text:
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 7

=CHAPTER 7: SIEGE WARFARE= The Mujahideen besieged several isolated DRA garrisons. If the besieging Mujahideen were local, then the siege went on indefinitely.If outside Mujahideen were involved, the siege usually failed since the Mujahideen could not maintain the supplies necessary for the siege or keep enough of the Mujahideen in place. Since the Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers who also had family responsibilities, they were seldom interested in staying around for uninteresting, lengthy sieges.

LEGEND ) INMAL SITUATION A A-1w° PHASE I--■•■■1: PHASE 2 Page 198 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

VIGNETTE 1: FAILED SIEGE AT URGUN
by General Gulzarak Zadran

Urgun was the home of the DRA's 21st Mountain Regiment. It islocated near the Pakistan border and is close to the strategic posi-tions of Khost, Gardez, and Ghazni, as well as Waziristan, Pakistan.Once, after the Mujahideen formed their government in exile, theywanted to make Urgun the symbolic seat of their government.Despite the fact that Urgun is located in 'an isolated area, its politi-cal significance prompted the DRA and Soviet forces to keep it undercontrol at all costs. One of the major Mujahideen actions at Urguntook place in 1983. About 800 Mujahideen from the Wazir, Zadran,and Kharoti tribes took part. Major commanders at the seige includ-ed Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqani, Mawlawi Arsalah, Matiullah,Mawlawi Ahmad Gul and Qauzi Kharoti. The military council for theseige included Captain Abdul Majid, Major Arsala Wazir, CaptainQayum, Captain Sardar, Amanullah, Mawlawi Abdul Ghafur and me.The regiment's main force was located in the old fortress at Urgunwhich is commonly called the Octagonal Fort (Hashtrakha Kala). Ithad one battalion based in another fort four kilometers south of theregiment at Nek Mohammad Kala. A reinforced company held theairfield to the west of the regimental headquarters. Another compa-ny protected the main road to Urgun at a post some 1.5 kilometers to the north. (Map 7-1 - Urgun) We planned to destroy the regiment in two phases. The first phasewould destroy the security around the main headquarters (the south-ern battalion plus the two outlying companies). The second phasewould destroy the regimental headquarters. The first phase began inAugust 1983. The Mujahideen based in the mountains east of UrgunValley encircled and besieged the battalion at Nek Mohammad Kala.This enemy battalion was deployed in a fort which had several towers.The fort was surrounded by minefields and heavy ZGU-1 machine

General Gulzarak Zadran was an officer in the Royal Afghan Army. He trained in theUnited States and attended the Afghan Army Higher Officers Training Institute, where theauthor, Ali Jalali, was his instructor. He joined the resistance and fought in Paktia Province.He fought in Zhawar one and two and at the Satakandow pass. He belonged to Abdul-RabRussul Sayyaf's Islamic Union of Afghanistan (IUA). After the fall of the DRA, he becamethe Deputy Minister of Defense in the interim government. Currently he lives nearPeshawar. [Map sheet 2882].

Page 200 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

guns were positioned in the towers which made it impossible for theMujahideen to approach close to the fort. This prevented theMujahideen from tightening their seige on the fort.

A few days after the seige began, the religious Festival of Sacrifice(Eid-al-Adha) occured. It was customary for Mujahideen to go homeduring the festival and the enemy felt that few Mujahideen would stillbe around. This time, however, we did not let our people go home butkept them at their bases. Thinking that the Mujahideen were not athreat, the DRA took advantage of the holiday and sent three tanksand a few trucks from the main regimental base to resupply thebattalion. We put an ambush force of approximately 70 Mujahideen,commanded by Mawlawi Hasan, in a dry stream bed about halfwaybetween the two forts. Among their weapons were some RPG-7s.When the DRA column entered the kill zone, he sprang the ambush.The ambush destroyed one tank and damaged another. The ambush-ers killed some DRA soldiers and captured 25. Some others escaped.The DRA abandoned one intact tank, but the Mujahideen could notretrieve it due to heavy machine gun fire from the battalion's fort.The fire forced the Mujahideen force back into a side canyon. Whennight fell, Mawlawi Hasan and Khan Zamak led a group ofMujahideen back to the intact tank. The Mujahideen group includedsome former DRA tank crewmen. They drove the tank away to theirposition.

We planned to attack the battalion fort three days later, usingthe tank as the main weapon. We formed an 11-man tank protectiongroup and mounted them on the tank. They were armed with someRPGs and small arms. They would ride the tank during a nightadvance through the antipersonnel minefield that surrounded thefort. In case the tank got stuck, the tank protection group wouldprotect the tank and free it. A 65-man assault force would follow inthe tracks of the tank as it passed throught the minefield. The tankcrew would blow a hole in the wall of the fort using the main gunof the tank. The 11-man tank protection crew would then dismountand secure the hole opening and the 65-man assault team wouldenter the fort. Mujahideen communications personnel would alsohelp in the assault by interrupting the communications betweenthe battalion and regiment. When possible, the radio operatorswould misdirect the artillery.1

1 It was common practice for Mujahideen and DRA to enter each others radio nets fordeception, harassment or to pass messages. General Gulzarak would often talk to theother side and curse and insult them. Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 201

At 2100 hours, the attack started. The Mujahideen tank movedon its designated route with the tank protection crew mounted ontop. As it approached the fort and crossed the antipersonnel mine-field, a few antipersonnel mines exploded, but the tank protectioncrew was unscathed. The tank crew opened fire on the fort's towerswith their main gun. The main gun rounds knocked out the heavymachine guns However, the artillery located with the regimentalheadquarters began firing into the area. Our Mujahideen communi-cations personnel began screaming into the radio their fire wasshort and was falling on the battalion. The artillery command postbecame confused with their demands that the fire be shifted furtheraway. The artillery stopped firing. The Mujahideen tank crew thenfired at the wall of the fort. After several rounds, they knocked a holein the wall. The tank drove to within ten meters of the wall andthe tank protection crew signaled the assault gimp with a flashlight.The tank protection crew immediately dismounted and secured thebreach. The assault group followed in the tank's tracks and enteredthe fort. The enemy was surprised by the sudden breach and offeredno resistance. The Mujahideen captured 243 men plus all theweapons and ammunition in the fort. We let those DRA prisonerswho wanted to join us. We released the others. We were now fourkilometers closer to the main fort.

Pishiano Ghar (the mountain of the cats) overlooks the octagonalfortress. The regiment had a security post with mortars located onthe mountain. Our next move was to seize the security post so thatthe seige would become more effective. A few days later, 70 Mujahi-deen attacked the security post from the north and south in a nightattack. The Mujahideen attack was successful. Once we controlledPishiano Ghar, the regiment pulled back the company that protectedhighway 141 to the regimental base. We prepared for phase two. Theenemy was now completely beseiged and could not receive supplies byroad and had to get supplies by air. The beseiged DRA could only getto the airfield, located some 1.5 kilometers to the west of the fortress,by armored vehicles, since we could take out trucks and jeeps. Ourmachine guns on Pishiano Ghar prevented DRA resupply by day. Wecontinued to tighten the seige. Mujahideen from Zadran broughttheir tank to help out.

The DRA brought in an operations group from Kabul. Their jobwas to help the regiment plan its defense and a linkup with a Sovietunit which was coming from Ghazni to break the seige. DRA GeneralJamaluddin Omar was in charge of the group. He was my old tactics

Page 202 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

instructor at the Royal Afghan Military Academy. The DRA spreadtheir 3rd battalion in the south of the city instead of in the fort. Theyhad two companies in the forward defensive line. To the southeast,natural ditches and ravines created barriers to our advance. Theairfield lay to the west. One approach to west of the airfield was inad-equately mined, so the DRA covered the gap with guards and patrols.

Besides our two tanks, we had two 76mm mountain guns, one122mm D30 howitzer, one 107mm mountain mortar, other lightermortars, many RPGs, many DShK and ZGU heavy machine guns andother lighter machine guns. It was January and snow was on theground. We covered part of our tanks with white cloth to hide them.We recorded the sound of a moving tank. We received some l'oud-speakers from Peshawar and assigned people to use them on the east-ern flank to depict tanks coming from the east. We structured ourforces for the assault by creating several groups:

•A tank and tank protection group commanded by MawlawiShadam •Two assault groups—Northern and Southern •An evacuation group to carry away the spoils. •A family and dependents protection group to protect the fami-lies of DRA officers who were in the garrison •A truck transport group •A command and control group

We planned the attack. Following an artillery preparation, a tank wouldspearhead the assault from the north and the south to clear a paththrough the antipersonnel minefields. An assault group would follow inthe tank's tracks to hit the enemy from two sides simultaneously.

