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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 58

Question. 58 - OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is justice?

(2) Whether justice is always towards another?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?

(5) Whether it is a general virtue?

(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue?

(7) Whether there is a particular justice?

(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?

(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?

(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?

(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

Art. 1 - Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?
Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.

Objection 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.

Objection 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."

Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his right.

I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A[2]). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others."

Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.

Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice."

Reply to Objection 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not."

Reply to Objection 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.

Reply to Objection 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, "constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

Reply to Objection 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.

Reply to Objection 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.

Art. 2 - Whether justice is always towards one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive appetite is subject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.

Objection 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

Objection 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]; FS, Q[113], A[1]) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. FP, Q[29], A[2]] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

Reply to Objection 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above (FS, Q[113], A[1]) where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.

Reply to Objection 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.

Art. 3 - Whether justice is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Lk. 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice

I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

Reply to Objection 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life."

Reply to Objection 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."

Reply to Objection 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.

Art. 4 - Whether justice is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.

Objection 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

Objection 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."

I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the FP, Q[81], A[2]. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.

Reply to Objection 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.

Reply to Objection 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are "rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.

Art. 5 - Whether justice is a general virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.

Objection 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A[2] ). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."

I answer that, Justice, as stated above (A[2]) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (AA[7],12).

Reply to Objection 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.

Reply to Objection 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."

Art. 6 - Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.

Objection 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A[5]), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.

Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.

Art. 7 - Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.

Objection 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA[5],6). Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.

Objection 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.

On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

Reply to Objection 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.

Reply to Objection 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."

Reply to Objection 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.

Art. 8 - Whether particular justice has a special matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.

Objection 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.

Reply to Objection 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another."

Reply to Objection 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.

Art. 9 - Whether justice is about the passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [*FS, Q[23], A[4]; FS, Q[31], A[1]; FS, Q[35], A[1]] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.

Objection 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

Objection 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.

I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (FS, Q[22], A[3]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i, 8).

Reply to Objection 2: External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).

Art. 10 - Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.

Objection 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that it is the real mean.

I answer that, As stated above (A[9]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply to Objection 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.

Reply to Objection 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.

Art. 11 - Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."

I answer that, As stated above (AA[8],10), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

Reply to Objection 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further on (Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.

Art. 12 - Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

Reply to Objection 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

Reply to Objection 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/91

 PUBLIC LAW 95-235—FEB. 21, 1978

92 STAT. 37

Public Law 95-235 95th Congress An Act To authorize the Mayor of the District of Columbia to enter into an agreement with the United States Postal Service with respect to the use of certain public air space in the District of Columbia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Mayor of the District of Columbia may enter into an agreement with the United States Postal Service to enable the United States Postal Service to construct a conveyor bridge over First Street Northeast between Union Station Terminal and the City Post Office located at North Capitol Street and Massachusetts Avenue Northeast. Any such agreement shall provide that such construction, and the use of such bridge, shall not be inconsistent with the use, operation, and naaintenance of any street or alley and shall not deprive any real property not owned by the United States and administered by the United States Postal Service of easements of light, air, and access. Approved February 21, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-611 (Comm. on the District of Columbia). SENATE REPORT No. 95-622 (Comm. on Governmental Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): Sept. 26, considered and passed House. Vol. 124 (1978): Feb. 6, considered and passed Senate.

Feb. 2 1. 1978 [H.R. 7766]

D.C. U.S. Postal Service. Public air space use agreement.

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Author:Ambrosius Arnold Willem Hubrecht

Works

 * The Descent of the Primates (1897, lectures)
 * (in part)

title: Author:Ambrosius Arnold Willem Hubrecht


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/92

 9 2 STAT. 38

PUBLIC LAW 95-236—FEB. 21, 1978

Public Law 95-236 95th Congress An Act Feb. 21, 1978 [S. 266]

Radiation exposure. Remedial action.

