text:
Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 66

Question. 66 - OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.

Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?

(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?

(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?

(5) Whether every theft is a sin?

(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?

(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?

(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?

(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?

Art. 1 - Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Lk. 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."

I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Q[64], A[1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The 'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above (Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.

Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"

Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."

Art. 3 - Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, On the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A[2], OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in keeping it back.

Objection 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from 'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the night."

I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly."

Reply to Objection 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.

Reply to Objection 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but as regards its custody.

Art. 4 - Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and "manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.

Objection 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is done openly.

I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically.

Reply to Objection 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.

Reply to Objection 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.

Art. 5 - Whether theft is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): "And the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."

I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief, by laying hands on another's property secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): "The just took the spoils of the wicked."

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).

Reply to Objection 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.

Art. 6 - Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written." Therefore theft is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on (A[7]). Hence the text continues: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul."

Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2). Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).

Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere thought.

Art. 7 - Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.

Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.

On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for need has made it common.

I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man's ransom and freedom."

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.

Reply to Objection 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.

Reply to Objection 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.

Art. 8 - Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, according to what has been said (A[4]). Now it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is lawful.

On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Is. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not lawful to take anything by robbery.

I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes another's property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice---either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people's property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.

Reply to Objection 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.

Reply to Objection 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public authority.

Reply to Objection 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.

Art. 9 - Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q[55], AA[4],5). Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.

Objection 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery.

Objection 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.

On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is more severely punished than theft.

I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA[4],6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of theft.

Reply to Objection 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/143

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 89

continue to pursue the purposes of such project; and the probable net benefit to the Federal Government in paying such principal and interest will be greater than that which would result in the event of a default; "(2) the amount of such payment which the Administrator is authorized to pay shall be no greater than the amount of principal and interest which the borrower is obligated to pay under the loan agreement; and "(3) the borrower agrees to reimburse the Administrator for Reimbursement. such payment on terms and conditions, including interest, which are satisfactory to the Administrator.". SEC. 511. Section 204 of the Act is amended by redesignating subsec- Notes or tion (c) as subsection (d) and inserting after subsection (b) the fol- obligations, issuance to lowing new subsection (c): "(c) If at any time the moneys available in the fund are insufficient Treasury.1144. 30 USC to enable the Administrator to discharge his responsibilities under this title, he shall issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other obligations in such forms and denominations bearing such maturities, and subject to such terms and conditions, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. This borrowing authority shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are specified in appropriation Acts. Such authorizations may be without fiscal year limitations. Redemption of such notes or obligations shall be made by the Admin- Redemption. istrator from appropriations or other moneys available under this section. Such notes or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate Interest rate. determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, which shall not be less than a rate determined by taking into consideration the average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities during the month preceding the issuance of the notes or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase any notes or other obligations issued hereunder and for that purpose he is authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the purposes for which securities may be 31 USC 774. issued under that Act are extended to include any purchase of such notes or obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time sell any of the notes or other obligations acquired by him under this Sale. subsection. All redemptions, purchases, and sales by the Secretary of the Treasury of such notes or other obligations shall be treated as public debt transactions of the United States.". SEC. 512. Title II of the Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following: new section: " COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSISTANCE

"SEC. 205. (a) The Administrator, for any project which has a 30 USC 1145. guarantee under this title of not less than $50,000,000 and which will have an intended operating life of not less than five years to satisfy the purposes under this title for which the guarantee'has been made, shall endeavor to insure that, taking into consideration appropriate local community action and all reasonably available forms of assistance under this section and other Federal"and State statutes, that the impacts resulting from the proposed project have been fully evaluated by the borrower, the Administrator, and the Governor of the affected State, and that effective steps have been taken or will be taken in a •. timely manner to finance community planning and development costs resulting from such project under this section, if applicable under

�

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/144

 92 STAT. 90

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

State and local actions, review.

