the Troll came out of his house and set eyes on him.

"!" roared out the Troll; "is it you that has gone off with my seven silver ducks? "

"!" said the lad.

"Shall you be back soon?" asked the Troll.

"Very likely," said the lad.

So when he got back to the king, with the seven silver ducks, he was more liked than ever, and even the king was pleased to say, "Well done!" But at this his brothers grew more and more spiteful and envious; and so they


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 Rh went and told the coachman that their brother had said if he chose, he was man enough to get the king the Troll's bed-quilt, which had a gold patch and a silver patch, and a silver patch and a gold patch; and this time, too, the coachman was not slow in telling all this to the king. So the king said to the lad, how his brothers had said he was good to steal the Troll's bed-quilt, with gold and silver patches; so now he must go and do it, or lose his life.

Boots answered, he had never thought or said any such thing; but when he found there was no help for it, he begged for three days to think over the matter.

So when the three days were gone, he rowed over in his kneading-trough, and went spying about. At last, he saw those in the Troll's cave come out and hang the quilt out to air, and as soon as ever they had gone back into the face of the rock, Boots pulled the quilt down, and rowed away with it as fast as he could.

And when he was half across, out came the Troll and set eyes on him, and roared out,—

"! It is you who took my seven silver ducks?"

"" said the lad.

And now, have you taken my bed-quilt, with silver patches and gold patches, and gold patches and silver patches?"

"Ay lay! "said the lad.

"Shall you come back again?"

"Very likely," said the lad.

But when he got back with the gold and silver patchwork quilt every one was fonder of him than ever, and be was made the king's body-servant.


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 218 At this the other two were still more vexed, and to be revenged, they went and told the coachman,—

"Now, our brother has said he is man enough to get the king the gold harp which the Troll has, and that harp is of such a kind that all who listen when it is played grow glad, however sad they may be."

Yes; the coachman went and told the king, and he said to the lad,—

"If you have said this you shall do it. If you do it you shall have the Princess and half the kingdom. If you don't, you shall lose your life."

"I'm sure I never thought or said anything of the kind," said the lad; "but if there's no help for it, I may as well try; but I must have six days to think about it."

Yes, he might have six days, but when they were over he must set out.

Then he took a tenpenny nail, a birch-pin, and a waxen taper-end in his pocket, and rowed across, and walked up and down before the Troll's cave, looking stealthily about him. So when the Troll came out he saw him at once.

"HO, HO!" roared the Troll; "is it you who took my seven silver ducks?"

"!" said the lad.

"And it is you who took my bed-quilt, with the gold and silver patches?" asked the Troll.

"Ay! ay!" said the lad.

So the Troll caught hold of him at once, and took him off into the cave in the face of the rock.

"Now, daughter dear," said the Troll, "I've caught the fellow who stole the silver ducks and my bed-quilt with


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Page:History of West Australia.djvu/524

 spent a little time there in completing arrangements to go to the fields. When he arrived at Hall's Creek he was very much impressed with the country. There were not many miners on the ground, but Mr. Cohn equipped prospecting parties, obtained a public house license, and opened a general store in conjunction with it. Prospectors whom he sent out discovered several properties, and he was one of the first to erect machinery on the field. The Rising Sun battery, which he had erected, was, with the mine, afterwards sold to Messrs. Dalgety and Co., acting on behalf of an English syndicate. Mr. Cohn was manager of the company, but resigned because he had expressed dubious views with regard to its future. He remained on the Kimberley Goldfields for five or six years, and during that period was once speared by blacks, and on two occasions contracted fever and ague; the last time, his life hung in the balance. When he left Hall's Greek, Mr. Cohn intended to return to New South Wales and settle in Sydney, his principal reason for leaving being that he did not think gold mining could be made to pay there with white labour. He arrived in Perth when the Yilgarn goldfields had been in progress but a few months. Meeting with the late Mr. J. H. Monger and Mr. Alexander Forrest, M.L.A., they advised him not to leave until he had had a look at the Yilgarn field. Mr. Cohn followed this advice, and after inspecting Southern Cross he determined to stay there. He was appointed manager of mines for a prominent syndicate, and eventually took up the work on the Central, being the first to discover the rich chute of gold which brought this property with a bound before the public eye. After holding the position for eight months, he relinquished it to start in business as a contractor, forwarding agent, and aerated waters manufacturer. He built the Club Hotel and many other properties, each of which proved highly remunerative to him.

