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PUBLIC LAW 93-29-!VIAY 3, 1973 ^

[87 STAT.

Jess than that State received for the fiscal year endintr June 30, 1973. For the purpose of the exception contained in clause (A) of this paragraph only, the term 'State' does not include Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. "(3) The number of persons aged sixty or over in any State and in all States shall be determined by the Commissioner on the basis of the most recent and satisfactory data available to him. allotted to a State for a fiscal year under this section will not be used by such State for carrying out the purpose for which the allotment was made, he shall make such amount available for carrying out such purpose to one or more other States to the extent he determines such other States will be able to use such additional amount for carrying out such purpose. Any amount made available to a State from an appropriation for a fiscal year pursuant to the preceding sentence shall, for purposes of this title, be regarded as part of such State's allotment (as determined under the preceding provisions of this section) for such year. " (d) The allotment of a State under this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, shall remain available until the close of the following fiscal year. "(e) From a State's allotment under this section for a fiscal year— "(1) such amount as the State agency determines, but not more than 15 per centum thereof, shall be available for paying such percentage as such agency determines, but not more than 75 per centum, of the cost of administration of area plans; and "(2) such amount as the State agency determines, but (beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975) not more than 20 per centum thereof, shall be available for paying such percentage as such agency determines, but not more than 75 per centum, of the cost of social services which are not provided as a part of a comprehensive and coordinated system in planning and service areas for which there is an area plan approved by the State agency. The remainder of such allotment shall be available to such State only for paying such percentage as the State agency determines, but not more than 90 per centum of the cost of social services provided in the State as a part of comprehensive and coordinated systems in planning and service areas for which there is an area plan approved by the State agency. "ORGANIZATION
 * '(c) Whenever the Commissioner determines that any amount

"State Organization "SEC. 304. (a) In order for a State to be eligible to participate in the programs of grants to States from allotments under section 303 and section 306— "(1) the State shall, in accordance with regulations of the Commissioner, designate a State agency as the sole State agency (hereinafter in this title referred to as 'the State agency') to: (A) develop the State plan to be submitted to the Commissioner for approval under section 305, (B) administer the State plan within such State, (C) be primarily responsible for the coordination of all State activities related to the purposes of this Act, (D) review and comment on, at the request of any Federal department or agency, any application from any agency or organization within such State to such Federal department or agency for assistance related to meeting the needs of older persons; and (E) divide

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the entire State into distinct areas (hereinafter in this title referred to as 'planning and service areas'), in accordance with regulations of the Commissioner, after considering the geographical distribution of individuals aged sixty and older in the State, the incidence of the need for social services (including the numbers of older persons with low incomes residing in such areas), the distribution of resources available to provide such services, the boundaries of existing areas within the State which were drawn for the planning or administration of social services programs, the location of units of general purpose local government within the State, and any other relevant factors: Provided, That any unit of general purpose local government which has a population aged sixty or over of fifty thousand or more or which contains 15 per centum or more of the State's population aged sixty or over shall be designated as a planning and service area; except that the State may designate as a planning and service area, ni\y region within the State recognized for purposes of areawide planning which includes one or more such units of general purpose local government when the State determines that the designation of such a regional planning and service area is necessary for, and will enhance, the effective administration of the programs authorized by this title, the State may include in any planning and service area designated pursuant to this provision such additional areas adjacent to the unit of general purpose local government or region so designated as the State determines to be necessary for, and will enhance, the effective administration of the programs authorized by this title, and "(2) the State agency designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall— " (A) determine for which planning and service areas an area plan will be developed, in accordance with subsection (c) of this section, and for each such area designate, after consideration of the views offered by the unit or units of general purpose local government in such area, a public or nonprofit private agency or organization as the area agency on aging for such area; and " (B) provide assurances, satisfactory to the Commissioner that the State agency will take into account, in connection with matters of general policy arising in the development and administration of the State plan for any fiscal year, the views of recipients of social services provided under such plan. "Area Organization " (b) An area agency on aging designated under subsection (a) must be— "(1) an established office of aging which is operating within a planning and service area designated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or "(2) any office or agency of a unit of general purpose local government, which is designated for this purpose by the chief elected official or officials of such unit, or " (3) any office or agency designated by the chief elected official or officials of a combination of units of general purpose local government to act on behalf of such combination for this purpose, or "(4) any public or nonprofit private agency in a planning and service area which is under the supervision or direction for this purpose of the designated State agency and which can engage

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 128

Question. 128 - OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.

Art. 1 - Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q[117], A[5]). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.

Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Mat. 24:13): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.

Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[48]), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q[123], AA[3],6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; FS, Q[62], A[3]). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.

Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.

Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (FS, Q[40], A[2]) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, (FS, Q[40], A[4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"---i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q[123], A[1], ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.


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in the planning or provision of a broad range of social services within such planning and service area, and must provide assurance, found adequate by the State agency, that it will have the ability to develop an area plan and to carry out, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, a program pursuant to the plan within the planning and service area. In designating an area agency on aging, the State agency shall give preference to an established office on aging, unless the State agency finds that no such office within the planning and service area will have the capacity to carry out the area plan. "Area Plans "(c) I n order to be approved by the State agency, an area plan for a planning and service area shall be developed by the area agency on aging designated with respect to such area under subsection (a) and shall— "(1) provide for the establishment of a comprehensive and coordinated system for the delivery of social services within the planning and service area covered by the plan, including determining the need for social services in such area (taking into consideration, among other things, the numbers of older persons with low incomes residing in such area), evaluating the efleet!veness of the use of resources in meeting such need, and entering into agreements with providers of social services in such area, for the provision of such services to meet such need; "(2) in accordance with criteria established by the Commissioner by regulation relating to priorities, provide for the initiation, expansion, or improvement of social services in the planning and service area covered by the area jolan; "(3) provide for the establishment or maintenance of information and referral sources in sufficient numbers to assure that all older persons within the planning and service aiea covered by the plan will have reasonably convenient access to such sources. For purjioses of this section and section 305(a)(7), an information and referral source is a location where the State or other public or private agency or organization (A) maintains current information with respect to the opportunities and services available to older persons, and develops current lists of older persons in need of services and opportunities, and (B) employs a specially trained staff to inform older perSons of the opportunities and services which are available, and assists such persons to take advantage of such opportunities and services; and "(4) provide that the area agency on aging will— " (A) conduct periodic evaluations of activities carried out pursuant to the area plan; " (B) render appropriate technical assistance to providers of social services in the planning and service area covered by the area plan; " (C) where necessary and feasible, enter into arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the area plan, under which funds under this title may be used to provide legal services to older persons in the planning and service area carried out through federally assisted programs or other public or nonprofit agencies; " (D) take into account, in connection with matters of general policy arising in the development and administration of the area plan, the views of recij^ients of services under such plan;

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PUBLIC LAW 9?.-29-MAY 3, 1973

" (E) where possible, enter into arrangements with organizations providing day care services for children so as to provide opportunities for older persons to aid or assist, on a voluntary basis, in the delivery of such services to children; and " (F) establish an advisory council, consisting of representatives of the target population and the general public, to advise the area agency on all matters relating to the administration of the plan and operations conducted thereunder. "STATE PLANS

"SEC. 305. (a) I n order for a State to be eligible for grants for a fiscal year from its allotments under section 303 and section 306, except as provided in section 307(a), it shall submit to the Commissioner a State plan for such year which meets such criteria as the Commissioner may prescribe by regulation and which— "(1) provides that the State agency will evaluate the need for social services within the State and determine the extent to which existing public or private progiams meet such need; "(2) provides for the use of such methods of administration (including methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Commissioner shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure of office, or compensation of an individual employed in accordance wuth such methods) as are necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the plan; "(3) provides that the State agency will make such reports, in such form, and containing such information, as the Commissioner may from time to time require, and comply with such requirements as the Commissioner may impose to assure the correctness of such reports; "(4) provides that the State agency will conduct periodic evaluations of activities and projects carried out under the State plan; "(5) establishes objectives, consistent with the purposes of this title, toward which activities under the plan will be directed, identifies obstacles to the attainment of those objectives, and indicates how it proposes to overcome those obstacles; "(6) provides that each area agency on aging designated pursuant to section 3 0 4 (a)(2)(A) will develop and submit to the State agency for approval an area plan which complies with section 304(c); "(7) provides for establishing or maintaining information and referral sources in sufficient numbers to assure that all older persons in the State who are not furnished adequate information and referral sources under section 304(c)(3) will have reasonably convenient access to such sources; "(8) provides that no social service will be directly provided by the State agency or an area agency on aging, except where, in the judgment of the State agency, provision of such service by the State agency or an aiea agency on aging is necessary to assure an adequate supply of such service; and " (9) provides that subject to the requirements of merit employment systems of State and local governments, preference shall be given to persons aged sixty or over for any staff positions (full time or part time) in State and area agencies for which such persons qualify.

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Hearing.

^pp^^^-

72 Stat. 941; 80 Stat. 1323.

62 Stat. 928.

PUBLIC LAW 93-29-MAY 3, 1973

[87 STAT.

