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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 98

Question. 98 - OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?

(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?

(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?

Art. 1 - Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q[89], A[3]), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust.

Objection 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is: "Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury.

On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

I answer that, As stated above (Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply to Objection 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false.

Reply to Objection 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty."

Art. 2 - Whether all perjury is sinful?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed.

Objection 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God.

Reply to Objection 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there is to be understood this requisite condition---that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.

Reply to Objection 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above (FS, Q[96], A[4]).

Art. 3 - Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.

OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name." Therefore it is a mortal sin.

I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A[2]), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[89], A[7], ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

Reply to Objection 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.

Art. 4 - Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person.

Objection 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate'], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.

Objection 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely.

I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Mat. 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer."

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (Q[33], A[7]; Q[68], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1059

 PUBLIC LAW 94-369—JULY 22, 1976

90 STAT. 1009

month period which ends on the last day of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the date of enactment of this title, together with an explanation of the reasons for such decrease. Such reports shall be made as soon as it is practical and, in any case, not more than six months after the date on which the decision to impose such tax increase or decrease, such reductions in employment or services, or such decrease in State financial assistance is made public. PAYMENTS

SEC. 210. (a) IN GENERAL.—From the amount allocated for State 42 USC 6730. and local governments under section 203, the Secretary shall pay not later than five days after the beginning of each quarter to each State and to each local government which has filed a statement of assurances under section 205, an amount equal to the amount allocated to such State or local government under section 203. (b) ADJUSTMENTS.—Payments under this title may be made with necessary adjustments on account of overpayments or underpayments. (c) TERMINATION.—No amount shall be paid to any State or local government under the provisions of this section for any calendar quarter if— (1) the average rate of unemployment within the jurisdiction of such State or local government during the most recent calendar quarter which ended three months before the beginning of such calendar quarter was less than 4.5 percent, and (2) the rate of unemployment within the jurisdiction of such government for the last month of the most recent calendar quarter which ended three months before the beginning of such calendar quarter did not exceed 4.5 percent. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ECONOMIZATION

SEC. 211. Each State or unit of local government which receives 42 USC 6731. payments under this title shall provide assurances in writing to the Secretary, at such time and in such manner and form as the Secretary may prescribe by rule, that it has made substantial economies in its operations and that payments under this title are necessary to maintain essential services without weakening Federal Government efforts to stimulate the economy through reductions in Federal tax obligations. WITHHOLDING

SEC. 212. Whenever the Secretary, after affording reasonable notice Notice and and an opportunity for a hearing to any State or unit of local govern- hearing, ment, finds that there has been a failure to comply substantially with ^^ ^^^ ^^^2any assurance set forth in the statement of assurances of that State or units of local government filed under section 205, the Secretary shall notify that State or unit of local government that further payments will not be made under this title until he is satisfied that there is no longer any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied, no further payments shall be made under this title. REPORTS

SEC. 213. The Secretary shall report to the Congress as soon as is 42 USC 6733. practical after the end of each calendar quarter during which payments are made under the provisions of this title. Sucli report shall include information on the amounts paid to each State and units of

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 90 STAT. 1010

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PUBLIC LAW 94-369—JULY 22, 1976

local government and a description of any action which the Secretary has taken under the provisions of section 212 during the previous calendar quarter. The Secretary shall report to Congress as soon as is practical after the end of each calendar year during which payments are made under the provisions of this title. Such reports shall include detailed information on the amounts paid to State and units of local government under the provisions of this title, any actions with which the Secretary has taken under the provisions of section 212. and an evaluation of the purposes to which amounts paid under this title were put by State and units of local government and economic impact ' ' ' of such expenditures during the previous calendar year. ADMINISTRATION

42 USC 6734.

SEC. 214. (a) RULES.—The Secretary is authorized to prescribe, after consultation with the Secretary of Labor, such rules as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out his functions under this title. Such T'ules should be prescribed by the Secretary not later than ninety days of the effective date of this title. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the administration of this title. PROGRAM S T U D I E S AND

42 USC 6735.

Report to Congress.

