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 tion of the United States * * * constitutes, as we think, a wrong and injury not the subject of compensation by a mere money standard, but fairly within the doctrine where exemplary damages have been allowed." And the court held that for this invasion of such a right the jury would have been entitled to give a verdict for the full amount claimed, which, being six thousand dollars, of course bore no relation to the few dollars of mere property actually involved. Indeed, so far as the exercise of liberty in relation to national trade is concerned, it is peculiarly close in analogy to the cases of franchises, which have always been held to be governed by the rule of policy applicable to real and personal property—only in this case the sanctions behind protection are peculiarly high. For the right to engage in national trade is a franchise, whether secured to individuals or corporations, emanating not from the common law, but the Constitution itself—the supreme law of the land!


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Whatever the crimes perpetrated in the name of "liberty," they are not a circumstance to those sought to be justified by the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in United States vs. Knight.

And yet, that was perhaps the most ably argued of all the trust cases, and resulted in two of the most learned opinions—those of the Chief Justice and of Mr. Justice Harlan—to be found in the reports. Indeed, in the one or the other of those opinions can be found the foundation of most of the doctrines that have been enunciated since.

And, what is striking, is that, so far as the law was concerned, the difference of opinion was negligible.

The difficulty was not that the Chief Justice did not know the law of the case, but that he knew so much more than some of his readers—certainly this one—that he assumed understanding where instruction might be needed.

The Supreme Court says in Arkansas vs. Bank: "Whether the Supreme Court was warranted in assuming the facts, as it sets them forth, is no concern of ours. The important thing is that it was at pains to state them, and that it can have had no purpose in doing so other than to establish a liability. * * * If the statute imposed liability without, etc., * * * there was no need to go into these details."

61

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 If this be the right method of approach, and, of course, it is, being pointed out by the Supreme Court, there should be no difficulty as to the Knight case.

In the Knight case, the purpose being to prove non-liability, only those facts were necessarily inquired into whose presence would create liability, if found.

As the meaning of the decision, therefore, absolutely depends upon these findings, let us seek it in them.

In the first place, it was thought necessary to find that there was a complete purchase, a complete change of property. The reason is obvious.

In the second, that every one was left free. Again the reason is obvious.

In the third, that it was a case of contract, and the provisions related solely to that purchase and not to subsequent arrangements as to trade. Again the reason is obvious.

Again, that the refineries had continued to operate and had actually increased their product, that the object of purchase "was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the commodity;" "that there was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce" and, finally, that what was done was either "sanctioned," or "permitted" "by the States of residence or creation." And the decision—a veritable mine of law—held, of course correctly, that, under these findings, the restraint was indirect and, therefore, lawful.

Let the converse of this be stated:


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 If there had been invasion of liberty, proof of intention to restrain national trade, the control of discretion as to a business not completely owned, unified or merged, the deprivation of the public of a great utility for supplying a necessary food; a purpose to profit by non use, by stifling competition, instead of through production, acts prohibited by the States of creation or residence as in violation of their public policy as well as tending to a diminution of National trade—what then? The later cases fully answer. There would have been "tendency," direct restraint, illegality! And, if the method of approach now adopted (and it has the Supreme Court's sanction) be correct, that is what the Knight case decides!

It is the present purpose to demonstrate this. There has been a tendency to criticise the findings of the Knight case, especially that relating to intention or tendency—the sequel has unquestionably justified Mr. Justice Harlan's fears in that respect. But it is not fair to judge any case by conditions of trade arising or acts committed after the decision has been rendered. For the present purposes, it may not be important whether the inferences of fact were correct or not, but it well illustrates the law to consider them. Indeed, were they not the inferences universally drawn before the trusts had debauched trade to accomplish crime? Why was a man permitted to covenant that he would protect a good-will that he had sold? Simply because every one, for centuries, had considered that the best way of insuring that the business would go on; would maintain, or increase trade. No one had thought that a man would invest capital in a business that he might


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 destroy it. Just a few months before the Knight case this subject had been carefully considered by the House of Lords itself, and a similar conclusion reached. If, therefore, the inference was unjustifiable in the one case, neither of the greatest tribunals of the world was correct, and the Supreme Court had the justification of the precedent just set by the House of Lords.

The importance of the findings that "the manifest object" was to profit by use, not abuse, by manufacture, not restraint, can be understood when it is remembered that the Chief Justice was professedly writing the opinion "in the light of the common law," and concluding that all that was done was "sanctioned" by it. The great decision upon that law, with which the Chief Justice was of course perfectly familiar, was Oregon vs. Winsor. There, too, an instrumentality had been changed from one owner to another, and the transfer had also been held "sanctioned," "permitted," but why? The answer to this covers the whole subject. Simply because it "had no tendency to destroy the usefulness of the steamer, and did not deprive the country of any industrial agency. The transaction merely transferred the steamer from the employment of one company to that of another, situated and doing business in another State. It involved no * * * cessation or diminution of its business whatever. The presumption is that the arrangement * * * promoted the general interests of commerce. * * * The public was not injured by being deprived of any of the


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 ness enterprise of the country. * * * The vendees did not incapacitate themselves from carrying on business just as they had previously done and in the same locality. * * * The vendees did not incapacitate themselves from carrying on business. * * * Their business was rather facilitated by the arrangement." It is impossible that the Chief Justice had not this decision in mind as he had shortly before expressly followed it in Gibbs vs. Gas Company, where he himself says: "It is also too well settled to admit of doubt that a corporation cannot disable itself by contract from performing the public duties which it has undertaken and by agreement compel itself to make public accommodation or convenience subservient to its private interests." In view of all this, it is absolutely impossible to say that he was finding that it was lawful and "sanctioned" by the States, or any of them, to deprive the country of its industrial agencies, to destroy business, stop commerce and production, that national trade might be limited and the profits of monopoly be swollen!

No State ever sanctioned such public evil, and no judge ever knew this better than the Chief Justice. The whole case manifestly turned on the careful findings of its facts: the fact that the purpose was to profit by production, not by restraining commerce either directly or indirectly. For otherwise, the question of "indirection" could not possibly have been raised at all, since complete lawfulness is its very foundation.

This can, however, fortunately now be demonstrated by two later opinions of the Chief Justice. No sooner


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 had this decision been rendered than it was promptly abused by the trusts; and, after awhile, the Securities case, identical in method, came before the court, and it then found "tendency" as a fact on its added knowledge of trust methods, but it really followed the law of the Knight case, departing only from its inference of fact, which the trusts bad proved no longer tenable, by their subsequent misconduct.

And this is established by the unanimous opinion in the Harriman case. There Chief Justice Fuller says: "The objection was that the exercise of its powers, whether those of owner or of trustee, would tend to prevent competition, and thus to restrain commerce. Some of our number thought that as the Securities Company owned the stock the relief sought could not be granted, but the conclusion was that the possession of the power which, if exercised, would prevent competition, brought the case within the statute, no matter what the tenure of title was."

That is "tendency" controlled; not the question as to whether that unlawful thing resulted from one form of forbidden thing, rather than from another. But if this be not sufficient demonstration that the Knight case turned on the innocence of intent then believed in, Loewe vs. Lawlor certainly must close the discussion, for the Chief Justice again expressly says, p. 297:

"We do not pause to comment on cases such as United States vs. Knight (156 U. S. 1), Hopkins vs. United States (171 U. S. 578), and Anderson vs. United States, in which the undisputed facts showed that the purpose of the agreement was not


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 '''to obstruct or restrain interstate commerce. The object and intention of the combination determined its legality'''." And that is a better summary of the decision in the Knight case than any of its critics has ever reached; and, what is better still, it is the conclusion that the whole history of the law requires!


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, Thomas (1747-1813)


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So far as criminal liability under the Act is concerned, intra-state acts are only important as evidence tending to prove the interstate offence. The making of the combination, etc., is in and of itself the offence; and nothing further need be said on this phase of the matter.

But where a recovery under the Seventh Section is sought, they become of great importance; indeed, they may be vital.

The Act was manifestly drawn by a masterhand, as is shown in many respects.

As an example, acts in restraint must be of two or more; there must be some combined action. It was not overlooked that, otherwise, everyone who did not use his property, or stopped using his property to its full working capacity, might find himself subject to suits and penalties.

But the strongest illustration of the legal knowledge and precise and proper use of words of the drafters of the Act is found in this Seventh Section: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property * * * may sue therefore * * * and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained," etc. No one not an able lawyer could have drawn that section, for it exactly follows the principles of the common law.

