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(e) The Secretary, or his designee, shall from time to time, but at least annually, meet and consult with the Commission on general policies and specific matters related to planning, administration and development affecting the recreation area and other units of the national park system in Marin and San Francisco Counties. (f) The Commission shall act and advise by affirmative vote of a majority of the members thereof. (g) The Commission shall cease to exist ten years after the enactment of this Act. APPROPRIATION

Termination date.

LIMITATION

SEC. 6. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, but not more than $61,610,000 shall be appropriated for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands. There are authorized to be appropriated not more than $58,000,000 (May 1971 prices) for the development of the recreation area, plus or minus such amounts, if any, as may be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuations in construction costs as indicated by engineering cost indices applicable to the type of construction involved herein. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-590 AN ACT To extend the provisions of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4(a) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 779b(a)), as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and for the three" to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and for the four". SEC. 2. Section 4(c) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969," to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973,". SEC. 3. Section 4(b) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and for the three succeeding fiscal years, $650,000 in each year," to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and for the four succeeding fiscal years, $1,500,000 in each such year,". SEC. 4. The provisions of this Act shall be effective July 1, 1973. Approved October 27, 1972.

82-081 O - 73 - 85

October 27, 1972 [S, 3524]

Commercial

fiarch'andevelopment Act of ^^7^8'strt^'i'97^"* 82 stat^ 957. .c

A

Effective date.

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[86 STAT.

Public Law 92-591 October 27, 1972 [S. 3843]

AN ACT To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to make loans to certain railroads in order to restore or replace essential facilities and equipment damaged or destroyed as a result of natural disasters during the month of June 1972.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Emergency Rail United States of AmeHca in Congress assembled, That this Act may be Taction A?t.^^''°" cited as the "Emergency Rail Facilities Restoration Act". •:'A-r^.

24 Stat. 379; 84 Stat. 1499.

DEFINITIONS

fAa-u,..

SEC. 2 For the purpose of this Act— •>' --s' '^ ' « ^ (a) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Transportation. (b) "Railroad" means any common carrier by railroad subject to pait I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 1-27). (c) "Net income" means ordinary income reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the relevant railroad annual report form, adjusted for extraordinary items of a nonrecurring nature and directly related to railroad operations. AUTHORIZATION

Loans. Limitation. 47 Stat. 1474; 76 Stat. 572.

Appropriation.

SEC. 3. The Secretary is authorized to make loans, upon such terms and conditions as are specified by this Act and any others he deems appropriate, in an aggregate amount not to exceed $48,000,000 to railroads undergoing reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended (11 U.S.C. 205), to railroads which have reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission in the railroad annual report a deficit net income for either of the last two calendar years, and to railroads whose certified damage to railroad facilities or equipment as a result of the natural disasters which occurred during the month of June 1972 exceeds their net income for either of the last two calendar years for the purpose of restoring or replacing railroad facilities, equipment, or services which are determined to be essential to public service (including, without limitation, bridges, track, track structures, signal and communication systems, and rolling stock) damaged or destroyed as a result of the natural disaster's which occurred during the month of June 1972. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to remain available through June 30, 1975, such sums as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. TERMS AND

CONDITIONS

SEC. 4. (a) Prior to making a loan under this Act the Secretary shall— (1) find in writing that there is no other practicable means of obtaining funds from either private or government sources than a loan pursuant to this Act; (2) require that application be made by a railroad in such form and substance as the Secretary shall prescribe; (3) require satisfactory proof in writing of costs incurred or to be incurred in the restoration or replacement of essential railroad facilities, equipment, or services; (4) take appropriate action to insure that funds loaned under this Act are used solely for the purpose of restoring or replacing facilities and equipment (including the upgrading of such facilities and equipment) damaged or destroyed as a result of the natural disasters of June 1972;

