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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 103

Question. - OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?

(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?

(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?

(4) Whether it contains several species?

Art. 1 - Whether honor denotes something corporal?
Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above (Q[81], A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal things.

Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things.

I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to Mat. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).

Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for "glory" is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise."

Art. 2 - Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mat. 11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us.

Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his virtue, as stated above (A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men." But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due to the best."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.

For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some respect and not simply.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God": wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to him.

Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.

Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.

Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by kings.

Art. 3 - Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?
Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honor God.

Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him." Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God."

I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Q[101], A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.

Art. 4 - Whether dulia has various species?
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into specifically different virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.

Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.

I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above (A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1247

 PUBLIC LAW 94-393—AUG. 19, 1976 (b) For the development of essential public facilities there are authorized to be appropriated not more than $2,463,000. Within two years from the date of establishment of the historic site pursuant to this Act, the Secretary shall, after consulting with the Governor of the State of South Carolina, develop and transmit to the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Congress a general management plan for the development of the historic site consistent with the objectives of this Act, indicating: (1) the facilities needed to acconmiodate the health, safety, and interpretive needs of the visiting public; (2) the location and estimated cost of all facilities; and (3) the projected need for any additional facilities within the Ninety Six National Historic Site. Approved August 19, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1143 accompanying H.R. 9549 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 94-810 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): May 13, considered and passed Senate. June 8, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 9549. June 30, Senate concurred in House amendments with amendments. Aug. 10, House concurred in Senate amendments.

90 STAT. 1197 Management pla^' transmittal < committees,
 * congressional

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1248

 90 STAT. 1198

PUBLIC LAW 94-394—SEPT. 3, 1976

Public Law 94-394 94th Congress An Act Sept. 3. 1976 [S. 3435]

Privacy Protection Study Commission. Fiscal year expenditure limitation, removal. Appropriation authorization. 5 USC 552a note.

To increase an authorization of appropriations for the Privacy Protection Study Commission, and to remove the fiscal year expenditure limitation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provision of law referred to in the note immediately preceding section 553 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: "SEC. 9. There is authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitation only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, the sum of $2,000,000 to carry out the provisions of section 5 of this Act for the period beginning July 1, 1975, and ending on September 30, 1977.". Approved September 3, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1417 (Comm. on Government Operations). SENATE REPORT No. 94-861 (Comm. on Government Operations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): May 19, considered and passed Senate. Aug. 24, considered and passed House.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1249

 PUBLIC LAW 9 4 - 3 9 5 — S E P T. 3, 1976

90 STAT. 1199

Public Law 94-395 94th Congress An Act To provide assistance to the Government of Guam, to guarantee certain obligations of the Guam Power Authority, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 11 of the Organic Act of Guam (64 Stat. 387, 48 U.S.C. 1423a) is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following l a n g u a g e: " The Secretary of the Interior (hereafter in this section referred to as 'Secretary') is authorized to guarantee for purchase by the Federal F i n a n c i n g B a n k bonds or other obligations of the Guam Power Authority m a t u r i n g on or before December 31, 1978, which shall be issued in order to refinance short-term notes due or existing on June 1, 1976 and other indebtedness not evidenced by bonds or notes in an aggregate amount of not more than $36 million, and such bank, in addition to its other powers, is authorized to purchase, receive or otherwise acquire these same. The interest rate on obligations purchased by the Federal F i n a n c i n g Bank shall be not less than a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities, adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per centum, plus 1 per centum per annum. The Secretary, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, may extend the guarantee provision of the previous sentence until December 31, 1980. Such guaranteed bonds or other obligations shall, while outstanding, include a provision for semiannual payments of interest only. If the Secretary determines that the Guam Power Authority will not meet its obligation to pay interest, the Secretary shall request the Secretary of the Treasury to deduct such payments from sums collected and paid pursuant to Section 30 of this Act (48 U.S.C. 1421h). Should there be default at maturity on the bonds or other obligations so guaranteed, (1) the Secretary may withhold such sums as he determines may be necessary from sums collected by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Section 30 of this Act (48 U.S.C. 1421h) until losses incurred by the Secretary under the guarantee plus interest at the rate specified in this section have been reimbursed to the Secretary and (2) notwithstanding any other provision of law. Acts making appropriations may provide for the withholding of any payments from the United States to the Government of Guam which may be

Sept. 3, 1976 [H.R. 13679]

Guam Power Authority. Guaranteed bonds or other obligations.