The right to sue is, as at common law, made dependent not upon damage at all, but upon


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, Thomas (1764-1843)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, Thomas (1773-1858)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William (1690-1741)


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 "injury"; that is, "injuria," which, in turn, is "invasion of legal rights"; "obstruction," or "hindrance," as Lord Holt would have called it.

But at common law, as Broom says (Maxims) at p. 157: "Although damnum absque injuria is a matter of frequent occurrence, yet injuria absque damno may be said to be unknown to our law; for 'a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage when a man is thereby hindered of his right.' Per Holt, C. J. Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." This is finely stated by Lord Esher, M. R., in Campanhia vs. British (1892), 2 Q. B., at p. 405: "Damages," he says, "cannot be asked for as being themselves a cause of action. No one can seek damages on the bare assertion that he is entitled to damages, and therefore claims damages. Damage is sometimes stated to be a cause of action, but then damage means injury. Damages are one of the reliefs asked for as the compensation for an injury. But then the injury is the cause of action." Which is almost a paraphrase of the Act!

The fundamental, the original purpose of damages was the preservation, the vindication of the enjoyment of rights; that is, of liberty itself; and, thus, arose the necessity of the constitutional right and provision guaranteeing a trial by jury in civil cases; for juries were always considered by freemen as the best appraisers of the value of that intangible thing called liberty, upon which, however, the value and enjoyment of all tangible things must ultimately depend. And no one but a jury has any constitutional right to fix them in an action for tort. Watt vs. Watt, (1905), A. C. 120.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William (1799-1871)


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 The framer of the Act must, therefore, have understood this, and in giving the action for the "injuria," not the mere pecuniary "damage," he not only made the Act conform with the general theory of the common law, but brought it within its liberty-protecting principles.

But he went further—following the Statute of James I, and knowing that in all cases the injury imports some damages, he provides that, in this case, for the better protection of trade, that damages, or any damage, shall be threefold.

This being all so, it follows that, as no action is given in the absence of "injuria," the Act positively contemplates and requires that some right, either at common or statutory law, or under the Constitution, must be obstructed or hindered by some part or act of the conspiracy, &c., to justify a suit under this statute.

But that means, and must mean, that two things are absolutely necessary to found a civil action. First, that two or more have combined in restraint of trade, or one or more have attempted to monopolize; and, second, that through that combination, or attempt, or some act a part of it, the plaintiff has been hindered in some right. Damage alone will not do; its absence alone is also not a defence.

This is well expressed in Rourke vs. Elk, 75 N. Y. App. Div., at p. 148.

This, then, brings us to the subject matter of this chapter.

As national and constitutional rights are, if not entirely, at least chiefly, the liberty or right to enjoy other rights; and as those other rights are, as we have already explained, also chiefly, if not entirely,


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William (1783?-1873)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William (1808-1888)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William James Erasmus


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 protected by and within State jurisdiction, an action for damage must, in practically every case, involve that which is both interstate and intra-state.

In other words, the object, or the intent, must be to invade national right; but the means equally must, almost of necessity, be some intra-state matter.

Nothing could be more thoroughly intra-state than the specific transactions described in Atlanta vs. Chattanooga, 203 U. S. 390.

Whilst our objects, our purposes, may be interstate, they must almost inevitably be achieved chiefly, if not entirely, through intra-state acts and things.

It is of the first importance to bear this in mind, as otherwise error cannot be avoided.

Take the Knight case, for example. There the object was to profit by manufacture, not by curtailing trade. It was held perfectly legal to control a number of Pennsylvania refineries with this object, though manufacture could not be carried on except through imports of raw sugars. In the Addyston case, it quite as much related to the control of manufactures, even, indeed, to a less control; but as, under the circumstances, it was fair to presume that the object was to lessen competition and thus restrain trade, it was unanimously held to be illegal; and just so in the Montague and the Loewe cases. Some control of manufactures was sought in each case; but the legality of that control was determined by the purpose, the object of that control, ascertained, of course, from its real tendency under the circumstances. Thus, in both the Knight and Montague cases, import into a State was a necessity of the business; but,


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, William Rae


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 as in the former the "manifest object" was to do the business, and thus probably increase imports, it was held to be legal, an indirect restraint; whilst in the latter, as the purpose was to curtail the plaintiff's business, it was held to be a direct and, therefore, illegal restraint of that interstate trade which was a necessary incident of it.

And it must be so in each case.

All things are of necessity within the States, and are all subject to State jurisdiction; and the national jurisdiction does not attach, cannot attach, until, or unless, a use of them is intended against nationally protected right; but when that intent, that object is once reasonably inferred from the natural and real tendency of what is done, the national jurisdiction is as firmly established as that of the State was primarily.

The manufacture of rifles must be a purely State matter; but those who manufacture them with the object of shooting every one who dares exercise his freedom to trade between two States, would find the national jurisdiction reached him, notwithstanding every rifle was made in a single State, and as a purely intra-state matter.

No doubt the Debs riots in Chicago were a local offence, committed in each separate instance within a State, but their reasonable results being to stop national trade, the Supreme Court found no difficulty in stopping them. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564.

Since, therefore, an inv~ion of a right which, in almost every conceivable case must be an intra-state right, is a necessity of an action under the Act, the argument that it is a defence to an action where


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson, Wiltshire


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Wilson-Patten, John


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Rh Those who possess this are capable of the highest kind of education, and become in time the legislators of the state—for laws are the universals which control the particulars of experience. Thus it is not true that in intent, Plato subordinated the individual to the social whole. But it is true that lacking the perception of the uniqueness of every individual, his incommensurability with others, and consequently not recognizing that a society might change and yet be stable, his doctrine of limited powers and classes came in net effect to the idea of the subordination of individuality.

We cannot better Plato's conviction that an individual is happy and society well organized when each individual engages in those activities for which he has a natural equipment, nor his conviction that it is the primary office of education to discover this equipment to its possessor and train him for its effective use. But progress in knowledge has made us aware of the superficiality of Plato's lumping of individuals and their original powers into a few sharply marked-off classes; it has taught us that original capacities are indefinitely numerous and variable. It is but the other side of this fact to say that in the degree in which society has become democratic, social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of individuals, not stratification by classes. Although his educational philosophy was revolutionary, it was none the less in bondage to static ideals. He thought that change or alteration was evidence of lawless flux; that true reality was unchangeable. Hence while he would radically change the existing state of society, his aim was to construct a state in which change would subsequently have no place. The final end of life is fixed; given a state framed with this end in view, not even minor details are to be altered. Though they might not be inherently important, yet if permitted they would inure the minds of men to the idea of change, and hence be dissolving and anarchic. The breakdown of his philosophy is made apparent in the fact that he could not

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 the prohibited combination or attempt is properly inferred that intra-state matters are involved is absurd, however constantly made.

Where there is the "dangerous probability," constituting tendency, the "object," the "intent," to invade national right, the fact that that object includes, and is furthered by intra-state matters is, as Chief Justice Fuller points out in Loewe vs. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, "negligible"; and this is as clearly pointed out in the Swift case, 196 U. S., at p. 397, and even before that in Montague vs. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38. And should require no further discussion!


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Winchcombe, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Winchelsea, Robert de


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Winchester, John


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If the theories herein advanced are correct, they should accord with and reconcile the cases, at least those in the Supreme Court.

The Knight case has been examined. It was decided "in the light" of such cases as Oregon vs. Winsor, and the Maxim case. When businesses were bought to add to prosperity, not to stifle competition; when the manifest purpose was only so to profit; when the trust was actually increasing product to fill the channels of trade; and before the real policy of buying productive agencies only to withdraw them from public service, although by those already having enormous capacity idle, was inaugurated by the trusts. The Chief Justice was right because he saw; Mr. Justice Harlan because he foresaw. But with "intent," "interest" and "tendency" in its legal sense added, the decision in the Securities case was a legal necessity of the Knight case, its legitimate offspring; though the misconduct of the trusts had even then only convinced a majority of the court of the extent of individual wrong-doing!

The Joint Traffic and Freight Association cases are likewise beyond criticism. The circuit courts and circuit courts of appeals had largely been misled by Mr. Justice Jackson's exceedingly able but very misleading opinion In re Greene. He there had said:

"The question of its (a contract's) reasonableness depends on the consideration whether it is more


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windebank, Francis


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106 trust to gradual improvements in education to bring about a better society which should then improve education, and so on indefinitely. Correct education could not come into existence until an ideal state existed, and after that education would be devoted simply to its conservation. For the existence of this state he was obliged to trust to some happy accident by which philosophic wisdom should happen to coincide with possession of ruling power in the state.