" (b) The Commissioner shall approve any State jjlan which he finds fulfills the requirements of subsection (a) of this section. "(|(.) Xhe Commissioner shall not make a final determination disapproving any State plan, or any modification thereof, or make a final determination that a State is ineligible under section 304, without first affording the State reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing. " (d) Whenever the Commissioner, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the State agency, finds that— "(1) the State is not eligible under section 304, "(2) the State plan has been so changed that it no longer complies with the provisions of subsection (a), or "(3) in the administration of the jDlan there is a failure to comply substantially with any such provision of subsection (a), the Commissioner shall notify such State agency that no further payments from its allotments under section 303 and section 306 will be made to the State (or, in his discretion, that further payments to the State will be limited to projects under or portions of the State plan not affected by such failure), until he is satisfied that there will no longer be any failure to comply, I'ntil he is so satisfied, no further payments shall be made to such State from its allotments under section 303 and section 306 (or payments shall be limited to projects under or portions of the State plan not affected by such failure). The Commissioner shall, in accordance with regulations he shall prescribe, disburse the funds so withheld directljy^ to any public or nonprofit private organization or agency or political subdivision of such State submitting an approved plan in accordance with the provisions of section 304 and section 306. Any such payment or payments shall be matched in the proportions specified in sections 303 and 306. "(e) A State which is dissatisfied with a final action of the Commissioner under subsection (b), (c), or (d) may appeal to the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the State is located, by filing a petition with such court within sixty days after such final action. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commissioner, or any officer designated by him for that purpose. The Commissioner thereupon shall file in the court the record of the proceedings on which he based his action, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the action of the Commissioner or to set it aside, in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently, but until the filing of the record, the Commissioner may modify or set aside his order. The findings of the Commissioner as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, but the court, for good cause shown, may remand the case to the Commissioner to take further evidence, and the Commissioner may thereupon make new or modified findings of fact and may modify his previous action, and shall file in the court the record of the further proceedings. Such new or modified findings of fact shall likewise be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the court affirming or setting aside, in whole or in part, any action of the Commissioner shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United States Code. The commencement of proceedings under this subsection shall not, unless so specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Commissioners' action.

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" P L A N N I N G, COORDINATION, EVALUATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF STATE PLANS

"SEC. 306. (a)(1) Amounts appropriated as authorized by section 303 may be used to make grants to States for paying such percentages as each State agency determines, but not more than 75 per centum, of the cost of the administration of its State plan, including the preparation of the State plan, the evaluation of activities carried out under such plan, the collection of data and the carrying out of analyses related to the need for social services within the State, the dissemination of information so obtained, the provision of short-term training to personnel of public or nonprofit private agencies and organizations engaged in the operation of programs authorized by this Act, and the carrying out of demonstration projects of statewide significance relating to the initiation, expansion, or improvement of social service. "(2) Any sums allotted to a State under this section for covering part of the cost of the administration of its State plan which the State determines is not needed for such purpose may be used by such State to supplement the amount available under section 303(e)(1) to cover part of the cost of the administration of area plans. "(3) Any State which has designated a single planning and service area pursuant to section 304(a)(1)(E) covering all, or substantially all, of the older persons in such State, as determined by the Commissioner, may elect to pay part of the costs of the administration of State and area plans either out of sums allotted under this section or out of sums made available for the administration of area plans pursuant to section 303(e)(1), but shall not pay such costs out of sums allotted under both such sections. " (b)(1) From the sums appropriated for any fiscal year under section 303 lor carrying out the purposes of this section, each State shall be allotted an amount which bears the same ratio to such sum as the population aged sixty or over in such State bears to the population aged sixty or over in all States, except that (A) no State shall be allotted less than one-ha:lf of 1 per centum of the sum appropriated for the fiscal year for which the determination is made, or $160,000, whichever is greater, and (B) Ouam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall each be allotted no less than one-fourth of 1 per centum of the sum appropriated for the fiscal year for which the determination is made, or $50,000, whichever is greater. For the purpose of the exception contained in clause (A) of this paragraph, the term 'State' does not include Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territorv of the Pacific Islands. "(2) The number of persons aged sixty or over in any State and in all States shall be determined by the Commissioner on the basis of the most recent satisfactory data available to him. "(c) The amounts of any State's allotment under subsection (b) for any fiscal year which the Commissioner determines will not be required for that year shall be reallotted, from time to time and on such dates during such year as the Commissioner may fix, to other States in proportion to the original allotments to such States under subsection (b) for that year, but with such proportionate amount for any of such other States being reduced to the extent it exceeds the sum the Commissioner estimates such State needs and will be able to use for such year; and the total of such reductions shall be similarly reallotted among the States whose proportionate amounts were not so reduced. Such reallotments shall be made on the basis of the State plan so approved, after taking into consideration the population aged

Allotment.