Always an early riser, Mr. Cohn one morning witnessed a sight that would have been a feast for the eyes of Midas. At five o'clock on the morning we refer to he met Arthur Bayley returning from his now famous find at Coolgardie, he being the first to receive authentic news. Bayley approached with his two horses. Suspended from one of them were two heavy bags, and he asked Mr. Cohn to "feel" them. "What's in them?" queried Mr. Cohn. "Gold!" said Bayley. "How much?" said the astonished questioner. "Six hundred ounces!" was the quiet reply of the Coolgardie pioneer. Then the two sat down on the ground beside the horses, waiting for the bank to open, so that the gold might be safely deposited. Bayley recounted the incidents leading up to his rich discovery, and gave Mr. Cohn a lot of valuable information which he was not slow to act upon. When the telegraph office opened in the morning, Mr. Cohn wired the news of the find to Mr. A. Forrest, and gave all particulars concerning it. Acting on the information he received, Mr. Cohn organised teams and men to proceed to the field. Men and teams were ready next morning (Sunday) and a week after the first equipage reached Coolgardie. On the route plenty of water was found in the rocks and wayside "soaks." A month after despatching the teams, Mr. Cohn set out himself for Coolgardie, and on arrival formed the opinion that it was one of the best auriferous areas he had ever seen. He therefore acquired several properties on behalf of his syndicate. Meantime the "rush" had set in, and when tenders were called later on for mail delivery Mr. Cohn became the successful tenderer and opened up the first legitimate mail service, under the style of Cobb and Co. Still keeping up his contracting, he erected a number of wayside inns on the road to Coolgardie, and in that now rapidly-expanding centre built the first hotel, to wit, the Club, in Bayley Street. Mr. Cohn also claims the honour of building the first hotel in Kalgoorlie, also called the Club. In Dunnsville as well—the township founded on the site of John Dunn's sensational Wealth of Nations discovery—Mr. Cohn erected the pioneer hotel, and at Niagara he has erected several properties. Early in the history of the Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie fields, he acquired a considerable amount of town-site property.

On one occasion, when the excitement of the Wealth of Nations discovery was at its height, Mr. Cohn drove Messrs. Forrest, Hassell, Monger, Marmion, and Crossland—the original syndicate—to the scene of the find, and they were on the spot forty-three hours after leaving Perth, although the railway only ran as far as Southern Cross. He made special arrangements for the trip, and let out all his drags, buggies, &c., for the outing. About three years ago, Mr. Cohn sold out his interests in the coaches running from Coolgardie, but since then he has been the biggest mail contractor running to and from the fields. Out of eleven mail contracts let by the Government this year (1896), he secured eight. He has mail coaches running to Menzies, Niagara, Yerilla, Lake Darlot, Bulong, Kurnalpi, Esperance, and Norseman. As a contractor he erected the telegraph line to Dundas, and he is now engaged in the construction of the overland telegraph route to the South Australian border, a very large undertaking, involving the use of over 500 camels and the employment of 60 men. Outside the firm of Faiz and Taigh Mahomet, Mr. Cohn is the largest camel proprietor in the colony, owning over 600 "ships of the desert." In 1895 he lost over 10,000 through camels dying, and he has had considerable trouble with the Afghans, who, he states, are none too careful in their treatment of beasts owned by white men. The camels are used extensively in carrying goods, &c., and have done an immense amount of work for Mr. Cohn.

As a mining expert Mr. Cohn has had an extensive and successful experience in reporting on properties and recommending purchases, and every one has turned out well. He holds very large mining interests, and what with his forwarding agency, aerated waters business, mail contracts, and his public duties, his life is a busy one.

