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Statement on the Third Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

At this holiday season when most Americans are warmed and comforted by their family relationships and the blessings of this country, it is hard for us to realize that far away in a remote and mountainous land a valiant people is putting up a fight for freedom that affects us all. No matter how far removed from our daily lives, Afghanistan is a struggle we must not forget.

Afghanistan is important to the world, because the Afghan people are resisting Soviet imperialism. Three years ago on December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed a new Communist leader to head the Marxist regime that had taken power in 1978. For the first time since the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviets used a large-scale military force outside their borders and Eastern Europe to try to impose their will. If this aggression should succeed, it will have dangerous impact on the safety of free men everywhere.

Three years after the invasion, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not a success. Even with the augmentation of their forces to close to 105,000 men this year, the Soviets, with the puppet Karmal regime, have not been able to control the countryside or secure many cities. They have failed to rebuild the Communist-controlled Afghan Army and to create an effective government.

This is due to the spirit and will of the majority of the Afghan people and to the mujahedin, the freedom-fighters, who continue to resist the Soviet invaders. In the face of repeated offensive campaigns during the spring and summer of 1982, the mujahedin were able to drop back and then regain their positions once the Soviet forces had withdrawn. Their forces and their will remain intact.

We must recognize that the human costs of this struggle are immense. With the more intense fighting of 1982, casualties on both sides rose, and the civilian population suffered more than ever before. Crops and fields were destroyed by the Soviets, trying to deny to the mujahedin the support of the local population. Homes, and even entire villages, were leveled. We have convincing proof chemical weapons have been used by the Soviets against the Afghans. The refugee population has continued to grow, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, as peasants flee the destruction of war. It is a sad but inspiring story.

The United States does not intend to forget these brave people and their struggle. We have said repeatedly that we support a negotiated settlement for Afghanistan predicated on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. We joined the vast majority of the world community at the United Nations again in November in support of a resolution calling for a settlement along these lines. Just a few weeks ago, during his visit to the United States, I discussed with President Zia of Pakistan the need for a solution to the Afghanistan problem. We are both committed to a negotiated settlement that will return Afghanistan to the ranks of independent, nonaligned nations.

We in the United States sincerely hope that the new leadership of the Soviet Union will take advantage of the opportunities the new year will no doubt offer to achieve a solution for Afghanistan. The American people do not want to see the suffering and deprivation of the Afghan people continue, but we will not grow weary or abandon them and their cause of freedom.

It is our hope for 1983 that a free, independent Afghan nation will again find its place in the world community. We will not cease to support Afghan efforts to that end.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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Author:Graziadio Isaia Ascoli

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title: Author:Graziadio Isaia Ascoli


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STATE AND COUNTY EDUCATIONAL REORGANIZATION.

STATE AND COUNTY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION.

 * . In Preparation.

TEXT-BOOK IN THE PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION.

PRINCIPLES OF SECONDARY EDUCATION.

TEXT-BOOK IN THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION.

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Eisenstadt v. Baird

Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription. The District Court dismissed appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal, holding that the statute is a prohibition on contraception per se and conflicts "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. Appellant, inter alia, argues that appellee lacks standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives.

Held:

 * 1. If, as the Court of Appeals held, the statute under which appellee was convicted is not a health measure, appellee may not be prevented, because he was not an authorized distributor, from attacking the statute in its alleged discriminatory application to potential distributees. Appellee, furthermore, has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because their ability to obtain them will be materially impaired by enforcement of the statute. Cf. Griswold, supra; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249. Pp. 443-446.

 * 2. By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 446-455.

 * (a) The deterrence of fornication, a 90-day misdemeanor under Massachusetts law, cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute, since the statute is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and penalty structure are inconsistent with that purpose. Pp. 447-450.

 * (b) Similarly, the protection of public health through the regulation of the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the law, since, if health were the rationale, the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad, and federal and state laws already regulate the distribution of drugs unsafe for use except under the supervision of a licensed physician. Pp. 450-452.

 * (c) Nor can the statute be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception per se, for whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under Griswold, supra, the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible, since the constitutionally protected right of privacy inheres in the individual, not the marital couple. If, on the other hand, Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives, a prohibition limited to unmarried persons would be underinclusive and invidiously discriminatory. Pp. 452-455.

429 F.2d 1398, affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 455. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result,, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Joseph R. Nolan, Special Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General, John J. Irwin, Jr., and Ruth I. Abrams, Assistant Attorneys General, and Garrett H. Byrne.

Joseph D. Tydings argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs was Joseph J. Balliro.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Harriet F. Pilpel and Nancy F. Wechsler for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.; by Roger P. Stokey for the Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts; by Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Sylvia S. Ellison for Human Rights for Women, Inc.

title: Eisenstadt v. Baird


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Eisenstadt v. Baird/Opinion of the Court

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee William Baird was convicted at a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, § 21, first, for exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on contraception to a group of students at Boston University and, second, for giving a young woman a package of Emko vaginal foam at the close of his address. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unanimously set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives on the ground that it violated Baird's First Amendment rights, but by a four-to-three vote sustained the conviction for giving away the foam. Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969). Baird subsequently filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, which the District Court dismissed. 310 F. Supp. 951 (1970). On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the action with directions to grant the writ discharging Baird. 429 F. 2d 1398 (1970). This appeal by the Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 401 U.S. 934 (1971). We affirm.

Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, § 21, under which Baird was convicted, provides a maximum five-year term of imprisonment for "whoever...gives away...any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception," except as authorized in § 21A. Under § 21A, "[a] registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [And a] registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician." As interpreted by the State Supreme Judicial Court, these provisions make it a felony for anyone, other than a registered physician or pharmacist acting in accordance with the terms of § 21A, to dispense any article with the intention that it be used for the prevention of conception. The statutory scheme distinguishes among three distinct classes of distributees--first, married persons may obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or druggists on prescription; second, single persons may not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy; and, third, married or single persons may obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease. This construction of state law is, of course, binding on us. E. g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 507 (1971).

The legislative purposes that the statute is meant to serve are not altogether clear. In Commonwealth v. Baird, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court noted only the State's interest in protecting the health of its citizens: "[T]he prohibition in § 21," the court declared, "is directly related to" the State's goal of "preventing the distribution of articles designed to prevent conception which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences." 355 Mass., at 753, 247 N.E. 2d, at 578. In a subsequent decision, Sturgis v. Attorney General, 358 Mass. 37, 40, 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1970), the court, however, found "a second and more compelling ground for upholding the statute"--namely, to protect morals through "regulating the private sexual lives of single persons." The Court of Appeals, for reasons that will appear, did not consider the promotion of health or the protection of morals through the deterrence of fornication to be the legislative aim. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory goal was to limit contraception in and of itself—-a purpose that the court held conflicted "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where this Court struck down Connecticut's prohibition against the use of contraceptives as an unconstitutional infringement of the right of marital privacy. 429 F. 2d, at 1401-1402.

We agree that the goals of deterring premarital sex and regulating the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably be regarded as legislative aims of §§ 21 and 21A. And we hold that the statute, viewed as a prohibition on contraception per se, violates the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I
We address at the outset appellant's contention that Baird does not have standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under § 21A nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives. There can be no question, of course, that Baird has sufficient interest in challenging the statute's validity to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution. Appellant's argument, however, is that this case is governed by the Court's self-imposed rules of restraint, first, that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional," United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960), and, second, the "closely related corollary that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities," id., at 22. Here, appellant contends that Baird's conviction rests on the restriction in § 21A on permissible distributors and that that restriction serves a valid health interest independent of the limitation on authorized distributees. Appellant urges, therefore, that Baird's action in giving away the foam fell squarely within the conduct that the legislature meant and had power to prohibit and that Baird should not be allowed to attack the statute in its application to potential recipients. In any event, appellant concludes, since Baird was not himself a single person denied access to contraceptives, he should not be heard to assert their rights. We cannot agree.