4. .—In the eighteenth-century philosophy we find ourselves in a very different circle of ideas. "Nature" still means something antithetical to existing social organization; Plato exercised a great influence upon Rousseau. But the voice of nature now speaks for the diversity of individual talent and for the need of free development of individuality in all its variety. Education in accord with nature furnishes the goal and the method of instruction and discipline. Moreover, the native or original endowment was conceived, in extreme cases, as nonsocial or even as antisocial. Social arrangements were thought of as mere external expedients by which these nonsocial individuals might secure a greater amount of private happiness for themselves.

Nevertheless, these statements convey only an inadequate idea of the true significance of the movement. In reality its chief interest was in progress and in social progress. The seeming antisocial philosophy was a somewhat transparent mask for an impetus toward a wider and freer society—towards cosmopolitanism. The positive ideal was humanity. In membership in humanity, as distinct from a state, man's capacities would be liberated; while in existing political organizations his powers were hampered and distorted to meet the requirements and selfish interests of the rulers of the state. The doctrine of extreme individualism was but the counterpart, the obverse, of ideals of the indefinite perfectibility of man and of a social organization having a scope

title: Page:Democracy and Education.djvu/125


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windele, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windet, James


text:
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 injurious to the public than is required to afford a fair protection to a party in whose favor it is secured."

And a complete misunderstanding of such cases as Mogul vs. McGregor. It had never been common law that the public might be "reasonably" robbed a little, if the malefactor but profited a great deal. That, as had always been the case, was directly contrary to the law. Judge Taft, Justice Harlan and Judge Lurton concurring, made this, at last, clear in the Addyston case, saying:

"In Mallen vs. May, Baron Parke said: 'Contracts for the partial restraint are upheld, not because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the contract is made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the community, but because it is for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.' Many of these partial restraints on trade are perfectly consistent with public convenience and the general interest and have been supported. Such is the case of the disposing of a shop in a particular place, with a contract on the part of the vendor not to carry on a trade in the same place. It is, in effect, the sale of a good-will, and offers an encouragement to trade," etc.

That so valuable a case as Mogul vs. McGregor should not only have been totally misunderstood, but completely misapplied by the lower courts is almost incomprehensible. For it is the star case for, not against, competition. The lower courts seem to

76


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windeyer, Charles


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windeyer, Richard


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windeyer, William Charles


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 have completely overlooked the fact that such arrangements though made unlawful in all senses by the Sherman Act, were only unlawful in the sense that they would not be enforced—would be treated as nude pacts at common law. However much the parties might proclaim their servitude, the common law simply contented itself by continuing to regard them as free.

But, since the ultimate end in the Mogul case was to restrain trade, though through the legal means of competition, the combination was held in the sense of non-enforceability to be illegal—not legal at all! The difficulty for the plaintiffs in that case, and the sole difficulty, was that, having no Sherman Act, they had to show illegality in means to make it a case of molestation; and without molestation they could not recover damages, for there was no legal "injuria;" and they could but allege savage and unreasonable competition, and see how splendidly they were answered.

Lord Bowen, in the greatest English opinion on this subject, says: "The truth is that the combination of capital for the purposes of trade and competition (what was thought to be the case in the Greene and the Knight cases) "is a very different thing from the combinations of several against one with a view to harm him as falls under the head of an indictable conspiracy. There is no just cause or excuse in the latter class of cases. There is such a just cause or excuse in the former. * * * To limit combinations of capital when used for purposes of competition * * * would, in the present day, be impossible—would be only another method of


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Rh as wide as humanity. The emancipated individual was to become the organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society.

The heralds of this gospel were acutely conscious of the evils of the social estate in which they found themselves. They attributed these evils to the limitations imposed upon the free powers of man. Such limitation was both distorting and corrupting. Their impassioned devotion to emancipation of life from external restrictions which operated to the exclusive advantage of the class to whom a past feudal system consigned power, found intellectual formulation in a worship of nature. To give "nature" full swing was to replace an artificial, corrupt, and inequitable social order by a new and better kingdom of humanity. Unrestrained faith in Nature as both a model and a working power was strengthened by the advances of natural science. Inquiry freed from prejudice and artificial restraints of church and state had revealed that the world is a scene of law. The Newtonian solar system, which expressed the reign of natural law, was a scene of wonderful harmony, where every force balanced with every other. Natural law would accomplish the same result in human relations, if men would only get rid of the artificial man-imposed coercive restrictions.

Education in accord with nature was thought to be the first step in insuring this more social society. It was plainly seen that economic and political limitations were ultimately dependent upon limitations of thought and feeling. The first step in freeing men from external chains was to emancipate them from the internal chains of false beliefs and ideals. What was called social life, existing institutions, were too false and corrupt to be intrusted with this work. How could it be expected to undertake it when the undertaking meant its own destruction? "Nature" must then be the power to which the enterprise was to be left. Even the extreme sensationalistic theory of knowledge which was current derived

title: Page:Democracy and Education.djvu/126


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windham, Charles Ash


text:
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 attempting to set boundaries to the tides." Which is just the view contended for! To combine to add all the benefits of cooperation to all of those safeguarded by competition, cannot, possibly, be a public evil; but nevertheless the courts have a right and duty to, and do, in the first instance examine each such case critically. The remarks on this decision in the Addyston case should remove all further misunderstanding of it.

Perhaps, after all, it is fortunate that the Supreme Court refused to examine it or the common law critically in the two cases under consideration. For by so doing it has given the common law the tremendous added sanction afforded by like results reached by the independent reasonings of powerful minds. The dissent in those cases is quite as interesting as the prevailing opinions, as it but fortifies the right conclusion.

Mr. Justice White most ably argues along the lines of Mr Justice Jackson—that contracts that reasonably restrained were not contracts properly called contracts in restraint at all; and so were not within the act; but the fallacy of this seems to be in the fact that every contract that really restrained trade itself (and not merely the conduct of a trader that trade might be encouraged by honest dealing) was held to be unreasonable and unlawful, so that "reasonable restraints" were restraints that did not restrain at all, and only "reasonable" because they did not restrain! But it was not the common law, nor is it "reasonable" to say that a restraint is not a restraint because it is a reasonable restraint, while it is both to say "we shall look at substance not names, and if we find a thing is an encouragement


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windham, Joseph


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windham, William


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windsor, Thomas Windsor


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 we shall not treat it as a resstraint, no matter what it is called. The strange part of the dissent is that there is much in it to prove that Mr. Justice White really had the true distinction in his mind all the while. He even cites Mr. Justice Maule in Rannie vs. Irvine.

The passage in the Freight Association case on the treatment of intent, should be noted, being of the utmost importance, as are the following illustrations of what may be a direct restraint from the Joint Traffic Association case: "There can be no doubt that the general tendency of competition among competing railroads is toward lower rates for transportation, and the result of lower rates is generally a greater demand for the articles so transported, and this greater demand can only be gratified by a larger supply, the furnishing of which increases commerce. * * * The natural, direct and immediate effect of competition is, however, to lower rates, and to thereby increase the demand for commodities, the supplying of which increases commerce, and an agreement, whose first and direct effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains instead of promoting trade and commerce." And, of course, identity of reasoning must apply where one of the steps between the act and the result is removed, as where manufacture itself is stopped, and it was so unanimously determined in the Addyston case. Since this, there has been little difficulty. The Montague case was of a class where recovery has always been allowed, for citizens' freedom as to national trade was limited. It in no way


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windsor, William de


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108 itself from this conception. To insist that mind is originally passive and empty was one way of glorifying the possibilities of education. If the mind was a wax tablet to be written upon by objects, there were no limits to the possibility of education by means of the natural environment. And since the natural world of objects is a scene of harmonious "truth," this education would infallibly produce minds filled with the truth.

5. .—As soon as the first enthusiasm for freedom waned, the weakness of the theory upon the constructive side became obvious. Merely to leave everything to nature was, after all, but to negate the very idea of education; it was to trust to the accidents of circumstance. Not only was some method required but also some positive organ, some administrative agency for carrying on the process of instruction. The "complete and harmonious development of all powers," having as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive humanity, required definite organization for its realization. Private individuals here and there could proclaim the gospel; they could not execute the work. A Pestalozzi could try experiments and exhort philanthropically inclined persons having wealth and power to follow his example. But even Pestalozzi saw that any effective pursuit of the new educational ideal required the support of the state. The realization of the new education destined to produce a new society was, after all, dependent upon the activities of existing states. The movement for the democratic idea inevitably became a movement for publicly conducted and administered schools.

