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October 27, 1972 [S.3858]

[86 STAT.

• ' '

AN ACT '•'• •" '• ^ '• To amend the Public Health Service Act to improve the program of medical assistance to areas with health manpower shortages, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Emergency Health United States of AmeHca in Congress assembled, Personnel Act SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Emergency Health PerAmendments of 1972. sonnel Act Amendments of 1972". 84 Stat. 1868; SEC. 2. (a) Section 329(a) of the Public Health Service Act is 85 Stat. 462. amended to read as follows: 42 tfSC 254b. National Health "SEC. 329. (a) There is established, within the Service, the National Service Corps, Health Service Corps (hereinafter in this section referred to as the establishment. 'Corps') which shall consist of those officers of the Regular and Reserve Corps of the Service and such other personnel as the Secretary may designate and which shall be utilized by the Secretary to improve the delivery of health care and services to persons residing in areas which have critical health manpower shortages." (b) Section 329(b) of such Act is amended to read as follows: " (b)(1) The Secretary shall (A) designate those areas which he determines have critical health manpower shortages, (B) provide assistance to persons seeking assignment of Corps personnel to such designated areas to provide under this section health care and services for persons residing in such areas, and (C) conduct such information programs in such designated areas as may be necessary to inform the public and private health entities serving those areas of the assistance available under this section. Personnel, "(2)(A) The Secretary may assign personnel of the Corps to proassignment. vide, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, health care and services for persons residing in an area designated by the Secretary under paragraph (1) if— "(i) the State health agency of each State in which such area is located or the local public health agency or any other public or nonprofit private health entity in such area requests such assignment, and "(ii) the (I) local government of such area, and ( II) the State and district medical, dental, or other appropriate health societies (as the case may be), certify to the Secretary that such assignment of Corps personnel is needed for such area. If with respect to any proposed assignment of Corps personnel to an area the requirements of clauses (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence are met except for the certification by the State and district medical, dental, or other appropriate health societies required by clause (ii) and if the Secretary finds from all the facts presented that such certification has clearly been arbitrarily and capriciously withheld, the Secretary may, after consultation with appropriate medical, dental, or other health societies, assign such personnel to such area. Corps personnel shall be assigned under this section on the basis of the extent of an area's need for health care and services and without regard to the ability of the residents of an area to pay for health care and services. Facilities, " (B) In providing health care and services under this section. Corps utilization. personnel shall utilize the techniques, facilities, and organizational forms most appropriate for the area and shall, to the maximum extent feasible, provide such care and services (i) to all persons in such area regardless of the ability of such persons to pay for the care and services, and (ii) in connection with (I) direct health care programs carried out by the Service; ( II) any direct health care program carried out in whole or in part with Federal financial assistance; or ( III) any

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 135

Question. 135 - OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is doing great things.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

(2) Of the vice opposed to it.

Art. 1 - Whether meanness is a vice?
Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."

Art. 2 - Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above (A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above (A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above (A[1]). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.

Reply to Objection 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply to Objection 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.

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other health care activity which is in furtherance of the purposes of this section. " (C) Any person who receives health care or services provided under this section shall be charged for such care or service on a fee-for-service or other basis at a rate established by the Secretary, pursuant to regulations, to recover the reasonable cost of providing such care or service; except that if such person is determined under regulations of the Secretary to be unable to pay such charge, the Secretary shall provide for the furnishing of such care or service at a reduced rate or without charge. If a Federal agency, an agency of a State or local government, or other third party would be responsible for all or part of the cost of the care or service provided under this section if such care or service had not been provided under this section, the Secretary shall collect, on a fee-for-service or other basis, from such agency or third party the portion of such cost for which it would be so responsible. Any funds collected by the Secretary under this subparagraph shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts and shall be disregarded in determining (i) the amounts of appropriations to be requested under subsection (h), and (ii) the amounts to be made available from appropriations made under such subsection to carry out this section." (c) Section 329(c) of such Act is amended (1) by striking out "Service" and inserting in lieu thereof "Corps" and (2) by inserting at the end thereof the following: "The Secretary may reimburse applicants for positions in the Corps for actual expenses incurred in traveling to and from their place of residence to an area in which they would be assigned for the purpose of evaluating such area with regard to being assigned in such area. The Secretary shall not reimburse an applicant for more than one such trip." {d) Section 329(d) of such Act is amended— (1) by striking out "Service" in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "Corps", and by inserting before the period at the end of such sentence the following: ", except that if such area is being served (as determined under regulations of the Secretary) by a hospital or other health care delivery facility of the Service, the Secretary shall, in addition to such other arrangements as the Secretary may make to insure the availability in such area of care and services by Corps personnel, arrange for the utilization of such hospital or facility by Corps personnel in providing care and services in such area but only to the extent that such utilization will not impair the delivery of care and treatment through such hospital or facility to persons who are entitled to care and treatment through such hospital or facility"; (2) by striking out "If there are no such facilities in such area" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "If there are no health facilities in or serving such area"; (3) by adding after the second sentence the following new sentence: "In providing such care and services, the Secretary may (A) make such arrangements as he determines are necessary for the use of equipment and supplies of the Service and for the lease or acquisition of other equipment and supplies, and (B) secure the temporary services of nurses and allied health professionals."; and (4) by inserting " (1) " after " (d) " and by adding at the end the following: "(2) The Secretary shall conduct at medical and nursing schools and other schools of the health professions and training centers for the allied health professions, recruiting programs for the Corps. Such

