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Cenepa War

The Cenepa War or Third Ecuadorian-Peruvian War (26 January – 28 February 1995), also known as the Alto Cenepa War, was a brief and localized military conflict between Ecuador and Peru, fought over control of an area in Peruvian territory (i.e. in the eastern side of the Cordillera del Cóndor, Province of Condorcanqui, Región Amazonas, Republic of Perú) near the border between the two countries. The two nations had signed a border treaty following the Ecuadorian–Peruvian War of 1941, but Ecuador later disagreed with the treaty as it applied to the Cenepa and Paquisha areas, and in 1960 it declared the treaty null and void. Most of the fighting took place around the headwaters of the Cenepa River.

Mediation efforts of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States paved the way for the opening of diplomatic conversations that ultimately led to the signing of a definitive peace agreement (the Brasilia Presidential Act) on 26 October 1998. The peace agreement saw some of the territory being leased to Ecuador for a time. It was followed by the formal demarcation of the border on 13 May 1999 and the end of the multinational MOMEP (Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru) troop deployment on 17 June 1999, which effectively put an end to one of the longest territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere.

Official estimates give a death toll of 94. Demining is expected to be completed in 2024. As of 2024, it is the most recent military conflict in the Americas between countries contesting sovereignty over territory.

Background
The Cenepa War was the most recent military clash between Ecuador and Peru over a long-standing territorial dispute that dated back to the first decades of the 19th century, when both countries came into being after the Wars of Independence of the Spanish colonies in South America.

In modern times there were three previous military confrontations: war between 1857 and 1860, a full-scale war in 1941, the Paquisha War in 1981, both of which had seen the Peruvian military forces prevailing over the Ecuadorian military.

Overview
Most of the fighting of the Cenepa war was centered around the control of several outposts located on the headwaters of the Cenepa River (see map), a highland area covered with dense Amazonian jungle, inside a 78 km-long strip of territory where the process of demarcation between Ecuador and Peru remained stalled since 1951.

One of the outposts causing the dispute, called Tiwintza by the Ecuadorians, and Tiwinza by the Peruvians, came to symbolize the war because of the bitter clashes that took place around it, and the emotional importance that both sides attached to its possession. The conflict continued until the signing of a ceasefire and the eventual separation of forces, supervised by the MOMEP, a multinational mission of military observers from the "guarantor" countries of the 1942 Rio Protocol: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA.

The Cenepa war produced far-reaching consequences for relations between Ecuador and Peru. Among the effects of the war that paved the way for a definitive settlement of the border issues included the military outcome of the brief conflict; the lack of vindication of the Ecuadorian armed forces after the disappointing results of the wars of 1858, 1941, and 1981; and the Peruvians’ realization of the need for a resolution of a problem. Thus, in the aftermath of the war, both nations, brokered by the "guarantors" of the Rio Protocol, entered into a long and difficult negotiation process that concluded with the signing of a Peace Treaty in 1998, and the closing of the hitherto un-demarcated stretch of common border, deep in the Amazonian rainforest.

Disputed border
Following the Ecuadorian–Peruvian War of 1941, both countries had signed a Peace Treaty known as the Rio Protocol in 1942. This treaty — brokered by the US, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, which became known as the "guarantors" of the peace settlement — had the main purpose of defining the hitherto badly defined borders between Ecuador and Peru. The process of demarcation, begun in mid-1942, came to a halt in 1948, when populist Ecuadorian President José María Velasco Ibarra declared the Protocol impossible to implement in the area of the Cordillera del Cóndor, claiming inconsistencies between the instructions of the Protocol and the geographical realities on the ground. Peru contested this view, stating that such discrepancies had already been solved in an arbitration that had taken place in 1945, and that all that had to be done was to close the border following the guidelines of the Protocol and the ruling of the 1945 arbitration.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the situation had come to a deadlock. For the next 46 years, a 78 km-long strip of mostly unpopulated, and little explored territory, deep in the Amazonian rainforest and almost inaccessible by land, was left without a specific boundary; this served as a flashpoint for recurrent diplomatic and military crisis between Ecuador and Peru. While Peru held to the view that the border in the area ran along the heights of the Condor range, Ecuador insisted that there was no technical basis for considering that mountain range as the border between the two nations, hinting at the idea that the spirit of the Protocol, which had never mentioned the Cóndor range by name, would require the location of the border markers along the Cenepa River, immediately to the east of the range. The Ecuadorian stance had a symbolic meaning of its own: the Cenepa river was a small tributary of the Marañón River, in turn a tributary of the Amazon River, to which Ecuador had always claimed the right for sovereign access.

Events leading up to the war
Just as in the Paquisha Incident of 1981, the Cenepa War was caused by the installation by Ecuador, since 1994, of border outposts on the Cenepa River basin in eastern Cordillera del Condor (territory also claimed by Peru), with the names of Cueva de los Tayos, Base Sur and Tiwinza.

Tensions along the Condor range had been running high following a crisis that arose in July 1991 over the location of a Peruvian outpost called "Pachacútec" (Pachacútec Incident) inside a zone that, while 60 km north of the delimited and undemarcated area, had its own problems regarding the location of a single border marker (see map). Ecuador had protested over the location of "Pachacútec" since it was, according to Ecuador, inside Ecuadorian territory, and went on to set up an outpost of its own ("Etza") right in front of it. For Peru, there was no question that both "Pachacútec" and "Etza" were inside Peruvian territory. Although the crisis was defused the following month with the signing of a Pacto de Caballeros (gentlemen's agreement), by which both sides committed themselves to abandon these posts and separate their forces, the aftermath of the incident saw both countries accusing each other of violating the accord and reinforcing their military presence in the delimited and undemarcated area.

New crisis
Still, for the next three years, tensions were kept at manageable levels. Apart from the uneasy encounters between rival patrols, which sometimes included brief exchanges of fire, most commonly every January (anniversary of the signing of the Rio Protocol), no serious incidents happened.

Then, at the end of 1994, a new crisis suddenly erupted, this time in the undemarcated border area proper, around the Condor range and the Cenepa headwaters.

"Base Sur" and a meeting of colonels
Peruvian accounts state that in November 1994, a Peruvian patrol, advancing through the Cenepa headwaters, was intercepted by an Ecuadorian patrol. Being told they had crossed into Ecuadorian territory, the Peruvians were escorted to the Ecuadorian outpost of "Base Sur", where the patrol was given supplies before continuing their journey. Afterwards, realizing Base Sur was actually in Peruvian-claimed territory, the Peruvians asked the Ecuadorians for a meeting of superior officers. The meeting, which the Peruvians date to December 20 and the Ecuadorians to December 12, took place in "Base Sur", between the commanders of the opposing battalions in the area.

According to Ecuadorian accounts, during the meeting the Peruvian officer called to the attention of his Ecuadorian counterpart that the presence of Ecuadorian outposts in the headwaters of the Cenepa river constituted a violation of Peruvian territory, and that therefore the posts had to be abandoned and the troops moved back to the line of the Condor range. The Ecuadorian account of the meeting also states that the Peruvian officer went on to deliver an ultimatum: if the Ecuadorians did not abandon the area by the end of the week, the Peruvians would dislodge them by force.

After the meeting — if not before it — both Quito and Lima began to send reinforcements to the area, while further meetings between superior officers didn't manage to break the deadlock, apparently unable to reach a compromise solution.

In retrospect
It could be said that the Cenepa war had the same causes that caused the Peruvian victory in the false Paquisha of 1981, that is, the Peruvian discovery of Ecuadorian outposts on the eastern slopes of the Condor mountain range by expelled Ecuadorian troops from the territory in dispute. And further down in the Cenepa Valley, followed by the decision to evict Ecuadorians from these places by force.

The Ecuadorian Army, evidently bent on preventing any repetition of the "Pachacútec" incident, and to forestall any Peruvian attempt to reach to crests of the Condor range, had gone on to establish a "defensive" perimeter on the area of Cenepa valley, with two outposts, "Tiwinza" and "Base Sur", on the Cenepa headwaters (i.e. in the eastern side of the Cordillera del Cóndor, in Peru's land), and a larger outpost, "Coangos", on the high ground overlooking them from the north (see map).

In turn, the "guarantors" (Warrantors) military considered offensive both Ecuadorian and Peruvian moves, due to the fact that, lacking official border markers, the Ecuadorian and Peruvian military had long since agreed to consider the line of the Condor range a de facto border, already considered broken by both countries since 1981.

Mobilizing for war
During the second half of December both sides began to hastily reinforce their military presence in and around the Cenepa valley area, laying down new minefields, preparing supply bases, and intensifying the patrolling activity.

By the end of December, profiting from its internal lines of communications, the Ecuadorian Army had strengthened to a considerable degree its presence in the area, having deployed a number of units, foremost among them several Special Forces formations, as well as artillery and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers on the heights of the Cordillera del Cóndor. The entire Ecuadorian perimeter was covered by antiaircraft batteries and, most significantly, several teams carrying Soviet-made SA-16 Igla and British-made Blowpipe man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

Meanwhile, the Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) was frantically getting up to operational status its fleet of subsonic and supersonic jet aircraft, and adapting existing airfields in southeastern Ecuador to function as forward-deployment bases. For the Ecuadorian military, especially the Army and Air Force, the memories of the conflict of 1981 and its embarrassing outcome were still fresh, the lessons learned, and every measure was taken to avoid a similar outcome if and when the threat of war became a reality.

For the Peruvian military, the mobilization process was somewhat more problematic. The Cenepa valley area was devoid of any major roads, population centers, or helicopter bases on the Peruvian side. The Peruvian Army and the Peruvian Air Force (FAP), had to organize an air-bridge to get reinforcements to the zone. Troops, heavy weapons, ammunition and supplies had to be flown in first from the Peruvian hinterland and Lima to Bagua AFB, where they were transferred to light transport aircraft for the flight to the Ciro Alegría base. From this base, the final flight to the Peruvian forward bases in the Cenepa valley, mainly Observation Post 1 (PV-1), was made aboard Peru's Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-17 helicopter fleet, very often under poor weather conditions, with heavy rain and low cloud cover.

Altogether, by the third week of January, both Peru and Ecuador had managed to deploy around 5,000 troops to the immediate vicinity of the delimited and undemarcated area.

First encounters
With the coming of the new year, crisis loomed in the Cenepa valley. By 8 January the Peruvian Army had deployed four patrols near Base Sur. On the night of 9 January 1995, Ecuadorian troops found and captured four Peruvian soldiers that according to the Ecuadorian accounts were supposedly reconnoitering the approaches to the Ecuadorian outpost of Cueva de los Tayos. Following the customary regulations put in place by both armies for the handling of such instances, the so-called Cartillas de Seguridad y Confianza (Guidelines for Safety and Mutual Confidence), the captured Peruvian personnel were delivered to their own officers without further incident.