So far as Europe was concerned, the historic situation identified the movement for a state-supported education with the nationalistic movement in political life—a fact of incalculable significance for subsequent movements. Under the influence of German thought in particular, education became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the

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text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Windus, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Winefride


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 conflicts with the Anderson case, where there was neither tendency nor intent to that effect. The Hopkins case is of the same class as the Anderson.

The Securities case has already been sufficiently noted. It really largely turned, as did the Knight case, upon an inference as to the fact of tendency; but trade had so changed as to demand a new finding on that score in the later case.

One thing that is puzzling, however, in the opinion of Mr. Justice White, may be noticed. Pollock, C. B., in the Egerton case, says: "Where a contract is directly opposed to public welfare, it is void, though the parties may have a real interest in the matter, and an apparent right to deal with it." That has certainly been the accepted doctrine. Now, if "sole sale," or that tending to it, were the evils aimed at, the evils that constituted illegality in any contract tending to it, what earthly difference in principle does it make that the contract is made in one form rather than another? Every justice agreed that the contract in the Addyston case concerning admitted rights of property of the parties was illegal, because it tended to restrain trade; then why not any other form of contract that tended to the same evil? What special form of sanctity has a sale as contrasted with any other evil contract? Sales in all directions had been limited where tending to evil, and for centuries, and without doubt! With trade as it has since been conducted, the tendency in the Knight sales has been demonstrated to be as deadly as the sale of discretion in the Addyston. Would it not be strange, then, that form alone should be considered of the slightest importance, and is not the true explanation that "sales"


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 had taken on this sacred hue solely because for centuries they had never before been abused? Is there any other logical or sensible explanation? But a man has no unlimited right to sell poisons, and it can make no difference whether the poison was to kill men or kill that trade upon which their lives, comfort, and happiness so largely depend. The truth is, that the trusts have placed what was an unmixed agency for good among the most dangerous instruments of evil, and the courts have ultimately become conscious of the change; and that is the sole difference in the Knight and Securities cases.

It must never be forgotten that "when the acts consist of making a combination calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts, when done maliciously, cannot be denied, because they are to be followed and worked out by conduct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the acts. No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law." That sales for immoral or illegal uses are illegal has long been settled.

Such an attempt as this, made by one long withdrawn from practice, and accomplished during a single day's vacation, must necessarily be crude, fragmentary and incomplete. But believing that the common law


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 has received its greatest vindication; that the charge of inconsistency in the decisions of the Supreme Court is unjust and answered by considering that common law; that however little value my own conclusions may have, they may at least have some place as suggestions to those whose opinions have weight and value, I have felt justified in submitting my thoughts, knowing that it can do no harm, and hoping that it may do a little good.

Another consideration that must not be lost sight of, and that warrants every citizen's earnest consideration of this subject, is its danger to our splendid form of government. If that have a unique superiority, it is that ultimate power is vested in a body of men who but decide—not use. Tendency to selfish application is therefore reduced as it has never been in any other country. The keeping of that power there should, therefore, be the highest object of every lover of his country. But all history, from the Roman Emperors down, but demonstrates that any power under which monopolies spring to life or flourish is doomed. Never was Rhinegold so fatal to its possessors. What Zeno, what the absolute Tudors and Stuarts could not maintain in ignorant and despotic ages, can be no less a danger to any modern institution. Fortunately, the common law, and the Sherman Act interpreted by it, require no protection of monopolies by the Supreme Court in their enforcement of law; and it is fortunate and cannot be too well understood, as, were it required, it would inevitably destroy the most important and essential feature of our free government—America's greatest invention in government!


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Rh realization of the ideal of the national state. The "state" was substituted for humanity; cosmopolitanism gave way to nationalism. To form the citizen, not the "man," became the aim of education. The historic situation to which reference is made is the after-effects of the Napoleonic conquests, especially in Germany. The German states felt (and subsequent events demonstrate the correctness of the belief) that systematic attention to education was the best means of recovering and maintaining their political integrity and power. Externally they were weak and divided. Under the leadership of Prussian statesmen they made this condition a stimulus to the development of an extensive and thoroughly grounded system of public education.

This change in practice necessarily brought about a change in theory. The individualistic theory receded into the background. The state furnished not only the instrumentalities of public education but also its goal. When the actual practice was such that the school system, from the elementary grades through the university faculties, supplied the patriotic citizen and soldier and the future state official and administrator and furnished the means for military, industrial, and political defense and expansion, it was impossible for theory not to emphasize the aim of social efficiency. And with the immense importance attached to the nationalistic state, surrounded by other competing and more or less hostile states, it was equally impossible to interpret social efficiency in terms of a vague cosmopolitan humanitarianism. Since the maintenance of a particular national sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior interests of the

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If a variable $$\scriptstyle{v}$$ takes on successively a series of values that approach nearer and nearer to a constant value $$\scriptstyle{l}$$ in such a manner that $$\scriptstyle{|v-l|}$$ becomes and remains less than any assigned arbitrarily small positive quantity, then $$\scriptstyle{v}$$ is said to approach the limit $$\scriptstyle{l}$$, or to converge to the limit $$\scriptstyle{l}$$. Symbolically this is written

The following familiar examples illustrate what is meant:

(1) As the number of sides of a regular inscribed polygon is indefinitely increased, the limit of the area of the polygon is the area of the circle. In this case the variable is always less than its limit.

(2) Similarly, the limit of the area of the circumscribed polygon is also the area of the circle, but now the variable is always greater than its limit.

(3) Consider the series (A)

The sum of any even number $$\scriptstyle{(2n)}$$ of the first terms of this series is

Similarly, the sum of any odd number $$\scriptstyle{(2n+1)}$$ of the first terms of the series is


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110 state both in military defense and in struggles for international supremacy in commerce, social efficiency was understood to imply a like subordination. The educational process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development. Since, however, the ideal of culture as complete development of personality persisted, educational philosophy attempted a reconciliation of the two ideas. The reconciliation took the form of the conception of the 'organic' character of the state. The individual in his isolation is nothing; only in and through an absorption of the aims and meaning of organized institutions does he attain true personality. What appears to be his subordination to political authority and the demand for sacrifice of himself to the commands of his superiors is in reality but making his own the objective reason manifested in the state—the only way in which he can become truly rational. The notion of development which we have seen to be characteristic of institutional idealism (as in the Hegelian philosophy) was just such a deliberate effort to combine the two ideas of complete realization of personality and thoroughgoing 'disciplinary' subordination to existing institutions.

The extent of the transformation of educational philosophy which occurred in Germany in the generation occupied by the struggle against Napoleon for national independence, may be gathered from Kant, who well expresses the earlier individual cosmopolitan ideal. In his treatise on Pedagogics, consisting of lectures given in the later years of the eighteenth century, he defines education as the process by which man becomes man. Mankind begins its history submerged in nature—not as Man who is a creature of reason, while nature furnishes only instinct and appetite. Nature offers simply the germs which education is to develop and perfect. The peculiarity of truly human life is that man has to create himself by his own voluntary efforts; he has to make himself a truly moral, rational, and free being. This creative effort is carried on by

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text: Author:Joseph Jefferson

title: Author:Joseph Jefferson


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Rh the educational activities of slow generations. Its acceleration depends upon men consciously striving to educate their successors not for the existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a future better humanity. But there is the great difficulty. Each generation is inclined to educate its young so as to get along in the present world instead of with a view to the proper end of education: the promotion of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity. Parents educate their children so that they may get on; princes educate their subjects as instruments of their own purposes.

Who, then, shall conduct education so that humanity, may improve? We must depend upon the efforts of enlightened men in their private capacity. "All culture begins with private men and spreads outward from them. Simply through the efforts of persons of enlarged inclinations, who are capable of grasping the ideal of a future better condition, is the gradual approximation of human nature to its end possible.… Rulers are simply interested in such training as will make their subjects better tools for their own intentions." Even the subsidy by rulers of privately conducted schools must be carefully safeguarded. For the rulers' interest in the welfare of their own nation instead of in what is best for humanity, will make them, if they give money for the schools, wish to draw their plans. We have in this view an express statement of the points characteristic of the eighteenth century individualistic cosmopolitanism. The full development of private personality is identified with the aims of humanity as a whole and with the idea of progress. In addition we have an explicit fear of the hampering influence of a state-conducted and state-regulated education upon the attainment of these ideas. But in less than two decades after this time, Kant's philosophic successors, Fichte and Hegel, elaborated the idea that the chief function of the state is educational; that in particular the regeneration of Germany is to be accomplished by an education carried on in the

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112 interests of the state, and that the private individual is of necessity an egoistic, irrational being, enslaved to his appetites and to circumstances unless he submits voluntarily to the educative discipline of state institutions and laws. In this spirit, Germany was the first country to undertake a public, universal, and compulsory system of education extending from the primary school through the university, and to submit to jealous state regulation and supervision all private educational enterprises.

