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John Gabriel Stedman

John Gabriel Stedman (1744 – 7 March 1797) was a Dutch States Army officer and writer best known for writing The Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam (1796). This narrative covers describes his experience in Suriname between 1773 and 1777, where he was a soldier in a Dutch regiment deployed to assist colonial troops fighting against groups of Maroons. He first recorded his experiences in a personal diary that he later rewrote and expanded into the Narrative. The Narrative was a bestseller of the time and, with its firsthand depictions of slavery and other aspects of colonialism, became an important tool in the fledgling abolitionist movement. When compared with Stedman's personal diary, his published Narrative is a sanitized and romanticized version of Stedman's time in Surinam.

Early life
Stedman was born in 1744 in Dendermonde, then in the Austrian Netherlands, to Robert Stedman, a Scotsman and officer in the Dutch Republic's Scots Brigade, and his Franco-Dutch wife, Antoinetta Christina van Ceulen. He lived most of his childhood in the Dutch Republic with his parents, but also spent time with his uncle in Scotland. Stedman described his childhood as being "chock-full of misadventures and abrasive encounters of every description".

Military career
Stedman's military career began at the age of 16. His first commanded rank was ensign, under which he defended various Low Country outposts in the employment of the Dutch Stadthouder. His rank was later elevated to lieutenant. In 1771, Stedman reenlisted because of overwhelming debt after the death of his father.

Stedman left the Dutch Republic on 24 December 1772, after responding to a call for volunteers to serve in the West Indies. He was given the rank of Captain by way of a brevet, a temporary and honorary authorization for an officer to hold a higher rank. His corps comprised 800 volunteers to be sent to Surinam aboard the frigate Zeelust to assist local troops fighting against marauding bands of escaped slaves, known as Maroons, in the eastern region of the colony. The corps, which was trained for the battlefields of Europe, was unprepared for battle against the unfamiliar guerrilla tactics of its opponents.

After arriving in the colony, Stedman received orders from Colonel Fourgeoud, commander of the newly arrived troops. Fourgeoud was known for dining on gourmet meats, wine and other delicacies while his troops survived on meager and often spoiled rations. He treated Stedman cruelly, inventing tasks for him to complete and taking away his ammunition. Stedman believed that Fourgeoud neglected his duties as an officer, ignoring the well-being of his troops, and that he only retained his title through monetary bribes. Regarding Fourgeoud's poor leadership, Stedman was uncompromising: "I solemnly declare to have still omitted many other calamities that we suffered".

On 10 August 1775, shortly after falling ill in Surinam, Stedman wrote Colonel Fourgeoud a letter requesting both a furlough to regain health and six months' military pay that was owed him. Fourgeoud refused his request twice, although he granted similar requests to other officers. Stedman later wrote, "This so incensed me that I not only wished him in Hell, but myself also, to have the satisfaction of seeing him burn".

In addition to the 800 European soldiers, Stedman fought alongside the newly formed Free Negro Corps (FNC). The FNC, Black slaves purchased from their enslavers, were promised their freedom, a house with a garden plot and combat pay for service in action against the maroons. The FNC originally numbered 116 men, but 190 more were purchased and incorporated into the unit after the original group displayed courage and perseverance in action.

Stedman served in seven campaigns in the forests of Surinam, each averaging three months. He only engaged in one battle, which took place in 1774 and concluded with the capture of the village of Gado Saby. A portrayal of this battle can be seen in the frontispiece of Stedman's Narrative, which depicts Stedman standing over a dead slave in the foreground and a village burning in the distance.

Throughout these campaigns, ambushes occurred frequently and disease spread rapidly, resulting in an enormous loss of troops. These losses were so great that 830 additional European troops were sent from the Dutch Republic in 1775 to supplement the original 800. The campaigns were riddled with sickness, anger, fatigue, and death. Stedman observed the horrors of battle and the cat-and-mouse antics of both sides that resulted in merely pushing the battle across Surinam instead of quelling it.

Surinam

Surinam was first colonized by the governor of Barbados in the 1650s, then captured by the Dutch soon after, who quickly began to establish sugar plantations. In 1683 Surinam came under control of the Dutch West India Company. The colony developed an agricultural economy highly dependent on African slavery.

Two rivers were central to the colonies: the Orinoco and the Amazon. At the time of Stedman's deployment, the Portuguese lived along the river Amazon and the Spanish along the river Orinoco. Dutch colonists were spread along the seaside and the French lived in a small settlement known as Cayenne.

Stedman's Narrative
The Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam is an autobiographical account of Stedman's experiences in Surinam from the year 1773 through 1777. While Stedman kept a diary of his time in Surinam, which is held by the University of Minnesota Libraries, the Narrative manuscript wasn't composed until ten years after his return to Europe. In the Narrative manuscript, Stedman vividly describes the landscapes of Suriname, paying great attention to flora, fauna, and the social habits of indigenous, free and enslaved Africans, and European colonists in Suriname. His observations of life in the colony encompass the different cultures present at the time: Dutch, Scottish, native, African, Spanish, Portuguese, and French. Stedman also takes time to describe the day-to-day life in the colony.

The first pages of the Narrative record Stedman's voyage to Surinam. He spends his days reading on the deck of the Boreas, attempting to avoid those sick from the turbulent sea. The Boreas was accompanied by another ship the Weftellingwerf and three new frigate built transports. Stedman first arrives in Surinam on 2 February 1773. Upon his arrival in Surinam, Stedman and the troops are met by residents of the fortress Amsterdam, along the Surinam River. Here, Stedman gives his first description of the landscape of Surinam. According to Stedman, the land abounded with delicious smells – lemon, orange, and shaddocks. The natives, dressed in loincloths, were somewhat shocking to Stedman at first, and he described them as "bargemen as naked as when they were born."

Parts of the Narrative continue to focus on descriptions of Surinam's natural environments. Stedman writes that parts of Surinam are mountainous, dry, and barren, but much of the land is ripe and fertile, enjoying a year-long growing season, with rains and a warm climate. He notes that in some parts the land is low and marshy, and crops are grown with a "flooding" method of irrigation similar to that used in ancient Egypt. Stedman also describes Surinam as having large uncultivated areas; there are immense forests, mountains (some with valuable minerals), deep marsh, swamps, and even large savanna areas. Some areas of the coast are inaccessible, with navigational obstructions such as rocks, riverbanks, quicksand, and bogs.

In his Narrative, Stedman writes about the contrast between the beauty of the colony and his first taste of the violence and cruelty endemic there. One of his first observations involves the torture of a nearly naked enslaved woman, chained to an iron weight. His narrative describes the woman receiving 200 lashes and carrying the weight for a month as a result of her inability to fulfill a task to which she was assigned. Over the course of his Narrative, Stedman relays several stories regarding the state of the slaves and the horrors to which they are subjected. In one story detailed in his Narrative, involving a group sailing by boat, an enslaved mother was ordered by her mistress to hand over her crying baby. The mistress then threw the baby into the river, drowning it. The mother jumped into the river after her baby, whose body was recovered by fellow slaves. The mother later received 200 lashes for her defiant behavior. In another story, a small boy shoots himself in the head to escape flogging. In yet another, a man is completely broken on the rack and left for days to suffer until he died.

Publication history

Stedman's Narrative was published by Joseph Johnson, a radical figure who received criticism for the types of books he sold. In the 1790s, more than 50 percent of them were political, including Stedman's Narrative. The books he published supported the rights of slaves, Jews, women, prisoners and other oppressed peoples around the world. Johnson was an active member of the Society for Constitutional Information, an organization attempting to reform Parliament. He was condemned for the support and publication of writers who voiced liberal opinions, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine.

Stedman's Narrative became a major literary success. It was translated into French, German, Dutch, Italian, and Swedish, and was eventually published in more than twenty-five different editions, including several abolitionist tracts focused on Joanna. Stedman was highly acclaimed for his insights on the slave trade and his Narrative was embraced by the abolitionist cause. Paradoxically, it also became the handbook for counter-insurgency tactics in the tropics.

It took almost two centuries for a critical edition to be published. The unabridged critical edition, edited by Richard and Sally Price, was published in 1988. An abridged edition published in 1992 by Price and Price remains in print, as well as two editions published in 1962 and 1966 by the renowned antiquarian Stanbury Thompson. Of Thompson's 1962 and 1966 editions, Price and Price write, "Thompson's work confused as much as it elucidated. Examination of the original notebooks and papers that Thompson had used (which are now in the James Ford Bell Library at the University of Minnesota) revealed that, not only had he inserted his own commentary into that of Stedman...but he had changed dates and spellings, misread and incorrectly transcribed a large number of words". A facsimile edition of the 1988 unabridged critical edition of Stedman's original 1790 manuscript, edited by Richard and Sally Price, was published in 2010 by iUniverse and in 2016 by Open Road. This latter edition remains available.

Blake's illustrations
Stedman's Narrative associated him with some of Europe's foremost radicals. His publisher, Johnson, was imprisoned in 1797 for printing the political writings of Gilbert Wakefield. Johnson commissioned William Blake and Francesco Bartolozzi to create engravings for the Narrative. Blake engraved sixteen images for the book and delivered them in December 1792 and 1793, as well as a single plate in 1794. The images depict some of the horrific atrocities against slaves that Stedman witnessed, including hanging, lashing and other forms of torture. The Blake plates are more forceful than other illustrations in the book and have the "fluidity of line" and "hallucinatory quality of his original work". It is impossible to compare Stedman's sketches with the Blake plates because none of Stedman's original drawings have survived. Through their collaboration, Blake and Stedman became close friends. They visited one another often, and Blake later included some of his images from Stedman's Narrative in his poem "Visions of the Daughters of Albion".

Stedman the writer
As a writer, Stedman was intrigued by Surinam, a "New World" full of complexities that were both familiar and foreign. Torn between the roles of "incurable romantic" and scientific observer, Stedman attempted to maintain an objective distance from this strange new world, but was drawn in by its natural beauty and what he perceived as its exoticness.

