text:
Page:Dictionary of National Biography. Sup. Vol I (1901).djvu/36

 xxviii 1860). The artist, Frederick Walker, who was afterwards on intimate terms with Smith, casually called at the office as a lad and asked for work on the magazine. His capacities were tested without delay, and he illustrated the greater part of 'Philip,' the second novel that Thackeray wrote for the 'Cornhill.' It was Leighton who suggested to Smith that he should give a trial as an illustrator to George Du Maurier, who quickly became one of the literary and artistic acquaintances in whose society he most delighted.

Two essayists of different type, although each was endowed with distinctive style and exceptional insight, Fitzjames Stephen and Matthew Arnold, were among the most interesting of the early contributors to the 'Cornhill.' Stephen contributed two articles at the end of 1860, and through the years 1861-3 wrote as many as eight annually—on literary, philosophical, and social subjects.

Matthew Arnold's work for the magazine was of great value to its reputation. His essay on Eugénie de Guérin (June 1863) had the distinction of bearing at the end the writer's name. That was a distinction almost unique in those days, for the 'Cornhill' then as a rule jealously guarded the anonymity of its authors. On 16 June 1863 Arnold wrote to his mother of his Oxford lecture on Heine: 'I have had two applications for the lecture from magazines, but I shall print it, if I can, in the "Cornhill," because it both pays best and has much the largest circle of readers. "Eugénie de Guérin" seems to be much liked.' The lecture on Heine appeared in the 'Cornhill' for October 1863. The hearty welcome given his articles by the conductors of the 'Cornhill' inspired Arnold with a 'sense of gratitude and surprise.' A paper by him entitled 'My Countrymen' in February 1866 'made a good deal of talk.' There followed his fine lectures on 'Celtic Literature,' and the articles which were reissued by Smith, Elder, & Co. in the characteristic volumes entitled respectively 'Culture and Anarchy' (1868), 'St. Paul and Protestantism' (1869), and 'Literature and Dogma' (1871).

With both Fitzjames Stephen and Matthew Arnold Smith maintained almost from their first introduction to the 'Cornhill' close personal intercourse. He especially enjoyed his intimacy with Matthew Arnold, whose idiosyncrasies charmed him as much as his light-hearted banter. He published for Arnold nearly all his numerous prose works, and showed every regard for him and his family. While Arnold was residing in the country at a later period, Smith provided a room for him at his publishing offices in Waterloo Place when he had occasion to stay the night in town.


text:
User talk:68.193.78.140

Welcome

Hello, and welcome to Wikisource! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

 * Help pages
 * Style Guide
 * Inclusion policy

You are welcome to continue editing articles without logging in, but you may wish to  [ create an account] . Doing so is free, requires no personal information, and provides several benefits. For one thing, if you continue to edit without a username, your IP address is used to publicly identify you.

In any case, I hope you enjoy donating your time to grow the Wikisource library that is free for everyone to use! In discussions, please sign your comments using four tildes ( ~ ); this will automatically produce your IP address (or username if you're logged in) and the date. If you need help, ask me on my talk page, or ask your question here (click  [ edit] ) and place  before your question. Again, welcome! — billinghurst  sDrewth  05:19, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: User talk:68.193.78.140


text: User:Sourceo Ind

title: User:Sourceo Ind


text: Page:The White Peacock, Lawrence, 1911.djvu/1


text: Page:The White Peacock, Lawrence, 1911.djvu/2


text: Page:The White Peacock, Lawrence, 1911.djvu/3


text:
Page:Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett).djvu/9

Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett)/General Rules

Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett)/Appendices


text:
United States v. D'Auterieve/Dissent Curtis

Mr. Justice CURTIS.

Justices McLean, Wayne, Campbell, and myself, do not understand the opinion which has been delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson as intended to express the judgment of this court upon the validity of the complete French grant, alleged by the petition to have been made by The Western Company to Paris Duvernay in 1717, or upon the effect of the alleged confirmation of such alleged complete French title, or any part thereof, by the Spanish Governors, O'Reilly and Unzaga. The trial of such a title not being within the jurisdiction of this court upon this petition, according to the repeated decisions of this court, and the plain terms of the act of May 26, 1824, under which we derive our authority, it seems equally clear, that the questions whether there is any sufficient evidence that such a grant was made, or whether it could be located, or whether it embraced the premises in question, or whether it had been in part or in whole confirmed; and how extensive such confirmation, if made, was, are questions not judicially before us. For these questions belong exclusively to the trial of that legal title.

In our judgment, this embraces the whole case. It exhausts every allegation in the petition, which makes no claim to any incipient or imperfect French or Spanish title. It alleges only a complete French grant, and a confirmation to D'Auterieve, who was then in possession under it, of part of the land.

Now, the first section of the act of 1824, provides that a person, claiming lands by virtue of a French or Spanish grant, concession, warrant, or order of survey, which might have been perfected into a complete title, may present a petition to the District Court, setting forth, fully, plainly, and substantially, the nature of his claim to the lands, particularly stating the date of the grant, &c., under which he claims; and then it continues: 'and the said court is hereby authorized and required to hold and exercise jurisdiction of every petition presented in conformity with this act, and to hear and determine the same.' Unless, therefore, the petition is presented in conformity with this act, the special and limited jurisdiction which the act confers does not exist. The title shown by this petition being a complete title, derived from the Western Company, and confirmed by the Spanish authorities, and the petitioner not having shown, fully, plainly, and substantially, or even by the most obscure suggestion, any other title, we cannot perceive how this court has any jurisdiction under the act of 1824. We add, however, that if, as in the case of Davenport's Heirs, at the present term, the petition did duly aver facts, constituting in point of law an imperfect title, we should not consider the petition defective, though it might state an erroneous legal conclusion from those facts, and call the title a perfect one. That is not this case, as may be seen by recurring to the petition.

Our opinion is, that this petition should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any legal title of the petitioners, and that no opinion should be expressed by this court upon any question of fact or law arising upon the evidence.


text:
O'Reilly v. Morse/Dissent Grier

Mr. Justice GRIER.

I entirely concur with the majority of the court, that the appellee and complainant below, Samuel F. B. Morse, is the true and first inventor of the Recording Telegraph, and the first who has successfully applied the agent or element of nature, called electro-magnetism, to printing and recording intelligible characters at a distance; and that his patent of 1840, finally reissued in 1848, and his patent for his improvements as reissued in the same year, are good and valid; and that the appellants have infringed the rights secured to the patentee by both his patents. But, as I do not concur in the views of the majority of the court, in regard to two great points of the case, I shall proceed to express my own.

I. Does the complainant's first patent come within the proviso of the 6th section of the act of 1839? and should the term of fourteen years granted by it commence from the date of his patent here, or from the date of his French patent in 1838?

If the complainant's patent is within the provisions of this section, I cannot see how we can escape from declaring it void. The proviso declares that, 'in all cases, every such patent (issued under the provisions of that section) shall be limited to the term of fourteen years from the date or publication of such foreign letters-patent.' It is true it does not say that the patent shall be void if not limited to such term on its face; but it gives no power to the officer to issue a patent for a greater term. If the patent does not show the true commencement of the term granted by it, the patentee has it in his power to deceive the public, by claiming a term of fourteen years, while in reality it may be not more than one.

But I am of opinion that the patent in question does not come within this proviso.

The facts of the case, as connected with this point, are these: On the 6th of October, 1837, Morse filed in the office of the commissioner of patents, a caveat accompanied by a specification, setting forth his invention, and praying that it may be protected, till he could finish some experiments necessary to perfect its details. On the 9th of April, 1838, he filed a formal application for a patent, accompanied by a specification and drawings. On the first of May, 1838, the commissioner informs him, that his application has been granted. Morse answers on the 15th of May, that he is just about to sail to Europe, and asks the commissioner to delay the issue of his patent for the present, fearing its effect upon his plans abroad.

On the 30th of October, 1838, he obtained his useless French patent. On his return to this country in 1840, he requests his patent to be perfected and issued. In this application, filed on the 9th of April, 1838, there was an oversight in filling up the day and month. This clerical omission was wholly immaterial, but ex majori cautela a second affidavit was filed, and the patent issued on the 20th of June, 1840, for the term of fourteen years from its date.

The application of 1838 had a set of drawings annexed to the specification. The second set of drawings, required by the 6th section of the act of 1837, being for the purpose of annexation to the patent, they were entirely unnecessary till the patent issued, and are not required by law to accompany the application when first made, and the want of them cannot affect the validity of the application.

In many instances, owing to various causes, the patent is not issued till many months, and sometimes a year or more after the application. The commissioner requires time to examine the specification; he may suggest difficulties and amendments; and disputes often arise, which delay the issuing of the patent. But the application does not require to be renewed, and is never considered abandoned in consequence of such delay. It still remains as of the date of its filing for every purpose beneficial to the applicant. The law does not require that the specification and its accompaniments should be in the precise form which they afterwards assume in the patent. It requires only that the application be 'in writing,' and that the applicant should 'make oath that he is the original inventor,' &c. The other requirements of the act must precede the issuing of the patent, but make no part of the application, and are not conditions precedent to its validity.