Always following the Ecuadorian accounts, a subsequent incident took place two days later, on January 11, when another Peruvian patrol was detected near a place called the "Y", a point of tactical importance in the Ecuadorian lines. Shots were fired, apparently causing no casualties on either side.

Open war
By the third week of January, the Peruvian high command had deployed to the Cenepa area what it considered to be enough troops to clear any and all Ecuadorian troops on the Eastern side of the Cordillera del Cóndor. In retrospect, it is likely that Lima was expecting a repetition of the 1981 incident, unaware of the scale of the Ecuadorian deployment. Thus, as a preliminary to the attack, on 21 January Peruvian helicopters began a series of reconnaissance and troop insertion flights on the rear of the Ecuadorian positions, which continued for the next two days. The next day, 22 January, the Ecuadorians detected around twenty Peruvian troops setting up a heliport to the north and rear of the Ecuadorian forward outposts.

The stepping up of the Peruvian air operations, combined with the surprise discovery of a Peruvian base on the rear of the Ecuadorian perimeter, compelled the Ecuadorian high command to take the initiative. That same day, a reinforced Special Forces company was ordered to advance undetected through the dense jungle and dislodge the Peruvians from the site, named by the Ecuadorians' "Base Norte". Significantly, the decision to act was made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army before informing the President of the Republic, Sixto Durán-Ballén, and his National Security Council.

The Ecuadorian high command had by then interpreted the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Peruvian armed forces, General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza, to respond to calls from his Ecuadorian counterpart as a signal that the Peruvian military, with or without the knowledge of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, was preparing a military operation in the Cenepa valley.

The next day, the decision to act already taken, the Ecuadorian local commander informed his Peruvian counterpart that, from 24 January onwards, any Peruvian helicopter flying over Ecuadorian positions would be shot down. On the morning of Thursday, 26 January 1995, after three days of march, the Ecuadorian Special Forces detachment arrived undetected at the small Peruvian outpost "Base Norte" and launched a surprise attack on the unsuspecting garrison. A fierce firefight ensued, but the Peruvians were eventually forced to disperse through the jungle, leaving behind a number of dead soldiers, as well as weapons and supplies. The Cenepa War had begun.

Chronology of the War
The following days, the events unfolded in quick succession. Below is a complete chronological summary of the war.
 * 24 January: Peru mobilizes troops towards Tiwinza, Ecuador engages in preparing the FAE (Ecuadorian Air Force), Ecuadorian fighter jets.
 * 25 January: Peru militarizes a site in the Condor strip later known as Base Sur, thus provoking reaction by Ecuadorian forces, initiating the war.
 * 26 January: Peruvian conscripts setting up a heliport in Quebrada Fashin, behind the Ecuadorian outposts built in Peru's land since 1994, are attacked by Ecuadorian Special Forces, dislodging the Peruvians from the site; the Ecuadorians name the place Base Norte. Thus begins the shooting war.
 * 27 January: Ecuador and Peru order general mobilization. Armored units are deployed to the Pacific coast border area, ready to act in case of a general war. Altogether, around 140,000 men were mobilized during the war.
 * 28 January: At 7:45, the Peruvians launch the first ground assault against the Ecuadorian positions in the Cenepa headwaters. The attack is renewed at 11:05, this time with helicopters providing suppressive fire. At 09:00 a Peruvian Air Force (FAP) Bell 212 helicopter was damaged in its fuel tank by Ecuadorian fire. At 12:05, Peruvian ground attack aircraft make their first appearance over the valley, but withdraw upon being informed of the presence of FAE interceptors in the area.
 * 29 January: In a pattern that will continue during the next days, Peruvian forces launch multiple and simultaneous attacks all over the area, in an effort to off-balance the Ecuadorian defenses. The Ecuadorians fight back at Tiwinza, Cueva de los Tayos, Base Sur, and Coangos, and shoot down a Soviet-made Mi-8TV helicopter (EP-587) belonging to the Peruvian Army Aviation (AEP) becomes the first confirmed kill for the Ecuadorian MANPADS teams on the ground. At the end of the day, Peru announces having captured three Ecuadorian strongholds as a result of the day's actions, which Ecuador goes on to deny.
 * 31 January: After a 24-hours lull in the fight, the Peruvians resume their attacks against Tiwinza, Coangos, and Cueva de los Tayos. Ecuador and Peru reject an international appeal for an immediate ceasefire.
 * 1 February: The assaults continue, now with strong artillery support. Peruvian A-37B ground attack aircraft appear over the battlefield and bomb Ecuadorian positions. The Ecuadorian base of Cóndor Mirador, on the summit of the Cordillera del Cóndor falls also under attack. A Peruvian patrol approaching Cueva de los Tayos hits a minefield and suffers severe losses.
 * 2 February: During the day, the FAP carries out no less than twelve ground attack sorties, in support of the ground troops assaulting Cueva de los Tayos and Base Sur. FAE interceptors, still flying from bases too far north, near Guayaquil, appear too late to find any targets.
 * 3 February: Ecuadorian Strikemasters and A-37B ground attack aircraft appear for the first time to bomb Peruvian positions.
 * 4 February: Peruvian Tucanos bomb Ecuadorian positions in the valley during a night bombing sortie.
 * 6 February: The FAP begins to make use of its Canberra jet bombers to strike Ecuadorian positions. One Canberra is lost perhaps crashed into a mountain due to the bad weather conditions over the area.
 * 7 February: In a bitter reminder of the dangers that the Cenepa valley pose for low-speed aircraft flying at low-altitudes, a FAP Mi-25 helicopter gunship is downed after being hit in quick succession by at least two (probably three) SA-16s shoulder-fired missiles. FAE A-37Bs, escorted by Kfir fighters, continue to attack Peruvian positions. One A-37B is hit by Peruvian AA fire, but manages to get back to base.
 * 9 February: Heavy air activity. The FAP carries out no less than 16 ground attack sorties, throwing its fleet of Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bombers into the battle. FAP Canberras carry out a night bombing mission.
 * 10 February: Heavy air activity continues over the battlezone. During the morning, the FAP sends in A-37Bs and Sukhoi Su-22 to strike Ecuadorian positions. The FAE steps in. At 12:42, the Ecuadorian radars pick up five enemy targets approaching for another round of attacks. Two FAE Mirage F.1JAs and two IAI Kfir C.2s are sent to intercept the incoming aircraft. In the ensuing action an A-37B subsonic aircraft is shot down by a Kfir and two Peruvian Sukhoi Su-22s were claimed to be shot down by the Ecuadorian Mirage F1 respectively. Peru, however, denied that the two Sukhoi Su-22s were shot down by Mirages, stating that one was struck by Ecuadorian anti-aircraft artillery during a low-flying ground-attack mission, and the second because of an engine fire.  Regarding the two downed Su-22s, the Ecuadorian Air Force never showed the HUD videos of the Ecuadorian fighters shooting down the Su-22s.

 * 11 February: Further Peruvian Special Forces reinforcements arrive at PV-1. As the ground war drags on, air activity over the area increases. Encouraged by the events of the day before, the Ecuadorian A-37Bs launch even bolder ground-attack missions on Peruvian positions. One FAE A-37B is hit by a Peruvian MANPADS.
 * 12 February: Air operations continue. The Peruvians claim the destruction of one A-37B and one Kfir, both of them denied by Ecuador.
 * 13 February: Peruvian forces launch powerful attacks against Coangos and Tiwinza, with heavy air support. One Peruvian Mi-8TV is lost to Ecuadorian fire. In the evening, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori appears before the cameras to claim the taking of Tiwinza (Tiwinza "I" Cota 1209) and total victory for Peru. However the Ecuadorians denied this claim by "showing the position of Tiwinza" by GPS, but their coordinates were false.
 * 14–16 February: Combat continues all along the area.
 * 17 February: In the presence of the four guarantor countries of the Rio Protocol (the US, Brazil, Chile, Argentina), Ecuadorian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Fernández de Córdoba, and Peruvian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Ponce, sign a peace declaration in Brazil (Declaración de Paz de Itamaraty), confirming a ceasefire, a separation of forces, a general demobilization, and establishing a "guarantors" peacekeeping force, the MOMEP (Military Observer Mission, Ecuador Peru), charged with supervising the separation of forces, taking over the posts of Tiwinza and Base Sur, and suggesting the limits for an eventual demilitarized zone. Ecuador and Peru pledge themselves to begin talks on the "pending issues".
 * 21 February: The first MOMEP observers arrive to the Ecuadorian rear base of Patuca, but confused fighting rages on all-day long, preventing the observers to reach the area of the conflict. Ecuador claims Peruvian helicopters are violating the cease-fire by flying over the Ecuadorian posts.
 * 22 February: In a day that Ecuadorians refer to as "Black Wednesday", Peruvian forces launch a strong attack on Ecuadorian positions in Cenepa valley (Tiwinza Cota 1061). According to Ecuadorian sources, fourteen of their soldiers died that day, the worst in terms of casualties for the Ecuadorian Army during the war. That afternoon and night, the Ecuadorian forces retaliate against Peruvians positions until the next day, when intense activity was detected in the Peruvian lines, identified by the Ecuadorian officers as the evacuation of the casualties caused by the offensive the night before.
 * 28 February: After more days of confusing skirmishes, Ecuador and Peru sign the Montevideo Declaration, "reiterating their commitment to proceed to an immediate and effective ceasefire". Although minor incidents would continue all over the area during the next months, the Cenepa War is officially over.