Interest rate.

Semiannual interest payments.

Matured bonds, default. Withholding from collected

Withholding payments from United States to Guam.

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 90 STAT. 1200

or may become due pursuant to any law and offset the amount of such withheld payments against any claim the United States may have against the Government of Guam or the Guam Power Authority pursuant to this guarantee. For the purposes of this Act, under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) the term 'person' includes the Government of Guam and Guam Power Authority. The Secretary may place such stipulations as he deems appropriate on the bonds or other obligations he guarantees.".

"Person " f V s ' ^,

PUBLIC LAW 94-395~SEPT. 3, 1976

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Approved September 3, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: SENATE REPORT No. 94-1155 accompanying S. 3681 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): July 1, considered and passed House. Aug. 24, 25, considered and passed Senate, in lieu of S. 3681.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1251

 PUBLIC LAW 94-396—SEPT. 3, 1976

90 STAT. 1201

Public Law 94-396 94th Congress

An Act To amend section 512(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with respect to the tax treatment of the gain on the lapse of options to buy or sell securities.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 512(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to modifications to unrelated business taxable income) is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "There shall also be excluded all gains on the lapse or termination of options, written by the organization in connection with its investment activities, to buy or sell securities (as defined in section 1236(c)).". (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to gain from options which lapse or terminate on or after January 1, 1976, in tax-' able years ending on or after such date. SEC. 2. (a) The following provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are amended by striking out "September 1, 1976" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 15, 1976": (1) section 3402(a) (relating to income collected at source); (2) section 6153(g) (relating to installment payments of estimated income tax by individuals); and (3) section 6154(h) (relating to installment payments of estimated income tax by corporations). (b) Section 209(c) of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 is amended by striking out "September 1, 1976" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 15, 1976". Approved September 3, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1134 (Comm. on Ways and Means). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1172 (Comm. on Finance). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): June 8, considered and passed House. Aug. 3 1, considered and passed Senate, amended. Sept. 1, House concurred in Senate amendment. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 12, No. 37: Sept. 6, Presidential statement.

Sept. 3, 1976 [H.R. 3052]

Taxes. Certain option income of exempt organizations. 26 USC 512. 26 USC 1236. 26 USC 512 note.

ArOe, p. 782. 26 USC 3402. Ante, p. 782. 26 USC 6153. Ante, p. 782. 26 USC 6154. 26 USC 3402 note.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1252

 90 STAT. 1202

PUBLIC LAW 94-397—SEPT. 3, 1976

Public Law 94-397 94th Congress An Act Sept. 3, 1976 [H.R. 3650] Civil service annuities. Reemployed annuitants.

5 USC 5551.

5 USC 8331. 5 USC 8339.

Survivor annuity payments.

5 USC 8341.

5 USC 8334.

To clarify the application of section 8344 of title 5, United States Code, relating to civil service annuities and pay upon reemployment, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 8344(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: "(a) If an annuitant receiving annuity from the Fund, except— " (1) a disability annuitant whose annuity is terminated because of his recovery or restoration of earning capacity; " (2) an annuitant whose annuity, based on an involuntary separation (other than an automatic separation or an involuntary separation for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency), is terminated under subsection (b) of this section; "(3) an annuitant whose annuity is terminated under subsection (c) of this section; or "(4) a Member receiving annuity from the Fund; becomes employed in an appointive or elective position, his service on and after the date he is so employed is covered by this subchapter. Deductions for the Fund may not be withheld from his pay. An amount equal to the annuity allocable to the period of actual employment shall be deducted from his pay, except for lump-sum leave payment purposes under section 5551 of this title. The amounts so deducted shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Fund. If the annuitant serves on a full-time basis, except as President, for at least 1 year, or on a part-time basis for periods equivalent to at least 1 year of full-time service, in employment not excluding him from coverage under section 8331(1)(i) or (ii) of this title— " (A) his annuity on termination of employment is increased by an annuity computed under section 8339(a), (b), (d), (e), (h), and (i) of this title as may apply based on the period of employment and the basic pay, before deduction, averaged during that employment; and "(B) his lump-sum credit may not be reduced by annuity paid during that employment. If the annuitant is receiving a reduced annuity as provided in section 8339(j) or section 8339(k)(2) of this title, the increase in annuity payable under subparagraph (A) of this subsection is reduced by 10 percent and the survivor annuity payable under section 8341(b) of this title is increased by 55 percent of the increase in annuity payable under such subparagraph (A), unless, at the time of claiming the increase payable under such subparagraph (A), the annuitant notifies the Commission in writing that he does not desire the survivor annuity to be increased. If the annuitant dies while still reemployed, the survivor annuity payable is increased as though the reemployment had otherwise terminated. If the described employment of the annuitant continues for at least 5 years, or the equivalent of 5 years in the case of part-time employment, he may elect, instead of the benefit provided by subparagraph (A) of this subsection, to deposit in the Fund an amount computed under section 8334(c) of this title covering that employment and have his rights redetermined under this subchapter.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 104

Question. 104 - OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?