In the present case, we have, therefore, a regular application in due form, accompanied by a specification and drawings, filed on the 9th of April, 1838. It has not been withdrawn, discontinued, or abandoned. There is nothing in the act of Congress which requires that the patent should be issued within any given time after the application is filed, or which forbids the postponement of it for a time, at the suggestion either of the applicant or the officer. Nor is there any thing in the general policy of the patent laws which forbids it. On the contrary, it has always been the practice, when a foreign patent is desired, to delay the issuing of the patent here, after application filed, for fear of injuring such foreign application. It forms no part of the policy of any of our patent acts to prevent our citizens from obtaining patents abroad.

By the Patent Act of 1793, the applicant must swear 'that his invention, was not known or used before the application.' The filing of the application was the time fixed for determining the applicant's right to a patent. If a patent had issued abroad, or the invention had been in use or described in some public work, before that time, it was a good defence to it. The time of filing the application was, therefore, made by law the criterion of his right to claim as first inventor. A foreign patent subsequent to the date of his application, could not be set up as a defence against the domestic patentee. The American inventor who had filed his application and specification at home, was thus enabled to obtain his patent abroad, without endangering his patent at home. This was a valuable privilege to American citizens, and one of which he has never been deprived by subsequent legislation. And thus the law stood till the act of 4th July, 1836.

Before this time the right to obtain a patent was confined to American citizens, or those who had filed their intentions to become such. The policy of this act was to encourage foreign inventors to introduce their inventions to this country, but in doing so it evinces no intention of limiting our own citizens by taking away from them rights which they had hitherto enjoyed.

Accordingly it gave an inventor, who had obtained a patent abroad, and who was generally a foreigner, a right to have one here, provided he made his application here within six months after the date of his foreign patent. Neither the letter nor the spirit of this act interferes with the right of an inventor who has filed his application here, from obtaining a patent abroad, or his right to a term of fourteen years, from the date of his patent.

In 1838, therefore, when complainant filed his application, he was entitled to such a patent. But in March, 1839, an act was passed, by the 6th section of which it is alleged the complainant's rights have been affected. That section is as follows:

'That no person shall be debarred from receiving a patent for any invention, & c., as provided in the act of 4th July, 1836, to which this is additional, by reason of the same having been patented in a foreign country, more than six months prior to his application. Provided, that the same shall not have been introduced into public and common use in the United States prior to the application for such patent. And provided, also, that in all cases, every such patent shall be limited to the term of fourteen years from the date of publication of such foreign letterspatent.'

Now the act of 1836, as we have shown, had given a privilege to foreign patentees to have a patent within six months after date of such foreign patent. It had not affected, in any manner, the right previously enjoyed by American citizens, to take out a foreign patent after filing their applications here. This section gives additional rights to those who had first taken out patents abroad, and holding out an additional encouragement to foreign inventors to introduce their inventions here, subject to certain conditions contained in the proviso. Neither the letter, spirit, nor policy of this act, have any reference to, or bearing upon, the case of persons who had just made their applications here. To construe a proviso, as applicable to a class of cases not within its enacting clause, would violate all settled rules of construction. The office of a proviso, is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation, or to state a condition to which the privilege granted by the section shall be subjected.

Here the proviso is inserted, to restrain the general words of the section and impose a condition on those who accept the privileges granted by the section. It enlarged the privileges of foreign patentees, which had before been confined to six months, on two conditions. 1st. Provided the invention patented abroad had not been introduced into public use here; and 2d, on condition that every such patent should be limited in its terms. The general words, 'in all cases,' especially when restrained to every such patent, cannot extend the conditions of the proviso beyond such cases as are the subject-matter of legislation in the section. The policy and spirit of the act are to grant privileges to a certain class of persons which they did not enjoy before; to encourage the introduction of foreign inventions and discoveries, and not to deprive our own citizens of a right heretofore enjoyed, or to affect an entirely different class of cases, when the applications had been filed here before a patent obtained abroad.

It is supposed, that certain evils might arise by allowing an applicant for a patent here to delay its issue till he can obtain a foreign patent. To which, it is a sufficient answer to say, that if such evil consequences should be found to exist, it is for Congress to remedy them by legislation.

It is no part of the duty of this court, by a forced construction of existing statutes, to attempt the remedy of possible evils by anticipation.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the complainant's patent, as renewed, contained a valid grant of the full term of fourteen years from its original date.

II. The other point, in which I cannot concur with the opinion of the majority, arises in the construction of the eighth claim of complainant's first patent, as finally amended. The first claim, as explanatory of all that follow, should be read in connection with the eighth. They are as follows:

'1st. Having thus fully described my invention, I wish it to be understood, that I do not claim the use of the galvanic current or currents of electricity, for the purpose of telegraphic communications generally; but what I specially claim as my invention and improvement, is making use of the motive power of magnetism, when developed by the action of such current or currents substantially as set forth in the foregoing description of the first principal part of my invention, as means of operating or giving motion to machinery which may be used to imprint signals upon paper or other suitable material, or to produce sounds in any desired manner for the purpose of telegraphic communication at any distances. The only ways in which the galvanic current had been proposed to be used prior to my invention and improvement, were by bubbles resulting from decomposition, and the action or exercise of electrical power upon a magnetized bar or needle; and the bubbles and the deflections of the needles thus produced, were the subjects of inspection, and had no power or were not applied to record the communication. I therefore characterize my invention as the first recording or printing telegraph by means of electro-magnetism.

'There are various known modes of producing motions by electro-magnetism, but none of these had been applied prior to my invention and improvement to actuate or give motion to printing or recording machinery, which is the chief point of my invention and improvement.'

'8th. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims, the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.'

The objection to this claim is, that it is too broad, because the inventor does not confine himself to specific machinery or parts of machinery, as described in his patent, but claims that the essence of his invention consists in the application of electro-magnetism as a motive power, however developed, for printing characters at a distance. This being a new application of that element or power, of which the patentee claims to be the first inventor or discoverer.

In order to test the value of this objection, as applied to the present case, and escape any confusion of ideas too often arising from the use of ill-defined terms and propositions, let us examine, 1st. What may be patented; or what forms a proper subject of protection, under the Constitution and acts of Congress, relative to this subject.

2d. What is the nature of the invention now under consideration? Is it a mere machine, and subject to the rules which affect a combination of mechanical devices to effect a particular purpose.

3d. Is the claim true, in fact? And if true, how can it be too broad, in any legal sense of the term, as heretofore used, either in the acts of Congress, or in judicial decisions?

4th. Assuming the hypothesis that it is too broad, how should that affect the judgment for costs in this case?

1st. The Constitution of the United States declares that 'Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.'

The act of Congress of 1836, confers this exclusive right for a limited time, on 'any person who has discovered or invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by others, before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of his application for a patent, in public use,' &c.

A new and useful art or a new and useful improvement on any known art is as much entitled to the protection of the law as a machine or manufacture. The English patent acts are confined to 'manufactures' in terms; but the courts have construed them to cover and protect arts as well as machines; yet without using the term art. Here we are not required to make any latitudinous construction of our statute for the sake of equity or policy; and surely we have no right, even if we had the disposition, to curtail or narrow its liberal policy by astute or fanciful construction.

It is not easy to give a precise definition of what is meant by the term 'art,' as used in the acts of Congress-some, if not all, the traits which distinguish an art from the other legitimate subjects of a patent, are stated with clearness and accuracy by Mr. Curtis, in his Treatise on Patents. 'The term art, applies,' says he, 'to all those cases where the application of a principle is the most important part of the invention, and where the machinery, apparatus, or other means, by which the principle is applied, are incidental only and not of the essence of his invention. It applies also to all those cases where the result, effect, or manufactured article is old, but the invention consists in a new process or method of producing such result, effect, or manufacture.' Curt. on Pat. 80.

A machine, though it may be composed of many parts, instruments, or devices combined together, still conveys the idea of unity. It may be said to be invented, but the term 'discovery' could not well be predicated of it. An art may employ many different machines, devices, processes, and manipulations, to produce some useful result. In a previously known art a man may discover some new process, or new application of a known principle, element, or power of nature, to the advancement of the art, and will be entitled to a patent for the same, as 'an improvement in the art,' or he may invent a machine to perform a given function, and then he will be entitled to a patent only for his machine.

That improvements in the arts, which consist in the new application of some known element, power, or physical law, and not in any particular machine or combination of machinery, have been frequently the subject of patents both in England and in this country, the cases in our books most amply demonstrate. I have not time to examine them at length; but would refer to James Watt's patent for a method of saving fuel in steam-engines by condensing the steam in separate vessels, and applying non-conducting substances to his steam-pipes; Clegg's patent for measuring gas in water; Juhr v. Pratt, Webster's Pat. Cas. 103; and the celebrated case of Neilson's patent for the application of hot blast, being an important improvement in the art of smelting iron.

In England, where their statute does not protect an art in direct terms, they have made no clear distinction between an art or an improvement in an art, and a process, machine, or manufacture. They were hampered and confined by the narrowness of the phraseology of their patent acts. In this country, the statute is as broad as language can make it. And yet, if we look at the titles of patents, as given at the patent office, and the language of our courts, we might suppose that our statute was confined entirely to machines. Notwithstanding, in Kneiss v. The Bank, (4 Washington C. C. Rep. 19,) Mr. Justice Washington supported a patent which consisted in nothing else but a new application of copperplates to both sides of a bank-bill as a security against counterfeiting. The new application was held to be an art, and, therefore, patentable. So the patent in McClurg v. Kingsland (1 Howard, 204) was in fact for an improvement in the art of casting chilled rollers by conveying the metal to the mould in a direction approaching to the tangent of the cylinder; yet the patentee was protected in the principle of his discovery, (which was but the application of a known law of nature to a new purpose), against all forms of machinery embodying the same principle.

