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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 2

The raid is a surprise attack designed to seize a point, exploit success and then withdraw. It is a temporary measure to capture equipment, destroy installations, bait traps to draw enemy reactions and attack morale. The Mujahideen conducted raids as a primary way to obtain weapons and ammunition — preferably from DRA security posts. They also conducted raids to demonstrate their ability to attack DRA and Soviet installations with relative impunity. Raids generally require fewer supplies than an attack on a strong point since there is no intention of holding the objective for any length of time following a raid.

VIGNETTE 1: RAID ON THE TOTUMDARA SECURITY POST

 * by Commander Sarshar

(Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan who worked clandestinely with the Mujahideen. When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen commander in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile group in the Ghorband front near Charikar.)

The Soviets had a series of security posts protecting the Salang-Kabul highway. They had one at Totumdara which is eight kilometers north of Charikar (Map 2-1 - Totumdara). This post had five armored vehicles. We mounted a raid on the security post in September 1981. My base was in Ghorband Canyon. I had 60 Mujahideen armed with four Goryunov heavy machine guns, two PK medium machine guns, four RPG-7s, and Kalashnikov rifles. The area around my base is very mountainous, but also heavily patrolled, so we had to move at night. We moved from our base over the mountain pass to our staging area at Ofian-e Sharif. Ofian-e Sharif is about three kilometers south of our target and it took us six hours to reach it from Ghorband. We had to carry all our equipment on our backs.

We stayed in Ofian-e Sharif during the day and rested and made our plan. That night we crossed over to the east into the green zone and moved into the villages near the target. I positioned 40 of my Mujahideen to secure our route back into the mountains and to help carry the gear. The other 20 were my raiding party. I divided these 20 men into a 10-man group for immediate security and a 10-man assault group. The assault group had two Goryunov heavy machineguns, two PK medium machine guns, two RPG-7s and some Kalashnikovs. We attacked the post that same night. We destroyed two tanks with our RPGs and terrified their infantry with our Goryunovs. However, the security post was heavily protected by mines so we could not cross the mine fields to get into the post. The Soviet security post at Pul-e Matak and the Project security post(named after the Chinese irrigation project) were on the Totumdara security post flanks. Both of these posts opened fire on us and we were forced to withdraw. We withdrew to our base in Ghorband by the same route we came. We had no casualties.

COMMENTARY
The Soviets employed millions of mines in Afghanistan for installation security, LOC security and area denial. Mine clearing was a major problem for any Mujahideen attack on a prepared site and often prevented Mujahideen success. The Mujahideen needed rugged, light-weight mine detection and clearing gear which would allow them to clear mines quickly under fire. Often the Mujahideen had to resort to heaving large rocks to create a path through a minefield.

Attacking parked vehicles is certainly easier than attacking vehicles which are crewed and moving. Apparently the Soviets had not bothered to create a sandbag wall around their tanks, although an RPG can penetrate the turret armor of older tanks.

The Mujahideen chose a target flanked by two other outposts that could bring fire onto their attacking flanks. The flank security elements were close-in elements that merely guarded the flanks and did nothing to pin the outposts in position. The bridge outpost should have been an easier target with a better chance of success. This attack also could have employed a larger force in two phases. The first phase would be an attack to the flanks to neutralize the flanking fire. The second phase would then be an attack on the Totumdara post. Such an attack would require better coordination and discipline than demonstrated.

VIGNETTE 2: CHAMTALA RAID

 * by Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib

(Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib commanded the Ibrahimkhel Front north of the city of Paghman. His primary AOR extended from Paghman east and northeast to Kabul (some20 kilometers).)

In June 1982, Commander Sheragai led a group of ten of my Mujahideen on a successful raid on a DRA outpost on the Chamtala plain near Highway 2, just north of Kabul. Commander Sheragai was a Kochi and a kinsman of a Kochi clan which had its summer quarters in Paghman and in the areas around Kabul. Some of the families of the clan pitched their tents in Chamtala plain. There they tended their flocks of sheep and goats in the grazing lands just north of Kabul. Their grazing lands were close to a DRA security outpost. The DRA outpost hindered Mujahideen movement through the area (Map 2-2 - Chamtala).

We decided to raid the DRA outpost. I selected Commander Sheragai to lead the raid since he could easily gain the full cooperation of his Kochi clansmen in the area. His group was armed with small arms. They left our base at Qala-e Hakim in Paghman and walked to the Chamtala plain. There, Kochi families took the raiding party into their tents and cared for them. The raiding party stayed with the nomads for several days while they studied and evaluated the outpost and prepared for the raid. Commander Sheragai wanted to find an unmined approach to the outpost, so he asked his kinsmen to move their flocks to various spots around the outpost so he could probe the approaches. This went on for three days while Commander Sheragai picked the most secure approach to the outpost where the terrain allowed to Mujahideen to sneak up on the outpost unobserved. They cleared this approach of mines.

On the morning of the raid, the Mujahideen raiders moved to the target within a herd of sheep. Some Mujahideen posed as shepherds, while others crawled along in the middle of the grazing sheep. The herd moved right up to the DRA outpost, but the Mujahideen presence was never detected or suspected by the DRA guards. The raiding group spent the whole day in the middle of the sheep herd and found hiding places. At sunset, the shepherds drove the flock back toward the encampment, while the Mujahideen remained behind in hiding places. One of the things that the Mujahideen had discovered was when the seven-man security outpost had dinner, one guard was left on duty while the rest ate their dinner. As dinner was being served, three Mujahideen crept to the outpost, jumped the guard and disarmed him. One Mujahideen kept his hand on the mouth of the guard to prevent him from screaming. Then the rest of the raiding party swarmed into the outpost. They surprised the rest of the DRA soldiers and captured them all without firing a shot. A DRA lieutenant was among the prisoners. The Mujahideen took whatever they could carry and then left for their base with all their prisoners.

COMMENTARY
Kabul and the surrounding area were heavily guarded. The Soviet 103rd Airborne Division, the 180th and 181st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division, the DRA 8th Infantry Division, the DRA 37th Commando Brigade and the DRA 15th Tank Brigade were all garrisoned in Kabul. Careful reconnaissance, strict camouflage discipline and a clever deception plan enabled the Mujahideen to carry off this raid. Local assistance from the Kochi was essential to the plan. The selection of a Kochi commander and his efforts to gain the cooperation of his kinsmen paid off. The Mujahideen relied on the local populace for cover, food and water, intelligence, shelter and early warning. The time and effort spent were essential to the Mujahideen success.

On the other hand, the DRA commander allowed his outpost activities to become routine. The Mujahideen planned the attack when security was relaxed and captured the outpost without firing a shot or alerting neighboring garrisons.

VIGNETTE 3: RAID ON BAGRAMI DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

 * by Commander Shahabuddin

(Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul.)

In July 1983, local units of all seven major factions united to raid the Bagrami District Headquarters to the southeast of Kabul. We assembled about 250 Mujahideen armed with six 82mm mortars, nine recoilless rifles, and eight RPG-7s. We assembled at my base at Yakhdara, made our plans and then spread our forces out in the villages. We assigned 100 Mujahideen to route security and posted them prior to moving our main raiding forces to Bagrami and Qal-eAhmadkhan. These towns are in the suburbs just outside of Kabul and are part of the inner security belt of Kabul. The Bagrami 40-man assault group had eight RPG-7s, three recoilless rifles and two mortars. They were to attack the district headquarters from three directions. I led the assault group at Qal-e Ahmadkhan. I had 50 men - 10 of which I used for flank protection and 40 for the raid. I also attacked from three directions. As we approach Qal-e Ahmadkhan, we were stopped by a small outpost. We overran it. Then we attacked one of the many security outposts in the village. We overran this outpost killing 25 and capturing eight DRA soldiers. We also captured 14 Kalashnikovs and a telephone set. The Bagrami assault group could not get close enough to their target to attack it directly, so they shelled it instead.

COMMENTARY
The DRA and Soviets surrounded Kabul with a series of three security belts composed of outposts, minefields and obstacles. Their purpose was to deny Mujahideen entry into the city and prevent Mujahideen shelling attacks. The Mujahideen often attacked these outposts, but could not hold them. The main benefits of the security belt system to the Mujahideen were these attacks kept a large numbers of troops tied up in passive security roles, the outposts provided a source of weapons and ammunition and these attacks affected the morale of their opponents. There is no map with this.

VIGNETTE 4: ATTACK ON THE TSAWKEY SECURITY POSTS

 * by LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim

(LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim was an officer in the Afghan Army who became a Mujahideen and led a group in Kunar Province. )

Tsawkey is a district of Kunar Province. The DRA established asecurity post in the Tsawkey High School. This high school security post provided protection for a section of the Jalalabad to Asadabad highway. (Map 2-3 - Tsawkey) It was a usual practice of the DRA to convert public buildings to such uses. I decided to capture this post in October 1983. I had approximately 70 Mujahideen armed with two 82mm mortars, one DShK and some Enfield rifles. We planned our battle in our base in the nearby Babur Gorge. Other Mujahideen joined us from Dawagal. We would attack from three directions — from the north (high ground), along the road from the northeast and from the west. We moved from our base at night, deployed and attacked the target. Our attack lasted 30 minutes. We overran the post but could not hold it. We killed 11 DRA and captured one. We also captured a ZGU-1, a DShK and some Kalashnikovs. We had three Mujahideen KIA and one WIA. We could not hold the security post, so we left it.

There were two DRA security outposts near the Tsawkey District headquarters. One was in the high school and the other was near the bridge. We had a contact inside the second post who was a DRA officer — Musa Khan. In June 1985, he helped us capture his security post. I assembled 50 Mujahideen armed with an RPG-7, Kalashnikovs and Enfields. We came during the night from our base in Babur Valley and followed the road bank to the southwest. We approached the post at dawn from the high ground to the north. Our contact led us inside. Most of the soldiers were asleep and we wanted to capture them. However, some of our Mujahideen were not very quiet and the detail woke up and started fighting us. We killed seven of the security detail and captured one. We also captured one PK medium machine gun, 12 Kalashnikovs and ammunition. The firing alerted the other enemy unit in the Tsawkey high school. They sent a detachment to the outpost, but I had posted a security element on the road. This security element blocked the movement of the detachment and covered our withdrawal. We all withdrew up to our base in the mountains. I had one Mujahideen wounded.

