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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 73

Question. 73 - OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is backbiting?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Of its comparison with other sins;

(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?

Art. 1 - Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's character by secret words?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and "openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words.

Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.

Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.

'On the contrary,' It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."

'I answer that,' Just as one man injures another by deed in two ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling him, as stated above (Q[72], A[1])---and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.

Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and "openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).

Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.

Art. 2 - Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

'On the contrary,' It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."

'I answer that,' As stated above (Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above (Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of restitution.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the good of public justice.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because "the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man."

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.

Art. 3 - Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4, "Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.

Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave.

Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): "What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one's neighbor.

'On the contrary,' It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one's neighbor.

'I answer that,' The essential gravity of sins committed against one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches." Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.

The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.

Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q[66], A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer "occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 Jn. 3:15).

Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from.

Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one's neighbor.

Art. 4 - Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater." Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.

Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand backbiters.

'On the contrary,' Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters."

'I answer that,' According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.

Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to backbiting." If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[19], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Q[72], A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue."

Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/236

 92 STAT. 182

PUBLIC LAW 95-250—MAR. 27, 1978

Subpena power.

(c) The Secretary shall have the authority to obtain information necessary to carry out the responsibilities created under this Act in the same manner as provided by section 249 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.2321). (d) The Secretary shall offer all reasonable cooperation and assistance to individuals who believe they may qualify for the benefits, payments, preferential hiring rights, and other protections provided for employees under this Act. Among other things, the Secretary shall— (1) provide all covered employees with literature stating their rights and obligations in nontechnical terms; and (2) develop and implement procedures for the filing (including filing by mail in appropriate circumstances as determined by the Secretary) of applications, appeals, and complaints relating to the rights and entitlements established for employees by this title designed to facilitate prompt determinations and prompt payment to eligible applicants. (e) The Secretary shall direct that notices, reports, applications, appeals, and information concerning the implementation of this title required to be filed with the Secretary shall be filed at the offices of the United States Employment and Training Service in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties of the State of California and that information required to facilitate employees' exercise of their rights under this title shall be kept available at such offices unless the Secretary shall designate additionally. (f) In all cases where two or more constructions of the language of this title would be reasonable, the Secretary shall adopt and apply that construction which is most favorable to employees. The Secretary shall avoid inequities adverse to employees that otherwise would arise from an unduly literal interpretation of the language of this

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Approved March 27, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 95-581 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs), No. 95-581, pt. II (Comm. on Appropriations) and No. 95-931 (Comm. of Conference). SENATE REPORTS: No. 95-528 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources) and No. 95-578 (Comm. on Appropriations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Jan. 31, S. 1976 considered and passed Senate. Feb. 9, considered and passed House. ' Feb. 28, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of S. 1976. Mar. 14, House agreed to conference report. Mar. 21, Senate agreed to conference report. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 14, No. 13: Mar. 27, Presidential statement.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/237

 PUBLIC LAW 95-251—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 183

Public Law 95-251 95th Congress An Act To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that hearing examiners shall be known as administrative law judges, and to increase the number of such positions which the Civil Service Commission may establish and place at GS-16 of the General Schedule.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled., That section 5108 (a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "240 hearing examiner positions" and inserting in lieu thereof "340 administrative law judge positions". SEC. 2. (a) The provisions described in paragraphs (1) through (12) of this subsection are each amended by striking out "hearing examiner" or "hearing examiners", as appropriate, each place it appears, and inserting in lieu thereof "administrative law judge" or "administrative law judges", as appropriate— (1) sections 554(a)(2), 556(b)(3), 559, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301,
 * , 5335,5362, and 7521, of title 5, United States Code;

(2) section 6(c)(2) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. 136d(c)(2)); (3) section 11(k) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 248(k)); (4) subsections (b) and (c) of the first section of the Act entitled "An Act to authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to delegate certain functions", approved August 20, 1962 (15 U.S.C. 78d-l (b) and (c)); (5) section 1416(a) of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1715(a)); (6) section 509(i) of title 28, United States Code; (7) sections 12(e), 12(j), and 12(k) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 661(d), 661(i), 661(j)); (8) section 502(e) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 792(e)); (9) sections 5(e) and 428(b) of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (-30 U.S.C. 804(e), 938(b)); (10) sections 19(d) and 21(b) of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. 919(d), 921(b)); (11) section 705(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2 0 0 0 e ^ (a)); and (12) sections 6(h) and 9(a) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(h), 1657(a)). (b)(1) Sections 1305 and 5362 of title 5, United States Code, are each amended in the catchline, by striking out "Hearing examiners" and inserting "Administrative law judges" in lieu thereof. (2) Sections 3105 and 3344 of title 5, United States Code, are each amended in the catchline by striking out "hearing examiners" and inserting "administrative law judges" in lieu thereof. (c)(1) The table of sections for chapter 13 of title 5, United States Code, is amended so that the item relating to section 1305 reads as follows: "1305, Administrative law judges.".