other provisions of law, or by other means. When the project will be located on leased Federal lands, the Administrator shall specifically review State and local actions under section 9(a) of the Mineral Leasing Act Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-377) and insure that any funds made available to the State pursuant to such section 9(a) are used to finance such planning and development costs before any Federal assistance under subsection (c) of this section is considered or authorized. "(b) The Administrator, for projects not included under subsection (a), may in his discretion consider the community impacts which may result from such projects, and may take such actions, under authority directly available to him under other statutes or in coordination with other Federal agencies or the State, as he considers necessary and appropriate to insure timely and effective planning and financing for such community impacts. "(c)(1) In order to discharge his responsibilities under subsection (a), and in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Administrator in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, and subject to such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate, the Administrator is authorized, for the purposes of financing essential community development and planning which directly result from, or are necessitated by, a project under subsection (a), to— "(A) guarantee and make commitments to guarantee the payment of interest on, and the principal balance of, obligations for such financing issued by eligible States, political subdivisions, or Indian tribes, "(B) guarantee and make commitments to guarantee the payment of taxes imposed on such project by eligible non-Federal taxing authorities which taxes are earmarked by such authorities to support the payment of interest and principal on obligations for such financing, and "(C) require that the qualified borrower receiving assistance for a project under this section advance sums to eligible States, political subdivisions, and Indian tribes to pay for the financing of such development and planning: Provided, That the State, political subdivision, or Indian tribe agrees to provide tax abatement credits over the life of the project for such payments by such applicant. "(2) No guarantee or commitment to guarantee under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall exceed $1,000,000. "(3) In the event of any default by the borrower in the payment of taxes guaranteed by the Administrator under this section, the Administrator shall pay out of the fund established by this title such taxes at the time or times they may fall due, and shall have by reason of such payment a claim against the borrower for all sums paid plus interest. "(4) If after consultation with State, political subdivision, or Indian tribe, the Administrator finds that the financial assistance programs of paragraph (1) of this section will not result in sufficient funds to carry out the purposes of this subsection, then the Administrator may— "(A) make direct loans to the eligible States, political subdivisions, or Indian tribes for such purposes: Provided,^ That such loans shall be made on such reasonable terms and conditions as the Administrator shall prescribe: Provided further, That the Administrator may waive repayment of all or part of a loan made under this paragraph, including interest, if the State or political subdivision or Indian tribe involved demonstrates to the satisfaction

30 USC 191.

Payments, guarantees and commitments.

Sums, advancement. Tax abatement credits.

Limitation. Defaults, tax payment.

Consultation.

Loans.

Repayment, waiver.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/145

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 91

of the Administrator that due to a change in circumstances there will be net adverse impacts resulting from such project that would probably cause such State, subdivision, or tribe to default on the loan; or "(B) require that any community development and planning costs which are associated with, or result from, such project, and which are determined by the Administrator to be appropriate for such inclusion, shall be included in the aggregate costs of the project. "(5) The Administrator is further authorized to make grants to Grants States, political subdivisions, or Indian tribes for studying and planning for the potential economic, environmental, and social consequences of projects and for establishing related management expertise. "(6) At any time the Administrator may, in consultation with the Debt obligations Secretary of the Treasury, redeem, in whole or in part, out of the fund redemption. established by this section, the debt obligations guaranteed or the debt Consultation. obligations for which tax payments are guaranteed under this subsection. "(7) When one or more States, political subdivisions, or Indian tribes would be eligible for assistance under this subsection, but for the fact that construction and operation of the project occurs outside its jurisdiction, the Administrator is authorized to provide, to the greatest extent possible, arrangements for equitable sharing of such assistance. "(8) Such amounts as may be necessary for direct loans and grants pursuant to this subsection shall be available as provided in annual authorization Acts. "(9) The Administrator, if appropriate, shall provide assistance in Federal share the financing of up to 100 per centum of the costs of the required community development and planning piirsuant to this section. " (10) In carrying out the provisions of this section, the Administra- Facility title. tor shall provide that title to any facility receiving financial assistance under this section shall vest in the applicable State, political subdivision, or Indian tribe, as appropriate, and in the case of default by the borrower on a loan guarantee made or committed under subsection (b) of this section, such facility shall not be considered a project asset for the purposes of section 202 of this Act. Ante, p. 88. "(11) The Administrator shall not use his authority under this subsection to provide Federal assistance unless any Federal funds transferred pursuant to section 9(a) of the Mineral Leasing Act Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-377) to the State from the lease 30 USC 191 of Federal land for or associated with the project have been or, with assurance, will be committed, to the maximum extent allowable under Federal statutes, to financing such essential community development or planning directly resulting from, or necessitated by, a project on leased Federal lands.". TITLE VI—ELECTRIC AND HYBRID VEHICLE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM SEC. 601. (a) Section 7(b)(3) of the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C. 2506(b)(3)) is amended by striking out ", except that rules promulgated under paragraph (1) shall be amended not later than 6 months prior to the date for contracts specified in subsection (c)(2)". (b) Section 7(b)(4) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 2506(b)(4)) is amended to read as follows:

39-194 O—80—pt. 1

10: QL3

Demonstrations.