Mr. Cohn was gazetted a J.P. in June, 1895, and his decisions on the bench have given general satisfaction. He has always taken an interest in public matters. He has been a member of the Council at Southern Cross since its inception, and for the last two years has occupied the mayoral chair. He is also chairman of the Southern Cross Roads Board. He is a warm supporter of Sir John Forrest, and speaks highly of the uniform courtesy and kindness he has received when dealing with the Government and the officials on public business. He is a member of a large number of racing clubs in Western Australia, and is also connected with several agricultural societies.

Mr. Cohn has now amassed a comfortable competency, but his success in life came not without the reverses of Experience's "fiery furnace." He deserves credit for the work he has accomplished in Western Australia, and, though he was not born in it, he is one of its most solid and consistent supporters. He is a well-known figure on the goldfields, and the correspondence which reaches him on public matters from out-of-the-way parts shows how well he is liked and how thoroughly he is in touch with the mining population.

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 Rh gold and silver patches; put him into the fattening coop, and when he's fat we'll kill him, and make a feast for our friends."

She was willing enough, and put him at once into the fattening coop, and there he stayed eight days, fed on the best, both in meat and drink, and as much as he could cram. So, when the eight days were over, the Troll said to his daughter to go down and cut him in his little finger, that they might see if he were fat. Down she came to the coop.

"Out with your little finger!" she said,

But Boots stuck out his tenpenny nail, and she cut at it.

"Nay, nay! he's as hard as iron still," said the Troll's daughter, when she got back to her father; "we can't take him yet."

After another eight days the same thing happened, and this time Boots stuck out his birchen pin.

"Well, he's a little better," she said, when she got back to the Troll; "but still hell be as hard as wood to chew."

But when another eight days were gone, the Troll told his daughter to go down and see if he wasn't fat now.

"Out with your little finger," said the Troll's daughter, when she reached the coop, and this time Boots stuck out the taper end.

"Now he'll do nicely," she said.

"Will he?" said the Troll. "Well, then, I'll just set off and ask the guests; meantime you must kill him, and roast half and boil half."

So when the Troll had been gone a little while, the daughter began to sharpen a great long knife.

"Is that what you're going to kill me with?" asked the lad.


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 220 "Yes, it is," said she.

"But it isn't sharp," said the lad. "Just let me sharpen it for you, and then you'll find it easier work to kill me."

So she let him have the knife, and he began to rub and sharpen it on the whetstone.

"Just let me try it on one of your hair plaits; I think it's about right now."

So he got leave to do that; but at the same time that he grasped the plait of hair he pulled back her head, and at one gash cut off the Troll's daughter's head; and half of her he roasted and half of her he boiled, and served it all up.

After that he dressed himself in her clothes, and sat away in the corner.

So when the Troll came home with his guests, he called out to his daughter—for he thought all the time it was his daughter—to come and take a snack.

"No, thank you," said the lad, "I don't care for food. I'm so sad and downcast."

"Oh! " said the Troll, "if that's all, you know the cure; take the harp, and play a tune on it."

"Yes!" said the lad; "but where has it got to; I can't find it."

"Why, you know well enough," said the Troll; "you used it last; where should it be but over the door yonder?"

The lad did not wait to be told twice; he took down the harp, and went in and out playing tunes; but, all at once he shoved off the kneading-trough, jumped into it, and rowed off, so that the foam flew around the trough.

After a while the Troll thought his daughter was a long while gone, and went out to see what ailed her; and then he saw the lad in the trough, far, far out on the lake.


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 Rh ! Is it you," he roared, "that took my seven silver ducks?"

"" said the lad.

"Is it you that took my bed-quilt, with the gold and silver patches?"

"Yes!" said the lad.

"And now you have taken off my gold harp?" screamed the Troll.

"Yes!" said the lad; "I've got it, sure enough."

"And haven't I eaten you up after all, then? "

"No, no! 'twas your own daughter you ate," answered the lad.

