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Gonzales v. Carhart/Dissent Ginsburg

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992), the Court declared that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." There was, the Court said, an "imperative" need to dispel doubt as to "the meaning and reach" of the Court's 7-to-2 judgment, rendered nearly two decades earlier in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 505 U.S., at 845. Responsive to that need, the Court endeavored to provide secure guidance to "[s]tate and federal courts as well as legislatures throughout the Union," by defining "the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termination of pregnancies by abortion procedures." Ibid.

Taking care to speak plainly, the Casey Court restated and reaffirmed Roe 's essential holding. 505 U.S., at 845–846. First, the Court addressed the type of abortion regulation permissible prior to fetal viability. It recognized "the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State." Id., at 846. Second, the Court acknowledged "the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health." Ibid. (emphasis added). Third, the Court confirmed that "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child." Ibid. (emphasis added).

In reaffirming Roe, the Casey Court described the centrality of "the decision whether to bear...a child," Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), to a woman's "dignity and autonomy," her "personhood" and "destiny," her "conception of...her place in society." 505 U.S., at 851–852. Of signal importance here, the Casey Court stated with unmistakable clarity that state regulation of access to abortion procedures, even after viability, must protect "the health of the woman." Id., at 846.

Seven years ago, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute criminalizing the performance of a medical procedure that, in the political arena, has been dubbed "partial-birth abortion." With fidelity to the Roe-Casey line of precedent, the Court held the Nebraska statute unconstitutional in part because it lacked the requisite protection for the preservation of a woman's health. Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 930; cf. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006).

Today's decision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions. And, for the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman's health.

I dissent from the Court's disposition. Retreating from prior rulings that abortion restrictions cannot be imposed absent an exception safeguarding a woman's health, the Court upholds an Act that surely would not survive under the close scrutiny that previously attended state-decreed limitations on a woman's reproductive choices.

A
As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman's "control over her [own] destiny." 505 U.S., at 869 (plurality opinion). See also id., at 852 (majority opinion). "There was a time, not so long ago," when women were "regarded as the center of home and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and independent legal status under the Constitution." Id., at 896–897 (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)). Those views, this Court made clear in Casey, "are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution." 505 U.S., at 897. Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right "to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation." Id., at 856. Their ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to "their ability to control their reproductive lives." Ibid. Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature. See, e. g., Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1002–1028 (1984).

In keeping with this comprehension of the right to reproductive choice, the Court has consistently required that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in all cases, safeguard a woman's health. See, e. g., Ayotte, 546 U.S., at 327–328 ("[O]ur precedents hold...that a State may not restrict access to abortions that are necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the [woman]." (quoting Casey, 505 U.S., at 879 (plurality opinion))); Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 930 ("Since the law requires a health exception in order to validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect to previability regulation."). See also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–769 (1986) (invalidating a postviability abortion regulation for "fail[ure] to require that [a pregnant woman's] health be the physician's paramount consideration").

We have thus ruled that a State must avoid subjecting women to health risks not only where the pregnancy itself creates danger, but also where state regulation forces women to resort to less safe methods of abortion. See ''Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth'', 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a ban on a method of abortion that "force[d] a woman...to terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health"). See also Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 931 ("[Our cases] make clear that a risk to...women's health is the same whether it happens to arise from regulating a particular method of abortion, or from barring abortion entirely."). Indeed, we have applied the rule that abortion regulation must safeguard a woman’s health to the particular procedure at issue here--intact dilation and evacuation (intact D&E). .

In Stenberg, we expressly held that a statute banning intact D&E was unconstitutional in part because it lacked a health exception. 530 U.S., at 930, 937. We noted that there existed a "division of medical opinion" about the relative safety of intact D&E, id., at 937, but we made clear that as long as "substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health," a health exception is required, id., at 938. We explained:

"The word 'necessary' in Casey 's phrase 'necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the [pregnant woman],' cannot refer to an absolute necessity or to absolute proof. Medical treatments and procedures are often considered appropriate (or inappropriate) in light of estimated comparative health risks (and health benefits) in particular cases. Neither can that phrase require unanimity of medical opinion. Doctors often differ in their estimation of comparative health risks and appropriate treatment. And Casey 's words 'appropriate medical judgment' must embody the judicial need to tolerate responsible differences of medical opinion...." Id., at 937 (citation omitted).

Thus, we reasoned, division in medical opinion "at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its absence." Ibid. "[A] statute that altogether forbids [intact D&E]...consequently must contain a health exception." Id., at 938. See also id., at 948 (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("Th[e] lack of a health exception necessarily renders the statute unconstitutional.").

B
In 2003, a few years after our ruling in Stenberg, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act--without an exception for women's health. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The congressional findings on which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act rests do not withstand inspection, as the lower courts have determined and this Court is obliged to concede. Ante, at 165–166. See National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 482 (SDNY 2004) ("Congress did not...carefully consider the evidence before arriving at its findings."), aff’d ''sub nom. National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales'', 437 F.3d 278 (CA2 2006). See also ''Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (ND Cal. 2004) ("[N]one of the six physicians who testified before Congress had ever performed an intact D&E. Several did not provide abortion services at all; and one was not even an obgyn.... [T]he oral testimony before Congress was not only unbalanced, but intentionally polemic."), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (CA9 2006); Carhart v. Ashcroft'', 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (Neb. 2004) ("Congress arbitrarily relied upon the opinions of doctors who claimed to have no (or very little) recent and relevant experience with surgical abortions, and disregarded the views of doctors who had significant and relevant experience with those procedures."), aff’d, 413 F.3d 791 (CA8 2005).

Many of the Act's recitations are incorrect. See ante, at 165–166. For example, Congress determined that no medical schools provide instruction on intact D&E. § 2(14)(B), 117 Stat. 1204, notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV), p. 769, ¶ (14)(B) (Congressional Findings). But in fact, numerous leading medical schools teach the procedure. See Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1029; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 479. See also Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae 18 ("Among the schools that now teach the intact variant are Columbia, Cornell, Yale, New York University, Northwestern, University of Pittsburgh, University of Pennsylvania, University of Rochester, and University of Chicago.").

More important, Congress claimed there was a medical consensus that the banned procedure is never necessary. Congressional Findings ¶ (1). But the evidence "very clearly demonstrate[d] the opposite." Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1025. See also Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 1008–1009 ("[T]here was no evident consensus in the record that Congress compiled. There was, however, a substantial body of medical opinion presented to Congress in opposition. If anything...the congressional record establishes that there was a 'consensus' in favor of the banned procedure."); National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 488 ("The congressional record itself undermines [Congress'] finding" that there is a medical consensus that intact D&E "is never medically necessary and should be prohibited." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Similarly, Congress found that "[t]here is no credible medical evidence that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer than other abortion procedures." Congressional Findings (14)(B), in notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV), p. 769. But the congressional record includes letters from numerous individual physicians stating that pregnant women's health would be jeopardized under the Act, as well as statements from nine professional associations, including ACOG, the American Public Health Association, and the California Medical Association, attesting that intact D&E carries meaningful safety advantages over other methods. See National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 490. See also Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1021 ("Congress in its findings...chose to disregard the statements by ACOG and other medical organizations."). No comparable medical groups supported the ban. In fact, "all of the government's own witnesses disagreed with many of the specific congressional findings." Id., at 1024.

C
In contrast to Congress, the District Courts made findings after full trials at which all parties had the opportunity to present their best evidence. The courts had the benefit of "much more extensive medical and scientific evidence...concerning the safety and necessity of intact D&Es." Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1014; cf. National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (District Court "heard more evidence during its trial than Congress heard over the span of eight years.").