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(5) obtain satisfactory assurances from the applicant railroad that the restoration or replacement to be accomplished with funds made available under the loan shall be completed without undue delay; (6) require as a condition of the loan that the United States obtain such security as the Secretary deems will adequately protect the interests of the United States except that, in the case of a railroad undergoing reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended (11 U.S.C. 205), if the Secretary 47 Stat. i474; expressly determines in writing that the railroad does not have ^^ ^*^*- ^^2. sufficient working capital to fund the restoring or replacing of essential railroad facilities, equipment, or services, he may, notwithstanding section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) or any other law, require any priority or subordination of the interests of the United States he deems to be appropriate in relation to the claims of any other creditors of the railroad or its trustees, so long as such position is not lower than that of a prebankruptcy unsecured creditor of the railroad; and (7) require that no part of the restoration or replacement work to be financed by the loan program hereunder which is presently or should be performed under collective bargaining agreements by railroad employees shall be subcontracted by the railroad; except that to the extent that the Secretary finds in writing that railroad employees, including employees on furlough, in the affected region are insufficient to perform such restoration or replacement work and that such railroad employees on furlough, if not recalled by the railroad will be employed by a subcontractor to perform such work in which event such employees shall be deemed to be railroad employees retaining all the rights and privileges of railroad employees while so employed. (8) None of the foregoing conditions shall apply to such work .««ijB:<te)U undertaken prior to the enactment of this Act. (b) No loan application shall be approved under this Act after eight months have elapsed from its date of enactment. (c)(1) The Secretary in reviewing applications for loans shall Restoration or examine such applications to determine whether any service or facility •"^p^a'^ement. which is essential to the public interest in maintaining transportation service, including specifically the Sunbury-Wilkes-Barre (Buttonwood) line, will not be restored or replaced. I n making such determination the Secretary shall take into consideration the interests of persons and communities affected thereby; existing rail facilities and t-^s Q •«•'«'* the pattern of service by railroads; and the public interest in a balanced and economical transportation system responsive to the needs of the public and the users of such system. (2) If after such determination the Secretary finds that any such service or facility of the applicant railroad will not be restored or replaced, the Secretary shall not approve such application unless and until such application is amended to include such restoration and replacement. (3) As an aid to the formulation of public policy regarding rail transportation, the Secretary shall prepare and keep current a comprehensive schedule setting forth transportation facilities and services that he believes should be provided by railroads in the northeastern region of the United States. In formulating such a schedule the Secretary shall take into consideration the interests of persons and communities affected thereby; existing rail facilities and the pattern of service by railroads; and the public interest in a balanced and economical transportation system responsive to the needs of the public and the users of such system.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 139

Question. 139 - OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?

(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

Art. 1 - Whether fortitude is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).

I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.

Art. 2 - Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1] ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.


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(4) The Secretary shall provide as a condition of the loan that, in consideration of the relief provided by this Act, the railroad shall offer to convey to the State, for just compensation, or in the event any such railroad is subject to a proceeding under the bankruptcy laws, the court having jurisdiction in such bankruptcy proceedings shall direct the trustee or trustees or the debtor to offer to convey to the State, for just compensation, all of its right, title, and interest free and clear of all encumbrances, in any right-of-way, track, and other related real and personal property on any branch line within such State which has been damaged or destroyed as a result of the natural disasters of June 1972; which have not been scheduled for restoration or replacement under the loan program as approved by the Secretary; and which such State, or subdivision thereof, proposes to restore or replace. STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY

Limitation.

Appropriation.

Ante, p. 230.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary is authorized to make loans pursuant to this section to assist regional. State, and local public bodies and agencies thereof in financing the restoration and replacement of railroad facilities and equipment damaged or destroyed as a result of the natural disasters of June 1972. Eligible facilities and equipment may include railroad right-of-way, track, rolling stock, and other real and personal property needed for an efficient and coordinated railroad transportation system and conveyed in accordance with the provisions of section 4(c)(3). (b) No such loan shall be provided unless the Secretary determines that the applicant has or will have— (1) demonstrated a valid need for the establishment or restablishment of railroad service in the affected area; and (2) the technical capability to carry out the proposed project. ((.^ ^ ^ y such loau may be made for not to exceed 80 per centum of the total costs of the proposed project and shall be subject to such other terms and conditions as the Secretary may determine are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. ((J) There is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this section. Sums so appropriated shall remain available through June 30, 1975. (e) The Secretary shall impose as a condition of a n j such loan under this section such fair and equitable labor protective arrangements as are described in the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, as amended (45 U.S.C. 565). LINE ABANDONMENT

24 Stat. 379, 1 note.^^ ^'^^'

SEC. 6. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, and except for the conveyance of facilities pursuant bo subsection 4(c) (3), all abandonment of facilities and services shall continue to be subjcct to the appropriate provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. (^) '^^^ damage or destruction caused by the natural disasters of June 1972 to any railroad facility, equipment, or service therefrom, of a railroad obtaining assistance under this Act, or any action taken pursuant to this Act affecting any railroad, shall not be evidence in any proceeding before any Federal agency or in any court in which line abandonment is an issue. Any violation of this section shall be deemed to be prejudicial.

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INTEREST RATES

SEC. 7. Any loan made under this Act shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the current average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of th^ United States with remaining periods to maturity of ten to twelve years reduced by not to exceed 2 per centum per annum. In no event shall any loan made under this Act bear interest at a rate in excess of 6 per centum per annum. DEFERRAL OF PAYMENT

SEC. 8. Whenever he determines it necessary to insure the provision of essential transportation services of a railroad, the Secretary may in his discretion provide in the terms and conditions of a loan under this Act for deferral of the payment of principal and interest on the loan for a period not to exceed ten years from the date the loan is made. RULES AND REGULATIONS

SEC. 9. The Secretary shall issue such rules and regulations as are appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. ENFORCEMENT