Stedman made a daily effort to take notes on the spot, using any material in sight that could be written on, including ammunition cartridges and bleached bone. Stedman later transcribed the notes and strung them together in a small green notebook and ten sheets of paper covered front and back with writing. He intended to use these notes and journals to produce a book. Stedman also made a point to write clearly and distinguish truth from hearsay. He was diligent about facts and focused primarily on firsthand accounts of events.

On 15 June 1778, just a year after returning to the Netherlands from Surinam, Stedman began piecing together these notes and journals into what would ultimately become his Narrative. In 1787, Stedman began showing pieces of his journal to friends in an attempt to secure financial backing for the publication of the manuscript. He also attempted to gain potential subscribers in major cities throughout Europe. On 8 February 1791, Stedman sent the first edition of his newly completed manuscript, along with a list of 76 subscribers, to Johnson.

In 1786, Stedman wrote a series of retrospective journal entries recalling the events of his life up to the age of 28. In this diary, he portrayed himself in the style and tone of such fictional characters as Tom Jones and Roderick Random. He elaborated on his opposition to authority figures, which he also described during his time in Surinam, and on the sympathy he felt towards creatures and humans unnecessarily punished or tortured. In these entries, Stedman tells of occasions throughout his life when he interceded on the behalf of others to alleviate suffering. Stedman insisted that he did not describe the events of his life with the intention of gaining success or fortune. He explained that he wrote "purely following the dictates of nature, & equally hating a made up man and a made up story."

Discrepancies between published Narrative and personal diaries
Stedman wrote his Narrative ten years after the events took place. The Narrative sometimes deviates from the diary, but Stedman was careful to provide his sources and state firsthand observations as opposed to outside accounts. One of the main differences between the two works involves Stedman's representation of his relationship with Joanna. In the diary, he recounts numerous sexual encounters with enslaved women before he met Joanna, events which were removed from the Narrative. Stedman omitted a series of negotiations between himself and Joanna's mother, during which she offers to sell Joanna to him. Stedman also removes the early sexual encounters from the Narrative, and Joanna is represented as a romantic figure whom Stedman describes with sentimental and flowery language, as opposed to an enslaved girl who served his sexual and domestic needs. Mary Louise Pratt refers to these changes as a "romantic transformation of a particular form of colonial sexual exploitation".

Stedman and slavery

Stedman's attitude toward slaves and slavery has been the subject of scholarly debate. In spite of the abolitionist utility of the text, Stedman himself was far from an abolitionist. A defense of slavery runs throughout the text, emphasizing problems that would arise from sudden emancipation. In fact, Stedman believed that slavery was necessary in some form to continue allowing European nations to indulge their excessive desires for commodities such as tobacco and sugar.

Stedman's relationship with the slave Joanna further complicates his views toward slavery. Stedman described their relationship as one "of romantic love rather than filial servitude," although Joanna's feelings on the relationship are unknown.

The Narrative is also an ethnocentric text. Some critics argue that the book made Stedman seem like a much more consistent pro-slavery advocate than he intended. But Stedman's attitudes toward individual slaves did not coincide with his attitude toward the institution of slavery. His sympathy for the suffering slaves, expressed throughout the book, is consistently obfuscated by his opinion about slavery as an institution, which according to Werner Sollors was "complicated, its representation strongly affected by the revisions."

Sexual encounters
According to the editorial introduction to the Narrative, Stedman "larded his autobiographical sketch with amorous adventures." For example, as a young man growing up in Holland, Stedman had concurrent affairs with his landlord's wife and her maid until the landlady became jealous and evicted both Stedman and the maid simultaneously. Stedman details frequent sexual encounters with free and enslaved women of African descent in his travel diary, beginning on 9 February 1773, the night he arrived in Suriname's capital, Paramaribo. 9 February is recounted with the following entry: "Our troops were disembarked at Parramaribo...I get fudled [sic] at a tavern, go to sleep at Mr. Lolkens, who was in the country, I f—k one of his negro maids".

The personal journal that Stedman kept (and the sexual encounters mentioned therein) varies quite a bit from his published Narrative. The image-conscious Stedman, with a wife and children back in Europe, wanted to cultivate the impression of a gentleman rather than the serial adulterer he portrays in his diaries. Stedman's Narrative removes the depersonalized sex with women of color and replaces it with more detail regarding his relationship with Joanna. Price and Price summarize these changes as "While his diaries depicted a society in which depersonalized sex between European men and slave women was pervasive and routine, his 1790 manuscript transformed Suriname into the exotic setting for a deeply romantic and appropriately tragic love affair."

Joanna
Stedman first mentions Joanna by name in his journal on 11 April 1773 in relation to his negotiation with her mother for the purchasing of Joanna's sexual and domestic services: "J—, her Mother, and Q— mother come to a close bargain with me, we put it of for reasons I gave them." Stedman eventually negotiates an arrangement with Joanna's mother, which he indicates in this diary entry: "J—a comes to stay with me. I give her presents to the value of about ten Pound sterling and am perfectly happy." In the 1790 manuscript edition of Stedman's travel narrative, edited and expanded on from his travel diary, he praised the physical appearance of Joanna, "bespeaking the Goodness of her heart".

Throughout the Narrative, Stedman praises Joanna's character. He often describes instances of what he viewed as her loyalty and devotion to him through his absences and illnesses:

""She told me she had heard of my forlorn situation; and if I still entertained for her the same good opinion I had formerly expressed, her only request was that she might be permitted to wait upon me till I recovered. I gratefully accepted the offer; and by her unwearied care and attention, I had the good fortune to regain my health.""

In the nineteenth century, abolitionists circulated Stedman and Joanna's story, most notably in Lydia Maria Child's collection The Oasis in 1834. The first abridged edition of Stedman's Narrative to concentrate on Joanna's narrative was published in 1824, titled Joanna, or The Female Slave, a West Indian Tale. The anonymous compiler of the 1824 version writes in the preface that emancipation is "neither practicable or advisable" but advocates for "the abolition of cruelty". In 1838, Isaac Knapp, a Boston abolitionist and printer, published Narrative of Joanna; An Emancipated Slave, of Surinam. Knapp founded the New England Anti-Slavery Society in 1832 along with William Lloyd Garrison. Knapp and Garrison also co-founded the abolitionist newspaper, The Liberator in 1831. Like Lydia Maria Child's version of Stedman and Joanna's narrative included in the abolitionist collection The Oasis in 1834, Narrative of Joanna was circulated in a distinctly American abolitionist discourse.

Stedman and Joanna had a son, named Johnny. Johnny was eventually freed from slavery, but not Joanna. However, when Stedman returned to the Dutch Republic in June 1777, Joanna and their son stayed behind in Surinam. Stedman explained this by saying that Joanna refused to return with him:""She said, that if I soon returned to Europe, she must either be parted from me forever, or accompany me to a land where the inferiority of her condition must prove a great disadvantage to her benefactor and to herself; and in either of these cases, she should be most miserable.""

Shortly after his return to the Dutch Republic, Stedman married a Dutch woman, Adriana Wierts van Coehorn, and started a family with her. According to Stanbury Thompson's edition of Stedman's journals, Joanna died in 1782, after which their son migrated to Europe to live with Stedman and was educated at Blundell's School. Johnny later served as a midshipman in the Royal Navy and died at sea near Jamaica.

Stedman's family in Devon
Stedman's wife, Adriana, was the wealthy granddaughter of a well-known Dutch engineer. Together they settled in Tiverton, Devonshire, and had five children: Sophia Charlotte, Maria Joanna, George William, Adrian, and John Cambridge. Following the death of Joanna, Johnny joined their household. Adriana made no attempt to hide her feelings of resentment toward Johnny and Stedman often protected his son from her wrath. Stedman favored his first son and later wrote a journal almost entirely devoted to accounts of Johnny's adolescence. After Johnny's death, Stedman published a poem he wrote for his son, eulogizing their relationship. The last lines are as follows:

""Fly gentle shade, fly to that blest abode, There view thy mother – and adore thy God. There, O my boy!, on that celestial shore, O may we gladly meet, and part no more.""

Stedman's daughters were married to prosperous men of good families. His other sons joined the military. George William served as a lieutenant in the Royal Navy and died while attempting to board a Spanish ship off the coast of Cuba in 1803. Adrian fought in the First Anglo-Sikh War for which he was later honored after participating in the Battle of Aliwal against the Sikhs, and died at sea in 1849. John Cambridge served as captain of the 34th Light Infantry of the East India Company military and was killed in an attack on Rangoon in 1824.

Final years and death
Little is known about the final years of Stedman's life. The "Army List" continued to print his name until 1805, after he had been dead for eight years. On 5 July 1793, he was commissioned as a major in the second battalion of the Scots Brigade, and promoted to lieutenant-colonel on 3 May 1796. The title page of his book notes that he reached the rank of captain, via the brevet given at the start of his deployment in the West Indies. According to the Dictionary of National Biography, family tradition maintains that Stedman suffered a severe accident around 1796 which prevented him from commanding a regiment at Gibraltar. He retired to Tiverton, Devon. Instructions left by Stedman before his death requested that he be buried in the parish of Bickleigh next to self-styled gypsy king Bampfylde Moore Carew. He asked specifically to be interred at precisely midnight by torchlight. Stedman's final request was apparently not honored in full, as his grave lies in front of the vestry door, on the opposite side of the church from Carew.