During the District Court trials, "numerous" "extraordinarily accomplished" and "very experienced" medical experts explained that, in certain circumstances and for certain women, intact D&E is safer than alternative procedures and necessary to protect women's health. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 1024–1027; see Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1001 ("[A]ll of the doctors who actually perform intact D&Es concluded that in their opinion and clinical judgment, intact D&Es remain the safest option for certain individual women under certain individual health circumstances, and are significantly safer for these women than other abortion techniques, and are thus medically necessary."); cf. ante, at 161 ("Respondents presented evidence that intact D&E may be the safest method of abortion, for reasons similar to those adduced in Stenberg.").

According to the expert testimony plaintiffs introduced, the safety advantages of intact D&E are marked for women with certain medical conditions, for example, uterine scarring, bleeding disorders, heart disease, or compromised immune systems. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 924–929, 1026–1027; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 472–473; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 992–994, 1001. Further, plaintiffs' experts testified that intact D&E is significantly safer for women with certain pregnancy-related conditions, such as placenta previa and accreta, and for women carrying fetuses with certain abnormalities, such as severe hydrocephalus. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 924, 1026–1027; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 473–474; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 992– 994, 1001. See also Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 929; Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae 2, 13–16.

Intact D&E, plaintiffs' experts explained, provides safety benefits over D&E by dismemberment for several reasons: First, intact D&E minimizes the number of times a physician must insert instruments through the cervix and into the uterus, and thereby reduces the risk of trauma to, and perforation of, the cervix and uterus--the most serious complication associated with nonintact D&E. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 923–928, 1025; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 471; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 982, 1001. Second, removing the fetus intact, instead of dismembering it in utero, decreases the likelihood that fetal tissue will be retained in the uterus, a condition that can cause infection, hemorrhage, and infertility. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 923–928, 1025–1026; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 472; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1001. Third, intact D&E diminishes the chances of exposing the patient's tissues to sharp bony fragments sometimes resulting from dismemberment of the fetus. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 923–928, 1026; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 471; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1001. Fourth, intact D&E takes less operating time than D&E by dismemberment, and thus may reduce bleeding, the risk of infection, and complications relating to anesthesia. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 923–928, 1026; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 472; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1001. See also Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 928–929, 932; Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae 2, 11–13.

Based on thoroughgoing review of the trial evidence and the congressional record, each of the District Courts to consider the issue rejected Congress' findings as unreasonable and not supported by the evidence. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 1008–1027; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 482, 488–491; Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1032. The trial courts concluded, in contrast to Congress' findings, that "significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D&E] is the safest procedure." Id., at 1033 (quoting Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 932); accord Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 1008–1009, 1017–1018; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 480–482; cf. Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 932 ("[T]he record shows that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D&E] would be the safest procedure.").

The District Courts' findings merit this Court's respect. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991). Today's opinion supplies no reason to reject those findings. Nevertheless, despite the District Courts' appraisal of the weight of the evidence, and in undisguised conflict with Stenberg, the Court asserts that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act can survive "when...medical uncertainty persists." Ante, at 163. This assertion is bewildering. Not only does it defy the Court’s longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no carve-out for circumstances of medical uncertainty, see supra, at 172–173; it gives short shrift to the records before us, carefully canvassed by the District Courts. Those records indicate that "the majority of highly-qualified experts on the subject believe intact D&E to be the safest, most appropriate procedure under certain circumstances." Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 1034. See supra, at 177.

The Court acknowledges some of this evidence, ante, at 161, but insists that, because some witnesses disagreed with ACOG and other experts' assessment of risk, the Act can stand. Ante, at 162, 166–167. In this insistence, the Court brushes under the rug the District Courts' well-supported findings that the physicians who testified that intact D&E is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman had slim authority for their opinions. They had no training for, or personal experience with, the intact D&E procedure, and many performed abortions only on rare occasions. See Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 980; Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d, at 1025; cf. National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 462–464. Even indulging the assumption that the Government witnesses were equally qualified to evaluate the relative risks of abortion procedures, their testimony could not erase the "significant medical authority support[ing] the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D&E] would be the safest procedure." Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 932.

A
The Court offers flimsy and transparent justifications for upholding a nationwide ban on intact D&E sans any exception to safeguard a woman's health. Today's ruling, the Court declares, advances "a premise central to [Casey 's] conclusion"--i. e., the Government's "legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Ante, at 145. See also ante, at 146 ("[W]e must determine whether the Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child."). But the Act scarcely furthers that interest: The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion. See Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 930. And surely the statute was not designed to protect the lives or health of pregnant women. Id., at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); cf. Casey, 505 U.S., at 846 (recognizing along with the State's legitimate interest in the life of the fetus, its "legitimate interes[t]...in protecting the health of the woman" (emphasis added)). In short, the Court upholds a law that, while doing nothing to "preserv[e]...fetal life," ante, at 145, bars a woman from choosing intact D&E although her doctor "reasonably believes [that procedure] will best protect [her]," Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).

As another reason for upholding the ban, the Court emphasizes that the Act does not proscribe the nonintact D&E procedure. See ante, at 164. But why not, one might ask. Nonintact D&E could equally be characterized as "brutal," ante, at 157, involving as it does "tear[ing] [a fetus] apart" and "ripp[ing] off" its limbs, ante, at 135. "[T]he notion that either of these two equally gruesome procedures...is more akin to infanticide than the other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one but not the other, is simply irrational." Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 946–947 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Delivery of an intact, albeit nonviable, fetus warrants special condemnation, the Court maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant. Ante, at 158. But so, too, does a fetus delivered intact after it is terminated by injection a day or two before the surgical evacuation, ante, at 136, 164, or a fetus delivered through medical induction or cesarean, ante, at 140. Yet, the availability of those procedures--along with D&E by dismemberment--the Court says, saves the ban on intact D&E from a declaration of unconstitutionality. Ante, at 164–165. Never mind that the procedures deemed acceptable might put a woman's health at greater risk. See supra, at 180, and n. 6; cf. ante, at 136, 161–162.

Ultimately, the Court admits that "moral concerns" are at work, concerns that could yield prohibitions on any abortion. See ante, at 158 ("Congress could...conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition."). Notably, the concerns expressed are untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government's interest in preserving life. By allowing such concerns to carry the day and case, overriding fundamental rights, the Court dishonors our precedent. See, e. g., Casey, 505 U.S., at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (Though "[f]or many persons [objections to homosexual conduct] are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles," the power of the State may not be used "to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law." (citing Casey, 505 U.S., at 850)).

Revealing in this regard, the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem." Ante, at 159. Because of women's fragile emotional state and because of the "bond of love the mother has for her child," the Court worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature of the intact D&E procedure. Ante, at 159. The solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S., at 873 (plurality opinion) ("States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning."). Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.

This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the Constitution--ideas that have long since been discredited. Compare, e. g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–423 (1908) ("protective" legislation imposing hours-of-work limitations on women only held permissible in view of women's "physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functio[n]"); Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n. 12 (1996) (State may not rely on "overbroad generalizations" about the "talents, capacities, or preferences" of women; "[s]uch judgments have...impeded...women's progress toward full citizenship stature throughout our Nation’s history"); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (gender-based Social Security classification rejected because it rested on "archaic and overbroad generalizations" "such as assumptions as to [women's] dependency" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Though today's majority may regard women's feelings on the matter as "self-evident," ante, at 159, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that "[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped...on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society," Casey, 505 U.S., at 852. See also id., at 877 (plurality opinion) ("[M]eans chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."); supra, at 171–172.

B
In cases on a "woman's liberty to determine whether to [continue] her pregnancy," this Court has identified viability as a critical consideration. See Casey, 505 U.S., at 869–870 (plurality opinion). "[T]here is no line [more workable] than viability," the Court explained in Casey, for viability is "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.... In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child." Id., at 870.

Today, the Court blurs that line, maintaining that "[t]he Act [legitimately] appl[ies] both previability and postviability because...a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb." Ante, at 147. Instead of drawing the line at viability, the Court refers to Congress' purpose to differentiate "abortion and infanticide" based not on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is anatomically located when a particular medical procedure is performed. See ante, at 158 (quoting Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(G)).

