text:
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua

The United Fiji Party (Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua,, SDL) was a political party in Fiji. It was founded in 2001 by Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase as a power base; it absorbed most of the Christian Democratic Alliance and other conservative groups, and its endorsement by the Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) caused it to be widely seen as the successor to the Alliance Party, the former ruling party that had dominated Fijian politics from the 1960s to the 1980s. It drew its support mainly from indigenous Fijiians.

The party was led in Parliament by Prime Minister Qarase. The party organization was headed up by Ratu Kalokalo Loki as President and by Jale Baba as General Secretary (later termed National Director) until early 2006, when he was transferred at the beginning of 2006 to managing the campaign for the 2006 General Election. Peceli Kinivuwai took over as National Director.

History
From the time of its inception, the SDL stood for the economic and social advancement of all Fiji citizens. There was a strong focus however on reducing the economic gap between the different ethnic communities, which continued to be a controversial issue for many commentators who accused the SDL of blatant racism. It also called for a consolidation of the rule of law and claims to support an independent judiciary.

The SDL contested 59 of the 71 parliamentary seats in the 2001 elections; this figure included only 7 of the 19 seats reserved for Indo-Fijians. It received 26 percent of the vote, well short of the 32 percent polled by the Fiji Labour Party, but helped by preference deals with other ethnic Fijian-dominated parties as well as the Indo-Fijian-led National Federation Party, it became the largest party in Parliament, with 32 out of 71 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition with the Conservative Alliance.

After the 2006 Military Coup, SDL retained its Party Headquarters Office at 66 Mcgregor Rd, Suva. The Party Leadership structure remained intact amidst the political situation, Laisenia Qarase continued to be the Party Leader, Solomoni Naivalu - President, Ro Dona Takalaiyale - Vice President, Ro Teimumu Kepa - Patron. Peceli Kinivuawai remained National Director until he left for Australia and got a Protection Visa where Samisoni Tikoinasau took over until he also had to leave for Australia on a Protection Visa.

Mataiasi Ragiagia took over as Party General Secretary, assisted by the senior executives who were responsible for the administrative and daily organisational affairs of the party.

Controversial legislation
At its annual conference on 27 May 2005, the SDL strongly endorsed Prime Minister Qarase's controversial proposals to establish a Reconciliation and Unity Commission with powers, subject to presidential approval, to compensate victims and pardon perpetrators of the coup d'état that deposed the elected government in 2000. It agreed, however, to listen to objections. At the same conference, Qarase publicly welcomed what he claimed was an increase in the number of Indo-Fijians joining the SDL, evidence, he said, that the SDL was the multiracial party it had always claimed to be.

2005 municipal election
The SDL contested many of the mayoral and council positions throughout Fiji in the municipal elections scheduled for 22 October 2005. In many towns, the SDL was aligned with the National Federation Party (NFP), but in Suva, the two parties feuded over what the NFP claimed was a breach of a memorandum of understanding between the two parties after the previous municipal elections, held in 2002. According to the NFP, the agreement specified that each party would hold the Mayoralty of Suva for one year, with the two parties jointly choosing the Lord Mayor in the third year. The NFP accuses the SDL of having broken the agreement by forging a coalition in 2004 with the Fiji Labour Party to retain the Mayoralty. SDL Secretary Jale Baba denied on 19 October 2005 that his party had breached the agreement, saying that Umaria was putting his own spin on it; there was no agreement on sharing the Mayoralty in the third year, Baba said. The election was a bittersweet experience for the SDL; they gained a majority in their own right in Suva, but lost control of Nasinu, Fiji's largest municipality.

2006 parliamentary election
The SDL appointed former Fiji Development Bank Chairman Navitalai Naisoro to head a panel interviewing would-be parliamentary candidates for the SDL. The interviews began in the last week of August 2005. The party's general secretary, Jale Baba, had earlier said that the SDL was dissatisfied with the performance of about a third of its parliamentarians, and that they would not be nominated for another term. Names approved by the panel will be forwarded to the selection committee of the appropriate constituency, before a decision is finalized. On 27 February 2006, Baba, no longer general secretary but now coordinator of the election campaign, said that the selection process had begun and would take two to three weeks.

Indian candidates
On 12 August 2005, Baba claimed that three members of the opposition Fiji Labour Party's parliamentary caucus had applied for endorsement as SDL candidates for the parliamentary election scheduled to be held in mid-2006. He refused to name them, saying that to do so could prematurely end their political careers. The three were interviewed at 5am on an unrevealed date in early September to protect their identities, SDL President Ratu Kalokalo Loki said. The Fiji Live news service reported on 7 September that it had information that not three, but five, FLP members were interviewed.

SDL National Director Jale Baba announced on 11 September 2005 that the party would contest all 71 parliamentary seats in the 2006 election. Indo-Fijian candidates would be nominated for open constituencies as well as communal constituencies reserved for Indo-Fijians. Baba said that byelections showed that Indo-Fijian support for the SDL had increased since 2001, when it hardly registered, and that the party was confident of winning most of the seats in 2006. On 2 October, Baba said that members of all ethnic communities, including Indo-Fijians, had applied for nomination, which he described as "a major change" for a party hitherto dominated by indigenous Fijians.

Baba announced On 4 January 2006 that 43 Indo-Fijians had been shortlisted. Their names had been forwarded to the party's constituency councils which would finalize nominations in due course. The SDL was not an exclusively indigenous party, he emphasized. "We look after the interests of all. We are strongly pro-Fijian but not exclusive. We do not restrict membership to other communities. Programs are there for everyone."

Prime Minister Qarase reiterated on 23 January 2006 that the party intended to contest all 71 seats.

FLP parliamentarian Poseci Bune challenged the FLP on 3 February 2006 to substantiate its assertion that three FLP caucus members had applied to contest the upcoming election on the SDL ticket. The claim was untrue and just a campaign gimmick, Bune alleged. Baba did not reply to the challenge, but announced on 20 February that two more FLP defectors had joined the three seeking SDL endorsement. Citing confidentiality rules, Baba refused to name them, but said they were all Indo-Fijians, bringing to 48 the number of ethnic Indians who would stand in the primary elections to choose SDL candidates in the third week of February. All told, 321 sought nomination for the 71 constituencies.

The SDL launched an Indian wing on 23 March 2006. Seventy supporters attended the public launch at Namaka, Nadi, with Ratu Suliano Matanitobua, a Cabinet Minister and Tui Namosi (Paramount Chief of Namosi) as the chief speaker. Matanitobua praised the Indo-Fijian contribution to Fiji, and asked them to support the SDL to move Fiji forward.

Retiring parliamentarians
Party Secretary Jale Baba said on 20 September that three SDL members of the present Cabinet had not sought the SDL nomination for the 2006 election. He declined to identify the Ministers involved, but said they were stepping down for a variety of reasons. On 2 February 2006, Foreign Minister Kaliopate Tavola revealed that he was one who would not be seeking reelection.

Negotiations with NFP
Prime Minister Qarase also announced on 11 September that the SDL would attempt to negotiate preference deals with the National Federation Party (NFP) and the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) ahead of the 2006 election. He considered that parties dominated by the two respective principal races in the country needed each other's "preferences" under Fiji's so-called alternative vote system, which allows votes cast for low-polling candidates to be transferred to higher-polling candidates, as specified by the eliminated candidate.

The NFP said in August 2005 that it would withhold its preferences from the SDL unless it withdrew its controversial Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill, but Qarase expressed the hope that "good sense" would prevail. Aiming to establish a commission with the power to compensate victims and pardon perpetrators of the 2000 coup, the legislation has been branded by opponents as a thinly-veiled legal mechanism for freeing supporters of the present government, who have been convicted and imprisoned on coup-related charges. In September, however, the NFP appeared to adopt a somewhat more flexible position.

In the end, the NFP decided to give its preferences to the SDL in some constituencies, but not all. Prime Minister Qarase said that the NFP decision to give its preferences to the opposition Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in a number of marginal electorates was a breach of promise, and withdrew his own earlier offer to include the NFP in his post-election Cabinet.

Grand Coalition
On 30 July 2005, the SDL joined the Grand Coalition Initiative Group, an electoral alliance of predominantly indigenous Fijian parties that agreed to share preferences in the 2006 election. On 25 November, Prime Minister Qarase confirmed that the SDL would definitely share cooperate with members of the coalition, including the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), and that he was having talks with SVT President Sitiveni Rabuka about sharing preferences.

Merger with CAMV
Prime Minister Qarase announced on 16 February 2006 that the Conservative Alliance (CAMV), the coalition partner of Qarase's SDL, would be formalizing a decision the next day to deregister itself in order to merge with the SDL.

Election result
In the election, held on 6–13 May, the SDL won 44 percent of the popular vote (including 81 percent of the ethnic Fijian vote), and 36 out of 71 seats. All 23 Communal Constituencies allocated to indigenous Fijians were won by the SDL, most of them overwhelmingly; the party also won 13 of the 25 Open Constituencies elected by universal suffrage. The SDL failed to make any significant inroads into the Indo-Fijian community, polling barely 2 percent of the Indo-Fijian vote, and also lost the one minority voters' constituency it had held.

The SDL-led government was ousted in the military coup of December 2006 - the first coup in Fiji to overthrow an SDL government rather than an FLP one.

