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Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company/Opinion of the Court

This case comes before the court on a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. It was an action of trespass on the case, for the alleged infringement of certain rights secured by letters patent.

As the foundation of the suit, the declaration alleges, in effect, that the assignor of the plaintiff was the original and first inventor of certain improvements in the manufacture of India-rubber, and that in the year 1836 letters patent for such improvements were duly issued to him by the Commissioner of Patents, as is therein fully and correctly set forth and de scribed.

Those improvements, as is alleged in the declaration, consist in a mode of preparing the rubber for manufacturing purposes, and of reducing it to a pasty state, without the use of the spirits of turpentine or other solvents, and of applying the same to cloths, and for other purposes, by the use of heated rollers and other means, as set forth in the letters patent, saving thereby, as is alleged, a large portion of the expense of reducing the original material to a proper degree of softness, and of fitting and preparing it for the various uses to which it may be applied.

On application subsequently made to the Commissioner of Patents, in due form of law, by the original inventor, the patent was extended for the further term of seven years, from the thirty-first day of August, 1850; and the plaintiff alleges that the patentee, on the first day of July, 1853, transferred, assigned, and conveyed to him all his title to the invention and to the patent for the extended term.

By virtue of that deed of transfer, it is claimed in the declaration that the plaintiff acquired the right to demand and recover the damages for all infringements of the letters patent prior to the date of the transfer, as well as for those that have been committed since that time; and, accordingly, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants, on the thirty-first day of August, 1850, fraudulently commenced the use of those improvements, without law or right, and so continued to use them to the day of the commencement of this suit; averring, at the same time, that the defendants have prepared large quantities of the native rubber for manufacturing purposes, without the use of spirits of turpentine or other solvents, thereby making large gains, and greatly to the damage of the plaintiff.

As appears by the transcript, the action was entered in the Circuit Court at the May term, 1854, but was continued from term to term until the May term, 1857, when the parties went to trial upon the general issue.

From what is stated in the bill of exceptions, it appears that one Charles Goodyear was the owner of the original letters patent on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1846, and that he continued to own them for the residue of the term for which they were originally granted. On that day he entered into an indenture with one Henry Edwards, of the city Boston, whereby, for certain considerations therein expressed, he sold and conveyed to the said Henry Edwards, his executors, administrators, and assigns, the exclusive right and license to make, use, and vend, any and all articles appertaining to machines, or in the manufacture, construction, and use of, machines or machinery, of whatever description, subject to certain limitations and qualifications therein expressed.

By the terms of the instrument, it was understood that the right and license so conveyed was to apply to any and all articles substituted for leather, metal, and other substances, in the use or manufacture of machines or machinery, in so far as the grantor had any rights or privileges in the same, by virtue of any invention or improvement made or which should thereafter be made by him in the manufacture of India-rubber or gum-elastic goods, and in virtue of any and all letters patent or patent rights of the United States granted or belonging to him, or which should thereafter be granted or belong to him, for any and all inventions or improvements in the manufacture of such goods in this country, but excluding the right to make any contract with the Government of the United States. In consideration of the premises, the grantee paid the sum of one thousand dollars, as appears by the recital of the instrument, and agreed to pay a certain tariff, at the rate of five cents per superficial yard, or five cents per pound for the pure gum, according to the nature of the article manufactured.

Reference is made in the declaration to the letters patent, and to the deed of assignment from the patentee to the plaintiff, but neither of those instruments appears in the bill of exceptions or in any other part of the record.

At the trial of the cause, it was conceded and agreed that the defendants, before the date of the plaintiff's writ, used certain machinery, constructed in conformity with the specification annexed to the letters patent declared on, and that the defendants, in using the machinery, conformed to the directions contained in the specification, and that the same was so used for the preparation and application of India-rubber to the manufacture of the articles mentioned and described in the indenture from Charles Goodyear to Henry Edwards, and that all the machinery so used was constructed and in use as aforesaid before and at the time the original letters patent expired.

Upon this state of the case, according to the bill of exceptions, the presiding justice ruled and instructed the jury, that, under their title, the defendants had the right to continue to use the same machinery for the same purposes, and in conformity with the directions contained in the specification, after the expiration and renewal of the letters patent; and consequently, that the plaintiff could not recover.

Under the ruling and instruction of the court, the jury returned their verdict for the defendants; and the plaintiff excepted to the ruling, and his exceptions were duly allowed.

It is insisted by the counsel of the plaintiff, that the instruction given to the jury was erroneous; and that is the only question presented for decision at the present time. In considering that question, our attention must necessarily be confined to the evidence reported in the bill of exceptions, as the only means of ascertaining the precise state of facts on which the instruction to the jury was given. Whether the report of the evidence, as set forth in the bill of exceptions, may or may not be incomplete, or imperfectly stated, cannot be known in an appellate court. Bills of exception, when properly taken and duly allowed, become a part of the record, and, as such, cannot be contradicted.

By the admission of the parties in this case, it appears that the defendants, before the date of the plaintiff's writ, had used certain machinery, constructed in conformity with the specification of the plaintiff's patent. In the absence of any explanation or suggestion to the contrary, it must be inferred that the use of the machinery so admitted was without the license or consent of the plaintiff, and subsequent to the period when he became the owner of the patent for the extended term; and if so, the admission was sufficient, under the pleadings, to make out a prima facie case for the plaintiff. To maintain the issue on their part, the defendants proved in effect, or it was admitted, that all the machinery so used by them had been constructed, and was in use, as aforesaid, before and at the time the original letters patent expired, and that in using the machinery they had conformed to the directions contained in the specification, and that the same was so used for the purposes and in the manufacture of the articles specified and described in the before-mentioned indenture. As before stated, they had previously proved, or it had been admitted, that the owner of the original term of the patent had granted the exclusive right and license to a third party to use the invention for the same purposes for which the defendants, both under the original and extended term of the patent, had used their machinery; but they did not prove, and there is no evidence in the case to show, any privity between themselves, and that license, either by assignment or in any other manner. They offered no proof tending to show that their use of the machinery in question, under either term of the patent, was with the license, consent, or knowledge, of the patentee, or of any other person who ever had or claimed to have any power or authority under him to convey the right. Provision is made by the eighteenth section of the act of Congress, passed on the fourth day of July, 1836, for the extension of patents beyond the time of their limitation, on application therefor, in writing, by the patentee, to the Commissioner of the Patent Office, setting forth the grounds for such extension. By the latter clause of that section, the benefit of such renewal is expressly extended to assignees and grantees of the right to use the thing patented to the extent of their respective interests therein. 5 Stat. at Large, p. 125. Under that provision, it has been repeatedly held by this court, that a party who had purchased a patented machine, and was using it during the original term for which the patent was granted, might continue to use the machine during the extended term. Bloomer v. McQuewan et al., 14 How., 549; Wilson v. Rosseau, 4 How., 646. That rule rests upon the doctrine that the purchaser, in using the machine under such circumstances, exercises no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does he derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or the exclusive privilege granted to the patentee.

When the patented machine rightfully passes to the hands of the purchaser from the patentee, or from any other person by him authorized to convey it, the machine is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. According to the decision of this court in the cases before mentioned, it then passes outside of the monopoly, and is no longer under the peculiar protection granted to patented rights. By a valid sale and purchase, the patented machine becomes the private individual property of the purchaser, and is no longer protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of theState in which it is situated. Hence it is obvious, that if a person legally acquires a title to that which is the subject of letters patent, he may continue to use it until it is worn out, or he may repair it or improve upon it, as he pleases, in the same manner as if dealing with property of any other kind. Applying these principles to the present case, as it is exhibited in the bill of exceptions, there would be no difficulty in sustaining the instructions given to the jury, provided it appeared that the machinery used by the defendants had been legally purchased by them of the patentee or his assigns during the original term of the patent. But nothing appears in the evidence reported to warrant the inference that they were either assignees or grantees of the thing patented, within the meaning of the act of Congress or the decisions of this court. All that the indenture offered in evidence showed was the nature and extent that the defendants had used the invention, but, as is well contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, it proved nothing more. It did not prove, or tend to prove, that the defendants were rightfully in the enjoyment of the thing patented during the original term of the patent, and having failed to establish any right or license to use their machinery during the extended term by any other proof, they appear in the record as naked infringers.

Their right to continue to use the machinery as against the plaintiff is predicated in the instruction upon the assumption that they had a title to it, and were rightfully in the use of it under that title, before and at the time the original letters patent expired. That assumed fact finds no support in the evidence reported. It is clearly error for the court, in its instruction to the jury, to assume a material fact as proved, of which there is no evidence in the case. United States v. Breitling, 20 How., 255. And when the finding of the jury accords with the theory of the instruction, thus assumed without evidence, the error is of a character to deserve correction.