(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?

(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;

(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?

(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?

(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?

Art. 1 - Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.

Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and be subject to them."

I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.

Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."

Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.

Art. 2 - Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.

On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above (Q[80]).

I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A[1]), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. FP, Q[5], A[5]]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (FS, Q[96], A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word," etc.

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Q[58], A[10]).

Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. Q[82], A[2]] to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.

Art. 3 - Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q[81], A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.

On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience.

I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.

Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): "He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.

Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.

Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

Art. 4 - Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things.

Objection 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above (FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example."

Reply to Objection 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.

Reply to Objection 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey God's commands in all things.

Art. 5 - Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Objection 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to Dt. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. 2:13): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God." Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Objection 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.

I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.

Reply to Objection 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

Art. 6 - Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Objection 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.

On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13,14): "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."

I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens it." Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[5]), subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.

Reply to Objection 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.


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 PUBLIC LAW 94-397—SEPT. 3, 1976

90 STAT. 1203

If the annuitant dies while still reemployed and the described employment had continued for at least 5 years, or the equivalent of 5 years in the case of part-time employment, the person entitled to survivor annuity under section 8341(b) of this title may elect to deposit in the 5 USC 8341. Fund and have his rights redetermined under this subchapter.". (b) Section 8344 of title 5, United States Code, is amended— (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) thereof as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; and (2) by inserting immediately after subsection (a) thereof the following new subsections: "(b) If an annuitant, other than a Member receiving an annuity from the Fund, whose annuity is based on an involuntary separation (other than an automatic separation or an involuntary separation for cause or charges on misconduct or delinquency) is reemployed in a position in which he is subject to this subchapter, payment of the annuity terminates on reemployment. "(c) If an annuitant, other than a Member receiving an annuity from the Fund, is appointed by the President to a position in which he is subject to this subchapter, payment of the annuity terminates on reemployment.''. (c) Section 8344(d) of title 5, United States Code, as redesignated by this Act, is amended by striking out the last sentence. (d) Section 8339(f)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "8344(b)(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "8344(d)(1)". SEC. 2. (a) Except as provided under subsection (b) of this section, Effective date. the amendments made by this Act shall become effective on the date of 5 USC 8344 note. the enactment of this Act or October 1, 1976, whichever is later, and shall apply to annuitants serving in appointive or elective positions on and after such date. (b) The amendment made by subsection (c) of the first section of Effective date. this Act shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act or October 1, 1976, whichever is later, but shall not apply to any annuitant reemployed before such date. Approved September 3, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-336 (Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service). SENATE REPORTS: No. 94-877 (Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service) and No. 94-1030 (Comm. on Appropriations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 121 (1975): July 2 1, considered and passed House. Vol. 122 (1976): Aug. 9, considered and passed Senate, amended. Aug. 25, House concurred in Senate amendments.

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 90 STAT. 1204

PUBLIC LAW 94-398—SEPT. 4, 1976

Public Law 94-398 94th Congress An Act Sept. 4. 1976 [H.R. 10370] Canaveral National Seashore Advisory Commission. Membership. 16 USC 459J-5.

To amend the Act of January 3, 1975, establishing the Canaveral National Seashore. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 6 of the Act of January 3, 1975 (88 Stat. 2121, 2125) is amended as follows: (1) in subsection (a) delete "five members" and insert in lieu thereof "six members" and (2) delete (a)(3) in its entirety and insert in lieu thereof "(3) two members representing the general public: Provided, That one member shall be appointed from each county in which the seashore is located.". Approved September 4, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-802 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1157 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): Feb. 2, considered and passed House. Aug. 24, considered and passed Senate.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-399—SEPT. 4, 1976