The great art of printing, which has changed the face of human society and civilization, consisted in nothing but a new application of principles known to the world for thousands of years. No one could say it consisted in the type or the press, or in any other machine or device used in performing some particular function, more than in the hands which picked the types or worked the press. Yet if the inventor of printing had, under this narrow construction of our patent law, claimed his art as something distinct from his machinery, the doctrine now advanced, would have declared it unpatentable to its full extent as an art, and that the inventor could be protected in nothing but his first rough types and ill-contrived press.

I do not intend to review the English cases which adopt the principle for which I now contend, notwithstanding their narrow statute; but would refer to the opinion of my brother Nelson, in 14 Howard, 177; and will add, that Mr. Justice McLean, in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, quotes with approbation the language of Lord Justice Clerke, in the Neilson case, which is precisely applicable to the question before us. He says: 'The specification does not claim any thing as to form, nature, shape, materials, numbers, or mathematical character of the vessel or vessels in which the air is to be heated, or as to the mode of heating such vessels.' Yet this patent was sustained as for a new application of a known element; or, to use correct language, as an improvement in the art of smelting iron, without any regard to the machinery or parts of machinery used in the application. Such I believe to be the established doctrine of the English courts.

He who first discovers that an element or law of nature can be made operative for the production of some valuable result, some new art, or the improvement of some known art; who has devised the machinery or process to make it operative, and introduced it in a practical form to the knowledge of mankind, is a discoverer and inventor of the highest class. The discovery of a new application of a known element or agent may require more labor, expense, persevering injustiry, and ingenuity than the inventor of any machine. Sometimes, it is true, it may be the result of a happy thought or conception, without the labor of an experiment, as in the case of the improvement in the art of casting chilled rollers, already alluded to. In many cases, it is the result of numerous experiments; not the consequence of any reasoning a priori, but wholly empirical; as the discovery that a certain degree of heat, when applied to the usual processes for curing India rubber, produced a substance with new and valuable qualities.

The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature, without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a patent. But he who takes this new element or power, as yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man; who applies it to the perfecting of a new and useful art, or to the improvement of one already known, is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders its protection. The devices and machines used in the exercise of it may or may not be new; yet, by the doctrine against which I contend, he cannot patent then, because they were known and used before. Or, if he can, it is only in their new application and combination in perfecting the new art. In order words, he may patent the new application of the mechanical devices, but not the new application of the operative elements which is the essential agent in the invention. He may patent his combination of the machinery, but not his art.

When a new and hitherto unknown product or result, beneficial to mankind, is effected by a new application of any element of nature, and by means of machines and devices, whether new or old, it cannot be denied that such invention or discovery is entitled to the denomination of a 'new and useful art.' The statute gives the inventor of an art a monopoly in the exercise of it as fully as it does to the inventor of a mere machine. And any person who exercise such new art without the license of the inventor is an infringer of his patent, and of the franchise granted to him by the law as a reward for his labor and ingenuity in perfecting it. A construction of the law which protects such an inventor, in nothing but the new invented machines or parts of machinery used in the exercise of his art, and refuses it to the exercise of the art itself, annuls the patent law. If the law gives a franchise or monopoly to the inventor of an art as fully as to the inventor of a machine, why shall its protection not be coextensive with the invention in one case as well as in the other? To look at an art as nothing but a combination of machinery, and give it protection only as such, against the use of the same or similar devices or mechanical equivalents, is to refuse it protection as an art. It ignores the distinction between an art and a machine; it overlooks the clear letter and spirit of the statute; and leads to inextricable difficulties. It is viewing a statute or a monument through a microscope.

The reason given for thus confining the franchise of the inventor of an art to his machines and parts of machinery is, that it would retard the progress of improvement, if those who can devise better machines or devices, differing in mechanical principle from those of the first inventor of the art, or, in other words, who can devise an improvement in it, should not be allowed to pirate it.

To say that a patentee, who claims the art of writing at a distance by means of elector-magnetism, necessarily claims all future improvements in the art, is to misconstrue it, or draws a consequence from it not fairly to be inferred from its language. An improvement in a known art is as much the subject of a patent as the art itself; so, also, is an improvement on a known machine. Yet, if the original machine be patented, the patentee of an improvement will not have a right to use the original. This doctrine has not been found to retard the progress of invention in the case of machines; and I can see no reason why a contrary one should be applied to an art.

The claim of the patentee is, that he may be protected in the exercise of his art as against persons who may improve or change some of the processes or machines necessary in its exercise. The court, by deciding that this claim is too broad, virtually decides that such an inventor of an improvement may pirate the art he improves, because it is contrary to public policy to restrain the progress of invention. Or, in other words, it may be said that it is the policy of the courts to refuse that protection to an art which it affords to a machine, which it is the policy of the Constitution and the laws to grant.

2d. Let us now consider what is the nature of the invention now under consideration.

It is not a composition of matter, or a manufacture, or a machine. It is the application of a known element or power of nature, to a new and useful purpose by means of various processes, instruments and devices, and if patentable at all, it must come within the category of 'a new and useful art.' It is as much entitled to this denomination as the original art of printing itself. The name givento it in the patent is generally the act of the commissioner, and in this, as in many other cases, a wrong one. The true nature of the invention must be sought in the specification.

The word telegraph is derived from the Greek, and signifies 'to write afar off or at a distance.' It has heretofore been applied to various contrivances or devices, to communicate intelligence by means of signals or semaphores, which speak to the eye for a moment. But in its primary and literal signification of writing, printing, or recording at a distance, it never was invented, perfected, or put into practical operation till it was done by Morse. He preceded Steinheil, Cook, Wheatstone, and Davy in the successful application of this mysterious power or element of electro-magnestism to this purpose; and his invention has entirely superseded their inefficient contrivances. It is not only 'a new and useful art,' if that term means any thing, but a most wonderful and stonishing invention, requiring tenfold more ingenuity and patient experiment to perfect it, than the art of printing with types and press, as originally invented.

3d. Is it not true, as set forth in this eighth claim of the specification, that the patentee was the first inventor or discoverer of the use or application of electro-magnestism to print and record intelligible characters or letters? It is the very ground on which the court agree in confirming his patent. Now the patent law requires an inventor, as a condition precedent to obtaining a patent, to deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and to particularly specify what he claims to be his own invention or discovery. If he has truly stated the principle, nature and extent of his art or invention, how can the court say it is too broad, and impugn the validity of his patent for doing what the law requires as a condition for obtaining it? And if it is only in case of a machine that the law requires the inventor to specify what he claims as his own invention and discovery, and to distinguish what is new from what is old, then this eighth claim is superfluous and cannot affect the validity of his patent, provided his art is new and useful, and the machines and devices claimed separately, are of his own invention. If it be in the use of the words 'however developed' that the claim is to be adjudged too broad, then it follows that a person using any other process for the purpose of developing the agent or element of elector-magnetism, than the common one now in use, and described in the patent, may pirate the whole art patented.

But if it be adjudged that the claim is too board, because the inventor claims the application of this element to his new art, then his patent is to be invalidated for claiming his whole invention, and nothing more. If the result of this application be a new and useful art, and if the essence of his invention consists in compelling this hitherto useless element to record letters and words, at any distance and in many places at the same moment, how can it be said that the claim is for a principle or an abstraction? What is meant by a claim being to broad? The patent law and judicial decisions may be searched in vain for a provision or decision that a patent may be impugned for claiming no more than the patentee invented or discovered. It is only when he claims something before known and used, something as new which is not new, either by mistake or intentionally, that his patent is affected.

The act of Congress requires the applicant for a patent to swear that 'he is the original and first inventor of the art, machine, &c.' It requires the commissioner to make an examination of the alleged invention, 'and if it shall appear that the same has not been invented prior to the alleged invention, he shall grant a patent, &c. But if it shall appear that the applicant is not the original and first inventor or discoverer thereof, or that any part of that which is claimed as new, had before been invented,' then the applicant to have leave to withdraw his application.

The 13th section treats of defective specifications and their remedy where the applicant, through mistake or inadvertency, had claimed 'more than he had a right to claim as new.'

The 15th section, in enumerating the defences which a defendant may be allowed to make to a patent, states that inter alia he may show, 'that the patentee was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of the thing patented, or of a substantial and material part thereof claimed as new.' And the proviso to the same section allows the court to refuse costs, 'when the plaintiff shall fail to sustain his action on the ground that, in his specification or claim, is embraced more than that of which he was the first inventor.'

The 7th section of the act of March 3, 1837, specially defines the meaning of the phrase 'too broad,' to be 'when the patent claims more than that of which the patentee was the original and first inventor.' And the 9th section of the same act, again providing for cases, where by accident or mistake, the patentee claims more than he is justly entitled to, describes it to be 'where the patentee shall have in his specification claimed to be the original inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part, of which he is not the first and original inventor, and shall have no legal and just right to the same.'

Thus we see that it is only where, through inadvertence or mistake, the patentee has claimed something of which he was not the first inventor, that the court are directed to refuse costs.