SEC. 10. The Secretary shall insure that railroads which obtain loans under this Act comply with the provisions of this Act and any rules, regulations, or conditions imposed by the Secretary pursuant to this Act. In the event of any failure to comply with such provisions, rules, regulations, or conditions, the Secretary may take such enforcement action as he deems appropriate including a declaration that the obligation of applicant railroads is immediately due and payable as a claim of the United States without regard to any other provision of the loan or of this Act. REPORTS

SEC. 11. The Secretary shall, within one year after enactment of this Act, report to the President and to the Congress with respect to his activities pursuant to this Act, including an evaluation of the financial conditions of railroads which obtained loans under this Act and including an evaluation of the impact of this Act on the condition of the rail facilities and services described in the schedule prepared under subsection 4(c)(1) of this Act. Such report shall also include recommendations, if any, for additional legislation action. AUDIT

SEC. 12. The Comptroller General of the United States, or any of his duly authorized representatives, shall have access to such information, books, records, and documents as he determines necessary to effectively audit financial transactions and operations carried out by the Secretary in the administration of this Act. The Comptroller General shall make Reports to Consuch reports to the Congress on the results of any such audits as are ^^^^^' appropriate.

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[86 STAT.

IXTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION APPROVAL

41 Stat. 494; 79 Stat. 263.

SEC. 13. A railroad qualifying for a loan or loans under the provisions of this Act shall not be required to comply with the provisions of section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 20a) with respect to such loan or loans. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-592

October 27, 1972 [S. 1852]

Gateway National Recreation Area, N.Y.-N.J. Establishment.

Boundary revis i o n s, publication in Federal R e g i s ter.

Lands, waters, acquisition.

AN ACT ' To establish the Gateway National Recreation Area in the States of New York and New Jersey, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to preserve and protect for the lise and enjoyment of present and future generations an area possessing outstanding natural and recreational features, the Gateway National Recreation Area (hereinafter referred to as the "recreation area") is hereby established. (a) The recreation area shall comprise the following lands, waters, marshes, and submerged lands in the New York Harbor area generally depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Gateway National Recreation Area,-' numbered 951-40017 sheets 1 through 3 and dated May, 1972: (1) Jamaica Bay Unit—including all islands, marshes, hassocks, submerged lands, and waters in Jamaica Bay, Floyd Bennett Field, the lands generally located between highway route 27A and Jamaica Bay, and the area of Jamaica Bay up to the shoreline of John F. Kennedy International Airport; (2) Breezy Point Unit—^the entire area between the eastern boundary of Jacob Riis P a r k and the westernmost point of the peninsula; (3) Sandy Hook Unit—the entire area between Highway 36 Bridge and the northernmost point of the peninsula; (4) Staten Island Unit—including Great Kills Park, Miller Field (except for approximately 26 acres which are to be made available for public school purposes), Fort Wadsworth, and the waterfront lands located between the streets designated as Cedar Grove Avenue, Seaside Boulevard, and D r u r y Avenue and the bay from Great Kills to Fort Wadsworth; (5) Hoffman and Swinburne Islands; and (6) All submerged lands, islands, and waters within one-fourth of a mile of the mean low water line of any waterfront area included above. (b) The map referred to in this section shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the National P a r k Service, Department of the Interior, "Washington, District of Columbia. After advising the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate in writing, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized to make minor revisions of the boundaries of the recreation area when necessary by publication of a revised drawing or other boundary description in the Federal Register. SEC. 2. (a) Within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Secretary may acquire lands and waters or interests therein by donation, purchase or exchange, except that lands owned by the States of New York or New Jersey or any political subdivisions thereof may be acquired only by donation.

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 140

Question. 140 - OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:

(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.

Art. 1 - Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."

Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Q[122], A[1]), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.

Art. 2 - Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q[128]). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.

Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (Q[128]; Q[136], A[4]; Q[137], A[2]). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[3], A[2]), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.

Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.


