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Normandy landings

The Normandy landings were the landing operations and associated airborne operations on 6 June 1944 of the Allied invasion of Normandy in Operation Overlord during the Second World War. Codenamed Operation Neptune and often referred to as D-Day, it is the largest seaborne invasion in history. The operation began the liberation of France, and the rest of Western Europe, and laid the foundations of the Allied victory on the Western Front.

Planning for the operation began in 1943. In the months leading up to the invasion, the Allies conducted a substantial military deception, codenamed Operation Bodyguard, to mislead the Germans as to the date and location of the main Allied landings. The weather on the day selected for D-Day was not ideal, and the operation had to be delayed 24 hours; a further postponement would have meant a delay of at least two weeks, as the planners had requirements for the phase of the moon, the tides, and time of day, that meant only a few days each month were deemed suitable. Adolf Hitler placed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in command of German forces and developing fortifications along the Atlantic Wall in anticipation of an invasion. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt placed Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower in command of Allied forces.

The invasion began shortly after midnight on the morning of 6 June with extensive aerial and naval bombardment as well as an airborne assault—the landing of 24,000 American, British, and Canadian airborne troops. The early morning aerial assault was soon followed by Allied amphibious landings on the coast of France c. 06:30. The target 50 mi stretch of the Normandy coast was divided into five sectors: Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword. Strong winds blew the landing craft east of their intended positions, particularly at Utah and Omaha.

The men landed under heavy fire from gun emplacements overlooking the beaches, and the shore was mined and covered with obstacles such as wooden stakes, metal tripods, and barbed wire, making the work of the beach-clearing teams difficult and dangerous. Casualties were heaviest at Omaha, with its high cliffs. At Gold, Juno, and Sword, several fortified towns were cleared in house-to-house fighting, and two major gun emplacements at Gold were disabled using specialised tanks.

The Allies were able to establish beachheads at each of the five landing sites on the first day, but Carentan, Saint-Lô, and Bayeux remained in German hands. Caen, a major objective, was not captured until 21 July. Only two of the beaches (Juno and Gold) were linked on the first day, and all five beachheads were not connected until 12 June. German casualties on D-Day have been estimated at 4,000 to 9,000 men. Allied casualties were at least 10,000, with 4,414 confirmed dead.

Background
After the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin began pressing his new allies for the creation of a second front in western Europe. In late May 1942, the Soviet Union and the United States made a joint announcement that a "... full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." However, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill persuaded US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to postpone the promised invasion as, even with US help, the Allies did not have adequate forces for such an activity.

Instead of an immediate return to France, the western Allies staged offensives in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, where British troops were already stationed. By mid-1943, the campaign in North Africa had been won. The Allies then launched the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and subsequently invaded the Italian mainland in September the same year. By then, Soviet forces were on the offensive and had won a major victory at the Battle of Stalingrad. The decision to undertake a cross-channel invasion within the next year was taken at the Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943. Initial planning was constrained by the number of available landing craft, most of which were already committed in the Mediterranean and Pacific. At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill promised Stalin that they would open the long-delayed second front in May 1944.

The Allies considered four sites for the landings: Brittany, the Cotentin Peninsula, Normandy, and the Pas-de-Calais. As Brittany and Cotentin are peninsulas, it would have been possible for the Germans to cut off the Allied advance at a relatively narrow isthmus, so these sites were rejected. With the Pas-de-Calais being the closest point in continental Europe to Britain, the Germans considered it to be the most likely initial landing zone, so it was the most heavily fortified region. But it offered few opportunities for expansion, as the area is bounded by numerous rivers and canals, whereas, landings on a broad front in Normandy would permit simultaneous threats against the port of Cherbourg, coastal ports further west in Brittany, and an overland attack towards Paris and eventually into Germany. Normandy was hence chosen as the landing site. The most serious drawback of the Normandy coast—the lack of port facilities—would be overcome through the development of artificial Mulberry harbours. A series of modified tanks, nicknamed Hobart's Funnies, dealt with specific requirements expected for the Normandy Campaign such as mine clearing, demolishing bunkers, and mobile bridging.

The Allies planned to launch the invasion on 1 May 1944. The initial draft of the plan was accepted at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. General Bernard Montgomery was named commander of the 21st Army Group, which comprised all land forces involved in the invasion. On 31 December 1943, Eisenhower and Montgomery first saw the plan, which proposed amphibious landings by three divisions with two more divisions in support. The two generals insisted that the scale of the initial invasion be expanded to five divisions, with airborne descents by three additional divisions, to allow operations on a wider front and to hasten the capture of Cherbourg. The need to acquire or produce extra landing craft for the expanded operation meant that the invasion had to be delayed to June. Eventually, thirty-nine Allied divisions would be committed to the Battle of Normandy: twenty-two American, twelve British, three Canadian, one Polish, and one French, totalling over a million troops.

Operations
Operation Overlord was the name assigned to the establishment of a large-scale lodgement on the continent. The first phase, the amphibious invasion and establishment of a secure foothold, was codenamed Operation Neptune. To gain the air superiority needed to ensure a successful invasion, the Allies undertook a bombing campaign (codenamed Operation Pointblank) that targeted German aircraft production, fuel supplies, and airfields. Elaborate deceptions, codenamed Operation Bodyguard, were undertaken in the months leading up to the invasion to prevent the Germans from learning the timing and location of the invasion.

The landings were to be preceded by airborne operations near Caen on the eastern flank to secure the Orne River bridges and north of Carentan on the western flank. The Americans, assigned to land at Utah Beach and Omaha Beach, were to attempt to capture Carentan and Saint-Lô the first day, then cut off the Cotentin Peninsula and eventually capture the port facilities at Cherbourg. The British at Sword and Gold Beaches and the Canadians at Juno Beach would protect the US flank and attempt to establish airfields near Caen on the first day. (A sixth beach, code-named "Band", was considered to the east of the Orne). A secure lodgement would be established with all invading forces linked together, with an attempt to hold all territory north of the Avranches-Falaise line within the first three weeks. Montgomery envisaged a ninety-day battle, lasting until all Allied forces reached the River Seine.

Deception plans
Under the overall umbrella of Operation Bodyguard, the Allies conducted several subsidiary operations designed to mislead the Germans as to the date and location of the Allied landings. Operation Fortitude included Fortitude North, a misinformation campaign using fake radio traffic to lead the Germans into expecting an attack on Norway, and Fortitude South, a major deception involving the creation of a fictitious First United States Army Group under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, supposedly located in Kent and Sussex. Fortitude South was intended to deceive the Germans into believing that the main attack would take place at Calais. Genuine radio messages from 21st Army Group were first routed to Kent via landline and then broadcast, to give the Germans the impression that most of the Allied troops were stationed there. Patton was stationed in England until 6 July, thus continuing to deceive the Germans into believing a second attack would take place at Calais.

Many of the German radar stations on the French coast were destroyed in preparation for the landings. In addition, on the night before the invasion, a small group of Special Air Service operators deployed dummy paratroopers over Le Havre and Isigny. These dummies led the Germans to believe that an additional airborne landing had occurred. On that same night, in Operation Taxable, No. 617 Squadron RAF dropped strips of "window", metal foil that caused a radar return which was mistakenly interpreted by German radar operators as a naval convoy near Le Havre. The illusion was bolstered by a group of small vessels towing barrage balloons. A similar deception was undertaken near Boulogne-sur-Mer in the Pas de Calais area by No. 218 Squadron RAF in Operation Glimmer.

Weather
The invasion planners determined a set of conditions involving the phase of the moon, the tides, and the time of day that would be satisfactory on only a few days in each month. A full moon was desirable, as it would provide illumination for aircraft pilots and have the highest tides. The Allies wanted to schedule the landings for shortly before dawn, midway between low and high tide, with the tide coming in. This would improve the visibility of obstacles on the beach while minimising the amount of time the men would be exposed in the open. Eisenhower had tentatively selected 5 June as the date for the assault. However, on 4 June, conditions were unsuitable for a landing: high winds and heavy seas made it impossible to launch landing craft, and low clouds would prevent aircraft from finding their targets. The weather forecast that reported the storms was sent from a weather station on the western coast of Ireland.

Group Captain James Stagg of the Royal Air Force (RAF) met Eisenhower on the evening of 4June. He and his meteorological team predicted that the weather would improve enough for the invasion to proceed on 6 June. The next available dates with the required tidal conditions (but without the desirable full moon) would be two weeks later, from 18 to 20 June. Postponement of the invasion would have required recalling men and ships already in position to cross the English Channel and would have increased the chance that the invasion plans would be detected. After much discussion with the other senior commanders, Eisenhower decided that the invasion should go ahead on 6 June. A major storm battered the Normandy coast from 19 to 22 June, which would have made the beach landings impossible.