Dissolution
In January 2013 the Fijian regime announced new political party registration rules which would require all parties to register their names in English. In response the party reformed as the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA).

title: Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua


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BPI

BPI may refer to:

In banking:
 * Banca Popolare Italiana, an Italian bank merged into Banco Popolare
 * Banco Português de Investimento, a Portuguese bank
 * Bank of the Philippine Islands, the oldest bank in the Philippines
 * Bpifrance, a French bank

In business:
 * Baltimore Polytechnic Institute, a public high school in Maryland, United States
 * Beef Products, Inc., manufacturer of lean finely textured beef, or LFTB.
 * British Phonographic Industry, a record industry trade association
 * British Power International, a UK-based power sector consultancy
 * Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie, the German trade group for the pharmaceutical industry
 * Burma Pharmaceutical Industry, a pharmaceutical brand name in Myanmar

In measurement:
 * Base peak intensity, a type of mass chromatogram
 * Bits-per-inch or bytes-per-inch, used to specify the data density of magnetic tape
 * Bomb Power Indicator, used by the Royal Observer Corps during the Cold War to detect nuclear explosions
 * Brief Pain Inventory, used to measure the change in pain intensity after treatment, for example, with anti-cancer drugs

BPI may also be:
 * Bard Prison Initiative, an inmate college degree program offered by Bard College
 * Baseline Privacy Interface, a MAC layer security service
 * Biodegradable Products Institute, an organization that provides technically and scientifically credible certifications for materials that biodegrade in biologically active environments
 * Bipolar I disorder
 * Boolean prime ideal theorem, a mathematical theorem
 * Brachial plexus injury, an injury to the nerves that conduct signals from the spinal cord to the shoulder, arm and hand
 * Branch on Program Interrupt, a simulated IBM S/360 and S/370 instruction under the Michigan Terminal System, an early mainframe computer operating system
 * Business process interoperability, a state that exists when a business process can meet a specific objective automatically utilizing essential human labor only
 * Bureau of Plant Industry (Philippines)
 * Bactericidal permeability-increasing protein, an endogenous antibiotic protein that is part of the innate immune system

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: BPI


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Talk:Finitary

Heading
What a nice development in such a short time. Isn't it wonderful? A toast to co-operation! Pfortuny 19:53, 16 Dec 2003 (UTC)

Comparaison with intuitionism would be nice Spayrard 21:22, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

"in which the conditions limiting logical operations to the finitary ones" - this phrase does not make any sense in context - is there a word missing? Facetious Nickname 08:32, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Article misses the point
The current state of this article seems to mix the concept of a finitary operation with the concept of a finitary argument (cf. finitism). The article is just a stub at the moment, but this issue should be handled at some point. — Carl (CBM · talk) 16:51, 19 December 2017 (UTC)

Unclear statement
"Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem is sometimes alleged to undermine logicism because it shows that no particular axiomatization of mathematics can decide all statements, although such theorem itself is based in logic."

I am unable to make sense of this sentence. Not only is it grammatically iffy, it seems to be saying that Gödel's theorems are logic-dependent in some nontrivial way. They are not. Moreover, Gödelian incompleteness is not "sometimes alleged to undermine" logicism: it is the mainstream view that Gödel killed logicism outright. Some reasonable people disagree with this, but the right place to describe the neo-logicist program(s) is the page on logicism.

Thus, I'm deleting the sentence. Should anyone wish to reinstate it, they should at least provide references to both nay- and yay-sayers. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.224.188.19 (talk) 00:23, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

title: Talk:Finitary


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Fulmer

Fulmer is a village and civil parish in south Buckinghamshire, England. The village has, along most of its northern border, a narrow green buffer from Gerrards Cross and it's heavily wooded adjoining neighbouring villages of Iver Heath and Wexham. The village's name is derived from the Old English for "mere or lake frequented by birds". It was recorded in 1198 as Fugelmere.

In the late 17th century the owners of the manor of Fulmer were forced to sell their house to their servants because they had squandered their money and could not afford to pay them. The manor then passed into the hands of the Duke of Portland.

In the mid-19th century watercress was grown at Moor Farm, known locally as "The Bog", (now Low Farm) by Richard Whiting Bradbery, the son of William Bradbery, the first British watercress pioneer who had a large cress farm at West Hyde, Hertfordshire. Richard is buried in St James churchyard, Fulmer, with his wife Hannah.

Fulmer Chase on Stoke Common Road is a former home of the Wills tobacco family and was used as a military hospital during World War II.

Fulmer is close to Pinewood Studios and several films have been shot in the village, including Those Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines and Sleepy Hollow.

Education
Fulmer Infant School is in Fulmer.

Teikyo School United Kingdom is in the area.

Notable people

 * Marmaduke Darrell
 * Tess Daly
 * Vernon Kay
 * J. Peter Robinson (was born here)
 * Michael York (actor) (was born here)
 * Yasser Al-Habib
 * John Sulston (was born here)
 * Angelina Jolie (lived here)
 * David Newbery (was born here)

Sport and recreation
King George's Field is a playing field that was named in memorial to King George V.

Fulmer Cricket Club play friendly matches at King George's Field. A local village team has existed since 1886 but the current club was officially founded in 1895. Local resident and noted cricketer Denis Compton opened the new clubhouse in 1988.

title: Fulmer


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Hungarian Socialist Party

The Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt), commonly known by its acronym MSZP, is a centre-left to left-wing social-democratic    and pro-European  political party in Hungary.

It was founded on 7 October, 1989 as a post-communist evolution and one of two legal successors of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP). Along with its conservative rival Fidesz, MSZP was one of the two most dominant parties in Hungarian politics until 2010; however, the party lost much of its popular support as a result of the Őszöd speech, the consequent 2006 protests, and then the 2008 financial crisis. Following the 2010 election, MSZP became the largest opposition party in parliament, a position it held until 2018, when it was overtaken by the former far and now centre-right Jobbik.

History
The MSZP evolved from the communist Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (or MSZMP), which ruled Hungary between 1956 and 1989. By the summer of 1989, the MSZMP was no longer a Marxist–Leninist party, and had been taken over by a faction of radical reformers who favoured jettisoning the Communist system in favour of a market economy. One of its leaders, Rezső Nyers, the architect of the New Economic Mechanism in the 1960s and 1970s, was elected as chairman of a four-man collective presidency that replaced the old MSZMP Politburo. Although General Secretary Károly Grósz, who had succeeded longtime leader János Kádár a year earlier, was elected to this body, Nyers now outranked him–and was thus now the de facto leader of Hungary.

At a party congress on 7 October 1989, the MSZMP dissolved and refounded itself as the MSZP, with Nyers as its first president. A marginal "Communist" faction led by Grósz broke away to form a revived Hungarian Communist Workers' Party, now known as the Hungarian Workers' Party, the other successor of the MSZMP.

The decision to declare the MSZP a successor of the MSZMP was controversial, and still carries repercussions for both the MSZP and Hungary. Another source of controversy is that some members of the former communist elite maintained political influence in the MSZP. Indeed, many key MSZP politicians were active members or held leadership positions within the MSZMP (like Gyula Horn and László Kovács).

On economic issues, the Socialists have often been greater advocates of liberal, free market policies than the conservative opposition, which has tended to favor more state interventionism in the economy through economic and price regulations, as well as through state ownership of key economic enterprises. The MSZP, in contrast, implemented a strong package of market reforms, austerity and privatization in 1995–96, called the Bokros package, when Hungary faced an economic and financial crisis. According to researchers, the elites of the Hungarian 'left' (MSZP and SZDSZ) have been differentiated from the 'right' by being more supportive of the classical neo-liberal economic policies, while the 'right' (especially extreme right) has advocated more interventionist policies. In contrast, issues like church and state and former communists show alignment along the traditional left-right spectrum. It is also noteworthy that, according to research, the MSZP elite's positions used to be closer to voters of the SZDSZ than to their own.

Besides a more liberal approach to the economy overall, the MSZP differentiated itself from the conservative opposition through its more recent focus on transforming state social policy from a collection of measures that benefit the entire population, such as subsidies available to all citizens, to one based on financial and social need.

Besides Gyula Horn, the MSZP's most internationally recognized politicians were Ferenc Gyurcsány and László Kovács, a former member of the European Commission, responsible for taxation.

Electoral history
The MSZP faced the voters for the first time at the 1990 elections, the first free elections held in Hungary in 44 years. It was knocked down to fourth place with only 33 seats.

Nyers handed the leadership to Horn, Hungary's last Communist foreign minister. Horn led the MSZP to an outright majority at the 1994 parliamentary election. Although the MSZP could have governed alone, he opted to form a coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). He not only wanted to allay concerns inside and outside Hungary of a former Communist party holding a majority, but needed the Free Democrats' votes to get economic reforms (what became the Bokros package) past his own party's left wing. Thus the MSZP was released from a so-called "political quarantine" imposed by the other Hungarian parties; during the first five years after the change of system, the other parties cooperated to shut out the MSZP from decision-making.

After being turned out of office in 1998, the party was able to form a renewed centre-left coalition with the Free Democrats in 2002.

At the 2006 elections, MSZP won with 43.2% of party list votes, which gave it 190 representatives out of 386 in the Parliament. The MSZP was therefore able to retain its coalition government from the previous term. In earlier elections, the MSZP polled 10.89% (1990), 32.98% (1994), 32.92% (1998) and 42.05% (2002).

After the successful fees abolishment referendum, MSZP formed the first minority government of Hungary, following the SZDSZ's backing out of the coalition with a deadline of 1 May 2008.