90 STAT. 1205

Public Law 94-399 94th Congress An Act To provide for an independent audit of the financial condition of the government of the District of Columbia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established the Temporary Commission on Financial Oversight of the District of Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the "commission"). (b) The commission shall consist of eight members as follows: (1) three Members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate (or any designee of any such Member so appointed, which designee shall act for such Member in his stead); (2) three Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (or any designee of any such Member so appointed, which designee shall act for such Member in his stead); (3) the Mayor of the District of Columbia (or any designee of the Mayor, which designee shall act for the Mayor in his stead); and (4) the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia (or any designee of the Chairman, which designee shall act for the Chairman in his stead). (c) Five members of the commission shall constitute a quorum. (d)(1) A chairman and vice chairman of the commission shall be selected by a majority vote of the full commission from among the members thereof. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. (2) The commission is authorized to establish such operating procedures as it determines necessary to enable it to carry out its functions under this Act. (e) The first meeting of the commission shall be called by the majority leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, jointly. (f) The commission is authorized to utilize the personnel of the government of the District of Columbia, with the approval of the Mayor, or the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, as the case may be, and the Committee on the District of Columbia of the Senate, the Committee on the District of Columbia of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, or the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, with the approval of the chairman of such committee. The commission is authorized to utilize, on a reimbursable basis, the services and personnel of the General Accounting Office to assist the commission in carrying out its functions under this Act. SEC. 2. (a) For the purpose of meeting the responsibilities imposed by the Constitution on the Congress with respect to the District of Columbia, it shall be the function of the commission, after consultation with the Comptroller General, to select such qualified persons as the commission may determine necessary for the development of certain plans on behalf of the government of the District of Columbia (including assistance in the implementation thereof) for the purpose

Sept. 4, 1976 [H.R. 11009] D.C. Government financial condition, audit. D.C. Code 47-101 note. Temporary Commission on Financial Oversight of the District of Columbia. Establishment. Membership.

Quorum.

Personnel, utilization.

GAO services and personnel, utilization. Functions. D.C. Code 47-101 note, u s e prec. title 1.

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 the Pyramid Age. As we pass along the north wall of this vast temple we find it covered with enormous sculptures in relief, depicting the wars of the Egyptians in Asia. We see the giant figure of the Pharaoh as he stands in his war chariot, towering above all his fleeing foes, whom he drives before his plunging horses (Fig. 26). This is the first time we have met the horse on the ancient monuments. The animal has been imported from Asia, the chariot has come with him, and Egypt has learned


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 9 0 STAT. 1206

System improvements plan, contracts.

Reports to commission and Comptroller General.

System design plan.

