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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 100

Question. 100 - ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is simony?

(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?

(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?

(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?

(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?

(6) Of the punishment of simony.

Art. 1 - Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above (Q[10], A[2]). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual.

Objection 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.

Objection 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of legal compromise---Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently.

Objection 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with spiritual things."

Objection 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony."

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money."

Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (OBJ[1]). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God."

Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Mat. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give."

Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[58], A[4]), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term "buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither "the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us" (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.

Reply to Objection 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii [*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings 5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only "simoniacs" but also "giezites."

Reply to Objection 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons.

Reply to Objection 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body."

Reply to Objection 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.

Art. 2 - Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the TP, Q[68], A[6]; TP, Q[73], A[3]. But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful.

Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity.

Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): "Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood."

I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?"

Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. FS, Q[97], A[3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry."

Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves."

Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right.

Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of the work [*XP, Q[42], A[3]]. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing.

Art. 3 - Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.

Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.

Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.

Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.

On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.

I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.

Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.

Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).

Art. 4 - Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false.

Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical."

I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.

Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.

Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.

The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice, according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance.

The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or granted.

The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (Q[87], A[3]).

With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.

Art. 5 - Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received. Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal. Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's request. Therefore this is not simoniacal. Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony. On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: "Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony." I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the term "money" denotes "anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in service rendered." Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony. Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the revenue is manifest simony. Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls. Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.

Art. 6 - Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.

Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony.

Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above (FS, Q[74], AA[1],2; FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him.

Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.

Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony.

Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony.

Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received.

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money."

I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, "Freely have you received, freely give." Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].

Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others.

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church.

On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.

Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.

Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention.

Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.


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 90 STAT. 1182

PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976 forms, or allowances therefor, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5901-5902), $13,800,000, of which not to exceed $300 shall be used for official reception and representation expenses. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD SALARIES AND EXPENSES

For necessary expenses of the Civil Aeronautics Board, including hire of aircraft; hire of passenger motor vehicles; services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109; uniforms, or allowances therefor, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5901-5902); and not to exceed $1,000 for official reception and representation expenses, $21,450,000. PAYMENTS TO AIR CARRIERS

For payments to air carriers of so much of the compensation fixed and determined by the Civil Aeronautics Board under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1376), as is payable by the Board, $80,007,000, to remain available until expended.

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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION SAI^RIES AND EXPENSES

49 USC 305a.

For necessary expenses of the Interstate Commerce Commission, including services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, $57,036,000, of which $150,000 shall be available for valuation of pipelines, $1,250,000 shall be available for necessary expenses of the Rail Services Planning Office, $1,999,400 shall be available for necessary expenses of the Office of Rail Public Counsel: Provided, That Joint Board members and cooperating state commissioners may use Government transportation requests when traveling in connection with their official duties as stich. THE PANAMA CANAL CANAL ZONE GOVERNMENT OPERATING EXPENSES

For operating expenses necessary for the Canal Zone.Government, including operation of the Postal Service of the Canal Zone; hire of passenger motor vehicles; uniforms or allowances therefor, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5901-5902); expenses incident to conducting hearings on the Isthmus; expenses of special training of employees of the Canal Zone Government as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 4101-4118, contingencies of the Governor, residence for the Governor; medical aid and support of the insane and of lepers and aid and support of indigent persons legally within the Canal Zone, including expenses of their deportation when practicable; and maintaining and altering facilities of other Government agencies in the Canal Zone for Canal Zone Government use, $65,900,000.

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For acquisition of land and land under water and acquisition, construction, and replacement of improvements, facilities, structures, and equipment, as authorized by law (2 C.Z. Code, sec. 2; 2 C.Z. Code, sec. 371), including the purchase of not to exceed eighteen passenger motor vehicles for replacement only; improving facilities of other

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976

90 STAT. 1183

Government agencies in the Canal Zone for Canal Zone Government use; and expenses incident to the retirement of such assets; $3,150,000, to remain available until expended. PANAMA CANAL COMPANY CORPORATION

The Panama Canal Company is hereby authorized to make such expenditures within the limits of funds and borrowing authority available to it and in accordance with law, and to make such contracts and commitments without regard to fiscal year limitations as provided by section 104 of the Government Corporation Control Act, as amended (31 U.S.C. 849), as may be necessary in carrying out the programs set forth in the budget for the current fiscal year for such corporation, including maintaining and improving facilities of other Government agencies in the Canal Zone for Panama Canal Company use.

