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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 64

Question. 64 - OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?

(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?

(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?

(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?

(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?

Art. 1 - Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, "Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.

Objection 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.

Objection 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man."

I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).

Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): "Behold I have given you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth": and again (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you."

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use."

Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.

Reply to Objection 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Mat. 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.

Objection 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners.

Objection 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we wish our friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.

Reply to Objection 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).

Art. 3 - Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has sinned.

Objection 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him."

I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.

Reply to Objection 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.

Reply to Objection 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.

Art. 4 - Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers to death.

Objection 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."

I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 Pet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.

Reply to Objection 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.

Reply to Objection 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.

Reply to Objection 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority.

Art. 5 - Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.

Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself.

Objection 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself.

Objection 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man---not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else than a man."

I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I will make to live."

Reply to Objection 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.

Reply to Objection 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.

Art. 6 - Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?
Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person.

Objection 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.

Objection 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death."

I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (A[2]) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Reply to Objection 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears Him.

Reply to Objection 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

Reply to Objection 3: If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.

Art. 7 - Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own body.

Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life.

Objection 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A[3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A[3]), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

Reply to Objection 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Reply to Objection 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."

Art. 8 - Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.

Objection 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death.

Reply to Objection 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

Reply to Objection 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.


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 92 STAT. 76

Foreign countries' use, study.

Cooperation. Report to

Additional systems acquisition. Appropriation authorization.

Technology development. Appropriation authorization.

Military applications, prohibition.

42 USC 5821 note. Definitions.

42 USC 2011 note. Idaho flood damages. Land transfers, availability to farmers.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 as government funding, loan guarantees, tax incentives, the operation of pilot plants or production lines and other incentives deemed worthy of consideration by the Secretary of Energy, A preliminary report shall be submitted to Congress within six months following the enactment of this Act; (3) initiate and conduct a study involving the prospects for applications of solar photovoltaic energy systems for power generation in foreign countries, particularly lesser developed countries, and the potential for the exportation of these energy systems. This study shall involve the cooperation of the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, as well as other Federal agencies which the Secretary of P^nergy deems appropriate. A final report shall be submitted to the Congress, as well as a preliminary report within twelve months of the enactment of this Act; and (4) be authorized to acquire up to an additional 4.0 megawatts (peak) of solar photovoltaic energy systems. The sum of $13,000,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated (in addition to any other amounts authorized by this Act to be appropriated) for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, and for delivery in the following twelve months. Such sums shall remain available until expended. The solar photovoltaic energy systems acquired shall be available for use for power generation by Federal agencies, provided that no procurement takes place until their application on Federal sites is determined to be life cycle cost effective, (b) For technology development, particularly for engineering design and development of the manufacturing process of solar photovoltaic energy systems (primarily for the implementation of automated processes and other cost reducing production technologies), the sum of $6,000,000 is hereby authorized by this Act to be appropriated for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978. SEC. 209. (a) Nothing in this title shall apply with respect to any authorization or appropriation for any military application of nuclear energy, for research and development in support of the Armed Forces, or for the common defense and security of the United States. (b)(1) The term "military application" means any activity authorized or permitted by chapter 9 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Public Law 83-703, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2121, 2122). (2) The term "research and development," as used in this section, is defined by section 11 x., of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Public Law 83-703, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2014). (3) The term "common defense and security" means the common defense and security of the United States as used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Public Law 83-703, as amended). SEC. 210. (a) In order to provide economic farm units to qualifying farmers whose land is economically infeasible to reclaim from damages resulting from the Teton flood of June 5, 1976, and who are unable to find suitable replacement land for their flood damaged farm, and in order to restore the economic and agricultural base of the flood damaged region, there is hereby transferred 5,955 acres of land, hereinafter described, in the State of Idaho presently under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy, to the Secretary of the Interior who, acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, shall make such lands available for sale to qualifying farmers according to the terms hereafter provided.

