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Sectarianism

Sectarianism is a debated concept. Some scholars and journalists define it as pre-existing fixed communal categories in society, and use it to explain political, cultural, or religious conflicts between groups. Others conceive of sectarianism as a set of social practices where daily life is organised on the basis of communal norms and rules that individuals strategically use and transcend. This definition highlights the co-constitutive aspect of sectarianism and people's agency, as opposed to understanding sectarianism as being fixed and incompatible communal boundaries.

While sectarianism is often labelled as 'religious' and/or 'political', the reality of a sectarian situation is usually much more complex. In its most basic form, sectarianism has been defined as, 'the existence, within a locality, of two or more divided and actively competing communal identities, resulting in a strong sense of dualism which unremittingly transcends commonality, and is both culturally and physically manifest.'

Definition
The term "sectarianism" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion". The phrase "sectarian conflict" usually refers to violent conflict along religious or political lines, such as the conflicts between Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland (religious and class-divisions may play major roles as well). It may also refer to general philosophical, political disparity between different schools of thought, such as that between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Non-sectarians see free association and tolerance of different beliefs as the cornerstones to successful, peaceful human interaction. They adopt political and religious pluralism.

Polemics against the term "sectarianism"
Some scholars identify the problems with using the term "sectarianism" in articles. Western mainstream media and politicians often presume "sectarianism" as ancient and long-lasting. For example, Obama in his final State of the Union address phrased the sectarian violence in the Middle East as "rooted in conflicts that dated back millennia", but many pointed out that some sectarian tensions don't even date back a decade. "Sectarianism" is also too ambiguous, which makes it a slogan whose meanings are up to the observers. Scholars argued that the use of term "sectarianism" has become a catch-all explanation to conflicts, which drives analytical attention away from underlying political and socioeconomic issues, lacks coherence, and is often associated with emotional negativity. Many scholars find the term "sectarianism" problematic, and therefore three alternatives are proposed.

Alternative: Sectarianization
Hashemi and Postel and other scholars differentiate between "sectarianism" and "sectarianization". While "sectarianism" describes antipathy, prejudice, and discrimination between subdivisions within a group, e.g. based on their religious or ethnic identity, the latter describes a process mobilized by political actors operating within authoritarian contexts to pursue their political goals that involve popular mobilization around religious or identity markers. The use of the word sectarianism to explain sectarian violence and its upsurge in i.e. the Middle East is insufficient, as it does not take into account complex political realities. In the past and present, religious identities have been politicized and mobilized by state actors inside and outside of the Middle East in pursuit of political gain and power. The term sectarianization conceptualizes this notion. Sectarianization is an active, multi-layered process and a set of practices, not a static condition, that is set in motion and shaped by political actors pursuing political goals. The sectarianization thesis focuses on the intersection of politics and sectarian identity from a top-down state-centric perspective. While religious identity is salient in the Middle East and has contributed to and intensified conflicts across the region, it is the politicization and mobilization of popular sentiments around certain identity markers ("sectarianization") that explains the extent and upsurge of sectarian violence in the Middle East. The Ottoman Tanzimat, European colonialism and authoritarianism are key in the process of sectarianization in the Middle East.

Alternative: Sectarian as a prefix
Haddad argues "sectarianism" cannot capture sectarian relations in reality nor represent the complex expressions of sectarian identities. Haddad calls for an abandonment of -ism in "sectarianism" in scholarly research as it "has overshadowed the root" and direct use of 'sectarian' as a qualifier to "direct our analytical focus towards understanding sectarian identity". Sectarian identity is "simultaneously formulated along four overlapping, interconnected and mutually informing dimensions: doctrinal, subnational, national, and transnational". The relevance of these factors is context-dependent and works on four layers in chorus. The multi-layered work provides more clarity and enables more accurate diagnoses of problems at certain dimensions to find more specific solutions.