Aftermath
By the beginning of March 1995, the MOMEP observers had entered the area and began to supervise the separation of forces. In accordance with the Treaty of Itamaraty and the Declaration of Montevideo, the Ecuadorians began to withdraw all their units to the base of Coangos, while the Peruvians were to do the same to PV-1. From there, troops would be extracted according to a schedule implement by the MOMEP. All combatants were withdrawn from the delimited and undemarcated area by May 5, 1995. A demilitarized zone came into effect on August 4 of the same year. Ecuador and Peru went on to negotiate the final demarcation of the border, in a lengthy process marked by one crisis after another, with a total war almost erupting in August 1998. Finally, on October 26, 1998, in Brasília, Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador, and Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, along with the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile; and a personal representative of the President of the United States of America, signed a Presidential Act, which proclaimed "the definitive resolution of the border disputes between the two nations".
 * Negotiated ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from the combat zone.
 * The conflict ends on March 28, 1995, with the signing of "Reiteration of the commitment to stop an immediate and effective ceasefire", after the guarantor countries established a demilitarized zone.
 * Ecuadorian troops were forced to withdraw to the western side of the Cordillera del Cóndor as well as the entire head of the Cenepa River without having achieved their objective of obtaining the disputed territory and having sovereign access to the Amazon to compel Peru to a new delimitation in its borders. The posts installed by Ecuador came to be controlled by the Peruvian Army
 * Ecuador recognizes the authenticity and validity of the Rio Protocol and renounces its thesis of unenforceability of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol and its aspiration to be a coastal country of the Amazon River as well as its claim of sovereignty over the Marañón river.
 * The disputed territories are recognized as Peruvian. Tiwinza (cota 1061) was recognized by the guarantors as Peruvian territory.
 * Ecuador receives 1 km2 in Tiwinza (level 1061) as "private property", without sovereignty and only for commemorative and non-military acts. Anyone born in Tiwinza (20 km²) will be considered Peruvian Cenepa. Hoy 17 de Febrero de 1995 culmina la Guerra del Cenepa — Español
 * Brasilia Presidential Act signed on the 26 October 1998, closing the frontier, as stated in Protocolo de Rio de Janeiro, and declaring the end to all differences between the two nations.

In a decision that certain political sectors on both sides took as a setback, the Guarantors of the Rio Protocol determined that the boundary of the delimited and undemarcated zone was in fact the Cordillera del Cóndor line, as Peru had been claiming from the 1940s. While Ecuador was forced to renounce its decades-old territorial claims as Tumbes, Jaen and Maynas as well as on the eastern slopes of the Cordillera, as well as the entire western area of the Cenepa headwaters, Peru "gives" to Ecuador, as a "private property" but without sovereignty and only for commemorative and non-military events, one square kilometer of its territory, in the area where the Ecuadorian base of Tiwinza was located (level 1061), focal point of the war, inside the Peruvian soil, anyone born in Tiwinza will be considered Peruvian. The final demarcation of the border came into effect on May 13, 1999.

Casualties and material losses
Figures given for losses during the Cenepa War vary widely, especially regarding human casualties. Ecuadorian military sources put the casualties at 34 killed recognized by Comando Conjunto de las FFAA del Ecuador and 154 killed and wounded recognized by Asociación de ex combatientes del Cenepa, Quito, Ecuador. As of February 2005, an Ecuadorian Cenepa war veterans' association had a membership of 131 ex-combatants, some of them with long-term health disorders caused by the war. ALDHU, a human rights NGO, has put the total number of mortal casualties for both sides at around 500. This figure was also given by Ecuadorian senior officers after the war, reflecting the fact that Peruvians found themselves attacking well-protected Ecuadorian positions and subjected to continuous ambushes and well-aimed artillery and rocket fire from the heights of the Condor range.

The aircraft and helicopter losses mentioned above represent the losses acknowledged by each side during the conflict due to enemy action or to accidents, as cited in the Air Combat Information Group Website. According to the same source, Peru may have lost up to three helicopters during the conflict, and Ecuador may have lost one attack helicopter in unclear circumstances. Faundes, citing Ecuadorian sources, puts the total of Peruvian losses at four fixed-wing aircraft and three helicopters. Both sources agree that Ecuador lost one AT-33A trainer in an accident outside the combat area, three fallen A-37 and two defective Kfir cannot return to the theater of operations in the conflict.

Chile
During the war, a series of Peruvian newspapers brought forth information claiming that Chile had sold armament to Ecuador during the conflict. This claim was promptly denied by Chile the following day on February 5, 1995, but admitted that they had sold weaponry to Ecuador on September 12, 1994, as part of a regular commercial exchange that had no aim against any particular nation. The source of this deal has been traced back to 1977, when the military regime of Augusto Pinochet signed an agreement with the Ecuadorian military authorities then ruling the country (headed by Alfredo Poveda) for the sale of armament by the state-run FAMAE factory. That contract was reportedly renewed around the reported time of the registered legal sale (September 1994), which led to the aforementioned shipment of military hardware to Ecuador. In 1995, and due to lack of further information, Peru's president, Alberto Fujimori, put a momentary end to the scandal.

However, the controversy was once again ignited when General Víctor Manuel Bayas, former Chief of Staff of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces during the Cenepa War, made a series of declarations in regards to the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador. On March 21, 2005, General Bayas was asked by the Ecuadorian newspaper El Comercio if Chile had sold armaments to Ecuador during the Cenepa War, to which he replied: “Yes, it was a contract with the militaries during the conflict." Furthermore, General Bayas revealed that Argentina and Russia had also sold weaponry to Ecuador during the conflict. Later that same year, on April 11, Colonel Ernesto Checa, Ecuador's military representative in Chile during the Cenepa War, stated that Chile provided Ecuador with "ammunition, rifles and night vision devices" during the war. Moreover, the Peruvian government revealed that it held knowledge that during the war at least a couple of Ecuadorian C-130 transport airplanes had landed in Chilean territory to pick up 9mm ammunition, and that the Ecuadorian Air Force had planned three more of those armament acquisition voyages to Chile. Nonetheless, the Peruvian government at that time regarded this as a minor incident due to the Chilean Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations, Mariano Fernández, telling the Peruvian ambassador in Chile, Alfonso de Rivero, on February 2, 1995, that the Chilean government would take immediate measures to stop any other possible operations of this nature. In this communication, Fernández is reported to have concurred to de Rivero's residence and revealed that only 9mm ammunition, which had been paid with anticipation, had been loaded in the Ecuadorian planes; that a Chilean lawyer representing Ecuador had demanded the fulfillment of the contract and that Ecuadorian military personnel who came on the plane asked for additional armament, only to have this petition denied; however Peruvian Caretas magazine reported that part of this information wasn't precise (without specifying which part). Apparently, the Chilean authorities were being sincere, as President Frei only took notice of the departure of the Ecuadorian Hercules planes (loaded only with ammunition) hours after they had left.

Chile's response to the declarations made by General Bayas were made the following day on March 22, 2005. The government of Chile denied the claims and stated that the only registered sale of weapons to Ecuador was in 1994. Jaime Ravinet, the Chilean Minister of Defense, assured that any other armament transfer after the 1994 date had been illegal. Ravinet further stated that, after discussing the matter with his Peruvian counterpart, Roberto Chiabra, the situation had been resolved. Yet, the Peruvian government did not find the February 5, 1995, and March 22, 2005, declarations as acceptable or sufficient; and went on to send a note of protest to the Chilean government. Peru further claimed that Chile should have maintained absolute neutrality and that this alleged weapons commerce during the Cenepa War went against resolutions made by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

In the end, the whole operation was revealed to be the planning of former dictator Pinochet, then chief of the Armed Forces (until 1998). Quoting Peruvian ambassador to Chile in 1995 (de Rivero), the Chilean Sub-secretary (Fernández) "pointed out to me that President Frei and chancellor (foreign minister) Insulza had been deeply worried by the situation and that they were taking all the dispositions of the case to reform the military sales law". Reportedly, Pinochet himself later assumed direct responsibility for the shipment before the civilian authorities of his country (even if his lawyer denied it in 2005 ), as he still exercised considerable influence over state institutions and controlled the security apparatus, thus having power to bypass civilian controls to foreign arms sales. It is worth noting that Pinochet, who had lived in Ecuador during the second half of the 1950s as a military instructor, had a deep affection towards the country and, a couple of years later, in November–December 1997, made a controversial and highly publicized visit to Ecuador where he attended a series of ceremonies and was given six military and civilian decorations by that country's civilian and military authorities.

Argentina
Argentina admitted to the illegal sale of armament by revealing the existence of three secret decrees signed by President Carlos Menem between the years of 1991 and 1995. The controversy regarding the decrees came about when the weapons sold did not go to Panama, Bolivia, and Venezuela as had been accorded, but instead the weapons ended up in Croatia and Ecuador at times when both of these nations were involved in wars and prohibited from receiving international military aid. The sale Argentina gave to Ecuador included 6.500 tons of rifles, cannons, anti-tank rockets, and ammunition. Menem was taken to court for his alleged association with these illegal acts in 2001, but was acquitted by Argentina's Supreme Court. In October 2008 the case was re-opened, but Menem avoided being detained by Argentine authorities until 2010 due to his position as senator of La Rioja. Menem claimed to have had no association with the illegal weapons trade, and further adds that this is a political persecution made by Argentine president Cristina Fernández and, her husband and also former Argentine president, Néstor Kirchner. In 2013 Carlos Menem was sentenced to seven years in prison for arms-smuggling.

Characteristics of the fighting in 1995
Several explanations have been brought forward to explain the outcome of the Cenepa conflict. Some of these can be briefly summarized here:

 * Logistics. Both during the buildup of forces and during the clashes of January and February, the Peruvian Army found itself at a logistical disadvantage. The fact that all reinforcements and supplies had to be flown in by helicopter from Ciro Alegría base, more than 110 km to the south, meant that, in general, the Ecuadorian forces went into combat better armed and supplied. Moreover, once the shooting war started, the Cenepa valley became a rather dangerous place for the Peruvian Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-17 helicopters, which besides their transport duties also carried out ground-attack missions.
 * Force Composition. Right from the very first clashes, the Ecuadorian Army committed Special Forces units all along the combat area. In addition to the paratroopers, the Ecuadorians sent into battle a number of "Iwia" detachments — units composed of tribal people such as the Shuar people, specialized in jungle combat and survival. Until the arrival of some elite counterinsurgency units from the south (battle-hardened by a leftist insurgency) the Peruvian forces committed to the battle were composed mostly of young and inexperienced conscripts.
 * Terrain. In 1995, the Ecuadorian Army fought on terrain of its own choosing. From the heights of the Condor mountain range, the Ecuadorians had a commanding view of the entire combat area. The Ecuadorian artillery -carefully camouflaged on the reverse slopes of the Condor range- could deliver precise and deadly fire upon attacking Peruvian troops. By the same token, the Ecuadorian antiaircraft batteries and SAMs located on the heights made helicopter low-level flight into the valley a dangerous proposition.
 * State of the opposing air forces at the outbreak of the crisis. The war of 1995 came at a bad moment for the Peruvian Air Force, as the economic crisis that had struck the nation in the 1980s had a negative impact on the readiness of the FAP. At the beginning of January 1995, with a crisis looming on the horizon, the FAP found itself in no shape for a major air war. Most of its fleet of modern Mirage 2000Ps interceptors, bought in the mid-1980s and the backbone of the FAP, was grounded for lack of spare parts and proper maintenance due to lack of funds. Only three Mirage 2000Ps were immediately available for active operations. Its fleet of Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bombers was in the same situation, with some seven aircraft in flying condition; the lack of preparedness even affected the Cessna A-37B subsonic counterinsurgency and ground-attack aircraft. Although by the end of January the situation regarding operational aircraft had greatly improved, the crisis had probably left its impact on the FAP. Ecuador had also passed through a period of economic crisis of its own, but the FAE had kept in operational status a sizeable part of its fleet of Mirage F.1JAs, IAI Kfir C.2s, and SEPECAT Jaguars, with perhaps some ten Mirages, ten Kfirs, and four or six Jaguars in serviceable condition. Thus, while smaller in total number of planes, the FAE of January 1995 felt qualitatively capable of facing the FAP on equal terms - in striking contrast to the situation during the crisis of 1981, where except for a small number of missions, the FAE had been kept on the ground armed and ready for immediate action, to be committed only in case of a full-fledged war. In 1995 their positions in the Cordillera del Cóndor were well defended due to tactically placed SAMs, and units armed with British-made Blowpipe missiles and Russian-made SA-16 MANPADS. Nevertheless, such defences didn't stop the continuous raids of the Peruvian Air Force.

title: Cenepa War


text:
Marlon Jackson

Marlon David Jackson (born March 12, 1957) is an American entertainer, singer, and dancer best known as a member of the Jackson 5. He is the sixth child of the Jackson family. Marlon now runs Study Peace Foundation to promote peace and unity worldwide.