Mar. 27, 1978 [H.R. 69751

Hearing examiners reclassified as administrative law judges.

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Page:Hockey, Canada's Royal Winter Game.djvu/8

 a young team cannot, by their own interpretation of the rules—without hints or instruction, without seeing the more practiced men at play—arrive at a thorough appreciation of these rules, or grasp with sufficient clearness the idea, the objective point of our noble sport, until they are grown old and stiff.

Besides, our younger enthusiasts, even in cities where they enjoy every advantage of learning the game, are deficient in their knowledge of the rules and the fine points of the game, because, perhaps, they have never had a clear explanation of the same. They need, too, a guide to help them to the more quickly perfect themselves in their favorite pastime, and to avoid the dangers to which every player, however careful, is exposed.

A few random hints on the essential requisites of the game, on practice and scientific plays, should prove of some value to a careful reader.

To fill this necessity, to supply a demand that increases as the love of hockey spreads, to help educate the younger players, and to endeavor to make our exhilirating sport even more popular, the author assumes the pleasant task of writing this little essay, sincerely hoping that it may prove instructive to those who have not yet figured in senior ranks, and not uninteresting to those who have.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/238

 92 STAT. 184

PUBLIC LAW 95-251—MAR. 27, 1978 (2) The table of sections for chapter 31 of title 5, United States Code, is amended so that the item relating to section 3105 reads as follows: "3105. Appointment of administrative law judges.".

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(3) The table of sections for chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended so that the item relating to section 3344 reads as follows: . "3344. Details; administrative law judges.". (4) The table of sections for chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended so that the item relating to section 5362 reads as follows: "5362. Administrative law judges.".

(d)(1) The second sentence of section 3105 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "Hearing examiners" and inserting "Administrative law judges" in lieu thereof. (2) Section 1416(a) of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1715(a)) is amended in the catchline by striking out "hearing officers" and inserting "administrative law judges" in lieu thereof. 5 USC 3105 note. SEC. 3. Any reference in any law, regulation, or order to a hearing examiner appointed under section 3105 of title 5, United States Code, shall be deemed to be a reference to an administrative law judge. Approved March 27, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-321 (Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service). SENATE REPORT No. 95-697 (Comm. on Governmental Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): July 18, considered and passed House. Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 14, considered and passed Senate.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 74

Question. 74 - OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?

Art. 1 - Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into the ear." But to speak of another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] among the people." But an informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a backbiter.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points."

I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a backbiter." They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, "Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace."

Reply to Objection 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.

Reply to Objection 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or tale-bearer.

Reply to Objection 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added, "for he hath troubled many that were peace."

Art. 2 - Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip 19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord." But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth [Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above (Q[20], A[3]; FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; FS, Q[73], A[8]), sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse things.

Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to enmity.

Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren."


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/239

 PUBLIC LAW 95-252—MAR. 27, 1978

92 STAT. 185

Public Law 95-252 95th Congress An Act To extend the existing temporary debt limit.

Mar. 27. 1978 [H.R. 11518]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the firet sec- Public debt limit. tion of the Act of October 4, 1977, entitled " A n Act to increase the Temporary temporary debt limit, and for other purposes" (Public Law 95-120), increase. is amended by striking out "March 31, 1978" and inserting in lieu 31 USC 757b note. thereof " July 31, 1978". Approved March 27, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 984 (Comm. on Ways and Means). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 21, considered and passed House. Mar. 22, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/240

 92 STAT. 186

PUBLIC LAW 95-253—MAR. 27, 1978

Public Law 95-253 95th Congress

... ,.; Z \ Joint Resolution

Mar. 27, 1978 [HJ. Res. 715]

Sun Day. Proclamation authorization.

Proclaiming May 3, 1978, "Sun Day".

Whereas the realization and the promise of solar energy will be observed and celebrated throughout the Nation on the 3d of May, 1978; and Whereas the development of solar technologies will provide an abundant, economical, safe, and environmentally compatible energy supply; and Whereas a day devoted to a celebration of all solar technologies should help inform the general public, industry, and labor, and demonstrate the potential of the sun in meeting the Nation's energy needs; and Whereas Federal, State, and local governments should foster and encourage the further development, refinement, and utilization of solar energy technologies: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Seriate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, assembled, That May 3, 1978, is proclaimed "Sun Day", and the President is authorized and requested (a) to issue a proclamation calling upon the general public, industry. and labor of the United States to observe such day with appropriate activities and ceremonies, and (b) to direct all appropriate Federal agencies to cooperate with, and participate in, the celebration of "Sun Day". Approved March 27, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-919 (Coram, on Post Office and CivU Service). SENATE REPORT No. 95-686 (Coram, on the Judiciary). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, VoL 124 (1978): Mar. 6, considered and passed House. Mar. 14, considered and passed Senate.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 75

Question. 75 - OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?

