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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 105

Question. 105 - OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

Art. 1 - Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above (Q[104], A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.

Objection 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; FS, Q[72], A[5]; FS, Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God.

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom. 13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.

Reply to Objection 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply to Objection 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.

Art. 2 - Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q[94], A[3]). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q[14], A[2]). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1264

 90 STAT. 1214

Fees.

Penalty. "Persons."

Appropriation authorization.

PUBLIC LAW 94-400—SEPT. 7, 1976

(c) Except to the extent otherwise herein provided, nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent any claimant under this Act from exercising any rights to which he may be entitled under any other provisions of law. (d) Attorney and agent fees shall be paid out of the awards hereunder. No attorney or agent on account of services rendered in connection with each claim shall receive in excess of 10 per centum of the amount paid in connection therewith, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Whoever violates this subsection shall be fined a sum not to exceed $10,000. SEC. 10. For the purposes of this Act, the term "persons" means any individual, Indian, Indian tribe, corporation, partnership, company, municipality, township, association or other non-Federal entity. SEC. 11. If any particular provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the other provisions of this Act shall not be affected thereby. SEC. 12. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds as may be required to carry out the purposes of this Act. Approved September 7, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1423 (Comm. on the Judiciary). SENATE REPORT No. 94-963 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): June 17, considered and passed Senate. Aug. 24, considered and passed House, amended. Aug. 25, Senate concurred in House amendments. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 12, No. 37: Sept. 7, Presidential statement.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1265

 PUBLIC LAW 9 4 - 4 0 1 — S E P T. 7, 1976

90 STAT. 1215

Public Law 94-401 94th Congress An Act To amend title XX of the Social Security Act so as to permit greater latitude by the States in establishing criteria respecting eligibility for social services, to facilitate and encourage the implementation by States of child day care services programs conducted pursuant to such title, to promote the employment of welfare recipients in the provision of child day care services, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 2002(a) of the Social Security Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(14)(A) For purposes of paragraph s (5) and (6), an individual shall, at the option of the State, be deemed to be an individual described in paragraph (5)(B) if, because of the geographic area in which any particular service is provided to him, the characteristics of the community to which it is provided, the nature of the service, the conditions (other than income) of eligibility to receive it, or other factors surrounding its provision, the State may reasonably conclude, without individual determinations of eligibility, that substantially all of the persons who receive the service are members of families with a monthly gross income which is not more than 90 per centum of the median income of a family of four in the State, adjusted (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) to take into account the size of the family. " (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be applicable to child day care services furnished to any child other than a child of a migratory agricultural worker.". (b) Section 2000(a)(4) of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof (after and below subparagraph (E)) the following new sentence: " I n any case in which services are provided to individuals to whom the provisions of paragraph (14) are applied, the proportion of the expenditures for such services which are attributable to individuals described in the preceding sentence may be determined on the basis of generally accepted statistical sampling procedures.". (c) Section 2002(a)(6) of such Act is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ", family p l a n n i n g services," immediately after "referral service". (d) The amendments made by this section shall be effective on and after October 1, 1975. SEC. 2. Effective February 1, 1976, section 7(a)(3) of Public Law 93-647 is amended by striking out " February 1, 1976" and inserting in lieu thereof "October 1, 1977". SEC. 3. (a) For purposes of title X X of the Social Security Act, the amount of the limitation (imposed by section 2 0 0 2 (a)(2) of such Act) which is applicable to any State for the fiscal period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, or which is applicable to any State for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977, shall be deemed to be equal to whichever of the following is the lesser: (1) an amount equal to— (A) 106.4 per centum of the amount of the limitation so imposed (as determined without regard to this section) in the case of such fiscal period, or

RQ_1Q4 n _ 7 f t — n t

1

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Sept. 7, 1976 [H.R. 12455]

Social Security Act, amendments. 42 USC 1397a.

42 USC 1397a.

Effective date. 42 USC 1397a note. Effective date. 42 USC 1397 note. 42 USC 1397a note. 42 USC 1397.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1266

 90 STAT. 1216

Grants.

42 USC 1397.

42 USC 1397a.

PUBLIC LAW 94-401—SEPT. 7, 1976 (B) 108 per centum of the amount of the limitation so imposed (as determined without regard to this section) in the case of such fiscal year ending September 30, 1977, or (2) an amount equal to (A) 100 per centum of such limitation for such fiscal period or fiscal year (as determined without regard to this section), plus (B) an amount equal to the sum of (i) 75 per centum (in the case of such fiscal period) or 100 per centum (in the case of such fiscal year) of the total amount of expenditures (I) which are made during such fiscal period or year in connection with the provision of any child day care service, and (II) with respect to which payment is authorized to be made to the State under such title for such fiscal period or year, and (ii) the aggregate of the amounts of the grants, made by the State during such fiscal period or year, to which the provisions of subsection (c)(1) are applicable, (b) The additional Federal funds which become payable to any State for the fiscal period or fiscal year specified in subsection (a) by reason of the provisions of such subsection shall, to the maximum extent that the State determines to be feasible, be employed in such a way as to increase the employment of welfare recipients and other low-income persons in jobs related to the provision of child day care services. (c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), sums granted by a State to a qualified provider of child day care services (as defined in paragraph (3)(A)) during the fiscal period or fiscal year specified in subsection (a), to assist such provider in meeting its Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses (as defined in paragraph (3)(B)) with respect to individuals employed in jobs related to the provision of child day care services in one or more child day care facilities of such provider, shall be deemed, for purposes of title X X of the Social Security Act, to constitute expenditures made by the State, in accordance with the requirements and conditions imposed by such Act, for the provision of services directed at one or more of the goals set forth in clauses (A) through (E) of the first sentence of section 2002(a)(1) of such Act. With respect to sums to which the preceding sentence is applicable (after application of the provisions of paragraph (2)), the figure "75", as contained in the first sentence of section 2002(a)(1) of such Act, shall be deemed to read "100". (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not be applicable— (A) to the amount, if any, by which the aggregate of the sums (as described in such paragraph) granted by any State during the fiscal period or fiscal year specified in subsection (a) exceeds the amount by which such State's limitation (as referred to in subsection (a)) is increased pursuant to such subsection for such fiscal period or year, or (B) with respect to any grant made to a particular qualified provider of child day care services to the extent that (as determined by the Secretary) such grant is or will be used— (i) to pay wages to any employee at an annual rate in excess of $5,000, in the case of a public or nonprofit private provider, or (ii) to pay wages to any employee at an annual rate in excess of $4,000, or to pay more than 80 per centum of the wages of any employee, m the case of any other provider.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1267