I was with the southern forces. At 2000 hours on a cold Januarynight, our Mujahideen were all in position. We started artillerypreparatory fire on the DRA positions. Ten minutes later, our tankmoved north toward the city. The tank fired on two city towers andknocked out the machine guns in them. Then we turned on the loud-speakers in the southeast to create tank noises there. The enemyfired at the noises as our tank changed direction and headed westwhere it could reach the unmined area. Fifteen Mujahideen, includ-ing Mawlawi Shadam, Ismail Turkistani and me were on the tank asit entered the city. As we passed through the mined area, we dis-mounted and moved to the rear of the 3d battalion. Assault groupsouth followed the tank's tracks into the city. They stormed 'through

Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 203

the city and the 3d battalion resistance collapsed. Battalion person-nnel either surrendered or retreated north. As the Mujahideencontinued to advance, we were stopped by the fire of a DShK machinegun some 50 meters to our north. It was now 0300 in morning. Weattacked the position and killed the gunner—a Soviet adviser. Therest of the DRA regiment had retreated into the fortress with GeneralJamaluddin Omar.

At this point, Mawlawi Shadam reported that his tank was out ofammunition. The tank driver, Lt Mohammad Gul Logari, was wound-ed in the arm and the gunner was killed. The enemy resolve wasstrengthening and showing renewed resistance. Other Mujahideen inthe assault group were running low on ammunition. We had failed toplan for ammunition resupply. We instructed Mawlawi Shadam totake the tank and go back to get all types of ammunition and thenreturn to resupply and support our combatants. As the tank movedback, the Mujahideen and the DRA heard it and thought that we werewithdrawing. It was cold, early in the morning and our command andcontrol was collapsing. Mujahideen began to fall back. The enemycounterattacked and pushed us out of the city. Daybreak came withthe disorganized Mujahideen milling around outside the city. Waveafter wave of enemy aircraft appeared and began bombing and straf-fing the Mujahideen caught in the open. They destroyed our tank. Weretreated into the mountains.

I later learned that the northern assault group had not moved thatnight since their tank was stuck in the sand and they could not free it.The entire assault was from the south. This cost us an almost certainvictory. We had no other choice but to withdraw into our mountainhideouts in the east. In the following days, as we were preparing toresume the seige, a Soviet regiment arrived in Urgun from Ghazni toresupply and reinforce the Urgun garrison.

COMMENTARY: Ammunition resupply was clearly a problem and thewithdrawal of the tank at a critical juncture turned the tide of battle.Communications was as big a problem. The Mujahideen had radios,but they were not able to accompany the assault forces. The northernand southern assault groups were unable to communicate with eachother and, presumably, with the command and control group. If bothattacks had occured, prevention of fratricide would have been a diffi-cult problem without radio communications. Further, members of themilitary council were forward with the assault forces rather thandirecting the battle.

Page 204 The. Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Mujahideen air defense planning was also limited. The natural airapproach into Urgun follows highway 141 in a north-south direction.The Mujahideen had heavy machine guns and control of the highground flanking the approach. Evidently, most of the machine gunswere used to fire on DRA ground forces and the air defense posture wasdegraded at the time of the Soviet air response.

Mine clearance was a continual problem for Mujahideen forces andthe use of tanks to clear lanes through antipersonnel minefields and tobreach a hole in the fortress walls deserves high marks. The use of atank protection group, mounted on the tank, was a tactical innovationthat worked well. This may not seem a tactical innovation to profes-sional officers who always keep infantry up with their tanks, but it wasnot a common practice when Mujahideen acquired armor. The pres-ence of professional officers, like General Zadran, was responsible forthe formation of the tank protection group.

VIGNETTE 2: DEHRAWUD OFFENSIVE
In the spring and summer of 1984, the Soviet forces stepped uptheir attacks on Mujahideen hideouts and mobile bases in the threeadjoining provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Unizgan. The Sovietsalso intensified their efforts to intercept Mujahideen supply' convoyscoming through the mountains from Pakistan. In the fall, a number ofmajor Mujahideen commanders in these provinces decided to set up aregional supply base in the Uruzgan Mountains that could supportMujahideen units deployed in the area. Dehrawud District, located inUruzgan Province, seemed to be a suitable place for the supply base.It is an oasis in the mountains in the upper Helmand Valley. It is easyto defend and it is conveniently located between the three provinces(Map 7-2 - Dehrawud).

The Dehrawud District capital of Dehrawud was garrisoned bysome 500 government militia who manned security outposts aroundthe town. They were supplied by air since the town was blockaded bythe local Mujahideen who controlled all the roads leading into thetown. The Mujahideen council decided to attack the governmentenclave, dislodge the militia and consolidate control over the entirevalley. To do this, however, they first had to negotiate a truce betweenrival groups in the region to ensure their full cooperation during theupcoming operation. Two months before the action, Mujahideen dele-gations from Kandahar and Helmand mediated such a truce.

In October, Mujahideen forces from Kandahar under MullaMalang, Faizullah and other leaders joined a contingent of HelmandMujahideen commanded by the late Nasim Akhund Zada, the leadingresistance figure in Helmand Province. Haji Assadullah and someMujahideen fighters from Uruzgan and Baghran areas joined theattacking force. This force eventually numbered over 1,000 men. TheMujahideen force moved along different approaches to Dehrawud andsurrounded the government positions in the area. A 300-man detach-ment sealed off the main approach to Dehrawud from the south alongthe Helmand River. Another 100-man detachment deployed to thesoutheast to cover the Kotal-e Murcha (the Murcha pass) and mine its Sources for this vignette include Commander Mulla Malang, Akhund Zada Qasem, sever-al Mujahideen from Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and Mr. Jalali's personalnotes and papers.

DURSHAHAK DURSHAHAK GHA1/ \ ,/ ‘ / VBARIKI /..e ..1.4., \I V / i i. . 0/ / / //3).1 • • • 1 ...• 0 r<4 // / / // \ip,r. DEHRAWUD,'4‘i / u4t./ .I / ■srY1Y / ■• . ,".1.— ..■ KURKAK / s„, BARIKAY\ 'KAKRAK (GHARBI) KAKRAK ■ M‘1,/ 3), .14■ TARAK /FORD■\ no YATadIAK O CEGHAK I CE6rAKj DEZAK d*7 V 123 KM

Page 206 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 7, Vignette 2 Page 207

road. About 500 fighters deployed around the district center, while therest were engaged in fulltime logistic support. The siege lasted 45 days while the Mujahideen gradually tightenedthe noose around the militia positions. The Mujahideen kept only onethird of the fighters on the front line at any one time. The rest wereeither in reserve or involved in logistic service. The front line fighterswere relieved every 24 hours.

The Soviets and DRA supported the Dehrawud garrison with dailyair strikes on Mujahideen positions to check their advance. Theywould run two or three attack missions daily using fighter bombersand helicopter gunships. In the meantime, the Soviet/DRA commandassembled ground forces from Kandahar and Shindand to relieve theembattled militia at Dehrawud. However, it took the enemy weeksbefore he was ready to move large columns of infantry and tanks to themountainous battlefield.

One day, a Mujahideen gun crew on a ZGU-1 anti-aircraft heavymachine gun shot down one of a pair of Soviet fighter-bombers flyingover Dehrawud. The plane burst into flames and fell in the HelmandRiver. The pilot, said to be a high ranking officer,2 bailed out and land-ed five to six kilometers from the nearest Mujahideen position. Theother fighter circled the area and flew away apparently after pinpoint-ing the crash site of the fallen plane. A seven-man Mujahideen teamunder Mulla Juma Khan went to capture the pilot. By the time theMujahideen reached the pilot, he had moved to a position from whichhe could fire his AK-74 at the advancing resistance fighters.

TheMujahideen tried to capture the pilot alive. While they were prepar-ing to try and capture him, a swarm of transport helicopters and heli-copter gunships flew over the Kotal-e Murcha pass from Kandahar andbegan gun runs against the Mujahideen positions. Two helicoptershovered over the crash site. One hovered about 50 meters from theground and lowered a ladder. The Soviet pilot jumped up from his hideout and started climbing up the ladder. Seeing that the Soviet pilot was escaping, the Mujahideen opened fire and killed the pilot and damaged the helicopter. The helicopter tried to escape but crashedabout three kilometers away.

This incident triggered increased Soviet air activity as they tried tosoften up the area for the upcoming attack by ground forces moving ontwo axes to Dehrawud. One column was approaching along theHelmand River from Kajaki dam and the other from Khakrez acrossthe Kotal-e Murcha pass. For three days, Soviet air strikes continued

Mulla Malang states that he was a general officer.

Page 208 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

uninterrupted from dawn to dusk. However, the Mujahideen sufferedfewer casualties than the militiamen, who sustained losses from bothcollateral damage and "friendly fire."

Following three days of heavy bombardment, a column of enemyinfantry and tanks arrived from the Kajaki side. Although theMujahideen groups assigned to cover this approach had left earlier, theterrain did not support tank movement. A Soviet Movement SupportDetachnient (MSD) used road construction machines and demolitionsto open a way through the rocky approaches to Dehrawud for the tanksand APCs. The Soviets conducted airmobile insertions of soldiers onthe heights overlooking the movement route to provide flank security.