Reallotment.

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sixty or over. Any amount reallotted to a State under this subsection during a year shall be deemed pait of its allotment under subsection (b) for that year. " (d) The allotment of a State under this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, shall remain available until the close of the following fiscal year. "rATMEXTS

Matching funds.

"SEC. 307. (a) Payments of grants or contracts under this title may be made (after necessary adjustments on account of jjreviously made overpayments or underpayments) in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments, as the Commissioner may determine. From a State's allotment for a fiscal year which is available pursuant to section 306 the Commissioner may pay to a State which does not have a State plan approved under section 305 such amounts as he deems appropriate for the purpose of assisting such State in developing a State plan. From a State's allotment for a fiscal year which is available pursuant to section 303, the Commissioner may, during the period ending one year after the date of enactment of the Older Americans Comprehensive Services Amendments, pay, in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, to a State which does not have a State plan approved under section 305, such amounts as he deems appropriate for the purpose of continuing Federal financial assistance for activities assisted under the plan of such State approved under section 303 of this Act prior to enactment of the Older Americans (Comprehensive Services Amendments. " (b) Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1075, not less than 25 per centum of the non-Federal share (pursuant to section 303(e)) of the total expenditures under the State plan shall be met from funds from State or local public sources. "(c) A State's allotment under section 303 for a fiscal year shall be reduced by the percentage (if any) by which its expenditures for such year from State sources under its State plan approved under section 305 are less than its expenditures from such sources for the preceding fiscal year. "MODEL PROJECTS

Grants.

Housing.

Continuing education.

"SEC. 308. (a) The Commissioner may, after consultation with the State agency, make grants to any public or nonprofit private agency or organization or contracts with any agency or organization within such State for paying part or all of the cost of developing or operating statewide, regional, metropolitan area, county, city, or community model projects which will expand or improve social services or otherwise promote the well-being of older persons. In making grants and contracts under this section, the Commissioner shall give special consideration to projects designed to— '^ (1) assist in meeting the special housing needs of older persons by^ (A) providing financial assistance to such persons, who own their own homes, necessary to enable them to make the repairs and renovations to their homes which are necessary for them to meet minimum standards, (B) studying and demonstrating methods of adapting existing housing, or construction of new housing, to meet the needs of older persons suffering from physical disabilities, and (C) demonstrating alternative methods of relieving older persons of the burden of real property taxes on their homes; "(2) provide continuing education to older persons designed to enable them to lead more productive lives by broadening the educational, cultural, or social awareness of such older persons.

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emphasizing, where possible, free tuition arrangements with colleges and universities; "(3) provide preretirement education, information, and rele- Preretirement vant services (including the training of personnel to carry out such programs and the conducting of research with respect to the development and operation of such programs) to persons planning retirement; or "(4) provide services to assist in meeting the particular needs Physicaiiy or of the physically and mentally impaired olcler persons including per^'ons'! ""^^""^ special transportation and escort services, homemaker, home health and shopping services, reader services, letter writing services, and other services designed to assist such individuals in leading a more independent life. " (b) For the purpose of carrying out this section, there are author- Appropriation. ized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975." TITLE IV—TRAINING AND RESEARCH SEC. 401. The Older Americans Act of 1965 is amended by striking out titles IV and V and by inserting immediately after title III the sa^stauVn^.^' following new title: 42 USC 3031, 3041.

" TITLE IV — T R A I N I N G AND R E S E A R C H "PART A—TRAINING "STATEMENT or PURPOSE

"SEC. 401. The purpose of this part is to improve the quality of service and to help meet critical shortages of adequately trained personnel for programs in the field of aging by (1) developing information on the actual needs for personnel to work in the field of aging, both present and long range; (2) providing a broad range of quality training and retraining opportunities, responsive to changing needs of programs in the field of aging; (3) attracting a greater number of qualified persons into the field of aging; and (4) helping to make personnel training programs more responsive to the need for trained personnel in the field of aging. "APPRAISING PERSONNEL NEEDS IN THE FIELD OF AGING

