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76 Stat. 480.

Ante, p. 131780 Stat. 625. Effective date.

76 Stat. 518.

76 Stat. 518. 10 USC 1 3 5, 1 3 6.

PUBLIC LAW 92-596-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

leave accrued before entering a missing status, accrue not more than one hundred and fifty days' leave during the period he is in a missing status, unless his actual death occurs on a date when, had he lived, he would have accrued leave in excess of one hundred and fifty days, in which event settlement will be made for the number of days accrued to the actual date of death. Leave so accrued in a missing status shall be accounted for separately and paid for under the provisions of section 501 of title 37." SEC. 2. Section 501 of title 37, United States Code, is amended— (1) by striking out "section," in the first sentence of subsection (d) and inserting in place thereof "section and for accumulated leave under subsection (h) of this section,"; and (2) by adding the following new subsection: " (h) Payment shall be made for all leave accumulated under section 701(g) of title 10 as soon as possible after the name of the person concerned is removed from a missing status, as defined in section 551(2) of this title." SEC. 3. The first and second sections of this Act become effective as of February 28, 1961. SEC. 4. Chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Section 134 is amended to read as follows: duties; precedence " (a) There are two Deputy Secretaries of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as a Deputy Secretary of Defense within ten years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. " (b) The Deputy Secretaries shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Deputy Secretaries, in the order of precedence, designated by the President shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Secretary when the Secretary is disabled or there is no Secretary of Defense. "(c) The Deputy Secretaries take precedence in the Department of Defense immediately after the Secretary." (2) Sections 135(c) and 136(e) are each amended by striking out "Deputy Secretary" and inserting in place thereof "Deputy Secretaries". (3) The item in the analysis relating to section 134 is amended to read as follows: "134. Deputy Secretaries of Defense: appointment; powers and duties; precedence."
 * § 134. Deputy Secretaries of Defense: appointment; powers and

70A Stat. 8. 80 Stat. 460.

78 Stat. 169. 76 Stat. 517.

SEC, 5. Section 171(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "the" and inserting in place thereof "a". SEC. 6. Section 5313(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: "(1) Deputy Secretaries of Defense (2)." SEC. 7. Section 303(c) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 833(c)) is amended to read as follows: "(c) Notwithstanding section 133(d) of title 10, United States Code, only the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and the Director of the National Security Agency may be delegated any authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by subsection (a).". Approved October 27, 1972.

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Public Law 92-597 AN ACT To amend the Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-378, 84 Stat. 794) to expand the Youth Conservation Corps pilot program and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act of August 13, 1970 (84 Stat. 794) is amended to read as follows: uPOLICY AND PURPOSE

October 27, 1972 [S.2454]

Youth Conser"' vation Corps Act of 1970, amendment. 42 USC prec. 2711 note.

1. The Congress finds that the gainful employment during the summer months of American youth, representing all segments of society, in the healthful outdoor atmosphere afforded in the national park system, the national forest system, the national wildlife refuge system, and other public land and water areas of the United States creates an opportunity for understanding and appreciation of the Nation's natural environment and heritage. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this Act to further the development and maintenance of the natural resources of the United States b j the j^outh, upon whom will fall the ultimate responsibility for maintaining and managing these resources for the American people. "SECTION

"YOUTH CONSERVATION CORPS

"SEC. 2. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is established in the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture a Youth Conservation Corps (hereinafter referred to as the "Corps'). The Corps shall consist of young men and women who are Participants. permanent residents of the United States, its territories, possessions, or trust territories, who have attained age fifteen but have not attained age nineteen, and whom the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary Summer employment. of Agriculture may employ during the summer months, without regard to the civil service or classification lawSj rules, or regulations, for the purpose of developing, preserving, or maintaining the lands and waters of the United States under his jurisdiction. Equal " (b) The Corps shall be open to youth of both sexes and youth of nity and opportuemployall social, economic, and racial classifications, with no person being ment" te employed as a member of the Corps for a term in excess of ninety days during any single year. U

SECRETARIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS

"SEC. 3. (a) In carrying out this Act, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall— "(1) determine, with other Federal agencies, the areas under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretaries which are appropriate for carrying out programs using members of the Corps, and determine and select appropriate work and education programs and projects for participation by members of the Corps; " (2) determine the rates of pay, hours, and other conditions of employment in the Corps, except that members of the Corps shall not be deemed to be Federal employees other than for the purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, and chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code; "(3) provide for such transportation, lodging, subsistence, and other services and equipment as they may deem necessary or appropriate for the needs of members of the Corps in their duties;

82-081 O - 73 -

62 Stat. 982; 80 Stat. 306. 28 USC 2671. 80 Stat. 531; 82 Stat. 98. 5 USC 8101.

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 1320 Regulations. Facilities, availability to educational institutions.

Cost responsibility.

Unoccupied Federal facilities and surplus equipment, use.

Contract authority.