(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?

Art. 1 - Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.

Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.

Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.

On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person---while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him---and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.

Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.

Art. 1 - Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God." Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.: 'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided.

Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov. 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling."

Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispositively and imperfectly.

Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/241

 PUBLIC LAW 9 5 - 2 5 4 — A P R. 4, 1978

92 STAT. 187

Public Law 95-254 95th Congress An Act To rescind certain budget authority contained in the message of the President of January 27, 1978 (H. Doc. 95-28.5), transmitted pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following rescissions of budget authority proposed in the message of the President of January 27, 1978 ( H. Doc. 95-285), is made pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, n a m e l y:

Apr. 4, 1978 m R 10982]

Certain budget 31 USC 1301 note.
 * ""o"tyRescission.

CHAPTER 1 — P \ N D S APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Of the funds appropriated under t h i s head in the Foreign Assistance and Related Program s Appropriations Act, 1978, $40,200,000 are 91 Stat. 1233. rescinded. CHAPTER II — FEDERAL H O M E L O A N B A N K BOARD

Of the borrowing authority authorized for use by the Federal H o m e Loan B a n k Board pursuant to section 1016 of "Public Law 89-754 12 USC 1432, and title III of Public Law 91-126 for the purposes set forth in 1438. Public Law 89-754 (12 U.S.C. 1438(c)), $10,055,000 are rescinded. 12 USC 1428a note. CHAPTER III — DEPARTMENT OF STATE—INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

Of the funds appropriated under this head in the Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the J u d i c i a r y, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1978, $5,000,000 are rescinded. / 91 Stat 420. Approved April 4, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-896 (Coram, on Appropriations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 10, considered and passed House. Mar. 22, considered and passed Senate.

39-194 O—80—pt. 1

16: QL3

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Wisconsin v. Yoder/Concurrence Stewart

[p237] MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.

This case involves the constitutionality of imposing criminal punishment upon Amish parents for their religiously based refusal to compel their children to attend public high schools. Wisconsin has sought to brand these parents as criminals for following their religious beliefs, and the Court today rightly holds that Wisconsin cannot constitutionally do so.

This case in no way involves any questions regarding the right of the children of Amish parents to attend public high schools, or any other institutions of learning, if they wish to do so. As the Court points out, there is no suggestion whatever in the record that the religious beliefs of the children here concerned differ in any way from those of their parents. Only one of the children testified. The last two questions and answers on her cross-examination accurately sum up her testimony: "Q. So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going to school, and did not go to school since last September, is because of your religion?

"A. Yes.

"Q. That is the only reason?

"A. Yes." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear to me, therefore, that this record simply does not present the interesting and important issue discussed in Part II of the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. With this observation, I join the opinion and the judgment of the Court.

title: Wisconsin v. Yoder/Concurrence Stewart


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/242

 PUBLIC LAW 95-255—APR. 4, 1978

92 STAT. 188

Public Law 95-255 95th Congress

) Joint Resolution

Apr. 4, 1978 [H.J. Res. 796]

Making an urgent supplemental appropriation for disaster relief for the fiscal year ending September 30. 1!)78.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That tho following sum is appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, tuimely:

Supplemental appropriations, disaster relief.

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT FEoiiliAL D I S A S T E R A S S I S T A N C E

ADMIXISTKATTON

DISASTER RELIEF

For an additional amount for "Disaster relief", $300,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That not to exceed 3 per centum of the foregoing amount shall be available for administrative expenses. Approved April 4, 1978.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-990 (Comm. on Appropriations). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 22, considered and passed House. Mar. 23, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/243

 PUBLIC LAW 95-256—APR. 6, 1978

92 STAT. 189

Public Law 95-256 95th Congress An Act To amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to extend the age group of employees who are protected by the provisions of such Act, and for other purposes.

Apr. 6, 1978 [H.R. 5383]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assemhted,

Discrimination in Employment Act , s, SHORT TITLE Amendments of SECTIOX 1. This Act may be cited as the "Age Discrimination in 1978. 29 USC 621 note. Employment Act Amendments of 1978". SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

SEC. 2. (a) Section 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 623(f)(2)) is amended by inserting after "individual" a comma and the following: "and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such individual". (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, except that, in the case of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement which is in effect on September 1, 1977, which was entered into by a labor organization (as defined by section 6(d)(4) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), and which would otherwise be prohibited by the amendment made by section 3(a) of this Act, the amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall take effect upon the termination of such agreement or on January 1, 1980, whichever occurs first. APPLICATION o r AGE LIMITATION

'

"

Infra.