The Court of Appeals held that the statute under which Baird was convicted is not a health measure. If that view is correct, we do not see how Baird may be prevented, because he was neither a doctor nor a druggist, from attacking the statute in its alleged discriminatory application to potential distributees. We think, too, that our self-imposed rule against the assertion of third-party rights must be relaxed in this case just as in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra. There the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a licensed physician who had prescribed contraceptives for married persons and been convicted as accessories to the crime of using contraceptives were held to have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the patients with whom they had a professional relationship. Appellant here argues that the absence of a professional or aiding-and-abetting relationship distinguishes this case from Griswold. Yet, as the Court's discussion of prior authority in Griswold, 381 U.S., at 481, indicates, the doctor-patient and accessory-principal relationships are not the only circumstances in which one person has been found to have standing to assert the rights of another. Indeed, in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), a seller of land was entitled to defend against an action for damages for breach of a racially restrictive covenant on the ground that enforcement of the covenant violated the equal protection rights of prospective non-Caucasian purchasers. The relationship there between the defendant and those whose rights he sought to assert was not simply the fortuitous connection between a vendor and potential vendees, but the relationship between one who acted to protect the rights of a minority and the minority itself. Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 Yale L. J. 599, 631 (1962). And so here the relationship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so. The very point of Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge the Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives.

In any event, more important than the nature of the relationship between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert is the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests. In Griswold, 381 U.S., at 481, the Court stated: "The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." A similar situation obtains here. Enforcement of the Massachusetts statute will materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives. In fact, the case for according standing to assert third-party rights is stronger in this regard here than in Griswold because unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, unlike the users of contraceptives in Connecticut, are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, supra. The Massachusetts statute, unlike the Connecticut law considered in Griswold, prohibits, not use, but distribution.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that Baird, who is now in a position, and plainly has an adequate incentive, to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives, has standing to do so. We turn to the merits.

II
The basic principles governing application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are familiar. As The Chief Justice only recently explained in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971):

"In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)."

The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, §§ 21 and 21A. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that no such ground exists.

First. Section 21 stems from Mass. Stat. 1879, c. 159, § 1, which prohibited, without exception, distribution of articles intended to be used as contraceptives. In Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 62, 116 N.E. 265, 266 (1917), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained that the law's "plain purpose is to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and virtuous race of men and women." Although the State clearly abandoned that purpose with the enactment of § 21A, at least insofar as the illicit sexual activities of married persons are concerned, see n. 3, supra, the court reiterated in Sturgis v. Attorney General, supra, that the object of the legislation is to discourage premarital sexual intercourse. Conceding that the State could, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, regard the problems of extramarital and premarital sexual relations as "[e]vils of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies," Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), we cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law.

It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication, which is a misdemeanor under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, § 18. Aside from the scheme of values that assumption would attribute to the State, it is abundantly clear that the effect of the ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons has at best a marginal relation to the proffered objective. What Mr. Justice Goldberg said in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 498 (concurring opinion), concerning the effect of Connecticut's prohibition on the use of contraceptives in discouraging extramarital sexual relations, is equally applicable here. "The rationality of this justification is dubious, particularly in light of the admitted widespread availability to all persons in the State of Connecticut, unmarried as well as married, of birth-control devices for the prevention of disease, as distinguished from the prevention of conception." See also id., at 505-507 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Like Connecticut's laws, §§ 21 and 21A do not at all regulate the distribution of contraceptives when they are to be used to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease. Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E. 2d 151 (1940), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass., at 754, 247 N.E. 2d, at 579. Nor, in making contraceptives available to married persons without regard to their intended use, does Massachusetts attempt to deter married persons from engaging in illicit sexual relations with unmarried persons. Even on the assumption that the fear of pregnancy operates as a deterrent to fornication, the Massachusetts statute is thus so riddled with exceptions that deterrence of premarital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim.

Moreover, §§ 21 and 21A on their face have a dubious relation to the State's criminal prohibition on fornication. As the Court of Appeals explained, "Fornication is a misdemeanor [in Massachusetts], entailing a thirty dollar fine, or three months in jail. Massachusetts General Laws Ann. c. 272 § 18. Violation of the present statute is a felony, punishable by five years in prison. We find it hard to believe that the legislature adopted a statute carrying a five-year penalty for its possible, obviously by no means fully effective, deterrence of the commission of a ninety-day misdemeanor." 429 F.2d, at 1401. Even conceding the legislature a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent fornication, and recognizing that the State may seek to deter prohibited conduct by punishing more severely those who facilitate than those who actually engage in its commission, we, like the Court of Appeals, cannot believe that in this instance Massachusetts has chosen to expose the aider and abetter who simply gives away a contraceptive to 20 times the 90-day sentence of the offender himself. The very terms of the State's criminal statutes, coupled with the de minimis effect of §§ 21 and 21A in deterring fornication, thus compel the conclusion that such deterrence cannot reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.

Second. Section 21A was added to the Massachusetts General Laws by Stat. 1966, c. 265, § 1. The Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Baird, supra, held that the purpose of the amendment was to serve the health needs of the community by regulating the distribution of potentially harmful articles. It is plain that Massachusetts had no such purpose in mind before the enactment of § 21A. As the Court of Appeals remarked, "Consistent with the fact that the statute was contained in a chapter dealing with `Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order,' it was cast only in terms of morals. A physician was forbidden to prescribe contraceptives even when needed for the protection of health. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 1938, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222." 429 F.2d, at 1401. Nor did the Court of Appeals "believe that the legislature [in enacting § 21A] suddenly reversed its field and developed an interest in health. Rather, it merely made what it thought to be the precise accommodation necessary to escape the Griswold ruling." Ibid.

Again, we must agree with the Court of Appeals. If health were the rationale of § 21A, the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad. Dissenting in Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass., at 758, 247 N.E.2d, at 581, Justices Whittemore and Cutter stated that they saw "in § 21 and § 21A, read together, no public health purpose. If there is need to have a physician prescribe (and a pharmacist dispense) contraceptives, that need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons." The Court of Appeals added: "If the prohibition [on distribution to unmarried persons]...is to be taken to mean that the same physician who can prescribe for married patients does not have sufficient skill to protect the health of patients who lack a marriage certificate, or who may be currently divorced, it is illogical to the point of irrationality." 429 F.2d, at 1401. Furthermore, we must join the Court of Appeals in noting that not all contraceptives are potentially dangerous. As a result, if the Massachusetts statute were a health measure, it would not only invidiously discriminate against the unmarried, but also be overbroad with respect to the married, a fact that the Supreme Judicial Court itself seems to have conceded in Sturgis v. Attorney General, 358 Mass., at 40, 260 N.E.2d, at 690, where it noted that "it may well be that certain contraceptive medication and devices constitute no hazard to health, in which event it could be argued that the statute swept too broadly in its prohibition." "In this posture," as the Court of Appeals concluded, "it is impossible to think of the statute as intended as a health measure for the unmarried, and it is almost as difficult to think of it as so intended even as to the married." 429 F.2d, at 1401.

But if further proof that the Massachusetts statute is not a health measure is necessary, the argument of Justice Spiegel, who also dissented in Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass., at 759, 247 N.E.2d, at 582, is conclusive: "It is at best a strained conception to say that the Legislature intended to prevent the distribution of articles `which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences.' If that was the Legislature's goal, § 21 is not required" in view of the federal and state laws already regulating the distribution of harmful drugs. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 503, 52 Stat. 1051, as amended, 21 U.S. C. § 353; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 94, § 187A, as amended. We conclude, accordingly, that, despite the statute's superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations.

Third. If the Massachusetts statute cannot be upheld as a deterrent to fornication or as a health measure, may it, nevertheless, be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception? The Court of Appeals analysis "led inevitably to the conclusion that, so far as morals are concerned, it is contraceptives per se that are considered immoral--to the extent that Griswold will permit such a declaration." 429 F.2d, at 1401-1402. The Court of Appeals went on to hold, id., at 1402:

"To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the absence of demonstrated harm, we hold it is beyond the competency of the state."

We need not and do not, however, decide that important question in this case because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.

If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).