2010s decline
On 21 March 2009 Gyurcsány announced his resignation as Prime Minister due to failure management of the economic crisis. Gordon Bajnai became the nominee of MSZP for the post of prime minister in March 2009 and he became Prime Minister on 14 April. Gyurcsány also resigned from his position of party chairman, which he had occupied since 2007.

MSZP lost half of its supporters during the European Parliament election in 2009, receiving only 17.37% of the votes and gaining four seats compared to the previous nine seats. This electoral defeat marked the end of the de facto two-party system in Hungary, which had lasted since 1998.

The Hungarian Socialist Party suffered a heavy defeat in the 2010 election (won by Fidesz with a ⅔ majority), gaining only 19.3% of the votes, and 59 seats in the parliament. Following the resignation of Ildikó Lendvai, the party's prime minister candidate Attila Mesterházy was elected Chairman of the Socialist Party. Nevertheless, MSZP became the biggest opposition party in Hungary.

The left-wing fragmented after the 2010 election; at first Katalin Szili left the MSZP to form Social Union (SZU), following the similarly significant defeated local elections in October 2010, nevertheless Gyurcsány's detachment was a much worse disaster for the Socialists. Initially, the former PM wanted to reform the party, but his goals remained in the minority. As a result, Gyurcsány, along with nine other members of the parliamentary group, left MSZP and established Democratic Coalition (DK). Thus MSZP's number of MPs reduced to 48.

The Socialist Party entered into an alliance with four other parties in January 2014 to contest the April parliamentary election. Mesterházy was elected candidate for the Prime Minister position, but the Unity alliance failed to win. After that the electoral coalition disestablished. On the 2014 European Parliament election, MSZP suffered the largest defeat since the 1990 parliamentary election, gaining third place and only 10% of the votes. After the obvious failure, Mesterházy and the entire presidium of the Socialist Party resigned.

József Tóbiás was elected leader of the Socialist Party on 19 July 2014 following the resignation of Mesterházy. He also became leader of the parliamentary group in September 2014. During his leadership, the Socialist Party won a parliamentary by-election (2014) and an important mayoral by-election (Salgótarján), however the party itself was permanently pushed back to the third place by far-right Jobbik according to the opinion polls. Tóbiás did not support the full cooperation and unification of the left-wing opposition parties against Viktor Orbán. During the MSZP party congress in June 2016, he was defeated by Gyula Molnár, a former Socialist MP and mayor, who succeeded him as party chairman. In February 2016, the party decided to sell its headquarters at Jókai Street for financial reasons. In June 2018, Bertalan Tóth was elected president in the MSZP, shortly after the party suffered its worst electoral defeat since 1990.

The party further declined in the 2019 European election, only scoring 6.61% of votes (even in alliance with Dialogue for Hungary) and being overtaken by the Democratic Coalition and Momentum. In 2019 local elections the party managed (due to cooperation with other parties) to win mayorships ir Érd and Szombathely. Also in these elections MSZP managed to win mayorships in those areas, where it never had a mayor since 1990 (e. g. Mohács).

The 2019 local election results caused resignations from the party on the local level (e. g. Szeged mayor Laszlo Botka).

In 2020, the party's congress supported a change to the party's structure. Instead of having one leader, the party would nominate two co-leaders – a man and woman (similar structure has been implemented in 2019 by the Social Democratic Party of Germany).

Ideology
In political terms, the MSZP differentiates itself from its conservative opponents mainly in its rejection of Hungarian nationalism. The party is a member of the Progressive Alliance, the Socialist International, and the Party of European Socialists (PES), and it holds a chairmanship and several vice-chairmanships in committees at the European Parliament. The MSZP is a centre-left to left-wing party, but it has historically been centrist.

Single Member Constituencies voting consistently for MSZP
The image shows Single Member Constituencies (or SMCs) voting for MSZP in 1998, 2002, 2006 in dark red, while showing SMCs voting for MSZP in 2002 and 2006 in red. The dark red districts are considered the strongest positions of the party. Most if not all districts shown in dark red and red also voted for MSZP in 1994, a landslide victory for the party. So actually, dark red districts have an even longer uninterrupted voting history of supporting MSZP.

European Parliament
1 In an electoral alliance with Dialogue for Hungary 2 In an electoral alliance with DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance

title: Hungarian Socialist Party


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Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) was the ruling Marxist–Leninist party of the Hungarian People's Republic between 1956 and 1989. It was organised from elements of the Hungarian Working People's Party during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, with János Kádár as general secretary. The party also controlled its armed forces, the Hungarian People's Army.

Like all other Eastern Bloc parties, the MSZMP was organized on the basis of democratic centralism, a principle conceived by Vladimir Lenin that entails democratic and open discussion of issues within the party followed by the requirement of total unity in upholding the agreed policies. The highest body within the MSZMP was the party Congress, which convened every five years. When the Congress was not in session, the Central Committee of the MSZMP was the highest body. Because the Central Committee met twice a year, most day-to-day duties and responsibilities were vested in the Politburo. The party leader was the de facto chairman of the Politburo and a de facto chief executive of Hungary. At various points he served as the prime minister in addition to being party leader.

Overview
János Kádár announced the formation of the party via radio on 1 November 1956. The party supported the revolution, but turned against Imre Nagy's government after he denounced the Warsaw Pact. The party formed a 'Revolutionary Peasant-Worker Government' that took over the country, with Soviet support, on 4 November 1956.

Gradually, however, the new government instituted goulash Communism, a somewhat more humane way of governing than had prevailed under Mátyás Rákosi. Under Kádár's mantra of "he who is not against us is with us," Hungarians generally had more freedom than their Eastern Bloc counterparts to go about their daily lives. For example, his government executed only 350 people after the 1956 revolution. The government also gave limited freedom to the workings of the market via the New Economic Mechanism. However, it retained a monopoly of political power, and subjected the media to censorship that was fairly onerous by Western standards. The National Assembly, like its counterparts in the rest of the Soviet bloc, continued to rubber-stamp decisions already made by the MSZMP leadership. It was the dominant component of the Patriotic People's Front, a popular front that included some non-Communists. However, all prospective candidates had to accept the Front's program in order to stand. Indeed, Kádár and his close advisers used the Front to weed out candidates they deemed unacceptable.

Kádár retired on 22 May 1988 and was succeeded by Prime Minister Károly Grósz. However, Grósz soon found himself eclipsed by a group of radical reformers who favored establishing a market economy. On 28 January 1989, young Politburo member and minister of state Imre Pozsgay announced during an interview with the radio program 168 Hours that the Poliburo's historical sub-committee regarded the events of 1956 as a 'people's uprising'. This announcement, not approved in advance by the Politburo, provoked and catalyzed various developments within the party, and brought about sudden and ever-escalating changes that, within nine months, resulted in the ending of Communism in Hungary and the dissolution of the MSZMP.

By the summer of 1989, the MSZMP was no longer a Marxist–Leninist party, and the radical reformers, led by Prime Minister Miklós Németh, Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, Rezső Nyers, and Pozsgay, had taken over the party machinery. On 26 June 1989, the Central Committee was renamed the Political Executive Committee, and the Politburo was replaced by a four-man collective presidency chaired by Nyers. Although Grósz remained general secretary, Nyers now outranked him. On 7 October 1989 the MSZMP was dissolved and refounded as the Hungarian Socialist Party, a Western-style social democratic party. Two weeks later, the National Assembly approved numerous amendments to the constitution that purged it of its Marxist–Leninist character, ending one-party rule in Hungary.

A small Communist faction, centred on Károly Grósz, opposed these reforms and broke away to form the Hungarian Communist Workers' Party on 17 December 1989.

title: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party


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Hungarian Working People's Party

The Hungarian Working People's Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, abbr. MDP) was the ruling communist party of Hungary from 1948 to 1956.

It was formed by a merger of the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP). Ostensibly a union of equals, the merger had actually occurred as a result of massive pressure brought to bear on the Social Democrats by both the Hungarian Communists, as well as the Soviet Union. The few independent-minded Social Democrats who had not been sidelined by Communist salami tactics were pushed out in short order after the merger, leaving the party as essentially the MKP under a new name.

Other minor legal Hungarian political parties were allowed to continue as independent coalition parties until late 1949 but were completely subservient to the MDP.

Its leader was Mátyás Rákosi until 1956, then Ernő Gerő in the same year for three months, and eventually János Kádár until the party's dissolution.

During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the party was reorganized into the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) by a circle of communists around Kádár and Imre Nagy. The new government of Nagy declared to assess the uprising not as counter-revolutionary but as a "great, national and democratic event" and to dissolve State Security Police (ÁVH). Hungary's declaration to become neutral and to exit the Warsaw Pact caused the second Soviet intervention on 4 November 1956. After 8 November 1956, the MSZMP, under Kádár's leadership, fully supported the Soviet Union.

title: Hungarian Working People's Party


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Milford, New Hampshire

Milford is a town in Hillsborough County, New Hampshire, United States, on the Souhegan River. The population was 16,131 at the 2020 census, up from 15,115 at the 2010 census. It is the retail and manufacturing center of a multi-town area known informally as the Souhegan Valley.

The town center, where 9,212 people lived at the 2020 census, is defined as the Milford census-designated place (CDP), and is located at the junction of New Hampshire routes 13 and 101A.

History
Milford separated from neighboring Amherst in 1794. Like most towns named Milford in the United States, its name comes from the fact that it grew around a mill built on a ford—in this case on the Souhegan River.