Another position is assumed by the counsel of the plaintiff, which ought not to be passed over without a brief notice. They contend that the invention of the plaintiff, as described in the letters patent, is for a process, and not for a machine or machinery; and that the act of Congress, extending the benefit of renewals to assignees and grantees of the right to use the thing patented, when properly construed, does not include patents for a process, but should be confined to patents for machines. That question, if properly presented, would involve the construction of the letters patent in this case, as well as the act of Congress; but as the patent is not in the record, it is not possible to determine it at the present time, and we only advert to it that it may not appear to have escaped attention.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, with costs, and with directions to issue a new venire.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1559

 1508 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CHs. 525, 526 . 1929 . SEC. 9 . The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. Amen dment. March 2, 1029. [S. 5332.1 CHAP. 528 .-An Act To enable the mothers and widows of the deceased [Public, No. 952.] soldiers, sailors, and marines of the American forces now interred in the ceme- teries of Europe to make a pilgrimage to these cemeteries. Be it enacted by the Senate and Home o f Representatives o f the American cemeteries arP in Europe. United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary `la magei fomeo- of War is hereby authorized to arrange for pilgrimages to cemeteries Americ an forces who in Europe by mothers and widows of members of the military or died during World War and buried therein, to naval forces of the United States who died in the military or naval be arra nged for. service at any time between April 5, 1917, and July 1, 1921, and whose remains are now interred in such cemeteries. Such pilgrimages shall be made at the expense of the United States under the conditions set forth in section 2. SEC. 2. T he conditions under which such pilgrimag es may be mad e extended. (a) Invitations to make the pilgrimages shall be extended in the name of the United States to the mothers and widows for whom the pilgrimages are authorized to be arranged under section 1. (b) Upon acceptance of the invitation the mother or widow shall be en titled to mak e one such pil grimage ; b ut no mother or wi dow who has previous to the pilgrimage visited cemeteries described in section 1 shall be entitled to make any such pilgrimage, and no mother or widow shall be entitled to make more than one such (c) The pilgri h mages sall be madt e a such times during the period from May 1, 1930, to October 31, 1933, as may be designated by the Secretary of War. Is sue ,i or speu it pass- (d) For the purpose of the pilgrimages the Secretary of State shall port ; with limitation, if parties are citizens. (1 ) issu e speci al pass ports, limite d to th e dura tion of the pi lgrima ge, to mothers and widows making the pilgrimages and to such person- nel as may be selected to accompany and/or arrange for the pilgrim- ages, if such mothers, widows, and personnel are citizens of the United States, and (2) issue suitable travel documents, if aliens. No fee for either of such documents or for any application therefor shall be charged. Such alien mothers, widows, and personnel shall be per- mitted to return and be granted admission to the United States with- out regard to any law, convention, or treaty relating to the immigra- tion or exclusion of aliens, if the return is made within the period covered by the pilgrimage of the particular group or, in the case of personnel, within such times as the Secretary of War shall by regula- tion prescribe ; except that in any case of unavoidable detention the Secretary of War may extend in such case the time during which return may be made without regard to such laws, conventions, or treaties. (e) The pilgrimages shall be by the shortest practicable route and for the sho rtest practic able ti me, to be des ignated by th e Secre tary of War. No mother or widow shall be provided for at Government expense in Europe for a longer period than two weeks from the time of disembarkation in Europe to the time of reembarkation in Europe. In the case of any mother or widow willfully failing to continue the pilgrimage of her particular group, the United States shall not incur or be subject to any expense with regard to her pilgrimage after such failure. Expens e by Unite d States. Con diti ons. Upon acce ptance, one pilgrimage allowed. Restric tions. times the refor. Travel do cuments, if aliens. Wit hout fee. Alien mothers, etc., permitted to return to United S tates within period of pilgrimage. Extension of time . Invitations to be are as follows Des igna tion of the pilgrimage. Shortest practical route and time to be designated. Period for Govern- ment expense limited.

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text: Talk:Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company/Opinion of the Court


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1560

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CHs. 526, 527. 1929 . (f) Vessels owned or operated by the United States Government or any agency thereof shall be used for transportation at sea wher- ever practicable. (g) Suitable transportation, accommodations, meals, and other necessities pertaining thereto, as prescribed by the Secretary of War, shall be furnished each mother or widow included in any pilgrimage for the entire distance at sea and on land and while sojourning in Europe and while en route in the United States from home to port and from port to home. Cabin-class accommodations shall be furnished for all transportation at sea. No mother or widow shall be entitled, by reason of any payment made by or for her, to be furnished by the Government with transportation, accommodations, meals, and other necessities pertaining thereto different in kind from those prescribed by the Secretary of War for the pilgrimage of the particular group. (h) All pilgrimages shall be made in accordance with such regula- tions as the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe as to the time, route, itineraries, composition of groups, accommodations, transportation, program, arrangements, management, and other mat- ters pertaining to such pilgrimages. SEC. 3 . There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act. The Sec- retary of War is directed to make an investigation for the purpose of dete rmin ing (1) the tota l nu mber s of mot hers and wid ows enti tled to make the pilgrimages, (2) the number of such mothers and widows who desire to make the pilgrimages and the number who desire to make the pilgrimages during the calendar year 1930, and (3) the probable cost of the pilgrimages to be made. The Secretary of War shall report to the Congress not later than December 15, 1929, the results of such investigation. SEC. 4. As used in this Act- (a) The term " mother " means mother, stepmother, mother through adoption, or any woman who stood in loco parentis to the deceased member of the military or naval forces for the year prior to the commencement of his service in such forces. (b) The term " widow " means a widow who has not remarried since the death of the member of the military or naval forces. Approved, March 2, 1929. 1509 Sea travel by Go v- ernment vessels. Suitable transporta- tion, and other neces- sities for entire dis- tanc e, e tc ., furnished. Cabins for sea trans- portation. No one e ntit led by any payment to be fur nished transportation, etc ., different from those prescribed for the particular group. Regulati ons to be prescribed for all mat- ters of the pilgrimages. Necessary sums au- thorized. Investigation to de- termine numbers en- titled, those who desire to make the pilgrimage, and probable cost. Report of results to Congress. Meanin g of terms used. "Mother ." "Widow." March 2, 1929. CHAP. 527 .-An Act Relating to the construction of a chapel at the Federal 	[S. 5493 .1 Industrial Institution for Women at Alderson, West Virginia. [Public, No. 953 .1 Be it enacte d by the Sena te and House of Representat ives of the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That the Attorney General is hereby authorized to accept for and on behalf of the United States, funds raised or to be raised by popular subscription for the construction of a suitable chapel upon the premises occupied and used by and for the Federal Industrial Institution for Women at Alderson, West Virginia. The funds so donated shall be expended under the direction of the Attorney General for the construction of such chapel and, after construction, the chapel shall be maintained at the expense of the United States : Provided, That the Attorney Gener al is authori zed to procure by contract preliminary s ketches for the chapel, and after approval thereof by the Attorney General, to procure by contract working drawings, full-size details, specifica- tions, and so forth, for the construction of the chapel and supervision of the construction : Provided further, That the Secretary of the etcc ..,inOffice ofSuper- Treasury is hereby authorized, if requested of the Attorney General, T1ing A chitect of the to cause the plans, drawings, specifications, and estimates for the Fe dera l Ind ustr ial Ins titu tion for Women. Ac cept ance auth or- ized of funds to con- struct a chapel on premi ses of. Provisos. Pr elimi nary sket ches , working drawings, etc ., to be procured .

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1561

 1510 construction of the chapel to be prepared in the Office of the Super- vising Architect of the Treasury Department, and the work of constructing said chapel to be supervised by the field force of said Re imburs ement of office~ if practicable : And provided further, That the proper a ro- afiice expenses fro m donated funds. priation for the support and maintenance of the Office of the Super- vislng Architect be reimbursed from said donated funds for the cost of preparing such plans, drawings, specifications, and estimates for the afores aid work and the supervisi on of the cons truction of said cha pel. Approved, March 2, 192 9. March 2, 1929. [S. 5677.] [Public, No. 954.] Perdido Bay, Fla . and Ala. Bridge across, Lillian, Ala ., to Cummings Point, Fla ., may be ac- quired by counties of Eseambia or Ba ldwin, or F lorida and A la- bama. Vol. 44, p. 1266, amended. Tra nsfers au thorized, if acquired by counties or States. Construction, etc. Vol. 39, p. 236. Amendment. March 2, 1929. [S. 5824.] CHAP. 529 .-An Act Granting the consent of Congress to the State of Illinois ublic, No. ss5 .] to construct a bridge across the Little Calumet River at or near Ashland Avenue, in Cook County, State of Ill inois. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the Illinois Calumet River. United States o f America in Congress assembled, That the consent llinois may bridge, at Ashland Avenue, of Congress is hereby granted to the State of Illinois, to construct, cook County. maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto across the Little Calumet River, at a point suitable to the interests of naviga- Co nstruc tion. tion, at or near Ashland Avenue in said county and State, in accord- ance with the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906 . SEC. 2. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. Vol.34,p. 84. Amendment. SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. CHs . 527-529 . 1929 . CHAP. 528.-An Act To amend section 2 of the Act, chapter 254, approved March 2, 1 927, enti tled "An A ct a uthor izing the coun ty of Esca mbia, Flo rida, and/or the county of Baldwin, Alabama, and/or the State of Florida, and/or the State of Alabama to acquire all the rights and privileges granted to the Perdido Bay Bridge and Ferry Company by chapter 168, approved June 22, 1916, for the construction of a bridge across Perdido Bay from Lillian, Alabama, to Cummings Point, Florida ." Be it e nacted by the Senate and Ho use of Repres entatives of t he United States o f America in Congress assembled, That section 2 of the Act, chapter 254, approved March 2, 1927, entitled, "An Act authorizing th e county of E scambia, Flor ida, and/or th e county of Baldwin, Alabama, and/or the State of Florida, and/or the State of Alabama to acquire all the rights and privileges granted to the Per- dido Bay Bridge and Ferry Company by chapter 168, approved June 22, 1916, for the construction of a bridge across Perdido Bay from Lillian, Alabama, to Cummings Point, Florida," be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to read as follows "SEC . 2 . If the rights and privileges granted by said Act approved June 22, 1916, shall be acquired by any one or more of the counties or States designated in section 1 of this Act, it or they are authorized to trans fer and assign all s uch rig hts and privi leges t o eithe r or both of the counties or either or both of the St ates mentione d in said section 1, or to the highway commissioners or departments or other public agency of either or both of said States, but any bridge con- str ucted or reco nstructed und er authority o f said Act of June 22, 191 6, shall be m aintained and operated in a ccordance wit h all the terms, provisions, and conditions of said Act ." SEC. 3 . The r ight to alter, amend, or re peal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1562