�


text: Author:Charles Hill-Tout

title: Author:Charles Hill-Tout


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/146

 92 STAT. 92 Standards, transmittal to Speaker of House, President of Senate, and congressional committees. Contracts for vehicle purchase or lease.

Limitation. Information, availability to public.

Explanation, transmittal to Speaker of House, President of Senate, and congressional committees.

Contracts.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 " (4) The Administrator shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, and to the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, the performance standards developed under paragraph (1) and all revised performance standards established in connection with the demonstrations specified in subsection (c)(2).". (c) Section 7(c) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 2506(c)) is amended to read as follows: " (c)(1) The Administrator shall, within 6 months after the date of promulgation of performance standards pursuant to subsection (b)(1), institute the first contracts for the purchase or lease of electric or hybrid vehicles which satisfy the performance standards set forth under (b)(1). The delivery of such vehicles shall be completed according to the expedited best effort of the administering agency and the selected manufacturer. To the extent practicable, vehicles purchased or leased under such contracts shall represent a cross-section of the available technologies and of actual or potential vehicle use. "(2) Thereafter, according to a planned schedule, the Administrator shall contract for the purchase or lease of additional electric or hybrid vehicles which satisfy amended performance standards and represent continuing improvements in state-of-the-art. In conducting demonstrations, the Administrator shall consider-— "(A) the need and intent of the Congress to stimulate and encourage private sector production as well as public knowledge, acceptance, and use of electric and hybrid vehicles; and "(B) demonstration of varying degrees of vehicle operations, ,' management, and control for maximum widespread effectiveness and exposure to public use. "(3) The demonstration period shall extend through the fiscal year 1986, with purchase or leasing continuing through the fiscal year 1984. During the demonstration period the Administrator shall demonstrate 7,500 to 10,000 electric and hybrid vehicles. No more than 400 vehicles may be procured for this purpose during fiscal year 1978. In order to allow industry time for advanced planning, the size and nature of projected electric and hybrid vehicle leasing and procurements will be made public by the administering agency. Publications under the preceding sentence (each covering a period of two years) shall be released annually starting at an appropriate time in the fiscal year 1978. "(4) If the Administrator determines on the basis of his annual review of the program under this Act that— "(A) at least 200 vehicles cannot be added to the project during the fiscal year 1978, or "(B) at least 600 vehicles cannot b^ added to the project during ''' the fiscal year 1979, or "(C) at least 1,700 vehicles cannot be added to the project during the fiscal year 1980, or "(D) at least 7,500 vehicles in the aggregate cannot be added to the project during the fiscal years 1981 through 1984, he shall immediately forward a detailed explanation thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.". SEC. 602. Section 8 of the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C. 2507) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: "(d) In addition to contracting for the purchase or lease of vehicles
 * f5

�


text:
Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 67

Question. 67 - OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.

Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?

(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?

(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?

Art. 1 - Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.

Objection 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.

'On the contrary,' Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on Dt. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted to another."

'I answer that,' A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority.

Reply to Objection 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a young boy."

Reply to Objection 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].

Reply to Objection 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the ordinary.

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary. For it is written (Dt. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he knows.

Objection 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Dt. 1:17). Now "the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rom. 2:2), and it was foretold of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): "He shall not judge according to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what he knows himself.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth which he knows.

Objection 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the FP, Q[79], A[13]. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but against his conscience of the truth.

'On the contrary,' Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according to his private opinion.

'I answer that,' As stated above (A[1]; Q[60], AA[2],6) it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular ---in general through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts therewith---in some particular matter, through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence.

Reply to Objection 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.

Reply to Objection 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.

Art. 3 - Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?
Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even though there be no accuser.

Objection 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man without there being an accuser.

Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while being at the same time his accuser.

'On the contrary,' Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."

'I answer that,' A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above (Q[58], A[2] ), justice is not between a man and himself but between one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.

Reply to Objection 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth."

Reply to Objection 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says: "There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q[33], A[7]), the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the order of judicial procedure.

Reply to Objection 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A[2]). Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).

Art. 4 - Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy" shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.

Objection 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.

Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.