Milford was once home to numerous granite quarries, which produced a stone that was used, among other things, to make the pillars for the U.S. Treasury in Washington, D.C.—pillars that can be seen on the back of the American $10 bill. Its nickname remains "The Granite Town", although only one small quarry is in operation as of 2017.

Like many New England riverside towns, Milford developed several thriving textile mills in the 19th century. That industry left New England by World War II, but Milford remains the commercial and retail center for surrounding towns. Major employers included casting company Hitchiner Manufacturing Co., a metal cable manufacturer, Hendrix Wire and Cable Inc., and a contract manufacturing solutions company, Cirtronics Corporation. In 2018, local firm Alene Candles became one of the first companies in the state to implement a "conscious leadership" program in a manufacturing production setting.

Milford is home to the Milford State Fish Hatchery. The town also holds the Souhegan Valley Boys & Girls Club, built on the former home of the now-bankrupt private theater American Stage Festival.

Milford was a stop on the Underground Railroad for escaped slaves. It was also the home of Harriet E. Wilson, who published the semi-autobiographical novel Our Nig: Or, Sketches in the Life of a Free Black in 1859, making it the first novel by an African-American woman published in the country.

Officially designated "Union Square", the Milford Oval is neither square nor oval in shape, but rather triangular. The "square" name in American parlance denotes a town common irrespective of geometry, and the "oval" name dates from the 19th century, when it was oval in shape. The Oval is the town center, with the Pillsbury Bandstand as its centerpiece and the Souhegan River as the backdrop. The Oval is formed by a modified traffic rotary in which State Highways 13 and 101A intersect, with northbound 13 and eastbound 101A passing straight through and crossing each other at a right angle with a stop sign for traffic on Route 13.

Geography
According to the United States Census Bureau, the town has a total area of 66.0 km2, of which 65.8 sqkm are land and 0.1 sqkm are water, comprising 0.22% of the town. Milford is drained by the Souhegan River, an eastward-flowing tributary of the Merrimack River. The southwestern part of town is drained by Mitchell Brook and Spaulding Brook, which flow south into Brookline and are part of the Nashua River watershed, another tributary of the Merrimack. The town's highest point is near its western border, on the summit of Boynton Hill, at 814 ft above sea level.

Adjacent municipalities

 * Lyndeborough (north)
 * Mont Vernon (north)
 * Amherst (east)
 * Hollis (southeast)
 * Brookline (south)
 * Mason (southwest)
 * Wilton (west)

Climate
According to the Köppen Climate Classification system, Milford has a hot-summer humid continental climate, abbreviated "Dfa" on climate maps. The hottest temperature recorded in Milford was 101 F in July 2011, while the coldest temperature recorded was -21 F in January 1994.

Demographics
As of the census of 2010, there were 15,115 people, 5,929 households, and 4,004 families residing in the town. There were 6,295 housing units, of which 366, or 5.8%, were vacant. The racial makeup of the town was 94.8% white, 1.3% African American, 0.2% Native American, 1.3% Asian, 0.01% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 0.6% some other race, and 1.7% from two or more races. 2.2% of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race.

Of the 5,929 households, 35.7% had children under the age of 18 living with them, 52.0% were headed by married couples living together, 10.5% had a female householder with no husband present, and 32.5% were non-families. 25.3% of all households were made up of individuals, and 9.4% were someone living alone who was 65 years of age or older. The average household size was 2.53, and the average family size was 3.04.

In the town, 25.0% of the population was under the age of 18, 7.8% was from 18 to 24, 27.0% from 25 to 44, 28.3% from 45 to 64, and 11.9% were 65 years of age or older. The median age was 39.0 years. For every 100 females, there were 95.8 males. For every 100 females aged 18 and over, there were 93.3 males.

For the period 2011–2015, the estimated median annual income for a household was $64,576, and the median income for a family was $80,241. Male full-time workers had a median income of $55,313 versus $38,792 for females. The per capita income for the town was $32,918. 5.8% of the population and 3.7% of families were below the poverty line. 8.2% of the population under the age of 18 and 2.7% of those 65 or older were living in poverty.

Education
The Milford School District operates Jacques Memorial School (K-1), Heron Pond Elementary School (2-5), Milford Middle School (6-8), and Milford High School & Applied Technology Center (9-12).

Culture
The town is known for its "Pumpkin Festival", which is normally held in early October. It is held over a three-day weekend (Friday-Sunday) and attracts more than 35,000 people. The festival has many attractions including food vendors, music stages, craft fair, carved pumpkin lighting, a haunted trail, a beer and wine tasting and a fireworks display around the Oval.

Notable people

 * Linda Kasabian (1949–2023), former Manson Family member who participated in the Helter Skelter murders
 * John McLane (February 27, 1852 – April 13, 1911), 50th governor of New Hampshire, from 1905 to 1907
 * Abby Hutchinson Patton (1829–1892), 19th-century singer, poet
 * George A. Ramsdell (1834–1900), 46th governor of New Hampshire
 * Harriet E. Wilson (1825–1900), considered the first female African-American novelist, as well as the first African American of any gender to publish a novel on the North American continent

title: Milford, New Hampshire


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Gawcott

Gawcott is a village about 1.5 mi southwest of Buckingham in the Buckinghamshire district in the ceremonial county of Buckinghamshire, England. The village is in the civil parish of Gawcott with Lenborough.

History
The toponym is derived from the Old English for "cottage for which rent is payable". The Domesday Book of 1086 records the village as Chauescote. An alternative description for the name of Gawcott, however, comes from the old Norse word for the cuckoo, 'Gaukr', pronounced Gawk and 'cott' for house/ home/ cottage.

This explanation has some merit as in the west of the village the cuckoo was the prevalent bird up until the early 1940s when much of its habitat was destroyed to make space for servicemen in the Second World War. One of the local historic public houses of the village was also named the Cuckoo's Nest.

Sir George Gilbert Scott, the architect of the Midland Grand Hotel at St Pancras railway station in London (and numerous other buildings), was born in Gawcott where his father, the Reverend Thomas Scott (1780–1835), was perpetual curate.

Signal Hill
To the east of the village is Signal Hill, which was a former FCO/MI6 signals intelligence station.

title: Gawcott


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Gayhurst

Gayhurst is a village and civil parish in the unitary authority area of the City of Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire, England. It is about 2.5 mi NNW of Newport Pagnell, and 5 mi north of Central Milton Keynes.

The village name is an Old English language word meaning 'wooded hill where goats are kept'. In the Domesday Book in 1086 it was recorded as Gateherst; later names include Goathurst. At that time the manor was owned by Bishop Odo of Bayeux.

History
In 1582, Queen Elizabeth I made a grant of Gayhurst Manor "in the event of its reversion to the Crown" to Sir Francis Drake, but there is no record that he ever received it. The house once belonged to Sir Everard Digby (1578–1606), one of the conspirators in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. His son, Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665), was an English courtier, diplomat, natural philosopher and astrologer. He was born at Gayhurst.

Gayhurst had an outstation from the Bletchley Park codebreaking establishment, where one of the Bombes used to decode German Enigma messages in World War Two were housed.

Listed buildings and structures
The parish has two buildings listed at Grade I, five at Grade II* and 20 at grade II. The (Grade I listed) Church of St Peter was built in the classical style in 1728 to replace a medieval church; the designer is unknown.

title: Gayhurst


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Grammy Award for Best Traditional Blues Album

The Grammy Award for Best Traditional Blues Album was awarded from 1983 to 2011 and from 2017 onwards. Until 1992 the award was known as Best Traditional Blues Performance and was twice awarded to individual tracks rather than albums.

The award was discontinued after the 2011 Grammy season in a major overhaul of Grammy categories. From 2012 onwards, the category was merged with the Best Contemporary Blues Album category to form the new Best Blues Album category. However, in 2016 the Grammy organisation decided to revert the situation back to the pre-2012 era, with two separate categories for traditional and contemporary blues recordings respectively.

Years reflect the year in which the Grammy Awards were handed out, for music released in the previous year. B.B. King holds the record of most wins in the category with ten.


text:
User talk:Perez

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UtherSRG 20:07, 16 Dec 2003 (UTC)

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Thank you for your understanding and happy editing :) Editing on behalf of User:Jarry1250, LivingBot (talk) 22:46, 13 March 2011 (UTC)

title: User talk:Perez


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Farsightedness

Far-sightedness, also known as long-sightedness, hypermetropia, and hyperopia, is a condition of the eye where distant objects are seen clearly but near objects appear blurred. This blur is due to incoming light being focused behind, instead of on, the retina due to insufficient accommodation by the lens. Minor hypermetropia in young patients is usually corrected by their accommodation, without any defects in vision. But, due to this accommodative effort for distant vision, people may complain of eye strain during prolonged reading. If the hypermetropia is high, there will be defective vision for both distance and near. People may also experience accommodative dysfunction, binocular dysfunction, amblyopia, and strabismus. Newborns are almost invariably hypermetropic, but it gradually decreases as the newborn gets older.

There are many causes for this condition. It may occur when the axial length of eyeball is too short or if the lens or cornea is flatter than normal. Changes in refractive index of lens, alterations in position of the lens or absence of lens are the other main causes. Risk factors include a family history of the condition, diabetes, certain medications, and tumors around the eye. It is a type of refractive error. Diagnosis is based on an eye exam.

Management can occur with eyeglasses, contact lenses, or refractive corneal surgeries. Glasses are easiest while contact lenses can provide a wider field of vision. Surgery works by changing the shape of the cornea. Far-sightedness primarily affects young children, with rates of 8% at 6 years old and 1% at 15 years old. It then becomes more common again after the age of 40, known as presbyopia, affecting about half of people. The best treatment option to correct hypermetropia due to aphakia is IOL implantation.