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (b) As used in this section, the term: (1) "Teton flood" means the flood resulting from the collapse of Teton Dam of the Lower Teton Division of the Teton Basin Federal Reclamation Project on June 5, 1976. (2) "Department of Energy land" means those public and acquired lands in the State of Idaho identified as sections numbered fourteen (14), twenty-three (23), twenty-four (24), twenty-five (25), and thirty-six (36), in township six (6) north, or range thirty-three (33) east of the Boise meridian; sections numbered nineteen (19), thirty (30), and thirty-one (31) in township six (6) north, of range thirty-four (34) east of the Boise meridian; and the southeast quarter, the south half of the northeast quarter, the east half of the southwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter, of section numbered eight (8) and the south half of the north half of section numbered nine (9) in township five (5) north, of range thirtyfour (34) east of the Boise meridian, all situated in the county of Jefferson and State of Idaho, and containing 5,955 acres, more or less, which would be transferred for the purposes of this Act. (3) "Qualifying farmer" means the resident, owner-operator of a farm who resides in the immediate locality, whose livelihood is derived from his farming operation and whose land was damaged due to the collapse of the Teton Dam on June 5, 1976, to the extent that in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, it is not economically feasible to reclaim such land so that it produces an income commensurate with that earned prior to^ the Teton flood. (4) "Irrigable land" means farm land that is suitable for irrigated agriculture and has been certified as irrigable by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) For a period of not more than five years after transfer to the Bureau of Reclamation, the land heretofore described shall be available for purchase by those who, on or before October 1, 1978, are determined to be qualifying farmers pursuant to regulations issued in accordance with subsection (f) of this section by the Secretary of the Interior. (d) Department of Energy land as described in subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be certified as irrigable by the Secretary of the Interior, and lands so certified shall be made available in a manner to be prescribed by the Secretary for purchase by qualifying farmers at its current fair market value as determined by a board of appraisers composed of a Federal appraiser, a State appraiser, and one appraiser from the disaster region: Provided, That irrigable land transferred to a single ownership shall not exceed 160 acres of class I land as defined by the Secretary or the equivalent thereof in other land classes as determined by the Secretary. The United States, through the Secretary, shall convey fee simple title of the Department of Energy land to the qualifying farmer. The cost of developing the replacement land for farming shall be borne by the qualifying farmer who purchases the land. (e) Any part of the Department of Energy land remaining in the possession of the Bureau of Reclamation at the end of the five year period, except land needed for public rights-of-way, as determined by the Secretary, shall be returned to the Department of Energy. (f) Within ninety days after the enactment of this Act the Secretary shall prescribe and publish in the Federal Register such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section.

92 STAT. 77 Definitions.

Lands, purchase.

Irrigable lands, certification. Land purchases, fair market value.

Single ownership acreage limitation. Title conveyance. Development costs. Remaining lands, disposition.

Rules and regulations, publication in Federal Register.

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 92 STAT. 78

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

Farm losses, recovery.

Appropriation authorization.

(g) Full recovery for the loss of all or part of flood-damaged farms gj^g^jj j^g obtained by owners pursuant to the Teton Dam Disaster Assistance Act of 1976. Public Law 94-400, 90 Stat. 1211, and the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1976, Public Law 94-438, 90 Stat. 1415. (j^) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as ^^^ j^p necessary for the purposes of administration of this section.

Automotive Propulsion

TITLE III—AUTOMOTIVE PROPULSION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Kesearch and Development Act of 1978.

15 USC 2701 "''t^-

,

^

SHORT TITLE

SEC. 301. This title may be cited as the "Automotive Propulsion Research and Development Act of 1978''. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES

15 USC 2701.

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SEC. 302. (a) The Congress finds that— (1) existing automobile propulsion systems, on the average, fall short of meeting the long-term goals of the Nation with respect to environmental protection, and energy conservation; (2) advanced alternatives to existing automobile propulsion systems could, with sufficient research and development effort, meet these long-term goals, and have the potential to be mass produced at reasonable cost; and advanced automobile propulsion systems could operate with significantly less adverse environmental impact and fuel consumption than existing automobiles, while meeting all of the other requirements of Federal law; (3) insufficient resources are being devoted to both research on and development of advanced automobile propulsion system technology; (4) an expanded research and development effort with respect to advance automobile propulsion system technology would complement and stimulate corresponding efforts by the private sector and would encourage automobile manufacturers to consider seriously the incorporation of such advanced technology into automobiles and automobile components; and (5) the Nation's energy and environmental problems are urgent, and therefore advanced automobile propulsion system technology should be developed, tested, demonstrated, and prepared for manufacture within the shortest practicable time. (b) It is therefore the purpose of the Congress, in this title to— (1)(A) direct the Department of Energy to make contracts and grants for research and development leading to the development of advanced automobile propulsion systems within 5 years of the date of enactment of this Act, or within the shortest practicable time consistent with appropriate research and development techniques, and (B) evaluate and disseminate information with respect to advanced automobile propulsion system technology; (2) preserve, enhance, and facilitate competition in research, development, and production with respect to existing and alternative automobile propulsion systems; and (3) supplement, but neither supplant nor duplicate, the automotive propulsion system research and development efforts of private industry.

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92 STAT. 79

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 303. As used in this title, the term— 15 USC 2702. (1) "advanced automobile propulsion system" means an energy conversion system, including engine and drive train, which utilizes advanced technology and is suitable for use in an advanced automobile; (2) "developer" means any person engaged in whole or in part in research or other efforts directed toward the development of advanced automobile technology; (3) "fuel" means any energy source capable of propelling an automobile; (4) "fuel economy" refers to the average distance traveled in representative driving conditions by an automobile per unit of fuel consumed, as determined by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in accordance with test procedures which shall be established by rule and shall require that fuel economy tests be conducted in conjunction with the exhaust emissions tests mandated by section 206 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 1857f-5); (5) "intermodal adaptability" refers to any characteristics of an automobile which enable it to be operated or carried, or which facilitate its operation or carriage, by or on an alternative mode or other system of transportation; (6) "reliability" refers to (A) the average time and distance over which normal automobile operation can be expected without significant repair or replacement of parts, and (B) the ease of diagnosis and repair of an automobile, its systems, and parts in the event of failure during use or damage from an accident; .,. • (7) "safety" refers to the performance of an automobile propulsion system or equipment in such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable risk of accident and against unreasonable risk of death or bodily injury in case of accident; (8) "State" means any State, the District of Columbia, the .. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or any other territory or possession of the United States. DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SEC. 304. (a) The Secretary of Energy shall establish, within the Advanced Department of Energy, a program to insure the development of automobile advanced automobile propulsion systems within 5 years after the date propulsion of enactment of this Act, or within the shortest practicable time, systems, consistent with appropriate research and development technique. In development program, conducting such program, the Secretary of Energy shall— establishment. (1) establish and conduct new projects and accelerate existing 15 USC 2703. projects which may contribute to the development of advanced automobile propulsion systems; (2) give priority attention to the development of advanced propulsion systems with appropriate attention to those advanced propulsion systems which are flexible in the type of fuel used; and (3) insure that research and development under this title supplements, but neither supplants nor duplicates, the automotive research and development efforts of private industry. (b) The Secretary of Energy shall, in fulfilling his responsibilities Contracts and under this title, make contracts and grants with any Federal agency, grants, laboratory, university, nonprofit organization, industrial organiza-

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 92 STAT. 80

Administrative regulations.

Certification, provisions.