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cns. 530-533 . 1929 . 1511 CHAP. 530.-An Act Extending the times for commencing and completing March 2, 1929. the construction of a bridge across the Mississippi River at or near Arkansas [S .5825.] City, Ark ansa s. [Public, No. 956.] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o America in Congress assembled, Time ext That the times Tuns sexteRiver. f ended for for commencing and completing the construction of a bridge across b tyging, at Arkansas the Mis sissip pi Riv er at or nea r Arka nsas Ci ty, Ar kansas, auth orized Ante, p. 381. to be built by Henry Thane, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, by the Act of Congress approved March 29, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from March 2d, 1929. SEC. 2. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amendment. expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. CHAP. 531 .-An Act Authorizing the construction of a bridge across the [S. March 589 3	2, 1929 . 4 .] 3 Missouri River near Arrow Rock, Missouri. [Public, No. 951.] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Missouri River. Saint Louis-Kansas Congress is hereby granted to the Saint Louis-Kansas City Short City Short Line Rail. Line Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Missouri and road Company may f bridge, at Arrow Rock, their successors and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a Mo. bridge and approaches thereto across the Missouri River, at a point suitable to the interests of navigation, at or near the town of Arrow Rock, i n the State of Mis souri, in ac cordanc e with the p rovisi ons of Vol.34, p.184. the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906. SEC. 2. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby Amendment. express ly res erved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. CHAP. 532 . -An Act Authorizing the construction of a bridge across the 	[S. 5835.1	Missouri River near Saint Charles, Missouri. [Public, No. 958.] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o America in Congress assembled That the consent Missouri River. f Saint Louis-Kansas of Congress is hereby granted to the Saint Louis-Kansas City Short it co mp y may Line Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Missouri, and bridge, near Saint their successors and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate Charles, Mo. a bridge and approaches thereto across the Missouri River at a point about four miles south of west of the city of Saint Charles, in the county of Saint Charles, Missouri, to a point in Saint Louis construction. County in said State, in accordance with the provisions of the Act Vol.34,p.84. entitled "An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navi- gable wate rs," appr oved March 23, 1 9 06. Amendment. SEC. 2. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expres sly re served. Approved, March 2, 1929. CHAP. 533 .-An Aet To extend the times for commencing and completing [5 Mar . ch 5 .] 837.1 . the construction of a bridge across the Missouri River at or near Miami, Missouri. [Public, No. 959 .] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled That the times for Missouri River. Time exten ded fa r commencing and completing the construction of a bridge across the bridging, at Miami, Missou ri Riv er at or nea r Miam i, Sal ine Cou nty, M issour i, aut horize d Mo. to be built by Frank M. Burruss, his heirs, legal representatives, and

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United States v. Pacheco (63 U.S. 225)

THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Stanton for the United States, no counsel appearing for the appellees.

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

title: United States v. Pacheco (63 U.S. 225)


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1563

 1512 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHs. 533-536 . 1929 . Ante, p. 157. Amen dment. assig ns, by an Ac t of Congre ss app roved Febru ary 28, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from February 28, 1929. SEC. 2 . The right to alt er, amend, or repeal this A ct is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929 [5 . 5844 .]	. CHAP. 534 .-An Act To extend the times for commencing and completing the [Public, No. 960.1 construction of a bridge across the Mississippi River at or near Tenth Street in Bettendorf, State of Iowa. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Mississippi River. United States of America in Congress assembled, That the times Ti me extend ed for br idging, at Bet ten- for commencing and completi ng the constr uction of a br idge across dorf, Iowa. the Mississippi River at or near Tenth Street in Bettendorf, State of Iowa, authorized to be built by B. F. Peek, G. A. Shall berg, and C. I. Josephson, of Moline, Illinois; J. W. Bettendorf, A. J. Russell, and J. L. Hecht, of Bettendorf an d Davenport, Iowa, their he irs, Ante, p . 759. legal representatives, and assigns, by the Act of Congress approved May 26, 1928, are hereby extended one and three years, respectively, from May 26, 1929. Amendment. SEC. 2 . The right to alt er, amend, or repeal this A ct is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. [S. 5845 .1	CHAP. 535 .-An Act Granting the consent of Congress to the Kentucky and [Public, No. 961 .] Ohio Terminal Company its successors and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad bridge across the Ohio River near Cincinnati, Ohio. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Ohio River. United State s of America in Congress a ssembled, That the consent Teer rminayCompany of Congress is hereby granted to the Kentucky and Ohio Terminal may bridge, near Cin- cinnati, Ohio. Company, its successors and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad bridge and approaches thereto across the Ohio River, at a point suitable to the interests of navigation, above Cin- cinnati, Ohio, near Coney Island, to a point above Newport, Ken- Construction. tuck y, opposite the Ohio terminal, in accordance with the provisions Vol.34,p. 84. o f the t entitled "An Act to rgulate the construction f bridges over navigable waters," app roved March 23, 1 906. co Rig ht d t• sell, etc., SEC. 2 . The right to sell, assign, transfer, and mortgage all the rights, powers, and privileges conferred by this Act is hereby gra nted to the K entucky and O hio Terminal C ompany, its s uccessors and assigns; and any party to whom such rights, powers, and privi- leges may be sold, assigned, transferred, or who shall acquire the same by mortgage or foreclosure or otherwise, is hereby authorized to exercise the same as fully as though con ferred herein directly upon such party. Amendme nt. SEC. 3. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. March 2, 1929. [13. R.349.] CHAP. 536 .-An Act To supplement the naturalization laws, and for other [Public, No. 962.] purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Naturalization. United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the regis- try of aliens at ports of entry required by section 1 of the Act of June

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text: Talk:United States v. Pacheco (63 U.S. 225)


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United States v. Pacheco (63 U.S. 225)/Opinion of the Court

On the 31st of July, 1834, there was granted to Madame Pacheco a rancho of land, 'included between the Arroyo de las Nueces and the Sierra de Golgones, bounded by the said places, and bounded by the ranchos Las Juntas, San Ramon, and Monte Diablo.' This description was accompanied by a diseno, better defining the exterior boundaries than usual. But the grant has the following condition, amongst others: 'The land of which mention is made is two square leagues, a little more or less, as shown by the map which goes with the expediente. The migistrate who may give the possession will cause it to be measured in conformity with the ordinance, for the purpose of marking out the boundaries, leaving the surplus which may result to the nation, for its convenient uses.'

The board of commissioners held that this condition must govern as to quantity, and decreed two square leagues.

In the District Court, that decree was reversed, and the land, as above described, and as it is represented on the plan, was decreed to the claimants, regardless of any exact quantity. From this decree the United States appealed. The validity of the grant is not disputed; the contest respects quantity only.

The plan presented by the party, and referred to in the grant, will furnish a guide to the surveyor, as respects boundaries within which the survey shall be made. But, in ascertaining the quantity intended to be given, we think neither the general description, nor the call for 'two square leagues,' found in the condition of the grant, can be relied on, as they are inconsistent, and plainly contradict each other, and the adoption of the one must necessarily reject the other. To find the true quantity intended to be granted, we are compelled to rely on other title papers and proofs.

The map shows, when taken in connection with the evidence of witnesses, explaining its contents, that the body of land petitioned for and granted was something more than two leagues long, and about two leagues wide. To this effect, the parol evidence is conclusive; and the map is equally so on its face, however inaccurate it may possibly be found when the objects called for, and laid down on the map, are sought on the ground. Nothing could be more manifest than that the grant was intended to give to Madame Pacheco a rancho of at least two leagues on each side line, making four leagues in superficies. And as the plan is part of and accompanies the last title paper, we feel bound to give it due weight, in reaching the undoubted equity of the claim.