Publications

 * John Gabriel Stedman (1988). Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam: Transcribed for the First Time from the Original 1790 Manuscript. Edited by Richard Price and Sally Price. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1963). Expedition to Surinam. Being the Narrative of a Five Years Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam in Guiana etc. Edited and abridged by Christopher Bryant. Folio Society, 1963.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1962). Journal of John Gabriel Stedman soldier and author. Edited by Stanbury Thompson. London, The Mitre Press, 1962.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1818), Viaggio al Surinam e nell'interno della Guiana ossia relazione di cinque anni di corse e di osservazioni fatte in questo interessante e poco conosciuto paese dal Capitano Stedman. Milano : Dalla tipografia di Giambattista Sonzogno, 1818.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1800), Capitain Johan Stedmans dagbok öfwer sina fälttåg i Surinam, jämte beskrifning om detta nybygges inwånare och öfriga märkwärdigheter. : Sammandrag. Stockholm : Tryckt i Kongl. Ordens Boktryckeriet hos Assessoren Johan Pfeiffer, År 1800.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1799–1800), Reize naar Surinamen, en door de binnenste gedeelten van Guiana; / door den Capitain John Gabriël Stedman. ; Met plaaten en kaarten. ; Naar het engelsch. Te Amsterdam : By Johannes Allart, 1799–1800.
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1797), Stedmans Nachrichten von Suriname, dem letzten Aufruhr der dortigen Negersclaven und ihrer Bezwingung in den Jahren 1772 bis 1777. Auszugsweise übersetzt von M. C. Sprengel. Halle : In der Rengerschen Buchhandlung, 1797
 * John Gabriel Stedman The Study of Astronomy, adapted to the capacities of youth
 * John Gabriel Stedman (1797), Stedmans Nachrichten von Suriname, dem letzten Aufruhr der dortigen Negersclaven und ihrer Bezwingung in den Jahren 1772 bis 1777. Auszugsweise übersetzt von M. C. Sprengel. Halle : In der Rengerschen Buchhandlung, 1797
 * John Gabriel Stedman The Study of Astronomy, adapted to the capacities of youth
 * John Gabriel Stedman The Study of Astronomy, adapted to the capacities of youth
 * John Gabriel Stedman The Study of Astronomy, adapted to the capacities of youth

title: John Gabriel Stedman


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Beam tilt

Beam tilt is used in radio to aim the main lobe of the vertical plane radiation pattern of an antenna below (or above) the horizontal plane.

The simplest way is mechanical beam tilt, where the antenna is physically mounted in such a manner as to lower the angle of the signal on one side. However, this also raises it on the other side, making it useful in only very limited situations.

More common is electrical beam tilt, where the phasing between antenna elements is tweaked to make the signal go down (usually) in all directions. This is extremely useful when the antenna is at a very high point, and the edge of the signal is likely to miss the target (broadcast audience, cellphone users, etc.) entirely.

With electrical tilting, front and back lobes tilt in the same direction. For example, an electrical downtilt will make both the front lobe and the back lobe tilt down. This is the property used in the above example where the signal is pointed down in all directions. On the contrary, mechanical downtilting will make the front lobe tilt down and the back lobe tilt up. In almost all practical cases, antennas are only tilted down – though tilting up is technically possible.

The use of purely electrical tilt with no mechanical tilt is an attractive choice for aesthetic reasons which are very important for operators seeking acceptance of integrated antennas in visible locations.

In GSM and UMTS cellular networks, mechanical tilt is almost always fixed whereas electrical tilt can be controlled using remote actuators and position sensors, thus reducing operating expenses. Remote electrical tilt is abbreviated as RET and it is part of the Antenna Interface Standards Group's open specification for the control interface of antenna devices.

Occasionally, mechanical and electrical tilt will be used together in order to create greater beam tilt in one direction than the other, mainly to accommodate unusual terrain. Along with null fill, beam tilt is the essential parameter controlling the focus of radio communications, and together they can create almost infinite combinations of 3-D radiation patterns for any situation.

Beam tilt optimization
Beam tilt optimization is a network optimization technique used in mobile networks aiming at controlling the inclination of the vertical tilt angle of the antenna in order to optimize a set of network performance indicators.

Different studies in beam tilt optimization focus on Coverage-Capacity Optimization (CCO), for which the goal is to control the beam tilt in order to jointly optimize the radio coverage and capacity in the network cells and reduce interference from neighbouring cells.

There exists mainly two types of approaches to beam tilt optimization:

 * 1) Rule-based algorithms: consist of optimization strategies based on domain knowledge and control theory, and mainly based on the optimization of utility metrics, or threshold-based policies employing Fuzzy Logic (FL) to model representative network performance indicators.
 * 2) Data-driven algorithms : consist of optimization strategies based on the use learning techniques based on the availability of network data (e.g. Contextual Bandit (CB) techniques), or by directly interacting with the environment (e.g. Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques )

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Beam tilt


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Knights and Knaves

Knights and Knaves is a type of logic puzzle where some characters can only answer questions truthfully, and others only falsely. The name was coined by Raymond Smullyan in his 1978 work What Is the Name of This Book?

The puzzles are set on a fictional island where all inhabitants are either knights, who always tell the truth, or knaves, who always lie. The puzzles involve a visitor to the island who meets small groups of inhabitants. Usually the aim is for the visitor to deduce the inhabitants' type from their statements, but some puzzles of this type ask for other facts to be deduced. The puzzle may also be to determine a yes–no question which the visitor can ask in order to discover a particular piece of information.

One of Smullyan's examples of this type of puzzle involves three inhabitants referred to as A, B and C. The visitor asks A what type he is, but does not hear A's answer. B then says "A said that he is a knave" and C says "Don't believe B; he is lying!" To solve the puzzle, note that no inhabitant can say that he is a knave. Therefore, B's statement must be untrue, so he is a knave, making C's statement true, so he is a knight. Since A's answer invariably would be "I'm a knight", it is not possible to determine whether A is a knight or knave from the information provided.

Maurice Kraitchik presents the same puzzle in the 1953 book Mathematical Recreations, where two groups on a remote island – the Arbus and the Bosnins – either lie or tell the truth, and respond to the same question as above.

In some variations, inhabitants may also be alternators, who alternate between lying and telling the truth, or normals, who can say whatever they want. A further complication is that the inhabitants may answer yes–no questions in their own language, and the visitor knows that "bal" and "da" mean "yes" and "no" but does not know which is which. These types of puzzles were a major inspiration for what has become known as "the hardest logic puzzle ever".

Examples
A large class of elementary logical puzzles can be solved using the laws of Boolean algebra and logic truth tables. Familiarity with Boolean algebra and its simplification process will help with understanding the following examples.

Alice and Bob are residents of the island of knights and knaves.

Both knaves
Alice says, "We are both knaves”.

In this case, Alice is a knave and Bob is a knight. Alice's statement cannot be true, because a knave admitting to being a knave would be the same as a liar telling the truth that "I am a liar", which is known as the liar paradox. Since Alice is a knave this means she must have been lying about them both being knaves, and so Bob is a knight.

Same or different kinds
Alice says, "We are the same kind," but Bob says, "We are of different kinds."

In this scenario they are making contradictory statements, so one must be a knight and one must be a knave. Since that is exactly what Bob said, Bob must be the knight, and Alice is the knave.

Identity alone
If all one wants to know is whether someone is a knight or a knave, this can be tested by simply asking a question to which the answer is already known. In the film The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser, a character solves the puzzle of whether a man is a knight or a knave by suggesting asking the man "whether he was a tree frog".

Fork in the road
This is perhaps the most famous rendition of this type of puzzle: "John and Bill are standing at a fork in the road. John is standing in front of the left road, and Bill is standing in front of the right road. One of them is a knight and the other a knave, but you don't know which. You also know that one road leads to Death, and the other leads to Freedom. By asking one yes–no question, can you determine the road to Freedom?" This version of the puzzle was further popularised by a scene in the 1986 fantasy film, Labyrinth, in which the protagonist finds herself faced with two doors with guardians who follow the rules of the puzzle. One door leads to the castle at the centre of the labyrinth, and one to certain death. It had also appeared some ten years previously, in a very similar form, in the Doctor Who story Pyramids of Mars. This version of the puzzle was also used in the episode "Jack Tales" of the 2nd season of the American animated TV series Samurai Jack. It was again used in 4th season of the Belgian reality TV show De Mol in 2016. There are several ways to find out which way leads to freedom. All can be determined by using Boolean algebra and a truth table.

In Labyrinth, the protagonist's solution is to ask one of the guards: "Would tell me that  door leads to the castle?" With this question, the knight will tell the truth about a lie, while the knave will tell a lie about the truth. Therefore, the given answer will always be the opposite of the correct answer to the question of whether the door leads to the castle.

Another posited solution is to ask either man if they would say that their own path leads to freedom. In this case, the idea is that the knave, rather than lying about a truthful answer, will be forced to lie about the lie he would tell (ie, answer with a double negative), thus both knight and knave will give the correct answer.

Goodman's 1931 variant
The philosopher Nelson Goodman anonymously published another version in the Boston Post issue of June 8, 1931, with nobles never lying and hunters never telling the truth. Three inhabitants A, B, C meet some day, and A says either "I am a noble" or "I am a hunter", we don't yet know which. Then B, in reply to a query, says "A said, 'I am a hunter'". After that, B says "C is a hunter". Then, C says "A is noble". Now the problem is, which is each, and why?

Since a hunter always lies, they cannot admit their own identity: therefore, A could not have admitted to being a hunter. This means that B must be a hunter, his allegation directed at C must be false, and therefore A and C must be nobles.