Charges.

Applicants, travel expenses. 84 Stat. 1868. 42 USC 254b.

Recruiting programs.

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programs shall include the wide dissemination of written information on the Corps and visits to such schools by personnel of the Corpii." 5o fi^cA'of^K" (^) Section 329(f) of such Act is amended (1) by striking out 42 u Tico oc^K s e 254b. An "Service" in paragraphs (1) and (3) and inserting in lieu thereof "Corps", and (2) by striking out "to select commissioned oflcicers of the Service and other personnel" in paragraph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof "to select personnel of the Corps". (f) Subsection (g) of section 329 of such Act is redesignated as subsection (h) and the following new subsection is inserted after subsection (f) of such section: Report to Con" (g) The Secretary shall report to Congress no later than May 15 gress. of each year— "(1) the number of areas designated under subsection (b) in the calendar year preceding the year in which the report is made as having critical health manpower shortages and the number of areas which the Secretary estimates will be so designated in the calendar year in which the report is made; "(2) the number and types of Corps personnel assigned in such preceding calendar year to areas designated under subsection (b), the number and types of additional Corps personnel which the Secretary estimates will be assigned to such areas in the calendar year in which the report is submitted, and the need (if any) for additional personnel for the Corps; and "(3) the number of applications filed in such preceding calendar year for assignment of Corps personnel under this section and the action taken on each such application." Appropriation. (g) Subsection (h) of section 329 of such Act (as so redesignated by subsection (f) of this section) is amended by striking out "and" after "1972;" and by inserting immediately before the period at the end the following "; and $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974". (h) Section 329 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "State." <'(i) For purposes of this section, the term 'State' includes Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands." fa^'iitie^s^'^requireSEC. 3. (a) The Secretary may not close or transfer control of a ments. ' hospltal or other health care delivery facility of the Public Health Service unless— (1) he transmits to each House of Congress, on the same day and while each House is in session, a detailed explanation (meeting the requirements of subsection (b)) for the proposed closing or transfer, and (2) a period of ninety calendar days of continuous session of Congress has elapsed after the date on which such explanation is transmitted. For purposes of paragraph (2), continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the ninetyday period. (b) Each explanation submitted under subsection (a) for closing or transferring control of a hospital or other health care delivery -, > s; f»-i facility of the Public Health Service shall— ?.:..; (1) contain (A) assurances that persons entitled to treatment and care at the hospital or other facility proposed to be closed • or transferred and persons for whom care and treatment at such hospital or other facility is authorized will, after the proposed closing or transfer, continue to be provided equivalent care and treatment through such hospital or other facility or under a new