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LIMITATION ON GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Not to exceed $25,285,000 of the funds available to the Panama Canal Company shall be available for obligation during the current fiscal year for general and administrative expenses of the Company, including operation of tourist vessels and guide services. Funds available to the Panama Canal Company for obligation shall be available for the purchase of not to exceed twenty-four passenger motor vehicles, for replacement only, and for uniforms or allowances therefor as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5901-5902).

DEPARTMENT OF THE TEEASURY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY INVESTMENT IN FUND ANTICIPATION NOTES

For the acquisition, in accordance with section 509 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-210), of fund anticipation notes, $70,000,000, to remain available Ante, p. 76. until September 30, 1978. UNITED STATES RAILWAY ASSOCIATION ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

For necessary administrative expenses to enable the United States Railway Association to carry out its functions under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, as amended, $12,000,000. 45 USC 701 note. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION

To enable the Department of Transportation to pay the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, as part of the Federal contribution toward expenses necessary to design, engineer, construct, and equip a rail rapid transit system, as authorized by the National

89-194 O—78—pt. 1

78

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 90 STAT. 1184

PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976

D.C. Code 1-1441 note.

Capital Transportation Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-143), as amended, including acquisition of rights-of-way, land, and interest therein, to remain available until expended, $15,421,779 and for the fiscal year 1978, and for the fiscal year 1977, $6,800,000 for the design and construction of facilities for the handicapped as authorized by Public 23 USC 101 note. Law 93-87. INTEREST SUBSIDY

86 Stat. 464.

To enable the Department of Transportation to pay the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority the interest subsidy authorized by Public Law 92-349, $19,374,000, to remain available until expended. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY STUDY COMMISSION

Ante, p. 425.

For necessary expenses to enable the National Transportation Policy Study Commission to carry out its functions under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976, Public Law 94-280, the sum of $1,000,000 to remain available until expended. TITLE III GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. During the current fiscal year applicable appropriations to the Department of Transportation shall be available for maintenance and operation of aircraft; hire of passenger motor vehicles and aircraft; purchase of liability insurance for motor vehicles operating in foreign countries on official departmental business; and uniforms, or allowances therefor, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5901-5902). SEC. 302. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available „_ for the planning or execution of programs the commitments for which are in excess of $510,000,000 for Grants-in-aid for airports in fiscal year 1977. SEC. 303. None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the planning or execution of programs the obligations for ^, which are in excess of $21,000,(00 for "Highway-related safety grants" '" in fiscal year 1977. SEC. 304. None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the planning or execution of programs the obligations for which are in excess of $129,000,000 in fiscal year 1977 for "State and Community Highway Safety". ^ SEC. 305. None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the planning or execution of programs the obligations for which are in excess of $5,600,000 in fiscal year 1977 for "Territorial Highways". SEC. 306. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for administrative expenses in connection with commitments for the 49 USC 1601 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, aggregating note. more than $2,077,700,000 in fiscal year 1977, except that amounts appor49 USC 1604. tioned pursuant to section 5 of that Act and not committed in the year of apportionment may be committed notwithstanding this limitation.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976 SEC. 307. None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for administrative expenses in connection with obligations against contract authority for interstate substitutions under 23 U.S.C. 103(e) (4) aggregating more than $175/00,000 in fiscal year 1977. SEC. 308. None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the planning or execution of programs for any further construction of the Miami jetport or of any other air facility in the State of Florida lying south of the Okeechobee Waterway and in the drainage basins contributing water to the Everglades National Park until it has been shown by an appropriate study made jointly by the Department of the Interior and the Department of Transportation that such an airport will not have an adverse environmental effect on the ecology of the Everglades and until any site selected on the basis of such study is approved by the Department of the Interior and the Department of Transportation: Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect the availability of such funds to carry out this study. SEC. 309. The Governor of the Canal Zone is authorized to employ services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, in an amount not exceeding $150,000. SEC. 310. Funds appropriated for operating expenses of the Canal Zone Government may be apportioned notwithstanding section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 665), to the extent necessary to permit payment of such pay increases for officers or employees as may be authorized by administrative action pursuant to law which are not in excess of statutory increases granted for the same period in corresponding rates of compensation for other employees of the Government in comparable positions. SEC. 311. No funds appropriated or made available by this Act shall be used to implement the provision of section 155 of title 2 of the Canal Zone Code relating to the establishment of employment standards, pay levels and other conditions of employment within the Canal Zone. SEC. 312. Funds appropriated under this Act for expenditure by the Federal Aviation Administration shall be available (1) except as otherwise authorized by the Act of September 30, 1950 (20 U.S.C. 236-244), for expenses of primary and secondary schooling for dependents of Federal Aviation Administration personnel stationed outside the continental United States at costs for any given area not in excess of those of the Department of Defense for the same area, when it is determined by the Secretary that the schools, if any, available in the locality are unable to provide adequately for the education of such dependents and (2) for transportation of said dependents between schools serving the area which they attend and their places of residence when the Secretary, under such regulations as he may prescribe, determines that such schools are not accessible by public means of transportation on a regular basis. SEC. 313. Appropriations contained in this Act for the Department of Transportation shall be available for services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the per diem rate equivalent to the rate for a GS-18.

