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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 Plant related to alternative fuel cycle technologies, safeguard systems, spent fuel storage and waste management, except that none of the authorized funds may be used for operations of the plant to process spent fuel from reactors. (21) Liquid metal fast breeder reactor, $333,300,000: Provided, That $5,000,000 of such sums are hereby authorized for research and development on means to reduce the ability to divert plutonium from its intended purposes and to increase the detectability of plutonium if it should be so diverted. (22) Nuclear research and applications, $228,829,000. (23) Light water reactor safety facilities, $24,000,000. (24) High energy physics, nuclear physics, and basic energy sciences, $413,394,000. (25) Nuclear materials security and safeguards, $40,106,000. (26) Uranium enrichment, $989,185,000. All Other Programs, $444,604,000, including— (27)(i) Not more than $1,000,000 for the Water Resources Council to carry out the provisions of section 13 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 TJ.S.C 5912); (ii) Funds to carry out the provisions of section 11 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C 6910), in the amount of $500,000 for the Council on Environmental Quality; and (iii) Program management and support: (a) Program direction, $222,900,000. (b) Institutional relations, $34,179,000, including funds to reimburse the National Bureau of Standards for costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of section 14 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5913), as amended and including $1,800,000, is authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this paragraph (iii) for financial awards by the Department of Energy to independent inventors for the purpose of carrying out section 14 of the Federal Nonnuclear . Energy' Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5913) as amended. (c) Supporting activities, $37,460,000. (d) International cooperation, $5,000,000. Prior Year Authorizations (28) The sum of $40,000,000 which represents the portion of the appropriations heretofore made in the total amount of $56,000,000 for project 76-1-a (clean boiler fuel demonstration plant (A-E) and long-lead procurement) which remains unobligated and is no longer needed is hereby authorized to be made available instead, in addition to any amounts appropriated for the purposes involved pursuant to this Act for the low Btu gasification program. PLANT AND CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

SEC. 102. (a) For "Plant and capital equipment", including construction, acquisition, or modification of facilities, including land acquisition; and acquisition and fabrication of capital equipment not related to construction, a sum of dollars equal to the total of the following amounts: (1) Conservation Research and Development: (A) Project 78-1-a, high bay addition, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico, $800,000,

92 STAT. 49

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 92 STAT. 50

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (2) Fossil Energy Development: ' (A) Project 78-2-a, analytical research, chemistry and coal carbonization laboratory, Pittsburgh Energy Research Center, Pennsylvania, $6,600,000. ? (B) Project 78-2-b, modifications and additions to Energy Research Centers, various locations, $3,000,000. ^ (C) Project 78-2-c, low Btu fuel gas small industrial demonstration plants, sites undetermined (A-E and long-lead procurement only), $6,000,000. (D) Project 78-2-d, solvent refined coal demonstration plant, site undetermined (total estimated cost is $300,000,000, including the Federal share thereof), $30,000,000. (3) Magnetic Fusion: (A) Project 78-3-a, mirror fusion test facility, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, California, $94,200,000. (B) Project 78-3-b, fusion materials irradiation test facility, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Washington ' (A-E and long-lead procurement), $14,400,000. (4) Fuel Cycle Research and Development: ' (A) Project 78-5-a, facilities for the national waste terminal storage program, site undetermined (land acquisition, A - E and long-lead procurement), $10,000,000. (B) Project 78-5-b, liquid metal fast breeder reactor integrated prototype equipment test facility, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (A-E and long-lead procurement only), $3,000,000. (C) Project 78-5-c, advanced isotope separation facility, site undetermined (A-E only), $3,500,000. (5) Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: (A) Project 78-6-a, modifications to reactors, $8,700,000. (B) Project 78-6-b, safeguards and security upgrading, Idaho Falls, Idaho, and Chicago, Illinois, $4,935,000. (C) Project 78-6-c, safety research experimental facility, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho (A-E, long-lead procurement and limited construction only), $20,100,000. (D) Project 78-6-d, experimental breeder reactor II modification, Idaho Falls, Idaho ( A - E and selected long-lead procurement only), $3,100,000. (E) Project 78-6-e, modifications to facilities. Liquid Metal Engineering Center, Santa Susanna, California (A-E only), $4,000,000. (F) Project 78-6-f, fuels and materials examination facility, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Washington, $134,800,000. (G) Project 78-7-a, modifications to utility system 300 area, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Washington. $3,600,000. (H) Project 78-7-b, test reactor area steam distribution system upgrade, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho, J $1,100,000. (6) Light Water Reactor Safety Facilities: (A) Project78-8-a, upgrade Test Area North hot shop facility, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho, $3,000,000. (7) Environmental Research and Development: (A) Project 78-9-a, modifications and additions to biomedical and environmental research facilities, various locations, $6,000,000.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 60

Question. 60 - OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?

(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?