PUBLIC LAW 92-597-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

"(4) promulgate regulations to insure the safety, health, and welfare of the Corps members; and "'(5) provide, to the extent possible, that permanent or semipermanent facilities used as Corps camps be made available to local schools, school districts. State junior colleges and universities, and other educational institutions for use as environmental/ ecological education camps during periods of nonuse by the Corps program. Costs for operations, maintenance, and staffing of Corps camp facilities during periods of use by non-Corps programs as well as any liability for personal injury or property damage stemming from such use shall be the responsibility of the entity or organization using the facility and shall not be a responsibility of the Secretaries or the Corps. " (b) Whenever economically feasible, existing but unoccupied Federal facilities and surplus or unused equipment (or both), of all types, including military facilities and equipment, shall be utilized for the purposes of the Corps, where appropriate and with the approval of the Federal agency involved. To minimize transpoitation costs, Corps members shall be employed on conservation projects as near to their places of residence as is feasible. '' (c) The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture may contract with any public agency or organization or any private nonprofit agency or organization which has been in existence for at least five years for the operation of any Youth Conservation Corps project. "PILOT GRANT PROGRAM FOR STATK PROJEC^TS

'States.

Application requirements.

Approval,

"SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall jointly establish a pilot grant program under which grants shall be made to States to assist them in meeting the cost of projects for the employment of young men and women to develop, preserve, and maintain non-Federal public lands and waters within the States. For purposes of this section, the term 'States' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa. "(b)(1) Xo grant may be made under this section unless an application therefor has been submitted to, and approved by, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. Such application shall be in such form, and submitted in such manner, as the Secretaries shall jointly by regulation prescribe, and shall contain— " (A) assurances satisfactory to the Secretaries that individuals employed under the project for which the application is submitted shall (i) have attained the age of fifteen but not attained the age of nineteen, (ii) be permanent residents of the Ignited States or its territories, possessions, or- the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, (iii) be employed without regard to the personnel laws, rules, and regulations applicable to full-time employees of the applicant, (iv) be employed for a period of not more than ninety days in any calendar year, and (v) be emploved without regard to their sex or social, economic, or* racial classification; and " (B) such other information as the Secretaries may jointly by regulation prescribe. "(2) The Secretaries may approve applications which they determine (A) meet the requirements of paragraph (1), and (B) are for projects which will further the development, preservation, or mainte,nem lo • - 'Et •, o

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STAT.]

PUBLIC LAW 92-598-OCT. 27, 1972

nance of non-Federal public lands or waters within the jurisdiction of the applicant. "(c)(1) The amount of any grant under this section shall be determined jointly by the Secretaries, except that no grant for any project may exceed 80 per centum of the cost (as determined by the Secretaries) of such project. "(2) Payments under grants under this section may be made in advance or by way of reimbursement and at such intervals and on such conditions as the Secretaries find necessary. " (d) Thirty per centum of the sums appropriated under section 6 for any fiscal year shall be used for making grants under this section for such fiscal year.

1321

Limitation.

Payments.

Appropriation percentage.

"SECRETARIAL REPORTS

"SEC. 5. The Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Agriculture J°i"t '•epo>-t to shall annually prepare a joint report detailing the activities carried congrt^s"*. ^"'^ out under this Act and providing recommendations. Each report for a fiscal year shall be submitted concurrently to the President and the Congress not later than one hundred and eighty days following the close of that fiscal year. IIAUTHORIZATION O F APPROPRIATIONS

"SEC. 6. There are authorized to be appropriated amounts not to exceed $30,000,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and $60,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, to be made available to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated for any fiscal year to carry out this Act shall remain available for obligation and expenditure until the end of the fiscal year following the fiscal year for which appropriated." Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-598 AN ACT To provide for the particiijation of the United States in the International Exposition on the Environment to be held in Spokane, "Washington, in 1974, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepi'esentatlves of the Ignited States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with Public Law 91-269 (22 U.S.C. 2801 et seq.), the President is authorized to provide for United States participation in the International Exposition on the Environment (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "exposition"), which is being held at Spokane, Washington, in 1974. The purposes of such exposition are to— (1) offer to United States citizens and to people throughout the world a program for the improvement of man's physical environment; demonstrate through improved projects how the resources of air, water, and land can be utilized to man's benefit without pollution; and broaden public understanding of ecology and related sciences; (2) encourage tourist travel in and to the United States, stimulate foreign trade, and promote cultural exchanges; and (3) commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the city of Spokane.

October 27, 1972 [S. 4022]

International E x p o s i t i o n on the Environment. U.S. participation. 84 Stat. 271. Purposes,

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84 Stat. 272. Commissioner, appointment.

83 Stat. 863. 5 USC 5316. Consultants and experts. 80 Stat. 416. Travel expenses. 80 Stat. 499; 83 Stat. 190.

80 Stat. 443. 5 USC 5101. 5 USC 5332 note.

Contract authority. Land conveyance.

Expenditures.