Other common types of refractive errors are near-sightedness, astigmatism, and presbyopia.

Signs and symptoms
In young patients, mild hypermetropia may not produce any symptoms. The signs and symptoms of far-sightedness include blurry vision, frontal or fronto temporal headaches, eye strain, tiredness of eyes etc. The common symptom is eye strain. Difficulty seeing with both eyes (binocular vision) may occur, as well as difficulty with depth perception. The asthenopic symptoms and near blur are usually seen after close work, especially in the evening or night.

Complications
Far-sightedness can have rare complications such as strabismus and amblyopia. At a young age, severe far-sightedness can cause the child to have double vision as a result of "over-focusing".

Hypermetropic patients with short axial length are at higher risk of developing primary angle closure glaucoma, so, routine gonioscopy and glaucoma evaluation is recommended for all hypermetropic adults.

Causes
Simple hypermetropia, the most common form of hypermetropia, is caused by normal biological variations in the development of eyeball. Aetiologically, causes of hypermetropia can be classified as:
 * Axial: Axial hypermetropia occur when the axial length of eyeball is too short. About 1 mm decrease in axial length cause 3 diopters of hypermetropia. One condition that cause axial hypermetropia is nanophthalmos.
 * Curvatural: Curvatural hypermetropia occur when curvature of lens or cornea is flatter than normal. About 1 mm increase in radius of curvature results in 6 diopters of hypermetropia. Cornea is flatter in microcornea and cornea plana.
 * Index: Age related changes in refractive index (cortical sclerosis) can cause hypermetropia. Another cause of index hypermetropia is diabetes. Occasionally, mild hypermetropic shift may be seen in association with cortical or subcapsular cataract also.
 * Positional: Positional hypermetropia occur due to posterior dislocation of Lens or IOL. It may occur due to trauma.
 * Consecutive: Consecutive hypermetropia occur due to surgical over correction of myopia or surgical under correction in cataract surgery.
 * Functional: Functional hypermetropia results from paralysis of accommodation as seen in internal ophthalmoplegia, CN III palsy etc.
 * Absence of lens: Congenital or acquired aphakia cause high degree hypermetropia.

Far-sightedness is often present from birth, but children have a very flexible eye lens, which helps to compensate. In rare instances hyperopia can be due to diabetes, and problems with the blood vessels in the retina.

Diagnosis
A diagnosis of far-sightedness is made by utilizing either a retinoscope or an automated refractor-objective refraction; or trial lenses in a trial frame or a phoropter to obtain a subjective examination. Ancillary tests for abnormal structures and physiology can be made via a slit lamp test, which examines the cornea, conjunctiva, anterior chamber, and iris.

In severe cases of hyperopia from birth, the brain has difficulty in merging the images that each individual eye sees. This is because the images the brain receives from each eye are always blurred. A child with severe hyperopia can never see objects in detail. If the brain never learns to see objects in detail, then there is a high chance of one eye becoming dominant. The result is that the brain will block the impulses of the non-dominant eye. In contrast, the child with myopia can see objects close to the eye in detail and does learn at an early age to see objects in detail.

Classification

Hyperopia is typically classified according to clinical appearance, its severity, or how it relates to the eye's accommodative status.

Clinical classification
There are three clinical categories of hyperopia.
 * Simple hyperopia: Occurs naturally due to biological diversity.
 * Pathological hyperopia: Caused by disease, trauma, or abnormal development.
 * Functional hyperopia: Caused by paralysis that interferes eye's ability to accommodate.

Classification according to severity
There are also three categories severity:
 * Low: Refractive error less than or equal to +2.00 diopters (D).
 * Moderate: Refractive error greater than +2.00 D up to +5.00 D.
 * High: Refractive error greater than +5.00 D.

Components of hypermetropia
Accommodation has significant role in hyperopia. Considering accommodative status, hyperopia can be classified as:
 * Total hypermetropia: It is the total amount of hyperopia which is obtained after complete relaxation of accommodation using cycloplegics like atropine.
 * Latent hyperopia: It is the amount of hyperopia normally corrected by ciliary tone (approximately 1 diopter).
 * Manifest hyperopia: It is the amount of hyperopia not corrected by ciliary tone. Manifest hyperopia is further classified into two, facultative and absolute.
 * Facultative hyperopia: It is the part of hyperopia corrected by patient's accommodation.
 * Absolute hyperopia: It is the residual part of hyperopia which causes blurring of vision for distance.

So, Total hyperopia= latent hyperopia + manifest hyperopia (facultative + absolute)

Corrective lenses
The simplest form of treatment for far-sightedness is the use of corrective lenses, i.e. eyeglasses or contact lenses. Eyeglasses used to correct far-sightedness have convex lenses.

Surgery
There are also surgical treatments for far-sightedness:

Laser procedures
 * Photorefractive keratectomy (PRK): This is a refractive technique that is done by removal of a minimal amount of the corneal surface. Hyperopic PRK has many complications like regression effect, astigmatism due to epithelial healing, and corneal haze. Post operative epithelial healing time is also more for PRK.
 * Laser assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK): Laser eye surgery to reshape the cornea, so that glasses or contact lenses are no longer needed. Excimer laser LASIK can correct hypermetropia up to +6 diopters. LASIK is contraindicated in patients with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.
 * Laser epithelial keratomileusis (LASEK): Resembles PRK, but uses alcohol to loosen the corneal surface.
 * Epi-LASIK: Epi-LASIK is also used to correct hyperopia. In this procedure, use of epikeratome eliminates the use of alcohol.
 * Laser thermal keratoplasty (LTK): Laser thermal keratoplasty is a laser based non-destructive refractive procedure used to correct hyperopia and presbyopia. It uses Thallium-Holmium-Chromium (THC): YAG laser.

IOL implantation
 * Aphakia correction: High degree hypermetropia due to absence of lens (aphakia) is best corrected using intraocular lens implantation.
 * Refractive lens exchange (RLE): A variation of cataract surgery where the natural crystalline lens is replaced with an artificial intraocular lens; the difference is the existence of abnormal ocular anatomy which causes a high refractive error.
 * Phakic IOL: Phakic intraocular lens are lenses that implanted inside eye without removing the normal crystalline lens. Phakic IOLs can be used to correct hypermetropia up to +20 diopters.

Non laser procedures
 * Conductive keratoplasty (CK): Conductive keratoplasty is a non laser refractive procedure used to correct presbyopia and low hypermetropia (+0.75D to +3.25D) with or without astigmatism (up to 0.75D). It uses radiofrequency energy to heat and shrink corneal collagen tissue. CK is contraindicated in pregnant/breastfeeding women, central corneal dystrophies and scarring, history of herpetic keratitis, type 1 diabetes etc.
 * Automated lamellar keratoplasty (ALK): Hyperopic automated lamellar keratoplasty (H-ALK) and Homoplastic ALK are ALK procedures that corrects low to moderate hyperopia. Poor predictability and the risk of complications limits usefulness of these procedures.
 * Keratophakia and epi-keratophakia are another two non laser surgical procedures used to correct hypermetropia. Keratophakia is a surgical technique developed by Barraquer for treating high hypermetropia and aphakia. Poor predictability and induced irregular astigmatism are complications of these procedures.

Etymology
The term hyperopia comes from Greek ὑπέρ hyper "over" and ὤψ ōps "sight" ( GEN ὠπός ōpos).

title: Farsightedness


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Fidesz

Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség) is a right-wing populist and national-conservative political party in Hungary led by Viktor Orbán.

It was formed in 1988 under the name of Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége) as a center-left and liberal activist movement that opposed the ruling Marxist–Leninist government. It was registered as a political party in 1990, with Orbán as its leader. It entered the National Assembly following the 1990 parliamentary election; however, it lost two seats after the 1994 election. Following the election, it adopted liberal-conservatism which caused liberal members to leave and to join the Alliance of Free Democrats. It then sought to form a connection with other conservative parties, and after the 1998 election, it successfully formed a center-right government. It adopted nationalism in the early 2000s, but its popularity slightly declined due to corruption scandals. It served in the opposition between 2002 and 2010, and in 2006 it formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP).

The Őszöd speech (which was followed by mass protests) restored its popularity, which led Fidesz to winning a supermajority in the 2010 election. After returning to governing Hungary, it adopted national-conservative policies and shifted further to the right. It also became more critical of the European Union, which led to the party being described as Eurosceptic. In 2011, the new Hungarian constitution was adopted in the parliament and in 2012 it became effective, although it was subject to controversies due to its consolidation of power to Fidesz. Its majority of seats remained after the 2014 election, and following the escalation of the migrant crisis, Fidesz began using right-wing populist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Since its inception, its political position has changed drastically, and Fidesz is now positioned as a right-wing or far-right party. Political scientists have described the party's governance as illiberal or authoritarian, with Orbán describing their model of government as "Christian illiberal democracy".

Following the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election, it currently holds a majority in the National Assembly with 135 seats. It has also held the presidency since 2010, has endorsed the election of every president since 2000, and it enjoys majorities in all 19 county assemblies, while being in opposition in the General Assembly of Budapest. Fidesz was initially a member of the Liberal International until 2000, after which it joined the European People's Party. It remained its member until 2021, and since then it has served with the Non-Inscrits group within the European Parliament. On 30 June, 2024, the ANO 2011, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Fidesz, created a new alliance named Patriots for Europe.