On the other hand, if Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons. In each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1949), made the point:

"The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."

Although Mr. Justice Jackson's comments had reference to administrative regulations, the principle he affirmed has equal application to the legislation here. We hold that by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, §§ 21 and 21A, violate the Equal Protection Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


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Eisenstadt v. Baird/Concurrence Douglas

Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, there is for me a narrower ground for affirming the Court of Appeals. This to me is a simple First Amendment case, that amendment being applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359.

Under no stretch of the law as presently stated could Massachusetts require a license for those who desire to lecture on planned parenthood, contraceptives, the rights of women, birth control, or any allied subject, or place a tax on that privilege. As to license taxes on First Amendment rights we said in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115:

"A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."

We held in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, that a person speaking at a labor union rally could not be required to register or obtain a license:

"As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly. Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave and immediate danger to an interest the State is entitled to protect, are not instruments of harm which require previous identification of the speakers. And the right either of workmen or of unions under these conditions to assemble and discuss their own affairs is as fully protected by the Constitution as the right of businessmen, farmers, educators, political party members or others to assemble and discuss their affairs and to enlist the support of others.

.....

"...If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment." Id., at 539, 540.

Baird addressed an audience of students and faculty at Boston University on the subject of birth control and overpopulation. His address was approximately one hour in length and consisted of a discussion of various contraceptive devices displayed by means of diagrams on two demonstration boards, as well as a display of contraceptive devices in their original packages. In addition, Baird spoke of the respective merits of various contraceptive devices; overpopulation in the world; crises throughout the world due to overpopulation; the large number of abortions performed on unwed mothers; and quack abortionists and the potential harm to women resulting from abortions performed by quack abortionists. Baird also urged members of the audience to petition the Massachusetts Legislature and to make known their feelings with regard to birth control laws in order to bring about a change in the laws. At the close of the address Baird invited members of the audience to come to the stage and help themselves to the contraceptive articles. We do not know how many accepted Baird's invitation. We only know that Baird personally handed one woman a package of Emko Vaginal Foam. He was then arrested and indicted (1) for exhibiting contraceptive devices and (2) for giving one such device away. The conviction for the first offense was reversed, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holding that the display of the articles was essential to a graphic representation of the lecture. But the conviction for the giving away of one article was sustained. 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574. The case reaches us by federal habeas corpus.

Had Baird not "given away" a sample of one of the devices whose use he advocated, there could be no question about the protection afforded him by the First Amendment. A State may not "contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482. See also Thomas v. Collins, supra; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390. However noxious Baird's ideas might have been to the authorities, the freedom to learn about them, fully to comprehend their scope and portent, and to weigh them against the tenets of the "conventional wisdom," may not be abridged. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1. Our system of government requires that we have faith in the ability of the individual to decide wisely, if only he is fully apprised of the merits of a controversy.

"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102.

The teachings of Baird and those of Galileo might be of a different order; but the suppression of either is equally repugnant.

As Milton said in the Areopagitica, "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."

It is said that only Baird's conduct is involved and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, is cited. That case involved a registrant under the Selective Service Act burning his Selective Service draft card. When prosecuted for that act, he defended his conduct as "symbolic speech." The Court held it was not.

Whatever may be thought of that decision on the merits, O'Brien is not controlling here. The distinction between "speech" and "conduct" is a valid one, insofar as it helps to determine in a particular case whether the purpose of the activity was to aid in the communication of ideas, and whether the form of the communication so interferes with the rights of others that reasonable regulations may be imposed. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus, excessive noise might well be "conduct"--a form of pollution--which can be made subject to precise, narrowly drawn regulations. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But "this Court has repeatedly stated, [First Amendment] rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action...." Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-142.

Baird gave an hour's lecture on birth control and as an aid to understanding the ideas which he was propagating he handed out one sample of one of the devices whose use he was endorsing. A person giving a lecture on coyote-getters would certainly improve his teaching technique if he passed one out to the audience; and he would be protected in doing so unless of course the device was loaded and ready to explode, killing or injuring people. The same holds true in my mind for mousetraps, spray guns, or any other article not dangerous per se on which speakers give educational lectures.

It is irrelevant to the application of these principles that Baird went beyond the giving of information about birth control and advocated the use of contraceptive articles. The First Amendment protects the opportunity to persuade to action whether that action be unwise or immoral, or whether the speech incites to action. See, e. g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.

In this case there was not even incitement to action. There is no evidence or finding that Baird intended that the young lady take the foam home with her when he handed it to her or that she would not have examined the article and then returned it to Baird, had he not been placed under arrest immediately upon handing the article over.

First Amendment rights are not limited to verbal expression. The right to petition often involves the right to walk. The right of assembly may mean pushing or jostling. Picketing involves physical activity as well as a display of a sign. A sit-in can be a quiet, dignified protest that has First Amendment protection even though no speech is involved, as we held in Brown v. Louisiana, supra. Putting contraceptives on display is certainly an aid to speech and discussion. Handing an article under discussion to a member of the audience is a technique known to all teachers and is commonly used. A handout may be on such a scale as to smack of a vendor's marketing scheme. But passing one article to an audience is merely a projection of the visual aid and should be a permissible adjunct of free speech. Baird was not making a prescription nor purporting to give medical advice. Handing out the article was not even a suggestion that the lady use it. At most it suggested that she become familiar with the product line.

I do not see how we can have a Society of the Dialogue, which the First Amendment envisages, if time-honored teaching techniques are barred to those who give educational lectures.

title: Eisenstadt v. Baird/Concurrence Douglas


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Eisenstadt v. Baird/Concurrence White

Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in the result.

In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), we reversed criminal convictions for advising married persons with respect to the use of contraceptives. As there applied, the Connecticut law, which forbade using contraceptives or giving advice on the subject, unduly invaded a zone of marital privacy protected by the Bill of Rights. The Connecticut law did not regulate the manufacture or sale of such products and we expressly left open any question concerning the permissible scope of such legislation. 381 U.S., at 485.

Chapter 272, § 21, of the Massachusetts General Laws makes it a criminal offense to distribute, sell, or give away any drug, medicine, or article for the prevention of conception. Section 21A excepts from this prohibition registered physicians who prescribe for and administer such articles to married persons and registered pharmacists who dispense on medical prescription.

Appellee Baird was indicted for giving away Emko Vaginal Foam, a "medicine and article for the prevention of conception...." The State did not purport to charge or convict Baird for distributing to an unmarried person. No proof was offered as to the marital status of the recipient. The gravamen of the offense charged was that Baird had no license and therefore no authority to distribute to anyone. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted, the constitutional validity of Baird's conviction rested upon his lack of status as a "distributor and not...the marital status of the recipient." Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 753, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1969). The Federal District Court was of the same view.

I assume that a State's interest in the health of its citizens empowers it to restrict to medical channels the distribution of products whose use should be accompanied by medical advice. I also do not doubt that various contraceptive medicines and articles are properly available only on prescription, and I therefore have no difficulty with the Massachusetts court's characterization of the statute at issue here as expressing "a legitimate interest in preventing the distribution of articles designed to prevent conception which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences." Id., at 753, 247 N.E.2d, at 578. Had Baird distributed a supply of the so-called "pill," I would sustain his conviction under this statute. Requiring a prescription to obtain potentially dangerous contraceptive material may place a substantial burden upon the right recognized in Griswold, but that burden is justified by a strong state interest and does not, as did the statute at issue in Griswold, sweep unnecessarily broadly or seek "to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon" a protected relationship. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485.

Baird, however, was found guilty of giving away vaginal foam. Inquiry into the validity of this conviction does not come to an end merely because some contraceptives are harmful and their distribution may be restricted. Our general reluctance to question a State's judgment on matters of public health must give way where, as here, the restriction at issue burdens the constitutional rights of married persons to use contraceptives. In these circumstances we may not accept on faith the State's classification of a particular contraceptive as dangerous to health. Due regard for protecting constitutional rights requires that the record contain evidence that a restriction on distribution of vaginal foam is essential to achieve the statutory purpose, or the relevant facts concerning the product must be such as to fall within the range of judicial notice.