Art. 1 - Whether judgment is an act of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as stated above (Q[58], A[4]).

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.

Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned into judgment."

I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice."

Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as stated above (Q[51], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.

Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.

Art. 2 - Whether it is lawful to judge?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat. 7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment."

I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on (Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.

Art. 3 - Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.

Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere suspicion."

I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does him an injury.

Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external operations, as stated above (Q[58], AA[8],10,11; Q[59], A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder.

Art. 4 - Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense."

I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above.

Art. 5 - Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written law.

Objection 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), judgment is nothing else but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.

Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above (FS, Q[95], A[2]): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Art. 6 - Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without authority.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?"

I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the written law, as stated above (A[5]), he that pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the public authority.

Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.

Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.

With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 13, 17].

Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.

Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its coercive force.


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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 51

(8) High Energy Physics: (A) Project 78-10-a, accelerator improvements and modifications, various locations, $4,500,000. (B) 78-10-b, proton-proton intersecting storage accelerator facility, Brookhaven National Laboratory, $10,500,000. (C) Project 78-11-a, master substation reliability and capacity improvements, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California, $1,700,000. (9) Nuclear Physics: (A) Project 78-12-a, accelerator and reactor improvements and modifications, various locations, $1,900,000. (B) Project 78-12-b, high intensity uranium beams, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, California, $6,000,000. (10) Basic Energy Sciences: (A) Project 78-13-a, national synchrotron light source, Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York, $24,000,000. (B) Project 78-13-b, combustion research facility, Sandia Laboratories, Livermore, California, $9,400,000. (11) Uranium Enrichment: (A) Project 78-14-a, centrifuge facilities modifications, various locations, $30,000,000. (B) Project 78-14-b, process control modifications, plants, various locations, $17,400,000, (C) Project 78-15-a, water system improvements, gaseous diffusion plant, Paducah, Kentucky, $4,500,000. (12) Program Management and Support: (A) Project 78-1-b, chiller mcdifications for energy conservation, Bendix Plant, Kansas City, Missouri, $830,000. (B) Project 78-1-c, process waste heat utilization, gaseous diffusion plant, Paducah, Kentucky, $5,700,000. (C) Project 78-19-a, program support facility, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois (A-E and long-lead procurement only), $5,000,000. (13) Project 78-21, General Plant Projects, $44,265,000. (14) Project 78-22, Construction Planning and Design, $10,000,000. (15) Capital Equipment Not Related to Construction: (A) Conservation research and development, $8,670,000. (B) Fossil energy development, $5,500,000. (C) Solar energy development, $7,900,000. (D) Geothermal energy development, $2,500,000. (E) Magnetic fusion, $27,600,000. (F) Fuel cycle research and development, $25,300,000. (G) Liquid metal fast breeder reactor, $35,650,000. (H) Nuclear research and applications, $18,595,000. (I) Light water reactor safety facilities, $800,000. (J) High energy physics, nuclear physics, and basic energy sciences, $61,300,000." (K) Nuclear materials, security and safeguards, $2,794,000. (L) Uranium enrichment, $19,000,000. (M) Environmental research and development, $19,025,000. (N) Program management and support, $4,955,000. CHANGES TO PRIOR YEAR AUTHORIZATIONS

(b)(1) There is authorized an additional sum of $100,000,000 for Appropriation the process equipment modifications, gaseous diffusion plants (project authorization.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/106

