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 92 STAT. 164

Vested and possessory rights in certain real property. 16 USC 79c.

'"t'-j

Just compensation. Jurisdiction. 16 USC 79c.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 title to these lands held by the State of California, and such other reverters and conditions as may be consistent with the use and management of the donated lands as a portion of Redwood National Park. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary may expend appropriated funds for the management of and for the construction, design, and maintenance of permanent improvements on such lands and interests in land as are donated by the State of California in a manner not inconsistent with such reverters and other conditions.". (4) In subsection 3(b)(1), after "NPS-RED-7114-B", insert "and effective on the date of enactment of this phrase, there is hereby vested in the United States all right, title, and interest in, and the right to immediate possession of, all real property within the area indicated as 'Proposed Additions' on the map entitled 'Additional Lands, Redwood National Park, California', numbered 167-80005-D and dated March 1978, and all right, title, and interest in, and the right to immediate possession of the down tree personal property (trees severed from the ground by man) severed prior to January 1, 1975, or subsequent to January 81, 1978, wnthin the area indicated as 'Proposed Additions' on the map entitled 'Additional Lands, Redwood National Park, California', numbered 167-80005-D and dated March 1978,". At the end of subsection 3(b)(1), insert the following new paragraphs: "Down tree personal property severed subsequent to December 31, 1974, and prior to February 1, 1978 may be removed in accordance with applicable State and Federal law, or other applicable licenses, permits, and existing agreements, unless the Secretary determines that the removal of such down timber would damage second growth resources or result in excessive sedimentation in Redwood Creek: Provided, hov;erer, That down timber lying in stream beds mnj not be removed without permission of the Secretary: Provided, That such removal shall also be subject to such reasonable conditions as may be required by the Secretary to insure the continued availability of raw materials to Redwoods United, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation located in Manila, California. "The Secretary shall permit, at existing levels and extent of access and use, continued access and use of each acquired segment of the B line, L line, M line, and K and K roads by each current affected woods employer or its successor in title and interest: Provided, That such use is limited to forest and land management and protection purposes, including timber harvesting and road maintenance. The Secretary shall permit, at existing levels and extent of access and use, continued access and use of acquired portions of the Bald Hills road by each current affected woods employer or its successor in title and interest: Provided further. That nothing in this sentence shall diminish the authority of the Secretary to otherwise regulate the use of the Bald Hills road.". (5) In subsection 3(b)(2), delete the last sentence and add the following sentences at the end of the paragraph: "Any action against the United States with regard to the provisions of this Act and for the recovery of just compensation for the lands and interests therein taken by the United States, and for the down tree personal property taken, shall be brought in the United States district court for the district where the land is located without regard to the amount claimed. The United States may initiate proceedings at any time seeking a determination of just compensation in the district court in the manner provided by sections 1358 and 1403 of title 28, United States Code, and may deposit in the registry of the court the estimated just compensation, or a part thereof, in accordance with the procedure gen-

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 erally described by section 258a of title 40, United States Code. Interest shall not be allowed on such amounts as shall have been paid into the court. I n the event that the Secretary determines that the fee simple title to any property (real or personal) taken under this section is not necessary for the purposes of this Act, he may, with particular attention to minimizing the payment of severance damages and to allow for the orderly removal of down timber, revest title to such property subject to such reservations, terms, and conditions, if any, as he deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act, and may compensate the former owner for no more than the fair market value of the rights so reserved, except that the Secretary may not revest title to any property for which just compensation has been p a i d; or, the Secretary may sell at fair market value without regard to the requirements of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, such down timber as in his judgment may be removed without damage to the park, the proceeds from such sales being credited to the Treasury of the United States. I f the State of California designates a right-of-way for a bypass highway around the eastern boundary of P r a i r i e Creek Redwood State P a r k prior to October 1, 1984, the Secretary is authorized and directed to acquire such lands or interests in lands as may be necessary for such a highway and, subject to such conditions as the Secretary may determine are necessary to assure the adequate protection of Redwood National P a r k, shall thereupon donate the designated right-of-way to the State of California for a new bypass highway from a point south of P r a i r i e Creek Redwood State P a r k through the drainage of May Creek and Boyes Creek to extend along the eastern boundary of P r a i r i e Creek Redwood State P a r k within H u m b o l d t County. Such acreage as may be necessary in the judgment of the Secretary for this conveyance, and for a buffer thereof, shall be deemed to be a publicly owned highway for purposes of section 101(a)(2) of this amendment effective on the date of enactment of this section.". (6) I n subsection 3(e), delete "sixty d a y s " in the last sentence and add the following sentences at the end of the subsection: "Effective on the date of enactment of this sentence, there are made available from the amounts provided in section 10 herein or as may be hereafter pro^'ided such sums as may be necessary for the acquisition of interests in land. Effective on October 1, 1978, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the implementation of contracts and cooperative agreements pursuant to this subsection: Provided., That it is the express intent of Congress that the Secretary shall to the greatest degree possible insure that such contracts and cooperative agreements provide for the maximum retention of senior employees by such owners and for their utilization in rehabilitation and other efforts. The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, is further authorized, pursuant to contract or cooperative agreement with agencies of the Federal Executive, the State of California, any political or governmeaital subdivision thereof, any corporation, not-for-profit corporation, private entity or person, to initiate, provide funds, equipment, and personnel for the development and implementation of a program for the rehabilitation of areas within and upstream from the park contributing significant sedimentation because of past logging disturbances and road conditions, and, to the extent feasible, to reduce risk of damage to streamside areas adjacent to Redwood Creek and for other reasons: Provided further., That authority to make payments under this subsection shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appro-

92 STAT. 165

Interest. Title revestmeiit.

Down timber, sale. 40 USC 471 note. Highway right-ofway, land acquisition.

Land acquisition, availability of funds. 16 USC 79c. 16 USC 79]. i

contracts and agreements, appropriation authorization. Retention of senior employees. Land rehabilitation, contracts and cooperative agreements.

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 92 STAT. 166

Erosion and sedimentation study.