Alternative: Sextarianism
In her book Sextarianism, Mikdashi emphasizes the relationship between sect, sex and sexuality. She argues that sectarianism cannot be studied in isolation, because the practice of sectarianism always goes hand in hand with the practice of sexism. For this reason she proposes the term "sextarianism". Sex, sexuality and sect together define citizenship, and, since the concept of citizenship is the basis of the modern nation-state, sextarianism therefore forms the basis for the legal bureaucratic systems of the state and thus for state power.

Intersectionality in Sectarianism
The analytical framework of intersectionality in examining sectarianism has gained increasing prominence in the study of this subject. Intersectionality highlights the nature of religious, ethnic, political, and social identities in contexts marked by sectarian tensions and conflicts. Acknowledging that individuals' experiences of sectarianism are shaped not only by their religious affiliation or other sectarian categories but also by other dimensions such as sex, class, and nationality among others, are essentially contributing to those experiences.

Religious Dimension
Intersectionality reveals that factors like sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status intersect with religious identity to shape individuals' experiences of sectarianism. Authors such as Maya Mikdashi introduced the concept of 'Sextarianism', particularly showing how the role of gender is crucially influencing the individual's experience of religious sectarian differences in political sectarian systems such as in Lebanon. In the case of Sectarianism in Lebanon, she highlights how Sextarian differences are decisive vectors in determining woman's experiences of power and sovereignty in a political sectarian system.

Political Dimension
In the political dimensions, the intersectional lens recognizes the intricate connections between political identities and other social categories. Political parties or other factions may exploit religious divisions for political gain, exacerbating sectarian tensions. Intersectionality helps to understand how for instance political affiliations intersect with factors such as socioeconomic status and regional background, providing insights into the motivation behind political mobilization and the dynamics of power in sectarian settings.

Implications for Communities
The intersectionality of sectarianism has profound implications for affected communities, particularly for individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups such as women, migrants, and marginalized ethnicities living under sectarian systems. The recognition of these intersecting forms of discrimination and marginalization is decisive for developing inclusive strategies to promote peace, tolerance, and increased social cohesion within diverse societies.

Sectarianism in the 21st century
Sectarian tendencies in politics are visible in countries and cities associated with sectarian violence in the present, and the past. Notable examples where sectarianism affects lives are street-art expression, urban planning, and sports club affiliation.

United Kingdom
Across the United Kingdom, Scottish and Irish sectarian tendencies are often reflected in team-sports competitions. Affiliations are regarded as a latent representation of sectarianism tendencies. (Since the early 1900s, cricket teams were established via patronage of sectarian affiliated landlords. In response to the Protestant representation of the sport, many Catholic schools founded their own Cricket schools. ) Modern day examples include tensions in sports such as football and have led to the passing of the "Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012". Other general examples include the Gaelic sports in Ireland, established to serve as a counterweight to British traditional sports to preserve an Irish identity.

Iran
World leaders have criticised the political ambitions of Iran and have condemned its involvement and support for opposition groups such as Hezbollah. The political authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran has extended into neighboring countries, and has led to an increase of tensions in the region.

An important figure in this process of expansion was the major general of Iran's Quds Force (the foreign arm of the IRGC), Qasem Soleimani. Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone in January 2020 leading to an increase of tension between the United States of America and Iran. Soleimani was responsible for strengthening Iran's ties with foreign powers such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria's al-Assad, and Shia militia groups in Iraq. Soleimani was seen as the number-one commander of Iran's foreign troops and played a crucial role in the spread of Iran's ideology in the region. According to President Donald Trump, Soleimani was the world's most wanted terrorist and had to be assassinated in order to bring more peace to the Middle-East region and the rest of the world. however this was shown to be incorrect as his murder had little effect on Iranian ambitions and only increased support for Iran as it was an illegal act under international law.