Certifications, availability to congressional committees. 5 USC 500 et seq. 42 USC 5916.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 tion, public or private agency, institution, organization, corporation, partnership, or individual for research and development leading to advanced automobile propulsion systems which are likely to help meet the Nation's long-term goals with respect to fuel economy, environmental protection, and other objectives. (c) In providing financial assistance under this title, the Secretary of Energy shall give fidl consideration to the capabilities of Federal laboratories, except that not more than 60 per centum of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization under section 312 shall be directly expended in Federal laboratories. In accordance with section 307, such laboratories shall be available for testing components and subsystems which, in the Secretary of Energy's judgment, is likely to contribute to the development of advanced automobile propulsion systems. (d) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct evaluations, arrange for tests, and disseminate information pursuant to section 307 and submit reports required under section 310. (e) The Department of Energy shall intensify research in key basic science areas in which the lack of knowledge limits development of advanced automobile propulsion systems. (f)(1) The Secretary of Energy shall insure that the conduct of the program as defined in subsection (a) of this section— (A) supplements the autoniotive propulsion system research and development efforts of industry; (B) is not formulated in a manner that will supplant private industry research and development or displace or lessen industry's research and development; and (C) avoids duplication of private research and development. (2) To that end, the Secretary of Energy shall issue administrative regulations, within 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, which shall specify procedures, standards, and criteria for the timely review for compliance of each new contract, grant. Department of Energy project, or other agency project funded or to be funded under the authority of this Act. Such regulations shall require that the Secretary of Energy or his designee shall certify that each such contract, grant, or project satisfies the requirement of this subsection, and shall include in such certification a discussion of the relationship of any related or comparable industry research and development, in terms of this subsection, to the proposed research and development under the authority of this Act. The discussion shall also address related issues, such as cost sharing and patent rights. (3) Such certifications shall be available to the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate. The provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to such certifications and no court shall have any jurisdiction to review the preparation or adequacy of such certifications; but section 553 of title 5, United States Code, and section 17 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, as amended, shall apply to public disclosure of such certifications. (4) The Secretary of Energy also shall include in the report required by section 310(a) of this Act a detailed discussion of how each research and development contract, grant, or project funded under the authority of this Act satisfies the requirement of this subsection. (5) Further, the Secretary of Energy in each annual budget submission to the Congress, or amendment thereto, for the programs author-

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 65

Question. 65 - OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The mutilation of members;

(2) Blows;

(3) Imprisonment;

(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?

Art. 1 - Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person.

Objection 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority.

Objection 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."

I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above (Q[61], A[1]; Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.

Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says: "Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts."

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): "You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on (Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children.

Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q[32], A[2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave."

I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows.

Art. 3 - Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man.

Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons.

Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy.

I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.

Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.

Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds.

Art. 4 - Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.

Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.

Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy daughters be given,' etc.]."

I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above (FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.

Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q[154], A[8]).


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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 81

ized by this Act shall describe how each identified research and development effort in such submission satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (6) The provisions and requirements of this subsection shall not apply with respect to any contract, grant, or project which was entered into, made, or formally approved and initiated prior to the enactment of this Act, or with respect to any renewal or extension thereof. DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

SEC. 305. The Secretary of Transportation, in furtherance of the Annual report to purposes of this title, shall evaluate the extent to which the automo- Congress. bile industry utilizes advanced automotive technology which is or 15 USC 2704. could be made available to it. The Secretary of Transportation shall submit a report to the Congress each year on the results of such evaluation including any appropriate recommendations which may encourage the utilization of advanced automobile technology by the automobile industry. COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION

S E C 306. (a) The Secretary of Energy shall have overall manage- Program ment responsibility for carrying out the program under section 304. management. In carrying out such program, the Socrotary of Energy, consistent 15 USC 2705. with such oveiall management responsibility— (1) shall utilize the expertise of the Department of Transportation to the extent deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Energy; and (2) may utilize any other Federal agency (except as provided in paragraph (1)) in accordance with subsection (c) in carrying out any activities under this title, to the extent that the Secretary of Energy determines that any such agency has capabilities which would allow such agency to contribute to the purposes of this title. (b) The Secretary of Transportation, whenever the expertise of the contracts and Department of Transportation is utilized in accordance with subsec- grants. tion (a), may exercise the powers granted to the Secretary of Energy under subsection (c) and shall enter into contracts and make grants for such purpose, subject to the overall management responsibility of the Secretary of Energy. (c) The Secretary of Energy may, in accordance with subsection Federal agencies (a), obtain the assistance of any department, agency, or instrumental- cooperation, ity of the executive branch of the Federal Government upon written requests. request, on a reimbursable basis or otherwise and with the consent of such department, agency, or instrumentality. Each such request shall identify the assistance the Secretary of Energy deems necessary to carry out any duty under this title. (d) The Secretary of Energy shall consult with the Administrator ' i.. of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of Transportation, and shall establish procedures for periodic consultation with representatives of science, industry, and such other groups as may have special expertise in the area of automobile propulsion system research, development, and technology. The Secretary of Energy may Advisory panels. establish such advisory panels as he deems appropriate to review and make recommendations with respect to applications for funding under this title.