To authorize appropriations for financial assistance to limit radiation exposure to the public from uranium mill tailings used for construction, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives United States of America in Congress assembled,

of the

APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION

SECTION 1. I n addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated and appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated, for the fiscal year 1979, $1,500,000 to carry out the provisions of title II of the Act of June 16, 1972 (Public Law 92-314; 86 Stat, 226). AMENDMENTS TO PROGRAM PROVIDING REMEDIAL ACTION REGARDING U R A N I U M M I L L TAILINGS

Federal-State cooperation.

Waiver.

Report to congressional committees.

SEC. 2. (a) Section 202 of the Act of June 16, 1972, is amended— (1) in subsection (b), by striking out "four years" and inserting in lieu thereof "eight year s "; and (2) by striking out " and " at the end of subsection (f), by striking out the colon at the end of subsection (g) and inserting a semicolon in lieu thereof, and by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsections: " (h) that, notwithstanding any requirement under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, payment for any remedial action commenced before the date of the enactment of this subsection may be made by the State to the property owner of record at the time such action was undertaken, but only if application therefor is filed by such owner with the State of Colorado within one year after such date of enactment and if the Secretary determines that such remedial action was undertaken in accordance with otherwise applicable provisions of this title and regulations thereunder; and " (i) that the provision of subsection (c) of this section requiring any remedial action undertaken under this title be performed by the State of Colorado or its authorized contractor may be waived in writing by the State, with the approval of the Secretary, but only if application therefor is filed with the State by the property owner of record requesting such waiver and such waiver is granted before the commencement of such remedial action:". (b) Title II of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section: " SEC. 205. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Energy shall p r e p a r e and submit a detailed report to the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and on the Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and N a t u r a l Resources of the Senate with respect to actions taken or to be taken under this title, including data on payments made to the State and owners of record and a time table of those actions yet to be taken.".

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/93

 PUBLIC LAW 95-236—FEB. 21, 1978 (c) Section 202 of such Act is further amended— (1) by striking out "Atomic Energy Commission" each place it appears and inserting "Secretary of Energy" in lieu thereof; (2) by striking out "Commission" each place it appears and inserting "Secretary" in lieu thereof; and (3) by striking out "the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy" each place it appears and inserting "both Houses of Congress" in lieu thereof. (d) Section 203 of such Act is amended— (1) by striking out "Atomic Energy Commission" and inserting "Secretary of Energy" in lieu thereof; and (2) by striking out "as it deems necessary" and inserting "as he deems necessary" in lieu thereof. (e) Authority to make payments under title II of such Act under amendments made by this Act shall be available only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts. Approved February 21, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 95-649, pt. 1 (Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) and No. 95-649, pt. 2 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 95-72 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): Apr. 4, considered and passed Senate. Vol. 124 (1978): Jan. 24, considered and passed House, amended. Feb. 7, Senate concurred in House amendments.

92 STAT. 39 86 Stat. 226.

86 Stat. 226.

Payment authority,

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/94

 92 STAT. 40

PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978

Public Law 95-237 95th Congress An Act Feb. 24, 1978 [H.R. 3454] Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978. 16 USC 1132 note. 16 USC 1132 note.

16 USC 1131.

To designate certain endangered public lands for preservation as wilderness, ,...,,; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978". STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND POLICY

1. (a) The Congress finds that— (1) many areas of undeveloped national forest land possess and exhibit outstanding natural characteristics giving them high value as wilderness and will, if properly preserved, contribute as an enduring resource of wilderness for the benefit of the American people; (2) certain of these undeveloped national forest lands meet all statutory criteria for suitability as wilderness as established by subsection 2(c) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890), but are not adequately protected and lack statutory designation pursuant to the Wilderness Act as units of the National Wilderness Preservation System; (3) these and other undeveloped national forest lands exhibiting wilderness values are immediately threatened by pressures of a growing and more mobile population, large-scale industrial and economic growth, and development and uses inconsistent with the protection, maintenance, restoration, and enhancement of their wilderness character; and (4) among such immediately threatened areas are lands not being adequately protected or fully studied for wilderness suitability by the agency responsible for their administration. (b) Therefore, the Congress finds and declares that it is in the national interest that certain of these endangered areas be promptly designated as wilderness within the National Wilderness Preservation System, in order to preserve such areas as an enduring resource of wilderness which shall be managed to promote and perpetuate the wilderness character of the land and its specific multiple values for watershed preservation, wildlife habitat protection, scenic and historic preservation, scientific research and educational use, primitive recreation, solitude, physical and mental challenge, and inspiration for the benefit of all of the American people of present and future generations. SECTION