 92 STAT. 52 84 Stat. 299.

87 Stat. 143.

89 Stat. 1063.

90 Stat. 1043.

88 Stat. 115. ,

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 7 l - l - f), authorized by section 101(b)(1) of Public Law 91-273 (for a total project authorization of $920,000,000). (2) There is authorized an additional sum of $42,700,000 for the cascade uprating program, gaseous diffusion plants (project 74-1-g), authorized by section 101(b)(1) of Public Law 93-60 (for a total project authorization of $460,000,000). (3) There is authorized an additional sum of $30,000,000 for the high Btu synthetic pipeline gas demonstration plant (project 76-1-b) authorized by section 101(b)(1) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $55,000,000). (4) There is authorized an additional sum of $131,250,000 for the low Btu fuel gas demonstration plant (project 76-1-c) authorized by section 101(b)(1) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $150,000,000). (5) There is authorized an additional sum of $41,000,000 for the ten megawatt central receiver solar thermal powerplant, Barstow, California (project 76-2-b), authorized by section 101(b)(2) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $47,250,000): Provided, That if the solar electrical generating facility hereby supported contributes electricity to a distribution network serving the public on a commercial basis and if any Federal monetary contribution is included in the rate base for the purpose of computing return on capital investment to such utilities, that portion of the capital costs derived from Federal funds and included in the rate base shall be recovered with interest from the revenues of the solar facility. (6) There is authorized an additional sum of $24,000,000 for the Tokamak fusion test reactor, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, Plainsboro, New Jersey (project 76-5-a), authorized by section 101(b)(5) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $238,600,000). (7) There is authorized an additional sum of $1,750,000 for the conversion of existing steamplants to coal capability, gaseous diffusion plants and Feed Materials Production Center, Fernald, Ohio (project 76-8-e), authorized by section 101(b)(8) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $15,250,000). (8) There is authorized an additional sum of $107,630,000 for the enriched uranium production facilities, gas centrifuge (project 76-8-g), authorized by section 101(b)(8) of Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $362,630,000). (9) There is authorized an additional sum of $5,500,000 for the MHD component development and integration facility (project 77-1-d) authorized by Public Law 94-373 (for a total project authorization of $13,200,000). (10) There is authorized an additional sum of $5,000,000 for the high performance fuel laboratory, Richland, Washington (A-E only) (project 77-4-c) (for a total project authorization of $6,500,000). (11) There is authorized an additional sum of $23,000,000 for the fuel storage facility, Richland, Washington (project 77-4-d) (for a total project authorization of $30,000,000). (12) there is authorized an additional $3,200,000 for the 14 Mev intense neutron source facility, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico (project 76-5-b) authorized by Public Law 94-187 (for a total project authorization of $25,300.000). SEC. 103. Public Law 93-276, as amended, is further amended by rescinding therefrom authorization for project 75-5-g, molten salt breeder reactor (preliminary planning preparatory to possible future

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/107

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 demonstration project), $1,500,000, except for any funds heretofore obligated. SEC. 104. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of Liw, jurisdiction over matters transferred to the Department of Energy from the Energy Research and Development Administration which on the effective date of such transfer were required by law, regulation, or administrative order to be made on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing may be assigned to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or retained by the Secretary at his discretion. (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Energy shall not be required to delegate to the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration any energy research, development, and demonstration function vested in the Secretary, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act, the Geothermal Research, Development and Demonstration Act, the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development and Demonstration Act, the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act, the Solar Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act, and the Energy Reorganization Act. Additionally, the Secretary may utilize the capabilities of the Energy Information Administration as he deems appropriate for the conduct of such programs. (c) As part of the Department of Energy's responsibility to keep the Congress fully and currently informed, the Secretary shall make the following reports: (i) any proposal by the Secretary of the Department of Energy to terminate or make major changes in activities of the Government-owned and contractor-operated facilities, the national laboratories, energy research centers and the operations offices managing such laboratories, shall not be implemented until the Secretary transmits the proposal, together with all pertinent data, to the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, and waits a period of thirty calendar days (not including any day on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three calendar days to a day certain) from the date on which such report is received by such committees; and (ii) by January 31, 1978, the Secretary shall file a full and complete report on each such proposal which he has implemented, as described in the preceding paragraph, and any major program structure change with the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate. SEC. 105. (a) The Secretary of Energy shall prepare and submit to the Congress within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act a study which considers the available options, including, but not limited to— (1) Federal technical and financial aid in support of decommissioning high level waste disposal operations at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center; (2) Federal operation of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center for the purposes of decommissioning existing facilities and disposing of existing high level wastes, including a demonstration program for the solidification of high level wastes for permanent burial;

92 STAT. 53

Jurisdiction over functions, transfer. 42 USC 7151a.

42 USC 7135a.

Reports to congressional committees. 42 USC 7257 note.

Study, submittal to Congress.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 61

Question. 61 - OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative?

(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?

(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?

(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion?

Art. 1 - Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

Objection 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above (Q[58], A[2]). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice.

Objection 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice.

Objection 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.

Objection 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, commutations."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], AA[7],8), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution.

Reply to Objection 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.

Art. 2 - Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A[1]). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice.

Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.

Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.

On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is the mean.

Reply to Objection 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion.

Reply to Objection 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.

Art. 3 - Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.

Objection 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.

Objection 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds.

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice directs distributions, and another commutations."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[51], AA[8],10), justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.

If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Art. 4 - Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to Mat. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Objection 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Objection 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation.

I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): "He shall render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated above (Q[59], A[3]).

In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above (A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons.

Reply to Objection 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.


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 92 STAT. 54

Public hearings.

Public comments on study, submittal to Congress.