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arrangement, and (B) an estimate of the cost of providing such care and treatment to such persons after the proposed closing or transfer; and (2) the comments (if any) made by each— (A) section 314:(a) State health planning agency whose section 314(a) plan covers (in whole or in part) the area in which the hospital or other facility is located or which is served by the hospital or other facility, and (B) section 314(b) area-wide health planning agency whose section 314(b) plan covers (in whole or in part) such area, after the Secretary has provided each such agency a reasonable opportunity to review and comment on the proposed closing or transfer. For purposes of paragraph (2), the term "section 314(a) State health planning agency" means the agency of a State which administers or supervises the administration of a State's health planning functions under a State plan approved under section 314(a) (referred to in paragraph (2) as a "section 314(a) plan"), and the term "section 314(b) area-wide health planning agency" means a public or nonprofit private agency or organization which has developed a comprehensive regional, metropolitan, or other local area plan or plans referred to in section 314(b) (referred to in paragraph (2) as a "section 314(b) plan"). SEC. 4. Section 741(f)(1)(C) of the Public Health Service Act is amended by striking out "agreement with the Secretary to practice his profession for a period of at least two years in an area in a State determined by the Secretary" and inserting in lieu thereof "agreement with the Secretary to practice his profession (as a member of the National Health Service Corps or otherwise) for a period of at least two years in an area in a State designated under section 329(b) or otherwise determined by the Secretary". SEC. 5. Title II of the Public Health Service Act is amended by adding after section 224 the following new section:

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80 Stat. 1181; 84 Stat. 1304. 42 USC 246.

Definitions.

85 Stat. 449. 42 USC 294a.

Ante, p. 1290. 58 Stat. 683; 81 Stat. 539; 84 Stat. 1870. 42 USC 202.

"PUBLIC HEALTH AND NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS SCHOLARSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM

"SEC. 225. (a) The Secretary shall establish the Public Health and National Health Service Corps Scholarship Training Program (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 'Program') to obtain trained physicians, dentists, nurses, and other health-related specialists for the National Health Service Corps and other units of the Service. "(b) To be eligible for acceptance and continued participation in the Program, each applicant must— "(1) be accepted for enrollment, or be enrolled, as a full-time student in an accredited (as determined by the Secretary) educational institution in the United States, or its territories or possessions; "(2) pursue an approved course of study, and maintain an acceptable level of academic standing, leading to a degree in medicine, dentistry, or other health-related specialty, as determined by the Secretary; " (3) be eligible for, or hold, an appointment as a commissioned officer in the Regular or Reserve Corps of the Service or be selected for civilian service in the National Health Service Corps; and " (4) agree in writing to serve, as prescribed by subsection (e) of this section, in the Commissioned Corps of the Service or as a civilian member of the National Health Service Corps.

Establishment.

Acceptance and participation, requirements.

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Payments.

37 USC 203 note.

Contract authority.

Obligations.

Ante,

p. 1290.

Liability.

Waiv

[86 STAT.

"(c) Each participant in the Program will be authorized a scholarsliip for each approved academic year of training, not to exceed four years, in an amount prescribed by the Secretary and payable in monthly installments. The scholarship shall not exceed an amount equal to the basic pay and allowances of a commissioned officer on active duty in pay grade 0 - 1 with less than two years of service, plus an amount to cover the reasonable cost of books, supplies, equipment, student medical expenses, and other necessary educational expenses which are not otherwise paid as a part of the basic tuition payment. " (d) The Secretary may contract with an accredited educational institution for the payment of tuition and other education expenses, not otherwise covered under subsection (c) of this section, for persons participating in the Program. If necessary, persons participating in the Program may be reimbursed for the actual cost of tuition and other educational expenses authorized in this subsection, in lieu of a contract with the educational institution. "(e) A person participating in the Program shall be obligated to serve on active duty as a commissioned officer in the Service or as a civilian member of the National Health Service Corps following completion of academic training, for a period of time prescribed by the Secretary which will not be less than one year of service on active duty for each academic year of training received under the Program. At least one-half of the period of service required by the preceding sentence must be spent providing health care and services (1) in an area designated under section 329(b), (2) as a member of the Indian Health Service or the Federal Health Programs Service and in an area (determined under section 329 or otherwise) to have a health manpower shortage, or (3) in connection with any program, designated by the Secretary, for the provision of health care and services in such an area. For persons receiving a degree from a school of medicine, osteopathy, or dentistry, the commencement of a period of obligated service can be deferred for the period of time required to complete internship and residency training. For persons receiving degrees in other health professions the obligated service period will commence upon completion of their academic training. Periods of internship or residency shall not be creditable in satisfying an active duty service obligation under this subsection unless the internship or residency is served in a facility of the Service or other facility of the National Health Service Corps. " (f)(1) If, for any reason, a person fails to complete an active duty service obligation under this section, he shall be liable for the payment of an amount equal to the cost of tuition and other education expenses, and scholarship payments, paid under this section, plus interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate. Any amount which the United States is entitled to recover under this paragraph shall, within the three-year period beginning on the date the United States becomes entitled to recover such amount, be paid to the United States. " (2) When a person undergoing training in the Program is academicallv dismissed or voluntarily terminates academic training, he shall be liable for repayment to the Government for an amount equal to the cost of tuition and other educational expenses paid to or for him from Federal funds plus any scholarship payments which he received under the program. "(3) The Secretary shall by regulation provide for the waiver or suspension of any obligation under paragraph (1) or (^2) applicable to any individual whenever compliance by such individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship to such individual and if enforcement of such obligation with respect to any individual would be against equity and good conscience.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 136

Question. 136 - OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether patience is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(3) Whether it can be had without grace?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

Art. 1 - Whether patience is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

Art. 2 - Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

Art. 3 - Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.

Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. FS, Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

Art. 4 - Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Q[123], A[6]), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.

Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

Art. 5 - Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.

Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.


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PUBLIC LAW 92-586-OCT. 27, 1972

" (g) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, persons undergoing academic training under the Program shall not be comited against any employment ceiling affecting the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. " (h) The Secretary shall issue regulations governing the implementation of this section. " (i) To carry out the Program, there is authorized to be appropriated $3,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974." Approved October 27, 1972.

1295 Employment ceiling, exception.

Regulations. Appropriation.

Public Law 92-586 AN ACT To provide for the disposition of judgment funds of the Osage Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to distribute per capita to all persons whose names appear on the roll of the Osage Tribe of Indians approved by the Secretary of the Interior April 11, 1908, pursuant to the Act of June 28, 1906 (34 Stat. 539), all funds which were appropriated by the Act of January 8, 1971 (84 Stat. 1981), in satisfaction of a judgment that was obtained by the Osage Nation of Indians in the Indian Claims Commission against the United States in dockets numbered 105,106,107, and 108, together with interest thereon, except the sum of $1,000,000 and any funds that revert to the Osage Tribe and except the amount allowed for attorney fees and expenses and the cost of distribution. (b) The sum of $1,000,000 plus any funds that revert to the Osage Tribe may be advanced, expended, invested, or reinvested for the purpose of financing an education program or other socioeconomic programs of benefit to the Osage Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, such programs to be administered as authorized by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) The Secretary of the Interior may make appropriate withdrawals from the judgment funds and interest thereon, using interest funds first, to pay costs incident to carrying out the provisions of this Act. SEC. 2. (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a share or proportional share payable to a living original Osage allottee shall be paid to such allottee. (b) A share of a deceased Osage allottee having died prior to or after the passage of this Act shall be distributed to his heirs of Osage Indian blood pursuant to an order determining heirs by the Secretary of the Interior or a court of competent jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma, and such distributions by the Secretary of the Interior shall be final and conclusive. I n the event the heirs of Osage Indian blood of an Osage Indian having died prior to or after the passage of this Act have not been determined by the Secretary of the Interior or a court of competent jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma, such share shall be distributed to the heirs of Osage Indian blood upon the filing of proof of death and inheritance in accordance with the Oklahoma law of intestate succession in a form satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior whose findings and determinations upon such proof shall be final and conclusive: Provided, That when a person of Osage Indian blood receives an amount totaling less than $20 from one or more shares of one or more Osage allottees, that amount shall not be distributed to the individual, but will revert to the Osage Tribe.

October 27, 1972 [H. R. 7093]

Indians. Osage Tribe, Okla. Judgment funds, disposition.

Education program.

Fund withdrawals.

Distribution.

Exception.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1338

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Regulations.

Per c a p i t a shares.

Unclaimed shares.

Tax exemption. Regulations.

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[86

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(c) A share or proportional share payable to a person of Osage Indian blood under eighteen years of age and any person under guardianship pursuant to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact he has received a certificate of competency shall be disbursed under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. SEC. 3. All claims for per capita shares by heirs of Osage Indian blood shall be filed with the Superintendent, Osage Agency, Pawhuska, Oklahoma, not later than eighteen months from the date of approval of this Act. Thereafter, all claims and the right to file same shall be forever barred and the unclaimed shares shall revert to the Osage Tribe. Unclaimed shares of distributees shall revert to the Osage Tribe six months after determination by the Secretary of the Interior of their right to share. SEC. 4. None of the funds distributed per capita under the provisions of this Act shall be subject to Federal or State income taxes. SEC. 5. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-587

October 27, 1972 [H. R. 4678]

Imports. U. of Calif., carillon; caprolactam monomer; pre-Columbian a r t.