"SEC. 402. (a) The Commissioner shall from time to time appraise the Nation's existing and future personnel needs in the field of aging, at all levels and in all types of programs, and the adequacy of the Nation's efforts to meet these needs. In developing information relat- . ^se^^^y cooperaing to personnel needs in the field of aging, the Commissioner shall consult with, and make maximum utilization of statistical and other related information of the Department of Labor, the Veterans' Administration, the Office of Education, Federal Council on the Aging, the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, State educational agencies, other State and local public agencies and offices dealing with problems of the aging, State employment security agencies, and other appropriate public and private agencies. " (b) The Commissioner shall prepare and publish annually as a Report. part of the annual report provided in section 208 a report on the pro- Ante, p. 35. fessions dealing with the problems of the aging, in which he shall present in detail his view on the state of such professions and the

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trends which lie discerns with respect to the future complexion of programs for the aging throughout the Xation and the funds and the needs for well-educated personnel to statf such programs. The report shall indicate the Commissioner's plans concerning the allocation of Federal assistance under this title in relation to the plans and programs of other Federal agencies. " A T T R ACT IX G QUALIF^IED I'KRSOXS TO THE F I E L D O F AGIXG

Grants. Ante, p. 38.

"SEC. 403. The Couimissioner may make grants to State agencies jvferrcd to in section 304, State or local educational agencies, institutions of higher education, or other public or nonprofit private agencies, organizations, or institutions, and he may enter into contracts with any agency, institution, or organization for the purpose of— " (1) publicizing available opportunities for careers in the field of aging: "(2) encouraging qualified persons to enter or reenter the field of aging; "(3) encouraging artists, craftsmen, artisans, scientists, and persons from other professions and vocations and homemakers, to undertake assignments on a part-time basis or for temporary jieriods in the field of aging; or "(4) preparing and disseminating materials, including audiovisual materials and printed materials, for use in recruitment and training of persons employed or preparing for employment in carrying out programs related to the purposes of this Act. ''TRAIX1X<J rHO(KAMS FOK T E R S O X X E L IX THE F I E L D OF AGING

Grant s.

"SEC. 404. (a) The Commissioner may make grants to any public or nonprofit prixate agency, organization, or institution or with State agencies referred to in section 304, or contracts with any agency, organization, or institution, to assist them in training persons who are employed or preparing for employment in fields related to the purposes of this Act— " (1) to assist in covering the cost of courses of training or study (including short-term or regular session institutes and other inservice and preservice training programs), " (2) for establishing and maintaining fellowships to train persons to be supervisors or trainers of persons employed or preparing for employment in fields related to the purposes of this Act, ''(3) for seminars, conferences, symposiums, and workshops in the field, of aging, including the conduct of conferences and other meetings for the purposes of facilitating exchange of information and stimulating new approaches with respect to activities related to the purposes of this Act, " (4) for the improvement of programs for preparing personnel for careers in the field of aging, including design, development, and evaluation of exemplary training programs, introduction of high quality and more effective curricula and curricula materials, and "(5) the provision of increased opportunities for f)ractical experience. " (b) The Commissioner may include in the terms of any contract or grant under this part provisions authorizing the payment, to persons participating in training programs supported under this part, of such stipends (including allowances for subsistence and other expenses for such persons and their dependents) as he determines to be consistent with prevailing practices under comparable federally supported pro-

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grams. Where the Commissioner provides for the use of funds under this section for fellowships, he shall (in addition to stipends for the recipients) pay to colleges or universities in which the fellowship is being pursued such amounts as the Commissioner shall determine to be consistent with prevailing practices under comparable federally supported programs. " P A R T B—RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS "DESCRIPTION or ACTIVITIES

"SEC. 411. The Commissioner may make grants to any public or Grams, nonprofit private agency, organization, or institution and contracts with any agency, organization, or institution or with any individual for the purpose of— "(1) studying current patterns and conditions of living of older persons and identifying factors which are beneficial or detrimental to the wholesome and meaningful living of such persons; "(2) developing or demonstrating new approaches, techniques, and methods (including the use of multipurpose centers) which hold promise of substantial contribution toward wholesome and meaningful living for older persons; "(3) developing or demonstrating approaches, methods, and techniques for achieving or improving coordination of community services for older persons; "(4) evaluating these approaches, techniques, and methods, as well as others which may assist older persons to enjoy wholesome and meaningful lives and to continue to contribute to the strength and welfare of our Nation; "(5) collecting and disseminating, through publications and other appropriate means, information concerning research findings, demonstration results, and other materials developed in connection with activities assisted under this part; or "(6) conducting conferences and other meetings for the purposes of facilitating exchange of information and stimulating new approaches with respect to activities related to the purposes of this part. "SPECIAL STUDY AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS OF OLDER AMERICANS

"SEC. 412. (a) The Commissioner shall, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, conduct a comprehensive study and survey of the transportation proiblems of older Americans with emphasis upon solutions that are practicable and can be implemented in a timely fashion. In conducting the study and survey, the Commissioner shall consider— "(1) the use of all community transportation facilities, particularly public transportation systems, the possible use of school buses, and excess Department of Defense vehicles; and " (2) the need for revised and improved procedures for obtaining motor vehicle insurance by older Americans to be implemented for use in a coordinated transportation system. "(b) In connection with the study required by subsection (a), the Commissioner, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, shall conduct research and demonstration projects, either directly or by grants or

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Report X.O Secretary of Transportation, P r e s i dent, and Congress.