Authoritarian regimes
In recent years, authoritarian regimes have been particularly prone to sectarianization. This is because their key strategy of survival lies in manipulating sectarian identities to deflect demands for change and justice, and preserve and perpetuate their power. The sectarianization as a theory and process that extended beyond the middle east was introduced by Saleena Saleem (see and ). Christian communities, and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East, have been socially, economically and politically excluded and harmed primarily by regimes that focus on "securing power and manipulating their base by appeals to Arab nationalism and/or to Islam". An example of this is the Middle Eastern regional response to the Iranian revolution of 1979. Middle Eastern dictatorships backed by the United States, especially Saudi Arabia, feared that the spread of the revolutionary spirit and ideology would affect their power and dominance in the region. Therefore, efforts were made to undermine the Iranian revolution by labeling it as a Shi’a conspiracy to corrupt the Sunni Islamic tradition. This was followed by a rise of anti-Shi’a sentiments across the region and a deterioration of Shi'a-Sunni relations, impelled by funds from the Gulf states. Therefore, the process of sectarianization, the mobilization and politicization of sectarian identities, is a political tool for authoritarian regimes to perpetuate their power and justify violence. Western powers indirectly take part in the process of sectarianization by supporting undemocratic regimes in the Middle East. As Nader Hashemi asserts:"The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the support of various Western governments for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which commits war crime upon war crime in Yemen and disseminates poisonous sectarian propaganda throughout the Sunni world; not to mention longstanding Western support for highly repressive dictators who manipulate sectarian fears and anxieties as a strategy of control and regime survival – the 'ancient hatreds' narrative [between Sunnis and Shi’as] washes this all away and lays the blame for the regionʹs problems on supposedly trans-historical religious passions. Itʹs absurd in the extreme and an exercise in bad faith."

Approaches to Study Sectarian Identities in authoritarian regimes
Scholars have adopted three approaches to study sectarian discourses: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. Primordialism sees sectarian identity as rotted in biology and ingrained in history and culture. Makdisi describes the process of bringing the sectarian discourses back to early Islamic history as "pervasive medievalization". The centuries-old narrative is problematic as it treats sectarian identities in the Middle East as sui generis instead of modern collective identities. Scholars should be cautious of sectarian essentialism and Middle East exceptionalism the primordial narrative reinforces since primordialism suggests sectarian tensions persist while theological differences do not guarantee conflicts. Instrumentalism emphasizes that ruling elites manipulate identities to create violent conflicts for their interests. Instrumentalists see the Sunni-Shi'a divide as a modern invention and challenge the myths of primordial narratives since sectarian harmony have existed for centuries. Constructivism is in the middle ground of primordialism and instrumentalism.

Religious sectarianism
Wherever people of different religions live in close proximity to each other, religious sectarianism can often be found in varying forms and degrees. In some areas, religious sectarians (for example Protestant and Catholic Christians) exist peacefully side by side for the most part, although these differences have resulted in violence, death, and outright warfare as recently as the 1990s. Probably the best-known example in recent times were The Troubles.

Catholic-Protestant sectarianism has also been a factor in U.S. presidential campaigns. Prior to John F. Kennedy, only one Catholic (Al Smith) had ever been a major party presidential nominee, and he had been solidly defeated largely because of claims based on his Catholicism. JFK chose to tackle the sectarian issue head-on during the West Virginia primary, but that only sufficed to win him barely enough Protestant votes to eventually win the presidency by one of the narrowest margins ever.

Within Islam, there has been dilemmas at various periods between Sunnis and Shias; Shias consider Sunnis to be false, due to their refusal to accept the first caliph as Ali and accept all following descendants of him as infallible and divinely guided. Many Sunni religious leaders, including those inspired by Wahhabism and other ideologies have declared Shias to be heretics or apostates.

Europe
Long before the Reformation, dating back to the 12th century, there has been sectarian conflict of varying intensity in Ireland. Historically, some Catholic countries once persecuted Protestants as heretics. For example, the substantial Protestant population of France (the Huguenots) were expelled from the kingdom in the 1680s following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In Spain, the Inquisition sought to root out crypto-Jews and crypto-Muslims (Moriscos); elsewhere the Papal Inquisition held similar goals.