Allied control of the Atlantic meant German meteorologists had less information than the Allies on incoming weather patterns. As the Luftwaffe meteorological centre in Paris was predicting two weeks of stormy weather, many Wehrmacht commanders left their posts to attend war games in Rennes, and men in many units were given leave. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel returned to Germany for his wife's birthday and to petition Hitler for additional Panzer divisions.

German order of battle
Germany had at its disposal fifty divisions in France and the Low Countries, with another eighteen stationed in Denmark and Norway. Fifteen divisions were in the process of formation in Germany. Combat losses throughout the war, particularly on the Eastern Front, meant that the Germans no longer had a pool of able young men from which to draw. German soldiers were now on average six years older than their Allied counterparts. Many in the Normandy area were Ostlegionen (eastern legions)—conscripts and volunteers from Russia, Mongolia, and other areas of the Soviet Union. They were provided mainly with unreliable captured equipment and lacked motorised transport. Many German units were under strength.

In early 1944, the German Western Front (OB West) was significantly weakened by personnel and materiel transfers to the Eastern Front. During the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive (24 December 1943 – 17 April 1944), the German High Command was forced to transfer the entire II SS Panzer Corps from France, consisting of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, as well as the 349th Infantry Division, 507th Heavy Panzer Battalion and the 311th and 322nd StuG Assault Gun Brigades. All told, the German forces stationed in France were deprived of 45,827 troops and 363 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns.

The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler", 9th, 11th, 19th and 116th Panzer divisions, alongside the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", had only arrived in France in March–May 1944 for extensive refit after being badly damaged during the Dnieper-Carpathian operation. Seven of the eleven panzer or panzergrenadier divisions stationed in France were not fully operational or only partially mobile in early June 1944.

German Supreme commander: Adolf Hitler
 * Oberbefehlshaber West (Supreme Commander West; OB West): Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt
 * (Panzer Group West: General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg)
 * Army Group B: Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
 * 7th Army: Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann
 * LXXXIV Corps under General der Artillerie Erich Marcks

Cotentin Peninsula
Allied forces attacking Utah Beach faced the following German units stationed on the Cotentin Peninsula:
 * 709th Infanterie-Division Logo 1.svg 709th Static Infantry Division under Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben numbered 12,320 men, many of them Ostlegionen (non-German conscripts recruited from Soviet prisoners of war).
 * 729th Grenadier Regiment
 * 739th Grenadier Regiment
 * 919th Grenadier Regiment

Grandcamps Sector
Americans assaulting Omaha Beach faced the following troops:
 * 352nd Infanterie-Division logo.jpg 352nd Infantry Division under Generalleutnant Dietrich Kraiss, a full-strength unit of around 12,000 brought in by Rommel on 15 March and reinforced by two additional regiments.
 * 914th Grenadier Regiment
 * 915th Grenadier Regiment (as reserves)
 * 916th Grenadier Regiment
 * 726th Infantry Regiment (from 716th Infantry Division)
 * 352nd Artillery Regiment

Allied forces at Gold and Juno faced the following elements of the 352nd Infantry Division:
 * 914th Grenadier Regiment
 * 915th Grenadier Regiment
 * 916th Grenadier Regiment
 * 352nd Artillery Regiment

Forces around Caen
Allied forces attacking Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches faced the following German units:
 * 716th Infanterie-Division Logo.svg 716th Static Infantry Division under Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter. At 7,000 troops, the division was significantly understrength.
 * 736th Infantry Regiment
 * 1716th Artillery Regiment
 * 21st Panzer Division logo.svg 21st Panzer Division, (south of Caen) under Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger included 146 tanks and 50 assault guns, plus supporting infantry and artillery.
 * 100th Panzer Regiment (at Falaise under Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski; renamed 22nd Panzer Regiment in May 1944 to avoid confusion with 100th Panzer Battalion)
 * 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment(under Hans von Luck from April 1944)
 * 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment
 * 155th Panzer Artillery Regiment

Atlantic Wall

Alarmed by the raids on St Nazaire and Dieppe in 1942, Hitler had ordered the construction of fortifications all along the Atlantic coast, from Spain to Norway, to protect against an expected Allied invasion. He envisioned 15,000 emplacements manned by 300,000 troops, but shortages, particularly of concrete and manpower, meant that most of the strongpoints were never built. As it was expected to be the site of the invasion, the Pas de Calais was heavily defended. In the Normandy area, the best fortifications were concentrated at the port facilities at Cherbourg and Saint-Malo. Rommel was assigned to oversee the construction of further fortifications along the expected invasion front, which stretched from the Netherlands to Cherbourg, and was given command of the newly re-formed Army Group B, which included the 7th Army, the 15th Army, and the forces guarding the Netherlands. Reserves for this group included the 2nd, 21st, and 116th Panzer divisions.

Rommel believed that the Normandy coast could be a possible landing point for the invasion, so he ordered the construction of extensive defensive works along that shore. In addition to concrete gun emplacements at strategic points along the coast, he ordered wooden stakes, metal tripods, mines, and large anti-tank obstacles to be placed on the beaches to delay the approach of landing craft and impede the movement of tanks. Expecting the Allies to land at high tide so that the infantry would spend less time exposed on the beach, he ordered many of these obstacles to be placed at the high water mark. Tangles of barbed wire, booby traps, and the removal of ground cover made the approach hazardous for infantry. On Rommel's order, the number of mines along the coast was tripled. The Allied air offensive over Germany had crippled the Luftwaffe and established air supremacy over western Europe, so Rommel knew he could not expect effective air support. The Luftwaffe could muster only 815 aircraft over Normandy in comparison to the Allies' 9,543. Rommel arranged for booby-trapped stakes known as Rommelspargel (Rommel's asparagus) to be installed in meadows and fields to deter airborne landings.

German armaments minister Albert Speer notes in his 1969 autobiography that the German high command, concerned about the susceptibility of the airports and port facilities along the North Sea coast, held a conference on 6–8 June 1944 to discuss reinforcing defences in that area. Speer wrote:

"In Germany itself we scarcely had any troop units at our disposal. If the airports at Hamburg and Bremen could be taken by parachute units and the ports of these cities seized by small forces, invasion armies debarking from ships would, I feared, meet no resistance and would be occupying Berlin and all of Germany within a few days."

Armoured reserves
Rommel believed that Germany's best chance was to stop the invasion at the shore. He requested that the mobile reserves, especially tanks, be stationed as close to the coast as possible. Rundstedt, Geyr, and other senior commanders objected. They believed that the invasion could not be stopped on the beaches. Geyr argued for a conventional doctrine: keeping the Panzer formations concentrated in a central position around Paris and Rouen and deploying them only when the main Allied beachhead had been identified. He also noted that in the Italian Campaign, the armoured units stationed near the coast had been damaged by naval bombardment. Rommel's opinion was that because of Allied air supremacy, the large-scale movement of tanks would not be possible once the invasion was under way. Hitler made the final decision, which was to leave three Panzer divisions under Geyr's command and give Rommel operational control of three more as reserves. Hitler took personal control of four divisions as strategic reserves, not to be used without his direct orders.

Allied order of battle
Commander, SHAEF: General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Commander, 21st Army Group: General Bernard Montgomery

US zones
Commander, First Army: Lieutenant General Omar Bradley

The First Army contingent totalled approximately 73,000 men, including 15,600 from the airborne divisions.

 * Utah Beach
 * US VII Corps SSI.png VII Corps, commanded by Major General J. Lawton Collins
 * 4th Infantry Division SSI.svg 4th Infantry Division: Major General Raymond O. Barton
 * 82 Airborne Patch.svg 82nd Airborne Division: Major General Matthew Ridgway
 * 90th Infantry Division.patch.svg 90th Infantry Division: Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie
 * US 101st Airborne Division patch.svg 101st Airborne Division: Major General Maxwell D. Taylor

 * Omaha Beach
 * V Corps.svg V Corps, commanded by Major General Leonard T. Gerow, making up 34,250 men
 * US 1st Infantry Division SSI.svg 1st Infantry Division: Major General Clarence R. Huebner
 * 29th Infantry Division SSI.svg 29th Infantry Division: Major General Charles H. Gerhardt

British and Canadian zones
Commander, Second Army: Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey

Overall, the Second Army contingent consisted of 83,115 men, 61,715 of them British. The British and Commonwealth air and naval support units included a large number of personnel from Allied nations, including several RAF squadrons manned almost exclusively by overseas air crew. For example, the Australian contribution to the operation included a regular Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadron, nine Article XV squadrons, and hundreds of personnel posted to RAF units and RN warships. The RAF supplied two-thirds of the aircraft involved in the invasion.

