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Tupolev Tu-16

The Tupolev Tu-16 (USAF/DOD reporting name Type 39; NATO reporting name: Badger) is a twin-engined jet strategic heavy bomber used by the Soviet Union. It has been flown for almost 70 years. While many aircraft in Soviet service were retired after the Cold War ended, the Chinese license-built version Xian H-6 remains in service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force, with more being built.

Development

In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union was strongly committed to matching the United States in strategic bombing capability. The Soviets' only long-range bomber at the time was Tupolev's Tu-4 'Bull', a reverse-engineered copy of the American B-29 Superfortress. The development of the notably powerful Mikulin AM-3 turbojet led to the possibility of a large, jet-powered bomber.

The Tupolev design bureau began work on the Tu-88 ("Aircraft N") prototypes in 1950. The Tu-88 first flew on 27 April 1952. After winning a competition against the Ilyushin Il-46, it was approved for production in December 1952. The first production bombers entered service with Frontal Aviation in 1954, receiving the service designation Tu-16. It received the NATO reporting name Badger-A.

It had a new, large swept wing and two large Mikulin AM-3 turbojets, one in each wing root. It could carry a single massive FAB-9000 9000 kg bomb (the Russian equivalent in terms of size of the British Grand Slam, but a conventional bomb rather than a deep ground penetrator) or various nuclear weapons for a range of around 4800 km. Production took place in three aviation plants, Kazan Aircraft Production Association, Kuybyshev, and Voronezh Aircraft Production Association.

Although the Tu-16 began as a high-altitude, free-fall bomber, in the mid-1950s, it was equipped to carry early Soviet cruise missiles. The Tu-16KS-1 (Badger-B) version could carry AS-1 missiles over a combat radius of 1800 km. These very large weapons were aerodynamically similar to the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter, fitted with either a nuclear or conventional warhead, having a range of about 140 km. They were intended for use primarily against US Navy aircraft carriers and other large surface ships. Subsequent Tu-16s were converted to carry later, more advanced missiles, while their designations changed several times.

A versatile design, the Tu-16 was built in numerous specialized variants for aerial reconnaissance, maritime surveillance, electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT), and electronic warfare (ECM). In total, 1,507 aircraft were constructed in three plants in the Soviet Union, in 1954–1962. A civilian adaptation, the Tupolev Tu-104, saw passenger service with Aeroflot. The Tu-16 was also exported to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq. It continued to be used by the Air Forces and naval aviation of the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, until 1993.

Delivery of the Tu-16 to China began in 1958, and the Xi'an Aircraft Industrial Corporation license-produced the aircraft under the Chinese designation Xian H-6. At least 120 of these aircraft remain in service. On 14 May 1965, one of the PLAAF Tu-16 bombers carried out the first airborne nuclear weapon test inside China.

Variants

Among the main production variants of the Badger were the Tu-16 and Tu-16A bombers and Tu-16KS and Tu-16K-10 missile carriers, Tu-16SPS, "Elka", and Tu-16Ye ECM aircraft, Tu-16R reconnaissance aircraft, and Tu-16T torpedo bombers; others were produced from conversions. Individual aircraft could be modified several times, with designations changed, especially concerning missile-carrying aircraft.