In some countries where the Reformation was successful, there was persecution of Roman Catholics. This was motivated by the perception that Catholics retained allegiance to a 'foreign' power (the papacy or the Vatican), causing them to be regarded with suspicion. Sometimes this mistrust manifested itself in Catholics being subjected to restrictions and discrimination, which itself led to further conflict. For example, before Catholic Emancipation was introduced with the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, Catholics were forbidden from voting, becoming MP's or buying land in Ireland.

Ireland
Protestant-Catholic sectarianism is prominent in Irish history; during the period of English (and later British) rule, Protestant settlers from Britain were "planted" in Ireland, which along with the Protestant Reformation led to increasing sectarian tensions between Irish Catholics and British Protestants. These tensions eventually boiled over into widespread violence during the Irish Rebellion of 1641. At the end of that war the lands of Catholics were confiscated with over ten million acres granted to new English owners under the Act for the Settlement of Ireland 1652. The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland (1649–1653) saw a series of massacres perpetrated by the Protestant New Model Army against Catholic English royalists and Irish civilians. Sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants continued in the Kingdom of Ireland, with the Irish Rebellion of 1798 against British rule leading to more sectarian violence in the island, most infamously the Scullabogue Barn massacre, in which Protestants were burned alive in County Wexford. The British response to the rebellion which included the public executions of dozens of suspected rebels in Dunlavin and Carnew, also inflamed sectarian sentiments.

Northern Ireland
After the Partition of Ireland in 1922, Northern Ireland witnessed decades of intensified conflict, tension, and sporadic violence (see The Troubles (1920–1922) and The Troubles) between the dominant Protestant majority and the Catholic minority. In 1969 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed to support civil rights and end discrimination (based on religion) in voting rights (see Gerrymandering), housing allocation and employment. Also in 1969, 25 years of violence erupted, becoming what is known as “The Troubles” between Irish Republicans whose goal is a United Ireland and Ulster loyalists who wish for Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom. The conflict was primarily fought over the existence of the Northern Irish state rather than religion, though sectarian relations within Northern Ireland fueled the conflict. However, religion is commonly used as a marker to differentiate the two sides of the community. The Catholic minority primarily favour the nationalist, and to some degree, republican, goal of unity with the Republic of Ireland, while the Protestant majority favour Northern Ireland continuing the union with Great Britain.

England
In June 1780 a series of riots (see the Gordon Riots) occurred in London motivated by anti-Catholic sentiment. These riots were described as being the most destructive in the history of London and resulted in approximately 300-700 deaths. A long history of politically and religious motivated sectarian violence already existed in Ireland (see Irish Rebellions). The sectarian divisions related to the "Irish question" influenced local constituent politics in England.

Liverpool is an English city sometimes associated with sectarian politics. Halfway through the 19th century, Liverpool faced a wave of mass-immigration from Irish Catholics as a consequence of the Great Famine in Ireland. Most of the Irish-Catholic immigrants were unskilled workers and aligned themselves with the Labour party. The Labour-Catholic party saw a larger political electorate in the many Liverpool-Irish, and often ran on the slogan of "Home Rule" - the independence of Ireland, to gain the support of Irish voters. During the first half of the 20th century, Liverpool politics were divided not only between Catholics and Protestants, but between two polarized groups consisting of multiple identities: Catholic-Liberal-Labour and Protestant-Conservative-Tory/Orangeists.

From early 1900 onwards, the polarized Catholic Labour and Protestant Conservative affiliations gradually broke apart and created the opportunity for mixed alliances. The Irish National party gained its first electoral victory in 1875, and kept growing until the realization of Irish independence in 1921, after which it became less reliant on Labour support. On the Protestant side, Tory opposition in 1902 to vote in line with Protestant proposed bills indicated a split between the working class Protestants and the Tory party, which were regarded as "too distant" from its electorate.