The books of reports may be searched in vain for a case where a patent has been declared void, for being too broad, in any other sense.

Assuming it to be true, then, for the purpose of the argument, that the new application of the power of electro-magnetism to the art of telegraphing or printing characters at a distance, is not the subject of a patent, because it is patenting a principle; yet as it is also true, that Morse was the first who made this application successfully, as set forth in this eighth claim, I am unable to comprehend how, in the words of the statute, we can adjudge 'that he has failed to sustain his action, on the ground that his specification or claim embraces more than that of which he was the first inventor.' It is for this alone that the statute authorizes us to refuse costs.

4th. Assuming this eighth claim to be too broad, it may well be said, that the patentee has not unreasonably delayed a disclaimer, when we consider that it is not till this moment he had reason to believe it was too broad. But the bill claims, and it is sustained by proof, that the defendant had infringed the complainant's second patent for his improvement.

The court sustains the validity of this patent. Why, then, is the complainant not entitled to his costs? At law, a recovery on one good count is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover costs; and I can see no particular equity which the defendants can claim, who are adjudged to have pirated two inventions at once.

I am of opinion, therefore, that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed, with costs.

title: O'Reilly v. Morse/Dissent Grier


text:
Broome v. United States/Dissent Campbell

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL.

I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case.

The certificate of the Comptroller of the Treasury, of his approval of a bond which it is made his duty to accept on behalf of the government, is the best evidence of the time of its delivery, as a valid and operative obligation. If another date is asserted by the government, the burden of sustaining it by clear proof, devolves upon it.

The instruction to the jury by the District Judge, 'that the time of the approval of the bond, at the Treasury Department, is not to be taken as the time of delivery,' was, in my opinion, too general, and is erroneous.

The District Judge further instructed the jury, that although the bond 'may not have come to the hands of the officers of the government' till after the death of one of the obligors, yet 'if they had parted with it for the purpose of sending it, or having it sent to Washington city, before that time,' that would charge the legal representative of the person who had died.

The delivery of a bond is only complete when it has been accepted by the obligee, or a third person, 'for, and in his behalf, and to his use.'

The terms I have quoted from the Touchstone, imply a cession of the title to the paper in the act of delivery.

The third person, who thus represents the obligee, is not subject to the mandate of the obligor, nor amenable to his control.

The instructions of the District Judge would be satisfied by any surrender of the custody of the paper, if for the purpose of having it sent to Washington city; whether it be to the agent or servant of the obligors, who would be subject to their orders, or by its inclosure in a letter, the delivery of which might be countermanded; in other words, by acts which did not amount to a surrender of the property or legal right to control the paper. This, in my opinion, was erroneous. With respect for the opinion of this court, I enter, therefore, my dissent to the judgment which affirms these instructions.


text:
Brooks v. Fiske/Dissent McLean

Mr. Justice McLEAN.

I dissent from the opinion of the court. The defendants rest their defence on three grounds: 1. A want of novelty in Woodworth's invention.

2. That in the new patent of Woodworth, issued on the surrender of the old one, to correct the specifications, a new invention is claimed, not contained in the first patent.

3. That the defendant's machine is substantially different from the plaintiff's.

The Woodworth patent has been a subject of investigation frequently before the circuit courts of the United States, and of this court. And although the originality of the invention has been, I believe, uniformly sustained, still, the fact of novelty depends upon proof, and may be disputed by any one against whom suit is brought. The patent is prim a facie evidence of right in the patentee. A defence which denies the novelty of the invention, must be proved.

The original patent of Woodworth is dated the 27th of December, 1828. He describes his invention to be an 'improvement in the method of planing, tonguing, grooving, and cutting into mouldings, of either plank, boards, or any other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness, and also for facing and dressing brick, and cutting mouldings, or facing metallic, mineral, or other substances. He then describes the machinery by which this result is produced. And he says, in the conclusion, that he does not claim the invention of circular saws, or cutter wheels, knowing they have long been in use; but he claims as his invention, the improvement and application of cutter or planing wheels to planing boards, &c., as above stated, &c.

There is no claim, in his written specifications, for pressure rollers on both sides of the cutting cylinder, which confine the board to its place, and necessarily reduced it to an equal thickness; but in the drawings, these rollers appear at the proper places, and are so arranged as to reduce the board to a uniform thickness.

The written specifications, including the drawings, constitute a part of the patent, and must be construed as the claim of the plaintiff. In Ryan v. Goodwin, 3 Sumner, 514, it is said, if the court can perceive, on the whole instrument, the exact nature and extent of the claim made by the inventor, it is bound to adopt that interpretation, and to give it full effect. The same is held in Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story, 270, 286; and in Ames v. Howard, 1 Sumner, 482, 485, it is said 'the drawings are to be taken in connection with the words, and if, by a comparison of the words and the drawings, the one would explain the other sufficiently to enable a skilful mechanic to perform the work, the specification is sufficient.' Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 Car. & Payne, 558, is to the same effect.

Formerly, patents were construed strictly as giving monoplies; but of late years, in England, inventions are treated differently, and a liberal view is taken in favor of the right. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumn. 535, 539. This has been the settled doctrine in this country, and it is founded upon the highest considerations of policy and justice. The opinion, delivered by my brother Curtis this morning, as the organ of the court, cites the authorities.

No patent, it is believed, which has ever been granted in this country, has been so much litigated as this one. This affords no unsatisfactory evidence of its value. Very shortly after Woodworth's machine was put in operation, a system of piracy was commenced, and, although twenty-five years have elapsed, numerous suits are still pending contesting the right. Mr. Justice Story was one of the first judges whose duties required him to scrutinize this patent in all its parts, and he sustained it in all. This was before the specifications were corrected. And this court also sustained it, in 7 How. 712, where it says, 'the specifications accompanying the application for a patent are sufficiently full to enable a mechanic with ordinary skill to build a machine.' And this is what the law requires.

In the corrected specifications the patentee says: 'Having thus fully described the parts and combinations of parts, and operation of the machine for planing, tonguing, and grooving boards or plank, and shown various modes in which the same may be constructed and made to operate, without changing the principle or mode of operation of the machine, what is claimed therein, as the invention of William Woodworth, deceased, is the employment of rotary planes, substantially as herein described, in combination with rollers or any analogous device, to prevent the boards from being drawn up by the planes, when cutting upwards, or from the planed to the unplaned surface, as described. And also the combination of the rotating planes with the cutter wheels, for tonguing and grooving, for the purposes of planing, tonguing, and grooving boards, &c., at one operation, as described.'

'And, finally, the combination of either the tonguing or grooving cutter wheel, for tonguing and grooving boards, &c., with the pressure rollers, as described; the effect of the pressure in these operations being such as to keep the boards, &c., steady, and prevent the cutters from drawing the boards towards the centre of the cutter wheels, whilst it is moved through by machinery,' &c.

L. Roguin, of France, in the years 1817 and 1818, invented a machine for planing, grooving wood, moulding, &c., it is alleged, substantially on the same principles as Woodworth's machine.

A considerable number of experts were examined, in the Circuit Court, on both sides, and their opinions, as usual in such cases, were directly in conflict. Such testimony, being written, cannot lead the court to a satisfactory result, by weighing the evidence, as might be done by a jury, where the witnesses are examined in open court. There seems to be no other mode of arriving at a correct conclusion, than to read what the experts have said, and make up an opinion on the specifications of the patents, and on an examination of the models.

The French machine was improved in 1818. The patentee says: 'The parent idea of the first machine could not vary. This parent idea consisted in subjecting the wood to the action of a tool of a particular shape, and to impart to this tool a rotary movement; but the choice remained, either of making the tool stationary, and causing the wood to advance under it with a slow and progressive motion-one rotary, the other progressive. The first was adopted in the construction of the machine described in support of the petition for letters-patent; the second has been adopted in the construction of the improved machine.'

After describing the structure of the cylinder, he says: 'It is borne by a cast-iron carriage, and to the back part of this carriage is attached an iron axletree, bearing two brass pinions, which gear into a rack, and tend to regulate the movement of the carriage. The bench moves itself vertically by means of screws which support it, and tend to raise it or lower it, according to the thickness of the wood to be worked.' 'Four small, graduated plates of metal, placed in the interior angles of the superstructure, act as a regulator to fix this bench in a perfectly horizontal position.' 'Two iron squares abut the bench at both ends.' 'Experience,' he says, 'has taught that the weight of the bench was not sufficient, singly, to prevent the vibration imparted to it by the machine when in operation, and there resulted from this vibration waves on the surface of the planed board.' This was obviated by the weight of the carriage. 'The carriage is of cast iron, and weighs about two hundred and forty-one pounds. It is necessary that the carriage should be of sufficient weight, so as not to be raised by the strain of the tool.'

'The back part of the bench carries a claw, against which the wood is rested and stopped like a carpenter's bench. At the other extremity, the wood is stopped by movable dogs, which pass under a bar through which passes pressure screws.' And he further says: 'We have seen, in the description of the first machine, that the mece called guide (because it serves effectually to guide the wood under the tool for grooving and moulding) was fixed on the superstructure of the bench. In the new machine, this piece is borne by the carriage.'

From this description it appears, that the planing cylinder is carried by an iron frame, and passes over the surface of the board, which is fastened on a bed by a claw at one end, and at the other by movable dogs.' This bench, on which the board is placed, is movable vertically, so as to be adjusted by screws to the thickness of the wood to be worked.