Two results should stand out from this brief historical survey. The first is that such terms as the individual and the social conceptions of education are quite meaningless taken at large, or apart from their context. Plato had the ideal of an education which should equate individual realization and social coherency and stability. His situation forced his ideal into the notion of a society organized in stratified classes, losing the individual in the class. The eighteenth century educational philosophy was highly individualistic in form, but this form was inspired by a noble and generous social ideal: that of a society organized to include humanity, and providing for the indefinite perfectibility of mankind. The idealistic philosophy of Germany in the early nineteenth century endeavored again to equate the ideals of a free and complete development of cultured personality with social discipline and political subordination. It made the national state an intermediary between the realization of private personality on one side and of humanity on the other. Consequently, it is equally possible to state its animating principle with equal truth either in the classic terms of "harmonious development of all the powers of personality" or in the more recent terminology of "social efficiency." All this reënforces the statement which opens this chapter: The conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind.

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Rh These considerations pave the way for our second conclusion. One of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider social aim. The earlier cosmopolitan and 'humanitarian' conception suffered both from vagueness and from lack of definite organs of execution and agencies of administration. In Europe, in the Continental states consequently, the new idea of the importance of education for human welfare and progress was captured by national interests and harnessed to do a work whose social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive. The social aim of education and its national aim were identified, and the result was a marked obscuring of the meaning of a social aim.

This confusion corresponds to the existing situation of human intercourse. On the one hand, science, commerce, and art transcend national boundaries. They are largely international in quality and method. They involve interdependencies and coöperation among the peoples inhabiting different countries. At the same time, the idea of national sovereignty has never been as accentuated in politics as it is at the present time. Each nation lives in a state of suppressed hostility and incipient war with its neighbors. Each is supposed to be the supreme judge of its own interests, and it is assumed as matter of course that each has interests which are exclusively its own. To question this is to question the very idea of national sovereignty which is assumed to be basic to political practice and political science. This contradiction (for it is nothing less) between the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the narrower sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and purposes, exacts of educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of 'social' as a function and test of education than has yet been attained.

Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet the full social ends of the educative

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114 process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted? Internally, the question has to face the tendencies, due to present economic conditions, which split society into classes some of which are made merely tools for the higher culture of others. Externally, the question is concerned with the reconciliation of national loyalty, of patriotism, with superior devotion to the things which unite men in common ends, irrespective of national political boundaries. Neither phase of the problem can be worked out by merely negative means. It is not enough to see to it that education is not actively used as an instrument to make easier the exploitation of one class by another. School facilities must be secured of such amplitude and efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic inequalities, and secure to all the wards of the nation equality of equipment for their future careers. Accomplishment of this end demands not only adequate administrative provision of school facilities, and such supplementation of family resources as will enable youth to take advantage of them, but also such modification of traditional ideals of culture, traditional subjects of study and traditional methods of teaching and discipline as will retain all the youth under educational influences until they are equipped to be masters of their own economic and social careers. The ideal may seem remote of execution, but the democratic ideal of education is a farcical yet tragic delusion except as the ideal more and more dominates our public system of education.

The same principle has application on the side of the considerations which concern the relations of one nation to another. It is not enough to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything which would stimulate international jealousy and animosity. The emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in coöperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographical limitations. The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect

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Rh to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind. If these applications seem to be remote from a consideration of the philosophy of education, the impression shows that the meaning of the idea of education previously developed has not been adequately grasped. This conclusion is bound up with the very idea of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims. Otherwise a democratic criterion of education can only be inconsistently applied.

.—Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal. The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.

Three typical historic philosophies of education were considered from this point of view. The Platonic was found to have an ideal formally quite similar to that stated, but which was compromised in its working out by making a class rather than an individual the social unit. The so-called individualism of the eighteenth-century enlightenment was found to involve the notion of a society as broad as humanity, of whose progress

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116 the individual was to be the organ. But it lacked any agency for securing the development of its ideal as was evidenced in its falling back upon Nature. The institutional idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century supplied this lack by making the national state the agency, but in so doing narrowed the conception of the social aim to those who were members of the same political unit, and reintroduced the idea of the subordination of the individual to the institution.

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Page:General affidavit of Harriet Tubman (1898).djvu/1

________________, ________________, :

In the matter of _________________________________________________________________________________

ON THIS _________ day of _____________________, A. D. 18__, personally appeared before me ____________________ in and for the aforesaid County, duly authorized to administer oaths ___________________________ aged ______ years, a resident of ___________________________, in the County of _____________________________, and State of __________________________ whose Post-office address is _________________________________________________________________, aged ________ years, a resident of _______________________________, in the County of ______________________________, and State of ________________________________, whose Post-office address is ___________________________________________________________ well known to be reputable and entitled to credit, and who, being duly sworn, declared in relation to aforesaid case as follows: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

.—Affiants should state how they gain a knowledge of the facts to which they testify.)

My claim against the U.S. is for three years services as nurse and cook in hospitals, and as commander of several men (eight or nine) as scouts during the late War of the Rebellion, under directions and orders of Edwin M. Stanton Secretary of War, and of several generals.

''I claim for my services above named the sum of eighteen hundred dollars. The annexed copies have recently been read over to me and are true to the best of my knowledge information and belief.''

I further declare that I have no interest in said case and am not concerned in its prosecution. and allowance.


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160 before he disappeared with it into the trench. A trooper named Shanafelt repeated the feat, later, with a pail of coffee. Another trooper, George King, spent a leisure hour in the rear making soup out of some rice and other stuff he found in a Spanish house; he brought some of it to General Wood, Jack Greenway, and myself, and nothing could have tasted more delicious. At this time our army in the trenches numbered about 11,000 men, and the Spaniards in Santiago about 9,000, their reinforcements having just arrived. Nobody on the firing-line, whatever was the case in the rear, felt the slightest uneasiness as to the Spaniards being able to break out; but there were plenty who doubted the advisability of trying to rush the heavy earthworks and wire defences in our front. All day long the firing continued—musketry and cannon. Our artillery gave up the attempt to fight on the firing-line, and was withdrawn well to the rear out of range of the Spanish rifles; so far as we could see, it accomplished very little. The


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Rh gun was brought up to the right of the regimental line. It was more effective than the regular artillery because it was fired with smokeless powder, and as it was used like a mortar from behind the hill, it did not betray its presence, and those firing it suffered no loss. Every few shots it got out of order, and the Rough Rider machinists and those furnished by Lieutenant Parker—whom we by this time began to consider as an exceedingly valuable member of our own regiment—would spend an hour or two in setting it right. Sergeant Borrowe had charge of it and handled it well. With him was Sergeant Guitilias, a gallant old fellow, a veteran of the Civil War, whose duties were properly those of standard-bearer, he having charge of the yellow cavalry standard of the regiment; but in the Cuban campaign he was given the more active work of helping run the dynamite gun. The shots from the dynamite gun made a terrific explosion, but they did not seem to go accurately. Once one of them struck a Spanish trench and wrecked part of it. On another occasion one struck a big building, from which there promptly swarmed both Spanish cavalry and infantry, on whom the Colt automatic guns played with good effect during the minute that elapsed before they could get other cover. These Colt automatic guns were not, on the whole, very successful. The gun detail was under the


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 New York,  Cayuga , ss:

Sworn to and subscribed before me this day by the above named affiant, and I certify that I read said affadavit to said affiant , including the words _____________________________ _________ erased, and the words ______________________________ _________ added, and acquainted her with its contents before she executed the same. I further certify that I am in nowise interested in said case, nor am I concerned in its prosecution; and that said affiant is personally known to me and that she is a credible person.

[L. S.]

I, _______________________________________ Clerk of the County Court in and for aforesaid County and State, do certify that ____________________________________ Esq., who has signed his name to the foregoing declaration and affidavit, was, at the time of so doing __________________________________ in and for the said County and State, duly commissioned and sworn; that all his official acts are entitled to full faith and credit, and that his signature thereunto is genuine.

Witness my hand and seal of office, this ___________ day of _______________________, 18__

[L. S.] ____________________________________

Clerk of the _________________________

☞ To be executed before a Court of Record or some officer thereof having custody of its seal, a Notary Public, or Justice of the Peace, whose official signature shall be verified by his official seal, and in case he has none, his signature and official character shall be certified by a Clerk of a Court of Record, or a City or County Clerk.