77A Stat. 4 3 1; 84 Stat. 4 1 1.

AN ACT To provide foi* the free entry of a carillon for the use of the University of California at ISanta B a r b a r a, and for other purposes.

Be it ouicted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Vidted States of Amema in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to admit free of duty a carillon imported June, 1969, for the use of the University of California at Santa Barbara. SEC". 2. If the liquidation of the entry of the article described in the first section of this Act has become final, such entry shall be reliquidated and the appropriate refund of duty shall be made. SEC. 3. (a) Subpart B of part 1 of the appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the Ignited States (19 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by inserting immediately after item 907.-15 the following new item: 907.63

Effective date.

84 Stat. 284. 19 USC 1514.

Caprolactam monomer in water solution (provided for in item 403.70, part IB, schedule 4)

Free

No change

On or before December 31, 1972.

(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumi^tion on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Upon request therefor filed with the customs officer concerned on or before the ninetieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act, the entry or withdrawal of any article— (1) which was made after August 15, 1972, and before the date of the enactment of this Act, and (2) with respect to which there would have been no duty if the amendment made by subsection (a) applied to such entry or withdrawal, shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law, be liquidated or reliquidated as though such entry or withdrawal had been made on the date of the enactment of this Act.

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PUBLIC LAW 92-587-OCT. 27, 1972

1297

TITLE II—REGULATION OF IMPORTATION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN MONUMENTAL OR ARCHITECTURAL SCULPTURE OR MURALS SEC. 201. The Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of ^^^^^^' p'-°™"ig«State, by regulation shall promulgate, and thereafter when appropriate shall revise, a list of stone carvings and wall art which are preColumbian monumental or architectural sculptui^e or murals within the meaning of paragraph (3) of section 205. Such stone carvings and wall art may be listed by type or other classification deemed appropriate by the Secretary. SEC. 202. (a) No pre-Columbian monumental or architectural countr'y'oforigln? sculpture or mural which is exported (whether or not such exportation is to the United States) from the country of origin after the effective date of the regulation listing such sculpture or mural pursuant to section 202 may be imported into the United States unless the government of the country of origin of such sculpture or mural issues a certificate, in a form acceptable to the Secretary, which certifies that such exportation was not in violation of the laws of that country. (b) If the consignee of any pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural is unable to present to the customs officer concerned at the time of making entry of such sculpture or mural— (1) the certificate of the government of the country of origin ....^ required under subsection (a) of this section; (2) satisfactory evidence that such sculpture or mural was exported from the country of origin on or before the effective date of the regulation listing such sculpture or mural pursuant to section 202; or (3) satisfactory evidence that such sculpture or mural is not covered by the list promulgated under section 202; the customs officer concerned shall take the sculpture or mural into customs custody and send it to a bonded warehouse or public store to be held at the risk and expense of the consignee until such certificate or evidence is filed with such officer. If such certificate or evidence is not presented within the 90-day period after the date on which such sculpture or mural is taken into customs custody, or such longer period as may be allowed by the Secretary for good cause shown, the importation of such sculpture or mural into the United States is in violation of this title. SEC. 203. (a) Any pre-Columbian monumental or architectural Forfeiture. sculpture or mural imported into the United States in violation of this title shall be seized and subject to forfeiture under the customs laws. (b) Any pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural which is forfeited to the United States shall— (1) first be offered for return to the country of origin and shall be returned if that country bears all expenses incurred incident to such return and complies with such other requirements relating to the return as the Secretary shall prescribe; or (2) if not returned to the country of origin, be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law for articles forfeited for violation of the customs laws. SEC. 204. The Secretary shall prescribe such rules and regulations as Rules and reguare necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. ^^*^°"^SEC. 205. For the purposes of this title^— Definitions. (1) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury. (2) The term "United States" includes the several States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

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[86

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'

(3) The term "pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural" means— (A) any stone carving or wall art which— (i) is the product of a pre-Columbian Indian culture of Mexico, Central America, South America, or the Caribbean Islands; (ii) was an immobile monument or architectural structure or was a part of, or affixed to, any such monument or structure; and (iii) is subject to export control by the country of origin; or (B) any fragment or part of any stone carving or wall art described iii subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. (4) The term "country of origin', as applied to any preColumbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural, means the country where such sculpture or mural was first discovered. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-588 October 27, 1972 [H. J. R e s. 912]

N.C.-Va. seaward boundary agreement.