'On the contrary,' It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concerning anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him to death": and of the murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): "He shall die. Thou shalt not pity him."

'I answer that,' As may be gathered from what has been said (AA[2],3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished---for instance on account of some injury committed against the accuser---because it is not in the power of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished.

Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.

Reply to Objection 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it is not left to him to show mercy.

Reply to Objection 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the source of all laws.

Reply to Objection 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Dt. 13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the punishment of the man who has injured him.


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/147

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 93

when conducting the demonstrations established under section 7, the Administrator may acquire or secure use of such vehicles, or have such vehicles acquired or used by others, by making agreements and utilizing various forms of Federal assistance and participation which is authorized under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-438) and the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and 42 USC 5801 note. Development Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-577). "(e) When contracting and otherwise using Federal funds to con- 42 USC 5901 note. duct demonstrations under this Act, the Administrator shall seek costsharing with others to the maximum extent practical. During the first 2 years of demonstration activities the Administrator may enter into pi-ocurement or lease contracts for purposes of carrying out demonstrations under this Act without regard to the provisions of title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520; 41 U.S.C. IQa-lOc).". SEC. 603. (a)(1) Section 10(e) of the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Loan Guarantee!). Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C. Electric and Hybrid Vehicle 2509 (e)) is amended by adding at the end thereof: Development "(3)(A) There is established in the Treasury of the United States Fund. an Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Development Fund (hereinafter in Establishment. this paragraph referred to as the 'fund'), which shall be available to the Administrator for carrying out the loan guarantee and principal and interest assistance program authorized by this Act, including the payment of administrative expenses incurred in connection therewith. Moneys in the fund not needed for current operations may, with the Investments. approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, be invested in bonds or other obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United States. "(B) There shall be paid into the fund such part of the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 16 as the Administrator deems nec- 15 USC 2514. essary to carry out the purposes of this Act and such amounts as may be returned to the United States pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, and the amounts in the fund shall remain available until expended, except that after the expiration of the 7-year period established by subsection (h) of this section such amounts in the fund as are not required to secure outstanding guarantee obligations shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury. "(C) If at any time the moneys available in the fund are insufficient Notes or to enable the Administrator to discharge his responsibilities under this obligations, section, he shall issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other issuance to obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities^ Treasury. and subject to such terms and conditions os may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. This borrowing authority shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are specified in appropriation Acts. Such authority shall be without fiscal year limitation. Redemp- Redemption. tion of such notes or obligations shall be made by the Administrator from appropriations or other moneys available under this Act. Such Interest rate. notes or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, which shall not be less than a rate determined by taking into consideration the average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities during the month preceding the issuance of the notes or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase any notes or other obligations issued hereunder and for that purpose he is authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under 31 USC 774. that Act are extended to include any purchase of such notes or obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time sell any of the Sale.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/148

 92 STAT. 94

Annual report to Congress.

15 USC 2509.

Payments.

Defaults, recovery by Attorney General.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 notes or other obligations acquired by him under this subsection. All redemptions, purchases, and sales by the Secretary of the Treasury of such notes or other obligations shall be treated as public debt transactions of the United States. "(D) Business-type financial reports covering the operations of the fund shall be submitted to the Congress by the Administrator annually upon the completion of the appropriate accounting period.". (2) Section 10 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(j) The full faith and credit of the United States is pledged to the payment of all obligations incurred under this section.". (b) Section 10(g) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 2509(g)) is amended to read as follows: "(g)(1) With respect to any loan guaranteed pursuant to this section, the Administrator is authorized to enter into a contract to pay, and to pay, the lender for and on behalf of the borrower the principal and interest charges which become due and payable on the unpaid balance of such loan if the Administrator finds— " (A) that the borrower is unable to meet principal and interest charges, that it is in the public interest to permit the borrower to continue to pursue the purposes of the project, and that the probable net cost to the Federal Government in paying such principal will be less than that which would result in the event of a default; and "(B) that the amount of such principal and interest charges which the Administrator is authorized to pay shall be no greater than the amount of principal and interest which the borrower is obligated to pay under the loan agreement. "(2) In the event of any default by a qualified borrower on a guaranteed loan, the Administrator is authorized to make payment in accordance with the guarantee, and the Attorney General shall take such action as may be appropriate to recover the amounts of such payments (including any payment of principal and interest under paragraph (1)) from such assets of the defaulting borrower as are associated with the activity with respect to which the loan was made or from any other surety included in the terms of the guarantee.". (c) Section 10(h) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 2509(h)) is amended by striking out "the 5-year period" and inserting in lieu thereof "the 7-year period". Approved February 25, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: SENATE REPORT No. 95-179 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): June 13, considered and passed Senate. December 7, considered and passed House, amended. Vol. 124 (1978): Feb. 8, Senate concurred in House amendment.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/149