This court is not dealing with a legal title; none such can exist until there is a survey, the land severed from the public domain, and the public title transferred by a final grant from the United States into private ownership.

What precise tract of land is to be surveyed and granted to Pacheco's heirs, 'according to the principles of equity,' must be ascertained in this proceeding, to the end that the United States may grant the legal title, in satisfaction of the treaty; and a concession by leagues being the rule, and one extending to indefinite out-boundaries the exception, we hold that it was intended in this case to grant equal to two leagues square, situate within the given out-boundary; that is to say, four leagues in one tract, if so much is found in the general description and diseno.

The decree of the District Court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, to be further proceeded in, according to this opinion.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1564

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Cii. 536 . 1929 . 1513 29, 19 06 (Thirty-fourth Statutes at Large, part 1, page 596), as Aliens having no roc- ord of admission for amended, may be made as to any alien not ineligible to citizenship in permanent residence whose case there is no record of admission for permanent residence may be registered. , Vol.34,p. 596 . if such alien shall make a satisfactory showing to the Commissioner Genera l of I mmigra tion, in acc ordanc e with regula tions prescr ibed b y the Commissioner General of Immigration, with the approval of the Requirements. Secretary of Labor, that he- (1) Entered the United States prior to June 3, 1921 ; (2) Has resided in the United States continuously since such entry ; (3) Is a person of good moral character ; and (4) Is not subject to deportation. (b) For each such record of registry made as herein authorized Fee far registry. the alien shall pay to the Commissioner General of Immigration a fee of $20. All fees collected under this section shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. (c) The provisions of section 76 of the Act entitled "An Act to Punishment fo r false oaths, etc ., in citizen- codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States," shipapplications,made approved March 4, 1909, shall apply in respect of the record of regis- app Vol. s,ep .1102, try authorized by this section in the same manner and to the same extent, including penalties, as they apply in respect of the oaths, notices, affidavits, certificates, orders, records, signatures, and other instrume nts, pape rs, or pr oceedings specifi ed in suc h section 76. S EC. 2. Upon the making of a record of registry as authorized by Certificate of arrival to be issued when rec- section 1 of this Act, the certific ate of a rrival re quired by the four th ord of re gis tr y m ade. paragr aph of the s econd subdiv ision of sect ion 4 of suc h Act of Jun e Vol. 34, p. 597. 29, 1906, as amended, may be issued upon application to the Com- missioner of Naturalization, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Naturalization, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, and upon payment of the fee prescribed by Fee prescribed. section 5 of this Act. SEC. 3. For the of the im migrat ion la ws and the n atural i- Lawful ad mission pu rpose s deemed on record of zation laws an alien, in respect of whom a record of registry has been reg istry. made as authorized by section 1 of this Act, shall be deemed to have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of the date of his entry. SEC. 4. No declaration of intention shall be made by any alien under Decl arati on o f int en- such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, or, if made, be valid, until the tion requi res perma- 7 7 7 > > nent residence estab- lawful entry for permanent residence of such alien shall have been lished, and arrival established, and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of certificate. his arri val shall have bee n issued. SEC. 5. For any cert ificate o f arrival issued for natur alization pur- Fee for certi ficate. poses a fee of $5 shall be paid to the Commissioner of Naturalization, which fee shall be paid over to and deposited in the Treasury in the same m anner as oth er nat uraliz ation fees. SEC. 6. (a) The third paragraph of the second subdivision of section Vol. 34, p. 597, amend. 4 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended to read as ed. follows "As to each period of residence at any place in the county where Evidence as to resi- dence, etc ., from per- the petitioner resides at the time of filing his petition, there shall sonal witnesses . b e included in the petition the affidavits of at least two credible wit- nesses, citizens of the United States, stating that each has personally known the petitioner to have been a resident at such place for such period, and that the petitioner is and during all such period has been a person of good moral character ." (b) The fourth subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June 29, eVol. 34,p .598,amend. 1906, as amended, is amended to read as follows " Fourth. No alien shall be admitted to citizenship unless (1) imme- Evidence of continu- ous residence preceding diately preceding the date of his petition the alien has resided con- date of petition re- tinuously within the United States for at least five years and within q,,i red.

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text: Talk:United States v. Pacheco (63 U.S. 225)/Opinion of the Court


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1565

 1514 Fro m date of pet ition to admission to citizen- ship. Personal qualifica- tion. At hearings, ora l testimony of citizens to pr ove resid ence, etc ., required. Effect of returning to country of allegiance by petitioner for citizen- ship. Residence not re- quired of seamen on Ame rican ves sels. Vol .40, p .542, amend- ed. Naturaliz ed, without proofs of residence. Vol. 40, p. 542, amend- ed. Require ments re- pealed. Vol. 34, p, 5 99, repealed. R, S., sec. 2170, p. 350, repeale d. Fees. Vol. 34, p. 600, amend- ed. Decl arati on. Petition, certificate, etc. SEVENTIETH C ONGRESS. SEss. II. CH. 536 . 1929. the county where the petition er resided at the time of f iling his pet ition for at least six mon ths, (2) he ha s resided con tinuously within the United States from the date of his petition up to the time of his admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the periods referred to in this subdivision he has behaved as a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. At the hearing of the petition, residence in the county where the petitioner resides at the time of filing his petition, and the other qualifications required by this subdivision during such residence, shall be proved by the oral testimony of at le ast tw o credi ble wit nesses, citiz ens of the Un ited St ates, i n addi tion to the affidavits required by this Act to be included in the petition. If the petitioner has resided in two or more places in such county and for this reason two witnesses can not be procured to testify as to all such residence, it may be proved by the oral testimony of two such witnesses for each such place of residence, in addition to the affidavits required by this Act to be included in the petition. At the hearing, residence within the United States but outside the county, and the other qualifications required by this subdivision during such residence shall be proved either by depositions made before a natu- ral ization exami ner or by the oral testimon y of at least two such witnesses for each place of residence. " I f an individua l returns to the country o f his allegian ce and remains therein for a continuous period of more than six months and less than one year during the period immediately preceding the date of filing the petition for citizenship for which continuous resi- dence is required as a condition precedent to admission to citizenship, the continuity of such residence shall be presumed to be broken, but such presumption m ay be overcome by the prese ntation of sa tisfac- tory evidence that such individu al had a reas onable cause for not returning to the United States prior to the expiration of such six months. Absence from the United States for a continuous period of one year or more during the period immediately preceding the date of filing the petition for citizenship for which continuous resi- dence is required as a condition precedent to admission to citizenship shall break the continuity of such residence ." (c) So much of the seventh subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, as reads " or for three years on board of merchant or fishing vessels of the United States of more than twenty tons burden" is amended to read as follows : "or for three years on board vessels of more than twenty tons burden, whether or not documented under the laws of the United States, and whether public or private, which are not foreign vessels ." (d) So much of such subdivision as reads "without proof of the required five years' residence within the United States if upon examination by the representative of the Bureau of Naturalization, in accordance with the requirements of this subdivision it is shown that such residence can got be established " is amended to read as follows : "and may be naturalized without complying with the require ments of resi dence within t he United Sta tes and within the county." (e) Section 10 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, and section 2170 of the Revised Statutes, are repealed. SEC. 7. (a) The second and third paragraphs of section 13 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, are amended to read as follows : "( 1) For receivi ng and filing a decl aratio n of in tention and i ssuing a duplicate thereof, $5 ; "( 2) For making, filing, and docketing a petition for citizenship, and issuing a certificate of citizenship if the issuance of such certifi-