16 USC la-1.

16 USC lb, Ic.

16 USC 1.

Effective date. 16 USC 79c-l. 16 USC 79a.

16 USC 79c.

Economic impact study. 16 USC 79k.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 priation Acts. Such contracts or cooperative agreements shall be subject to such other conditions as the Secretary may determine necessary to assure the adequate protection of Redwood National Park generally, and to provide employment opportunities to those individuals affected by this taking and to contribute to the economic revival of Del Norte and Humboldt Counties in northern California. The Secretary shall undertake and publish studies on erosion and sedimentation ori^nating within the hydrographic basin of Redwood Creek with particular effort to identify sources and causes, including differentiation between natural and man-aggravated conditions, and shall adapt his general management plan to benefit from the results of such studies. The Secretary, or the Secretary of Agriculture, where appropriate, shall also manage any additional Federal lands under his jurisdiction that are within the hydrographic basin of Redwood Creek in a manner which will minimize sedimentation which could affect the park, and in coordination with plans for sediment management within the basin. To effectuate the provisions of this subsection, and to further develop scientific and professional information and data concerning the Redwood Forest ecosystem, and the various factors that may affect it, the Secretary may authorize access to the area subject to this subsection by designated representatives of the United States.". (b) The first section of the Act of August 18, 1970 (84 Stat. 825), is amended by adding the following: "Congress further reaffirms, declares, and directs that the promotion and regulation of the various areas of the National Park System, as defined in section 2 of this Act, shall be consistent with and founded in the purpose established by the first section of the Act of August 25, 1916, to the common benefit of all the people of the United States. The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress.". (c) Notwithstanding any provision of the Act of October 2, 1968, supra, the vesting in the United States of all right, title, and interest in, and the right to immediate possession of, all real property and all down tree personal property within the area indicated as "Proposed Additions" on the map entitled "Additional I^ands, Redwood National Park, California," numbered 167-8(X)05-D and dated March 1978, as established by subsection (a)(4) of the first section of this Act, shall be effective on the date of enactment of this section. The provisions of subsection 3(b)(3) of the Act of October 2, 1968, supra, shall also relate to the effective date of this section. From the appropriations authorized for fiscal year 1978 and succeeding fiscal years such sums as may be necessary may be expended for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands, and down tree personal property, authorized to be acquired, or acquired, pursuant to the provisions of this Act. SEC. 102. (a) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, shall conduct an analysis of appropriate Federal actions that may be necessary or desirable to mitigate any adverse economic impacts to public and private segments of the local economy, other than the owners of properties taken by this Act, as a result of the addition of property to Redwood National Park under the first section of this Act. The Secretaries shall also consider the benefits of making grants or entering into contracts or cooperative agreements with the State of California or Del Norte and Humboldt

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 Counties as provided by subsection (b) for the purpose of development and implementation of a program of forest resource improvement and utilization, including, but not limited to, reforestation, erosion control, and other forest land conservation measures, fisheries and fish and wildlife habitat improvements, and wood energy facilities. Not later than January 1, 1979, the Secretary shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate a report of his analysis, including his recommendations with respect to actions that should be taken to mitigate any significant short-term and long-term adverse effects on the local economy caused by such addition. (b) The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Secretary, and pursuant to his study, shall apply such existing programs as are necessary and appropriate to further mitigate identified employment and other adverse economic impacts on public and private segments of the local economy, other than with regard to the payment of just compensation to the owners of properties taken by this Act and by the Act of October 2, 1968, supra. In addition to the land rehabilitation and employment provisions of this Act, which should have a substantial positive economic effect on the local economy, the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor are further authorized and directed to implement existing authorities to establish employment programs, pursuant to such grants, contracts and cooperative agreements with agencies of the Federal Executive, the State of California, any political or governmental subdivision thereof, any corporation, not-for-profit corporation, private entity or person, for the development and implementation of such programs, as, in the discretion of the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, may be necessary to provide employment opportunities to those individuals affected by this taking and to contribute to the economic revival of Del Noite and Humboldt Counties, in northern California. Effective on October 1, 1978, there are authorized such sums as may be necessary to carry out the employment and economic mitigation provisions of this Act: Provided, That the authority to make payments under this section shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts. (c) The Secretary of Agriculture within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, shall prepare and transmit to Congress a study of timber harvest scheduling alternatives for the Six Kivers National Forest, Such alternatives shall exclude the timber inventories now standing on units of the Wilderness Preservation System and shall be consistent with laws applicable to management of the national forests. In developing the alternatives, the Secretary shall take into consideration economic, silvicultural, environmental, and social factors. PREFERENTIAL

92 STAT. 167

Report, submittal to Congress.

Employment and economic mitigation programs.

16 USC 79a,

Appropriation authorization.

Timber harvest study, Six Rivers National Forest. 16 USC 79k note. Transmittal to Congress.

HIRING

SEC. 103. (a) In order to utilize the skills of individuals presently 16 USC 79/. working in the woods and in the mills to the greatest degree possible to both ease the personal economic effects of this taking, and to assist in the necessary rehabilitation, protection, and improvement of lands acquired by this Act through implementation of sound rehabilitation and land use practices, the Secretary shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of seven full-time and thirty-one temporary personnel to assist in carrying out such programs necessary for the protection and enhancement of Redwood National Park. In filling these positions, preference shall be given to affected employees (as defined m title II of this Act) for a period ending on September 30, 1984, notwithstanding applicable civil service laws and regulations.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 71

Question. 71 - OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?

(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate?

(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?

(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?

Art. 1 - Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Mat. 25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.

Objection 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.

'On the contrary,' He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the poor.

'I answer that,' Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q[32], AA[5],9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place," because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by reason of time," because one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:17): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel."

It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on the sick.

Reply to Objection 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated above.

Art. 2 - Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of advocate?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man's suit, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore no man should be debarred from this office.

Objection 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.

Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own cause.

'On the contrary,' According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Infames, many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.