 * Gold Beach
 * XXX Corps 1944-1945 shoulder flash.jpg XXX Corps (UK), commanded by Lieutenant General Gerard Bucknall
 * 50 inf div -vector.svg 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division: Major General Douglas Graham
 * reinforced with
 * 56th Independent Infantry Brigade.svg 56th Infantry Brigade
 * 8th armoured brigade.svg 8th Armoured Brigade
 * 47th (Royal Marine) Commando

 * Juno Beach

 * I Corps.svg British I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John Crocker
 * 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Patch (Modern Correct Pantone).svg 3rd Canadian Division: Major General Rod Keller

 * Sword Beach
 * British I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John Crocker
 * British 3rd Infantry Division2.svg 3rd Infantry Division: Major General Tom Rennie
 * UK 6th Airborne Division Patch.svg 6th Airborne Division (UK): Major General Richard Gale

79th Armoured Division: Major General Percy Hobart provided specialised armoured vehicles which supported the landings on all beaches in Second Army's sector.

Coordination with the French Resistance

Through the London-based État-major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior), the British Special Operations Executive orchestrated a campaign of sabotage to be implemented by the French Resistance. The Allies developed four plans for the Resistance to execute on D-Day and the following days:

 * Plan Vert was a 15-day operation to sabotage the rail system.
 * Plan Bleu dealt with destroying electrical facilities.
 * Plan Tortue was a delaying operation aimed at the enemy forces that would potentially reinforce Axis forces at Normandy.
 * Plan Violet dealt with cutting underground telephone and teleprinter cables.

The resistance was alerted to carry out these tasks by messages personnels transmitted by the BBC's French service from London. Several hundred of these messages, which might be snippets of poetry, quotations from literature, or random sentences, were regularly transmitted, masking the few that were actually significant. In the weeks preceding the landings, lists of messages and their meanings were distributed to resistance groups. An increase in radio activity on 5 June was correctly interpreted by German intelligence to mean that an invasion was imminent or underway. However, because of the barrage of previous false warnings and misinformation, most units ignored the warning.

A 1965 report from the Counter-insurgency Information Analysis Center details the results of the French Resistance's sabotage efforts: "In the southeast, 52 locomotives were destroyed on 6 June and the railway line cut in more than 500 places. Normandy was isolated as of 7 June."

Naval activity
Naval operations for the invasion were described by historian Correlli Barnett as a "never surpassed masterpiece of planning". In overall command was British Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who had served as Flag officer at Dover during the Dunkirk evacuation four years earlier. He had also been responsible for the naval planning of the invasion of North Africa in 1942, and one of the two fleets carrying troops for the invasion of Sicily the following year.

The invasion fleet, which was drawn from eight different navies, comprised 6,939 vessels: 1,213 warships, 4,126 landing craft of various types, 736 ancillary craft, and 864 merchant vessels. The majority of the fleet was supplied by the UK, which provided 892 warships and 3,261 landing craft. In total there were 195,700 naval personnel involved; of these 112,824 were from the Royal Navy with another 25,000 from the Merchant Navy; 52,889 were American; and 4,998 sailors from other allied countries. The invasion fleet was split into the Western Naval Task Force (under Admiral Alan G. Kirk) supporting the US sectors and the Eastern Naval Task Force (under Admiral Sir Philip Vian) in the British and Canadian sectors. Available to the fleet were five battleships, 20 cruisers, 65 destroyers, and two monitors. German ships in the area on D-Day included three torpedo boats, 29 fast attack craft, 36 R boats, and 36 minesweepers and patrol boats. The Germans also had several U-boats available, and all the approaches had been heavily mined.

Naval losses
At 05:10, four German torpedo boats reached the Eastern Task Force and launched fifteen torpedoes, sinking the Norwegian destroyer HNOMS Svenner (G03) off Sword Beach but missing the British battleships HMS Warspite (03) and HMS Ramillies (07). After attacking, the German vessels turned away and fled east into a smoke screen that had been laid by the RAF to shield the fleet from the long-range battery at Le Havre. Allied losses to mines included the American destroyer USS Corry (DD-463) off Utah and submarine chaser USS PC-1261, a 173-foot patrol craft.

Bombardment
Bombing of Normandy began around midnight with more than 2,200 British, Canadian, and US bombers attacking targets along the coast and further inland. The coastal bombing attack was largely ineffective at Omaha, because low cloud cover made the assigned targets difficult to see. Concerned about inflicting casualties on their own troops, many bombers delayed their attacks too long and failed to hit the beach defences. The Germans had 570 aircraft stationed in Normandy and the Low Countries on D-Day, and another 964 in Germany.

Minesweepers began clearing channels for the invasion fleet shortly after midnight and finished just after dawn without encountering the enemy. The Western Task Force included the battleships USS Arkansas (BB-33), USS Nevada (BB-36), and USS Texas (BB-35), plus eight cruisers, twenty-eight destroyers, and one monitor. The Eastern Task Force included the battleships HMS Ramillies (07) and HMS Warspite (03) and the monitor HMS Roberts (F40), twelve cruisers, and thirty-seven destroyers. Naval bombardment of areas behind the beach commenced at 05:45, while it was still dark, with the gunners switching to pre-assigned targets on the beach as soon as it was light enough to see, at 05:50. Since troops were scheduled to land at Utah and Omaha starting at 06:30 (an hour earlier than the British beaches), these areas received only about 40 minutes of naval bombardment before the assault troops began to land on the shore.

Airborne operations
The success of the amphibious landings depended on the establishment of a secure lodgement from which to expand the beachhead to allow the build-up of a well-supplied force capable of breaking out. The amphibious forces were especially vulnerable to strong enemy counter-attacks before the arrival of sufficient forces in the beachhead could be accomplished. To slow or eliminate the enemy's ability to organise and launch counter-attacks during this critical period, airborne operations were used to seize key objectives such as bridges, road crossings, and terrain features, particularly on the eastern and western flanks of the landing areas. The airborne landings some distance behind the beaches were also intended to ease the egress of the amphibious forces off the beaches, and in some cases to neutralise German coastal defence batteries and more quickly expand the area of the beachhead.

The US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were assigned to objectives west of Utah Beach, where they hoped to capture and control the few narrow causeways through terrain that had been intentionally flooded by the Germans. Reports from Allied intelligence in mid-May of the arrival of the German 91st Infantry Division meant the intended drop zones had to be shifted eastward and to the south. The British 6th Airborne Division, on the eastern flank, was assigned to capture intact the bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne, destroy five bridges over the Dives 6 mi to the east, and destroy the Merville Gun Battery overlooking Sword Beach. Free French paratroopers from the British SAS Brigade were assigned to objectives in Brittany from 5 June until August in Operations Dingson, Samwest, and Cooney.

BBC war correspondent Robert Barr described the scene as paratroopers prepared to board their aircraft:

"Their faces were darkened with cocoa; sheathed knives were strapped to their ankles; tommy guns strapped to their waists; bandoliers and hand grenades, coils of rope, pick handles, spades, rubber dinghies hung around them, and a few personal oddments, like the lad who was taking a newspaper to read on the plane ... There was an easy familiar touch about the way they were getting ready, as though they had done it often before. Well, yes, they had kitted up and climbed aboard often just like this—twenty, thirty, forty times some of them, but it had never been quite like this before. This was the first combat jump for every one of them."

United States
The US airborne landings began with the arrival of pathfinders at 00:15. Navigation was difficult because of a bank of thick cloud, and as a result, only one of the five paratrooper drop zones was accurately marked with radar signals and Aldis lamps. Paratroopers of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, numbering over 13,000 men, were delivered by Douglas C-47 Skytrains of the IX Troop Carrier Command. To avoid flying over the invasion fleet, the planes arrived from the west over the Cotentin Peninsula and exited over Utah Beach.

Paratroops from 101st Airborne were dropped beginning around 01:30, tasked with controlling the causeways behind Utah Beach and destroying road and rail bridges over the Douve River. The C-47s could not fly in a tight formation because of thick cloud cover, and many paratroopers were dropped far from their intended landing zones. Many planes came in so low that they were under fire from both flak and machine-gun fire. Some paratroopers were killed on impact when their parachutes did not have time to open, and others drowned in the flooded fields. Gathering together into fighting units was made difficult by a shortage of radios and by the bocage terrain, with its hedgerows, stone walls, and marshes. Some units did not arrive at their targets until afternoon, by which time several of the causeways had already been cleared by members of the 4th Infantry Division moving up from the beach.

Troops of the 82nd Airborne began arriving around 02:30, with the primary objective of capturing two bridges over the River Merderet and destroying two bridges over the Douve. On the east side of the river, 75 per cent of the paratroopers landed in or near their drop zone, and within two hours they captured the important crossroads at Sainte-Mère-Église (the first town liberated in the invasion) and began working to protect the western flank. Because of the failure of the pathfinders to accurately mark their drop zone, the two regiments dropped on the west side of the Merderet were extremely scattered, with only four per cent landing in the target area. Many landed in nearby swamps, with much loss of life. Paratroopers consolidated into small groups, usually a combination of men of various ranks from different units, and attempted to concentrate on nearby objectives. They captured but failed to hold the Merderet River bridge at La Fière, and fighting for the crossing continued for several days.