 * "Aircraft 88" - Initial prototype.
 * "Aircraft 97" - Twin-engined long-range bomber development project of Tu-16 with two RD-5 engines.
 * "Aircraft 103" - Supersonic bomber development project of Tu-16 with four VD-7 AM-13 engines.
 * Badger A (Tu-16) – This is the basic configuration of the Tu-16 bomber deployed in 1954 to replace the Tu-4. Several modified models of this variant existed, all of which were known as Badger A in the West.
 * Tu-16A – Modified Tu-16s designed to carry nuclear bombs, one of main versions, with 453 built. Many of these were subsequently converted into other variants.
 * Tu-16Z – An early specialized version of the Tu-16 that served as airborne tankers (a refuelling method: wing-to-wing), though retaining their medium bomber role.
 * Tu-16G (Tu-104G) – Fast air mail model, Aeroflot aircrew training version.
 * Tu-16N – A dedicated tanker version for Tu-22/Tu-22M bombers, with probe and drogue system. Entered service in 1963. Similar aircraft Tu-16NN converted from Tu-16Z.
 * Tu-16T – Limited production maritime strike version (torpedo bomber), that served in the Soviet Naval Aviation, and carried torpedoes, mines and depth charges. 76 built and some more converted. All units subsequently converted into Tu-16S configuration.
 * Tu-16S – A lifeboat carrier version used for search and rescue operations.
 * Tu-16Ye – These were equipped with heavy electronic warfare and electronic intelligence (ELINT) equipment.
 * Badger B (Tu-16KS) – Variant designed as a launch platform for two AS-1 Kennel/KS-1 Komet missiles. 107 built in 1954–1958, served with the Soviet Naval Aviation, Egypt and Indonesia. Soviet ones later converted with newer missiles.
 * Badger C (Tu-16K-10) – Another Naval Aviation variant, units of this version carried a single AS-2 Kipper/K-10S anti-ship missile. 216 built in 1958–1963. It differed from other variants in having a radar in a nose. A further development, the Tu-16K-10-26, carried a single K-10S and two KSR-2 or KSR-5 AS-6 Kingfish missiles (K-26 missile complex). Some were later converted into ELINT platforms.
 * Badger D (Tu-16RM-1) – Maritime reconnaissance model with ELINT equipment; 23 converted from Tu-16K-10. It retained its radar in a nose and could guide K-10S missiles, fired from other planes, at targets.
 * Badger E (Tu-16R) – Reconnaissance version of the airframe, with ELINT equipment, first of all meant for maritime reconnaissance. It could guide KS missiles.
 * Tu-16RM-2 – modified Tu-16R, serving in the Naval Aviation. It could guide KSR-2 missiles.
 * Tu-16KRM – Launch platforms for target drones (a variant of Tu-16K-26).
 * Badger F (Tu-16RM-2) – Another reconnaissance version based on the −16R/RM but with the addition of external ELINT equipment.
 * Badger G (Tu-16K/Tu-16KSR) – Serving in the Naval Aviation, these were conversions from earlier models. These were designed to carry bombs in internal bays in addition to carrying air-to-surface missiles externally, such as the AS-5 Kelt and AS-6 Kingfish. There existed numerous variants, designated either from carried missile complex (K-11, K-16 and K-26) or from missiles of these complexes (KSR-11, KSR-2 and KSR-5). Following further modifications, they were also given suffixes. Main variants:
 * Tu-16KSR-2 – carrying the K-16 complex (two KSR-2 missiles). Used from 1962. Similar aircraft, converted from other variants, were designated Tu-16K-16.
 * Tu-16K-11-16 – carrying the K-16 complex (KSR-2 missiles) or the K-11 complex (two anti-radar KSR-11 missiles). Used from 1962. Similar aircraft were designated Tu-16KSR-2-11. Over 440 Tu-16 could carry the K-16 or K-11 complex.
 * Tu-16K-26 – carrying the K-26 complex (two KSR-5 missiles), retaining a capability of KSR-2 and 11 missiles. Used from 1969. Similar aircraft were designated Tu-16KSR-2-5-11 or Tu-16KSR-2-5 (no KSR-11 capability). Over 240 Tu-16 could carry the K-26 complex.
 * Tu-16K-26P – carrying the K-26P missiles (two anti-radar KSR-5P missiles, as well as KSR-5, 2 or 11).
 * Badger H (Tu-16 Elka) – Designed for stand-off electronic warfare and electronic counter-measures support.
 * Badger J (Tu-16P Buket) – Another electronic warfare variant configured as an ECM strike escort.
 * Badger K (Tu-16Ye) – Believed to be a version of the Badger F configuration possessing enhanced ELINT capability.
 * Badger L (Tu-16P) – Another version of the Badger J with more modern systems and used in ELINT role.
 * "Aircraft 90" - Turboprop-powered project.
 * Tu-104 - Civilian airliner version.

Former operators

 * Armenian Air Force: 30 aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union. Out of service by 1995.
 * Azerbaijan Air Force: 10 aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union. Out of service by 1995.
 * Belarus Air Force: 18 aircraft inherited upon the fall of the Soviet Union, out of service by 1995.
 * People's Liberation Army Air Force: A few Tu-16s were acquired in 1959; the type was then built under licence as the Xian H-6.
 * Egyptian Air Force: Operated Tu-16KS, Tu-16T, Tu-16KSR-2-11, and Tu-16R. Also operated H-6. Last retired in 2000. By 1966, Air Group 65, with its primary base at Cairo West Air Base, was operating three squadrons of Tu-16s: No. 34 and 36 Squadrons with bomber variants, and No. 95 Squadron equipped with the Tu-16KS' that could carry AS-1 Kennel air-to-surface missiles.
 * undefined
 * Georgian Air Force: 20 aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union. Out of service by 1995.
 * People's Liberation Army Air Force: A few Tu-16s were acquired in 1959; the type was then built under licence as the Xian H-6.
 * Egyptian Air Force: Operated Tu-16KS, Tu-16T, Tu-16KSR-2-11, and Tu-16R. Also operated H-6. Last retired in 2000. By 1966, Air Group 65, with its primary base at Cairo West Air Base, was operating three squadrons of Tu-16s: No. 34 and 36 Squadrons with bomber variants, and No. 95 Squadron equipped with the Tu-16KS' that could carry AS-1 Kennel air-to-surface missiles.
 * undefined
 * Georgian Air Force: 20 aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union. Out of service by 1995.
 * Georgian Air Force: 20 aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union. Out of service by 1995.
 * Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU): 26 Tu-16KS-1 acquired in 1961. Used during the preparation of Operation Trikora in 1962, being the capture of Western New Guinea from the Netherlands (now Papua and Papua Barat). They were also planned to be used for attacking the Colossus-class aircraft carrier HNLMS Karel Doorman (R81). All were based at Iswahjudi Air Force Base, Madiun, East Java, and were grounded in 1969. Removed from service in 1970.
 * 🇮🇶 Iraq
 * Iraqi Air Force: 8 x Tu-16 and 6 x Tu-16KSR-2-11. Also operated 4 B-6D (H-6D). One B-6D was downed during the Iran-Iraq War. Two were destroyed in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
 * 🇷🇺 Russia
 * Russian Air Force
 * Russian Naval Aviation
 * Soviet Air Force (transferred to successor states)
 * Soviet Naval Aviation (transferred to successor states)
 * Ukrainian Air Force: 121 aircraft inherited from USSR. All retired from service.
 * Ukrainian Air Force: 121 aircraft inherited from USSR. All retired from service.
 * Ukrainian Air Force: 121 aircraft inherited from USSR. All retired from service.

Notable accidents

 * On 25 May 1968 a Soviet Air Force Tu-16 Badger-F piloted by Colonel Andrey Pliyev buzzed the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Essex (CV-9) in the Norwegian Sea. The Tu-16 made four passes, and on the last a wing clipped the sea and it crashed with no survivors. Parts of three bodies were recovered by the US.