Ante, p. 48. Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, S.C, ^^^^y-

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (3) permanent Federal ownership of and responsibility for all or part of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center, and Federal receipt of the license from the present co-licensees; and (4) use of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center for other purposes. (b) Preparation of such study shall be in cooperation with the Nuclear Kegulatory Commission and other Federal agencies, the State of New York, the industrial participants, and the public, and the Secretary of Energy shall conduct informational public hearings (in lieu of any formal administrative hearings) prior to completion of the study. The study shall recommend allocation of existing and future responsibilities among the Federal Government, the State of New York, and present industrial participants in the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. (c) Ninety days prior to submission of the study to the Congress the Secretary of Energy shall release the proposed study for comment by interested parties, and such comments as are received shall be submitted as attachments to the final study submitted to the Congress. (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as intending to commit the Federal Government to any new assistance or participation in the Western New York Nuclear Service Center, nor as relieving any party of any duties or responsibilities under any law, regulation, or contract to provide for the safe storage of nuclear waste. (e) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section. there is included in subsection 101(20) of this Act authorization of appropriations in the amount of $1,000,000. SEC. 106. (a) The Department of Energy shall conduct a study of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant located in South Carolina to determine if that facility may be utilized in support of the nonproliferation objectives of the United States. (b) The study required under subsection (a) shall— (1) include an evaluation of the multinational and international management options available for utilizing the Barnwell facility; (2) include an evaluation of how Barnwell facility might be used to contribute to the INFCE, including preliminary studies on siting and design for adjacent facilities to the Barnwell Separations Plant to solidify liquid waste and mixed oxide evolving from the chemical separations process (these preliminary efforts being consistent with similar efforts undertaken as part of the I N F C E); (3) include an evaluation of a possible role for the IAEA in utilization of Barnwell facility for international non-proliferation programs; (4) include an evaluation of the means b;y^ which the Barnwell facility could be used in demonstration of improved safeguards equipment and proceedings; (5) include an evaluation of how the Barnwell facility can be used to complement the United States-approved research and development program at the Japanese Tokai Mura Reprocessing Plant, and non-proliferation research activities to be undertaken at the British Windscale Reprocessing Plant; and (6) include an evaluation of whether and how the Barnwell facility might be transferred to the Federal Government. (c) In carrying out the study required under subsection (a) due consideration shall be given to the impact which the effective and

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 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 efficient use of resources and the independence of resource supply can have in assuring our national security objectives. (d) The study shall be completed and a report submitted to the Congress not later than six months after the date that funds are appropriated for carrying out the purposes of this section. In addition, the report shall include recommendations and funding requirements to implement recommended programs resulting from such study. (e) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, there is included in subsection 101(20) of this Act an authorization of appropriations in the amount of $1,000,000. SEC. 107. Department of Energy is hereby authorized to nndertako studies, in cooperation with other nations, on a multinational or international basis designed to determine the general feasibility of expanding capacity of existing spent fuel storage facilities; to enter into agreements, subject to the consent of the Congress (by joint or concurrent resolution or legislation hereafter enacted), with other nations or groups of nations, for providing appropriate support to increase international or multinational spent fuel storage capacity; to conduct studies on the feasibility of establishing regional storage sites; and to conduct studies on international transportation and storage systems. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, there is included in subsection 101(20) of this Act authorization of appropriations in the amount of $20,000,000: Provided, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, that none of the funds made available to the Secretary of Energy under any other authorization or appropriation Act shall be used, directly or indirectly, for the repurchase, transportation or storage of any foreign spent nuclear fuel (including anj'^ nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the legal ownership or control of the fuel or the reactor, and regardless of the origin or licensing of the fuel or the reactor, but not including fuel irradiated in a research reactor, and not including fuel irradiated in a power reactor if the President determines that (1) use of funds for repurchase, transportation or storage of such fuel is required by an emergency situation, (2) it is in the interest of the common defense and security of the United States to take such action, and (3) he notifies the Congress of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation and justification thereof, as soon as possible) unless the President formally notifies, with the report information specified herein, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives of such use of funds thirty calendar days, during such time as either House of Congress is in session, before the commitment, expenditure, or obligation of such funds: And -provided further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, that none of tHe funds appropriated pursuant to this Act or any other funds made available to the Secretary of Energy under any other authorization or appropriation Act shall be used, directly or indirectly, for the repurchase, transportation, or storage of any such foreign spent nuclear fuel for storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, in the United States, unless the use of the funds for that specific purpose has been (1) previously and expressly authorized by Congress in legislation hereafter enacted, (2) previously and expressly authorized by a concurrent resolution, or (3) the President submits a plan for such use, with the report information specified herein, thirty days during which the Congress is in continuous session,

92 STAT. 55

Report, submittal to Congress.

Ante, p. 48. Spent fuel storage facilities, studies and agreements. 22 USC 3224si.