DESIGNATION OF WILDERNESS AREAS

16 USC 1132 note. 16 USC 1131 note.

SEC. 2. In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act, the following lands (hereinafter referred to as "wilderness areas"), as generally depicted on maps appropriately referenced, dated January 1978, are hereby designated as wilderness and, therefore, as components of the National Wilderness Preservation System— Pusch Ridge (a) certain lands in the Coronado National Forest, Arizona, Wilderness, Ariz. which comprise about fifty-six thousand four hundred and thirty

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/95

 PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978

92 STAT. 41

acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Pusch Kidge Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Pusch Ridge Wilderness; (b) certain lands in the Inyo and Sequoia National Forests, Golden Trout California, which comprise about three hundred and six thousand Wilderness, acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Golden Trout Calif. Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Golden Trout Wilderness; (c) certain lands in and adjacent to the Los Padres National Santa Lucia Forest, California, which comprise about twenty-one thousand Wilderness, two hundred and fifty acres, are generally depicted on a map Calif. entitled "Santa Lucia Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Santa Lucia Wilderness: Provided, That the tract Notice. identified on said map as "Wilderness Reserve" is designated as Publication in wilderness, subject only to the removal of the existing and tempo- Federal Register. rary nonconforming improvement, at which time the Secretary of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is directed to publish notice thereof in the Federal Register. Pending such notice, and subject only to the maintenance of the existing nonconforming improvement, said tract shall be managed as wilderness in accordance with section 5 of this Act. In order to 16 USC 1134. guarantee the continued viability of the Santa Lucia watershed and to insure the continued health and safety of the communities serviced by such watershed, the management plan for the Santa Lucia area to be prepared following designation as wilderness shall authorize the Forest Service to take whatever appropriate actions are necessary for fire prevention and watershed protection including, but not limited to, acceptable fire presuppression and fire suppression measures and techniques. Any special provisions contained in the management plan for the Santa Lucia AVilderness area shall be incorporated in the planning for the Los Padres National Forest: Provided, That the Forest Service is authorized to continue fire presuppression, fire suppression measures and techniques, and watershed maintenance pending completion of the management plan for the Santa Lucia area; (d) certain lands in the Los Padres National Forest, California, Ventana which comprise about sixty-one thousand acres, are generally Wilderness, depicted on a map entitled "Ventana Wilderness Additions—Pro"- Calif. posed", and which are hereby incorporated in, and shall be deemed to be a part of, the Ventana Wilderness as designated by Public Law 91-58. In order to guarantee the continued viability of the 16 USC 1132 Ventana watershed and to insure the continued health and safety note. of the communities serviced by such watershed, the management plan for the Ventana area to be prepared following designation as wilderness shall authorize the Forest Service to take whatever appropriate actions are necessary for fire prevention and watershed protection including, but not limited to, acceptable fire presuppression and fire suppression measures and techniques. Any special provisions contained in the management plan for the Ventana Wilderness area shall be incorporated in the planning for the Los Padres National Forest; (e) certain lands in the White River National Forest, Colorado, Hunterwhich comprise approximately seventy-four thousand four hun- Fryingpan dred and fifty acres, are generally depicted as area "A" on a map Wilderness, Colo. entitled "Hunter-Fryingpan Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Hunter-Fryingpan Wilderness. The area Spruce Creek commonly known as the "Spruce Creek Addition", depicted as Addition. area " B " on said map and comprising approximately eight thou-

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/96

 92 STAT. 42 16 USC 1132. Review. Report to President. Recommendation, submittal to Congress.

43 USC 616. 43 USC 600f.

Manzano Mountain Wilderness, N. Mex. Sandia Mountain Wilderness, N. Mex.

ehama River eanyon Wilderness, N. Mex. Lone Peak Wilderness, Utah.