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 92 STAT. 82

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (e) Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to reduce in any way the responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy for automotive research, development, and demonstration under the Energy Keorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.) and the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.). EVALUATIGN, TESTING, AND INFORMATION

DISSEMINATION

15 USC 2706.

SEC. 307. (a) The Secretary of Energy shall, for the purposes of performing his responsibilities under this title, consider any reasonable new or improved technology, a description of which is submitted •" -5.. to the Secretary of Energy in writing, which could lead or contribute to the development of advanced automobile propulsion system technology. (b) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall test, or cause to be tested, in a facility subject to Environmental Protection Agency supervision, each advanced automobile propulsion system in an appropriately modified production vehicle equipped with such a system developed in whole or in part with Federal financial assistance under this title, or referred to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for such purpose by the Secretary of Energy, to determine whether such vehicle complies with any exhaust emission standards or any other requirements promulgated or reasonably expected to be promulgated under any provision of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq.), the Noise Control Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.), or any other provision of Federal law administered by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. In conjunction with any test for compliance with exhaust emission standards under this section, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall also conduct tests to determine the fuel econEPA test data and omy of such vehicle. The Administrator of the Environmental Proresults, submittal tection Agency shall submit all test data and the results of such tests to Secretary. to the Secretary of Energy. (c) The Secretary of Energy shall collect, analyze, and disseminate to developers information, data, and materials that may be relevant to the development of advanced automobile propulsion system technology. PATENTS

15 USC 2707.

SEC. 308. Section 9 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5908) shall apply to any contract (including any assignment, substitution of parties, or subcontract thereunder) or grant, entered into, made, or issued by the Secretary of Energy under this title. COMPTROLLER GENERAL AUDIT AND

15 USC 2708.

"contract."

EXAMINATION

SEC. 309. Section 306 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5876) shall apply with respect to the authority of the Comptroller General to have access to and rights of examination of books, documents, papers, and records of recipients of financial assistance under this title; except that for the purposes of this title, the term "contract" (as used in section 166 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2206), insofar as it relates to such section 306) means "contract or grant".

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/137

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 83

REPORTS

SEC. 310. (a) As a separate part of the annual report submitted under section 15(a) of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Kesearch and Development Act of 1974 with respect to the comprehensive plan and program then in effect under section 6(a) and (b) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress an annual report of activities under this title. Such report shall include— (1) a current comprehensive program definition for implementing this title; (2) an evaluation of the state of automobile propulsion system research and development in the United States; (3) the number and amount of contracts and grants made under this title; (4) an analysis of the progress made in developing advanced automobile propulsion system technology; and (5) suggestions for improvements in advanced automobile propulsion system research and development, including recommendations for legislation. (b) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct a survey of developers. lending institutions, and other appropriate persons or institutions and shall otherwise make a study for the purpose of determining whether, and under what conditions, research, development, demonstration, and commercial availability of advanced automobile propulsion system technology may be aided by the guarantee of financial obligations by the Federal Government. The Secretary of Energy shall report the results of such survey and study to the Congress within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act. Such report shall include an examination of those stages of advanced automobile propulsion system technology research, development, demonstration, and commercialization for which financial obligation guarantees may be useful or appropriate and shall contain such legislative recommendations as may be necessary.

15 USC 2709. 42 USC 5914. 42 USC 5905. r

•

-Si!:;'; i-.

Survey and study,

AMENDMENT OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT

SEC. 311. (a) Section 102 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451) is amended by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f), and by inserting immediately after subsection (d) the following new subsection: "(e) The Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the unique competence in scientific and engineering systems of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration also be «., - ,..,..; directed toward the development of advanced automobile propulsion systems. Such development shall be conducted so as to contribute to the achievement of the purposes set forth in section 302(b) of the Automotive Propulsion Research and Development Act of 1978.". ^n^«. P- 78. --i (b) The subsection of section 102 of such Act redesignated as subsection (f) by subsection (a) of this section is amended by striking out '. s.: > i; "and (d) " and inserting in lieu thereof " (d), and (e)". AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATION

'

S E C 312. There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the 15 USC 2710. purposes of this title, in addition to any amounts made available for j, such purposes pursuant to title I of this Act, the sum of $12,500,000 for Ante, p. 47. the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978.