 * On 1 February 1971 a modified Tu-16 flying laboratory crashed during testing of a new jet engine, resulting in the death of the entire crew, including test pilot Amet-khan Sultan.
 * On 28 August 1978 an early model Tu-16 crashed on Hopen island in Svalbard, Norway. All seven crew were killed in the accident. It was discovered by a four-man Norwegian weather forecasting team. The Soviets refused to admit the loss of an aircraft until the bodies of the crew were given to them. Norway transcribed the contents of the flight recorder over the objections of the Soviet government.
 * On 27 June 1980 a Soviet Air Force Tu-16 Badger on a Tokyo Express flight crashed near Komatsu Air Base in Ishikawa Prefecture in the Sea of Japan. There were no survivors. The remains of three crew members were recovered by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ship Nemuro.

title: Tupolev Tu-16


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William B. Bankhead

William Brockman Bankhead (April 12, 1874 – September 15, 1940) was an American politician who served as the 42nd speaker of the United States House of Representatives from 1936 to 1940, representing Alabama's 10th and later 7th congressional districts as a Democrat from 1917 to 1940. Bankhead was a strong liberal and a prominent supporter of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal of pro-labor union legislation, thus clashing with most other Southern Democrats in Congress at the time. Bankhead described himself as proud to be a politician, by which he meant that he did not neglect matters that concerned his district or reelection. He was the father of actress Tallulah Bankhead.

Bankhead died on September 15, 1940, from an abdominal hemorrhage, while still in office.

Early life
Bankhead was born at the Bankhead plantation in Lamar County, Alabama. His father, John H. Bankhead, was an active politician who had served in the Alabama legislature, and later as US Representative and Senator. His mother was Tallulah James Brockman, granddaughter of South Carolina state Senator Thomas Patterson Brockman, and he was raised as a Methodist. Bankhead's brother, John H. Bankhead II, also served in the Senate.

William Bankhead attended the University of Alabama, where he was a member of Phi Delta Theta fraternity, and played on the university's first football team, organized in 1892. He studied law at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC, graduating in 1895.

He was immediately admitted to the bar in Alabama, and practiced law in Huntsville.

Political career
In 1898, he became city attorney of Huntsville, serving until 1902. In 1900, he was elected to the Alabama House of Representatives for one term, serving through 1901.

In 1905, he moved to Jasper, Alabama. In 1910 he was appointed solicitor of the fourteenth judicial circuit of Alabama, serving until 1914.

In 1914, he sought the Democratic nomination for US Representative, but failed. In 1916 he was elected Representative from the newly created 10th Congressional District. (Alabama was apportioned a tenth Congressional seat after the 1910 Census, but the seat was filled by at-large election in 1912 and 1914.) Bankhead held the 10th District until it was abolished after the 1930 Census, when Alabama lost a seat. He was the only person ever elected from the 10th District.

After reapportionment and redistricting following the 1930 Census, Bankhead was re-elected Representative from the 7th District in 1932, and was re-elected three times, serving until his death in 1940. Bankhead served as chairman of the House Rules Committee from April 1934 until January 1935, taking over for Edward W. Pou who died in office. In 1934, he was chosen House Majority Leader by his fellow Democrats. On June 4, 1936, he was chosen Speaker of the House to succeed Jo Byrns, who had died that morning. Bankhead served as Speaker until his death on September 15, 1940. His cause of death was a stomach hemorrhage.

As Speaker, Bankhead held the second-highest political office ever attained by any Alabamian, after only Vice President William R. King.

At the 1940 Democratic National Convention (three months before his death), he finished second to Henry A. Wallace on the vice presidential ticket, losing the delegate count 626–329.

Bankhead family
Bankhead's father, John H. Bankhead, was a U.S. Representative and Senator. His elder brother John H. Bankhead II was also a U.S. Senator, and his nephew Walter Will Bankhead was a U.S. Representative. His daughter, Tallulah Bankhead, was the acclaimed theatrical, radio and motion picture actress.

The William B. Bankhead National Forest and sections of old US Highway 78 in northern Alabama are named in his honor. His home in Jasper has been renovated to house the Walker Area Community Foundation's "Bankhead House and Heritage Center", a history museum and arts venue.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: William B. Bankhead


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Moldovan Police

The General Police Inspectorate (Inspectoratul General al Poliției, IGP) is the national civilian police force of the Republic of Moldova. It is a state institution subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that regulates law enforcement in Moldova. The current Chief of the General Police Inspectorate is currently Viorel Cernauteanu.

History
The GPI was established as the Police of the Republic of Moldova on 13 September 1990, after the Government of Moldova adopted resolution no. 321 "On the reform of the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Moldovan SSR", which provided for the creation of the police and district police stations. Thus, the place of the Soviet-era militia was occupied by the new police.

On 18 December 1990, the Parliament of Moldova adopted the Law on police. In 1995 the national police of Moldova were under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. Internal troops were reported to have 2,500 men, and the numbers of riot police were put at 900. The scope and quality of Moldova's state security apparatus were difficult to determine. Like the armed forces, local assets of the former Moldavian KGB were transferred to the new government along with those personnel who wished to enter the service of the new government. These elements functioned at the time under the republic's Ministry of National Security before being transferred to the MAI.

On 27 December 2012, a law which entered into force on 5 March 2013 established the General Police Inspectorate under the MIA. On 24 April 2013, the new police uniform was approved. On 8 April 2014, the Strategic Development Program was approved, a basic document of the Police, elaborated for a period of 3 years, which ensures the prioritization of the various objectives for the IGP.