 PUBLIC LAW 94-401—SEPT. 7, 1976 (3) For purposes of this subsection— (A) the term "qualified provider of child day care services", when used in reference to a recipient of a grant by a State, includes a provider of such services only if, of the total number of children receiving such services from such provider in the facility with respect to which the grant is made, at least 20 per centum thereof have some or all of the costs for the child day care services so furnished to them by such provider paid for under the State's services program conducted pursuant to title X X of the Social Security Act; and (B) the term "Federal welfare recipient employment expenses" means expenses of a qualified provider of child day care services which constitute Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses as defined in section SOB (a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or which would constitute Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses as so defined if the provider were a taxpayer entitled to a credit (with respect to the wages involved) under section 40 of such Code. (d)(1) In the administration of title X X of the Social Security Act, the figure "75", as contained in the first sentence of section 2002 (a)(1) of such Act, shall, subject to paragraph (2), be deemed to read "100" for purposes of applying such sentence to expenditures made by a State for the provision of child day care services during the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977. (2) The total amount of Federal payments which may be paid to any State for such fiscal year under title X X of the Social Security Act at the rate specified in paragraph (1) shall not exceed an amount equal to the excess (if any) of— (A) the amount by which such State's limitation (as referred to in subsection (a)) is increased pursuant to such sulDsection for such year, over (B) the aggregate of the amounts of the grants, made by the State during such year, to which the provisions of subsection (c)(1) are applicable. SEC. 4. (a) Section 50A(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to amount of credit for work incentive program expenses) is amended— (1) by adding at the end of paragraph (2) the following new sentence: "The preceding sentence shall not apply to so much of the credit allowed by section 40 as is attributable to Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses described in subsection (a)(6)(B).", and (2) by striking out paragraph (6) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(6) EES.—

90 STAT. 1217 Definitions.

42 USC 1397.

26 USC SOB. 26 USC 40. 42 USC 1397a.

'''*'

26 USC 50A.

LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ELIGIBLE EMPLOY" (A)

NONBUSINESS ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES.—Notwithstanding

paragraph (1), the credit allowed by section 40 with respect 26 USC 40. to Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year to an eligible employee whose services are not performed in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer shall not exceed $1,000.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1268

 90 STAT. 1218

PUBLIC LAW 94-401—SEPT. 7, 1976 "(B)

26 USC 40.

26 USC SOB.

26 USC 50A note.

42 USC 1397a.

Waiver.

Effective date. 42 USC 1397a note.

CHILD DAY CARE SERVICES ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES.—Not-

withstanding paragraph (1), the credit allowed by section 40 with respect to Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year to an eligible employee whose services are performed in connection with a child day care services program, conducted by the taxpayer, shall not exceed $1,000.". (b) Section 50B(a)(2) of such Code (relating to definitions; special rules) is amended to read as follows: " (2) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, the term 'Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses' means the amount of wages paid or incurred by the taxpayer for services rendered to the taxpayer by an eligible employee— "(A) before July 1, 1976, or "(B) in the case of an eligible employee whose services are performed in connection with a child day care services program of the taxpayer, before October 1, 1977.". (c) The amendments made by this section with respect to Federal welfare recipient employment incentive expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer to an eligible employee whose services are performed in connection with a child day care services program of the taxpayer shall apply to such expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer to an eligible employee whom such taxpayer hires after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 5. (a) Section 2002(a)(9)(A) (ii) of the Social Security Act is amended— (1) by striking out "and" at the end of clause ( II), and (2) by adding after the comma at the end of clause ( III) the following: "(IV) the State agency may waive the staffing standards otherwise applicable in the case of a day care center or group day care home in which not more than 20 per centum of the children in the facility (or, in the case of a day care center, not more than 5 children in the center) are children whose care is being paid for (wholly or in part) from funds made available to the State under this title, if such agency finds that it is not feasible to furnish day care for the children, whose care is so paid for, in a day care facility which complies with such staffing standards, and if the day care facility providing care for such children complies with applicable State standards, and (V) in determining whether applicable staffing standards are met in the case of day care provided in a family day care home, the number of children being cared for in such home shall include a child of the mother who is operating the home only if such child is under age 6,". (b) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall, insofar as such amendments add a new clause (V) to section 2002(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Social Security Act, be effective for the period beginning October 1, 1975, and ending September 30, 1977; and on and after October 1, 1977, section 2002(a)(9)(A) (ii) of the Social Security Act shall read as it would if such amendments had not been made.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 106

Question. OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?

(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?

(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?

(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver?

(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?

Art. 1 - Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above (Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to religion.

Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).

Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.

Art. 2 - Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?
Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.

Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Lk. 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.

I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis": wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Art. 3 - Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?
Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.

Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them.

Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.

Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received.

Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give thanks."

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (Q[31], A[3]; Q[101], A[2]), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor."

Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby."

Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.

Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!"

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3).

Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment."

Art. 4 - Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?
Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once.

Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness."

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful."

Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.

Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors.

Art. 5 - Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor's disposition or at the deed?
Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.

Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."

I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer."

Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.