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1566

 SEVENTIETH C ON GR ES S. SEss. II. CH. 536 . 1929 . cate is authorized by the court, a nd for the final hearing on the peti tion, $10. " (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9 of the Act entitled "An Act to fix the salaries of the clerks of the United States district courts and to provide for their office expenses, and for other pur- poses," approved February 26, 1919, as amended, all fees received by the clerks of court to which such sectio n applies for services rend ered in natu rali zati on p roce edin gs s hall be paid ove r to the Bureau of Naturalization within thirty days from the close of each quarter in each fiscal year and the mon eys so r eceived shall be dis- posed of in the same manner as provided in section 13 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended . SEC. 8 . The first sentence of section 28 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended to read as follows "The Commissioner of Naturalization, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall make such rules and regulations and such changes in the forms prescribed by section 27 of this Act as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the naturalization laws ." SEC . 9 . Such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following " SEC. 32 . (a) If any certificate of citizenship issued to any citizen, or any declaration of intention furnished to any declarant, under the naturalization laws, is lost, mutilated, or destroyed, the citizen or declarant may, upon the payment to the commissioner of a fee of $10, make application (accompanied by two photographs of the applicant) to the Commissioner of Naturalization for a new certificate or declaration. If the commissioner finds that the certificate or declaration is lost, mutilated, or destroyed, he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate or declaration with one of such photo- graphs of the applicant affixed thereto. " (b) Upon payment to the Commissioner of Naturalization of a fee of $10, the commissioner shall issue, for any naturalized citizen, a special certificate of citizenship, with a photograph (furnished by such citizen) affixed thereto, for use by such citizen only for the purpose of obtaining recognition as a citizen of the United States by the country of former allegiance of such citizen . Such certificate, whe n issued, shall be furni shed to the Secr etary of State f or trans - mission by him to the proper authority in such country of former al legi ance . " SEc. 33. (a) Any individual over twenty-one years of age who claims to have derived United States citizenship through the natural- ization of a p arent, or a husband, may, upon the payme nt of a fee of $10, make application to the Commissioner of Naturalization, accompanied by two photographs of the applicant, for a certificate of citizenship. Upon obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of Labor showing the date, place, and manner of arrival in the United States, upon proof to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the applicant is a citizen and that the alleged citizenship was derived as claimed, and upon taking and subscribing to, before a designated representative of the Bureau of Naturalization within the United States, the oath of allegiance required by the naturalization laws of a petitioner for citizenship, such individual shall be furnished a certificate of citizenship by the commissioner, but only if such indi- vidual is at the time within the United States. In all courts, tri- bu nals, an d public offices of the United S tates, a t home a nd abroa d, of the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or insular possession of the United States, the certificate of citizenship issued under this section shall have the same effect as a certificate of citizen- ship issued by a court having naturalization jurisdiction. 54835•-29-rT 1-99 1515 Naturalization fees to be paid over to Natu- ralization Bureau by clerks of courts. Vol. 40, p. 1182. Vol.34,p.600. Vol. 34, p. 606, amend- ed. Commi ssioner to make necessary rules, etc. New matter. Vol .34, p. 607, amend- ed. Issue of new certifi- cates, etc ., for those that are lost etc. Special certificates of citizenship for natural- ized citizens for use in co untry of forme r al le- giance. Transmission to au- thori ty in that co untry . Application for cer- tificate through natur- alization of parent, etc. Issue on pr oof of claim. Legal effe ct, e tc.

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text:
Sinnot v. Davenport

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Phillips for the plaintiffs in error, and submitted or a printed brief by Mr. C. C. Clay, jun., for the appellees.

Mr. Phillips gave a history of the case, and then proceeded:

The construction given to this act by the Supreme Court of the State includes boats engaged in commerce between the ports of another State and a port within its own territory. See cases of Cuba, Swan, and Bell, 28 Ala. Rep., 185. And the question thus presented is, whether this is not an interference with the power to regulate commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and in conflict with the acts of Congress on the same subject matter.

Commencing with the act of 1st September, 1789, 1 Stat., 55, we find a provision for registering vessels, coupled with the declaration, that vessels so registered 'shall be deemed and taken to be and denominated vessels of the United States, and entitled to the benefits granted by any law of the United States to ships or vessels of the descriptions aforesaid.'

This registry is to be made with the collector of the district to which the vessel belongs, and the form of a certificate is given, to be signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the party applying having first made the prescribed oath, which, among other, contains the names of the owners and their residences.

Bond is to be given that the certificate thus issued shall not be transferred, and provision is made that, in case of any change of ownership, it is to be given up to be cancelled, and a new certificate issued. The 22d section of the act makes similar provisions as to enrolment.

These provisions are re-enacted in the act of December 31, 1792, 1 Stat., 287; 18th February, 1793, 1 Stat., 305.

The statute of 2d March, 1797, makes provision for the case of a sale by process of law. 1 Stat., 498.

The 2d section of the act 2d March, 1819, authorizes vessels licensed to trade between the different districts of the United States, to carry on said trade 'between the districts included within the aforesaid great districts, and between a State in one and an adjoining State in another great district, in manner and subject only to the regulations that are now by law required to be observed by such ships or vessels in trading from one district to another in the same State, or from a district in one State to a district in the next adjoining State.'By the act 29th July, 1850, 9 Stat., 440, it is provided that no bill of sale, mortgage, &c., shall be valid against any other person than the grantor or mortgagor, and those having actual notice, unless the same be recorded in the office of the collector of customs where the vessel is registered or enrolled. It is made the duty of the collector to keep a record of all such conveyances, and shall, when required, certify the same, setting forth the names of the owners, their proportionate shares, &c., for which fees are allowed.

The power to regulate commerce conferred in the Constitution of the United States includes the regulation of navigation, and was one of the primary objects which led to its adoption.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 567.

State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 18 How., 431.

The power to regulate navigation is the power to prescribe rules in conformity with which navigation must be carried on. It extends to the persons who conduct it, as well as to the instruments used.

Cooley v. Portwardens Phil., 12 How., 316.

Is the power to regulate commerce thus granted to the Federal Government exclusive? In Gibbons v. Ogden the court say: 'It has been concluded that, as the word 'regulate' implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes necessarily the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated. There is great force in the argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.'

In Miln v. State of New York, (11 Peters, 130,) which involved the constitutionality of an act requiring captains of vessels arriving in the port of that State to furnish a list of passengers, &c., and which was sustained as a police regulation, the court 'waived the examination of the question whether the power to regulate commerce be or be not exclusive of the States.'

In commenting on this case, Justice WAYNE says that the power to be exercised under State authority was after the passengers had landed. That on the question as to the exclusiveness of the power the judges were divided, four being in favor of the exclusiveness, and three opposed, and to this state of opinion was owing the waiver above quoted.

7 Howard, 431.

In the passenger cases (7 Howard) Justice McLEAN said: 'The power to regulate commerce, foreign and between the States, was vested exclusively in Congress.' (P. 400.)

title: Sinnot v. Davenport


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1567

 1516 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Cu. 536. 1929 . Acts puni shab le. "(b) Any person who (1) knowingly issues or is a party to the Unlawful issue of cer- tificate . issuance under this section of a certificate of citizenship not author- authol e c ti g, etc ., un- ized by the provisions of this section ; or (2) demands, charges, col- lects, or receives any other or additional fees or moneys under this Certifying, untruth- section except the fees and moneys herein specified ; or (3) knowingly fully, personal appear- ance of signer of of l- certifies that an applicant, affiant, or witness named in an affidavit, davit, etc . application, or certificate of citizenship or other paper or writing required to be executed under the provisions of this section, per- sonally appeared before him, and was sworn thereto or acknowledged the execution thereof or signed the same when in fact such petitioner, affiant, or witness did not personally appear before him or was not sworn thereto, or did not execute the same, or did not acknowledge Procuring certificate the execution thereof ; or (4) procures a certificate of citizenship unla wfull y. under this section, knowing or having reason to believe that he is Punishment for. not entitled thereto, shall be guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five y ears, or both. Punishment for citi- "(c) The provisio ns of section s 74 to 81, i nclusive, of t he Act zenship and naturaliza- tion offenses made entitled "An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the applicable. United St ates," approve d March 4, 19 09, shall app ly in respect of Vol . 35, pp. 1102, 1103 . proceedings and certificates of citizenship under this section in the same manner and to the same extent, including penalties, as they apply in respect of proceedings and certificates of citizenship under the naturalization laws . Deposit of fees. " SEC . 34 . Fees collect ed by the Com missioner of N aturalization under the two preceding sections shall be paid over to and deposited in the Tr easury and acc ounted for by the commissi oner to the Ge n- eral Acco unting Office in the same m anner as othe r naturalizati on fees received by the Bureau of Naturalization. Extension of ter m " SEC . 35 . When used in this Act the term `county' includes parish in the State of Louisiana ; any political subdivision of a State not included within any county ; a division of the judicial district in the Territory of Alaska ; the entire island in the case of Porto Rico ; the entire territory comprised within the Virgin Islands in the case of the Virgin Islands ; and the entire district in the case of the District of Columbia . Pho to gra phs to be " SEC. 36. Two photographs of himself shall be furnished by each furnished by appli- cants. applicant for a declaration of intention and by each petitioner for Affixing, etc° citiz enship. One of such photographs shall be affixed by the clerk of the court to the declaration of intention issued to the declarant and one to the declaration of intention required to be forwarded to the Bureau of Naturalization ; and one of such photographs shall be affixed to the certificate of citizenship issued to the naturalized citizen and one to the duplicate certificate of citizenship required to be forwarded to the Bureau of Naturalization ." Report seeking of those seeking citizen- SEC . 10. The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized and ship to be prepared, directed to prepare fro m the records in the custo dy of the Bure au of Naturalization a report upon those heretofore seeking citizenship Details. to show by nationalities their relation to the numbers of annually arriving aliens and to the prevailing census populations of foreign born, their economic, vocational, and other classification, in statistical form, with analytical comment thereon, and to prepare such report ann uall y th erea fter . Necessary sums au- SEC . 11 . There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums thorized . as may be necessary to cary out the provisions of his Act . Effective da te . SEC . 12 . Sections 1 to 10, inclusive, of this Act shall take effect on July 1, 1929 . The remainder of the Act shall take effect upon its enact ment. Approved, March 2, 1929.