90 STAT. 1185

Everglades National Park, Fla. Ecology study.

FAA dependents' school expenses. 20 USC 241 note.

5 USC 5332 note.

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 90 STAT. 1186

49 USC 1601 note.

49 USC 1604.

Fiscal year limitation.

Midway Airport and O'Hare Airport, 111.

PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976 SEC. 314. None of the funds in this Act shall be available for the implementation or execution of a program in the Department of Transportation to collect fees, charges or prices for approvals, tests, authorizations, certificates, permits, registrations, and ratings which are in excess of the levels in effect on January 1, 1973, or which did not exist as of January 1, 1973, until such program is reviewed and approved by the appropriate committees of the Congress. SEC. 315. None of the funds provided in this Act for liquidation of contractual obligations under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, shall be made available for liquidation of obligations entered into under Section 5 of that Act, to support mass transit facilities, equipment or operating expenses unless the applicant for such assistance has given satisfactory assurances in such manner and form as the Secretary may require, and in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe, that the rates charged elderly and handicapped persons during nonpeak hours shall not exceed one-half of the rates generally applicable to other persons at peak hours: Provided, That the Secretary, in prescribing the terms and conditions for the provision of such assistance shall (1) permit applicants to continue the use of preferential fare systems for elderly or handicapped persons where those systems were in effect on or prior to November 26, 1974, (2) allow applicants a reasonable time to expand the coverage of operating preferential fare systems as appropriate, and (3) allow applicants to define the eligibility of ''handicapped persons" for the purposes of preferential fares in conformity with other Federal laws and regulations governing eligibility for benefits for disabled persons. SEC. 316. No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall remain available for obligation beyond the current fiscal year unless expressly so provided herein. SEC. 317. None of the funds provided under or included in this Act shall be available for the planning or execution of programs, the obligations for which are in excess of $7,200,000,000 for "FederalAid Highways" and for "Highway Safety Construction Programs" in fiscal year 1977: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply to obligations for emergency relief under section 125 of title 23 U.S.C., special urban high density traffic program under section 146 of title 23 U.S.C., and special bridge replacement program under section 144 of title 23 U.S.C.: Provided further, That this limitation shall not become effective if subsequent legislation containing an obligation limitation on the Federal-Aid Highways and Highway Safety Construction Programs for fiscal year 1977 is enacted into law by September 30, 1976. SEC. 318. Such funds as may be necessary shall be utilized from the appropriations hereinabove made available to the Federal Aviation Administration and to the Civil Aeronautics Board for the preparation of a plan to coordinate as promptly as possible the use of Midway Airport with O'Hare Airport in Chicago, Illinois, for service by airline carriers, in order to relieve air traffic congestion and to promote air safety in that area.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-387—AUG. 14, 1976

90 STAT. 1187

SEC. 319. Section 302 of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1976, and the period ending September 30, 1976 (Public Law 94-134) is amended by striking out "$350,000,000" and all that follows down through the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "$437,500,000 in fiscal year 1976, including the period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1976.". This Act may be cited as the "Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1977." Approved August 14, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-1221 (Comm. on Appropriations) and No. 94-1361 (Coram. of Conference). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1017 (Comm. on Appropriations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, VoL 122 (1976): June 28, considered and passed House. July 1, considered and passed Senate, amended. Aug. 3, House agreed to conference report; receded and concurred in certain amendments with amendments. Aug. 4, Senate agreed to conference report; concurred in House amendments.