Reinforcements arrived by glider around 04:00 (Mission Chicago and Mission Detroit), and 21:00 (Mission Keokuk and Mission Elmira), bringing additional troops and heavy equipment. Like the paratroopers, many landed far from their drop zones. Even those that landed on target experienced difficulty, with heavy cargo such as Jeeps shifting during landing, crashing through the wooden fuselage, and in some cases crushing personnel on board.

After 24 hours, only 2,500 men of the 101st and 2,000 of the 82nd Airborne were under the control of their divisions, approximately a third of the force dropped. This wide dispersal had the effect of confusing the Germans and fragmenting their response. The 7th Army received notification of the parachute drops at 01:20, but Rundstedt did not initially believe that a major invasion was underway. The destruction of radar stations along the Normandy coast in the week before the invasion meant that the Germans did not detect the approaching fleet until 02:00.

British and Canadian
The first Allied action of D-Day was the capture of the Caen canal and Orne river bridges via a glider assault at 00:16 (since renamed Pegasus Bridge and Horsa Bridge). Both bridges were quickly captured intact, with light casualties by the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Regiment. They were then reinforced by members of the 5th Parachute Brigade and the 7th (Light Infantry) Parachute Battalion. The five bridges over the Dives were destroyed with minimal difficulty by the 3rd Parachute Brigade. Meanwhile, the pathfinders tasked with setting up radar beacons and lights for further paratroopers (scheduled to begin arriving at 00:50 to clear the landing zone north of Ranville) were blown off course and had to set up the navigation aids too far east. Many paratroopers, also blown too far east, landed far from their intended drop zones; some took hours or even days to be reunited with their units. Major General Richard Gale arrived in the third wave of gliders at 03:30, along with equipment, such as antitank guns and jeeps, and more troops to help secure the area from counter-attacks, which were initially staged only by troops in the immediate vicinity of the landings. At 02:00, the commander of the German 716th Infantry Division ordered Feuchtinger to move his 21st Panzer Division into position to counter-attack. However, as the division was part of the armoured reserve, Feuchtinger was obliged to seek clearance from OKW before he could commit his formation. Feuchtinger did not receive orders until nearly 09:00, but in the meantime on his own initiative he put together a battle group (including tanks) to fight the British forces east of the Orne.

Only 160 men out of the 600 members of the 9th Battalion tasked with eliminating the enemy battery at Merville arrived at the rendezvous point. Lieutenant Colonel Terence Otway, in charge of the operation, decided to proceed regardless, as the emplacement had to be destroyed by 06:00 to prevent it firing on the invasion fleet and the troops arriving on Sword Beach. In the Battle of Merville Gun Battery, Allied forces disabled the guns with plastic explosives at a cost of 75 casualties. The emplacement was found to contain 75 mm guns rather than the expected 150 mm heavy coastal artillery. Otway's remaining force withdrew with the assistance of a few members of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion.

With this action, the last of the D-Day goals of the British 6th Airborne Division was achieved. They were reinforced at 12:00 by commandos of the 1st Special Service Brigade, who landed on Sword Beach, and by the 6th Airlanding Brigade, who arrived in gliders at 21:00 in Operation Mallard.

Tanks
Some of the landing craft had been modified to provide close support fire, and self-propelled amphibious Duplex-Drive tanks (DD tanks), specially designed for the Normandy landings, were to land shortly before the infantry to provide covering fire. However, few arrived in advance of the infantry, and at Omaha many sank before reaching the shore. Other specialist tanks landed in the early waves to clear the beach defences.

Utah Beach
Utah Beach was in the area defended by two battalions of the 919th Grenadier Regiment. Members of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division were the first to land, arriving at 06:30. Their landing craft were pushed to the south by strong currents, and they found themselves about 2000 yd from their intended landing zone. This site turned out to be better, as there was only one strongpoint nearby rather than two, and bombers of IX Bomber Command had bombed the defences from lower than their prescribed altitude, inflicting considerable damage. In addition, the strong currents had washed ashore many of the underwater obstacles. The assistant commander of the 4th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the first senior officer ashore, made the decision to "start the war from right here," and ordered further landings to be re-routed.

The initial assault battalions were quickly followed by 28 DD tanks and several waves of engineer and demolition teams to remove beach obstacles and clear the area directly behind the beach of obstacles and mines. Gaps were blown in the sea wall to allow quicker access for troops and tanks. Combat teams began to exit the beach at around 09:00, with some infantry wading through the flooded fields rather than travelling on the single road. They skirmished throughout the day with elements of the 919th Grenadier Regiment, who were armed with antitank guns and rifles. The main strongpoint in the area and another 1300 yd to the south were disabled by noon. The 4th Infantry Division did not meet all of their D-Day objectives at Utah Beach, partly because they had arrived too far to the south, but they landed 21,000 troops at the cost of only 197 casualties.

Pointe du Hoc
Pointe du Hoc, a prominent headland situated between Utah and Omaha, was assigned to two hundred men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder. Their task was to scale the 30 m cliffs with grappling hooks, ropes, and ladders to destroy the coastal gun battery located at the top. The cliffs were defended by the German 352nd Infantry Division and French collaborators firing from above. Allied destroyers USS Satterlee (DD-626) and HMS Talybont (L18) provided fire support. After scaling the cliffs, the Rangers discovered that the guns had already been withdrawn. They located the weapons, unguarded but ready to use, in an orchard some 550 m south of the point, and disabled them with explosives.

The Rangers fended off numerous counter-attacks from the German 914th Grenadier Regiment. The men were isolated, and some were captured. By dawn on 7 June, Rudder had only 90 men able to fight. Relief did not arrive until 8 June, when members of the 743rd Tank Battalion and others arrived. By then, Rudder's men had run out of ammunition and were using captured German weapons. Several men were killed as a result, because the German weapons made a distinctive noise, and the men were mistaken for the enemy. By the end of the battle, the Rangers casualties were 135 dead and wounded, while German casualties were 50 killed and 40 captured. An unknown number of French collaborators were executed.

Omaha Beach

Omaha, the most heavily defended beach, was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division and 29th Infantry Division. They faced the 352nd Infantry Division rather than the expected single regiment. Strong currents forced many landing craft east of their intended position or caused them to be delayed. For fear of hitting the landing craft, US bombers delayed releasing their loads and as a result most of the beach obstacles at Omaha remained undamaged when the men came ashore. Many of the landing craft ran aground on sandbars, and the men had to wade 50–100m in water up to their necks while under fire to get to the beach. In spite of the rough seas, DD tanks of two companies of the 741st Tank Battalion were dropped 5000 yd from shore; however, 27 of the 32 flooded and sank, with the loss of 33 crew. Some tanks, disabled on the beach, continued to provide covering fire until their ammunition ran out or they were swamped by the rising tide.

Casualties were around 2,000, as the men were subjected to fire from the cliffs above. Problems clearing the beach of obstructions led to the beachmaster calling a halt to further landings of vehicles at 08:30. A group of destroyers arrived around this time to provide fire support so landings could resume. Exit from the beach was possible only via five heavily defended gullies, and by late morning barely 600 men had reached the higher ground. By noon, as the artillery fire took its toll and the Germans started to run out of ammunition, the Americans were able to clear some lanes on the beaches. They also started clearing the gullies of enemy defences so that vehicles could move off the beach. The tenuous beachhead was expanded over the following days, and the D-Day objectives for Omaha were accomplished by 9 June.

Gold Beach

The first landings on Gold Beach were set for 07:25 because of the differences in the tide between there and the US beaches. High winds made conditions difficult for the landing craft, and the amphibious DD tanks were released close to shore or directly on the beach instead of further out as planned. Three of the four guns in a large emplacement at the Longues-sur-Mer battery were disabled by direct hits from the cruisers HMS HMS Ajax (22) and HMS Argonaut (61) at 06:20. The fourth gun resumed firing intermittently in the afternoon, and its garrison surrendered on 7 June. Aerial attacks had failed to hit the Le Hamel strongpoint, which had its embrasure facing east to provide enfilade fire along the beach and had a thick concrete wall on the seaward side. Its 75 mm gun continued to do damage until 16:00, when an Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE) tank fired a large demolition charge into its rear entrance. A second casemated emplacement at La Rivière containing an 88 mm gun had been neutralised by a tank at 07:30.

Meanwhile, infantry began clearing the heavily fortified houses along the shore and advanced on targets further inland. The No. 47 (Royal Marine) Commando moved toward the small port at Port-en-Bessin and captured it the following day in the Battle of Port-en-Bessin. Company Sergeant Major Stanley Hollis received the only Victoria Cross awarded on D-Day for his actions including attacking two pillboxes at the Mont Fleury high point. On the western flank, the 1st Battalion, Royal Hampshire Regiment captured Arromanches (future site of Mulberry "B"), and contact was made on the eastern flank with the Canadian forces at Juno. Bayeux was not captured the first day because of stiff resistance from the 352nd Infantry Division. Allied casualties at Gold Beach are estimated at 1,000.