'I answer that,' In two ways a person is debarred from performing a certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of sense---either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors---or exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less." For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails.

Art. 3 - Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.

Objection 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause.

'On the contrary,' It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.

'I answer that,' It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was stated above (Q[62], A[7]), that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.

Reply to Objection 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end.

Reply to Objection 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Q[40], A[3]), it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.

Art. 4 - Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee." Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in money for pleading.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.

Objection 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), "the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.

'On the contrary,' Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice."

'I answer that,' A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom."

Reply to Objection 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.

Reply to Objection 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.

Reply to Objection 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from the party he assists.


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 92 STAT. 168

Civilian jobs.

Notice, job availability.

Consideration for employment, conditions.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 (b) In order to effectively administer the expanded Redwood National Park created by this Act in a manner that will provide maximum protection to its resources and to provide for maximum visitor use and enjoyment to ease the local economic effects of this taking, the Secretary shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of two full-time and twenty temporary employees in the competitive service. In filling these positions, preference shall be given to affected employees (as defined in title II) for a period ending on September 30, 1984, notwithstanding applicable civil service laws and regulations. The Secretary shall further have power to appoint and fix the compensation of an additional thirty-two full-time and forty temporary employees in the competitive service as provided by this subsection at the time of the donation of those park lands or interests in land owned by the State of California as are within the boundaries of Redwood National Park as provided herein. In filling these positions, preference shall be given to those State employees affected by this transfer for a period not to exceed six years from the date of transfer; permanent State civil service employees shall be provided the opportunity to transfer to a comparable Federal civil service classification notwithstanding applicable civil service laws and regulations. (c) An affected employee shall be given full consideration for certain civilian jobs as provided in this section both with the Federal Government and with those private employers that have certain undertakings or programs that involve Federal participation or approval for the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending September 30, 1984, if the positions will be primarily located in Humboldt or Del Norte Counties or other counties in California adjacent thereto, and if the employee is otherwise qualified under this section. (d)(1) Any Federal agency that is creating or filling a civilian Federal job that is within the scope of clause (2)(A) of this subsection, pursuant to contract, civil service merit system, or otherwise, that will be primarily located in Humboldt or Del Norte Counties, California, or other counties in California adjacent thereto, must provide notice in advance of the availability of that job and must provide qualified affected employee applicants for these positions with full consideration for these positions if the further conditions set forth in clause (2)(B) of this subsection are met. The notice required by this paragraph shall be as provided by applicable law and regulation through the offices of the Employment and Training Services located in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties, California, and through such other means as are likely to gain the attention of affected employees. (2) Consideration for employment under this section shall be provided under the following conditions: (A) the job involves skills and training that could reasonably be expected to have been gained by individuals who have been employed as logging and related woods employees or sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing employees, or office employees, or that can reasonably be expected to be gained while so employed, or pursuant to retraining as provided herein; and (B) the applicant has the ability, or can reasonably be expected to have the ability after appropriate training of reasonable duration as further provided herein, to perform the duties of the job: Provided, That the full consideration shall not be required with respect to those affected employee applicants requiring training

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 in a situation where the schedule for completion of the work is . such that the period during which said employee can reasonably be expected to work following completion of training is determined by the Secretary to be incommensurate with the time and funds required to provide said employee with the necessary training. (e)(1) Any Federal agency involved in the manner provided herein with a private employer responsible for filing an employment position that is within the scope of clause (2)(A) of subsection (d), above, that will be primarily located in Humboldt or Del Norte Counties, or other counties in California adjacent thereto, is directed to require that any Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance, and any Federal lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use, not constituting an existing property right as of the date of enactment of this Act, that is a condition to or a requirement of the conduct of harvesting and related activities or replanting and land rehabilitation or the conduct of wood processing and related activities or the conduct of highway construction and related activities shall be subject to and conditioned upon said private employer giving full consideration to affected employees as provided herein. (2) Any private employer who participates with a Federal agency in the manner described above and who is, accordingly, subject to the requirements as provided herein, shall— (A) provide notice of the availability of those jobs described in subsection (d)(2)(A) in the manner generally provided by subsection (d)(1); and (B) provide full consideration to qualified affected employee applicants for these positions if the further conditions established by clause (2)(B) of subsection (d) are met. (f) The Secretary is directed to seek and authorized to enter into agreements with affected employers and industry employers providing that full consideration shall be given with respect to the employment of affected employees who had been employed by affected employers in jobs that may become available in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties and other counties adjacent thereto. The execution and carrying out of such an agreement, or the giving of full consideration to the employment of affected employees under subsection (c) of this section, shall not subject an employer to any additional liability or obligations under any Federal or State equal employment law, rule, regulation, or order. (g)(1) The Secretary, except as otherwise provided, shall be responsible for the implementation of this section and— (A) is authorized and directed to make needed training available, upon application, to an affected employee applicant who, although not presently qualified for a position, can be reasonably expected to be qualified after appropriate training; (B) is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that an affected employee is not denied full consideration because of the need for training where there is no substantial reason to believe that the applicant would be unable to perform the duties of the job after proper training. If the job is one which must be filled while the affected employee would be in training, the Secretary shall encourage the employer to fill the job only on a temporary basis subject to the successful completion of the training by the affected employee; (C) shall require that, in a case in which two or more affected

92 STAT. 169

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/224

 92 STAT. 170

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 i

Noncompliance.

Job opening, agency notiHcation.

Union liaison.

Judicial review.