PUBLIC LAW 92-598-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

SEC. 2. (a) The President, through the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to carry out in the most effective manner the proposal for Federal participation in the exposition transmitted by the President to the Congress pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 91-269 (22 U.S.C. 2803). (b) The President is authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Commissioner for a Federal exhibit at the exposition (as provided in the proposal referred to in subsection (a)) who shall be in the Department of Commerce and receive compensation at the rate prescribed for level V of the Federal Executive Salary Schedule. The Commissioner shall perform such duties in the execution of this Act as the Secretary of Commerce may assign. SEC. 3. (a) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to obtain the services of consultants and experts as authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, to the extent he deems it necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Persons so appointed shall be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses incurred including a per diem allowance, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently. (b) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of persons, other than consultants and experts referred to in subsection (a), who perform functions to carry out the provisions of this Act, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates: Provided, however, That no person appointed under this paragraph shall receive compensation at a rate in excess of that received by persons appointed subject to chapter 51 of such title for performing comparable duties. (c) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to enter into such contracts as may be necessary to provide for United States participation in the exposition. (d) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to erect such buildings and other structures as may be appropriate for the United States participation in the exposition on land (approximately four acres including land necessary for ingress and egress) conveyed to the United States, in consideration of the participation by the United States in the exposition, and without other consideration. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to accept title to such land or any interest therein: Provided, however, That the land or interest may be accepted only if the Secretary determines that it is free of liens, or of any other encumbrances, restrictions, or conditions that would interfere with the use of the property for purposes of the United States or prevent the disposal of the property as hereinafter set out. I n the acceptance of such property and in the design and construction of buildings and other structures and facilities thereon, the Secretary of Commerce shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of General Services, and the heads of other interested agencies to assure that such activities will be undertaken in a manner that (1) minimizes to the greatest extent practicable any adverse effects on the recreation, fish and wildlife, and other environmental values of the area; and (2) preserves and enhances to the greatest extent practicable the utility of the property for governmental purposes, needs, or other benefits following the close of the exposition. (e) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to incur such other expenses as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, including but not limited to expenditures involved in the selection, purchase, rental, construction, and other acquisition, of exhibits and materials and equipment therefor and the actual display thereof, and

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including but not limited to related expenditures for costs of transportation, insurance, installation, safekeeping, printing, maintenance, and operation, rental of space, and dismantling; and to purchase books of reference, newspapers, and periodicals. SEC. 4. The head of each department, agency, or instrumentality of ,,

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Agency cooperation.

the federal Urovernment is authorized— (1) to cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce with respect to carrying out any of the provisions of this Act; and (2) to make available to the Secretary of Commerce, from time to time, on a reimbursable basis, such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Secretary of Commerce to carry out his functions under this Act. SEC. 5. The Secretary of Commerce shall report to the Congress Report to within one year after the date of the official close of the exposition on *^°"Kress. the activities of the Federal Government pursuant to this Act, including a detailed statement of expenditures. Upon transmission of such Termination. report to the Congress, all appointments made under this Act shall terminate, except those which may be extended by the President for such additional period of time as he deems necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. SEC. 6. After the close of the exposition, all Federal property shall be disposed of in accordance with provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and other applicable Federal 63 Stat. 377. laws relating to the disposition of excess and surplus property. no1:e."^^ ^^ ^ SEC. 7. The functions authorized by this Act may be performed without regard to the prohibitions and limitations of the following laws: (1) That part of section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, 8° Stat. 4i6. which reads "(not in excess of one year)". (2) Section 16(a) of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (ch. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810; 31 U.S.C. 638a) to the extent that it pertains to hiring automobiles. (3) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529) (advance of public moneys). (4) Sections 302-305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 393 et seq.) as amended (41 U.S.C. 252-255) (competitive bids; negotiated contracts, advances). (5) Section 322 of the Act of June 20, 1932 (ch. 314, 47 Stat. 412; 40 U.S.C. 278a) (lease of buildings to Government; maximum rental). ••^ Stat. 1517. (6) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5) (advertisement of proposals for competitive bids). (7) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8) (opening of bids). (8) Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (ch. 212, 47 Stat. 1520; 41 U.S.C. 10a) (Buy American Act). (9) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13) (contracts limited to one year). (10) Section 501 of title 44, United States Code (printing by Gov- 82 Stat. 1243. ernment Printing Office). (11) Section 3702 of title 44, United States Code (advertisements without authority), (12) Section 3703 of title 44, United States Code (rates of payment for advertisement). SEC. 8. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to Appropriation. exceed $11,500,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out United States participation in the exposition. Approved October 27, 1972.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 142

Question. 142 - OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?

(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?

(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;

(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?

Art. 1 - Whether insensibility is a vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.

Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.

On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.

It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.

Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the FP, Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.

Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.

Art. 2 - Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth, fornication. . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*{Akolasia} which Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']

I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals." Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): "Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason."

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).

There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf. Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.

Art. 3 - Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A[2]; Q[141], A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.

Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than intemperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice." Therefore it is more sinful.

I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.

First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.

In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.

Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater vice.

Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.

Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.

Art. 4 - Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."

I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q[103], A[1]), and glory denotes clarity (Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q[141], AA[2],3). Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.


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PUBLIC LAW 92-599-OCT. 27, 1972

Public Law 92-599 October 27, 1972

[H. R. 16810]

• - ' ^

[86 STAT.

•

A.N ACT

T,) iirovide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit and to place a limitation on expenditures and net lending for the liscal year ending June 30, 1973.