Juno Beach

The landing at Juno Beach was delayed because of choppy seas, and the men arrived ahead of their supporting armour, suffering many casualties while disembarking. Most of the offshore bombardment had missed the German defences. Several exits from the beach were created, but not without difficulty. At Mike Beach on the western flank, a large crater was filled using an abandoned AVRE tank and several rolls of fascine, which were then covered by a temporary bridge. The beach and nearby streets were clogged with traffic for most of the day, making it difficult to move inland.

Major German strongpoints with 75 mm guns, machine-gun nests, concrete fortifications, barbed wire, and mines were located at Courseulles-sur-Mer, St Aubin-sur-Mer, and Bernières-sur-Mer. The towns had to be cleared in house-to-house fighting. Soldiers on their way to Bény-sur-Mer, 3 mi inland, discovered that the road was well covered by machine gun emplacements that had to be outflanked before the advance could proceed. Elements of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade advanced to within sight of the Carpiquet airfield late in the afternoon, but by this time their supporting armour was low on ammunition so the Canadians dug in for the night. The airfield was not captured until a month later as the area became the scene of fierce fighting. By nightfall, the contiguous Juno and Gold beachheads covered an area 12 mi wide and 7 mi deep. Casualties at Juno were 961 men.

Sword Beach

On Sword Beach, 21 of 25 DD tanks of the first wave were successful in getting safely ashore to provide cover for the infantry, who began disembarking at 07:30. The beach was heavily mined and peppered with obstacles, making the work of the beach clearing teams difficult and dangerous. In the windy conditions, the tide came in more quickly than expected, so manoeuvring the armour was difficult. The beach quickly became congested. Brigadier Simon Fraser, 15th Lord Lovat and his 1st Special Service Brigade arrived in the second wave, piped ashore by Private Bill Millin, Lovat's personal piper. Members of No. 4 Commando moved through Ouistreham to attack from the rear a German gun battery on the shore. A concrete observation and control tower at this emplacement had to be bypassed and was not captured until several days later. French forces under Commander Philippe Kieffer (the first French soldiers to arrive in Normandy) attacked and cleared the heavily fortified strongpoint at the casino at Riva Bella, with the aid of one of the DD tanks.

The 'Morris' strongpoint near Colleville-sur-Orne was captured after about an hour of fighting. The nearby 'Hillman' strongpoint, headquarters of the 736th Infantry Regiment, was a large complex defensive work that had come through the morning's bombardment essentially undamaged. It was not captured until 20:15. The 2nd Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry began advancing to Caen on foot, coming within a few kilometres of the town, but had to withdraw due to lack of armour support. At 16:00, the 21st Panzer Division mounted a counter-attack between Sword and Juno and nearly succeeded in reaching the Channel. It met stiff resistance from the British 3rd Division and was soon recalled to assist in the area between Caen and Bayeux. Estimates of Allied casualties on Sword Beach are as high as 1,000.

Aftermath

The Normandy landings were the largest seaborne invasion in history, with nearly 5,000 landing and assault craft, 289 escort vessels, and 277 minesweepers participating. Nearly 160,000 troops crossed the English Channel on D-Day, with 875,000 men disembarking by the end of June. Allied casualties on the first day were at least 10,000, with 4,414 confirmed dead and the Germans had 4,000–9,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing, or captured). The Germans never achieved Hitler's stated aim of "throwing the Allies back into the sea" on D-Day or at any time thereafter.

The Allied invasion plans had demanded a rapid build-up of troops and the establishment of a secure bridgehead, which was achieved with fewer casualties than expected. The plan had also called for the capture of Carentan, Saint-Lô, Caen, and Bayeux on the first day, with all the beaches (other than Utah) linked with a front line 10 to 16 km from the beaches; none of these latter objectives were achieved. At Utah the 4th Division made significant progress inland, making a rendezvous with the airborne troops, and the British and Canadians were between four and seven miles inland (six to eleven kilometres). The five beachheads were not connected until 12 June, by which time the Allies held a front around 97 km long and 24 km deep. Caen, a major objective, was still in German hands at the end of D-Day and would not be completely captured until 21 July. The Germans had ordered French civilians other than those deemed essential to the war effort to leave potential combat zones in Normandy. Civilian casualties on D-Day and D+1 are estimated at 3,000.

The Allied victory in Normandy stemmed from several factors. German preparations along the Atlantic Wall were only partially finished; shortly before D-Day Rommel reported that construction was only 18 per cent complete in some areas as resources were diverted elsewhere. The deceptions undertaken in Operation Fortitude were successful, leaving the Germans obliged to defend a huge stretch of coastline. Rommel was in Berlin and the forecasted stormy weather meant that some other German commanders and troops were not present in Normandy. The Allies achieved and maintained air supremacy, which meant that the Germans were unable to make observations of the preparations underway in Britain and were unable to interfere via bomber attacks. Infrastructure for transport in France was severely disrupted by Allied bombers and the French Resistance, making it difficult for the Germans to bring up reinforcements and supplies. Some of the opening bombardment was off-target or not concentrated enough to have any impact, but the specialised armour worked well except on Omaha (where most of it had been lost at sea), providing close artillery support for the troops as they disembarked onto the beaches. Indecisiveness and an overly complicated command structure on the part of the German high command were also factors in the Allied success.

War memorials and tourism
At Omaha Beach, parts of the Mulberry harbour are still visible, and a few of the beach obstacles remain. A memorial to the US National Guard sits at the location of a former German strongpoint. Pointe du Hoc is little changed from 1944, with the terrain covered with bomb craters and most of the concrete bunkers still in place. The Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial is nearby, in Colleville-sur-Mer. A museum about the Utah landings is located at Sainte-Marie-du-Mont, and there is one dedicated to the activities of the US airmen at Sainte-Mère-Église. Two German military cemeteries are located nearby.

Pegasus Bridge, a target of the British 6th Airborne, was the site of some of the earliest action of the Normandy landings. The bridge was replaced in 1994 by one similar in appearance, and the original is housed on the grounds of a nearby museum complex. Sections of Mulberry HarbourB still sit in the sea at Arromanches, and the well-preserved Longues-sur-Mer battery is nearby. The Juno Beach Centre, opened in 2003, was funded by the Canadian federal and provincial governments, France, and Canadian veterans. The British Normandy Memorial above Gold Beach was designed by the architect Liam O'Connor and opened in 2021.

title: Normandy landings


text:
Talk:January 1

Please see WT:DOY to discuss the format of the 366 day-of-year pages, with text generated by Template:Day or Template:This_date_in_recent_years, etc.

Sources required
I am loathe to tag this article unduly, but not in agreement with its current condition. I have stated in comments above that birth and death dates can be verified through the sources in the articles on people listed, and need not be repeated here. But the section on events has no such backup for sources, and particularly when events of recent (or current) years (or decades) are concerned, there is a tendency for edits to be made without sources, appearing as unsubstantiated or contentious claims, and often requiring reversion or other correction. This correction then falls to the equally unsubstantiated knowledge and good faith of current editors, who may not challenge what they don't know to the contrary. That is backwards. Verification is a fundamental principle of WP, and that which has no source, and is not common knowledge (as in, "the unclouded sky is blue"), needs to be removed as unknown and possibly incorrect or misleading or unnotable. But it doesn't strike me as right, out of hand, to blank the events section in one stroke. I intend to start challenging certain entries on this basis, though, and proceeding gradually over time, and especially with regards to new entries. I invite all to contribute sources where they know of them, as I will. Each event should have at least one source unless there is an article on the event, in which case the article can be linked as with births and deaths. Feel free to comment if you disagree. I'd rather not start at all unless there is at least implicit consensus. Evensteven (talk) 19:39, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
 * The events section does not need sources per WP:DAYS. Each entry must link to an article that supports the claim.  Anything that does not have this type of support should be removed.  -- Mufka (u) (t) (c) 21:06, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Ah, I wasn't aware of that arrangement, but it makes sense. Thanks. Evensteven (talk) 06:48, 2 January 2015 (UTC)
 * And things have changed. Sources are now required.  It makes sense. Toddst1 (talk) 18:31, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Lithuania in 1362.
How could Lithuania make it in 1362 if Lithuania was pagan at the time? Or it was not meant as a Christian holiday? --Yomal Sidoroff-Biarmskii (talk) 21:32, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