Savage Run Wilderness, Wyo.

PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978 sand acres, shall, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3(d) of the Wilderness Act, be reviewed by the Secretary as to its suitability or nonsuitability for preservation as wilderness. The Secretary shall complete his review and report his findings to the President and the President shall submit to the United States Senate and the House of Representatives his recommendation with respect to the designation of the Spruce Creek area as wilderness not later than two years from the date of enactment of this Act. Subject to valid existing rights, the wilderness study area designated by this subsection shall, until Congress determines otherwise, be administered by the Secretary so as to maintain presently existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion m the National Wilderness Preservation System. No right, or claim of right, to the diversion and use of the waters of Hunter Creek, the Fryingpan or Roaring Fork Rivers, or any tributaries of said creeks or rivers, by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Public Law 87-690, Eighty-seventh Congress, and the reauthorization thereof by Public Law 93-493, Ninety-third Congress, under the laws of the State of Colorado, shall be prejudiced, expanded, diminished, altered, or affected by this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to expand, abate, impair, impede, or interfere with the construction, maintenance, or repair of said FryingpanArkansas Project facilities, nor the operation thereof, pursuant to the Operating Principles, House Document Numbered 130, Eighty-seventh Congress, and pursuant to the water laws of the State of Colorado; (f) certain lands in the Cibola National Forest, New Mexico, which comprise about thirty-seven thousand acreSj are generally depicted on a map entitled "Manzano Mountain Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Manzano Mountain Wilderness; (g) certain lands in Cibola National Forest, New Mexico, which comprise about thirty thousand nine hundred and thirty acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Sandia Mountain Wilderness Area (North and South Units)—Proposed", and shall be known as the Sandia Mountain Wilderness; (h) certain lands in the Santa Fe and Carson National Forests, New Mexico, which comprise approximately fifty thousand three hundred acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Chama iRiver Canyon Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Chama River Canyon Wilderness; (i) certain lands in Wasatch and Unita National Forests, Utah, which comprise about twenty-nine thousand five hundred and sixty-seven acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Lone Peak Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Lone Peak Wilderness: Provided, That the Forest Service is directed to utilize whatever sanitary facilities are necessary (including but not limited to vault toilets, which may require service by helicopter) to insure the continued health and safety of the communities serviced by the Lone Peak watershed; furthermore, nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit motorized access and road maintenance by local municipalities for those minimum maintenance activities necessary to guarantee the continued viability of whatsoever watershed facilities currently exist, or which may be necessary in the future to prevent the degradation of the water supply in the Lone Peak area; (j) certain lands in the Medicine Bow National Forest, Wyoming, which comprise about fourteen thousand nine hundred and

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 59

Question. 59 - OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?

Art. 1 - Whether injustice is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

'On the contrary,' Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

'I answer that,' Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice (Q[58], AA[5],6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.

Reply to Objection 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above (Q[58], A[9], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice.

Art. 2 - Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

'On the contrary,' The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust."

'I answer that,' Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice.

Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.

Art. 3 - Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A[2]). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.

Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.

Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.

'On the contrary,' To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

'I answer that,' Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).

Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another's action.

Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."

Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A[2]). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

Art. 4 - Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.

'On the contrary,' Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q[64], seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

'I answer that,' As stated above (FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A[2])

Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.

Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/97

 PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978 forty acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Savage Eun Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Savage Run Wilderness; and (k) certain lands in Lolo National Forest, Montana, which comprise approximately twenty-eight thousand four hundred and forty acres are generally depicted on a map entitled "Welcome Creek Wilderness Area—Proposed", and shall be known as the Welcome Creek "VMlderness.

92 STAT. 43

Welcome Creek Wilderness, Mont.