By this time, the Mujahideen were too widely dispersed for effec-tive control. The contingents from Kandahar and Helmand were onopposite sides of the Helmand River and could not cross it. Theirheavy weapons, such as the ZGU-1, DShK and surface-to-surface rock-ets were also positioned on both sides of the river. Their fires could notbe coordinated. Five days after they killed the Soviet pilot on theHelmand River, the Mujahideen realized that they had lost commandand control over the scattered detachments and could not deal with thetwo-pronged enemy advance. Therefore, the Mujahideen groups with-drew to their separate provincial bases by mountain paths.

The Soviet column from Kajaki reached Dehrawud and recov-ered the body of the dead pilot. The Mujahideen had removedhis documents earlier. As the Mujahideen pulled out, the columnfrom Kandahar stopped at Khakrez and did not proceed toDehrawud. It conducted a number of search and destroy actionsin the area and returned. During the entire 45-day battle, theDRA militia incurred the heaviest losses. Mujahideen casualtieswere negligible. Mulah Malang states that the Mujahideen shotdown a jet fighter and 10 helicopters.

COMMENTARY:
This Mujahideen seige was a conventional battle by aguerrilla force. It ended in a tactical setback. Had the Mujahideenestablished an operational command system in the region, it wouldhave been easier for them to coordinate their action in terms of timeand space: Lack of such an arrangement left a sizeable Mujahideenforce without operational support by other local groups, especially inblocking the movement of Soviet/DRA reinforcements.

Guerrilla forces are best employed for actions of short duration.Long, extended operations, such as this seige, asks a lot of unpaidvolunteers. The Mujahideen did assign detachments to cover the approaches to Dehrawud from the south, but, as the seige continued,many of the fighters found more pressing business to attend tothen sitting idly on a mountain. They departed one after another andleft the approaches open. Both the Kajaki axis and the Kotal-eMurcha axis were very easy to block with a small detachment ofdetermined fighters. If the Mujahideen had held their positions,they could have stopped the large columns of their enemy and cele-brated a Mujahideen victory in Dehrawud. But, once again, theMujahideen experience demonstrated their tactical and logisticallimitations in maintaining control over large forces for an extendedperiod of time. Most of the Mujahideen were not fighting on theirhome territory and, therefore, were less enthusiastic about remain-ing in stationary positions for an extended period of time while theSoviet Air Force attacked them.

Air power, while seldom decisive in guerrilla war, played a majorrole in breaking this seige. Once the Mujahideen assumed static posi-tions, the Soviet Air Force was able to delay the Mujahideen assaultand gain the time needed for the ground forces to reach the battlefield.


text:
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 8

=CHAPTER 8: DEFENDING AGAINST RAIDS= Effective defense against ground raids requires timely intelligence, plans and battle drills, prepared fighting and sheltered positions, a ready reaction force, accessible weapons and ammunition, escape routes, security patrols and sentries and early warning elements post-ed far enough away to provide adequate early warning. Rehearsal of plans, battle drills, the ready reaction force and escape and withdraw-al are essential to effective defense against raids.

s)Itj ..)•1" RAZA KHAN4•1" IN`]HAJITALEB Page 212 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War 1 KMSAYGHANI VILLAGE Map 8-1

VIGNETTE 1: SOVIET RAID ON MUJAHIDEEN HIDEOUT AT SAYGHANI
by Haji Abdul Qader

On 9 January 1981, a Soviet detachment mounted a raid on my home in Sayghani Village, about six kilometers northeast ofBagram air base. At that time, I commanded a group of some 200local Mujahideen who were spread among several mobile bases in the area. We would conduct specific missions in Bagram and neigh-boring districts in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces. I rarely spent the night in my village since it is very close to the Soviet garrison at Bagrami and difficult to defend. I would alternate among my mobile bases and would stay at a different location every night. I was usually accompanied by no more than 20 of my men who were disguised as peaceful civilians.

A week before, JIA Commander Mawlawi Zaher of Gujarkhel and I combined forces to ambush a Soviet/DRA column at Sofi Baba along the road from Koh-e Top to Sayad. The column had seven or eight trucks and six APCs. The column was returning from Khanaqa and Niazi in the south where the DRA had conducted a press gang to draft recruits into the DRA army. We ambushed their column at dusk and destroyed two APCs and four trucks with short-range RPG-7 fire. We captured some 70 Kalashnikovs, which we desperately needed. We divided the weapons between our two groups. I believe that the raid on my home was in retaliation for this ambush.

That night I had some guests from Laghman and entertained them until late in the evening in my house in the village. In the late evening, I sent most of my men to other villages and kept about 40 at Sayghani (22 of them were residents of the Village). Sayghani is a village of about 100 homes located off the main road. My home is near the village mosque, protected by several fort-like structures ringing the village (Map 8-1 - Saygháni). I posted two guard details—one at my house and the other at the mosque. The night was very quiet and at midnight the snow began to fall. Early in the morn-ing, I woke up for morning prayer. The guards on my roof reported

Haji Abdul Qader was a school teacher who became a Mujahideen commander. He was initially with the HIK faction and later with the IUA faction. [Map sheet 2886, vic grid 2970].Mr. Anthon Jalali's notes also used in this vignette.

1 The Soviet 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 354th Separate Airborne Regimentwere garrisoned in Bagram. Page 214 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

that everything was all right. However, when I was half way throughablutions,2 I noticed signal flares streaking across the cloudy sky. They were coming from the northeast and southeast.

The night may have seemed quiet to my guards, but it was busy for the Soviet raiding detachment. Led by local guides and informants, the raiders had stealthily walked from Bagram to the village during the snowfall and quietly occupied several buildings around the village. By dawn, the enemy had taken up positions at Haji Satar, Rahim, HajiTaleb, Raza Khan, Haji Rahmat Sayed and Amanullah forts.3

As soon as I saw the flares, I asked the guards about it. They said that they thought that the enemy was on the road to the village some two kilometers away. I thought that the flares were much closer. I had no time to gather all my men, so I took the 15 men who were staying in my house and we tried to exfiltrate from the village. Shortly after we left my house, I realized that I had forgotten my briefcase full of data about my group. I sent my younger brother to fetch the briefcase and ordered my men to move down the road to the mosque and then on the Rahmat Said fort at the edge of the village. From there, we would take the path to Mujahideen-held areas. I waited for my brother. A few minutes later he joined me and we hurried after the group. We caught up with the group as they approached the stream beyond the mosque. The stream bed was full of Soviet soldiers in ambush. They opened up on my group with AK-74s and killed three of my men on the spot. The rest of my group disappeared in the dark and moved to the southwest, where they were soon trapped in another ambush and killed to the last man. An enemy tracer bullet had set my tsadar on fire. My brother warned me that I was on fire. I pulled off my burn-ing tsadar and threw it away, but that attracted the attention of the first ambush group who again opened up on us and killed my brother.

I had lost contact with my group and so I moved in the opposite direc-tion and slipped out through a house at the edge of the village. The enemy had blocked all streets and escape routes and none of my Mujahideen survived the raid. The enemy killed all 40 Mujahideen and 15 civilians at different locations in the village.

COMMENTARY:
Lack of effective security contributed decisively to the Soviet success and led to the destruction of the resistance force. Combat security should protect a unit from surprise attack and

2 Muslims pray five times a day and wash before prayers. 3 Many of the home in Afghanistan are surrounded by high, thick adobe walls and are actually small forts. Chapter 8, Vignette 1 Page 215

provide sufficient time and space for the main body to prepare and deploy for combat in the most favorable conditions possible. Had the Mujahideen posted security patrols on the approaches to the village, the Soviets probably would have been unable to approach undetected and to surprise the unprepared resistance fighters. The two guard details that Commander Qader deployed inside the village could provide only close-in protection but could not provide early warning or tactical security for the unit.

The secrecy of the Soviet movement to the village and their stealthy deployment at the village played a decisive role in the outcome of the raid. Taken by surprise, the Mujahideen lost control of the situ-ation and were forced to act under conditions dictated by the Soviets.

The Mujahideen could have avoided the disaster by preparing contingency plans with clear-cut instructions to the combatants and group leaders in the event of surprise attack. The plan would deter-mine the location of each combatant and sub-group leader during their overnight stay in the village. Bagram was a major Soviet installation and the overconfidence and bravado of the Mujahideen contributed to their defeat.

Once he discovered the Soviet presence, the Mujahideen comman-der did little to establish effective command and control over the situation. He said that he did not have time to reach every combatant and sub-group leader. But the commander failed to lead even the small15-man group that was with him. He waited for his briefcase and told his men to proceed without assigning a group leader in his absence. This group was leaderless as it blundered into the two ambushes.

Local informers and collaborators were also vital to the Soviet success. The Soviet detachment could not have achieved its goal with-out help from the inside. Such cases of collaboration created a lot of suspicion among the Mujahideen and sometimes resulted in very trag-ic consequences to innocent people.