Art. 6 - Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.

Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.

Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.

I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), gratitude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.

Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.


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 PUBLIC LAW 94-401—SEPT. 7, 1976

90 STAT. 1219

SEC. 6. Effective February 1, 1976, section 4(c) of Public Law 94- Effective date. 120 is amended by striking out "January 31, 1976" and "February 1, "^2 USC 1397a 1976" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1977" and "October °**^' 1, 1977", respectively. Approved September 7, 1976,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-903 (Comm. on Ways and Means) and No. 94-1317 (Comm. of Conference). SENATE REPORT No. 94-857 (Comm. on Finance). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): Mar. 16, considered and passed House. May 20, considered and passed Senate, amended. July 1, House receded and concurred in Senate amendments with an amendment. Aug. 24, Senate agreed to conference report and concurred in House amendment. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 12, No. 37: Sept. 7, Presidential statement.

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 90 STAT. 1220

PUBLIC LAW 94-402—SEPT. 7, 1976

Public Law 94-402 94th Congress An Act Sept. 7, 1976 [H.R. 12261] D.C. Council. Criminal law revision, prohibition. Extension.

D.C. Code 22-3201.

To extend the period during which the Council of the District of Columbia is prohibited from revising the criminal laws of the District.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That paragraph (9) of section 602(a) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (D.C. Code, sec. 1-147(a)(9)) is amended by striking out "twenty-four" and inserting in lieu thereof "forty-eight", and by inserting, immediately preceding the word "during", a comma and the words "or with respect to any criminal offense pertaining to articles subject to regulation under chapter 32 of title 22 of the District of Columbia Code". Approved September 7, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1418 (Comm. on the District of Columbia). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): Aug. 23, considered and passed House. Aug. 24, considered and passed Senate. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 12, No. 37: Sept. 7, Presidential statement.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94^03—SEPT. 9, 1976

90 STAT. 1221

Public Law 94-403 94th Congress An Act Granting the consent of Congress to the New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Sewage Waste Disposal Facilities Compact.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rejrresentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress is hereby given to the New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Sewage Waste Disposal Facilities Compact which has been entered into in accordance with the provisions of section 103(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The compact reads as follows: "NEW HAMPSHIRE-VERMONT INTERSTATE SEWAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL F A C I L I T I E S COMPACT

Sept. 9, 1976 [H.R. 9153]

New HampshireVermont Sewage and Waste Disposal Facihties Compact. Congressional consent. 33 USC 1253.

"ARTICLE I a GENERAL PROVISIONS

"A. STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is recognized that in certain cases municipalities in New Hampshire and Vermont may, in order to avoid duplication of cost and effort, and in order to take advantage of economies of scale, find it necessary or advisable to enter into agreements whereby joint sewage and waste disposal facilities are erected and maintained. The states of New Hampshire and Vermont recognize the value of and need for such agreements, and adopt this compact in order to authorize their establishment. "B. REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.—This compact

shall not become effective until approved by the United States Congress. "C. DEFINITIONS.—

"1. 'Sewage and waste disposal facilities' shall mean publiclyowned sewers, interceptor sewers, sewerage facilities, sewage treatment facilities and ancillary facilities whether qualifying for grants in aid under title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as 33 USC 1281. amended, or not. "2. 'Municipalities' shall mean cities, towns, village districts or other incorporated units of local government possessing authority to construct, maintain and operate sewage and waste disposal facilities and to raise revenue therefor by bonding and taxation, which may legally impose and collect user charges and impose and enforce pretreatment conditions upon users of sewage and waste disposal facilities. "3. 'Water pollution agency' shall mean the agencies within New Hampshire and Vermont possessing regulating authority over the construction, maintenance and operation of sewage and waste disposal facilities and the administration of grants in aid from their respective state and under the Federal Water Pollution Act, as amended, for the 33 USC 1251 note. construction of such facilities. "4. 'Governing body' shall mean the legislative body of the municipality, including, in the case of a town, the town meeting, and, in the case of a city, the city counsel, or the board of mayor and aldermen or any similar body in any community not inconsistent with the intent of this definition.

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 90 STAT. 1222

PUBLIC LAW 94-403—SEPT. 9, 1976 "ARTICLE II "PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS " A. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AUTHORIZED.—Any

.•:

two

or

more

municipalities, one or more located in New H a m p s h i r e and one or more located in Vermont, may enter into cooperative agreements for the construction, maintenance and operation of a single sewage and waste disposal facility serving all of the municipalities who are parties thereto. " B. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS.—Any agreement entered into under this compact shall, prior to becoming effective, be approved by the water pollution agency of each state, and shall be in a form established jointly by said agencies of both states. " C. METHOD o r ADOPTING AGREEMENT.—Agreements h e r e under shall

be adopted by the governing body of each municipality in accordance with existing statutory procedures for the adoption of intergovernmental agreements between municipalities within each state. " D. REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF P L A N S. — The w a t e r pollution agency

of the state in which any part of a sewage and waste disposal facility which is proposed under an agreement pursuant to this compact is proposed to be or is located is hereby authorized and required, to the extent such authority exists under its state law, to review and approve or disapprove all reports, designs, plans and other engineering document required to apply for federal g r a n t s in aid or g r a n t s in aid from said agency's state, and to supervise and regulate the planning, design, construction, maintenance and operation of said part of the facility. " E. FEDERAL GRANTS AND F I N A N C I N G. —

Application.