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 92 STAT. 84

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 TITLE IV—ESTABLISHMENT O F FINANCIAL S U P P O E T PROGRAM FOR MUNICIPAL WASTE REPROCESSING DEMONSTRATION F A C I L I T I E S

Ante, p. 61.

SEC. 401. The Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.), as amended by section 207 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section: > " F I N A N C I A L SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR M U N I C I P A L WASTE REPROCESSING DEMONSTRATION FACILITIES

42 USC 5920.

Demonstration project.

Municipal waste.

'Municipal.

Federal share.

Regulations. 42 USC 5906.

Compliance, consultation. 42 USC 6984.

"SEC. 20. (a) It is the purpose of this section— " (1) to assure adequate Federal support to foster a program to demonstrate municipal waste reprocessing for the production of fuel and energy intensive products; and "(2) to gather information about the technological, economic, environmental, and social costs, benefits, and impacts of such demonstration facilities. "(b)(1) The Administrator is authorized and directed, to the extent provided in appropriation Acts, to establish such a demonstration program by making grants, contracts, price supports, and cooperative agreements pursuant to this Act or any combination thereof for the establishment of municipal waste reprocessing demonstration facilities. For the purpose of this section municipal waste shall include but not be limited to municipal solid waste, sewage sludge, and other municipal organic wastes. "(2) The aggregate amount of funds available for grants, contracts, price supports, and cooperative agreements for municipal waste reprocessing demonstration facilities shall not exceed $20,000,000 in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978. "(3) For purposes of this section the term 'municipal' shall include any city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other public body created by or pursuant to State law. "(4) Municipal waste reprocessing demonstration facilities established under this section shall be owned or operated (or both owned and operated) by the municipality and shall involve the recovery of energy or energy intensive products. Such facilities may be established by any public or private entity, by contract or otherwise, as may be determined by the local government which will own or operate (or both own and operate) such facilities and to which financial support is provided. The Federal share for any such facility to which this section applies shall not exceed 75 per centum of the cost of such facility, and not more than $40,000,000 in Federal funds under this section may be used for the construction of any one facility. "(5) The Administrator shall promulgate such regulations as he deems necessary, pursuant to section 7(a)(4) and section 7(c)(1) and (6) of this Act, for purposes of establishing a price support program for revenue producing products of municipal waste reprocessing demonstration facilities. "(c)(1) The Administrator shall consult with the Environmental Protection Agency to assure that the provisions of section 8004 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580) are applied in carrying out this section.

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 85

"(2) Any energy-related research, development, or demonstration Project project for the conversion (including bioconversion) of municipal administration. waste carried out by the Energy Kesearch and Development Administration pursuant to this or any other Act shall be administered in accordance with the May 7, 1976, Interagency Agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Energy Research and Development Administration on the development of energy from solid wastes; and specifically, in accordance with such Agreement (A) for those energy-related projects of mutual interest, planning will be conducted jointly by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Energy Research and Development Administration, following which project responsibility will be assigned to one agency; (B) energy-related aspects of projects for recovery of fuels or energy intensive products from municipal waste as defined in this section shall be the responsibility of the Energy Research and Development Administration including energy-related economic and institutional aspects; and (C) the Environmental Protection Agency shall retain responsibility for the environmental and other economic and institutional aspects of solid waste projects and for assurance that such projects are consistent with any applicable suggested guidelines published pursuant to section 1008 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580), and any applicable State 42 USC 6907. or regional waste management plan. "(d)(1) The Administrator shall establish such guidelines as he Guidelines, deems necessary for purposes of obtaining pertinent information from availability to municipalities receiving funding under this section. These guidelines congressional shall include but not be limited to methods of assessment and evalu- committees. ation of projects authorized under this section. Such assessments and evaluations shall be presented by the Administrator to the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources upon the request of either such committee. "(2) The Administrator shall annually submit a report to the Con- Annual report to gress concerning the actions taken or not taken by the Administrator Congress. under this section during the preceding fiscal year, and including but not limited to (A) a discussion of the status of each demonstration facility and related facilities financed under this section, including progress made in the development of such facilities, and the expected or actual production from each such facility including byproduct production therefrom, and the distribution of such products and byproducts, (B) a statement of the financial condition of each such demonstration facility, (C) data concerning the environmental, community, and health and safety impacts of each such facility and the actions taken or planned to prevent or mitigate such impacts, (D) the administrative and other costs incurred by the Administrator and other Federal agencies in carrying out this program, and (E) such other data as may be helpful in keeping Congress and the public fully and currently informed about the program authorized by this section. "(3) The annual reports required by this subsection shall be a part of the annual report required by section 15 of this Act, except that the 42 USC 5914. matters required to be reported by this subsection shall be clearly set out and identified in such annual reports. Such reports shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the House Committee on Science and Technology and to the President of the Senate and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. "(e) No part of the program authorized by this section shall be