Haji Abdul Qader learned a very important lesson at a very high price. As he says, his group never again stayed overnight in Sayghani without posting a strong security detail on approaches to the village at points not less than two kilometers from the place.

Page 216 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

VIGNETTE 2: BATTLE FOR ALISHANG DISTRICT CENTER
by Commander Sher Padshah

In August 1981, the Mujahideen controlled the district center of Alishang in Laghman Province. My base was in a remote upper valley near Daulatshah. I brought 29 of my Mujahideen south through the fertile Alishang Valley to Alishang Village. (Map 8-2 - Alishang) This is a trip of over 45 kilometers. When we arrived, we were very tired and the local Mujahideen, who numbered 50, told us to sleep and that they would provide security. In the morning, as we were rising for morning prayers, we heard shots. The guards then realized that we were surrounded. We decided to escape into the mountains. The Badrow hills are about three kilometers northeast of the village and lead to the mountains. As we tried to get out of the village, we came under fire from all directions. Within five minutes, we lost 14 Mujahideen KIA and 50 WIA. Mawlawi Niaz Mohammed, the local Mujahideen commander, was among the dead. Faced with withering fire and heavy losses, we retreated back into the village to conduct a desperate defense.

Our force was down, to 15 Mujahideen but our mortars were still in position from where we had set them up the night before. Besides the mortars, we had RPG-7s, PK machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, and Bernau "20-shooters."4 We mounted a stubborn defense. We discov-ered that Soviet forces had surrounded the village. At 0800 hours, a DRA reinforcing column with tanks and infantry came from the provincial capitol of Mehtar Lam. We started firing the mortars at the column. The DRA kept trying to get into the village, but we drove them back. Sometimes the fight degenerated to hand-to-hand combat. We hit one tank with a RPG-7. Around noon, a jeep full of Soviet advisers drove into range. One of my RPG-7 gunners destroyed the jeep. We also captured some of the DRA soldiers who were close to the jeep. We demanded that they surrender and they did. The fighting continued until 1600 hours. Then, as sunset neared, the DRA and Soviets with-drew, leaving the village in our hands. Besides our 14 Mujahideen KIA and 50 WIA, there were many dead and wounded Afghan civilians including women and children. I do not know what the total enemy casualties were.

Commander Sher Padshah is from Laghman Province. [Map sheet 3086, vic grid 0149]. 4 The Bernau is the Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun. The Mujahideen called them"20-shooters." Page 218 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

I am sure that someone from the village had told the government that we were there. Some of the villagers had left the village before the Soviets surrounded it. The villagers that were left actively helped the Mujahideen in the defense. The women provided us with food and showed us where to take cover. They led us from house-to-house as the enemy tightened his noose around us. That evening, after the fighting, we asked the locals for donkeys and mules to haul away our dead. We put our dead on their animals and took the bodies to their villages for burial. We took our wounded to local doctors for treatment. They helped as best they could, including some of the doctors from the government hospital.

The Soviets left some of their dead in the village of Alishang. They moved south to the village of Qawalkhel. They surrounded the village and told the villagers to go to Alishang and recover their dead or they would destroy their village. The Qawalkhel elders came to us and asked for the Soviet dead. We told them that they could recover the Soviet dead after we left.

COMMENTARY:
Mujahideen night time security, when sleeping in a village, was usually only a guard or two posted inside the village. The Mujahideen needed to get security out to the key terrain dominating the village to provide timely warning. When the Soviets and DRA had timely intelligence, they were often able to surround sleeping Mujahideen whose guards were within yards of the sleepers. The Soviet forces were probably from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Jalalabad—some 40 kilometers away. The DRA force was probably from the 71st Infantry Regiment—garrisoned only seven kilometers away in Mehtar Lam. The area is open and easily accessible by road. The local Mujahideen's overconfidence hurt the resistance badly.

VIGNETTE 3: VISION IN THE BAR KOT VALLEY
by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq

It was December 1983. I left my village of Sotan in Dara-i NurValley for the nearby valley of Bar Kot. I had five of my Mujahi-deen with me. In Bar Kot Valley, we stopped at the village of Dud-Reg where we spent the night in a Mujahideen guest house(Map 8-3 - Vision). Dud-Reg is the last village in the valley before the forest begins. In this area, the mountains are all heavily wooded with pine, juniper and sycamore. It was foggy, rainy and very cold. There were other Mujahideen from IRMA staying in the house next door to ours. After supper, everyone but my sentry went to bed. I was asleep and dreaming. In my dream, I saw a man in a white robe who laid his hand on my shoulder and said "You will prevail." Then the man dropped ammunition in my lap and gave' me an Enfield rifle. "This is the time to go forward" the man said. I woke up and looked around. I could not find any ammunition or Enfield rifle, but I checked to make sure that my Kalashnikov and pistol were still under my pillow as I was thinking about the dream.

At 0030 hours, I again awoke as I heard a shot fired. I scrambled to my feet and asked the sentry what was going on. "Nothing, every-thing is all right" Agha Gul replied. I lay back down. Shortly after-ward, I heard another shot. I jumped up, pulled on my shoes and grabbed my weapons. The other Mujahideen were also up. I looked outside. The sentry said "The Soviets are here. We are surrounded. I see their signal rockets all around us." The other group of IRMA Mujahideen rushed out into the night and up into the mountains. My five Mujahideen asked me "What should we do?" I replied, "Well, they've come for us, so let's give them a fight." The enemy had us surrounded and had blocked all the exits by this time.

The house that we were in had a large, enclosed courtyard (60meters x 60 meters). The enemy were firing at us and they knew exactly where we were. I went to the back of the enclosure and crawled over the wall into a narrow meter-wide alley. I asked my Mujahideen to follow me. We moved down the alley and into the open fields. I could see Soviets in the open field.

Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet3186, vic grid 4341]. Page 220 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 8, Vignette 3 Page 221

I told my Mujahideen that I would lay down a base of fire so that they could cross the field. Once they crossed the field, they were to go to the flank of the field and hold it. Just behind us was the house where the IRMA Mujahideen had stayed. I did not know that they had gone and were worried that they would unintentionally fire into our backs. I fired as my Mujahideen crossed the field, but they came under fire. We all fired back and retreated into the mountains. As we started up the mountains, we bumped into still more Soviets who were positioned in the mountains. As we were taking shelter behind a wall, one of my Mujahideen was hit and killed. We did not know this area very well, so we did not know how to get out. It took us about three hours to find our way safely up into the mountain. As we reached the moun-tain, we met the IRMA Mujahideen who had escaped earlier. They asked us to use tracer rounds to mark targets for their mortars. I fired at the enclosure that we had started out from with tracer bullets. The IRMA Mujahideen then fired their mortar at the enclo-sure. As daylight broke the IRMA Mujahideen mortar fire became more effective. In all, they fired 42 mortar rounds. The Soviets did not want to stay around and get mortared, so they withdrew. As I watched the Soviets pull back, I realized that we had prevailed and that my dream had come true. It was now time to go forward.

After the battle, I learned that the IRMA Mujahideen also had one of their group killed by the Soviets. Two Afghan women were also killed near the enclosure. The Soviet force had come from Jalalabad(about 20 kilometers away).5 They had come at night on their APCs. They were guided by an Afghan named Nader. He was from Shewa. Since the DRA was established in this area, the people were divided in their loyalties and people like Nader worked against us.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were lax about security in this area, despite the known divided loyalties within the populace. The guest-house that the Mujahideen were staying in was not a private home, but a Mujahideen guesthouse regularly used by Mujahideen passing through the area. All the local villagers knew about its presence and function. The Soviet's guide came from Shewa, which is 15 kilometers away and yet he had no trouble pinpointing its location at night. The Soviets drove through a well-populated area on APCs to conduct their raid, yet the Mujahideen got no advance warning and their sentry was

5 The Soviet force was either from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade or the Spetsnaz battalion based in Jalalabad.

Page 222 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War surprised. The Mujahideen were complacent about security and set patterns that the Soviets reacted to. Only the presence of the Mujahideen mortar and a large stock of mortar ammunition saved them.

VIGNETTE 4: SURPRISED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE DARA-E NUR
by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq In March 1984, the DRA and Soviet forces again tried to destroy the Mujahideen forces in the Dara-e Nur Valley. A total of 120Mujahideen armed with seven RPG-7s, one 82mm mortar, one DShK and many Kalashnikovs blocked their advance at Shokyali Village which is located at the junction of Dara-e Nur and Bar Kot Valleys.(Map 8-4 - Bar Kot) We positioned our forces to block both valleys and the high ground between them. The enemy came and tried to overcome our defenses but failed. Then the government sent a group of the area's elders to talk to us. The elders tried to persuade us not to fight in the area and to leave, but we refused. We held the area for another year before the enemy brought another column against us.