" 1, Application for federal g r a n t s in aid for the planning, design and construction of sewage and waste disposal facilities other than sewers shall be made jointly by the agreeing municipalities, with the amount of the g r a n t attributable to each state's allotment to be based upon the relative total capacity reserves allocated to the municipalities in the respective states determined jointly by the respective state water pollution agencies. E a c h municipality shall be responsible for applying for federal grants for sewers to be located within the municipal boundaries. "2. Municipalities are hereby authorized to raise and appropriate revenue for the purpose of contributing p r o rata to the planning, design and construction cost of sewage and waste disposal facilities constructed and operated as joint facilities pursuant to this compact. " F. CONTENTS OF AGREEMENTS.—Agreements entered into pursuant to this compact shall contain the following: " 1. A uniform system of charges for industrial users of the joint sewage and waste disposal facilities. "2. A uniform set of pretreatment standards for industrial users of the joint sewage and waste disposal facilities. " 3. A provision for the p r o rata sharing of operating and maintenance costs based upon the ratio of actual flows to the plant as measured by devices installed to guage such flows with reasonable accuracy. "4. A provision establishing a procedure for the arbitration and resolution of disputes. "5. A provision establishing a procedure for the carriage of liability insurance, if such insurance is necessary under the laws of either state. "6. A provision establishing a procedure for the modification of the agreement.

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-403—SEPT. 9, 1976 "7. A provision establishing a procedure for the adoption of regulations for the use, operation and maintenance of the joint facilities. "8. A provision setting forth the means by which the municipality that does not own the joint sewage and waste disposal facility will pay the other municipality its share of the maintenance and operating costs of said facility. "G. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to authorize the establishment of interstate districts, authorities, or any other new governmental or quasi-governmental entity. "ARTICLE

III

"EFFECTIVE DATE

"This compact shall become effective when a bill of the general assembly of each of the states of New Hampshire and Vermont which incorporates the compact becomes a law in each such state and when it is approved by the United States Congress.". SEC. 2. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. Approved September 9, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1117 (Comm. on the Judiciary). SENATE REPORT No. 94-1165 (Comm. on the Judiciary). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol 122 (1976): May 17, considered and passed House. Aug. 26, considered and passed Senate.

90 STAT. 1223

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 90 STAT. 1224

PUBLIC LAW 94-404—SEPT. 10, 1976

Public Law 94-404 94th Congress An Act Sept. 10. 1976 [H.R. 11481] Maritime Appropriation Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1977.

Merchant Marine Academy, N.Y.

To authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1977 for certain maritime programs of the Department of Commerce, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Maritime Appropriation Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1977". SKC. 2. Funds are authorized to be appropriated without fiscal year limitation as the appropriation Act may provide for the use of the Department of Commerce, for the fiscal year 1977, as follows: (1) For payment of obligations incurred for operatingdifferential subsidy, not to exceed $403,721,000; (2) For expenses necessary for research and development activities, not to exceed $22,500,000; (3) For reserve fleet expenses, not to exceed $4,560,000; (4J For maritime training at the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, not to exceed $13,260,000; and (5) For financial assistance to State marine schools, not to exceed $4,000,000. SEC. 3. There are authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1977, in addition to the amounts authorized by section 2 of this Act, such additional supplemental amounts, for the activities for which appropriations are authorized under section 2 of this Act, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, or other employee benefits authorized by law, and for increased costs for public utilities, food service, and other expenses of the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York. Approved September 10, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-871 (Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries) and No. 94-1375 (Comm. of Conference). SENATE REPORTS: No. 94-833 (Comm. on Commerce) and No. 94-1056 (Comm. of Conference). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, VoL 122 (1976): Mar. 11, considered and passed House. June 15, considered and passed Senate, amended. Aug. 3, Senate agreed to conference report. Aug. 30, House agreed to conference report. ,,

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 PUBLIC LAW 9 4 - 4 0 5 — S E P T. 10, 1976

90 STAT. 1225

Public Law 94-405 94th Congress An Act To provide Federal financial assistance to States in order to assist local educational agencies to provide education to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugee children, and for other purposes.

Sept. 10. 1976 [S. 2145]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may Indochina be cited as the "Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976". Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976. TITLE I — P R O G R A M FOR THE 1976 F I S C A L Y E A R 20 USC 1211b note. APPLICABILITY; DEFINITIONS

SEC. 101. (a) The provisions of this title shall be applicable for fiscal year 1976. (b) A s used in this title— (1) The term "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Education. (2) The term "elementary school" means a day or residential school which provides elementary education, as determined under State law. (3) The term "free public education" means education which is provided at public expense under public supervision and direction, and without tuition charge, and which is provided as elementary or secondary school education in the applicable State. (4) The term "Indochinese refugee children" means children who are refugees within the meaning of that term as defined in section 3 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. (5) The term "average p e r pupil expenditure" for a State means the aggregate current expenditures during the second fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which the determination is made (or if satisfactory data for that year are not available at the time of computation, then during the most recent preceding fiscal year for which satisfactory data are available) of all local educational agencies in the State, plus any direct current expenditures by the State for the operation of such agencies (without regard to the source of funds from which either of such expenditures is m a d e), divided by the aggregate number of children in average daily attendance to whom such agencies provided free public education during such preceding year. (6) The term "current expenditures" means all expenditures for free public education, except for (A) expenditures attributable to fixed charges, including payments of principal and interest on shortterm and long-term debt, and payments for retirement benefits, for insurance and judgments, for rental of land and buildings, and for construction costs, (B) expenditures attributable to admmistration, and (C) expenditures attributable to transportation or building maintenance. (7) The term "local educational agency" means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city,

20 USC 1211b note.

22 USC 2601 note.

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 90 STAT. 1226

PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

^ county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools. Such term also includes any other public institu, tion or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school. (8) The term "secondary school" means a day or residential school which provides secondary education, as determined under State law. (9) The term "State" includes, in addition to the several States of the Union, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (10) The term "State educational agency" means the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the Governor or by State law. (11) The term "elementary or secondary nonpublic schools" means schools which comply with the compulsory education laws of the State and which are exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the 26 USC 501. Internal Revenue Code. STATE ENTITLEMENTS

20 USC 1211b note,

22 USC 2601 note,

"State."