Experts and consultants. 80 Stat. 4 1 6. Agency cooperation.

[87

STAT.

contracts with public or private nonprofit agencies and organizations, in order to— "(1) demonstrate i30ssible solutions of economic and service aspect of furnishing adequate transportation to older persons in rural and urban areas including transportation services furnished by social service agencies; '•(2) demonstrate improvement of transportation services available to older persons with emphasis on (A) establishing special transjwrtation subsystems for older persons or similar groups with similar mobility restrictions, (B) providing portalto-portal service and demand actuated services, (C) making payments directly to older persons to enable them to obtain reasonable and necessary transportation services; "(3) demonstrate improved coordination between transportation systems and social service delivery systems; and "(4) demonstrate innovative solutions for other special transportation problems confronting older Americans. "(c) A t least half of the projects authorized under subsection (b) of this section shall be conducted in States that are predominantly rural in character. Congress, a report on his findings and recommendations, including a plan for implementation of improved transportation services for older Americans and recommendations for additional legislation, administrative and other measures to provide solutions to the transl)ortation problems of older Americans not later than January 1, 1975, as he deems advisable. "(e) I n carrying out the study and survey, and the demonstration and research projects under this section, the Commissioner is authorized to— " (1) procure temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, and "(2) secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment or instrumentality information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purpose of this section; and each such department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment or instrumentality is authorized and directed, to the extent permitted by law, to furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commissioner upon request made by him. " P A R T C—MULTIDISCIPLIXARY CENTERS OF GP:ROXTOLOGY
 * '(d) yiot later than January 1, 1975, the Commissioner shall prepare and transmit to the Secretary, to the President, and to the

Grants.

"SEC. 421. The Commissioner may make grants to public and private nonprofit agencies, organizations, and institutions for the purpose of establishing or supporting multidisciplinary centere of gerontologvA grant may be made under this section only if the application therefor— "(1) provides satisfactory assurance that the applicant will expend the full amount of the grant to establish or support a multidisciplinary center of gerontology which shall— " (A) recruit and train personnel at the professional and subprofessional levels, " (B) conduct basic and applied research on work, leisure, and education of older people, living arrangements of older

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people, social services for older people, the economics of aging, and other related areas, " (C) provide consultation to public and voluntary organizations with respect to the needs of older people and in planning and developing services for them, " (D) serve as a repository of information and knowledge with respect to the areas for which it conducts basic and applied research, " (E) stimulate the incorporation of information on aging into the teaching of biological, behavioral, and social sciences at colleges or universities, " (F) help to develop training programs on aging in schools of social work, public health, health care administration, education, and in other such schools at colleges and universities, and " (G) create opportunities for innovative, multidisciplinary efforts in teaching, research, and demonstration projects with respect to aging; "(2) provides for such fiscal control and fund accounting procedures as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement of and accounting for funds paid to the applicant under this section; and "(3) provides for making such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the Commissioner may require to carry out his functions under this section, and for keeping such records and for affording such access thereto as the Commissioner may find necessary to assure the corr-ectncss and verification of such reports. " P A R T D — AUTHORIZATION O F ArpROPRiATioNs "AUTHORIZATION

"SEC. 431. There are authorized to be appropriated for the pur))oses of carrying out this title such sums as may be necessary for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975. u PAYMENTS OF GRANTS

"SEC. 432. (a) To the extent he deems it appropriate, the Commissioner shall require the recipient of any grant or contract under this title to contribute money, facilities, or services for carrying out the project for which such grant or contract was made. " (b) Payments under this part pursuant to a grant or contract may Advance paybe made (after necessary adjustment, in the case of grants, on account '"^"*^' of previously made overpayments or miderpayments) in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments and on such conditions, as the Commissioner may determine. "(c) The Commissioner shall make no grant or contract under this title in any State which has established or designated a State agency for purposes of title III of this Act unless the Commissioner has con- Ante, p. 36. suited with such State agency regarding such grant or contract."