Goodman reports the puzzle came back to him from various directions, including a 1936 Warsaw Logicians' meeting via Carnap; some echo versions were corrupted by joining B two utterances into a single one, which make the puzzle unsolvable. Some years later, Goodman heard about the fork in the road variant; having scruples about counterfactuals, he devised a non-subjunctive, non-contrary-to-fact question that can be asked.

title: Knights and Knaves


text:
Talk:Knights and Knaves

Lying and truthtelling
As usually described, problems don't say what they mean. What is actually meant in a Knights and Knaves problem is that a knave negates the answer a knight would give, a la boolean logic. This is what makes asking about future questions work in those "one question" problems, because the knave is forced to double negate, meaning both the knight and the knave will give the same answer. It is most definitely possible to tell a lie that is not a negation of a true statement. I am the lying guard in the two paths/doors problem. if someone asks me "if i were to ask you if this path is correct, would you say yes?" and I give an answer of "I don't know", I have just told a lie. In fact it's an incredibly obvious lie, but it doesn't give the poor sap any information other than that i'm the liar. u mad, logician? u mad bro?74.211.60.216 (talk) 05:37, 13 June 2018 (UTC)

Tacos and Beer
Did anyone notice this rather strange edit? Haven't deleted it cause I'm wondering if this might be in some pop cultural joke reference that could be noted on this page. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.184.6.193 (talk) 20:35, 4 March 2013 (UTC)

 * It's just garbage. Herr Gruber (talk) 10:38, 9 March 2013 (UTC)

Smullyan's involvement and the 'Two Guards' puzzle
I'm not certain that Smullyan first did these, but he certainly does many of them. To my mind, the ancestor of these puzzles is the old story about the two guards on two doors, one with treasuer, one with a tiger, and one guard lies, one tells the truth, and you only have one question to ask. Does this old one have a specific name? Where does it originate? (it has a 1001 nights feel?) -- Tarquin 21:48 19 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Alternate solution to Question 2?
Regarding Question 2 - Without using any formal boolean algebra, a different solution came to me immediately - it appears to me that it could also be that both Bill and John are knaves (in this case, both Bill and John's statements are false, which is consistent with them both being knaves). Any problem with that solution? It seems a much simpler reasoning than the solution presented in section 1.5... Zoopee 09:09, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

 * I believe that's correct, they're both knaves, since they can't both be knights because of Bill's statement, they can't be a knave and a knight because then John's statement wouldn't be false, and they can't be a knight and a knave because then Bill's statement would be true. Which leaves us with two knaves. The solution to the puzzle isn't given in the article though, I think it was just meant as an example.--BigCow 21:18, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

 * yes, both of you are right, they are both knaves. I wrote the solution in the italian version but I can't write it in good english --Arirossa 20:55, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

 * On the other hand, if Bill is a knight and John is a knave, it works: Bill's statement that they are different is truthful, and, seeing as the requirements for John's statement to have meaning are unfulfilled, it could well be that he is lying and Bill's position has no bearing on John. The 2-knaves answer obviously works as well, so this has more than one answer.--68.100.78.205 20:06, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

 * I don't think that is correct. It doesn't work if Bill is a knight and John is a knave. The reason being, if John is a knave then the statement "If Bill is a knave, then John is a knight." is false. And when negated (assuming it is a conditional, not biconditional) it turns into "Bill is a knave and John is a knave." Thus if what John says is false, Bill can not be a knight. This is my math: (if not p, then q) = (p or q), so not(if not p, then q) = not(p or q) = not p and not q. --[I'm not a user] time: 11:52, September 23, 2007 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.12.147.8 (talk) 04:54, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

 * I have now edited the article to make it clearer why the situation doesnt work.Yarilo2 (talk) 01:28, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

 * I think Question 2 is unsolvable: Suppose Bill is a knave, then John is effectively saying that he is a knave. This is impossible, therefore Bill is a knight. This makes John's statement automatically true (P->Q is true if P is false), hence John is also a knight. But then John and Bill are not different, in contradiction to what Bill (who is a knight) says. Without Bill's statement, the question would be solvable (both are knights). 212.61.144.123 (talk) 09:09, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

 * I think you are confused by the boolean logic, Boolean logic states that if P->Q and !P (not P) then the STATEMENT "P->Q" is TRUE by if-part failure. HOWEVER, I think you are confused because you are thinking that this leads to John also being a knight, but this cannot be concluded because no light can be shed onto whether or not John can be a knight by his own statement. It is then that the solver must use Bill's statement as true because he can't (by logic) be a knave, and must be a knight. As his statement states taht he and John are different, it can only be that John is a knave since Bill is logically a knight. I hope this explains things some 97.101.32.93 (talk) 05:13, 17 June 2008 (UTC)

 * OK, let's go back to the Boolean algebra in the article then, if you don't believe my reasoning. There is a mistake in there, now that I have a good look at that. You will agree that !B->!J (John's statement, if we assume the definitions of B and J in the article) is equivalent in saying !(!B) | !J =  !J | B. Or, alternatively, it is !(J & !B), if we keep the ANDs (DeMorgan translates the one into the other). This is definitely not the same as !J & !B, with which the statement was translated in the puzzle. If you calculate with these changes, you will arrive at "Bill and John are both knights", just as I stated earlier (which, by the way, proves that my earlier reasoning was valid). Then remains the fact that Bill, being a knight, states that he and John are different, which appears to be not true - they are both knights. So unless you want to apply Bill's statement to some other unnamed feature of John and Bill, Bill is a knight who lies, contrary to the definition of a knight and the problem is therefore unsolvable. 212.61.144.123 (talk) 14:32, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

 * John didn't say "Bill is a knave and I am not a knight" (contrary to what the boolean algebra states).

 * If John is a knight then Bill can be neither a knight nor a knave (either would make Bills statement self-contradictory), yet if John is a knave Bill's statement is consistent no matter what he is. So John would have to be a knave or we would have a paradox.

 * Given that John is a knave and his statement was a logical implication, this means that one or more of the following is true:

 * (i) Bill and John can't both be knaves
 * (ii) Bill and John can't both be knights
 * (iii) John can't be a knave while Bill is a knight
 * (iv) John can be a knight while Bill is a knave

 * The first two are consistent with Bill being a knight but the third and fourth cause contradiction. As a result the only consistent scenario is with Bill as a knight and John as a knave, where his statement is false for accepting the inconsistent as possible.

 * I recommend changing the question to the one relevant to the boolean algebra example, else make an algebra example elsewhere as this particular problem is fairly ugly looking in it's algebraic form.
 * 82.4.230.85 (talk) 22:36, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

I think the correct answer to #2 is that it is impossible to determine who is a knight and who is a knave. Here is my proof:

The statement is "If Bill is Knight, then I am a Knight".

An "If...then" statement is false ONLY if the premise is true, but the conclusion is false. If both the premise and the conlcusion are false, the statement is true. If the premise is false and the conlcusion is true, the statement is true. If both the premise and conclusion are true, then the statement is true.

Applying this principle to the John's statement, the only way John's statement is a false is if Bill is a Knight, and John is a Knave. If both of them are Knaves, the statement is true. If both are Knights, the statement is true. If Bill is a Knave, and John is a Knight, the statement is true.

If they are both Knights, then John's statement is true, and it's therefore possible for John (as a Knight) to say it.

If Bill is a Knight and John is a Knave, then John's statement is false. It would be possible for John (as a Knave) to say it.

If Bill is a Knave and John is a Knight, then John's statement is true. It would be possible for for John (as a Knight) to say it.

If they are both Knaves, then John's statement is true. But it would not be possible for John (as a Knave) to say it.

So, the only combination we can exclude as a possibility is that both Bill and John are Knaves. Any other combination is possible.

Stoyen (talk) 22:46, 3 October 2008 (UTC)

Question 3
Answer to 3, in case someone can put it in boolean: John answers yes to the first question (if he answered no, he would have to be a knight and the logician would figure it out immediately) and yes to the second (if he answered no, the answer would remain unclear). He is a knave and Bill is a knight; allowing him to say no yes both times (since John and Bill are different, both yeses are untrue).--68.100.78.205 20:15, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

 * Well, Question 3 seems to be a trick question. I suspect it's just not worded such that it is very understandable. The Logician asks if both John and Bill are knights. John replies, either saying, "Yes," or saying, "No." In the case of the former, John is a knave as his assertion is impossible due to the nature of the puzzle. In the case of the latter, he is reaffirming one of the conditions of the puzzle. In this case, he would be telling the truth, and would thus be a knight.

 * From this we can see that in both cases, the Logician can identify the knight and the knave in the situation from his first question, contrary to what Question 3 states. I propose that Question 3 be reworded or removed.86.8.242.110 (talk) 15:37, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

 * Actually, it seems that the article doesn't state that John must either be a knight or a knave and Bill a knight if John is a knave or a knave if Bill is a knight. It seems I was mistaken. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.8.242.110 (talk) 16:46, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

It seems that the text by the answer to Question 3 is misplaced. Also, it is not possible for a knight or knave in this universum to change his mind - a statement is either true or false, so maybe the second line is false. From the first statement it can be inferred that John answered "yes"; a "No" would have proven that John is a knight and Bill is a knave. On the second question and assuming that John again answers either Yes or No, if John answers "Yes", then John is a knave and Bill is a knight, otherwise, the logician again has insufficient information. The third quistion is a dud; it is exactly the opposite of the second question, so you will get the same answers with Yes and No exchanged. 212.61.144.123 (talk) 14:56, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Question 4's answer
For 4: The answer is "Are you the sort of person who would say that Someplaceorother is to the left?" Nobody would claim to be a knave, so if they say yes, it is to the left, and if no, it is to the right. The second problem posed has nothing to do with the question: "Does 2+2=4?" would do, or any obvious equivalent. --68.100.78.205 20:19, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

 * The question presumes, but does not state, that the knave is incapable of giving the obvious false answer of "I Don't know." Since the problem presupposes both know the answer, any answer of "I Don't know" is provably false, and thus a valid choice for a Knave.  I am aware of no question that will gain information about which path to take that also precludes the answer of "I Don't know".  If the knave is asked a question that has a truth value that he does not know the answer to, then he is trapped in a paradox, because he can't say he doesn't know, but doesn't know enough to give an answer that is true or false.  The problem also does not state that either is under any obligation to obey any instruction to not answer "I don't know." 74.211.60.182 (talk) 16:47, 3 October 2016 (UTC)

 * I think the question to be to one of them could be: Would that other guy say that Someplace is to the left?

 * If you are asking the Knight, and Someplace is actually to the right, the Knight will answer YES. If you are asking the Knave and Someplace is actually to the right, the Knave will also say YES because we know that if the Knave were to speak the truth, he would say that the answer from another truth-teller would be NO.