Harriet Davis

Late Harriet Tubman

___________

Claimant

____________

____________


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ADEMOISELLE STANGERSTON had been almost murdered for the second time. Unfortunately, she was in too weak a state to bear the severer injuries of this second attack as well as she had those of the first. She had received three wounds in the breast from the murderer's knife, and she lay long between life and death. Her strong physique, however, saved her; but though she recovered physically it was found that her mind had been affected. The slightest allusion to the terrible incident sent her into delirium, and the arrest of Robert Darzac which followed on the day following the tragic death of the keeper seemed to sink her fine intelligence into complete melancholia.

Robert Darzac arrived at the château towards half-past nine. I saw him hurrying through the park, his hair and clothes in disorder and his face a deadly white. Rouletabille and I were looking out of a window in the gallery. He saw us, and gave a despairing cry: "I'm too late!"

Rouletabille answered: "She lives!"

A minute later Darzac had gone into Mademoiselle Stangerson's room and, through the door, we could hear his heart-rending sobs.


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 "There's a fate about this place!" groaned Rouletabille. "Some infernal gods must be watching over the misfortunes of this family!—If I had not been drugged, I should have saved Mademoiselle Stangerson. I should have silenced him forever.  And the keeper would not have been killed!"

Monsieur Darzac came in to speak with us. His distress was terrible. Rouletabille told him everything: his preparations for Mademoiselle Stangerson's safety; his plans for either capturing or for disposing of the assailant for ever; and how he would have succeeded had it not been for the drugging.

"If only you had trusted me!" said the young man, in a low tone. "If you had but begged Mademoiselle Stangerson to confide in me!—But, then, everybody here distrusts everybody else, the daughter distrusts her father, and even her lover. While you ask me to protect her she is doing all she can to frustrate me.  That was why I came on the scene too late!"

At Monsieur Robert Darzac's request Rouletabille described the whole scene. Leaning on the wall, to prevent himself from falling, he had made his way to Mademoiselle Stangerson's room, while we were running after the supposed murderer. The ante-room door was open and when he entered he found Mademoiselle Stangerson lying partly thrown over the desk. Her dressing-gown was dyed with the blood flowing from her bosom. Still under the influence of the drug, he felt he was walking in a horrible nightmare.


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 He went back to the gallery automatically, opened a window, shouted his order to fire, and then returned to the room. He crossed the deserted boudoir, entered the drawing-room, and tried to rouse Monsieur Stangerson who was lying on a sofa. Monsieur Stangerson rose stupidly and let himself be drawn by Rouletabille into the room where, on seeing his daughter's body, he uttered a heart-rending cry. Both united their feeble strength and carried her to her bed.

On his way to join us Rouletabille passed by the desk. On the floor, near it, he saw a large packet. He knelt down and, finding the wrapper loose, he examined it, and made out an enormous quantity of papers and photographs. On one of the papers he read: "New differential electroscopic condenser. Fundamental properties of substance intermediary between ponderable matter and imponderable ether." Strange irony of fate that the professor's precious papers should be restored to him at the very time when an attempt was being made to deprive him of his daughter's life! What are papers worth to him now?

The morning following that awful night saw Monsieur de Marquet once more at the château, with his Registrar and gendarmes. Of course we were all questioned. Rouletabille and I had already agreed on what to say. I kept back any information as to my being in the dark closet and said nothing about the drugging. We did not wish to suggest in any way that Mademoiselle Stangerson had been expecting her nocturnal visitor. The


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 poor woman might, perhaps, never recover, and it was none of our business to lift the veil of a secret the preservation of which she had paid for so dearly.

Arthur Rance told everybody, in a manner so natural that it astonished me, that he had last seen the keeper towards eleven o'clock of that fatal night. He had come for his valise, he said, which he was to take for him early next morning to the Saint-Michel station, and had been kept out late running after poachers. Arthur Rance had, indeed, intended to leave the château and, according to his habit, to walk to the station.

Monsieur Stangerson confirmed what Rance had said, adding that he had not asked Rance to dine with him because his friend had taken his final leave of them both earlier in the evening. Monsieur Rance had had tea served him in his room, because he had complained of a slight indisposition.

Bernier testified, instructed by Rouletabille, that the keeper had ordered him to meet at a spot near the oak grove, for the purpose of looking out for poachers. Finding that the keeper did not keep his appointment, he, Bernier, had gone in search of him. He had almost arrived at the donjon, when he saw a figure running swiftly in a direction opposite to him, towards the right wing of the château. He heard revolver shots from behind the figure and saw Rouletabille at one of the gallery windows. He heard Rouletabille call out to him to fire, and he had fired. He believed he had killed the man until he learned, after Rouletabille had uncovered the body, that the man had


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 died from a knife thrust. Who had given it he could not imagine. "Nobody could have been near the spot without my seeing him." When the examining magistrate reminded him that the spot where the body was found was very dark and that he himself had not been able to recognise the keeper before firing, Daddy Bernier replied that neither had they seen the other body; nor had they found it. In the narrow court where five people were standing it would have been strange if the other body, had it been there, could have escaped. The only door that opened into the court was that of the keeper's room, and that door was closed, and the key of it was found in the keeper's pocket.

However that might be, the examining magistrate did not pursue his inquiry further in this direction. He was evidently convinced that we had missed the man we were chasing and we had come upon the keeper's body in our chase. This matter of the keeper was another matter entirely. He wanted to satisfy himself about that without any further delay. Probably it fitted in with the conclusions he had already arrived at as to the keeper and his intrigues with the wife of Mathieu, the landlord of the Donjon Inn. This Mathieu, later in the afternoon, was arrested and taken to Corbeil in spite of his rheumatism. He had been heard to threaten the keeper, and though no evidence against him had been found at his inn, the evidence of carters who had heard the threats was enough to justify his retention.

The examination had proceeded thus far when, to our surprise, Frédéric Larsan returned to the


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 château. He was accompanied by one of the employés of the railway. At that moment Rance and I were in the vestibule discussing Mathieu's guilt or innocence, while Rouletabille stood apart buried, apparently, in thought. The examining magistrate and his Registrar were in the little green drawing-room, while Darzac was with the doctor and Stangerson in the lady's chamber. As Frédéric Larsan entered the vestibule with the railway employé, Rouletabille and I at once recognised him by the small blond beard. We exchanged meaningful glances. Larsan had himself announced to the examining magistrate by the gendarme and entered with the railway servant as Daddy Jacques came out. Some ten minutes went by during which Rouletabille appeared extremely impatient. The door of the drawing-room was then opened and we heard the magistrate calling to the gendarme who entered. Presently he came out, mounted the stairs and, coming back shortly, went in to the magistrate and said:—

"Monsieur,—Monsieur Robert Darzac will not come!"

"What! Not come!" cried Monsieur de Marquet.

"He says he cannot leave Mademoiselle Stangerson in her present state."

"Very well," said Monsieur de Marquet; "then we'll go to him."

Monsieur de Marquet and the gendarme mounted the stairs. He made a sign to Larsan and the railroad employé to follow. Rouletabille and I went along too.


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 On reaching the door of Mademoiselle Stangerson's chamber, Monsieur de Marquet knocked. A chambermaid appeared. It was Sylvia, with her hair all in disorder and consternation showing on her face.

"Is Monsieur Stangerson within?" asked the magistrate.

"Yes, Monsieur."

"Tell him that I wish to speak with him."

Stangerson came out. His appearance was wretched in the extreme.

"What do you want?" he demanded of the magistrate. "May I not be left in peace, Monsieur?"

"Monsieur," said the magistrate, "it is absolutely necessary that I should see Monsieur Darzac at once. If you cannot induce him to come, I shall be compelled to use the help of the law."

The professor made no reply. He looked at us all like a man being led to execution, and then went back into the room.

Almost immediately after Monsieur Robert Darzac came out. He was very pale. He looked at us and, his eyes falling on the railway servant, his features stiffened and he could hardly repress a groan.

We were all much moved by the appearance of the man. We felt that what was about to happen would decide the fate of Monsieur Robert Darzac. Frédéric Larsan's face alone was radiant, showing a joy as of a dog that had at last got its prey.

Pointing to the railway servant, Monsieur de Marquet said to Monsieur Darzac:


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 "Do you recognise this man, Monsieur?"

"I do," said Monsieur Darzac, in a tone which he vainly tried to make firm. "He is an employé at the station at Epinay-sur-Orge."

"This young man," went on Monsieur de Marquet, "affirms that he saw you get off the train at Epinay-sur-Orge—"

"That night," said Monsieur Darzac, interrupting, "at half-past ten—it is quite true."