COMMENTARY
Less than 15% of the Mujahideen commanders had previous military experience, yet the impact of the military who joined the Mujahideen was significant. They provided a continuity, an understanding of military planning and issues, a modicum of uniform training and an ability to deal with outside agencies providing aid to the Mujahideen. On the other hand, these were fairly soft targets. The security outposts were situated in existing buildings backed by wooded high ground. The Mujahideen had concealed approaches and exits as well as inside help.

VIGNETTE 5: RAID ON PUL-E CHARKHI RADIO TRANSMITTER STATION

 * by Major Sher Aqa Kochay and others

(Principally based on an interview with Major Sher Aqa Kochay in Peshawar on September14, 1996. Other sources include NIFA documents about the battle, Ali Jalali's discussions with Hasan Khan Karokhel in 1986 in Peshawar, his interviews with the late Wali Khan Karokhel (NIFA's provincial military commander of Kabul) in Peshawar and Islamabad in 1984 and 1986 and interviews with General Abdul Rahim Wardak. [Map sheet 2886, vicgrid 3221].)

In June 1984, Provincial NIFA leader Wali Khan issued orders to Major Sher Aqa Kochay, the commander of a NIFA base in Sewak (about 20 kilometers southeast of Kabul). Major Aqa would join two other regional commanders — Haji Hussein Jan of Narey Oba and Sayed Hasan Khan of Khak-e Jabar—in a raid on a radio transmitter station. The transmitter was located near Pul-e Charkhi (20 kilometers east of Kabul city) and the raid would take place on the night of 26 June. The Soviet-backed Afghan government was expanding the transmitter facility which would reach wider audiences inside and outside the country. The station used local broadcasts as well as programs produced in the Soviet Union.

The transmitter station was located in Pul-e Charkhi near a military complex which included the DRA 15th Tank Brigade, DRA 10thfield Engineer Regiment and some other units. (see Map 16a - Qafus 1,Chapter 1 and Map 2-4 - Pul-e Charkhi.) Further to the east, between Butkhak and Sarobi, a government-paid militia force patrolled the area and protected the power lines and pylons that supplied electricity from Naghlo Dam through Sarobi to Kabul. The militia was recruited from the local tribe of the Karokhel clan of Ahmadzai Pushtuns. Their chief was Hasan Khan Karokhel. On the surface, Hasan Khan was a government supporter. But he was actually a major Mujahideen collaborator. He provided the Mujahideen with logistic support, sheltered their resistance fighters and even provided medical care to Mujahideen wounded at regime medical institutions.

According to the plan, Mujahideen from the three bases wouldassemble at Mulla Omar for final instructions prior to the raid. By theafternoon of 26 June, all three groups were in Mulla Omar. Major Sher Aqa and Haji Hussein Jan had each brought 30 men from their basesin Sewak and Narey Oba. Sayed Hasan Khan came with a 50-manunit from Khak-e Jabar.

Wali Khan Karokhel issued the final instructions. Major Sher Aqa was appointed the overall commander of the raiding group. He divided his force into four teams. A 20-man assault team, commanded by Haji Hussein Jan, carried automatic rifles, light machine guns and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers. Their mission was to attack the transmitter from the southwest, destroy the facility and then withdraw under the cover of the support group.

Major Sher Aqa's 20-man support team would cover the assault team from positions in a ditch immediately to the east of the target. The group had one 82mm mortar, a single barrel 107mm rocketlauncher (BM-1), a PK medium machine gun, a few RPG-7s and AK-47 assault rifles. Major Sher Aqa decided to stay with this team since it would be the last to pull-out.

Sayed Hasan Khan commanded a 25 to 30-man containment team. They were armed with small arms and RPG-7s. They would block the Pul-e Charkhi-Butkhak road on the east bank of Kabul River and prevent the enemy forces from reaching the target. The rest of the Mujahideen were assigned as supply and evacuation elements to help the other groups.

Major Aqa decided to launch the assault at midnight. Since it is about 15 kilometers from Mulla Omar to the site and since the raiding party had to bypass a Soviet unit deployed in Gazak, the departure time was set at dusk (about 2000 hours). The party would move from Mulla Omar through Gazak to reassemble briefly at Lewano Kandow. The Mujahideen force moved out in small groups following each otheron the same route all the way to Lewano Kandow. A pair of reconnaissance patrols moved on the flanks and one moved to the front of the column—keeping within voice contact distance.

When the force reached a water spring at the Lewano Kandow, Major Sher Aqa issued the last coordinating instructions and ordered the groups to open fire when he did. This would signal the start of the raid. From their Lewano Kandow assembly area, the different elements of the raiding party moved separately toward their designated areas.

Just before midnight, all groups were in place. Everything was quiet around the transmitter site. At Major Sher Aqa's signal, the assault team opened fire on the site and began the attack. The support team covered their advance. RPG rounds set the wooden buildings on fire and soon fire swept the site. The defenders at the site panicked and failed to put up an organized resistance. The assault team over-ran the site, killed several soldiers, captured five Kalashnikov assault rifles and demolished the transmitter station.

The DRA quickly responded by moving a tank column from the Pul-e Charkhi garrison to the site. The column crossed the bridge over the Kabul River but then left the main road and bypassed the Mujahideen blocking positions established by the containment (holding) team of Sayed Hasan Khan. The tanks, driving with their headlights off, cut across the plain to the east of the Mujahideen, cutting off their escape route. A young Mujahideen named Babrak hit one tank with an RPG-7 rocket and set it on fire. But the rest of the column moved swiftly to the south-west.

Fearing encirclement, the containment (holding) team and the assault team immediately broke contact and, without notifying Major Sher Aqa, pulled out toward the Lewano Kandow, leaving the support team behind. As Commander Sher Aqa was desperately trying to establish contact with the other teams, he heard tanks moving to the rear of his position. By this time, all electric lights in the area were extinguished, but the transmitter station continued to burn brightly. The Mujahideen and the DRA tank column both used the fire for orientation. Facing a threatening situation, Major Sher Aqa instructed his men not to panic but to exfiltrate individually through the intervals between the tanks. Using masking terrain, his Mujahideen managed to exfiltrate and move to the designated assembly area at Lewano Kandow. As they straggled in, they found that the assault and containment teams along with supply and evacuation personnel were already waiting there. Major Sher Aqa discovered that all the groups, except his support group, had withdrawn when the enemy tank column arrived. All Mujahideen reached Lewano Kandow by 0200.

Mujahideen casualties were six wounded — one from the supporting team who died on the way back, two from the assault team and three from the containment team. It was not safe for the Mujahideen to move further, since daybreak would be in two hours and the Mujaideen would once again have to bypass the Soviet force at Grazak. The raidon Pul-e Charkhi would clearly have alerted the Soviets to the presence of a Mujahideen force in their area.

Two groups, Haji Hussein Jan's detachment and Sayed Hasan Khan's party, decided to stay during the day in the Lewano Kandow mountain since they could not reach their bases during the remaining hours of the night. Major Sher Aqa's group, along with the wounded, moved forward to Mulla Omar. This was only possible since Hasan Khan Karokhel had sent trucks to Lewano Kandow to carry the wounded and other Mujahideen to safety before daybreak. The trucks, posing as militia patrols trying to hunt down the raiding force, took these Mujahideen to Mulla Omar where they were taken care of and medical personnel were summoned from Kabul who tended to the wounded. The next night, the Mujahideen groups returned to their bases and sent the body of the one dead warrior to his family for burial.

COMMENTARY
The assistance extended by the Karokhel militia contributed markedly to the Mujahideen success. Such assistance was essential for actions conducted around a strongly defended city like Kabul. From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate into Kabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in the heart of the enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. Large groups could carry heavy loads, provide needed labor in the field and carry and escort the wounded and dead. Many Mujahideen felt more comfortable having their relatives or close friends with them.

Lack of reliable internal communications among the Mujahideen combat teams led to a situation that could have turned disastrous. The containment team did not contain the DRA tanks and pulled out immediately after it saw the tanks bypass its position. The group helped the assault team during the assault, but this was not their assigned mission. Had the group laid anti-tank mines in areas that the enemy tanks had to pass over — particularly in the vicinity of the bridge over the Kabul River and the river fords — it could have delayed the tank column and allowed them to engage it more effectively. This would have prevented the enveloping movement that almost encircled the whole Mujahideen contingent.

Apparently, the DRA had not developed and rehearsed contingency plans to deal with such a raid. This, and luck, helped the Mujahideen escape heavy casualties. A more active reaction by the DRA could easily have jeopardized the concentration of a sizeable Mujahideen force in an area totally controlled by Soviet/DRA forces. Relying on tanks, the enemy failed to deploy infantry with the tanks. Infantry are more effective in the dark against guerrillas and provide protection to the tanks against anti-tank gunners. At the same time, the Mujahideen failed to take advantage of the tank column's vulnerability and use their RPG-7s at close distance against the unprotected tanks. The Mujahideen had the opportunity to kill more than the one tank they actually destroyed. Fear of being cut off inhibited much of the Mujahideen action after they successfully destroyed the transmitter. However, through good leadership, Major Sher Aqa turned a threatening tactical situation into a more manageable one and succeeded in pulling his men out through the tank cordon.

