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Eisenstein's criterion

In mathematics, Eisenstein's criterion gives a sufficient condition for a polynomial with integer coefficients to be irreducible over the rational numbers – that is, for it to not be factorizable into the product of non-constant polynomials with rational coefficients.

This criterion is not applicable to all polynomials with integer coefficients that are irreducible over the rational numbers, but it does allow in certain important cases for irreducibility to be proved with very little effort. It may apply either directly or after transformation of the original polynomial.

This criterion is named after Gotthold Eisenstein. In the early 20th century, it was also known as the Schönemann–Eisenstein theorem because Theodor Schönemann was the first to publish it.

Criterion
Suppose we have the following polynomial with integer coefficients: $$Q(x) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0.$$

If there exists a prime number $p$ such that the following three conditions all apply:

 * $p$ divides each $a_{i}$ for $0 ≤ i < n$,
 * $p$ does not divide $a_{n}$, and
 * $p^{2}$ does not divide $a_{0}$,

then $Q$ is irreducible over the rational numbers. It will also be irreducible over the integers, unless all its coefficients have a nontrivial factor in common (in which case $Q$ as integer polynomial will have some prime number, necessarily distinct from $p$, as an irreducible factor). The latter possibility can be avoided by first making $Q$ primitive, by dividing it by the greatest common divisor of its coefficients (the content of $Q$). This division does not change whether $Q$ is reducible or not over the rational numbers (see Primitive part–content factorization for details), and will not invalidate the hypotheses of the criterion for $p$ (on the contrary it could make the criterion hold for some prime, even if it did not before the division).

Examples
Eisenstein's criterion may apply either directly (i.e., using the original polynomial) or after transformation of the original polynomial.

Direct (without transformation)
Consider the polynomial $Q(x) = 3x^{4} + 15x^{2} + 10$. In order for Eisenstein's criterion to apply for a prime number $p$ it must divide both non-leading coefficients $15$ and $10$, which means only $p = 5$ could work, and indeed it does since $5$ does not divide the leading coefficient $3$, and its square $25$ does not divide the constant coefficient $10$. One may therefore conclude that $Q$ is irreducible over $Q$ (and, since it is primitive, over $Z$ as well). Note that since $Q$ is of degree 4, this conclusion could not have been established by only checking that $Q$ has no rational roots (which eliminates possible factors of degree 1), since a decomposition into two quadratic factors could also be possible.

Indirect (after transformation)
Often Eisenstein's criterion does not apply for any prime number. It may however be that it applies (for some prime number) to the polynomial obtained after substitution (for some integer $a$) of $x + a$ for $x$. The fact that the polynomial after substitution is irreducible then allows concluding that the original polynomial is as well. This procedure is known as applying a shift.

For example consider $H = x^{2} + x + 2$, in which the coefficient 1 of $x$ is not divisible by any prime, Eisenstein's criterion does not apply to $H$. But if one substitutes $x$ for $x + 3$ in $H$, one obtains the polynomial $x^{2} + 7x + 14$, which satisfies Eisenstein's criterion for the prime number $7$. Since the substitution is an automorphism of the ring $Q[x]$, the fact that we obtain an irreducible polynomial after substitution implies that we had an irreducible polynomial originally. In this particular example it would have been simpler to argue that $H$ (being monic of degree 2) could only be reducible if it had an integer root, which it obviously does not; however the general principle of trying substitutions in order to make Eisenstein's criterion apply is a useful way to broaden its scope.

Another possibility to transform a polynomial so as to satisfy the criterion, which may be combined with applying a shift, is reversing the order of its coefficients, provided its constant term is nonzero (without which it would be divisible by $x$ anyway). This is so because such polynomials are reducible in $R[x]$ if and only if they are reducible in $R[x, x^{−1}]$ (for any integral domain $R$), and in that ring the substitution of $x^{−1}$ for $x$ reverses the order of the coefficients (in a manner symmetric about the constant coefficient, but a following shift in the exponent amounts to multiplication by a unit). As an example $2x^{5} − 4x^{2} − 3$ satisfies the criterion for $p = 2$ after reversing its coefficients, and (being primitive) is therefore irreducible in $Z[x]$.

Cyclotomic polynomials
An important class of polynomials whose irreducibility can be established using Eisenstein's criterion is that of the cyclotomic polynomials for prime numbers $p$. Such a polynomial is obtained by dividing the polynomial $x^{p} − 1$ by the linear factor $x − 1$, corresponding to its obvious root $1$ (which is its only rational root if $p > 2$): $$\frac{x^p - 1}{x - 1} = x^{p - 1} + x^{p - 2} + \cdots + x + 1.$$

Here, as in the earlier example of $H$, the coefficients $1$ prevent Eisenstein's criterion from applying directly. However the polynomial will satisfy the criterion for $p$ after substitution of $x + 1$ for $x$: this gives $$\frac{(x+1)^p - 1}{x} = x^{p - 1} + \binom{p}{p-1}x^{p - 2} + \cdots + \binom{p}2 x + \binom{p}1,$$ all of whose non-leading coefficients are divisible by $p$ by properties of binomial coefficients, and whose constant coefficient is equal to $p$, and therefore not divisible by $p^{2}$. An alternative way to arrive at this conclusion is to use the identity $(a + b)^{p} = a^{p} + b^{p}$ which is valid in characteristic $p$ (and which is based on the same properties of binomial coefficients, and gives rise to the Frobenius endomorphism), to compute the reduction modulo $p$ of the quotient of polynomials: $$\frac{(x+1)^p - 1}{x} \equiv \frac{x^p +1^p-1}{x} = \frac{x^p}{x} = x^{p-1}\pmod p,$$ which means that the non-leading coefficients of the quotient are all divisible by $p$; the remaining verification that the constant term of the quotient is $p$ can be done by substituting $1$ (instead of $x + 1$) for $x$ into the expanded form $x^{p−1} + ... + x + 1$.

History
Theodor Schönemann was the first to publish a version of the criterion, in 1846 in Crelle's Journal, which reads in translation

"That $(x − a)^{n} + pF(x)$ will be irreducible to the modulus $p^{2}$ when $F(x)$ to the modulus $p$ does not contain a factor $x−a$."

This formulation already incorporates a shift to $a$ in place of $0$; the condition on $F(x)$ means that $F(a)$ is not divisible by $p$, and so $pF(a)$ is divisible by $p$ but not by $p^{2}$. As stated it is not entirely correct in that it makes no assumptions on the degree of the polynomial $F(x)$, so that the polynomial considered need not be of the degree $n$ that its expression suggests; the example $x^{2} + p(x^{3} + 1) ≡ (x^{2} + p)(px + 1) mod p^{2}$, shows the conclusion is not valid without such hypothesis. Assuming that the degree of $F(x)$ does not exceed $n$, the criterion is correct however, and somewhat stronger than the formulation given above, since if $(x − a)^{n} + pF(x)$ is irreducible modulo $p^{2}$, it certainly cannot decompose in $Z[x]$ into non-constant factors.

Subsequently Eisenstein published a somewhat different version in 1850, also in Crelle's Journal. This version reads in translation

"When in a polynomial $F(x)$ in $x$ of arbitrary degree the coefficient of the highest term is $1$, and all following coefficients are whole (real, complex) numbers, into which a certain (real resp. complex) prime number $m$ divides, and when furthermore the last coefficient is equal to $εm$, where $ε$ denotes a number not divisible by $m$: then it is impossible to bring $F(x)$ into the form $\left (x^{\mu} + a_1 x^{\mu-1} + \cdots + a_{\mu} \right) \left (x^{\nu} + b_1 x^{\nu-1} + \cdots + b_{\nu} \right)$ where $μ, ν ≥ 1$, $μ + ν = deg(F(x))$, and all $a$ and $b$ are whole (real resp. complex) numbers; the equation $F(x) = 0$ is therefore irreducible."

Here "whole real numbers" are ordinary integers and "whole complex numbers" are Gaussian integers; one should similarly interpret "real and complex prime numbers". The application for which Eisenstein developed his criterion was establishing the irreducibility of certain polynomials with coefficients in the Gaussian integers that arise in the study of the division of the lemniscate into pieces of equal arc-length.