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(b) With the concurrence of the agency having custody thereof, any Federal property within the boundaries of the recreation area may be transferred, witnout consideration, to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary for administration as a part of the recreation area. (c) Within the Breezy Point Unit, (1) the Secretary shall acquire an adequate interest in the area depicted on the map referred to in section 1 of this Act to assure the public use of and access to the entire beach. The Secretary may enter into an agreement with any property owner or owners to assure the continued maintenance and use of all remaining lands in private ownership as a residential community composed of single-family dwellings. Any such agreement shall be irrevocable, unless terminated by mutual agreement, and shall specify, among other things: (A) that the Secretary may designate, establish and maintain a buffer zone on Federal lands separating the public use area and the private community; (B) that all construction commencing within the community, including the conversion of dwellings from seasonal to yearround residences, shall comply with standards to be established by the Secretary; (C) that additional commercial establishments shall be permitted only with the express prior approval of the Secretary or his designee. (2) If a valid, enforceable agreement is executed pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the authority of the Secretary to acquire any interest in the property subject to the agreement, except for the beach property, shall be suspended. (3) The Secretary is authorized to accept by donation from the city of New York any right, title, or interest which it holds in the parking lot at Eockaway which is part of the Marine Bridge project at Riis Park. Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize the United States to extinguish any present or future encumbrance or to authorize the State of New York or any political subdivision or agency thereof to further encumber any interest in the property so conveyed. (d) Within the Jamaica Bay Unit, (1) the Secretary may accept title to lands donated by the city of New York subject to a retained right to continue existing uses for a specifically limited period of time if such uses conform to plans agreed to by the Secretary, and (2) the Secretary may accept title to the area known as Broad Channel Community only if, within five years after the date of enactment of this Act, all improvements have been removed from the area and a clear title to the area is tendered to the United States. SEC. 3. (a) The Secretary shall administer the recreation area in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4), as amended and supplemented. In the administration of the recreation area the Secretary may utilize such statutory authority available to him for the conservation and management of wildlife and natural resources as he deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act: Provided, That the Secretary shall administer and protect the islands and waters within the Jamaica Bay Unit with the primary aim of conserving the natural resources, fish, and wildlife located therein and shall permit no development or use of this area which is incompatible with this purpose. (b) The Secretary shall designate the principal visitor center constructed within the recreation area as the "William Fitts Eyan Visitor Center" in commemoration of the leadership and contributions which Representative William Fitts Eyan made with respect to the creation and establishment of this public recreation area.

1309 Federal property transfer.

Breezy Point Unit.

Rockaway, parking lot, conveyance.

J a m a i c a Bay Unit.

Broad Channel Community.

Administration.

William F i t t s Ryan Visitor Center, designation.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1352

 1310 coo^erI«ve*°*^ agreements.

PUBLIC LAW 92-592-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

(^) '^^^ Secretary is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with the States of New York and New Jersey, or any political subdivision thereof, for the rendering, on a reimbursable basis, of rescue, firefighting, and law enforcement services and cooperative assistance by nearby law enforcement and fire preventive agencies. Water resource ^^j^ 'pj^g authority of the Secretary of the Army to undertake or eve opmen s. contribute to Water resource developments, including shore erosion control, beach protection, and navigation improvements (including the deepening of the shipping channel from the Atlantic Ocean to the New York harbor) on land and/or waters within the recreation area shall be exercised in accordance with plans which are mutually acceptable to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army and which are consistent with both the purpose of this Act and the purpose of existing statutes dealing with water and related land resource development. Airway faciii(^^ ^ h e authority of the Secretary of Transportation to maintain operaTk)", and"i^^-' ^^^ Operate cxisting airwav facilities and to install necessary new staiiation. facilities within the recreation area shall be exercised in accordance with plans which are mutually acceptable to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Transportation and which are consistent with both the purpose of this Act and the purpose of existing statutes dealing with the establishment, maintenance, and operation of airway facilities: Provided, That nothing in this section shall authorize the expansion of airport runways into Jamaica Bay or air facilities at Floyd Bennett Field. Hunting, fish(f) x h c Secretary shall permit hunting, fishing, shellfishing, traping, an tfapp ng, pjj^g^ ^j^^j ^j^g taking of spccimeus on the lands and waters under his jurisdiction within the Gateway National Recreation Area in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States and the laws of the States of New York and New Jersey and political subdivisions thereof, except that the Secretary may designate zones where and establish periods when these activities may not be permitted for reasons of public safety, administration, fish or wildlife management, or public use and enjoyment. ^ Sandy Hook and (gr) I n the Sandy Hook and Staten Island Units, the Secretary unitt" ^ ^" shall inventory and evaluate all sites and structures having present and potential historical, cultural, or architectural significance and shall provide for appropriate programs for the preservation, restoration, interpretation, and utilization of them. Donations. (h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary is authorized to accept donations of funds from individuals, foundations, or corporations for the purpose of providing services and facilities which he deems consistent with the purposes of this Act. Gateway Nationgp;c. 4. (a) Thcrc is hcrcby established a Gateway National RecreaAdvitory^commisl^ tion Area Advisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the sion, establish"Commission"). Said Commission shall terminate ten years after the ment; termination. ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ establishment of the rccreation area. Membership. ^|^^ rpj^g Commission shall be composed of eleven members each appointed for a term of two years by the Secretary as follows: (1) two members to be appointed from recommendations made by the Governor of the State of New York; (2) two members to be appointed from recommendations made by the Governor of the State of New Jersey; (3) two members to be appointed from recommendations made by the mayor of New York City; (4) two members to be appointed from recommendations made by the mayor of Newark, New Jersey; and

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1353

 86 STAT. ]

1311

PUBLIC LAW 92-593-OCT. 27, 1972

(5) three members to be appointed by the Secretary to represent the general public, (c) The Secretary shall designate one member to be Chairman. Any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. 1(d) A member of the Commission shall serve without compensation as such. The Secretary is authorized to pay the expenses reasonably incurred by the Commission in carrying out its responsibility under this Act upon vouchers signed by the Chairman. (e) The Commission established by this section shall act and advise by affirmative vote of a majority of the members thereof. (f) The Secretary or his designee shall, from time to time, consult with the members of the Commission with respect to matters relating to the development of the recreation area. SEC. 5. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, but not more than $12,125,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands and not more than $92,813,000 (July, 1971 prices) for development of the recreation area, plus or minus such amounts, if any, as may be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuations in the construction costs as indicated by engineering cost indices applicable to the type of construction involved herein. Approved October 27, 1972.