Early life
Marlon David Jackson was born on March 12, 1957, at St Mary's Mercy Hospital in Gary, Indiana, the sixth child of Joseph who was a steel mill worker, and played in an R&B band, the Falcons, with his brother Luther, and Katherine Jackson, a Jehovah's Witness. He was born seventeen and a half months before his younger brother Michael (born August 29, 1958). Growing up, Marlon was especially close to Michael, whom he considered the substitute for his lost twin brother, Brandon, who died shortly after birth. “We were the jokers of the family," Marlon said.

By 1964, Marlon and Michael joined their brothers Tito, Jackie and Jermaine, forming the group the Jackson 5. Their mother, Katherine, played the piano and clarinet, and sang harmonies with the brothers. Father, Joe led the rehearsals, keeping them off the street and away from trouble. They won singing competitions all over the state including New York. That marked the beginning of their career. Marlon was not the most prominent member of the Jackson 5, though he did sing background vocals on many of their hits. He also played the conga and tambourine. Brother Randy later joined the band when Jermaine chose to stay at Motown after the group left the label and renamed themselves the Jacksons. Marlon has three sisters; Rebbie, La Toya, and Janet.

The Jackson 5
Marlon and his brothers first signed as the Jackson 5 with Gordon Keith of Steeltown Records in November 1967, and their first single "Big Boy", was released on January 31, 1968. After the group recorded three more songs with the Steeltown label (on two records) they were signed with Berry Gordy of Motown Records in 1969. Not feeling that they were being paid fair royalties by Motown Records for their success as well as their desire for creative control, the Jackson 5 decided to leave the label and sign with Epic Records in 1975. Jermaine split from the Jackson Five to start a solo career at Motown, and was replaced by his brother Randy Jackson. Unbeknownst to the group, Gordy had trademarked the name The Jackson Five and did not allow the group to continue using the name when they left the label. Once signed with Epic, the group became known simply as The Jacksons. In 1983, Gordy asked the group to perform at the Motown 25: Yesterday, Today, Forever television special. In 1997, he was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1997 with his brothers. In 2001, he reunited with his brothers to perform for the Michael Jackson 30th Anniversary Special.

Solo career
Like Michael and Jermaine, Marlon began a solo career, releasing the album Baby Tonight in 1987. Despite Baby Tonight reaching No. 22 on the Top R&B Albums chart in the United States, Marlon has not released another album since then.

Later work
Marlon was successful within real estate in Southern California. In 1999, Marlon started running the Major Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) along with Florida attorney Willie E. Gary, baseball player Cecil Fielder, boxer Evander Holyfield, and Alvin James. MBC was a religious network based in Atlanta. In October 1, 2004, they rebranded as Black Family Channel. In May 2007, the Black Family Channel was sold to the Gospel Music Channel, now known as Up TV. In 2008, Marlon and a board of new partners founded the Motherland Group, LLC bringing recognition to Badagry, Nigeria.

Marlon now runs the Study Peace Foundation, founded in 2015, aimed to promote peace and unity in communities worldwide offering programs designed to engage children, adults and the elderly to live in peaceful environments. “As a community we all should know that promoting peace and unity would cause a chain reaction that children will observe. It all starts with what we make accessible to the children,” he said. The foundation went into a partnership with KaBOOM! (non-profit organization) to build playgrounds in New Orleans, Gary and Los Angeles.

Family
In August 1975, 18-year-old Jackson married his girlfriend, Carol Ann Parker, whom he met in New Orleans during one of the Jacksons' tours. Marlon and Parker have three children:

 * Valencia Caroline Jackson (born December 18, 1976)
 * Brittany Shauntee Jackson (born September 4, 1978)
 * Marlon David Jackson Jr. (born September 23, 1981)

Marlon and Carol have six grandchildren, two from Valencia and four from Brittany.

Michael's memorial
On July 7, 2009, at the Staples Center, Marlon and his family offered their final eulogies for Michael, saying he was the "soul" of the family, addressing the crowd: "Maybe now, Michael, they will leave you alone" and "I would like for you to give our brother, my twin brother, Brandon, a hug for me." Marlon said, "I love you, Michael, and I'll miss you.". In honor of Michael, Marlon and his brothers, Tito, Jackie, Jermaine and Randy Jackson served as pallbearers wearing a gold necktie, a single white glove and sunglasses.

In a 2019 Rolling Stone interview, Marlon was vocal about the allegations against his brother Michael saying, "if your brother was deceased and someone wanted to slander his name, you'd be supporting him. That's not him. That's not his character. We definitely know our brother, and there are no facts whatsoever to corroborate these allegations." He continues, "It's a quick money grab. That's all it is."

Other contributions

 * 1980: La Toya Jackson – La Toya Jackson
 * 1981: My Special Love – La Toya Jackson
 * 1983: Wright Back at You – Betty Wright
 * 1983: Respect – Billy Griffin
 * 1984: Heart Don't Lie – La Toya Jackson
 * 1984: Dream Street – Janet Jackson
 * 1985: "We Are the World" – USA for Africa
 * 1986: The Golden Child Soundtrack.
 * 1989: 2300 Jackson Street – The Jacksons featuring Michael Jackson, Janet Jackson, Rebbie Jackson and Marlon Jackson.
 * 2011: AI Feat. The Jacksons (Jackie Jackson/Tito Jackson/Marlon Jackson) - Letter in the Sky
 * 2021: Tito Jackson Feat. Marlon Jackson/Stevie Wonder/Kenny Neal and Bobby Rush - Love One Another

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Marlon Jackson


text:
Mia X

Mia Young (born January 9, 1970), better known by her stage name Mia X, is an American rapper and songwriter from New Orleans. She enjoyed success in the local "bounce" scene of the early 1990s. She was the first female emcee to get a contract with rapper and entertainment magnate, Master P on his successful record label No Limit Records. She is known for collaborations with several No Limit Records artists, including Master P and Silkk the Shocker on the seminal albums, Ice Cream Man, Ghetto D and Charge It 2 Da Game.

Personal life
Young grew up in the Lafitte housing project in New Orleans' seventh ward. Her father was a trucker and her mother was a counselor. She graduated from Redeemer High School and briefly attended Delgado Community College before she decided to pursue a career in music.

In 2006 in a magazine article, her publicist releases a statement of an upcoming cookbook. Before her cookbook she did on online page on Instagram #teamwhipdempots. Her cookbook was finally released in 2018.

In the 2010s, Mia X was diagnosed with uterine cancer and beat it. In surgery for the cancer, the surgeons accidentally "tore her cornea off", and that left her with 73% vision in one eye.

Music beginnings
Mia X's rap career began in the late '80s and early '90s before she graduated from high school, when she performed in a "mobile entertainment service" called New York Inc. with Mannie Fresh, who would later rise to stardom as the production genius behind Cash Money Records. She made her recorded debut in 1992 with the single "Ask them Suckas" (an answer song created in response to "Ask them Hoes" by 39 Posse), on Lamina Records. In 1993, she released "Da Payback," a maxi-single which appeared on both the Rap Dis! and Lamina Records labels, which despite its status as "the No. 1-selling local record of 1993 at Odyssey Records" did not generate any income for the artist.

In 1994, Mia X signed a contract for two albums with Roy Joseph, Jr.'s Emoja Records. The label (along with its successor, Slaughterhouse Records) released her full-length debut Mommie Dearest in 1995. Joseph later filed a $10 million lawsuit against Master P and No Limit Records, asserting that the label "persuaded Mia X to break her contract." No Limit Records subsequently filed a countersuit against Joseph asking for $20 million in damages.

1995: TRU, No Limit Records and Good Girl Gone Bad
In 1995, Mia X was signed to Master P's label No Limit Records after he inquired at Peaches Records and Tapes (where she was working at the time) about promising local female rappers. She joined the roster as a solo artist and also became a member of Master P's group at the time, TRU, where she experienced national success. She was the first female rapper to be signed by No Limit Records. On November 21, 1995, Mia X released her first album titled Good Girl Gone Bad, which failed to chart on any of the Billboard charts.

1997–98: Unlady Like and Mama Drama
In 1997, she released her first single from her upcoming second album titled "The Party Don't Stop" featuring Master P and Foxy Brown. On June 24, 1997, Mia X released her second album, Unlady Like, which peaked at No. 21 on the Billboard 200 and No. 11 on the Top R&B/Hip-Hop Albums chart. The record was certified gold in October 1997.

On October 27, 1998, Mia X released her third album, Mama Drama, which peaked at No. 7 on the Billboard 200 and No. 3 on the Top R&B/Hip-Hop Albums charts.

1999–present
Beginning in 1999, Mia X went on hiatus from recording following the deaths of fourteen family members, including both her parents, in an eighteen-month span, in addition to the dissolution of the No Limit roster due to Master P pursuing non-musical interests. In the early 2000s, she worked in real estate and as a ghostwriter for other hip-hop artists.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Mia X recorded "My FEMA People" in response to the ensuing disastrous conditions in New Orleans.

Mia X appeared on C-Murder's 2008 release Screamin' 4 Vengeance, on tracks titled "Mihita" and "Posted on tha Block". On June 13, 2014, she released a new single titled "Mr. Right", featuring artist Ms. Tasha via her label, Mama Mia Muzic. On September 1, 2015, Mia X released a new single titled "No More" featuring Caren Green. She released a mixtape in 2010 titled Unladylike Forever, and claimed she was working on a new album titled Betty Rocka Locksmith, but it was never released.