Report to congressional committees.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/110

 92 STAT. 56 31 USC 1301 "ote.

PUBLIC LAW 9 5 - 2 3 8 — F E B. 25, 1978 as defined in the I m p o u n d m e n t Control Act of 1974, prior to snch use and neither House of Congress approves a resolution of disapproval of the plan prior to the expiration of the aforementioned thirty-day period. I f such a resolution of disapproval has been introduced, but has not been reported by the Committee on or before the twentieth day after transmission of the Presidential message, a privileged motion shall be in order in the respective body to discharge the Committee from further consideration of the resolution and to provide for its immediate consideration, using the procedures specified for consideration of aji impoundment resolution in section 1017 of the I m p o u n d m e n t Control Act of 1974 (31 U.S.C. 1407). Any report or plan proposed under this proviso shall include information and any supporting documentation thereof relating to policy objectives, technical description and discussion, geographic information, cost data, justification and projections, legal and regulatory considerations, environmental impact information and any related bilateral or international agreements, arrangements or understandings: And provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed in any executive branch action, administrative proceeding, regulatory proceeding, or legal proceeding as being intended to delay, modify, or reverse the Memorandum and Order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of June 28, 1977, for the issuance of License No. X S N M - 8 4 5 to the agent-applicant for the Government of I n d i a and the subsequent export thereby licensed of the special nuclear material to be used as fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station or any other order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a license for the export of special nuclear material and subsequent exports thereby licensed, or any consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory (Commission of a license application for the export of special nuclear material. TITLE II—GENERAL

PROVISIONS

SEC. 201. Title I of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 is amended by a d d i n g at the end thereof the following new section: "PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO AXXUAL AUTHORIZATION ACTS

42 USC 5821. 42 USC 2017. 42 USC 5915. Post, p. 81.

" SEC. 111. (a) All appropriations made to the Energy Research and Development Adndnistration or the Administrator shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be subject to annual authorization in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, section 16 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, and section 305 of this Act. The provisions of this section shall apply with respect to appropriations made pursuant to the Act providing such authorization (hereinafter in this section referred to as 'annual authorization Act s '). " (b)(1) Funds a p p r o p r i a t e d pursuant to an annual authorization Act for 'Operating expenses' may be used for— " (A) the construction or acquisition of any facilities, or major items of equipment, which may be required at locations other than installations of the Administration, for the performance of research, development, and demonstration activities, and " (B) g r a n t s to any organization for purchase or construction of research facilities. No such funds shall be used under this subsection for the acquisition of land. Fee title to all such facilities and items of equipment shall be vested in the United States, unless the Administrator or his designee

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/111

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 determines in writing that the research, development, and demonstration authorized by such Act would best be implemented by permitting fee title or any other property interest to be vested in an entity other than the United States; but before approving the vesting of such title or interest in such entity, the Administrator shall (i) transmit such determination, together with all pertinent data, to the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and (ii) wait a period of thirty calendar days (not including any day in which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three calendar days to a day certain), unless prior to the expiration of such period each such committee has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action. "(2) No funds shall be used under paragraph (1) for any facility or major item of equipment, including collateral equipment, if the estimated cost to the Federal Government exceeds $5,000,000 in the case of such a facility or $2,000,000 in the case of such an item of equipment, unless such facility or item has been previously authorized by the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, or the Administrator— "(A) transmit to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on such facility or item showing its nature, purpose, and estimated cost, and "(B) waits a period of thirty calendar days (not including any day in which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three calendar days to a day certain), unless prior to the expiration of such period each such committee has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action. "(c)(1) Not to exceed 1 per centum of all funds appropriated pursuant to any annual authorization Act for 'Operating expenses' may be used by the Administrator to construct, expand, or modify laboratories and other facilities, including the acquisition of land, at any location under the control of the Administrator, if the Administrator determines that (A) such action would be necessary because of changes in the national programs authorized to be funded by such Act or because of new scientific or engineering developments, and (B) deferral of such action until the enactment of the next authorization Act would be inconsistent with the policies established by Congress for the Administration. "(2) No funds may be obligated for expenditure or expended under paragraph (1) for activities described in such paragraph unless— " (A) a period of thirty calendar days (not including any day in which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three calendar days to a day certain) has passed after the Administrator has transmitted to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate a written report containing a full and complete statement concerning (i) the nature of the construction, expansion, or modification involved, (ii) the cost thereof, including the cost of any real estate action pertaining thereto, and (iii) the reapon why such construction, expansion, or modification is necessary and in the national interest, or

92 STAT. 57

Report to congressional committees;

Expenditure limitations.

Report to congressional committees.

Limitation.

Report, transmittal to cong committees. Notice.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/112

 92 STAT. 58

Report, transmittal to cong committees. Notice.

Funds merger, limitation.