Public debt limit. Temporary in-

"«"«•

Ante, p. 63.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives Vnited States of America in Conqress assembled, •'

^

of the

'

TITLE I—TEMPORARY INCREASE IN THE PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT SEC. 101. During the period beginning on November 1, 197*2, and ending on June 30, 1973, the public debt limit set forth in the first seuteuce of section 21 of the Second Liberty Bond Act (31 U.S.C. 7i37b) shall be temporarily increased by $65,000,000,000. TITLE II — L I M I T A T I O N ON EXPENDITURES A N D N E T L E N D I N G FOR F I S C A L 1973 SEC. 201. (a) Expenditures and net lending during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, under the budget of the United States Government shall not exceed $250,000,000,000. (b) The provisions of this title shall cease to apply on the day after the date of the enactment of this Act and no action taken befor-e such day under such provisions shall have any force or effect on or after such day. (c) In the administration of any program as to which— (1) the amount of expenditures is limited pursuant to subsection (a), and (2) the allocation, grant, apportionment, or other distribution of funds among recipients is required to be determined by application of a formula involving the amount appropriated or otherwise made available for distribution, the amount available for obligation (as determined by the President) shall be substituted for the amount appropriated or otherwise made available in the application of the formula.

TITLE III—JOINT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW OPERATION OF BUDGET CEILING AND TO RECOMMEND PROCEDURES FOR IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER BUDGETARY OUTLAY AND RECEIPT TOTALS Establishment; ggc. 301. (a) There is hereby established a joint committee comip. posed of thirty-two members appointed as follows: (1) seven members from the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of i> the House; (2) seven members from the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House; (3) two additional Members of the House of Representatives, one from the majority party, and one from the minority party, appointed by the Speaker of the House; (4) seven members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate;

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PUBLIC LAW 92-599-OCT. 27, 1972

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(5) seven members of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate; and (6) two additional Members of the Senate, one from the majority party, and one from the minority party, appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate. Xo person appointed by reason of his membership on any of the committees referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5) shall continue to serve as a member of the joint committee after he has ceased to be a member of that committee from which he was chosen, except that the members chosen from the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives who have been reelected to the House of Representatives may continue to serve as members of the joint committee notwithstanding the expiration of the Congress. A vacancy in the joint vacancy. committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original selection. (b) The joint committee created by subsection (a) shall make a study and refull study and review of— ^'^'^" (1) the procedures which should be adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals, including procedures for establishing and maintaining an overall view of each year's budgetary outlays which is fully coordinated with an overall view of the anticipated revenues for that year, and (2) the operation of the limitation on expenditures and net lending imposed by section 201 of this Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. The joint committee shall report the results of such study and review Report to conto the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President 2'"^^^pro tempore of the Senate, not later than February 15, 1973. (c)(1) The chairman of the joint committee shall be selected by chairman. the members of the joint committee. (2) The joint committee is authorized to appoint such staff, and ^*^"to request such assistance from the existing staffs of the Congress, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. (d) The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed Expenses. $100,000 through February 28, 1973, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the joint committee. (e) The joint committee shall cease to exist at the close of the first Termination, session of the Ninety-third Congress. SEC. 302. For purposes of paragraph 6 of rule X X V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a member of the joint committee, or as chairman of the joint committee, shall not be taken into account.

TITLE IV—FEDERAL IMPOUNDMENT INFORMATION SHORT TITLE

SEC. 401. This title may be cited as the "Federal Impoundment and title. j. Citation Information Act".

of

AMENDMENT O F THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACT OF 1950

SEC. 402. Title II of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 3^ ysc 58 fb. ^ section:

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 143

Question. 143 - OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.

Art. 1 - Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See Q[169], A[1].] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q[141], A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.

The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is "sobriety." Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have "purity."

The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.

This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility." The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness."

With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity."

With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes "moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."

Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q[165], A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.

Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.


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PUBLIC LAW 92-600-OCT. 27, 1972 "REPORTS ON IMPOUNDED

Presidential report to Congress.

P u b l i c a t i o n in Federal Register.

[86 STAT.

FUNDS

"SEC. 203. (a) If any funds are appropriated and then partially or completely impounded, the President shall promptly transmit to the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States a report containing the following information: "(1) the amount of the funds impounded; "(2) the date on which the funds were ordered to be impounded; " (3) the date the funds were impounded; "(4) any department or establishment of the Government to which such impounded funds would have been available for obligation except for such impoundment; "(5) the period of time during which the funds are to be impounded; " (6) the reasons for the impoundment; and "(7) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of the impoundment. " (b) If any information contained in a report transmitted under subsection (a) is subsequently revised, the President shall promptly transmit to the Congress and the Comptroller General a supplementary report stating and explaining each such revision. "(c) Any report or supplementary report transmitted under this section shall be printed in the first issue of the Federal Register published after that report or supplementary report is so transmitted."' TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL-STATE EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT C O M P E N S A T I O N ACT O F 1970

84 Stat. 709. 26 USC 3304 notes.

SEC. 501. Section 203(e)(2) of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Effective with respect to compensation for weeks of unemployment beginning before July 1, 1973, and beginning after the date of the enactment of this sentence (or, if later, the date established pursuant to State law), the State may by law provide that the determination of whether there has been a State 'off' indicator ending any extended benefit period shall be made under this subsection as if paragraph (1) did not contain subparagraph (A) thereof." Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-600

October 27, 1972 [H. R. 17038]

Oakley R e s e r voir, Sangamon River, III. Name change. 76 Stat. 1180.