But when the Troll heard that, he was so sorry, he burst; and then Boots rowed back, and took a whole heap of gold and silver with him, as much as the trough could carry. And so, when he came to the palace with the gold harp he got the Princess and half the kingdom, as the king had promised him; and, as for his brothers, he treated them well, for he thought they had only wished his good when they said what they had said.

GOOSEY GRIZZEL.

on a time there was a widower, who had a house-keeper named Grizzel, who set her mutch at him, and teazed him early and late to marry her. At last the man got so weary of her he was at his wit's end to know how to get rid of her.


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 222 So it fell on a day, between hay time and harvest, the two went out to pull hemp. Grizzel's head was full of her good looks and her handiness, and she worked away at the hemp till she grew giddy from the strong smell of the ripe seed, and at last down she fell flat, fast asleep among the hemp. While she slept, her master got a pair of scissors and cut her skirts short all round, and then he rubbed her all over, face and all, first with tallow and then with soot, till she looked worse than the Deil himself. So, when Grizzel woke and saw how ugly she was, she didn't know herself.

"Can this be me now?" said Grizzel. "Nay, nay! it can never be me. So ugly have I never been; it's surely the Deil himself?"

Well! that she might really know the truth, she went off and knocked at her master's door, and asked,—

"Is your Girzie at home the day, father?"

"Ay, ay, our Girzie is at home safe enough," said the man, who wanted to be rid of her.

"Well, well!" she said to herself, "then I can't be his Grizzel," and stole away; and right glad the man was, I can tell you.

So, when she had walked a bit she came to a great wood, where she met two thieves. "The very men for my money," thought Grizzel, "since I am the Deil thieves are just fit fellows for me."

But the thieves were not of the same mind, not they. As soon as they set eyes on her they took to their heels as fast as they could, for they thought the Evil One was come to catch them. But it was no good, for Grizzel was longlegged and swift-footed, and she came up with them before they knew where they were.


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Harvey Milk Day

 * Harvey Milk Day (2007-2008)
 * Harvey Milk Day (2009-2010)

title: Harvey Milk Day


text:
Talk:Executive Order 6166

Executive Order 6166--Organization of executive agencies

section 16 of the act of March 3, 1933 (Public, No. 428, 47 Stat. 1517), provides for reorganizations within the executive branch of the Government; requires the President to investigate and determine what reorganizations are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute; and authorizes the President to make such reorganizations by Executive order; and

I have investigated the organization of all executive and administrative agencies of the Government and have determined that certain regroupings, consolidations, transfers, and abolitions of executive agencies and functions thereof are necessary to accomplish the purposes of section 16;

, by virtue of the aforesaid authority, I do hereby order that:

Section 1.— Procurement

 * The function of determination of policies and methods of procurement, warehousing, and distribution of property, facilities, structures, improvements, machinery, equipment, stores, and supplies exercised by any agency is transferred to a Procurement Division in the Treasury Department, at the head of which shall be a Director of Procurement.

 * The Office of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury Department is transferred to the Procurement Division, except that the buildings of the Treasury Department shall be administered by the Treasury Department and the administration of post office buildings is transferred to the Post Office Department. The General Supply Committee of the Treasury Department is abolished.

 * In respect of any kind of procurement, warehousing, or distribution for any agency the Procurement Division may, with the approval of the President, (a) undertake the performance of such procurement, warehousing, or distribution itself, or (b) permit such agency to perform such procurement, warehousing, or distribution, or (c) entrust such performance to some other agency, or (d) avail itself in part of any of these recourses, according as it may deem desirable in the interest of economy and efficiency. When the Procurement Division has prescribed the manner of procurement, warehousing, or distribution of any thing, no agency shall thereafter procure, warehouse, or distribute such thing in any manner other than so prescribed.

 * The execution of work now performed by the Corps of Engineers of the Army shall remain with said corps, subject to the responsibilities herein vested in the Procurement Division.

 * The Procurement Division shall also have control of all property, facilities, structures, machinery, equipment, stores, and supplies not necessary to the work of any agency; may have custody thereof or entrust custody to any other agency; and shall furnish the same to agencies as need therefore may arise.