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/140

 92 STAT. 86

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 transferred to any other agency or authority, except pursuant to Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section. "(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating any obligations of any municipality receiving financial assistance pursuant to this section to comply with Federal and State environmental, land use, water, and health and safety laws and regulations or to obtain applicable Federal and State permits, licenses, and certificates.". TITLE V—AMENDMENTS TO THE GEOTHERMAL ENERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION ACT

Definitions. 30 USC 1101 note. 30 USC 1121.

ehairman.

30 USC 1123. 30 USC 1125.

Loan guaranty program, establishment. 30 USC 1141.

SEC. 501. As used in this title— (1) the term "Act" means the Geothermal Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1079); and (2) the term "Administrator" means the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration. SEC. 502. Section 101(b) of the Act is amended— (1) by striking out subparagraph (E) of paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: " (E) the Assistant Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration for Solar, Geothermal, and Advanced Energy Systems;"; (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; (3) by adding at the end of paragraph (1) the following new subparagraphs: "(G) an Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; " (H) an Assistant Secretary of Treasury; and " (I) an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture."; and (4) by striking out "one member of the Project" in paragraph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof "the Assistant Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration for Solar, Geothermal, and Advanced Energy Systems". SEC. 503. Section 103(b)(4) of the Act is amended by inserting the phrase "or administrative regulations" after "legislation", and by inserting ", environmental and taxing" after "leasing". SEC. 504. Section 105(e)(3) of the Act is amended by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof "or such assistance would not be adequate to satisfy the goals and requirements of the demonstration program under this section.". SEC. 505. Section 201(b) of the Act is amended by striking out "or" at the end of paragraph (3), by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (4) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or", and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(5) construction and operation of a new commercial, agricultural, or industrial structure or facility or modification and operation of an existing commercial, agricultural, or industrial structure or facility, when geothermal hot water or steam is to be used within or by such structure or facility, or modification thereto, for the purposes of space heating or cooling, industrial or agricultural processes, onsite generation of electricity for use other than for sale or resale in commerce, other commercial applications, or combinations of applications separately eligible under this title for loan guarantee assistance.".

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 SEC. 506. Section 201(b)(4) of the Act is amended by striking out "from" and inserting in lieu thereof "using". SEC. 507. Section 201(c) of the Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "In the case of a guaranty for the purposes specified in subsection (b)(5), the aggregate cost of the project shall be deemed to be that portion of the total cost of construction and operation which is directly related to the utilization of geothermal energy within the structure or facility in question, except that the aggregate cost of the project with respect to which the loan is made may be the total cost including construction and operation in cases where the facility or structure has been located near a geothermal energy resource predominantly for the purpose of utilizing geothermal energy, or as determined by the Administrator the economic viability of the project is substantially dependent upon the performance of the geothermal reservoir.". SEC. 508. Section 201(e) of the Act is amended— (1) by striking out "$25,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$100,000,000: Provided, That in the case of a guaranty under subsection (b)(5), the amount of the guaranty for any loan for a project shall not exceed $50,000,000"; (2) by striking out "$50,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "200,000,000"; and (3) by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: ", unless the Administrator determines in writing that a guaranty in excess of these amounts is in the national interest. Any such determination shall be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives, and to the President of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, accompanied by a full and complete report on the proposed project and guaranty. The proposed guaranty or commitment to guarantee shall not be finalized under authority granted by this Act prior to the expiration of thirty calendar daj^s (not including any date on which either House of Congress is not in session) from the date on which such report is received by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. SEC. 509. Section 201 of the Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: "(g) With respect to any guaranty which is issued after the enactment of this subsection by, or in behalf of, any State, political subdivision, or Indian tribe and which is either guaranteed under, or supported by taxes levied by said issuer which are guaranteed under this title, and for which the interest paid on such obligation and received by the purchaser thereof is included in gross income for the purposes of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code for 1954, as amended, the Administrator shall pay to such issuer out of the fund established by this title such portion of the interest on such obligations, as determined by the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to be appropriated after taking into account current market yields (1) on obligations of such issuer, if any, or (2) on other obligations with similar terms and conditions, the interest on which is not so included in gross income for purposes of chapter 1 of said Code, and in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Administrator shall require in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury. "(h) The full faith and credit of the United States is pledged to the payment of all guaranties issued under this title with respect to principal and interest.