AN ACT Designating the Oakley Reservoir on the Sangamon River at Decatur, Illinois, as the William L. Springer Lake.

Be it enacted hi^ the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Oakley Reservoir on the Sangamon River at Decatur, Illinois, authorized by section 203 of the Flood Control Act of 1962, shall hereafter be known as the William L. Springer Lake, and any law, regulation, document, or record of the United States in which such project is designated or referred to shall be held to refer to such project under and by the name of "William L. Springer Lake." Approved October 27, 1972. /.:.

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PUBLIC LAW 92-601-OCT. 27, 1972

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Public Law 92-601 AN ACT To prohibit the use of certain small vessels in United States fisheries.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, during the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person on board any prohibited vessel— (1) to transfer at sea or cause to be transferred at sea any prohibited fish; or (2) to land or cause to be landed any prohibited fish in any port of the United States. SEC. 2. (a) Any person who knowingly— (1) violates the first section of this Act; (2) takes, sells, transfers, purchases, or receives any prohibited fish which are transferred or landed in violation of the first section of this Act; or (3) violates any regulation issued pursuant to section 4 of this Act; shall be liable to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000, in addition to any other penalty provided by law. Each separate unlawful transfer or landing of prohibited fish shall constitute a separate violation of the first section of this Act. (b) Any prohibited fish transferred or landed in violation of the first section of this Act, or the monetary value thereof, shall be subject to forfeiture. SEC. 3. (a) The judges of the United States district courts and the United States magistrates may, within their respective jurisdictions, upon proper oath or affirmation showing probable cause, issue such warrants or other process as may be required for enforcement of this Act and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. (b) Enforcement of this Act and the regulations issued pursuant thereto shall be the joint responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating. (c) Any person authorized to carry out enforcement activities hereunder shall have the power to execute any warrant or process issued by any officer or court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of this Act and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. (d) Such person so authorized shall have the power, with or without a warrant or other process, to search any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (e) Such person so authorized may seize, whenever and wherever lawfully found, all prohibited fish transferred, landed, taken, sold, purchased, or received in violation of the provisions of this Act or the regulations issued pursuant thereto. Any prohibited fish so seized may be disposed of pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section or, if perishable, in a manner prescribed by regulations of the Secretary concerned. (f) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 2464 of title 28, United States Code, when a warrant of arrest or other process in rem is issued in any cause under this section, the marshal or other officer shall stay the execution of such process, or discharge any prohibited fish seized if the process has been levied, on receiving from the claimant of the prohibited fish a bond or stipulation for the value of the property with

October 27, 1972 [S. 3358]

U.S. fisheries. Prohibited v e s s e l s and fish.

Violations and penalty.

Enforcement.

V e s s e l search.

Seizure.

Bond. 62 Stat. 974.

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Regulations.

Definitions. 62 Stat. 859.

October 27, 197 2 [H. R. 16804]

Mineola Dam and L a k e, S a b i n e River, T e x. Name c h a n g e. 84 Stat. 1824.

PUBLIC LAW 92-602-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

sufficient surety to be approved by a judge of the district court having jurisdiction of the violation, conditioned to deliver the prohibited fish seized, if condemned, without impairment in value or, in the discretion of the court, to pay its equivalent value in money or otherwise to answer the decree of the court in such cause. Such bond or stipulation shall be returned to the court and judgment thereon against both the principal and sureties may be recovered in event of any breach of the conditions thereof as determined by the court. In the discretion of the accused, and subject to the direction of the court, the prohibited fish may be sold for not less than its reasonable market value and the proceeds of such sale placed in the registry of the court pending judgment in the case. SEC. 4. The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating are authorized jointly and severally to issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. SEC. 5. As used in this Act— (1) The term "person" means a person as defined in section 1 of title 1, United States Code. (2) The term "prohibited fish*' means, with respect to any prohibited vessel, the fish, mollusk, crustacean, or other form of marine animal or plant life which such vessel was authorized to engage in the catching of before the prohibition described in paragraph (3)(C) of this section was imposed on such Aessel by the foreign country concerned. (3) The term "prohibited vessel" means any vessel of less than five net tons which was— (A) constructed in a foreign country, (B) used in a fishery of such foreign country, and (C) subsequently prohibited by such foreign country from being used in such fisheiy; but does not mean any such vessel which was acquired by a citizen of the United States or a resident alien before the date of the enactment of this Act. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-602

"

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AN ACT To rename the Mineola Dam and Lake as the Carl L. Estes Dam and Lake.

Be it eimcted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Mineola Dam and Lake on the Sabine Kiver, Texas, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1970 shall be known and designated hereafter as the "Carl L. Estes Dam and Lake". Any law, regulation, map, or record of the United States in which such dam and lake is referred shall be held and considered to refer to such dam and lake by the name of "Carl L. Estes Dam and Lake". Approved October 27, 1972. .

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 144

Question. 144 - OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

(2) What is its object?

(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?

(4) What kind of people are ashamed?

Art. 1 - Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.

I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above (FS, Q[40], A[1]; FS, Q[41], A[2]; FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q[142], A[4]) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.

Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

Art. 2 - Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.

Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[41], A[2]; FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."

Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men."

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[63], A[3]), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.

Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

Art. 3 - Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."

I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.

Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.

Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful.

Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.

Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

Art. 4 - Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above (Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous man is not shamefaced."

I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous hypothetically."

Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.


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Public Law 92-603 AN ACT

To amend the Social Security Act, and for other purposes.

October 30, 1972

[H. R. i]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act, with sociai security the following table of contents, may be cited as the "Social Security ^g™^"'^'"^"*^ °^ Amendments of 1972". TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE I—PROVISIONS RELATING TO OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec.

101. Special minimum primary insurance amount. - " 102. Increased widow's and widower's insurance benefits. 103. Delayed retirement credit. 104. Age-62 computation point for men. 105. Liberalization and automatic adjustment of earnings test. 106. Exclusion of certain earnings in year of attaining age 72. 107. Reduced benefits for widowers at age 60. 108. Entitlement to child's insurance benefits based on disability which began between age 18 and 22. Sec. 109. Continuation of child's benefits through end of semester. Sec. 110. Child's benefits in case of child entitled on more than one wage record. Sec. 111. Adoptions by disability and old-age insurance beneficiaries. Sec. 112. Child's insurance benefits not to be terminated by reason of adoption. Sec. 113. Benefits for child based on earnings record of grandparent. Sec, 114. Elimination of support requirement as condition of benefits for divorced and surviving divorced wives. Sec. 115. Waiver of duration-of-relationship requirement for widow, widower, or stepchild in case of remarriage to the same individual. Sec. 116. Reduction from 6 to 5 months of waiting period for disability benefits. Sec. 117. Elimination of disability insured-status requirement of substantial recent covered work in case of individuals who are blind. Sec. 118. Applications for disability insurance benefits filed after death of insured individual. Sec. 119. Workmen's compensation offset for disability insurance beneficiaries. Sec. 120. Wage credits for members of the uniformed services. Sec. 121. Optional determination of self-employment earnings. Sec. 122. Payments by employer to survivor or estate of former employee. Sec. 123. Coverage of vow-of-poverty members of religious orders. Sec. 124. Self-employment income of certain individuals temporarily living outside the United States. Sec. 125. Coverage of Federal Home Loan Bank employees. Sec. 126. Policemen and firemen in Idaho. Sec. 127. Coverage of certain hospital employees in New Mexico. Sec. 128. Coverage of certain employees of the government of Guam. Sec. 129. Coverage exclusion of students employed by nonprofit organizations auxiliary to schools, colleges, and universities. Sec. 130. Penalty for furnishing false information to obtain social security account number, and for deceptive practices involving social security account numbers. Sec. 131. Increase of amounts in trust funds available to pay costs of rehabilitation services. Sec. 132. Acceptance of money gifts made unconditionally to social security. Sec. 133. Payment in certain cases of disability insurance benefits with respect to certain periods of disability. Sec. 134, Recomputation of benefits based on combined railroad and social security earnings. Sec. 135. Changes in tax schedules. Sec, 136. Allocation to disability insurance trust fund.

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[86 STAT.

137. Method of issuance of social security account numbers. 138. Payments by employer to disabled former employee. 139. Termination of coverage of registrars of voters in Louisiana. 140. Computation of income of American ministers and members of religious orders performing services outside the "United States. 141. Modification of State agreements with respect to certain students and certain part-time employees. 142. Benefits in case of certain individuals interned during World War II. 143. Modification of agreement with West Virginia to provide coverage for certain policemen and firemen. 144. Perfecting amendments related to the 20-percent increase provision enacted in Public Law 92-336. 145. Elimination of duration-of-relationship requirements in certain cases involving survivor benefits (where insured's death was accidental or occurred in line of duty while he was a serviceman).

TITLE II—PROVISIONS RELATING TO MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH Sec. 201. Coverage for disability beneficiaries under Medicare. Sec. 202. Hospital insurance benefits for uninsured individuals not eligible under transitional provision. Sec. 203. Amount of supplementary medical insurance premium. Sec. 204. Change in supplementary medical insurance premium. Sec. 206. Automatic enrollment for supplementary medical insurance. Sec. 207. Incentives for States to establish effective utilization review procedures under Medicaid. See. 208. Cost-sharing under Medicaid. Sec. 209. Medicaid conditions of eligibility for certain employed families. Sec. 210. Payment under Medicare to individuals covered by Federal employees health benefits program. Sec. 211. Payment under Medicare for certain inpatient hospital and related physicians' services furnished outside the United States. Sec. 212. Optometrists' services under Medicaid. Sec. 213. Limitation on liability of beneficiary where Medicare claims are disallowed. Sec. 221. Limitation on Federal participation for capital expenditures. Sec. 222. Demonstrations and reports; prospective reimbursement; extended care; intermediate care and homemaker services; ambulatory surgical centers; physicians' assistants; performance incentive contracts. Sec. 223. Limitations on coverage of costs under Medicare. Sec. 224. Limits on prevailing charge levels. Sec. 225. Limits on payment for skilled nursing home and intermediate care facility services. Sec. 226. Payments to health maintenance organizations. Sec. 227. Payment under Medicare for services of physicians rendered at a teaching hospital. Sec. 228. Advance approval of extended care and home health coverage under Medicare. Sec. 229. Authority of Secretary to terminate payments to suppliers of services. Sec. 230. Elimination of requirement that States move toward comprehensive Medicaid programs. Sec. 231. Repeal of section 1902(d) of Medicaid. Sec. 232. Determination of reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid and under maternal and child health program. Sec. 233. Amount of payments where customary charges for services furnished are less than reasonable cost. Sec. 234. Institutional planning under Medicare. Sec. 235. Payments to States under Medicaid for installation and operation of claims processing and information retrieval systems. Sec. 236. Prohibition against reassignment of claims to benefits. Sec. 237. Utilization review requirements for hospitals and skilled nursing homes under Medicaid and under maternal and child health program. Sec. 238. Notification of unnecessary admission to a hospital or extended care facility under Medicare. Sec. 239. Use of State health agency to perform certain functions under Medicaid and under maternal and child health program. Sec. 240. Relationship between Medicaid and comprehensive health care programs. Sec. 241. Program for determining qualifications for certain health care personnel.