Studio albums

 * Good Girl Gone Bad (1995)
 * Unlady Like (1997)
 * Mama Drama (1998)

Extended plays

 * Da Payback (1993)
 * ''Mommie Dearest (1995)

Filmography

 * Films

title: Mia X


text:
Talk:Quorum sensing

Reorganize around Signaling Systems?
This source http://bioinfo.imtech.res.in/manojk/sigmol/uniq_QSSMs.php records 5 categories of signaling systems - AHLs, AI-2, DKPs, DSFs, HAQs(, and 'other'). Some of them aren't included in this article yet. It might be good to reorganize the examples around the categories of signaling systems. - Whatsit369 (talk) 21:06, 6 July 2018 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article is or was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Gjoshira.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 07:38, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article is or was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment. Further details are available on the course page. Peer reviewers: Radhikabhake.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 07:38, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article is or was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Celina Sewlochan, Jodymao.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 07:38, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: The Microbiology of College Life
— Assignment last updated by Yp337 (talk) 20:14, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: The Microbiology of College Life
— Assignment last updated by Jason.DeLaCruz1313 (talk) 00:31, 10 May 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Quorum sensing


text:
Norwegian Home Guard

The Norwegian Home Guard (Heimevernet – "HV") is the rapid mobilization force within the Norwegian armed forces. Its main focus is local defense and civil support, but it can also detach volunteers for international operations. Its main tasks are safeguarding territorial integrity, strengthening military presence, and protecting important infrastructure.

It has land defense units, and has volunteers and conscript personnel with backgrounds from all branches. Founded 6 December 1946, it is the second youngest branch in the Norwegian armed forces after the Norwegian Cyber Defence Force (Cyberforsvaret).

Organization
The Home Guard is divided into 11 districts ("HV-districts"), which again is divided into smaller units, typically covering a single county. In a wartime situation Heimevernet will typically be used to protect the local infrastructure and population.

The Home Guard district commanders represent a level of command subordinate to the Joint Operational Headquarters but with territorial responsibility which includes responsibility for operational planning. They also have a responsibility to the Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Home Guard for force production.

The Home Guard maintains contact with the civil community through a civil-military network based on mutual knowledge and trust. The local commanders are responsible for fostering cooperation with the police and the civil sector at local and county levels.

Strength
The Home Guard has 45,000 soldiers all over the country, distributed on eleven regional districts. The Home Guard also has several rapid-reaction intervention forces consisting of 3,000 voluntarily recruited and well-trained soldiers.

Troop exchange
The Home Guard does a troop exchange with the Minnesota National Guard every year. The exchange grew from Norwegian American soldiers sent to Norway to assist resistance fighters in World War II. As part of the exchange, American Guard members are flown to Værnes Air Station and Norwegians are sent to Camp Ripley. Troops complete each other's training, and tour the area.

The Rapid Reaction Forces
From 2005, the Home Guard has recruited for a high readiness force with better trained and equipped personnel. It is called the "Rapid Reaction Force" (Innsatsstyrke). This is the spearhead of the combat force that consists of specially selected, educated and equipped personnel. The force can be mobilized rapidly and is a national resource. Effort strengths contribute to national security.

Soldiers often come from operational armed forces in the Armed Forces and commit themselves to a minimum of 3 years service each and can be ordered on a sharp mission in Norway. They must update and further develop their military competence continuously. They can attend a number of courses, task force missions and other defense activities.

There is one Rapid Reaction Force per district, in total 3,000 men and women. The Rapid Reaction Force is the speartip of the Norwegian Home Guard, and contains flexible and mobile units. It has top priority when concerning weapons, material and training resources. The force is ready to respond within hours to acts of terrorism, bomb threats, and or other emergencies. In peacetime, the RRFs can support the police and civilian community with a variety of tasks, including providing security for the public and enforcing police regulations. The RRFs are named after operations executed during WW2 by the Norwegian Independent Company 1 (a.k.a. Linge Company):

 * Oslofjord HV-district 01: RRF Polar Bear VI
 * Oslo and Akershus HV-district 02: RRF Derby
 * Telemark and Buskerud HV-district 03: RRF Gunnerside
 * Opplandske HV-district 05: RRF Grebe
 * Agder and Rogaland HV-district 08: RRF Osprey and Varg
 * Bergenhus HV-district 09: RRF Bjørn West
 * Møre and Fjordane HV-district 11: RRF Archery
 * Trøndelag HV-district 12: RRF Rype
 * Sør-Hålogaland HV-district 14: RRF Heron
 * Nord-Hålogaland HV-district 16: RRF Claymore
 * Finnmark HV-district 17: RRF Ida & Lyra and Delfin

The Naval branch of the Home Guard used to be four RRFs. but the Norwegian government closed the units down in 2017 due to saving costs.

 * South: RRF Bundle
 * West: RRF Salamander
 * North: RRFs Waxwing and Anklet

Platoons
The Rapid Reaction Forces consists of several different platoons within each district. In this way, each district will be able to respond to any kind of incident that could occur, without having to rely on outside help. Each district (with some variations) will have trained operators in these different types of units:

 * Jegertropp (Ranger platoon)
 * Skarpskyttertropp (Sniper platoon)
 * MP-tjeneste (Military Police)
 * Hundetjenesten (K9 unit)
 * Stabstropp (Staff platoon – (S-1, to S-4), transport & logistics)
 * Sambandstropp (Signal platoon)
 * Dykkerlag (Diving team – Underwater reconnaissance, explosives-detection)
 * Sanitetstropp (Medical platoon)
 * Innsatstropper (Infantry platoons)

A Light Mechanized unit has been established in district's 12, 14 and 16. this one is called Multi-Troppen (Multi Platoon). These platoons handle the custom made Geländewagen 290 multi III and is the speartip of the RRF's.

In Oslo, one of the Home Guard units is styled as a cavalry squadron, and wears black cavalry berets, because it used to be equipped with M24 Chaffee light tanks and M3 White armored cars, and was manned by former army dragoons. Its main mission was the defense of the former Fornebu airport; this mission was changed to escort duties, and it is now one of the rapid response units in Oslo.

Equipment

Until the end of the 1960s, the Home Guard used second-hand weapons from the Norwegian Army. At the end of the period, the Home Guard was equipped with more modern and heavier weapons.

The Home Guard today uses small arms like the MP-7 submachine guns, HK416 automatic rifles, MG-3 machine gun and FN Minimi light machine guns. Additionally, the Barrett M82 sniper rifle and Glock 17 pistol are used. Additionally, the Carl Gustaf 8.4cm recoilless rifle is used by the rapid reaction forces infantry platoons.

The vehicle fleet consists mainly of Mercedes-Benz G-Class utility vehicles, ambulances, BV 206 and Scania lorries. In November 2020, The Rapid Reaction Forces received 420 new Volkswagen Amarok field wagons, to replace the older MB 240 wagons.

Home Guard districts
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
 * Oslofjord Heimevernsdistrikt 01 – HV-01 – Rygge
 * Oslo og Akershus Heimevernsdistrikt 02 – HV-02 – Lutvann
 * Telemark og Buskerud Heimevernsdistrikt 03 – HV-03 – Heistadmoen
 * Opplandske Heimevernsdistrikt 05 – HV-05 – Terningmoen
 * Rogaland Heimevernsdistrikt 08 – HV-08 – Vatneleiren
 * Bergenhus Heimevernsdistrikt 09 – HV-09 – Bergenhus
 * Møre og Romsdal Heimevernsdistrikt 11 – HV-11 – Setnesmoen
 * Trøndelag Heimevernsdistrikt 12 – HV-12 – Værnes
 * Sør-Hålogaland Heimevernsdistrikt 14 – HV-14 – Drevjamoen
 * Nord-Hålogaland Heimevernsdistrikt 16 – HV-16 – Elvegårdsmoen
 * Finnmark Heimevernsdistrikt 17 – HV-17 – Porsangermoen

Weapons school
The Home Guards weapon school Heimevernets våpenskole (HVVS) established in 1947 is located at Dombås. The training centre is providing education and courses for Home Guard personnel, but also for the other branches in the armed forces.

HVVS schools 1200 NCOs and officers yearly, and offers 70 different courses of various length.

title: Norwegian Home Guard


text:
NASA Earth Observatory

NASA Earth Observatory is an online publishing outlet for NASA which was created in 1999. It is the principal source of satellite imagery and other scientific information pertaining to the climate and the environment which are being provided by NASA for consumption by the general public. It is funded with public money, as authorized by the United States Congress, and is part of the EOS Project Science Office located at Goddard Space Flight Center.

, NASA Earth Observatory has won the Webby People's Voice Award in Education three times. There were a series of publicized images issued by the website in 2008, including imagery of clouds streaming over the Caspian Sea, dust storms curling off the coast of Morocco, the crumbling of the Wilkins Ice Shelf, Hurricane Bertha, and others.

title: NASA Earth Observatory


text:
User:Hcatlin

My name is Hampton Catlin. I was the Mobile Development Lead for the Wikimedia Foundation from 2008-2011. I currently live in San Francisco, CA with my wonderful Husband. I am the creator of Haml and Sass markup languages, the author of "The Pragmatic Guide to Sass", and a contributing author of "Beginning Rails: From Novice to Professional".