92 STAT. 87 Ante, p. 86. Extent of guaranty.

Limitation.

Determination, transmittal to Speaker of House, President of Senate, and congressional committees. Finalization.

Interest payment consultation.

26 USC 1 et seq.

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 92 STAT. 88

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

Guaranties, fees.

"(i) The Administrator shall charge and collect fees for guaranties in amounts sufficient in his judgment to cover applicable administrative costs and probable losses on guaranteed obligations, but in any event not to exceed 1 per centum per annum of the outstanding indebtedness covered by each guaranty. Fees collected under this subsection shall be deposited in the fund established by this title. "(j) The Secretary of the Treasury shall insure to the maximum extent feasible that the timing, interest rate, and substantial terms and conditions of any guaranty exceeding $25,000,000 will have the minimum possible impact on the capital markets of the United States, taking into account other Federal direct and indirect commercial securities activities.". SEC. 510. Section 202 of the Act is amended to read as follows:

Capital market impact minimization.

30 USC 1142.

"DEFAULT; PAYMENT or INTEREST

Rights, subrogation.

Notification to Attorney General. Payment recovery.

Payments, contracts.

IK

"SEC. 202. (a) If there is a default by the borrower, as defined in regulations promulgated by the Administrator and set forth in the guarantee contract, the holder of the obligation shall have the right to demand payment of the unpaid amount from the Administrator. Within such period as may be specified in the guarantee or related agreements, the Administrator shall pay to the holder of the obligation the unpaid interest on, and unpaid principal of the guaranteed obligation as to which the borrower has defaulted, unless the Administrator finds that there was no default by the borrower in the payment of interest or principal or that such default has been remedied. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any forebearance by the holder of the obligation for the benent of the borrower which may be agreed upon by the parties to the guaranteed obligation and approved by the Administrator,. "(b) If the Administrator makes a payment under subsection (a) of this subsection, the Administrator shall be subrogated to the rights of the recipient of such payment as specified in the guarantee.or related agreements including, where appropriate, the authority (notwithstanding any other provision of law) to complete, maintain, operate, lease, or otherwise dispose of any property acquired pursuant to such guarantee or related agreements, or to permit the borrower, pursuant to an agreement with the Administrator, to continue to pursue the purposes of the project if the Administrator determines this to be in the public interest. The rights of the Administrator with respect to any property acquired pursuant to such guarantee or related agreements, shall be superior to the rights of any other person with respect to such-property. "(c) In the event of a default on any guarantee under this title, the Administrator shall notify the Attorney General, who shall take such action as may be appropriate to recover the amounts of any payments made under subsection (a), including any payment of principal and interest under subsection (d), from such assets of the defaulting borrower as are associated with the project, or from any other security included in the terms of the guarantee. "(d) With respect to any obligation guaranteed under this title, the Administrator is authorized to enter into a contract to pay, and to pay, holders of the obligation, for and on behalf of the borrower, from the Geothernial Resources Development Fund, the principal and interest payments which become due and payable on the unpaid balance of su6li obligation if the Administrator finds that— "(1) the borrower is unable to meet such payments and is not in default; it is in the public interest to permit the borrower to

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