One wonders how long a line that saves no fetus from destruction will hold in face of the Court's "moral concerns." See supra, at 182; cf. ante, at 147 (noting that "[i]n this litigation" the Attorney General "does not dispute that the Act would impose an undue burden if it covered standard D&E"). The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed. Throughout, the opinion refers to obstetrician-gynecologists and surgeons who perform abortions not by the titles of their medical specialties, but by the pejorative label "abortion doctor." Ante, at 144, 154, 155, 161, 163. A fetus is described as an "unborn child," and as a "baby," ante, at 134, 138; second-trimester, previability abortions are referred to as "late-term," ante, at 156; and the reasoned medical judgments of highly trained doctors are dismissed as "preferences" motivated by "mere convenience," ante, at 134, 166. Instead of the heightened scrutiny we have previously applied, the Court determines that a "rational" ground is enough to uphold the Act, ante, at 158, 166. And, most troubling, Casey 's principles, confirming the continuing vitality of "the essential holding of Roe, are merely "assume[d]" for the moment, ante, at 146, 161, rather than "retained" or "reaffirmed," Casey, 505 U.S., at 846.

A
The Court further confuses our jurisprudence when it declares that "facial attacks" are not permissible in "these circumstances," i. e., where medical uncertainty exists. Ante, at 167; see ibid. ("In an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack."). This holding is perplexing given that, in materially identical circumstances we held that a statute lacking a health exception was unconstitutional on its face. Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 930; see id., at 937 (in facial challenge, law held unconstitutional because "significant body of medical opinion believes [the] procedure may bring with it greater safety for some patients" (emphasis added)). See also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–610 (2004) (identifying abortion as one setting in which we have recognized the validity of facial challenges); Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L. J. 853, 859, n. 29 (1991) ("[V]irtually all of the abortion cases reaching the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), have involved facial attacks on state statutes, and the Court, whether accepting or rejecting the challenges on the merits, has typically accepted this framing of the question presented."). Accord Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1356 (2000); Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 271–276 (1994).

Without attempting to distinguish Stenberg and earlier decisions, the majority asserts that the Act survives review because respondents have not shown that the ban on intact D&E would be unconstitutional "in a large fraction of [relevant] cases." Ante, at 167 (citing Casey, 505 U.S., at 895). But Casey makes clear that, in determining whether any restriction poses an undue burden on a "large fraction" of women, the relevant class is not "all women," nor "all pregnant women," nor even all women "seeking abortions." Ibid. Rather, a provision restricting access to abortion "must be judged by reference to those [women] for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction." Ibid. Thus the absence of a health exception burdens all women for whom it is relevant--women who, in the judgment of their doctors, require an intact D&E because other procedures would place their health at risk. Cf. Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 934 (accepting the "relative rarity" of medically indicated intact D&Es as true but not "highly relevant"— for "the health exception question is whether protecting women's health requires an exception for those infrequent occasions"); Ayotte, 546 U.S., at 328 (facial challenge entertained where "[i]n some very small percentage of cases...women...need immediate abortions to avert serious and often irreversible damage to their health"). It makes no sense to conclude that this facial challenge fails because respondents have not shown that a health exception is necessary for a large fraction of second-trimester abortions, including those for which a health exception is unnecessary: The very purpose of a health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.

B
If there is anything at all redemptive to be said of today's opinion, it is that the Court is not willing to foreclose entirely a constitutional challenge to the Act. "The Act is open," the Court states, "to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete case." Ante, at 168; see ante, at 167 ("The Government has acknowledged that preenforcement, as-applied challenges to the Act can be maintained."). But the Court offers no clue on what a "proper" lawsuit might look like. See ante, at 167–168. Nor does the Court explain why the injunctions ordered by the District Courts should not remain in place, trimmed only to exclude instances in which another procedure would safeguard a woman's health at least equally well. Surely the Court cannot mean that no suit may be brought until a woman's health is immediately jeopardized by the ban on intact D&E. A woman "suffer[ing] from medical complications," ante, at 168, needs access to the medical procedure at once and cannot wait for the judicial process to unfold. See Ayotte, 546 U.S., at 328.

The Court appears, then, to contemplate another lawsuit by the initiators of the instant actions. In such a second round, the Court suggests, the challengers could succeed upon demonstrating that "in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used." Ante, at 167. One may anticipate that such a preenforcement challenge will be mounted swiftly, to ward off serious, sometimes irremediable harm, to women whose health would be endangered by the intact D&E prohibition.

The Court envisions that in an as-applied challenge, "the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced." Ibid. But it should not escape notice that the record already includes hundreds and hundreds of pages of testimony identifying "discrete and well-defined instances" in which recourse to an intact D&E would better protect the health of women with particular conditions. See supra, at 177–179. Record evidence also documents that medical exigencies, unpredictable in advance, may indicate to a welltrained doctor that intact D&E is the safest procedure. See ibid. In light of this evidence, our unanimous decision just one year ago in Ayotte counsels against reversal. See 546 U.S., at 331 (remanding for reconsideration of the remedy for the absence of a health exception, suggesting that an injunction prohibiting unconstitutional applications might suffice).

The Court's allowance only of an "as-applied challenge in a discrete case," ante, at 168--jeopardizes women's health and places doctors in an untenable position. Even if courts were able to carve out exceptions through piecemeal litigation for "discrete and well-defined instances," ante, at 167, women whose circumstances have not been anticipated by prior litigation could well be left unprotected. In treating those women, physicians would risk criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment if they exercise their best judgment as to the safest medical procedure for their patients. The Court is thus gravely mistaken to conclude that narrow as-applied challenges are "the proper manner to protect the health of the woman." Cf. ibid.

IV
As the Court wrote in Casey, "overruling Roe 's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law." 505 U.S., at 865. "[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." Id., at 854. See also id., at 867 ("[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.").

Though today's opinion does not go so far as to discard Roe or Casey, the Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations of "the rule of law" and the "principles of stare decisis." Congress imposed a ban despite our clear prior holdings that the State cannot proscribe an abortion procedure when its use is necessary to protect a woman's health. See supra, at 174–175, n. 4. Although Congress' findings could not withstand the crucible of trial, the Court defers to the legislative override of our Constitution-based rulings. See supra, at 174–176. A decision so at odds with our jurisprudence should not have staying power.

In sum, the notion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act furthers any legitimate governmental interest is, quite simply, irrational. The Court's defense of the statute provides no saving explanation. In candor, the Act, and the Court's defense of it, cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court--and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women's lives. See supra, at 171, n. 2; supra, at 174–175, n. 4. When "a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue." Stenberg, 530 U.S., at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (CA7 1999) (Posner, C. J., dissenting)).