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Sec. 242. Penalties for fraudulent acts and false reporting under Medicare and Medicaid. Sec. 243. Provider Reimbursement Review Board. Sec. 244. Validation of surveys made by Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. Sec. 245. Payment for durable medical equipment under Medicare. Sec. 246. Uniform standard s for skilled nursing facilities under Medicare and Medicaid. Sec. 247, Level of care requirements for skilled nursing home services. Sec. 248. Modification of Medicare's 14-day transfer requirement for extended care benefits. Sec. 249. Reimbursement r a t e s for skilled nursing homes and intermediate care facilities. Sec. 249A. Medicaid certification and approval of skilled nursing facilities. Sec. 249B. Payments to States under Medicaid for compensation of inspectors responsible for maintaining compliance with Federal standard s. Sec. 249C. Disclosure of information concerning the performance of carriers, intermediaries, State agencies, and providers of services under Medicare and Medicaid. Sec. 249D. Limitation on institutional care. Sec. 249E. Determining eligibility for assistance under title X IX for certain individuals. Sec. 249F. Professional standard s review. Sec. 251. Physical therapy and other therapy services under Medicare. Sec. 252. Coverage of supplies related to colostomies. Sec. 255. Coverage prior to application for medical assistance. Sec. 256. Hospital admissions for dental services under Medicare. Sec. 257. Extension of grace period for termination of supplementary medical insurance coverage where failure to pay premiums is due to good cause. Sec. 258. Extension of time for filing claim for supplementary medical insurance benefits where delay is due to administrative error. Sec. 259. Waiver of enrollment period requirements where individual's rights were prejudiced by administrative error or inaction. Sec. 260. Elimination of provisions preventing enrollment in supplementary medical insurance program more than three years after first opportunity. Sec. 261. Waiver of recovery of incorrect payments from survivor who is without fault under Medicare. Sec. 262. Requirement of minimum amount of claim to establish entitlement to hearing under supplementary medical insurance program. Sec. 263. Collection of supplementary medical insurance premiums from individuals entitled to both social security and railroad retirement benefits. Sec. 264. Prosthetic lenses furnished by optometrists under supplementary medical insurance program. Sec. 265. Provision of medical social services not mandatory for extended care facilities. Sec. 266. Refund of excess premiums under Medicare. Sec. 267. Waiver of registered nurse requirement in skilled nursing facilities in rural areas. Sec. 268. Exemption of Christian Science sanatoriums from certain nursing home requirements under Medicaid. Sec. 269. Requirements for nursing home administrators. Sec. 271. Increase in limitation on payments to P u e r to Rico and the Virgin Islands for medical assistance. Sec. 271A. Medical assistance in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. Sec. 272. Extension of title V to American Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Sec. 273. Inclusion of chiropractor services under Medicare. Sec. 274. Miscellaneous technical and clerical amendments. Sec. 275. Chiropractors' services under Medicaid. Sec. 276. Services of podiatric interns and residents under part A of Medicare. Sec. 277. Use of consultants for extended care facilities. Sec. 278. Designation of extended care facilities and skilled nursing homes a s skilled nursing facilities. Sec. 279. Direct laboratory billing of patients. Sec. 280. Clarification of meaning of "physicians' services" under title X IX. Sec. 281. Limitation on adjustment or recovery of incorrect payments under the Medicare program. Sec. 283. Conditions of coverage of outpatient speech pathology services under Medicare. Sec. 287. Termination of Medical Assistance Advisory Council. Sec. 288. Modification of the role of the Health Insurance Benefits Advisory Council.