Organization
As a law enforcement body of state power, the police of the Republic of Moldova are divided into state and municipal. State police perform their duties throughout the republic, municipal - in the territory of the corresponding administrative unit. State and municipal police carry out their tasks in close cooperation. The State Police provides the municipal police with methodological and advisory assistance, as well as assists in the implementation of the duties assigned to it by their own forces and means. The municipal police assist the state police in carrying out operational investigative measures, timely inform them of the persons and facts of interest to them.

Institutions under the GPI are:
 * National Inspectorate of Investigations
 * National Inspectorate for Public Security
 * Police Department of Chisinau Municipality
 * General Directorate of Criminal Investigation
 * Special Forces Brigade "Fulger"
 * Chinologic Center
 * Technical-Forensic Center and Judicial Expertise
 * Center for International Police Cooperation (Interpol)
 * Judicial Police
 * Procurement and Logistics Service
 * Directorate of Inspection
 * 42 police inspectorates at district level

Recognition
On the inspectorate's 30th anniversary in 2017, the Police Directorate of the Chisinau Municipality was awarded by President Igor Dodon the Order of Ștefan cel Mare.

Uniform
The IGP has a summer outfit, a spring-autumn outfit and a winter outfit. The parade dress is worn during the participation in the festivities (taking the oath, awarding of ministerial and departmental distinctions, march pasts, national holidays, and official receptions).

Public perception
The common lack of respect towards law, in general, among Moldovans results in a predominant distrust for police. This is not helped by the fact that police incompetency due to various reasons is frequent.

Ill-treatment by police
Moldova is not a part of the EU. Torture and ill-treatment in Moldova remain widespread and systemic despite some initial legislative steps made by the government to change police practices in order to eradicate it, Amnesty International said in October 2007. "Although efforts have been made to bring legislation into line with international and European standards, practice and attitudes are lagging behind. Beatings and abuse of detainees remain the norm. Channels for seeking redress stay blocked. Lack of transparency breeds impunity," Amnesty Internationals researcher said. The events during the April 2009 Moldova civil unrest have drawn criticism of human rights violations, including in regard to the deaths of Valeriu Boboc, Ion Ţâbuleac, and Eugen Ţapu

title: Moldovan Police


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Crime in Moldova

Crime in Moldova, as everywhere in the Post-Soviet states, has risen in the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, although in recent years there has been an improvement. Corruption in Moldova, economic and drug-related crimes are the most visible and predictable results of the deteriorating economic situation. Racketeering and the mafia have also risen up during the 1990s and 2000s. Petty crimes, such as pickpocketing and street thefts, are also common.

Corruption
Corruption in Moldova is one of the country's most serious problems. In 2014, $1bn has vanished from three of Moldova's leading banks.

Murder
In 2023, Moldova had a murder rate of 2,27 per 100,000 population. There were a total of 78 murders in Moldova in 2023.

Drug trade
Illicit cultivation of opium poppies and cannabis is carried out in Moldova, mainly for consumption in CIS countries. According to NATO, drug trafficking in Moldova is valued between $200 million to $250 million per year.

Moldova is a transshipment point for illegal drugs to Western Europe.

Human trafficking
The CIA names human trafficking, widespread crime and underground economic activity among major crime issues of Moldova. Moldova is a source and transit nation in the trafficking in human beings, in particular women and girls into forced prostitution. The annual country human rights report from the United States Department of State pinpoints some involvement by government officials and Moldovan law enforcement in human trafficking.

According to the United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report of 2018: "The Government of Moldova does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period; therefore Moldova was upgraded to Tier 2. The government demonstrated increasing efforts by investigating and prosecuting more suspected  traffickers,  including  complicit  officials,  and increasing budgets for victim protection. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Identifying victims and conferring official victim status continued to be a challenge. Corruption, particularly in law enforcement and the judiciary, impeded prosecutions and influenced the outcomes of cases, including cases against complicit officials. Victims continued to suffer from intimidation from traffickers, and authorities provided uneven levels of protection during court proceedings."

E. Benjamin Skinner in his book "A Crime So Monstrous", on page 156, speculates that between 1991 and 2008, up to 400,000 women were trafficked from Moldova.

Human rights violations
According to Amnesty International, the most common human rights abuses in Moldova are restrictions on freedom of association, unfair trials, torture and other ill-treatment in places of detention, and discrimination against LGBT and Roma minority.

title: Crime in Moldova


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Law enforcement in China

Law enforcement in China consists of an extensive public security system and a variety of enforcement procedures used to maintain order in the country. Along with the courts and procuratorates, the country's judicial and public security agencies include the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), with their descending hierarchy of departments, bureaus (, "Jú"), subbureaus (, "Fù jú"), and stations (, "Suǒ").

Hong Kong and Macau have separate law enforcement agencies, different legal systems and are classified as separate jurisdictions under the one country two systems framework. However, Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and Public Security Police Force of Macau often cooperate with the mainland MPS on cases involving cross border crime.

Overview
The national security system is made up of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission vets all law enforcement officers and legal officials for political reliability.

Ministry of Public Security (MPS) oversees all domestic police activity in China. The ministry is responsible for police operations and detention centers and has dedicated departments for internal political, economic, and communications security. Its lowest organizational units are public security stations, which maintain a close day-to-day contact with the public. The People's Armed Police Force, with its 1.5 million personnel, is organized into 45 divisions. These include security police, border defense personnel, guards for government buildings and embassies, and police communications specialists.

Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established in 1983 to ensure "the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist system." The ministry is guided by a series of laws enacted in 1993, 1994, and 1997 that replaced the "counterrevolutionary" crime statutes. The ministry's operations include intelligence collection, both domestic and foreign. Authorities have used arrests on charges of revealing state secrets, subversion, and common crimes to suppress political dissent and social advocacy.