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Report to Congress.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SEC. 215. (a) EVALUATION.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an investigation of the impact which emergency support grants have on the operations of State and local governments and on the national economy. Before and during the course of such investigation the Comptroller General shall consult with and coordinate his activities with the Congressional Budget Office and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Comptroller General shall report the results of such investigation to the Congress within one year after the date of enactment of this title together with an evaluation of the macroeconomic effect of the program established under this title and any recommendations for improving the effectiveness of similar programs. All officers and employees of the United States shall make available all information, reports, data, and any other material necessary to carry out the provisions of this subsection to the Comptroller General upon a reasonable request. (b) COUNTERCYCLICAL STUDY.—The Congressional Budget Office and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations shall conduct a study to determine the most effective means by which the Federal Government can stabilize the national economy during periods of rapid economic growth and high inflation through programs directed toward State and local governments. Such study shall include a comparison of the effectiveness of alternative factors for triggering and measuring the extent of the fiscal coordination problem addressed by this program, and the effect of the recession on State and local expenditures. Before and during the course of such study, the Congressional Budget Office and the Advisory Commission shall consult with and coordinate their activities with the Comptroller General of the United States. The Congressional Budget Office and the Advisory Commission shall report the results of such study to Congress within two years after the date of enactment of this title. Such study shall include the opinions of the Comptroller General with respect to such study.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1061

 PUBLIC LAW 94-369—JULY 22, 1976

90 STAT. 1011

TITLE III — FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS SEC. 301. There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, other than sections 206, 208, and 209, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977, not to exceed $700,000,000 which sum (subject to such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts) shall be allotted to each State listed in column 1 of table IV contained in House Public Works and Transportation Committee Print numbered 94-25 in accordance with the percentages provided for such State (if any) in column 5 of such table. The sum authorized by this section shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any funds otherwise authorized to carry out such title during such fiscal year. Any sums allotted to a State under this section shall be available until expended. CARL ALBERT

Speaker of the House of Representatives. JOHN CULVER

Acting President of the Senate pro tempore. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, July 21, 1976. The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the bill (S. 3201) entitled "An Act to authorize a local public works capital development and investment program, to establish an antirecessionary program, and for other purposes", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the Senate, in which it originated, it was Resolved, That the said bill pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative. Attest: FRANCIS R. VALEO

Secretary. I certify that this Act originated in the Senate. FRANCIS R. VALEO

Secretary. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S., July 22, 1976. The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the bill (S. 3201) entitled "An Act to authorize a local public works capital development and investment program, to establish an antirecessionary program, and for other purposes", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the Senate, in which it originated, and passed by the Senate on reconsideration of the same, it was

Appropriation authorization. 33 USC 1287 33*ug(^281

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 99

Question. 99 - OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is sacrilege?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of the species of sacrilege;

(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.

Art. 1 - Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.

Objection 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; FS, Q[101], A[4]), a thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people." Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.

Art. 2 - Whether sacrilege is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.

I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.

Art. 3 - Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.

Objection 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.

Objection 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.

On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

Reply to Objection 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.

Art. 4 - Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?
Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction." But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.

On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver."

I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.

Reply to Objection 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.

Reply to Objection 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.

Reply to Objection 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.


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 90 STAT. 1012

PUBLIC LAW 94-369—JULY 22, 1976 Resolved, That the said bill pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same. Attest:

'

EDMUND L. HENSHAW, JR.

Clerk.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-1077 accompanying H.R. 12972 (Coram, on Public Works and Transportation) and No. 94-1260 (Coram, of Conference). SENATE REPORTS: No. 94-710 (Corara. on Public Works) and No. 94-939 (Comra. of Conference). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): Apr. 12, 13, considered and passed Senate. May 13, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 12972. June 16, Senate agreed to conference report. June 23, House agreed to conference report. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 12, No. 28: July 6, vetoed; Presidential message. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): July 2 1, Senate overrode veto. July 22, House overrode veto. ' ' '' *