Grand Duchy Lithuania 1362
>>January 1 became the official start of the year as follows: 1362 - Grand Duchy Lithuania, etc. Is there any reference on that fact? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mepfkartophelus (talk • contribs) 12:58, 18 January 2020 (UTC)
 * I don't understand what you are asking for? Could you please explain? If you want something added to the article, you need to provide a citation. Deb (talk) 15:21, 18 January 2020 (UTC)
 * I interpreted Mepf's question as a virtual tag on the Grand Duchy line.  There was no reference provided.   Yomal effectively challenged it above, as well.   In the spirit of the grand cleanup, I've removed it as an unsourced entry. Toddst1 (talk) 18:28, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Requested move 22 February 2022

 * The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: This is not the place to discuss WikiProject Days of the year basics. Toddst1 (talk) 06:49, 22 February 2022 (UTC)

– Why are all the date articles not have the ending? Jishiboka1 (talk) 02:36, 22 February 2022 (UTC)
 * January 1 → January 1st
 * January 2 → January 2nd
 * January 3 → January 3rd

 * Jishiboka1 has also requested the two above moves. They are very closely related so I'm directing the discussions here. PrimeHunter (talk) 03:32, 22 February 2022 (UTC)

 * Oppose – contrary to MOS:ORDINAL / MOS:BADDATE. — BarrelProof (talk) 03:30, 22 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Oppose per MOS:ORDINAL and MOS:BADDATE. Using cardinal numerals instead of ordinal numerals in dates have been a staple of Wikipedia's Manual of Style since as far as I remember. I have assumed because the use of the cardinal numerals in date stamps seems to be more common in reliable sources around the world. For example, take any article from CNN.com like this one and the date stamp when it was updated is in the cardinal numeral instead of the ordinal numeral. Any further proposal on this issue should be moved to Wikipedia talk:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers. Zzyzx11 (talk) 06:14, 22 February 2022 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Apology
I did not know these things, I will now read the guidelines before requesting any of these controversial topics. I deeply Apologize, please forgive me. Thanks! Jishiboka1 (talk) 01:57, 24 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Hey, there's absolutely no need to apologise, it can take a while to get to grips with such conventions. The best thing is to read, understand, contribute, even argue a different point of view. Kiwipete (talk) 06:28, 24 February 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 26 October 2023
Could you add Ali Maâloul, the Tunisian footballer his year of birth was 1990, to (Births)? and my source is: 102.11.121.209 (talk) 08:55, 26 October 2023 (UTC)
 * ✅ Thank you. Liu1126 (talk) 22:13, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

Incorrect information
Haruo Nakajima is incorrectly listed as having died in 1929, rather than being born. I can't seem to edit the page myself. 96.245.80.164 (talk) 04:11, 2 January 2024 (UTC)

 * Thanks, I've fixed the entry. Kiwipete (talk) 06:39, 2 January 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 31 January 2024
1500 – Portuguese explorer Pedro Álvares Cabral discovers the coast of Brazil.[12] not the correct date, he discovered and landed on Brazil on the April 22nd 1500, as referred on other articles / languages. Oliveira82 (talk) 09:07, 31 January 2024 (UTC)

— Urro[ talk ] [ edits ] 13:22, 31 January 2024 (UTC)
 * You appear to be correct and I've removed that entry. Deb (talk) 09:27, 31 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Deb -- Please ensure you close requests that have been responded to. (You probably know this and just forgot, which I get...) Thank you for carrying it out, though! :)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:January 1


text:
Operation Gambit

Operation Gambit was a part of Operation Neptune, the landing phase of the invasion of northern France (Operation Overlord) during the Second World War. Gambit involved two X class submarines (British midget submarines) marking the ends of the Anglo-Canadian invasion beaches. Using navigation lights and flags, the submarines indicated the western and eastern limits of Sword and Juno Beaches. X20 and X23 arrived in position on 4 June and due to the delay caused by bad weather, remained in position until 4:30 a.m. on 6 June (D-Day) when they surfaced, erected the navigational aids, an 18 ft telescopic mast with a light shining to seaward, a radio beacon and echo sounder, tapping out a message for the minelayers approaching Sword and Juno.

A similar operation had been offered to the US landing forces to mark their beaches but this was declined. The team of Captain Logan Scott-Bowden and Sergeant Bruce Ogden-Smith did investigate Omaha Beach for General Omar Bradley, returning with a sand sample. The submarines were at some risk of damage due to friendly fire and to avoid this, Lieutenant George Honour the captain of X23 flew a White Ensign of the size more normally used by capital ships.

title: Operation Gambit


text:
Classified information

Classified information is material that a government body deems to be sensitive information that must be protected. Access is restricted by law or regulation to particular groups of people with the necessary security clearance and need to know. Mishandling of the material can incur criminal penalties.

A formal security clearance is required to view or handle classified material. The clearance process requires a satisfactory background investigation. Documents and other information must be properly marked "by the author" with one of several (hierarchical) levels of sensitivity—e.g. restricted, confidential, secret, and top secret. The choice of level is based on an impact assessment; governments have their own criteria, including how to determine the classification of an information asset and rules on how to protect information classified at each level. This process often includes security clearances for personnel handling the information.

Some corporations and non-government organizations also assign levels of protection to their private information, either from a desire to protect trade secrets, or because of laws and regulations governing various matters such as personal privacy, sealed legal proceedings and the timing of financial information releases.

With the passage of time much classified information can become less sensitive, and may be declassified and made public. Since the late twentieth century there has been freedom of information legislation in some countries, whereby the public is deemed to have the right to all information that is not considered to be damaging if released. Sometimes documents are released with information still considered confidential obscured (redacted), as in the adjacent example.

The question exists among some political science and legal experts whether the definition of classified ought to be information that would cause injury to the cause of justice, human rights, etc., rather than information that would cause injury to the national interest; to distinguish when classifying information is in the collective best interest of a just society, or merely the best interest of a society acting unjustly to protect its people, government, or administrative officials from legitimate recourses consistent with a fair and just social contract.

Government classification
The purpose of classification is to protect information. Higher classifications protect information that might endanger national security. Classification formalises what constitutes a "state secret" and accords different levels of protection based on the expected damage the information might cause in the wrong hands.

However, classified information is frequently "leaked" to reporters by officials for political purposes. Several U.S. presidents have leaked sensitive information to influence public opinion.

Typical classification levels
Although the classification systems vary from country to country, most have levels corresponding to the following British definitions (from the highest level to lowest).

Top Secret (TS)
Top Secret is the highest level of classified information. Information is further compartmented so that specific access using a code word after top secret is a legal way to hide collective and important information. Such material would cause "exceptionally grave damage" to national security if made publicly available. Prior to 1942, the United Kingdom and other members of the British Empire used Most Secret, but this was later changed to match the United States' category name of Top Secret in order to simplify Allied interoperability.

The Washington Post reported in an investigation entitled "Top Secret America" that, as of 2010, "An estimated 854,000 people ... hold top-secret security clearances" in the United States.

Secret
Secret material would cause "serious damage" to national security if it were publicly available.

In the United States, operational "Secret" information can be marked with an additional "LimDis", to limit distribution.

Confidential
Confidential material would cause "damage" or be prejudicial to national security if publicly available.

Restricted
Restricted material would cause "undesirable effects" if publicly available. Some countries do not have such a classification in public sectors, such as commercial industries. Such a level is also known as "Private Information".

Official
Official (equivalent to US DOD classification FOUO – For Official Use Only) material forms the generality of government business, public service delivery and commercial activity. This includes a diverse range of information, of varying sensitivities, and with differing consequences resulting from compromise or loss. Official information must be secured against a threat model that is broadly similar to that faced by a large private company.

The Official Sensitive classification replaced the Restricted classification in April 2014 in the UK; Official indicates the previously used Unclassified marking.

Unclassified
Unclassified is technically not a classification level. Though this is a feature of some classification schemes, used for government documents that do not merit a particular classification or which have been declassified. This is because the information is low-impact, and therefore does not require any special protection, such as vetting of personnel.

A plethora of pseudo-classifications exist under this category.

Clearance
Clearance is a general classification, that comprises a variety of rules controlling the level of permission required to view some classified information, and how it must be stored, transmitted, and destroyed. Additionally, access is restricted on a "need to know" basis. Simply possessing a clearance does not automatically authorize the individual to view all material classified at that level or below that level. The individual must present a legitimate "need to know" in addition to the proper level of clearance.

Compartmented information
In addition to the general risk-based classification levels, additional compartmented constraints on access exist, such as (in the U.S.) Special Intelligence (SI), which protects intelligence sources and methods, No Foreign dissemination (NoForn), which restricts dissemination to U.S. nationals, and Originator Controlled dissemination (OrCon), which ensures that the originator can track possessors of the information. Information in these compartments is usually marked with specific keywords in addition to the classification level.

Government information about nuclear weapons often has an additional marking to show it contains such information (CNWDI).

International
When a government agency or group shares information between an agency or group of other country's government they will generally employ a special classification scheme that both parties have previously agreed to honour.