PUBLIC LAW 9 4 - 3 9 9 — S E P T. 4, 1976

of improving the financial planning, reporting, and control systems of such government. Plans to be considered for development and implementation pursuant to this Act shall include, among others, plans for the following: immediate improvement in financial control and reporting; assessing the scope of further necessary improvements; financial management system improvements; personnel-payroll system improvements; water-sewage billing and information system improvements; purchasing and material management system improvements; property accounting system improvements; real property system improvements; welfare payments system improvements; human resources eligibility, payment, and reporting system improvements; health care financial system improvements; and traffic ticket system control improvements. (b) Each contract entered into with a person pursuant to subsection (c) of this section for the development of a system improvements plan shall contain a provision requiring that person to include within such plan procedures for the establishment of an ongoing training program for operating personnel of the government of the District of Columbia whose duties involve matters covered by such plan or part thereof in order to provide training for such personnel in connection with the operation of such system. Each such contract shall further contain provisions comparable to those provided by Standard Form 32, section 1-16.901-32 of title 41, Code of Federal Regulations. (c) Upon the selection by the commission of each qualified person to develop and implement a plan pursuant to this section, the chairman of the commission shall enter into a negotiated fixed price contract or contracts with that person for the development and implementation of such plan. (d)(1) Each such contract so entered into shall set forth the scope of the work to be performed, amounts to be paid thereunder, and a schedule of reporting and completion dates, including a schedule of implementation dates, for each portion of such work. Each contractor shall have full access to such books, individuals, accounts, financial records, reports, files, and other papers, things, or property of the government of the District of Columbia as such contractor deems necessary to complete such contract. The Comptroller General shall have full access to all documents produced under each contract. (2) After establishment of the schedule for completing each such contract and until the completion of such contract, each contractor shall report, at such time as such contract shall provide, to the commission and the Comptroller General on the progress toward completion of such contract, except that each such contractor shall report at least once during the one-hundred-and-eighty-day period after establishment of such schedule for completion of such contract. (e)(1) With respect to any such contract or part thereof involving the design (including a preliminary design) of a S3^stem referred to in subsection (a) of this section, the contractor, upon the completion of the plan or part relating to such design (including procedures for its implementation), shall submit such plan or part, together with a schedule for its implementation, to the Comptroller General. (2) With respect to any such contract involving work other than the design of such a system, the contractor, upon the completion of the plan or part thereof relating to such work, shall submit such plan or part thereof, together with a schedule for implementing such plan or part, to the Comptroller General.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-399—SEPT. 4, 1976 (3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, in no case shall any contractor under this Act submit a plan, part, or schedule to the Comptroller General unless such plan, part, or schedule has first been submitted by that contractor to the contractor responsible for the development and implementation of a financial management system improvements plan for such contractor's review, comments, and recommendations. A copy of such comments and recommendations, if any, shall be submitted, together with such plan, part, or schedule, to the Comptroller General in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. (4) Within the sixty-day period following the date of the receipt by him of such plan or part thereof, and after consultation with the commission, the Comptroller General shall approve, disapprove, or modify such plan or part (including any schedule for the implementation thereof), in whole or in part. On or before the expiration of such sixty-day period, the Comptroller General shall submit such plan or part, as so approved, modified, or disapproved to the Congress for its consideration, together with his reasons for such modification or disapproval. (f)(1) Each such plan or part thereof so approved by the Comptroller General without modification shall be deemed on the date of such approval, to be a part of the financial planning, reporting, accounting, control, and operating procedures of the government of the District of Columbia. Each such plan or part thereof modified by the Comptroller General shall, upon the expiration of the forty-fiveday period of continuous session of the Congress following the date on which such modified plan or part thereof is so submitted to the Congress, be deemed to be a part of the financial planning, reporting, accounting, control, and operating procedures of the government of the District of Columbia, unless within such forty-five-day period, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution disapproving the action of the Comptroller General with respect to such modifications. In any case in which any such concurrent resolution is so adopted by the Congress, such plan or part thereof, as it existed immediately prior to any such modification, shall be deemed a part of such procedures as of the date of the adoption by Congress of such concurrent resolution. No such plan or part thereof disapproved by the Comptroller General shall take effect, unless, within such forty-five-day period following the date of its submission to the Congress, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution disapproving the action of the Comptroller General in disapproving such plan or part thereof. If such action of the Comptroller General is so disapproved, such plan or part thereof shall be deemed a part of such procedures as of the date of the adoption by Congress of such concurrent resolution. (2) For purposes of this section, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in computation of such forty-five-day period. (g) With respect to any such plan or part so deemed to be a part of the financial planning, reporting, accounting, control, and operating procedures of the government of the District of Columbia under subsection (f)(1), the Mayor of the District of Columbia, with the assistance of the contractor responsible for such plan or part, shall implement such plan or part for the government of the District of Columbia in accordance therewith. The Comptroller General shall

90 STAT. 1207

Approval.

Plan, submittal to Congress.

Plan implementation.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1258

 90 STAT. 1208

PUBLIC LAW 94-399—SEPT. 4, 1976

monitor such implementation and report as he deems appropriate to the commission. Balance sheet SEC. 3. (a)(1) For the purpose of meeting the oversight responsiaudit. bilities imposed by the Constitution on the Congress with respect to D.C. Code the District of Columbia, the Congress hereby authorizes the com47-101 note, use prec. title 1. mission, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, to cause to be undertaken, on behalf of the government of the District of Columbia, by a certified public accountant licensed in the District of Columbia, a balance sheet audit of the financial position of the District of Columbia as of September 30, 1977. Such audit may— (A) include an identification of assets, liabilities, accumulated surplus or deficit; and (B) exclude statements of revenues and expenses, changes in fund balances, statements of changes in financial position for enterprise funds, and property and equipment. (2) The balance sheet audit authorized by paragraph (1) of this Notification. subsection shall cover the financial position of the District of Columbia as of September 30, 1977, unless the commission, on or before August 1, 1977, is notified by the Comptroller General to the effect that such an audit as of that date is not practicable, in which case the commission is authorized to cause to be undertaken a balance sheet audit of the financial position of the District of Columbia as of such date as the Comptroller General shall recommend to the commission. (b) The commission is further authorized to cause to be underAudit. taken, on behalf of the government of the District of Columbia, by a certified public accountant licensed in the District of Columbia, an audit or audits of the financial position and results of operations of the District of Columbia for each fiscal year or years next following September 30, 1977, or the date recommended \>y the Comptroller General for the conduct of a balance sheet audit pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, whichever last occurs, and which precede the fiscal year commencing October 1, 1979. (c) Upon the selection by the commission of each qualified person to conduct an audit pursuant to this section, the chairman of the commission shall enter into a negotiated fixed price contract with that person for that purpose. Each such audit shall be carried out in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and the financial statements shall be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The results of each such audit shall be subAudit results, submittal to mitted to the Congress, the President of the United States, the Council Congress, of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, President, and the Comptroller General. Council of the (d) Such contractor shall have full access to such books, individuals, District of Columbia, Mayor, accounts, financial records, reports, files, tax returns, and other papers, and Comptroller things, or property of the government of the District of Columbia as General. such contractor deems necessary to complete each such audit required by such contract. Fiscal year audit. SEC. 4. (a) For the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1979, and each D.C. Code fiscal year thereafter, the government of the District of Columbia shall 47-120-2. conduct, out of funds of the government of the District of Columbia, an audit of the financial operations of such government. Each such audit shall be conducted by a certified public accountant licensed in the District of Columbia and carried out in accordance with generally acccepted auditing standards and the financial statements shall be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-399—SEPT. 4, 1976

90 STAT. 1209

(b) For the purpose of conducting an audit for each such fiscal Fiscal year year as required by subsection (a) of this section, the Mayor of the audits. District of Columbia shall, on or after January 2, 1979, select, subject to the advice and consent of the Council of the District of Columbia, a qualified person to conduct such audits for the fiscal year commencing October 1, 1979, and the next following three fiscal years. Thereafter, each individual elected as Mayor in a general election held for Mayor of the District of Columbia shall, on or after January 2 next following his or her election to, and the assuming of, the Office of Mayor, select, subject to the advice and consent of the Council of the District of Columbia, a qualified pereon to conduct such audits for the fiscal year commencing October 1 of the calendar year in which such Mayor takes office, and the next following three fiscal years. The person previously selected for a four-year period shall not succeed himself or herself. If the Council fails to act on any such selection within a thirty-day period following the date on which it receives from the Mayor the name of such person so selected, the Mayor shall be authorized to enter into a contract with that person for the conduct of such audits. I f any person so selected by the Mayor to conduct any such audits for such fiscal years is rejected by the Council, the Mayor shall submit to the Council the name of another qualified person selected by the Mayor to conduct such audits. I n the event that the Notice to Council rejects the second person so selected by the Mayor, the Mayor congressional shall, within t h i r t y days following that rejection, notify the chairman committees. of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, in writing, of that fact. W i t h i n fifteen days following the receipt of that notice, such chairmen shall jointly select a person to conduct such audits and shall inform the Mayor, in writing, of the name of the person so selected. W i t h i n ten days following the receipt by the Mayor of such name, the INIayor shall enter into a contract with such person pursuant to which that person shall conduct such audits for such fiscal years as herein provided. (c) The Mayor shall submit a copy of the audit report with respect Report, submittal to each such audit so conducted to the Congress, the President of the to Congress, United States, the Council of the District of Columbia, and the Comp- President, Council of the troller General. District of SEC. 5. (a) For the purpose of making payments under contracts Columbia, and entered into under sections 2 and 3 of this Act, for reimbursing the Comptroller Comptroller General under subsection (f) of the first section of this General. Act, and for meeting other expenses incurred by the commission under Appropriation this Act, there is authorized to be appropriated to the commission the authorization. sum of $16,000,000, of which $8,000,000 shall be from funds in the D.C. Code Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and $8,000,000 shall be from 47-101 note. funds in the Treasury to the credit of the District of Columbia. Sums appropriated pursuant to this section are authorized to remain available until expended. (b) No funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section out of funds in the Treasury to the credit of the District of Columbia may be used for any payment under any contract entered into pursuant to section 2 or 3 of this Act, for any payment as reimbursement to the General Accounting Office, or for expenses of the commission, in an amount greater than 50 per centum of the total amount of any such payment. (c) The chairman of the commission may enter into contracts under sections 2 and 3 of this Act only to the extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.

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 90 STAT. 1210 Definitions. D.C. Code 47-101 note.

Termination. D.C. Code 47-101 note.