Nader, the DRA police chief for the area, sent us a message also trying to persuade us not to continue to fight in this area. He warned us that, if we did not leave, the Soviets would destroy all the villages in the area. It was now April 1985. At 2030 hours one evening, my group left the village of Sotan. We were armed with an RPG-7 and Kalashnikovs. We were moving to the junction of the two valleys along the foot of the mountains. One of my men stated "I will fire a shot to show our presence and let the people know that we are not cowards. It will show them that we are not intimidated and that we are still here. "I tried to talk him out of it, but he finally fired the shot. As soon as he fired, the night lit up with return fire from all the Soviets who we discovered were in the area in force. The Soviets had arrived the previous night and had waited all day for us. We had not reached the junction yet, but were at a place called Kar. The Soviets were firing at us from positions on the mountain to the west and to the east is a steep canyon with a sheer 150 meter wall. We were trapped and surround-ed, so we went to ground and fought back through the night and next day. With the day, helicopters came and fired at us. We grimly held our position and waited for the next night when we would try a break-out. But the Soviets had also had enough fighting, and they pulled out at the end of the day. I lost one KIA and one. WIA. I do not know if there were any Soviet casualties.

Doctor Mohammed Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in. Kunar Province and was also the narrator of the previous vignette. [Map sheet 3186, vic grid 4742.] Page 224 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 8, Vignette 4 Page 225

COMMENTARY:
The Mujahideen believed in the invulnerability of their defenses and let the routines of positional defense dull their alertness. The Soviets again were able to infiltrate a force deep into the Mujahideen territory and take them by surprise. The lack of Mujahideen discipline triggered the ambush, but apparently triggered the ambush prematurely before the entire force was in the kill zone. Mujahideen leaders led by consensus, force of personality and moral persuasion. The Mujahideen failed to man their defenses around the clock andthe Soviets were able to move through their unmanned positions and surprise the Mujahideen. It is unclear whether the Soviets were in a deliberate ambush or were waiting for night fall to move on Sotan to attack the Mujahideen.

One of the problems that a guerrilla movement has is that the peo-ple who suffer the retaliations for guerrilla actions are usually the civilian populace. What starts as a popular cause, supported enthusi-astically by the populace, can sour when the local populace has to bear the reprisals with no apparent end in sight. The local populace that remains often just wants to be left alone by all sides. The Mujahideenin this area lost a great deal of local support and, consequently, intelli-gence information and early warning.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
Mujahideen local security was often lax in those areas which they controlled or which Soviet/DRA forces had not visited in awhile. Often,Mujahideen local security was even lax in areas adjacent to majorSoviet and ,DRA garrisons. KHAD infiltrators and informers often managed to provide timely information that resulted in successful raids. The Mujahideen often failed to post security at a sufficient dis-tance from their force to provide adequate warning. Instead, they relied on local inhabitants to provide that warning. In areas where the local populace had fled or were tired of the war, the Mujahideen were blind. The factional nature of the Mujahideen also discouraged the dis-tribution of timely intelligence to all Mujahideen forces in an area.

The Mujahideen often failed to plan against raids, constitute a ready reaction force, designate escape routes and assembly areas and rehearse their defense. Aggressive Soviet or DRA raids had a good chance of success against unprepared Mujahideen. The trick was to withdraw before the Mujahideen had a chance to recover and pursue.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 9