19 USC 2322.

Annual report, submittal to Congress. 16 USC 79m.

employee applicants have approximately equal qualifications for a job for which they are to receive full consideration, that applicant with the greatest creditable service shall be given preference among those applicants entitled to full consideration; and (D) upon the filing of a complaint by an employee who alleges that said employee's rights to full consideration were disregarded, the Secretary shall make a finding on the merits of such complaint. If it is determined that there has been noncompliance with this section, the Secretary shall take such action as may be appropriate to correct the situation. (2) To assist in implementing this section, agencies shall notify the Secretary, in advance, of any job opening as provided for by subsection (d) and of any Federal commitment as provided for by subsection (e). (3) The Secretary shall— ' (A) seek the cooperation of the State of California and the county and local governments within Humboldt and Del Norte Counties in the implementation of the provisions of this section and in the adoption of similar provisions for full consideration of affected employees with regard to State, county, and local jobs and activities; and (B) appoint, from among nominees proposed by certified or recognized unions representing employees, a person or persons who shall serve as the Secretary's liaison with employees and their union and as consultant to the Secretary with regard to the administration of those provisions of this Act for which the Secretary is responsible, (h) An employee, a group of employees, a certified or recognized union, or an authorized representative of such employee or group, aggrieved by any determination by the Secretary under this Act shall be entitled to judicial review of such determination in the same manner and under the same conditions as provided by section 250 of The Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 2029). (i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any additional or alternative rights under a law, regulation, or contract (including, but not limited to, veteran preference and contracts between private employers and unions) in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act, and the implementation of this section shall be carried out in accord with applicable civil service laws and regulations except as otherwise provided for in this section. Employees appointed to Federal jobs pursuant to this section shall have their compensation fixed at rates not to exceed that now or hereafter prescribed for the highest rate of grade 15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 104. (a) The Secretary shall submit an annual written report to the Congress on January 1, 1979, and annually thereafter for ten years, reporting on the status of payment by the Secretary for real property acquired pursuant to section 101(a)(4) and section 101(a) (2) of this amendment; the status of the actions taken regarding land management practices and watershed rehabilitation efforts authorized by section 101(a)(6) and section 102(b) of this amendment; the status of the efforts to mitigate adverse economic impacts as directed by this Act; this status of National Park Service employment requirements as authorized by section 103 of this amendment; the status of the new bypass highway and of the agreement for the donation of the

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/225

 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 State park lands as contemplated by section 101(a)(5) of this amendment; and, the status of the National Park Service general management plan for the park. (b) No later than January 1, 1980, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, a comprehensive general management plan for Redwood National Park, to include but not be limited to the following: (1) the objectives, goals, and proposed actions designed to assure the preservation and perpetuation of a natural redwood forest ecosystem; (2) the type and level of visitor use to be accommodated by the park, by specific area, with specific indications of carrying capacities consistent with the protection of park resources; (3) the type, extent, and estimated cost of development proposed to accommodate visitor use and to protect the resource, to include anticipated location of all major development areas, roads, and trails; and (4) the specific locations and types of foot trail access to the Tall Trees Grove, of which one route shall, unless shown by the Secretary to be inadvisable, principally traverse the east side of Redwood Creek through the essentially virgin forest, connecting with the roadhead on the west side of the park east of Orick. SEC. 105. Effective on October 1, 1978, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated $33,000,000 to carry out the rehabilitation provisions of this Act. SEC. 106. (a) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of the Act entitled "An Act to provide for certain payments to be made to local governments by the Secretary of the Interior based upon the amount of certain public lands within the boundaries of such locality", approved October 20, 1976 (90 Stat. 2662), the Secretary is authorized and directed to make payments on a fiscal year basis to each unit of local government, in the manner provided by the Act of October 20, 1976, in which lands owned by the United States within Redwood National Park are located. Such payments may be used for any governmental purpose. The amount of such payments shall be computed as provided in subsections (b) and (c). (b) Payment made for any fiscal year to a unit of local government shall include that amount determined pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of the Act of October 20, 1976, (c) Payment made for any fiscal year to a unit of local government shall also include that amount determined pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of the Act of October 20, 1976: Provided, however, That any amount computed as provided by section 3(c)(1) of the Act of October 20, 1976, but not paid because of the limitation of subsection (c)(2) and subsection (d) of that section shall be carried forward and shall be applied to future years in which this portion of the total payment would not otherwise equal the amount of real property taxes assessed and levied on such property during the last full fiscal year before the fiscal year in which such land or interest was acquired for addition to Redwood National Park until such amount is exhausted. (d) The Redwoods Community College District shall be considered as an affected school district for purpose of section 3(a) of the Act of October 20, 1976, as amended herein. SEC. 107. The Secretary is further authorized, and the Congress specifically directs that it shall be a purpose of this Act, that the com-

39-194 O—80—pt. 1

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92 STAT. 171

General management plan, submittal to congressional committees.

Appropriation authorization. 16 USC 79n. Payments to local governments. 16 USC 79o. 31 USC 1601.

31 USC 1602.

31 USC 1603. Payment carry forward. 31 USC 1602.

31 USC 1602. Redwoods United, Inc., Manila, Calif. 16 USC 79p.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/226

 92 STAT. 172

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

munity services and employment opportunities provided by Eedwoods United, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation located in Manila, California, shall be maintained at the present rate of employment to the greatest degree practicable. J«8t SEC. 108. The Congress further acknowledges and directs that the coppejfation. fuH faith and credit of the United States is pledged to the prompt 16 USC 79q. payment of just compensation as provided for by the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States for those lands and properties taken by this Act. 16 USC 79k note. SEC. 109. Unless otherwise indicated hereinbefore, a reference to the Secretary will refer to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, except in subsections 103(d) through 103(i), where a reference to the Secretary will refer to the Secretary of the Department of Labor. TITLE II DETINITIONS