The Ministry of Justice maintains oversees the operation of prisons.

The Security Bureau is the local security department for Hong Kong. The paramilitary style Hong Kong Police Force was established in 1844 during the British occupation of Hong Kong and has 27,375 uniformed personnel and 4,885 civilian staff. Hong Kong Correctional Service was established in 1879 and has 6,659 uniformed personnel and civilian staff. Both services report to the Security Bureau.

Secretariat for Security (Macau) is the local security department in Macau. Macau Security Force (established in 1999 by the merger of the Judiciary Police Unitary Police Service, Macau Prisons) is a force of 3,700 personnel and reports to the local Security department.

Judicial and legal system
In 2004 the National People's Congress (NPC) amended the constitution so that for the first time the protection of the individual was incorporated as a constitutional requirement. Specifically, Articles 37 and 38 recognize the "freedom of the person" and the "personal dignity of citizens" as "inviolable."

The 1997 Criminal Procedure Law allows the police to detain a person for up to 37 days before release or formal arrest, more vigorous court reviews have led to the release of thousands of unlawfully detained individuals. The law stipulates that the authorities must notify a detainee's family or work unit of the detention within 24 hours.

Police sometimes hold individuals without granting access to family members or lawyers, and their trials are sometimes conducted in secret. Detained criminal suspects, defendants, their legal representatives, and close relatives are entitled to apply for bail, but, in practice, few suspects are released pending trial. There used to be a reeducation-through-labor system that allows nonjudicial panels of police and local civil authorities to sentence individuals to up to three years in prison-like facilities, which practice was abolished in 2013.

Citizens have a constitutional guarantee of the right to use their own spoken and written language in court proceedings. Courts and procuratorates are advised by the constitution that they "should provide translations for any party to the court proceedings who is not familiar with the spoken or written languages in common use in the locality." The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the courts are subjected to party and government policy guidance that influences the outcome of verdicts and sentences. Conviction rates in criminal cases in the early 2000s were approximately 90 percent, and trials generally were little more than sentencing hearings. Although most suspects in criminal cases are legally guaranteed the right to counsel, they often meet their appointed attorney only once before the hearing; at best, a defense attorney can obtain a reduction of the sentence. In many politically sensitive trials, rarely lasting more than several hours, the courts hand down guilty verdicts immediately following proceedings, and death sentences are often implemented within days of the rejection of an appeal.

The legal system in Hong Kong is based in English Common law and remains unchanged for at least 50 years from 1997. The legal system in Macau is based in Portuguese legal system, as well as some aspects of German law, Chinese law, Italian law, and some English common law. Like Hong Kong, the Macau's legal structure will remain as is for at least 50 years from 1999. Both SARs have separate judicial systems, but the NPC is still the highest legal organ.

Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
The Ministry of Public Security is the principal police authority. The ministry has functional departments for areas such as internal security, intelligence, counter-terrorism, police operations, prisons, and political, economic, and communications security. Subordinate to the ministry are provincial-level public security departments; public security bureaus (PSB's) and sub-bureaus at the county level (the bureaus located in the prefectures and large cities, the sub-bureaus in counties and municipal districts); and public security stations at the township level.

While public security considerations has a strong influence at all levels of administration, the police appear to wield progressively greater influence at the lower levels of government.

The organization of local public security stations can be inferred from the tasks with which the police are charged. Generally, each station has sections for population control, pre-trial investigations, welfare, traffic control, a detention center, and other activities.

The public security station - the police element in closest contact with the people - is supervised by the public security sub-bureau as well as by local governments and procuratorates. The procuratorate assumes direct responsibility for handling any case it chooses, and it supervises investigations in those cases it allows the public security station to conduct. A great deal of coordination occurs among the public security organs, the procuratorates, and the courts, so that a trial is unlikely to produce a surprise outcome.

The public security station generally has considerably broader responsibilities than a police station in the other countries, involving itself in every aspect of the district people's lives. In a rural area it has a chief, a deputy chief, a small administrative staff, and a small police force. In an urban area it has a greater number of administrative staff members and seven to eighteen patrolmen. Its criminal law activities includes investigation, apprehension, interrogation, and temporary detention. The station's household section maintains a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces are recorded and confirmed through household checks. The station regulates all hotels and requires visitors who remain beyond a certain number of days to register. It also regulates the possession, transportation, and use of all explosives, guns, ammunition, and poisons.

Another important police function is controlling change of residence. Without such controls, larger numbers of rural residents undoubtedly would move to the overcrowded cities in search of better living standards, work, or education (see Urbanization in China). In April 1984 the State Council issued the "Tentative Regulations Governing People's Republic of China Resident Identity". The regulations, to be implemented over a period of years, required all residents over sixteen years of age, except active-duty members of the PLA and the People's Armed Police and inmates serving sentences, to be issued resident identity cards by the Ministry of Public Security. The picture cards indicated the name, sex, nationality, date of birth, and address of the bearer.

Special police operations involve the employment of agents and informants. Informants are used in surveillance of suspected criminals.

The criminal laws in force after January 1, 1980, restricted police powers regarding arrests, investigations, and searches. A public security official or a citizen could apprehend a suspect under emergency conditions, but a court or procuratorate was required to approve the arrest. The accused had to be questioned within twenty-four hours and his or her family notified of the detention "except in circumstances where notification would hinder the investigation or there was no way to notify them." Any premeditated arrest required a court or procuratorate warrant. The time that an accused could be held pending investigation was limited to three to seven days, and incarceration without due process is illegal.