VIGNETTE 6: RAID FROM CHELTAN ON OUTPOSTS IN THE KABUL SUBURBS

 * by Commander Asil Khan

Kabul was surrounded by three security belts made up of security outposts manned by Soviet and DRA forces. A battalion from the DRA 8th Infantry Division garrisoned the old highway construction headquarters, commonly known as "the company," in the western suburbs of Kabul. The battalion also guarded a number of government supply depots located across the highway to the west. The battalion built security outposts on the Khwaja Pushta hills in the south. The battalion protected all its installations with mine fields except for the outposts on the hills. This made all the other installations too difficult to attack in the dark. I commanded a joint 200 Mujahideen detachment made up from local resistance units affiliated with NIFA, HIK and Etehad-e Islami(IUA). According to our agreed plan, we were to move from our bases around Cheltan and converge on the target area in the dark. We would continually shell the main battalion camp and the depots, while the assault groups would attack the Khwaja Pushta hill outposts (Map 2-5 - Cheltan). In the late afternoon of 1 June 1985, I led my NIFA Mujahideenfrom our base at Morghgiran. We arrived near the target after 2000hours. We deployed for battle according to plan. I established blocking positions at Asia-e Beni and Pul-e Khushk and deployed about 20Mujahideen at each position. I positioned one 82mm mortar with its five-man crew and two 82mm recoilless rifles (each with a five-man crew) at Asia-e Beni to shell the enemy battalion. The raid began around 2100 hours and lasted until 2300 hours. Our heavy weapons kept the enemy battalion and the depot forces pinned in place. The enemy responded with artillery fire but made no attempt to counter with infantry or tanks. No enemy helicopters responded throughout the raid. This lack of response left the tactical initiative in my hands. We easily overran the enemy outposts on the Khwaja Pushta hills and captured weapons and a radio set. Most of the DRA soldiers ran away. At one outpost, we killed two enemy soldiers and wounded another. We had no casualties. We pulled out before midnight and the force split up and returned to their bases. Asil Khan was a NIFA commander and a famed guerrilla commander in the Kabul area.[Map sheets 2885 and 2886]. Page 88 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War COMMENIARY: Throughout the war, Soviet and DRA forces were reluctant to respond aggressively to Mujahideen night attacks. Unless the Soviet and DRA forces had planned and rehearsed a counter-attack drill, they rarely left the relative safety of their prepared positions to deal with Mujahideen night attacks. This encouraged the Mujahideento harass the enemy continuously at night and to attack the weakest points of their defenses. Often, the Mujahideen boldly attacked areas adjacent to large forces. These security posts were out of supporting range of other posts, so the DRA refusal to react to the attack practically handed the outpost to the Mujahideen. However, the Mujahideen could not fully exploit their enemy's reluctance to fight at night to achieve decisive tactical results. The Mujahideen could not readily penetrate the heavily-mined zones surrounding Soviet and DRA positions. As long as the Soviet/DRA forces felt no serious threat from isolated Mujahideen night attacks, they preferred to respond by artillery fire instead of risking stumbling into an ambush. The Soviet and DRA response came in the form of well-planned major cordon and search operations in those areas where the Mujahideen had gained an upper hand.

VIGNETTE 7 RAID ON MAHIPAR OUTPOSTSby Commander Wazir Gul In July 1984 three groups of Mujahideen combined to raidSoviet/DRA security outposts on the main Kabul-Jalalabad highway.(Map 2-6 - Mahipar) Highway 1 at Mahipar passes through a deep gorge, with the river flowing immediately to the north of the road and with a steep ridge rising on the south. Other than the highway, the main access to Mahipar is through Mulla Omar Dara, a mountain valley connecting Mulla Omar Village with Highway 1. At that time, the DRA had a militia unit headquartered at Mulla Omar. The DRA militia commander was Hasan Khan Karokhel, the local Ghilzai Pashtun chieftain. Hasan Khan was also a secret collaborator with the Mujahideen. He helped facilitate our movements and combat against Soviet/DRA forces in the area. My group reached Mulla Omar in the evening after a day march from our base at Tangi Tezin. There, we were joined by two NIFA commanders, Captain Afghan of Deh Sabz, and Sayed Hasan Khan of Khak-e Jabar. All together, we had 80 Mujahideen armed with AK-47sand .303 Enfield rifles, five BM-ls, four 82mm recoilless rifles, four82mm mortars, two DShKs and 13 RPG-7s. We planned our combined action at Mulla Omar and moved out the next morning toward Mahipar over Lataband mountain. We had packed our heavy weapons on mules. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had BM-1s and 82mm mortars. Their mission was to attack and pin down the DRA base on the left flank and the Soviet base on the right flank. The assault group consisted of three teams. Each assault team had a designated outpost to attack. Each assault team had RPGs and recoilless rifles to support their attack. In order to minimize the daylight available to the enemy's aircraft, we began our attack at 1600. We knew it would take several hours for them to respond. Our heavy weapons pounded the flanking bases to isolate the attack area. The assault teams began to fire on the security posts and slowly move forward. The attack on the security posts was hindered by enemy mines and it took several hours for the Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheet 2986, vic grid 4723]. Page 90 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,

VIGNette 7 Page 91 Mujahideen to overrun the outposts after heavy clashes. By 2100, theDRA soldiers manning the outposts were either killed or had escaped.We took one tank crew prisoner. The Soviet base and outposts further down the road could notsupport the embattled DRA outposts. But as we pulled out, theSoviet base began heavy fire on the withdrawing Mujahideengroups. Their fire had little effect in the dark. We destroyed twotanks, killed nine enemy soldiers and captured three DShKs, six AK-47 rifles and a large amount of ammunition. Two Mujahideen werewounded in the battle. We spent the night at Mulla Omar andreturned to our bases the next day. COMMENTARY: The terrain here is very restrictive and rugged. TheSoviet/DRA bases and outposts were all in the canyon. TheSoviets/DRA surrendered the initiative in this area and trusted that the difficulty in crossing the rugged terrain, coupled with their bunkers and field fortifications, would protect these sites from the Mujahideen. There were a series of three security outposts along the road: two on the high ground on both sides of the gorge and the other on the road. The purpose of security outposts was to protect bridges, hydroelectric installations, dams and block the side valleys. The out-posts on the high ground were not high enough to interfere with Mujahideen freedom of action. There were a few observation posts on the high peaks but they were not effective, particularly at night. Thesecurity outposts on the high ground were mostly manned by DRA or militia which lacked training and were in fact prisoners in their mine-protected enclaves. The Mujahideen could easily bypass them—particularly at night. The Soviets/DRA had mined the main approaches to the gorge, but given the steep nature of the approaches, the mines usually washed away when it rained. The Mujahideen often used such steep areas to descend to the highway. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, saw this set up as an excellent opportunity to punish their opponent, pick up some weapons and resupply ammunition. The Mujahideen developed a standard pattern for attacking outposts along this road. They would attack late in the afternoon to minimize the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery. They would fire rockets and mortars at the main base camps on both flanks of the target area to seal the area and hold the attention of the base camps so that they would not interfere with the main attack. Then they would launch the attack against the outposts which were mostly manned by ill-trained, poorly-motivated conscript DRA. The Page 92 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War DRA had little stomach for the fight and, once the Mujahideen got through the minefields surrounding the outposts, the Mujahideen would strip the outposts of everything they could carry and disappear into the night. The Mujahideen would usually offer DRA prisoners the opportunity to serve as labor service with the Mujahideen or simply turn them loose. The Mujahideen felt that the conscript DRA soldier had little choice in the fight. DRA officers were kept prisoner untilthey could be tried by field tribunal. The Mujahideen felt fairly secure from sallies from the base camps at night. Soviet and DRA reaction was mainly limited to area shelling and bombing.

VIGNETTE 8 RAID ON LATABAND SECURITY OUTPOSTSby Commander Wazir Gul There are two highways between Kabul and Sarobi. The northern highway is the newer one and is part of Highway 1—the main highway of Afghanistan. The older Kabul-Sarobi highway runs roughly parallel to Highway 1, some four-ten kilometers to the south. A series of Soviet and DRA security bases and outposts protected both highways. In September 1985, several Mujahideen groups combined to conduct a raid on the Soviet/DRA security outposts in the Lataband pass east of Kabul (Map 2-7 - Lataband). Lataband is located on the old Kabul-Sarobi highway. The Lataband pass was protected by a Soviet base atMulla Omar in the west, and a DRA Sarandoy base at Lataband in the east. The area between the two bases was protected by several security outposts manned by DRA military detachments. My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers south of the pass. I planned the attack at the base. We left the base at1500 and moved to the Tezin Valley where we spent the night. We car-ried our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to the TezinValley, I met with the commanders of other groups and we coordinated our attack. The total strength of the combined Mujahideen force was about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate com-bat at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought the mules with us. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars).Their mission was to attack and pin down the Soviet base at MullaOmar and the Sarandoy base at Lataband. The assault group had twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. The assault group was composed of three 20-man teams Each 20-man team had a designated enemy outpost to attack. We moved into position. In order to minimize the daylight avail-able to the enemy's aircraft, we decided to start our attack in the late afternoon. We began the attack at 1600 with heavy fire on the bases at Mulla Omar and Lataband. Meanwhile, the assault teams occupy- Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985 and 2986vic grid 5618]. Page 94 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,

VIGNette 8 Page 95 ing the high ground south of the Lataband pass began to fire on the enemy outposts below. The shelling confused the enemy as the three teams of the assault group approached their outposts and launched the attack. The battle continued into the evening and the assault teams overran the enemy outposts. As the Mujahideen approached the out-posts, most of the DRA soldiers ran away and left behind an enormous amount of ammunition and other equipment. We loaded what we could on our mules and hauled it away. The enemy responded by saturating the area in and around the outposts with artillery fire and air attacks. We lost two mules to artillery fire and so withdrew at 2100. We suffered personnel losses. The losses, in my own group were one KIA and six WIA. We captured two DRA soldiers and lots of ammunition and supplies. COMMENTARY: The isolated highway security posts were extremely vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who controlled the surrounding high ground. The Soviets/DRA had insufficient intelligence or surveil-lance in the immediate region. Furthermore, their contingency plans to reinforce outposts or to react swiftly against Mujahideen attacks were lacking or poorly executed. The forces in the bases seemed to have a severe case of "bunker mentality" and passively sat out the Mujahideen shelling and attack on the outposts. The Soviets and DRA seemed particularly reluctant to move and fight at night. The Mujahideen exploited this reluctance. Air support apparently was slow in coming and was not very accurate at night. In this example, the Soviet/DRA base forces waited until the out-posts were overrun and the Mujahideen were withdrawing before they reacted. They reacted with artillery and air strikes—not maneuver forces. The DRA in the outposts were left to their own devices. The DRA forces were generally ill-trained and had poor morale. Most of the DRA soldiers had been press-ganged into the army and had no desire to fight their countrymen. Therefore, the DRA soldiers were more interested in escaping than in stubborn defense and were quite willing to abandon the ammunition and supplies of the outpost to the attacking Mujahideen. The Mujahideen preferred to attack DRA outposts for this reason. Mujahideen dependence on these types of raids for weapons and ammunition cost them casualties. The Soviets and DRA reacted with artillery and air strikes when they could, but they did not continue them all night long. This gave the Mujahideen the option of immediately entering the camp to seize what material they could and then Page 96 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War leaving to get far away before dawn or waiting for the artillery to sub-side and then leaving with less time until daylight. Both courses entailed risk.