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976

90 STAT. 1013

Public Law 94-370 94th Congress An Act To iuipiove coastal zone management in the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Avierica in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976". SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Section 302 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451) is amended— (1) by inserting "ecological," immediately after "recreational," in subsection (b); (2) by striking out— (A) the semicolon at the end of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively, and (B) "; and" at the end of subsection (g), and inserting in lieu of such matter at each such place a period; and (3) by inserting immediately after subsection (h) the follow= "(i) The national objective of attaining a greater degree of energy self-sufficiency would be advanced by providing Federal financial assistance to meet state and local needs resulting from new or expanded energy activity in or aft'ecting the coastal zone.", SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. Section 304 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1453) is amended— (1) by redesignating paragraph (a) as paragraph (1), and by amending the first sentence of such paragraph (1) (as so redesignated)— (A) by striking out "'Coastal" and inserting in lieu thereof "The term 'coastal"; and (B) by inserting immediately after "and includes" the following: "islands,"; (2) by redesignating paragraph (b) as paragraph (2), and by amending such paragraph (2) (as so redesignated)— (A) by striking out " 'Coastal" and inserting in lieu thereof "The term 'coastal"; and (B) by striking out " (1) " and " (2) " and inserting in lieu thereof " (A) " and " (B)", respectively; (3) by striking out "(c) 'Coastal" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3) The term 'coastal"; (4) by inserting immediately before paragraph (d) thereof the following: "(4) The term 'coastal energy activity' means any of the following activities if, and to the extent that (A) the conduct, support, or facilitation of such activity requires and involves the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of any equipment or facility; and (B) any technical requirement exists which, in the determination of the Secretary, necessitates that the siting, construction, expansion, or

July 26, 1976 [S. 5861 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976. 16 USC 1451 note.

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 90 STAT. 1014

,

tj -

Post, p. 1019. 16 USC 1456.

PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976 operation of such equipment or facility be carried out in, or in close proximity to, the coastal zone of any coastal state; "(i) Any outer Continental Shelf energy activity, "(ii) Any transportation, conversion, treatment, transfer, or storage of liquefied natural gas. "(iii) Any transportation, transfer, or storage of oil, natural gas, or coal (including, but not limited to, by means of any deepwater port, as defined in section 3 (10) of the Deep water Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1502(10))). P'or purposes of this paragraph, the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of any equipment or facility shall be 'in close proximity to' the coastal zone of any coastal state if such siting, construction, expansion, or operation has, or is likely to have, a significant effect on such coastal zone. "(5) The term 'energy facilities' means any equipment or facility which is or will be used primarily— "(A) in the exploration for, or the development, production, conversion, storage, transfer, processing, or transportation of, any energy resource; or "(B) for the manufacture, production, or assembly of equipment, machinery, products, or devices which are involved in any activity described in subparagraph (A). The term includes, but is not limited to (i) electric generating plants; (ii) petroleum refineries and associated facilities; (iii) gasification plants; (iv) facilities used for the transportation, conversion, treatment, transfer, or storage of liquefied natural gas; (v) uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel processing facilities; (vi) oil and gas facilities, including platforms, assembly plants, storage depots, tank farms, crew and supply bases, and refining complexes; (vii) facilities including deep water i^orts, for the transfer of petroleum; (viii) pipelines and transmission facilities; and (ix) terminals which are associated with any of the foregoing."; (5) by striking out "(d) 'Estuary' " and inserting in lieu thereof "(6) The term 'estuary'"; (6) by redesignating paragraph (e) as paragraph (7) and by amending such paragraph (7) (as so redesignated) — (A) by striking out "'Estuarine" and inserting in lieu thereof "The term 'estuarine", and ^ (B) by striking out "estuary, adjoining transitional areas, and adjacent uplands, constituting" and inserting in lieu ii H; thereof the following: "estuary and any island, transitional area, and upland in, adjoining, or adjacent to such estuary, 1,'-: and which constitutes"; (7) by striking out paragraph (f) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(8) The term 'Fund' means the Coastal Energy Impact Fund established by section 308(h). "(9) The term 'land use' means activities which are conducted in, or on the shorelands within, the coastal zone, subject to the requirements outlined in section 307(g). "(10) The term 'local government' means any political subdivision of, or any special entity created by, any coastal state which (in whole or part) is located in, or has authority over, such state's coastal zone and which (A) has authority to levy taxes, or to establish and collect user fees, or (B) provides any public facility or public service which is financed in whole or part by taxes or user fees. The term includes, but is not limited to, any school district, fire district, transportation authority, and any other special purpose district or authority.";
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 PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976 (8) by striking out "(g) 'Management" and inserting in lieu thereof " (11) The term 'management"; (9) by inserting immediately after paragraph (11) (as redesignated by paragraph (8) of this section) the following: "(12) The term 'outer Continental Shelf energy activity' means any exploration for, or any development or production of, oil or natural gas from the outer Continental Shelf (as defined in section 2(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 (a))), or the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of any new or expanded energy facilities directly required by such exploration, development, or production. "(13) The term 'person' means any individual; any corporation, partnership, association, or other entity organized or existing under the laws of any state; the Federal Government; any state, regional, or local government; or any entity of any such Federal, state, regional, or local government. "(14) The term 'public facilities and public services' means facilities or services which are financed, in whole or in part, by any state or political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, highways and secondary roads, parking, mass transit, docks, navigation aids, fire and police protection, water supply, waste collection and treatment (including drainage), schools and education, and hospitals and health care. Such term may also include any other facility or service so financed which the Secretary finds will support increased population. "(15) The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce."; (10) by striking out "(h) 'Water" and inserting in lieu thereof " (16) The term 'water"; and (11) by striking out paragraph (i). SEC. 4. MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GRANTS. Section 305 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1454) is amended to read as follows: u MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