For the reasons stated, I dissent from the Court's disposition and would affirm the judgments before us for review.

title: Gonzales v. Carhart/Dissent Ginsburg


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Marshall, Alfred

MARSHALL, mär'shạl, Alfred, English economist: b. London, 26 July 1842. He was educated at Saint John's College, Cambridge, and in 1877 was principal of University College, Bristol. In 1883-84 he was lecturer at Balliol College, Oxford, from 1885-1908 he was professor of political economy at Cambridge University, and a member of the Royal Commission on Labor in 1891. He has published ‘Economics of Industry’ (1879); ‘Principles of Economics’

(1890); ‘Elements of Economics’ (1891); ‘Fiscal Policy of International Trade’ (1903), etc.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 {|
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" width="40px" | 264. || align="right" width="40px" | 1883. || The Estuaries of the Severn and its Tributaries; an Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of their Tidal Sediment and Alluvial Flats. Q. J. G. S., Vol. XXXIX, pp. 611–626.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 265. || align="right" | 1856. || On the Physical Geography of the Old Red Sandstone Sea of the Central District of Scotland. Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal, n. s., 13 pp.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 266. || align="right" | 1907. || Einführung in die Palæontologie.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 267. || align="right" | 1912. || Pawpaw-Hancock Folio, Maryland-West Virginia-Pennsylvania. United States Geological Survey, Folio No. 179, p. 5.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 268. || align="right" | 1852. || On a Protruded Mass of Upper Ludlow Rock at Hagley Park in Herefordshire. Q. J. G. S., Vol. VIII, pp. 381–5.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 269. || align="right" | 1909. || Lehrbuch der Palaeozoologie. I Teile; Wirbelose Tiere.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 270. || align="right" | 1913. || A Biological Survey of the Waters of Woods Hole and Vicinity. Bull. of the Bureau of Fisheries, Vol. XXXI, 1911, two parts.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 271. || align="right" | 1886. || On Proscorpius osbornei Whitfield. Am. Nat. Vol. XX, pp. 269–274.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 272. || align="right" | 1898. || New forms of Fossil Fishes in the Silurian and Old Red Sandstone. Summary of Progress of the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom for 1897, pp. 72–74, 82–83.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 273. || align="right" | 1900. || On a New Species of Cephalaspis, discovered by the Geological Survey of Scotland, in the Old Red Sandstone of Oban. Trans. Roy. Soc. Edin., Vol. XXXIX, part III, No. XX, pp. 591–593, one plate.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 274. || align="right" | 1900. || On Thelodus Pagei, Powrie, sp. from the Old Red Sandstone of Forfarshire. Ibid., No. XXI, pp. 595–602, one plate.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 275. || align="right" | 1900. || Report on Fossil Fishes collected by the Geological survey of Scotland in the Silurian Rocks of the South of Scotland. Ibid., No. XXXII, pp. 827–864, 4 pls.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 276. || align="right" | 1885. || On a Silurian Scorpion from Gotland. Kongliga Svenska Vetenskap-Akademiens Handlingar. Bandet XXX, Häftet II, No. 9, pp. 1–33, 1 pl.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 277. || align="right" | 1909. || The Silurian Section at Arisaig, Nova Scotia. A. J. S. Vol. XXVIII, p. 151.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 278. || align="right" | 1911. || Revision of the Paleozoic System. Bull. G. S. A., Vol. XXII, No. 3 pp. 281–680, pls. 25–29.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 279. || align="right" | 1843. || Geological Report of the Third District of New York.
 * }


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 {|
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" width="40px" | 280. || align="right" width="40px" | 1874. || Report upon the Invertebrate Animals of Vineyard Sound and Adjacent Waters.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 281. || align="right" | 1882. || Notice of the Discovery of a Poecilopod in the Utica Slate Formation. Am. Jour. Sci., Vol. XXIII, pp. 151, 152.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 282. || align="right" | 1882. || Description of a New Genus of the Order Eurypterida from the Utica Slate Formation. Am. Jour. Sci., Vol. XXIII, pp. 213–226.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 283. || align="right" | 1899. || Pre-Cambrian Fossiliferous Formations. Bull. G. S. A., Vol. X, pp. 199–244, pls. XXII, XXIII.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 284. || align="right" | 1906. || Algonkian Formations of Northwestern Montana. Bull. G. S. A., Vol. XVII, pp. 1–28, pls. I–II.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 285. || align="right" | 1906. || Algonkian Formations of Northwestern Montana. Ibid., Vol. XVII, pp. 1–28, pls. I, II.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 286. || align="right" | 1910. || Evolution of Early Paleozoic Faunas in Relation to their Environment. Outlines of Geological History with Especial reference to North America. Chapter III. (Edited by Willis and Salisbury).
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 287. || align="right" | 1910. || Abrupt appearance of the Cambrian Fauna on the North American Continent. Cambrian Geology and Palæontology, Vol. II, Smiths. Misc. Coll., Vol. LVII, No. 1, pp. 1–16.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 288. || align="right" | 1911. || Middle Cambrian Merostomata. Cambrian Geology and Palæontology, Vol. II, No. 2, Smiths. Misc. Coll., Vol. LVII, No. 2, pp. 17–40, 6 plates.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 289. || align="right" | 1912. || Middle Cambrian Branchiopoda, Malacostraca, Trilobita, and Merostomata. Ibid. No. VI, pls. 24–34.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 290. || align="right" | 1914. || Pre-Cambrian Algonkian Algal Flora. Smiths. Misc. Coll., Vol. LXIV, No. 2, pp. 77–156, pls. 4–23.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 291. || align="right" | 1893. || Einleitung in die Geologie als historische Wissenschaft. I Teil, Bionomie des Meeres.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 292. || align="right" | 1900. || Das Gesetz der Wüstenbildung.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 293. || align="right" | 1904. || Die Fauna der Solnhofener Plattenkalke. Abdruck aus der Festschrift zum siebziegsten Geburtstag von Ernst Haeckel, pp. 135–214.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 294. || align="right" | 1908. || Geschichte der Erde und des Lebens.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 295. || align="right" | 1910. || Die Sedimente des Taubenbank im Golfe von Neapel, 49 pp.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 296. || align="right" | 1911. || Are the Fossils of the Dolomites Indicative of Shallow Highly Saline and Warm Water Seas? Bull. G. S. A., Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 227–231.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 297. || align="right" | 1908. || Commissao de Estudos das Minas de Carvao de Pedra do Brazil. Final Report by I. C. White, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 589–605, pl. X, figs. 1–4, pl. XI, figs. 1–10.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 298. || align="right" | 1884. || Palæozoic Fossils. Geological Survey Canada, Vol. III, pt. I, p. 42, pl. VII, fig. 3.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 299. || align="right" | 1885. || An American Silurian Scorpion. Science, Vol. VI, p. 87.
 * }


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Marshall, John

MARSHALL, John, chief justice of the United States: b. Germantown (now Midland), Fauquier County, Va.. 24 Sept. 1755; d. Philadelphia, 6 July 1835. He was the eldest son of Col. Thomas Marshall of Westmoreland County, Va., a distinguished officer in the French War and in the War of Independence, and of Mary Keith, a member of the well-known Randolph family. Thomas Marshall removed from Westmoreland County to Fauquier soon after his marriage; this community was sparsely settled and the educational advantages which he could give his children were meagre, consequently he became their earhest teacher and succeeded in imbuing them with his own love of literature and of history. For two years John Marshall had, as tutor, James Thompson of Scotland and he was sent for one year to the academy of the Messrs. Campbell of Westmoreland County, where James Monroe was also a pupil. He had no college training except a few lectures on law and natural philosophy at William and Mary in 1779. He was always fond of field sports and excelling in running, leaping and quoit throwing. He loved the free natural life of the country, and his long tramps through the woods around his fathers home, Oak Hill, together with his athletic exercises gave him great strength and agility. At 18 he began the study of law, but soon left his studies to enter the Revolutionary army. He was active in endeavoring to enlist men for the service and helped to form and drill a company of volunteers. As a member of his father's regiment he took part in the battle of Great Bridge where he displayed signal valor. In 1776 he became a lieutenant in the 11th Virginia, and the next year was made captain. He served in Virginia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York, always displaying great courage and valor and a cheerful acceptance of hardships and privations. This experience was of untold value to Marshall, it broadened his views and quickened his insight in governmental questions. As he says, he entered the army a Virginian and left it an American. In 1780 during a period of military inactivity he attended a course of law lectures at William and Mary and in 1781, after leaving the army, was granted a license and began the practice of law in Fauquier County. The next year he was elected to the Virginia assembly, and shortly afterward wss made a member of the executive council. He served his State as legislator during eight sessions. In 1784, although he had then removed his residence to Richmond, he was again elected delegate from Fauquier County, and in 1787 served as member from the county of Henrico. When the city of Richmond was granted a representative in the legislature Marshall had the honor of this office which he held from 1788 to 1791. He was also a member of the Federal Convention which met in 1788 to discuss the ratification of the Constitution of the United States,