TITLE V—MULTIPURPOSE SENIOR CENTERS SEC. 501. The Older Americans Act of 1965 is further amended by inserting immediately after title IV the following new title:

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 129

Question. 129 - OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES) [*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]
We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?

(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(6) Of its relation to confidence;

(7) Of its relation to assurance;

(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

Art. 1 - Whether magnanimity is about honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.

Objection 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

Objection 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (Q[103], AA[1],2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors.

Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.

Reply to Objection 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (Q[123], AA[4],5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.

Reply to Objection 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.

Art. 2 - Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (A[1]). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.

Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.

I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

Art. 3 - Whether magnanimity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (FS, Q[55], A[4]). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q[113]] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. 15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above (A[1]; FS, Q[11], A[2], OBJ[3]). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.

Reply to Objection 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.

Reply to Objection 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

Reply to Objection 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.

Reply to Objection 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

Art. 4 - Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Is. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA[1],2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (Q[103], A[1], ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply to Objection 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

Art. 5 - Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.

Objection 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[61], A[3]), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."

Reply to Objection 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.

Art. 6 - Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Is. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself---for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]; FS, Q[40], A[4]), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.

Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

Art. 7 - Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion (FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (FS, Q[5], AA[3],7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.

Art. 8 - Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.

Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.


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PUBLIC LAW 93-29-MAY 3, 1973

[87

STAT.

"TITLE V—MULTIPURPOSE SENIOR CENTERS " P A R T A—ACQUISITION, ALTERATIOX, OR RENOVATION or MULTIPURPOSE SENIOR CENTERS a.GRANTS

Limitation.

"Multipurpose senior center. "

AUTHORIZED

"SEC. 501. (a) I n order to provide a focal point in communities for the development and delivery of social services and nutritional services designed primarily for older persons, the Commissioner may make grants to units of general purpose local government or other public or nonprofit private agencies or organizations and may make contracts with any agency or organization to pay not to exceed 75 per centum of the cost of acquiring, altering, or renovating existing facilities to serve as multipurpose senior centers (including the initial equipment of such facilities). Facilities assisted by grants or contracts under this part shall be in close proximity to the majority of individuals eligible to use the multipurpose senior center, and within walking distance where possible. " (b) The total payments made pursuant to grants or contracts under this section in any State for any fiscal year shall not exceed 10 per centum of the total amount appropriated for the year for the purposes of carrying out this part, "(c) The term 'multipurpose senior center' means a community facility for the organization and pi-ovision of a broad spectrum of services (including provision of health, social, and educational services and provision of facilities for recreational activities) for older persons. REQUIREMENTS FOR APPROVAL O F APPLICATION S

82 Stat. 718. 42 USC 4 1 5 1.

49 Stat. 1011.

"SEC. 502. (a) A grant or contract for purchase under this)>art may be made only if the application therefor is approved by the Commissioner u))on his determination that— "(1) the application contains or is supported by reasonable assurances that (A) for not less than ten yearS after purchase, the facility will be used for the purposes foi- which it is to be purchased, (1^) sufficient funds will be available to meet the nonFederal share of the cost of purchase of the facility. (C) sufficient funds will be available, when purchase is comi)]eted, for elective use of the facility for the purpose for which it is being purchased, and (I)) the facility Avill not be used and is not intended to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship; "(2) the application contains or is snooorti^d by reasom^ble assurances that there are no existing facilities in the community suitable for leasing as a multipurpose senior center; "(3) the plans and Specificatious are in accordance with regulations relating to minimum standards of construction and equipment (promulgated with particular emphasis on securing compliance with the requirements of the Architectural Bari-iers Act of 198 (Public Law 90-480)); and "(4) the ap)>lication contains or is supported by adequate assurance that any laborer oi- mechanic employed by any contiaetors or subcontractors in the))erforinance of work on the facility will be Daid wages at rates not less than those prevailing for similar work in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon.Vet, as amended (40 T'.S.C. 27a276a5). The Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to the labor standards specified in this para<rraph. the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950

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PUBLIC LAW 93-29-MAY 3, 1973

(15 F.R. 3176; 64 Stat. 1267), and section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934, as amended (40 U.S.C. 276c). "(b) In making grants or contracts under this part, the Commissioner shall— "(1) give preference to the acquisition of multipurpose senior centers in areas where there is being developed a comprehensive and coordinated system under title III of this Act; and "(2) consult with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development with respect to the technical adequacy of any proposed alteration or renovation. uPAYMENTS