1988–1989: Liberal activist beginnings
The party was founded in the spring of 1988 and named Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats) with the acronym FIDESZ. It grew out of an underground liberal student activist movement opposed to the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Founding such a movement was semi-illegal at the time, so the founders risked their careers by being involved in the opposition. The membership had an upper age limit of 35 years (this requirement was abolished at the 1993 party congress).

In 1989, Fidesz won the Thorolf Rafto Memorial Prize. The movement was represented at the award ceremony by one of its leaders, Péter Molnár, who later became a Member of Parliament in Hungary.

1990–1998: Center-left opposition and conservative turn
In the 1990 elections, the party entered the National Assembly after winning about 6% of the vote. They became a small, though quite popular oppositional party. In 1992, Fidesz joined the Liberal International. At the time, it was a moderate liberal centrist party, sometimes also described as social-liberal.

At the 1993 party congress, it changed its political position from liberal to civic-centrist ("polgári centrumpárt"). The turn in ideology caused a severe split in the membership. Péter Molnár left the party along with Gábor Fodor and Klára Ungár, who joined the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats. Viktor Orbán was elected party chairman.

After its disappointing result in the 1994 elections, Fidesz remained an opposition party but grew increasingly conservative. In 1995, it changed its name to Hungarian Civic Party (Magyar Polgári Párt) and sought connections to the national-conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum, a former governing party.

1998–2002: First Orbán government
Fidesz gained power for the first time at the 1998 elections, with Viktor Orbán becoming prime minister. Their coalition partners were the smaller Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Independent Smallholders' Party. In 2000, Fidesz terminated its membership in the Liberal International and joined the European People's Party. The government constituted a "relatively conventional European conservative" rule.

2002–2010: Return to opposition
Fidesz narrowly lost the 2002 elections to the Hungarian Socialist Party, garnering 41.07% to the Socialists' 42.05%. Fidesz had 169 members of the National Assembly, out of a total of 386. Immediately after the election, they accused the opponents of electoral fraud. The 2002 Hungarian municipal elections saw again huge Fidesz losses.

In the spring of 2003, Fidesz took its current name, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union.

It was the most successful party in the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections: it won 47.4% of the vote and 12 of its candidates were elected as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), including Lívia Járóka, the second Romani MEP.

Fidesz's nominee, Dr. László Sólyom, was elected President of Hungary in the 2005 election. He was endorsed by Védegylet, an NGO including people from the whole political spectrum. A self-described "conservative liberal," he championed elements of both political wings with a selective, but conscious choice of values.

In 2005, Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) formed an alliance for the 2006 elections, which were won by the social-democratic and liberal coalition of Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Fidesz received 42% of the list votes and 164 of 386 representatives in the National Assembly.

On 1 October 2006, Fidesz won the municipal elections, which counterbalanced the MSZP-led government's power to some extent. Fidesz won 15 of 23 mayoralties in Hungary's largest cities—although its candidate narrowly lost the city of Budapest to a member of the SZDSZ—and majorities in 18 out of 20 regional assemblies.

In the 2009 European Parliament election, Fidesz won a landslide victory, gaining 56.36% of the vote and 14 of Hungary's 22 seats.

In a closed-door party meeting in 2009, Orbán called for a "central political forcefield" to govern Hungary for up to 20 years to achieve political stability.

In January 2010, László Kövér, head of the party's national board, told reporters the party was aiming at winning a two-thirds majority at the parliamentary elections in April. He noted that Fidesz had a realistic chance to win a landslide. However, this feat was threatened by the rise of the radical nationalist Jobbik party. Kövér said it was a "lamentably negative" tendency, adding that it was rooted in the "disaster government" of the Socialist Party and its former liberal ally Free Democrats.

2010–present: In power
The strong and preeminent Fidesz has benefited from the fragmented and disjointed opposition that has proved inept at mounting a unified challenge to the ruling party in a country where a majority of parliamentary seats are allocated to the party that garners the plurality of votes in a constituency.

Government debt has fallen by 6% in the 8 years after Fidesz took power in 2010 while the country's credit ratings have improved. Economic growth had almost quadrupled with wages rising by over 10% and destitution decreasing by almost 50% (though still considerable). According to official figures, unemployment had fallen by nearly two-thirds. However, as many as almost half of newly employed Hungarians had found work elsewhere in the EU. A public works program has also been criticized by some economists for artificially and deceptively reducing unemployment numbers while engaging in and compensating people for possibly unneeded or unnecessarily inefficient work. Hungary has been highly dependent on EU funds during Fidesz's rule; these representing nearly 4% of the country's GDP, more than for any other EU member.

2010–2014: Second Orbán government
In a landslide victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections, the party won an outright majority in the first round on 11 April, with the Fidesz-KDNP alliance winning 206 seats, including 119 individual seats. In the final result, Fidesz 263 seats, of which 173 are individual seats. Fidesz held 227 of these seats, giving it an outright majority in the National Assembly by itself.

Fidesz was widely seen as propelled to a sweeping victory in large part due to the dissatisfaction with the ruling political establishment which was plagued by corruption scandals and by the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The socialist government had also imposed harsh austerity measures in an attempt to rein in its ballooning budget deficits even before the late 2000s’ crisis. In September 2006, a recording of the prime minister admitting to lying about the country's dire economic prospects was revealed by the media and broadcast on radio. Steel barriers were erected around the parliament to protect it from tens of thousands of protesters.

After winning 53% of the popular vote in the first round of the 2010 parliamentary election, which translated into a supermajority of 68% of parliamentary seats, giving Fidesz sufficient power to revise or replace the constitution, the party embarked on an extraordinary project of passing over 200 laws and drafting and adopting a new constitution—since followed by nearly 2000 amendments.

The new constitution has been widely criticized     by the European Commission for Democracy through Law, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the United States for concentrating too much power in the hands of the ruling party, for limiting oversight of the new constitution by the Constitutional Court of Hungary, and for removing democratic checks and balances in various areas, including the ordinary judiciary, supervision of elections, and the media.

In October 2013, Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe said that the council was satisfied with the amendments which had been made to the criticized laws.

2014–2018: Third Orbán government
Fidesz won the nationwide parliamentary election in April 2014 and secured a second supermajority with 133 seats (of 199) in the legislature. This supermajority was lost, however, when Tibor Navracsics was appointed to the European Commission. His Veszprém County seat was taken by an independent candidate in a by-election. Another by-election on 12 April 2015 saw the supermajority lose a second seat, also in Veszprém, to a Jobbik candidate.

2018–2022: Fourth Orbán government
Fidesz won the nationwide parliamentary election in April 2018 and secured a 3rd supermajority with 133 seats (of 199) in the legislature. Orbán and Fidesz campaigned primarily on the issues of immigration and foreign meddling, and the election was seen as a victory for right-wing populism in Europe.

With the start of 2019, the prime minister's residence was relocated from the Hungarian Parliament Building to the Buda Castle, a former Carmelite monastery and former royal residence. The move was first planned in 2002 during the first Fidesz government, but was never carried out. Government representatives stated the move was necessary to uphold the separation of the executive and legislative branch by physically separating the two (in contrast to the Communist era when the two branches operated in the same building) while the opposition criticized the move as profligate (the renovation cost Ft21bn, or €65.5M) and as a symbolic revival of the Horthy era (Miklós Horthy also took up residence in the building).

In 2019 local elections, the party lost its majority in General Assembly of Budapest and numerous city councils.

2022–present: Fifth Orbán government
Fidesz won the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election and secured a supermajority for the fourth time with 135 seats (of 199) in the legislature. Reuters described it as a "crushing victory". With 54.13% of the popular vote, Fidesz received the highest vote share by any party since Hungary returned to democracy in 1989.

In June 2024 it was revealed that Fidesz had become Google's biggest advertiser in the whole of the European Union.

Ideology and policies
Fidesz's position on the political spectrum has changed over time. At its inception as a student movement in the late 1980s, the party was positioned on the center-left on the political spectrum, and it advocated for liberalism and libertarianism. It was strongly committed towards anti-clerical and secular policies. As the Hungarian political landscape crystallized following the fall of Communism and the first free elections in 1990, Fidesz moved to the right four years later. Although Fidesz was in opposition to the Hungarian Democratic Forum's national-conservative coalition government from 1990 to 1994, Fidesz became the most prominent liberal-conservative political force in Hungary by 1998. It adopted nationalism,  national-liberalism,  and Christian democracy in the early 2000s. It was positioned on the center-right, although it moved more to the right as the decade progressed.

Fidesz is currently a right-wing party, and it is national conservative while favoring interventionist policies on economic issues like handling of banks, and has a strong conservative stance on social issues,   a soft Eurosceptic vision towards European integration,      and has been described as right-wing populist. In the late 2010s, the party has increasingly been described as far-right;
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.
 * its ruling style has also been variously described as "soft fascism", "soft dictatorship", and "soft autocracy". The Fidesz party has denied such accusations and distanced itself from the extreme right, criticizing such accusations as politically motivated opposition to its anti-immigrant policies and pursuit of illiberal democracy.

Illiberal democracy
Orbán and other Fidesz politicians have prominently described their model of government as a Christian illiberal democracy.

Orbán has described liberal democracy as having undemocratic characteristics because of "being intolerant of alternative views", and being incompatible with and antithetical to Christian democracy (saying: "Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal."), and praised Turkey, Russia, China, and Singapore as successful examples of illiberal states.