Expenses.

Appropriation.

Public Law 92-593 AN ACT

October 27, 1972

To establish the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in the States of Arizona and Utah.

[S- 27]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,, That in order to provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of Lake Powell and lands adjacent thereto in the States of Arizona and Utah and to preserve scenic, scientific, and historic features contributing to public enjoyment of the area, there is established the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area (hereafter referred to as the "recreation area") to comprise the area generally depicted on the drawing entitled "Boundary Map Glen Canyon National Recreation Area," numbered GLC-91,006 and dated August 1972, which is on file and available for public inspection in the office of the National P a r k Service, Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior (hereafter referred to as the "Secretary") may revise the boundaries of the recreation area from time to time by publication in the Federal Register of a revised drawing or other boundary description, but the total acreage of the national recreation area may not exceed one million two hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred and eighty acres. SEC. 2. (a) Within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Secretary may acquire lands and interests in lands by donation, purchase, or exchange. Any lands owned by the States of Utah or Arizona, or any State, political subdivisions thereof, may be acquired only by donation or exchange-. No lands held in trust for any Indian tribe may be acquired except with the concurrence of the tribal council. (b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the mineral rights reserved to the Navajo Indian Tribe under section 2 of the Act of September 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 1686), or the rights reserved to the Navajo Indian Tribal Council in said section 2 with respect to the use of the lands there described under the heading "PARCEL B ".

Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Ariz.Utah. Establishment,

Publication in Federal Register.

Land acquisition.

Limitation.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1354

 1312 Public lands, withdrawal.

64 Stat. 4 6 3.

41 Stat. 437; 74 Stat. 790. 61 Stat. 913.

Funds, disposition.

Administration.

70 Stat. 105. 43 USC 620.

Hunting and fishing.

Leases.

Easements and rights-of-way.

Proposed road, study.

PUBLIC LAW 92-593-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

SEC. 3. (a) The lands within the recreation area, subject to valid existing rights, are withdrawn from location, entry, and patent under the United States mining laws. Under such regulations as he deems appropriate, the Secretary shall permit the removal of the nonleasable minerals from lands or interests in lands within the national recreation area in the manner prescribed by section 10 of the Act of August 4, 1939, as amended (53 Stat. 1196; 43 U.S.C. 387 et seq.), and he shall permit the removal of leasable minerals from lands or interests in lands within the recreation area in accordance with the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), or the Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing Act of August 7, 1947 (30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.), if he finds that such disposition would not have significant adverse effects on the Glen Canyon project or on the administration of the national recreation area pursuant to this Act. (b) All receipts derived from permits and leases issued on lands in the recreation area under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended, or the Act of August 7, 1947, shall be disposed of as provided in the applicable Act; and receipts from the disposition of nonleasable minerals within the recreation area shall be disposed of in the same manner as moneys received from the sale of public lands. SEC. 4. The Secretary shall administer, protect, and develop the recreation area in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented, and with any other statutory authority available to him for the conservation and management of natural resources to the extent he finds such authority will further the purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall affect or interfere with the authority of the Secretary granted by Public Law 485, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session, to operate Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir in accordance with the purposes of the Colorado River Storage Project Act for river regulation, irrigation, flood control, and generation of hydroelectric power. SEC. 5. The Secretary shall permit hunting, fishing, and trapping on lands and waters under his jurisdiction within the boundaries of the recreation area in accordance with applicable laws of the United States and the States of Utah and Arizona, except that the Secretary may designate zones where, and establish periods when, no hunting, fishing, or trapping shall be permitted for reasons of public safety, administration, or public use and enjoyment. Except in emergencies, any regulation of the Secretary pursuant to this section shall be put into effect only after consultation with the appropriate State fish and game department. SEC. 6. The administration of mineral and grazing leases within the recreation area shall be by the Bureau of Land Management. The same policies followed by the Bureau of Land Management in issuing and administering mineral and grazing leases on other lands under its jurisdiction shall be followed in regard to the lands within the boundaries of the recreation area, subject to the provisions of sections 3(a) and 4 of this Act. SEC. 7. The Secretary shall grant easements and rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis upon, over, under, across, or a;long any component of the recreation area unless he finds that the route of such easements and rights-of-way would have significant adverse effects on the administration of the recreation area. SEC. 8. (a) The Secretary together with the Highway Department of the State of Utah, shall conduct a study of proposed road alinements within and adjacent to the recreation area. Such study shall locate the specific route of a scenic, low-speed road, hereby authorized, from Glen Canyon City to Bullfrog Basin, crossing the Escalante