90 STAT. 1015

. v.

GRANTS

"SEC. 305. (a) The Secretary may make grants to any coastal state— " (1) under subsection (c) for the purpose of assisting such state in the development of a management program for the land and ' water resources of its coastal zone; and " "(2) under subsection (d) for the purpose of assisting such state in the completion of the development, and the initial implementation, of its management program before such state qualifies for administrative grants under section 306. Post, p. 1017. "(b) The management program for each coastal state shall include Requirements, each of the following requirements: "(1) An identification of the boundaries of the coastal zone subject to the management program. "(2) A definition of what shall constitute permissible land uses and water uses within the coastal zone which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters. "(3) An inventory and designation of areas of particular concern within the coastal zone. " (4) An identification of the means by which the state proposes to exert control over the land uses and water uses referred to in

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 90 STAT. 1016 V

PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976

.) paragraph (2), including a listing of relevant constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and judicial decisions. "(5) Broad guidelines on priorities of uses in particular areas, including specifically those uses of lowest priority. "(6) A description of the organizational structure proposed to V implement such management program, including the responsibilities and interrelationships of local, areawade, state, regional, and interstate agencies in the management process. "(7) A definition of the term 'beach' and a planning process for the protection of, and access to, public beaches and other public coastal areas of environmental, recreational, historical, esthetic, ecological, or cultural value. " (8) A planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which may significantly affect, the coastal zone, including, but not limited to, a process for anticipating and managing the impacts from such facilities. "(9) A planning process for (A) assessing the effects of shoreline erosion (however caused), and (B) studying and evaluating ways to control, or lessen the impact of, such erosion, and to restore areas adversely affected by such erosion. No management program is required to meet the requirements in para, graphs (7), (8), and (9) before October 1, 1978. "(c) The Secretary may make a grant annually to any coastal state for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) if such state reason. ably demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such grant will be used to develop a management program consistent with the Post, p. 1017. requirements set forth in section 306. The amount of any such grant shall not exceed 80 per centum of such state's costs for such purposes in any one year. No coastal state is eligible to receive more than four grants pursuant to this subsection. After the initial grant is made to any coastal state pursuant to this subsection, no subsequent grant shall be made to such state pursuant to this subsection unless the Secretary finds that such state is satisfactorily developing its management program. "(d)(1) The Secretary may make a grant annually to any coastal state for the purposes described in subsection (a)(2) if the Secretary finds that such state meets the eligibility requirements set forth in ' paragraph (2). The amount of any such grant shall not exceed 80 per centum of the costs for such purposes in any one year. Eligibility. " (2) A coastal state is eligible to receive grants under this subsection if it has— " (A) developed a management program which— "(i) is in compliance with the rules and regulations promulgated to carry out subsection (b), but "(ii) has not yet been approved by the Secretary under section 306; "(B) specifically identified, after consultation with the Secretary, any deficiency in such program which makes it ineligible for approval by the Secretary pursuant to section 306, and has established a reasonable time schedule during which it can remedy any such deficiency; "(C) specified the purposes for which any such grant will be used; "(D) taken or is taking adequate steps to meet any requirePost, p. 1018. ment under section 306 or 307 which involves any Federal official or agency; and