 * The Fuel Yards of the Bureau of Mines of the Department of Commerce are transferred to the Procurement Office.

[Sec. 1 amended by EO 6623 of March 1, 1934]

Section 2.— National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations

 * All functions of administration of public buildings, reservations, national parks, national monuments, and national cemeteries are consolidated in an Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations in the Department of the Interior, at the head of which shall be a Director of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations; except that where deemed desirable there may be excluded from this provision any public building or reservation which is chiefly employed as a facility in the work of a particular agency. This transfer and consolidation of functions shall include, among others, those of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior and the National Cemeteries and Parks of the War Department which are located within the continental limits of the United States. National cemeteries located in foreign countries shall be transferred to the Department of State, and those located in insular possessions under the jurisdiction of the War Department shall be administered by the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department.

 * The functions of the following agencies are transferred to the Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations of the Department of the Interior, and the agencies are abolished:

 * Arlington Memorial Bridge Commission
 * Public Buildings Commission
 * Public Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capital
 * National Memorial Commission
 * Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway Commission

 * Expenditures by the Federal Government for the purposes of the Commission of Fine Arts, the George Rogers Clark Sesquicentennial Commission, and the Rushmore National Commission shall be administered by the Department of the Interior.

Section 3.— Investigations

 * All functions now exercised by the Bureau of Prohibition of the Department of Justice with respect to the granting of permits under the national prohibition laws are transferred to the Division of Internal Revenue in the Treasury Department.

 * All functions now exercised by the Bureau of Prohibition with respect to investigations and all the functions now performed by the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice are transferred to and consolidated in a Division of Investigation in the Department of Justice, at the head of which shall be a Director of Investigation.

 * All other functions now performed by the Bureau of Prohibition are transferred to such divisions in the Department of Justice as in the judgment of the Attorney General may be desirable.

Section 4.—  [Repealed]

[Sec. 4 repealed by Pub. L. 97-258 of Sept. 13, 1982 (96 Stat. 1086)]

Section 5.— Claims by or against the United States

 * The functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and demands by, and offsenses against, the Government of the United States, and of defending claims and demands against the Government, and of supervising the work of United States attorneys, marshals, and clerks in connection therewith, now exercised by any agency or officer, are transferred to the Department of Justice.

 * As to any case referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense in the courts, the function of decision whether and in what manner to prosecute, or to defend, or to compromise, or to appeal, or to abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any agency or officer, is transferred to the Department of Justice.

 * For the exercise of such of his functions as are not transferred to the Department of Justice by the foregoing two paragraphs, the Solicitor of the Treasury is transferred from the Department of Justice to the Treasury Department.

 * Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the function of any agency or officer with respect to cases at any stage prior to reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.

Section 6.— Insular Courts

 * The United States Court for China, the District Court of the United States for the Panama Canal Zone, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands of the United States are transferred to the Department of Justice.

Section 7.— Solicitors

 * The Solicitor for the Department of Commerce is transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of Commerce.

 * The Solicitor for the Department of Labor is transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of Labor.

Section 8.— Internal Revenue

 * The Bureaus of Internal Revenue and of Industrial Alcohol of the Treasury Department are consolidated in a Division of Internal Revenue, at the head of which shall be a Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Section 9.— Assistant Secretary of Commerce

 * The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics shall be an Assistant Secretary of Commerce and shall perform such functions as the Secretary of Commerce may designate.

Section 10.— Official Register

 * The function of preparation of the Official Register is transferred from the Bureau of the Census to the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11.— Statistics of Cities

 * The function of the Bureau of the Census of the Department of Commerce of compiling statistics of cities under 100,000 population is abolished for the period ending June 30, 1935.

Section 12.— Shipping Board

 * The functions of the United States Shipping Board including those over and in respect to the United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation are transferred to the Department of Commerce, and the United States Shipping Board is abolished.