VIGNETTE 9 RAID ON OUTPOSTS AT WRESHMIN GORGEby Commander Wazir GuI During October 1985, Mujahideen factions took turns blockingthe Kabul-Jalalabad highway at Wreshmin Tangay (gorge) between Dabili and Dargo bridges (Map 2-8 - Wreshmin). My mission was to block the highway for eight days. At that time, I commanded 70 Mujahideen. We were armed with five BM-ls, two BM-12s, four 82mm recoilless rifles, two ZGU-1s, three 82mm mortars and many RPG-7s. In order to block the highway, I had to remove enemy security posts along that stretch of road. I moved my force from Manayin Hisarak to the Tsapar (Capar) mountain where I refined my battle plan. Since there are limited access routes into the area and since the area near the highway was heavily mined, I decided to launch the initial attack against the flanks of the area we were going to block, i.e. against the Dabili bridge in the west and the Dargo bridge in the east. These two places are relatively accessible from the mountains in the south. After destroying the road bridges at these two points, I planned to isolate the area and continue the attack down the highway against 'the security outposts. The high-way approach was best since the highway itself was not mined. I divided my detachment into two groups and moved them to Dabili and Dargo. I kept a reserve centrally located to the rear between the two attacking groups. The two groups approached the target at night. The next day, they captured the Dabili and Dargo bridges by swift attacks. They immediately destroyed the bridges with explosives. This isolated the area. Then, the two groups attacked down the road(to avoid the DRA minefields) from the opposite directions. They eventually overran 16-17 small Soviet/DRA security outposts located on the road. Then they turned around to consolidate their success and rein-forced the defenses at the east and west flanks of the blockade. During the next eight days, the Soviets and DRA tried to reopen the highway, but failed. Their air strikes and artillery were generally ineffective due to the narrowness of the canyon. The enemy sent a column from Jalalabad to force the road, but we stopped them in the narrow confines around Dargo bridge and they had to withdraw. We spent the Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985, 2986, vic grid 7617 to 8317]. Page 98 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,

VIGNette 9 Page 99 eight days stripping all the ammunition, weapons and supplies out of the bases and outposts. We hauled the spoils of war into the mountains. We captured about 100 weapons and an enormous amount of ammunition. At the end of our eight days, I withdrew my detachment and we returned to our base. I lost six KIA and 18 WIA or about 30% of my force. Enemy losses were heavier and included some 50 killed or wounded and 24 soldiers captured. COMMENTARY: The terrain played a major role in shaping the battle. The Soviets/DRA controlled the ribbon of highway running through a narrow gorge, while the Mujahideen controlled the surrounding mountains whenever they wanted to. The Mujahideen had the freedom to choose the time and place to raid dozens of security outposts sprinkled along the treacherous highway snaking through the very narrow canyon in Mahipar and the Wreshmin Tangay. In the WreshminTangay, virtually all Mujahideen groups habitually first attacked the two main bridges i.e. Dabili and Dargo. Then, after destroying the bridges, they would attack the rest of the security posts from both ends. This method proved to be the most effective one given the terrain, minefields, enemy dispositions and Mujahideen capabilities. BRIDGE POST -0 're% I YAWAR GALA`14' 44.t Irri-• I SA61EAELIUL 0.5 KM ITO ALINGAR TOWNI GHULAMALI QALA /Tres ‘'s 1)-14+ • Page 100 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan WarALINGAR Map 2-9

VIGNETTE 10 RAID ON THE BRIDGE POST IN ALINGARby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In February 1986, Commander Abdul Qudus Alkozai led a group of 15 Mujahideen on a raid of a government post near the center of the Alingar District in Laghman Province. The post overlooked a bridge on the Alingar River near Barwai Village, some four kilometers north of Alingar. The bridge outpost was located within a walled enclosure and included covered firing positions and parapets. The post included a one-room guard house for the six soldiers who manned the post. The outpost was part of a security belt protecting the district center against Mujahideen attacks. There were several other outposts in the area established in individual houses and fort-like structures. Among them were Ghulamali Qala to the north and Yawar Qala and Sahebgul Qalato the south of the bridge post. They were about 150-200 meters apart(Map 2-9 Alingar). My guerrilla raiding party left its base in a nearby village at 2200hours on a dark, cold, rainy winter night. Moving north to the objective, I dropped a two-man observation/security party opposite the Sahebgul Qala outpost. I posted another two-man observation/ security party outside the Yawar Qala outpost and a final two-man observation/security party alongside the road to the bridge. They were to pin down any forces which attempted to come to the aid of the bridge out-post. My eight remaining Mujahideen and I were armed with eight automatic rifles and one RPG-7. We moved to the bridge and deployed in the cover of a roadside ditch. We completely blocked the western approach to the bridge. My plan was to remain in the ditch until the soldiers at the out-post opened the door of the guard house to relieve the sentry. Then, using the light coming from the opened door to guide on, we would jump over the low (one-meter) outpost enclosure wall, storm the post and kill the occupants. We waited for two miserable hours in the cold rain, but nothing happened inside the outpost. Finally, I decided to take the initiative. Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. Hejoined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud--before the communist revolution. He had noformal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet3086, vic grid 2455]. Page 102 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War I directed three men to, move quietly to the post, jump over the walland attack the sentry. Then, as soon as the other soldiers started tocome out of the guard house, we would rush the guard house anddemand their surrender. I positioned the RPG-7 where it could hit the guard house and told the gunner not to fire if he heard his comrades telling the soldiers to surrender (surrender was the code word). I instructed him to open fire if the enemy initiated contact and opened fire on us. At about 0100, my three-men party approached the outpost. One man covered the team while the other two jumped over the wall. One of these Mujahideen landed squarely on the back of the sleeping enemy sentry. The sentry was wrapped in a blanket and sound asleep, but when my Mujahideen landed on him, he woke up and began to shout. My panicked Mujahideen opened fire and killed the sentry. Anticipating the reaction of the guards, one Mujahideen tossed a hand grenade into the door of the guard room. As it exploded, they rushed into the structure. My RPG gunner heard the commotion, but did not hear his comrades demanding the enemy surrender. Since the codeword was not used, my RPG gunner assumed that the enemy had over-whelmed his comrades and therefore opened fire on the guard house.

The RPG-7 rocket ripped through the wall of the guard house, killing two soldiers and seriously injuring one of my Mujahideen standing nearby. This changed the situation drastically. My wounded Mujahideen was calling for help and his comrades stopped to evacuate him. As soon as my other Mujahideen saw their comrades stop to attend to their fallen comrade, they also stopped their attack. I called off the raid and ordered a withdrawal. As we withdrew, my security teams rejoined us and we returned to our base.

C0MMENFARY: The Mujahideen timing for the raid was ideal. Inclement weather and night movement covered their approach. The enemy guard was even asleep. This lack of enemy alertness was not unusual. The DRA and Soviets usually failed to deploy foot patrols at night between their outposts. There was also little tactical and fire coordination between outposts. This passivity at night resulted in a bunker mentality among the Soviet/DRA soldiers manning isolated security outposts and allowed the Mujahideen freedom of movement and the chance to own the night and conduct their hit and run raids.

Lack of control of the raiding party at the objective foiled an other-wise skillfully-planned action. What went wrong was a combination of Murphy's law, a lack of precombat rehearsals and a lack of a regular chain of command. Landing on a sleeping soldier was bad luck, but dry rehearsals would have exercised the option of an approach being dis- .covered and provided for the continuation of the attack while wounded are being evacuated. Since the force commander did not have communication with his RPG gunner, he needed the firm, positive control that a subordinate leader, located with the RPG gunner, could have provided. Lack of communication, subordinate leadership and fire coordination at the objective cost the Mujahideen a tactical victory.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen raid depended on surprise and quick execution. Raids produced needed weapons, ammunition and equipment. They also proved a good way to destroy DRA or Soviet security posts and sites. A well-organized raid had an assault force, a fire support group and a security element. Portable radios were needed to coordinate the raiding elements, but all too often the Mujahideen lacked these radios. The Mujahideen primary obstacle in a raid was to get past the minefields which the Soviets and DRA emplaced around their security posts and sites. The Mujahideen launched most of their raids at night. They did so to prevent being hit by effective air or artillery strikes and to avoid further contact with DRA or Soviet forces which were reluctant to leave their garrisons at night.


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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3: SHELLING ATTACKS
Mujahideen shelling attacks on garrisons, outposts, airfields andcities were a daily event. The Mujahideen usually used mortars, rock-ets and recoilless rifles in these attacks. Sometimes they used moun-tain guns and howitzers. The objective was to harrass their foes anddestroy war material. Mujahideen gunners learned to construct mul-tiple firing sites and to fire and then quickly displace before DRA orSoviet artillery or aviation could respond effectively. When possible,Mujahideen would keep water near their firing sites to dampen theground behind the rocket or recoilless rifle. This would help curb theamount of tell tale dust raised by the backblast of the ordnance. TheSoviets and DRA tried to curb these attacks with counterbattery fires,rapid reaction forces and ambushes. Due to their routine nature, theMujahideen did not usually discuss these unless the interviewerprobed. The Mujahideen considered these as usually rather dullevents that did not bear retelling. The following attacks, however,were hardly dull events.