Construction design services.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 "(B) each such committee before the expiration of such period has transmitted to the Administrator a written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action; except that this paragraph shall not apply to any project the estimated total cost of which does not exceed $50,000. "(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in the authorization Act involved— "(A) no amount appropriated pursuant to any annual authorization Act may be used for any program in excess of the amount actually authorized for that particular program by such Act, and " ( B j no amount appropriated pursuant to any annual authorization Act may be used for any program which has not been presented to, or requested of the Congress, unless (i) a period of thirty calendar days (not including any day in which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three calendar days to a day certain) has passed after the receipt by the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate of notice given by the Administrator containing a full and complete statement of the action proposed to be taken and the facts and circumstances relied upon in support of such proposed action, or (ii) each such committee before the expiration of such period has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action. "(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or the authorization Act involved, the aggregate amount available for use within the categories of coal, petroleum and natural gas, oil shale, solar, geothermal, nuclear energy (non-weapons), environment and safety, and conservation from sums appropriated pursuant to an annual authorization Act may not, as a result of reprograming, be decreased by more than 10 per centum of the total of the sums appropriated pursuant to such Act for those categories. "(e) Subject to the applicable requirements and limitations of this section and the authorization Act involved, when so specified in an appropriation Act, amounts appropriated pursuant to any annual authorization Act for 'Operating expenses' or for 'Plant and capital equipment' may be merged with any other amounts appropriated for like purposes pursuant to any other Act authorizing appropriations for the Administration: Provided, That no such amounts appropriated for 'Plant and capital equipment' may be merged with amounts appropriated for 'Operating expenses'. "(f) When so specified in an appropriation Act, amounts appropriated pursuant to any annual authorization Act for 'Operating expenses' or for 'Plant and capital equipment' may remain available until expended. " (g) The Administrator is authorized to perform construction design services for any administration construction project whenever (1) such construction project has been included in a proposed authorization bill transmitted to the Congress by the Administration, and (2) the Administration determines that the project is of such urgency in order to meet the needs of national defense or protection of life and property or health and safety that construction of the project should be initiated promptly upon enactment of legislation appropriating funds for its construction. "(h) When so specified in appropriation Acts, any moneys received by the Administration may be retained and used for operating expenses, and may remain available until expended, notwithstanding

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/113

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 the provisions of section 3617 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 484); except that— "(1) this subsection shall not apply with respect to sums received from disposal of property under the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955 or the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, as amended, or with respect to fees received for tests or investigations under the Act of May 16, 1910, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2301; 50 U.S.C. 98h; 30 U.S.C. 7); and "(2) revenues received by the Administration from the enrichment of uranium shall (when so specified) be retained and used for the specific purpose of ofi^settin^ costs incurred by the Administration in providing uranium enrichment service activities, "(i) When so specified in an appropriation Act, transfers of sums from the 'Operating expenses' appropriation made pursuant to an annual authorization Act may be made to other agencies of the Government for the performance of the work for which the appropriation is made, and in such cases the sums so transferred may be merged with the appropriations to which they are transferred.". SEC. 202. (a) The Secretary of Energy is authorized to start any project set forth in section 102(a)(1) through (12) only if at the time the project is started the then currently estimated cost does not exceed by more than 25 per centum the estimated cost set forth for that project; and the total cost of any such project shall not exceed the estimated cost set forth for that project by more than 25 per centum (if such estimated cost was $5,000,000 or more) unless and until appropriations covering such excess are authorized. (b) The Secretary of Energy is authorized to start any project under section 102(a) (13) only if the maximum currently estimated cost of such project does not exceed $750,000 and the then maximum currently estimated cost of any building included in the project does not exceed $300,000 and the total cost of all projects undertaken under such section shall not exceed the estimated cost set forth in such section by more than 10 per centum. SKC. 203. The Secretary of Energy, in C(X)peration with the Secretary of State, shall report to the Committees on Science and Technology and International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Energy and Natural Resources and Foreign Relations of the Senate, within six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the effects of the April 20, 1977, message from the President of the United States, "Establishing for the United States a Strong and Effective Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy", on nuclear research and development cooperative agreements. This report shall include impacts of the message and related initiatives through the promulgation, repeal, or modification of Executive orders. Presidential proclamations, treaties, other international agreements, and other pertinent documents of the President, the Executive Office of the President, the administrative agencies, and the departments, on cooperation between the United States and any other nation in the research, development, demonstration, and commercialization of all nuclear fission and nuclear fusion technologies. After the initial report, the Administrator shall report to such Committees on each subsequent major related initiative. SEC. 204. (a) In carrying out the programs for which funds are authoiized by this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall provide a realistic and adequate opportunity for small business concerns to participate in such programs to the optimum extent feasible consistent with the size and nature of the projects and activities involved.

39-194 O—80—pt. 1

8: QL3

92 STAT. 59

Funds, transfer.

Limitation. Ante, p. 49.

Limitation.

Report to congressional committees. 22 USC 2429 note.

Small businesses participation in programs. 42 USC 7256 note.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/114

 92 STAT. 60 Report to congressional committees.

Transfer of municipal installations, annual assistance.