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SEC. 201. As used in this title, the term— (1) "Secretary" unless otherwise indicated, means the Secretary of the Department of Labor; (2) "expansion area" means the area indicated as "Proposed Additions" (exclusive of the park protection zone) on the map entitled "Additional Lands, Redwood National Park, Humboldt County, California", numbered 167-80005-D and dated March 1978. The number of acres authorized to be included within the expansion area is forty-eight thousand acres, as further provided herein; (3) "employee" means a person emplcr^ed by an affected employer and, with such exceptions as the Secretary may determine, in an occupation not described by section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1)); (4) "contract employees" are employees performing work pursuant to a contract or agreement for services within or directly related to the expansion area between an affected contract employer and an affected woods employer; (5) "industry employer" means a corporation, partnership, joint venture, person, or other form of business entity (including a predecessor or successor by purchase, merger, or other form of acquisition), of which a working portion or division is an affected employer; (6) "affected employer" means a corporation, partnership, joint venture, person, or other form of business entity (including a predecessor or a successor by purchase, merger, or other form of acquisition), or a working portion or division thereof, which is engaged in the harvest of timber or in related sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing operations, and which meets the qualifications set forth in the definition of affected woods employer, affected mill employer, or affected contract employer; (7) "affected woods employer" means an affected employer engaged in the harvest of redwood timber who owns at least 3 per centum of the number of acres authorized to be included within the expansion area on January 1, 1977, and on the date of enactment of this section: Provided, That an affected woods employer shall be only that major portion or division of the industry employer directly responsible for such harvesting operations;

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/227

 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 173

(8) "affected mill employer" means an affected employer engaged in sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing operations in Humboldt or Del Norte Counties in the State of California who has either (A) obtained 15 per centum or more of its raw wood materials directly from affected woods employers during calendar year 1977, or (B) is a wholly owned mill of an affected woods employer: Provided, That an affected mill employer shall be only that major portion or division of the industry employer directly responsible for such wood processing operations; (9) "affected contract employer" means an affected employer providing services pursuant to contract with an affected woods employer, if at least 15 per centum of said employer's employeehours worked during calendar year 1977 were within or directly related to the expansion area pursuant to such contract or contracts; (10) "covered employee" means an employee who— (A) had seniority under a collective bargaining agreement with an affected employer as of May 31, 1977, has at least twelve months of creditable service as of the date of enactment of this section, and has performed work for one or more affected employers on or after January 1, 1977, or (B) has performed work for one or more affected employers for at least one thousand hours from January 1, 1977, through the period to the date of enactment of this section, and has a continuing employment relationship with an affected employer, as determined by the Secretary, as of the date of enactment of this section or, if laid off on or after May 31, 1977, had such a relationship as of the date of such layoff; (11) "affected employee" means a covered employee who is either totally or partially laid off by an affected employer within a time period beginning on or after May 31, 1977, and ending September 30, 1980, unless extended, as provided in section 203, or is determined by the Secretary to be adversely affected by the expansion of the Eedwood National Park. An employee shall be deemed adversely affected as of the date of the employee's layoff, downgrading, or termination; (12) "total layoff" means a calendar week during which affected employers have made no work available to a covered employee and made no payment to said covered employee for time not worked, and "partial layoff" means a calendar week for which all pay received by a covered employee from affected employers is at least 10 per centum less than the layoff or vacation replacement benefit that would have been payable for that week had said covered employee suffered a total layoff: Provided, That the terms "total layoff" and "partial layoff" shall also apply to a covered employee who had received any workers' compensation benefits or unemployment compensation disability benefits after said covered employee becomes able to work and available for work and is otherwise within the meaning of total layoff and partial layoff as defined in this paragraph; (13) "Federal agency" has the same meaning as "agency" in section 552(c) of title 5, United States Code; (14) "suitable work" shall be defined— 5 USC 551.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/228

 92 STAT. 174

Terminal pay reductions,

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 (A) as set forth in the California Unemployment Insurance Code, or Federal law if applicable, unless otherwise more restrictively defined by the Secretary, taking into account the unique characteristics of logging and related work; and (B) with respect to an employee who has completed retraining paid for by the Secretary, as a job paying no less than the prevailing wage rate in the area for the occupation for which said employee was retrained; or (C) as a job comparable with that which said employee would be required to accept pursuant to the seniority provisions of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement (or, if not covered by such an agreement, in accordance with the usual practice of the affected employer); (15) "seniority" with respect to an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement with an affected employer, shall be determined as provided in such agreement and shall be deemed to refer to company seniority, if the agreement provides for such seniority and, otherwise, to plant seniority; (16) "continuous service" with respect to employees not having seniority under a collective-bargaining agreement with an affected employer or an industry employer shall mean a period of time measured in months equal to the sum of all hours during which the employee performed work for said employer plus all hours for which the employee received pay for time not worked divided by one hundred and seventy-three; (17) "performed work" shall include any time during which an employee worked for an affected employer or with respect to which an employee received pay from such an employer for time not worked, and shall also include any time during which an employee would have been at work for such an employer if not for service in the armed forces, for a leave (approved by the employer) for work with an employee organization, or for a disability for which said employee received workers' compensation, disability compensation benefits provided under California law, or social security disability pension benefits: Provided, That contract employees shall be deemed to have performed work during the period of such service or disability only if— (A) the employee worked within or directly related to the expansion area immediately prior to the occurrence of such service or disability and (B) the employee returned or sought to return to work for an affected contract employer immediately after the end of the service or disability if that was prior to the date of enactment. The term "work performed", when used in relation to a period of time, shall also be deemed to include any period during which an employee is deemed to have performed work; (18) "terminal pay" means the payments to employees provided for in sections* 207, 208, and 209 which, regardless of the designations used herein to distinguish among them are intended and shall be deemed to be severance pay and, as such, shall be treated for Federal income tax and State unemployment insurance purposes in the same manner as is provided by California State law; (19) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Secretary shall reduce the amount of terminal pay for an employee,

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/229

 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 175

as calculated pursuant to section 207, 208, or 209, by the amount of the Federal and State income taxes which would be required to be withheld by an employer from wages equal to such terminal pay if paid to an employee with the same number of income tax exemptions as the recipient. For purposes of determining the amounts of such reductions with respect to severance payments made pursuant to sections 208 and 209, said severance payments shall be prorated over the number of weeks the equivalent sums would have been paid if the employees were eligible for and claiming the weekly layoff benefits provided in section 207. The Secretary shall withhold social security contributions from terminal pay in the same amounts as would be withheld if such pay (before the reductions provided for in this subsection) were wages and the Secretary shall make contributions on behalf of employees receiving terminal pay to the trust funds created under section 201 of the Social Security Act equal to the contributions required 42 USC 401. to be made by an employer paying wages equal to such unreduced terminal pay; and (20) "Sixty-fifth birthday" means the last day of the month in which the sixty-fifth birthday occurs. SEC. 202. The Secretary is authorized to develop the necessary procedures to implement this title. AFFECTED EMPLOYEES