CHAPTER 9: FIGHTING HELIBORNE INSERTIONS
Soviet technology often had minimal impact on the Mujahideenguerrilla. Many Mujahideen tactics were virtually unchanged andstill effective from their combat with Great Britain in the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. Soviet high-performance aviationposed a direct threat to the civilian populace of Afghanistan, but, theMujahideen learned how to avoid or misdirect high-performanceaircraft. However, the Soviet transport helicopter and helicoptergunship proved to be major concerns to the Mujahideen. Helicopters,and later the SU-25 close air support aircraft, were potent systems inthe Soviet arsenal that the Mujahideen respected and feared. Soviettransports could land raiding parties deep in Mujahideen areas whilegunships and close support aircraft could attack any opposition.Throughout the war, the Mujahideen had difficulty countering heli-borne insertions, but they did learn that planning, drills and airdefense ambushes could help alleviate the 'heliborne threat. Page 228 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 SOVIET HELIBORNE RAID ACHIEVES SURPRISEby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In the mid 1980s, Mujahideen forces based in Alingar District of the Laghman Province intensified their attacks on Soviet/DRAcolumns moving between Alingar and the provincial capital of MehtarLam. Mujahideen action included harassing supply columns, blockingtraffic and launching raids on security outposts protecting governmentestablishments. These actions were usually conducted by local resis-tance groups of 30 to 70 men. Most were affiliated with the Hezb-eIslami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIH). Mujahideen commanders dispersed their men, weapons and equip-ment in the villages and hideouts and sometimes even buried theirweapons between actions. However, rarely a day would pass in theregion without some combat initiated by the Mujahideen or the DRAforces. In response, the Soviet/DRA forces targeted suspected bases orhouses (permanent residences or headquarters) of major Mujahideencommanders in the area. Most of the raids were conducted by groundtroops. However, after 1984, Soviet special forces launched severalheli-borne raids on Mujahideen targets in the region. Their action atBadiabad Village was one of these. In the summer of 1985, a Soviet heli-borne detachment raided thehouse of a local Mujahideen commander, Mamur Ghulam Jailani, inthe village of Badiabad. The village is located about 15 kilometersnortheast of Mehtar Lam on the main road connecting the provincialcapital with the Alingar District (Map 9-1 - Badiabad). CommanderJailani commanded 150 Mujahideen located in and around Badiabad.His group was armed with automatic rifles, RPG-7 grenade launchers and a few heavy, and light machine guns. The Soviet raid began around 0900 hours with successive gun runsby pairs of helicopter gunships. Continual heavy helicopter rocket andmachine gun raked the village and gave the villagers little opportuni-ty to move into the surrounding hills—a standard practice by womenand children to escape the ground force attacks that usually followed Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. Hejoined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud--before the communist revolution. He had noformal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet3086, vic grid 1745]. Page 230 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War air strikes. That day Commander Jailani was staying two villagesaway at Mirza Qala, less than one kilometer to the east. His 14-year-old son was alone in the house during the raid. The youngster waswounded, but managed to escape. The aerial preparation continued about 30 minutes without anyMujahideen reaction or return fire. Four lift helicopters then set downin some corn fields 200-300 meters west of the commander's house.The corn stalks were about 20-30 centimeters high at the time. About40 commandoes disembarked and immediately split into three groups.Two 10-man groups secured the northern and southern flanks of thevillage and a 20-man group stormed through the village to the houseonly to find that it was empty. The commandoes, seized (stole) cashand other valuables in the house and destroyed what they could nottake away. They searched several neighboring houses and found onlywomen and children. They detained two unarmed Mujahideen whohad buried their weapons. They were later released. Several Mujahideen groups from the surrounding villages moved toBadiabad to fight the Soviets, but none arrived on time. The Sovietdetachment withdrew unopposed and flew away in the helicopters thatbrought it in. The entire action lasted about an hour. COMMENTARY: Soviet intelligence as to the location of the commander'shouse was good, probably reflecting the presence of an informer in thearea. However, the Soviets did not have current intelligence to pin-point when the commander would be in his house. This indicates thatthey were relying on only one intelligence asset and should have direct-ed other assets to supplement their agent's reports. The resulting lackof accurate, current intelligence resulted in a failed mission. On theother hand, the guerrillas did not have an early warning system andhad not developed and rehearsed a plan or drills to counter a Soviet-helicopter raid. This lack may have saved the Soviet force. The guerrillas' lack of an overall village security plan and slowreaction time cost the resistance a good opportunity for inflicting heavylosses on the raiding detachment. A good security plan would concen-trate on destroying the lift ships first and then fragmenting anddestroying the raiding detachment piecemeal. Eyewitnesses say that Jailani had left an RPG-7 in his house. Asthe Soviet gunships started strafing the village, he asked for a volun-teer to go to the village and retrieve the valuable weapon. He offered40,000 Afghanis (about 100 dollars) as a reward. His 17-year-oldnephew, Ismail, volunteered, reached the embattled house and Chapter 9, Vignette 1 Page 231 retrieved the weapon minutes before the Soviets stormed the place. Instead of retiring with the RPG-7, the Mujahideen commandercould have it used against the raiding force—perhaps to knock outenemy helicopters. There was no lack of brave men among theMujahideen, like Ismail, who rushed to the village for combat. TheMujahideen, in this case, demonstrated a lot of individual courage butlittle tactical teamwork, initiative or cohesiveness. About one month later, the Mujahideen had another chance andreversed the outcome of a similar raid just four kilometers north ofBadiabad. This is the subject of the next vignette. Page 232 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 SOVIET RAID ON KANDAby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In July 1985, about one month after the Soviet raid on theMujahideen base in the village of Badiabad, the Soviets made asimilar attack against the resistance base of Doctor Alkozai at KandaWarajayee. Kanda Warajayee, commonly called Kanda, is located onthe main road between the provincial capital of Mehtar Lam andthe Alingar District in the Laghman Province. The village is nearlyeight kilometers south of the Alingar District center. I located my base just outside the village to the west of themain road. I moved all the crew-served weapons from my house inthe village to the base since the Soviets had conducted a series ofraids on the homes of known Mujahideen commanders. I located mybase in a ruin near an intermittent drainage ditch and protected itwith security posts and crew-served weapons firing positions. One day in July 1985, a group of six Soviet helicopters flew intomy area. The helicopter group included four gunships which startedfiring at positions around my house. It seemed to me that the enemyintended to land troops and mount a raid on my house. TheMujahideen in my base opened up with machine gun fire on theenemy helicopters. This forced the Soviets to land at a distance fromthe village. As the helicopters landed about three kilometers awayfrom Kanda on Shakhatara Dashta (plain), six of my Mujahideencarried an 82mm Chinese-manufactured recoilless rifle to a naturaldrainage ditch which extended from the village to the Prang GharMountain to the west (Map 9-2 - Kanda). The Soviet soldiers jumped from their helicopters onto the openterrain near a flock of sheep. The Soviets promptly gunned down theunarmed teenage shepherd. The enemy then tried to advance onKanda under the air cover provided by their gunships. But the inten-sity of fire from my Mujahideen pinned them down in the open. Asthe fire fight continued, more of my Mujahideen rushed into the fray.This forced the Soviet troops to withdraw, quickly board their heli-copters and fly away. The Soviet raid was a complete failure. Haji Sidiqullah and Dr. Abdul Qudus are the narrators of the previous vignette. iMap sheet3086, vic grid 1948]. Page 234 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen's prompt reaction to the enemy attacksaved the day. The Mujahideen had learned that enemy airmobileassaults in a guerrilla-controlled area have little chance of successwhen met with coordinated fire from multiple directions. Dr. Alkozaihad planned for enemy air assault and positioned weapons to deal withthat possibility. On the other hand, the Soviet forces paid heavily for theirattempt to land small units in an area totally dominated by the resis-tance. A heliborne attack may succeed when it is launched against anenemy caught by surprise and unable to respond swiftly. However,heavy Mujahideen ground fire should have convinced the Soviet com-mander to abort his mission. Instead, he relied on gunship fire tocarry the day and was forced to withdraw from a hot LZ. He waslucky not to lose some lift ships, particularly since his landing zonewas so close to the objective. Soviet intelligence about their target appears to have beengood, but the Soviet commander lacked the complete intelligencepicture about the strength and location of guerrilla forces. If the Sovietcommander had inserted some forces to secure the high groundoverlooking Kanda before landing the bulk of his force, he mighthave been able to suppress guerrilla crew-served weapons and accom-plish his raid. Page 236 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 9, Vignette 3 Page 237 VIGNETTE 3 AIR ASSAULT ON MARO STRONGHOLDby Toryalai Hemat In April 1987, the Soviets and DRA launched a combined strike onthe Mujahideen stronghold in Nangrahar Province, Shinwar Districtnear the Nazian Valley. The Nazian Valley was heavily populated,although many of the inhabitants had emigrated to Pakistan to avoidthe Soviet bombing attacks. The Mujahideen stronghold that theenemy wanted was at Maro, some 70 kilometers southeast ofJalalabad near the Pakistan border. Several Mujahideen groupsfrom different factions were located around Maro and there wereprobably some 500 well-armed Mujahideen in the stronghold area.The Soviets called this stronghold the Melava fortified region.1 For 18 days prior to the attack, the Soviets hit the area withairstrikes. Then, a mechanized Soviet/DRA column moved eastfrom Jalalabad and, when it reached Shinwar Town, it split in two(Map 9-3 - Maro). One column moved through Shinwar and up theNazian Valley, while the other column moved further to the east to the subdistrict of Dur Baba and then attacked to the southwest.Commander Saznur and his men defended on the Dur Babaapproach. Commander Khaled and I, along with our 10 otherMujahideen, defended Ghazgisar—the highest ground in the areaoverlooking Maro. The enemy launched heavy air strikes against us.Following the airstrikes, Soviet helicopters landed air assault forceson the high ground between the two axes.2 Some 40 or 50 heli-copter sorties were involved. One of the landing zones was right infront of us. The fighting was fierce. Nine of my group were killed bythe bombing or while fighting the air assault force. Only Khaled, Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the lUA--IslamicUnion of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet3185, vic grid 8892]. 1 A Soviet account of this action is contained in vignette 26 of The Bear Went Over theMountain. The Soviet account mistakenly has the action to the northeast of Jalalabad, amistake that Les Grau made based on a similar name and some vague text. 2These were two battalions from the 56th Air Assault Brigade in Gardez. The battalionsdrove to Jalalabad and then to Shinwar. They staged the air assault from a field site inShinwar. Why they did not fly to Jalalabad airfield and then stage the air assault from theairfield is a mystery. The ground force was most likely from the Soviet 66th SeparateMotorized Rifle Brigade and the DRA 11th Infantry Division. Page 238 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Abdul Wakil and I survived. The Mujahideen [under CommanderSaznur] initially stopped the column from Dur Baba, but the columncoming from the Nazian Valley advanced quickly and captured Maro.In my group, we three survivors were caught between two LZs. Wesnuck out of the area and crossed the border into Pakistan and hikedto the nearby village of Bazar. When the enemy took Maro, many Mujahideen fled across theborder and assembled at Bazar (Tirah Agency in Pakistan).Reinforcements from the HIH and IUA factions poured into thearea. Arab volunteers along with Talibs from religious schools alsocame for the fighting. We launched a counterattack. The fighting forthe bases was so fierce that at times it was hand-to-hand combat. Ipersonally was so close to some Russians during the fighting that Iwould recognize them today. The enemy left many vehicles behindand many dead on the ground. The Soviets did not usually leavetheir dead, but we counted 75 Soviet KIA. I do not know the totalnumber of Mujahideen casualties, but I do know of 72 Mujahideenkilled and wounded. The Soviets only held Maro for three days. Theyburned and destroyed what they could and mined the area beforethey withdrew. COMMENTARY: The Soviet air assault raids on mountain base campsusually lasted for one to three days. As in this instance, the Sovietspreferred to have ground forces involved to link up 'with the airassault forces. They tried to seize the area, destroy as much of the base as possible, lay down mines and depart. And, they tried toavoid getting trapped in the mountains fighting the Mujahideen ontheir turf. As in Zhawar and Magistral, the Mujahideen initiallyretreated, regrouped and reinforced and then launched a punishingattack. The close proximity of this base to Pakistan allowed theMujahideen to do this. The Soviet planning and execution of thisaction was well done, but they apparently were late in withdrawingand had to fight a running withdrawal. The Mujahideen distribution of forces on the two axes was unevenand the air assault prevented the Mujahideen from employing areserve against the threatened axis. Part of the maldistribution isdue to the fact that various factions of various strengths were in thearea and missions were assigned by faction, not by strength.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
In the early days of the war, Soviet air assault missions were rathertimid and unimaginative. Later, the Soviets became more confidentwith the air assault concept and struck deeper and more aggressively.Ambush forces were delivered by helicopter, and raiding forcesstruck deep at Mujahideen supply bases and staging areas and evenconducted raids against Mujahideen redoubts such as the one at Maro.The Soviets usually sent a ground element to link up with the airassault element if the air assault element had to remain in the area forany length of time. Soviet air assaults relied on helicopter gunshipsand SU-25 close air support aircraft for fire support, but frequentlybrought their artillery with them by helicopter. The Mujahideen learned to counter air assaults with thoroughplanning, immediate action drills, an early warning system and airdefense ambushes. They learned to mine likely LZs, employ massedRPG fire against hovering or landing helicopters, and to try andoverrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to getorganized and oriented. They also learned to "hug" Soviet forces sothat helicopter gunships could not fire at them. Mazer-e11110 tSharif KABUL 2 AsadabadJalalabad 4 Herat Gardez Afghanistan Chapter 10 KandaharIncidents