and it was largely due to his convincing arguments that ratification was carried, as the question was hotly debated and the anti-Constitution party had able and detemined representatives. For several years he held no public office and devoted himself entirely to his extensive law practice, but in 1795 was again elected to the legislature. During this session he defended the unpopular “Jay Treaty” with England, and by his overwhelming arguments completely refuted the theory of his opponents that the executive has no power to negotiate a commercial treaty. Marshall's attitude during his service as legislator toward all questions concerning Federal power demonstrated his increasing belief that a strong central government is necessary to real efficiency. In 1783 he had married Mary Ambler, daughter of Jacqueline Ambler, treasurer of the State, and soon after his marriage made his permanent home in Richmond. The honors bestowed on him testify to the esteem in which he was held by the State and by the nation. He refused the Attorney-Generalship and the Ministry to France, but in 1789 accepted the office of Special Envoy to France with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry. This mission related to the indignities which the French had offered the American navy and attempted to adjust the commercial relations between the two countries. It failed on account of the arrogant attitude of France, but “Marshall's dignified correspondence added greatly to the prestige of America,” and on his return he was welcomed with many evidences of approbation from his grateful countrymen. Yielding to the earnest solicitation of Washington he became a candidate for Congress and was elected a member of that body in 1798. In Congress he was the leader of the Administration party and the greatest debater in the House on all constitutional matters. In one of his most noted speeches he defended the action of President Adams in the case of Jonathan Robbins and proved conclusively that this case was a question of executive and not of judicial cognizance. In 1800 he was made Secretary of State, and in 1801 appointed chief justice of the United States, which office he held until his death in 1835. In 1829 he, like ex-Presidents Madison and James Monroe, was a member of the Virginia convention which met to alter the State constitution, and by his wisdom and moderation did much to prevent radical changes and to thwart the attempts of politicians against the independence of the judiciary. In 1831 his health, hitherto unusually vigorous, began to fail; he underwent a severe surgical operation in Philadelphia and was seemingly restored, but the death of his wife was a great shock and a return of the disease in 1835 proved fatal. He died in Philadelphia, whither he had gone for medical relief, and was buried by the side of his wife in the New-Burying-Ground, now Shockhoe Hill Cemetery, Richmond. The sorrow over the country was deep and widespread; even his bitterest enemies mourned for the kindly, upright man.

Though somewhat ungainly, Marshall was always dignified in appearance; his tall, loosely-jointed figure gave an impression of freedom, while his finely shaped head and strong, penetrating eyes bespoke intelligence and power. Directness and simplicity were his dominant characteristics. He was free from any display

of pomp, air of office or studied effect. His unfailing good humor, his benignity, his respect for women, his devotion to wife and family and his well-known reverence for religion made him loved and admired even by those who heartily disliked his political opinions. As chief justice for more than 30 years be rendered numerous decisions which were of prime importance to a nation in process of formation. The faculty which made Marshall invaluable as a jurist was his power of going directly to the core of any matter. No subtleties, no outside issue confused him, his analysis was unerring, his logic incontrovertible; he cared nothing for the graces of rhetoric and made no appeal to the emotions; his power lay in his deep conviction and in his illuminating and progressive argument. At a period when the powers of the Constitution were ill-defined, when our government was experimental, Marshall's decisions in constitutional and international cases were invaluable factors in forming a well-organized Federal government. “He made the Constitution live, he imparted to it the breath of immortality, and its vigorous life at the present hour is due mainly to the wise interpretation he gave to its provisions during his long term of office.” Marshall was the author of numerous reports and papers, of a history of the colonies and of a ‘Life of Washington,’ a book of small literary merit, but containing a mass of valuable authentic information. Consult Cooley, ‘Constitutional History of the United States’ (1889); Margruder, ‘John Marshall’ (1885); Thayer, ‘John Marshall’ (in ‘Beacon Biographies’ series, 1901); Beveridge, A. J., ‘Life of John Marshall’ (1916).

JOHN MARSHALL

Chief Justice United States Supreme Court


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Page:The Habitat of the Eurypterida.djvu/284

 {|
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" width="40px" | 300. || align="right" width="40px" | 1885. || On a Fossil Scorpion from the Silurian Rocks of America. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist. Bull., Vol. I, art 9, pp. 181–190.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 301. || align="right" | 1893. || Report of the Geological Survey of Ohio, Vol. VII.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 302. || align="right" | 1899. || Die Fauna der silurischen Ablagerungen des Gouvernements Podolien. Materialen zur Geologie Russlands. Kaiserlichen Mineralogiechen Gesellschaft. Band XIX, pp. 1–256 in Russian; German summary, pp. 257–266, pl. IX, fig. 9.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 303. || align="right" | 1915. || An Eurypterid Horizon in the Niagara Formation of Ontario. Canada Department of Mines. Mus. Bull. No. 20, Geol. Series No. 29, pp. 21, pls. 5.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 304. || align="right" | 1902. || Stratigraphy and Structure, Lewis and Livingston Ranges, Montana. Bull. G. S. A., Vol. XIII, 305–352.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 305. || align="right" | 1909. || Eurypterida. In the Cambridge Natural History. Vol. IV, Ch. XI, pp. 283–294.
 * - valign="top"
 * colspan="3" |
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 306. || align="right" | 1863. || On the "Seraphim" and its Allies. The Intellectual Observer, Vol. IV, pp. 229–237, one plate.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 307. || align="right" | 1864. || On a Nearly Perfect Specimen of Eurypterus lanceolatus (Salter) from the Upper Ludlow Rock at Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire, Geol. Mag., Vol. I, pp. 107–111, pl. V, figs. 7–9.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 308. || align="right" | 1864. || Descriptions of some New Palæozoic Crustacea. Ibid, pp. 196–200, pl. X.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 309. || align="right" | 1864. || On the Eurypteridæ, with descriptions of some new Genera and Species. Ibid., pp. 239–240.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 310. || align="right" | 1865. || On the Family of the Eurypteridæ, with Descriptions of Some New Genera and Species. Reports Brit. Ass. Adv. Sci. for 1864. Transactions of Sections, p. 73.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 311. || align="right" | 1865. || On Some New Species of Crustacea Belonging to the Order Eurypterida. Q. J. G. S., Vol. XXI, pp. 482–489, pls. XIII, XIV.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 312. || colspan="2" style="padding-left:48px; text-indent:-39px" | 1866–1878. Monograph of the British Fossil Crustacea Belonging to the Order Merostomata. Palæontographical Society.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 313. || align="right" | 1867. || On some Points in the Structure of the Xiphosura, having Reference to their Relationship with the Eurypteridæ. Q. J. G. S., Vol. XXIII, pp. 28–37, pls. I, II.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 314. || align="right" | 1868. || On Some New Species of Crustacea from the Upper Silurian rocks of Lanarkshire, etc. Q. J. G. S., Vol. XXIV, pp. 289–296, pls. IX, X.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 315. || align="right" | 1871. || Extract from the American Naturalist. December, p. 14.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 316. || align="right" | 1871. || On Euphoberia Brownii, H. Woodw. a new species of Myriopod from the Coal Measures of the West of Scotland. Geol. Mag., Vol. VIII, pp. 102–104, pl. III, figs. 6a, b, c.
 * - valign="top"
 * align="right" | 317. || align="right" | 1871. || On some New Phyllopodous Crustaceans from the Palæozoic Rocks. Ibid., pp. 104–107, pl. III, fig. 3.
 * }


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lived in a small ground-floor room that was only lighted from the staircase. The furniture could not have been simpler,—a bad chair, a poor bed, and a broken-down table. At the end of the room there was a fireplace with a lighted fire; but the fire was painted, and by the fire was a painted saucepan that was boiling cheerfully, and sending out a cloud of smoke that looked exactly like real smoke.