Effective date. 29 USC 623 note.

29 USC 206.

'

SEC. 3. (a) Section 12 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 631) is amended to read as follows: "AGE

LIMITATION

"SEC. 12. (a) The prohibitions in this Act shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age. "(b) In the case of any personnel action affecting employees or applicants for employment which is subject to the provisions of section 15 of this Act, the prohibitions established in section 15 of this 29 USC 6338. Act shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. "(c)(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who, for the 2-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/244

 92 STAT. 190

PUBLIC LAW 95-256—APR. 6, 1978

annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000. Regulations. "(2) I n applying the retirement benefit test of paragraph (1) of this subsection, if any such retirement benefit is in a form other than \ a straight life annuity (with no ancillary benefits), or if employees contribute to any such plan or make rollover contributions, such benefit shall be adjusted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, so that the benefit is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no ancillary benefits) under a plan to which employees do not contribute, and under which no rollover contributions are made. "(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory >,j j > { retirement of any employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) at an institution of higher education (as defined by section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965).". Effective date. (b)(1) Sections 12(a), 12(c), and 12(d) of the Age Discrimination 29 USC 631 note. in Employment Act of 1967, as amended by subsection (a) of this secAnu, p. 189. tion, shall take effect on January 1, 1979. Effective date. (2) Section 12(b) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, shall take effect on September 30, 1978. Repeal, effective (3) Section 12(d) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a) of date. this section, is repealed on July 1, 1982. 29 USC 631.

ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE

SEC. 4. (a) Section 7(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(c)) is amended by inserting " (1) " after the subsection designation and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: Trial by jury. "(2) In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this Act, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action.". (b)(1) Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626 (d)) is amended to read as follows: Filing of charges. "(d) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination lias been filed with the Secretary. Such a charge shall be filed— "(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or 29 USC 633. "(2) in a case to which section 14(b) applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier. Notice. Upon receiving such a charge, the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.". 29 USC 626 note. (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall )^-l. •

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/245

 PUBLIC LAW 95-256—APR. 6, 1978 take effect with respect to civil actions b r o u ^ t after the date of enactment of this Act. (c)(1) Section 7(e) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(e)) is amended by inserting " (1) " after the subsection designation and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(2) For the period during which the Secretary is attempting to effect voluntary compliance with requirements of this Act through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion pursuant to subsection (b), the statute of limitations as provided in section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 shall be tolled, but in no event for a period in excess of one year,". (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall take effect with respect to conciliations commenced by the Secretary of Labor after the date of enactment of this Act. i

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

92 STAT. 191

29 USC 626. .,

29 USC 255. Effective date, 29 USC 626 note.

EMPLOYMENT

SEC. 6. (a) Section 15(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a (a)) is amended by inserting "who'are at least 40 years of age" after "applicants for employment" and by inserting "personnel actions" after "except". (b)(1) Section 3322 of title 5, United States Code, relating to temporary appointments after age 70, is repealed. (2) The analysis for chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out the item relating to section 3322. (c) Section 8335 of title 5, United States Code, relating to mandatory separation, is amended— (1) by striking out subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) thereof; (2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively; and (3) by adding after subsection (b), as so redesignated, the following new subsections: " (c) An employee of the Alaska Railroad in Alaska and an employee who is a citizen of the United States employed on the Istbnnis of Panama by the Panama Canal Company or the Canal Zone Government, who becomes 62 years of age and completes 15 years of service in Alaska or on the Isthmus of Panama shall be automatically separated from the service. The separation is effective on the last day of the month in which the employee becomes age 62 or completes 15 years of service in Alaska or on the Isthmus of Panama if then over that age. The employing office shall notify the employee in writing of the date of separation at least 60 days in advance thereof. Action to separate the employee is not effective, without the consent of the employee, until the last day of the month in which the 60-day notice expires. "(d) The President, by Executive order, may exempt an employee from automatic separation under this section when he detennines the public interest so requires.". (d) Section 8339(d) of title 5, United States Code, relating to computation of annuity, is amended by striking out "section 8335(g) " and inserting in lieu thereof "section 8335(b)". (e) Section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

Repeal,

Mandatory separation.

Exemption by President .?

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/246

 92 STAT. 192

-.dsd %y Ante, p. 189. Study.

Report to President and Congress.