For example, the marking Atomal, is applied to U.S. Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data and United Kingdom Atomic information that has been released to NATO. Atomal information is marked COSMIC Top Secret Atomal (CTSA), NATO Secret Atomal (NSAT), or NATO Confidential Atomal (NCA). BALK and BOHEMIA are also used.

NATO classifications
For example, sensitive information shared amongst NATO allies has four levels of security classification; from most to least classified:
 * 1) COSMIC Top Secret (CTS)
 * 2) NATO Secret (NS)
 * 3) NATO Confidential (NC)
 * 4) NATO Restricted (NR)

 * ATOMAL: This designation is added to the NATO security classification when applicable. For example, COSMIC TOP SECRET ATOMAL (CTS-A). ATOMAL information applies to U.S. RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA or United Kingdom Atomic Information released to NATO.

A special case exists with regard to NATO Unclassified (NU) information. Documents with this marking are NATO property (copyright) and must not be made public without NATO permission.

COSMIC is an acronym for "Control of Secret Material in an International Command".

International organizations

 * The European Union has four levels: EU Top Secret, EU Secret, EU Confidential, EU Restricted. (Note that usually the French terms are used. )
 * Très Secret UE/EU Top Secret: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
 * Secret UE/EU Secret: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
 * Confidentiel UE/EU Confidential: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
 * Restreint UE/EU Restricted: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
 * Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, a European defence organisation, has three levels of classification: OCCAR Secret, OCCAR Confidential, and OCCAR Restricted.
 * ECIPS, the European Centre for Information Policy and Security, has four levels of Security Information, COSMIC (Top Secret), EC-Secret, EC-Confidential and EC-Committees.
 * The United Nations has two classification levels: Confidential and Strictly Confidential.

By country
Most countries employ some sort of classification system for certain government information. For example, in Canada, information that the U.S. would classify SBU (Sensitive but Unclassified) is called "protected" and further subcategorised into levels A, B, and C.

Australia
On 19 July 2011, the National Security (NS) classification marking scheme and the Non-National Security (NNS) classification marking scheme in Australia was unified into one structure.

As of 2018, the policy detailing how Australian government entities handle classified information is defined in the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF). The PSPF is published by the Attorney-General's Department and covers security governance, information security, personal security, and physical security. A security classification can be applied to the information itself or an asset that holds information e.g., a USB or laptop.

The Australian Government uses four security classifications: OFFICIAL: Sensitive, PROTECTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The relevant security classification is based on the likely damage resulting from compromise of the information’s confidentiality..

All other information from business operations and services requires a routine level of protection and is treated as OFFICIAL. Information that does not form part of official duty is treated as UNOFFICIAL.

OFFICIAL and UNOFFICIAL are not security classifications and are not mandatory markings.

Caveats are a warning that the information has special protections in addition to those indicated by the security classification of PROTECTED or higher (or in the case of the NATIONAL CABINET caveat, OFFICIAL: Sensitive or higher). Australia has four caveats:

Codewords are primarily used within the national security community. Each codeword identifies a special need-to-know compartment.
 * Codewords (sensitive compartmented information)
 * Foreign government markings
 * Special handling instructions
 * Releasability caveats

Foreign government markings are applied to information created by Australian agencies from foreign source information. Foreign government marking caveats require protection at least equivalent to that required by the foreign government providing the source information.

Special handling instructions are used to indicate particular precautions for information handling. They include:

 * EXCLUSIVE FOR (named person)
 * CABINET
 * NATIONAL CABINET

A releasability caveat restricts information based on citizenship. The three in use are:

 * Australian Eyes Only (AUSTEO)
 * Australian Government Access Only (AGAO)
 * Releasable To (REL).

Additionally, the PSPF outlines Information Management Markers (IMM) as a way for entities to identify information that is subject to non-security related restrictions on access and use. These are:

 * Legal privilege
 * Legislative secret
 * Personal privacy

Brazil
There are three levels of document classification under Brazilian Law No. 12.527, the Access to Information Act: ultrassecreto (top secret), secreto (secret) and reservado (restricted).

A top secret (ultrassecreto) government-issued document may be classified for a period of 25 years, which may be extended up to another 25 years. Thus, no document remains classified for more than 50 years. This is mandated by the 2011 Information Access Law (Lei de Acesso à Informação), a change from the previous rule, under which documents could have their classification time length renewed indefinitely, effectively shuttering state secrets from the public. The 2011 law applies retroactively to existing documents.

Background and hierarchy
The government of Canada employs two main types of sensitive information designation: Classified and Protected. The access and protection of both types of information is governed by the Security of Information Act, effective 24 December 2001, replacing the Official Secrets Act 1981. To access the information, a person must have the appropriate security clearance and the need to know.

In addition, the caveat "Canadian Eyes Only" is used to restrict access to Classified or Protected information only to Canadian citizens with the appropriate security clearance and need to know.

Special operational information
SOI is not a classification of data per se. It is defined under the Security of Information Act, and unauthorised release of such information constitutes a higher breach of trust, with a penalty of up to life imprisonment if the information is shared with a foreign entity or terrorist group.

SOIs include:
 * military operations in respect of a potential, imminent or present armed conflict
 * the identity of confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada
 * tools used for information gathering or intelligence
 * the object of a covert investigation, or a covert collection of information or intelligence
 * the identity of any person who is under covert surveillance
 * encryption and cryptographic systems
 * information or intelligence to, or received from, a foreign entity or terrorist group

Classified information
Classified information can be designated Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. These classifications are only used on matters of national interest.
 * Top Secret: applies when compromise might reasonably cause exceptionally grave injury to the national interest. The possible impact must be great, immediate and irreparable.
 * Secret: applies when compromise might reasonably cause serious injury to the national interest.
 * Confidential: disclosure might reasonably cause injury to the national interest.

Protected information
Protected information is not classified. It pertains to any sensitive information that does not relate to national security and cannot be disclosed under the access and privacy legislation because of the potential injury to particular public or private interests.
 * Protected C (Extremely Sensitive protected information): designates extremely sensitive information, which if compromised, could reasonably be expected to cause extremely grave injury outside the national interest. Examples include bankruptcy, identities of informants in criminal investigations, etc.
 * Protected B (Particularly Sensitive protected information): designates information that could cause severe injury or damage to the people or group involved if it was released. Examples include medical records, annual personnel performance reviews, income tax returns, etc.
 * Protected A (Low-Sensitive protected information): designates low sensitivity information that should not be disclosed to the public without authorization and could reasonably be expected to cause injury or embarrassment outside the national interest. Example of Protected A information include employee identification number, pay deposit banking information, etc.

Federal Cabinet (Queen's Privy Council for Canada) papers are either protected (e.g., overhead slides prepared to make presentations to Cabinet) or classified (e.g., draft legislation, certain memos).

People's Republic of China
The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (which is not operative in the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau) makes it a crime to release a state secret. Regulation and enforcement is carried out by the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets.

Under the 1989 "Law on Guarding State Secrets", state secrets are defined as those that concern:

 * 1) Major policy decisions on state affairs
 * 2) The building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces
 * 3) Diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign countries and those to be maintained as commitments to foreign countries
 * 4) National economic and social development
 * 5) Science and technology
 * 6) Activities for preserving state security and the investigation of criminal offences
 * 7) Any other matters classified as "state secrets" by the national State Secrets Bureau

Secrets can be classified into three categories:
 * Top Secret, defined as "vital state secrets whose disclosure would cause extremely serious harm to state security and national interests"
 * Highly Secret, defined as "important state secrets whose disclosure would cause serious harm to state security and national interests"
 * Secret, defined as "ordinary state secrets whose disclosure would cause harm to state security and national interests"

France
In France, classified information is defined by article 413-9 of the Penal Code. The three levels of military classification are
 * Très Secret Défense (Very Secret Defence): Information deemed extremely harmful to national defence, and relative to governmental priorities in national defence. No service or organisation can elaborate, process, stock, transfer, display or destroy information or protected supports classified at this level without authorization from the Prime Minister or the national secretary for National Defence. Partial or exhaustive reproduction is strictly forbidden.
 * Secret Défense (Secret Defence): Information deemed very harmful to national defence. Such information cannot be reproduced without authorisation from the emitting authority, except in exceptional emergencies.
 * Confidentiel Défense (Confidential Defence): Information deemed potentially harmful to national defence, or that could lead to uncovering some information classified at a higher level of security.

Less sensitive information is "protected". The levels are
 * Confidentiel personnels Officiers ("Confidential officers")
 * Confidentiel personnels Sous-Officiers ("Confidential non-commissioned officers")
 * Diffusion restreinte ("restricted information")
 * Diffusion restreinte administrateur ("administrative restricted information")
 * Non Protégé (unprotected)

A further caveat, spécial France (reserved France) restricts the document to French citizens (in its entirety or by extracts). This is not a classification level.