 * If you are asking the Knight, and Someplace is actually to the left, the Knight will answer NO because he knows that the Knave would lie about the correct direction. If you are asking the Knave and Someplace is actually to the left, the Knave will also say NO because we know that if the Knave were to speak the truth, he would say that the answer from another truth-teller would be YES.  But he will lie and say NO.

 * Having received YES, the traveler knows that Someplace is actually to the right. If the traveler received NO, the correct direction would be to the left.

 * I'm reasonably sure that one of the premises of this quiz has to be that you cannot ask a question to which you already know the answer. So asking if 2+2=4 would fall out as improper.  I think that the second question would have to be: Would that other guy say you are a Knight?

 * If you are asking the Knight, he will answer NO since he knows the Knave will lie about him. If you are asking the Knave, he will respond YES because we know that if the Knave were to momentarily speak the truth, he would say that the answer from another truth-teller would be NO.  But he will lie and say YES.

 * As a result if you hear NO, you are speaking to the Knight. If you hear YES, you have asked the Knave instead.

 * Implicit in this is the assumption that the Knights and Knaves all know who each of them are. I think this article should state that more clearly as a premise.  Move over, I think that it should be made clear that you cannot ask a question to which you already know the answer.  That would defeat the whole point of the puzzle.  Dawgknot 21:42, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

 * In question 4, you can disregard one person completely to get the right path. "Does this path I'm pointing to lead to freedom being true, the same as you being a Knight?". In terms of Boolean equality, this holds true as follows: Let Q be the question, A and B being the two people, and L being the truth of the selected path leading to freedom. And hence we formulate the problem in terms of Boolean Equality as follows: Q ≡ A ≡ L ∧ A ≡ ￢B. From here, we already have a solution. Q ≡ (A ≡ L), which is the question stated above, where you take the path if the answer is Yes, or take the other path if the answer is No (That is, the truth value of the question Q). B can be completely disregarded, as it is unimportant in this scenario.
 * Let's do a case analysis too:
 * Case 1: Path is correct, and A is a Knight: A says YES (True ≡ True is True. Knight tells the truth and will agree).
 * Case 2: Path is wrong, and A is a Knight: A says NO. (False ≡ True is False. Knight tells the truth and will disagree).
 * Case 3: Path is correct, and A is a Knave: A says YES. (True ≡ False is False; Knave lies and will agree).
 * Case 4: Path is wrong, and A is a Knave: A says NO. (False ≡ False is True; Knave lies and will disagree).
 * And there you have it.
 * Regarding the next part of Question 4, I believe that stepping on the foot of the knight is cheating; you're just supposed to ask a question, and not do anything else. I personally would ask a question based on the premise that Q ≡ A ≡ (A ≡ True). That is, Question posed to A whether A is a Knight. Simplify this: Q ≡ (A ≡ A) ≡ True (Associativity of equivalence), then Q ≡ True ≡ True, and finally Q ≡ True. So just ask any question that the answer is already known, i.e. 1 + 1?, or "Am I asking you a question?, or "Is True 'True'?" (ha ha), or ask a logic puzzle :). 203.188.235.14 (talk) 06:28, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Solution to Question 1
Here is the text in the article after establishing that John is knave.

Since knaves lie, and one statement is true, the other statement must be false

Wouldn't it be clearer, given the construction of the Question, to say:

''Since knaves lie, then both statements cannot be true. Therefore, the other statement must be false''

Also, is it an unspoken assumption that the knights and the knaves know among themselves which is which? That is to say that John and Bill know the truth about each other? If so, perhaps that should be premised. Dawgknot 21:00, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

More popular culture references
I think there's an episode of Samurai Jack that features a version of this puzzle, but I can't recall which episode. B7T 20:11, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

 * Also used in The Book of Lost Things by John Connolly. cryptoboy (talk) 19:54, 17 January 2015 (UTC)
 * I realise these comments are from some years ago, but there's a long list of examples in which a puzzle like this is set on tvtropes.org. Aoeuidhtns (talk) 16:25, 18 April 2023 (UTC)

Boolean Equality
Has anyone ever heard of this here? It's a very good read in regards to the problem of the Knights and Knaves. 203.188.235.14 (talk) 14:41, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

Intro
An early example of this type of puzzle involves three inhabitants referred to as A, B and C. The visitor asks A what type he is, but does not hear A's answer. B then says "A said that he is a knave" and C says "Don't believe B: he is lying!" To solve the puzzle, note that no inhabitant can say that he is a knave. Therefore B's statement must be untrue, so he is a knave, making C's statement true, so he is a knight and A is a knight.

I don't know where this example comes from, but I don't think it's true. We can't make any conclusions about A in this puzzle, the statements of the other two work whether A is a knight or a knave.

99.241.128.44 (talk) 06:44, 11 February 2008 (UTC)Alex

 * The example comes from "What is the name of this book?" by Raymond Smullyan, an excellent book if you like these kind of puzzles. In this book, the answer correctly states that A's type cannot be determined. The answer has now been fixed, I see, but it is still not entirely correct. The fact that A did not say that he is a knave (because nobody can), does not mean that he said that he is a knight. We simply don't know what A said, other than that it is not what B stated. Which makes A's type truly undecided. 212.61.144.123 (talk) 15:32, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Also, there is no actual encyclopedic introduction to this puzzle. There is also no explanation of what "Knights and Knaves" literally refers to, and no explanation of the Knights DO and what the Knaves DO (knights "always tell the truth" while knaves "always lie" right?), which is obviously a crucial rule to include at the very beginning of the puzzle. —Preceding unsigned comment added by TurilCronburg (talk • contribs) 02:32, 22 October 2010 (UTC)

Question 1: fallacy?
Question one is really strange.

Look at this statement: "If John was a knight, he would not be able to say that he was a knave since he would be lying. Therefore the statement 'John is a knave' must be true."

Sentence one is right, but sentence one does not imply sentence two at all. If John was a knave, he would not be able to say that was a knave either, because he would be telling the truth. This contradicts with the fact that knaves always lie.

Also, although I'm not an expert on Boolean algebra, could an expert verify if the Boolean algebra performed is correct?

-- Freiddie 12:22, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

 * It is very subtle: There are not two statements "John is a knave" and "Bill is a knave". In that case you would indeed get a contradiction. There is a single statement: "John is a knave AND Bill is a knave". John as a knight could not say that, because the statement would be untrue (since John would not be a knave), hence John must be a knave. Then the statement "John is a knave and Bill is a knave" must be untrue. Since John is a knave, then Bill cannot also be a knave (then the statement would be true), so Bill is a knight, and the statement is untrue (because Bill is not a knave, although John is). 212.61.144.123 (talk) 09:26, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

 * Oh I see now. The "AND" operator is also being said, but it's not assumed. Okay, I get it now. Thank you. -- Freiddie 00:59, 5 June 2008 (UTC)  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Freiddie (talk • contribs)

 * I'm going to reword the question to remove the ambiguity; as it stands it is very unclear. bokkibear (talk) 12:15, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Solution for Question 2
The solution given for Question 2 is incorrect and the question itself is ugly and confusing. John didn't say "we are not of different kinds". John's asserting that the two person's states are dependent on each other, which is a higher level statement than simply "we are the same". Such a statement can be false simply because the dependency doesn't exist regardless of what states they actualy are.

This is my attempt at a 'solution': Purely based on Bill's statement, John can't be a knight because that would mean Bill is saying "I am a knave" which is paradoxical. Since John is a knave, Bill can be either a knight or a knave.

All we can know from John's statement being false is that one can be a knave (such as John) without the other also being a knave. The only way for John's statement to be provably false by itself would be if Bill were a knight, but as pleasing as this solution is it doesn't negate the possibility that Bill is a knave and that John's statement is false for other reasons such as admitting the possibilty of himself being a knave. He is of course a knave, but you can't be consistent while suggesting you might be lying.

Be careful with those implications; they make assertions about possibilities that in these puzzles don't exist.86.5.179.220 (talk) 03:07, 25 August 2011 (UTC)

At first I thought the second question was similar to the first and that Bill was a knight, but maybe this is not so. By the logic of the first question anyone who calls himself a knave is a knave (and always will be because they never trade places), so John is a knave by calling himself one, but Bill’s identity remains unknown because John does not declare Bill a knight or knave. This means Bill’s statement of being different offers no help. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.186.34.109 (talk) 21:45, 5 September 2011 (UTC)

Q''uestion 1: my thinking progress(realising my mistake) John and Bill are residents of the island of knights and knaves.

Question 1
John says: We are both knaves.

Who is what?

John's statement can't be true because nobody can admit to being a knave (see Liar paradox). Since John is a knave this means he must have been lying about them both being knaves, and so Bill is a knight...... However! after John admits being a knave we realise he can also tell the truth and since we are not told of anything that negates  the possibility of them both being knaves or knights (that is because John could have told truth about Bill being a knave just like a told the truth about himself being a knave) it is  possible for the other character (Bill) to be a knave as well.

The second writing was my thought but the simple fact that negates it is this: If john can only lie then it is not possible for him to admit be a person who only lies. Therefore the lie must be in the other part of his statement (which makes the entire statement a lie and then it doesn't matter that john told the truth about himself being a liar in the first part of the statement.) which says that bill is a liar. After writing this I thought: "then perhaps he is a knight (which can only tell the truth" But then I remembered that it is not possible for a knight to say he is a knave for that would be a lie.

All this mistake came after I read the riddle and it's answer and started thinking this: (this is only true if john uses two separate statements for this, the statements being: "I am a knave" and "the second character is a knave". That is because John already lies about himself being.

one could say it is a "smart ass" riddle since it's solution is only possible if you refer to the statements/the two parts of the same statement as one.