Neither requirement is met here. Nothing in the record even suggests that the distribution of vaginal foam should be accompanied by medical advice in order to protect the user's health. Nor does the opinion of the Massachusetts court or the State's brief filed here marshal facts demonstrating that the hazards of using vaginal foam are common knowledge or so incontrovertible that they may be noticed judicially. On the contrary, the State acknowledges that Emko is a product widely available without prescription. Given Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, and absent proof of the probable hazards of using vaginal foam, we could not sustain appellee's conviction had it been for selling or giving away foam to a married person. Just as in Griswold, where the right of married persons to use contraceptives was "diluted or adversely affected" by permitting a conviction for giving advice as to its exercise, id., at 481, so here, to sanction a medical restriction upon distribution of a contraceptive not proved hazardous to health would impair the exercise of the constitutional right.

That Baird could not be convicted for distributing Emko to a married person disposes of this case. Assuming, arguendo, that the result would be otherwise had the recipient been unmarried, nothing has been placed in the record to indicate her marital status. The State has maintained that marital status is irrelevant because an unlicensed person cannot legally dispense vaginal foam either to married or unmarried persons. This approach is plainly erroneous and requires the reversal of Baird's conviction; for on the facts of this case, it deprives us of knowing whether Baird was in fact convicted for making a constitutionally protected distribution of Emko to a married person.

The principle established in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and consistently adhered to is that a conviction cannot stand where the "record fail[s] to prove that the conviction was not founded upon a theory which could not constitutionally support a verdict." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 (1969). To uphold a conviction even "though we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground...would be to countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment of constitutional rights." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942).

Because this case can be disposed of on the basis of settled constitutional doctrine, I perceive no reason for reaching the novel constitutional question whether a State may restrict or forbid the distribution of contraceptives to the unmarried. Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

title: Eisenstadt v. Baird/Concurrence White


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Eisenstadt v. Baird/Dissent Burger

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting.

The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in sustaining appellee's conviction for dispensing medicinal material without a license seems eminently correct to me and I would not disturb it. It is undisputed that appellee is not a physician or pharmacist and was prohibited under Massachusetts law from dispensing contraceptives to anyone, regardless of marital status. To my mind the validity of this restriction on dispensing medicinal substances is the only issue before the Court, and appellee has no standing to challenge that part of the statute restricting the persons to whom contraceptives are available. There is no need to labor this point, however, for everyone seems to agree that if Massachusetts has validly required, as a health measure, that all contraceptives be dispensed by a physician or pursuant to a physician's prescription, then the statutory distinction based on marital status has no bearing on this case. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).

The opinion of the Court today brushes aside appellee's status as an unlicensed layman by concluding that the Massachusetts Legislature was not really concerned with the protection of health when it passed this statute. Mr. Justice White acknowledges the statutory concern with the protection of health, but finds the restriction on distributors overly broad because the State has failed to adduce facts showing the health hazards of the particular substance dispensed by appellee as distinguished from other contraceptives. Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion does not directly challenge the power of Massachusetts to prohibit laymen from dispensing contraceptives, but considers that appellee rather than dispensing the substance was resorting to a "time-honored teaching technique" by utilizing a "visual aid" as an adjunct to his protected speech. I am puzzled by this third characterization of the case. If the suggestion is that appellee was merely displaying the contraceptive material without relinquishing his ownership of it, then the argument must be that the prosecution failed to prove that appellee had "given away" the contraceptive material. But appellee does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and himself summarizes the record as showing that "at the close of his lecture he invited members of the audience...to come and help themselves." On the other hand, if the concurring opinion means that the First Amendment protects the distribution of all articles "not dangerous per se" when the distribution is coupled with some form of speech, then I must confess that I have misread certain cases in the area. See, e. g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).

My disagreement with the opinion of the Court and that of Mr. Justice White goes far beyond mere puzzlement, however, for these opinions seriously invade the constitutional prerogatives of the States and regrettably hark back to the heyday of substantive due process.

In affirming appellee's conviction, the highest tribunal in Massachusetts held that the statutory requirement that contraceptives be dispensed only through medical channels served the legitimate interest of the State in protecting the health of its citizens. The Court today blithely hurdles this authoritative state pronouncement and concludes that the statute has no such purpose. Three basic arguments are advanced: First, since the distribution of contraceptives was prohibited as a moral matter in Massachusetts prior to 1966, it is impossible to believe that the legislature was concerned with health when it lifted the complete ban but insisted on medical supervision. I fail to see why the historical predominance of an unacceptable legislative purpose makes incredible the emergence of a new and valid one. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445-449 (1961). The second argument, finding its origin in a dissenting opinion in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, rejects a health purpose because, "[i]f there is need to have a physician prescribe...contraceptives, that need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons." 355 Mass. 746, 758, 247 N.E. 2d 574, 581. This argument confuses the validity of the restriction on distributors with the validity of the further restriction on distributees, a part of the statute not properly before the Court. Assuming the legislature too broadly restricted the class of persons who could obtain contraceptives, it hardly follows that it saw no need to protect the health of all persons to whom they are made available. Third, the Court sees no health purpose underlying the restriction on distributors because other state and federal laws regulate the distribution of harmful drugs. I know of no rule that all enactments relating to a particular purpose must be neatly consolidated in one package in the statute books for, if so, the United States Code will not pass muster. I am unable to draw any inference as to legislative purpose from the fact that the restriction on dispensing contraceptives was not codified with other statutory provisions regulating the distribution of medicinal substances. And the existence of nonconflicting, nonpre-emptive federal laws is simply without significance in judging the validity or purpose of a state law on the same subject matter.

It is possible, of course, that some members of the Massachusetts Legislature desired contraceptives to be dispensed only through medical channels in order to minimize their use, rather than to protect the health of their users, but I do not think it is the proper function of this Court to dismiss as dubious a state court's explication of a state statute absent overwhelming and irrefutable reasons for doing so.

Mr. Justice White, while acknowledging a valid legislative purpose of protecting health, concludes that the State lacks power to regulate the distribution of the contraceptive involved in this case as a means of protecting health. The opinion grants that appellee's conviction would be valid if he had given away a potentially harmful substance, but rejects the State's placing this particular contraceptive in that category. So far as I am aware, this Court has never before challenged the police power of a State to protect the public from the risks of possibly spurious and deleterious substances sold within its borders. Moreover, a statutory classification is not invalid

"simply because some innocent articles or transactions may be found within the proscribed class. The inquiry must be whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat." Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204 (1912).

But since the Massachusetts statute seeks to protect health by regulating contraceptives, the opinion invokes Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and puts the statutory classification to an unprecedented test: either the record must contain evidence supporting the classification or the health hazards of the particular contraceptive must be judicially noticeable. This is indeed a novel constitutional doctrine and not surprisingly no authority is cited for it.

Since the potential harmfulness of this particular medicinal substance has never been placed in issue in the state or federal courts, the State can hardly be faulted for its failure to build a record on this point. And it totally mystifies me why, in the absence of some evidence in the record, the factual underpinnings of the statutory classification must be "incontrovertible" or a matter of "common knowledge."

The actual hazards of introducing a particular foreign substance into the human body are frequently controverted, and I cannot believe that unanimity of expert opinion is a prerequisite to a State's exercise of its police power, no matter what the subject matter of the regulation. Even assuming no present dispute among medical authorities, we cannot ignore that it has become commonplace for a drug or food additive to be universally regarded as harmless on one day and to be condemned as perilous on the next. It is inappropriate for this Court to overrule a legislative classification by relying on the present consensus among leading authorities. The commands of the Constitution cannot fluctuate with the shifting tides of scientific opinion.