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text: Talk:Sinnot v. Davenport

title: Talk:Sinnot v. Davenport


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1568

 SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SEss. II. Cus. 537, 538 . 1929 . 1517 March 2, 1929. [H. R.6499.] [Public, No. 963 .] New Arizo na. Cons ent given for compacts between, for equitable division of wate r supply of Gila and San Francisco River s. CHAP. 537.-An Act Granting the consent of Congress to compacts or agree- ments between the States of New Mexico and Arizona with respect to the division and apport ionment of the water s of the Gila and Sa n Francisco Rivers a nd all other s treams in wh ich such Sta tes are joint ly intereste d. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress in hereby given to the States of New Mexico and Ari- zona to negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements providing for an equitable division and apportionment between such States of the water supply of the Gila and San Francisco Rivers and of the streams tributary thereto and of all other streams in which such States are jointly interested. SEC. 2 . Such c onsent is gi ven up on con dition that a repre sentat ive of the United States from the Department of the Interior, to be appointed by the President, shall participate in the negotiations and shall make report to Congress of the proceedings and of any compact or agreement entered into. Other than the compensation and expenses of such representative the United States shall not be liable for any expenses in connection with such negotiations, com- pact or agreement. The payment of such expenses of such Reclamation fund to rep resen tati ve ar e aut hori zed t o be paid from the appro pria tions be used. for cooperative and general investigations for the Bureau of Reclamation. SEC. 3. No such compact or agreement shall be binding or obliga- Co mpac t sub ject to approval of each legisla- tory upon either of such States unless and until it has been approved tune and Congress . by the legislature of each of such States and by the Congress of the United States. SEC. 4. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 1929. Amend ment. Mexi co and Federal representa- tive to take part in negotiations, and report to Congress. Expenses limited. March 2, 1929. [H. R. 702.5 .] [Public, No. 964 .] CHAP. 538 .-An Act Granting the consent of Congress to compacts or agree- ments between the States of Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas with respect to the division a nd apportionment of the waters of the Ar kansas River and all other streams i n which such States are jointly inter ested. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That the consent Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas. of Congr ess is he reby give n to the S tate s of Color ado, Okla homa, Cons ent given for and Kansas to negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements compacts divson for t~ equitable ivisi of providing for an equitable division and apportionment between such water supply of Arkan- States of the water supply of the Arkansas River and of the streams sas River, etc' tributary thereto and of all other streams in which such States are jointly interested. SEC. 2 . Such c onsent is gi ven up on con dition that a repre sentat ive F ede ral representa- tive to take part in of the United States from any department of the United States negotiations,andreport Government, to be appointed by the President, shall participate in to congress. the negotiations and shall make report to Congress of the proceed- ings and of any compact or agreement entered into . Other than the compensation and expenses of such representative the United States shall not be liable for any expenses in connection with such negotiations, compact or agreement . The payment of such expenses b Reclamation fund to of such representative is authorized to be paid from the appro- priations for cooperative and general investigations for the Bureau of Reclamation. SEC. 3. No such compact or a greement shall be binding or obliga- a comas o s ubj ect . to agre emen t laturo and Congress. tort' upon either of such States unless and until it has been approved by the legislature of each of such States and by the Congress of the United States. « Exp ense s lim ited. e

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text:
Sinnot v. Davenport/Opinion of the Court

Justice WAYNE: This power 'includes navigation upon the high seas, and in the bays, harbors, lakes, and navigable waters within the United States, and any law by a State in any way affecting the right of navigation, or subjecting the exercise of the right to a condition, is contrary to the grant.' (P. 414.)

Justices CATRON and GRIER: 'That Congress has regulated commerce and intercourse with foreign nations and between the several States, by willing that it shall be free, and it is therefore not left to the direction of each State in the Union either to refuse a right of passage to persons or property through her territory, or to exact a duty for permission to exercise it.' (P. 464.)

In Cooley v. Portwardens of Philadelphia, the court say: 'Although Congress has legislated on the subject of pilotage, its legislation manifests an intention, with a single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the several States. To these precise questions, which are all we are called on to decide, this opinion must be understood to be confined. It does not extend to the question, what other subjects under the commercial power are within the exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated by the States in the absence of all Congressional legislation,' &c.

12 Howard, 320.

But whether this power is exclusive or not, when Congress, in pursuance of the power, proceeds to regulate the subject matter, it necessarily excludes State interference with the same subject matter.

In Houston v. Moore, (5 Wheat.,) the court say: 'We are altogether incapable of comprehending how two distinct wills can at the same time be exercised in relation to the same subject, to be effectual, and at the same time compatible with one another.'

In Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (16 Pet., 617,) the language of the court is: 'If Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do regulate it in a particular manner, and in a certain form, it cannot be that the State Legislatures have a right to interfere, and, as it were, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any further legislation to act upon the subject matter. Its silence as to what it does not do is as expressive of what its intention is, as the direct provisions made by it.'

The license granted to the steamer to carry on the coasting trade is a grant of authority to do whatever it purports to authorize. The States cannot add to the regulations made by the paramount authority, nor subtract anything from them.

Gibbons v. Ogden, p. 579.

The People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 479.

The act of the State is in direct conflict with these principles, for, in effect, it declares that vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or the coasting trade, shall not navigate its waters, without complying with a condition not prescribed by the acts of Congress. If the State has the power to inflict a penalty for the violation of the condition, it is equally authorized to use force to prevent the violation.

It is not pretended that the act is based on the police power of the State; neither the preservation of the health, morals, nor the peace of the community, is affected by it. In the language of the Supreme Court of the State, its object is merely to 'advance the remedies for torts or contracts done or made by the agents of steamboats,' &c.

While the power of the State over its legal remedies is admitted, this, like the taxing power of the State, cannot be exercised so as to interfere with the power delegated to Congress to regulate commerce.

Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419.

Hays v. Steamship Company, 17 How., 599.

Towboat Company v. Steamboat Company, Law Register, March, 1857, p. 284.

The act of Congress of 29th July, 1850, provides the mode by which sales and transfers shall be made, and what shall be the evidence of ownership, while the act of the State disregards the mode thus provided, and declares a different rule shall prevail in its courts.

The case of the owners of the Swan against same defendant differs only in this-that the boat in question was engaged in the business of a lighter and tow between the wharves of the city and the vessels, and the vessels anchored in the lower part of the bay.

(See the succeeding case of Foster et al. v. Davenport et al.)

Mr. Clay's argument (adopting a brief filed by Mr. J. T. Taylor) was as follows:

There are three cases on appeal from the Supreme Court of Alabama, against this defendant, now pending. It is supposed they will all be submitted together, as the same question arises alike in all.

See the cases reported in 28 Alabama, 185.

The only question to be determined by this court is, whether the act of the Legislature of the State of Alabama is in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

The object sought, and the evil intended to be cured by the act, is clearly indicated on its face. The narrow and shallow channels in the bay and interior rivers of Alabama required the aid of legislative protection. Navigation would be impeded by the sinking of wrecks, discharging ballast, &c., by careless, negligent, and irresponsible seamen. On the narrow rivers particularly, competition, strife, explosions, and collisions, were of frequent occurrence, against all which, the Legislature found it necessary to provide for the safety of navigation, and the protection of the life, property, and rights, of all persons trading or navigating the waters. But the whole of these police regulations were rendered inefficient, and irresponsible employees rendered more reckless, from the fact that responsibility could not be fixed on the owner and real wrong-doer. Even with the home vessels, in case of explosion, collision, or the boat becoming involved in debt, no responsible owner could be found; and if any name at all appeared, it was generally an irresponsible clerk or bar-keeper, or a man of straw. And as to those running from other States, the difficulty was greater; and where the vessel itself was lost, or exhausted by claims, no redress was or could be obtained for their injuries, depredations, and violation of law. To remedy this, the act referred to was passed, requiring simply the captain or managing officer of all steamboats running the waters to give the names of their owners, under such restrictions as would make the record available, in case of wrong, injury, or violation of law. It will be seen that the act does not in any way prohibit, obstruct, or interfere with free and uncontrolled navigation; and a compliance with it could not injure, but would encourage, both domestic and foreign trade and commerce. Neither is the law partial; it acts alike on all, and is for the benefit and protection of all.

The act, therefore, being for the purpose of carrying out and rendering effectual the undisputed police regulations of the State, is itself of the same police character, admitted, by undisputed authority, to be within the power of the States.

The coasting license authorizes the navigation of the waters, and the carrying on of trade and commerce within the States but it does not pretend to authorize a disregard of the police laws passed by the States for the observance of its own citizens. And all laws for the protection of life, health, and property, inspection laws, and laws to prevent strife and confusion in bays, harbors, and rivers, and to secure the rights of vessels navigating the waters, are of this kind. The following authorities sustain these propositions:

18 Alabama, 185.

11 Peters, 102.

4 Sandford, 492.

12 Howard, 299.

7 Iredel, 321.

16 B. Monroe, 699.

1 Parker C. R., 659, 583.

18 Mississippi, 283.

4 Rich., 286.

14 Texas, 153.

5 Texas, 426.

31 Maine, 360.

18 Connecticut, 500.

32 Maine, 383.

4 Georgia, 26.

12 Connecticut, 7.

7 Shep., 353.

2 Spears, 769.

2 Peters, 251.

14 Howard, 574.

The Legislature of New York passed 'an act requiring the master of every vessel arriving at New York, from a foreign port, or any port of any other of the States, under certain penalties, to make a report in writing, containing the names, &c., of all passengers.' The ship in question landed passengers, and failed and refused to file a report, as required. A suit was brought for the penalty. The defence was, that the law was unconstitutional; but it was held good by the Supreme Court of the United States, as a police law. The case at bar, and that above cited, differ in this only-one requires the names of passengers to be recorded, and the other requires the owners' names to be recorded. The law of New York was for the protection of her citizens only. The act of Alabama was for the mutual benefit of all persons and vessels.