OREGON OMNIBUS WILDERNESS ACT OF 1978

SEC. 3. In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act, the following lands (hereinafter referred to as "wilderness areas") as generally depicted on maps appropriately referenced, dated January 1978, are hereby designated as wilderness and, therefore, as components of the National Wilderness Preservation System— (a) certain lands in the Siskiyou National Forest, Oregon, which comprise about ninety-two thousand acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Kalmiopsis Wilderness Additions— Proposed", and which are hereby incorporated in and shall be deemed to be a part of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness as designated by Public Law 88-577; (b) certain lands in the Siskiyou National Forest, Oregon, which comprise about thirty-six thousand seven hundred acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Wild Rogue Wilderness—Proposed", and shall be known as the Wild Rogue Wilderness: Provided, That the portion of the segment of the Rogue River designated as a component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System by section 3(a)(5) of the Wild and Scenic River Act (82 Stat. 906, as amended) which lies within the Wild ^ogue Wilderness shall be managed as a wild river notwithstanding section 10(b) of that Act or any provisions of the Wilderness Act to the contrary; (c) certain lands in the Umatilla National Forest, Oregon and Washington, which comprise about one hundred and eighty thousand acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "WenahaTucannon Wilderness—Proposed", and shall be known as the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness; (d) certain lands in the Mount Hood National Forest, Oregon, which comprise about thirty-three thousand acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "Mount Hood (Zig Zag) Proposed Wilderness Additions", and which are hereby incorporated in, and shall be deemed to be a part of the Mount Hood Wilderness as designated by Public Law 88-577; and (e) certain lands in the Willamette National Forest, Oregon, which comprise about forty-five thousand four hundred acres, are generally depicted on a map entitled "French Pete Creek and Other Proposed Additions, Three Sisters Wilderness", and which are hereby incorporated in, and shall be deemed to be a part of, the Three Sisters Wilderness as designated by Public Law 88-577.

16 USC 1132 note.

16 USC 1131 note. Kalmiopsis Wilderness, Oreg.

16 USC 1131 note. Wild Rogue Wilderness, Oreg.

16 USC 1274. 16 USC 1281. WenahaTucannon Wilderness, Oreg. Mount Hood Wilderness, Oreg.

Three Sisters Wilderness, Oreg.

16 USC 1131 note.

GOSPEL-HUMP AREA

SEC. 4. (a)(1) In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act, 16 USC 1132 certain lands in the Nezperce National Forest, Idaho, which comprise note. about two hundred and six thousand acres, as generally depicted under the category "Wilderness" on a map entitled "Gospel-Hump Planning Unit" and dated January 1978, are hereby designated as wilderness

39-194 O—80—pt. 1

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/98

 92 STAT. 44

Advisory Committee. Establishment.

Members.

IK' ' J

Travel expenses.

Termination. Fish and game research program.

Grants.

PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978 and therefore, as components of the National Wilderness Preservation System. (2) Certain other contiguous roadless lands which comprise about ninety-two thousand acres, as generally depicted on said map as "Management Areas" shall be managed in accordance with the multipurpose resource development plan required by this section. (3) Certain other contiguous roadless lands which comprise about forty-five thousand acres, as generally depicted on said map as "Development Areas" shall be immediately available for resource utilization under the existing applicable Forest Service land management plans. (b)(1) Within ninety days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall appoint a seven-member Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") on the management of the GospelHump Area who shall advise the Secretary as to the progress of the fish and game research program, and the multipurpose resource development plan required by this section, and who shall evaluate the results of the research program and development plan on an ongoing basis. (2) The Committee shall be comprised of two members of the timber industry who purchase timber from the Nezperce National Forest, two members from organizations who are actively engaged in seeking the preservation of wilderness lands, and three members from the general public who otherwise have a significant interest in the resources and management of the Gospel-Hump Area. (3) Committee members shall serve without pay except that while away from their homes or regular places of business in performance of services for the Committee, members of the Committee shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed under section 5703(b) of title 5 of the United States Code. (4) The Secretary shall provide that the Committee shall meet as soon as practicable after all the members are appointed, but in no case later than one hundred and fifty days after the enactment of this Act. Subsequently, the Committee shall meet every one hundred and eighty days, or as often as the Secretary deems necessary. (5) The Committee shall terminate one hundred and fifty days after transmittal of the completed multipurpose resource development plan required under this section. (c)(1) The Secretary shall cooperate with agencies and institutions of the State of Idaho, and with the Secretary of the Interior, in conducting a comprehensive fish and game research program within the Gospel-Hump Area and surrounding Federal lands in north-central Idaho. The Secretary shall assure that this research program includes detailed investigations concerning resident and anadromous fisheries resources (including water quality relationships) and the status, distribution, movements, and management of game populations, in order to provide findings and recommendations concerning integration of land management and development with the protection and enhancement of these fish and game resources. (2) To carry out the comprehensive fish and game research program, the Secretary is authorized to make grants of funds to agencies and institutions of the State of Idaho and to provide the assistance of personnel from agencies under his jurisdiction. (3) The Secretary shall assure that the comprehensive fish and ^ame research program is scheduled and progressing on a timely basis so that findings and recommendations are fully integrated in preparation of the multipurpose resource development plan required by this section.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/99