89 Stat. 695.

Short title.

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 90 STAT. 1188

PUBLIC LAW 94-388—AUG. 14, 1976

Public Law 94- 388 94th Congress An Act Aug. 14, 1976 [S. 1689] Pennsylvania Avenue Development Act of 1972, amendment. Appropriation authorization.

Development plan. 40 USC 874. Demonstration area.

16 USC 460/-4 note.

To amend the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-578), as amended.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 17 of the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 1266) as amended (40 U.S.C. 885), is further amended to read as follows: "SEC. 17. (a) In addition to the sums heretofore appropriated, there are authorized to be appropriated for operating and administrative expenses of the Corporation sums not to exceed $1,300,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976; $325,000 for the period July 1 through September 30, 1976; and $1,500,000 each, for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1977, and September 30, 1978. "(b) To commence implementation of the development plan authorized by section 5 of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Corporation through the fiscal years ending September 30, 1978, $38,800,000, to remain available without fiscal year limitation through September 30, 1990: Provided, That appropriations made under the authority of this paragraph shall include sufficient funds to assure the development of square 225 as a demonstration area for the development plan, and shall assure the preservation of the Structure now located on square 225 known as the Willard Hotel and its historic facade. No appropriations shall be made from the Land and Water Conservation Fund established by the Act of September 30, 1964 (78 Stat. 897, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 4601), to effectuate the purposes of this Act.'. Approved August 14, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-894 accompanying H.R. 7743 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 94-572 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 121 (1975): Dec. 18, considered and passed Senate. Vol. 122 (1976): July 26, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 7743. Aug. 5, Senate concurred in House amendment.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-389—AUG. 14, 1976

90 STAT. 1189

Public Law 94-389 94th Congress Joint Resolution Providing for Federal participation in preserving the Tule elk population in California.

Aug. 14, 1976 [H.J. Res. 738]

Whereas, although Tule elk once roamed the central valleys of California in vast numbers, the species became nearly extinct during the latter part of the last century as a result of its native habitat being developed for agricultural purposes and urban growth; and Whereas, although around 1870 the Tule elk population reached a low of approximately thirty animals, through the dedicated efforts of various citizen groups and individual cattlemen, the population has slowly recovered to a total of approximately six hundred animals, the majority of which may be found in free-roaming herds in the Owens Valley, at Cache Creek in Colusa County, California, a small number which are captive in the Tupman Refuge in Vern County, California; and Whereas in 1971 the California Legislature, recognizing the threat to the Tule elk as a species, amended section 332 and enacted section 3951 of the Fish and Game Code which provide for the encouragement of a statewide population of Tule elk of not less than two thousand, if suitable areas can be found in California to accommodate such population in a healthy environment, and further fixed the population of the Tule elk in the Owens Vallev at four hundred and ninety animals, or such greater number as might thereafter be determined by the California Department of Fish and Game, in accordance with game management principles, to be the Owens Valley holding capacity; and Whereas the Tule elk is considered by the Department of the Interior to be a rare, though not endangered, species by reason of the steps taken by the State of California; and Whereas the protection and maintenance of California's Tule elk in a free and wild state is of educational, scientific, and esthetic value to the people of the United States; and Whereas there are Federal lands in the State of California (including, but not limited to, the San Luis National Wildlife Refuge, the Point Reyes National Seashore, various national forests and national parks, and Bureau of Land Management lands located in central California, as well as lands under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense such as Camp Pendleton, Camp Roberts, and Camp Hunter Liggett) which, together with adjacent lands in public and private ownership, offer a potential for increasing the Tule elk population in California to the two thousand level envisioned by the California Legislature: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United, States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of California. Congress that the restoration and conservation of a Tule elk ponn- Tule elk lation in California of at least two thousand, except that the number population, of Tule elk in the Owens River Watershed area shall at no time exceed preservation. four hundred and ninety or such greater number which is determined 16 USC 673d. by the State of California to be the maximum holding capacity of such area, is an appropriate national goal.

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 90 STAT. 1190 Cooperation. 16 USC 673e.

Report to Congress. 16 USC 673f.

Tule elk restoration and conservation plan. 16 USC 673g.