2 Peters, 102.

2 Paine C. C., 429.

The State of Pennsylvania passed an act requiring all vessels to take a pilot, and on refusal shall pay to the master warden of the pilots, for the use of the society, &c., one-half the regular amount of pilotage. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of the United States held that this law was not void or inconsistent with the Constitution or any of the acts of Congress.

See 12 Howard, 299.

In this case, Justice DANIEL, in delivering the opinion, said: 'The power delegated to Congress by the Constitution relates properly to the terms on which commercial engagements may be prosecuted, the character of the articles they may embrace, the permission and terms according to which they may be introduced, and do not necessarily, or even materially, extend to the means of precaution and safety adopted within the waters or limits of the States, by the authority of the latter, for the preservation of vessels and cargoes, and the lives of navigators or passengers; these last subjects are essentially local. In the case of Vezie v. Moore, 14 Howard, 574, this court says: 'The design and object of the clause of the Constitution under consideration was to establish a perfect equality between the States, and to prevent unjust discriminations,' & c.; and in accordance therewith have been the expositions of this court in the decisions quoted by counsel, &c.

And in nearly all the cases above referred to, it is held that a State has the right to make improvements in its navigable waters, in order to make the common right more beneficial to all, and to pass laws for mutual protection.

In Connecticut, it is held that an act of the State Legislature, imposing reasonable tolls as a compensation for improving the navigation, is constitutional and valid; that commerce is not crippled by such tolls, but the act of the Legislature comes in aid of the power of Congress.

18 Conn., 500.

In South Carolina, a law appointing a person to assign to vessels their proper places, and requiring a fee to be paid and a penalty for non-observance, &c., was held good by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

4 Rich., 286.

It is also held by the Supreme Court of Texas, that an act of the Legislature, imposing wharfage dues on all vessels landing at Buffalou Bayou was constitutional, as these dues were limited to the improvement of the navigation of the bayou.

14 Texas, 157.

A case was lately decided in New York, where most of the authorities on this subject are collected. The case was this. The Legislature passed an act as follows:

'Whenever any steamboat shall be navigating in the night time, the master of such boat shall cause her to carry and show two good and sufficient lights-one to be exposed near her bow, and the other near her stern, and the last shall be at least twenty feet above her deck.'

The defence was, that the steamer in that case was not bound to carry more than one light, because she was a vessel owned in another State, navigating a river subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, under a national enrolment and license. In this case, too, Congress had acted on this same subject matter. The act of Congress of 1838 made it the duty of masters and owners of every steamboat, running between sunset and sunrise, to carry one or more signal lights, under a penalty, &c., and it was further contended that the license prohibited a further requirement to be added by the State; but the court, after a full argument, held the State law good, and that the defendants were liable for all the penalties imposed for disregarding it. See the case and the numerous authorities there cited.

4 Sandford, 462.

II. If it should be considered that the act of Alabama is not a police regulation, still, as it is necessary for the protection and the security of the rights of all persons trading and navigating the rivers, and is not in direct conflict with any act of Congress, it will be held good. It was never intended by Congress, in passing general laws for all the waters of the Union, to prohibit the States from passing such other regulations, not in conflict, that might be found necessary for safe and peaceful navigation, on particular streams or localities. In 14 Howard, United States, 296, it is said that 'the grant of commercial power to Congress does not forbid the States from passing laws, not in conflict with the acts of Congress. The power to regulate commerce includes various subjects, upon some of which there should be uniform rule, and upon others different rules in different localities.'

In the case 4 Sandford, the court, after commenting on the authorities of the Supreme Court of the United States, says: 'If any principle may be deduced from the decisions and opinions of the judges of that high tribunal, it is this: that each State may pass such laws affecting commerce, to operate within its own limits, not in conflict with the provision of the Constitution of the United States, or acts of Congress, as are necessary for the preservation of the life, the health, the personal rights, and property of its citizens, and of those enjoying its protection.' A great majority of the cases already cited hold the same. The object of the act of Alabama was to afford all passengers and persons trading, or navigating the waters, some certain evidence by which to sustain their rights or redress their wrongs, and a means of getting at the secret wrong-doers; to give fair play and ready redress to all. Upon examining this act with the acts of Congress, it will be seen that it does not conflict with the acts of Congress; it is rather in addition, or in aid of the objects of those laws.

III. There are three classes of these cases appealed from the Supreme Court of Alabama, one of which was engaged in running from Mobile to Montgomery, one in towing vessels in and about the port of Mobile, and one between New Orleans and Montgomery. As to the two first boats mentioned, they are domestic vessels entirely, running on our own waters within our limits, and so regularly occupied and engaged, and not between the ports of different States. The mere fact, therefore, that they happened to have a coasting license on board, can't help them. The Supreme Court of the United States, in 14 Howard, 573, says: 'These categories are, 1st, commerce with foreign nations; 2d, commerce among the several States; 3d, commerce with the Indian tribes. Taking the term commerce in its broadest acceptation, supposing it to embrace not merely traffic, but the means and vehicles by which it is prosecuted, can it properly be made to include objects and purposes such as those contemplated by the law under review? Commerce with foreign nations must signify commerce, which in some sense is necessarily connected with those nations, transactions which, either immediately or at some stage of their progress, must be extra territorial. It can never be applied to transactions wholly internal,' &c.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.

The suit was brought by the plaintiffs below, commissioners of pilotage of the harbor of Mobile, against the steamboat Bagaby, of which Sinnot, the defendant, was master, to recover certain penalties for a violation of the law of the State of Alabama, passed February 15, 1854, entitled 'An act to provide for the registration of the names of steamboat owners.'

The 1st section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of the owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the State, before such boat shall leave the port of Mobile, to file in the office of the probate judge a statement in writing, setting forth the name of the steamboat and of the owner or owners, his or their place or places of residence, and their interest therein, which statement shall be signed and sworn to by the owners, or their agent or attorney, and which statement shall be recorded by the said judge of probate; and, also, in case of a sale of said boat, it is made the duty of the vendee to file a statement of the change of ownership, his place of residence, and the interest transferred, which statement shall be signed by the vendor and vendee, his or their agent or attorney, and recorded in the office of the aforesaid judge.

The 2d section provides, that if any person or persons, being owner or owners of any steamboat, shall run, or permit the same to be run or navigated, on any of the waters of the State, without having first filed the statement as provided by the act, he or they shall forfeit the sum of $500, to be recovered in the name of the commissioners of pilotage of the bay of Mobile, either by a suit against the owners or by attachment against the boat, the one half to the use of the commissioners, and the other half to the person or persons who shall first inform said commissioners.

The steamboat Bagaby in question was seized and detained under this act until discharged, on a bond being given to pay and satisfy any judgment that might be rendered in the suit. A judgment was subsequently rendered against the vessel in the city court of Mobile, for the penalty of $500, with costs, which, on an appeal to the Supreme Court was affirmed.

The material facts in the case are, that the steamboat was engaged in navigation and commerce between the city of New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, and the cities of Montgomery and Wetumpka, in the State of Alabama, and that she touched at the city of Mobile only in the course of her navigation and trade between the ports and places above mentioned; that she was an American vessel, built at Pittsburgh, in the State of Pennsylvania, and was duly enrolled and licensed in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and had been regularly cleared at the port of New Orleans for the ports of Montgomery and Wetumpka, whither she was destined at the time of the seizure and detention under the act in question.

The plaintiffs in error, the master, and stipulators in the court below, insist that the judgment rendered against them is erroneous, upon the ground that the statute of the Legislature of the State of Alabama is unconstitutional and void, it being in conflict with that clause in the Constitution which confers upon Congress the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States,' and the acts of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. The act of Congress relied on is that of the 17th February, 1793, providing for the enrolment and license of vessels engaged in the coasting trade. The force and effect of this act was examined in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wh., pp. 210, 214,) and it was there held that vessels enrolled and licensed in pursuance of it had conferred upon them as full and complete authority to carry on this trade as was in the power of Congress to confer.

The Chief Justice says, (speaking of the 1st section:) 'This section seems to the court to contain a positive enactment that the vessels it describes shall be entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade. These privileges cannot be separated from the trade, and cannot be enjoyed unless the trade may be prosecuted.' Again, the court say, to construe these words otherwise than as entitling the ships or vessels described to carry on the coasting trade would be, we think, to disregard the apparent intent of the act. And again, speaking of the license provided for in the 4th section, the word 'license' means permission or authority; and a license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and, if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license.