Yuval. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 46.116.154.228 (talk) 01:13, 18 January 2012 (UTC)

Labyrinth
The version in Labyrinth does have an issue as a riddle since one of the two guards actually explains the conditions to Sarah; that means he has to be the knight if the terms of the puzzle are accepted as true, so it's rather self-defeating. Accepting he's the knave would mean he was lying about the two being a knight and a knave. (It can also be assumed that the two lower heads are not knights or knaves since one says they don't know the answer and the other agrees with him). Herr Gruber (talk) 10:45, 9 March 2013 (UTC)

Problem with the second solution to 3
The "if I asked you would you say yes" example has the problem that it requires the knave to tell the truth, even though he can't do that. The most likely get-out would be he would negate the resulting answer again on the basis it was the true answer and he cannot tell the truth (or that in complex questions he need not lie about every aspect of the answer as long as his answer is a generally a lie), and say "no" if his door leads to freedom and "yes" if it does not; he would then be telling a lie about a lie about a lie.

The "would he tell me this was the correct door?" solution does not require this (it is not a complex question and the knave's answer in both cases is the actual opposite of the true answer), and therefore is a stronger solution to the problem. Herr Gruber (talk) 03:38, 5 December 2015 (UTC)

 * Firstly, I believe the "if I asked you would you say yes" solution to be stronger as it doesn't require that each person has knowledge of what the other would say, only what they themselves would say.
 * Secondly, I see no such issue with the knave saying he would say "yes" (when his path leads to freedom). You seem to be confusing the answer to the question "what would you answer?" with the answer to the question itself: He wouldn't be telling the truth if he says that he would say "yes" to a question to which he must actually say "no". The knave has no such freedom to, as you put it "negate the resulting answer again" and say that he wouldn't say "yes" as this would be the truth (the one thing the knave must not say) and this is evidenced by the fact that asking him if his path leads to freedom when it in fact does requires him to not respond "yes". Nbrader (talk) 21:25, 17 January 2016 (UTC)

 * The knave cannot tell the truth, but once you start asking complex questions you complicate how he is allowed to deal with that. It is up to him, not you, how he parses this and what he considers to be a lie. He can either only lie about one part of the complex question (since you were, after all, told you could ask one question, not one nested in another, so he can legitimately choose to only reply to part of your question since you're cheating) and say no when the answer is yes, directly lie about his response and truthfully identify the lie he would initially tell (he says yes because he would actually say no because the answer is yes, even though an even number of negations also means he's technically telling the truth), or lie about the lie about the lie and say no when the answer is yes (he says no because he would say yes, because he would say no because the answer is yes).

 * Perhaps the most powerful problem, though, is the assumption that the knave must truthfully identify his lie about his answer to a question he isn't asked to directly reply to. He could instead use the false premise that his original answer would have been the truth to address the complex question:

 * "If I were asked that question, I would lie about it and say no, because the answer is yes" -> "Therefore, I will pretext my reply on the falsehood that I would tell the truth about it, which I would not do, and use yes as my initial answer" -> "Therefore, I will give an answer that is the opposite of my false initial answer" -> "No."

 * The "what would he answer" example only requires that the knight and knave understand which one of the two they are and that the other is not that one, and only involves a legitimate simple one-part yes / no question. Since there is no way for the knight and knave to not know who they are, they can probably guess which the other is, even if we accept that they've somehow never done this to anyone else to observe the other's behaviour. Herr Gruber (talk) 10:53, 22 January 2016 (UTC)

 * You are arbitrarily introducing behavior that the knave has never before been stated to have (and which are incompatible with the statement "the knave only tells lies"): You assert "he can legitimately choose to only reply to part of your question since you're cheating" when nowhere in the original problem is this given. Furthermore, you've introduced a notion of 'complex question' that was also never mentioned and which I consider ill-defined. I have difficulty seeing how a question about what they themselves would answer is any more complex or "one nested in another" than a question about what the other person would answer. As such your argument is self-defeating.

 * If instead you follow the simple rule originally given- that a knave only tells lies and that a knight only tells truths -and understand that a truth is a truth regardless of it's subject matter and similarly a lie is a lie no matter what the lie is about, then the problem has a clear and well-defined resolution. Nbrader (talk) 22:53, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

 * Addendum: I'll put it this way (using bold to highlight similar parts): Do you agree that if X happens then "X happens" is the truth? It follows that if asking a person Q results in them responding 'Yes' then "asking a person Q results in them responding 'Yes'" is the truth. For example, if asking a person "Does your path lead to freedom?" results in them responding 'Yes' then "asking a person "Does your path lead to freedom?" results in them responding 'Yes'" is the truth.

 * Hence, if you ask a person "Would asking you "Does your path lead to freedom?" result in you responding 'Yes'?" results in them responding 'Yes' and asking them "Does your path lead to freedom?" results in them responding 'Yes' then the first respond was the truth.

 * On the other hand, if you ask a person "Would asking you "Does your path lead to freedom?" result in you responding 'Yes'?" results in them responding 'Yes' and asking them "Does your path lead to freedom?" results in them responding 'No' then the first respond was not the truth.

 * If a person is required to not tell the truth then they cannot respond in the former way (in the case where the path does in fact lead to freedom) as the first response was the truth, evidenced by the second response. If that same person must also answer either 'Yes' or 'No' to every question then they must answer in the latter way as it is the only permitted answer to give. Both of these conditions are imposed on knaves and therefore he answers in the latter way. The other response (to the question "Does your path lead to freedom?") in each case is determined by whether or not the path actually leads to freedom and each combination of knave and path results in a comparable situation to the one outlined above. Nbrader (talk) 23:27, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

 * Addendum 2: NB: Throughout this we assume that the knight and knave both have perfect knowledge about the things they are asked to avoid some legitimate philosophical problems. As soon as you break this assumption the term 'lie' becomes ambiguous as it may refer to contradicting reality or contradicting belief. Nbrader (talk) 23:45, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

 * The problem is you're trying to ask them a two part question: "If I asked you this, what would you say?" The knave doesn't have to tell the truth about what the answer to the first question would be, so he can answer with a lie about the truth rather than a lie about a lie. Since you're asking a conditional question, he can tell a conditional lie. It's a bad example, and it's also not the one most commonly used (Labyrinth, one of the most well-known uses of the knight and knave puzzle, uses "what would he say?" Herr Gruber (talk) 23:49, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

 * When asked the question "Would asking you "Does your path lead to freedom?" result in you responding 'Yes'?" you don't respond with two answers: You respond with one answer. It is a question like any other yes/no question, the responses of which having a simple method of verification: To ask the question "Does your path lead to freedom?" and compare the response with the one they said they'd give. That doesn't mean you must verify it or that you are even permitted to do so. It simply means that it has a well-defined truth-value. If he answers "Yes" when he would indeed answer "Yes" to the inner question then he is telling truth and so cannot be a knave. He is not, as you are suggesting, permitted to give such an answer if he is a knave. This is a stated assumption of the problem and I don't know how I can make it any clearer to you.

 * I'm familiar with the film "Labyrinth" and the solution it gives. Yes, this might give that solution some cultural importance but this in no way prevents it from being a needlessly complicated solution. Aside from requiring perfect knowledge of another persons mind, which I see as a bigger assumption than knowing one's own mind, but if indeed the question is "what would he say?" then that's even worse as it relies on the possible responses of "Yes" or "No" being interpreted not as agreement/rejection but as referring to the responses themselves. Compare and contrast: "Give a word with three letters!" (with possible responses including "Yes" and "Dog" as words) and "Are you a dog?" (with only the possible responses "Yes" and "No" as states of agreement).Nbrader (talk) 00:11, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * It isn't needlessly complex, it's a very simple solution based on a non-conditional question which is based on how a truth table works, and merely requires the knave to know he is not the knight and the knight to know he is not the knave. Since you yourself say they must have perfect knowledge or the puzzle falls apart, you can't cite this as a problem. Yours is instead a conditional question that requires the knave to behave in a very specific way which gives a non-conditional answer. The thing is, he can tell a series of lies (he is the knight, he would tell the truth, so he lies about the truth) which gives the opposite answer, which is a conditional untruth. You can't demand an answer less complex than your question is and expect it to actually work. Since "Would he say this door leads to freedom?" is not a conditional, it's reasonable to expect a simple answer to it. Herr Gruber (talk) 00:19, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * They must have perfect knowledge about whatever they are asked. This means that if you want a simpler situation, where the people involved don't require unlikely knowledge then it is your responsibility to ask a question that doesn't require it. That doesn't mean you aren't able to ask questions that entail that they have unlikely knowledge. There are even questions that can never exist in such a situation such as "Is your answer to this question a lie?".

 * I'm not sure what you mean by conditional truth. In what sense is one truth conditional and another not in your examples? You seem to be introducing at least one more value into your truth table other than 'True' and 'False' which you may label 'Conditionally True'. This is not the two-valued logic of which I'm making use.

 * Also, in your explanation of how your preferred solution is simpler, you made a tacit assumption that there is exactly one knight and one knave. This assumption is not required by my preferred solution. In this way and others, mine is simpler.Nbrader (talk) 00:46, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * How "unlikely" is it that the knight and knave, who stand next to each other and have presumably done this before, don't know what the other answers? You're creating a problem out of thin air here, there's no logical reason to think they don't understand how their puzzle works.

 * Your version is overcomplicated by the fact that the question is explicitly presented as a conditional: "assuming X, Y?" Since the knave can assume a false X, he can start from the basis that he is actually the knight. His statement is therefore false for an assumed value of X, and is therefore a conditional falsehood.

 * Also, the door puzzle is built on the assumption that one speaker is a knight and the other is a knave, that's not my "tacit assumption" at all. And how is your solution "simpler" when it requires over twice as much explanation? Herr Gruber (talk) 00:53, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * How unlikely? More unlikely than them knowing themselves. My problem with the Labyrinth solution is not that it doesn't work, but that it relies on more than it has to and this makes it harder to grasp and utilize.

 * The Labyrinth solution assumes the exact same thing implicitly. It shouldn't be counted against my solution that it has been stated more explicitly. I could easily state it as implicitly as you have done in your solution: "What would you say?".