Pages Created
Hal Abelson

Jacksonville Skyway

Furman University

Goto Dengo (stub)

Major Revisions
Greenville, South Carolina

Travelers Rest, South Carolina

Public Key
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAoET83J1YKyC8C0su4RfGVWz9Lx69dwSgPamrAGue/BvQ4W7IDvCQZPi8pKMZuhY4N7OkjjhTjV7JqMqqjKICCwFVHZQSuMbFKYbaMtuYGGno0kGVRpGd7n9x4bHAep5K6H/FUpedPPjuhfXmvl7EYRIYHJrayMS2P79o5GcFFwQ6rYuBvc/vAMkOp1NFjfOktPLUmaU4PMroeIPf1XJ+n2Wr5hFw7fehHcYF7VmJft6jhPN+DVHyziJPRWEhFe5axfkqEC6wIk2O/d7OqnPATlk+7+vEh69yOzZu8Jh/FrNn9HzGHH8ZzvuksUvVoRyw8qlhFRxJKLbl/IPPZ5v7Dw== hcatlin@greed.local

title: User:Hcatlin


text:
Talk:Leo Frank

Impact on the Ku Klux Klan Revival
"His case spurred the creation of the Anti-Defamation League and the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan." Shouldn't there be an elaboration on this in the "After the Trial" section? This line name-drops the KKK but doesn't appear to explain why or how it led to the resurgeance of the KKK. If it's important enough to include in the opening of the article, surely it should be alluded to in places other than the opening the article alone? Horizons 1 (talk) 16:35, 29 August 2023 (UTC)

 * I have added a paragraph in the aforementioned section. Horizons 1 (talk) 16:49, 29 August 2023 (UTC)
 * This remains unresolved. Horizons 1 (talk) 00:49, 24 March 2024 (UTC)
 * +1. Also found this a bit strange 84.52.235.68 (talk) 11:38, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

Citation 1 does not include supposed quote
In the first paragraph of the article, it is claimed that the modern consensus is that Mr. Frank was wrongfully convicted, although the citation ([1]) does not contain the quote listed in [n 1] Iamsombrero (talk) 09:52, 29 March 2024 (UTC)

 * The quoted text begins on the third line of the second page of the archived pdf of the cited source. NebY (talk) 10:04, 29 March 2024 (UTC)
 * My mistake, I apologise.
 * Viewing from mobile, more than one page weren’t evident. Iamsombrero (talk) 13:47, 29 March 2024 (UTC)

 * "Modern Consensus" is used in the cited article however the author solely pulls from Leonard Dinnerstein's book, The Leo Frank Case (printed in 1968 but cited article states 1987). One person does not constitute a consensus. --Asr1014 (talk) 09:43, 7 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Plenty of sources in the article support the assertion that there is a modern consensus. Writ Keeper ⚇♔ 20:01, 7 May 2024 (UTC)
 * The cited article is Professor Wilkes' review of Dinnerstein's book; his statement concerning the modern consensus is not based solely on Dinnerstein and Wilkes explicitly identifies other books and articles. NebY (talk) 20:15, 7 May 2024 (UTC)

"Night Witch"
This article states that Jim Conley misspelled "night watchman" as "night witch". Although it was assumed at the time by many that this was the case, it is inaccurate.

There was a belief among Southern African Americans at the time in a creature called the "night witch". This creature was said to come in through a keyhole at night, get upon the chest of a sleeping person and take his or her breath away. That was what Conley was referring to when he wrote "he said he would love me laid down, play like the night witch did it."

Whites were almost totally unaware of this superstitious African American belief, thus they assumed that "night witch" was a misspelling of "night watchman". Of course, it was not in Conley's best interest to correct them, since he was alleging that Frank dictated the note, and it was highly unlikely that a Jewish man from the North would know about the "night witch". Jersey Jan (talk) 14:57, 28 April 2024 (UTC)

Consensus of wrongful conviction?
It seems odd to me that the evidence indicating a consensus among historians is single comment from a non-scholarly news source (CNN). It's a low-quality source for such a strong claim. JDiala (talk) 00:06, 27 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Did you read the entire article, not just the lede? Specifically the section "Later consensus: a miscarriage of justice"?  Acroterion   (talk)   00:39, 27 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Ah, right. Strenuously disagree (I think he was guilty), but fighting this fight is probably not worth it on my end. JDiala (talk) 04:38, 27 May 2024 (UTC)
 * What is your assertion that he was guilty based on? Longhornsg (talk) 06:19, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I suspect part of the answer is, he was a rich man found to be guilty by a jury of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt. He had the resources to defend himself properly and he used them, but was still found guilty at his trial.
 * I suspect the other part of the answer is, he was a Jewish man that was lynched and the historians who are asked about this are either Jewish themselves and find his lynching abhorrent for that reason, or they are non-Jewish and are afraid of being labelled anti-Semitic if the say they think he was guilty. Either way, they come to the conclusion that Leo Frank was actually innocent, potentially without actually believing this. 2603:7080:402:D900:8F1:B239:2FA8:1095 (talk) 00:07, 15 June 2024 (UTC)
 * You're really telling on yourself when you assume that "being Jewish" is the only reason someone could find the lynching of a Jewish person abhorrent. Writ Keeper ⚇♔ 00:14, 15 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I apologize if my earlier statements lent themselves to being misinterpreted, as appears to be the case. I do not pretend to know whether Jim Conley or Leo Frank were in fact guilty in this case (or if it was some other third party), nor do I have particularly strong feelings one way or the other. I personally suspect Jim Conley was the actual rapist/murderer, but I would only say that I have ~60% confidence in this belief.
 * My earlier statements were my suspicions/theories in regard to why other people believe that Leo Frank is guilty. The part of my statement that you take issue with (the second part) is my theory about why a person (presuming good faith in that person) would disagree with most historians about this case being a miscarriage of justice. My theory is as follows:

 * Historians look at this case and see that Leo Frank was a victim of a lynch mob. Lynching (extrajudicial killing) is wrong, even when there are legitimate reasons to believe that the lynching victim has committed heinous acts (such as a guilty verdict in a court). They also see that there was a lot of antisemitism in the press at the time, and given this antisemitism (and aggressive press coverage before the trial) it was unlikely that Leo Frank received a fair trial. Furthermore, the historians see that there was an alternative suspect, Jim Conley, who-given the pressure to quickly charge and convict the perpetrator-may not have been fully considered/investigated, especially if the wider community was already convinced they knew who the killer was. The historians look at all this and more, and they come to the conclusion that it was more likely that Jim Conley was the killer than Leo Frank, and that an innocent man was wrongly convicted and subsequently lynched.
 * I believe that people who disagree with these historians may be thinking that the real reason the historians are coming to the conclusion that Leo Frank was innocent is specifically because he was lynched and the historians want Leo Frank to be innocent so that the lynch mob is wrong not just in their actions but also in all their beliefs that led to their actions. This desire for the lynch mob to be wrong in both action and thought would be particularly strong for Jewish historians who might see themselves in (an innocent) Leo Frank and for non-Jewish historians who are concerned about being considered anti-Semitic if they come to any other conclusion about the case.
 * Additionally people that disagree with the historians might simply have disdain for the ADL, which was founded in response to this case. If someone dislikes the ADL they will want Leo Frank to be guilty because then it will mean that the ADL was founded on a lie.

2603:7080:402:D900:CC30:A083:FB94:BD94 (talk) 04:36, 16 June 2024 (UTC)

 * It seems like this post is being heavily misinterpreted. This post does not theorize with the motivations of scholars/historians, it theorizes about the motivations of people who disagree with scholars/historians. It also doesn't criticize the ADL; it points out that people critical of the ADL will be motivated to think Leo Frank is guilty (potentially when the majority of the evidence suggest otherwise. I think it is important to remind users of the "assume good faith" policy. 134.6.207.163 (talk) 14:12, 16 June 2024 (UTC)
 * For the umpteenth time, this talk page isn't a forum for your views concerning Frank or the ADL, it is for specific, reliably sourced article improvement. "My theory is as follows" is not an appropriate use of any talk page.  Acroterion   (talk)   14:27, 16 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I know, that's why I haven't been using it as a forum for my views concerning Frank or the ADL. One of the users "JDiala" took issue with the claim "The consensus of researchers on the subject is that Frank was wrongly convicted" and I was explaining why I thought he and others would take issue with this wording, although-I'll admit-it's gotten a bit off topic. Re-wording this claim to include that this is the view expressed by Jessica Ravits (CNN) and/or Donald Eugene Wilkes Jr. (Flagpole Magazine) would be better, in my opinion. Although I think superior to either of those sources would be to directly quote/reference Leonard Dinnerstein (Historian/Professor), since Eugene Wilkes Jr. relies on Dinnerstein's book in his article anyway. 134.6.207.163 (talk) 15:37, 16 June 2024 (UTC)
 * If you are the same editor who attacked Acroteria on an IPv6 address expect to be blocked if you do it again.  Doug Weller  talk 11:25, 17 June 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 29 June 2024
The first sentence in the last paragraph in the section "Abduction and lynching of Frank" is not accurately sourced. The source that discusses Frank's body in Atlanta being forced to be on view to the public after threats of violence is from The Sun newspaper based in New York, printed on August 18, 1915. Here is a link to the correct source: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/1915-08-18/ed-1/seq-2/#words=%5Bu’Frank’,%20u’FRANK’,%20u’l.eo’,%20u’LEO’,%20u’Leo’%5D&date1=1915&date2=1915&sequence=&lccn=&state=&rows=20&ortext=&proxtext=Leo+Frank&year=&phrasetext=&andtext=&proxValue=&dateFilterType=yearRange&index=17

If you check the current source you will see there is no mention of Frank's body in Atlanta on view both on the sourced page, page 1, but also not mentioned on page 3 of the source which is the continuation of the front page story.

The source also does not mention bricks specifically, only crashed in windows so the section "after they began throwing bricks, they were allowed to file past the corpse." should be changed to "after the mob began breaking glass panes, they were allowed to file past the corpse." A sentence directly following this can also be added stating, "Around 15,000 people were estimated to have looked upon Frank's body. Policemen guarded Frank's casket for fear of further violence." 2603:3003:1B05:D100:940B:AD89:CCC6:42B (talk) 15:45, 29 June 2024 (UTC)

 * ✅ ABG (Talk/Report any mistakes here) 23:55, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Leo Frank


text:
List of United States natural gas companies

This is a list of natural gas companies in the United States.