Section 13.— National Screw Thread Commission

 * The National Screw Thread Commission is abolished, and its records, property, facilities, equipment, and supplies are transferred to the Department of Commerce.

Section 14.— Immigration and Naturalization

 * The Bureaus of Immigration and of Naturalization of the Department of Labor are consolidated as an Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Labor, at the head of which shall be a Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

Section 15.— Vocational Education

 * The functions of the Federal Board for Vocational Education are transferred to the Department of the Interior, and the Board shall act in an advisory capacity without compensation.

Section 16.— Apportionment of Appropriations

 * The functions of making, waiving, and modifying apportionments of appropriations are transferred to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

[Sec. 16 amended by EO 12608 of September 9, 1987, 52 FR 34617, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 245]

Section 17.— Coordinating Service

 * The Federal Coordinating Service is abolished.

Section 18.— [Revoked]

[Sec. 18 revoked by EO 6586 of February 6, 1934]

Section 19.— General Provisions

 * Each agency, all the functions of which are transferred to or consolidated with another agency, is abolished.

 * The records pertaining to an abolished agency or a function disposed of, disposition of which is not elsewhere herein provided for, shall be transferred to the successor. If there be no successor agency, and such abolished agency be within a department, said records shall be disposed of as the head of such department may direct.

 * The property, facilities, equipment, and supplies employed in the work of an abolished agency or the exercise of a function disposed of, disposition of which is not elsewhere herein provided for, shall, to the extent required, be transferred to the successor agency. Other such property, facilities, equipment, and supplies shall be transferred to the Procurement Division.

 * All personnel employed in connection with the work of an abolished agency or function disposed of shall be separated from the service of the United States, except that the head of any successor agency, subject to my approval, may, within a period of four months after transfer or consolidation, reappoint any of such personnel required for the work of the successor agency without reexamination or loss of civil-service status.

Section 20.— Appropriations

 * Such portions of the unexpended balances of appropriations for any abolished agency or function disposed of shall be transferred to the successor agency as the Director of the Budget shall deem necessary.

 * Unexpended balances of appropriations for an abolished agency or function disposed of, not so transferred by the Director of the Budget, shall, in accordance with law, be impounded and returned to the Treasury.

Section 21.— Definitions

As used in this order—

 * “Agency” means any commission, independent establishment, board, bureau, division, service, or office in the executive branch of the Government.

 * “Abolished agency” means any agency which is abolished, transferred, or consolidated.

 * “Successor agency” means any agency to which is transferred some other agency or function, or which results from the consolidation of other agencies or functions.

 * “Function disposed of” means any function eliminated or transferred.

Section 22.— Effective Date

 * In accordance with law, this order shall become effective 61 days from its date; Provided, That in case it shall appear to the President that the interests of economy require that any transfer, consolidation, or elimination be delayed beyond the date this order becomes effective, he may, in his discretion, fix a later date therefore, and he may for like cause further defer such date from time to time.

title: Talk:Executive Order 6166


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Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 06.djvu/198

 resigned on his appointment as canon of Christ Church, Oxford, on 24 May 1723. He received the degree of D.D. on 27 Aug. of the same year; and on 29 Aug. 1724 was nominated to both the deanery of Christ Church and the bishopric of Bristol, receiving the two preferments in commendam. He published in 1730 a 'Sermon preached before the House of Lords on 30 Jan. 1729-30.' Bradshaw died at Bath on 16 Dec. 1732. He was buried in Bristol Cathedral, where a plain flat stone, about two feet beyond the bishop's stall towards the chancel, was inscribed: 'William Bradshaw, D.D., Bishop of Bristol and Dean of Christ Church, in Oxford; died 16 Dec. 1732, aged 62' (Rawlinson MSS. 4to, i. 267). It is also erroneously said that Bradshaw was buried at Bath (, Fasti); 'ibique jacet sepultus' (, De Præsulibus). Bradshaw left 300l. to Christ Church.

BRADSHAWE, NICHOLAS (fl. 1635), fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, was the author of 'Canticvm Evangelicvm Summam Sacri Evangelii continens,' London, 1635, 8vo, dedicated to Sir Arthur Mainwaring, knight. This book is unnoticed by all bibliographers.