text:
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 12

CHAPTER 12: COUNTERAMBUSH
Counterambush is a tedious, time-consuming effort requiringroute planning, patrols, timely intelligence, counterambush drillsand flank security. Planning should ensure that alternate routes andtimes of travel are used, that potential ambush sites are cleared andthat movement through areas is coordinated with local forces.Movement details need to be safeguarded and deception measurestaken to prevent ambush. Page 342 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 CAUGHT IN A SOVIET AMBUSHby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch In 1983, we had one GMC pickup truck to support my force. Wecalled GMC pickups ahu (deer), since they were fleet and nimble Itwas the month of Ramadan and we were going from our base in Qala-e Naw to Kotalak to get some gasoline. Soviet soldiers were the mainsource of our gasoline. We would buy it from them. Our rendezvouspoint for gasoline was north of Kotolak. We left early in the afternoonand drove along the river avoiding the main roads (Map 12-1 -Kotolak). There was a Kochi1 in our truck who had visited our baseand we were giving him a ride back to his village camp. As we gotabout 10 kilometers south of Kotolak, we saw the Kochi's camp nearthe river. We stopped, both to let our passenger off and to wait fordark, since we were now within 50 kilometers of the Soviet base atDelaram and should not travel any further in the day light. Wewatched as the Kochi entered the woods some 500-600 meters awayon his way to his camp. We saw some people attack him and drag himto the side. We didn't know what was going on and thought that itwas a fight between Kochis. "What's going on?" we yelled. They didnot answer so we fired some shots into the air. The people whograbbed the Kochi realized that they had been seen and started firingat us. We exchanged fire for about a half hour until helicopters land-ed behind the wooded area. The other group boarded the helicoptersand left. It was late afternoon. • We had prematurely and inadvertently triggered a Sovietambush. We were on the western bank of the Khash Rud river andthe ambush force was on the eastern bank. Soviet ambushes werealways better planned and prepared than those of the DRA. TheSoviets would drop their ambush party by helicopter at night and theparty would walk into position so that their ambush could not bedetected. This ambush party was probably from Delaram2 and had Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the KhashRud district capitol on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Malawi Mohammad NabiMohammadi of the Harakat-e Ingelab-i Islam' (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK (Khalis).[Map sheet 1680]. 1 Kochi are nomadic tribesmen of Afghanistan. They live primarily by herding and tradingsheep, goats and camels. 2 More probably, these were Spetsnaz from Lashkar Gah. Page 344 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War probably moved into their wooded position the previous night. TheSoviets suffocated the Kochi who had been our passenger and hadkilled another Kochi earlier in the same fashion. The river was ford-able, so after the helicopters left, we forded the river to look at theambush sight. Villagers found the bodies of the two murdered Kochi.We crossed back to the west side, got in our truck and began drivingon the road to Kotolak since it was now night. About two kilometers south of Kotolak the Soviets had set anotherambush in some hills straddling the road. We were moving in enemyterritory and I considered the route dangerous so we stopped short of the hills and I had seven of my men dismount and walk the road to theother side of the hills checking for ambushers. If they saw nothing,then we would move the truck forward. This left eight Mujahideenwith the truck—three in the cab and five in the pickup bed. My sevenwalkers walked past the hills, checked for ambush and gave us an all-clear sign—a signal rocket. The ambush party let my walkers pass through unmolested. Whenwe saw the rocket, we moved out confidently. Suddenly, I thought thatsomeone had set us on fire. We were in an ambush kill zone and bul-lets were flying all around us. Two men in the truck bed and the mannext to me in the cab were killed. The driver was wounded in theshoulder. One tire was hit. The driver slammed the truck into reversegear and tried to drive out of the kill zone. He drove the truck behinda sheltering hillock and stopped it. I had three KIA and two WIA. Wechanged the tire and left the area in the dark. My walkers continuedto Kotolak. Later on, the walkers returned individually to my basecamp. As we were reversing the truck out of the kill zone, the body ofone of my dead Mujahideen fell out of the truck bed. The next daywhen we returned to recover his body, we discovered that it was boobytrapped. We had to tie a rope to our dead comrade and drag him for adistance, before it was safe to carry him home for burial. COMMENTARY: At the first ambush site, the Soviets failed to put outflank observers and consequently were surprised by the Mujahideen intheir stationary truck. This failure compromised their ambush. At the second ambush site, the Mujahideen walkers walked aroundthe hills, not along the military crest where the ambushers should be.The ambushers wisely let the patrol pass to concentrate on the vehicle.However, the Soviets failed to employ directional, command-detonatedmines or an RPG to effectively stop the truck in the kill zone. Further,the ambush commander did not know the size of the Mujahideen force Chapter 12, Vignette 1 Page 345 and, following the ambush, did not pursue the Mujahideen or push outa patrol to determine the Mujahideen's position and status. After the first ambush, the Soviets knew that the Mujahideenintended to move north. It was also clear that the Soviets were in thearea, yet the Mujahideen did not contact other local Mujahideengroups to check on Soviet and DRA activities in the area. The faction-alized nature of the resistance prevented the spread of tactical intelli-gence which may have saved the Mujahideen from disaster. ESTALIF FARZA tiEHOW 0 2 KM op• 84■ 1 PM1 11/ 11/ 1/I //• ZARG AR AN •• ARA DEH ■ ■ MIRAFGHAN ••FARZA Map 12-2 Page 346 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 AMBUSHED AT FARZAby Commander Sofi Lal Gul In April 1984, the regional Mujahideen called for a shura (localcouncil) to discuss local issues and decide on common approaches. SofiRasul and myself were to attend as the local Mujahideen commandersfrom Farza. The meeting would be held five kilometers to our north inEstalif. We were accompanied by 28 Mujahideen armed with AK47sand two RPG-7s. Someone must have been working for DRA intelli-gence in our area, since the DRA knew about our plans and set anambush on the trail near Farza. We left Farza while it was still dark so that the enemy would notsee us. Our route took us between two hills near a DRA air defensebattery position (Map 12-2 - Farza). We were about half way to Estalifat a point which we call Wotaq, when the enemy opened fire on us fromthe surrounding hills. A DRA force had set up the ambush during thenight. There is no doubt that they knew the exact route we would take.We went to ground in the kill zone and tried to find good fighting posi-tions. The firing was fierce, we were totally surprised and we did notknow the enemy strength and exact positions. Our return fire wasineffective and uncontrolled. As dawn broke, our situation improved slightly, but we were still inshock. I had no command or control over my men and they acted asindividuals trying to break contact and leave the kill zone. Enemy firewas still heavy. During a lull in the fighting, I managed to find a fewMujahideen sheltering in a ditch. I led them to the safety of the moun-tains in the west. Twelve Mujahideen eventually reached the safety of the terrain folds and mountain valleys in the west. Two others andmyself were wounded. We remained hidden in the valley until we sawthe ambush force leave that afternoon. Then we returned to theambush site where we discovered that 18 of our comrades were killed.Some of their bodies were mutilated by the enemy and most had theirclothing shredded. Late that afternoon, we moved their bodies forburial. I do not know if there were any enemy casualties, but during Commander Sofi Lal Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District. This is about25 kilometers north of Kabul. He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan NationalLiberation Front of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviets. Commander SofiLal Gul concentrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vicgrid 0350]. Page 348 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War the fighting, I saw helicopters landing and taking off. They may havecome to evacuate dead and wounded. CO1VIIVIENTARY: This successful DRA ambush inflicted more than 60percent loss on the Mujahideen force. Soviet/DRA recruitment of localagents and informants gradually expanded their intelligence network.in the Afghan rural areas. Often, agent/informant information was nottimely, but when it was, the Soviet/DRA planners reacted to it.Intelligence was central to Soviet/DRA ambush planning and attemptsto assassinate Mujahideen commanders. The Soviets/DRA usuallyconducted ambushes based on hard information and seldom placedrandom ambushes on the hope that a force might stumble into it. If the Mujahideen felt that they were moving through uncontestedterritory, they often failed to post route security or send a forward andflanking patrols. This lack of attention to tactical security stemmedfrom the notion that they completely controlled the countryside andthat the DRA/Soviet forces were unable to operate covertly in the coun-tryside for long. This over-confidence cost the Mujahideen dearly. TheSoviet/DRA forces exploited this Mujahideen hubris by settingambushes even in areas located deep inside Mujahideen-controlledterritory. When ambushed, the Mujahideen had difficulty maintaining com-mand and control. This exacerbated the situation and increased theircasualties. Mujahideen commanders often failed to train their person-nel in drills and counter-ambush procedures. In this example, thecommander lost control immediately and failed to regain it. This wasa contributing factor to the very-high Mujahideen losses. Further, themiddle of a kill zone is no place to establish a defense. If the comman-der had a counterambush battle drill where his men immediatelyassaulted into the teeth of the ambush, more of his force might havesurvived. VIGNETTE 3 BLASTING OUT OF AN AMBUSHby Amir Mohammad It was in 1985. We had a large truck that we were haulingweapons, rockets and ammunition in from Pakistan to our base campin the Argandab river valley (No map). We were taking a circuitousroute. We neared Lora near sunset when we saw a helicopter. Therewas nowhere to hide since we were on an open plain. The helicopterlanded and Soviet soldiers jumped out of it and took up positions allaround us. We stopped the truck, jumped out and took up positions allaround the truck. We had 13 Mujahideen and there were 10-12Soviets. The Soviets had the advantage of better weapons, positionand fire power. We started firing at each other. The Soviets started toadvance on us. The driver was afraid that we would be captured, so hetook a jerry can of gasoline, poured the gasoline onto the truck and setit on fire. He yelled at us to take cover. Despite the Soviet small-armsfire, we scurried to new positions for cover. Soon, the fire reached theammunition and rockets and the truck exploded with a tremendousroar. The rockets and rounds were not stacked neatly, but werestacked in every possible direction. Consequently, the rockets and bul-lets were exploding and streaking off in every possible direction. Itwas spectacular. The explosion and flying rounds frightened theSoviets. They ran back to their helicopter and took off. After the heli-copter left and things stopped exploding, we walked to a nearby vil-lage. Neither side had any casualties, but we lost a good truck and lotsof ammunition and we had to walk back to our base camp. COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure areaand were driving during the day. Usually, Mujahideen trucks movedat night. Evidently the Soviets hoped to capture the truck or theywould have shot it up and created the same explosion that theMujahideen did. Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razik's group in the Shahr-e Safa districtnortheast of Kandahar. There is no map with this vignette. VIGNETTE 4 CAUGHT IN A DRA AMBUSHby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch In 1986, we were moving three pickup trucks full of ammunitionfrom Iran to our base. We had two motorcyclists patrolling five kilo-meters in front of the pickup trucks. We were near the border of Iranat Shand near Helmond lake. There is a point where two hills constrictthe road and limit maneuver. The DRA border guard set up an ambushthere (No map). Our two motorcyclists rode through the ambush zoneand the DRA let them pass. As the motorcyclists cleared the ambushzone, they saw the DRA. They dismounted their motorcycles and tookup firing positions on an adjacent hill Our trucks rolled into the killzone. The motorcyclists opened fire on the ambushers to warn thepickup trucks and to distract the ambushers. The DRA opened fire andhit the middle truck. The first pickup truck drove out of the kill zonewhile the Mujahideen in the last truck dismounted and attacked theambushers. The DRA fled. We lost two Mujahideen KIA and one truckwas damaged. There were no known DRA casualties. COMIVIENTARY: When Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure area,they would move supplies during the day. The Mujahideen felt securein this area since they were moving in the daylight. Still, they had aforward patrol checking for ambush. The patrol, however, seems roadbound and did not get off the road to check likely ambush sites care-fully. The patrol had no communication with the main body, so whenthe motorcyclists finally detected the ambush, they were unable toimmediately contact them. Consequently, two of the three trucks werein the kill zone by the time the motorcyclists opened fire. Still, therewas enough spacing between trucks which prevented the entire forcefrom being in the kill zone simultaneously. The Mujahideen showed aggressive spirit and resolve by immediate-ly assaulting the ambushers and driving them from the scene. The DRAcontrolled the dominant terrain and had the opportunity to preparefighting positions. They should have been able to stand, yet they fled inthe face of Mujahideen resolve. The immediate assault into the ambushprobably saved the Mujahideen convoy. Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the capi-tol of Khash Rud district on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Mawlawi MohammadNabi Mohammadi of the Harakat-e Islam' (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK(Khalis). There is no map with this vignette. VIGNETTE 5 AMBUSHED ON THE HIGH PLAINby Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak In May 1987, we were moving supplies from Peshawar, Pakistan toour base west of Kabul. We followed the Logar route from Parachinar,Pakistan across the Afghanistan border to Jaji in Paktiya Province.From there, we followed mountain canyons to Dobandi. Past Dobandi,the mountains ended and we had a broad plain to cross before wereached the mountains near our base. We finally reached Dobandi andstayed there for three days (Map 12-3 - Dobandi). We waited therewhile I made sure that the way was clear because the Soviets would setambushes to interdict our supplies. I went from Dobandi to KafarDara canyon for information on Soviet activity. The Mujahideen atKafar Dara did not have any information either, so I went on to Sepetswhere there were several Mujahideen bases belonging to HA.R andHezb-e Islami. These Mujahideen gave us two guides—Akhunzada ofHAR and Mulla Nawab. We brought up all our supplies to Sepets inthe late afternoon. Including the guides, I had 31 Mujahideen withme. I planned to go forward, clear the route, establish security posi-tions on key terrain and likely ambush sites and then bring the sup-plies forward. I moved in the middle of the column. We moved across the open plain from Sepets. There is a placecalled the Childrens' cemetery where we stopped to offer our late after-noon prayers. Since it was still daylight, we moved well spread outwith a distance between every Mujahideen. This was a precautionagainst air attacks. I told the guide, Mulla Nawab, to stay with usuntil we passed through this area and reached the Gardez highway.We followed a stream bed through a brush-covered area. We nearedthe water mill midpoint between Sepets and Khato Kalay at 1920hours, when I looked at my watch to see if it was time for eveningprayer. There was high ground on both sides of us. Suddenly machine-gun fire opened up in front of me. At first, I thought that it was myMujahideen firing, but then I saw Soviets to the north firing on us. MyMujahideen immediately scattered and crouched behind bushes. TheSoviets fired at the bushes, but my Mujahideen held their fire. TheSoviets assumed that they had killed all my Mujahideen and jumped Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak is from the Chardehi district of Kabul ( a southern sub-urb). He was affiliated with NIFA. [Map sheet 2884, vic grid 3058]. •1111 •DOBANDI KABUL 64 KM 2817 ■ ABCHAKAN ■ ▪• • •KHATOKALAYDOBANDI Map 12-3p 1?? $ P KM Chapter 12, Vignette 5 Page 353 up from their positions. As I saw the Soviets jump up, I yelled "AllahAkbar"(God is the greatest) and we opened fire on them. This led to aprolonged fire fight. My Mujahideen were spread in a single file and Iwas the 16th person in the column. Dadgul was next to me, but we didnot really know exactly where the Soviets were and they did not knowexactly where we were. We fired at each other off and on. At approx-imately 2200 hours, we heard the sound of armored vehicle enginesmoving toward us. They had come from the northwest at Pul-e Alam.Mamur Abdul Ali began firing rockets in our support from his base inSepets. One landed close to us and the next went further on. The fifthrocket landed in the enemy column. This slowed down the enemy col-umn. Akhunzada also started firing rockets at the enemy column fromhis base. I instructed my Mujahideen to fall back to the mountainsnear Abchakan and then move south of Sepets to the mountain valleywhere the Mujahideen bases were located. It was 0200 when wereached Akhunzada base. Sixteen of my Mujahideen were missing—those who were in front of me in the column. The next morning at 1000hours, we went forward and found Mohammaday, who was woundedand my RPG-7 man who was killed. The rest of my Mujahideen hadgone on to Logan I do not know what the Soviet losses were, but therewere reports that they had casualties. The Soviets never used thatparticular ambush site again.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet ambush party probably came from the 108thMotorized Rifle Division or the 103rd Airborne Division. Both weregarrisoned in Kabul. The 56th Air Assault Brigade at Gardez wascloser to the site, but the relief element came from the Kabul direction.The Soviet ambush site was not well laid out. There was no attemptto seal the kill zone. There were no firing lanes cleared, no aimingstakes emplaced, no directional mines employed and no indirect fireplanned on the kill zone. The Soviet ambush was triggered by a lonegunner and not by massed fire directed by the ambush commander.The Soviet commander evidently did not know that he had a strung-out Mujahideen column, which could not mass fires, to his front. Oncenight fell, the Mujahideen did not break contact and the ambushcommander then evidently felt that he was in contact with a large forceand called for an armored column to rescue him.