Economy
Like the Hungarian right in general, Fidesz has been more skeptical of the neoliberal economic policies than the Hungarian left. According to researchers, the elites of the Hungarian left (the Hungarian Socialist Party and the former Alliance of Free Democrats) have been differentiated from the right by being more supportive of the classical liberal economic policies, while the right (especially extreme right) has advocated more economic interventionist policies. In contrast, on issues like church and state and family policies, the liberals show alignment along the traditional left–right spectrum. In the past, Fidesz has implemented several economic liberal policies, including an income flat tax, reductions in the corporate tax rate, restrictions on unemployment benefits, and privatization of state-owned land.

The Fidesz government has embraced some government schemes, including "public works job program, pension hikes, utility bill cuts, a minimum wage increase and cash gifts for retirees." It has also implemented a national public works program aimed in particular at assisting neglected rural communities. It has sought national control of key economic sectors while assuming a cautious stance on economic globalization.

NATO intervention in Yugoslavia
During the NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia, Orbán refused the requests of the United States and Great Britain to invade the northernmost territory of Serbia in order to hinder the intervention of Serbian forces in Kosovo. However, he expressed concern about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Serbia and had to cede airspace to NATO forces because Hungary had obtained NATO membership before the war.

Invasion of Iraq
Fidesz opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Hungarian participation in it, questioning the international legitimacy of the invasion.

European Union
Despite the conflict with the European People's Party and European Union (EU) institutions, Fidesz and the Orbán government have claimed to be not in conflict with, but purportedly in line with pan-European values. As he struggled to maintain rapport with the EPP, Orbán began forming a right-wing populist alliance to electorally challenge the conservative EU establishment despite voicing a desire for Fidesz to remain a member. Orbán and his government have clashed with the EU over the handling of the 2014–2016 European migrant crisis and the death penalty, which is prohibited by EU rules.

Russia and Ukraine
Hungary was the only EU member state to vote against financial aid for Ukraine during its conflict with Russia-sponsored separatists, and has been a vocal critic of EU sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine. The main cause is that since 2017, relations with Ukraine rapidly deteriorated over the issue of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Hungary has been obstructing Ukraine's integration efforts in the EU and NATO, even though Hungary has also been continuously helping and supporting Ukraine, with an exceptional attention to Transcarpathia. Orbán has strongly criticized EU sanctions against Russia but abstained from vetoing them. The Fidesz government joined the UK-led diplomatic offensive after the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, expelling Russian embassy officials. Orbán has hailed Russia as an exemplary case of illiberal democracy.

During his presidency, Orbán has been described as drawing closer to Russian president Vladimir Putin. The closer relationship between the two leaders and nations has however largely been motivated by a tighter economic relationship, part of the government's "Eastern Opening" strategy, announced in 2011.

The Fourth Orbán Government initially strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, aligning the country with NATO and the European Union on the matter: Orbán announced that Hungary would be sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but declined to send military equipment. President János Áder (also a Fidesz member) strongly condemned the Russian invasion, comparing it to the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. However, Fidesz soon realigned with its formerly pro-Russian position: the party repeatedly opposed sanctions against the Russian Federation, prompting international press to describe Orbán as "a key Putin's ally". Orbán has called for Russia and the United States to negotiate a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, stating that the Ukrainians could not win the war militarily.

Immigration
Fidesz has adopted anti-immigration stances and rhetoric. The Fidesz government has conversely begun admitting increasing numbers of foreign workers due to a labor shortage resulting from strong economic growth, population decline, and rising wages.

Nativism
In a 2018 address, Orbán said: "We must state that we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our own color, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of others. We do not want this. We do not want that at all. We do not want to be a diverse country." Orbán has "often expressed a preference for a racially homogeneous society." The government has modified the country's Constitution to make it illegal to "settle foreign populations in Hungary."

Despite a very low fertility rate that has led to a demographic deficit, the Fidesz government has remained steadfastly opposed to economic immigration that has been harnessed by other European countries to relieve its worker deficits. Instead, the government announced pecuniary incentives (including eliminating taxes for mothers with more than 3 children, and reducing credit payments and easier access to government-subsidized mortgages), and expanding day care and kindergarten access. The Fidesz government's child incentive program also offers a 10-million-forint government-subsidized zero-interest loan to married couples who are willing to have a baby after 1 July 2019.

Social policy
Changes passed by the Fidesz government have given citizens the right to use arms for self-defense on one's own property. Fidesz has passed legislation criminalising homelessness.

Christianity
Orbán has on multiple occasions emphasized upholding Christian values as central to his government, and has described his government as creating a Christian democracy. Hungarian Catholic bishop András Veres described some of Fidesz' policies, such as providing free IVF treatment for couples at state-run clinics, as being at odds with some Christian denominations, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, which opposes IVF. Orbán is a member of the Reformed Church in Hungary. However, the party has been described as taking a more secular position on abortion, the role of the church and education than its ally, the Christian Democratic People's Party.

Family policy
Fidesz is opposed to an abortion ban, instead preferring to promote natalism. However, the Fidesz government has introduced a requirement for women seeking abortions to listen to a pulse generated by the ultrasound monitor before making their decision.

The Fidesz government has introduced loan subsidies for married couples that have three or more children and a personal income tax exemption for women that have four or more children.

Anti-communism
The party is anti-communist. In May 2018, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker attended and spoke at a celebration of the deceased Karl Marx's 200th birthday, where he defended Marx's legacy. In response, MEPs from Fidesz wrote: "Marxist ideology led to the death of tens of millions and ruined the lives of hundreds of millions. The celebration of its founder is a mockery of their memory."

The Fidesz government spokesman Zoltán Kovács justified the government's controversial policies as an effort to "get rid of the remnants of communism that are still with us, not only in terms of institutions but in terms of mentality."

During the party's rule, statues of communists regarded as traitors have been removed with Fidesz politicians in attendance. In December 2018, Hungarian authorities removed a statue of Imre Nagy for renovation. Nagy was a Hungarian reformist communist politician who led the failed anti-Soviet 1956 Hungarian Revolution and was later executed for his role in the uprising; the statue was replaced with a memorial dedicated to the victims of the short-lived 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic.

National Consultations and political informational campaigns
The government has often propagated Fidesz's political ideas in tax-funded advertisements, putting up posters portraying a grinning George Soros, while calling on the citizens to oppose his purported support of illegal immigration (many of the posters portraying Soros, who is Jewish, were defaced with antisemitic graffiti), posters depicting Soros and European Commission head Jean-Claude Juncker laughing together with text suggesting Soros' control of EU institutions (while also disseminating the accusation by letters sent to all Hungarian citizens),   and posters using the stock photo featuring photo models from the "distracted boyfriend" internet meme to promote family values. Additionally, various party members have been accused of antisemitism.

The government has employed so-called National Consultations, sending questionnaires to citizens that survey their opinions on government policy and legislation while pushing the Fidesz governments' ideology and agenda with suggestive questions (e.g. by referring to a supposed "Soros plan" to "convince Brussels to resettle at least one million immigrants from Africa and the Middle East annually on the territory of the European Union, including Hungary", that this "is part of the Soros plan to launch political attacks on countries objecting to immigration and impose strict penalties on them", and asking citizens whether they agree, or blasting "Brussels bureaucrats" in a consultation about family policy). On other occasions, such as just prior to elections, the government sent letters notifying citizens that it will reduce their gas payments by €38, or sent pensioners gift vouchers. The Fidesz government has also carried out taxpayer-funded "information campaigns", or "national messaging initiatives", that have denounced supposed enemies of Hungary with budgets of tens of millions of euros per year.

Youth wing
The Fidesz youth affiliate Fidelitas was founded in 1996. In December 2022, Dániel Farkas was elected president, succeeding Boglárka Illés. Fidelitas is a member of European Democrat Students (EDS) and the International Young Democracy Union.

International affiliations
Fidesz was a member of the Liberal International from 1992 to 2000, and is currently a member of the International Democratic Union and Centrist Democrat International.

 European Union

Following its ideological turn to conservatism, it joined the center-right European People's Party (EPP) but was suspended on 20 March 2019. Fidesz MEPs left the European People's Party group in the European Parliament on 3 March 2021, after the EPP changed its rules to allow it to expel a party's entire delegation. It has served with the Non-Inscrits since then.

In July 2021, Fidesz signed a joint declaration with National Rally, Law and Justice, Vox, the League, the Brothers of Italy, the Estonian Conservative People's Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, Belgium's Vlaams Belang, the Danish People's Party, the Finns Party, VMRO – Bulgarian National Movement, Greek Solution, the Romanian Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party and Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance on the future of the EU.

In December 2021, the party participated in the Warsaw summit with Law and Justice, the Estonian Conservative People's Party, the Finns Party, the Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party, Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance, the Freedom Party of Austria, Vox, National Rally, Vlaams Belang and the Dutch JA21, signing a document outlining new collaboration at the EU level between the parties.

In January 2022, the party participated in the Madrid summit, hosted by Vox, alongside National Rally, Law and Justice, Vlaams Belang, JA21, the Estonian Conservative People's Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, VMRO - Bulgarian National Movement, the Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party and Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance, signing a joint declaration on policies towards the EU and Russia.

In November 2022, Fidesz MEPs signed a cooperation agreement with MEPs from Sovereign Poland, Vox, Lega, the Freedom Party of Austria and the National Rally to collaborate within the European Parliament.