Even if it were conclusively established once and for all that the product dispensed by appellee is not actually or potentially dangerous in the somatic sense, I would still be unable to agree that the restriction on dispensing it falls outside the State's power to regulate in the area of health. The choice of a means of birth control, although a highly personal matter, is also a health matter in a very real sense, and I see nothing arbitrary in a requirement of medical supervision. It is generally acknowledged that contraceptives vary in degree of effectiveness and potential harmfulness. There may be compelling health reasons for certain women to choose the most effective means of birth control available, no matter how harmless the less effective alternatives. Others might be advised not to use a highly effective means of contraception because of their peculiar susceptibility to an adverse side effect. Moreover, there may be information known to the medical profession that a particular brand of contraceptive is to be preferred or avoided, or that it has not been adequately tested. Nonetheless, the concurring opinion would hold, as a constitutional matter, that a State must allow someone without medical training the same power to distribute this medicinal substance as is enjoyed by a physician.

It is revealing, I think, that those portions of the majority and concurring opinions rejecting the statutory limitation on distributors rely on no particular provision of the Constitution. I see nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or any other part of the Constitution that even vaguely suggests that these medicinal forms of contraceptives must be available in the open market. I do not challenge Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, despite its tenuous moorings to the text of the Constitution, but I cannot view it as controlling authority for this case. The Court was there confronted with a statute flatly prohibiting the use of contraceptives, not one regulating their distribution. I simply cannot believe that the limitation on the class of lawful distributors has significantly impaired the right to use contraceptives in Massachusetts. By relying on Griswold in the present context, the Court has passed beyond the penumbras of the specific guarantees into the uncircumscribed area of personal predilections.

The need for dissemination of information on birth control is not impinged in the slightest by limiting the distribution of medicinal substances to medical and pharmaceutical channels as Massachusetts has done by statute. The appellee has succeeded, it seems, in cloaking his activities in some new permutation of the First Amendment although his conviction rests in fact and law on dispensing a medicinal substance without a license. I am constrained to suggest that if the Constitution can be strained to invalidate the Massachusetts statute underlying appellee's conviction, we could quite as well employ it for the protection of a "curbstone quack," reminiscent of the "medicine man" of times past, who attracted a crowd of the curious with a soapbox lecture and then plied them with "free samples" of some unproved remedy. Massachusetts presumably outlawed such activities long ago, but today's holding seems to invite their return.

title: Eisenstadt v. Baird/Dissent Burger


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1. .—The most notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is that the former maintain themselves by renewal. A stone when struck resists. If its resistance is greater than the force of the blow struck, it remains outwardly unchanged. Otherwise, it is shattered into smaller bits. Never does the stone attempt to react in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow, much less so as to render the blow a contributing factor to its own continued action. While the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but loses its identity as a living thing.

As long as it endures, it struggles to use surrounding energies in its own behalf. It uses light, air, moisture, and the material of soil. To say that it uses them is to say that it turns them into means of its own conservation. As long as it is growing, the energy it expends in thus turning the environment to account is more than compensated for by the return it gets: it grows. Understanding the word 'control' in this sense, it may be said that a living being is one that subjugates

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Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to continuing human rights abuses and the conduct of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan

HRES 43 IH

101st CONGRESS

1st Session

H. RES. 43 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to continuing human rights abuses and the conduct of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 19, 1989 Mr. SOLOMON (for himself, Mr. PETRI, Mr. MCCRERY, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. COBLE, Mr. PENNY, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. COX, and Mr. ARMEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to continuing human rights abuses and the conduct of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan.

Whereas December 27, 1988, marked the 9th anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union;

Whereas the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been characterized by extreme brutality and a campaign of indiscriminate violence that has taken the lives of an estimated 1,000,000 Afghans and that has displaced more than 4,000,000 others;

Whereas the 43rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has found that (1) violations of human rights persist with the same frequency as in the past, (2) over 2,000 persons remain in prisons of the Soviet-supported Afghan regime for political reasons, (3) allegations of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners and disappearances of individuals continue, and (4) the economic, social, and cultural situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and has now become critical after years of conflict; and

Whereas it is reported that Soviet military forces continue to place thousands of hard-to-detect, plastic, antipersonnel mines in areas from which they are now withdrawing: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives--

(1) renews its condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which has been conducted in a manner that violates all acceptable military standards of conduct and which contravenes all recognized principles of international law;

(2) finds the Soviet-supported Afghan regime to be equally responsible for the continuing abuses of human rights in Afghanistan;

(3) calls upon the Soviet Union to halt the further emplacement of antipersonnel mines and other lethal weapons and substances in the Afghan countryside;

(4) calls upon the Soviet Union to complete the withdrawal of all its military forces from that country by February 15, 1989;

(5) calls for the restoration of a truly independent, broad-based, and freely chosen Afghan government;

(6) calls upon the international community to keep human rights abuses in Afghanistan under close scrutiny; and

(7) renews its commitment, should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989, to support the people of Afghanistan through the provision of appropriate material support.


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following pages embody an endeavor to detect and state the ideas implied in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the problems of the enterprise of education. The discussion includes an indication of the constructive aims and methods of public education as seen from this point of view, and a critical estimate of the theories of knowing and moral development which were formulated in earlier social conditions, but which still operate, in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal. As will appear from the book itself, the philosophy stated in this book connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization, and is concerned to point out the changes in subject matter and method of education indicated by these developments.

Hearty acknowledgments are due to Dr. Goodsell of Teachers College for criticisms; to Professor Kilpatrick of the same institution for criticisms, and for suggestions regarding the order of topics, of which I have freely availed myself, and to Miss Elsie Ripley Clapp for many criticisms and suggestions. The two firstnamed have also been kind enough to read the proofsheets. I am also greatly indebted to a long line of students whose successive classes span more years than I care to enumerate.

J. D.

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 on, 167; Committee on, and “log-rolling,” 168.

Taxation, sensitiveness of people concerning, 131; direct and indirect, 132, 133; Mr. Gladstone on direct and indirect, 134; direct, by

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 States, indirect, by federal govt., 133.

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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Contents

 * Introduction
 * Foreword
 * Acknowledgments
 * Preface
 * About the Book

 * Chapter 1: Ambushes
 * Chapter 2: Raids
 * Chapter 3: Shelling Attacks
 * Chapter 4: Attacking a Strong Point
 * Chapter 5: Mine Warfare
 * Chapter 6: Blocking Enemy Lines of Communication
 * Chapter 7: Siege Warfare
 * Chapter 8: Defending Against Raids
 * Chapter 9: Fighting Heliborne Insertions
 * Chapter 10: Defending Against a Cordon and Search
 * Chapter 11: Defending Base-Camps
 * Chapter 12: Counter-Ambush
 * Chapter 13: Encirclement
 * Chapter 14: Urban Combat
 * Chapter 15: Conclusion

 * Glossary


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Author:John Forbes White

Works

 * Life and Art of G. P. Chalmers, R.S.A., joint author

Contributions to EB1911

 * (in part)
 * (in part)

Works about White

 * http://www.dundee.ac.uk/umis/conf1998.htm#melville "John Forbes White" by Jenny Melville
 * John Forbes White Collection from gov.uk

title: Author:John Forbes White


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Author:Robert Reynold Merhige

Works

 * Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for City of Richmond

title: Author:Robert Reynold Merhige


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Introduction

INTRODUCTION
As we have throughout our history—the Philippines, Haiti,Nicaragua, Lebanon, Vietnam and Somalia—Marines will encounterguerrilla forces in the 21st century. Marines must understand potentialadversaries, and learn as much as possible about them. Themujahideen of the Soviet-Afghan War prevailed against a larger anddecisively better equipped foe, the Soviet Army. The Other Side of theMountain presents the story of the mujahideen's fight against that foe.

On 27 December 1979, Moscow ordered the Soviet Army into Afghanistan. Organized, equipped, and trained for the execution ofcombined arms operations, that force embodied the concept ofblitzkrieg. Nine years later, it withdrew in defeat. The Other Side of the Mountain was written from the reports of mujahideen combat veterans and provides a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas waging war against a technologically superior foe. Absolute supremacy of firepower did not guarantee victory. Native knowledge of terrain and detailed study of a known adversary offsetthat advantage. In particular, the chapter on urban combat will be ofgreat interest to commanders concerned with force protection. This book and its companion volume, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, published for the United StatesMarine Corps in 1996, offers a chronicle of the Afghan War by the war fighters.