The Mujahideen movement plan was commendable. The comman-der did not hazard his supplies until he had cleared the route and post-ed security at key points. He coordinated with other factions to obtaininformation and tactical intelligence. He moved spread out on open terrain so he did not present an air target and moved in the middle of the column where he could best exert control. He gets low marks forfollowing the guide down a stream bed without sending flankers tosweep the high ground. But, when his force was hit, the commanderwas able to ascertain that his column was not in immediate danger ofannihilation and shut down return fire. This allowed his men to deter-mine where their ambushers were and to draw them out of position.The commander ordered an escape to the northeast and then a movesouth in the safety of the mountains rather than retracing their routeand risking another ambush or drawing the relief column into theSepets area.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
Successful counterambush is the result of careful planning, battledrills, rehearsals, information security, patrolling, current tacticalintelligence, and deception measures. Movement of supplies needs tovary by route, time and composition of the supply column.Mujahideen supplies were moved on mule, horse, donkey, camel,truck and human porter. While some factions had their own transport, the bulk of Mujahideen supplies were carried by contracted teamsters and muleteers. The cost of transport was high and a groupwith a reputation of getting ambushed would be hard put to find willing teamsters.

In some areas, the Mujahideen only had to transport ammunition,but in other areas they had to transport food, clothing, and forage aswell. Ammunition requirements for a small ambush by a 20-man group armed with Enfields, Kalashnikovs, an RPG-7, a PK mediummachine gun, and five antitank mines, might exceed 375 pounds. Theweight of required ammunition shoots up dramatically as mortars,recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns are added.' Even if the ammu-nition was furnished free, the cost of getting it to where it was neededwas considerable and the wise Mujahideen commander carefullyprotected his supplies against interdiction. 3 'The Logistics System of the Mujahideen", page 55, unpublished government contractstudy written in 1987.