After the First and Second World War, religiously mixed battalions provided a counterweight to anti-Roman Catholic and anti-Protestant propaganda from either side. While the IRA-bombing in 1939 (see S-Plan) somewhat increased violence between the Irish-Catholic associated Labour party and the Conservative Protestants, the German May Blitz destroyed property of more than 40.000 households. Rebuilding Liverpool after the war created a new sense of community across religious lines. Inter-church relations increased as a response as well, as seen through the warming up of relations between Archbishop Worlock and Anglican Bishop David Sheppard after 1976, a symbol of decreasing religious hostility. The increase in education rates and the rise of trade and labour unions shifted religious affiliation to class affiliation further, which allowed Protestant and catholic affiliates under a Labour umbrella in politics. In the 1980s, class division had outgrown religious division, replacing religious sectarianism with class struggle. Growing rates of non-English immigration from other parts of the Commonwealth near the 21st century also provides new political lines of division in identity affiliation.

Northern Ireland has introduced a Private Day of Reflection, since 2007, to mark the transition to a post-[sectarian] conflict society, an initiative of the cross-community Healing Through Remembering organization and research project.

The Balkans
The civil wars in the Balkans which followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have been heavily tinged with sectarianism. Croats and Slovenes have traditionally been Catholic, Serbs and Macedonians Eastern Orthodox, and Bosniaks and most Albanians Muslim. Religious affiliation served as a marker of group identity in this conflict, despite relatively low rates of religious practice and belief among these various groups after decades of communism.

Africa
Over 1,000 Muslims and Christians were killed in the sectarian violence in the Central African Republic in 2013–2014. Nearly 1 million people, a quarter of the population, were displaced.

Australia
Sectarianism in Australia is a historical legacy from the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, between Catholics of mainly Celtic heritage and Protestants of mainly English descent. It has largely disappeared in the 21st century. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, religious tensions were more centered between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim nationalists, amid the backdrop of the War on Terror.

Japan
For the violent conflict between Buddhist sects in Japan, see Japanese Buddhism.

Pakistan
Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries the world, has seen serious Shia-Sunni sectarian violence. Almost 85-90% of Pakistan's Muslim population is Sunni, and another 10-15% are Shia. However, this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country, larger than the Shia majority in Iraq.

In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006. Among the culprits blamed for the killing are Al Qaeda working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shi'a apostates.

Sri Lanka
Most Muslims in Sri Lanka are Sunnis. There are a few Shia Muslims too from the relatively small trading community of Bohras. Divisiveness is not a new phenomenon to Beruwala. Sunni Muslims in the Kalutara district are split in two different sub groups. One group, known as the Alaviya sect, historically holds its annual feast at the Ketchimalai mosque located on the palm-fringed promontory adjoining the fisheries harbour in Beruwala.

It is a microcosm of the Muslim identity in many ways. The Galle Road that hugs the coast from Colombo veers inland just ahead of the town and forms the divide. On the left of the road lies China Fort, the area where some of the wealthiest among Sri Lankans Muslims live. The palatial houses with all modern conveniences could outdo if not equal those in the Colombo 7 sector. Most of the wealthy Muslims, gem dealers, even have a home in the capital, not to mention property.

Strict Wahabis believe that all those who do not practise their form of religion are heathens and enemies. There are others who say Wahabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to the Taliban as well as Osama bin Laden. What has caused concern in intelligence and security circles is the manifestation of this new phenomenon in Beruwala. It had earlier seen its emergence in the east.

Ottoman Empire
In 1511, a pro-Shia revolt known as Şahkulu Rebellion was brutally suppressed by the Ottomans: 40,000 were massacred on the order of the sultan.

Republican era (1923-)
Alevis were targeted in various massacres including 1978 Maraş massacre, 1980 Çorum massacre and 1993 Sivas massacre.

During his campaign for the 2023 Turkish presidential election, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was attacked with sectarian insults in Adıyaman.