The wood is fastened on this adjustable bed, and the iron frame which carries the cutting cylinder is of sufficient weight to keep the cutters on the board, but this machinery cannot reduce the plank to the same thickness. When the bench rises or falls, the whole surface of the plank rises and falls, and the cutting knives cannot so operate by pressure on so long a surface as to reduce the inequalities of the board. But this can be done by pressure rollers, as in Woodworth's machine, on each side of the cutting cylinder-one adjustable, so as to admit the unplaned plank; the other fixed, so as to admit the passage of the plank, when reduced to the required thickness. The French machine may present a smooth surface, but the inequalities of the board will not be removed. They will remain in the same proportion as before the planing operation.

It is argued, that the piece or bar which, in the first machine, was fastened to the bench, and which, in the improved one, was annexed to the carriage, operated as a pressure roller. If this were admitted, it would not remove the difficulty, as one pressure roller or bar could answer no valuable purpose. There must be two rollers, one adjustable, as above stated, or two fixed rollers, or bar and an adjustable bed, to reduce the plank to an equal thickness. But if L. Roguin be permitted himself to describe the function of this bar, it is, 'to guide the wood under the tool for grooving, tonguing, and moulding.' Shall the language of the inventor be misapplied, and this bar be appropriated to a use which it would seem be never thought of, to render invalid Woodworth's patent?

Several of the witnesses on both sides gave their testimony from the description of L. Roguin's patent, published in a book called 'Brevets d'Inventions;' but, as that book was not published until after Woodworth's invention, its description is evidence only so far as it agrees with the specification attached to the patent of L. Roguin. And it does appear, from the original specifications, filed by him, a certified copy of which has been recently procured by M. Perpigna, that there are some material variances. We must therefore look to the authentic paper and drawings, as certified, for evidence in regard to the machine.

The organization of this machine does not seem to be on the same principle as Woodworth's, and the result is different.

The other French machine, alleged to be similar to that of Woodworth's, is De Manneville's. This machine was patented in France in 1825 and described in the printed work called 'Brevets d'Inventions.' The patent embraced two machines, having for (their) object the grooving, planing, and reducing to a uniform thickness, wood intended for inlaid work; as well as all sorts of boards, whatsoever may be their dimensions. The inventor calls them a groover and planer.

The description of this machine by the inventor is confused, and scarcely intelligible. One of the defendants' witnesses describes it as having two planes, one of which is called rough, the other smooth, both of which are kept down to the face of the board by a tool-bearer, and are moved backward and forward by a crank motion. The rough plane is movable to and from the board, by being held to it by a spring; the smooth plane, or finisher, is immovable, principally, from the board, except to separate the shavings from it. The position of the board is edgewise, resting on the horizontal rollers-friction rollers; and it is carried through by a pair of fluted cylinders or rollers, vertical, and parallel to each other; which rollers press upon each side of the board, one of which, the back one, is made to slide in its boxes, held up by a spring, and thus made to yield to the inequalities of the thickness of the board. Another pair of rollers, holding the same vertical position, called discharging cylinders, neither of which is yielding, nor are they fluted; and to adjust the different thicknesses, the inventor suggests rollers of different diameters, and on an adjustable bed.

Any one can at once see that this is not an organization of machinery similar to Woodworth's machine. It is not the same principle, nor is it in substance like it. This remark is made in regard to the combination claimed by Woodworth, and not to all the elements of which that combination is formed. In the Manneville machine there is no combination of pressure rollers with rotary cutters, as in Woodworth's; the cutters have a reciprocating motion instead of a rotary one. Several of the elements in both machines are the same, but they are not so arranged as to act in the same manner or on the same principle.

Some of the witnesses for the defendants think, that from the two French patents, the Woodworth machine might be constructed without invention; but these machines must be considered singly, and not together. In the defence it is alleged, in reference to Woodworth's machine, that 'the same thing substantially was patented in France, in 1817 and 1818, by L. Roguin, and in 1825, by Manneville. The defence, in this respect, is not sustained, as neither of the patents are substantially the same as Woodworth's.

The next point for consideration is, whether, in the amended specifications of Woodworth's patent, in 1845, a new invention was claimed, not embraced in the original patent.

It must be admitted, that the subject-matter of the new patent is the same. The patent was surrendered, to correct defective specifications, which did not result from any fraudulent intent. This right was secured to the patentee by the thirteenth section of the patent act of 1836; and, on an application to the commissioner of patents, he, finding there had been no fraud, a new patent was issued for the same invention, more accurately described, as the law authorized.

In the case of Woodworth v. Stone 3 Story's Rep. 749, and Allen v. Blunt, Ib. 742, it was held, that the action of the commissioner, in accepting a surrender of a patent and issuing a new one, concluded the parties, unless fraud be shown. And in Stimpson v. West Chester Railroad, 4 Howard, 380, this court say, 'In whatever manner the mistake or inadvertence may have occurred is immaterial. The action of the government in renewing the patent, must be considered as closing this point, and as leaving open for inquiry, before the court and jury, the question of fraud only.'

The corrected specifications of the new patent, on a surrender, would necessarily be different from those that were defective. And it is the duty of the commissioner not to permit a new invention to be claimed under the pretence of correcting defective specifications.

Some things are omitted in the new patent which were claimed in the old one. But the principal objection on this ground seems to be, that pressure rollers were claimed in the new patent, and were not claimed in the old one. This is a mistake, as has already been shown. These rollers were represented in the drawings, and in that way were more accurately described than they could have been by a written specification. These drawings are a part of the patent. It does not appear that the corrected specifications embrace a new invention, not included in the original patent.

The third and last point is, whether the defendants' machine is an infringement of the plaintiffs'.

In the opinion of the Circuit Court in this case, it is said, 'The defect in the Hill machine was, that it did not reduce the board to a uniform thickness. This desideratum the plaintiff has obtained by an improvement, for which he was entitled to a patent. The defendant has accomplished the same purpose without using the improvement of the plaintiff, but merely by a new invention of his own, and therefore does not infringe.'

From these remarks it would seem, that the Circuit Court considered Woodworth as entitled to a patent, 'for reducing boards to a uniform thickness,' but that his patent does not cover it. In this the Circuit Court was mistaken, as I shall endeavor to show, in fact and in law.

It is not controverted, that Woodworth's combination of machinery does reduce boards to an equal thickness. He did not and could not claim a patent for reducing a board to a uniform thickness; for an exclusive right could not be given for such a result. For centuries, boards have been reduced to a uniform thickness by hand planes, and, perhaps, by other means. What, under the patent law, could Woodworth claim? He had a right to claim, as he did claim, a combination of machinery which would produce such a result. Was it necessary, in the summing up of his claim, which is done to distinguish what he has invented from parts of his machine which he has not invented, that he should claim the combination of his machine for the purpose of reducing boards to a uniform thickness? This would have limited his invention to that purpose, when it was applicable, and was intended to be applied, to that and many other purposes.

By the sixth section of the patent law of 1836, an inventor is required to describe his invention in every important particular, in his application for a patent, so as to enable those skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; and if the invention be a machine, he is required to state 'the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of the principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; and 'shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention and discovery.' He is required to accompany the whole with a drawing, and, if a machine, a model, &c.

Is it not clear that Woodworth has explained the principle, and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of the principle or character of his machine, by which, in the language of the act, it may be distinguished from other inventions? The plank is planed, tongued, and grooyed, by an organization of machinery unknown before. This is all, in the summing up, which the act requires.

It is objected that Woodworth does not include, in his claim, that of reducing a plank to a uniform thickness. The invention consists in the means through which this is done. A result, or an effect, is not the invention. This appears to have been the turning point in the opinion of the Circuit Court.

But Woodworth has, in the specifications of his machinery stated that the board is necessarily reduced to a uniform thickness. He says 'The edges of the plank, as its planed part passes the planing cylinder, are brought into contract with the above-described tonguing and grooving wheels, which are so placed upon their shafts, as that the tongue and groove shall be left at the proper distance from the face of the plank, the latter being sustained against the planing cylinder by means of the carriage, or bed plate, or otherwise, so that it cannot deviate, but must be reduced to a proper thickness, and correctly tongued and grooved.' Here Woodworth describes the combined operation of planing, tonguing, and grooving; and by which the plank is reduced to a proper thickness, that is, the required thickness; and correctly tongued and grooved,' &c. This is the effect of his machine in planing boards clearly, described.

He says, the board is kept against the planing cutters by means of the carriage, or bed plate, or otherwise. The pressure rollers are claimed in his specification written, and also in his drawings, which show how they are to be applied. He also says, 'Fig. 7 represents the same machine with the axes of the planing cylinder placed horizontally, and intended to operate on one plank only at the same time. A A is the frame; B B the heads of the planing cylinder; C C the knives or cutters attached to said heads, to meet the different thicknesses of the plank; the bearings of the shaft of the cylinder may be made movable by screws or other means, to adjust it to the work, or the carriage of the bed plate may be made so as to raise the plank up to the planing cylinder.'