 * The assumption was tacit in this conversation till I mentioned it (which was the only reason I said it was tacit).

 * Don't make the mistake of thinking my solution more complicated simply because I try harder to explain things in detail than you do.Nbrader (talk) 01:07, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * It's not unlikely at all, though. There's nothing improbable about two guys who stand near each other as part of their job knowing who the other person actually is and what they do, I'm not sure why you regard that as some vast leap of faith rather than something that would basically have to be true unless they'd been parachuted in there five minutes beforehand with a note saying which door was which.

 * The solution in Labyrinth is phrased as a simple question, which means it can be expected to receive a simple answer. You're using a conditional and expecting to still receive a simple answer, which is a weaker solution.

 * The actual biggest problem with 3 in fiction is usually the doorkeepers explain the puzzle, often alternating in a way that means the knave has to be telling the truth (Labyrinth, notably, actually gets this right since the one who explains the puzzle is the knight if it's assumed Sarah went through the door that was not certain death and the lower heads aren't knights or knaves). This means that you could easily beat most instances of this puzzle just by directing your question at the one who explained it since either he is the knight or there is no reason to believe any of the rules you were just told apply. Herr Gruber (talk) 01:12, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * All I meant by 'more unlikely' is relying on more assumptions because every time you make a new assumption, it presents an additional opportunity for at least one assumption to fail. Though all assumptions may hold for this puzzle, the answer given is less likely to work on similar puzzles.

 * In the film, she says "Answer yes or no. Would he tell me that this door leads to the castle?". How is this any less 'conditional' (as you put it) than my question: "Would asking you "Does your path lead to freedom?" result in you responding 'Yes'?"? If anything, her question allows misleading answers such as answering "No" because he assumes you never actually asked the question in your hypothetical scenario (she only asked if he would answer, not that she asked). I stated my question as I did to try and avoid that kind of ambiguity. If you like I can restate it like hers: "Would you say that your path leads to freedom?"

 * You're wrong about the film being consistent with regards to the knight/knave explaining the puzzle too: The knight agrees with the knave that you can only ask one of them. The knight can never agree with the knave in a knights and knaves puzzle.

 * I'd like to have acknowledgement that my solution is indeed a solution. I personally prefer my solution as it still works in a similar puzzle without there necessarily being 1 knight and 1 knave and without them having to know anything about each other. Nbrader (talk) 13:14, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

 * But the solution is to an example where there is necessarily one knight and one knave (that's in the description), so it just adds a layer of pointless complexity and more ways to get out of it since you overstate the question to the point it's an explicit conditional question which could reasonably be given a conditional answer. Sarah does not ask an if-then question, she just asks what the other guard would say. This provides a lot less space for bullshitting because it's a much simpler way to state the question and so leaves fewer ways to work around it by creative interpretation. Sure, you still have "no, he wouldn't tell you" rather than "no, it's the wrong door," (though you could assume they'll both give you charitable answers if you're not obviously trying to cheat around the "one question only" rule) but your example is like an RPG genie wish where it has seven hundred different conditions attached to it to try to stop the GM giving you a cloak of giant strength that currently has a giant in it or that you lose immediately after getting or that belongs to someone else, and it still doesn't stop him doing it.

 * And if you asked the knight and knave "would you say your path leads to freedom" you're not going to get anywhere, because to that question the knave would give the opposite answer to the knight. You have to have the truth about a lie / lie about the truth to make sure the answer you get is always false, since you can't get a true answer out of the knave, so it needs to be what the other one would say.

 * The knave does make a statement which is partially false ("you can't ask us, you can only ask one of us" is a contradiction, and so cannot be completely true), though I do admit I forgot that line. Herr Gruber (talk) 14:37, 3 February 2016 (UTC)
 * Being explicit might make the sentence harder to parse but you shouldn't confuse that with logical complexity: A poorly defined question introduces huge complexity.

 * In the non-Labyrinth question you get a lie about a lie or a truth about a truth, resulting in yes if the door of the person you ask leads to freedom (regardless of whether knight/knave). So it does still work, contrary to what you thought. The knave does not give the opposite answer to the knight in either of the two suggested solutions. They don't have to answer the question differently because the same question asked to a different person is then about a different subject, resulting in a different proposition.

 * I did notice that about the knave explaining the rules but interpreted that as "You can't ask us both". I'm happy to agree that this makes it unclear whether they were being consistent or not. You could give the movie the benefit of the doubt here. Nbrader (talk) 08:42, 4 February 2016 (UTC)

 * I move that we edit the article to introduce interesting points from this discussion that we agree on. I move that this includes both solutions suggested here. Nbrader (talk) 09:02, 4 February 2016 (UTC)

Third Opinion
A third opinion has been requested. The discussion has been so lengthy that it isn't obvious what the question is. Please state the question concisely. Robert McClenon (talk) 18:04, 3 February 2016 (UTC)
 * Largely whether the classic solution to the third puzzle on the page or this apparently "simpler" overcomplicated gibberish should be used, the latter being much harder to explain, requiring the knave lie twice in the same answer rather than just saying something that isn't true, and introducing excessive complexity into the conditions of a puzzle that only functions if it's kept extremely simple. Nbrader's at about the point the knight can start lying to him because he didn't ask whose freedom the door led to. Herr Gruber (talk) 01:29, 4 February 2016 (UTC)
 * I'm not even sure how to read that last sentence. I certainly am not suggesting the knight can lie. You on the other hand have suggested multiple times that the knave can choose to tell the truth, which is something I've always denied.

 * The main point of dispute is on how to edit the article. I would suggest we should at least present both solutions to problem 3. Herr Gruber doesn't seem to consider one of these solutions to be valid whereas I do. Furthermore, I see this solution as simpler whereas he does not. The only point in favour of including the solution appearing in 'Labyrinth' is cultural, whereas the other solution is logically simpler.Nbrader (talk) 08:09, 4 February 2016 (UTC)
 * The two suggested solutions are as follows (in their simple+ambiguous form):
 * "Would he tell me that this door leads to the castle?" - Labyrinth Solution
 * "Would you tell me that this door leads to the castle?" - Simpler Solution
 * Additionally to suggesting the simpler solution (and as a separate, secondary point) I also proposed making the question more explicit by rephrasing it thusly:
 * "Would asking you "Does your path lead to freedom?" result in you responding 'Yes'?"
 * I would agree that this is slightly harder to read but it avoids some pedantic issues where they might validly assume you didn't ask a question in the given hypothetical scenario. This doesn't change the intended meaning of the question, but simply makes it clearer what is meant (which is one point Herr Gruber doesn't seem to be understanding and is confusing with the first point). Nbrader (talk) 09:10, 4 February 2016 (UTC)
 * I'd say the best option is completeness - presenting both sounds like the best go. We could even include both and just let the article contradict itself a bit - something like this is bound to have differing views after all. TheLogician112 (talk) 05:43, 5 February 2016 (UTC)

Problem with the Noble/Hunter variant
It has to be said that I don't know the original text referred to, but there is a logical problem with the way this is put:

"with nobles never lying and hunters never telling the truth"

and then swapping further down the text to:

"a hunter always lies".

The negation of a specific condition, as opposed to the affirmation of a different specific condition, doesn't work here. The two things do not mean the same.

That is, to never tell the truth does not rule out the possibility of uttering paradoxes, as paradoxes aren't the truth (and vice versa: to never tell lies would not rule out the possibility of making paradoxical statements).

This category of puzzle relies on the notion that people don't utter paradoxes, but the use of "never" leaves that possibility open, and causes problems with the terms of the puzzle.

Could this be considered, and perhaps corrected in some way?

 * I guess there are tacit assumptions at play here:
 * That every response has a well-defined truth-value (which is what you're getting at).
 * That any response is given at all (as not giving a reply would also be permitted by the rules "never tell the truth" and "never tell a lie").
 * It probably bears mention though probably as a footnote at best. Nbrader (talk) 13:42, 19 July 2022 (UTC)

Labyrinth version, unsolvable?
So, in the Labyrinth version of the riddle, the rules are told to us by one of the guards. Part of the rules is, that the truthful one is ALWAYS truthful and vice versa. This means the first problem is, what if we were lied to about the rules?

There's another version where each guard tells us half of the rules. This is impossible to solve, assuming a liar is always lying and vice versa.

However, it's possible to solve it if one or both guards don't have to be consistent.

Am I missing something?

Lise, 20231107. 83.94.61.104 (talk) 15:04, 7 November 2023 (UTC)

title: Talk:Knights and Knaves


text:
WSTE-DT

WSTE-DT (channel 7), branded on air as Teleisla, is a Spanish-language independent television station serving San Juan, Puerto Rico, that is licensed to Ponce. It is owned by TelevisaUnivision. The station maintains its studios on Calle Carazo in Guaynabo. To provide island-wide coverage, WSTE maintains a network of five transmitter sites, located at Cerro Maravilla in Ponce, at Cerro La Marquesa in Aguas Buenas, at Cerro Canta Gallo in Aguada, on Highway 22 in Arecibo, and at the Monte del Estado in San Germán.

WRIK-TV

The station first signed on as WRIK-TV on February 2, 1958, after receiving the FCC permit to go on the air on channel 7. It was the first television station in Ponce, and the fourth in Puerto Rico, after WKAQ-TV, WAPA-TV (both were established four years earlier), and WORA-TV (established three years earlier). It was owned by Alfredo Ramírez de Arellano. Its news director was Manuel Morales-Flores, with Felix Suria as production manager and Edmund Reid as its chief engineer. The station maintained a transmitter—originally located at El Vigía —and studios at the Edificio Darlington—the first high-rise building in Ponce, completed in 1952. Two years later, the transmitter was relocated to the Hotel Ponce Intercontinental.