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90 STAT. 1017

" (E) complied with any other requirement which the Secretary, by rules and regulations, prescribes as being necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection. "(3) No management program for which grants are made under this subsection shall be considered an approved program for purposes of section 307. 16 USC 1456. "(e) Grants under this section shall be made to, and allocated among, Rules and the coastal states pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by regulations, the Secretary; except that— "(1) no grant shall be made under this section in an amount which is more than 10 per centum of the total amount appropriated to carry out the purposes of this section, but the Secretary may waive this limitation in the case of any coastal state which is eligible for grants under subsection (d); and "(2) no grant shall be made under this section in an amount which is less than 1 per centum of the total amount appropriated to carry out the purposes of this section, but the Secretary shall waive this limitation in the case of any coastal state which requests such a waiver. "(f) The amount of any grant (or portion thereof) made under this section which is not obligated by the coastal state concerned during the fiscal year for which it was first authorized to be obligated by such state, or during the fiscal year immediately following, ghall revert to , the Secretary who shall add such amount to the funds available for grants under this section. "(g) With the approval of the Secretary, any coastal state may allocate to any local government, to any areawide agency designated under section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, to any regional agency, or to any interstate agency, a 42 USC 3334. portion of any grant received by it under this section for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section. "(h) Any coastal state which has completed the development of its management program shall submit such program to the Secretary for review and approval pursuant to section 306. Whenever the Secretary I^fra^ approves the management program of any coastal state under section 306, such state thereafter— "(1) shall not be eligible for grants under this section; except that such state may receive grants under subsection (c) in order to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of • • • subsection (b); and " (2) shall be eligible for g r a n t s under section 306. " (i) The authority to make g r a n t s under this section shall expire on Expiration date. September 30, 1979.". SEC. 5. ADMINISTRATIVE GRANTS. Section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1455) is amended— (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: " (a) The Secretary may make a grant annually to any coastal state for not more than 80 per centum of the costs of administering such state's management program if the Secretary (1) finds that such program meets the requirements of section 305(b), and (2) approves such Ante, p. 1015.. program in accordance with subsections (c), (d), and (e)."; (2) by amending subsection (c)(2)(B) by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "; except that the Secretary shall not find any mechanism to be 'effective' for purposes of this subparagraph unless it includes each of the following requirements:

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Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for City of Richmond/Dissent Merhige

Merhige, District Judge (dissenting).

I am in full accord with the majority as to their conclusion that this action does not fit within the compass of Fed. R.Civ.P. 23. Regretfully, however, my views as to the constitutionality of the statute in question, as it applies to consenting adults acting in the privacy of their homes, does not conform with theirs. In my view, in the absence of any legitimate interest or rational basis to support the statute's application we must, without regard to our own proclivities and reluctance to judicially bar the state proscription of homosexuality, hold the statute as it applies to the plaintiffs to be violative of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), is, as the majority points out, premised on the right of privacy, but I fear my brothers have misapplied its precedential value through an apparent over-adherence to its factual circumstances.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of individuals to make personal choices, unfettered by arbitrary and purposeless restraints, in the private matters of marriage and procreation. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 169, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); accord Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. 479, 498, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (Harlan, J., concurring). I view those cases as standing for the principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern. A mature individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her own home, would appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private and intimate concern. Private consensual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest.

In my view, the reliance of the majority on Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting statement in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961), is misplaced. An analysis of the cases indicates that in 1965 when Griswold, which invalidated a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples, was decided, at least three of the Court, relying primarily on Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, and Mr. Justice Harlan himself, would not have been willing to attach the right of privacy to homosexual conduct. In my view, Griswold applied the right of privacy to its particular factual situation. That the right of privacy is not limited to the facts of Griswold is demonstrated by later Supreme Court decisions. After Griswold, by virtue of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 430, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the legal viability of a marital-nonmarital distinction in private sexual acts if not eliminated, was at the very least seriously impaired. In Eisenstadt, supra, the Court declined to restrict the right of privacy in sexual matters to married couples:

Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038.

See also, Lovisi v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp. 620, 625 (E.D.Va.1973).

In significantly diminishing the importance of the marital-nonmarital distinction, the Court to a great extent vitiated any implication that the state can, as suggested by Mr. Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, forbid extra-marital sexuality, and such implications are no longer fully accurate.

"It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy." 367 U.S. 498, at 553, 81 S.Ct. 1752, at 1782 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Griswold, supra, in its context, applied the right of privacy in sexual matters to the marital relationship. Eisenstadt, supra, however, clearly demonstrates that the right to privacy in sexual relationships is not limited to the marital relationship. Both Roe, supra, and Eisenstadt, supra, cogently demonstrate that intimate personal decisions or private matters of substantial importance to the well-being of the individuals involved are protected by the Due Process Clause. The right to select consenting adult sexual partners must be considered within this category. The exercise of that right, whether heterosexual or homosexual, should not be proscribed by state regulation absent compelling justification.