 PUBLIC LAW 95-239—MAR. 1, 1978

92 STAT. 95

Public Law 95-239 95th Congress An Act To amend the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act to improve the black lung benefits program established under such Act, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives United States of America in Congress assembled,

Mar. 1, 1978 [H.R. 4544]

of the

SHORT TITUJ

Black Lung Benefits Reform Art nf 1077 Acioii:///.

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Black L u n g Benefits 30 USC 801 note. Reform Act of 1977". DEFINITIONS H i: SEC. 2. (a) Section 402(b) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the " Act ") is amended to read as follows: " (b) The term 'pneumoconiosis' means a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.". (b) Section 402(d) of the Act is amended to read as follows: " (d) The term 'miner' means any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such term also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment.". ! (c) Section 402(f) of the Act is amended to read as follows: " (f)(1) The term 'total disability' has the meaning given it by regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for claims under part B of this title, and by regulations of the Secretary of Labor for claims under part C of this title, subject to the relevant provisions of subsections (b) and (d) of section 413, except that— " (A) in the case of a living miner, such regulations shall provide that a miner sihaP be considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him or her from engaging in gainful i employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of t i m e; " (B) such regulations shall provide that (i) a deceased miner's employment in a mine at the time of death shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the miner was not totally disabled; and (ii) in the case of a living miner, if there are changed circumstances of employment indicative of reduced ability to perform his or her usual coal mine work, such miner's employment in a mine shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the miner is not totally disabled; " (C) such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act; and

30 USC 902.

..,

30 USC 921 et seq. 30 USC 931 et seq. 30 USC 923.

''"'

42 USC 423.

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/150

 92 STAT. 96

PUBLIC LAW 95-239—MAR. 1, 1978

Medical tests criteria, establishment. Consultation.

" (D) the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, shall establish criteria for all appropriate medical tests under this subsection which accurately reflect total disability in coal miners as defined in subparagraph (A). "(2) Criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor in the case of— "(A) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, or subject to a determination by the Secretary of Labor, under section 435(a); " (B) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Labor under section 435(b); and "(C) any claim filed on or before the effective date of regulations promulgated under this subsection by the Secretary of Labor; shall not be more restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973, whether or not the final dispositon of any such claim occurs after the date of such promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of Labor.". (d) Section 402 of the Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: (h) The term "fund" means the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund established in section 3(a)(1) of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977.".

Post, p. 103.

30 USC 902.

30 USC 934a. Anu, p. 12.

SURVIVOR ENXrrLKMEXTS '••••

30 USC 921.

30 USC 922.

30 USC 922.

Supra.

•

•

' • •''.

. 1

.

• •;

i'-

SKC. 3. (a) Section 411(c) of the Act is amended— (1) in paragraphs (1) and (2) thereof, by striking out "if" and • I inserting in lieu thereof "If" and by striking out the semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof a period; (2) in paragraph (3) thereof, by striking out "if" the first place '/ it appears therein and inserting in lieu thereof "If" and by striking out"; and" and inserting in lieu thereof a period; and (3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: " (5) In the case of a miner who dies on or before the date of the enactment of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 who • - was employed for 25 years or more in one or more coal mines before June 30, 1971, the eligible survivors of such miner shall be entitled to the payment of benefits, at the rate applicable under section 412 (a)(2), unless it is established that at the time of his or her death such miner was not partially or totally disabled due to pneu' I? moconiosis. Eligible survivors shall, upon request by the Secretary, furnish such evidence as is available with respect to the health of the miner at the time of his or her death.". (b)(1)(A) Section 412(a)(3) of the Act is amended by striking out "and'* the first place it appears therein, and by inserting after "the time of her death," the following: "and in the case of any child or children entitled to the payment of benefits under paragraph (5) of section 411(c),". (B) The first sentence of section 412(a)(5) of the Act is amended— (i) by striking out "or" the fifth place it appears therein; and ..-•'.••• (ii) by inserting after "child, or parent," the following: "in the case of the dependent parent or parents of a miner (who is not survived at the time of his or her death by a widow or a child) who are entitled to the payment of benefits under paragraph (5) of section 411(c), or in the case of the dependent surviving brother(s) or sister(s) of a miner (who is not survived at the time of his or her death by a widow, child, or parent) who are entitled to the payment of benefits under paragraph (5) of section 411(c),".