The patent of the defendants was issued February 12th, 1850. It is alleged to be an improvement upon Hill's machine. That machine, from the description, consisted of a planing cylinder, a platform bench, with an aperture in it, through which the planing cutters operated, so as to cut away any required thickness from the surface of the plank subjected to its action; the relation of the cylinder to the bench was permanent; a spring plate bore upon the plank nearly opposite to the cylinder, and forced it towards the cylinder and bench; feeding rollers carried the plank forward, the same as in Woodworth's machine.

By this operation a stratum of equal thickness was cut from the plank, leaving a smooth surface, but not removing the inequalities of the board. The combination of machinery was different in principle from Woodworth's, and, consequently, the result was different.

Norcross says, his invention is an improvement of Hill's machine, and 'renders it capable of reducing or planing a board to an equal thickness throughout its length.' He says, 'Hill's machine was capable of planing or reducing a board on one side, or removing from such side a stratum or layer of wood of an equal thickness,' but this did not make the board of uniform thickness.

The amended machine contains rotatory planes which cut, from the planed to the unplaned surface of the plank; an adjustable bar and rest, is at a fixed distance from the cutting action of the planes; the rotating planes and this rest bar were so connected together in a separate frame as to move vertically with the frame, and is borne downwards by their weight; two bars, one before and the other behind the rotating planes, and on the face of the plank cut by them, to cause its opposite face, in its progress through the machine, of whatever thickness and however warped, to pass in contact with the rest bar F. One of the said bars is termed a platform B, and the distance between this and the rest bar F, is variable and self-adjusting to the varying thickness of the plank before it is planed, and the other, called a horizontal bar or throat-piece G, placed at the same distance from the rest bar F, as the line of the cutting action of the rotating planes, to act on the face of the plank which has been planed, and ensure the contact of the opposite and unplaned face with the rest bar F.

Norcross says, what I claim as my invention is, the combination of the rotatory planing cylinder E, and the rest F, with mechanism, by which the two can be freely moved up or down, simultaneously and independently of the bed, or platform B B, or any analogous device, substantially in the manner and for the purpose of reducing a board to an equal thickness throughout its length, all as hereinbefore specified.'

'I also claim the above-described improvement of making the underside of the rest concave, in combination with so extending the part B, under the rest F, and applying it to the concave part thereof, as to cause the board, as it passes across the rest, to be bent, and presented with a concave surface to the operation of the rotatory cutter planing cylinder, substantially as specified.'

This organization of machinery seems to be the same in principle as that of Woodworth's, and produces the same result. If the concave surface of the board, on which the cutters operate, be an improvement, or any other slight change has been made, which may be an improvement on Woodworth's machine, that would give the defendants no right to use it without a license.

The difference between the machines appears to be this. The rotating planes and the plate or bed of Woodworth's are stationary in the main frame, and the roller or analogous device on that face of the plank to be planed, is movable toward and from the plate or bed to suit the varying thickness of the plank. While in the Norcross machine, two bars are substituted for the pressure rollers; and instead of making the one which acts on the plank before it is planed, movable, to suit the varying thickness of the plank, it is fixed permanently in the main frame; and the rotating planes and the plate or bed, termed by him the rest bar, F, are connected together in a separate frame, and together move up and down, to adapt themselves to the inequalities in the thickness of the plank.

Norcross has made that part of his machinery movable, which in the Woodworth machine is fixed; and that which is movable in the Woodworth machine, he has made permanent. These changes, and the reversal of Woodworth's machine, is the difference in their structure. A cast of the eye on the models, will satisfy a machinist of the truth of this representation.

Whether the cutting cylinder operates above or below the bench on which the plank is laid, can be of no importance; nor is the difference material whether a pressure roller varies to suit the variable thickness of the plank, or the planing cylinder, connected permanently with the bench, shall be elevated or depressed to accomplish the same object. These devices, though different in form, are the same in principle, and produce the same effect.

I think there is an infringement, and that the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed.

title: Brooks v. Fiske/Dissent McLean


text:
Northern Indiana Railroad Company v. Michigan Central Railroad Company/Separate Catron

Mr. Justice CATRON.

The Northern Indiana Railroad Company and the Railroad Commissioners for the Western Division of the Buffalo and Mississippi Railroad Company, filed their bill against the Michigan Central Railroad Company, in the Circuit Court of the United States in the District of Michigan, seeking an injunction against the defendant to prevent the Michigan company from laying down and using a railroad around the southern end of Lake Michigan, and within the State of Indiana; which road crosses the road of the complainants, and runs near to, and parallel with it, and, as the complainants allege, will materially withdraw their profits. And the complainants insist that they have a monopoly by their charter to construct the only road near to and around the southern end of the lake, and that the defendant has violated the chartered rights secured to the complainants.

The bill was demurred to, and the demurrer was sustained by the Circuit Court. The first cause of demurrer set forth is, that the complainants have not, by their bill, made such case as entitles them to any discovery or relief against the defendant as to the matters contained in the bill, or any of them; and the judgment of the court is prayed whether the defendant shall be compelled to make further answer; and, on this state of pleadings, the question standing in advance of all others is, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to entertain the bill, as between these parties, independent of the merits of the case set forth. The bill alleges that the Northern Indiana Railroad Company, and the Commissioners of the Buffalo company were, severally, corporations created by the State of Indiana, and were doing business in said State according to their charters; 'and are, in meaning and contemplation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, citizens of the State of Indiana, and entitled to be deemed and taken as such citizens for all the purposes of suing and being sued, and for the purposes of this bill of complaint.'

A corporation is composed of many individual members, having a joint interest, and a joint right to sue in their corporate name; and the consideration here presented is, whether a State law, creating the corporation, makes such corporation 'a citizen,' according to the Constitution, regardless of the fact where its members reside. If the corporation be such citizen, then every member of the corporate body might reside in Michigan, and yet have the right to sue citizens of Michigan there in the United States court.

The Constitution gives jurisdiction to the courts of the Union, 'between citizens of different States.' Now, if it be true, that corporations-such as for making roads, &c.-be citizens in the established sense of the Constitution, it must have been thus settled in the case of the Louisville Railroad Company v. Letson, 2 How. 497; as, previous to that decision, (made in 1844,) this court did not suppose that a corporation was a citizen. Nor was any such question presented in Letson's case; far from it.

Letson sued the railroad company in covenant, by their corporate name, distinctly averring that the members of the company were citizens of South Carolina, and that the plaintiff was a citizen of New York.

The defendant pleaded in abatement, that Rutherford and Baring, two of the stockholders, were citizens of North Carolina; and that the State of South Carolina was also a stockholder. To this plea there was a demurrer, which was sustained in the Circuit Court and in this court.

It was held, 1. That the State could not object, as she stood on the foot of every other individual stockholder and need not be sued; and,

2. That fugitive stockholders, who were changing every day, and quite too numerous to be included in a suit, need not be made parties of record.

This, from the report of the case, seems to have been the unanimous opinion of the members of this court, who were present at the time; certainly it was my opinion.

The president and directors of the railroad company were alleged to be, and admitted to be by their plea, citizens of South Carolina; they represented the stockholders, and were their trustees, and whose acts were binding on the stockholders. This state of parties conformed to the act of Congress of 1839, and the spirit of the 47th, 48th, 49th, and 50th rules for the government of chancery practice in the federal courts, adopted in 1842.

It is now assumed, that Letson's case overruled the decision in Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Cranch, 276. That decision undoubtedly proceeded on the true rule.

There were various complainants to a bill in equity; and the bill alleged that some of the complainants were citizens of Massachusetts, where the suit was brought; and that the defendants were also citizens of Massachusetts, except Curtis, who was stated to be of Vermont, and a subpoena was served on him in that State. There, it was held, 'that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts.' A bill thus framed could not at this day be treated seriously.

The next case supposed to be in conflict with Letson's case is that of the United States Bank v. Devereux, 5 Cranch, 61. The old Bank of the United States sued Devereux and Robertson, in the Circuit Court of Georgia, alleging that it was a corporation established under an act of Congress of 1791; and alleging, further, that the petitioners, the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States, were citizens of the State of Pennsylvania; and that Devereux and Robertson, the defendants, were citizens of Georgia; and this averment was held sufficient by the court.

That Letson's case overruled that of the R. R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocum and others, is true; and it was justly overruled, as I think. Slocum, Richards, & Company sued the Bank, alleging that they were citizens of Louisiana, and that the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank were citizens of Mississippi. The Bank pleaded in abatement, that Lambeth and Thompson, two of the stockholders, were citizens of Louisiana. And this court sustained that plea; whereas, according to Letson's case, it was quite immaterial where the stockholders resided, so that the president and directors were citizens of the State where the suit was brought.

What a corporation is, was very fully discussed in Devereux's case (5 Cranch); nor will I discuss it further here, as I do not feel called on to prove, to the legal profession of this country, that a corporation is not a citizen. And as no averment is made in the bill before us, that the president and directors of the corporations suing, are citizens of different States from the president and directors of the corporation sued, I think the demurrer ought to be sustained, and the court below instructed to dismiss the bill.

I view this assumption of citizenship for a corporation as a mere evasion of the limits prescribed to the United States courts by the Constitution. The profitable corporations are owned in a great degree in the cities; there the president and directors often reside; whilst the charter was granted in another State, and there the owners keep an agency, the business being in fact conducted in the city.

Now these owners and directors may sue their next neighbors of their own State and city, in the United States courts, according to the rule that the corporation is a citizen of the State where is was created, and that jurisdiction depends on this sole fact.