This approach does not unqualifiedly sanction personal whim. If the activity in question involves more than one participant, as in the instant case, each must be capable of consenting, and each must in fact consent to the conduct for the right of privacy to attach. For example, if one of the participants in homosexual contact is a minor, or force is used to coerce one of the participants to yield, the right will not attach. Towley v. Peyton, 303 F.Supp. 581 (W.D.Va. 1969); Hughes v. State, 14 Md.App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972). Similarly, the right of privacy cannot be extended to protect conduct that takes place in publicly frequented areas. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); Lovisi v. Slayton, supra, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.Va.1973). However, if the right of privacy does apply to specific courses of conduct, legitimate state restriction on personal autonomy may be justified only under the compelling state interest test. See Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. 113, 215-18, 93 S.Ct. 705 (Douglas, J., concurring).

Plaintiffs are adults seeking protection from the effects of the statute under attack in order to engage in homosexual relations in private. Viewing the issue as we are bound to, as Mr. Justice Blackmun stated in Roe v. Wade, supra, at 116, 93 S.Ct. at 709, "by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and predilection," it is my view that they are entitled to be protected in their right to privacy by the Due Process Clause.

The defendants, represented by the highest legal officer of the state, made no tender of any evidence which even impliedly demonstrated that homosexuality causes society any significant harm. No effort was made by the defendants to establish either a rational basis or a compelling state interest so as to justify the proscription of § 8.1-212 of the Code of Virginia, presently under attack. To suggest, as defendants do, that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will in some manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution of existing ones is unworthy of judicial response. In any event, what we know as men is not forgotten as judges--it is difficult to envision any substantial number of heterosexual marriages being in danger of dissolution because of the private sexual activities of homosexuals.

On the basis of this record one can only conclude that the sole basis of the proscription of homosexuality was what the majority refers to as the promotion of morality and decency. As salutary a legislative goal as this may be, I can find no authority for intrusion by the state into the private dwelling of a citizen. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) teaches us that socially condemned activity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and was intended by the Constitution to be beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the privacy of the home. "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home,...." United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 43 S.Ct. 2674, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973). Whether the guarantee of personal privacy springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, or, as I believe, in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that fundamental rights of such an intimate facet of an individual's life as sex, absent circumstances warranting intrusion by the state, are to be respected. My brothers, I respectfully suggest, have by today's ruling misinterpreted the issue--the issue centers not around morality or decency, but the constitutional right of privacy.

I respectfully note my dissent.


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 90 STAT. 1018 Notice.

PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976
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"(i) Such management agency is required, before implementing any management program decision which would conflict with any local zoning ordinance, decision, or other action, to send a notice of such management program decision to any local government whose zoning authority is affected thereby. " (ii) Any such notice shall provide that such local govern•' ment may, within the 30-day period commencing on the date of receipt of such notice, submit to the management agency • written comments on such management program decision, and any recommendation for alternatives thereto, if no action is taken during such period which would conflict or interfere with such management program decision, unless such local government waives its right to comment. "(iii) Such management agency, if any such comments are submitted to it, with such 30-day period, by any local government— " (I) is required to consider any such comments, " ( II) is authorized, in its discretion, to hold a public hearing on such comments, and ^ ^ "(III) ma^y not take any action within such 30-day period to implement the management program decision, whether or not modified on the basis of such comments."; (3) by amending subsection (c)(8) to read as follows— "(8) The management program provides for adequate consideration of the national interest involved in planning for, and in the siting of, facilities (including energy facilities in, or which significantly affect, such state's coastal zone) which are necessary '' i ^ to meet requirements which are other than local in nature. In the case of such energy facilities, the Secretary shall find that the state has given such consideration to any applicable interstate energy plan or program."; (4) by amending subsection (g) to read as follows: '' "(g) Any coastal state may amend or modify the management program which it has submitted and which has been approved by the Secretary under this section, pursuant to the required procedures described in subsection (c). Except with respect to any such amendment which is made before October 1, 1978, for the purpose of complying with the Ante, p. 1015. requirements of paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of section 305(b), no grant shall be made under this section to any coastal state after the date of such an amendment or modification, until the Secretary ! < ".:n • approves such amendment or modification.". SEC. 6. CONSISTENCY AND MEDIATION. Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1456) is amended— (1) by striking out "INTERAGENCY" in the title of such section; (2) by striking out the last sentence of subsection (b); (3) by amending subsection (c)(3) by inserting "(A) "immediately after "(3)", and by adding at the end thereof the following: "(B) After the management program of any coastal state has been 16 USC 1455. approved by the Secretary under section 306, any person who submits to the Secretary of the Interior any plan for the exploration or development of, or production from, any area which has been leased under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.) and regulations under such Act shall, with respect to any exploration, development, or production described in such plan and affecting any land use or water use in the coastal zone of such state, attach to such