"True ninetydegree bearing." Boundary marker, appropriation.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Granting the consent of Congress to an agreement between the States of North Carolina and Virginia establishing their lateral seaward boundary. Whereas, by virtue of the provisions of chapter 452 of the Acts of Assembly of 1971 of the General Assembly of North Carolina, amending chapter 141 of the General Statutes of North Carolina by adding thereto a new section designated as G.S. 141-8, and by virtue of the provisions of chapter 343 of the Acts of Assembly of 1970 of the General Assembly of Virginia, amending title 7.1 of the Code of Virginia by adding thereto a new section designated as 7.1-4.1, the States of North Carolina and Virginia have agreed to their mutual lateral seaward boundary; and Whereas, by the aforesaid Acts, the Legislatures of North Carolina and Virginia both established and described said boundary in substance as follows: Beginning at the intersection of the low water mark of the Atlantic Ocean and the existing North CarolinaVirginia boundary line; thence due east on a true ninety-degree bearing to the seaward j\irisdictional limits of North Carolina and Virginia, respectively; such boundary line to be extended on the true ninety-degree bearing as far as a need for further delimitation may arise: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the /Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of the Congress is hereby granted to said boundary agreement, and to each and every part thereof, and the aforesaid Acts of the States of North Carolina and Virginia are hereby approved, subject to the understanding that within the agreement the phrase "true ninety-degree bearing" means "line of constant latitude." SEC. 2. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized, empowered, and instructed to survey and properly mark by suitable monuments the seaward boundary between the States of North Carolina and Virginia, and so much of the interior boundary as is considered necessary for this purpose by the Secretary, and the necessary appropriations for this work are hereby authorized. SEC. 3. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is expressly reserved. Approved October 27, 1972.

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PUBLIC LAW 92-589-OCT. 27, 1972

1299

Public Law 92-589 AN ACT To establish the Golden Gate National Recreation Area in the State of California, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

October 27, 1972 [H. R. 16444]

Golden Gate National Recrea* tion Area, Calif.

ESTABLISHMENT

1. In order to preserve for public use and enjoyment certain areas of Marin and San Francisco Counties, California, possessing outstanding natural, historic, scenic, and recreational values, and in order to provide for the maintenance of needed recreational open space necessary to urban environment and planning, the Grolden Gate National Recreation Area (hereinafter referred to as the "recreation area") is hereby established. In the management of the recreation area, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") shall utilize the resources in a maimer which will provide for recreation and educational opportunities consistent with sound principles of land use planning and management. In carrying out the provisions of this Act, the Secretary shall preserve the recreation area, as far as possible, in its natural setting, and protect it from development and uses which would destroy the scenic beauty and natural character of the area. SECTION

COMPOSITION A N D BOUNDARIES

SEC. 2. (a) The recreation area shall comprise the lands, waters, and submerged lands generally depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Golden Gate National Recreation Area", numbered NRA-GG-80,003A, sheets 1 through 3, and dated July, 1972. (b) The map referred to in this section shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Offices of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, District of Columbia. After ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ advising the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United o£°ro^ngre8*sionai' States House of Representatives and the United States Senate (here- committees. inafter referred to as the "committees") in writing, the Secretary may Publication in make minor revisions of the boundaries of the recreation area when ^'^^'^^ Register. necessary by publication of a revised drawing or other boundary description in the Federal Register. ACQUISITION POI/ICT

SEC. 3. (a) Within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Secretary may acquire lands, improvements, waters, or interests therein, by donation, purchase, exchange or transfer. Any lands, or interests therein, owned by the State of California or any political subdivision thereof, may be acquired only by donation. When any tract of land is only partly within such boundaries, the Secretary may acquire all or any portion of the land outside of such boundaries in order to minimize the payment of severance costs. Land so acquired outside of the boundaries may be exchanged by the Secretary for non-Federal lands within the boundaries. Any portion of land acquired outside the boundaries and not utilized for exchange shall be reported to the General Services A(toiinistration for disposal under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377), as amended: Provided, That no disposal shall be for less than fair market value. Except as hereinafter provided. Federal property within

•Ante, p. 503. 40 USC 471 note.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 137

Question. 137 - OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(3) Of its relation to constancy;

(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?

Art. 1 - Whether perseverance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."

Art. 2 - Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated (Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf. Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Mat. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

Art. 3 - Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q[128], A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.

Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

Art. 4 - Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A[1]). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now "before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace.

Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above (FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith."

Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.