VIGNETTE 1: A SHELLING ATTACK TURNS BAD by Mawlawi Shukur Yasini In the spring of 1981, the Soviets and DRA were very active inour area. As a result, we dismantled our permanent bases andchanged them to mobile bases scattered throughout the area. Iintended to launch a major show of force against the Soviets usingmy mobile bases. I had two mortars—a 60mm and an 82mm. Theproblem with the 60mm mortar is that it only has a range of 1,400meters, so the gunner has to get close to the target to use it. I alsohad two DShK machine guns, and five RPG-7s. I kept these heavyweapons at my base at Gerdab. My men had small arms which theykept with them. On 17 April 1981, I launched a shelling attack against the Soviet66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samarkhel. I only took 42men with me since we were not very well equipped and we were notready for a major encounter with superior forces. Further, KamaDistrict is right across the river from the 66th Brigade garrison andthey kept the area under constant surveillance. I did not want tomove a large group of men through the area and alert them. Toavoid observation, we went north from Gerdab into the mountainsand then west across the mountains and into Mamakhel Village inthe Kama area (Map 3-1 - Dargo). We stayed for three nights inMamakhel and spent the days in the mountains at Dargo Chinaspring—some three kilometers away. From Mamakhel, we went to Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominent religious leader in Nangrahar Province. He is fromthe village of Gerdab in Kama District northeast of Jalalabad. During the war, he was amajor commander of the Khalis group (HIK). Later, he joined NIFA. During the war, hetook television journalist Dan Rather to his base in Afghanistan. He also accompaniedCongressman Charles Wilson of Texas into Afghanistan several times. During most of thewar he was active in his own area, fighting the DRA in Jalalabad and the Soviet 66thSeparate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. He became a member of the Nangrahargoverning council after collapse of the communist regime—a position he held until theTaliban advance in September 1996. [Map sheet 3185].

One day, three Soviet soldiers from the 66th Brigade crossed the Kabul River for apicnic. They were drinking vodka and cooking shashlik around a campfire when MawlawiShukur captured them. One of the Soviets, named Naomov, converted to Islam and foughtwith the Mujahideen for three years. Author Ali Jalali interviewed Naomov during his visitto Washington,D.C. sponsored by the Freedom House. Naomov spoke Pushtu well by thattime. Naomov recommended that "the Mujahideen quit fighting one another and uniteagainst the enemy." Naomov settled in Canada.

Kama Village where some people were still living—although manypeople had already emigrated to Pakistan.

At Kama, I put my nephew Shahpur in charge and told him totake my two mortars and 38 men and to go shell the 66th's camp. Ikept four men with me. The shelling group left Kama at dusk. Theypositioned the 82mm mortar on the north side of the river at thehouse of Khan-e Mulla at Jamali Village—since it had the range.Then they crossed the river at Bela and approached the campthrough the village of Samarkhel. They occupied positions close to the entrance of the enemy camp. They had the guerrilla mortar(60mm) and the RPGs with them. They opened fire with the RPGsand the 60mm mortar from close range at 2200 hours. The 82mmmortar joined in long-range fires onto the sleeping camp. Theshelling attack created chaos. The shelling group fired at intervalsover a two-hour period and then broke contact and withdrew. I wasin Kama throughout the attack. My men had orders to join me in themountains at the Dargo China spring the next day. I went to therendezvous point. I arrived at dawn and they were already there.Two of my men were missing, since they had forgotten the 60mmmortar and a video camera and had gone back to retrieve them.

While I was in Kama, informers told me that the enemy wouldlaunch a search and destroy mission in Kama District in five days. Idecided that they would now come sooner since we had shelled them. I decided that we had to leave the area. At sunrise, I instructed mymen to go deeper into the mountains. I was tired and had a cold, so I decided to go back home to Gerdab. However, as I set out, I saw twohelicopters lifting off from the airport and flying low over KamaDistrict. I hit the ground and hid. I was alone except for HajiShahbaz. Other helicopters followed the first two. At first I thoughtthat the helicopters were enroute to Kunar Province, but then theystarted landing troops from two helicopters at Mirji Gholi point onDerghi Ghar mountain—about a kilometer away.

They also landed troops north of Mamakhel on the plain and on Gedaro Ghunday hill.My men saw the helicopters landing and realized that they would beseen if they continued to climb into the mountains. So they turnedaround in the wide canyon and started back toward me. I was in aditch between Mirji Gholi and Dargo China and was hidden by theearly morning shadow from the mountain. As I raised my head, Icould make out some 25 Soviet soldiers along with several peoplewearing tsadar moving to the southeast from the high ground of MirjiGholi toward Gedaro Ghunday. I could also see Soviets setting upmortars on top of Gedaro Ghunday. I crawled about 50 meters in theditch. The Soviets were facing the sun and I was in the shadow, sothey couldn't see me. As I crawled, I got rid of heavy things that I hadin my pockets—such as pliers and wads of money. I headed northtoward the mountain ridge. At that point, Zafar and Noor, carryingthe missing 60mm mortar and video camera, walked into the Sovietgroup setting up at Gedaro Ghunday. They were immediately cap-tured. Noor was my cousin.

I climbed Derghi Ghar Mountain to try and see what was hap-pening. I saw that my men had split. Thirteen were now back inDargo China. These 13 men were commanded by Tajahul and therest, commanded by Shahpur, were going back into the mountains. Isaw that part of the Soviets were heading toward my 13 men. TheSoviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark their position.Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine gun fire.Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them. Afterthe air attack, the Soviets began attacking my 13-man group. I wasmidway between the attacking Soviets and my men—about 500meters away. I looked in my binoculars and saw that another groupof Soviets were down in the valley picking up the pliers, first aidpackets and money I had discarded. The group examining my thingslooked different than the others and I thought that they were officers.I decided that when the helicopters made their next strafing run, Iwould use the noise of their gunfire to hide my fire. When the heli-copters made their next gun run, I fired on the group in the valleyand hit one. I then took cover, raised my head, fired and got anotherone. This drew the Soviets attention and they opened up on me.Artillery started to fall all around. I ran from this position to anoth-er position about 100 meters away. I had a "20-shooter" [Czechoslo-vak M26 light machine gun] and some of my men had "20-shooters."As I ran to change positions, I heard firing from "20-shooters" in mygroup. They were involved in a heavy fire fight.

I then heard noise from the north and I thought that the Sovietswere coming from that direction as well. But then I saw Shapur andone of my other men. They were coming for me. Shapur reported thattanks were moving through Kama and had sealed the exits. Theenemy were arresting people throughout Kama. We decided to leaveto the north. Earlier, Shapur had sent a messenger to my group of 13telling them to move north. However, they were pinned down by heavyartillery fire and direct fire. They could not break contact and foughtto the last man. As we left the area, one of my Mujahideen fired anRPG at a helicopter. The helicopter caught fire and flew off and fell to the ground near Kama—where it exploded. I don't know whether theRPG hit the helicopter or whether other ground fire got it.

We moved to the village of Ghara Mamakhel, some four hours intothe mountains, where I met two more of my men. By morning, 12 ofmy people arrived there. I learned the fate of my group of 13. TheSoviets remained in Kama for two days. Then we returned to retrievethe bodies of my men. I found the bodies of my 13 men in a group, plusthose of Zafar and Noor and five more of my men. The Soviets hadbooby-trapped some of the bodies and had sprinkled chemicals on otherbodies which caused them to disintegrate. We couldn't evacuate thesebodies. So we built graves over them. Their bodies are still thereunder stones. I do not know what the Soviet casualties were, but I doknow that I shot two, we downed a helicopter and the Soviets lost threearmored vehicles to our mines during this action.

Throughout the war, I faced the Soviets like this during sevensweeps. I moved the families of the martyrs to refugee camps inPeshawar, Pakistan, since we couldn't support them in the Kama area.I later learned that the Soviets were looking for me personally. Theyarrested someone who looked like me (the narrator has a prominentnose) while he was harvesting clover. At that time, my beard wasshorter. They took him to Jalalabad and paraded him around—"We'vecaught the son of a b" they said. Someone finally recognized him,and said that he wasn't me and so he was released. Around that sametime, the DRA governor of Kama District was in the Merzakhel Village.The Soviets arrested him and put him into forced labor since they did-n't recognize him. They had him carrying water to their soldiers on thehigh ground. The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. Theykilled several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of mymen who was unarmed. I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but thesubsequent actions of the Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. Ihave written many poems of protest against their current activities.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrisonover a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positionsto avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrolsto find the firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. Theartillery fire did no good. Apparently, the garrison commander hadnot surveyed potential and actual Mujahideen firing positions tocounter them.

The Mujahideen rendezvous point was located in one of threeescape routes into the mountains from Kama District. Further, it isadjacent to a likely blocking position which the Soviets used duringtheir periodic block and sweep operations. The Mujahideen werecaught downhill from the Soviet blocking force and could not escape.As usual, the Mujahideen were severely hampered by the lack ofportable, short-range radios which would have allowed them tocoordinate their actions.

VIGNETTE 2 A NEW YEARS PRESENT FOR THE SOVIETSby Mawlawi Shukur Yasini The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. I decidedthat we should give them a combination anniversary and New Yearspresent on 29 December 1983. The present would be a shelling attackon the 66th Separate. Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. I assem-bled 150 Mujahideen with two 82mm mortars, two RPG-7s, one recoil-less rifle, and five or six antitank mines We had 250 mortar roundsfor the attack. I placed my nephew Shapur in command. He formedfour groups: a mortar group commanded by Awozubellah; a mortargroup commanded by my son Abdul Basir; an observation post/fireadjustment group commanded by Shapur; and a light group. We start-ed moving the ammunition and supplies on donkeys and mules twodays before the attack. We had to move all of it across the Kabul Riverand stockpile it in the village of Gerdi Kats. From there we had to move it. to Khwaja Hanafi Baba Ghar Mountain overlooking Samarkhel (Map 3-2 - New Year). We moved all the ammunition and supplies to the mountain areaundetected during the two days. We set up the mortars behind themountain and set up the observation post on top.. The light group hadthe recoilless rifle, RPGs and antitank mines. They crossed the riverat Bela at night and went through Samarkhel to the west. LocalMujahideen met them, guided them to the objective and helped themplant the mines They planted the mines in the road near the maingate of the compound near a mosque. Our plan was to start with aquick strike by the light group and then follow on with the mortarattack. The 66th Brigade was garrisoned in barracks and tents, so wehoped that our mortar fire would be effective against them. It was arainy night with lots of lightning. The light group launched the attackat 2200 by firing the recoilless rifle and RPGs at the main gate of theenemy compound. The enemy reacted with tanks and APCs whichcame roaring out of the gate. Two of them were destroyed or damagedby the antitank mines The light group withdrew. At the same time,the mortars went into action. They sent all 250 rounds of hot steel intothe enemy compound as our New Year's present to the 66th Brigade.The 66th Brigade responded with BM-21s, artillery and mortars. Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is the narrator of the previous vignette. [Map sheet 3185]. Page 114 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Round after round of enemy fire slammed into the mountains, whilethe Mujahideen mortars continued to fire from the valley between themountains. With the Soviet fire, the Mujahideen mortars and thelightning, the night was practically turned into day. It was a spectac-ular fireworks display. I had stayed at Gerdab and had a cow killed and cooked. Iplanned to welcome my returning heroes with a feast. They weresupposed to return at dawn and so all the arrangements for the feastwere ready as the eastern sky lightened. But, my men did not returnat dawn. They were pinned down by the heavy Soviet return fire. Atdaybreak, Soviet helicopters and aircraft began flying over the areaand firing everywhere. I despaired that anyone would survive. Ipromised Allah that I would donate a large sum of money to charityif even half of my men would return. At 0800, my body guard, JumaKhan, and I left Gerdab and climbed the mountain overlookingGerdab. I was using my binoculars, I saw a shepherd running towardme. Everything was now calm. The aircraft had returned to theairfield and the artillery had quit firing. I climbed down to meet theshepherd. He brought me the good news that my Mujahideen hadsurvived and had returned to Gerdab. None of my Mujahideen wereeven hurt! We had a very good feast. Due to the heavy Soviet shelling, many other Mujahideen lefttheir areas. Our contacts in the Soviet camp later reported that heli-copters evacuated wounded and dead from Samarkhel to Jalalabadairport. The helicopters made 12 trips. Our contacts told me thatthere were at least 200 killed and wounded. This attack increasedSoviet activity and Soviet helicopters were out flying every day look-ing for Mujahideen.