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1069

 PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976 plan a certification that each activity which is described in detail in such plan complies with such state's approved management program and will be carried out in a manner consistent with such program. No Federal official or agency shall grant such person any license or permit for any activity described in detail in such plan until such state or its designated agency receives a copy of such certification and plan, together with any other necessary data and information, and until— "(i) such state or its designated agency, in accordance with the procedures required to be established by such state pursuant to subparagraph (A), concurs with such person's certification and notifies the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior of such concurrence; "(ii) concurrence by such state with such certification is conclusively presumed, as provided for in subparagraph (A); or "(iii) the Secretary finds, pursuant to subparagraph (A), that each activity which is described in detail in such plan is consistent with the objectives of this title or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security. If a state concurs or is conclusively presumed to concur, or if the Secretary makes such a finding, the provisions of subparagraph (A) are not applicable with respect to such person, such state, and any Federal license or permit which is required to conduct any activity affecting land uses or water uses in the coastal zone of such state whicn is described in detail in the plan to which such concurrence or finding applies. If such state objects to such certification and if the Secretary fails to make a finding under clause (iii) with respect to such certification, or if such person fails substantially to comply with such plan as submitted, such person shall submit an amendment to such plan, or a new plan, to the Secretary of the Interior. With respect to any amendment or new plan submitted to the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the preceding sentence, the applicable time period for purposes of concurrence by conclusive presumption under subparagraph (A) is 3 months."; and (4) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(h) In case of serious disagreement between any Federal agency and a coastal state— "(1) in the development or the initial implementation of a management program under section 305; or (2) in the administration of a management program approved under section 306; the Secretary, with the cooperation of the Executive Office of the President, shall seek to mediate the differences involved in such disagreement. The process of such mediation shall, with respect to any disagreement described in paragraph (2), include public hearings which shall be conducted in the local area concerned.". SEC. 7. COASTAL ENERGY IMPACT PROGRAM. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 is further amended by redesignating sections 308 through 315 as sections 311 through 318, respectively; and by inserting immediately after section 307 the following:

90 STAT. 1019

Ante, p. 1015. 16 USC 1455.

16 USC 1457-1464.

"COASTAL ENERGY IMPACT PROGRAM

"SEC. 308. (a)(1) The Secretary shall administer and coordinate, as part of the coastal zone management activities of the Federal Government provided for under this title, a coastal energy impact program. Such program shall consist of the provision of financial

16 USC 1456a.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 101

Question 101 - OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety:

(1) To whom does piety extend?

(2) What does piety make one offer a person?

(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?

(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?

Art. 1 - Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons.

Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service."

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.

Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where is My honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word 'pious' to God Himself."

Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.

Art. 2 - Whether piety provides support for our parents?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents.

Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents.

Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's parents.

On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents.

I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor."

Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mat. 15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father because it is due to him as to one greater.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

Art. 3 - Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice.

I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.

Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father."

Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.

Art. 4 - Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion?
Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of James and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied: "Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Objection 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honor we owe them.

I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to good." Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, as stated above (FS, Q[7], A[2]; FS, Q[18], A[3]), the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk. 12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred."

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter." Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them." For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the funeral." Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Lk. 9, "this disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him."

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Mat. 25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.

Reply to Objection 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for his parents' support.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1070

 90 STAT. 1020

Post, p. 1030. Rules and regulations. 16 USC 1463. Grants. Calculations.

PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976 assistance to meet the needs of coastal states and local governments in such states resulting from specified activities involving energy development. Such assistance, which includes— "(A) grants, under subsection (b), to coastal states for the purposes set forth in subsection (b)(4) with respect to consequences resulting from the energy activities specified therein; "(B) grants, under subsection (c), to coastal states for study of, and planning for, consequences relating to new or expanded energy facilities in, or which significantly aifect, the coastal zone; "(C) loans, under subsection (d)(1), to coastal states and units of general purpose local government to assist such states and units to provide new or improved public facilities or public services which are required as a result of coastal energy activity; "(D) guarantees, under subsection (d)(2) and subject to the provisions of subsection (f), of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued by coastal states and units of general purpose local government for the purpose of providing new or improved public facilities or public services which are required as a result of coastal energy activity; " (E) grants or other assistance, under subsection (d)(3), to coastal states and units of general purpose local government to enable such states and units to meet obligations under loans or guarantees under subsection (d)(1) or (2) which they are unable to meet as they mature, for reasons specified in subsection (d)(3); and " (F) grants, under subsection (d)(4), to coastal states which have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer any unavoidable loss of a valuable environmental or rex;reational resource; shall be provided, administered, and coordinated by the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of this section and under the rules and regulations required to be promulgated pursuant to paragraph (2). Any such financial assistance shall be subject to audit under section 313. "(2) The Secretary shall promulgate, in accordance with section 317, such rules and regulations (including, but not limited to, those required under subsection (e)) as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of this section. "(b)(1) The Secretary shall make grants annually to coastal states, in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. "(2) The amounts granted to coastal states under this subsection shall be, with respect to any such state for any fiscal year, the sum of the amounts calculated, with respect to such state, pursuant to subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D): "(A) An amount which bears, to one-third of the amount appropriated for the purpose of funding grants under this subsection for such fiscal year, the same ratio that the amount of outer Continental Shelf acreage which is adjacent to such state and which is newly leased by the Federal Government in the immediately preceding fiscal year bears to the total amount of outer Continental Shelf acreage which is newly leased by the Federal Government in such preceding year. "(B) An amount which bears, to one-sixth of the amount appropriated for such purpose for such fiscal year, the same ratio that the volume of oil and natural gas produced in the immediately preceding fiscal year from the outer Continental Shelf acreage which is adjacent to such state and which is leased by the Federal

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1071

 PUBLIC LAW 94-370—JULY 26, 1976 Government bears to the total volume of oil and natural gas produced in such year from all of the outer Continental Shelf acreage which is leased by the Federal Government. "(C) An amount which bears, to one-sixth of the amount appropriated for such purpose for such fiscal year, the same ratio that the volume of oil and natural gas produced from outer Continental Shelf acreage leased by the Federal Government which is first landed in such state in the immediately preceding fiscal year bears to the total volume of oil and natural gas produced from all outer Continental Shelf acreage leased by the Federal Government which is first landed in all of the coastal states in such year. "(D) An amount which bears, to one-third of the amount appropriated for such purpose for such fiscal year, the same ratio that the number of individuals residing in such state in the immediately preceding fiscal year who obtain new employment in such year as a result of new or expanded outer Continental Shelf energy activities bears to the total number of individuals residing in all of the coastal states in such year who obtain new employment in such year as a result of such outer Continental Shelf energy activities. "(3)(A) The Secretary shall determine annually the amounts of the grants to be provided under this subsection and shall collect and evaluate such information as may be necessary to make such determinations. Each Federal department, agency, and instrumentality shall provide to the Secretary such assistance in collecting and evaluating relevant information as the Secretary may request. The Secretary shall request the assistance of any appropriate state agency in collecting and evaluating such information. "(B) For purposes of making calculations under paragraph (2), outer Continental Shelf acreage is adjacent to a particular coastal state if such acreage lies on that state's side of the extended lateral seaward boundaries of such state. The extended lateral seaward boundaries of a coastal state shall be determined as follows: " (i) If lateral seaward boundaries have been clearly defined or fixed by an interstate compact, agreement, or judicial decision (if entered into, agreed to, or issued before the date of the enactment of this paragraph), such boundaries shall be extended on the basis of the principles of delimitation used to so define or fix them in such compact, agreement, or decision. "(ii) If no lateral seaward boundaries, or any portion thereof, have been clearly defined or fixed by an interstate compact, agreement, or judicial decision, lateral seaward boundaries shall be determined according to the applicable principles of law, including the principles of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and extended on the basis of such principles. " (iii) If, after the date of enactment of this paragraph, two or more coastal states enter into or amend an interstate compact or agreement in order to clearly define or fix lateral seaward boundaries, such boundaries shall thereafter be extended on the basis of the principles of delimitation used to so define or fix them in such compact or agreement, "(C) For purposes of making calculations under this subsection, the transitional quarter beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, shall be included within the fiscal year endine: June 30, 1976.

90 STAT. 1021

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