Overview
Sectarianism in Iran has existed for centuries, dating back to the Islamic conquest of the country in early Islamic years and continuing throughout Iranian history until the present. During the Safavid dynasty's reign, sectarianism started to play an important role in shaping the path of the country. During the Safavid rule between 1501 and 1722, Shiism started to evolve and became established as the official state religion, leading to the creation of the first religiously legitimate government since the occultation of the Twelfth imam. This pattern of sectarianism prevailed throughout the Iranian history. The approach that sectarianism has taken after the Iranian 1979 revolution is shifted compared to the earlier periods. Never before the Iranian 1979 revolution did the Shiite leadership gain as much authority. Due to this change, the sectarian timeline in Iran can be divided in pre- and post-Iranian 1979 revolution where the religious leadership changed course.

Pre-1979 Revolution
Shiism has been an important factor in shaping the politics, culture and religion within Iran, long before the Iranian 1979 revolution. During the Safavid dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology. The establishment of Shiism as an official government ideology opened the doors for clergies to benefit from new cultural, political and religious rights which were denied prior to the Safavid ruling. During the Safavid dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology. The Safavid rule allowed greater freedom for religious leaders. By establishing Shiism as the state religion, they legitimised the religious authority. After this power establishment, religious leaders started to play a crucial role within the political system but remained socially and economically independent. The monarchial power balance during the Safavid ere changed every few years, resulting in a changing limit of power of the clergies. The tensions concerning power relations of the religious authorities and the ruling power eventually played a pivotal role in the 1906 constitutional revolution which limited the power of the monarch, and increased the power of religious leaders. The 1906 constitutional revolution involved both constitutionalist and anti-constitutionalist clergy leaders. Individuals such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va'iz were constitutionalist clergies whereas other clergies such as Mohammed Kazem Yazdi were considered anti-constitutionalist. The establishment of a Shiite government during the Safavid rule resulted in the increase of power within this religious sect. The religious power establishment increased throughout the years and resulted in fundamental changes within the Iranian society in the twentieth century, eventually leading to the establishment of the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

Post-1979 Revolution: Islamic Republic of Iran
The Iranian 1979 revolution led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of the Islamic Government of Iran. The governing body of Iran displays clear elements of sectarianism which are visible within different layers of its system. The 1979 revolution led to changes in political system, leading to the establishment of a bureaucratic clergy-regime which has created its own interpretation of the Shia sect in Iran. Religious differentiation is often used by authoritarian regimes to express hostility towards other groups such as ethnic minorities and political opponents. Authoritarian regimes can use religion as a weapon to create an  "us and them"  paradigm. This leads to hostility amongst the involved parties and takes place internally but also externally. A valid example is the suppression of religious minorities like the Sunnis and Baha-ís. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran sectarian discourses arose in the Middle-East as the Iranian religious regime has attempted and in some cases succeeded to spread its religious and political ideas in the region. These sectarian labeled issues are politically charged. The most notable Religious leaders in Iran are named Supreme-leaders. Their role has proved to be pivotal in the evolvement of sectarianism within the country and in the region. The following part discusses Iran's supreme-leadership in further detail.

Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's first supreme-leader, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the participation of all Iranians in the war. His usage of Shia martyrdom led to the creation of a national consensus. In the early aftermath of the Iranian 1979 revolution, Khomeini started to evolve a sectarian tone in his speeches. His focus on Shiism and Shia Islam grew which was also implemented within the changing policies of the country. In one of his speeches Khomeini quoted: "the Path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala." His phrase lead to many different interpretations, leading to turmoil in the region but also within the country. From a religious historic viewpoint, Karbala and Najaf which are both situated in Iraq, serve as important sites for Shia Muslims around the world. By mentioning these two cities, Khomeini led to the creation of Shia expansionism. Khomeini's war with the Iraqi Bath Regime had many underlying reasons and sectarianism can be considered one of the main reasons. The tensions between Iran and Iraq are of course not only sectarian related, but religion is often a weapon used by the Iranian regime to justify its actions. Khomeini's words also resonated in other Arab countries who had been fighting for Palestinian liberation against Israel. By naming Jerusalem, Khomeini expressed his desire for liberating Palestine from the hands of what he later often has named "the enemy of Islam." Iran has supported rebellious groups throughout the region. Its support for Hamas and Hezbollah has resulted in international condemnation. This desire for Shia expansionism did not disappear after Khomeini's death. It can even be argued that sectarian tone within the Islamic Republic of Iran has grown since then. The Friday prayers held in Tehran by Ali Khamenei can be seen as a proof of growing sectarian tone within the regime. Khamenei's speeches are extremely political and sectarian. He often mentions extreme wishes such as the removal of Israel from the world map and fatwas directed towards those opposing the regime.