The Marine Corps of the 21st century will have tremendous advan-tages over guerrilla forces. Our equipment, technology, training, and support are the best in the world. Yet, technological superiority is notin and of itself a guarantee of success. Insight into our adversary's capabilities, tactics and motivation will provide the decisive edge. The Other Side of the Mountain will help us gain this insight. I heartily recommend this book to all Marines.

 * J. E. RHODES
 * Commanding General,Marine Corps Combat Development Command


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Foreword

FOREWORD
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few expertsbelieved that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had achance of withstanding the modern, mechanized, technologically-advanced Soviet Army. Most stated that resistance was futile and thatthe Soviet Union had deliberately expanded their empire to the south.The Soviet Union had come to stay. Although some historians lookedat the British experience fighting the Afghan mountain tribesmen,most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union pos-sessed an unprecedented advantage in fire power, technology andmilitary might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied armsand material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creat-ing a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the Soviet flank, not defeatingthe Soviet Union. They did not predict that the Soviet Union wouldvoluntarily withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.

What caused the Soviet withdrawal? The Soviets realized thatthey were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering"death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hopeof winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do. Afterfailing to achieve military victory, the Soviet Union cut its losses andwithdrew. The Soviet Union lost 13,833 killed. Over 1.3 millionAfghans died and over a third of the population became refugees. Mosthave not yet returned to war-torn Afghanistan.

There have been few studies of guerrilla warfare from the guer-rilla's perspective. To capture this perspective and the tactical experi-ence of the Mujahideen, the United States Marine Corps commissioned this study and sent two retired combat veterans to interview Mujahideen. The authors were well received and generously assisted by various Mujahideen who willingly talked about their long, bitter war. The authors have produced a unique book which tells the guerrillas' story as interpreted by military professionals. This is a book about small-unit guerrilla combat. This is a book about death and survival, adaptation and perseverance.

This is a book for the combat-arms company and field grade officer and NCO. It provides an understanding of guerrilla field craft, tactics, techniques and procedures. It has application in Basic and AdvancedOfficer and NCO courses as well as special warfare courses. Seniorleaders will also find valuable insights for training and supportingguerrilla forces as well as defending against guerrilla forces. This book is a companion piece to The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan which National Defense University press published in 1996.


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Acknowledgments

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not be possible without the open, friendly and will-ing support of the many Mujahideen we interviewed. We thankMawlawi Abdul-Rahman, Haidar Ahmadi, Mohammad Akbar,Akhtarjhan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai, Assadullah MohammadAsef, Assadullah, Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch, Abdul Baqi Balots,Abdul Nasrin Baz, Commander Didar, Daoud, Gulaga Farid, GhulamFarouq, Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani, Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, AbdulGhani, Sofi Lal Gul, Wazir Gul, Tsaranwal Sher Habib, HajiHabibulah, Ghulam Haidar, Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif, MawlaliNezamuddin Haqani, Hedayatullah, Toryalai Hemat, EngineerMohammad Ibrahim, Mohammad Shah Kako, Asef Khan, Asil Khan,Haji Badshah Khan, Nawaz Khan, Counsel General Haji AbdulKhaleq, Haji Badshah Khan, Major Sher Aqa Kochay, Lalai, MullaMalang, Haji Malangyar, Akhtar Mohammad, Amir Mohammad, HajiLal Mohammad, Haji Pir Mohammad, Engineer Sayed Mohammad,Qari Feda Mohammad, Sultan Mohammad, Mohammad AminMudaqeq, Haji Nematullah, Lieutenant Zabet Omar, Sher Padshah,Haji Abdul Qader, Akhund Zada Qasem, Mawlawi Qasem, LTC HajiMohammad Rahim, Abdul Razek, Mohammad Saber, Abdul Sabur,Doctor Mohammad Sadeq, Amin Safi, Haji Aaquelshah Sahak, AbdulSadiq Sahebzada, Sarshar, Haji Mohammad Seddiq, Shahabuddin,Haji Mohammad Shah, Mohammad Humayun Shahin, MawlawiAbdul Shukur Yasini, Haji Sidiqullah, Qazi Guljan Tayeb, GeneralAbdul Rahim Wardak, Doctor Mohammad Wakil, Doctor MohammadWali, Haji Mohammad Yakub, General Gulzarak Zadran and Zakarifor generously sharing their time and experience. We can only hopethat peace will finally come to Afghanistan so that they can start thelong, difficult job of rebuilding their shattered country. Our special thanks for the generous hospitality and supportextended to us by Nancy Dupree of the Agency Coordinating Body forAfghan Relief, Pir Gailani, Mr. Kamaluddin of the Afghan MediaResource Center, Abdul Ahad Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, GeneralCounsel Haji Abdul Khaleq, Vice Counsel Muhammad Wali Naeemiand Abdul Ghani Wardak.

A special thanks to our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, who wentinto areas of Afghanistan to conduct interviews where we could not go. We contacted several major Mujahideen commanders such as Ismail Khan, Masood, Abdul Haq, and Jalaluddin Haqani for interviews and material, but we were unable to meet with them before the book dead-line. Our thanks in advance for the privilege of returning at a future time to conduct those interviews and to include them in a follow-on book.

Our special thanks to Colonel David O. Smith, Lieutenant ColonelTerry Cook, Captain Bob Hehl and TSGT Barry Cuthbertson of theUnited States Defense Attache Office in Islamabad and PrincipalOfficer of the United States Consulate in Peshawar, Brad Hanson.

The United States Marine Corps funded the research, writing andpublication of this book. Charlie Cutshaw, Karen Dolan and Dick Voltzof the USMC Studies and Analysis Division at Quantico, Virginiaprovided funding for printing The Bear Went Over The Mountain:Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and agreed to underwrite theproduction of this counterpart volume on Mujahideen tactics. ColonelCharles Johnston, the former Director of the U.S. Army ForeignMilitary Studies Office (FMSO) enthusiastically supported theresearch and production as did FMSO Director Dr. Graham Turbiville,and FMSO analysts Dr. Jacob Kipp, Tim Thomas and Major RayFinch. Robert Love helped with translation support and Linda Prideand Al Lindman provided computer assistance. The Combined ArmsResearch Library and Command and General Staff College MapLibrary at Fort Leavenworth provided invaluable assistance. AliceMink of FMSO kept the whole production on time and under budget.

A "band of brothers," skilled in tactics, read and provided commen-tary on the manuscript. Our special thanks to Colonel (Ret) David M.Glantz of Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Colonel (Ret.) Charles E. Johnston,former Director of FMSO; Colonel (Ret) William M. Mendel of FMSO;Allen E. Curtis, Director of Intelligence and Security at the NationalTraining Center; former Marine Captain (Ret) Tim Leaf of Quantico,Virginia; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of CENTCOM; LieutenantColonel Karl Prinslow of FMSO; and Major Darr Reimers of the 1stCavalry Division. Mary Ann Glantz graciously edited the manuscript. JonathanPierce was the book editor/designer, Rhonda Gross created the initialmap graphics, and Emily Pierce did a superb job of finishing the mapsand designing the cover.

Homaira Jalali and Gina Grau showed remarkably good humorand supported the efforts of their husbands as they gathered the mate-rial and worked on the book. We thank all of you for your help. Any mistakes are the authors.


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/About the Book

About the Book
Author Les Grau, regularly travels back and forth to Russia. Hereceived a book from the History of Military Art department at theFrunze Combined Arms Academy in Moscow. The book was intendedfor students' classroom use only and, as such, shows both the goodand the bad. With Frunze Academy permission, Les translated thisbook and added commentary before it was published by NDU Pressas The. Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics inAfghanistan. Author Ali Jalali, helped in the editing process. "TheBear" showed the tactics of the Soviets, but the Mujahideen tacticswere absent. Charlie Cuthbertson and Dick Voltz of the USMC inQuantico agreed that both sides needed to be presented and sent Aliand Les to Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview Mujahideen com-manders for a companion volume.