COMMENTARY: A lot of Mujahideen mortar firing was observed firefrom the forward slopes of a mountain with the gunner making firingadjustments. The mortar crews in this attack would not have survivedthe Soviet return fire if they had tried firing from the forward slopes.Their reverse slope firing positions in the valley made it difficult forSoviet artillery to reach the firing positions. The use of forwardobservers to adjust fire is a mark of sophistication among Mujahideenforces. However, the Soviet mortar battery commanders should havesurveyed these likely firing sites and had them plotted long before theMujahideen attack. Apparently, they did not. This is a step that firesupport commanders should take whenever their forces stop. This was a permanent garrison, so such planning should have been done years before. The figure of 200 dead and wounded seems high, but it was awell-planned and executed attack.

DRA and Soviet intelligence efforts in the Kama area seem inade-quate. Commanders, like the narrator, operated from the same areathroughout the war and moved freely through populated areas, yet theDRA seemed unable to react in time. The Soviets and DRA knew whothe narrator was, what he looked like and where he was from, but theywere never able to kill or capture him.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen fired from fixed, surveyed sites and from mobilefiring bases. The mobile fire base deployed in two phases. During theday, the firing survey party would move into the area, determineweapons positions, map locations, headings, intended positions for theaiming stakes and firing data. At night, the firing party would arrivein a jeep, meet with the survey party, set up their weapons, conduct aquick firing raid and depart. The Mujahideen also employed unmanned firing bases. Unmannedfiring bases were used against targets which were devoid of cover andconcealment. The Mujahideen would survey these points in daylightand set up rockets on makeshift or disposable launchers. They wouldconnect these rockets to time-delay firing devices. The Mujahideenwould be well away from the area when the Soviet or DRA forces wouldlaunch a search for them.

Shelling attacks had mixed results. When launched against mili-tary airfields and garrisons, they occasionally destroyed militarytargets of value. Further, they prevented the DRA or Soviet forcesfrom sleeping and depressed morale. When launched against cities,they frequently killed innocent civilians. This cost the Mujahideenpotential supporters. As some civilians expressed it, "the government oppress us during the day and the Mujahideen oppress us at night."