42 USC 2391.

Report to congressional committees.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (b) At least once every six months, or upon request, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate a full report on the actions taken in carrying out subsection (a) during the preceding six months, including the extent to which small business concerns are participating in the programs involved and in projects and activities of various types and sizes within each such program, and indicating the steps currently being taken to assure such participation in the future. SEC. 205. (a) Section 91 of chapter 9 of the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955 is amended— (1) by striking out subsection a. and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "a. From the date of transfer of any municipal installations to a governmental or other entity at or for the community, the Administrator is authorized, for a period of ten years, to make annual assistance payments of just and reasonable sums to the State, county, or local entity having jurisdiction to collect property taxes or to the entity receiving the installation transferred hereunder: Provided, however, That with respect to the cities of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Richland, Washington, the Richland School District, the T^s Alamos School Board, and the county of Los Alamos, New Mexico, the Administrator is authorized to continue to make assistance payments of just and reasonable sums after expiration of such ten-year period: Provided further, That the Administrator is also authorized to make payments of just and reasonable sums to Anderson County and Roane County, Tennessee. In determining the amount and recipient of such payments the Administrator shall consider— "(1) the approximate real property taxes and assessments for local improvements which would be paid to the governmental entity upon property within the community if such property were not exempt from taxation by reason of Federal ownership; " (2) the maintaining of municipal services at a level which will not impede the recruitment or retention of personnel essential to the Energy Research and Development Administration programs; " (3) the fiscal problems peculiar to the governmental entity by reason of the construction at the community as a single-purpose national defense installation under emergency conditions; "(4) the municipal services and other burdens imposed on the governmental or other entities at the community by the United States in its operations in the project area; and " (5) the tax revenues and sources available to the governmental entity, its efforts and diligence in collection of taxes, assessment of pix)perty, and the efficiency of its operations."; and (2) by striking out subsection d. and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "d. With respect to any entity not less than six months prior to the expiration of the ten-year period referred to in subsection a. (or not less than six months prior to June 30, 1979, in the case of the cities of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Richland, Washington, and the Richland School District; or not less than six months prior to June 30, 1986, in the case of Anderson County and Roane County, Tennessee, and the Los Alamos School Board; and not less than six months prior to June 30, 1987, in the case of the county of Los Alamos, New Mexico), the Administrator shall present to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate recommendations as to the need for any further assistance payments to such entity.".

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/115

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 (b) Chapter 9 of such Act is further amended by striking out section 94 and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "SEC. 94. CONTRACTS.—The Administrator is authorized, without regard to section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, to enter into a contract with any governmental or other entity to which payments are authorized to be made pursuant to section 91, obligating the Administrator to make to such entity the payments directed or authorized to be made by section 91: Provided, however, That the term of such contracts, in the case of the cities of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Richland, Washington, and the Richland School District, shall not extend beyond June 30, 1979; and in the case of the Los Alamos School Board shall not extend beyond June 30, 1986; and in the case of the county of Los Alamos, New Mexico, shall not extend beyond June 30, 1987.". SEC. 206. (a) Section 6 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(c) Based upon the comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a), the Administrator shall develop and transmit to the Congress, on or before September 1, 1978, a comprehensive environment and safety program to insure the full consideration and evaluation of all environmental, health, and safety impacts of each element, program, or initiative contained in the nuclear and nonnuclear energy research, development, and demonstration plans.". (b) Section 15(a) of such Act is amended— (1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (2), (2) by striking out the comma at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof "; and", and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph: "(4) a detailed description of the environmental and safety research, development, and demonstration activities carried out and in progress including the procedures adopted to mitigate undesirable environmental and safety impacts,". SEC. 207. (a) Section 7(a) of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5906) is amended— (1) by striking out "and" after the semicolon at the end of paragraph (5), (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting in lieu thereof "; and", and (3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(7) Federal loan guarantees and commitments thereof as provided in section 19.". (b) The Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5901, et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

92 STAT. 61 Contract authority. 42 USC 2394. 31 USC 665. 42 USC 2391.

eomprehensive environment and safety program, transmittal to Congress.

42 USC 5905.

42 USC 5914.

Infra.

LOAN GUARANTEES FOR ALTERNATIVE FUEL DEMONSTRATION FACILITIES

"SEC. 19. (a) It is the purpose of this section— 42 USC 5919. "(1) to assure adequate Federal support to foster a demonstration program to produce alternative fuels from coal, oil shale, biomass, and other domestic resources; "(2) to authorize assistance, through loan guarantees under subsection (b) and (y) for construction and startup and related costs, to demonstration facilities for the conversion of domestic coal, oil shale, biomass, and other domestic resources into alternative fuels; and

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/116

 92 STAT. 62

Rules and regulations.

Cooperative agreemeiits.

42 USC 5907. Limitation.

Financial assistance, eligibility for certain facilities.

PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978 "(3) to gather information about the technological, economic, environmental, and social costs, benefits, and impacts of such demonstration facilities. "(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection and subsection (y) of this section the Administrator is authorized, in accordance with such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to guarantee and to make commitments to guarantee, in such manner and subject to such conditions (not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act) as he deems appropriate, the payment of interest on, and the principal balance of, bonds, debentures, notes, and other obligations issued by, or on behalf of, any borrower for the purpose of financing the construction and startup costs of demonstration facilities for the conversion of domestic coal, oil shale, biomass, and other domestic resources into alternative fuels: Provided, That no loan guarantee for a full sized oil shale facility shall be provided under this section until after successful demonstration of a modular facility producing between six and ten thousand barrels per day, taking into account such considerations as water usage, environmental effects, waste disposal, labor conditions, health and safety, and the socioeconomic impacts on local communities: Provided further, That no loan guarantee shall be available under this subsection for the manufacture of component parts for demonstration facilities eligible for assistance under this subsection. "(2) An applicant for any financial assistance under this section shall provide information to the Administrator in such form and with such content as the Administrator deems necessary. "(3) Prior to issuing any guarantee under this section the Administrator shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the timing, interest rate, and substantial terms and conditions of such guarantee. The Secretary of the Treasury shall insure to the maximum extent feasible that the timing, interest rate, and substantial terms and conditions of such guarantee will have the minimum possible impact on the capital markets of the T"ni+ed States, taking into account other Federal direct and indirect securities activities. "(4) The full faith and credit of the United States is pledged to the payment of all guarantees issued under this section with respect to principal and interest. "(5)(A) The Administrator is authorized, in the case of a facility for the conversion of oil shale to alternative fuels which is determined by the Administrator pursuant to the proviso in paragraph (1) of this subsection, to be constructed at a modular size, to enter into a cooperative agreement with the applicant in accordance with section 8 of this Act and the other provisions of this Act to share the estimated total design and construction costs, plus operation and maintenance costs, of such modular facility. The Federal share shall not exceed 75 per centum of such costs. All receipts for the sale of any products produced during the operation of the facility shall be used to offset the costs incurred in the operation and maintenance of the facility. The provisions of subsections (d), (e), (k), (m), (p), (s), (t), (u), (v), (w), and (x) shall apply to any such modular facility. The provisions of this section shall apply to any loan guarantee for such modular facility. "(B) After successful demonstration of the modular facility, as determined by the Administrator, the facility is eligible for financial assistance under this section for purposes of expansion to a full sized

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 92 Part 1.djvu/117

 PUBLIC LAW 95-238—FEB. 25, 1978

92 STAT. 63

facility and the applicant may purchase the Federal interest in the modular facility as represented by the Federal share thereof by means of (i) a cash payment to the United States, or (ii) a share of the product or sales resulting from such expanded operation, as determined by the Administrator. If expansion of such facility is determined not to be warranted by the Administrator, he may, at the option of the applicant, dispose of the modular facility to the applicant at not less than fair market value, as determined by the Administrator as of the date of the disposal, or otherwise dispose of it, in accordance with applicable provisions of law, and distribute the net proceeds thereof, after expenses of such disposal, to the applicant in proportion to the applicant's share of the costs of such facility. "(6) To the extent possible, loan guarantees shall be issued on the basis of competitive bidding among guarantee applicants in a particular technology area. "(c) The Administrator, with due regard for the need for competition, shall guarantee or make a commitment to guarantee any obligation under subsection (b) or (y) only if— "(1) the Administrator is satisfied that the financial assistance applied for is necessary to encourage financial participation; "(2) the amount guaranteed to any borrower at any time does Limitation, not exceed— "(A) an amount equal to 75 per centum of the project cost of the demonstration facility as estimated at the time the guarantee is issued, which cost shall not include amounts expended for facilities and equipment used in the extraction of a mineral other than coal or shale, and in the case of coal only to the extent that the Administrator determines that the coal is to be converted to alternative fuel; and "(B) an amount equal to 60 per centum of that portion of the actual total project cost of any demonstration facility which exceeds the project cost of such facility as estimated at the time the loan guarantee is issued; "(3) the Administrator has determined that there will be a continued reasonable assurance of full repayment; "(4) the obligation is subject to the condition that it not be subordinated to any other financing; "(5) the Administrator has determined, taking into consideration all reasonably available forms of assistance under this section and other Federal and State statutes, that the impacts resulting from the proposed demonstration facility have been fully evaluated by the borrower, the Administrator, and the Governor of the affected State, and that effective steps have been taken or will be taken in a timely manner to finance community planning and development costs resulting from such facility under this section, under other provisions of law, or by other means; "(6) the maximum maturity of the obligation does not exceed Maturity twenty years, or 90 per centum of the projected useful economic limitation. life of the physical assets of the demonstration facility covered by the guarantee, whichever is less, as determined by the Administrator; "(7) the Administrator has determined that, in the case of any Facilities on demonstration or modular facility planned to be located on Indian lands, Indian lands, the appropriate Indian tribe, wuth the approval tribal consent. of the Secretary of the Interior, has given written consent to such location;

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