An interval of silence followed.

"Monsieur Darzac," the magistrate went on in a tone of deep emotion, "Monsieur Darzac, what were you doing that night, at Epinay-sur-Orge—at that time?"

Monsieur Darzac remained silent, simply closing his eyes.

"Monsieur Darzac," insisted Monsieur de Marquet, "can you tell me how you employed your time, that night?"

Monsieur Darzac opened his eyes. He seemed to have recovered his self-control.

"No, Monsieur."

"Think, Monsieur! For, if you persist in your strange refusal, I shall be under the painful necessity of keeping you at my disposition."

"I refuse."

"Monsieur Darzac!—in the name of the law, I arrest you!"

The magistrate had no sooner pronounced the words than I saw Rouletabille move quickly towards Monsieur Darzac. He would certainly have spoken to him, but Darzac, by a gesture, held him off. As the gendarme approached his


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 prisoner, a despairing cry rang through the room:—

"Robert!—Robert!"

We recognised the voice of Mademoiselle Stangerson. We all shuddered. Larsan himself turned pale. Monsieur Darzac, in response to the cry, had flown back into the room.

The magistrate, the gendarme, and Larsan followed closely after. Rouletabille and I remained on the threshold. It was a heart-breaking sight that met our eyes. Mademoiselle Stangerson, with a face of deathly pallor, had risen on her bed, in spite of the restraining efforts of two doctors and her father. She was holding out her trembling arms towards Robert Darzac, on whom Larsan and the gendarme had laid hands. Her distended eyes saw—she understood—her lips seemed to form a word, but nobody made it out; and she fell back insensible.

Monsieur Darzac was hurried out of the room and placed in the vestibule to wait for the vehicle Larsan had gone to fetch. We were all overcome by emotion and even Monsieur de Marquet had tears in his eyes. Rouletabille took advantage of the opportunity to say to Monsieur Darzac:

"Are you going to put in any defense?"

"No!" replied the prisoner.

"Very well, then I will, Monsieur."

"You cannot do it," said the unhappy man with a faint smile.

"I can—and I will."

Rouletabille's voice had in it a strange strength and confidence.


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 "I can do it, Monsieur Robert Darzac, because I know more than you do!"

"Come! Come!" murmured Darzac, almost angrily.

"Have no fear! I shall know only what will benefit you."

"You must know nothing, young man, if you want me to be grateful."

Rouletabille shook his head, going close up to Darzac.

"Listen to what I am about to say," he said in a low tone, "and let it give you confidence. You do not know the name of the murderer. Mademoiselle Stangerson knows it; but only half of it; but I know his two halves; I know the whole man!"

Robert Darzac opened his eyes, with a look that showed he had not understood a word of what Rouletabille had said to him. At that moment the conveyance arrived, driven by Frédéric Larsan. Darzac and the gendarme entered it, Larsan remaining on the driver's seat. The prisoner was taken to Corbeil.


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HAT same evening Rouletabille and I left the Glandier. We were very glad to get away and there was nothing more to keep us there. I declared my intention to give up the whole matter. It had been too much for me. Rouletabille, with a friendly tap on my shoulder, confessed that he had nothing more to learn at the Glandier; he had learned there all it had to tell him. We reached Paris about eight o'clock, dined, and then, tired out, we separated, agreeing to meet the next morning at my rooms.

Rouletabille arrived next day at the hour agreed on. He was dressed in a suit of English tweed, with an ulster on his arm, and a valise in his hand. Evidently he had prepared himself for a journey.

"How long shall you be away?" I asked.

"A month or two," he said. "It all depends."

I asked him no more questions.

"Do you know," he asked, "what the word was that Mademoiselle Stangerson tried to say before she fainted?"

"No—nobody heard it."

"I heard it!" replied Rouletabille. "She said 'Speak!'"

"Do you think Darzac will speak?"

"Never."


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 I was about to make some further observations, but he wrung my hand warmly and wished me good-bye. I had only time to ask him one question before he left.

"Are you not afraid that other attempts may be made while you're away?"

"No! Not now that Darzac is in prison," he answered.

With this strange remark he left. I was not to see him again until the day of Darzac's trial at the court when he appeared to explain the inexplicable.


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N the 15th of January, that is to say, two months and a half after the tragic events I have narrated, the "Epoque" printed, as the first column of the front page, the following sensational article:—

"The Seine-et-Oise jury is summoned to-day to give its verdict on one of the most mysterious affairs in the annals of crime. There never has been a case with so many obscure, incomprehensible, and inexplicable points.  And yet the prosecution has not hesitated to put into the prisoner's dock a man who is respected, esteemed, and loved by all who knew him—a young savant, the hope of French science, whose whole life has been devoted to knowledge and truth. When Paris heard of Monsieur Robert Darzac's arrest a unanimous cry of protest arose from all sides.  The whole Sorbonne, disgraced by this act of the examining magistrate, asserted its belief in the innocence of  Mademoiselle Stangerson's fiancé.  Monsieur Stangerson was loud in his denunciation of this miscarriage of justice.  There is no doubt in the mind of anybody that could the victim speak she would claim from the jurors of Seine-et-Oise the


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 man she wishes to make her husband and whom the prosecution would send to the scaffold. It is to be hoped that Mademoiselle Stangerson will shortly recover her reason, which has been temporarily unhinged by the horrible mystery at the Glandier. The question before the jury is the one we propose to deal with this very day.

"We have decided not to permit twelve worthy men to commit a disgraceful miscarriage of justice. We confess that the remarkable coincidences, the many convicting evidences, and the inexplicable silence on the part of the accused, as well as a total absence of any evidence for an alibi, were enough to warrant the bench of judges in assuming that in this man alone was centered the truth of the affair.  The evidences are, in appearance, so overwhelming against Monsieur Robert Darzac that a detective so well informed, so intelligent, and generally so successful, as Monsieur Frédéric  Larsan, may be excused for having been misled by them.  Up to now everything has gone against Monsieur Robert Darzac in the magisterial inquiry.  To-day, however, we are going to defend him before the jury, and we are going to bring to the witness stand a light that will illumine the whole mystery of the Glandier. For we possess the truth.

"If we have not spoken sooner, it is because the interests of certain parties in the case demand that we should take that course. Our readers may remember the unsigned reports we published relating to the 'Left foot of the Rue Oberkampf,' at the time of the famous robbery of the Crédit


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Rh connected with relieving the firing line. Under the intense heat, crowded down in cramped attitudes in the rank, newly dug, poisonous soil of the trenches, the men needed to be relieved every six hours or so. Accordingly, in the late morning, and again in the afternoon, I arranged for their release. On each occasion I waited until there was a lull in the firing and then started a sudden rush by the relieving party, who tumbled into the trenches every which way. The movement resulted on each occasion in a terrific outburst of fire from the Spanish lines, which proved quite harmless; and as it gradually died away the men who had been relieved got out as best they could. Fortunately, by the next day I was able to abandon this primitive, though thrilling and wholly novel, military method of relief.

When the hardtack came up that afternoon I felt much sympathy for the hungry unfortunates in the trenches and hated to condemn them to six hours more without food; but I did not know how to get food in to them. Little McGinty, the bronco buster, volunteered to make the attempt, and I gave him permission. He simply took a case of hardtack in his arms and darted toward the trenches. The distance was but short, and though there was an outburst of fire, he was actually missed. One bullet, however, passed through the case of hardtack just


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 and the famous case of the 'Gold Ingots of the Mint.' In both those cases we were able to discover the truth long before even the excellent ingenuity of  Frédéric Larsan had been able to unravel it. These reports were written by our youngest reporter, Joseph Rouletabille, a youth of eighteen, whose fame to-morrow will be world-wide. When attention was first drawn to the Glandier case, our youthful reporter was on the spot and installed in the château, when every other representative of the press had been denied admission. He worked side by side with Frédéric Larsan. He was amazed and terrified at the grave mistake the celebrated detective was about to make, and tried to divert him from the false scent he was following; but the great Fred refused to receive instructions from this young journalist. We know now where it brought Monsieur Robert Darzac.

"But now, France must know—the whole world must know, that, on the very evening on which Monsieur Darzac was arrested, young Rouletabille entered our editorial office and informed us that he was about to go away on a journey. 'How long I shall be away,' he said, 'I cannot say; perhaps a month—perhaps two—perhaps three perhaps I may never return.  Here is a letter.  If I am not back on the day on which Monsieur Darzac is to appear before the Assize Court, have this letter opened and read to the court, after all the witnesses have been heard.  Arrange it with Monsieur Darzac's counsel.  Monsieur Darzac is innocent.  In this letter is written the name of the


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 murderer; and—that is all I have to say. I am leaving to get my proofs—for the irrefutable evidence of the murderer's guilt.' Our reporter departed. For a long time we were without news from him; but, a week ago, a stranger called upon our manager and said: 'Act in accordance with the instructions of Joseph Rouletabille, if it becomes necessary to do so. The letter left by him holds the truth.' The gentleman who brought us this message would not give us his name.