SEC. 203. The total or partial layoff of a covered employee employed by an affected employer during the period beginning May 31, 1977, and ending September 30, 1980, other than for a cause that would disqualify an employee for unemployment compensation, except as provided in section 205, is conclusively presumed to be attributable to the expansion of Redwood National Park: Provided, That the Secretary may, for good cause, extend this period for any group of covered employees by no more than one year at a time after September 30, 1980. Any covered employee laid off during that period by an affected employer shall be considered an affected employee at any time said employee is on such layoff within the period ending September 30, 1984, or, if earlier, the end of said employee's period of protection as defined herein: Provided, however, That the number of affected employees with respect to an affected contract employer shall be limited in any week to that number of such employees otherwise affected as provided herein that is equal to the percentage of the affected employer's employee hours during calendar year 1977 that were worked within or directly related to the expansion area. SE(\ 204. (a) The Secretary shall provide, to the maximum extent Employee rights feasible, for retention and accrual of all rights and benefits which and benefits. affected employees would have had in an employment with affected employers during the period in which they are aft'ected employees. The Secretary is authorized and shall seek to enter into such agreements as he may deem to be appropriate with affected employees and employers, labor organizations representing covered employees, and trustees of applicable pension and Avelfare funds, or to take such other actions as he deems appropriate to provide for affected employees (including the benefits provided for in section 207(d)) the following rights and benefits: (1) retention and accrual of seniority rights, including recall rights (or, in the case of employees not covered by collectivebargaining agreements, application of the same preferences and

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/230

 92 STAT. 176

42 USC 1395. Payments to pension and welfare trust funds.

29 USC 1001 note. 29 USC 186.

29 USC 1001 note. Filing date.

Layoff and vacation replacement benefits, eligibility requirements.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 privileges based upon length of continuous service as are applied < under the affected employer's usual practices) under conditions ' no more burdensome to said employees than to those actively employed; and (2) continuing entitlement to health and welfare benefits and accrual of pension rights and credits based upon length of employment and/or amounts of earnings to the same extent as and at no greater cost to said employees than would have been applicable had they been actively employed. (b) The Secretary shall provide, additionally, for continuing entitlement to health and welfare benefits (other than group life and additional death, dismemberment, and loss of sight benefits) for employees who— (1) retired from employment with an affected employer for reasons other than disability on or after May 31, 1977, but not i later than September 30, 1984; (2) are receiving pension benefits under a plan financed by industry employers; (3) were age sixty-two or older but less than age sixty-five at the time of retirement; and (4) are not eligible for benefits under title X VIII of the Social Security Act. (c) The agreements described in subsection (a) of this section shall provide for the Secretary, effective October 1, 1977, to make payments on behalf of eligible affected employees including employees eligible for the benefits provided for in section 207(d) to the applicable pension and welfare trust funds and to insurance companies. Such payments may be made in the form of grants and/or contributions equivalent to the difference between the amounts payable by their affected employers and labor organizations pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements (or, in the absence of such agreements, pursuant to established practice) and the amounts that would have been paid by their affected employers and their labor organizations had said employees worked or received pay for the periods for which they receive layoff benefits: Provided, That no payment shall be made to a pension fund on behalf of an employee who is receiving a pension from such fund. For purposes of determining the amounts of contributions calculated on the basis of worked or compensable hours, layoff and vacation replacement benefits shall be converted into the hours they represent in accordance with regulations to be issued by the Secretary. (d) No person shall be subject to liability under the Employee Ketirement Income Security Act of 1974, section 302 of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 1947, or any other law, solely by reason of the receipt of payments from the Secretary or the payment of benefits to affected employees in accordance with this section. Receipt of such payments and the payment of such benefits are deemed to be consistent with any relevant plan documents. No action taken pursuant to this section shall be deemed to place the Secretary in the position of an employer or a party in interest (including a fiduciary) for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. SEC. 205. (a) An application for unemployment compensation filed by a covered employee on or after the first Monday following the date of enactment shall be deemed an application for the benefits provided by this Act. (b) An affected employee shall be eligible (unless said employee has received a social security retirement or disability benefit or a pension under a plan contributed to by an affected employer) for layoff and

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 72

Question. 72 - OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is reviling?

(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?

(4) Of the origin of reviling.

Art. 1 - Whether reviling consists in words?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

Objection 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.

Objection 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore reviling consists in words.

I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above (Q[64], seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence reviling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] "is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words." Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, "contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame others."

Reply to Objection 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.

Reply to Objection 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66): where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant force of words.

Reply to Objection 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by "taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.

Art. 2 - Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. FS, Q[60], A[5]] to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said (Lk. 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as stated above (FS, Q[88], AA[4],6). Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.

On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, according to Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples "foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God's service, not our own."

Reply to Objection 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain.

Art. 3 - Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.

Objection 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written (Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.

Objection 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."

I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other" [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life."

Reply to Objection 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him."

Reply to Objection 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire."

Art. 4 - Whether reviling arises from anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above (Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Objection 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise to revilings."

I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.

Reply to Objection 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) "anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with anger.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.