As soon as he reached home Geppetto took his tools and set to work to cut out and model his puppet.

'What name shall I give him?' he said to himself; 'I think I will call him Pinocchio. It is a name that will bring him luck. I once knew a whole family so called. There was Pinocchio the father, Pinocchia the mother,


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 and Pinocchi the children, and all of them did well. The richest of them was a beggar.'

Having found a name for his puppet he began to work in good earnest, and he first made his hair, then his forehead, and then his eyes.

The eyes being finished, imagine his astonishment when he perceived that they moved and looked fixedly at him.

Geppetto seeing himself stared at by those two wooden eyes took it almost in bad part, and said in an angry voice:

'Wicked wooden eyes, why do you look at me?'

No one answered.

He then proceeded to carve the nose; but no sooner had he made it than it began to grow. And it grew, and grew, and grew, until in a few minutes it had become an immense nose that seemed as if it would never end.

Poor Geppetto tired himself out with cutting it off; but the more he cut and shortened it, the longer did that impertinent nose become!

The mouth was not even completed when it began to laugh and deride him.

'Stop laughing!' said Geppetto, provoked; but he might as well have spoken to the wall.

'Stop laughing, I say!' he roared in a threatening tone.


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 The mouth then ceased laughing, but put out its tongue as far as it would go.

Geppetto, not to spoil his handiwork, pretended not to see, and continued his labours. After the mouth he fashioned the chin, then the throat, then the shoulders, the stomach, the arms and the hands.

The hands were scarcely finished when Geppetto felt his wig snatched from his head. He turned round, and what did he see? He saw his yellow wig in the puppet's hand.

'Pinocchio! . . . Give me back my wig instantly!'

But Pinocchio, instead of returning it, put it on his own head, and was in consequence nearly smothered.

Geppetto at this insolent and derisive behaviour felt sadder and more melancholy than he had ever been in his life before; and turning to Pinocchio he said to him:

'You young rascal! You are not yet completed, and you are already beginning to show want of respect to your father! That is bad, my boy, very bad!'

And he dried a tear.

The legs and the feet remained to be done.

When Geppetto had finished the feet he received a kick on the point of his nose.

'I deserve it!' he said to himself; 'I should have thought of it sooner! Now it is too late!'


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 He then took the puppet under the arms and placed him on the floor to teach him to walk.

Pinocchio's legs were stiff and he could not move, but Geppetto led him by the hand and showed him how to put one foot before the other.

When his legs became flexible Pinocchio began to walk by himself and to run about the room; until, having gone out of the house door, he jumped into the street and escaped.

Poor Geppetto rushed after him but was not able to overtake him, for that rascal Pinocchio leapt in front of him like a hare, and knocking his wooden feet together against the pavement made as much clatter as twenty pairs of peasants' clogs.

'Stop him! stop him!' shouted Geppetto; but the people in the street, seeing a wooden puppet running like a racehorse, stood still in astonishment to look at it, and laughed, and laughed, and laughed, until it beats description.

At last, as good luck would have it, a carabineer arrived who, hearing the uproar, imagined that a colt had escaped from his master. Planting himself courageously with his legs apart in the middle of the road, he waited with the determined purpose of stopping him, and thus preventing the chance of worse disasters.

When Pinocchio, still at some distance,


text: Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography/Reichel, Charles Gotthold


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Page:Collodi - The Story of a Puppet, translation Murray, 1892.djvu/26

 saw the carabineer barricading the whole street, he endeavoured to take him by surprise and to pass between his legs. But he failed signally.

The carabineer without disturbing himself in the least caught him cleverly by the nose—it was an immense nose of ridiculous proportions that seemed made on purpose to be laid hold of by carabineers—and consigned him to Geppetto. Wishing to punish him, Geppetto intended to pull his ears at once. But imagine his feelings when he could not succeed in finding them. And do you know the reason? It was that, in his hurry to model him, he had forgotten to make them.

He then took him by the collar, and as he was leading him away he said to him, shaking his head threateningly:

'We will go home at once, and as soon as we arrive we will regulate our accounts, never doubt it.'

At this announcement Pinocchio threw himself on the ground and would not take another step. In the meanwhile a crowd of idlers and inquisitive people began to assemble and to make a ring round them.

Some of them said one thing, some another.

'Poor puppet!' said several, 'he is right not to wish to return home! Who knows how Geppetto, that bad old man, will beat him! . . .'


text: Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography/Rehn, Frank Knox Morton


text:
User talk:Grigorievitch

CYGNIS INSIGNIS 23:47, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

title: User talk:Grigorievitch


text:
Author:John Percival

Works

 * (with section Soil and Disease by James Lane-Notter)

title: Author:John Percival


text:
User talk:JMRsAuthorOfConfusion

Adding those titles to the author pages is a good thing, and made even better if you note the source of the info in the edit summary. CYGNIS INSIGNIS 00:22, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

By "the info" you mean where I found the titles? Usually just googling their names...

title: User talk:JMRsAuthorOfConfusion


text:
Has the General Government the Right to Coerce a State?

To consider this question, a distinction must first be drawn between the right of war and the exercise of a constitutional function of the government on itself, in a constitutional way. The right of war exists only against other governments — and by the law of nations, it is immaterial whether these are usurping or legitimate governments. It suffices that each party has an actual possession or government, a control de facto over some territory or people which it enjoys, disconnected with, or by dispossessing the other's government. The writers on public law agree that a declaration of war necessarily admits that the parly declared against is an actual government — even though its legitimacy as a government may be the very point in dispute; and because it is in fact, a government, other nations who have treaties of amity and peace with the one may enter into like treaties with the other, and recognize the government de facto without impairing their neutrality or violating their obligations of amity and peace to those who claim legitimate authority over the government de facto.

It is not from the length of time that the government de facto has existed, but from the fact that the opposing government claiming to be legitimate, cannot control the other by civil means, and has not an actual military possession and control over it — that other nations are justified in treating it as a government and entering into alliances with it. Thus, in our own War of Independence, after the declaration, Spain, Holland, and France, acknowledged the independence of the Colonies, and formed treaties, without those acts violating their existing treaties with England.

If, then, the secession of a State from this Union were followed by a declaration of war against her by the United States, such declaration would open to foreign nations the right to make alliances and treaties with her, commercial and otherwise, without thereby violating their treaties with the United States; and all Europe, if their interests or sympathies led them in that direction, would be morally free to aid and help her in sustaining her act of secession.

Attempts to coerce by war, then, would tend, by relieving foreign nations from the obligation of non-interference in domestic questions, to confirm secession, and to expose what ought to be a purely domestic question of constitutional constriction to the complications and embarrassments which rival powers could easily create, without endangering existing treaties. It would be the most effectual means of removing all the obligations of a State, and enabling her to resist any return to them. No one could be so foolish as to desire to submit the construction of the Constitution of this Union to the interference of foreign and hostile nations. It would surely bring down on this Union the calamity of disunion, and in itself be unconstitutional. The construction of the Constitution is domestic to the States of the Union, and should be adjusted through their domestic machinery, without exposing these States, by the imprudence of hostilities, to that foreign interference which the Union was created to avoid.

Half the strength of these Colonies in the Revolution was derived from foreign interference, and had England, by avoiding force, kept the question of taxation purely domestic, she might have preserved, instead of losing, her connexion with her Colonies, and been spared the hatred that has survived the hostilities that gave it birth by more than eiiility years. It was madness in lier so to act as to let Ln the rival and jealous powers of Europe to give aid and comfort to the weaker side. Let such madness be avoided by us.

The free people of the thirty-three States of this Union boast that their obedience is paid to the power of the laws they make, and not to the persons who are enlrnsied with the duty of executing them; that resistance to tyrants is obedience to God.