"To-day, the 15th of January, is the day of the trial. Joseph Rouletabille has not returned.  It may be we shall never see him again.  The press also counts its heroes, its martyrs to duty.  It may be he is no longer living.  We shall know how to avenge him. Our manager will, this afternoon, be at the Court of Assize at Versailles, with the letter—the letter containing the name of the murderer!"

At the head of the article appeared a portrait of Rouletabille—the same given as the frontispiece to this book.

Those Parisians who flocked to the Assize Court at Versailles, to be present at the trial of what was known as the "Mystery of The Yellow Room," will certainly remember the terrible crush at the Saint-Lazare station. The ordinary trains were so full that special trains had to be made up. The article in the "Epoque" had so excited the populace that discussion was rife everywhere even to the verge


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 of blows. Partisans of Rouletabille fought with the supporters of Frédéric Larsan. Curiously enough the excitement was due less to the fact that an innocent man was in danger of a wrongful conviction than to the interest taken in their own ideas as to the Mystery of The Yellow Room. Each had his explanation to which each held fast. Those who explained the crime on Frédéric Larsan's theory would not admit that there could be any doubt as to the perspicacity of the popular detective. Others who had arrived at a different solution, naturally insisted that this was Rouletabille's explanation, though they did not as yet know what that was.

With the day's "Epoque" in their hands, the "Larsans" and the "Rouletabilles" fought and shoved each other on the steps of the Palais de Justice, right into the court itself. Those who could not get in remained in the neighbourhood until evening and were, with great difficulty, kept back by the soldiery and the police. They became hungry for news, welcoming the most absurd rumours. At one time the rumour spread that Monsieur Stangerson himself had been arrested in the court and had confessed to being the murderer. This goes to show to what a pitch of madness nervous excitement may carry people. Rouletabille was still expected. Some pretended to know him; and when a young man with a "pass" crossed the open space which separated the crowd from the Court House, a scuffle took place. Cries were raised of "Rouletabille!—there's Rouletabille!" The arrival of the manager of the paper


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158 next twenty-four hours, however, the amount of comfort was small, as in the way of protection and covering we only had what blankets, raincoats, and hammocks we took from the dead Spaniards. Ammunition, which was, of course, the most vital need, was brought up in abundance; but very little food reached us. That afternoon we had just enough to allow each man for his supper two hardtacks, and one hardtack extra for every four men. During the first night we had dug trenches sufficient in length and depth to shelter our men and insure safety against attack, but we had not put in any traverses or approaches, nor had we arranged the trenches at all points in the best places for offensive work; for we were working at night on ground which we had but partially explored. Later on an engineer officer stated that he did not think our work had been scientific; and I assured him that I did not doubt that he was right, for I had never before seen a trench, excepting those we captured from the Spaniards, or heard of a traverse, save as I vaguely remembered reading about them in books. For such work as we were engaged in, however, the problem of intrenchment was comparatively simple, and the work we did proved entirely adequate. No man in my regiment was ever hit in the trenches or going in or out of them.

But on the first day there was plenty of


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 was the signal for a great demonstration. Some applauded, others hissed.

The trial itself was presided over by Monsieur de Rocouz, a judge filled with the prejudice of his class, but a man honest at heart. The witnesses had been called. I was there, of course, as were all who had, in any way, been in touch with the mysteries of the Glandier. Monsieur Stangerson—looking many years older and almost unrecognisable—Larsan, Arthur Rance, with his face ruddy as ever, Daddy Jacques, Daddy Mathieu, who was brought into court handcuffed between two gendarmes, Madame Mathieu, in tears, the two Berniers, the two nurses, the steward, all the domestics of the château, the employé  of the Paris Post Office, the railway employé from Epinay, some friends of Monsieur and Mademoiselle Stangerson, and all Monsieur Darzac's witnesses. I was lucky enough to be called early in the trial, so that I was then able to watch and be present at almost the whole of the proceedings.

The court was so crowded that many lawyers were compelled to find seats on the steps. Behind the bench of justices were representatives from other benches. Monsieur Robert Darzac stood in the prisoner's dock between policemen, tall, handsome, and calm. A murmur of admiration rather than of compassion greeted his appearance. He leaned forward towards his counsel, Maître Henri Robert, who, assisted by his chief secretary, Maître Andre Hesse, was busily turning over the folios of his brief.


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 expected that Monsieur Stangerson, after giving his evidence, would have gone over to the prisoner and shaken hands with him; but he left the court without another word. It was remarked that the jurors appeared to be deeply interested in a rapid conversation which the manager of the "Epoque" was having with Maître Henri Robert. The manager, later, sat down in the front row of the public seats. Some were surprised that he was not asked to remain with the other witnesses in the room reserved for them.

The reading of the indictment was got through, as it always is, without any incident. I shall not here report the long examination to which Monsieur Darzac was subjected. He answered all the questions quickly and easily. His silence as to the important matters of which we know was dead against him. It would seem as if this reticence would be fatal for him. He resented the President's reprimands. He was told that his silence might mean death.

"Very well," he said; "I will submit to it; but I am innocent."

With that splendid ability which has made his fame, Maître Robert took advantage of the incident, and tried to show that it brought out in noble relief his client's character; for only heroic natures could remain silent for moral reasons in face of such a danger. The eminent advocate however, only succeeded in assuring those who were already assured of Darzac's innocence. At the adjournment Rouletabille had not yet arrived. Every


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 time a door opened, all eyes there turned towards it and back to the manager of the "Epoque," who sat impassive in his place. When he once was feeling in his pocket a loud murmur of expectation followed. The letter!

It is not, however, my intention to report in detail the course of the trial. My readers are sufficiently acquainted with the mysteries surrounding the Glandier case to enable me to go on to the really dramatic denouement of this ever-memorable day.

When the trial was resumed, Maître Henri Robert questioned Daddy Mathieu as to his complicity in the death of the keeper. His wife was also brought in and was confronted by her husband. She burst into tears and confessed that she had been the keeper's mistress, and that her husband had suspected it. She again, however, affirmed that he had had nothing to do with the murder of her lover. Maitre Henri Robert thereupon asked the court to hear Frederic Larsan on this point.

"In a short conversation which I have had with Frédéric Larsan, during the adjournment," declared the advocate, "he has made me understand that the death of the keeper may have been brought about otherwise than by the hand of Mathieu. It will be interesting to hear Frédéric  Larsan's theory."

Frédéric Larsan was brought in. His explanation was quite clear.

"I see no necessity," he said, "for bringing Mathieu in this. I have told Monsieur de Marquet


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 that the man's threats had biassed the examining magistrate against him. To me the attempt to murder Mademoiselle and the death of the keeper are the work of one and the same person. Mademoiselle Stangerson's murderer, flying through the court, was fired on; it was thought he was struck, perhaps killed. As a matter of fact, he only stumbled at the moment of his disappearance behind the corner of the right wing of the château. There he encountered the keeper who, no doubt, tried to seize him. The murderer had in his hand the knife with which he had stabbed Mademoiselle Stangerson and with this he killed the keeper."

This very simple explanation appeared at once plausible and satisfying. A murmur of approbation was heard.

"And the murderer? What became of him?" asked the President.

"He was evidently hidden in an obscure corner at the end of the court. After the people had left the court carrying with them the body of the keeper, the murderer quietly made his escape."

The words had scarcely left Larsan's mouth when from the back of the court came a youthful voice:—

"I agree with Frédéric Larsan as to the death of the keeper; but I do not agree with him as to the way the murderer escaped!"

Everybody turned round, astonished. The clerks of the court sprang towards the speaker, calling out silence, and the President angrily


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 the intruder to be immediately expelled. The same clear voice, however, was again heard:—

"It is I, Monsieur President—Joseph Rouletabille!"


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Wikisource:Books/John Dewey - Democracy and Education

by John Dewey (1916)

 * Democracy and Education
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter I
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter II
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter III
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter IV
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter V
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter VI
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter VII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter VIII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter IX
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter X
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XI
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XIII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XIV
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XV
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XVI
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XVII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XVIII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XIX
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XX
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXI
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXII
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXIV
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXV
 * Democracy and Education/Chapter XXVI