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PUBLIC LAW 92-589-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

the boundaries of the recreation area is hereby transferred without consideration to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary for the purposes of this Act, subject to the continuation of such existing uses as may be agreed upon between the Secretary and the head of Facilities and the agency formerly having jurisdiction over the property. Notwithimprovements. standing any othcr provision of law, the Secretary may develop and administer for the purposes of this Act structures or other improvements and facilities on lands for which he receives a permit of use and occupancy from the Secretary of the Army. Forts cronkhite, (b) Fort Croukhlte, Fort Barry, and the westerly one-half of F o i t Sansf'er o1 S^u-"^' Bakcr, iu Marin County, California, as depicted on the map entitled diction. "Golden Gate Military Properties" numbered NRAGG-20,002 and dated January 1972, which shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the National P a r k Service, are hereby transferred to the jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act, subject to continued use and occupancy by the Secretary of the Army of those lands needed for existing air defense missions, reserve activities and family housing, until he determines that such requirements no longer exist. The Coast Guard Radio Receiver Station, shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating. When this station is determined to be excess to the needs of the Coast Guard, it shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act. Horseshoe Bay, (Q) The easterly one-half of Fort Baker in Marin County, CaliBaker? "^'^ "^ fomia, shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Department of the " Army. When this property is determined by the Department of Defense to be excess to its needs, it shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act. The Secretary of the Army shall grant to the Secretary reasonable public access through such property to Horseshoe Bay, together with the right to construct and maintain such public service facilities as are necessary for the purposes of this Act. The precise facilities and location thereof shall be determined between the Secretary and the Secretary of the Army. rig^^^'o/occupancy. (^) Upou euactmeut, the Secretary of the Army shall grant to the Secretary the irrevocable use and occupancy of one hundred acres of the Baker Beach area of the Presidio of San Francisco, as depicted on the map referred to in subsection (b). Ai^fie^Y ^™r ^^^ Secretary of the Army shall grant to the Secretary within occupancy.^ ° 3, rcasouable time, the irrevocable use and occupancy of forty-five acres of the Crissy Army Airfield of the Presidio, as depicted on the map referred to in subsection (b). Giilrd s^a^"' ^°^^* ^^) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^11 01" ^^y substantial portion of the remainder of the cont'inued-u°s"' Prcsidio is determined by the Department of Defense to be excess to permit. its needs, such lands shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act. The Secretary shall grant a permit for continued use and occupancy for that portion of said Fort Point Coast Guard Station necessary for activities of the Coast Guard. Po^int"Diab"o'^and (s) Polnt Boulta, Polut Diablo, and Lime Point shall remain Lime Point, trans- under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department in which fer of jurisdiction, ^hc Coast Guard is operating. When this property is determined to be excess to the needs of the Coast Guard, it shall be transferred to the aids^aTJtt" iurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act. The Coast Guard may continue to maintain and operate existing navigational aids: Provided, That access to such navigational aids and the installation of necessary new navigational aids within the recreation area shall be undertaken in accordance with plans which are mutually acceptable to the Secretary and the Secretary of the Department ,. in which the Coast Guard is operating and which are consistent \»7vr with both the purposes of this Act and the purpose of existing