Two officials were needed to conduct a criminal investigation. They were required to show identification and to inform the accused of the crime allegedly committed before he or she was questioned. The suspect could refuse to answer only those questions irrelevant to the case.

The 1980 laws also provided that in conjunction with an arrest the police could conduct an emergency search; otherwise, a warrant was required. They had the right to search the person, property, and residence of an accused and the person of any injured party. They could intercept mail belonging to the accused and order an autopsy whenever cause of death was unclear.

In July 1980 the government approved new regulations governing police use of weapons and force. Police personnel could use their batons only in self-defense or when necessary to subdue or prevent the escape of violent criminals or rioters. Lethal weapons, such as pistols, could be used if necessary to stop violent riots, to lessen the overall loss of life, or to subdue surrounded but still resisting criminals. The regulations also governed use of sirens, police lights, and whistles. The rules were changed in 1996, with the type of crimes made more specific.

The relationship between the police officers assigned to neighbourhood patrols and the people is close. Police officers live in a neighbourhood on a long-term assignment and are expected to know all the residents personally. Their task is not only to prevent and punish crime but to promote desirable behaviour by counselling and acting as role models. This positive side of the police officer's duties was a constant responsibility, and the bond between the public security units and the people are strengthened annually by means of "cherish-the-people" months, during which the police officer makes a special effort to be of help, especially to the aged and the infirm.

People's Armed Police (PAP)

The People's Armed Police (PAP) is the Gendarmerie paramilitary police force originally under the joint supervision of the MPS and Central Military Commission (CMC). However, after a series of high-profile corruption scandals involving their misuse by Bo Xilai, then party secretary of Chongqing, in the Wang Lijun incident, it was decided under the 2015 military reforms to place all People's Armed Police personnel under the direct and exclusive control of the CMC. After a trial period in selected jurisdictions, the PAP was officially established at the national level in 1983. In line with the general policy of reducing the size of the armed forces and transferring responsibilities to the civilian sector, the newly established force was formed from internal security units reassigned from the PLA to the Ministry of Public Security and from border defense (customs) and fire-fighting units. In 1985 the PAP consisted of approximately 600,000 volunteers and conscripts. With a headquarters at the national level and division-level provincial units, regimental-level detachments, and battalion-level brigades, it retained its military organization. Current strength of PAP is estimated at 1.5 million.

PAP units are responsible for guarding party and state organizations and foreign embassies and consulates, as well as for responding to emergencies and maintaining law and order. Border defense units performed standard customs duties, such as inspecting vehicles and ships entering and leaving the country, and maintained surveillance against smugglers and drug traffickers. PAP firefighting units were responsible for fire-prevention education as well as for fighting fires. PAP units at every level worked in close cooperation with the armed forces and other public security organizations.

As of July 1, 2018, the China Coast Guard was transferred from civilian control of the State Council and the State Oceanic Administration, to the People's Armed Police, ultimately placing it under the command of the Central Military Commission.

In June 2018, the China Coast Guard was granted maritime rights and law enforcement akin civilian law enforcement agencies in order to carry out contrast of illegal activities, keep peace and order, as well as safeguarding security at sea, when performing duties related to the use of marine resources, protection of marine environment, regulation of fishery, and anti-smuggling.

Urban Administration and Law Enforcement Bureaus
Cities in China often have uniformed, but unarmed, urban management officers often referred to as "Chengguan" (lit: "City Management Officers") under the control of the municipal governments of each province. Chengguan are hired and employed by the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureaus of local governments. They are usual civil servants acting as parapolice and do have formal police or law enforcement powers. The agency is in charge with enforcement of urban management of the city. This includes enforcing local bylaws on city appearance, environmental, sanitation, work safety, pollution control and health. Additionally, their duties also involve enforcement of planning, greening, industry and commerce regulations, environment protection, municipal affairs and water in large cities.

Since the establishment of the Chengguan in 2001/2002, there have been numerous cases of Chengguan in cities across China using excessive violence and abuse of power. Numerous incidents have occurred over the years involving Chengguan seriously wounding innocents and even beating people to death in public. Chengguan are known to have a notorious reputation due to corruption and nepotism in their hiring, training and recruitment and is the source of much resentment among local Chinese. In recent years efforts have been made to ameliorate the tense relation between the Chengguan and the general public, with mixed results.

Police vehicles
Police cars in the mainland are white with a dark blue swoosh painted on the side such as BYD e6. China does not have a uniform fleet buying program so local departments typically buy from a variety of local dealerships. Volkswagen Santanas and Volkswagen Passats are the most common but other makes and models are present as well.

Hong Kong Police vehicles have been influenced by British and Chinese schemes and still today retain them. Police in Macau use generic European design patterns.

Historical background
However much the public security system may have been influenced by communist ideology and practice, it remained rooted directly in the traditional Chinese concept of governmental control through imposed collective responsibility. Even in the pre-imperial era, a system was proposed to organize the people into "groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each other's good behavior and share each other's punishments." The Qin (221-207 BCE) and Han (206 BCE-CE 220) dynasties made use of the concept, and the Song dynasty (960-1279) institutionalized it on a nationwide basis in the bao jia (tithing) system. It entailed the organization of family households into groups of ten, each unit being organized successively into a larger unit up to the county level of administration. Each family sent a representative to the monthly meeting of its unit, and each unit elected a leader to represent it at the next higher level. Since the head of each unit was responsible to the next higher level for the conduct of all members of his unit, the system served as an extension of the central government. Eventually, each group of families also was required to furnish men to serve in the militia. Bao jia, which alternately flourished or languished under later rulers and usually existed more in theory than in practice, was reinstituted during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911).