Author Ali Jalali has the perfect credentials to do this book. Aliwas a Colonel in the Afghan Army and taught at the Afghan Military Academy and Army Staff College. His foreign education included the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; theBritish Army Staff College at Camberley; and the Soviet FrunzeAcademy. Many of Ali's officer students were key resistance figures.Ali was also a member of the resistance and an accredited journalistduring the conflict. Now Ali works as a journalist and has coveredAfghanistan and Central Asia over the last 15 years. Ali is respectedby all the factions and has exceptional entre to the Mujahideen.

All and Les arrived in Pakistan in September 1996 and were preparing to go into Afghanistan when the Taliban advance on Kabulclosed the borders to American citizens. Ali interviewed some 40Mujahideen during a month in Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad,Pakistan. Our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviewsfor another two months inside Afghanistan for this book. The inter-views are the basis of this book. In those interviews where we haveseveral sources for the same vignette or where we have lots ofsupporting written reports and material, we have written the vignettein the third person. In those cases where the person interviewed is theprimary source, we have written the vignette in the first person. Thevignettes are arranged chronologically by type of action. Occasionally,when the actions occur at the same place over time, we lump thoseactions together instead of chronologically. We have tried to make thebook as accurate as possible, but realize that time and retelling mayhave altered some of the facts. We have limited the span of the bookfrom the Soviet invasion until their withdrawal. The war startedbefore the Soviet invasion and continued long after their departure. We plan to write about these battles in a future book. We used edition 2-DMA series U611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S.Defense Mapping Agency for the final preparation of the material.For those who wish to consult the map sheets, map sheet numbersare given with each vignette. We have numbered each vignette within the chapter and started each chapter with a country map showing the rough location of each vignette. The interviews were long andexhaustive, so many details are available. Many of the interviewswere conducted at different times and places, with different peoplewho had been part of the same battle or operation. This allowed usto check and compare details and sequences of events. Map eleva-tions are given in meters. Contour intervals are not consistent andmerely show elevation. Place and name spelling is based on Ali Jalali's best transliteration efforts. Consistency in spelling is difficult when two alphabets are involved—some spellings are different than in other books on Afghanistan. Although the Mujahideen always say 'Russian' instead of 'Soviet', we have used 'Soviet' throughout unless it is a direct quote.

We use Russian map graphics on the maps. The Afghan Army used the Soviet graphics system and most Mujahideen were familiar with them. Russian graphics are more "user friendly" ( flexible and illustrative) than Western graphics. The Russians can show thesequential development of an action by adding times or identifyinglines to their graphics. These lines are explained in the legend. A table of Russian map graphics is located in the back of the book. Mujahideen forces are shown in blue and Soviet/DRA forces are shown in red.