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Sec. 289. Authority of Secretary to administer oaths in Medicare proceedings. Sec. 290. Withholding of Federal payments under Medicaid with respect to certain health care facilities. Sec. 292. Intermediate care services in States which do not have a Medicaid program. Sec. 293. Required information relating to excess Medicare tax payments by railroad employees. Sec. 294. Appointment and confirmation of Administrator of Social and Rehabilitation Service. Sec. 295. Repeal of section 1903(b)(1). Sec. 297. Coverage under Medicaid of intermediate care furnished in mental and tuberculosis institutions. Sec. 298. Independent review of intermediate care facility patients. Sec. 299. Intermediate care, maintenance of effort in public institutions. Sec. 299A. Disclosure of ownership of intermediate care facilities. Sec. 299B. Treatment in mental hospitals for individuals under age 21. Sec. 299D. Public disclosure of information concerning survey reports of an institution. Sec. 299E. Family planning services mandatory under Medicaid. Sec. 299F. Penalty for failure to provide child health screening services under Medicaid. Sec. 2991. Chronic renal disease considered to constitute disability. Sec, 299K. Elimination of coinsurance payment with respect to home health services under part B of Medicare. Sec. 299L. Certification of intermediate care facilities located on an Indian reservation. Sec. 2990. Determinations and appeals. TITLE III—SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, , BLIND, AND DISABLED Sec. 301. Establishment of program. "TITLE XVI—SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND. AND DISABLED "Sec. 1601. Purpose; appropriations. "Sec. 1602. Basic eligibility for benefits. "^''-

"Part A—Determination of Benefits

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•?>;

"Sec. 1611. Eligibility for and amount of benefits. "(a) Definition of eligible individual. • r;. y. "(b) Amounts of benefits. ''"8' "(c) Period for determination of benefits.
 * vs,n'ifi

"(d) Special limits on gross income. "(e) Limitation on eligibility of certain individuals. s*<«iii i «(f) Suspension of payments to individuals who are outside the United States. "(g) Certain individuals deemed to meet the resources test. "(h) Certain individuals deemed to meet the income test. "Sec. 1612. Income. " (a) Meaning of income. "(b) Exclusions from income. "Sec. 1618. Resources. "(a) Exclusions from resources. "(b) Disposition of resources. "Sec. 1614. Meaning of terms. " (a) Aged, blind, or disabled individual. "(b) Eligible spouse. -i" "(c) Definition of child. "(d) Determination of marital relationships. ="" "(e) United States. "(f) Income and resources of individuals other than eligible individuals and eligible spouses. "Sec. 1615. Rehabilitation services for blind and disabled individuals. "Sec. 1616. Optional State supplementation. '•»uu:f •; ' ••,

"Part B—Procedural and General Provisions

"Sec. 1631. Payments and procedures. "(a) Payment of benefits. "(b) Overpayments and underpayments. "(c) Hearings and review.

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"(d) Procedures; prohibitions of assignments, representation of claimants. "(e) Applications and furnishing of information. "(f) Furnishing of information by other agencies. "Sec. 1632. Penalties for fraud. "Sec. 1633. Administration. "Sec. 1634. Determinations of medicaid eligibility. "TITLE VI—GRANTS TO STATES FOR SERVICES TO THE AGED, BLIND, OR DISABLED "Sec. 601, Appropriation. "Sec. 602. State plans for services to the aged, blind, or disabled. "Sec. 603. Payments to States. "Sec. 604. Operation of State plans. "Sec. 605. Definitions." Sec. 303. Repeal of titles I, X, and XIV of the Social Security Act. Sec. 304. Provision for disregarding of certain income in determining need for aid to the aged, blind, or disabled for assistance. Sec. 305. Advances from OASI Trust Fund for administrative expenses. Sec. 306. Disregarding of income of OASDI recipients in determining need for public assistance.

' ' ,

•.q.siniv

TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 401. Limitation on fiscal liability of States for optional State supplementation. Sec. 402. Transitional administrative provisions. Sec. 403. Savings provision regarding certain expenditures for social services. Sec. 404. Change in Executive Schedule—Commissioner of Social Security, Sec. 405. Separation of social services not required. Sec. 406. Manuals and policy issuances not required without charge. Sec. 407. Effective date of fair hearing decision. Sec. 408. Absence from State for more than 90 days. Sec. 409. Rent payments to public housing agency. Sec. 410. Statewideness not required for services. Sec. 411. Prohibition against participation in food stamp or surplus commodities program by persons eligible to participate in employment or assistance programs. Sec. 412. Child welfare services. Sec. 413. Safeguarding information.

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TITLE I—PROVISIONS RELATING TO OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE SPECIAL MINIMUM PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT

SEC. 101. (a) Section 215(a) of the Social Security Act is amended— ^"'«' P- ••lo. (1) by striking out "paragraph (2)" in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof •'paragraphs (2] and (3)"; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: "(3) Such primary insurance amount shall be an amount equal to $8.50 multiplied by the individual's years of coverage in excess of 10 in any case in which such amount is higher than the individual's primary insurance amount as determined under paragraph (1) or (2). For purposes of paragraph (3), an individual's 'years of coverage' " Year s of cov is the number (not exceeding 30) equal to the sum of (i) the number e r a g e. " (not exceeding 14 and disregarding any fraction) determined by dividing the total of the wages credited to him (including wages deemed to be paid prior to 1951 to such individual under section 217, 64 Stat. 512. use compensation under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 prior to 1951 42 Stat. 417. 50 307. which is creditable to such individual pursuant to this title, and wages 45 USC 228a. deemed to be paid prior to 1951 to such individual under section 231) Post, p. 1367. for years after 1936 and before 1951 by $900, plus (ii) the number equal to the number of years after 1950 each of which is a computation base year (within the meaning of subsection (b)(2)(C)) and in each

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