During the Qing period, the people's aversion to legalistic procedures and the rulers' preferences for socially and collectively imposed sanctions continued. Technically, the magistrate was to hear even minor criminal cases; but local elders and village leaders were allowed to handle most disputes, freeing the magistrate for more important work and saving the government expense. The people preferred to handle matters in this way, outside the intimidating court system.

Other practices for maintaining public order in China during the imperial era included the formation of mutual aid groups of farm households, which over time came to assume police functions. In a manner similar to twentieth-century means of ideological control, the Qing bureaucracy organized mass lectures that stressed the Confucian principle of obedience. Still another traditional form of policing was the appointment of censors to investigate corruption and misconduct up to the highest levels of government. Doing that job too well cost many censors their lives.

In 1932 Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) government reinstituted the bao jia system. In the KMT's revised bao jia system, in addition to the chief, there were two officers of importance within each 100-family unit. The population officer maintained the records and reported all births, deaths, marriages, moves, and unlawful activities to the district office. The bao jia troop commander headed a self-defense unit and was responsible for maintaining law and order. In rural China, however, the local village was generally a self-contained world, and the peasants remained aloof from distant and higher-ranking centers of authority.

The Japanese were introduced to the bao jia system on Taiwan when they assumed control of the island after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), and they found the system highly suitable for administering occupied areas. They instituted modified versions of it in north China after 1937. The Japanese imposed severe restrictions on the population, and the system aided in taking the census, restricting movement, and conducting spot checks. Each household had to affix a wooden tablet on the front door with the names of all inhabitants inscribed. Anyone missing or not on the list during an inspection by Japanese troops was assumed to be an insurgent. Since there were not as many Japanese troops in south China as in the north, the local leaders assisted the Japanese in administering the areas. They also disseminated propaganda at neighborhood meetings and established self-defense and youth corps.

The Communists were themselves products of Chinese society, and when they came to power in 1949 they liberally borrowed from these historical examples. They extensively organized the population and maintained the principles of mutual surveillance and mutual responsibility. They also retained the concept of self-defense forces. Communist control, however, exceeded that of bao jia or any other traditional system and extended into virtually every household. Under communist rule, the family was not considered an effective control mechanism. To achieve near-total control, a large number of administrative agencies and social organizations were established or adapted. Police forces resembling the Soviet police in organization, power, and activities were organized with the aid of Soviet advisers.

From 1949 to 1953, the newly established government of the People's Republic made use of the PLA, militia units made up of demobilized soldiers and other civilians, the police, and loyal citizens to put down resistance and establish order. Remnants of the Republic of China Armed Forces remained in pockets on the mainland, and communist efforts to enforce tax laws and agricultural rules provoked disturbances and riots. Extending responsibility for public order to include the police, military, and citizenry proved to be a highly effective arrangement, and the concept was written into the Common Program that preceded the 1954 state constitution.

The PLA and the militia continued to share responsibility for internal security and public order under the 1954 state constitution. The PLA's involvement in internal affairs was most extensive during the more turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Mao Zedong, perceiving that the public security cadres were protecting precisely the party leaders he wished to purge, directed youthful Red Guards to crush the police, courts, and procuratorates as well. The minister of public security, Luo Ruiqing (who concurrently served as the chief of Joint staff), was purged, soon followed by heads of the courts and procuratorates.

Initially, the military tried to remain uninvolved. But on Mao's orders, the PLA, which had once been told to support (actually to acquiesce to) the Red Guards, moved in to quell the chaos that Mao had inspired. The PLA gradually took over public security functions by establishing military control committees to replace the government bureaucracy. Revolutionary committees were set up as provincial-level and local administrative organs, usually with a PLA cadre in charge, and order gradually returned. By the summer of 1968 the Red Guards were being disbanded, and mass trials were used to punish and intimidate rioters.

With nineteen of China's twenty-nine provincial-level people's revolutionary committees headed by PLA commanders, the military again was in charge of administration and security throughout the country, but it badly needed help from experienced police officers. A policy of leniency toward most former officials evolved, and some public security cadres returned to work. The PLA also recruited inexperienced people to form auxiliary police units. These units were mass organizations with a variety of names reflecting their factional orientation. Perhaps the best known unit was the "Attack with Reason, Defend with Force Corps" named for the militant slogan of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. Public security forces were composed largely of non-professionals and lacked the disciplined informant networks and personnel dossiers previously used to maintain order.

Beginning in 1968, the authorities called upon the PLA to help remove millions of urban dwellers from the overcrowded cities and relocate them to the countryside and to transport cashiered officials to special cadre schools for indoctrination and labor. The migration to the country mostly involved students and other youths for whom there were not enough jobs or places in the school system within the cities. Yet despite the discontent these campaigns caused, reported crime declined after 1970. Increased concern over the threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 forced the PLA gradually to return to barracks, and control of the country reverted to the civilian leadership.

The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element. It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, discovering electronic listening devices in Mao's office and performing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the late 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four, but it reportedly was deactivated soon after that event.

The militia also participated in maintaining public order in the 1970s. Their involvement was especially evident in the 1973-76 period. In 1973 the Gang of Four, concerned over the transformation of the PLA into a more professional, less political, military force, took control of the urban militia from the PLA and placed it under local party committees loyal to them. For the next three years, the urban militia was used extensively to enforce radical political and social policies. It was the urban militia, along with the public security forces, that broke up the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square honoring the memory of Zhou Enlai in April 1976 — the event that served as the pretext for the second purge of Deng Xiaoping. At the time, in rural areas the militia was more under the control of the PLA.