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Glossary

GLOSSARY
Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF)—Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli Afghanistan}) founded by Sebqhatullah Mojadeddi. Theparty is moderate. AGS-17—A Soviet-manufactured, tripod-mounted automatic grenade launcher which fires 30mm grenades from a thirty round drum magazine. The maximum range of the AGS-17 is 1,700 meters.Air assault—Helicopter borne assault into an area.ANLF-Afghanistan National Liberation Front of Mojadeddi.AO—Area of operations. APC—Armored personnel carrier, any of the wheeled or trackedSoviet-manufactured combat vehicles used to transportsoldiers. Bernau—Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun which fires from a top-loading 20-round magazine. This excellent 7 9mm weapon wasdeveloped between World War I and II and was sold abroad asthe M30 to China, Yugoslavia and Romania. The British Brengun is based on the M26 design. The Mujahideen called them20-shooters. BM-1—Single barrel 107mm rocket launcher. BM-12—An obsolete Soviet multiple rocket launcher. The Chineseimproved and manufactured it as the Type 63. MostMujahideen BM-12s were actually Chinese Type 63s. It isground-mounted, has twelve barrels and fires 107mm rockets toa distance of 8,500 meters. It weighs 611 kilograms. M-21—A truck-mounted, 40-tube multiple rocket launcher whichfires 122mm rockets to a distance of 20.5 kilometers. TheMujahideen mostly called this the BM-40. BM-22—A truck-mounted, 16-tube multiple rocket launcher whichfires 220mm rockets to a distance of 40 kilometers. The type ofrocket warheads include high-explosive fragmentation, chemi-cal, incendiary and remotely delivery mines The Soviet nick- Page 408 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War name for this lethal system is Uragan (Hurricane). Westernanalysts initially identified this system as the BM27. BMP—A Soviet tracked infantry fighting vehicle that carries a three-man crew and a squad of eight soldiers. The BMP-1 mounts a73mm cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun and an antitank missile.The BMP-2 carries a 30mm automatic gun and a different anti-tank missile and launcher. BRDM—A Soviet four-wheeled armored car used primarily for recon-naissance. It has two auxiliary wheels for extra mobility. In itsvarious configurations, it carries either a 12.7mm machine gun,a 7.62mm machine gun or both. BMD—A Soviet air-dropable, armored personnel carrier that carriesup to nine men (usually a maximum of seven). It has the sameturret as the BMP, so the BMD-1 has the 73mm cannon of theBMP-1 and the BMD-2 has the 30mm automatic gun of theBMP-2. They were widely used by Soviet airborne and airassault force. The Mujahideen called them "commando tanks" BTR—A Soviet eight-wheeled armored personnel carrier that cancarry up to an 11-man squad. It mounts 14.5mm and 7.62mmmachine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well. TheBTR and BMP were the most common infantry carriers of theSoviet Forces. Commander—During the war against the Soviets, the Mujahideenhad no rank structure, so the term commander applied to allmilitary commanders whether they led 10 men or 1,000. Dari—Afghan Farsi or Persian spoken by about 50% of the population.DRA—Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The communist govern-ment of Afghanistan. DShK—Soviet-manufactured 12.7mm heavy machine gun. It is aprimary armament on Soviet-manufactured armored vehiclesand is effective against ground and air targets. It has awheeled carriage, tripod and mountain mount for ground andair defense firing. It has rate of fire of 540-600 rounds perminute with a maximum range of 7000 meters and an effectiverange of 1500 meters against ground targets and 1000 metersagainst air targets. Enfield—British-manufactured .303 bolt-action rifle which was thestandard British infantry weapon from 1895 through the Glossary Page 409 Korean War. It saw wide service on the North-West Frontierand its long range and powerful cartridge made it a favorite inIndia and Afghanistan. It has a maximum range of 2550meters and an effective range of 800 meters. It has a 10-roundmagazine and can carry an additional round in the chamber, sothe Mujahideen called them 11-shooters. Etehad-e Islami (EIA)—Mujahideen faction led by Abdurab RasulSayaf. Ghar—Pushto term for mountain. Green zone—Agricultural region of gardens, orchards, fields andvineyards bisected by a network of irrigation ditches. They nor-mally border rivers and some sections of highway and most arepractically impassible for vehicles. Goryunov—The heavy machine gun SGM Stankovy GoryunovModernizovanniy M-49 was adopted by the Soviet Army duringWorld War II and modernized versions are in service with theRussian Army today. It is a gas-operated, air-cooled, company-level, 7.62mm weapon that has vehicle and ground mounts. Ithas a rate of fire of 650 round per minute and a maximum rangeof 2,500 meters and an effective range of 1,000 meters. Haji—The title of a person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.Harbakai—Pashtu tribal policemen or regulators. HI—Islamic Movement of Ayatollah Shaikh Asef Muhsini.HIH—Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. HIK—Islamic Party of Mawlawi Yunus Khalis. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—Pakistan's intelligence servicefor internal and external security, political and military intelli-gence and counterintelligence. The ISI was responsible for fun-neling aid to the Mujahideen and providing training toMujahideen combatants and support personnel. IRMA—Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan of MawlawiMohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Islamic Party (HIH)— (Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin) founded in 1974 tofight the Daoud government. It later split as cofoundersRabanni and Khalis founded their own factions. Its leader,Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is a fundamentalist internationalist.Hikmatyar's party received more outside aid from Pakistan, theUnited States and Saudi Arabia than any other party. Page 410 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Islamic Party (HIK)—(Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis) was founded byMawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis who left Afghanistan forPakistan in 1973 after the Daoud coup. Khalis is fromNangahar Province. His most famous commanders includeAbdul Haq in Kabul and Jalladuddin Hagani of PaktiaProvince. The party is fundamentalist. Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA)—(Harakat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami) was founded by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Theparty is moderate (traditional Islamist). Islamic Movement (HI)—(Harakat-i Islami) was founded byAyatollah Asef Muhsini in Iran as a minority Shia faction. Theparty has a traditional Islamic orientation. Islamic Society (JIA)—(Jamiat-i-Islami) was founded by Burha-nud-din Rabbani who fled to Pakistan in 1974. His mostfamous commanders are Ahmd Shah Masood and IsmailKhan. The party is primarily fundamentalist and dominatedby ethnic Tadjiks. Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IUA)—(Itttihad-i-Islami) was founded by Abd Al-Rab Abdul-RassulSayyaf. This used to be called the EIA until 1981. The factionis fundamentalist. In the mid-1980s, they again changed thename to the Islamic Union of Afghanistan. JIA—Islamic Society Of Rabbani. Jihad—Holy war conducted for preservation of the faith. Kal—Local term in Farah Province for canyon Kalashnikov—Soviet automatic assault rifle. The AK-47 and AKMKalashnikovs fire a 7.62mm round while the AK-74 fires a5.45mm round. Kandow—Pushto term for mountain pass. Karez—An Afghanistan system of underground tunnels used for thecollection of ground water and for carrying water for surfaceirrigation. The Mujahideen used them for shelter and ambush. KHAD—The secret police of the Afghan government responsible fordetecting and eradicating domestic political opposition, sub-verting the mujahideen, penetrating opposition groups abroadand providing military intelligence to the armed forces throughits military wing. The KHAD was patterned after the SovietKGB and GRU and apparently reported to the KGB. Khalq—(Farsi for masses or people). One of the two communist fac-tions of the PDPA. KIA—Killed in action. Glossary Page 411 Kochi—Kochi are nomadic tribesmen of Afghanistan. They liveprimarily by herding and trading sheep, goats and camels.Koh—Dari term for mountain. Lashkar—A Pushto term for tribal armed force. LOC—Lines of communication. LZ—Landing zone. Madrassa—Arabic term for an Islamic religious school.Markaz—Mujahideen base. Mawlawi—Islamic religious scholar. MIA—Missing in Action. Model 1938 Mortar—The Soviet Model 1938 107mm mortar was orig-inally the standard regimental mortar for mountain units. It isa reduced size version of the 120mm mortar suitable for trans-port on a pack animal. It can fire 15 rounds per minute and hasa maximum range of 5150 meters firing the heavy round and6300 meters firing the light round. Mulla—Islamic religious leader or Imam. Mosin-Nagant—The Model M1891/30 is a Russian/Soviet bolt-actionrifle or carbine which fires the 7.62x54 cartridge. It was usedin the Russo-Japanese War, World War I and World War II.Many models come with a folding bayonet. The rifle has a max-imum range of 2000 meters and an effective range of 400meters. The Mujahideen called them five-shooters. MRL (Multiple rocket launcher)—A ground-mounted or truck-mounted rocket artillery system capable of firing a salvo ofrockets at a target. Mujahideen (holy warrior)—A member of the Afghan resistance. National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)—(Mahaz-e-MelliIslami}). Founded by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, this moderateparty attracted a number of former officers from the AfghanArmy and moderate technocrats. NIFA—National Islamic Front of Afghanistan of Gailani. OP—Observation Post. Parcham—(Farsi for flag) Faction of the communist PDPA.PDPA—Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan—the communistparty of Afghanistan. Pir—Title designating sainthood and leader in the Sufi orders. Page 412 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War PK—Soviet 7.62mm company machine gun which replaced theGoryunov machine gun. It weighs 16.5 kilograms and has aneffective range of 1000 meters. The Mujahideen call them 100-shooters since they fire out of a 100 round box of linkedammunition. POL—Petroleum, oil and lubricants. Pushtun—The dominant ethnic group (nearly 50%) of Afghanistanwho speak Pashtu. The British historically referred to thesepeople as Pathans. Qawm—The basic subnational Afghan identify based on kinship, res-idence and sometimes occupation. Ramadan—The Islamic holy month of fasting. RDM—Remotely delivered mines Mines which can be emplaced byaviation, artillery or MRL fire. RPG-7—Soviet manufactured shoulder-fired antitank weapon whichfires a shaped-charge rocket. It has an effective range of 300meters. RPG-18—Soviet manufactured single-shot, shoulder-fired antitankweapon which fires a 66mm shaped-charge rocket. The rock-et is stored in an extendable storage tube which also functionsas a launcher. The launcher is thrown away after use. It hasan effective range of 135 meters and is a copy of theUSM72A2 LAW. Sagar—Egyptian 107mm or 122mm MRL. It has one, two, three andfour-barrel light-weight launchers. The 107mm (Saqar 20) hasa maximum range of 8000 meters and the 122mm (Saqar 30)has a maximum range of 10,800 meters. The 107mm model wasmore common in Afghanistan. Some Mujahideen state thatthey had special rounds which enabled the Saqar to reach 20kilometers and the Saqar 30 to reach 30 kilometers. Saqarmeans "eagle" in Egyptian. Sarandoy—DRA Ministry of the Interior armed forces, a heavilyarmed police force. They were organized into six brigades orregiments (numbering about 60,000 men) and were based inKandahar, Badakhstan, Baghlan and Paravan provinces plustwo in Kabul. The Sarandoy had an additional estimated 6,000men in operational and mountain battalions. Shaheed—Martyr. The plural is shaheedan or shuhada.. Glossary Page 413 Shia—The minority Islamic community in Afghanistan following theImami Shiism (the dominant faith in neighboring Iran) orIsmaili Shiism. SKS—(Samozaryadiy karabin Simonova}) gas-operated semi-automat-ic Soviet carbine with a folding bayonet. It has a ten-shot mag-azine and fires the 7.62x39 cartridge to a maximum range of1000 meters with a 400 meter effective range. The first modelswere fielded in 1931 and it was a standard weapon of the Soviet -Army during World War II through the early 1950s. TheMujahideen simply called them carbines. SOP—Standard operating procedures. Spetsnaz—Soviet forces trained for long-range reconnaissance, com-mando and special forces type combat. Sufi—A mystic branch of Islam with considerable influence inAfghanistan. Sufis are more widespread among Sunnis. Sunni—The majority Islamic community in Afghanistan. Over two-thirds of the populace are Sunnis, followers of the HanafiSchool. Tadjik—Ethnic Afghans from the northeastern regions of Afghanistanwho make up about 25% of the population. Tsadar—All purpose cloth that Afghans carry and wear. It serves asa ground cloth, sleeping bag, camouflage covering, bundle wrapand shroud. Uzbek—Ethnic Afghans primarily in the north central part ofAfghanistan who make up 10% of the population and speakTurkic. WIA—Wounded in Action. ZGU—(Zenitnaya gornaya ustanovka}) Mountain air defense weaponsmount. Any Soviet air defense weapon that can disassembledfor transport into the mountains by pack animals or porters.Usually this means that the weapons mount or pedestal has nowheels. ZGU-1—A ZPU-1 mounted on a ZGU mount. ZPU-1—A Soviet 14 5mm ground-mounted antiaircraft machine gunwhich is towed on a light, two-wheeled carriage. The system isbuilt around a single-barreled KPV heavy machine gun whichhas a cyclic rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute and a practi- Page 414 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War cal rate of fire of 150 rounds per minute. The belt-fed machinegun feeds from a 150 round box and has a maximum horizontalrange of 7000 meters and a maximum effective antiaircraftrange of 1400 meters. It weighs 581 kilograms ZPU-2—A twin-barrel version of the ZPU-1. ZSU-23 4—A Soviet self-propelled air defense weapon Which fires four23mm machine guns simultaneously. The Soviets used thisweapon for counter ambushes and in the destruction of groundtargets.