Could I consent to pronounce from this bench an opinion deemed by myself extrajudicial, and, therefore, without authority, I might attempt an argument to expose the irregularity and impotence of an adjudication confined, by law, within prescribed geographical limits, with respect to subjects purely local, whenever it should be attempted to extend the operation of such adjudication beyond the locus to which the law has allotted it. For of this character has been the action of the Circuit Court upon the controversy of these two corporations now before us. The Northern Indiana Railroad Company, incorporated by the State of Indiana, have complained of an invasion of their local rights, a tort to real property situated within the territory of Indiana, by a company incorporated by, and situated within, the State of Michigan; and the Circuit Court for the State of Michigan, limited in its cognizance of local matters to the territory of that State, has undertaken to adjudicate upon the merits of this complaint. But irregular and futile as is the action of the Circuit Court of Michigan, and as it is by all here admitted to have been, can it have been more irregular than is the undertaking, on the part of this tribunal, to pronounce authoritatively upon the character of the acts, or the relative rights and powers of the parties, over which the Circuit Court of Michigan has claimed cognizance? Is not the warrant for cognizance by the Circuit Court and by this tribunal essentially, nay, precisely, the same? Are they not both to be found, if existing at all, in the Constitution of the United States? And is it not indispensable that such cognizance should be regularly and certainly vested in the Circuit Court, before this court can sanction its validity? If it be asked, by what provision of the Constitution the Circuit Court could assume jurisdiction of the present controversy, it must, of necessity, be referred to that (2d sec. 3d Art.) provision which extends the judicial power to controversies between citizens of different States. This, indeed, is admitted; and the admission carries with it inevitably the implication that a corporation can and must, for certain purposes, become a citizen, and must, ex necessitate, possess the attributes of citizenship in order to obtain access to a court of the United States. Having, on a former occasion, (vide the case of Rundle et al. v. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, 14 Howard, 95,) endeavored to expose the incongruities involved in, and incident to, this anomalous conception, I will not now attempt a further enumeration of them beyond this obvious remark,-that citizenship and corporate existence, created by State authority, being decreed by this court to be, to some extent at least, identical, as must be the case to authorize this court to call the parties before them, it must follow that, to the same extent, a corporation can be a citizen, and a citizen can become a corporation. The process by which the latter transformation may be accomplished has not yet been pointed out. We are told, by the English jurists, and by the decisions of the English courts, and so, too, in the case of the Bank of the United States v. Devereux, it is laid down by Marshall, C.J., that a corporation is an invisible, intangible, artificial creature. In one sense, at least, the citizen may render himself invisible and intangible-he may abscond. In what signification he must become artificial, amongst the infinite varieties which may be imagined, will present a question more difficult to be determined. But in the possession of a portion even of his corporate attributes, the citizen may be deemed a quasi corporation, when it shall be thought convenient; and will, doubtless, in that chrysalis condition, furnish as just a representation of the integral legal entity, as the latter, in the shape of quasi citizen, can ever supply of the real, material, and social being with whom it is sought to identify it.

Powerless and vain as probably ever will be the 'still small voice' of an humble individual, in opposition to the united declaration of those justly considered the learned and the wise, still, under the most solemn conviction of duty, the effort can never be forborne to raise that humble voice in accents of alarm at whatever is believed to threaten even the sacred bark in which the safety both of the States and of the United States is freighted. I hold that, beyond the Constitution of the United States, there is no federal government, either in the mass or in the detail. That beyond the pale and limits prescribed by that instrument, to be interpreted, not by indirect or ingenious or forced constructions, or by remote implications, but by the plain and common-sense import of its language, a language familiar to the common and general understanding, all is unwarranted assumption and wrong-a termination of all legitimate federal power. Whilst therefore I profess, as I really feel, my belief in the wisdom and purity of those who think themselves justified in what I regard as an infringement upon the terms and objects of our only charter, I am constrained to record my solemn protest against their doctrine and their act.

On these grounds I dissent from the opinion just pronounced, and think that this cause should have been remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to dismiss it, as one over which the courts of the United States can have no jurisdiction with respect to the parties.


text:
Northern Indiana Railroad Company v. Michigan Central Railroad Company/Separate Campbell

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL.

I concur fully in the opinion of the court denying jurisdiction to the Circuit Court to entertain this bill. The objection made in the opinion to the exercise of jurisdiction, and which is fairly presented by the record, is sufficient to dispose of the case. The court has declined to determine any question upon the averments of the bill, in regard to the citizenship of the parties. The question is left exactly where it was when this case was presented. I state these facts, that no inference may be drawn to the contrary, and that the decision of the court may not be misunderstood.


text:
Page:Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett).djvu/66

Ablutions, 29, 54.

Absolution, The, 1, 19.

Acts of reverence, 5, 6, 7.

Advent, 11, 50.

Agnus Dei., 5, 24.

Alb, The, 15, 48.

Alms, offering of, 19, 38.

Altar, approach to, 16.

Altar, The, 41.
 * steps, 42.
 * cross, 42.
 * linen, 42.
 * frontals, 42.
 * kissed, 16, 19.

Altar-breads, 14, 47.

Amice, The, 15, 48.

Basin, for alms, 19, 32.
 * for ablutions, 32.

Benedictus qui venit, 20.

Bell, 33.

Biretta, 31, 51.

Black-letter days, 51.

Blessing, The, 1.

Blessed Sac. reserved, 8, 47.

Blessing the people, 28.

Bread, quality of, 47.
 * oblation of, 18.
 * prayer at offering, 18, 38.
 * box, 18.

Breast, smiting the, 4, 23.

Bows, 5.

Burse, The, 15, 16, 46.

Candles, 42.
 * sticks, 42.

Canon, of the mass, 20.

Cere-cloth, 42.

Chalice, shape of, 44.
 * cup of, 27, 44.
 * how held, 16.
 * preparation of, 14.
 * veil, 14, 17, 46.

Chasuble, 16, 49.

Ciborium, 18, 30.

Collect, The. 16.

Collects, endings of, 9.

Colours of vestments, 50.

Comfortable Words, 1.

Commandments, The, 16.

Commixture, The, 24.

Communion, of priest, 24, 40.
 * of server, 25.
 * of people, 26.
 * order of, 26.
 * prayer at, 40.

Concomitance, 53.

Confession, the general, 1, 19.

Consecration, acts of, 20, 21, 22.

Consecration, a second, 13.

Corporal, 16, 44.
 * how folded, 29.
 * over paten, 27.

Covering for the altar, 42.

Covering the vessels, 27, 29, 51.

Credence, The, 17, 32, 43.

Creed, when omitted, 11.

Cross or crucifix, 42.

Cruets, 14, 32, 33.

Dead, mass for, 11.
 * commemoration of, 23, 40.

Decalogue, 1.

Dedication festival, 50.

Desk, for mass-book, 16, 31.

Directions, for celebrating, 14, 30.
 * for serving, 31, 33.

Elevation, of host, 21.
 * of chalice, 22.

Ember-days, 50.

Epiphany, feast of, 50.
 * Gospel for, 12.

Epistle, announcement of, 10.
 * reading of, 4, 16.

Eucharist, matter of, 47.

Exhortation, The, 1, 19, 20.

Eyes, use of, 2.

Fair linen cloth, 42.

Faithful departed, 23, 39.

Foot-pace, 16, 42.

Frontals, 42.


text:
Page:Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett).djvu/67

Rh Genuflections, 7, 21, 22.

Girdle, 15, 48.

Gloria in excelsis, 11, 27.

Gloria Patri, 6.

Good Friday, 12.

Gospel, announcement of, 4, 10, 17.
 * the last, 11, 30.

Gradine, 16, 17.
 * see Retable.

Hands, use of, 3, 4, 31.
 * joined, 3.
 * extended, 4.

Head, bowed, 6.

Holy Communion,
 * see Communion.

Holy Saturday, 12.

Humble Access, prayer of, 1, 19.

Intinction, 52.

Kisses, 5.

Knop, of chalice, 44.

Kyries, 16.

Laundering of linen, 47.

Lavabo-basin, 19, 32.
 * towel, 19, 32, 47.

Lent, 50.

Lights, altar, 14, 42.

Maniple, 15, 48.

Mass, preparation for, 14.
 * when not celebrated, 12.
 * of requiem, 11.
 * solitary, 12.

Matter, of the Eucharist, 47.

Matin office, 14.

Mensa, 41.

Movements, manner of, 1.

Non-liturgical days, 12.

Notices, 17.

Oblation, of bread, 18.
 * of wine, 18.

Offerings presented, 18.

Offertory, The, 17.

Omissions, 11.

Order of communion, 26.

Pall, The, 14, 17, 45.

Paten, The, 14, 17, 44.

Post-communion, 14, 28.

Prayer of consecration, 20.

Preparatory prayers, 16, 36.

Priest, vesting of, 15.

Private prayers, 34, 40.

Preface, The, 20.
 * proper, 15.

Pulpit, 17.

Purification, wine of, 29.

Purificator, 14, 18, 46.

Reservation,
 * see Blessed Sacrament.

Retable, 41.

Reverence, acts of, 5.

Rogation days, 50.

Sacristy, 30.
 * drain, 47.

Sanctus, 20.

Sedilia, 17.

Server, directions for, 31, 33.