Effective date. 29 USC 633a note. Supra.

PUBLIC LAW 95-256—APR. 6, 1978 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: "(f) Any personnel action of any department, agency, or other entity referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be subject to. or affected by, any provision of this Act, other than the provisions of section 12(b) of this Act and the provisions of this section. " (s)(l) The Civil Service Commission shall undertake a study relating to the effects of the amendments made to this section by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, and the effects of section 12(b) of this Act, as added by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978. "(2) The Civil Service Commission shall transmit a report to the President and to the Congress containing the findings of the Commission resulting from the study of the Commission under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Such report shall be transmitted no later than January 1, 1980.". (f) The amendments made by this section shall take effect on September 30, 1978, except that section 15(g) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended by subsection (e) of this section, shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act. REPORT BY SECRETARY OF LABOR

Ante, p. 189.

Transmittal to President and Congress.

SEC. 6. (a)(1) Section 5 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 624) is amended by inserting "(a)(1)" after the section designation, and by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Such study shall include— "(A) an examination of the effect of the amendment made by section 3(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 in raising the upper age limitation established by section 12(a) of this Act to 70 years of age; "(B) a determination of the feasibility of eliminating such limitation; "(C) a determination of the feasibility of raising such limitation above 70 years of age; and " (D) an examination of the effect of the exemption contained in section 12(c), relating to certain executive employees, and the exemption contained in section 12(d), relating to tenured teaching personnel.". (2) Section 5(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as so redesignated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(2) The Secretary may undertake the study required by paragraph (1) of this subsection directly or by contract or other arrangement.". (b) Section 5 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is further amended by addinar at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(b) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall be transmitted to the President and to the Congress as an interim report not later than January 1, 1981, and in final form not later than January 1, 1982.". ,

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/247

 PUBLIC LAW 95-256~APR. 6, 1978

92 STAT. 193

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 7. Section 17 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 635) is amended by striking out ", not in excess of $5,000,000 for any fiscal year,". Approved April 6, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 95-527, pt. 1 (Comm. on Education and Labor) and No. 95-950 (Comm. of Conference) SENATE REPORT No. 95-493 (Comm. on Human Resources). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): Sept. 13, 23, considered and passed House. Oct. 19, considered and passed Senate, amended. Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 2 1, House agreed to conference report. Mar. 23, Senate agreed to conference report. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: Vol. 14, No. 14 (1978): Apr. 6, Presidential statement.

29 USC 634.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/248

 92 STAT. 194

PUBLIC LAW 95-257—APR. 7, 1978

Public Law 95-257 95th Congress An Act Apr. 7. 1978 [H.R. 9169]

Fishing vessels. Obligations for financing.

To amend title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to permit the guarantee of obligations for financing fishing vessels in an amount not exceeding 87% per centum of the actual or depreciated actual cost of each vessel.

Be it enacted by the Senate mid House of Representatives of the United States of Aine7'ica in Congress assembled, That section 1104 (b)(2) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 U.S.C. 1274(b)(2)), is amended by striking the semicolon at the end thereof, and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the following: Provided, further, That in the case of any vessel to be used in the fishing trade or industry, such obligations may be in an aggregate principal amount which does not exceed 87i/^ per centum of the actual cost or depreciated actual cost of the vessel;". Approved April 7, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; HOUSE REPORT No. 95-740 (Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). SENATE REPORT No. 95-703 (Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Jan. 23, considered and passed House. Mar. 22, considered and passed Senate. .- ' >

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 76

Question. 76 - OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?

(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?

(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

(4) Of its comparison with other sins.

Art. 1 - Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.

Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.

Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.

Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).

I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.

Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above (FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.

Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.

Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul.

Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.

Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat. 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.

I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful.

From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.

Art. 3 - Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die."

It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above (Q[72], A[2]).

From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.

Art. 4 - Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.

Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated above (Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest: 'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.

Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than the backbiter.

On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has been said (A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.

I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is the worse (FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being equal.

Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices.

Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A[3]), cursing, in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of the will.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/249

 PUBLIC LAW 95-258—APR. 7, 1978

92 STAT. 195

Public Law 95-258 95th Congress An Act Relating to the year for including in income certain payments under the Agricultural Act of 1&49 received in 1978 but attributable to 1977, and to extend for one year the existing treatment of State legislators' travel expenses away from home.

Apr. 7, IV/o [H.R. 11055]

Be it enacted by the /Senate and House of Representatives of the Taxes. United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. YEAR OF INCLUSION FOR CERTAIN CROP PAYMENTS RECEIVED IN 1978.

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Certaip crop payments. State legislator' travel expenses. 26 USC 451 note.