 PUBLIC LAW 9 5 - 2 3 7 — F E B. 24, 1978 (d)(1) W i t h i n four years after enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall implement a multipurpose resource development plan for development of the Federal lands identified on the m a p referenced in this section as "Management Areas". (2) The multipurpose resource development plan shall comply with the provisions of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (74 Stat. 215; 16 U.S.C. 528) and the Forest and Rangeland Eenewable Resources P l a n n i n g Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 476; 16 U.S.C. 1601) as amended, and shall conform in all respects to the provisions of the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (90 Stat. 2949; 16 U.S.C. 1600), including the regulations, guidelines, and standards promulgated pursuant to those Acts. I n p r e p a r i n g the multipurpose resource development plan, the Secretary shall take particular care to gather and integrate detailed field data on soil types and soil hazards, and to consider timber volumes, timber site classes, and productivity. The current findings and recommendations of the comprehensive fish and game research program and other available information shall be integrated into the preparation of the multipurpose resource development plan. The multipurpose resource development plan may be periodically revised to accommodate new information as it becomes available. (3) I n p r e p a r i n g the multipurpose resource development plan, the Secretary shall assure adequate public involvement, and he shall make full use of the recommendations of the Committee established by this section. (4) One year after the date of enactment of this Act and every year thereafter, the Secretary shall review the multipurpose resource development plan being prepared in accordance with this section to determine which lands, if any, might be scheduled for development prior to the completion of the final multipurpose resource development plan. (5) The Secretary shall publish a notice of the completion of the multipurpose resource development plan or a portion thereof in the Federal Register and shall transmit it to the President and to the Senate and House of Representatives. The completed multipurpose resource development plan or relevant portions thereof shall be implemented by the Secretary no earlier than ninety days and no later than one h u n d r e d and fifty calendar days from the date of such transmittal. (e) The Secretary shall prepare a wilderness management plan for the Gospel-Hump Wilderness designated pursuant to this section, taking into account the findings of the comprehensive fish and game research program. (f) W i t h i n t h i r t y days suiter the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall include the timber resources on the lands identified on the m a p referenced in this section as "Development A r e a s " and "Management A r e a s " within the annual allowable timber harvest level for the Nezperce National Forest. (g) Nothing in this Act shall prevent within the Gospel-Hump Wilderness A r e a any activity, including prospecting, for the purpose of gathering information about mineral or other resources, if such activity is carried on in a manner compatible with the preservation of the Avilderness environment. F u r the r more, in accordance with such program as the Secretary of the Interior shall develop and conduct in consultation with the Secretary, the Gospel-Hump Wilderness Area shall be surveyed on a planned recurring basis consistent with the concept of wilderness preservation by the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines to determine the mineral values, if any, that may be present, and the results of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President and the Congress.

92 STAT. 45 Multipurpose resource development plan.

Completion notice. Publication in Federal Register. Transmittal to President and Congress. Wilderness management plan.