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text: Author:Gustav Krüger

title: Author:Gustav Krüger


text:
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 4

CHAPTER 4: ATTACKING A STRONG POINT
Attacking a strong point is often similar to conducting a raid andmany of the same tactical considerations and techniques apply.Attackers quickly abandon their objective after a successful raid,while there is usually an intent to hold a captured strong pointfor some period of time. Therefore, an attack on a strong pointgenerally involves more supplies and heavier armaments. Mostoften, the strong points were political centers which the Mujahideenwanted to hold for propaganda value. 1 KM 0 ■ • IN ■ ■■ •• •• •■ r. • •me TOKHIKHWAR • \ ••• ■ ■ ■• •• •• • • • ■ ) • ALINGAR cc wlALINGAR 2 Map 4-1 AMIR •SHAHID ■HILL NOT TO SCALE Page 118 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 TAKING ALINGAR DISTRICT CAPITALby Nawaz Khan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Haji M. Siddiqullah In July of 1980, the subdistrict capital of Nengrach was collocatedwith the Alingar District Capital in the town of Alingar. This isbecause the Mujahideen had driven the government out of the moun-tain redoubt of Nengrach. The district government of Nuristan wasalso there. This was a common practice. The DRA maintained many"governments in exile" for areas they did not control and held "nation-wide" congresses using emigrants to represent those uncontrolledareas. The DRA never controlled more than 15% of the countryside.We decided to eliminate all these governments by seizing Alingar town.It proved to be a major victory. The DRA 81st Regiment had a battalion in Alingar and there weresome DRA militia forces as well.' (Map 4-1 - Alingar 2) We had twocontacts in the DRA garrison. One was Captain Yar Mohammad whohad a brother in our Mujahideen group. Captain Mohammad was fromnearby Koh-e Safi and routinely provided us information about gov-ernment plans. We talked to the Captain about capturing Alingar andhe agreed to help us. We introduced the Captain to our other contact,Piroz. Piroz was a cook in the DRA garrison. We gave drugs to Piroz.The Captain and Piroz agreed that Piroz would drug the food beforeour attack and that the captain would signal us when that was doneand we could launch our attack. We asked the cook how manyMujahideen we should bring. "Not too many to cause trouble, but nottoo few to fail" he replied. "Okay, about 70,000" we joked. "No, onlyabout 10,000" he joked back. In any case, the Mujahideen sympathiz-ers in the DRA camp would kill the communist officers. The signal toattack was the firing of a magazine full of tracer ammunition. Nawaz Khan was a cadet in the Afghanistan Military Academy when he joined the resis-tance. He was a Mujahideen commander in Mehtar Lam, the Provincial Capital ofLaghman Province. Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH fac-tion in Laghman. He joined HIH in the fight against Dauod before the communist revolu-tion. Dr. Qudus was a commander under Sidiqullah who doubled as the force medic. [Mapsheet 3086, vic grid 2455]. 1 According to Soviet sources, the DRA 71st Infantry Regiment was garrisoned in MehtarLam with some forces in the Alingar area. The 81st Mechanized Infantry Regiment wasstationed further to the south in Nangrahar Province. General Alexandr Mayorov, Pravdaob Afganskoy voyne [Truth about the war in Afghanistan], Moscow: Prava Chiloveka, 1996,Map set. Page 120 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War There were about 300 total Mujahideen formed in four groups andabout 30 subgroups. We called the group commanders together andtold them to concentrate their men at night in Tokhi Khwar about onekilometer from the district headquarters. We told them that we hadinside contacts but provided no details. We also assigned a group ofMullas with megaphones to begin broadcasting after the attack. Theywere to persuade the beseiged DRA to surrender. H-hour was midnight. There were 150 Mujahideen in Nawaz Khan's group. They werearmed with three DShK heavy machine guns, two 82mm recoillessrifles, some mortars and Kalashnikov rifles. Dr. Qudus group hadone Soviet PPSH submachine gun, some bolt-action rifles and someother weapons. Several Mujahideen were unarmed. The other Muja-hideen groups were similarly equipped. The signal to attack wasgiven 10 minutes early. The tracers ripped into the air. Although thedrugged food did not have its desired effect, Piroz and 10 otherMujahideen sympathizers had killed their communist officers. TheDRA battalion surrendered to us as we stormed inside the battalioncompound. The first one in was Doctor Nasar who just this year fin-ished his education in Egypt. It was the 1st of July 1980. The Mujahideen had deployed forces to the north, south and west of the district center. One group attackedthe DRA security posts on Baghal mountain to the northwest. Onegroup attacked along the main road which ran east of the river. Onegroup attacked to seize and cross the bridge. One group attacked theDRA posts on the Amir Shahid hill to the southeast. The DRA militarydid not want to fight us, however, the local militia units were reluctantto surrender and fought on. The militia were still protecting the gov-ernment enclaves of Alingar, Nuristan and Nengrach. The militarythen cooperated with us and turned their guns on the militia. A fiercebattle ensued with the Mujahideen and military fighting the militia.During the fighting, the district governor of Alingar and eight or nineaides managed to escape to Mehtar Lam. Still, we captured Alingarand eliminated the DRA governments of Nengrach and Alingar.Thirteen officials from Nuristan made a break, but were cut down inour cross fire. The governor of Nuristan was killed by a Mujahideenwhose brother had been killed by this same governor. At one point,Sidiqullah saw Saidagul, the Alingar Communist Party Secretary,being dragged off by a group he did not recognize. Since he had lenthis rifle to a friend, Sidiqullah was unarmed and so he struck twostones together to imitate a bolt action rifle action and challengedthem. Mawlawi Rahim identified himself and stated that they had Chapter 4, Vignette 1 Page 121 captured a DRA soldier. Sidiqullah identified Saidagul and told themthat they had a much more important catch. The fighting continuedthrough the night, the Mujahideen moving to cut off the fleeing DRAofficials and pursuing them in the dark. The fighting ended in time formorning prayers. One of the groups involved in the fighting was a group of teenagersfrom 13 to 18 years old who we called the Khandakiano (bull terriers)group. During the fighting, one 14-year-old was fighting a desperatehand-to-hand combat with a DRA sports captain named Sharif.Fortunately, another Mujahideen killed Sharif during the fight. We killed 285 DRA officials, police, soldiers, militia and civilians.2We captured 80 heavy weapons, two armored vehicles and 1,200 smallarms. The heavy weapons included one 76mm mountain gun, one76mm field gun, some ZGU-1 heavy machine guns, a 107mm mortar,several DShK heavy machine guns, and some 82mm mortars. Manygovernment people also surrendered to us. It was a bonanza. InNawaz Khan's group, they lost three KIA and seven WIA. InSidiqullah's group they lost two KIA. We kept the district capital forsome time until a joint Soviet/DRA force pushed us out and reestab-lished DRA government in Alingar. COMMENTARY: Alingar is about 30 kilometers from the province capitalof Mehtar Lam. At this point of the war, the Mujahideen were deter-mined to control political centers so that they could claim to be a legit-imate government in Afghanistan. The DRA was equally determinedto prevent this. 2 Sidiqullah states 120 DRA casualties. Page 122 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 THE BATTLE FOR PANJWAYEEbased on an interview with Mulla Malang In September 1982, the DRA, backed by Soviet forces, had firmcontrol of Panjwayee, the district capital of Panjwayee District (Map4-2 - Panjwayee). Panjwayee is located some 25 kilometers southwestof Kandahar. The district was militarily significant to both sides sincethe town and its surrounding hills provided a favorable base for mili-tary action in the green zones which stretch all the way to the city ofKandahar. This area was also the hot bed of resistance in the region.Seizing control of Panjwayee was in the interest of all the localMujahideen groups based in the area. Therefore, about 1,000 Mujahi-deen assembled near. Panjwayee to take the town. The operation wasdirected by HIK commander Mulla Malang and others. The town was defended by up to 300 militia who lived there withtheir families The militiamen had turned their houses and all otherbuildings into fortified positions. They placed bunkers on the roof topsand occupied and fortified the high ground overlooking the town andthe approaches to it. The Mujahideen began by surrounding the townand shelling it for two days. The shelling had little effect on thedefenders, but the Mujahideen soon found themselves the object ofenemy artillery fire and aerial bombardment. Most of the Mujahideenwithdrew into the neighboring villages of Sperwan and Zangabad. On the third day, Commander Mulla Malang decided to penetratethe town with a small group and to seize control of a number of thedominant positions that covered the approaches to the town. At noon,Mulla Malang led a group of 25 Mujahideen to the southern edge of thetown. They carried picks and shovels. They quietly dug a hole throughthe adobe wall and broke into a house. Once inside, they began toadvance from house to house by knocking holes into the walls. Theiradvance was totally unobserved by the militia who were occupying therooftop positions overlooking the streets of the town. The Mujahideenfinally knocked a hole through a wall that opened onto a courtyard.They burst into the courtyard with weapons at the ready. Themilitiamen were caught by surprise. They assumed that the town Mulla Malang was one of the most famous commanders of the Kandahar area. He was anadherent of Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis-Islamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami Khalis). [Mapsheet 2180, vic grid 4794]. Page 124 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War was already captured by the Mujahideen, and fled from the town.Mulla Malang's group established a secure area and signaled theMujahideen outside the town. Soon, hundreds of other Mujahideenpoured into the town and cleared it from the southeast to the north-west, ending on the bank of the Arghandab River. They cleared thetown building by building, again avoiding the streets by advancing byknocking holes in the walls Other Mujahideen immediately climbedto the roof tops and manned the abandoned positions. Only the districtheadquarters remained under militia control. That night, theMujahideen consolidated their gains and captured the district head-quarters the next day. The militia had suffered heavy casualties and retreated to the over-watching high ground of a neighboring hill. The Mujahideen sur-rounded the militia positions. The government forces then openednegotiations with the Mujahideen—apparently to gain time As theywere talking, an armored Soviet/DRA column arrived from Kandahar.The Mujahideen withdrew inside Panjwayee. The following night, the Soviet and DRA forces attackedPanjwayee and a heavy house-to-house battle ensued. The Mujahi-deen fired from the roof tops at the government forces advancingalong the streets. Eventually, the Soviet/DRA combat power made theMujahideen position untenable. The Mujahideen withdrew in smallgroups under the cover of darkness. The regime restored the districtgovernment in Panjwayee. CommErrrARY: The Mujahideen gradually learned that overrunningand seizing control of government administrative centers is easy, butretaining them usually resulted in rapid Soviet or DRA retaliation.The Soviets/DRA felt that they had to retain control of local govern-ment agencies and would go to great lengths and take high risks todefend local administrative centers, even when they were tightlybesieged by the resistance. Control of a district center symbolizedcontrol of the district, though this was seldom the case. In someremote districts, government control was restricted to a few buildingsin the center of the district town. The government spared no effort tomaintain their presence in these remote district centers despite theirinsignificant military usefulness and the high costs,in men and mate-rial, of holding them. This policy was promoted by the political impor-tance of maintaining control, albeit nominal, over all provinces,districts and subdistricts in a country which was in revolt against theforeign-installed government. Chapter 4, Vignette 2 Page 125 The battle of Panjwayee is an example of how easily the resistancecould seize control of an isolated district center and how vulnerable theresistance became once it was forced to defend the town in the face ofoverwhelming Soviet/DRA forces. For this reason, it was only towardthe end of the Soviet occupation that the Mujahideen again moved toseize control of major district and provincial centers. The source of theresistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas andthe hundreds of the cross-border supply and infiltration routes whichthey controlled throughout the war. Tactically, a 25-man detachment accomplished what a 1,000 manforce could not. They did this through surprise and the indirectapproach. However, the lack of an overall operational command leftthe Mujahideen vulnerable. After seizing Panjwayee, the Mujahi-deen became overconfident and failed to prepare for the enemycounter attack. They confidently parleyed with the militia while theSoviet/DRA force formed and moved. The Mujahideen failed toconsolidate their victory and to establish defensive positions on thehills to the east and west of Panjwayee and on the Arghandab Riverto the north. They failed to post reconnaissance and ambush forceson the likely enemy avenues of approach. Instead of having to fighttheir way through a series of ambushes and then bumping intooutlying Mujahideen fortified positions, the Soviet/DRA relief forcemoved unopposed to the battlefield and surprised the victoriousMujahideen at Panjwayee. Tactically, the Mujahideen realized that movement along streets issuicidal in urban combat. However, the spontaneous nature of theunpaid, volunteer Mujahideen made control very difficult. Mujahideenforces joined the battle and left as they wished. Often, they did notbother to let the coordinating commander know. Page 126 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War DARA-ENURVALLEY x 1618 DARAH-EA6k,NUR 1483 BODYALAYGHAR SHEWA • •• ImoKuNA,„arm.-91f KMBODYALAY Map 4-3 VIGNETTE 3 ATTACK ON THE BODYALAY GARRISONby Doctor Mohammad Sadeq A DRA border guard battalion' at Bodyalay near Shewa Districthad security posts on the high ground commanding the Dara-i-NurValley which stretches northward from Bodyalay. We decided to attackthe security posts in March 1983 (Map 4-3 Bodyalay). We had 65Mujahideen armed with one DShK heavy machine gun, one 82mmmortar, four RPG-7s, 22 Kalashnikovs and other small arms. At thattime, we did not have a permanent base but moved from village to vil-lage in the Dara-i Nur Valley. We came down from the mountains inthe north through the side valley that opens onto Ziraybaba abouteight kilometers to the east. From that valley, we moved on mountainpaths to reach the eastern flank of the main valley at BodyalayMountain We positioned the DShK and mortar near the peak ofBodyalay Mountain. I divided our force into four groups. One groupdeployed against the south side of the battalion garrison to pin them inposition and cut off any aid from the south. The second group deployedagainst the government base at the village of Darah-e Nur to pin themdown. The third group deployed against the two battalion outposts onBodyalay Mountain. The fourth group was the support group whichmanned the DShK and mortar on the top of Bodyalay Mountain. We started our attack after midnight. One mortar shell scored adirect hit on a government OP and killed one and wounded five of theenemy defenders. We were fighting for 2 hours and 30 minutes butwere unable to overrun either of the outposts. As the day dawned, wehad to withdraw since we were surrounded by enemy forces and wereabout to lose the advantage of night. We withdrew over the samemountain paths. I had two wounded Mujahideen from the attack. COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen force harassed the DRA battalion, butlacked sufficient combat power to overrun any of its outposts sincemuch of its force was deployed to prevent the DRA forces from movingto reinforce the besieged outposts. Even if the attack succeeded, theattackers would have only had time to grab weapons and other spoilsand leave. The Mujahideen force escaped over the same route that Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet3186, vic grid 4830]. 3 Probably the 902nd Border Guards Battalion. Page 128 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War they arrived on. If the DRA informer net was effective, the Mujahideenwere risking ambush on their return. The Mujahideen had no radiosor other rapid communications and so control of the battle was prob-lematic at best. VIGNETTE 4 ATTACK ON SORUBAYby Toryalai Hemat There were a lot of DRA sympathizers in the Nazian Valley. Wecalled this area "Little Moscow", as did the many Arabs in the areawho had joined us in jihad.4 The district headquarters of the NazianValley is Sorubay. All the residents of Sorubay were communistsympathizers. We decided to seize the district center in July 1985(Map 4-4 - Sorubay). It was a combined action by the forces ofHikmatyar, Sayyaf, Mohammadi and Khalis (HIH, IUA, IRMA andHIK). There were about 1,000 Mujahideen in various bases in theMaro Mountain stronghold area. Sorubay District center is 12 kilometers north of the Melava baseand Maro Mountains—about a six-hour hike through the mountains.I had 80 men in my command and we were well armed. I had threeBM12s, some medium mortars and many heavy machine guns in mygroup. This was a major attempt by us to seize the Nazian Districtgovernment and in many respects was closer to conventional warthan guerrilla war. For two weeks, Mujahideen supply trains resup-plied Melava base, replenished our ammunition and our MRL rock-ets. We prepared for the attack for an additional week and thenmoved from Maro Mountain down into the Nazian Valley. Early inthe morning, we deployed our first groups against the DRA OPswhich sat on the small mountains overlooking Sorubay. There wereabout 12 security OPs on the mountains surrounding Sorubay, so theattack on the center started with the attack on the security posts.After conducting heavy fire on these posts, we attacked and seizedthem. We captured Sar Ghar and Tor Ghar security posts by 1000hours. Then we started shelling the district center and descended onSorubay. Government officials, DRA soldiers and their families start-ed fleeing. They left in such a hurry that when we entered Sorubay,we discovered that the occupants had left their dinners still cookingand bread dough was waiting to be baked. We captured many impor- Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the IUA—IslamicUnity of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet3185, vic grid 8299]. 4 Moscow soghra is the Arabic. Many Arabs came to Afghanistan for the jihad. The over-all Afghan impression of the Arab Mujahideen, gathered from our interviews, is that theywere prima donnas who were more interested in taking videos than fighting. Page 130 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War ■ 4%•. SHINWAR• 1:I ♦ ♦ I I ♦ SAR GHAR SORIBAY•I • TOR GHAR 02345 KMSORUBAY Map 4-4 Chapter 4, Vignette 4 Page 131 tant government documents which we sent to Peshawar. We sent ourDRA captives to Landay. I lost seven KIA during the attack. Westayed in Sorubay overnight. The enemy responded by sending forces from Jalalabad. Heavyenemy artillery fire began to fall on the OPs located on the highground. Aircraft hit us as enemy armored vehicles neared the districtcenter. We could not hold the district center against the air andartillery and so we vacated the place. During this fighting, we lostmany people. I lost another seven KIA in my group. We left one ofour dead, Ahmad Said, behind. He used to wear camouflage fatigues.The next day the DRA radio stated that they had identified Chinesemercenaries among our dead. Perhaps this was Ahmad. Two dayslater, we attacked Sorubay again and I lost yet another seven MA. Ihad lost 21 of 80 men in this action. I don't know what the enemycasualties were, but I personally saw 15 bodies when we capturedSorubay. We returned to our bases. COMMENTAAY: There was a political advantage to holding districtcapitals, as it conferred a degree of legitimacy on the Mujahideen.However, these capitals were usually located on accessible groundand were not sited for defense against modern artillery and airpower. In this instance, the Mujahideen moved from guerrilla war-fare to a set-piece battle to capture Sorubay and were victorious.However, their attempt to hold the prize resulted in heavy losses andno political advantage.