SEC. 102. (a) The Commissioner shall, in accordance with the provisions of this title, make payments to State educational agencies for the fiscal year 1976 for the purposes set forth in section 103, (b)(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3), each State educational agency shall be entitled to receive, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, an amount which, in addition to any amounts received by such agency and the local educational agencies of such State in that fiscal year under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, equals the additional expenditures, as determined under section 103, incurred by such State and local education agencies in that fiscal year in providing additional basic educational services and necessary supplementary educational services for Indochinese refugee children, (2) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, no State educational agency shall be entitled to receive an amount under this title, which, when combined with any funds received by such agency and the local educational agencies of such State in such fiscal year under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, exceeds an amount equal to the average per pupil expenditure in such State for such fiscal year multiplied by the number of Indochinese refugee children in such State receiving public educational services, (3) For the purpose of this subsection, the term "State" does not include American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, (c)(1) The jurisdictions to which this subsection applies are American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (2) Each jurisdiction to which this subsection applies shall be entitled to a grant for the purposes set forth in section 103 in an amount equal to an amount determined by the Commissioner in accordance with criteria established by him, except that the aggregate of the amount to which such jurisdictions are so entitled for any fiscal year shall not exceed an amount equal to 1 per centum of the aggregate of

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 PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

90 STAT. 1227

the amounts to which all States are entitled under subsection (b) of this section for that fiscal year. If the aggregate of the amounts, determined by the Commissioner pursuant to the preceding sentence, to be so needed for any fiscal year exceeds an amount equal to such 1 per centum limitation, the entitlement of each such jurisdiction shall be reduced proportionately until such aggregate does not exceed such 1 per centum limitation. (d) Determinations with respect to the number of Indochinese refugee children by the Commissioner under this section for any fiscal year shall be made, whenever actual satisfactory data are not available, on the basis of estimates. No such determination shall operate, because of an underestimate, to deprive any State educational agency of its entitlement to any payment (or the amount thereof), under this section to which such agency would be entitled had such determination been made on the basis of accurate data. USES OF FUNDS

SEC. 103. (a) Financial assistance to State and local educational 20 USC 1211b agencies under this title shall be available only to meet the cost of note. providing Indochinese refugee children— (1) supplementary educational services necessary to enable those children to achieve a satisfactory level of performance including, but not limited to— (A) English language instruction, (B) other bilingual educational services, and (C) special materials and supplies; (2) additional basic instructional services which are directly attributable to the presence in the school district of Indochinese refugee children, including the cost of providing additional classroom teachers and additional teaching materials and supplies, but not including overhead costs, costs of construction, acquisition or rental of space, or costs of transportation; and (3) special inservice training for personnel who will be providing instruction described in either paragraph (1) or (2). (b) The Commissioner shall by regulation prescribe standards for Standards. the determination of the actual additional expenditures incurred by State and local educational agencies in providing educational services for Indochinese refugee children. Such standards may include— (1) maximum incremental costs for providing basic educational services in relation to the number of additional children; (2) maximum allowable costs for particular types of supplementary educational services; and (3) to the extent consistent with this section, categories of programs, services, and expenditures for which funds provided under this title may be used. ALLOCATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 104. (a) If the sums appropriated for the fiscal year 1976 for 20 USC 1211b making the payments provided for in this title are not sufficient to pay note. in full the total amounts which State educational agencies are entitled to receive under this title for such year, the allocations to such State educational agencies shall be ratably reduced to the extent necessary to bring the aggregate of such allocations within the limits of the amount so appropriated.

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 90 STAT. 1228

PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976 (b) In the event that funds become available for making payments under this title for such fiscal year after allocations have been made under subsection (a) for that year, the amounts reduced under subsection (a) shall be increased on the same basis as they were reduced. APPLICATIONS

Submittal to Commissioner. 20 USC 1211b °°*®'

I

^ /

,is,;.; .

SEC. 105. (a) No State educational agency shall be entitled to any payment under this title for any fiscal year unless that agency submits j^jj application to the Commissioner at such time, in such manner, and containing or accompanied by such information, as the Commissioner may reasonably require. E a c h such application shall—

(1) provide that the educational programs, services, and activities for which payments under this title are made will be administered by or under the supervision of the agency; (2) provide that payments under this title will be used for purposes set forth in section 103; (3) provide such data and assurances as the Commissioner may prescribe— (A) to demonstrate that the costs of the additional instructional services for which the payment will be made are the direct result of the presence of Indochinese refugee children and that those additional instructional services will actually be provided to those children for the duration of the period for which assistance is made available under this title; and (B) to demonstrate that such payments are distributed between the State educational agency and the local educational agencies within the State in proportion to the contribution to such costs by each such agency; (4) provide assurances that the State educational agency will not finally disapprove in whole or in part any application for funds received under this title without first affording the local educational agency submitting an application for such funds reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing; (5) provide for making such reports as the Commissioner may reasonably require to perform his functions under this title; and (6) provide assurances— (i) that to the extent consistent with the number of IndoChinese refugee children enrolled in the elementary or secondary nonpublic schools within the district served by a local educational agency, such agency, after consultation with appropriate officials of such schools, shall provide for the benefit of these children secular, neutral, and nonideological services, materials, and equipment necessary for the education of such children; (ii) that the control of funds provided under this paragraph and title to materials, equipment, and property repaired, remodeled, or constructed therewith shall be in a public agency for the uses and purposes provided in this title, and a public agency shall administer such funds and property; and (iii) that the provision of services pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by employees of a public agency or through contract by such public agency with a person, association, agency, or corporation who or which, in the provision of such services, is independent of such elementary or secondary nonpublic school and of any religious organization;