PUBLIC LAW 94-389—AUG. 14, 1976 SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Defense shall cooperate with the State of California in making the lands under their respective jurisdictions reasonably available for the preservation and grazing of Tule elk in such manner and to such extent as may be consistent with Federal law. SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Interior shall submit, on or before the first of March of each year, a report to the Congress as to the estimated size and condition of the various Tule elk herds in California and the nature and condition of their respective habitats. The Secretary shall include in such report his determination as to whether or not the preservation of the Tule elk herd at its then-existing level is, or may be, endangered or threatened hj actual or proposed changes in land use or land management practices on lands owned by any Federal, State, or local agency, together with his recommendations as to what Federal actions, if any, should be taken in order to preserve the Tule elk herds at the then-existing level or such other level as may be determined from time to time by the State of California. SEC. 4. The Secretary of the Interior, in coordination with all Federal, State, and other officers having jurisdiction over lands on which Tule elk herds are located or lands which would provide suitable Tule elk habitat, shall develop a plan for Tule elk restoration and conservation, including habitat management, which shall be integrated with the comparable plans of State and local authorities in California. The Secretary's annual report to Congress shall describe the development and implementation of such plan. Approved August 14, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-895 (Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1120 (Comm. on Commerce). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): Mar. 15, considered and passed House. '" Aug. 6, considered and passed Senate.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-390—AUG. 19, 1976

90 STAT. 1191

Public Law 94-390 94th Congress An Act To amend sections 2734a(a) and 2734b(a) of title 10, United States Code, to provide for settlement, under international agreements, of certain claims incident to the noncombat activities of the armed forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That title 10, United States Code, is amended— (1) by amending section 2734a (a) to read as follows: "(a) When the United States is a party to an international agreement which proAddes for the settlement or adjudication and cost sharing of claims against the United States arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of an armed force of the United States done in the performance of official duty, or arising out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which an armed force of the United States is legally responsible under the law of another party to the international agreement, and causing damage in the territory of such party, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Transportation or their designees may— "(1) reimburse the party to the agreement for the agreed pro rata share of amounts, including any authorized arbitration costs, paid by that party in satisfying awards or judgments on claims, in accordance with the agreement; or " (2) pay the party to the agreement the agreed pro rata share of any claim, including any authorized arbitration costs, for damage to property owned by it, in accordance with the agreement."; and (2) by amending section 2734b(a) to read as follows: "(a) When the United States is a party to an international agreement which provides for the settlement or adjudication by the United States under its laws and regulations, and subject to agreed pro rata reimbursement, of claims against another party to the agreement arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of an armed force of that party done in the performance of official duty, or arising out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which that armed force is legally responsible under applicable United States law, and causing damage in the United States, or a territory. Commonwealth, or possession thereof; those claims may be prosecuted against the United States, or settled by the United States, in accordance with the agreement, as if the acts or omissions upon which they are based were the acts or omissions of a member or a civilian employee of an armed force of the United States.". Approved August 19, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-543 (Comm. on the Judiciary). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1121 (Comm. on the Judiciary). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 121 (1975): Nov. 3, considered and passed House. Vol. 122 (1976): Aug. 9, considered and passed Senate.

Aug. 19, 1976 [H.R. 7896]

Military claims. Settlement under international agreements.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 102

Question. 102 - OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

(2) What does observance offer?

(3) Of its comparison with piety.

Art. 1 - Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

Objection 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

I answer that, As explained above (Q[101], AA[1],3; Q[80]), according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13): "Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[101], A[3], ad 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.

Reply to Objection 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above (Q[58], A[6]).

Art. 2 - Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all.

Objection 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them." Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity."

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.

Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[80]), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor.

Art. 3 - Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety.

Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's kindred.

Objection 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence.

I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply to Objection 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being.

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1242

 90 STAT. 1192

PUBLIC LAW 94-391—AUG. 19, 1976

Public Law 94-391 94th Congress An Act Aug. 19, 1976 rjT p 103741

National Archives Trust Fund Board. Membership change.