�


text:
Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/151

 PUBLIC LAW 95-239—MAR. 1, 1978

92 STAT. 97

(2) Section 414(e) of the Act is amended by striking out "or" the 30 USC 924, second place it appears therein and by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: ", or (3) any such individual is entitled to benefits under paragraph (5) of section Ante, p. 96. 411(c).". (3) Section 421(a) of the Act is amended by inserting after "pneu- 30 USC 931. moconiosis" the second place it appears therein the following: ", and in any case in which benefits based upon eligibility under paragraph (5) of section 411(c) are involved.". (4) The first sentence of section 422(a) of the Act is amended by 30 USC 932. inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: ", or with respect to entitlements established in paragraph (5) of section 411(c)". OFFSET LIMITATION

SEC. 4. The first sentence of section 412(b) of the Act is amended by inserting after "disability of such miner" the following: "due to pneumoconiosis".

30 USC 922.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CLAIM

SEC. 5. (a) Section 413(b) of the Act is amended by inserting after the second sentence thereof the following new sentences: "Where there is no medical or other relevant evidence in the case of a deceased miner, such affidavits shall be considered to be sufficient to establish that the miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his or her death was due to pneumoconiosis. In any case in which there is other evidence that a miner has a pulmonary or respiratory impairment, the Secretary shall accept a board certified or board eligible radiologist's interpretation of a chest roentgenogram which is of a quality sufficient to demonstrate the presence of pneumoconiosis submitted in support of a claim for benefits under this title if such roentgenogram has been taken by a radiologist or qualified technician, except where the Secretary has reason to believe that the claim has been fraudulently represented. In order to insure that any such roentgenogram is of adequate quality to demonstrate the presence of pneumoconiosis, and in order to provide for uniform quality in the roentgenograms, the Secretary of Labor may, by regulation, establish specific requirements for the techniques used to take roentgenograms of the chest. Unless the Secretary has good cause to believe that an autopsy report is not accurate, or that the condition of the miner is being fraudulently misrepresented, the Secretary shall accept such autopsy report concerning the presence of pneumoconiosis and the stage of advancement of pneumoconiosis.". (b) Section 413(b) of the Act, as amended in subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Each miner who files a claim for benefits under this title shall upon request be provided an opportunity to substantiate his or her claim by means of a complete pulmonary evaluation.". (c) The fifth sentence of section 413(b) of the Act is amended by striking out " (f), " and by striking out "and (1)," and inserting in lieu thereof "(1),and (n),". (d) Section 413 of the Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(d) No miner who is engaged in coal mine employment shall (except as provided in section 411(c)(3)) be entitled to any bene-

30 USC 923.

Roentgenogram techniques, regulations.

Benefits entitlement, limitation. 30 USC 921.

�


text:
Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 68

Question. 68 - OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?

(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?

(3) How is an accusation vitiated?

(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?

Art. 1 - Whether a man is bound to accuse?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse.

Objection 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]: wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse.

Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[33], AA[6],7; Q[67], A[3], ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man.

Reply to Objection 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7] ---or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it.

Art. 2 - Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation needs not to be made in writing.

Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing should be accepted."

Objection 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.

On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without the accusation be in writing."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[67], A[3]), when the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing.

Reply to Objection 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in writing.

Reply to Objection 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when the accuser is present.

Reply to Objection 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.

Art. 3 - Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?
Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being slanderous.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated above (A[1]; Q[33], A[7]). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.

Objection 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation unjust.

On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), accusation is ordered for the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation. This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere].

Reply to Objection 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.

Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.

Reply to Objection 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin ---in one way, in the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one another---in another way, if the accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.

Art. 4 - Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of retaliation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation.

Objection 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of the injury he has done to someone---but not on account of any injury done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to prove his accusation.

Objection 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.

On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation inferred."

I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), in a case, where the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer a like punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.

Reply to Objection 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially, however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.

Reply to Objection 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).