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1279

 90 STAT. 1229

PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

and such employment or contract shall be under the control and supervision of such public agency, and the funds provided under this paragraph shall not be commingled with State or local funds, (b) The Commissioner shall approve an application which meets Approval. the requirements of subsection (a). The Commissioner shall not finally Notice and disapprove an application of a State educational agency except after hearing. reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record to such agency. PAYMENT

SEC. 106. (a) The Commissioner shall pay to each State educa- 20 USC 1211b tional agency having an application approved under section 105 the note. amount which that State is entitled to receive under section 102. (b) The Commissioner is authorized to pay to each State educational agency amounts equal to the amounts expended by it for the proper and efficient administration of its functions under this title, except that the total of such payments for any fiscal year shall not exceed 1 per centum of the amounts to which that State educational agency is entitled to receive for that year under this title. (c) If a State is prohibited by law from providing public educa- Waiver. tional services for children enrolled in elementary and secondary nonpublic schools, as required by section 105(a)(6), the Commissioner may waive such requirement and shall arrange for the provision of services to such children through arrangements which shall be subject to the requirements of this title. WITHHOLDING

SEC. 107. Whenever the Commissioner, after reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing to any State educational agency, finds that there is a failure to meet the requirements of this title, the Commissioner shall notify that agency that further payments will not be made to the agency under this title, or in his discretion, that the State educational agency shall not make further payments under this title to specified local educational agencies (whose actions cause or are involved in such failure) until he is satisfied that there is no longer any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied, no further payments shall be made to the State educational agency under this title or payments by the State educational agency under this title shall be limited to local educational agencies whose actions did not cause or were not involved in the failure, as the case may be.

Notice and hearing. 20 USC 1211b note.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 108. There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 20 USC 1211b 1976 such sums as may be necessary to make payments to which State note. educational agencies are entitled under this title and payments for administration under section 106(b). TITLE II—PROGEAM FOR THE TRANSITION AND THE 1977 FISCAL YEAR

PERIOD

APPLICABILITY: DEFINITIONS

SEC. 201. (a) The provisions of this title shall be applicable for 20 USC 1211b the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977. note.

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 90 STAT. 1230

PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

(b) As used in this title— (1) The term "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Education. (2) The term "elementary school" means a day or residential school which provides elementary education, as determined under State law. 22 USC 2601 note" -"

26 USC 501.

(3) The term "Indochinese refugee children" means children who are refugees within the meaning of that term as defined in section 3 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. (4) The term "local educational agency" means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public e l e m e n t a r j or secondary schools. Such term also includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school,

(5) The term "secondary school" means a day or residential school which provides secondary education, as determined under State law. (6) The term "State" includes, in addition to the several States of the Union, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (7) The term "State educational agency" means the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the Governor or by State law. (8) The term "elementary or secondary nonpublic schools" means schools which comply with the compulsory education laws of the State and which are exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. STATE

20 USC 1211b mote,

ENTITLEMENTS

SEC. 202. (a) The Commissioner shall, in accordance with the provisions of this title, make payments to State educational agencies for the period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1977, for the purposes set forth in section 203. (b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the maximum amount of the g r a n t to which a State educational agency is entitled under this title, for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977, shall be equal to the sum of—

(A) the number of Indochinese refugee children aged 5 to 17, ^ inclusive, receiving public educational services under the supervision of each local educational agency within that State during the period for which the determination is made; multiplied by— (B) the lesser of— (i) $300 for each of the first one hundred such children who are furnished such services under the supervision of each local educational agency within such State, or (ii) if the number of such children equals or exceeds 1 per centum of the total number of children enrolled in the schools ' ' -' * • '; '^ of that agency, $300 for each such child in such 1 per centum

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1281

 PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

90 STAT. 1231

who is furnished such services under the supervision of each local educational agency within such State; and (C) $600 for each additional such child in excess of one hundred such children, or in excess of such 1 per centum, as the case may be, being furnished such services under the supervision of that agency. (2) For the purpose of this subsection, the term " State " does not "State." include American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the T r u s t T e r r i to r y of the Pacific Islands. (c)(1) The jurisdictions to which this subsection applies are American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the T r u s t Territory of the Pacific Islands. (2) E a c h jurisdiction to which this subsection applies shall be entitled to a g r a n t for the purposes set forth in section 203 in an amount equal to an amount determined by the Commissioner in accordance with criteria established by him, except that the aggregate of the amount to which such jurisdictions are so entitled for any period shall not exceed an amount equal to 1 per centum of the aggregate of the amounts to which all States are entitled under subsection (b) of this section for that period. If the aggregate of the amounts, determined by the Commissioner pursuant to the preceding sentence, to be so needed for any period exceeds an amount equal to such 1 per centum limitation, the entitlement of each such jurisdiction shall be reduced proportionately until such aggregate does not exceed such 1 per centum limitation. (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no State educational agency shall be entitled to receive a g r a n t for any period in excess of the amount equal to the amount to which such agency would otherwise be entitled under this section for that period minus the sum of the amounts received by the local educational agencies of that State and by that State educational agency for that period under 22 USC 2601 the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. (e) Determinations with respect to the number of Indochinese note. refugee children by the Commissioner under this section for any period shall be made, whenever actual satisfactory data are not available, on the basis of estimates. No such determination shall operate, because of an underestimate, to deprive any State educational agency of its entitlement to any payment (or the amount thereof), under this section to which such agency would be entitled had such determination been made on the basis of accurate data. USES o r

FUNDS

SEC. 203. Payments made under this title to any State may be used 20 USC 1211b in accordance with applications approved under section 205 for public note. educational services for Indochinese refugee children in the schools of the local educational agencies of that State and in elementary and secondary nonpublic schools of that State. ALLOCATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 204. (a) If the sums appropriated for the period from July 1, 20 USC 1211b 1976, to September 30, 1977, for making the payments provided for note. in this title are not sufficient to pay in full the total amounts which State educational agencies are entitled to receive under this title for such period, the allocations to such State educational agencies shall