WRIK-TV operated as a Spanish-language independent station; it carried some 18 daily programs, including news, movies, cartoons, and soap operas, among others. One notable show, airing in the late afternoons, was El Show de Tío Carlitos. In 1964, the station's staff had expanded to include George A. Mayoral, president, general manager William Cortada, commercial manager and news director Luis A. "Wito" Morales, promotional manager Monsita M. Diaz, and chief engineer Americo Cintron. The transmitter was relocated atop Cerro Maravilla in 1967.

Rikavisión
In 1969, Ramírez de Arellano announced the sale of 80 percent of WRIK-TV to United Artists Corporation for a reported $7 million. Under United Artists, WRIK began operating from color-equipped studios in Ponce and San Juan and rebranded as Rikavisión. The station's logo was a rooster. From San Juan, the station broadcast El Show de Tito Rodriguez for two seasons; the station also produced Ahi Va Eso (with Awilda Carbia, Jacobo Morales and Norma Candal), Contigo Anexo 3 (which included a young Lou Briel), Showtime (with Wilkins), Las Caribelles, El Show de Carol Myles, and children's show Rikalandia (hosted by Sandra Zaiter). One notable 1971 show was María, with Lucy Boscana. The station continued some programming from Ponce, including local newscasts. Its news anchor was Rafael L. Torres, in whose name the Southern Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce later created an Excellence in Journalism award.

Cerro Maravilla incident
In 1978, two pro-independence activists attempted to blow up the WRIK-TV transmitter tower at Cerro Maravilla in an effort to call attention to their cause. Their plan was discovered by police and the two young men were ambushed by police at the peak during their operation. They were arrested and then murdered by the police while still in their custody at the peak.

Teleluz (1979–1987)
In 1979, WRIK-TV was acquired by Puerto Rican producer Tommy Muñiz, owner of AM radio station WLUZ (or Radio Luz); its callsign was subsequently changed to WLUZ-TV (branded as "Teleluz") on March 28, 1979.

Programs shown during this era included a continuation of Sandra Zaiter's children's show and live, low-budgeted professional boxing telecasts from around Puerto Rico on Saturday nights. Boxers who fought on Teleluz frequently included Julian and Rafi Solis, Felix Trinidad Sr. and Victor Callejas.

SuperSiete / Teleisla (1987–present)
Financial troubles forced Muñiz to sell the station to Malrite Communications Group for $1.3 million in 1985. In 1987, the station was rebranded as SuperSiete, and on February 18, 1987, the station changed its call letters to WSTE.

The station experienced limited success at the time using colorful motion graphics and a new logo as well as major advertising in newspapers, and televising popular American sitcoms of the time, such as The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air and The Simpsons, along with major Hollywood movies. It also was acknowledged for its children's show El Show de Burbujita y Bolillo, produced by Milly Cangiano, and its Saturday morning cartoons. Around this time, one of Puerto Rico's longest-running shows, No te Duermas with Antonio Sánchez El Gangster, began airing on channel 7 as well. WSTE also produced a successful game show, La Hora de Oro with Hector Marcano and Sánchez, and two family-oriented sitcoms, Maripili and El Cuartel de la Risa. SuperSiete also broadcast five daily news segments named Noticapsulas (literal translation: news capsules) hosted by news reporter Doris Torres.

In 1991, Malrite bought WLII-TV and WSUR-TV and sold WSTE to Siete Grande Television, Inc., owned by Florida entrepreneur Jerry Hartman. WSTE was then branded as "El Nuevo SuperSiete" ("The New SuperSeven"). During the 1990s, WSTE was rebranded as "Tele-Isla" during prime time hours. Due to the failure of the new programming, and the lack of full island coverage by WLII at the time, WSTE began re-broadcasting WLII's prime time programming mainly for the western and central areas of Puerto Rico.

In 1995, WLII entered into an affiliation agreement with WORA-TV. This created a conflict with the FCC, as WLII's programming was being rebroadcast by two different stations across the island; WLII and WSTE in the north, WSUR-TV and WSTE in the south, and WSTE, WNJX-TV and WORA-TV in the west. During this time, the channel proudly showed its coverage channels on its "ident", as 11-9-7-5-22. After admonishment by the FCC, WLII dropped WSTE and WNJX-TV coverage.

After that point (sometime in 1995) and to this day, the station mostly airs infomercials and locally-produced advertisements for car dealerships. The station aired horse racing from Hipodromo Camarero from 2013 to 2020.

On March 23, 2007, Siete Grande Television, Inc. announced it would sell WSTE to Univision Communications. The sale was approved by the FCC on October 11, 2007. On June 23, 2009, the station's call letters were revised to WSTE-DT.

The channel's SuperSiete "ident" animation, logo, and name survived for over 25 years, dating back to 1987. A new logo with the Teleisla branding was introduced a few months before the FCC-mandated digital transition date of June 12, 2009. On January 2, 2012, WSTE-DT introduced a new logo in the form of a four-color clover (orange representing morning, green representing afternoon, violet representing weekend, and blue representing nightly programming). The station also expanded its broadcast day to 1:00 a.m. On November 1, 2012, Dish Network began carrying WSTE-DT on channel 12. In early 2016, WSTE-DT expanded its broadcast schedule to 24 hours a day, and adding the health program Hablando de Salud from 1:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.

Subchannels
The station's digital signal is multiplexed:

{{legend|#E6FFF7|Simulcast of subchannels of another station}}

Analog-to-digital conversion
WSTE shut down its analog signal, over VHF channel 7, at noon on June 12, 2009, the official date on which full-power television stations in the United States transitioned from analog to digital broadcasts under federal mandate. The station's digital signal relocated from its pre-transition VHF channel 8 to channel 7 for its post-transition operations.

Transmitter facilities
To effectively cover all of Puerto Rico, WSTE used booster-type translator facilities across the island prior to the analog shutdown. In order for this booster system to work without any interference, WSTE's main transmitter had to be kept silent. The Ponce area was thus served from an auxiliary station transmitting at 100 kW. WSTE now uses a five-site, digital distributed transmission system to cover the island as the booster system had done before it.

title: WSTE-DT


text:
Peugeot 106

The Peugeot 106 is a supermini produced by French automaker Peugeot between 1991 and 2003. Launched in September 1991, it was Peugeot's entry level offering throughout its production life, and was initially sold only as a three-door hatchback, with a five-door hatchback joining the range in the beginning of 1992. Production ended in July 2003.

For the first year of production, the 1.0 and 1.1 petrol engines came with a carburettor, but were replaced by fuel injected engines from the end of 1992, as a result of EEC emissions regulations.

Phase I (1991–1996)
The "10" line of Peugeot superminis had commenced in 1972 with the launch of the 104, one of the first modern European superminis. The 104 was effectively replaced by the Peugeot 205 in 1983, but remained in production for some markets until 1988. There was no "105".

The 106 was introduced as a three-door hatchback in continental Europe in September 1991, and two months later in the United Kingdom. The initial engine range had 1.0, 1.1 and 1.4 petrol engines, as well as a 1.5 diesel.

The early 1.0 and 1.1s were carburetted, but were replaced with fuel injection after a year due to EC emissions requirements.

Phase II (1996–2003)
It was updated in July 1996, with changes including the introduction of side impact bars and availability of driver and passenger airbags for the first time, with the new 1.6 GTI joining the range as the spiritual successor to the hugely popular and highly regarded 205 GTI, which had been discontinued in 1994.

In January 1996, the Peugeot 106 also formed the basis for the near identical looks and size Citroën Saxo.

The 106's successor, the Peugeot 107, along with rebadged versions, Citroën C1 and Toyota Aygo, was launched two years later in June 2005, as a joint venture with Toyota.

High performance variants
Marketed as having "fewer frills, more thrills", the Rallye version had trademark steel wheels painted white. Power steering, central locking, and electric windows were omitted to keep the weight down to 825 kg.

There were pre and post facelift versions of the 106 Rallye known to enthusiasts as S1 and S2 models, with the latter having a 103 bhp 1.6 litre (TU5J2) engine in place of the original high revving Rallye specific 1.3 100 bhp (TU2J2) engine fitted to pre facelift cars.

Contrary to some sources, the S1 models did not share the same engine with the 205 Rallye and AX Sport, which used a carburettor TU24 engine. The dimensions of the aluminium S1 block resemble those of the 1.4 iron block with slightly lowered capacity to comply with the rules of the lower French rally classes at the time (under 1,300 cc). The S1 (TU2J2) and S2 (TU5J2) were fuel injected, employing Magneti Marelli multi point fuel injection systems.

The S1 Rallye were designed as a homologation special to compete in the 1300 cc rally class. It featured a four-cylinder, 8-valve, high compression engine with an aggressive cam profile designed to come "on song" between 5,400 and the 7,200 rpm redline.

This engine coupled to a short ratio five speed gearbox made the 1.3 more of a sprinter than a cruiser. 70 mph on the motorway was a noisy 4,000 rpm in fifth gear, but given enough tarmac, the 1.3 would redline in top gear at 115 mph.

The 106 was competitive in racing, but also made a practical small family car. All cars had steel wheels, and Rallye decals and seat coverings featuring a one or three colour flash, which again varied between early and late cars. With facelift came new top model named Peugeot 106 GTI with 1.6 litre 16 valves engine that produce 120 hp. It came with new exterior body kit and new wheels. On some markets in Europe, it was badged S16 or Rallye.

Electric version
In 1995, Peugeot launched an electric powered version of the 106, called the 106 Electrique. This was offered in a number of European countries including France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The electric powertrain was developed and built by French engineering company Heuliez. The car used Nickel-cadmium battery technology manufactured by Saft Groupe S.A., had a top speed of 56 mph (90 km/h) and had an official range of 100 km.

Despite the high price of the vehicle, Peugeot anticipated demand for around 15,000 to 20,000 Peugeot 106 Électriques each year, with an expected total production run of 100,000 vehicles. In the end, only 6,400 Peugeot 106 Électriques were sold between 1995 and 2003, most purchased by the French Administration.

Special Editions
As with most Peugeot models at the time, there were many special editions of the 106 offered between 1991 and 2003.

title: Peugeot 106