PUBLIC LAW 94-399—SEPT. 4, 1976 SEC. 6. As used in this Act, the term— (1) "person" means any individual, partnership, firm, corporation, or other entity; and (2) "government of the District of Columbia" includes the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Council of the District of Columbia, the courts of the District of Columbia, and all agencies (as defined in paragraph (3) of section 3 of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code, sec. 1-1502(3))). SEC. 7, Thirty days after notification by the Comptroller General to the commission of the completion and implementation of all plans and designs under this Act, or thirty days after final payment of all contracts entered into pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this Act, whichever last occure, the commission shall cease to exist. Approved September 4, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-1094 (Comm. on the District of Columbia) and No. 94-1381 (Comm. of Conference). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1015 (Comm. on the District of Columbia). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): May 24, considered and passed House. July 1, considered and passed Senate, amended. Aug. 23, House agreed to conference report. Aug. 24, Senate agreed to conference report.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-400—SEPT. 7, 1976

90 STAT. 1211

Public Law 94-400 94th Congress An Act To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to make compensation for damages arising out of the failure of the Teton Dam a feature of the Teton Basin Federal reclamation project in Idaho, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress finds that without regard to the proximate cause of the failure of the Teton Dam, it is the purpose of the United States to fully compensate any and all persons, for the losses sustained by reason of the failure of said dam. The purposes of this Act are (1) to provide just compensation for the deaths, personal injuries and losses of property, including the destruction and damage to irrigation works, resulting from the failure on June 5, 1976, of the Teton D a m in the State of I d a h o, and (2) to provide for the expeditious consideration and settlement of claims for such deaths, personal injuries, and property losses. SEC. 2. All persons who suffered death, personal injury, or loss of property directly resulting from the failure on June 5, 1976, of the Teton D a m of the Lower Teton Division of the Teton Basin Federal reclamation project which was authorized to be constructed by the Act of September 7, 1964 (78 Stat. 925) shall be entitled to receive from the United States full compensation for such death, personal injury, or loss of property. Claimants shall submit their claims in writing to the Secretary, under such regulations as he prescribes, within two years after the date on which the regulations required by section 5 are published in the Federal Register. Claims based on death shall be submitted only by duly authorized legal representatives. SEC. 3. (a) The Secretary of the Interior, or his designee for the purpose, acting on behalf of the United States, is hereby authorized to and shall investigate, consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any claim for money damages asserted under section 2. Except as otherwise provided herein, the laws of the State of I d a h o shall a p p l y: Provided, That determinations, awards, and settlements under this Act shall be limited to actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries or loss involved and shall not include interest prior to settlement or punitive damages. (b) I n determining the amount to be awarded under this Act the Secretary shall reduce any such amount by an amount equal to the total of insurance benefits (except life insurance benefits) or other payments or settlements of any n a t u r e previously paid with respect to such death claims, personal injury, or property loss. (c) Payments approved by the Secretary under this Act on death, personal injury, and property loss claims, shall not be subject to insurance subrogation claims in any respect under this Act but without prejudice under other laws as provided in subsection (f). (d) The Secretary shall not include in an award any amount for reimbursement to any insurance fund for loss payments made by such company or fund. (e) Except as to the United States, no claim cognizable under this Act shall be assigned or transferred.

Sept. 7, 1976 [S. 3542]

Teton Dam, Idaho. Damages, compensation.

Casualty or property losses, claims. 43 USC 616nn.

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 90 STAT. 1212

Advance or partial payments.

Regulations; publication in Federal Register. Publication in newspaper.