BRADSTREET, ANNE (1612–1672), poetess, was born in 1612, probably at Northampton, and was the second of the six children of Thomas Dudley, by Dorothy, his first wife (Works in Prose and Verse, Introd. p. xiv). Her father was once page to Lord Compton, then, steward to the Earl of Lincoln, and finally governor of Massachusetts. In 1628 Anne had the small-pox. Later in the same year she married Simon Bradstreet, son of Simon Bradstreet, a nonconformist minister in Lincolnshire: the younger Simon had been eight years in the Earl of Lincoln's family under Anne's father (Magnolia Christi Americana, bk. ii. p. 19), and in 1628 was steward to the Countess of Warwick (Works, &c., Introd. p. xxii). On 29 March 1630 the Bradstreets, the Dudleys, and Arbella (the Earl of Lincoln's sister, wife of Isaac Johnson), with many others, set sail for New England, and on 12 June landed at Salem, whence they removed at once to Charlestown (ib. p. xxxi). In 1632 Anne had a 'fit of sickness,' and in 1634 the party settled at Ipswich, Massachusetts (Works, Introd. p. xxxv). Simon Bradstreet formed a plantation at Merrimac in 1638, the year in which Anne wrote her 'Elogie on Sir Philip Sidney.' At Ipswich, on Monday, 28 Sept. 1640, she at last became a mother, and she could eventually write, 23 June 1659 (Poems, p. 245):

In 1641 Anne Bradstreet wrote a poem in honour of Du Bartas, and she shortly made a collection of her poems. The chief of them was entitled 'The Four Elements;' she dedicated the volume in verse to her father, under date 20 March 1642. These poems were distributed in manuscript, and gained her great celebrity. Cotton Mather spoke of her as 'a crown to her father' (Magnalia, bk. ii. p. 17), whilst Griswold calls her 'the most celebrated poet of her time in America' (Poets and Poetry of America, p. 92). The book was at last published, in London, 1650, under the title 'The Tenth Muse,' … 'By a Gentlewoman in Those Parts (i.e. New England).' In 1643, on 27 Dec., Dorothy Dudley, Anne Bradstreet's mother, died (Poems, p. 220); in 1644 her father married again (having three more children by this marriage). In 1653 Anne's father died. In 1661 she had a further long and serious illness, and her husband, then secretary to the colony, had to proceed to England on state business. Anne wrote 'Poetical Epistles' to him. By 3 Sept. 1662 he had returned. Anne Bradstreet wrote poems in 1665 and 1669 commemorating the deaths of three grandchildren; and on 31 Aug. 1669 Anne wrote her last poem, beginning As weary pilgrim, now at rest. After this Anne Bradstreet's health failed entirely, and she died of consumption, at Andover, Massachusetts, 16 Sept. 1672, aged 60.

It is not known where Anne Bradstreet was buried. Her poems, says Cotton Mather, are a 'monument for her memory beyond the stateliest marbles;' and these 'Poems' were issued in a second edition, printed by John Foster, at Boston (America), in 1678. Anne Bradstreet also left a small manuscript book of 'Meditations,' designed for the use of her children. Extracts from this book appeared, with the title of 'The Puritan Mother,' in the American 'Congregational Visitor,' 1844; in Dr. Budington's 'History of the First Church in Charlestown,' and in many American newspapers to which they were contributed by Mr. Dean Dudley (Works, Introd. p. x). In 1867 Mr. John Harvard Ellis edited Anne Bradstreet's 'Works,' and there these 'Meditations,' together with all that Anne Bradstreet ever wrote, are given in their entirety.


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Author:William Ernest Dalby

Works

 * (in part)
 * (Applied (in part))
 * (Introductory and Mechanical)
 * (Locomotive Power)
 * (Introductory and Mechanical)
 * (Locomotive Power)

title: Author:William Ernest Dalby


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 Simon Bradstreet (a portrait of whom is in the senate chamber of the State House, Massachusetts) married again after Anne's death, and became governor of Massachusetts in 1679, not dying till 1697, aged 94. Amongst Anne's descendants are Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dana, and Dr. Channing, besides many other of the best-known Americans.