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1355

 86 STAT. ]

PUBLIC LAW 92-594-OCT. 27, 1972

1313

River south of the point where the river has entered Lake Powell when the lake is at the three thousand seven hundred-foot level. In determining the route for this road, special care shall be taken to minimize any adverse environmental impact and said road is not required to meet ordinary secondary road standards as to grade, alinement, and curvature. Turnouts, overlooks, and scenic vistas may be included in the road plan. I n no event shall said route cross the Escalante River north of Stephens Arch. (b) The studv shall include a reasonable timetable for the engineer- Construction. ing, planning, and construction of the road authorized in section 8(a) and the Secretary of the Interior shall adhere to said timetable in every wav feasible to him. (c) The Secretary is authorized to construct and maintain markers and other interpretive devices consistent with highway safety standards. (d) The study specified in section 8(a) hereof shall designate what Additional additional roads are appropriate and necessary for full utilization of roads. the area for the purposes of this Act and to connect with all roads of ingress to, and egress from the recreation area. Report (e) The findings and conclusions of the Secretary and the Highway gress. to ConDepartment of the State of Utah, specified in section 8(a), shall be submitted to Congress within two years of the date of enactment of this Act, and shall include recommendations for any further legislation necessary to implement the findings and conclusions. I t shall specify the funds necessary for appropriation in order to meet the timetable fixed in section 8 (D). Report to PresiSEC. 9. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, dent. the Secretary shall report to the President, in accordance with subsections 3(c) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890j 16 U.S.C. 1132 (c^ and (d)), his recommendations as to the suitability or nonsuitability of any area within the recreation area for preservation as wilderness, and any designation of any such area as wilderness 16 USC 1131 shall be in accordance with said Wilderness Act. note. SEC. 10. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums Appropriation. as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, not to exceed, however, $400,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands and not to exceed $37,325,400 for development. The sums authorized in this section shall be available for acquisition and development undertaken subsequent to the approval of this Act. Approved October 27, 1972. Public Law 92-594 AN ACT To amend section 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1907.

October 27, 1972 [S. 3545]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection (e) prolectY^^A'c f of section 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C. 1977 1967^'aJe^ndments. (e^), is amended to read as follows r 82 Stat. 729. "(e) The provisions of this section shall be effective until July 1, sect 1977.". SEC. 2. Clause (1) of subsection (f) of section 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C. 1977(f)(1)), is amended to read as follows: "(1) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce.". Approved October 27, 1972.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1356

 1314

PUBLIC LAW 92-595-OCT. 27, 1972 Public Law 92-595

October 27, 1972

[s. 3337]

Small B u s i n e s s Investment Act Amendments of 1972. 75 Stat. 752. 15 USC 662. Investment companies financing disadvantaged persons. 72 Stat. 691; 81 Stat. 269. 15 USC 681.

Purchase of debentures. 81 Stat. 270; 85 Stat. 776. 15 USC 683.

Supra.

' ^^

'

[86

STAT.

'•''' '

ACT

ij.y amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Re-presentathnes of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1972". SEC. 2. The Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended, is further amended as follows: (a) Sections 103(3) and (7) are amended by striking " (c) " after "Section 301" at the end thereof. (b) Section 301 is amended by adding the following new subsection: " (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a small business investment company, the investment policy of which is that its investments will be made solely in small'business concerns which will contribute to a well-balanced national economy by facilitating ownership in such concerns by persons whose participation in the free enterprise system is hampered because of social or economic disadvantages may be organized and chartered under State business or nonprofit corporation statutes, and may be licensed by the Administration to operate under the provisions of this Act." (c) Section 303 is amended— (1) by inserting the word "private" in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of subsection (b), to read "combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus"; (2) by striking the figure "$7,500,000" in the last sentence of paragraph (1) of subsection (b), and inserting the figure "$15,000,000"; (3) by amending paragraph (2) of said subsection (b) to read as follows: "(2) The total amount of debentures which may be purchased or guaranteed and outstanding at any one time from a company not complying with section 301(d) of this Act, which has investments or legal commitments of 65 per centum or more of its total funds available for investment in small business concerns invested or committed in venture capital, and which has combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of $500,000 or more shall not exceed 300 per centum of its combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus. In no event shall the debentures of any such company purchased or guaranteed and outstanding under this paragraph exceed $20,000,000. Such additional purchases or guarantees which the Administration makes under this paragraph shall contain conditions to insure appropriate maintenance by the company receiving such assistance of the described ratio during the period in which debentures under this paragraph are outstanding." (d) Section 303 is amended by adding the following new subsection: "(c) Subject to the following conditions, the Administration is authorized to purchase preferred securities, and to purchase, or to guarantee the timely payment of all principal and interest payments as scheduled, on debentures issued by small business investment companies operating under authority of section 301(d) of this Act. The full faith and credit of the United States is pledged to the payment of all amounts which may be required to be paid under any guarantee under this subsection. , Kj BiliiSkil