States
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Mississippi Missouri Minnesota Montana Nebraska Nevada New Jersey New Hampshire New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
 * Spire
 * Enstar Natural Gas
 * Fairbanks Natural Gas
 * Southwest Gas Corporation
 * Transwestern Pipeline
 * Chesapeake Operating Inc
 * CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission
 * Kinder Morgan, Inc.
 * Mississippi River Transmission
 * SourceGas Arkansas Inc.
 * Spectra Energy, Inc.
 * Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation
 * Black Hills Energy
 * City of Long Beach Gas & Oil Department
 * City of Palo Alto Gas Department
 * Pacific Gas & Electric
 * San Diego Gas & Electric
 * Southern California Gas
 * Sierra Pacific - Nevada & California, Southwest Gas Corporation
 * Vernon Light & Power Department
 * Clean Energy
 * Atmos Energy
 * El Paso Natural Gas
 * Patara Oil & Gas
 * SourceGas Distribution, LLC
 * Transwestern Pipeline
 * Xcel Energy
 * Murex Petroleum
 * Black Hills Energy
 * City of Norwich Department of Public Utilities
 * Eversource Energy (via Yankee Gas)
 * UIL Holdings Corp (via Connecticut Natural Gas and Southern Connecticut Gas),
 * Chesapeake Utilities
 * Delmarva Power
 * Florida Gas Transmission Company
 * Mirabito Gas
 * TECO Peoples Gas
 * Florida Public Utilities
 * Lake Apopka Natural Gas
 * Southern Company Gas,
 * Gas South
 * Hawai'i Gas
 * Aquila, Inc.
 * Atmos Energy
 * Kansas Gas Service
 * Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
 * Xcel Energy
 * Black Hills Energy
 * Atmos Energy
 * EQT Corporation
 * Columbia Gas
 * People's Gas
 * Chesapeake Energy
 * Atmos Energy
 * Florida Gas Transmission Company
 * Gulf South Pipe Line
 * Trunkline Gas Company
 * Entergy
 * Avista Utilities
 * Intermountain Gas Company
 * Direct Energy
 * Ameren Illinois Company
 * Hudson Energy
 * Illinois Gas Transmission
 * Nicor Gas
 * Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
 * Peoples Gas
 * North Shore Gas
 * Integrys
 * Direct Energy
 * Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
 * Vectrennipsco
 * MidAmerican Energy Company
 * Black Hills Energy
 * Unitil Corp.
 * Bangor Gas
 * Maine Natural Gas
 * Summit Natural Gas
 * Columbia Gas of Maryland - Baltimore Gas & Electric
 * Chesapeake Utilities
 * Direct Energy
 * Easton Utilities
 * Northeast Utilities
 * Sandpiper Energy
 * UGI
 * Washington Gas
 * Berkshire Gas
 * Blackstone Gas Company
 * Colonial Gas
 * Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
 * Eversource Energy
 * Holyoke Gas and Electric
 * Liberty Utilities
 * Middleboro Municipal Gas and Electric Department
 * National Grid
 * Unitil Corporation
 * Wakefield Municipal Gas and Light Department
 * Westfield Gas and Electric Department
 * Consumers Energy
 * Direct Energy
 * DTE Energy
 * Semco Energy
 * TransCanada
 * We Energies
 * Atmos Energy
 * Missouri Gas Energy
 * City Utilities of Springfield
 * Laclede Gas
 * Spire Inc
 * Xcel Energy
 * CenterPoint Energy
 * Northwestern Corporation
 * MDU Resources
 * Energy West Montana
 * Cut Bank Gas Company
 * Metropolitan Utilities District
 * SourceGas Distribution, LLC
 * Northwestern Corporation
 * Black Hills Energy
 * NV Energy
 * Southwest Gas Corporation
 * Direct Energy
 * Elizabethtown Gas
 * New Jersey Resources
 * New Jersey Natural
 * Public Service Enterprise Group
 * South Jersey Industries
 * Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G)
 * Eversource Energy
 * Unitil Corporation
 * Transwestern Pipeline
 * Xcel Energy
 * New Mexico Gas (NMG)
 * Central Hudson Gas & Electric
 * Corning Natural Gas
 * Direct Energy
 * National Fuel Gas
 * National Grid USA
 * Consolidated Edison
 * Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E)
 * New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG)
 * St. Lawrence Gas
 * Duke Energy
 * Piedmont Natural Gas
 * XOOM Energy
 * Public Service of North Carolina (PSNC)
 * Frontier Natural Gas,
 * Xcel Energy
 * MDU Resources
 * Direct Energy
 * East Ohio Gas
 * Duke Energy
 * Nisource
 * Columbia Gas of Ohio
 * Dominion Energy
 * Northeast Ohio Natural Gas
 * Orwell Natural Gas
 * Chesapeake Energy
 * Oklahoma Gas & Electric
 * Oklahoma Natural Gas
 * ONEOK
 * Xcel Energy
 * Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation
 * Avista Utilities
 * Northwest Natural Gas
 * Cascade Natural Gas
 * CNX Resources
 * Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania
 * Direct Energy
 * EQT Corporation
 * National Fuel Gas
 * PECO Energy Company
 * Peoples Natural Gas
 * Philadelphia Gas Works
 * UGI
 * Providence Gas Company (National Grid USA)
 * Rhode Island Energy
 * Piedmont Natural Gas
 * SCANA Corporation
 * Lancaster County Natural Gas Authority
 * Patriots Energy Group
 * York County Gas Authority
 * Chester County Gas Authority
 * Fountain Inn Natural Gas
 * SCE&G
 * Dominion Carolina Gas Transmission
 * Fort Hill Natural Gas Authority
 * Xcel Energy
 * Northwestern Corporation
 * MDU Resources
 * Atmos Energy
 * Piedmont Natural Gas
 * Atmos Energy
 * Texas Gas Service
 * SiEnerg
 * Oro Negro
 * Lewis Energy
 * CenterPoint Energy
 * ConocoPhillips
 * CoServ Gas
 * Direct Energy
 * Gulf South Pipeline
 * Patara Oil & Gas LLC
 * Texas Natural Gas
 * Transwestern Pipeline
 * J-W Operating Company
 * Xcel Energy
 * Talos Energy
 * Dominion Energy
 * Énergir
 * Atmos Energy
 * EQT Corporation
 * Washington Gas
 * Virginia Natural Gas
 * Columbia Gas of Virginia
 * Dominion Energy
 * Columbia Gas Transmission
 * Appalachian Natural Gas Distribution Company
 * Roanoke Gas Company
 * Carroll County Natural Gas
 * CNX Resources
 * Richmond Gas Works
 * Avista Utilities
 * Puget Sound Energy
 * Cascade Natural Gas
 * Northwest Natural Gas - City of Ellensburg
 * EQT Corporation
 * NiSource
 * Bluefield Natural Gas
 * Mountaineer Gas Company
 * We Energies
 * Xcel Energy
 * Madison Gas & Electric
 * SourceGas Distribution, LLC
 * Dominion Energy
 * MDU Resources
 * Black Hills Energy

Territories
District of Columbia

 * Washington Gas

Puerto Rico

 * EcoEléctrica


text:
Analytical Thomism

Analytical Thomism is a philosophical movement which promotes the interchange of ideas between the thought of Thomas Aquinas (including the philosophy carried on in relation to his thinking, called 'Thomism'), and modern analytic philosophy.

Scottish philosopher John Haldane first coined the term in the early 1990s and has since been one of the movement's leading proponents. According to Haldane, "analytical Thomism involves the bringing into mutual relationship of the styles and preoccupations of recent English-speaking philosophy and the ideas and concerns shared by St Thomas and his followers".

History 19th century—World War
The modern revival of Aquinas's thought can be traced to the work of mid-19th Century thomists, such as Tommaso Maria Zigliara, Josef Kleutgen, Gaetano Sanseverino, and Giovanni Maria Cornoldi. This movement received an enormous impetus by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris of 1879. In the first half of the twentieth century, Edouard Hugon, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Étienne Gilson, and Jacques Maritain, among others, carried on Leo's call for a Thomist revival. Gilson and Maritain in particular taught and lectured throughout Europe and North America, influencing a generation of English-speaking Catholic philosophers. Some of the latter then began to harmonize Thomism with broader contemporary philosophical trends.

Similarly, the Kraków Circle in Poland used mathematical logic in presenting Thomism, which the Circle judged to have "a structured body of propositions connected in meaning and subject matter, and linked by logical relations of compatibility and incompatibility, entailment, etc." The Circle has been said to be "the most significant expression of Catholic thought between the two World Wars".

Postwar philosophical reception of Aquinas
By the middle of the 20th century Aquinas's thought came into dialogue with the analytical tradition through the work of G. E. M. Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Anthony Kenny. Anscombe was Ludwig Wittgenstein's student, and his successor at the University of Cambridge; she was married to Geach, himself an accomplished logician and philosopher of religion. Geach had converted to Roman Catholicism while studying at Oxford, Anscombe had converted before she came up, and both were instructed in the Faith in Oxford by the Dominican Richard Kehoe, who received them both into the Church before they met one another. Kenny, an erstwhile priest and former Catholic, became a prominent philosopher at the University of Oxford and an editor and executor of Wittgenstein's literary estate, and is still portrayed by some as a promoter of Aquinas (Paterson & Pugh, xiii-xxiii), though his denial of some basic Thomist doctrines (e.g. divine timelessness) casts doubt on this.

Anscombe, and other Aristotelians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, Mortimer Adler, and John Finnis, can largely be credited with the revival of "virtue ethics" in analytic moral theory and "natural law theory" in jurisprudence. Both movements draw significantly upon Aquinas.

Notable analytical Thomists
Philosophers and theologians working in the intersection of Thomism and analytic philosophy include:

• Michael Staron (Saint Anselm's Abbey School)

• Mortimer Adler (1902-2001)

• David Braine

• John C. Cahalan (independent scholar)

• Brian Davies (Fordham)

• Gabriele De Anna (Udine) (Bamberg)

• Edward Feser

• John Finnis (Oxford)

• Peter Geach (Deceased)

• John Haldane (St Andrews) (Baylor University)

• Simon Hewitt (Leeds)

• Jonathan Jacobs (Colgate)

• Anthony Kenny (Oxford)

• Fergus Kerr (Oxford)

• Gyula Klima (Fordham)

• Norman Kretzmann

• John Lamont

• Elizabeth Anscombe (Deceased)

• Anthony J. Lisska (Denison)

• Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame)

• Bruce D. Marshall (Southern Methodist Univ)

• William Marshner (Christendom)

• Christopher Martin (St Thomas, Houston)

• Cyrille Michon (Nantes, France)

• Mark Murphy (Georgetown)

• Herbert McCabe (Deceased)

• John P. O'Callaghan (Notre Dame)

• Robert Pasnau (CU Boulder)

• Craig Paterson (Independent Scholar)

• Roger Pouivet (Nancy, France)

• Alexander Pruss (Baylor University)

• Matthew S. Pugh (Providence College)

• Eleonore Stump (Saint Louis)

• Thomas Sullivan and Sandra Menssen (University of St. Thomas, MN)

• Stephen Theron, Denys Turner (Yale), Michael Thompson (Pittsburgh)

• Giovanni Ventimiglia (Lugano, Switzerland)

• James Madden (Benedictine College)

• Jeffrey Brower (Purdue University)

• Andrew Jaeger (Benedictine College)

• Robert Alspaugh (St. Anselm's Abbey School)

• Christopher Bobier (St. Mary's University of Minnesota)

• T. Adam Van Wart (Ave Maria University)

• David Burrell

• Michał Głowala (University of Wroclaw)

title: Analytical Thomism


text:
Talk:Jerry Nelson

Untitled
Check out this fansite honoring legendary Muppeteer Jerry Nelson who performs Floyd, Robin, The Count, and many more.

Halfway Down The Stairs http://e.domaindlx.com/jerrynelson

Signature characters
I know The Count is considered Jerrys most popular muppet, but the way I see it, I think he has at least one signature character for each production. Take a look:

The Muppet Show: Floyd Pepper

Sesame Street: The Count

Fraggle Rock: Gobo Fraggle

And sorry bout earlier, I was spouting off too many words at once.