 BRADSTREET, DUDLEY (1711–1763), adventurer, was born in 1711 in Tipperary, where his father had obtained considerable property under the Cromwellian grants, which, however, was much reduced by debts. Dudley, his youngest son, was left in his early years in charge of a foster father in Tipperary. While a youth he became a trooper, but soon quitted the army and traded unsuccessfully as a linen merchant, and subsequently as a brewer. For several years, in Ireland and England, Bradstreet led an erratic life, occupied mainly in pecuniary projects. During the rising of 1745, Bradstreet was employed by government officials to act as a spy among suspected persons. He was also engaged and equipped by the Dukes of Newcastle and Cumberland to furnish them with information on the movements of Prince Charles Edward and his army. Bradstreet assumed the character of a devoted adherent to the Stuart cause, and, under the name of 'Captain Oliver Williams,' obtained access to the prince and his council at Derby. There he acted successfully as a spy for the Duke of Cumberland, and, without being suspected by the Jacobites, continued on good terms with them, and took his leave as a friend when they commenced their return march to Scotland. Bradstreet's notices of Prince Charles and his associates are graphic. He describes circumstantially the executions, in August 1746, of the Earl of Kilmarnock and Lord Balmerino, at which he states he was present. Although Bradstreet's services as a secret agent were admitted by the government officials, he was unable to obtain from them either money or a commission in the army, which he considered had been promised to him. He, however, succeeded in bringing his case under the notice of the king, from whom he consequently received the sum of one hundred and twenty pounds. Bradstreet subsequently subsisted for a time on the results of schemes, his success in which he ascribed to the 'superstition' of the English people, and 'their credulity and faith in wondrous things.' The last of his devices at London appears to have been that styled the 'bottle conjurer,' which, with the assistance of several confederates, he carried out with great gains in January 1747-8. On his adventures in connection with the affair Bradstreet wrote a play, in five acts, styled 'The Magician, or the Bottle Conjurer,' which he states was revised for him by some of the best judges and actors in England, including Mrs. Woffington, who gave him 'the best advice she could about it.' This play was four times performed with great success at London, but on the fifth night, when Bradstreet was to have taken the part of 'Spy,' the principal character, it was suppressed by the magistrates of Westminster. 'The Bottle Conjurer' was printed by Bradstreet with his 'Life.' After other adventures, Bradstreet returned to Ireland, where he owned a small property in land. He attempted unsuccessfully to carry on trade as a brewer in Westmeath, and became involved in contests with officials of the excise. To raise funds, he printed an account of his life and adventures. The work is written with vivacity and descriptive power. Bradstreet died at Multifarnham, Westmeath, in 1763. His brother, Simon Bradstreet, was called to the bar in Ireland in 1758, created a baronet in 1759, and died in 1762. Sir [q. v.], third baronet, was a younger brother of Sir Simon, the first baronet's son and heir.

 BRADSTREET, ROBERT (1766–1836), poet, son of Robert Bradstreet, was born at Higham, Suffolk, in 1766, and educated under the care of the Rev. T. Foster, rector of Halesworth in that county. On 4 June 1782 he was admitted a pensioner of St. John's College, Cambridge, and he became a fellow-commoner of that society on 23 Jan. 1786. The dates of his degrees are B.A. 1786, M.A. 1789. Bradstreet was the possessor of an estate at Bentley in Suffolk, with a mansion called Bentley Grove, which, it is believed, he inherited from his father. He resided for several years abroad, and witnessed many of the scenes of the French revolution, of which he was at one time an advocate. He married in France, but took advantage of the facility with which the marriage tie could there be dissolved, and on his return to England he married, in 1800, Miss Adham of Mason's Bridge, near Hadleigh, Suffolk, by whom he had a numerous family. For some time he lived at Higham