Remarkably Schönemann and Eisenstein, once having formulated their respective criteria for irreducibility, both immediately apply it to give an elementary proof of the irreducibility of the cyclotomic polynomials for prime numbers, a result that Gauss had obtained in his Disquisitiones Arithmeticae with a much more complicated proof. In fact, Eisenstein adds in a footnote that the only proof for this irreducibility known to him, other than that of Gauss, is one given by Kronecker in 1845. This shows that he was unaware of the two different proofs of this statement that Schönemann had given in his 1846 article, where the second proof was based on the above-mentioned criterion. This is all the more surprising given the fact that two pages further, Eisenstein actually refers (for a different matter) to the first part of Schönemann's article. In a note ("Notiz") that appeared in the following issue of the Journal, Schönemann points this out to Eisenstein, and indicates that the latter's method is not essentially different from the one he used in the second proof.

Basic proof
To prove the validity of the criterion, suppose $Q$ satisfies the criterion for the prime number $p$, but that it is nevertheless reducible in $Q[x]$, from which we wish to obtain a contradiction. From Gauss' lemma it follows that $Q$ is reducible in $Z[x]$ as well, and in fact can be written as the product $Q = GH$ of two non-constant polynomials $G, H$ (in case $Q$ is not primitive, one applies the lemma to the primitive polynomial $Q/c$ (where the integer $c$ is the content of $Q$) to obtain a decomposition for it, and multiplies $c$ into one of the factors to obtain a decomposition for $Q$). Now reduce $Q = GH$ modulo $p$ to obtain a decomposition in $(Z/pZ)[x]$. But by hypothesis this reduction for $Q$ leaves its leading term, of the form $ax^{n}$ for a non-zero constant $a ∈ Z/pZ$, as the only nonzero term. But then necessarily the reductions modulo $p$ of $G$ and $H$ also make all non-leading terms vanish (and cannot make their leading terms vanish), since no other decompositions of $ax^{n}$ are possible in $(Z/pZ)[x]$, which is a unique factorization domain. In particular the constant terms of $G$ and $H$ vanish in the reduction, so they are divisible by $p$, but then the constant term of $Q$, which is their product, is divisible by $p^{2}$, contrary to the hypothesis, and one has a contradiction.

A second proof of Eisenstein's criterion also starts with the assumption that the polynomial $Q(x)$ is reducible. It is shown that this assumption entails a contradiction.

The assumption that $$Q(x)=a_nx^n+a_{n-1}x^{n-1}+\cdots+a_1x+a_0$$ is reducible means that there are polynomials $$\begin{align} G(x) &= c_r x^r + c_{r-1} x^{r-1} + \cdots + c_0 && r \ge 1 \\ H(x) &= d_s x^s + d_{s-1} x^{s-1} + \cdots + d_0 && s \ge 1 \end{align}$$ Such that $$Q(x) = G(x) \cdot H(x), \qquad n = r+s.$$ The coefficient $a_{0}$ of the polynomial $Q(x)$ can be divided by the prime $p$ but not by $p^{2}$. Since $a_{0} = c_{0}d_{0}$, it is possible to divide $c_{0}$ or $d_{0}$ by $p$, but not both. One may without loss of generality proceed

 * with a coefficient $c_{0}$ that can be divided by $p$ and
 * with a coefficient $d_{0}$ that cannot be divided by $p$.

By the assumption, $$p$$ does not divide $$a_n$$. Because $a_{n} = c_{r} d_{s}$, neither $c_{r}$ nor $d_{s}$ can be divided by $p$. Thus, if $$a_r$$ is the $$r$$-th coefficient of the reducible polynomial $$Q$$, then (possibly with $$d_t = 0$$ in case $$t>s$$) $$a_r=c_r d_0 + c_{r-1}d_1 + \cdots + c_0 d_r$$ wherein $$c_r d_0$$ cannot be divided by $$p$$, because neither $$d_0$$ nor $$c_r$$ can be divided by $$p$$.

We will prove that $$c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_{r-1}$$ are all divisible by $p$. As $$a_r$$ is also divisible by $p$ (by hypothesis of the criterion), this implies that $$c_r d_0 = a_r- \left (c_{r-1}d_1 + \cdots + c_0 d_r \right )$$ is divisible by $p$, a contradiction proving the criterion.

It is possible to divide $$c_0 d_r$$ by $$p$$, because $$c_0$$ can be divided by $$p$$.

By initial assumption, it is possible to divide the coefficient $a_{1}$ of the polynomial $Q(x)$ by $p$. Since $$a_1 = c_0 d_1 + c_1 d_0$$ and since $d_{0}$ is not a multiple of $p$ it must be possible to divide $c_{1}$ by $p$. Analogously, by induction, $$c_i$$ is a multiple of $$p$$ for all $$i<r$$, which finishes the proof.

Advanced explanation
Applying the theory of the Newton polygon for the $p$-adic number field, for an Eisenstein polynomial, we are supposed to take the lower convex envelope of the points

where $(0, 1), (1, v_{1}), (2, v_{2}), ..., (n − 1, v_{n−1}), (n, 0)$ is the $p$-adic valuation of $v_{i}$ (i.e. the highest power of $p$ dividing it). Now the data we are given on the $a_{i}$ for $v_{i}$, namely that they are at least one, is just what we need to conclude that the lower convex envelope is exactly the single line segment from $0 < i < n$ to $(0, 1)$, the slope being $(n, 0)$.

This tells us that each root of $Q$ has $p$-adic valuation $−1/n$ and hence that $Q$ is irreducible over the $p$-adic field (since, for instance, no product of any proper subset of the roots has integer valuation); and a fortiori over the rational number field.

This argument is much more complicated than the direct argument by reduction mod $p$. It does however allow one to see, in terms of algebraic number theory, how frequently Eisenstein's criterion might apply, after some change of variable; and so limit severely the possible choices of $p$ with respect to which the polynomial could have an Eisenstein translate (that is, become Eisenstein after an additive change of variables as in the case of the $p$-th cyclotomic polynomial).

In fact only primes $p$ ramifying in the extension of $1/n$ generated by a root of $Q$ have any chance of working. These can be found in terms of the discriminant of $Q$. For example, in the case $Q$ given above, the discriminant is $x^{2} + x + 2$ so that $−7$ is the only prime that has a chance of making it satisfy the criterion. Modulo $7$, it becomes $7$— a repeated root is inevitable, since the discriminant is $(x − 3)^{2}$. Therefore the variable shift is actually something predictable.

Again, for the cyclotomic polynomial, it becomes

the discriminant can be shown to be (up to sign) $0 mod 7$, by linear algebra methods.

More precisely, only totally ramified primes have a chance of being Eisenstein primes for the polynomial. (In quadratic fields, ramification is always total, so the distinction is not seen in the quadratic case like $(x − 1)^{p−1} mod p$ above.) In fact, Eisenstein polynomials are directly linked to totally ramified primes, as follows: if a field extension of the rationals is generated by the root of a polynomial that is Eisenstein at $p$ then $p$ is totally ramified in the extension, and conversely if $p$ is totally ramified in a number field then the field is generated by the root of an Eisenstein polynomial at $p$.

Generalized criterion
Given an integral domain $D$, let $$Q = \sum_{i=0}^n a_i x^i$$ be an element of $p^{p−2}$, the polynomial ring with coefficients in $D$.

Suppose there exists a prime ideal $x^{2} + x + 2$ of $D$ such that

 * $D[x]$ for each $p$,
 * $a_{i} ∈ p$, and
 * $i ≠ n$, where $a_{n} ∉ p$ is the ideal product of $a_{0} ∉ p^{2}$ with itself.

Then $Q$ cannot be written as a product of two non-constant polynomials in $p^{2}$. If in addition $Q$ is primitive (i.e., it has no non-trivial constant divisors), then it is irreducible in $p$. If $D$ is a unique factorization domain with field of fractions $F$, then by Gauss's lemma $Q$ is irreducible in $D[x]$, whether or not it is primitive (since constant factors are invertible in $D[x]$); in this case a possible choice of prime ideal is the principal ideal generated by any irreducible element of $D$. The latter statement gives original theorem for $F[x]$ or (in Eisenstein's formulation) for $F[x]$.

Proof
The proof of this generalization is similar to the one for the original statement, considering the reduction of the coefficients modulo $D = Z$; the essential point is that a single-term polynomial over the integral domain $D = Z[i]$ cannot decompose as a product in which at least one of the factors has more than one term (because in such a product there can be no cancellation in the coefficient either of the highest or the lowest possible degree).

Example
After $p$, one of the basic examples of an integral domain is the polynomial ring $D/p$ in the variable $u$ over the field $k$. In this case, the principal ideal generated by $u$ is a prime ideal. Eisenstein's criterion can then be used to prove the irreducibility of a polynomial such as $Z$ in $D = k[u]$. Indeed, $u$ does not divide $Q(x) = x^{3} + ux + u$, $D[x]$ does not divide $a_{3}$, and $u$ divides $u^{2}$ and $a_{0}$. This shows that this polynomial satisfies the hypotheses of the generalization of Eisenstein's criterion for the prime ideal $a_{0}, a_{1}$ since, for a principal ideal $a_{2}$, being an element of $p = (u)$ is equivalent to being divisible by $u$.

title: Eisenstein's criterion


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Federal Security Service

The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB or FSS) is the principal security agency of Russia and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union's KGB; its immediate predecessor was the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) which was reorganized into the FSB in 1995. The three major structural successor components of the former KGB that remain administratively independent of the FSB are the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Protective Service (FSO), and the Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP).

The primary responsibilities are within the country and include counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counterterrorism, surveillance and investigating some other types of serious crimes and federal law violations. It is headquartered in Lubyanka Square, Moscow's center, in the main building of the former KGB. The director of the FSB is appointed by and directly answerable to the president of Russia. Being part of Russia's executive branch formally, the FSB has significant, if not decisive, power over it.

In 2003, the FSB's responsibilities were expanded by incorporating the Border Guard Service and a major part of the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI); this would include intelligence activities in countries that were once members of the Soviet Union, work formerly done by the KGB's Fifth Service. The SVR had in 1992 signed an agreement not to spy on those countries; the FSB had made no such commitment.

Initial recognition of the KGB
The Federal Security Service (FSB or FSS) (Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации [ФСБ, ФСБ России], lit. 'Federal Service [of] Safety') is one of the successor organizations of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). Following the attempted coup of 1991—in which some KGB units as well as the KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov played a major part—the KGB was dismantled and ceased to exist from November 1991. In December 1991, two government agencies answerable to the Russian president were created by President Yeltsin's decrees on the basis of the relevant main directorates of the defunct KGB: Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia) (SVR, the former First Main Directorate) and the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI, merging the functions of the former 8th Main Directorate and 16th Main Directorate of the KGB). In January 1992, another new institution, the Ministry of Security, took over domestic and border security responsibilities. Following the 1993 constitutional crisis, the Ministry of Security was reorganized on 21 December 1993 into the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FSK). The FSK was headed by Sergei Stepashin. Before the start of the First Chechen War's main military activities, the FSK was responsible for the covert operations against the separatists led by Dzhokhar Dudayev.

Creation of the FSB
In 1995, the FSK was renamed and reorganized into the Federal Security Service (FSB) by the Federal Law "On the Federal Security Service" (the title of the law as amended in June 2003 ) signed by the president on 3 April 1995. The FSB reforms were rounded out by decree No. 633, signed by Boris Yeltsin on 23 June 1995. The decree made the tasks of the FSB more specific, giving the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to eight: two first deputies, five deputies responsible for departments and directorates and one deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate. Yeltsin appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as the new director of the FSB. In 1998, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin, a KGB veteran who would later succeed Yeltsin as federal president, as director of the FSB. Putin was reluctant to take over the directorship, but once appointed conducted a thorough reorganization, which included the dismissal of most of the FSB's top personnel. Putin appointed Nikolai Patrushev as the head of FSB in 1999.

Role in the Second Chechen War
After the main military offensive of the Second Chechen War ended and the separatists changed tactics to guerilla warfare, overall command of the federal forces in Chechnya was transferred from the military to the FSB in January 2001. While the army lacked technical means of tracking the guerrilla groups, the FSB suffered from insufficient human intelligence due to its inability to build networks of agents and informants. In the autumn of 2002, the separatists launched a massive campaign of terrorism against the Russian civilians, including the Dubrovka theatre attack. The inability of the federal forces to conduct efficient counterterrorist operations led to the government to transfer the responsibility of "maintaining order" in Chechnya from the FSB to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in July 2003.

Putin reforms
After becoming president, Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganization of the FSB. First, the FSB was placed under direct control of the President by a decree issued on 17 May 2000. The internal structure of the agency was reformed by a decree signed on 17 June 2000. In the resulting structure, the FSB was to have a director, a first deputy director and nine other deputy directors, including one possible state secretary and the chiefs of six departments: Economic Security Department, Counterintelligence Department, Organizational and Personnel Service, Department of activity provision, Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning, Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism.

In 2003, the agency's responsibilities were considerably widened. The Border Guard Service of Russia, with its staff of 210,000, was integrated to the FSB via a decree signed on 11 March 2003. The merger was completed by 1 July 2003. In addition, The Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) was abolished, and the FSB was granted a major part of its functions, while other parts went to the Ministry of Defense. Among the reasons for this strengthening of the FSB were the enhanced need for security after increased terror attacks against Russian civilians starting with the Moscow theater hostage crisis; the need to end the permanent infighting between the FSB, FAPSI and the Border Guards due to their overlapping functions; and the need for more efficient response to migration, drug trafficking and illegal arms trading. In addition, the FSB was the sole power base of the new president, so the restructuring strengthened his position (see Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency).

On 28 June 2004, in a speech to high-ranking FSB officers, Putin emphasized three major tasks of the agency: neutralizing foreign espionage, safeguarding the economic and financial security of the country, and combating organized crime. In September 2006, the FSB was shaken up by a major reshuffle. Combined with some earlier reassignments – most notably those of FSB Deputy Directors Yury Zaostrovtsev and Vladimir Anisimov in 2004 and 2005 – the changes were widely believed to be linked to the Three Whales Corruption Scandal that had slowly unfolded since 2000. Some analysts considered the changes to be an attempt to undermine FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev's influence, as his team from the Karelian KGB Directorate of the late 1980s to early 1990s suffered most, and he had been on vacations during the events.

By 2008, the agency had one Director, two First Deputy Directors and 5 Deputy Directors. It had the following 9 divisions:
 * 1) Counter-Espionage
 * 2) Service for Defense of Constitutional Order and Fight against Terrorism
 * 3) Border Service
 * 4) Economic Security Service
 * 5) Current Information and International Links
 * 6) Organizational and Personnel Service
 * 7) Monitoring Department
 * 8) Scientific and Technical Service
 * 9) Organizational Security Service

Counterterrorist operations

Beginning with the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002, Russia was faced with increased levels of terrorism. FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha Group and Vympel played a key role in hostage rescue operations during the Moscow theater siege and the Beslan school siege. Their performance was criticised due to the high number of hostage casualties. In 2006, the FSB successfully killed Shamil Basayev, who was behind the Beslan tragedy and several other high-profile terrorist acts. According to the FSB, the operation was planned over six months and made possible due to the FSB's increased activities in foreign countries that were supplying arms to the terrorists. Basayev was tracked via surveillance of this arms trafficking. He and other militants were preparing to carry out a terrorist attack in Ingushetia when FSB agents destroyed their convoy; 12 militants were killed.

During the last years of the Vladimir Putin's second presidency (2006–2008), terrorist attacks in Russia dwindled, falling from 257 in 2005 to 48 in 2007. Military analyst Vitaly Shlykov praised the effectiveness of Russia's security agencies, saying that the experience learned in Chechnya and Dagestan had been key to the success. In 2008, the American Carnegie Endowment's Foreign Policy magazine named Russia as "the worst place to be a terrorist" and highlighted especially Russia's willingness to prioritize national security over civil rights. By 2010, Russian forces led by the FSB had managed to eliminate the top level leadership of the Chechen insurgency, except for Dokka Umarov.

Increased terrorism and expansion of the FSB's powers
Starting from 2009, the level of terrorism in Russia increased again, particularly suicide attacks. Between February 2005 and August 2008, no civilians were killed in such attacks. In 2008, at least 17 were killed, and in 2009 the number rose to 45.

In March 2010, Islamist militants organised the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings, which killed 40 people. One of the two blasts took place at Lubyanka station, near the FSB headquarters. Militant leader Doku Umarov—dubbed "Russia's Osama Bin Laden"—took responsibility for the attacks.

In July 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev expanded the FSB's powers in its fight against terrorism. FSB officers received the power to issue warnings to citizens on actions that could lead to committing crimes and arrest people for 15 days if they fail to comply with legitimate orders given by the officers. The bill was harshly criticized by human rights organizations.

Role in Ukraine
Since 2014, the FSB devoted substantial resources to preparing for a Russian takeover of Ukraine. Although Russia's SVR and GRU (foreign and military intelligence services) were also involved, FSB had a lead role on "intelligence and influence operations".

The FSB's Fifth Service, also referred to as the "Department for Operational Information" and "Operational Information and International Relations Service" is stated by the BBC and Radio Free Europe as counterintelligence in former territories of the Soviet Union, work formerly done by the KGB's Fifth Service. Its Ninth Directorate of the Fifth Service targets Ukraine. Putin was persuaded to invade Ukraine by a small group of his closest associates, especially Nikolai Patrushev, Yury Kovalchuk and Alexander Bortnikov. According to some experts, Bortnikov played a key role in Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.

According to a report of the Royal United Services Institute citing interviews officers and analysts of Security Service of Ukraine, the FSB Ukraine team greatly expanded July 2021, and by February 2022 it had "around 200 officers" although most teams consist of only 10–20. Before the 2022 invasion, intelligence agencies in Ukraine, Germany, the UK, and the US reported that the FSB planned to replace elected leaders of Ukraine with Ukrainians now living in Russia.

In 2014, according to a Russian military analyst, the FSB badly misled Putin with claims that Ukrainians would welcome a Russian invasion of Crimea to free them from "fascists". According to Radio Free Europe, in 2022, the FSB again promised easy victory if Russia invaded Ukraine.

With the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian counterintelligence has repeatedly asserted that the FSB suffered failures of operations security, including acts of insubordination and possible sabotage. In March 2022, Russia's encrypted communication system in Ukraine became useless after the Russian military destroyed cellphone towers; unencrypted phone calls from the FSB in Ukraine to superiors in Moscow discussing the death of Vitaly Gerasimov were tapped and released publicly. Ukrainian intelligence reported that FSB members were leaking intelligence to them, including the location of the Chechen commandos sent to assassinate Zelensky. In late March, Ukrainian intelligence posted online the names, addresses, phone numbers, and more of 620 people they identified as FSB agents. None of these reports have been confirmed by the FSB.

Media outlets of Ukraine, its allies in the West, and Russian dissidents report that Vladimir Putin has blamed setbacks in the military operations on the FSB and the Fifth Service. On 11 March 2022, investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov reported that Fifth Service head Sergey Beseda and his deputy, Anatoly Bolyukh were under house arrest due to Putin's discontent with intelligence failures regarding the invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. official interviewed by The Wall Street Journal described the arrest report as "credible".

On 11 April 2022, the Times of London, citing unnamed sources who had spoken to Bellingcat executive director Christo Grozev, reported that Beseda was transferred to Lefortovo Prison, the scene of mass executions during Stalin's purges. The same report claims that up over 100 FSB agents from the Fifth Service had been sacked. The Times of London also reports that "it is thought that" the Fifth Service is now headed by Beseda's former subordinate, Grigory Grishaev.

According to an article in the 11 April 2022 issue of The Washington Post: "Several current and former officials described the Russian security service as rife with corruption, beset by bureaucratic bloat and ultimately out of touch. A Ukrainian intelligence official said the FSB had spent millions recruiting a network of pro-Russian collaborators who ultimately told Putin and his top advisers, among them the current FSB director, what they wanted to hear."

A series of alleged leaked letters from FSB analysts, made public after the invasion began, report the same kind of problem. For example: "You have to write the analysis in a way that makes Russia the victor ... otherwise you get questioned for not doing good work."

Counterintelligence
In 2011, the FSB said it had exposed 199 foreign spies, including 41 professional spies and 158 agents employed by foreign intelligence services. The number has risen in recent years: in 2006 the FSB reportedly caught about 27 foreign intelligence officers and 89 foreign agents. Comparing the number of exposed spies historically, the then-FSB Director Nikolay Kovalyov said in 1996: "There has never been such a number of spies arrested by us since the time when German agents were sent in during the years of World War II." The 2011 figure is similar to what was reported in 1995–1996, when around 400 foreign intelligence agents were uncovered during the two-year period.

In a high-profile case of foreign espionage, the FSB said in February 2012 that an engineer working at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Russia's main space center for military launches, had been sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of state treason. A court judged that the engineer had sold information about the testing of new Russian strategic missile systems to the American CIA.

A number of scientists have been accused of espionage and illegal technology exports by the FSB since it was established; instances include researcher Igor Sutyagin, physicist Valentin Danilov, physical chemist Oleg Korobeinichev, academician Oskar Kaibyshev, and physicist Yury Ryzhov. Ecologist and journalist Alexander Nikitin, who worked with the Bellona Foundation, was accused of espionage. He published material exposing hazards posed by the Russian Navy's nuclear fleet. He was acquitted in 1999 after spending several years in prison (his case was sent for re-investigation 13 times while he remained in prison). In August 2021, the FSB arrested plasma physics-expert Alexander Kuranov, chief designer of the Hypersonic Systems Research Center (NIPGS in Russian) in St. Petersburg. Kuranov is suspected of passing secret information to a foreigner about hypersonic technology; he oversaw concept design on the Ayaks/Ajax hypersonic aircraft and has run a Russia-US scientific symposium for several years.

Other instances of prosecution are the cases of investigative journalist and ecologist Grigory Pasko, Vladimir Petrenko, who described danger posed by military chemical warfare stockpiles, and Nikolay Shchur, chairman of the Snezhinskiy Ecological Fund.

Other arrested people include Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB officer who assisted Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Kazantsev, who disclosed illegal purchases of eavesdropping devices from foreign firms, and Vil Mirzayanov, who had written that Russia was working on a nerve-gas weapon.

Counterterrorism
In 2011, the FSB prevented 94 "crimes of a terrorist nature", including eight terrorist attacks. In particular, the agency foiled a planned suicide bombing in Moscow on New Year's Eve. The agency failed to prevent terrorists perpetrating the Domodedovo International Airport bombing. Over the years, FSB and affiliated state security organizations have killed all presidents of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria including Dzhokhar Dudaev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev. During the Moscow theater hostage crisis and Beslan school hostage crisis, all hostage-takers were killed on the spot by FSB spetsnaz forces. Only one of the suspects, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, survived and was convicted later by the court. It is reported that more than 100 leaders of terrorist groups have been killed during 119 operations on North Caucasus during 2006. On 28 July 2006, the FSB presented a list of 17 terrorist organizations recognized by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, to Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, which published the list that day. The list had been available previously, but only through individual request. Commenting on the list, Yuri Sapunov, head of counterterrorism at the FSB, named three main criteria necessary for organizations to be listed.

Foreign intelligence
According to some unofficial sources,    since 1999, the FSB has also been tasked with the intelligence-gathering on the territory of the CIS countries, wherein the SVR is legally forbidden from conducting espionage under the inter-government agreements. Such activity is in line with Article 8 of the Federal Law on the FSB.

According to the Royal United Services Institute, FSB's Department for Operational Information "is responsible for compiling data on Russia's 'near abroad, having taken over the work of KGB's Fifth Service, which ran counterintelligence inside territories of the Soviet Union.

Targeted killing
In the summer of 2006, the FSB was given the legal power to engage in targeted killing of terrorism suspects overseas if ordered by the president.

Border protection

The Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) has been part of the FSB since 2003. Russia has 61000 km of sea and land borders, 7500 km of which is with Kazakhstan, and 4000 km with China. One kilometer (.62 miles) of border protection costs around 1 million rubles per year.

Export control
The FSB is engaged in the development of Russia's export control strategy and examines drafts of international agreements related to the transfer of dual-use and military commodities and technologies. Its primary role in the nonproliferation sphere is to collect information to prevent the illegal export of controlled nuclear technology and materials.

Surveillance
In September 2017, WikiLeaks released "Spy Files Russia", revealing how a company called Peter-Service helped state entities gather data on Russian mobile phone users as part of an online surveillance system called the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) with close collaboration with the FSB. SORM-1 is for wiretapping phones. SORM-2 intercepts electronic correspondence and Internet traffic. Beginning in the summer of 2014, SORM-3 has been "on guard" and integrates all telecommunication services in real time.

Cyber Units
In recent years, the FSB has expanded its mission to include foreign intelligence collection and offensive cyber operations. Cyber analysts have referred to FSB hackers as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Gamaredon, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti, and Koala.

The FSB reportedly has two primary centers overseeing its information security and cyber operations. The first is the 16th Center, which houses most of the FSB's signals intelligence capabilities. The FSB also includes the 18th Center for Information Security, which oversees domestic operations and security but conducts foreign operations as well. The U.S. government indicted 18th Center FSB officers in 2017 for breaching Yahoo and millions of email accounts. In 2021, Ukrainian intelligence released information and recordings of 18th Center FSB officers based in Crimea as part of the "Gamaredon" hacking group.

Media reporting indicates FSB units are capable of manufacturing their own advanced malware tools and have been documented manipulating exposed malware to mimic other hacking teams and conceal their activities. Reporting indicates the FSB oversees training and research institutes, which directly support the FSB's cyber mission.

One FSB team reportedly focuses on penetrating infrastructure and energy sector targets. Most operations linked to this team appear to be reconnaissance or clandestine surveillance. The targeting of the energy sector has raised concern within the U.S. government. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have documented the unit's reconnaissance and noted the possibility of inserting malware to cause future damage in an attack. The U.S. government also has linked the unit to attempts to penetrate state and local government networks in 2020.

Media reporting has documented close connections between the FSB and criminal and civilian hackers, which the FSB reportedly uses to augment and staff its cyber units. DOJ has indicted multiple Russian hackers for a variety of criminal and state-sponsored cyber activities. Many of these indictments describe the close relationship between criminal hackers and the FSB.

Director
Since 2008, the director of the FSB has been General Alexander Bortnikov.

First Deputy Director
The current First Deputy Director of the FSB is Sergei Korolev. He was appointed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 February 2021.

Head of scientific and technical service
As of 2022 Eduard Chernovoltsev was listed the Head of scientific and technical service of the FSB.

Regional structure
Below the nationwide level, the FSB has regional offices in all the federal subjects of Russia. It also has administrations in the armed forces and other military institutions. Sub-departments exist for areas such as aviation, special training centers, forensic expertise, military medicine, etc.

Structure of the Federal Office (incomplete):
 * Counterintelligence Service (Department) – chiefs: Oleg Syromolotov (since Aug 2000), Valery Pechyonkin (September 1997 – August 2000)
 * Directorate for the Counterintelligence Support of Strategic Facilities
 * Military Counterintelligence Directorate – chiefs: Alexander Bezverkhny (at least since 2002), Vladimir Petrishchev (since January 1996)
 * Service (Department) for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism – chiefs: Alexey Sedov (since March 2006), Alexander Bragin (2004 – March 2006), Alexander Zhdankov (2001–2004), German Ugryumov (2000–2001)
 * Directorate for Terrorism and Political Extremism Control – chiefs: Mikhail Belousov, before him Grafov, before the latter Boris Mylnikov (since 2000)
 * Economic Security Service (Department) – chiefs: Sergei Alpatov (acting since 4 March 2021), Sergei Korolev (June 2016 to 24 February 2021),  (2008 to June 2016), Alexander Bortnikov (2 March 2004 to 2008), Yury Zaostrovtsev (January 2000 – March 2004), Viktor Ivanov (April 1999 – January 2000), Nikolay Patrushev (1998 – April 1999), Alexander Grigoryev (28 August – 1 October 1998).
 * Operational Information and International Relations Service (Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Department) – chiefs: Sergey Beseda (since 2009), Viktor Komogorov (1999–2009), Sergei Ivanov (1998–1999); The successor of the KGB's Fifth Service, this department is in charge of counterintelligence operations against territories of the former Soviet Union.
 * Organizational and Personnel Service (Department) – chiefs: Yevgeny Lovyrev (since 2001), Yevgeny Solovyov (before Lovyrev)
 * Department for Activity Provision – chiefs: Mikhail Shekin (since September 2006), Sergey Shishin (before Shekin), Pyotr Pereverzev (as of 2004), Alexander Strelkov (before Pereverzev)
 * Border Guard Service – chiefs: Vladimir Pronichev (since 2003)
 * Control Service – chiefs: Alexander Zhdankov (since 2004)Рашид Нургалиев и Александр Бортников.jpeg (left) and Alexander Bortnikov in April 2010]]
 * Inspection Directorate – chiefs: Vladimir Anisimov (2004 – May 2005), Rashid Nurgaliyev (12 July 2000 – 2002),
 * Internal Security Directorate – chiefs: Alexander Kupryazhkin (until September 2006), Sergei Shishin (before Kupryazhkin since December 2002), Sergei Smirnov (April 1999 – December 2002), Viktor Ivanov (1998 – April 1999), Nikolay Patrushev (1994–1998)
 * Science and Engineering Service (Department) – chiefs: Nikolai Klimashin
 * Center of Information Security
 * Investigation Directorate – chiefs: Nikolay Oleshko (since December 2004), Yury Anisimov (as of 2004), Viktor Milchenko (since 2002), Sergey Balashov (until 2002 since at least 2001), Vladimir Galkin (as of 1997 and 1998)

Besides the services (departments) and directorates of the federal office, the territorial directorates of FSB in the federal subjects are also subordinate to it. Of these, St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate of FSB and its predecessors (historically covering both Leningrad/Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast) have played especially important roles in the history of this organization, as many of the officers of the Directorate, including Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Patrushev, later assumed important positions within the federal FSB office or other government bodies. After the last Chief of the Soviet time, Anatoly Kurkov, the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate were led by Sergei Stepashin (29 November 1991 – 1992), Viktor Cherkesov (1992 –1998), Alexander Grigoryev (1 October 1998 – 5 January 2001), Sergei Smirnov (5 January 2001 – June 2003), Alexander Bortnikov (June 2003 – March 2004) and Yury Ignashchenkov (since March 2004).

Directors of the FSB
On 20 June 1996, Boris Yeltsin fired Director of FSB Mikhail Barsukov and appointed Nikolay Kovalyov as acting Director and later Director of the FSB. Aleksander Bortnikov took over on 12 May 2008.

 * Nikolai Golushko, December 1993 – February 1994
 * Sergei Stepashin, February 1994 – June 1995
 * Mikhail Barsukov, July 1995 – June 1996
 * Nikolai Kovalyov, July 1996 – July 1998
 * Vladimir Putin, July 1998 – August 1999
 * Nikolai Patrushev, August 1999 – 12 May 2008
 * Alexander Bortnikov, 12 May 2008 – present

Criticism
The FSB has been criticised for corruption, human rights violations and secret police activities. Some Kremlin critics such as Alexander Litvinenko have claimed that the FSB is engaged in suppression of internal dissent; Litvinenko died in 2006 as a result of polonium poisoning. Litvinenko, along with a series of other authors such as Yury Felshtinsky, David Satter, Boris Kagarlitsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky, Mikhail Trepashkin, have claimed that the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities were a false flag attack coordinated by the FSB in order to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya and boost former FSB director and then prime minister Vladimir Putin's popularity in the lead-up to parliamentary elections and presidential transfer of power. The FSB has been further criticized by some for failure to bring Islamist terrorism in Russia under control. In the mid-2000s, the pro-Kremlin Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya claimed that the FSB played a dominant role in the country's political, economic and even cultural life.

After the annexation of Crimea, the FSB may also have been responsible for the forced disappearances and torture of Crimean Tatar activists and public figures. According to the United Nations, in occupied Crimea, the FSB used torture with elements of sexual violence against pro-Ukrainian activists, forcing them to confess to crimes related to terrorism. The detainees were, allegedly, beaten, tortured with electric shocks in the genitals and threatened with rape. Some, such as Oleh Sentsov, have been detained and accused in politically motivated kangaroo courts. The FSB spied on and filmed a gathering of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses while they were about to undergo baptism rites, with the videos used as evidence in a trial against the defendants in 2021; Jehovah's Witnesses have been banned as a group in Russia since 2017 for "extremism".

In spite of various anti-corruption actions of the Russian government, FSB operatives and officials are routinely found in the center of various fraud, racket and corruption scandals. FSB officers have been frequently accused of torture,   extortion, bribery and illegal takeovers of private companies, often working together with tax inspection officers. Active and former FSB officers are also present as "curators" in "almost every single large enterprise", both in public and private sectors. Several unnamed current and former officials described the FSB as less effective than the KGB, describing it as "rife with corruption, beset by bureaucratic bloat and ultimately out of touch", in a report by The Washington Post in 2022. ''

On 29 December 2016, the White House accused and sanctioned the FSB and several other Russian companies for what the US intelligence agencies said was their role in helping the Russian military intelligence service, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) disrupt and spread disinformation during the 2016 US presidential election. In addition, the State Department also declared 35 Russian diplomats and officials persona non-grata and denied Russian government officials access to two Russian-owned installations in Maryland and New York.

An investigation by Bellingcat and The Insider implicated FSB agents in the poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in August 2020, where he became ill during a flight.

It was reported that during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, FSB officers carried out filtration activities in Mariupol, which were accompanied by searches, interrogations, forced deportations to Russia, beatings and torture.

According to an investigative report by Novaya Gazeta, some of the suspicious deaths of Russian businesspeople in 2022–2023 may possibly be connected to large scale accounting fraud by Gazprom executives, who may have funneled money to a network of businesses owned by friends and family members with ties to the FSB and Russian military.

Role in the Russian doping scandal
Following the broadcast of a documentary film alleging systematic doping in Russia, World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) president Craig Reedie authorized an Independent Commission (IC) to investigate the issues brought up by the documentary in 2015. The IC authorized a review of practices on whether there were any breaches by the Russian Anti-Doping Agency. The report found direct interference into the laboratory's operations by the Russian State undermined the laboratory's independence and that tests conducted by the laboratory were highly suspect. The report elaborates on the role of the FSB:"[A] laboratory staff member reported that an FSB agent regularly visits the Moscow laboratory. The IC sources within the laboratory identified the FSB agent as Evgeniy Blotkin/Blokhin. Sources reported that Moscow laboratory Director Rodchenkov was required to meet with Evgeniy Blotkin weekly to update him on the 'mood of WADA'. One laboratory staff member provided information to IC investigators about the suspected bugging or wiretapping of telephones, while another staff member reported that office spaces within the Moscow laboratory were monitored (bugged) by the FSB in order to be informed of the laboratory's activities. This could not be independently verified by the IC, but the reported statements demonstrate the perceptions of laboratory officials, who believe they are under constant state surveillance. This perception is also fuelled by the FSB's regular visits to the laboratory and the questioning of its staff members. For example, the IC learned that staff members were routinely questioned by FSB upon their return from global laboratory and WADA seminars. Following the airing of the ARD documentary, select laboratory staff members were directed by the FSB not to cooperate with the WADA investigation."

In January 2016, the head of Russia's anti-doping laboratory Grigory Rodchenkov fled Russia and exposed the doping program, which included members of the FSB replacing tainted urine samples with older, clean ones. As a result of the scandals the International Association of Athletics Federations suspended Russia from all international athletic competitions including the 2016 Summer Olympics.

In July 2016, the first McLaren Report found that "beyond a reasonable doubt" the Russian Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the FSB, and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow "operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes" within a "state-directed failsafe system" using "the disappearing positive [test] methodology". In a second McLaren Report released December 2016, it was found that "In the period before the Sochi Games, a 'clean urine bank' was established at the FSB Command Centre, which was situated immediately adjacent to the Sochi Laboratory. Inside that building a dedicated room containing several large freezers was set up for the purpose of storing the clean urine samples."

Crocus City Hall attack
On 7 March the United States Embassy in Moscow warned that "extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts" That day, the US also privately warned Russian officials of the danger of an impending attack from IS–KP from intelligence gathered earlier in March, under the US intelligence community's "duty to warn" requirement, specifically mentioning the Crocus City Hall venue. Ten days after the attack it was reported that Iran had also warned Russia that a major "terrorist operation" was being planned, based on information gathered from IS militants arrested after the 2024 Kerman bombings.

Three days before the Crocus City Hall attack, President Vladimir Putin told the board of the FSB that Western warnings of a potential attack inside Russia were "provocative" and "resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilise our society".

On 22 March 2024, four Tajik ISIS–K gunmen launched an attack on a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, Russia, with rifles and incendiaries. The attack, claimed by ISIS–K, killed 144 and injured 551 and marked the deadliest attack on Russian soil since the Beslan school siege in 2004. Putin and the FSB suggested that Ukraine was involved in the attack, without offering evidence. Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the FSB, said that "radical Islamists" prepared the attack with help from Ukrainian and Western "special services". Bortnikov claimed that the US warning was "of a general nature".

IS-affiliated Amaq News Agency published a video filmed by one of the attackers. Ukraine denied any involvement in the attack, and described the FSB's claims that the perpetrators of the Crocus City Hall attack tried to escape to Ukraine as "very doubtful and primitive" disinformation, recalling that the border is heavily guarded by soldiers and drones, mined in many areas, and constantly shelled from both sides. A short video on Telegram allegedly showed one of the suspects being tortured by FSB agents, who cut off his ear and forced him to eat it.

Navalny associate Ivan Zhdanov criticized Russian security services for their "catastrophic incompetence" and the FSB for being "busy with everything except its direct responsibilities – killing their political opponents, spying on citizens and prosecuting people who are against the war." Another associate, Leonid Volkov, said that the FSB "can't do the only job it really should be doing: preventing a real, nightmarish terrorist attack." Novaya Gazeta Europe's chief editor, Kirill Martynov, criticized Putin for dismissing Western intelligence warnings and focusing resources on "LGBT extremists" and the war with Ukraine instead of guarding against "real threats".

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Federal Security Service


text:
Talk:Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Unreliable source
Does anyone have an idea why ref. 15 was marked as an "unreliable source"? It is an official publication of the university, so they probably know themselves what their basic principles are... PhiRho (talk) 03:58, 25 June 2011 (UTC)

Translation
The policy of publication at the 'Vrije Universiteit Brussel' is that the name of the university should never be translated. Certainly not in French, because that would refer to the ULB. But also the English translation of 'Free University of Brussels' is disliked by the university's administration. The original name is preferred in all publications, in any language. -- Wouter Lievens

 * Why is it "disliked"? Just because of the confusion? I think most European universities' official English names are the native names -- and I think it's usually not because of there's another university by the same English name. --Menchi 11:01, 3 Dec 2003 (UTC)

 * It is the policy of the university itself! I think organisations have the right to choose their own names, and have the right to restrict their translations. -- Wouter Lievens

 * No need to get so defensive. I was not saying I don't support VUB's decision. Before I even asked you my question above, I had already changed the sentence re: "Free University of Brussels", didn't I? I was curious to see if you know why European universities in general don't translate. --Menchi 04:44, 4 Dec 2003 (UTC)

 * May be they think that the "Free" is ambiguous, studies at VUB isn't free actually... -- TheSpecialist Dec 4, 2003; 8:21 (UTC)

 * I wasn't being offensive, Menchi. Sorry if it seemed like that. The word 'free' is a bad translation because 'free' is associated with 'free of charge', i.e. you needn't pay. That's definately not the case for the VUB! The word 'vrije' is better described in French perhaps, as 'Libre'. On the other hand, Liberal University is an even worse translation (as Liberal has at several possible political meanings across the world). So, with there being no good translation at all, they choose not to translate it. Makes sense to me :-) -- Wouter Lievens

 * It makes perfect sense. If I said I study at the Free University of Brussels, where do I study? At the VUB or the ULB? Both names translate to Free University of Brussels, and if both universities would use the name Free University of Brussels it would become very confusing very quickly. Leprecon (talk) 22:52, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

This quote may explain what is meant by the word 'Free' in the translation. "Free speech, not free beer."

Scientia vincere tenebras
This motto was translated correctly, then changed to "Science will triumph over darkness" which is blatantly incorrect!

Scientia in this motto is an ablative, and not the subject of the phrase. The motto should thus be translated as:

"Conquering the darkness through science" -- User:LHOON

Given that the Latin motto of the VUB and the ULB are the same, wouldn't it be best to include the same English translations on their pages? At the moment it is translated as "Conquering darkness with knowledge" on ULB, and "Conquering darkness by science" here. Perhaps some Latin-speaking Wikipedians can form a consensus? N3hima (talk) 14:37, 29 January 2015 (UTC)

Public or private?
What exactly is the VUB's statute? It gets most of its funding from state sources but it was not founded by the state, so should we classify it as a public or as a private school?

Random Nonsense 22:55, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

 * In Belgium every university recieves funding from state sources, so maybe the person who wrote the article thought of it being irrelevant. Mykeyspace 22:35, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Well it isn't that easy. There are 2 major school-"systems" in Belgium; Catholic and Free education (again not as in free beer). Both get funded by the state but not equally. Free education is mostly state funded, Catholic schools are mostly funded by the diocese, which gets funded for offering education by the state ... and so on. I am no expert and i'm not posting an entry about this, but this has to be added. MrHefnner (talk) 22:11, 17 March 2008 (UTC)
 * True, but that's only primary and secondary education, no? As far as I know, all universities get funded by the state at the same rate, regardless of their religious/ethical orientation. Random Nonsense (talk) 23:29, 17 March 2008 (UTC)
 * The VUB is a private institution, as opposed to for example the University of Ghent which is state-owned. 81.83.106.115 (talk) 17:40, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Alumni - politicians
In the articles about K.U.Leuven and UGent, politicians have been omitted in the list of "famous alumni" because the lists would become too long. I suggest that we also skip them in the VUB article. MaartenVidal 21:39, 20 September 2006 (UTC)

 * I see no real need for that. It's not like the "alumni" list is all that big, and to arbitrarily delete this section seems a bit biased against politicians. :p

Random Nonsense 14:53, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

 * I wouldn't omit politicians. First of all because i see no reason for omitting certain people based on their profession. Besides, putting politicians on an alumni list might give a good impression of the ideology of a university, so it might not be entirely irrelevant. Second of all it would go against the spirit of the VUB, they list the politicians explicitly on their alumni list and on panels at events on campus. I guess they are rather proud of it. I can't really blame the University of Antwerp for not wanting to have e.g. Filip Dewinter on their alumni list. And thirdly, since quite a few politicians seem to have gone to the VUB, it would be quite unfair if they couldn't list them. It's part of the heritage of the VUB. Mykeyspace 22:54, 18 January 2007 (UTC)mykeyspace

title: Talk:Vrije Universiteit Brussel


text:
Université libre de Bruxelles

The Université libre de Bruxelles (Free University of Brussels; abbreviated ULB) is a French-speaking research university in Brussels, Belgium. ULB is one of the two institutions tracing their origins to the Free University of Brussels, founded in 1834 by the lawyer and liberal politician Pierre-Théodore Verhaegen.

The split occurred along linguistic lines, forming the French-speaking ULB in 1969, and Dutch-speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) in 1970. One of the leading Belgian universities open to Europe and the world, the ULB now has about 24,200 students, 33% of whom come from abroad, and an equally cosmopolitan staff.

Name
Brussels has two universities whose names mean Free University of Brussels in English: the French-speaking Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and the Dutch-speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Neither uses the English translation, since it is ambiguous.

Establishment of a university in Brussels

The history of the Université libre de Bruxelles is closely linked with that of Belgium itself. When the Belgian State was formed in 1830 by nine breakaway provinces from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, three state universities existed in the cities of Ghent, Leuven and Liège, but none in the new capital, Brussels. Since the government was reluctant to fund another state university, a group of leading intellectuals in the fields of arts, science, and education — amongst whom the study prefect of the Royal Athenaeum of Brussels, Auguste Baron, as well as the astronomer and mathematician Adolphe Quetelet — planned to create a private university, which was permitted under the Belgian Constitution.

In 1834, the Belgian episcopate decided to establish a Catholic university in Mechelen with the aim of regaining the influence of the Catholic Church on the academic scene in Belgium, and the government had the intent to close the university at Leuven and donate the buildings to the Catholic institution. The country's liberals strongly opposed to this decision, and furthered their ideas for a university in Brussels as a counterbalance to the Catholic institution. At the same time, Auguste Baron had just become a member of the freemasonic lodge Les Amis Philantropes. Baron was able to convince Pierre-Théodore Verhaegen, the president of the lodge, to support the idea for a new university. On 24 June 1834, Verhaegen presented his plan to establish a free university.

After sufficient funding was collected among advocates, the Université libre de Belgique ("Free University of Belgium") was inaugurated on 20 November 1834, in the Gothic Room of Brussels Town Hall. The date of its establishment is still commemorated annually, by students of its successor institutions, as a holiday called Saint-Verhaegen/Sint-Verhaegen (often shortened to St V) for Pierre-Théodore Verhaegen. In 1836, the university was renamed the Université libre de Bruxelles ("Free University of Brussels").

After its establishment, the Free University faced difficult times, since it received no subsidies or grants from the government; yearly fundraising events and tuition fees provided the only financial means. Verhaegen, who became a professor and later head of the new university, gave it a mission statement which he summarised in a speech to King Leopold I: "the principle of free inquiry and academic freedom uninfluenced by any political or religious authority." In 1858, the Catholic Church established the Saint-Louis Institute in the city, which subsequently expanded into a university in its own right.

Growth, internal tensions and move

The Free University grew significantly over the following decades. In 1842, it moved to the Granvelle Palace, which it occupied until 1928. It expanded the number of subjects taught and, in 1880, became one of the first institutions in Belgium to allow female students to study in some faculties. In 1893, it received large grants from Ernest and Alfred Solvay and Raoul Warocqué to open new faculties in the city. A disagreement over an invite to the anarchist geographer Élisée Reclus to speak at the university in 1893 led to some of the liberal and socialist faculty splitting away from the Free University to form the New University of Brussels (Université nouvelle de Bruxelles) in 1894. The institution failed to displace the Free University, however, and closed definitively in 1919.

In 1900, the Free University's football team won the bronze medal at the Summer Olympics. After Racing Club de Bruxelles declined to participate, a student selection with players from the university was sent by the Federation. The team was enforced with a few non-students. The Institute of Sociology was founded in 1902, then in 1904 the Solvay School of Commerce, which would later become the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management. In 1911, the university obtained its legal personality under the name Université libre de Bruxelles - Vrije Hogeschool te Brussel.

The German occupation during World War I led to the suspension of classes for four years in 1914–1918. In the aftermath of the war, the Free University moved its principle activities to the Solbosch in the southern suburb of Ixelles and a purpose-built university campus was created, funded by the Belgian American Educational Foundation. The university was again closed by the German occupiers during World War II on 25 November 1941. Students from the university were involved in the Belgian Resistance, establishing Groupe G which focused on sabotage.

Splitting of the university
Until the early 20th century, courses at the Free University were taught exclusively in French, the language of the upper class in Belgium at that time, as well as of law and academia. However, with the Dutch-speaking population asking for more rights in Belgium (see Flemish Movement), some courses began being taught in both French and Dutch at the Faculty of Law as early as 1935. Nevertheless, it was not until 1963 that all faculties offered their courses in both languages. Tensions between French- and Dutch-speaking students in the country came to a head in 1968 when the Catholic University of Leuven split along linguistic lines, becoming the first of several national institutions to do so.

On 1 October 1969, the French and Dutch entities of the Free University separated into two distinct sister universities. This splitting became official with the act of 28 May 1970, of the Belgian Parliament, by which the French-speaking Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and the Dutch-speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) officially became two separate legal, administrative and scientific entities.

Campuses
The ULB comprises three main campuses: the Solbosch campus, on the territories of the City of Brussels and Ixelles municipalities in the Brussels-Capital Region, the Plaine campus in Ixelles, and the Erasmus campus in Anderlecht, beside the Erasmus Hospital.

The main and largest campus of the university is the Solbosch, which hosts the administration and general services of the university. It also includes most of the faculties of the humanities, the École polytechnique, the large library of social sciences, and among the museums of the ULB, the Museum of Zoology and Anthropology, the Allende exhibition room and the Michel de Ghelderode Museum-Library.

The Plaine campus hosts the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Pharmacy. There are also the Experimentariums of physics and chemistry, the Museum of Medicinal Plants and Pharmacy and student housing. This site is served by Delta station.

The Erasmus campus houses the Erasmus Hospital and the Pôle Santé, the Faculty of Medicine, the School of Public Health and the Faculty of Motor Sciences. There is also the School of Nursing (with the Haute école libre de Bruxelles – Ilya Prigogine), the Museum of Medicine and the Museum of Human Anatomy and Embryology. This site is served by Erasme/Erasmus metro station.

The university also has buildings and activities in the Brussels municipality of Auderghem, and outside of Brussels, in Charleroi on the Aéropole Science Park and Nivelles.

Faculties and institutes

 * Institute for European Studies
 * Interfacultary School of Bio-Engineering
 * School of Public Health
 * High Institute of Physical Education and Kinesiotherapy
 * Institute of Work Sciences
 * Institute of Statistics and Operational Research
 * Institute for Astronomy and Astrophysics
 * Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management
 * Faculty of Sciences

International Partnerships
University of California, Berkeley, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, Université de Montréal, Waseda University, Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI, BeiHang University, Universidade de São Paulo, Université de Lausanne, Université de Genève, University Ouaga I Pr. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, University of Lubumbashi

Research
At the heart of the Free University of Brussels there are at least 2000 PhD students and around 3600 researchers and lecturers who work around different scientific fields and produce cutting-edge research.

The projects of these scientists span thematics that concern exact, applied and human sciences and researchers at the heart of the ULB have been awarded numerous international awards and recognitions.

The research carried out at the ULB is financed by different bodies such as the European Research Council, the Walloon Region, the Brussels Capital Region, the National Fund for Scientific Research, or one of the foundations that are dedicated to research at the ULB; the ULB Foundation or the Erasme Funds.

Since the early 2000s, the MAPP project has started studying political party membership evolution through the time.

Notable people

 * Count Richard Goblet d'Alviella (b. 1948), businessman
 * Jules Anspach (1829–1879), politician and mayor of Brussels
 * Philippe Autier (b. 1956), epidemiologist and clinical oncologist
 * Zénon-M. Bacq (1903–1983), radiobiologist, laureate of the 1948 Francqui Prize
 * Radu Bălescu (1932–2006), Romanian and Belgian physicist, laureate of the 1970 Francqui Prize
 * Saeed Bashirtash (b. 1965), Iranian dentist, writer and political activist
 * Didier Bellens (1955–2016), businessman, CEO of Belgacom
 * Vincent Biruta (b. 1958), Rwandan physician and politician, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 * Jules Bordet (1870–1961), physician, laureate of the 1919 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine
 * Karel Bossart (1904–1975), aeronautical engineer, designer of the SM-65 Atlas
 * Jean Brachet (1909–1998), biochemist
 * Robert Brout (1928–2011), American physicist, laureate of the 2004 Wolf Prize
 * Jean Bourgain (1954–2018), mathematician, laureate of the 1994 Fields Medal
 * Albert Claude (1899–1983), biologist, laureate of the 1974 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine
 * Heidi Cruz (b. 1972), American businesswoman, wife of U.S. Senator Ted Cruz
 * Herman De Croo (b. 1937), liberal politician
 * Théophile de Donder (1872–1957), physicist, mathematician, and father of irreversible thermodynamics
 * Vũ Đức Đam (b. 1963), Vietnamese politician, Deputy Prime Minister
 * Pierre Deligne (b. 1944), mathematician, laureate of the 1978 Fields Medal
 * Antoine Depage (1862–1925), surgeon, founder and president of the Belgian Red Cross, and one of the founders of Scouting in Belgium
 * Mathias Dewatripont (b. 1959), economist, laureate of the 1998 Francqui Prize
 * François Englert (b. 1932), physicist, laureate of the 2004 Wolf Prize, laureate of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics
 * Jacques Errera (1896–1977), physicochemist, laureate of the 1938 Francqui Prize
 * Aleth Félix-Tchicaya (b. 1955), Congolese writer
 * Louis Franck (1868–1937), lawyer, liberal politician and statesman
 * Matyla Ghyka (1881–1965), Romanian poet, novelist, mathematician, historian, and diplomat
 * Michel Goldman (b. 1955), immunologist
 * Nico Gunzburg (1882–1984), lawyer and criminologist
 * Camille Gutt (1884–1971), economist, politician, and industrialist, first Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
 * Marc Henneaux (b. 1955), physicist, laureate of the 2000 Francqui Prize
 * Amir Abbas Hoveida (1919–1979), Iranian economist and politician, Prime Minister
 * Enver Hoxha (1908–1985), Albanian politician, leader of Communist Albania
 * Julius Hoste Jr. (1884–1954), businessman and liberal politician
 * Léon Van Hove (1924–1990), physicist, laureate of the 1958 Francqui Prize, Director General of the CERN
 * Paul Hymans (1865–1941), politician and first President of the League of Nations
 * Paul Janson (1840–1913), liberal politician
 * Bahadir Kaleagasi (b. 1966), Turkish writer, International co-ordinator of TUSIAD
 * Jeton Kelmendi (b. 1978), Albanian writer, laureate of the 2010 International Solenzara Prize
 * Henri La Fontaine (1854–1943), lawyer, laureate of the 1913 Nobel Prize for Peace
 * Roberto Lavagna (b. 1942), Argentine economist and politician, Minister of Economy and Production
 * Maurice Lippens (b. 1943), businessman and banker
 * Lucien Lison (1908–1984), Belgian-Brazilian physician and biochemist, considered the "father of histochemistry"
 * Amer Husni Lutfi (b. 1956), Syrian politician, Minister of Economy and Trade
 * Paul Magnette (b. 1971), socialist politician and political scientist, mayor of Charleroi, laureate of the 2000 Francqui Prize
 * Marguerite Massart (1900–1979), first Belgian female engineer
 * Adolphe Max (1869–1939), politician, mayor of Brussels
 * Adrien-Jean Le Mayeur (1880–1958), painter
 * Fradique de Menezes (b. 1942), São Toméan politician, President
 * Françoise Meunier, doctor, Director General of the EORTC
 * Charles Michel (b. 1975), politician, Prime Minister and President of the European Council
 * Constantin Mille (1861–1927), Romanian socialist militant and journalist
 * Axel Miller (b. 1965), businessman, CEO of Dexia
 * Roland Mortier (1920–2015), philologist, laureate of the 1965 Francqui Prize
 * François Narmon (1934–2013), economist and businessman, President of Dexia and the Belgian Olympic Committee
 * Amélie Nothomb (b. 1967), writer, laureate of the 1999 Grand Prix du roman de l'Académie française
 * Paul Otlet (1868–1944), author, entrepreneur, lawyer and peace activist, founding father of documentation
 * Henri De Page (1894–1969), jurist, Professor in Law, generally seen as the most important Belgian lawyer ever
 * Marc Parmentier (b. 1956), scientist, laureate of the 1999 Francqui Prize
 * Etienne Pays (b. 1948), molecular biologist, laureate of the 1996 Francqui Prize and of the Carlos J. Finlay Prize for Microbiology
 * Robert Peston (b. 1960), British journalist, presenter, and author, ITV News Political Editor
 * Martine Piccart (b. 1953), medical oncologist, President of the EORTC
 * Marie Popelin (1846–1913), jurist and feminist
 * Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003), physicist and chemist, laureate of the 1955 Francqui Prize and of the 1977 Nobel Prize in Chemistry
 * Lodewijk De Raet (1870–1914), economist and politician
 * Eric Remacle (1960–2013), economist, laureate of the 2000 Francqui Prize
 * Jan Van Rijswijck (1853–1906), lawyer, liberal politician and journalist, mayor of Antwerp
 * David Ruelle (b. 1935), Belgian-French mathematical physicist
 * Pedro Sánchez (b. 1972), Spanish politician, Prime Minister
 * Jean Auguste Ulric Scheler (1819–1890), philologist
 * Paul-Henri Spaak (1899–1972), politician, statesman, Prime Minister, Secretary General of NATO, and one of the Founding fathers of the European Union
 * Isabelle Stengers (b. 1949), philosopher
 * Jean Stengers (1922–2002), historian
 * Jacques Tits (1930–2021), Belgian-French mathematician, laureate of the 1993 Wolf Prize and of the 2008 Abel Prize
 * Michel Vanden Abeele, diplomat, Director-General of the European Commission
 * Raoul Vaneigem (b. 1934), writer and Situationist theorist
 * Emile Vandervelde (1866–1938), statesman, socialist leader, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Foreign Affairs
 * Adamantios Vassilakis (1942–2021), Greek ambassador to the United Nations
 * August Vermeylen (1872–1945), writer and literature critic

 * Éliane Vogel-Polsky (1926–2015), lawyer and feminist
 * Raoul Warocqué (1870–1917), industrialist
 * Charles Woeste (1837–1922), lawyer and politician
 * Odette De Wynter (1927–1998), first woman to be a notary in Belgium

Nobel Prize Winners
For pre-1970 notable faculty and alumni, see Free University of Brussels:
 * Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003): Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977
 * François Englert (b. 1932): Nobel Prize in Physics in 2013
 * Denis Mukwege (b. 1955): Nobel Prize for Peace in 2018

title: Université libre de Bruxelles