In June 2024, Fidesz announced its intention to form the Patriots for Europe parliamentary group in the European Parliament, which subsequently included the Czech ANO 2011 and Přísaha, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Portuguese Chega, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the French National Rally, the Italian Lega, the Danish People's Party, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the Spanish Vox, Latvia First and the Greek Voice of Reason.

 European countries

 * Austria

Orbán has more recently cultivated close ties between Fidesz and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), noting "strategic cooperation" between the parties and "friendly ties based on mutual confidence and Christian-conservative values". Prior to the 2019 Austrian legislative election, he held a joint press conference with FPÖ leader Norbert Hofer, where he wished the party success in the upcoming election and stressed the "similar views" of the two parties.

 * Belgium

Hungarian Justice Minister Judit Varga addressed a rally in Antwerp hosted by Vlaams Belang in June 2022, alongside representatives of other Identity and Democracy Party member parties.

Orbán released a video message endorsing Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the President of Republika Srpska, ahead of the 2022 Bosnian general election. Orbán's government has reportedly provided political and financial support to the SNSD.
 * Bosnia

 * Czech Republic

Orbán sent a letter of support to Václav Klaus Jr.'s newly formed Tricolour Citizens' Movement in the Czech Republic in 2019. Orbán has a relationship with Klaus's father, President Václav Klaus, who has expressed support for Orbán's rule.

During the 2021 Czech parliamentary election, Orbán endorsed Czech Prime Minister and ANO 2011 leader Andrej Babiš, appearing alongside him at campaign events in the Czech Republic.

 * Croatia

Orbán expressed strong support for Tomislav Karamarko's leadership of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), having written a letter endorsing Karamarko for his stance on immigration that was read out at an HDZ rally during the 2015 Croatian parliamentary election campaign.

 * France

Orbán initially rejected association with Marine Le Pen's National Rally, and instead endorsed François Fillon, the candidate of The Republicans, in the 2017 French presidential election. However, in 2021, Fidesz opened relations with National Rally, congratulating Le Pen on her re-election as the party's leader. Orbán subsequently hosted Le Pen during her October 2021 visit to Budapest and had discussions with her regarding a formal alliance between the parties. Orbán released a video of support for Le Pen during the 2022 French presidential election, which was aired at one of her campaign rallies.

Orbán also has relations with Reconquête leader Éric Zemmour, hosting him in Budapest in September 2021.

 * Germany

Fidesz continues to reject cooperation with Alternative for Germany, describing the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria as its natural allies there.

 * Italy

Orbán has praised the tenure of former Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, the leader of the League, declaring him an "ally and our fellow combatant in the fight for the preservation of European Christian heritage and the tackling of migration" after Salvini's departure from the Italian government in August 2019. Orbán previously urged closer political ties between the EPP and the League, and cooperated extensively on immigration with Salvini, describing Salvini as "my hero". Orbán has also fostered ties with Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni, but Meloni later blocked Fidesz joining the European Conservatives and Reformists.

 * North Macedonia

Orbán has also fostered close political ties with right-wing Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) politician and former PM Nikola Gruevski. While awaiting a ruling on an appeal to a corruption conviction in early 2019, Gruevski fled to Hungary to evade a looming jail sentence. The whereabouts of Gruevski were revealed only 4 days after he failed to report to serve his prison sentence. North Macedonian officials have suggested that Gruevski (for whom an international arrest warrant had been issued) was in contact with Hungarian officials in the days preceding his flight, and North Macedonian authorities have launched an investigation into whether Gruevski was transported across the border in a Hungarian diplomatic vehicle. The Hungarian government denied accusations of impropriety. Hungarian businesspeople close to Orbán that had previously invested into Slovenian right-wing media also entered into ownership of North Macedonian right-wing media companies, propping up outlets friendly to Gruevski and his party. In May 2023, Orbán pledged that Fidesz would assist VMRO-DPMNE in "various policy areas" ahead of the Macedonian elections.

 * Poland

Prior to the 2019 European Parliament election, Fidesz announced it would discuss an alliance with Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party if it leaves the EPP. The two nations' conservative governments have shared a close friendship and alliance for multiple years and the Polish government has pledged political support for Hungary within the EU. Orbán and PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński have vowed to wage a "cultural counter-revolution" within the EU together, with the Polish government seeing Hungary under Fidesz as a model for Poland. The relationship between Fidesz and PiS deteriorated following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, after the two parties took different stances on the conflict. The relationship was later repaired after PiS lost power in Poland, with Mateusz Morawiecki inviting Fidesz to join the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament in February 2024.

 * Serbia

Orbán has a warm relationship with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó campaigning for Vučić before the 2017 Serbian presidential election. Companies close to the Orbán government have won public contracts with the Serbian government. The Serbian government has also been accused of taking a similar approach to the Hungarian government towards the media. In May 2023, Szijjártó once again addressed an SNS rally in support of President Vučić.

 * Slovenia

Orbán has allied closely with Slovenian PM Janez Janša and the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) he heads, going so far as to campaign for SDS during the 2018 Slovenian parliamentary election. Businesspeople close to Orbán also provided funds to SDS-affiliated media companies that then also used some of the funds to purchase campaign ads on behalf of SDS to circumvent Slovenian campaign finance laws. After the election, and while SDS was struggling to secure political support to form a coalition government, Janša again met with Orbán on a private visit to Budapest; during the meeting, Orbán also conducted a conference call with former US president Donald Trump with Janša joining in. SDS's unconditional backing of Fidesz within the EPP was reportedly pivotal in preventing Fidesz's expulsion from EPP, resulting in a more lenient suspension. In a letter to EPP leader, Janša warned of an "inevitable" split in the EPP if the vote to expel Fidesz were to take place.

 * Slovakia

Fidesz provided campaign advisers to Robert Fico's Smer party ahead of the 2023 Slovak parliamentary election. Prior to the election, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó held a joint press conference with Fico.

In 2020, Hungarian officials from the Fidesz government suggested it was in their interest that the Slovak National Party win seats during the 2020 Slovak parliamentary election. Szijjárto also praised the Slovak National Party following a 2022 meeting with its leader, Andrej Danko, stating that "parties standing on national foundations always understand each other well" and emphasising their shared "Christian-conservative values".

 * Other

Orbán has also developed ties with Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) leader Geert Wilders, Vox leader Santiago Abascal, Conservative People's Party of Estonia leader Mart Helme and the Chega leader, André Ventura.

As of 2024, the Finns Party rejects cooperation with Fidesz, strongly supporting the exclusion of Fidesz from the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament. The Sweden Democrats initially ruled out cooperation with Fidesz altogether, but later insisted that Fidesz sign a declaration in support of Ukrainian territorial integrity prior to allowing formal cooperation.

 * Hungarian national minority parties

Some political parties of Hungarian minorities are said to be allies of the Fidesz like the Slovak Hungarian Alliance (MKP), the Serbian Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ), the Ukrainian KMKSZ – Hungarian Party in Ukraine, and Hungarian Democratic Party in Ukraine (UMDP), Democratic Union of Hungarians of Croatia (HMDK), the Slovenian Hungarian National Self-Government Association of Prekmurje (MMNÖK), the Romanian Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ),  the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) and the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (EMNP). The Fidesz, the RMDSZ, MKP, VMSZ the HMDK and the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDP) support each other in the 2019 European Parliament election. The MKP, VMSZ and RMDSZ are members or associates of the EPP.

 Non-European countries

Israel

Orbán and his government have also fostered close ties with the Israeli Likud government under Benjamin Netanyahu, with the two heads of government forging a cordial relationship, having known one another for decades. Netanyahu advised Orbán on economic reforms conducted by the Hungarian government in the early 2000s. Netanyahu later extended public political support to Orbán at a time when Orbán was confronting criticism for praising Miklós Horthy, Hungary's former leader, whose government passed anti-Jewish legislation and collaborated with Nazi Germany, and for allegedly employing anti-Semitic tropes in his criticism of George Soros. The Israeli foreign ministry issued a statement condemning Soros in a show of solidarity with the Orbán government. A Likud lawmaker also introduced legislation modeled on Fidesz's "Stop Soros law" in the Israeli Knesset.

United States of America

Orbán and his government have gained favor with US president Donald Trump and his Republican administration (in stark contrast to the policy of isolation practiced by the preceding Obama Administration). Orbán was the first European head of government to endorse Trump's presidential bid during the 2016 United States presidential election. Trump has praised Hungary's immigration policies in a discussion with Orbán. The more amiable attitude of the Trump Administration toward the Hungarian government prompted criticism and a protest by 22 Democratic Party lawmakers that called for a more disciplinary policy towards the country's government over what they perceived as a problematic track record. Steve Bannon, former head of Breitbart News and a former close associate of President Trump who had an integral role in Trump's electoral campaign and administration, has also praised Orbán and announced plans to work with Fidesz in orchestrating the party's electoral campaign for the 2019 European parliament election.

Criticism
Fidesz has been accused of exhibiting anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies while in government. The Fidesz-led government has been accused of severely restricting media freedom, undermining the independence of the courts, subjugating and politicising independent and non-governmental institutions, spying on political opponents, engaging in electoral engineering, and assailing critical NGOs. The Fidesz-led government has been accused of engaging in cronyism and corruption. Fidesz has been accused of antisemitism, and the Fidesz-led government has been accused of passing legislation that violates the rights of queer persons. Due to its controversial actions, Fidesz and its government have come in conflict with the EU on multiple occasions.

European Parliament
1 Joint list with Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)

title: Fidesz