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 90 STAT. 1232

PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976 be ratably reduced to the extent necessary to bring the aggregate of such allocations within the limits of the amount so appropriated. (b) In the event that funds become available for making payments under this title for such period after allocations have been made under subsection (a) for that period, the amounts reduced under subsection (a) shall be increased on the same basis as they were reduced. APPLICATIONS

Submittal to ^°'?J^P®^°°®'"" nntA ^^^^^ note

41 lU

1^

SEC. 205. (a) No State educational agency shall be entitled to any payment under this title for any period unless that agency submits an application to the Commissioner at such time, in such manner, and containing or accompanied by such information, as the Commissioner may reasonably require. Each such application shall— (1) provide that the educational programs, services, and activities for which payments under this title are made will be administered by or under the supervision of the agency; (2) provide that payments under this title will be used for purposes set forth in section 203; (3) provide assurances that such payments will be distributed among local educational agencies within that State in accordance with sections 202(b)(1) and 202(d); (4) provide assurances that the State educational agency will not finally disapprove in whole or in part any application for funds received under this title without first affording the local educational agency submitting an application for such funds reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing; (5) provide for making periodic reports to the Commissioner evaluating the effectiveness of the payments made under this title, and such other reports as the Commissioner may reasonably require to perform his functions under this title; and (6) provide assurances— (i) that to the extent consistent with the number of Indochinese refugee children enrolled in the elementary or secondary nonpublic schools within the district served by a local educational agency, such agency, after consultation with appropriate officials of such schools, shall provide for the benefit of these children secular, neutral, and nonideological services, materials, and equipment necessary for the education of such children; (ii) that the control of funds provided under this paragraph and title to materials, equipment, and property repaired, remodeled, or constructed therewith shall be in a public agency for the uses and purposes provided in this title, and a public agency shall administer such funds and property; and (iii) that the provision of services pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by employees of a nublic agency or through contract by such public agency with a person, association, agency, or corporation who or which, in the provision of such services, is independent of such elementary or secondary nonpublic school and of any religious organization; and such employment or contract shall be under the control and supervision of such public agency, and the funds provided under this paragraph shall not be commingled with State or local funds.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1283

 PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

90 STAT. 1233

(b) The Commissioner shall approve an appheation which meets Approval. the requirements of subsection (a). The Commissioner shall not finally Notice and disapprove an application of a State educational agency except after hearing. reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record to such agency. PAYMENTS

SEC. 206. (a) The Commissioner shall pay to each State educational 20 USC 1211b agency having an application approved under section 205 the amount note. which that State is entitled to receive under this title. (b) The Commissioner is authorized to pay to each State educational agency amounts equal to the amounts expended by it for the proper and efficient administration of its functions under this title, except that the total of such payments for any period shall not exceed 1 per centum of the amounts which that State educational agency is entitled to receive for that period under this title. (c) If a State is prohibited by law from providing public educational services for children enrolled in elementary and secondary nonpublic schools, as required by section 205(a)(6), the Commissioner may waive such requirement and shall arrange for the provision of services to such children through arrangements which shall be subject to the requirements of this title. WITHHOLDING

SEC. 207. Whenever the Commissioner, after reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing to any State educational agency, finds that there is a failure to meet the requirements of this title, the Commissioner shall notify that agency that further payments will not be made to the agency under this title, or in his discretion, that the State educational agency shall not make further payments under this title to specified local educational agencies (whose actions cause or are involved in such failure) until he is satisfied that there is no longer any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied, no further payments shall be made to the State educational agency under this title or payments by the State educational agency under this title shall be limited to local educational agencies whose actions did not cause or were not involved in the failure, as the case may be.

Notice and hearing. 20 USC 1211b note.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 208. There are authorized to be appropriated for the period 20 USC 1211b beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977, such sums as note. may be necessary to make payments to which State educational agencies are entitled under this title and payments for administration under section 206(b). TITLE III—ADULT EDUCATION PKOVISION AMENDMENT TO THE ADULT EDUCATION

ACT

SEC. 301. The Adult Education Act (Public Law 91-230) is 20 USC 1201 note. amended by adding the following new section at the end thereof: 'EMERGENCY ADULT EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEES

"SEC. 315. (a) From the appropriations authorized for the period Grants, beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977, but not appro- 20 USC 1211b. priated for other programs under this title, the Commissioner shall

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PUBLIC LAW 94-405—SEPT. 10, 1976

carry out a program of making grants to State and local education agencies for such years for the purpose of operating special adult education programs for Indochina refugees, as defined in section 3 of 22 USC 2601 the Indochina Migration and Eefugee Assistance Act of 1975. Such notegrants may be used for— " (1) programs of instruction of adult refugees in basic reading, mathematics, development and enhancement of necessary skills, and promotion of literacy among refugee adults, for the purpose of enabling them to become productive members of American society; "(2) administrative costs of planning and operating such programs of instruction; "(3) educational support services which meet the needs of adult refugees, including but not limited to guidance and counseling ' with regard to educational, career, and employment opportunities; and "(4) special projects designed to operate in conjunction with existing Federal and non-Federal programs and activities to develop occupational and related skills for individuals, particularly programs authorized under the Comprehensive Employment 29 USC 801 note. and Training Act of 1973 or under the Vocational Education Act 20 USC 1241 of 1963. note. "(b) The Commissioner shall not approve an application for a grant State education under this section unless (1) in the case of an application by a local agency review. education agency, it has been reviewed by the respective State education agency which shall provide assurance to the Commissioner that, if approved by the Commissioner, the grant will not duplicate existing and available programs of adult education which meet the special needs of Indocliina refugees, and (2) the application includes a plan acceptable to the Commissioner which provides reasonable assurances that adult refugees who are in need of a program are located in an area near that State or local education agency, and would participate in the program if available. ^ "(c) Applications for a grant under this section shall be submitted at such time, in such manner, and contain such information as the Commissioner may reasonably require. "(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 305 and 307(a), the Commissioner shall pay all the costs of applications approved by him under this section.". Approved September 10, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: HOUSE REPORTS: No. 94-719 accompanying H.R. 7897 (Comm. on Education and Labor) and No. 94-1333 (Comm. of eonference). SENATE REPORT No. 94-432 (Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 121 (1975): Oct. 29, considered and passed Senate. Vol. 122 (1976): Jan. 19, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 7897. Aug. 30, House agreed to conference report. Sept. 1, Senate agreed to conference report. »