PUBLIC LAW 94-400—SEPT. 7, 1976 (f) The acceptance by the claimant of any award, compromise, or settlement under this Act, except an advance or partial payment made under section 4(c), shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States by reason of the same subject matter. A release shall not, however, prevent an insurer with rights as a subrogee under its own name or that of the claimant from exercising any right of action against the United States to which it may be entitled under any other laws for payments made to the claimant for a loss arising from the subject matter, (g) Any claim for damages which may be payable in whole or in part by a claimant's insurer, shall not be paid by the Secretary unless and until the claimant provides written proof that the insurer has denied the claim or has failed to approve or deny such claim within six months of its presentment, and the claimant assigns to the United States his rights against the insurer with respect to such claim. Upon the acceptance of any payment or settlement under this Act, the claimant shall assign to the United States any rights of action he has or may have against any other third party, including an insurer. SEC. 4. (a) In the determination and settlement of claims asserted under this Act, the Secretary shall limit himself to the determination of— (1) whether the losses sustained directly resulted from the failure of the Teton Dam on June 5, 1976; (2) the amounts to be allowed and paid pursuant to this Act; and (3) the persons entitled to receive the same. (b) The Secretary shall determine and fix the amount of awards, if any, in each claim within twelve months from the date on which the claim was submitted. (c) At the request of a claimant, the Secretary is authorized to make advance or partial payments prior to final settlement of a claim, including final settlement on any portion or aspect of a claim determined to be logically severable. Such advance or partial payments shall be made available under regulations promulgated by the Secretary under section 5, which regulations shall include, but not be limited to, provisions for such payments where the Secretary determines that to delay payment until final settlement of the claim would impose a substantial hardship on such claimant. When a claimant pursues a remedy as provided for in section 9 of this Act, he shall be permitted to retain such advance or partial payments under a final court decision on the merits. (d) Payments may be made for compensation for direct investments made in on-farm structural facilities in anticipation of service from the Teton Reservoir to the extent that such facilities are unuseable or are diminished in value by the denial of such service. SEC. 5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary shall within fifteen days after the enactment of this Act promulgate and publish in the Federal Register, final regulations and procedures for the handling of the claims authorized in section 2 of this Act. The Secretary shall also cause to be published, in newspapers with general circulation in the State of Idaho, an explanation of the rights conferred by this Act and the procedural and other requirements imposed by the rules of procedure promulgated by him. Such explanation shall be in clear, concise, and easily understandable language. In addition, the Secretary shall also disseminate such explanation con-

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-400—SEPT. 7, 1976

90 STAT. 1213

cerning such rights and procedures, and other data helpful to claimants, in the State of I d a h o, by means of brochures, pamphlets, radio, television, and other media likely to reach prospective claimants. SEC. 6. The claims program established by this Act shall, to the extent practicable, be coordinated with other disaster relief operations conducted by other Federal agencies under the Disaster Belief Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5121) and other provisions of law. The Secretary shall consult with the heads of such other Federal agencies, and shall, as he deems necessary, consistent with the expeditious determination of claims hereunder, make use of information developed by such agencies. The heads of all other Federal agencies performing disaster relief functions under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and other Federal authorities are hereby authorized and directed to provide the Secretary, or his designee, such information and records as the Secretary or his designee shall deem necessary for the administration of this Act. 'SEC. 7. I n order to expedite the repair and restoration of irrigation facilities damaged as a direct result of the failure of the Teton Dam, the Secretary is authorized and directed to enter into agreements with the owners of such facilities to finance the repair or reconstruction thereof, to the standards and conditions existing immediately prior to the failure of Teton Dam, either by direct payment or through construction contracts administered by the Bureau of Reclamation to the extent the cost of repairs or construction are not covered by insurance. The cost of such repairs or reconstruction shall be nonreimbursable. SEC. 8. A t the end of the year following approval of this Act and each year thereafter until the completion of the claims program, the Secretary shall make an annual report to the Congress of all claims submitted to him under this Act stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, a brief description of the claim, and the status or disposition of the claim including the amount of each administrative payment and award under the Act. SEC. 9. (a) A n action shall not be instituted in any court of the United States upon a claim against the United States which is included in a claim submitted under this Act until the Secretary or his designee has made a final disposition of the pending claim. A pending claim may be withdrawn from consideration prior to final decision upon fifteen days written notice, and such withdrawal shall be deemed an abandonment of the claim for all purposes under this Act. After withdrawal of a claim or after the final decision of the Secretary or his designee on a claim under this Act, a claimant may elect to assert said claim or institute an action thereon against the United States in any court of competent jurisdiction under any other provision of applicable law, and upon such election there shall be no further consideration or proceedings on the claim under this Act. (b) Any claimant aggrieved by a final decision of the Secretary under this Act may file within sixty days from the date of such decision with the United States District Court for the District of I d a h o a petition p r a y i n g that such decision be modified or set aside in whole or in part. The court shall hear such appeal on the record made before the Secretary. The filing of such an appeal shall constitute an election of remedies. The decision of the Secretary incorporating his findings of fact therein, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.

Consultation.

Teton Dam facilities, repair or reconstruction. Financial agreement.

Report to Congress.

Court action. Claim withdrawal, notice.

Petition.

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