Declassification of documents can be done by the Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale (CCSDN), an independent authority. Transfer of classified information is done with double envelopes, the outer layer being plastified and numbered, and the inner in strong paper. Reception of the document involves examination of the physical integrity of the container and registration of the document. In foreign countries, the document must be transferred through specialised military mail or diplomatic bag. Transport is done by an authorised conveyor or habilitated person for mail under 20 kg. The letter must bear a seal mentioning "Par Valise Accompagnee-Sacoche". Once a year, ministers have an inventory of classified information and supports by competent authorities.

Once their usage period is expired, documents are transferred to archives, where they are either destroyed (by incineration, crushing, or overvoltage), or stored.

In case of unauthorized release of classified information, competent authorities are the Ministry of Interior, the 'Haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité ("high civil servant for defence and security") of the relevant ministry, and the General secretary for National Defence. Violation of such secrets is an offence punishable with seven years of imprisonment and a 100,000 euro fine; if the offence is committed by imprudence or negligence, the penalties are three years of imprisonment and a 45,000 euro fine.

Hong Kong
The Security Bureau is responsible for developing policies in regards to the protection and handling of confidential government information. In general, the system used in Hong Kong is very similar to the UK system, developed from the Colonial Hong Kong era.

Four classifications exists in Hong Kong, from highest to lowest in sensitivity:
 * Top Secret (絕對機密)
 * Secret (高度機密)
 * Confidential (機密)
 * Temporary Confidential (臨時保密)
 * Restricted (限閱文件/內部文件)
 * Restricted (staff) (限閱文件(人事))
 * Restricted (tender) (限閱文件 (投標))
 * Restricted (administration) (限閱文件 (行政))

Restricted documents are not classified per se, but only those who have a need to know will have access to such information, in accordance with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.

New Zealand
New Zealand uses the Restricted classification, which is lower than Confidential. People may be given access to Restricted information on the strength of an authorisation by their Head of department, without being subjected to the background vetting associated with Confidential, Secret and Top Secret clearances. New Zealand's security classifications and the national-harm requirements associated with their use are roughly similar to those of the United States.

In addition to national security classifications there are two additional security classifications, In Confidence and Sensitive, which are used to protect information of a policy and privacy nature. There are also a number of information markings used within ministries and departments of the government, to indicate, for example, that information should not be released outside the originating ministry.

Because of strict privacy requirements around personal information, personnel files are controlled in all parts of the public and private sectors. Information relating to the security vetting of an individual is usually classified at the In Confidence level.

Romania
In Romania, classified information is referred to as "state secrets" (secrete de stat) and is defined by the Penal Code as "documents and data that manifestly appear to have this status or have been declared or qualified as such by decision of Government". There are three levels of classification—Secret, Top Secret, and Top Secret of Particular Importance. The levels are set by the Romanian Intelligence Service and must be aligned with NATO regulations—in case of conflicting regulations, the latter are applied with priority. Dissemination of classified information to foreign agents or powers is punishable by up to life imprisonment, if such dissemination threatens Romania's national security.

Russia
In the Russian Federation, a state secret (Государственная тайна) is information protected by the state on its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational and investigative and other activities, dissemination of which could harm state security.

Sweden
The Swedish classification has been updated due to increased NATO/PfP cooperation. All classified defence documents will now have both a Swedish classification (Kvalificerat hemlig, Hemlig, Konfidentiell or Begränsat Hemlig), and an English classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Restricted). The term skyddad identitet, "protected identity", is used in the case of protection of a threatened person, basically implying "secret identity", accessible only to certain members of the police force and explicitly authorised officials.

Switzerland
At the federal level, classified information in Switzerland is assigned one of three levels, which are from lowest to highest: Internal, Confidential, Secret. Respectively, these are, in German, Intern, Vertraulich, Geheim; in French, Interne, Confidentiel, Secret; in Italian, Ad Uso Interno, Confidenziale, Segreto. As in other countries, the choice of classification depends on the potential impact that the unauthorised release of the classified document would have on Switzerland, the federal authorities or the authorities of a foreign government.

According to the Ordinance on the Protection of Federal Information, information is classified as Internal if its "disclosure to unauthorised persons may be disadvantageous to national interests." Information classified as Confidential could, if disclosed, compromise "the free formation of opinions and decision-making of the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council," jeopardise national monetary/economic policy, put the population at risk or adversely affect the operations of the Swiss Armed Forces. Finally, the unauthorised release of Secret information could seriously compromise the ability of either the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council to function or impede the ability of the Federal Government or the Armed Forces to act.

Turkey
According to the related regulations in Turkey, there are four levels of document classification: çok gizli (top secret), gizli (secret), özel (confidential) and hizmete özel (restricted). The fifth is tasnif dışı, which means unclassified.

United Kingdom

Until 2013, the United Kingdom used five levels of classification—from lowest to highest, they were: Protect, Restricted, Confidential, Secret and Top Secret (formerly Most Secret). The Cabinet Office provides guidance on how to protect information, including the security clearances required for personnel. Staff may be required to sign to confirm their understanding and acceptance of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989, although the Act applies regardless of signature. Protect is not in itself a security protective marking level (such as Restricted or greater), but is used to indicate information which should not be disclosed because, for instance, the document contains tax, national insurance, or other personal information.

Government documents without a classification may be marked as Unclassified or Not Protectively Marked.

This system was replaced by the Government Security Classifications Policy, which has a simpler model: Top Secret, Secret, and Official from April 2014. Official Sensitive is a security marking which may be followed by one of three authorised descriptors: Commercial, LocSen (location sensitive) or Personal. Secret and Top Secret may include a caveat such as UK Eyes Only.

Also useful is that scientific discoveries may be classified via the D-Notice system if they are deemed to have applications relevant to national security. These may later emerge when technology improves so for example the specialised processors and routing engines used in graphics cards are loosely based on top secret military chips designed for code breaking and image processing. They may or may not have safeguards built in to generate errors when specific tasks are attempted and this is invariably independent of the card's operating system.

United States
The U.S. classification system is currently established under Executive Order 13526 and has three levels of classification—Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The U.S. had a Restricted level during World War II but no longer does. U.S. regulations state that information received from other countries at the Restricted level should be handled as Confidential. A variety of markings are used for material that is not classified, but whose distribution is limited administratively or by other laws, e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO), or Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for the protection of information related to the design of nuclear weapons. The term "Restricted Data" is used to denote certain nuclear technology. Information about the storage, use or handling of nuclear material or weapons is marked "Formerly Restricted Data". These designations are used in addition to level markings (Confidential, Secret and Top Secret). Information protected by the Atomic Energy Act is protected by law and information classified under the Executive Order is protected by Executive privilege.

The U.S. government insists it is "not appropriate" for a court to question whether any document is legally classified. In the 1973 trial of Daniel Ellsberg for releasing the Pentagon Papers, the judge did not allow any testimony from Ellsberg, claiming it was "irrelevant", because the assigned classification could not be challenged. The charges against Ellsberg were ultimately dismissed after it was revealed that the government had broken the law in secretly breaking into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and in tapping his telephone without a warrant. Ellsberg insists that the legal situation in the U.S. in 2014 is worse than it was in 1973, and Edward Snowden could not get a fair trial. The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 might have given judges the authority to review such questions in camera, but the bill was not passed.

When a government agency acquires classified information through covert means, or designates a program as classified, the agency asserts "ownership" of that information and considers any public availability of it to be a violation of their ownership — even if the same information was acquired independently through "parallel reporting" by the press or others. For example, although the CIA drone program has been widely discussed in public since the early 2000s, and reporters personally observed and reported on drone missile strikes, the CIA still considers the very existence of the program to be classified in its entirety, and any public discussion of it technically constitutes exposure of classified information. "Parallel reporting" was an issue in determining what constitutes "classified" information during the Hillary Clinton email controversy when Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield noted, "When policy officials obtain information from open sources, 'think tanks,' experts, foreign government officials, or others, the fact that some of the information may also have been available through intelligence channels does not mean that the information is necessarily classified."

Corporate classification
Private corporations often require written confidentiality agreements and conduct background checks on candidates for sensitive positions. In the U.S., the Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits private employers from requiring lie detector tests, but there are a few exceptions. Policies dictating methods for marking and safeguarding company-sensitive information (e.g. "IBM Confidential") are common and some companies have more than one level. Such information is protected under trade secret laws. New product development teams are often sequestered and forbidden to share information about their efforts with un-cleared fellow employees, the original Apple Macintosh project being a famous example. Other activities, such as mergers and financial report preparation generally involve similar restrictions. However, corporate security generally lacks the elaborate hierarchical clearance and sensitivity structures and the harsh criminal sanctions that give government classification systems their particular tone.

Traffic Light Protocol
The Traffic Light Protocol was developed by the Group of Eight countries to enable the sharing of sensitive information between government agencies and corporations. This protocol has now been accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30 other countries. The protocol provides for four "information sharing levels" for the handling of sensitive information.

title: Classified information