To amend section 2301 of title 44. United States Code, to change the membership "^ *^^ National Archives Trust Fund Board.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 2301 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by deleting the first sentence and substituting in lieu thereof the following sentence: "The National Archives Trust Fund Board shall consist of the Archivist of the United States, as ChairmanL and the chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations and the chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.". Approved August 19, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-988 (Coram, on Governraent Operations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): May 3, considered and passed House. Aug. 9, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1243

 PUBLIC LAW 94-392—AUG. 19, 1976

90 STAT. 1193

Public Law 94-392 94th Congress An Act To authorize the government of the Virgin Islands to issue bonds in anticipation of revenue receipts and to authorize the guarantee of such bonds by the United States under specified conditions, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) in addition to the authority conferred by section 8(b) of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands (48 U.S.C. 1574(b)), the legislature of the government of the Virgin Islands is authorized to cause to be issued bonds or other obligations of such government in anticipation of revenues to be received under section 28(b) of such Act (26 U.S.C. 7652). The proceeds of such bonds or other obligations may be used for any purpose authorized by an act of the legislature. The legislature of the government of the Virgin Islands may initiate, by majority vote of the members, a binding referendum vote to approve or disapprove the amount of any such bond or other obligation and/or any purpose for which such bond or other obligation is authorized. (b) The legislature of the government of the Virgin Islands may provide, in connection with any issue of bonds or other obligations authorized to be issued under subsection (a) the proceeds of which are to be used for public works or other capital projects, that a guarantee of such bonds or obligations by the United States should be applied for under section 2 of this Act. (c) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the provisions of section 8(b) (ii) of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands (other than the limitation contained in the proviso to the first sentence of subparagraph (A)) shall apply to bonds and other obligations authorized to be issued under subsection (a). SEC. 2. (a) When authorized under subsection (b) of the first section of this Act, the government of the Virgin Islands may apply to the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") for a guarantee of any issue of bonds or other obligations authorized to be issued under subsection (a) of the first section of this Act. Any such application shall contain such information as the Secretary may prescribe. (b) The Secretary is authorized, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to guarantee and to enter into commitments to guarantee, upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, payment of principal and interest on bonds and other obligations issued by the government of the Virgin Islands under subsection (a) of the first section of this Act. No guarantee or commitment to guarantee shall be made unless the Secretary determines— (1) that the proceeds of such issue will be used only for public works or other capital projects; (2) taking into account anticipated expenditures by the government of the Virgin Islands while the bonds or other obligations forming a part of such issue will be outstanding, all outstanding obligations of the government of the Virgin Islands which will mature while the bonds or other obligations forming a part of such issue will be outstanding, and such other factors as he deems

Aug. 19, 1976 [H.R. 13359]

Virgin Islands. Revenue bonds. 48 USC 1574a.

48 USC 1574.

Bond guarantee, application. 48 USC 1574b.

Principal and interest payments.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1244

 90 STAT. 1194 26 USC 7652.

Fee collection.

26 USC 1 et seq. Guarantee limitation; termination. Revolving fund.

Business-type budget, transmittal to Congress.

Transfer of funds.

Issuance of notes to the Treasury.

PUBLIC LAW 94-392—AUG. 19, 1976

pertinent, that the revenues expected to be received under section 28(b) of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands will be sufficient to pay the principal of, and interest on, the bonds or other obligations forming a part of such issue; (3) that credit is not otherwise available on reasonable terms and conditions and that there is reasonable assurance of repayment, and (4) that the maturity of any obligations to be guaranteed does not exceed thirty years or 90 per centum of the useful life of the physical assets to be financed by the obligation, whichever is less as determined by the Secretary. (c) The Secretary shall charge and collect fees in amounts sufficient in his judgment to cover the costs of administering this section. Fees collected under this subsection shall be deposited in the revolving fund created under subsection (g). (d) Any guarantee made by the Secretary shall be conclusive evidence of the eligibility of the obligation for such guarantee, and the validity of any guarantee so made shall be incontestable, except for fraud or material misrepresentation, in the hands of the holder of the guaranteed obligation. Such guarantee shall constitute a pledge of the full faith and credit of the United States for such obligation. (e) The interest on any obligation guaranteed under this section shall be included in gross income for purposes of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. (f) The aggregate principal amount of obligations which may be guaranteed under this Act shall not exceed $61,000,000, No commitment to guarantee shall be entered into under this Act after October 1, 1979. (g)(1) There is hereby created within the Treasury a separate fund (hereinafter referred to as "the fund") which shall be available to the Secretary without fiscal year limitation as revolving fund for the purpose of this Act. A business-type budget for the fund shall be prepared, transmitted to the Congress, considered, and enacted in the manner prescribed by law (sections 102, 103, and 104 of the Government Corporation Control Act (31 U.S.C. 847-849)) for wholly owned Government corporations. (2) All expenses, including reimbursements to other government accounts, and payments pursuant to operations of the Secretary under this Act shall be paid from the fund. If at any time the Secretary determines that moneys in the fund exceed the present and any reasonably prospective future requirements of the fund, such excess may be transferred to the general fund of the Treasury. (3) If at any time the moneys available in the fund are insufficient to enable the Secretary to discharge his responsibilities under guarantees under this Act, he shall issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities, and subject to such terms and conditions, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Redemption of such notes or obligations shall be made by the Secretary from appropriations which are hereby authorized for this purpose. Such notes or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, which shall not be less than a rate determined by taking into consideration the average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities during the month preceding the issuance of the notes or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase any notes or other obligations issued hereunder and for that purpose he is author-