The license is general in its terms, according to the form given in the act of Congress: 'License is hereby granted for the said steamboat (naming her) to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof, and no longer.'

In the case already referred to, it was denied in the argument that these words authorized a voyage from New Jersey to New York. The court observed, in answer to this objection: It is true that no ports are specified; but it is equally true that the words used are perfectly intelligible, and do confer such authority as unquestionably as if the ports had been mentioned. The coasting trade is a term well understood. The law has defined it, and all know its meaning perfectly. The act describes with great minuteness the various operations of vessels engaged in it; and it cannot, we think, be doubted that a voyage from New Jersey to New York is one of those operations.

On looking into the act of Congress regulating the coasting trade, it will be found that many conditions are to be complied with by the owners of vessels, before the granting of the enrolment or license. 1. The vessel must possess the same qualifications, and the same requisites must be complied with, as are made necessary to the registering of ships or vessels engaged in the foreign trade by the act of December 31, 1792. These conditions are many and important, as will be seen by a reference to the act. 2. A bond must be given by the husband, or managing owner, and the master, with sureties to the satisfaction of the collector, conditioned that such vessel shall not be employed in any trade by which the United States shall be defrauded of its revenues; and also the master must make oath that he is a citizen of the United States; that the license shall not be used for any other vessel or any other employment than that for which it is granted, or in any trade or business in fraud of the public revenues, as a condition to the granting of the license. These are the guards and restraints, and the only guards and restraints, which Congress has seen fit to annex to the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade, and upon a compliance with which, as we have seen, as full and complete authority is conferred by the license to carry on the trade as Congress is capable of conferring.

Now, the act of the Legislature of the State of Alabama imposes another and an additional condition to the privilege of carrying on this trade within her waters, namely: the filing of a statement in writing, in the office of the probate judge of Mobile county, setting forth: 1. The name of the vessel; 2. The name of the owner or owners; 3. His or their place or places of residence; and 4. The interest each has in the vessel. Which statement must be sworn to by the party, or his agent or attorney. And the like statement, mutatis mutandis, is required to be made each time a change of owners of the vessel takes place. Unless this condition of navigation and trade within the waters of Alabama is complied with, the vessel is forbidden to leave the port of Mobile, under the penalty of $500 for each offence.

If the interpretation of the court, as to the force and effect of the privileges afforded to the vessel by the enrolment and license in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, are to be maintained, it can require no argument to show a direct conflict between this act of the State and the act of Congress regulating this trade. Certainly, if this State law can be upheld, the full enjoyment of the right to carry on the coasting trade, as heretofore adjudged by this court, under the enrolment and license, is denied to the vessel in question.

If anything further could be necessary, we might refer to the enrolment prescribed by the act of Congress, by which it is made the duty of the owner to furnish, under oath, to the collectors, all the information required by this State law, and which is incorporated in the body of the enrolment. Congress, therefore, has legislated on the very subject which the State act has undertaken to regulate, and has limited its regulation in the matter to a registry at the home port.

It has been argued, however, that this act of the State is but the exercise of a police power, which power has not been surrendered to the General Government, but reserved to the States; and hence, even if the law should be found in conflict with the act of Congress, it must still be regarded as a valid law, and as excepted out of and from the commercial power.

This position is not a new one; it has often been presented to this court, and in every instance the same answer given to it. It was strongly pressed in the New York case of Gibbons v. Ogden. The court, in answer to it, observed: 'It has been contended, that if a law passed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes in conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, they affect the subject and each other, like equal opposing forces.' But, the court say, the framers of the Constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it. The same doctrine was asserted in the case of Brown v. the State of Maryland, 12 Wh., pages 448, 449, and in numerous other cases. (5 How., pages 573, 574, 579, 581; 2 Peters, 251, 252; 4 Wh., pages 405, 406, 436.)

We agree, that in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together; and, also, that the act of Congress should have been passed in the exercise of a clear power under the Constitution, such as that in question.

The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the Constitution under the regulation of Congress, and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, is therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power. When, therefore, an act of the Legislature of a State prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the State law must give way; and this, without regard to the source of power whence the State Legislature derived its enactment.

This paramount authority of the act of Congress is not only conferred by the Constitution itself, but is the logical result of the power over the subject conferred upon that body by the States. They surrendered this power to the General Government; and to the extent of the fair exercise of it by Congress, the act must be supreme.

The power of Congress, however, over the subject does not extend further than the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. Beyond these limits the States have not surrendered their power over the subject, and may exercise it independently of any control or interference of the General Government; and there has been much controversy, and probably will continue to be, both by the bench and the bar, in fixing the true boundary line between the power of Congress under the commercial grant and the power reserved to the States. But in all these discussions, or nearly all of them, it has been admitted, that if the act of Congress fell clearly within the power conferred upon that body by the Constitution, there was an end of the controversy. The law of Congress was supreme.

These questions have arisen under the quarantine and health laws of the States-laws imposing a tax upon imports and passengers, admitted to have been passed under the police power of the States, and which had not been surrendered to the General Government. The laws of the States have been upheld by the court, except in cases where they were in conflict, or were adjudged by the court to be in conflict, with the act of Congress.

Upon the whole, after the maturest consideration the court have been able to give to the case, we are constrained to hold, that the act of the Legislature of the State is in conflict with the Constitution and law of the United States, and therefore void.

The judgment of the court below is reversed.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 45 Part 1.djvu/1569

 0 1518 Am endment. March 2, 1929. [H. R. 10431.] [Public, No. 965 .] United States courts. Vol. 44, p. 408, amend- ed. Oklahoma ju dicial dis tricts. Northern district. Ter ms of court. Proviso. R ooms at P awhu ska, Miami, and Bartles- ville. Eastern district. Terms of court. Proviso. R ooms at H ugo, Po- teau, Ada, Okmul gee, Pawls Valley, and Du- rant. Western district. Terms of court. Provisos. Rooms at Mangum. Adjournment, etc., of terms. SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CI-18. 538, 539 . 1929 SEC. 4. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is herewith expressly reserved. Approved, March 2, 19 29. CHAP. 539.-An Act To amend section 101 of the Judicial Code. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That section 101 of the Judicial Code, as amended, be, and it is hereby, amended to read as follows " SEC . 101 . The State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts, to be known as the northern, the eastern, and the western districts of Oklahoma . The territory embraced on January 1, 1925, in the counties of Craig, Creek, Delaware, Mayes, Nowata, Osage, Ottawa, Pawnee, Rogers, Tulsa, and Washington, as they existed on said date, shall constitute the northern district of Oklahoma . Term s of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma shall be held at Tulsa on the first Monday in January, at Vinita on the first Monday in March, at Pawhuska on the first Monday in May, at Miami on the first Monday in November, and at Bartlesville on the first Monday in June in each year : Provided, That suitable rooms and accommodations for holding court at Paw- huska, Miami, and Bartlesville are furnished free of expense to the United States. " The eastern district of Oklahoma shall include the territory embraced on the 1st day of January, 1925, in the counties of Adair, Atoka, Bryan, Cher okee, Choct aw, Co al, Ca rter, Garvi n, Gra dy, Haskell, Hughes, Johnston, Jefferson, Latimer, Le F lore, Love, M cClain , Muskogee, McIntosh, McCurtain, T furray, Marshall, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, Pittsburg, Pushmataha, Pontotoc, Seminole, Stephens, Sequoyah, and Wagoner. Terms of the district court of the eastern district shall be held at Muskogee on the first Monday in January, at Ada on the first Monday in March, at Okmulgee on the first Monday in April, at Hugo on the first Monday in May, at South McAlester on the first Monday in June, at Ardmore on the first Monday in October, at Chickasha on the first Monday in Nov ember, at Pot eau on the fi rst Monday in December in e ach year, and annually at Pauls Valley and Durant at such times as may be fixed by the judge of the eastern district : Provided, That suitable rooms and accommodations for holding said court at Hugo, Poteau, Ada, Okmulgee, Pauls Valley, and Durant are furnished free of exp ense to the U nited States. " The western district of Oklahoma shall include the territory embraced on the 1st day of January, 1925, in the counties of Alfalfa, Beaver, Beckham, Blaine, Caddo, Canadian, Cimarron, Cleveland, Comanche, Cotton, Custer, Dewey, Ellis, Garfield, Grant, Greer, Harmon, Harper, Jackson, Kay, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Major, Noble, Oklahoma, Payne, Pottawatomie, Roger Mills, Texas, Tillma n, Was hita, Woods, and Woodwa rd . The terms of the district court for the western district shall be held at Oklahoma City on the first Monday in January, at Enid on the first Monday of March, at Guthrie on the first Monday of May, at Mangum on the first Mon- day of September, at Lawton on the first Monday of October, and at Woodward on the first Monday of November : Provided, That suit- able r ooms a nd acc ommod ations for h olding cour t at M angum are furnished free of expense to the United States : And provided fur- ther, That the district judge of said district, or in his absence a dis- trict j udge or a circ uit ju dge ass igned t o hold court in said distr ict,

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