The outposts overlooking Sorubay appear to have been sited rather haphazardly with little planning for mutual support. The DRA evidently fragmented their force to little advantage.

VIGNETTE 5 STORMING GULA'lby Haji Malangyar The Nangrahar agricultural/irrigation project was located inShinwar District, Nangrahar Province southeast of Jalalabad. Themassive irrigation project was built with Soviet help and guardedby several DRA military garrisons. (No Map) A battalion and somemilitia units protected the irrigation system. The battalion was gar-risoned at the main water pump some 1.5 kilometers north of Gula'i.Gula'i is three kilometers northwest of Ghanikhel. A canal runs par-allel to the main road north of Ghanikhel and a militia unit guard-ed a bridge on this road. Another battalion protected a bridge furtherto the northwest. Our base at Marochina, was seven kilometers west of Gula'i.There were no people left in Gula'i since everyone had migrated. Ihad 59 Mujahideen armed with an 82mm mortar and 12 RPG-7s.The 8th of July 1985 was the last day of fasting in Ramadan. Thenext day would be the Feast of Ramadan (Eid-al-Fitr). We felt thatmany DRA soldiers would celebrate the festival at home makingthis a good time to attack. As was our custom, we prayed to Godand put the Koran inside the cloth tsadar. We held the tsadar highand had every Mujahideen pass under it to ask God's blessing onus. We walked to Gula'i and spent the night of July 8th in an aban-doned house. I selected four groups of eight-to-ten men each todivert and contain the outposts at the Narai Pul bridge, the AozhdaGhundai hill, Smats hill, and the Spin Khwar syphon. I had radiocommunication with all groups. I commanded the 19 men in themain attack. Each containment group had two RPGs and the mainattack group had four RPGs. I positioned our mortar near theCongregation Mosque (Eidgah). I started the attack at 1600 hoursand three hours later we overran the government post in Gula'i. Thecontainment groups prevented any assistance to the post. Afterdark, we all gathered at the designated assembly area. We had twoWIA. The enemy lost three KIA and two POWs. We also captured11 Kalashnikovs, 100 boxes of badly needed ammunition and somehand grenades. Haji Malangyar fought in the heavily contested Shinwar District. There is no map with thisvignette. [Map sheet 3185, vic grid 7910].

COMMENTARY: Radios greatly helped coordinate Mujahideen actions.Evidently, attacking during the Feast of Ramadan also helped.Because the DRA had to protect military, political and economic instal-lations this spread the DRA force thin and inhibited offensive actions.The agricultural project was vital to the economic well-being of thearea and, although the Mujahideen attacked the military posts, theydid not attack the canals.

VIGNETTE 6 DESTRUCTION OF THE BAGH-E MUMTAZ BRIGADEby Doctor Mohammad Wakil In 1988, the DRA deployed a security ,brigade north of Kabul tosecure the route for the withdrawal of the Soviet 40th Army. It wasstationed on the Kabul-Charikar highway near the road junction withthe road leading to Shakardara—the district headquarters ofShakardara District. The brigade was stationed in the Mumtazorchard, so it was called the Bagh-e Mumtaz Brigades (Map 4-5 -Shakardara). My brother, the late Commander Wasil, was the overallcommander of the many factions involved in this battle. He workedout the plan during several commanders councils at thevarious factionbases. At 0800 hours on 21 June 1988, we would begin our attack onthe brigade. The first phase would be the isolation and artillery prepa-ration phase. Mujahideen would block the road from the north andsouth to isolate the garrison and begin a seven-day artillery prepara-tion with a BM-12, Saqar MRL, 122mm howitzer, 82mm mortars and82mm recoilless rifles. The artillery preparation would be fired fromfour directions. The second phase would be the ground offensive. Onehundred Mujahideen would attack on each of four axes. The attackfrom the south would be led by my brother, Commander Wasil, on thesouthern axis Sehab-e Quli Village—Morad Beg town. Commander TajMohammad would lead the attack on the southwest axis from Karez-eMir Village. Commander Naser would lead the attack on the westernaxis while Commander Anwar would lead the attack on the easternaxis. Mujahideen armaments included one Saqar, one BM12, one122mm howitzer, six 82mm mortars, eight 82mm recoilless rifles andapproximately 40 RPG-7s. We also had some ZSU-23-2 antiaircraftguns and some Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

The attack started on time, but the garrison did not last for the sevendays. The brigade's morale broke and we overran it by 1400 hours on thefirst day. The brigade's tanks broke out. The brigade commander andsome of his deputies were on board the tanks. We tried to stop them withRPG fire, but they escaped to Kabul. I do not know the total Mujahideencasualties, but I do know of four KIA, including my brother. I also know Doctor Mohammad Wakil is from Shakardara District north of Kabul. He graduated fromhigh school before the war. He joined the resistance and received medical training inPakistan. [Map sheet 2886., vic grid 0737]. 5 Bagh-e means orchard. This was probably the 520th Brigade. Page 136 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War 10 of the Mujahideen WIA. We killed around 100 in the brigade and cap-tured some 400-450 DRA soldiers. We also captured some 40 armoredvehicles, although not all of them were functioning We captured 10trucks and some 600 small arms. The Kabul government was slow inreacting to our attack, since they did not expect that the brigade's resis-tance would collapse so quickly. After 1400 hours, the artillery of theDRA 8th Infantry Division" began firing on the captured garrison frompositions in Qargha and the Kabul airport. However, they did notemploy any aircraft against us due to the presence of the ZSU-23-2s andStingers. We did not intend to hold the garrison area and had no desireto remain under artillery fire, so we grabbed what we could and left. Thegovernment never reestablished a unit at that garrison site.

COMMENTARY: Planning a seven-day siege within 15 kilometers of theheavily garrisoned capital of Kabul is a high-risk option, but the garri-son evidently capitulated as soon as its commander abandoned it andfled in a tank. The Mujahideen southern roadblock was evidently nottoo effective since the brigade's tanks managed to blast right throughit. At this point in the war, the DRA's morale (which was never high)was at a record low. The Soviets had begun their withdrawal on May15th over this same road and were conducting few offensive actions.The DRA felt like the hapless brigade watching their commander flee.The Soviets were clearly preparing to abandon the DRA.

The Mujahideen, on the other hand, were practically giddy withanticipation of the complete Soviet withdrawal. The Mujahideen hadnot expected to win the war and now could sense victory Their actionsbecame more daring. However, after the Soviet withdrawal, theMujahideen began quarreling among themselves even more than usualand the DRA resolve strengthened. The war went on. Coordinating an attack by different factions with uncertaincommunications from four directions is also a high-risk option whichchances fratricide. However, audacity prevailed and the Mujahideenquickly destroyed a larger force.

The introduction of the U.S.-manufactured, shoulder-fired Stingerair defense missile caused a change in Soviet aerial tactics. TheSoviets would not employ close air support forward of their own forcesif Stingers were present. Further, a Mujahideen rocket attack on theKabul airfield about this same time reportedly destroyed five SU-25close air support aircraft and damaged three others. Mujahideen airdefenses and aircraft availability probably limited the Soviet/DRAresponse to artillery fire.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
When the guerrilla force decides to seize and hold a strong point,implied missions are the conduct of regular logistic resupply, thecontinual manning of the strong point and the ability to withstandartillery and air strikes. None of these are easy for a guerrilla forcedependent on part-time guerrillas. Further, it requires the commit-ment of crew-served weapons and sufficient ammunition—commo-dities that are hard to remove during a forced withdrawal. Theguerrilla is trading his mobility and anonymity for a fixed-piececonventional battle. Quite frequently, the pierrilla is unable tomake the transition. Asadabadalalabad


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Rh Saracens; the Coptic patriarch, and all the Christians of the church of Alexandria, were their slaves or servants; but the Abyssinians were free and independent, both in church and state, and a mortal hatred had followed the conquest from variety of causes, of which the persecution of the Christians in Egypt was not one of the least. As it was probable that these reasons would increase daily, the consequence which promised inevitably to follow was, that the Abyssinians would not apply to Alexandria, or Cairo, for a metropolitan sent by the Mahometans, but would choose a head of their own, and so become independent altogether of the chair of St Mark. As they were cut off from the rest of the world by seas and deserts almost inaccessible, as they wanted books, and were every day relaxing in discipline, total ignorance was likely to follow their separation from their primitive church, and this could not end but in a relapse into Paganism, or in their embracing the religion of Mahomet.

prohibition of making any of their countrymen Abuna, secured them always a foreigner, and a man of foreign education and attachments, to fill the place of Abuna, and by this means assured the dependence of the Abyssinians upon the patriarch of Alexandria. This is what I judge probable, for I have already invincibly shewn, that it is impossible this canon could be one of the first general Council; and its being in Arabic, and conceived in very barbarous terms, sufficiently evinces that it was forged at this period.