Mineral value survey, availability to public. Submittal to President and Congress.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/100

 92 STAT. 46 Appropriation authorization.

31 USC 1301 note.

PUBLIC LAW 95-237—FEB. 24, 1978 (h) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated after October 1, 1978, such funds as may be necessary to carry out the comprehensive fish and game research program and the multipurpose resource development plan authorized under this section. Appropriations requests by the President to implement the multipurpose resource development plan shall express in qualitative and quantitative terms the most rapid and judicious manner and methods to achieve the purposes of this Act. Amounts appropriated to carry out this Act shall be expended in accordance with the Budget Eeform and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 297). ADMINISTRATION OF WILDERNESS AREAS

16 USC 1131 note. Effective date.

16 USC 1133.

SEC. 5. Subject to valid existing rights, each wilderness area designated by this Act shall be administered by the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act: Provided, That any reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act: Provided further, That with respect to the Gospel-Hump Wilderness Area designated by section 4(a)(1) of this Act, all references under section 4(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act of 1964 to December 31, 1983, shall be deemed to be December 31, 1988, and any reference to January 1, 1984, shall be deemed to be January 1, 1989: Provided, however, That all activities resulting from the exercise of valid existing mineral rights on patented or unpatented mining claims within the GospelHump Wilderness Area shall be subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary as he deems necessary or desirable for the preservation and management of this area. F I L I N G OF MAPS AND DESCRIPTIONS

SEC. 6. As soon as practicable after enactment of this Act, a map and a legal description of each wilderness area shall be filed with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United States Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives, and each such map and description shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act: Provided, That correction of clerical and typographical errors in each such legal description and map may be made. Each such map and legal description shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service, Department of Agriculture. Approved February 24, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 95-540 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs) and No. 95-861 (Coram, of eonference). SENATE REPORTS: No. 95-490 (Coram, on Energy and Natural Resources), and No. 95-626 (Coram, of Conference). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): Sept. 12, considered and passed House. Oct. 20, considered and passed Senate, amended. Vol. 124 (1978): Feb. 8, Senate agreed to conference report. Feb. 9, House agreed to conference report. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: Vol. 14, No. 8 (1978): Feb. 24, Presidential statement.

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Page:Hockey, Canada's Royal Winter Game.djvu/20

 Shinny, so called, perhaps, on account of the frequent danger to which a player's shins were exposed, was a grand exhilirating sport. It had a hold upon us that the chilly atmosphere, or "the love we bore for learning," could not unfasten. Boys swarmed to the lakes in batallions and rattled along on old iron or wooden skates tied to their feet with rope. A few broken bones, a few frozen fingers, but, never mind, there were plenty of men to replace the dead. What a sight did a shinny match present! Hundreds on the same sheet of glare black ice, all eagerly engaged in one glorious game. What laughing, calling, cheering and chasing, there was to be sure! With their bright eyes and rosy cheeks they dart now in one direction, now in another till the great congealed bay roars and cracks with its living weight. The ball is in all directions in seconds of time, till finally the vast struggling crowd surges towards the goals, surrounds them, and a fierce lucky swipe knocks it through, while a hundred lusty voices cry their loudest Game! Game!!

Like the fabled Greek who used to give his time so undividedly to his work that he forgot his meals, these enthusiasts of an infant game forgot their meals, forgot their schools, forgot everything, save the game itself, but when darkness came on and their shadows grew longer, they returned home, with fresh


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/101

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 47

Public Law 95-238 95th Congress An Act To authorize appropriations to the Department of Energy, for energy research, development, and demonstration, and related programs in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, section 305 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 16 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Department of Energy Act of 1978—Civilian Applications". ' SEC. 2. In accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2017), section 305 of the Energy Eeorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5875), section 16 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5915), there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy, for energy research, development, and demonstration, and related activities, the sum of $6,081,445,000.

feb. 25, 1978 [S. 1340]

Department of Energy Act of 1978—Civihan Apphcations.

TITLE I—ENERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES OPERATING

EXPENSES

SEC. 101. For "Operating expenses", for the following programs, a sum of dollars equal to the total of the following amounts: Fossil Energy Development Fossil energy (1) C o a l:

development.