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 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 177

vacation replacement benefits, as defined herein, effective the first Monday following the date of enactment, for each week of total or partial layoff if, with respect to said week, said employee— (1) is registered with the United States Employment and Training Service in Humboldt or Del Norte Counties or one of the adjacent counties in the State of California or at such other location as the Secretary may designate; (2) is eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under the California Unemployment Insurance Code: Provided, That Payments to the Secretary is authorized and directed to provide for the pay- ineligible or ment of benefits under this title to an affected employee who is disqualified employees. held ineligible or is disqualified for benefits under said code solely because of one or more of the following reasons: insufficient base period earnings; exhaustion of benefit rights; earnings in excess of the amount which would entitle the employee to a partial benefit for the week; the waiting week requirement; unavailability for work because of jury duty, National Guard duty, retraining authorized, financed or approved by a public agency, or because of a similar reason as determined by the Secretary; refusal of work which is not "suitable work'" as defined in section 201(14); receipt of a worker's compensation or other benefit for partial disability which the employee would be entitled to receive while working; and any other cause of ineligibility with respect to which the Secretary determines that, under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable or otherwise contrary to the purpose of this Act to deny said employee a benefit provided for herein; and (3) the employee's period of protection has not been exhausted or otherwise ended by acceptance of a severance payment. SEC. 206, (a) The period of protection for an affected employee shall Protection start with the beginning of the first week for which said employee is period. eligible to receive a layoff or vacation replacement benefit as provided by this title, and shall continue until the earliest of (i) the date said employee accepts a severance payment provided for below, (ii) a period equal to the length of the employee's creditable service is exhausted, or (iii) said employee's sixty-fifth birthday. Ixv no event shall such period extend beyond September 30, 1984, except as provided by subsection (d) of section 207. Creditable (b) Creditable service shall be computed as follows: (1) a period equal to the length of an employee's seniority (or service, continuous service as defined herein) with said employee's last computation. affected employer as of the date said employee's period of protection begins; plus (2) a period equal to the sum of all prior periods during which the employee had seniority (or continuous service) with the same affected employer and with other industry employers: Provided, That if such seniority was broken (or such continuous service was interrupted) for more than three consecutive years for any • reason other than employment with other affected or industry • employers, periods of service in the Armed Forces or disabilities for which said employee received any workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation disability benefits, or disability benefits under the Social Security Act, any periods of seniority (or continuous service) prior to the break in seniority (or interruption in continuous service) shall be disregarded. (c) If necessary, in order to establish an employee's creditable service, the Secretary shall request authorization to examine said employee's social security wage record and shall compute such service from it by a method to be prescribed by regulation.

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 92 STAT. 178 Weekly layoff benefit, computation.

Seasonal employees, classification, benefit computation.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 SEC. 207. (a) Except as further provided in this section, the amount of an eligible employee's weekly layoff benefit shall be equal to (1) the annual average of all hours of work performed by said employee for the last affected employer or whom the employee worked prior to the date of enactment of this section during those three of the five calendar years immediately preceding said date during which such hours were greatest, counting hours paid for at time and a half and double time as one and one-half and two hours, respectively, multiplied by (2) the wage rate applicable, during the week for which the benefit is payable, to the highest paid job held by said employee, other than by temporary assignment, with said affected employer during the period from January 1, 1977, through the date of enactment of this section, and divided by (3) fifty-two. (b) The weekly benefit amount for an eligible employee with less than five calendar years of employment with one affected employer immediately prior to the enactment date shall be equal to the lessor of— (1) the average benefit that would be payable with respect to the same week to those covered employees (if they were eligible in the same week) who had five or more calendar years of employment with the same affected employer (in accord with subsection (a) of this section) whose benefit amounts are computed on the basis of the wage rate for a job the same as, or most similar to, the highest paid job said employee had held, other than by temporary assignment, with said affected employer during the period from January 1, 1977, through the date of enactment of this section, or (2) an amount calculated by substituting in clause (1) of subsection (a) the annual average of all hours of work performed by said employee for said employer during those calendar years for which said employee had performed work and throughout which he had seniority (or continuous service). (c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the Secretary shall classify as a "seasonal employee" any affected employee whose highest paid job held, other than by temporary assignment, with said affected employer during the period from January 1, 1977, through the date of enactment of this section was in an occupation in which the average annual number of weeks during which work was actually performed by all covered employees employed in said occupation during the five calendar years preceding the enactment date was forty or less. With respect to such seasonal employees— (1) the calculation of benefit amount set forth in subsection (a) shall be modified by— (A) deducting from the hours for which said employee received pay those hours representing vacation pay and vacation pay increments and; (B) substituting for the fifty-two provided in clause (3) of subsection (a) a divisor equal to the average annual number of weeks for which said employee performed work for an affected employer in said occupation during those three of the five calendar years immediately preceding the date of enactment during which the number of such weeks was greatest: Provided, That this calculation shall be modified in accord with subsection (b) with respect to those employees who had less than five calendar years of employment with one affected employer immediately prior to the date of enactment of this section.

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 (2) the number of weekly benefits payable in any calendar year shall not exceed the annual average number of weeks for which a seasonal employee received pay from an affected employer for work performed in the employee's occupation, as established by paragraph (1)(B), and shall be payable only during those weeks of each year determined by the Secretary to be the usual season for that occupation; (3) vacation pay and vacation pay increments shall be paid in the same amounts and at the same times of each year as they would have been paid had said employe© performed work during all of the time for which said employee receives layoff benefits. Such pay is referred to herein as "vacation replacement benefits". (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the benefits for any affected employee who will reach the age of sixty on or before September 30, 1984, shall be extended after the end of the employee's period of protection (unless severance pay has been accepted) until the employee's sixty-fifth birthday, and shall be equal to said employee's weekly layoff benefit. (e) The benefit amount provided by this section for any week of total or partial layoff shall be reduced by— (1) the full amount of any earnings, including pay for time not worked with respect to the same week, from employment obtained pursuant to section 103, or employment by employers engaged in timber harvesting, or in related sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing operations; (2) 50 per centum of earnings and pay for time not worked from any other employer with respect to that week; and (3) the full amount of any unemployment compensation attributable to that week. SEC. 208. (a) An affected employee (other than a short-service employee described in subsection (a) of section 209) shall be paid severance pay in accordance with this section if said employee: (1) has been on a continuous layoff from employment with the employee's last affected employer for a period of at least twenty weeks subsequent to December 31, 1977; (2) has no definite recall date for work with the affected employer by whom the employee was laid off and no offer of suitable work by any affected employer; and (3) applies for severance pay during a week with respect to which said employee has not performed work for an affected employer: Provided, That this clause shall not result in denial of severance pay to an otherwise eligible employee who at the time of application is totally and permanently disabled as defined in the Social Security Act; or (4) was permanently separated from employment with an affected employer during the period beginning May 31, 1977, and ending on the date of enactment of this Act, as a result of the closure of the mill or plant in which said employee was employed and has not, since said separation, been employed by an affected employer. Provided, That an employee shall be deemed an affected employee for purposes of this section if said emplovee meets the requirements of clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 204(b). (b) The amount of severance pay payable to an employee shall be computed by multiplying the applicable number of weeks determined in accordance with subsection (c) by the amount of the weekly layoff

92 STAT. 179

Elder employees, extension of protection period.