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1285

 PUBLIC LAW 94-406—SEPT. 10, 1976

90 STAT. 1235

Public Law 94-406 94th Congress An Act To authorize appropriations for the Coast Guard for the procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establisliments, to authorize for the Coast Guard a year-end strength for active duty personnel, to authorize for the Coast Guard average military student loads, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1977 for the use of the Coast Guard as follows: (1) For procurement of vessels: $86,168,000; For procurement of three port safety boats, one inland construction tender, six aids to navigation boats, three harbor tugboats, thirty search and rescue boats, two high/medium endurance cutter replacements, ten high speed surface delivery systems for pollution control, and one motor life boat. (2) For procurement of aircraft: $24,300,000; For procurement of six medium-range surveillance aircraft. (3) For construction of shore and offshore establishments: $24,401,000; For construction at: (a) Portsmouth, Virginia—Phase IV of new Coast Guard Support Center; (b) Rodanthe, North Carolina—improvement of Oregon Inlet Station; (c) Elizabeth City, North Carolina—phase I of improvement at Coast Guard Aircraft and Supply Center; (d) Alameda, California—construction of classroom building at Coast Guard Training Center; (e) New York, New York—phase II of New York vessel traffic service; (f) Loran-C National Implementation Plan—antenna erection, construction, and outfitting of stations at Malone, Florida, Grangeville, Louisiana, and Raymondville, Texas; antenna erection and outfitting of station at Elmira, New York; and construction and outfitting at Narrow Cape, Alaska; (g) Public family quarters—construction of family housing at Chicago, Illinois, Sitka, Alaska, and Point Judith, Rhode Island, or other locations; and (h) Provincetown, Massachusetts—construction of new station. (4) For procurement of vessels and/or aircraft for carrying out Coast Guard missions, including fishery law enforcement: $100,000,000. (5) For procurement of vessels with ice-breaking capability to be used on the Great Lakes: $50,000,000. SEC. 2. For fiscal year 1977, the Coast Guard is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel of 38,918; except that the ceiling shall not include members of the Ready Reserve called to active duty under the authority of section 764 of title 14, United States Code.

Sept. 10, 1976 [H.R. 11670]

U.S. Coast Guard. Appropriation authorization.

Active duty personnel strength.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1286

 90 STAT. 1236 Military training student loads.

14 USC 656 note.

14 USC prec.211 note.

Alaska, cargocarrying vessels, exemptions permit. 46 USC 420.

PUBLIC LAW 94-406—SEPT. 10, 1976

SEC. 3. For fiscal year 1977, average military training student loads for the Coast Guard are authorized as follows: (1^ recruit and special training, 4,209 students; (2) flight training, 154 students; (3) professional training in military and civilian institutions, 372 students; and (4) officer acquisition, 1,175 students. SEC. 4. Section 475 of title 14, United States Code, is amended— (1) by striking subsection (e) and redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (e) and (f), respectively; and (2) by amending the redesignated subsection (f) to read as follows: "(f) The authority conferred by subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) may not be utilized after April 1, 1973, unless all reports required by subsection (e) have been filed with the Congress.". SEC. 5. After fiscal year 1977, funds may not be appropriated to or for the use of the Coast Guard (1) for the operation and maintenance of the Coast Guard; (2) for acquisition, construction, rebuilding, or improvement of aids to navigation, shore or offshore establishments, vessels, or aircraft, including equipment related thereto; (3) for alteration of obstructive bridges; or (4) for research, development, tests, or evaluation related to any of the above, unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after December 31, 1976. SEC. 6. (a) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1977, the Congress shall authorize the end strength as of the end of each fiscal year for active duty personnel of the Coast Guard, and no funds may be appropriated for any such fiscal year to or for the use of the active duty personnel of the Coast Guard unless the end strength for such active duty personnel for such fiscal year has been authorized by law. (b) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1977, the Congress shall authorize the average military training student loads for the Coast Guard. Such authorization shall be required for student loads for the following individual training categories: recruit and specialized training; flight training; professional training in military and civilian institutions; and officer acquisition training. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1977 for the use of training any military personnel of the Coast Guard in the aforementioned categories unless the average student loads for the Coast Guard for such fiscal year have been authorized by law. SEC. 7. No funds authorized or appropriated for operation and maintenance of the Coast Guard shall be used for enforcement of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (46 U.S.C. 1451, et seq.) on Lake Winnipesaukee and Lake Winnisquam, their interconnecting waterways, or the Merrimack River in the State of New Hampshire during fiscal year 1977. SEC. 8. (a) In order to minimize hardships and to aid inhabitants of certain remote areas in the State of Alaska, the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating is authorized to issue permits exempting specific cargo-carrying vessels from all or part of the requirements of the following laws and the regulations ISSUGQ. t/llGrGIUlQCI*

(1) section 4417 of the Revised Statutes (46 U.S.C. 391); (2) section 4417 of the Revised Statutes (46 U.S.C. 391a); (3) section 4426 of the Revised Statutes (46 U.S.C. 404); and (4) section 1 of the Act of August 27, 1935, as amended (46 U.S.C. 88).

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