We may as well commence this examination by the proposition — That if a secedui! late cannot he coerced hji the crenercil government i"iti'iuiil viuhilnig the Constitution and the laws, then she cannot be coerced at all. This remits us to two enquiries: What is the offence against the Constitution by a State when she secedes? and, What Constitutional mode and means of punishment or prevention by the general government exist? It is not our purpose to draw the line between secession and revolution, as abstract ideas; we are content to examine a single case, which is stated thus: The people of a sovereign State in Conveiilion secede from the Union by repealing the ratification she gave to the Constitution of that Union of 1785, What is the offence? and what the means of prevention or punishment?

We admit that while she remains in the Union there are many means pointed Gilt by the Consiiiiftion to compel her citizens to obedience to the law. The Constitution was binding upon her citizens, because the Statle in her sovereignty silting in Convention adopted it. or to use the better expression, ratiiied it. The Constitution was a mere project or speculation of a Convention of philosophers when it came lothe State Convention — it depended on the jieople of each State in its State Convention for the power to become ii law; and because States were soveieign and did ratify it, then-fore it became part and parcel of the State Constitutions, of equal force and obligation with the other orffanic acts of the people of the States in their sovereignty, providing for a government for The State. It hns the like force on the sovereign people of a State with their Constitntioii, and no more, no less, in this, that it purports to represent the will of the State, and is law so long as it has the solemn consent of the people of the State, acting in their sovereignty. By a Constitution, the people of a State delegate the power of representing their sovereijnty ; but thev do not renounce the sovereignty or iraiisl'cr it. A Constilulion makes agents to exercise powers of government, and limits and dehnes the spheres and powers of these agents, the servants ol the people. It does not transfer the sovereignly from the people to their agents, making the agent lo be sovereign, and the former sovereisrn lo be the subject. On the contrary, every constitutional government announces lliat all powers are derived from the will of the people, and all powers not granted by the people are reserved. The agent cannot have more powers than the principal. The creature cannot be greater than the creator. Let us look at the ratifying part of the Constitution of the United States. It was proposed that when nine States should agree thai this instrument should bo part of their constitution, or organic law; then this general agent should be organized and fo into force. The Congress of the old confederation, whom this new plan proposed to supplant, were friendly to the submission of the new plan; but mark the logic, — the plan provided for the extinction of the old confederation by secession. The Congress favored it. and the Conventions of the States were called lo consider the secession from the Confederation and the adoption of the new constitution. Nine States peacefully seceded in 1787 and 1788. Two States — Rhode Island and North Carolina — lingered a year and a half before they joined the new Confederation: North Carolina not joining until satisfactory amendments were made to the Constitution, and Rhode Island joining upon conditions.

Notwithstanding the 12th article of confederation says, the articles shall be inviolably preserved and the Union be perpetual, and no alteration shall be hereafter iiiiule unless it be continued by the Legislature ofevery State, yet there has never been a question that the States could not rightfully secede from the old Confederation, although its articles of constitution were entitled "articles of confederation and perpetual union," and in the new-Constitution as amended, the words, reserving to the States all powers not granted, are as clear as in the Articles of Confederation (see Art. 1(1): "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respt-clively, or to the people." It follows, then, that if secession was no offence in 1788 against the old Confederation, unless words granting away the right to secede are found in the new Constitution, or words prohibit inir secession to the States, then the ritfhl is reserved intact by the several States. We lind no such grant nor such prohibition. The rinlil of secession remains a purl of The sovereignty of the respective States, just as perfectly as when they last exercised it in 1788-9 in order to adopt this present Constitution. It is nowhere mnde an oH'ence iigiiinst the new goveriinient for the State lo resume its delcfriiled puwers. Whilst she is in tiie Union the delegation ot" powers is good against lier, because " the theory otllie Union is the delegatiiic the same power hy each Sialelo theone C, general agent. It is the equality of rights and equality of oiiligalions that makes the base and substance of the Union — and the Act of each State in her sovereighty makes the Supreme Court of the Uniled States the ludge of all questions arising under that grant of jiowers, but not on other subjects. Finding, then, neither grant by the States, nor prohibition lo them, of their sovereitin power to secede, and having shown that when t'alled on to ratify this Convention they were asked to do it by the act of secession from the existing one — it may well be deemed, this power reniains in the people of the State, unless we find some necessary implication of an inconsistent nature arising elsewhere in the Constitution: such as a grant of power to coerce a State when negligent of her oblii:alions under the Constitution. Is there any such grant? None appears — powers ovpr individinils appear. The judges of a State are commanded to obedience to the decisions of The Supreme Court, but there are no words commanding the legislatures of the several States. Those hoi. ling the executive power of the States in the Union may. |ierhaps, be reached directly through the juiliciary as individuals, (as Congress has attempted in the last Consular act on the subject ol' granting passports) but no implication as to the States in their sovereignly is lo be discovered. Congress, even, is only authorized to make laws for executins' the powers granted to itself and those vested in the Government by this Constitniion. or in any department or olllcer thereof This subject may be still more conclusively set at rest by referring to the joitrnals of the Convention that formed the Constitution.

We find there that Mr. Edmund Randolph's programme, included a power to coerce Stat-;s who were negligent of their duties or engagements, but that the Convention steadfastly resisteil and rejected the graiitintr of such a power lo the General Government. It was not incorporated in the Constitniion when submitted to the States for their approval. This is not all. So jealous were the several States, lest this power afterwards might be assumed by construction, that only six States ratified the Constitution unconditionally. Six other States attached conditions lo their raiilicatlon, either directly as conditions, or else by declaring the construction of the Constitniion on which they ratilied it, and insisting that this construction should be made more clear by amendmeni.s and ex[ilieii declarations. One State. North Carolina, refused to give even a conditional ratiticaiion, before the amendments were made. The leadinsr condition of consirnciion thus made imperative by the concordant action of the States forming the Union, was immediately afterwards substantially adopted as an amendment, being art;cle 10th: "that the powers not delegated lo the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." The States who insisted on thus "making assurance doubly sure,'" with regard to the limits of the delegation of powers, were South Carolina, New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, with whom North Carolina stood. (Vide Ellioll's Debates on the Federal Constitution. Vol. 4. Katiticalion of the States.) The power lo coerce cannot then be derived from any just implication, and was refused to be incorporated originally in the Constitution. The States who formed this Union stood after it was, both by their condilional raliiication and by the amendment article 10, adopted and put into existence as a general governmerl. exactly as they stood in relation to the old confederation, when they declared. July fiih, 17*8. that their style sluiuld be the United States of America, and that Eacii State retains its sovereignly, freedom, independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this conlederaiion expressly delegated lo the United States." so far as theii reserved rights were concerned. Coming, then, to a closer consideration of the objects of the'Union of these United States, and of the delegation ol powers lo eflect those objects, we find that the recitals of the objects of the "perpetual union" establislied in 1777, coincide i)erleclly with the objects of the "more perfect union" commenced in 177, so far as each jirovides for the miilual and general welfire, common defence and security of their liberties. In llie Constitniion, we find "lo establish justice and insure domestic tranquility," added to the prior objects. It does not appear from the avowed objects of The Union of the States, any more than from the grants of powers lo the General Government, or from the prohibition to the States to exercise certain acts of sovereign power whilst in the UnTon, that a prohibition of the authority to secede from the Union, or the power to coerce a State, were either of them included in the articles of the Conslitulion, or that any State has ever ratified to the United States these parts of her sovereign powers, or been even asiied to separate them from her sovereignty. And when we contemplate that the framers of the Constitution proposed the peaceful secession of nine States from the old Confederation to the new one, as the only means of starting or instituting this present general government, how can it be imagined that they looked with such horror on secession by act of the people, in State sovereignty, as to mark with eternal future reprobation, the act they were then inviting the States to take?