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1245

 PUBLIC LAW 94-392—AUG. 19, 1976 ized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act and the purposes for which securities may be issued under that Act are extended to include any purchase of such notes or obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time sell any of the notes or other obligations acquired by him under this subsection. All redemptions, purchases, and sales by the Secretary of the Treasury of such notes or other obligations shall be treated as public debt transactions of the United States. SEC. 3. Each issue of bonds or other obligations issued under subsection (a) of the first section of this Act shall have priority for payment of principal and interest out of revenues received under section 28(b) of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands in the order of the date of issue, except that issues guaranteed under section 2 shall have priority, according to the date of issue, over issues not so guaranteed and the revenues received under section 28(b) of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands shall be pledged for the payment of such bonds or other obligations. SEC. 4. The Secretary is authorized and directed to make grants to the government of the Virgin Islands for operation of such government in an amount not to exceed $8,500,000. SEC. 5. Chapter 44, section 1, of the Act of July 12, 1921 (42 Stat. 123; 48 U.S.C. 1397), is hereby amended by striking the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following language: ": Provided further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands is authorized to levy a surtax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligation to the government of the Virgin Islands.". SEC. 6. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Approved August 19, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1080 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1021 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): May 3, considered and passed House. July 26, considered and passed Senate, amended. Aug. 10, House concurred in Senate amendments.

90 STAT. 1195 31 USC 774.

Payment priorities.

48 USC 1574c. 26 USC 7652.

Grants. 48 USC 1574d.

Income, ten per cent surtax levy.

Appropriation authorization. 48 USC 1574a note.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1246

 90 STAT. 1196

PUBLIC LAW 94-393—AUG. 19, 1976

Public Law 94-393 94th Congress An Act Aug. 19, 1976 [S. 2642]

Ninety Six National Historic Site, S.C. Establishment. 16 USC 461 note.

Publication in Federal Register.

Administration. 16 USC 461 note.

Appropriation authorization. 16 USC 461 note.

To provide for the establishment of the Ninety Six National Historic Site in the State of South Carolina, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to preserve and commemorate for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations an area of unique historical significance associated with the settlement and development of the English Colonies in America and with the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War, including the Star Fort, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized to acquire lands and interests therein by donation, purchase, or exchange, not to exceed one thousand one hundred and twenty acres, in the vicinity of the Old Ninety Six and Star Fort National Historic Landmark in the State of South Carolina, for establishment as the Ninety Six National Historic Site, as generally depicted on the map entitled "96 New Area Study Alternative 2, Ninety Six Site, Ninety Six, South Carolina, Sheet 8 of 17", and dated May 1976, which shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the National Park Service, Washington, District of Columbia: Provided, That lands and interests therein owned by the State of South Carolina or any political subdivision thereof may be acquired only by donation. The Secretary shall establish the historic site by publication of a notice to that effect in the Federal Register at such time as he determines that sufficient property to constitute an administrable unit has been acquired. After advising the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Senate and House of Representatives in writing, the Secretary may from time to time revise the boundaries of the historic site, but the total acreage of the site shall not exceed one thousand one hundred and twenty acres. SEC. 2. Pending establishment of the site and thereafter, the Secretary shall administer property acquired pursuant to this Act in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4), as amended and supplemented, and the Act of August 21, 1935 (49 Stat. 666; 16 U.S.C. 461-467), as amended. SEC. 3. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, but not more than $320,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands.

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