(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a taxpayer reporting on the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, if— (1)(A) the taxpayer receives in his first taxable year beginning in 1978 payments under the Agricultural Act of 1949, as 7 USC 1421note. amended, as a result of— (i) the destruction or damage to crops caused by drought, flood, or any other natural disaster, or (ii) the inability to plant crops because of such a natural disaster, and (B) the taxpayer establishes that, under his practice, income from such crops could have been reported for his last taxable year beginning in 1977, or (2)(A) the taxpayer receives in his first taxable year beginning in 1978 deficiency (or "target price") payments under the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, for any 1977 crop, and (B) the fifth month of such crop's marketing year ends before December 1, 1977. then the taxpayer may elect to include such proceeds in income for his last taxable year beginning in 1977. (b) MAKING AND EFFECT or ELECTION.—An election under this sec- Regulations, tion for any taxable year shall be made at such time and in such manner as the Secretary of the Treasury may by regulations prescribe and shall apply with respect to all proceeds described in subsection (a) which were received by the taxpayer. SEC. 2. STATE LEGISLATORS' TRAVEL EXPENSES AWAY FROM HOME. 26 USC 162 note.

Subsections (a) and (d) of section 604 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 are each amended by striking out "January 1, 1977," and inserting in lieu thereof "January 1, 1978,". Approved April 7, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-929 (Coram, on Ways and Means). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 13, considered and passed House. Mar. 22, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/250

 PUBLIC LAW 95-259—APR. 17, 1978

92 STAT. 1%

Public Law 95-259 95th Congress An Act At>r. 17, 1978 [H.R, 5981]

AmeHcan Folklife Center. Appropriation authorization.

To amend the American B'olklife Preservation Act to extend the iuithoriziitinns of appropriations contained in such Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amerlca in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the American Folklife Preservation Act (20 U.S.C. 2107) is amended by striking out "and" immediately after "1977," and inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: "$G85,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, $1,065,000 for the fiscal year eliding September 30, 1980, and $1,355,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981". SEC. 2. Section 4(c) of such Act (20 U.S.C. 2103(c)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Members appointed by the President under clause (1) of subsection (b) shall serve only during the time they are officials of Federal departments and agencies concerned with some aspect of American folklife traditions and arts." Approved April 17, 1978.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-865 (Coram, on House Administration). SENATE REPORT No. 95-712 (Coram, on Rules and Administration). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Feb. 28, considered and passed House. ~, 'Apr. 4, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/251

 PUBLIC LAW 9 5 - 2 6 0 — A P R. 17, 1978

9 2 §TAT. 197

Public Law 95-260 95th Congress An Act To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to memorialize the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence in Constitution Gardens in the District of Columbia. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "Secretary'') may establish a memorial in honor of the fifty-six men who signed the Declaration of Independence, such memorial to be on a suitable site selected by the Secretary, with the approval of the National Commission of F i n e A r t s and the National Capital P l a n n i n g Commission, in the area known as Constitvition Gardens in the District of Columbia. SEC. 2. The Administrator of the American EeVolution Bicentennial Administration (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "'Administrator") shall prepare, in consultation with the American Revolution Bicentennial Board, the Secretary, the National Commission of Fine A r t s, and the National Capital P l a n n i n g Commission, the design and plans for the memorial authorized by the first section. SEC. 3. (a) Not to exceed $500,000 of the funds, other than appropriated funds, which are available to the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration under the Act entitled " A n Act to establish the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, and for other purposes", approved December 11, 1973 (87 Stat. 697), and as approved by the American Revolution Bicentennial Board, may be used to carry out the provisions of the first two sections of this Act. (b) Of the funds described in subsection (a) which are not used by the Administrator in carrying out the provisions of section 2, the Administrator shall transfer to the Secretary such sums as may be necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out the provisions of the first section of this Act. SEC. 4. (a) The establishment of the memorial authorized by the first section may not begin unless the Secretary determines that sums expended in carrying out the first two sections of this Act will not exceed $500,000. Such determination shall be made in consultation with the Administrator if the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration has not terminated pursuant to section 7 of the Act of December 11, 1973 (87 Stat. 701). (b) The authority contained in the first section shall expire unless the establishment of the memorial authorized by such section is begun within two years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 5. (a) The maintenance and care of the memorial authorized under the first section shall be the responsibility of the Secretary. (b) There are authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1977, and each fiscal year thereafter such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of subsection (a). SEC. 6. No funds other than funds described in section 3 and funds authorized to be appropriated in section 5(b) may be used by the Administrator or the Secretary to carry out this Act.

Apr. 17. 1978 [H.R. 2960]

Signers of Declaration of Independence,

memorial. 16 USC 431 note.