Iraq
Sunni Iraqi insurgency and foreign Sunni terrorist organizations who came to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein have targeted Shia civilians in sectarian attacks. Following the civil war, the Sunnis have complained of discrimination by Iraq's Shia majority governments, which is bolstered by the news that Sunni detainees were allegedly discovered to have been tortured in a compound used by government forces on 15 November 2005. This sectarianism has fueled a giant level of emigration and internal displacement.

The Shia majority oppression by the Sunni minority has a long history in Iraq. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British government placed a Sunni Hashemite monarchy to the Iraqi throne which suppressed various uprisings against its rule by the Christian Assyrians and Shi'ites.

Syria
Although sectarianism has been described as one of the characteristic features of the Syrian civil war, the narrative of sectarianism already had its origins in Syria's past.

Ottoman rule
The hostilities that took place in 1850 in Aleppo and subsequently in 1860 in Damascus, had many causes and reflected long-standing tensions. However, scholars have claimed that the eruptions of violence can also be partly attributed to the modernizing reforms, the Tanzimat, taking place within the Ottoman Empire, who had been ruling Syria since 1516. The Tanzimat reforms attempted to bring about equality between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms, combined with European interference on behalf of the Ottoman Christians, caused the non-Muslims to gain privileges and influence.

In the silk trade business, European powers formed ties with local sects. They usually opted for a sect that adhered to a religion similar to the one in their home countries, thus not Muslims. These developments caused new social classes to emerge, consisting of mainly Christians, Druzes and Jews. These social classes stripped the previously existing Muslim classes of their privileges. The involvement of another foreign power, though this time non-European, also had its influence on communal relations in Syria. Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt ruled Syria between 1831 and 1840. His divide-and-rule strategy contributed to the hostilities between the Druze and Maronite community, by arming the Maronite Christians. However, it is noteworthy to mention that different sects did not fight the others out of religious motives, nor did Ibrahim Pasha aim to disrupt society among communal lines. This can also be illustrated by the unification of Druzes and Maronites in their revolts to oust Ibrahim Pasha in 1840. This shows the fluidity of communal alliances and animosities and the different, at times non-religious, reasons that may underline sectarianism.

After Ottoman rule
Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate in Syria, the Syrian territory had already witnessed massacres on the Maronite Christians, other Christians, Alawites, Shias and Ismailiyas, which had resulted in distrustful sentiments between the members of different sects. In an attempt to protect the minority communities against the majority Sunni population, France, with the command of Henri Gouraud, created five states for the following sects: Armenians, Alawites, Druzes, Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. This focus on minorities was new and part of a divide-and-rule strategy of the French, which enhanced and politicized differences between sects. The restructuring by the French caused the Alawite community to advance itself from their marginalized position. In addition to that, the Alawites were also able to obtain a position of power through granting top level positions to family members of the ruling clan or other tribal allies of the Alawite community.

During the period 1961–1980, Syria was not necessarily exclusively ruled by the Alawite sect, but due to efforts of the Sunni Muslim extremist opponents of the Ba’th regime in Syria, it was perceived as such. The Ba’ath regime was being dominated by the Alawite community, as well as were other institutions of power. As a result of this, the regime was considered to be sectarian, which caused the Alawite community to cluster together, as they feared for their position. This period is actually contradictory as Hafez al-Assad tried to create a Syrian Arab nationalism, but the regime was still regarded as sectarian and sectarian identities were reproduced and politicized.