Benefit amount, reduction.

Severance pay, eligibility.

Severance pay, amount.

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 92 STAT. 180

Protection period, termination. Return-payment agreement.

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978 benefit (without reduction for earnings or other benefits) which is payable, or would be payable if the employee were eligible, for the week in which the application was filed: Provided, That for a seasonal employee the amount so calculated, plus the amount of vacation replacement benefits applicable for that year shall be multiplied by the number of weeks in said employee's usual season, as determined in section 207(c), and the result divided by fifty-two. (c) The number of weeks of severance pay shall be equal to one week for each month of the employee's creditable service up to a maximum of seventy-two weeks: Provided, That the severance payment to any employee shall not exceed the total amount of the weekly layoff and vacation replacement benefits which would have been payable if said employee were to be eligible for such benefits continuously from the week of application until the end of the applicable period of protection (or, in the case of an employee described in the final proviso of subsection (a), until the earlier of said employee's sixty-fifth birthday or September 30, 1984), calculated on the basis of the weekly amounts of such benefits as of the date of application for severance pay. (d) Acceptance of severance pay terminates the affected employee's period of protection and makes said employee ineligible thereafter for all other forms of terminal pay and for the protections provided in section 204, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act. (e) Before making a severance payment to an employee, the Secretary shall obtain said employee's written agreement that, upon resumption of employment in the industry within Humboldt and Del Norte Counties and the counties adjacent thereto in the State of California prior to September 30, 1980, or such later date established by the Secretary with respect to said employee pursuant to section 203, said employee Avill return it in weekly installments equal to a specified percentage of the employee's earnings in the industry, which the Secretary shall set at a reasonable level. The agreement shall include authorization for the Secretary to arrange with an employer for withholding of the applicable amounts from the employee's pay. SHORT-SERVICE EMPLOYEES

Benefits, ineligibility.

Severance pay.

'*' *

SEC. 209. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an affected employee as defined in this title shall be ineligible for any benefit under this title except as provided in this section if: (1) said employee will not reach age sixty before October 1, 1984; and (2) said employee as of the date of becoming an affected employee, does not have service credit for pension purposes of at least five full years under a pension plan contributed to by industry employers. (b) An affected employee described in subsection (a) shall be paid severance pay in accordance with this section if said employee meets the requirements of section 208(a). (c) Said employee shall be paid a severance payment equal to forty times the hourly wage rate applicable at the time of application for severance pay to the highest paid job held by said employee, other than by temporary assignment, during calendar year 1977, with the employee's last affected employer for each one hundred and seventythree hours for which said employee performed work for affected employers.

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Author:Margaret Lindsay Huggins

Works

 * An Atlas of Representative Stellar Spectra from λ4870 to λ3300, together with a discussion of the evolution order of the stars, and the interpretation of their spectra; preceded by a short history of the observatory with William Huggins (1899)
 * Agnes Mary Clerke and Ellen Mary Clerke - An Appreciation (Printed for Private Circulation) 1907.
 * The Scientific Papers of Sir William Huggins with William Huggins (1909)

title: Author:Margaret Lindsay Huggins


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/235

 PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 181

(d) Subsection (d) of section 208 shall be applicable to employees applying for and accepting severance payments pursuant to tfhis section except that such employees shall remain eligible for allowances provided for in sections 211 and 212, and for retraining as provided for in section 210(a) and while in good faith engaged m such training shall be paid the same stipends and allowances as are generally applicable to individuals engaged in such retraining programs who are not employees as defined in this Act. RETRAINING

SEC. 210. (a) An affected employee is eligible to apply for and the Secretary shall authorize training (including training for teclinical and professional occupations) at Government expense during said employee's period of protection if— (1) the Secretary determines that there is no suitable employment available for the employee within a reasonable commuting area; and (2) there is substantial reason to believe that the employee's employment prospects would be enhanced after successful completion of the training for which application lias been filed. (b) An affected employee engaged in training authorized by subsection (a) shall be paid layoff and variation replacement benefits while in good faith engaged in such training and shall continue to be paid such benefits while so engaged. SEC. 211. Upon application filed by an affected employee during said employee's period of protection, said employee shall be eligible for a job search allowance under the same terms, conditions, and amounts as provided in section 237 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2297). SEC. 212. (a) A relocation allowance shall be paid upon application by an affected employee during the applicable period of protection if— (1) the Secretary determines that said employee cannot reasonably be expected to obtain suitable work in the commuting area in which said employee resides; and (2) the employee has obtained— (A) suitable employment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term duration in the area in which said employee wishes to relocate; or (B) a bona fide offer of such employment; or (3) the employee relocated during the period beginning May 31, 1977, and ending on the date of enactment, because of acceptance of employment requiring a change in residence to a location outside the commuting area in which said employee resided immediately prior to becoming an affected employee. (b) The Secretary shall provide the same moving expense benefits for the same purposes as are set forth in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-236),

Layoff and vacation replacement benefits. Job search allowance.

Relocation allowance.

Moving expense benefits. 45 USC 701 note.

ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 213. (a) The Secretary shall be responsible for paying promptly all benefits and payments provided by this title. (b) Effective October 1, 1977, there are authorized to be appro- Appropriation priated annually such sums as may be required to meet the obligations authorization, provided for in this title.

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