Funds, limitation.

Funds, transfer.

Authority, expiration.

Appropriation authorization.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/252

 92 STAT. 198

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PUBLIC LAW 95-260—APR. 17, 1978 SEC. 7. The Secretary shall carry out any functions of the xVdministrator under this Act after the termination of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration pursuant to section 7 of the Act of December 11, 1973 (87 Stat. 701), provided that the Secretary shall consult with those persons who were members of the American Revolution Bicentennial Board on the date of its termination. Approved April 17, 1978.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-462, pt. I (Comm. on House Administration). SENATE REPORT No. 95-621 (Comm. on Rules and Administration). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 23 (1977): July 11, considered and passed House. Vol. 24 (1978): Jan. 27, considered and passed Senate, amended. Apr. 4, House agreed to Senate amendment.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/253

 PUBLIC LAW 95-261—APR. 17, 1978

92 STAT. 199

Public Law 95-261 95th Congress An Act To amend title 44, United States Code, to provide for the designation of libraries of accredited law schools as depository libraries of Government publications.

Apr. 17, 1978 [H.R. 8358]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 19 of Depository title 44, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof libraries, designation. the following new section: "§ 1916. Designation of libraries of accredited law schools as 44 USC 1916. depository libraries " (a) Upon the request of any accredited law school, the Public P r i n t e r shall designate the library of such law school as a depository library. The Public P r i n termay not make such designation unless he determines that the library involved meets the requirements of this chapter, other than those requirements of the first undesignated paragraph of section 1909 of this title which relate to the location of such library. " (b) For purposes of this section, the term 'accredited law school' "Accredited law means any law school which is accredited by a nationally recognized school." accrediting agency or association approved by the Commissioner of Education for such purpose or accredited by the highest appellate court of the State in which the law school is located.". SEC. 2. The table of sections for chapter 19 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item: "1916. Designation of libraries of accredited law schools as depository libraries.".

SEC, 3. The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on October 1, 1978. Approved April 17, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-650 (Coram, on House Administration). SENATE REPORT No. 95-670 (Coram, on Rules and Adrainistration). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 123 (1977): Oct. 25, considered and passed House. Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 6, considered and passed Senate, araended. Apr. 4, House agreed to Senate araendments.

Effective date. 44 USC 1916 note.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/254

 92 STAT. 200

PUBLIC LAW 95-262—APR. 17, 1978

Public Law 95-262 95th Congress

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Joint Resolution Apr. 17. 1978 [HJ. Res. 770]

Education Day, U.S.A. Designation authorization.

"To authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating April 18, 1978, as "Education Day, P.S.A.".

Whereas the Congress recognizes a need for the Nation to set aside on the calendar a day devoted to the importance of education to the lives of its citizens and to the general well-being of the Nation; and Whereas the Lubavitch Movement, which conducts educational activities at more than sixty centers in twenty-eight States as well as around the world, is especially committed to the advancement of education and has proposed the establishment of an "Education Day, U.S.A."; and Whereas world Jewry marked in 1977 the seventy-fifth birthday of the revered and renowned Jewish leader, the head of the worldwide Lubavitch Movement, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who proclaimed on that occasion a "Year of Education*'; and Whereas the seventy-sixth birthday of this celebrated spiritual leader will occur on April 18, 1978, thus concluding the year of Lubavitch Movement activities dedicated to the "Year of Education" and the Lubavitcher Rebbe's milestone birthday: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating April 18, 1978, as "Education Day, U.S.A.".

Approved April 17, 1978.

 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Apr. 11, 12, considered and passed House. Apr. 13, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/255

 PUBLIC LAW 9 5 - 2 6 3 ~ A P R. 17, 1978

Public Law 95-263 95th Congress

9 2 STAT. 201

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Joint Resolution

To authorize the President to issue a proclamation designating the week beginning on April 16 through April 22,197S. as "National Oceans Week". Vliercas the oceans are playing; an iiicreasingly important role in the food, energy, and mineral production of the United States as well as the transportation of United States goods; and "Whereas it will be beneficial for the American public to learn of the interrelationship of the United States and the world's oceans; and Whereas the declaration of a National Oceans Week would help Americans learn about the imi^ortance of the oceans: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the week of April 16 through April 22, 1978, as "Xational Oceans Week*' and calling upon the people of the United States to observe such same week with appropriate activities. Approved April 17, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-978 (Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Mar. 20, considered and passed Senate. Apr. 4, considered and passed House, in lieu of H.J. Res. 730.

Apr. 17, Iy7'a_ [SJ, Res. 124J .