Matt Vogel/Count von Count
So will Matt Vogel soon be the new Count von Count since Jerry Nelson just died? -- 173.76.121.93 (talk) 21:51, 28 August 2012 (UTC)

 * Only time will tell in the end, friend. --Smartie2thaMaxXx (talk) 00:58, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

 * You're right. But for right now we can still hope that he does, right? -- 173.76.121.93 (talk) 14:00, 5 September 2012 (UTC)

The grammar under "Later Life" in the article doesn't make any sense, but I don't know what is intended so I'm not sure how to change it. It says someone is doing something with Nelson, even after Nelson has passed away. 71.34.249.210 (talk) 19:49, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Notability
I am confused by the insertion of a question of notability to this biography. As per WP:BIO, this actor "[...]has had significant roles in multiple notable films, television shows, stage performances, or other productions," appearing in more than a dozen major motion pictures as well as a nationally syndicated television series.

I have removed the tag; if you disagree with this, please list your concerns about the notability on this Talk page. -- Metahacker (talk) 15:27, 26 December 2012 (UTC)

External links modified
Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on Jerry Nelson. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20120927001742/http://news.moviefone.com/2012/08/24/jerry-nelson-dead-muppet-performer_n_1827955.html to http://news.moviefone.com/2012/08/24/jerry-nelson-dead-muppet-performer_n_1827955.html

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 16:45, 20 April 2017 (UTC)

Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease/Empysyma
So the link for emphasyma takes you to the entry on Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. From what I read they appear to be the same thing, but the’re listed in the bio as two different diseases. I considered deleting one of the two terms myself, but, as I am not a doctor, I’m not 100% sure, and didn’t feel comfortable doing that. It’d be great if an actual physician would review that section and delete one of the terms if appropriate.

I’d also like to add that I was a huge fan of Mr. Nelson’s work and am very saddened to learn that he suffered so much. May he Rest In Peace.

title: Talk:Jerry Nelson


text:
Talk:Organization of American States

America, the continent
and purpose

"To strengthen the peace and security of the continent." "To eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the continent." "The Organization has played a leading part in the removal of landmines deployed in member states and it has led negotiations to resolve the continent's remaining border disputes (Guatemala/Belize; Peru/Ecuador)." "The OAS is one of the three agencies currently engaged in drafting a treaty aiming to establish a continental free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego."

According to this English Wikipedia, America is not a continent but a supercontinent. Or this article refers bad to the meaning, or all those discssions on "The Americas" article was just bullshit...
 * This illustrates the difference between primary speakers on the one hand and secondary speakers and multilingual situations on the other. While the concept of one American continent is not unknown in the English-speaking world, just seen as old-fashioned, the two American continents model is either unknown or hotly resented in Latin America. It was easier for the US and Canada to just let this usage slide than to endanger the enyire undertaking. --Khajidha (talk) 22:38, 19 December 2017 (UTC)

According to English Wikipedia "it was still not uncommon for American atlases to treat them as one continent up until World War II¨. Since the OAS was founded shortly after World War II, it makes sense that they used the most universally accepted option at the time.69.172.171.194 (talk) 01:44, 26 January 2020 (UTC)

Venezuela
The issue of Venezuela is complicated since the constitution doesn't give the interim president power to revert the decision made to exit the OAS. Looking at the law, it's clear that he only has a mandate to set new elections so I don't really see any reason to say Venezuela is still in the OAS. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.94.29.210 (talk) 22:34, 29 May 2019 (UTC)

Is this article biased wrt OAS way of being in the world?...
What about these perspectives?

Exposing the OAS' Anti-Venezuela, Pro-US Bias and Right-Wing Hypocrisy

How the OAS and US Just Helped Overthrow Another GovernmentThe U.S. government and the Organization for American States can notch another coup on their belts.

comment added by Williamwallacetooke (talk • contribs) 07:15, 14 November 2019 (UTC)

 * These perspectives are widely reported and would be worth inclusion. Why don't you add a "Criticisms" or "Controversies" section, as in other pages like for the OAU or ICC? Kyle MoJo (talk) 21:10, 21 November 2019 (UTC)

Many of the references in the section were opinion articles or constituted WP:SYNTH, as well as including repeated content. As such, I have merged the content to the respective History section. --NoonIcarus (talk) 12:23, 21 November 2021 (UTC)

Individual Rights and property ownership
What will be the consequences of every sovereign state in the Americas including the USA slowly and quietly transitioning from the free Republic of its founding fathers into the monster known as a democracy and majority rule? Democracy is basically winner take all and to hell with the minority rights. Lmnopxyz (talk) 14:54, 23 December 2019 (UTC)

The Venezuelan State is not a member of the OAS, therefore it should be removed from the map.
Althought the OAS recognizes the Guaidó government, he does not control the state. He has basically no power at all, Maduro does, and sadly it seems like he will for a long time. It is wrong to put Venezuela as a member state. If no one opposes this, I will change their color to red in one week from now. Seekallknowledge (talk) 22:14, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
 * But Guaidó's appointee is still Venezuela's representative in the OAS, including its Permant Councils, and the organization voted to approve recognizing him as much. --NoonIcarus (talk) 12:34, 28 November 2021 (UTC)

 * But none of the territory in that map is under Guaido's control. None. He essentially controls nothing in the Venezuelan state, therefore, it simply cannot be called a member state. He only controls certain companies outside Venezuela, but that doesn't change anything. Maybe, Icarus, we could reach a compromise and have the venezuelan territory not controlled by Guaidó shown as red (former member state) in the map, and in the list we have "Interim/National Assembly/Guaido's Venezuela as a member state. What do you think? Seekallknowledge (talk) 12:51, 28 November 2021 (UTC)

 * I continue disagreeing on these points, mostly because of what I stated, but for the sake of a compromise I can note that the article of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights depicts an image that has distinguished the situation of Venezuela. While that map uses stripes for the country, a different color can also be considered (such as yellow), if it preferrable to you. --NoonIcarus (talk) 22:29, 28 November 2021 (UTC)

 * I think that the map, as it is now, that is with Venezuela indicated among the members, can only generate confusion. Guaidò and his faction do not control any part of the nation, so there is no point in pointing him this way on the map. Maybe a different color, as suggested by NoonIcarus, could help understand the situation, but what do we put in the caption? If we do not find an explanatory solution, I would be in favor of removing Venezuela from the map.--Mhorg (talk) 11:41, 29 November 2021 (UTC)
 * Possibly the "Disputed" caption or a similar label, along with an explanatory footnote, in the case it sounds alright. --NoonIcarus (talk) 22:32, 29 November 2021 (UTC)
 * There are 3 options, then:
 * 1- Venezuela remains a member state in the map because the OAS recognizes it as such. (supported by Icarus)
 * 2- Venezuela is classified as a former member state because Guaido's government does not control the territory. (supported by me)
 * 3- Venezuela is considered a "disputed member state" because of the conflict of both factions. Maybe colour it as yellow in the map. (support by me, icarus and considered possible by you)
 * I think 3 is, for now, the best option due to the dividing nature of the issue and the fact we all kinda accept it. Do we have an agreement? Seekallknowledge (talk) 00:41, 2 December 2021 (UTC)
 * I believe we do, I can implemment the changes if Mhorg doesn't want any changes (a different color than yellow, for instance). --NoonIcarus (talk) 08:41, 2 December 2021 (UTC)
 * Ah, I see the change has been made, thank you! --NoonIcarus (talk) 19:56, 3 December 2021 (UTC)
 * Sorry but really @NoonIcarus "But Guaidó's appointee is still Venezuela's representative in the OAS" Liuxinyu970226 (talk) 06:34, 18 October 2022 (UTC)
 * As recently as 29 September, nearly a year after I made that comment, Gustavo Tarre continues participating in the OAS' proceedings. Even the article currently mentions a failed attempt to remove him from his position. --NoonIcarus (talk) 11:20, 18 October 2022 (UTC)
 * The map showing Venezuela in a different color is a good resolution, and my perspective is that there's no need to do anything different at this time. Tarre continues to sit as an envoy. The facts are funny, because more than a majority of member states want the Guaido envoy out (more members than wanted a Guaido envoy in!), but it takes 2/3rds super majority to remove. There are maybe some places in the body of the article where wording could be revised a little bit but overall things seem good as-is. JArthur1984 (talk) 12:49, 18 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I essentially think the same and I have little to add to this. I will try to help with this later on if possible. --NoonIcarus (talk) 12:40, 19 October 2022 (UTC)
 * @NoonIcarus If this is true, and based on your one Commons revert action (especially part of its edit summary "The same situation happened with Venezuela."), I strongly urge you to agree that Nicaragua should better be yellow colored (instead of normal green), otherwise we have to point that who's the representative of OAS within Nicaragua before completing stay-away process, just note: Rodriguez, the ambassador of United States to Nicaragua, is totally unable to be "this man", as their Nicaraguan visa has been revoked, plus being sanctioned by NI government on border-entry. Liuxinyu970226 (talk) 12:17, 11 November 2022 (UTC)
 * The withdrawal process of Nicaragua has not finished, and the withdrawal has not been contested by the opposition within Nicaragua. Once the process ends, Nicaragua can be painted red. --NoonIcarus (talk) 10:39, 19 November 2022 (UTC)
 * @NoonIcarus Even not finished today? Two-year period will soon past. Liuxinyu970226 (talk) 09:37, 7 August 2023 (UTC)
 * Nicaragua's Foreign Minister Denis Moncada announced the withdrawal on 19 November. As soon as the time passes, reliable sources will surely cover the news, which are essential for the change. In that case, I will be the first person to support the change. --NoonIcarus (talk) 09:21, 18 August 2023 (UTC)
 * I think this should be changed now owing to the dissolving of Guaido's government. 174.89.94.18 (talk) 01:10, 15 January 2023 (UTC)
 * Yes, no doubt about it my friend! I will do it once I have free time. Seekallknowledge (talk) 05:39, 21 April 2023 (UTC)
 * Guaidó's government was not dissolved. Rather, Guaidó was dismissed and replaced by Dinorah Figuera. The OAS should hold a vote before this situation is reverted, just like it was approved in the first place. --NoonIcarus (talk) 09:19, 18 August 2023 (UTC)

Inconsistency
The article says All independent nations of the Americas are members of the OAS. But Cuba is in red in the map.--Damián A. Fernández Beanato (talk) 03:30, 25 February 2022 (UTC)

 * Probably a bit simple:
 * Former member: Cuba
 * Probably the Supranational American bodies should also reflect so. --Liuxinyu970226 (talk) 04:37, 6 October 2022 (UTC)
 * ✅ Correction to template has now been made. Wiz9999 (talk) 18:36, 29 January 2023 (UTC)

title: Talk:Organization of American States