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1343

 86 STAT. ]

1301

PUBLIC LAW 92-589-OCT. 27, 1972

statutes dealing with establishment, maintenance, and operation of navigational aids. (h) That portion of Fort Miley comprising approximately one and seven-tenths acres of land presently used and required by the Secretary of the Navy for its inshore, underseas warfare installations shall remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy until such time as all or any portion thereof is determined by the Department of Defense to be excess to its needs, at which time such excess portion shall be transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of this Act. (i) New construction and development within the recreation area on property remaining under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of the Army and not subject to the provisions of subsection (d) or (e) hereof shall be limited to that which is required to accommodate facilities being relocated from property being transferred under this Act to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary or which is directly related to the essential missions of the Sixth United States Army: Provided, however, That any construction on presently undeveloped open space may be undertaken only after prior consultation with the Secretary. The foregoing limitation on construction and development shall not apply to expansion of those facilities known as Letterman General Hospital or the Western Medical Institute of Research. (j) The owner of improved property on the date of its acquisition by the Secretary under this Act may, as a condition of such acquisition, retain for himself and his heirs and assigns a right of use and occupancy of the improved property for noncommercial residential purposes for a definite term of not more than twenty-five years, or, in lieu thereof, for a term ending at the death of the owner or the death of his spouse, whichever is later. The owner shall elect the term to be reserved. Unless the property is wholly or partially donated to the United States, the Secretary shall pay to the owner the fair market value of the property on the date of acquisition minus the fair market value on that date of the right retained by the owner. A right retained pursuant to this section shall be subject to termination by the Secretary upon his determination that it is being exercised in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of this Act, and it shall terminate by operation of law upon the Secretary's notifying the holder of the right of such determination and tendering to him an amount equal to the fair market value of that portion of the right which remains unexpired. (k) The term "improved property", as used in subsection (j), means a detached, noncommercial residential dwelling, the construction of which was begun before June 1, 1971, together with so much of the land on which the dwelling is situated, the said land being in the same ownership as the dwelling, as the Secretary shall designate to be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dwelling for the sole purpose of noncommercial residential use, together with any structures accessorv to the dwelling which are situated on the land so designated. (1) Whenever an owner of property elects to retain a right of use and occupancy as provided for in the Act, such owner shall be deemed to have Avaived any benefits or rights accruing under sections 203, 204, 205, and 206 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1894), and for the purposes of those sections such owner shall not be considered a displaced person as defined in section 101(6) of that Act. (m) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary shall have the same authority with respect to contracts for the acquisition of land and interests in land for the j^urposes of this Act as was

Fort Miley, transfer of jurisdiction.

New construction, limitation.

Exceptions.

Property owners, retention r i g h t s.

"Improved property."

42 USC 46234626. 42 USC 4 6 0 1. Contract authority.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1344

 1302

40 USC 261. Installment payments; interest rate.

70 Stat. 694; 84 Stat. 782. 31 USC 724a. 75 Stat. 415; 62 Stat. 979.

Police and fire protection, cooperative agreements. Water resource developments.

Transportation system, study.

PUBLIC LAW 92-589-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

given the Secretary of the Treasury for other land acquisitions by section 34 of ^he Act of May 30, 1908, relating to purchase of sites for public buildings (35 Stat. 545), and the Secretary and the owner of land to be acquired under this Act may agree that the purchase price will be paid in periodic installments over a period that does not exceed ten years, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at a rate which is not in excess of the current average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to maturity comparable to the average maturities on the installments. Judgments against the United States for amounts in excess of the deposit in court made in condemnation actions shall be subject to the provisions of the Act of July 27, 1956 (70 Stat. 624) and sections 2414 and 2517 of title 28, United States Code. ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary shall administer the lands, waters and interests therein acquired for the recreation area in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4), as amended and supplemented, and the Secretary may utilize such statutory authority available to him for the conservation and management of wildlife and natural resources as he deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding their inclusion within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Muir Woods National Monument and Fort Point National Historic Site shall continue to be administered as distinct and identifiable units of the national park system in accordance with the laws applicable to such monument and historic site. (b) The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements with any Federal agency, the State of California, or any political subdivision thereof, for the rendering, on a reimbursable basis, of rescue, firefighting, and law enforcement and fire preventive assistance. (c) The authority of the Army to undertake or contribute to water resource developments, including shore erosion control, beach protection, and navigation improvements on land and/or waters within the recreation area shall be exercised in accordance with plans which are mutually acceptable to the Secretary and the Secretary of the Army and which are consistent with both the purpose of this Act and the purpose of existing statutes dealing with water and related resource development. (d) The Secretary, in cooperation with the State of California and affected political subdivisions thereof, local and regional transit agencies, and the Secretaries of Transportation and of the Army, shall make a study for a coordinated public and private transportation system to and within the recreation area and other units of the national park system in Marin and San Francisco Counties. ADVISORY COMMISSION

Establishment; membership.

SEC. 5. (a) There is hereby established the Golden Gate National Recreation Area Advisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). (b) The Commission shall be composed of fifteen members appointed by the Secretary for terms of three years each. (c) Any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (d) Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation, as such, but the Secretary may pay, upon vouchers signed by the Chairman, the expenses reasonably incurred by the Commission and its members in carrying out their responsibilities under this Act.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 138

Question. 138 - OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Of effeminacy;

(2) Of pertinacity.

Art. 1 - Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally 'softness']
Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i.e. obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them." Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

Art. 2 - Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q[92], A[1]). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious." "Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man "perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or {idiognomones}, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (Q[127], A[2], ad 1; Q[133], A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.

Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance.