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Ontario Agricultural College

The Ontario Agricultural College (OAC) originated at the agricultural laboratories of the Toronto Normal School, and was officially founded in 1874 as an associate agricultural college of the University of Toronto. Since 1964, it has become affiliated with the University of Guelph, which operates campuses in Guelph and Ridgetown and formerly in Alfred and Kemptville, all in Ontario.

History
Ontario farmers increasingly demanded more information on the best farming techniques which led to farm magazines and agricultural fairs. In 1868 the assembly created an agricultural museum, which morphed into the Ontario Agricultural College in Guelph in 1874. Its first building was Moreton Lodge, located where Johnston Hall now stands, which included classrooms, residences, a library, and a dining room. (Several buildings constructed during this time period are still a part of campus life today, including President's Residence, Raithby House, and Day Hall.)

The War Memorial Hall is a landmark building built in June 1924 as a lecture hall or theatre at the Ontario Agricultural College to honour students who had enlisted and died in the First World War, and in the Second World War. Two bronze tablets in the Memorial Chapel remembers alumni who have died during these wars.

Subsequently, the Ontario Agricultural College (OAC) became one of three founding colleges of the University of Guelph in 1964. (The other two were the Ontario Veterinary College and the Macdonald Institute.)

The OAC opened on May 1, 1874, with an enrollment of 28 students. The OAC administration was housed in Moreton Lodge until 1931, when the building was torn down to make way for Johnston Hall. The OAC's offices have resided in Johnston Hall ever since.

Campuses
In 1997, the provincial government amalgamated agriculture education across the province under the University of Guelph and OAC. Three previous Colleges of Agricultural Technology were now being run by the University of Guelph and OAC: College d'Alfred, a francophone college in the eastern part of the province at Alfred, Ontario; Kemptville College, founded in 1917 and located at Kemptville, Ontario about 30 minutes south of Ottawa, and Ridgetown College at Ridgetown, Ontario founded in 1922 and located in southwestern Ontario near Chatham. In May 2007, they were renamed Campus d'Alfred, Kemptville Campus and Ridgetown Campus in order to recognize their full integration into the university. Serious changes took place in 2015 with the decision to close some OAC campuses, including the Campus of Alfred, the only francophone campus. Financial reasons and the challenge to run the same programs in multiple locations were among the reasons leading to restructuring.

Programs
The OAC offers a wide range of degree and diploma programs based on four main pillars: food, agriculture, environment, and rural communities. The following degrees and diplomas are available under the OAC:
 * Associate Diploma
 * Agriculture
 * Environmental Management
 * Equine Care & Management
 * Horticulture
 * Turfgrass Management
 * Veterinary Technology
 * Bachelor of Arts
 * Food, Agriculture & Resource Economics
 * Bachelor of Bio-Resource Management
 * Equine Management
 * Environmental Management
 * Food Industry Management
 * Bachelor of Science in Agriculture
 * Animal Science
 * Crop, Horticultural, and Turfgrass Sciences
 * Honours Agricultural Science
 * Bachelor of Science in Environmental Sciences
 * Environmental Sciences
 * Environmental Economics & Policy
 * Bachelor of Landscape Architecture
 * Bachelor of Commerce
 * Food and Agricultural Business
 * Bachelor of Science
 * Animal Biology
 * Environmental Biology
 * Food Science
 * Plant Science

Milestones

 * 1874 – The first class of 20 Ontario School of Agriculture diploma students are accepted.
 * 1877 – The one-year diploma program expanded to two years.
 * 1880 – School's name changed to the Ontario Agricultural College.
 * 1887 – BSA degree program begins (University of Toronto awards the degrees from 1888 until 1964).
 * 1891 – Short courses offered to general public.
 * 1901 – Degree program adds a fourth year (still a U of T degree).
 * 1926 – Graduate program begins.
 * 1964 – Formation of the University of Guelph.
 * 1965 – The Bachelor of Landscape Architecture begins.
 * 1988 – Bachelor of Commerce and Bachelor of Environmental Science programs begin.
 * 1995 – "Experience Agriculture" curriculum for B.Sc.(Agr) program begins.
 * 1997 – Agricultural colleges in Kemptville, Ridgetown and Alfred affiliate with OAC and the University of Guelph becoming campuses of the University of Guelph.
 * 2006 – The Faculty of Environmental Sciences is relocated permanently to the OAC.
 * 2007 – The Bachelor of Bio-Resource Management – Equine Management program begins.
 * 2008 – The Bioproducts Discovery and Development Centre opens. The Guelph Centre for Urban Organic Farming opens on campus.
 * 2009 – The School of Environmental Sciences is formed by a merger of the departments of Environmental Biology and Land Resource Sciences, and the Faculty of Environmental Sciences.
 * 2014 – The Gosling Research Institute for Plant Preservation opens.

Notable alumni and faculty

 * Bernie Brennan graduated 1949, Canadian Football League player for the Ottawa Rough Riders and veterinarian for Rideau Carleton Raceway
 * W. B. George (1899–1972), graduated 1920s, lecturer at Kemptville Agricultural School and president of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association
 * Bill Hanley (1915–1990), studied dairy production, later worked for the Ontario Hockey Association and inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame
 * Jack Roxburgh (1901–1975), graduated 1920s, member of parliament for Norfolk and president of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association

Community
The Student Federation of the Ontario Agricultural College (SFOAC) is the student government for all students studying in OAC's programs. Each OAC class has a representative on SFOAC, and these representatives aim to promote spirit, leadership, enthusiasm and opportunity. With the sanction of the dean of the college, the SFOAC gives the student body of the OAC self-governance in matters pertaining to the student body, as well as distributing fees to classes and clubs within the OAC to promote activities.

Students enrolled in OAC programs connected to agriculture often refer to themselves as 'Aggies'. They are known on and off campus for their strong sense of college pride, which is carried out through various traditions. Many generations of Aggies sport leather jackets. These jackets are ordered for each new class year and sport a class crest, class colours, class graduation year and their program of study. Aggies are also known for their weekly 'pub nights' hosted on campus.

All students of the University of Guelph, including students of the OAC, participate in the tradition of painting Old Jeremiah.

College Royal
An annual feature of the university is its open house, known as College Royal. The event began in 1925 and now welcomes over 20,000 visitors each year. For a weekend each March, every part of the campus and its programs are exhibited to the public, from the barns to the sugar bush in the Arboretum. It is highly popular with visitors of all ages, especially families with children who take advantage of the March Break (the usual Ontario school break) to have an outing. For students, College Royal is a 12-day long experience including events such as Fashion Show, Kick-Off Pub and Super Thursday.

Tractor Tug for Tots
Tractor Tug for Tots is an event run by the Tractor Tug for Tots club of the Student Federation of the Ontario Agricultural College. The annual charity event raises funds for youth organizations each year by having teams pay to compete against each other in pulling tractors down Reynolds Walk.

Good Times
Good Times is annual banquet held for OAC students, staff, donors and alumni. The banquet includes a full dinner as well as an awards ceremony recognizing outstanding members of the OAC. Good Times is said to be a favourite event by many of the OAC ‘Aggies’.

LABash
The LABash is an annual conference originally started by three landscape architecture students at the University of Guelph. This multi-day event is coordinated for landscape architecture students from all across North America and provides students with the opportunity to discuss current landscape architecture trends while networking with fellow students and professionals.

Environmental Sciences Symposium
The Environmental Sciences Symposium is an annual event organized and hosted by students on the Environmental Sciences Student Executive (ESSE). The day brings together students, experts, and community members to learn about an environmental theme through workshops and discussions that incorporate science and social science perspectives.

title: Ontario Agricultural College


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Sacrilege

Sacrilege is the violation or injurious treatment of a sacred object, site or person. This can take the form of irreverence to sacred persons, places, and things. When the sacrilegious offence is verbal, it is called blasphemy, and when physical, it is often called desecration. In a more general sense, any transgression against what is seen as the virtue of religion would be a sacrilege, and so is coming near a sacred site without permission.

Most ancient religions have a concept analogous to sacrilege, often considered as a type of taboo. The basic idea is that realm of sacrum or haram stands above the world of the profane and its instantiations, see the Sacred–profane dichotomy.

Etymology
The term "sacrilege" originates from the Latin sacer, meaning sacred, and legere, meaning to steal. In Roman times, it referred to the plundering of temples and graves. By the time of Cicero, sacrilege had adopted a more expansive meaning, including verbal offences against religion and the undignified treatment of sacred objects.

Owing to the phonetic similarities between the words sacrilegious and religious, and their spiritually-based uses in modern English, many people mistakenly assume that the two words are etymologically linked, or that one is an antonym of the other. Religious is derived from the Latin word religio, meaning "reverence, religion", (from religare, "to bind [to the god{s}]"; Tully derived it from re- [again] and legere [to read]), whereas sacrilegious is derived ultimately from the Latin combining form sacr-, meaning sacred, and the verb legere, meaning "to steal", "to collect", or "to read". The Latin noun sacrilegus thus means "one who steals sacred things".1

Christianity
With the advent of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, the Emperor Theodosius criminalized sacrilege in an even more expansive sense, including heresy, schism, and offenses against the emperor, such as tax evasion.

By the Middle Ages, the concept of sacrilege was again restricted to physical acts against sacred objects, and this forms the basis of all subsequent Catholic teachings on the subject. A major offence was to tamper with a consecrated host, otherwise known as the Body of Christ. Additionally, Bible desecration has resulted in prosecution.

Most modern nations have abandoned laws against sacrilege out of respect for freedom of expression, except in cases where there is an injury to persons or property. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court case Burstyn v. Wilson (1952) struck down a statute against sacrilege, ruling that the term could not be narrowly defined in a way that would safeguard against the establishment of one church over another and that such statutes infringed upon the free exercise of religion and freedom of expression.

Despite their decriminalisation, sacrilegious acts are still sometimes regarded with strong disapproval by the public, even by nominal or former members and non-adherents of the offended religion, especially when these acts are perceived as manifestations of hatred toward a particular sect or creed.

Catholic Church
According to Catholic theology sacrilege is classified as personal, local, or real.

Personal sacrilege is irreverence shown to a person consecrated by religious vows (monks, nuns, etc.) or by holy orders (deacons, priests, bishops). Ridiculing, mocking, or abusing members of the clergy is considered personal sacrilege, as often the animosity is directed not at the person themselves but at the Church or at God whom they represent. Whenever those in religious or clerical life violate the sixth Commandment and break their vow of chastity, it is considered a personal sacrilege on their part. Laying violent hands on a cleric used to incur an automatic excommunication according to the 1917 Code of Canon Law. Since 1983, only someone who physically attacks the pope is excommunicated.

Local sacrilege is the violation and desecration of sacred places and space. Robbing or vandalizing a church, chapel, oratory, convent, or monastery would be of this category. It could also be committing immoral and sinful acts inside a sacred building, such as murder or sexual acts. The 1917 Code considered the burial of a publicly excommunicated person in a Catholic cemetery or hallowed ground to be sacrilege. The current 1983 Code makes no mention of it.

Real sacrilege is the contemptuous irreverence shown for sacred things, especially the Seven Sacraments or anything used for divine worship (altars, vestments, chalices, tabernacles, et al.). This can happen first of all by the administration or reception of the sacraments in the state of mortal sin, as such as receiving Communion, as also by advertently doing any of those things invalidly. Using sacred vessels for secular use, such as a chalice to drink cocktails, or using common items like paper plates and Styrofoam cups for liturgical worship, are also examples of real sacrilege. The worst kind is desecration of the Blessed Sacrament, as it is the most important and most sacred item in Catholicism (far more than any relic or historical artifact whatsoever).

England and Wales
In Post-Reformation England, sacrilege was a criminal offence for centuries, though its statutory definition varied considerably. Most English dictionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries appealed to the primary sense of stealing objects from a church.

Criminal law was consolidated by Peel's Acts from 1828. Of these, 7 & 8 Geo 4 c 27 repealed the provisions of 1 Ed 6 c 12 in relation to sacrilege, while two created new laws around larceny: 7 & 8 Geo 4 c 29 for England and Wales, and 9 Geo 4 c 55 for Ireland. Section 10 of each was identical:

"That if any person shall break and enter any church or chapel, and steal therein any chattel, or having stolen any chattel in any church or chapel, shall break out of the same, every such offender, being convicted thereof, shall suffer death as a felon."

Both of those sections were replaced by section 50 of the Larceny Act 1861, which was described by its marginal note as "breaking and entering a church or chapel and committing any felony" and which read:

"Whosoever shall break and enter any church, chapel, meeting house, or other place of divine worship, and commit any felony therein, or being in any church, chapel, meeting house, or other place of divine worship, shall commit any felony therein and break out of the same, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement."

This offence was not triable at quarter sessions

Section 50 of the Larceny Act 1861 was repealed by section 48(1) of, and the schedule to, the Larceny Act 1916. It was replaced by section 24 of the Larceny Act 1916 which provided:

"Every person who -
 * (1) breaks and enters any place of divine worship and commits any felony therein; or
 * (2) breaks out of any place of divine worship, having committed any felony therein;

shall be guilty of felony called sacrilege and on conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for life."

The words "arrestable offence" were substituted for the word "felony", in subsections (1) and (2), by section 10(1) of, and paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 2 to, the Criminal Law Act 1967.

Section 24 was replaced by sections 9 and 10 of the Theft Act 1968 (which create the offences of burglary and aggravated burglary.

As violence, self-harm and pride
Violence against God was the sign of arrogance which brought attributes of a divine nature down to the material world, while their existence belonged to gods and thus was inviolable.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Sacrilege


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Los Angeles Christmas Festival

The Los Angeles Christmas Festival was a post-season college football bowl game played at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum in Los Angeles, California, on December 25, 1924, between the USC Trojans and the Missouri Tigers. It was the first and only Festival game ever played, in a time where bowl games were a fairly new concept. It was Missouri's first bowl appearance and USC's second, having last played in the 1923 Rose Bowl.

Proposed revival
A group led by Derek Dearwater looked to create a new Christmas Bowl in 2010. According to Dearwater, the game was supposed to pit the Pac-10's No. 7 team (or a school from the Mid-American Conference if the Pac-10 didn't have any more bowl-eligible squads) against the Western Athletic Conference's No. 2 team. The L.A. Coliseum was the planned venue, either on Christmas Eve or the following Monday, December 27. The Children's Miracle Network ("Creating Christmas Miracles for Children in Need") was to be the game's chief benefactor.

However, the bowl proposal "fell short of meeting the NCAA's licensing criteria due to an inability to secure a back-up conference agreement" for the Pac-10's No. 7 selection. The game applied to the NCAA for certification in 2011 and again in 2014, unsuccessfully.

In 2019, the Los Angeles Bowl was announced, with the game to be played at the new SoFi Stadium.

title: Los Angeles Christmas Festival


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Talk:Niihau

Trivia

 * In 1992 Universal Pictures was allowed to film scenes for Jurassic Park on the island.

I've moved this trivia to the talk page. There are dozens of films shot in Hawaii. If this is important, surely there must be something else to say, or perhaps there is an article about films in Hawaii where it might be appropriate. Viriditas (talk) 12:18, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Close paraphrasing
Per Close paraphrasing, I've removed content that copied too closely from the source. I've explained my reasons here.  Please rewrite the material in your own words, or use proper quoting and attribution. Viriditas (talk) 09:25, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

Family Tree
Why is the family tree in the article? Wouldn't it be more appropriate in an article about the Robinson family rather than an article about an island. Plus, according to the family tree, Aubrey Robinson and Alice Gay are first cousins, which seems odd since they married each other. Is that possibly vandalism? There is no source or references for the family tree. Martylunsford (talk) 16:14, 6 December 2012 (UTC)
 * I think first-cousin marriage was fairly common in the 19th century, but I don't know if this tree is accurate or not. It was originally added to illustrate how the ownership of the island changed hands over time within the family ("Owners' family tree"). User:W Nowicki first added it to the article in late 2010.  I also agree that we should have a source for this information in order for it to remain, so I support removing it. Viriditas (talk) 21:10, 6 December 2012 (UTC)

Name
Moving this content here from the main article for an editor to work on. It lacks explicit sources: "The term Niihau, by itself, has no real meaning, other than referring to the island or an inhabitant of the island. One known epithet for Niihau i ke kīkū, meaning 'Niihau leans firmly back', thus implying that the people of Niihau are independent, slightly contradictory to the accounts of those inhabitants completely deserting the island, seeking refuge, from a famine and drought, on Kauai. In one of the earliest known maps done by Cook's crew of the Hawaiian Islands, puts Niihau's name as Neehow, then in 1798 an early French map of the islands calls the island Oneeheow. Also, in the 1840's, in a printing by Lahainaluna School, the island is called Niiheu."

Thanks. Viriditas (talk) 20:51, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Ni'ihau translates as milk-island-big-seed. That means food for the island consisted of milk and fruit. Which makes sense due to the lack of free flowing water. Fifty years ago I had a school classmate who had lived there. She said her diet was of fruit supplemented with occasional fish. If the language includes letters T and R, instead of K and L, then the residents are speaking Polynesian, not the Hawaiian dialect. The Hawaiian dialect developed after the arrival of westerners. The original Hawaiian Bible wrote K and L for the sounds of T and R. This resulted in the shift in pronunciation from Polynesian to Hawaiian. My Flatley (talk) 17:43, 13 May 2018 (UTC)

Niihau incident
Current version states " A Japanese navy fighter pilot crashed on the island and terrorized its residents for a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor" is not objective - "terror" (time between pilot escaping and being killed) lasted less than 24 hours and even during that time he did not exactly terrorize random villagers. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.131.91.86 (talk) 14:04, 28 August 2014 (UTC)

External links modified
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Niihau dialect
From the article: Oral tradition maintains that the Niʻihau dialect is closer to the Hawaiian register spoken during the time of discovery; there is linguistic evidence to support this claim.[citation needed]

Here's an article which seems to support this claim. (See section "A living language.") I'm putting the link here in case anyone wants to verify this, and possibly cite this article in the Wikipedia article. https://www.hawaiimagazine.com/content/keepers-flame-how-cultural-practitioners-are-preserving-niihaus-unique-traditions

Omc (talk) 20:29, 5 July 2018 (UTC)
 * Thank you, Omc. I read the article, and agree with you about support for the claim. I have included it as a reference.--FeralOink (talk) 07:08, 8 November 2021 (UTC)

legal and economic history
The article says, "Elizabeth Sinclair purchased Niʻihau in 1864 for $10,000 from the Kingdom of Hawaii". I'm not sure what that means? Was the island no longer part of the Kingdom of Hawaii? Apparently there was no private property? Were the residents and their homes also sold to Sinclair? Did the residents lose their traditional land rights? Did the Sinclair family essentially become feudal lords until the present day, with no residents owning property and the absence of any local elected governing body that is not subjugated to feudal power? 2A01:E0A:E:9050:6820:419F:7C33:36D3 (talk) 09:52, 18 January 2019 (UTC)

Population and school
Here is an opportunity to make the article more accurate: if the population ranges between 35–50 people, it seems very unlikely that 25 to 50 students attend the Niʻihau School. 25 out of 35 residents are school-aged? 2601:281:CC80:5AE0:78EE:830:5C67:14E6 (talk) 01:34, 6 September 2020 (UTC)

So this is a cult owned island, and the best advert for nationalizing land there is. The natives are kept in the dark, forbidden telecommunication devices, and have their votes stolen from them. Cult alert. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 51.6.10.171 (talk) 14:02, 8 November 2021 (UTC)

Move discussion in progress
There is a move discussion in progress on Talk:Oahu which affects this page. Please participate on that page and not in this talk page section. Thank you. —RMCD bot 18:46, 10 July 2023 (UTC)

title: Talk:Niihau


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Discouraged worker

In economics, a discouraged worker is a person of legal employment age who is not actively seeking employment or who has not found employment after long-term unemployment, but who would prefer to be working. This is usually because an individual has given up looking, hence the term "discouraged".

A discouraged worker, since not actively seeking employment, has fallen out of the core statistics of the unemployment rate since they are neither working nor job-seeking. Their giving up on job-seeking may derive from a variety of factors including a shortage of jobs in their locality or line of work; discrimination for reasons such as age, race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, and disability; a lack of necessary skills, training, or experience; a chronic illness or disability; or simply a lack of success in finding a job.

As a general practice, discouraged workers, who are often classified as marginally attached to the labor force, on the margins of the labor force, or as part of hidden unemployment, are not considered part of the labor force, and are thus not counted in most official unemployment rates—which influences the appearance and interpretation of unemployment statistics.

One of the reasons why people become discouraged workers is discrimination in the workplace. The research found that minorities are more likely to become discouraged workers due to discrimination. The minorities, such as African Americans, ethnic and racial minorities in Europe, and older workers, tend to become discouraged workers more than others. Discrimination leads workers to be discouraged workers because discrimination caused feelings of helplessness and uncontrollability and decreases a level of self-efficacy. The studies of discouraged workers are undertaken, as it is seen as "hidden unemployment". However, it is related to major social problems like minority discrimination and the lack of a diverse community.

There are not significant behavioral patterns of labor force participation across age-sex groups in the business cycle. It is related to the unemployment rate in the region. Generally, the discouraged worker effect gets stronger when the unemployment rate exceeds a certain level. Young workers are most dependent on the business cycle, regarding the decision of whether to participate in the labor force. There is a linear relationship only among the prime-age female between the added workers and the discouraged workers. The discouraged worker effects appear more for older workers during the exception phase, which is the phase when the unemployment rates of workers departed.

United States
In the United States, a discouraged worker is defined as a person not in the labor force who wants and is available for a job and who has looked for work sometime in the past 12 months (or since the end of his or her last job if a job was held within the past 12 months), but who is not currently looking because of real or perceived poor employment prospects.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not count discouraged workers as unemployed but rather refers to them as only "marginally attached to the labor force". This means that the officially measured unemployment captures so-called "frictional unemployment" and not much else. This has led some economists to believe that the actual unemployment rate in the United States is higher than what is officially reported while others suggest that discouraged workers voluntarily choose not to work. Nonetheless, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has published the discouraged worker rate in alternative measures of labor underutilization under U-4 since 1994 when the most recent redesign of the CPS was implemented.

The United States Department of Labor first began tracking discouraged workers in 1967 and found 500,000 at the time. Today, In the United States, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics as of April 2009, there are 740,000 discouraged workers. There is an ongoing debate as to whether discouraged workers should be included in the official unemployment rate. Over time, it has been shown that a disproportionate number of young people, blacks, Hispanics, and men make up discouraged workers. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that the number of discouraged workers is underestimated because it does not include homeless people or those who have not looked for or held a job during the past twelve months and is often poorly tracked.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the top five reasons for discouragement are the following:
 * 1) The worker thinks no work is available.
 * 2) The worker could not find work.
 * 3) The worker lacks schooling or training.
 * 4) The worker is viewed as too young or too old by the prospective employer.
 * 5) The worker is the target of various types of discrimination.

As the world navigates through the effects of the global coronavirus pandemic, a growing number of job seekers in the United States are becoming discouraged, leaving the labor force entirely, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of government data. The number of Americans who are out of work and have experienced long-term unemployment, while still continuing to look for a job for more than six months, has increased considerably in the year since the start of the COVID-19 recession. During periods of economic weakness, the labor force participation rate in the United States has tended to decline during economic downturns. During the 2007–09 recession, the unemployment rate for discouraged workers more than doubled. From late 2007 to early 2011, the number of discouraged workers increased from about 350,000 to a peak of about 1.3 million. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that the lingering effects of the 2007–2009 recession and the slow recovery will continue to restrain participation. The effects of the coronavirus greatly impacted the United States economy. Pew Research Center reports that overall, 25% of U.S. adults say they or someone in their household was laid off or lost their job because of the coronavirus outbreak, with 15% saying this happened to them personally. Nearly 529,000 Americans were classified as discouraged workers in February 2021, roughly 100,000 more than the number one year ago. As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, labor market participation rate sharply declined due to the lack of job opportunities that perpetuated discourage people from searching for employment. Like most economic crisis as the labor market improves and jobs becomes more plentiful, unemployed workers will reenter the labor force. CBO expects that discouraged workers are likely to continue to reenter the labor force as more people find jobs and wage growth increases.

Canada
In Canada, discouraged workers are often referred to as hidden unemployed because of their behavioral pattern, and are often described as on the margins of the labour force. Since the numbers of discouraged workers and of unemployed generally move in the same direction during the business cycle and the seasons (both tend to rise in periods of low economic activity and vice versa), some economists have suggested that discouraged workers should be included in the unemployment numbers because of the close association.

The information on the number and composition of the discouraged worker group in Canada originates from two main sources. One source is the monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is a monthly survey that provides an estimate of both employment and unemployment. The LFS’ definition of discouraged workers has not changed since 1997. It is defined as people who were willing and available to work during the reference week but did not work because they believed there was no suitable work available. The other source is the Survey of Job Opportunities (SJO), which is much closer in design to the approach used in many other countries. In this survey, all those expressing a desire for work and who are available for work are counted, irrespective of their past job search activity.

In Canada, while discouraged workers were once less educated than "average workers", they now have better training and education but still tend to be concentrated in areas of high unemployment. Discouraged workers are not seeking a job for one of two reasons: labour market-related reasons (worker discouragement, waiting for recall to a former job or waiting for replies to earlier job search efforts) and personal and other reasons (illness or disability, personal or family responsibilities, going to school, and so on).

The table below uses the data from the LFS since 2016. Unemployment was slowly rising from the year 2016 where it was 10,115,700 people to 2019 where the number increased to 10,555,000 people. Similar to the rest of the world, the Covid-19 pandemic caused an even greater increase in the total unemployment, affecting a high of 11,156,000 people. Among the set of the population classified as discouraged workers, there is a greater rise, going from 21,800 people in 2019 to 70,400 in 2020.

LFS Reason for not looking for work x 1000: Both sexes, ages 15 and older. It is worth noting that there is a vast population of Aboriginal people that reside in Canada. Canada classifies the following  three groups under the broad term Aboriginal: the First Nations, Inuit, and the Metis. Statistics Canada does not measure Aboriginal unemployment separate from the population as a whole, but the Aboriginal people make up a big portion of the unemployed and discouraged worker count. The 2008 recession hit the Aboriginals harder than the rest of the population, which created a pattern of high rates of unemployment and discouraged workers.

The Aboriginal have greater restrictions to work than the normal population due to race, lower human capital, and education. These factors subject the population to more part-time-part-year work, layoffs, job loss and lower pay. Dealing with this over time produces more discouraged workers, and produces a smaller labor force participation. Aboriginal peoples were three times as likely to be discouraged workers than the rest of the population.

Australia
In Australia, discouraged workers are recorded by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) into a category of potential workers who are not actively seeking work. In order to be categorized as discouraged, individuals must a) want to work, b) be available to start working within 4 weeks, and c) are not actively applying for jobs because they are discouraged. According to ABS, there were 808,000 persons classified as unemployed in February 2021 plus an additional 1.157 million marginally attached to the labor force. The 113,000 discouraged workers fall into this marginally attached group.

The top three reasons that discouraged workers in Australia did not actively seek work in the week prior were:

 * 1) Considered too young or too old by employers
 * 2) No jobs in locality, line of work or no jobs at all
 * 3) No jobs in suitable hours

The table below shows how there has been an overall increase in the number of discouraged workers in Australia, even with decreases from 2015 to 2016 and again from 2018 to 2019. As with many other countries, the number of discouraged workers increases during times of economic downturn which would explain the increases seen in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, women are more likely to be discouraged workers than men in Australia. The Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at The Australian National University has done further research of discouraged workers within Australia’s Indigenous population. As discussed by Hunter and Gray, Indigenous Australians are more than three times more likely to become discouraged than the Australian population as a whole. Similar to what is seen in the entire Australian population, Indigenous females experience higher rates of discouraged workers as compared to males. The top two reasons for becoming discouraged for the indigenous population as a whole were “childcare and other family responsibilities” and “studying/returning to studies.”

European Union
Unemployment statistics published according to the ILO methodology may understate actual unemployment in the economy. The EU statistical bureau EUROSTAT started publishing figures on discouraged workers in 2010. According to the method used by EUROSTAT there are 3 categories that make up discouraged workers;
 * underemployed part-time workers
 * jobless persons seeking a job but not immediately available for work,
 * persons available for work but not seeking it

The first group are contained in the employed statistics of the European Labour Force Survey while the second two are contained in the inactive persons statistics of that survey. In 2012 there were 9.2 million underemployed part-time workers, 2.3 million jobless persons seeking a job but not immediately available for work, and 8.9 million persons available for work but not seeking it, an increase of 0.6 million for underemployed and 0.3 million for the two groups making up discouraged workers.

If the discouraged workers and underemployed are added to official unemployed statistics Spain has the highest number real unemployed (8.4 Million), followed by Italy (6.4 Million), United Kingdom (5.5 Million), France (4.8 Million) and Germany (3.6 Million).

India
The discouraged worker effects in India are divided into two concepts, unexplained gender wage gap and degree of underemployment. The discouraged worker effects are related to the recession in the business cycle, mainly affecting women or the secondary income earners in the household. Gender discrimination in the labor market, the lack of job opportunities, and the wage gap discourage women from entering the labor force in India. In Kerala, India, it worsened the female-to-male wage ratio between 2004 and 2012, which is one of the causes why it generated discouraged women workers. The discouraged worker effect of the wage gap was 2.6% in 2011/12 in India, which is the ratio of a 1% increase in the wage gap. This ratio of the wage gap for India exceeds the ratio for the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Gender imbalance for the participation rate is historically higher in the southern states than in the northern states. For example, the participation rate was 21% for all all-India of, whereas 25% was in Andhra Pradesh, which is in the south of India, and 14% in Uttar Pradesh, which is in the north of India. The participation rate for Kerala was 42%, which is much higher than the national average, while the rate for Uttarakhand was 21% in 2011/12. The participation rate of the labor force for women is higher in western and southern states than in central India. The participation rate is positively related to the education level. As the education level reached to graduate, the probability of labor force entry increased by 5.7% in 2011/12.

United States

 * Bureau of Labor Statistics
 * Current Population Survey
 * 99ers

Canada

 * Labour and Household Surveys Analysis Division of Statistics Canada

United States

 * Discouraged workers in glossary, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Division of Information Services
 * Employment Situation Summary, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Division of Information Services
 * Alternative measures of labor underutilization, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Division of Information Services
 * Discouraged Worker, Investopedia
 * Down And Out: "Discouraged" Workers, Time magazine
 * Actual U.S. Unemployment: 15.8%, The Washington Post
 * 'Hidden Unemployment' Inflates State's Real Jobless Figures, The Hartford Courant
 * Tracking the Long-Term Unemployed and Discouraged Workers, The Heritage Foundation
 * Ranks of Discouraged Workers and Others Marginally Attached to the Labor Force Rise During Recession Issues in Labor Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Division of Information Services
 * Discouraged Workers, Drexel
 * Jobless statistics overlook many, San Francisco Chronicle
 * PROMOTING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP
 * Labor force characteristics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey

Canada

 * Discouraged Workers

title: Discouraged worker


text:
User talk:Vala~enwiki

Hi! I'm an italian student of Università Cattolica of Milan. I'm working about a project for my thesis in sociology of comunication. My study is about the end of the author's right, or better, the definition of a sort of 'collettive right', as it is used in Wikipedia. I'm grateful if anyone could help me in my research of information. I'm interesting of reading your experiences in Wikipedia and so on. Thanx to all.

Ciao Vala,

Vedo che hai postato su Gianfranco/Talk. Purtroppo è quasi un anno che non si hanno sue notizie.

 * Ciao, User:Tomi (3 dicembre 2003)

Tu mi sai dare una mano e dirmi un po' di cose... hai letto la questione no? Grazie!

User categorisation
You were listed on the Wikipedians/Italy page as living in or being associated with Italy. As part of the User categorisation project, these lists are being replaced with user categories. If you would like to add yourself to the category that is replacing the page, please visit Category:Wikipedians in Italy for instructions. --Army1987 21:11, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

Your account will be renamed
Hello,

The developer team at Wikimedia is making some changes to how accounts work, as part of our on-going efforts to provide new and better tools for our users like cross-wiki notifications. These changes will mean you have the same account name everywhere. This will let us give you new features that will help you edit and discuss better, and allow more flexible user permissions for tools. One of the side-effects of this is that user accounts will now have to be unique across all 900 Wikimedia wikis. See the announcement for more information.

Unfortunately, your account clashes with another account also called Vala. To make sure that both of you can use all Wikimedia projects in future, we have reserved the name Vala~enwiki that only you will have. If you like it, you don't have to do anything. If you do not like it, you can pick out a different name. If you think you might own all of the accounts with this name and this message is in error, please visit Special:MergeAccount to check and attach all of your accounts to prevent them from being renamed.

Your account will still work as before, and you will be credited for all your edits made so far, but you will have to use the new account name when you log in.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

Yours, Keegan Peterzell Community Liaison, Wikimedia Foundation 03:29, 20 March 2015 (UTC)

Renamed
 This account has been renamed as part of single-user login finalisation. If you own this account you can |log in using your previous username and password for more information. If you do not like this account's new name, you can choose your own using this form after logging in: . -- Keegan (WMF) (talk) 20:10, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

title: User talk:Vala~enwiki


text:
Labor force in the United States

[[File:Jobs and quits rate.webp|thumb|380px|right|

]]

The labor force is the actual number of people available for work and is the sum of the employed and the unemployed. The U.S. labor force reached a high of 164.6 million persons in February 2020, just at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Before the pandemic, the U.S. labor force had risen each year since 1960 with the exception of the period following the Great Recession, when it remained below 2008 levels from 2009 to 2011. In 2021, The Great Resignation resulted in record numbers in voluntary turn over for American workers. The labor force participation rate, LFPR (or economic activity rate, EAR), is the ratio between the labor force and the overall size of their cohort (national population of the same age range). Much as in other countries in the West, the labor force participation rate in the U.S. increased significantly during the later half of the 20th century, largely because of women entering the workplace in increasing numbers. Labor force participation has declined steadily since 2000, primarily because of the aging and retirement of the Baby Boom generation. Analyzing labor force participation trends in the prime working age (25-54) cohort helps separate the impact of an aging population from other demographic factors (e.g., gender, race, and education) and government policies. The Congressional Budget Office explained in 2018 that higher educational attainment is correlated with higher labor force participation for workers aged 25–54. Prime-aged men tend to be out of the labor force because of disability, while a key reason for women is caring for family members.

Definition
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the labor force as:

"Included are persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities, homes for the aged), and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces."

Gender and the U.S. labor force
[[File:US Labor Force Participation Rate by gender.png|thumb|upright=1.5|US labor force participation rate from 1948 to 2021, by gender.

]]

Women
In the United States, there were three significant stages of women's increased participation in the labor force. During the late 19th century through the 1920s, very few women were employed. Working women were often young single women who typically withdrew from labor force at marriage unless their family needed two incomes. These women worked primarily in the textile manufacturing industry or as domestic workers. This profession empowered women and allowed them to earn a living wage. At times, they were a financial help to their families.

Between 1930 and 1950, female labor force participation increased primarily due to the increased demand for office workers, women participating in the high school movement, and electrification which reduced the time spent on household chores. In the 1950s to the 1970s, most women were secondary earners working mainly as secretaries, teachers, nurses, and librarians (pink-collar jobs).

Starting from 1960, the world and the U.S. witnessed a significant increase in female LFP in the labor market, especially in developed countries such as Europe and the U.S. The main reasons leading to this increase could be:

 * Higher real wage
 * The decline in reservation wage
 * Changes in attitudes and policies

According to Congressional Research Service, the gap between women and men has been smaller since 1979. The cumulative % change in real wages for women was increased by 9.6% (10th percentile), while men decreased by -7.7%. However, with the incredible increase, women's real wage was still lower than men's. Different starting points could explain this. In 1979, women had more options and opportunities to earn a higher degree than a high school diploma. Also, according to the research, only men with bachelor's degrees or higher would have higher actual earnings than women.

Claudia Goldin and others, specifically point out that by the mid-1970s there was a period of revolution of women in the labor force brought on by different factors. Women more accurately planned for their future in the work force, choosing more applicable majors in college that prepared them to enter and compete in the labor market. In the United States, the labor force participation rate rose from approximately 59% in 1948 to 66% in 2005, with participation among women rising from 32% to 59% and participation among men declining from 87% to 73%.

A common theory in modern economics claims that the rise of women participating in the US labor force in the late 1960s was due to the introduction of a new contraceptive technology, birth control pills, and the adjustment of age of majority laws. The use of birth control gave women the flexibility of opting to invest and advance their career while maintaining a relationship. By having control over the timing of their fertility, they were not running a risk of thwarting their career choices. However, only 40% of the population actually used the birth control pill. This implies that other factors may have contributed to women choosing to invest in advancing their careers.

Another factor that may have contributed to the trend was the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which aimed at abolishing wage disparity based on sex. Such legislation diminished sexual discrimination and encouraged more women to enter the labor market by receiving fair remuneration to help raise children.

In 1963, Equal Pay Act passed, the Civil Rights Act (1964), and Title IX (1972); these policies supported increasing women's LFP. The Equal Pay Act protects both men and women against discrimination on account of sex in the payments of wages. These policies also ensure that the labor market pays attention to and obey the regulation regard of sex term. Nevertheless, the big move was the pill's power (1960). Even though the FDA approved the medicine in 1960, the change happened later that year since every state needed to settle its regulations and restrictions. After the pill, women could extend their time for professional education and the age of first marriage. According to the University of Chicago Press Journal, there was a significant change in women's first marriage and education careers. More than a 20% increase for first-year law students, fewer than 30% of young women would like to marry before their 23rd birthday. Most women interviewees answered that the change was because of the pill. It was natural that men kept working regardless their pay was up or down and were not affected by their wives. However, women, especially young students, would be different. However, from 1980, married women were willing to work regardless of their husband's employment situation.

Since 2000, LFP was kept the same and slightly changed though other developed countries keep increasing. Many factors could lead to this result. The U.S. government was seen as having a weakness in "family-friendly policy." According to Claire Cain Miller, NYT, other wealthy countries such as Denmark, Germany, Norway, etc. spend an average of $14,000 annually for childcare while the U.S. government support only $500. In addition, a guaranteed spot in after-school care while U.S parents need to compete for a place.

Historical trends
According to the US Census in 1861, one third of women were in the labor force and of these one fourth were married women.

According to Ellen DuBoise and Lynn Dumenil, they estimate that the number of women in the labor force from 1800 - 1900 are:

According to the US Department of Labor and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics:

According to the US Department of Labor, as of 2017 women make up 47% of the total labor force with 70% of them mothers with children under 18 years of age.

Men
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, men's LFP decreased since 1950 with 86.4%, 79.7% in 1970, 76.4% in 1990, and 73.3% in 2005. Experts predict this decrease could remain higher over the year because of different policies such as the Social Security Act (1960). In addition, a decline in male education participation, age of marriage, the rise of substance abuse, and addiction to video games could lead to a decrease in Men LFP.

According to the article "Why are prime-age men vanishing from the labor force? " (Economic review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, first quarter 2018), the author found that from 1996 to 2015, most men in the prime-age who only hold a high-school degree or associate's degree would have a nonparticipation rate much higher than who holds an advanced degree. The demand for middle-skilled laborers could explain this during that period. During the Great Recession, overall, the nonparticipation rate increased for everyone regardless of their education level. However, the author tried to dig deeper and categorized men into four different groups: those who do not have a high school diploma, who have a high school diploma, who have an associate's degree, and who have a bachelor's degree or higher. It was apparent that the tremendous increase was from the group with only a high school diploma.

The aging in the U.S. population also explained the decrease in Men LFP. The median age of males increased from 34 years old to 37.2 years old. In addition, the baby boomer was raised, which meant more people over 65 years old, and fewer people in labor age. According to the 2020 Current Population Survey, most men reported that they could not work due to higher education, illness, or disability. However, this is a self-report. Regarding the Social Security Disability Program, there was 35% of recipients responded that their disability due to mental health disorder. Another 30% responded their disability correlated to musculoskeletal disorders, many of which are due to obesity.

The men's LFPR tends to increase further after COVID-19. Experts said that many reasons could lead to these results. People the age about to retire would like to bed earlier; even though they are healthy, they would prefer to spend their time on family, hobbies, or voluntary. In addition, COVID-19 created a threat to most people, especially those who had a problem with their health before. Another reason is that many companies are trying to move their plant to different countries, which could cut companies' costs and benefits. According to Science Advances, more than half of men in their 30s have a criminal arrest history. This is another reason why the men's nonparticipation rate increases.

Historical Trends
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics:

Occupation
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of 2019 Asians are most likely to hold a management position, while Hispanics or Latinos are most likely to hold a job in the service sector.

According to the U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, male LFP decreased and has continued decreasing since 1950 with 86.4%, 79.7% in 1970, 76.4% in 1990, and 73.3% in 2005. Experts predict that this decrease could remain and become higher over the years because of different policies such as the Social Security Act (1960). In addition, a decline in male education participation, age of marriage, the rise of substance abuse, and addiction to video gaming could lead to the decrease in male LFP. This decrease in male labor force participation rate was probably from the benefit of disability insurance, especially in the group of less-educated men.

According to the article "Why are prime-age men vanishing from the labor force? " (Economic review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, first quarter 2018), author found that from 1996 to 2015, most men in the prime-age who only hold a high-school degree or associate's degree would have a nonparticipation rate much higher than those who hold an advanced degree. There were studies that showed that the demand in low-skilled workers had been down during 1970 to 1980. Alternatively, the demand of middle-skilled labors during that period of time increased significantly, this could be explained since organizations tried to replace the low-skilled workers and used middle-skilled workers. During the Great Recession, overall, the nonparticipation rate increased for everyone regardless of their education level. However, the author tried to dig deeper and categorized men into four different groups: those, who do not have a high school diploma, who have a high school diploma, who have an associate's degree, and who have a bachelor's degree or higher. It was obvious that the greatest increase was from the group with only a high school diploma.

The aging in U.S population also explained the decrease in Men LFP. The median-age of male was increased from 34 years old to 37.2 years old. In addition, baby-boomer numbers increased which meant more people over 65 years old, and fewer people who were of labor age. With these numbers, even though the labor force participation rate remained same, the aging in population still could affect and drag the LFPR down. According to the 2020 Current Population Survey, most men reported that they were not able to work due to higher education, ill health, or disability, however, this is a self-report. Regarding the Social Security Disability Program, 35% of recipients responded that their disability was due to mental health disorder. According to National Library of Medicine, the percentage of men diagnosed with depression was lower than women, yet the effect on the male labor force participation rate was considerable. There were different reasons leading to this, it could be unrecognized, undiagnosed, and untreated. Another 30% responded that their disability correlated to musculoskeletal disorder, much due to obesity.

The men LFPR tend to increase further after COVID-19. Experts said that there are many reasons could lead to this results. People within the age that about to retire would like to retire earlier, even though they are healthy, they would prefer to spend their time for family, hobbies, or voluntary. In addition, COVID-19 created a threat to most people, especially who have problem with their health before. Another reason could be many companies are trying to move their plant to different countries where could cut companies' costs and benefits. According to Science Advances, more than half of men in their 30s has a criminal history arrest. This could be another reason explains why men nonparticipation rate increases.

Health Inequalities in the Labor Force
A person's occupation is one of the main social determinants of health which greatly contributes to health inequalities and health disparities, racially and ethnically. Determinants under the occupation category include: income, housing, paid sick leave and health insurance; they are related to a person's socioeconomic status. The U.S. health care system is connected to employment and it is very likely that a worker is paying for health insurance through their employer; low-wage workers who opt for coverage through their employment pay a higher portion from their income than their middle- income and higher- income counterparts. There is a disproportionate number of employed workers, based on race across the labor sectors, especially those of high- risk. *Numbers in the table are estimated.

Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance

The updated data from U.S Census Bureau in September 2022 does not change or is slightly different compared to last year's period. Three factors are being discussed:

 * The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM)
 * People with Health Insurance coverage
 * Household Income

The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). According to Congressional Research Service, SPM is a measure of economic deprivation. This tool helps to collect, effort, and report the data of individuals, households, etc., living with a lack of financial resources to reach a certain standard of living. Poverty thresholds are family size and composition. People will be considered their poverty status based on their financial resources against the thresholds. Those whose financial resources are lower than thresholds will be regarded as poor. In 2021, the official poverty rate was 11.6%, equal to 37.9 million people in poverty, and SPM was 7.8%, slightly decreasing compared with 9.2% in 2020 and 11.7% in 2019. SPM in 2021 was also the lowest rate since 2009.

Health Insurance Coverage. There are two sector, public and private insurance. According to Center for Disease Control and Prevention statistics, in 2021, 13.5% of people aged 18–64 were uninsured, 39.5% used public insurance, and 60.4% used private insurance. Even though personal insurance coverage is more common than public insurance coverage, and people typically change insurance type during the calendar year, in 2021, the percentage of general insurance coverage will be higher than private compared to 2020. The data from the National Center for Health Statistics, the ratio of adult aged from 18 to 64 that are uninsured tend to decrease and is related to households' income level. The percentage of uninsured people from 18 to 64 fell and significantly decreased as the following 24.5%, 23.7%, and 8.4%. The Federal Poverty Level (FPL) is divided into less than 100%, above 100%, less than 200%, and 200%.

Income. Similarly to SPM, there is no significant change in revenue in 2021 compared to 2020, $70,784 vs. $71,186. Although the total number of workers in both years is the same, the status of employees tends to move from part-time to full-time employees in 2021. Part-time employees have higher median earnings than full-time employees, about 4.1%.

During COVID-19
The Family First Coronavirus Act (FFCRA), provided mandated paid sick leave for workers that are impacted by COVID-19 and people of color are affected since because of the exemptions in that law; only certain public employers, private employers of less than 500 employees, and small business with less than 50 employees may qualify for the mandate. COVID-19 affected workers disproportionately, with Black and non-White races more likely to make up the baseline of the essential workforce this exposes to them to infections causing them to be unable to or to continue to work; FFCRA (2020) was passed in hopes of protecting workers but the ambiguity of the law puts minorities' paid sick leave at risk. Less than 30% of the workforce in the United States have paid sick leave that is protected by state law

Overall rate
From 1962 to 1999, women entering the U.S. workforce represented a nearly 8 percentage point increase in the overall LFPR. The U.S. overall LFPR (age 16+) has been falling since its all-time high point of 67.3% reached in January–April 2000, reaching 62.7% by January 2018. This decline since 2000 is primarily driven by the retirement of the Baby Boom generation. Since the overall labor force is defined as those age 16+, an aging society with more persons past the typical prime working age (25-54) exerts a steady downward influence on the LFPR. The decline was forecast by economists and demographers going back into the 1990s, if not earlier. For example, during 1999 the BLS forecast that the overall LFPR would be 66.9% in 2015 and 63.2% in 2025. A 2006 forecast by Federal Reserve economists (i.e., before the Great Recession that began in December 2007) estimated the LFPR would be below 64% by 2016, close to the 62.7% average that year.

The labor force participation rate decreases when the percentage increase in the defined population (denominator) is greater than the percentage increase in the labor force (i.e., the sum of employed and unemployed, the numerator). With respect to the unemployment rate, if the percentage increase in the number of unemployed (numerator) is greater than the percentage increase in the number in the labor force (denominator), the unemployment rate will rise.

Prime working age rate
[[File:Work Force Participation Rate by Age Group.webp|thumb|300px|Work Force Participation Rate by Age Group

]] Economists also analyze the LFPR for those prime-aged workers, aged 25–54. Mathematically, this ratio is computed with a numerator (labor force age 25–54) and denominator (civilian population age 25–54). This can help remove the impact of aging demographics, to better understand trends among working-aged persons. The prime-aged LFPR peaked at 84.5% at three times between October 1997 and April 2000. Prior to the Great Recession, the rate was 83.3% in November 2007, then fell to a trough of 80.5% in July 2015, before steadily climbing back to 81.7% in January 2018. It is one of the few key labor market variables that had yet to recover its pre-crisis level as of January 2018 and is an indicator of slack in the labor market.

 * Men's prime-aged labor force participation has been falling consistently since at least the 1960s. It ranged between 93 and 95% during the 1980s, fell to around 90% during the 2000s and was 88.5% in October 2017. Higher labor force participation is correlated with higher educational attainment.
 * Women's prime-aged labor force participation rose consistently from at least the early 1960s, reaching a peak of 77.2% in August 1997. It has fluctuated around 75% since then, resisting the decline in men's prime age participation. Women have increased their educational attainment relative to men.

The Congressional Budget Office explained in 2018 higher educational attainment is correlated with higher labor force participation. Prime-aged men tend to be out of the labor force due to disability, while a key reason for women is caring for family members. To the extent an aging population requires the assistance of prime-aged family members at home, this also presents a downward pressure on this cohort's participation.

Teen labor force participation
In 1979, there had been the highest teen labor force participation rate with 57.9 percent of teens participating. In the early 21st century, there had been a drastic decrease in the teen labor force participation rate with the decrease expected to only decline more from 2017 to 2024.

The reason for the decrease in teen labor force participation was the environment teens were in, including pressures by their family. The environment pressured many to go to college, summer school became more prevalent, and schoolwork became more exhausting. The cost of college has risen over the years, but it has not persuaded teens not to go to college. There is a higher number of teens requesting assistance to attend college. There is an increased number of teens attending school and a decreased number of teens participating in the labor force.

Teens who do not want to attend college have competition from individuals that are more experienced such as individuals who have graduated from college with a degree, individuals that are adults, and individuals from other countries that move to the United States and try to obtain jobs. This has also contributed to the decrease in teen labor force participation.

According to a Pew Research Center analysis on monthly 1944-2017 Current Population Survey, Millennials aged more than 16 represented the largest generation in the U.S. labour force and the highest quote since the postwar, with more than 35% of participants working or looking for a work.

Participation during COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a massive drop in employees persons in the labor force. According to Pew Research Center, from February 2020 to February 2021 an estimated 4.2 million people left the labor force because of COVID-19, a loss of employment that far exceeds that seen during the Great Recession. Out of those that left the labor force, women accounted for 2.4 million, which is more than half of those that left despite the fact that they account for less than half of the labor force. Employers have cut 417,500 jobs so far in 2023, the most since 2020. Layoffs have been largely concentrated in the technology sector, which has seen 136,800 layoffs so far this year.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic transformed the American workplace, about 76.7 percent of employers reported little or no telecommuting among employees. The percentage of organizations reporting that some of their employees work from home was around 30% in 2021, but has dropped to 16% in 2022.

The Great Resignation
[[File:Jobs and quits rate.webp|thumb|300px|right|

]] The pandemic created a shift in the labor market where workers began voluntarily leaving their jobs in large numbers. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics states by July 2021 4 million workers had voluntarily separated from their employer. A number of factors were impacting the trend which started in early 2021. With the large shift to working from home, and the risks associated with returning to unsafe working conditions, lack of childcare, coupled with a labor market where one can leave a job and higher pay elsewhere, and overall employee burnout, employers were experiencing higher turnover rates with little evidence of slowdown. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, all industries in the U.S. labor market were impacted with highest numbers in hospitality and healthcare, while construction, mining, and oil/gas industries saw little to no impact.

A SHRM survey found that Millennials and Gen Z have a higher probably to look for new work than Baby Boomers and Gen X. The findings cite a desire to seek employment that will allow them to live a more balanced life, and having access to growth opportunities lacking in their current roles, for the workforce exodus of their respondents. These reasons are not isolated to the SHRM respondents, however. A shift in worker attitudes, overall priorities, and perception of their relationship with their jobs is a symptom of the pandemic, which forced many to drastically change the way they work and live. For example, some workers developed a quiet quitting mindset by deliberately limiting their work activities to formal job descriptions, meeting yet not exceeding the preestablished expectations, and never volunteering for additional tasks.

The shifting sentiment of workers during a time of instability, women's rate of exit were twice that of men, according to Texas A&M University Organizational Psychologist, Anthony Klotz, who also coined the term "The Great Resignation." As a result, their participation in the labor force is at a 30-year low.

Foreign-born workers
There were 27.8 million foreign-born workers in the labor force as of January 2018. This group had an overall LFPR of 65.1% in January 2018. As of 2013, the highest group of people participating in the Foreign-born immigrant labor force in the United States were individuals from Mexico and Central America. They made up of 40.3 percent of the immigrant labor force participation. Mexico heavily outweighed Central America in which they held the majority of workers with 32 percent of workers just from Mexico. In 2013, California held most of the foreign-born worker immigrants in the United States, with about half from Mexico and Central America.

Foreign-born women
People who stay in the United States but were not born in the U.S. is considered foreign-born. In most cases, they were born in different countries with parents who were not U.S. citizens. Hispanic makes up almost haft of foreign-born workers in the labor market. According to the News Release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, foreign-born added more than 670,000 in 2021. This number was unchanged for the native-born. Regarding gender, foreign-born men contributed to the market more than men native-born in 2021, with 76.8%, and women's foreign-born rate is lower than women native-born at 56.6%. Regarding median earnings, foreign-born workers tend to be paid less than native-born workers, with weekly payments of $898 and $1,017, respectively.

Since 1960, foreign-born immigrant women have the lowest labor market participation rate between all of the groups in the United States. The groups include immigrant men and individuals born in the United States. Foreign-born immigrant women participate in the labor force between 75 and 78 percent lower than native born males. In terms of labor force participation, the foreign-born immigrant women from Mexico and Central America are the smallest number of participants in the labor force. As far as foreign-born immigrants that are trying to participate in the labor force but cannot find employment, the unemployment rates are as follows. The unemployment are foreign-born immigrant women workers (9.1 percent), native women workers (7.9 percent), Mexico and Central American foreign-born immigrant women workers (12.1 percent), and other foreign-born immigrant women workers (7.7 percent).

Foreign-born men
In terms of labor force participation, the foreign-born immigrant men from Mexico and Central America are the largest number of participants in the labor force. The number of potential labor force participants for foreign-born immigrant men are foreign-born immigrant men workers (9.9 percent), native men workers (10.4 percent), Mexico and Central American foreign-born immigrant men workers (11.4 percent), and other foreign-born immigrant men workers (8.6 percent). Foreign-born immigrant men have a similar unemployment rate to native workers, but the unemployment rate for foreign-born immigrant men that are from Mexico and Central America is considerably more than other groups of foreign-born immigrant men looking for work in the United States.

International comparison
For 2017, the Central Intelligence Agency ranked the U.S. as having the fourth largest labor force in the world at about 160 million, behind China (807 million), India (522 million), and the European Union (235 million).

By sector
Below is a chart taken from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is a list of job classifications and the annual growth rate in each category.

title: Labor force in the United States


text:
Battle of Solway Moss

The Battle of Solway Moss took place on Solway Moss near the River Esk on the English side of the Anglo-Scottish border in November 1542 between English and Scottish forces.

The Scottish King James V had refused to break from the Catholic Church, as urged by his uncle King Henry VIII, who then launched a major raid into south-west Scotland. The Scottish army that marched against them was poorly led and organised, and many Scots were either captured or drowned in the river. News of the defeat is believed to have hastened the early death of James V.

Background
When Henry VIII of England broke from the Roman Catholic Church, he asked James V of Scotland, his nephew, to do the same. James ignored his uncle's request and further insulted him by refusing to meet with Henry at York. Furious, Henry VIII sent troops against Scotland. In retaliation for the massive English raid into Scotland, James assigned Robert, Lord Maxwell, the Scottish Warden of West March, the task of raising an army.

James V wrote to the Pope Paul III on 9 November 1542 about the English raid, and explained that he defied Henry VIII's attempts to convert him to the Protestant faith by waging war with his vast resources gained from the dissolution of the monasteries. The Earl of Angus wrote that Cardinal Beaton and the Earl of Moray had intended to follow the Scottish army into England at the East March and serve a Papal interdict in English churches.

Battle
On 24 November 1542, an army of 15,000–18,000 Scots advanced into England. Lord Maxwell, though never officially designated commander of the force, declared he would lead the attack in person. A report of George Douglas of Pittendreich, who was not present, and some later chronicle accounts, say that in the absence of Maxwell, Oliver Sinclair, James V's favourite, declared himself to be James's chosen commander. According to this account of the battle, the other commanders refused to accept his command and the command structure disintegrated. The English commanders Lord Wharton and Sir William Musgrave made reports of the battle. William Musgrave reported that Maxwell was still in charge and fought with the rest of the Scottish nobles, who were forced to dismount on the bank of the River Esk.

The Scots' advance into England was met near Solway Moss by Lord Wharton and his 3,000 men. The battle was uncoordinated and may be described as a rout. Sir Thomas Wharton described the battle as the overthrow of the Scots between the rivers Esk and Lyne. The Scots, after the first encounter of a cavalry chase at "Akeshawsill", now Oakshawhill, moved "down" towards Arthuret Howes. They found themselves penned in south of the Esk, on English territory between the river and the Moss (a peat bog), and after intense fighting surrendered themselves and their 10 field guns to the English cavalry. Wharton said the Scots were halted at the Sandy Ford by Arthuret mill dam. The Scots were 'beguiled by their own guiding', according to one Scottish writer. Several hundred of the Scots may have drowned in the marshes and river.

James, who was not present at the battle (he had remained at Lochmaben), withdrew to Falkland Palace humiliated and ill with fever. The news that his wife had given birth to a daughter instead of a son further crushed his will to live, and he is reported to have stated that the House of Stewart "came with a lass and will go with a lass". He died at Falkland two weeks later at the age of thirty. According to George Douglas, in his delirium he lamented the capture of his banner and Oliver Sinclair at Solway Moss more than his other losses.

Aftermath
Gervase Phillips has estimated that only about seven Englishmen and 20 Scots were killed but 1,200 Scottish prisoners were taken, including Sinclair, the Earls of Cassilis, Glencairn, and Maxwell. Prisoners taken to England included Lord Gray, and Stewart of Rosyth. A number of captured Scottish earls, lords, and lairds were released; they sent hostages, called "pledges" into England in their place. On 14 December 1542, Thomas Wharton's report of the battle was read to Privy Council, and they ordered that Scottish prisoners entering London should wear a red St Andrew's cross. Among the captured guns were four falconets with the cast cipher of 'JRS' for 'Jacobus Rex Scotorum' and the Scottish royal arms with an imperial crown.

Eustace Chapuys reported that the Scottish prisoners attended Henry's court on Christmas Day wearing swords and dirks. They were able to talk to the French ambassador and Henry gave them each a present of a gold chain. These hostages and prisoners were mostly well treated in England, as it was hoped that when they returned to Scotland after their ransoms were paid, they would further the English cause. Some of the high-ranking prisoners taken at the battle were exchanged for their 'pledges' at Carlisle on 10 January 1543. Chapuys said the return of some prisoners was prevented at this time by the Scottish government which claimed they were traitors for losing the battle, or suspected they were now being influenced by Henry. As their families were arrested, these prisoners could not provide their pledges and stayed on the border at Berwick-upon-Tweed.

However, a modern historian Marcus Merriman sees the battle and hostage-taking more as the culmination of James V's war rather than the beginning of Henry VIII's War of Rough Wooing (also known as the Nine Years' War). He notes that the capture of so many Scottish nobles at the time of the birth and accession of Mary, Queen of Scots did not affect Henry's policy or the Scottish lords' subsequent rejection of the Treaty of Greenwich in December 1543.

Schedules of prisoners, keepers, and pledges
The chief Scottish prisoners were taken to Newcastle upon Tyne, and were listed with their English keepers at that time in a schedule prepared by Sir Thomas Wharton; below the keepers of their substitute 'pledges' or hostages are added from a list compiled later in 1543 amongst the papers of the Earl of Shrewsbury.

 * James Douglas of Drumlanrig; keeper, the Master Customar of Carlisle.
 * John Maxwell of Cohill; keeper, William Sandes; pledge, Archibald Maxwell, his brother, a child, in Yorkshire.
 * James Sinclair; keeper Alexander Musgrave; pledge, as for Oliver Sinclair.
 * John Charteris; keeper, William Porter
 * Robert Charteris; keeper, John Wharton
 * John Maxwell, brother of Lord Maxwell; pledge, his nephew Hugh Maxwell in Yorkshire.
 * Patrick Hepburn; keeper Lionel Carnaby
 * Walter Ker, laird of Graddon; keeper Thomas Denton; his pledge with Sir William Gascoigne, senior.
 * George Hume, laird of Ayton; keeper Thomas Warcup
 * Laird of Awncastell (John Maitland, laird of 'Awik Castle', Annan); keeper Simon Musgrave; pledge, his brother with Thomas Wentworth.
 * William, Earl of Menteith; keeper Lancelot Lancaster.
 * Robert Erskine, son of Lord Erskine; keeper Edward Aglionby.
 * Patrick, Lord Gray; keeper Walter Strickland; pledges with the Archbishop of York.
 * Laurence, Lord Oliphant: keeper Sir John Lowther; pledges with the Bishop of Durham.
 * Oliver Sinclair: keeper Sir John Lowther: pledge, son of the Laird of Cleisburn
 * Hugh, Lord Somerville; keeper Sir Thomas Curwen
 * Malcolm, Lord Fleming; keeper Sir William Musgrave. Deceased when the Talbot-Shrewsbury papers list was compiled.
 * Gilbert Kennedy, Earl of Cassilis; keeper Sir Thomas Wharton: pledge with Archbishop of Canterbury.
 * Lord Maxwell; keeper Sir Thomas Wharton; remained at Carlisle in person.
 * William Cuninghame, 4th Earl Glencairn, keeper Duke of Norfolk

In March 1544, as the War of Rough Wooing or Nine Years' War commenced in earnest, Henry VIII sent his Richmond Herald, Gilbert Dethick, to the Privy Council of Scotland at Stirling Castle to demand the return to England of a number of these high-ranking prisoners who had been allowed home on licence. These were: the Earls of Cassilis and Glencairn, Lords Somerville, Maxwell, Gray, Oliphant, and Fleming, with Oliver Sinclair, George Hume of Ayton, Robert Master of Erskine, William Seton, Patrick Hepburn, James Pringle, James Sinclair, Alexander Sinclair, John Maitland of Awencastle, Henry Maxwell brother of lord Maxwell, John Ross of Craigie, the laird of Moncrieff, John Leslie younger son of the earl of Rothes, and John Carmichael. If the council did not organise their return, Henry threatened revenge on their pledges in England, and penalties on future captives.

Commemoration
The battlefield is registered by English Heritage, and currently under research to be inventoried and protected by Historic Scotland under the Scottish Historical Environment Policy of 2009.

title: Battle of Solway Moss


text:
Talk:List of tallest buildings in the United States

Cutoff
Should we leave the cutoff at 800 ft or decrease it to 700?192.231.40.122 (talk) 18:15, 29 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Why would we decrease it? NYC list is at 650ft/200m, so 700 for the entire country seems too low, even 750/230 is not really that tall when the entire country is considered. 81.177.27.61 (talk) 12:40, 4 October 2021 (UTC)
 * I would also be in favor of a 700 ft cutoff in the name of inclusivity. Sfoske70 (talk) 06:07, 21 December 2023 (UTC)
 * The cutoff actually was 700 feet on an older version of this article. It was changed to 800 feet in a revision dated 12 May 2021 by an unregistered user and the new cutoff seems to have stuck. Personally I'm in favor of this list being more inclusive than exclusive. There are not that many buildings between 700 and 800 feet, so the list wouldn't have to be too much longer. Freehuggs21 (talk) 05:37, 7 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Weakly oppose, maybe 750 ft could be justified, but 700 ft is no longer tall enough to be significant in terms of height when talking about skyscrapers in the United States. 71.62.176.24 (talk) 19:48, 1 February 2024 (UTC)

Measurement unit ordering inconsistency
In the height column, some entries display meters first, with feet in parentheses, while others are the opposite, displaying feet first, with meters in parentheses. Is there a reason for this inconsistency, or should it be resolved? (probably to feet first since this is a non-scientific US-centric article, per MOS:UNITS) P 1 (talk / contributions) 14:24, 3 July 2023 (UTC)

 * Yes feet should be consistently used first, there may be a script that changes the templates to be uniform quickly, 71.62.176.24 (talk) 19:41, 1 February 2024 (UTC)

Missing Brooklyn tower
Should be around #12 2600:1017:B8C2:5D9C:AC29:84F9:5CA1:325D (talk) 20:18, 17 November 2023 (UTC)

 * It is there, currently at 18th and should fall further soon. 71.62.176.24 (talk) 19:42, 1 February 2024 (UTC)

Eh?
So, One wtc 2013-present keeps pinnacle height but empire state doesnt? 2607:FEA8:FDC0:8179:60D1:9A25:F2A1:FB3A (talk) 22:25, 7 January 2024 (UTC)

 * You are getting pinnacle and architectural height confused. The architectural height of the ESB is 1,250 ft, and for 1WTC is 1,776 ft. Presently, as of 2024, pinnacle height for the ESB is 1,454 ft, and for 1WTC is 1,792 ft. Pinnacle height includes antennas and other elements that can be swapped or added/removed. The ESB's antenna has been previously swapped out as prior to 1985 it was instead 1,472 ft to its pinnacle. Whereas architectural height includes permanent elements of the skyscraper only. In short only architectural height is used, and the permanent spires of the BOA Tower and 1WTC are just a larger percentage of their height. Previously roof-height was sometimes used instead to avoid this confusion, however skyscrapers, such as he Burj Khalifa, have no clear delineation as to where the roof ends and the spire begins, and so that has largely fallen out of favor. Height to highest usable floor is still in widespread use however. 71.62.176.24 (talk) 19:33, 1 February 2024 (UTC)

Cities with the most skyscrapers
This quite deliberately uses 500 ft as the cutoff as MOS:NUM directs the primary use of United States customary units here. There may be a case for raising the value to 600 ft, or even 800 ft to match the main table, but changing to 492 ft is a poor decision, especially as the purpose appears to be that of getting certain cities higher on the list.

Another thing to be mindful of is that it is necessary when changing a columns value to update all entries in the column, not just those of one preferred entry. In this case many of those swings would be quite large, and the result of simply relabeling was to degrade the accuracy of the material. 2603:7000:8B00:2B01:595F:7721:364E:D509 (talk) 14:36, 10 June 2024 (UTC)

 * You’re breaking rules here. In the U.S we go off https://www.ctbuh.org/ rankings and what they classify as a skyscraper, since they make up the rules in the skyscraper world. 150 Meters translates to 492 feet, so it’s not “getting cities higher” on a list. It’s just factually correct. The misinformation on your page isn’t only about San Francisco. Austin is also incorrect. I will continue to keep changing it to the CORRECT ranking. Which is 492 feet not 500, and I will make sure to spread the word via social media for you guys to take accountability for speeding false information and falsifying records for possible self satisfaction on your own city to have a higher ranking. This has never been an issue and must be addressed correctly. 2603:9008:1200:27F9:9DDE:E197:D561:FDC1 (talk) 17:06, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Thank you for finally engaging on this page.
 * First things first, assuming you are not a vandal, robo-reverts to any changes that are not your own have caused the table to be factually inaccurate when you try to use 492. As just one example, you would need to allow New York to move from 302 to 317. Many others would also have to be adjusted accordingly.
 * Secondly Wikipedia does not go off of any one definition. Indeed there is no single definition for a skyscrpaper, Emporis for example used 100 meters. It is true that the CTBUH values are widely repeated in reference, but that does not make them the only standard. As just one example List of tallest buildings in San Francisco does not use it.
 * Ultimately these cutoffs are set by page consensus, and actually this page mostly uses 800 ft. Now it could be 555 ft or 553 ft. And in the end there is nothing that prevents column seperations of 108 ft starting at 461 ft or 143 ft starting at 339 ft but you do need to gain consensus for that change, bearing in mind MOS:NUM. But the page was accurate in its ranking of cities by number of buildings over 500 ft until you started to mess around with it and robo-revert anyone who wasn't you. 2603:7000:8B00:2B01:E4A8:4D80:60D7:D855 (talk) 17:40, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
 * And now I feel silly for trying to WP:AGF, but yeah the number for NYC at 492 would be 316 or 317, depending on the precise definition of complete, but now you tried to change it to 348. I know you think this kind of subtle trolling makes you clever, but it doesn't. 2603:7000:8B00:2B01:E4A8:4D80:60D7:D855 (talk) 17:46, 11 June 2024 (UTC)