The people of one State surrendered no part of their sovereignty over their own State to other States. Whilst in the Union, the Constitution is their law, because it is their act. The general government has no sovereignly over any State of this Union. It is the agent of the States, having several powers from each; it can touch no subject not included in the powers granted to il by the States. We have seen that neither the pretence of coercion nor the pretence of secession being prohibited to a State is supported by the record. The general government has no power to act in a case of secession. It concerns the States, in their sovereignly, and is beyond the limited sphere of the general government. Whom, then, does secession concern? And is there any remedy or retribution? We answer that it concerns the oilier States, in that portion of their sovereignty not delegated to the general government, nor even to the State legislatures. It concerns the sovereign people of each State in this Union, and them only. Congress has no powers to represent them. The people of the sovereign States have delegated no powers to any agent, State or general, to represent them. In their conventions alone can They meet this issue, by either delegating powers to some agent or agencies equal to the. emergency ; or consider what other appropriate remedies, if any, are necessary. To the question, is there any retribution for secession? we say: not under the Constitution. But outside of the Constitution, is retribution to be sought? If the States feel justly offended because the seceding State has withdrawn from their alliance, they can treat her as a hostile neighbor, a nation with whom they have cause of war, and may follow her with all the means that the law of nations points out in cases of public war. lf they conquer her, they may make her a territory, or annex her as territory to some State of the Union. But from the moment of secession she has no rights in the sisterhood of States — no protection in the Constitution. She is alien p.-m1 stranger. Whether the States will resort to the harsh means of war, and rush into the discords of social evils sure to follow in the footsteps of such a war, or whether recognizing some justice in their grievances, peaceful means to mitigate by treaties the evils of disunion, or else by timely additional guarantees in the Constitution, to give full assurance of the equality and protection demanded in the Union, are questions of future policy for discussion in each State.


text:
Song of Songs (Bible)

 * "Songes of Songes" in the Wycliffe version of the Bible (1380s)
 * "Song of Songs" in the Bishops' version (1568)
 * "Canticle of Canticles" in the Douay-Rheims version (1610)
 * "Song of Solomon" in the Authorized Version (1611)
 * "Song of Solomon" in the King James version (1769)
 * "Song of Solomon" in the American Standard version (1901)
 * "Song of Songs" in the Jewish Publication Society version (1917)
 * "Song of Solomon" in the World English version (in progress since 1997)

 * "Song of Solomon" in the Wikisource edition (in progress since 2006)
 * "Song of Songs" in the Literal Standard Version of the Bible (2020)

title: Song of Songs (Bible)


text:
Canticle of Canticles

 * A book of the Hebrew Bible, now better known as Song of Songs or Song of Solomon; for versions, see Song of Songs (Bible).

title: Canticle of Canticles


text:
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text:
Wisdom (Bible)

 * "Wisdom" in the Wycliffe version of the Bible (1380s)
 * "Wisdom" in the Douay-Rheims version (1610)
 * "Wisedome" in the Authorized Version (1611)
 * "Wisdom of Solomon" in the King James version (1769)
 * "Wisdom of Solomon" in the Wikisource edition (in progress since 2006)

title: Wisdom (Bible)


text:
Book of Wisdom

 * A book of the Hebrew bible, also known as Wisdom and Wisdom of Solomon; for versions, see Wisdom (Bible)
 * Biblical commentary and analysis:

title: Book of Wisdom


text:
Help:Disambiguation

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title: Help:Disambiguation


text: An Antidote Against Atheism

title: An Antidote Against Atheism


text:
Page:Narrative of an Official Visit to Guatemala.djvu/71

CH. IV.]. I discovered that the Commissary was Don José Barazo, and felt a little ashamed that I had not known, or not attended to, his name before, for he was the very same person who had accompanied me into Acapulco. I was glad to find he experienced but little bad effects from his fall.

The troops at this station are composed of the most abandoned portion of the Mexican population. Most of those we met with on the road, when the officer was so strenuous in defence of their honour, were convicts, who were coming to replenish the ranks of the hopeful band who were on the parade. There was scarcely a man of them, I was told, who had not committed crimes worthy of death: one of them, a fair slight made man, about twenty-three, with light hair, was particularly pointed out to me as known to be one of the greatest desperados that ever had human form; he is said to have bragged that he had committed thirteen murders and assassinations, amongst which his father was one of the victims. These are


text:
Page:Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile - In the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773 volume 2.djvu/392

 being sent governor to Tigre, was to enter Lasta from that quarter on the N. E. He is said to have received his appointment with a great degree of concern, and to have told his friends, that he foresaw he never was to return from that expedition, which he did not regret, because he was convinced, by living much longer, it would be made his duty to assist at the fall of the Catholic religion.

having performed his devotions at Fremona, this general advanced through Gouliou, a territory mostly inhabited by Galla, and destitute of any sort of provisions; after which he took possession of the mountains of Lasta, with a view to cover the march of the young prince Facilidas, whom he every day expected. But that prince not appearing in time, and provisions becoming scarce, no measure remained but making his retreat to Tigré; and, although he formed the best disposition for that purpose, the people of Lasta observing his intention in time, on his first movement attacked his rear-guard while he was descending the mountain, and put it to flight: being thereby masters of the higher ground, they had the command of the cowardly soldiers below them, who could not insure their destruction more certainly than by the indecent manner in which they were flying.

, deserted by all except a few servants, continued courageously fighting; and, although it was very possible for him to have escaped, he disdained to survive the loss of his army. Receiving at that time a wound from a javelin, which palled through his belly, and judging the stroke to be mortal, he gave up all further resistance, fell upon his knees to prayer, and was again wounded by a


text: An Antidote Against Atheism/Preface

title: An Antidote Against Atheism/Preface


text:
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title: Template:Distinguish/doc


text:
Page:Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile - In the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773 volume 2.djvu/393

 stone, which struck him to the ground. Two of the mountaineers immediately came up to him, one of whom did not know him, and contented himself with stripping the body; but the other remembering his face, cut his head off, and carried it to the rebel Melca Christos.

misfortune was followed by another in Gojam, great to the nation in general, and greater still to the Catholic cause in particular. At the time that Sela Christos was in Begemder with prince Facilidas, the Galla from Bizamo, supposing the province of Damot without defence, passed the Nile, laying the whole province waste before them. Fecur Egzie, lieutenant-general under Sela Christos, although he had with him only a small number of troops, did not hesitate to march against those savages, to endeavour, if possible, to stop their ravages. The Galla, surprised at this, thought it was Sela Christos, and fled before him. He had now pursued them almost alone, and lighted in a low meadow to give grass to his horse, when he was surrounded and slain by a number of the enemy that lay hid among the bushes, and discovered how ill he was attended.

was reputed a man of the best understanding, and the most liberal sentiments of any in Ethiopia; a great orator, excelling both in the gracefulness of manner and copiousness and purity of his language. He was among the first that embraced the Catholic religion, even before the king or Sela Christos, and was the principal promoter of the translations of the Portuguese books into Ethiopic, assisted by the Jesuit Antonio de Angelis. We have seen, in the year 1613, the great efforts he made in the embassy to India by the coast of Melinda. He was an excellent horseman, but more violent


text:
Isaiah (Bible)

 * "Isaiah" in the Wycliffe version of the Bible (1380s)
 * "Isaiah" in the Bishops' version (1568)
 * "Isaiah" in the Douay-Rheims version (1610)
 * "Isaiah" in the Authorized Version (1611)
 * "Isaiah" in the King James version (1769)
 * "Isaiah" in the American Standard version (1901)
 * "Isaiah" in the Jewish Publication Society version (1917)
 * "Isaiah" in the World English version (in progress since 1997)

 * "Isaiah" in the Wikisource edition (in progress since 2006)
 * "Isaiah" in the Literal Standard Version of the Bible (2020)

title: Isaiah (Bible)