"SEC. 503. Upon approval of any application for a grant or contract under this part, the Commissioner shall reserve, from any appropriation available therefor, the amount of such grant or contract. The amount so reserved may be paid in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments consistent with progress in alteration or renovation, as the Commissioner may determine. The Commissioner's reservation of any amount under this section may be amended by him, either upon approval of an amendment of the application or upon revision of the estimated cost of altering or renovating the facility. "RECAPTURE or PAYMENTS

"SEC. 504. If, within ten years after purchase of any facility for which funds have been paid under this part— " (a) the owner of the facility ceases to be a public or nonprofit private agency or organization, or " (b) the facility ceases to be used for the purposes for which it was purchased (unless the Commissioner determines, in accordance with regulations, that there is good cause for releasing the applicant or other owner from the obligation to do so), the United States shall be entitled to recover from the applicant or other owner of the facility an amount which bears to the then value of the facility (or so much thereof as constituted an approved project or projects) the same ratio as the amount of such Federal funds bore to the cost of the facility financed with the aid of such funds. Such value shall be determined by agreement of the parties or by action brought in the United States district court for the district in which such facility is situated. a AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

"SEC. 505. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of making grants or contracts under section 501, such sums as may be necessary for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975. "(b) Sums appropriated for any fiscal year under subsection (a) of this section and remaining unobligated at the end of such year shall remain available for such purpose for the next fiscal year. " M O R T G A G E INSURANCE FOR MULTIPURPOSE SENIOR CENTERS

"SEC. 506. (a) I t is the purpose of this section to assist and encourage the provision of urgently needed facilities for programs for the elderly.

51 63 Stat. 108.

^"'e, p. 36.

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PUBLIC LAW 93-29-MAY 3, 1973 Definitions.

12 USC 1713.

Limitation.

[87 STAT.

" (b) For the purpose of this part the terms 'mortgage', 'mortgagor, 'mortgagee', 'maturity date', and 'State' shall have the meanings respectively set forth in section 207 of the National Housing Act. " (c) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is authorized to insure any mortgage (including advances on such mortgage during acquisition, alteration, or renovation) in accordance with the provisions of this section upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe and make commitments for insurance of such mortgage prior to the date of its execution or disbursement thereon. '^(d) I n order to carry out the purpose of this section, the Secretary is authorized to insure any mortgage which covers a new multipurpose senior center, including equipment to be used in its operation, subject to the following conditions: "(1) The mortgage shall be executed by a mortgagor, approved by the Secretary, who demonstrates ability successfully to operate one or more programs for the elderly. The Secretary may in his discretion require any such mortgagor to be regulated or restricted as to minimum charges and methods of financing, and, in addition thereto, if the mortgagor is a corporate entity, as to capital structure and rate of return. As an aid to the regulation or restriction of any mortgagor with respect to any of the foregoing matters, the Secretary may make such contracts with and acquire for not to exceed $100 such stock interest in such mortgagoi- as he may deem necessary. Any stock or interest so purchased shall be paid for out of the Multipurpose Senior Center Insurance Fund, and shall be redeemed by the mortgagor at par upon the termination of all obligations of the Secretary under the insurance. "(2) The mortgage shall involve a principal obligation in an amount not to exceed $250,000 and not to exceed 90 per centum of the estimated replacement cost of the property or project, including equipment to be used in the operation of the multipurjjose senior center, when the proposed improvements are completed and the equipment is installed. "(3) The mortgage shall— " (A) provide for complete amortization by peiiodic jjayments within such term as the Secretary shall prescribe, and " (B) bear interest (exclusive of i^remiam charges for insurance and service charges, if any) at not to exceed such per centum per annum on the principal obligation outstanding at any time as the Secretary finds necessary to meet the mortgage maiket. " (4) The Secretary shall not insure any mortgage under this section unless he has determined that the center to be covered by the mortgage will be in comj^liance with minimum standards to be prescribed by the Secretary. "(5) In the plans for such Multipurpose Senior Center, due consideration shall be given to excellence of architecture and design, and to the inclusion of works of art (not representing more than 1 per centum of the cost of the pioject). "(e) The Secretary shall fix and collect premium charges for the insurance of mortgages under this section which shall be jiayable annually in advance by the mortgagee, either in casii or in debentures of the Multipurpose Senior Center Insurance Fund (established by subsection (h)) issued at par plus accrued interest. In the case of any mortgage such charge shall be not less than an amount equivalent to one-fourth of 1 per centum per annum nor more than an amount equivalent to 1 per centum per annum of the amount of the principal obligation of the mortgage outstanding at any one time, without taking into account delinquent payments or prepayments. In addition to the

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