Sermon, The, 17.

Sick, communion of, 53.

Sign of the cross, at Gospel, 4.
 * how made, 8.

Solitary masses, 12.

Species, adm. of both, 25, 52.

Stole, 15, 49.

Summary of the Law, 16.

Surplice, chasuble-shaped, 49.

Salutation, The, 17.

Tabernacle, The, 43.

Thanksgiving, of priest, 30.

Unleavened bread, 47.

Vessels, sacred, 43.
 * extra, 21.

Vesting, order of, 15.
 * prayers at, 35.

Vestments, 48.
 * care of, 51.

Voice, use of, 2, 20.
 * in canon, 20.

Washing, of fingers, 19.

Washing, of hands, 14, 30.

Water-cruet, 14, 32, 33.

Water, put in wine, 18, 38.

Wine, oblation of, 18.
 * quality of, 47.
 * prayer at offering, 18, 38.


text: Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett)

title: Low Mass Ceremonial (Burnett)


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/70

Rh Holding also good Correspondence with the other Great Men in the State, Or else the Remedie is worse then the Disease.

had rather beleeve all the Fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universall Frame is without a Minde; and, therefore, God never wrought Miracle to convince Atheisme, because his Ordinary Works convince it. It is true, that a little Philosophy inclineth man's mind to Atheisme; But depth in Philosophy bringeth Men's mindes about to Religion: For while the Minde of Man looketh upon Second Causes Scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and goe no further: But when it beholdeth the Chaine of them Confederate, and linked together, it must needs flie to Providence and Deitie. Nay, even that Schoole, which is most accused of Atheisme doth most demonstrate Religion; That is, the Schoole of Leucippus, and Democritus, and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more Credible that foure Mutable Elements, and one Immutable Fift Essence, duly and Eternally placed, need no God, then that an Army of Infinite small Portions or Seedes unplaced should have produced this Order and Beauty without a Divine Marshall. The Scripture saith, The Foole hath thought in his Heart, there is no God: it is not said, The Foole hath thought in his Heart: So as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly beleeve it, or be persuaded of it. For none deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh that there were

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/70


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/71

Rh no God. It appeareth in nothing more that Atheisme is rather in the Lip then in the Heart of Man then by this, That atheists will ever be talking of that their Opinion, as if they fainted in it within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthned by the Consent of others; Nay more, you shall have Atheists strive to get Disciples, as it fareth with other Sects; And, which is most of all, you shall have of them that will suffer for Atheisme, and not recant; Wheras, if they did truly thinke that there were no such Thing as God, why should they trouble themselves? Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit’s sake, when he affirmed There were blessed Natures, but such as enioyed themselves without having respect to the Government of the World; Wherin they say he did temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly, he is traduced, For his Words are Noble and Divine: Non Deos vulgi negare profanum; sed vulgi opiniones Dijs applicare profanum. Plato could have said no more. And although he had the Confidence to deny the Administration, he had not the Power to deny the Nature. The Indians of the West have Names for their particular Gods, though they have no name for God: as if the Heathens should have had the Names Iupiter, Apollo, Mars, &c., but not the word Deus; which shewes that even those Barbarous People have the notion, though they have not the Latitude and Extent of it. So that against Atheists, the very Savages take part with the very subtillest Philosophers. The Contemplative Atheist is rare; a Diagoras, a Bion, a Lucian perhaps, and some others; And yet they seeme to be more than they are; For that all that Impugne a received Religion, or Superstition, are, by the adverse Part, branded with the Name of Atheists. But

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/71


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/72

Rh the great Atheists, indeed, are Hypocrites, which are ever Handling Holy Things, but without Feeling; So as they must needs be cauterized in the End.

The causes of Atheisme are; Divisions in Religion, if they be many; For any one maine Division addeth Zeale to both Sides, But many Divisions introduce Atheisme. Another is, Scandal of Priests, When it is come to that which S. Bernard saith, Non est iam dicere, ut populus, sic Sacerdos: quia nec sic Populus, ut Sacerdos. A third is, Custome of Profane Scoffing in Holy Matters, which doth, little by little, deface the Reverence of Religion. And lastly, Learned Times, specially with Peace and Prosperity: For troubles and Adversities doe more bow Men’s Mindes to Religion. They that deny a God destroy Man’s Nobility; For certainly Man is of Kinne to the Beasts by his Body; And if he be not of Kinne to God by his Spirit, he is a Base and Ignoble creature. It destroies likewise Magnanimity and the Raising of Humane Nature; For take an example of a Dog, And mark what a Generosity and Courage he will put on, when he findes himselfe maintained by a Man, who to him is in stead of a God or Melior Natura; which courage is manifestly such as that Creature, without that Confidence of a better Nature then his owne, could never attaine. So Man, when he resteth and assureth himselfe upon divine Protection and Favour, gathereth a Force and Faith, which Humane Nature in it selfe could not obtaine. Therefore, as Atheisme is in all respects hatefull, so in this, that it depriveth humane Nature of the Meanes to exalt it selfe above Humane Frailty. As it is in particular Persons, so it is in Nations: Never was there such a State for Magnanimity as Rome: Of this state heare what Cicero saith; Quam volumus, licet, patres conscripti, nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos,

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/72


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/73

Rh nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pænos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso huius Gentis et Terrae domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed Pietate, ac Religione, atque hâc una Sapientiâ, quod Deorum Immortalium Numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes Gentes Nationesque Superavimus

were better to have no Opinion of God at all then such an Opinion as is unworthy of him: For the one is Unbeleefe, the other is Contumely: And certainly Superstition is the Reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose; Surely (saith he) I had rather, a great deale, Men should say there was no such Man at all as Plutarch, then that they should say that there was one Plutarch that would eat his Children, as soon as they were born, as the Poets speake of Saturne. And, as the Contumely is greater towards God, so the Danger is greater towards Men. Atheisme leaves a Man to Sense, to Philosophy, to Naturall Piety, to Lawes, to Reputation; All which may be Guides to an outward Morall vertue, though Religion were not; But Superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute Monarchy in the Mindes of Men. Therefore Atheisme did never perturbe States; For it makes Men wary of themselves, as looking no further: And we see

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/73


text:
Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/28

 THE PLACE OF SOCIOLOGY AMONG THE SCIENCES word sociology first appeared in print in its French form "sociologie" in the fourth volume of Auguste Comte's Positive Philosophy, the first edition of which was published in 1839. The author's "avertissement" prefixed to that volume is dated December 13, 1838, so that the word must have been penned during the year 1838 or earlier. That edition has long been exhausted and is accessible to few, but in the third edition of 1869, which is perhaps the best known to the public, the word occurs on page 185 of Vol. IV. In a footnote the author says:

The world is certainly greatly indebted to Comte for this word, as it is also for that other useful word of his, altruism. Words are the tools of thought, and ideas can no more progress without words than can the arts without instruments and machinery. Although the word sociology is derived from both Latin and Greek, still it is fully justified by the absence in the Greek language of the most essential component. While it need not altogether replace the virtually synonymous expression social science it can be used in many cases where that could not. It tends to give compactness to the general conception and to unify the nomenclature of the sciences. In doing so it also adds somewhat both qualitatively and quantitatively to the thought. We


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/3

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/3


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/2

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/2


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/174

 Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight is in privateness

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/174


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/175

 and retiring; for ornament is in discourse; and for ability is in the judgment and disposition of business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars, one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning, by study; and studies themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men condemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation.

Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments, and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/175


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/1

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/1


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/176

153 memory; If he Conferre little, he had need have a Present Wit; And if he Reade litle, he had need have much Cunning, to seeme to know that he doth not. Histories make Men Wise; Poets Witty ; The Mathematicks Subtill; Naturall Philosophy deepe; Morall Grave ; Logick and Rhetorick Able to Contend. Abeunt studia in Mores. Nay, there is no Stond or Impediment in the Wit but may be wrought out by Fit Studies; Like as Diseases of the Body may have Appropriate Exercises. Bowling is good for the Stone and Reines; Shooting for the Lungs and Breast; Gentle Walking for the Stomacke; Riding for the Head; And the like. So if a Man's Wit be Wandring, let him Study the Mathematicks; For in Demonstrations, if his Wit be called away never so little, he must begin again: If his Wit be not Apt to distinguish or find differences, let him Study the Schoole-men; For they are Cymini sectores. If he be not Apt to beat over Matters, and to call up one Thing to Prove and Illustrate another, let him Study the Lawyers' Cases: So every Defect of the Minde may have a Speciall Receit.

have an Opinion not wise, That for a Prince to Governe his Estate, Or for a Great Person to governe his Proceedings, according to the Respect of Factions , is a Principall Part of Policy: whereas contrariwise, the Chiefest Wisdome is, either in Ordering those Things, which are

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/176


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/4

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/4


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/5

 Pitt Press Series

BACON'S ESSAYS.

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/5


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/7

1908

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/7


text:
Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/8

First Edition 1897, Reprinted 1899.

1905, 1908

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/8


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/328

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/328


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/327

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/327


text:
User:Guimis

es:usuario:Guimis

title: User:Guimis


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/340

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/340


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/337

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/337


text: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/338

title: Page:Bacons Essays 1908 West.djvu/338


text:
User:SilkTork

SilkTork on Wikipedia

title: User:SilkTork