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1357

 86 STAT. ]

PUBLIC LAW 92-595-OCT. 27, 1972

"The Administration may purchase— "(1) shares of nonvoting stock (or other securities having similar characteristics), provided— " (i) dividends are preferred and cumulative to the extent of 3 per centum of par value per annum; "(ii) on liquidation or redemption, the Administration is entitled to the preferred payment of the par value of such securities; and prior to any distribution (other than to the Administration) the Administration may require the preferred payment of the difference between dividends paid thereon and cumulative dividends payable at a late equal to the interest rate determined pursuant to section 303(b) for debentures with a term of fifteen years, without interest on such difference; "(iii) the purchase price shall be at par value and, in any one sale, $50,000 or more; and "(iv) the amount of such securities purchased and outstanding at any one time shall not exceed (A) from a company having combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of less than $300,000 and licensed on or before October 13, 1971, the amount of combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus invested after such date, nor (B) from any company having combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of $300,000 or more but less than $500,000, the amount of its combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus in excess of $300,000, nor (C) from any company having combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of $500,000 or more, the amount of its combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus. "The Administration may purchase or guarantee— "(2) debentures subordinated pursuant to subsection (b) of this section (other than securities purchased under paragraph (1) of this subsection (c)), provided— "(i) such debentures are issued for a term of not to exceed fifteen years; "(ii) the interest rate is determined pursuant to sections 303(b) and 317; and "(iii) the amount of debentures purchased or guaranteed and outstanding at any one time pursuant to this paragraph (2) from a company having combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of less than $500,000 shall not exceed 200 per centum of its combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus less the amount of preferred securities outstanding under paragraph (1) of this subsection, nor from a company having combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of $500,000 or more, 300 per centum of its combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus less the amount of such preferred securities. "(3) debentures purchased and outstanding pursuant to section 303(b) of this section may be retired simultaneously with the issuance of preferred securities to meet the requirements of subparagraph (2) (iii) of this subsection (c). "(4) the Administration may require, as a condition of the purchase or guarantee of any securities in excess of- 200 per centum of the combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of a company, that the company maintains a percentage of its total funds available for investment in small business concerns invested or legally committed in venture capital (as defined in subsection (b) of this section) determined by the Administration to be reasonable and appropriate."

1315 NonvotingprepurThase!^""'^^'

subordinated chase*orgua^an". tee.

Ante, p. i3i4. ^°sf, p. laie. '' *

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text:
Page:The Eurypterida of New York Volume 1.pdf/438

 and the telson is in both specimens narrower than in, a difference which is surely in part and perhaps wholly due to preservation, the thin telsons being somewhat laterally compressed.

On account of the scarcity of the material we do not know to what extent these differences are expressions of different growth stages, but it is quite obvious that  as represented by these specimens, was remarkably similar in all its features, save the pincers, to   and.

Judging from the fragmentary pincers of the specimen figured by Pohlman [1883, pl. 3, fig. 3] as, we surmise that this also belongs to.

Horizon and locality. Bertie waterlime, Schooley's farm, Litchfield, Herkimer co., N. Y.


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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 86.djvu/1358

 1316 74 Stat. 196. 15 USC 684. 81 Stat. 271. 15 USC 686. Repeal. 72 Stat. 691; 80 Stat. 1360. 15 USC 681. Interest subsidy. Ante, p. 1314.

Joint ownership companies, benefits.

Preferred stock asset coverage requirement, exemption. 54 Stat. 817; 72 Stat. 694. 15 USC 661 note.

80 Stat. 132. Handicapped persons, loans. Ante, p. 898.

PUBLIC LAW 92-595-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT.