Public security officials also made extensive use of the authority granted them to impose administrative sanctions by two sets of documents. These were the 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through Labor, which were reissued in 1979 with amendments, and the 1957 Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order, which were rescinded and replaced in 1986 by regulations of the same name. Offenders under the Regulations on Reeducation Through Labor might include "vagabonds, people who have no proper occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order." The police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to reeducation through labor with the approval of local labor-training administration committees. The 1957 regulations placed no limit on the length of sentences, but beginning in the early 1960s three or four years was the norm. The 1979 amended regulations, however, limited the length of reeducation through labor to three years with possible extension for extraordinary cases. The Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order empowered the police to admonish, fine, or detain people for up to fifteen days. Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confiscated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in the event injury had been caused.

History of grass-roots organizations
Neighborhood committees in the 1980s continued to be heavily involved in law enforcement and mediation of disputes at the local level. Among the enforcement procedures these committees used to influence both thought and behavior were criticism and collective responsibility.

Before the reform era, aspects of Chinese society also contributed to shaping the contemporary structure for maintaining public order. During the beginning of the 1980s economic reforms, urban and rural dwellers rarely changed their residences. Amid the sprawling cities, neighborhoods remained closeknit communities. For the 80 percent of the population that lived in the countryside, home and place of work were the same. With little physical mobility, most villagers stayed put for generations and knew each other intimately. In such close-knit environments, where everyone was likely to know everyone else and noticed most of what happened, mutual surveillance and peer pressure was extremely effective.

The structure of the public security system remained extensive in the 1980s, and the authority of its forces exceeded that of most police forces in the West. Nevertheless, public security agencies required and received the assistance of a wide-ranging network of grass-roots organizations to mobilize residents' responses to the government's call for observance of laws, lead the people in maintaining social order and public security, and settle disputes among residents.

In urban areas an average of 11 patrolmen were responsible for controlling an area containing 15,000 or more residents. A patrolman could not know all the people and their particular problems, and therefore needed and enlisted help. The local people's governments and congresses shared responsibility for public order but had no special personnel for the task. The armed forces were available, but they had other primary concerns and would be called out only in the most extreme circumstances.

To provide security beyond what could be provided by the police and to extend government control, a system of neighborhood or street committees had been established on a nationwide basis in 1954. The committees were charged with the responsibility of assisting the government in maintaining order. They usually controlled from 10,000 to 20,000 people and consisted of 3 to 7 full-time officials. In the late 1970s, the size and functions of neighborhood committees were expanded. The neighborhood committees were specifically responsible for maintaining public order and were accountable to the local people's congress.

Residents' committees and residents' "small groups," also established in 1954, were subordinate to neighborhood committees. These were the genuine grass-roots organizations, staffed by unpaid local residents elected by their neighbors. They directly involved the people in controlling their neighborhoods, and they reduced the demands on formal state institutions by maintaining surveillance for the public security forces and mediating most civil disputes and minor criminal cases for the judiciary. A residents' committee supervised from 100 to 600 families with a staff of 7 to 17 members, one from each subordinate residents' small group. A residents' small group controlled fifteen to forty households. The public security organization in the countryside was also pervasive. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, it was structured along military lines. The people's commune was the lowest level of government organization, with its administrative committee on a legal par with the local people's government in the urban areas. People's communes were subdivided into production brigades and production teams. Each team elected a people's public security committee, which sent a representative to the committee at the brigade level. Physical control was mostly the responsibility of the militia units organized at the team, brigade, and commune levels. In the winter of 1982-83 communes were replaced by township governments, and grass-roots committees were patterned after urban committees. These rural grass-roots committees were given legal status by the Draft Organic Regulations for Villagers' Committees approved by the National People's Congress in April 1987.

Residents' committees and small groups were staffed originally by housewives and retired persons but involved others as their functions expanded. Their pervasive presence made them a primary means for disseminating propaganda, and their grass-roots nature allowed for effective use of peer pressure in mediating disputes and controlling troublemakers. Perhaps 4 or 5 percent of the adult population exercised some authority in what Western experts have described as "participatory democracy in an extended form." The functional subunits, the residents' committees and residents' small groups, were particularly important in controlling the people.

People's mediation committees, guided and supervised jointly by the basic people's court and the public security station, performed an important function within the residents' committees. They settled minor disputes and disagreements using conciliation and peer pressure. Mediation committees were established originally in communist areas during the Chinese Civil War (1945–49) as a natural outgrowth of traditional preferences for local mediation of disputes. Upon taking over the major cities of China in 1949, the Communists were confronted with a tremendous backlog of judicial cases. Mediation committees provided a means of resolving disputes while actively propagandizing and involving the people in the new government. Beginning in 1954 mediation committees were set up in neighborhoods, stores, schools, enterprises, factories, and workshops in the cities and in the production brigades and teams in the countryside.

In the 1980s the five- to eleven-member people's mediation committees were elected by popular vote to two-year terms with the option of being reelected. Members served without pay and could be removed at any time by the electors for dereliction of duty. They were responsible for settling disputes, strengthening popular unity, promoting production and order, and conducting propaganda activities. Parties in dispute came voluntarily to the mediation committee; people seemed to feel they should try mediation before proceeding to a lawsuit. Mediators' duties ranged from acting as go-betweens for parties who refused to talk to one another to defining issues, deciding questions of fact, and issuing tentative or advisory decisions. Mediation committees also exerted strong political, economic, social, and moral pressures upon one or both parties to gain "voluntary" compliance with the decisions. In addition to mediation committees, other officials, police officers, party members, and work supervisors were expected to serve as mediators. Members of the residents' committees and small groups who were not members of the mediation committees were also involved in the mediation process.

title: Law enforcement in China