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/256

 92 STAT. 202

PUBLIC LAW 95-264—APR. 18, 1978

Public Law 95-264 95th Congress An Act Apr. 18. 1978 [H.R. 2540]

Umatilla Indian Reservation, Oreg. Inheritance of trust or restricted lands. 25 USC 463d note. 25 USC 463d note.

25 USC 463d note. 25 USC 463d note.

25 USC 463d note.

Pertaining to the inheritance of trust or restricted lands on the Umatilla Indian Reservation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right to inherit trust or restricted land on the Umatilla Indian Reservation, to the extent that the laws of descent of the State of Oregon are inconsistent herewith, shall be as provided herein. SEC. 2. When any Indian dies leaving any interest in trust or restricted land within the Umatilla Reservation and not having lawfully devised the same, such interest shall descend in equal shares to his or her children and to the issue of any deceased child by right of representation; and if there is no child of the decedent living at the time of his or her death, such interests shall descend to his or her other lineal descendants; and if such descendants are in the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take such real property equally, or otherwise they shall take according to the right of representation. An interest taken hereunder shall be subject to the right of a surviving spouse as provided in section 3. SEC. 3. The surviving spouse of any Indian who dies leaving any interest in trust or restricted land within the Umatilla Reservation shall be entitled to obtain a one-half interest in all such trust or restricted interests in land during his or her lifetime. SEC. 4. If any Indian, who leaves any interest in trust or restricted land within the Umatilla Reservation, makes provisions for his or her surviving spouse by an approved will, such surviving spouse shall have an election whether to take the provisions as made in such will or to take the interest as set forth in section 3 of this Act, but such survivin<r spouse shall not be entitled to both unless it plainly appears by the will to have been so intended by the testator. When any surviving spouse is entitled to an election under this section, he or she shall be deemed to have elected to take the provisions as made in such will unless, at or prior to the first hearing to probate the will, he or she has elected to take under section 3 of this Act and not under the will. SEC. 5. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all estates of decedents who die on or after the date of enactment of this Act. Approved April 18, 1978.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 95-820 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). SENATE REPORT No. 95-718 (Select Comm. on Indian Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 124 (1978): Feb. 6, considered and passed House. April 5, considered and passed Senate.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/257

 PUBLIC LAW 95-265—APR. 24, 1978

92 STAT. 203

Public Law 95^265 95th Congress An Act To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain public and acquired lands in the State of Nevada to the county of Mineral, Nevada.

Be it enacted by the Seriate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Secretary of the Interior, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary", shall issue to the county of Mineral, State of Nevada, a patent or other instrument of conveyance for the land owned by the United States and comprising approximately two thousand six hundred and twenty acres described in this section, or any portion thereof, upon payment into the Treasury of the United States the appraised value of the parcel to be conveyed, plus the costs of appraisal, surveys and extinguishing adverse claims: Provided, That any of the land described in this section which remains unconveyed to the county of Mineral on and after five years from the date of approval of this Act shall no longer be subject to conveyance under this Act. (b) The following described lands situated in the State of Nevada are hereby made subject to this Act: (1) The west half of the northwest quarter of section 26, township 8 north, range 30 east; the part of the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 26, township 8 north, range 30 east, that is north of the highway 95 right-of-way. (2) The northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the east half of the east half of section 25, township 8 north, range 29 east; all of sections 29 and 30, township 8 north, range 30 east; the north half of the southeast quarter of section 28, township 7 north, range 30 east. (3) The part of section 21, township 7 north, range 30 east, that is west of Nevada State Highway Route 31; the north half of the northwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 28, township 7 north, range 30 east; the part of the northeast quarter of section 28, township 7 north, range 30 east, that is west of Nevada State Highway Route 31; the part of section 27, township 7 north, range 30 east, that is west of Nevada State Highway Route 31; the east half of the northwest quarter and the north half of the southeast quarter of section 34, township 7 north, range 30 east; the part of the northeast quarter of section 34, township 7 north, range 30 east, that is west of Nevada State Highway Route 31; the part of section 35, township 7 north, range 30 east, that is west of Nevada State Highway Route 31. SEC. 2. Upon receipt of a request from the county of Mineral, State of Nevada, for the purchase of a tract of the lands described in section 1, the Secretary shall immediately cause the same to be appraised and, upon completion of such appraisal, shall notify the county of Mineral of the appraised value of such tract and the county shall have six months from the date of such notice to complete the purchase of such tract by payment of the appraised value into the Treasury of the United States whereupon the Secretary shall issue a patent or other instrument conveying such tract to such county. Any such patent or

39-194 O-

-pt. 1

17: QL3

Apr. 24, 1978 [H.R. 4979] ' Mineral, Nev. Land conveyance,

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