(e) Subsection 304(a) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is amended by inserting "and unincorporated" after "incorporated". (f) Section 306 is amended (1) by inserting the word "private" in subsection (a) thereof to read "combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus" and (2) by repealing subsection (b) thereof. (g) Title III is further amended by adding thereto new sections to read as follows: "SEC. 317. Notwithstanding section 303(b), the effective rate of interest after October 13, 1971, during the first five years thereafter of the term of any debenture purchased by the Administration from a small business investment company under authority of section 303(c), shall be the greater of 3 per centum or 3 percentage points below the interest rate determined pursuant to section 303(b). The Administration is authorized to apply interest paid to it by such company for the period from October 13, 1971, to the effective date of this section, without interest thereon, to interest payable after such effective date. No company which has received the benefit of this section may make a distribution (other than to the Administration) unless it has first paid to the Administration an amount e(j[ual to the difference between the rate of interest payable to the Administration pursuant to the previous sentence, and the rate of interest which would have been payable pursuant to section 303(b). "SEC. 318. The Administration is authorized to extend the benefits of sections 303(c) and 317 to any small business investment company operating under authority of section 301(d) of this Act, and which is owned, in whole or in part, by one or more small business investment companies, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Administration. "SEC. 319. Section 18 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (15 U.S.C. 80a-18), is further amended by amending subsection (k) to read as follows: " '(k) The provisions of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to investment companies operating under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, and the provisions of paragraph (2) of said subsection shall not apply to such companies so long as such class of senior security shall be held or guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.' " SEC. 3. The Small Business Act is amended as follows: (a) Subsection (c) of section 4 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 633(c)) is amended by inserting " 7 (g), " immediately after "7(e)," in each of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) thereof. (b) Section 7 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: " (g)(1) The Administration also is empowered, where other financial assistance is not available on reasonable terms, to make such loans (either directly or in cooperation with Banks or other lending institutions through agreements to participate on an immediate or deferred basis) as the Administration may determine to be necessary or appropriate— " (A) to assist any public or private organization— " (i) which is organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, operated in the interest of handicapped individuals, the net income of which does not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any shareholder or other individual; "(ii) which complies with any applicable occupational health and safety standard prescribed by the Secretary of Labor; and

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Summa Theologiae/Second Part of the Second Part/Question 141

Question. 141 - OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?

(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?

(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?

(6) What is the rule of temperance?

(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?

(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?

Art. 1 - Whether temperance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (FS, Q[68], A[4]). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue."

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.

Art. 2 - Whether temperance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.

I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA[4],5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA[4],5; Q[142], A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).

Art. 3 - Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" [*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (FS, Q[23], AA[1],2; FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires.

Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.

Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal passions.

Art. 4 - Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.

Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."

I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.

Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.

Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.

Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.

Art. 5 - Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A[4]), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.

Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste."

I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.

Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is served.

Art. 6 - Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.

Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123], A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.

Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."

Art. 7 - Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?" Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.

Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (FS, Q[25], A[4]). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence.

On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49).

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (A[4]). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.

Art. 8 - Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."

I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual," wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.

Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals.

Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.


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STAT.]

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PUBLIC LAW 92-596-OCT. 27, 1972

"(iii) which, in the production of commodities and in the provision of services during any fiscal year in which it receives financial assistance under this subsection, employs handicapped individuals for not less than 75 per centum of the man-hours required for the production or provision of the commodities or services; or " (B) to assist any handicapped individual in establishing, acquiring, or operating a small business concern. "(2) The Administration's share of any loan made under this subsection shall not exceed $350,000, nor may any such loan be made if the total amount outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business loan and investment fund established by section 4(c)(1)(B) of this Act would exceed $350,000. I n agreements to participate in loans on a deferred basis under this subsection, the Administration's participation may total 100 per centum of the balance of the loan at the time of disbursement. Any loan made under this subsection shall bear interest at the rate of 3 per centum per annum. The maximum term of any such loan, including extensions and renewals thereof, may not exceed fifteen years. All loans made under this subsection shall be of such sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repayment: Provided, howecer^ That any reasonable doubt shall be resolved in favor of the applicant. "(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'handicapped individual' means a pereon who has a physical, mental, or emotional impairment, defect, ailment, disease, or disability of a permanent nature which in any way limits the selection of any type of employment for which the person would otherwise be qualified or qualifiable." Approved October 27, 1972.

Limitation.

80 Stat. 132. 15 USC 633.

' 'Handicapped individual."

Public Law 92-596 AN ACT To amend titles 10 and 37, United States Code, to authorize members of the armed forces who are in a missing status to accumulate leave without limitation, to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize an additional Deputy Secretary of Defense, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 701 of title 10, United States Code, is amended— (1) by inserting "and subsection (g) " after "subsection (f) " in subsection (b); and (2) by adding the following new subsection: " (g) A member who is in a missing status, as defined in section 551(2) of title 37, accumulates leave without regard to the sixty-day limitation in subsection (b) and the ninety-day limitation in subsection (f). Notwithstanding the death of a member while in a missing status, he continues to earn leave through the date— " (1) the Secretary concerned receives evidence that the member is dead; or "(2) that his death is prescribed or determined under section 555 of title 37. Leave accumulated while in missing status shall be accounted for separately. I t may not be taken, but shall be paid for under section 501(h) of title 37. However, a member whose death is prescribed or determined under section 555 or 556 of title 37 may, in addition to

October 27, 1972 [H. R. 14911]

Armed Forces. Members in missing s t a t u s, leave accumulation. 76 Stat. 492; 81 Stat. 782. 80 Stat. 625.

80 Stat. 628.

P o s t, p. 1318.

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