(A) Coal liquefaction, $107,000,000. (B) High Btu gasification (coal), $51,200,000. (C J Low Btu gasification (coal), $73,900,000. (D) Advanced power systems, $25,500,000. (E) Direct combustion (coal), $65,200,000. (F) Advanced research and supporting technology, $50,000,000: Provided, That of those funds authorized, funds as may be necessary are hereby authorized for the following purpose: The Secre- Study, tary of Energy shall conduct a feasibility study of the technology and the commercial applications of the process of fine grinding of coal and dry vegetable residues for the purpose of preparing these substances as clean burning fuels. (G) Demonstration plants and major test facilities (coal), $60,900,000. (H) Magnetohydrodynamics, $70,800,000: Provided, That at least 5 percent of the amount appropriated for magnetohydrodynamics shall be expended for closed cycle technology. (2) Petroleum and natural gas: (A) Enhanced oil recovery, $46,100,000. (B) Enhanced gas recovery, $30,000,000. (C) Drilling, exploration and offshore technology, $7,600,000. (D) Processing and utilization, $1,400,000. (3) Oil shale and in situ technology: (A) Oil shale, $28,000,000. . (B) In situ coal gasification, $19,000,000.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/102

 92 STAT. 48 Solar energy development.

Geothermal energy development.

Conservation research and development.

Environment and safety research and development.

Nuclear research and development.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 Solar Energy Development " (4) Thermal applications, $104,700,000, including $94,400,000 for heating and cooling of buildings. (5) Fuels from biomass, $20,500,000; and under such rules and regulations as he may establish, the Department of Energy is authorized to guarantee a loan or loans for the demonstration of a 50 MW wood-fueled power generating facility. (6) Other Solar Energy Programs, $219,700,000, including $7,000,000 for a parallel design of a 1500 kilowatt wind energy conversion system and the production of two test units, and $203,700,000 for other solar electric applications: Provided, That $7,500,000 of such sum is hereby authorized for design work for small community applications. Geothermal Energy Development (7) Engineering research and development, $15,500,000. (8) Resource exploration and assessment, $17,600,000. (9) Hydrothermal technology applications, $28,000,000. (10) Advanced technology applications, $24,300,000. (11) Utilization experiments, $16,000,000. (12) Environmental control and institutional studies, $8,100,000. (13) Low head hydroelectric program, $15,000,000. Conservation Research and Development (14) Electric energy systems and energy storage: '. > *; (A) Electric energy systems, $36,800,000. (B) Energy storage systems, $48,500,000. (15) End use conservation and technologies to improve efficiency: (A) Industrial energy conservation, $38,000,000. (B) Buildings and community systems, $59,500,000: Provided, That $2,000,000 of such sum are hereby authorized for a research and development program in residential gas and oil furnaces. (C) Transportation energy conservation, $87,000,000, of which $1,000,000 shall be available to the Alternative Fuels Utilization Program for study of automotive utilization of alcohol fuels and blends: Provided, That of those funds authorized for the Alternative Fuels Utilization Program, funds as may be necessary are hereby authorized for the Department of Energy to conduct studies to determine the feasibility of utilizing existing distillery facilities or other types of refineries including but not limited to sugar refineries, in the implementation of programs to extend the supply of gasoline by means of a mixture of gasoline and alcohol. (D) Improved conversion efficiency, $69,700,000. (16) Energy extension service, $8,000,000. •: (17) Small grants for appropriate technology, $8,000,000. Environment and Safety Research and Development (18) Environmental and Safety Research and Development: (A) Overview and Assessmient, $50,010,000. (B) Environmental Research, $143,970,000. (C) Life Sciences Research, $38,113,000. (D) Decontamination and Decommissioning, $19,000,000. Nuclear Research and Development (19) Magnetic fusion, $207,900,000. (20) Fuel cycle research and development, $363,885,000, including $20,000,000 for international spent fuel disposition, pursuant to section 107 and including $13,000,000 for research, development, assessment, evaluation, and other activities at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels

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