Sectarian tensions that later gave rise to the Syrian civil war, had already appeared in society due to events preceding 1970. For example, President Hafez al-Assad's involvement in the Lebanese civil war by giving political aid to Maronite Christians in Lebanon. This was viewed by many Sunny Muslims as an act of treason, which made them link al-Assad's actions to his Alawite identity. The Muslim Brothers, a part of the Sunni Muslims, used those tensions towards the Alawites as a tool to boost their political agenda and plans. Several assassinations were carried out by the Muslim Brothers, mostly against Alawites, but also against some Sunni Muslims. The failed assassination attempt on President Hafez al-Assad is arguably the most well-known. Part of the animosity between the Alawites and the Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brothers is due to the secularization of Syria, which the later holds the Alawites in power to be responsible for.

Syrian Civil War
As of 2015, the majority of the Syrian population consisted of Sunni Muslims, namely two-thirds of the population, which can be found throughout the country. The Alawites are the second largest group, which make up around 10 percent of the population. This makes them a ruling minority. The Alawites were originally settled in the highlands of Northwest Syria, but since the twentieth century have spread to places like Latakia, Homs and Damascus. Other groups that can be found in Syria are Christians, among which the Maronite Christians, Druzes and Twelver Shias. Although sectarian identities played a role in the unfolding of events of the Syrian Civil War, the importance of tribal and kinship relationships should not be underestimated, as they can be used to obtain and maintain power and loyalty.

At the start of the protests against President Basher al-Assad in March 2011, there was no sectarian nature or approach involved. The opposition had national, inclusive goals and spoke in the name of a collective Syria, although the protesters being mainly Sunni Muslims. This changed after the protests and the following civil war began to be portrayed in sectarian terms by the regime, as a result of which people started to mobilize along ethnic lines. However, this does not mean that the conflict is solely or primarily a sectarian conflict, as there were also socio-economic factors at play. These socio-economic factors were mainly the result of Basher al-Assad's mismanaged economic restructuring. The conflict has therefore been described as being semi-sectarian, making sectarianism a factor at play in the civil war, but certainly does not stand alone in causing the war and has varied in importance throughout time and place.

In addition to local forces, the role of external actors in the conflict in general as well as the sectarian aspect of the conflict should not be overlooked. Although foreign regimes were first in support of the Free Syrian Army, they eventually ended up supporting sectarian militias with money and arms. However, it has to be said that their sectarian nature did not only attract these flows of support, but they also adopted a more sectarian and Islamic appearance in order to attract this support.

Introduction
In Yemen, there have been many clashes between Salafis and Shia Houthis. According to The Washington Post, "In today’s Middle East, activated sectarianism affects the political cost of alliances, making them easier between co-religionists. That helps explain why Sunni-majority states are lining up against Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah over Yemen."

Historically, divisions in Yemen along religious lines (sects) used to be less intense than those in Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. However, the situation has changed dramatically after the Houthi takeover in 2014. Most political forces in Yemen are primarily characterized by regional interests and not by religious sectarianism. Regional interests are, for example, the north's proximity to the Hejaz, the south's coast along the Indian Ocean trade route, and the southeast's oil and gas fields. Yemen's northern population consists for a substantial part of Zaydis, and its southern population predominantly of Shafi’is. Hadhramaut in Yemen's southeast has a distinct Sufi Ba’Alawi profile.

Ottoman era, 1849–1918
Sectarianism reached the region once known as Arabia Felix with the 1911 Treaty of Daan. It divided the Yemen Vilayet into an Ottoman controlled section and an Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section. The former dominated by Sunni Islam and the latter by Zaydi-Shia Islam, thus dividing the Yemen Vilayet along Islamic sectarian lines. Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din became the ruler of the Zaidi community within this Ottoman entity. Before the agreement, inter-communal battles between Shafi’is and Zaydis never occurred in the Yemen Vilayet. After the agreement, sectarian strife still did not surface between religious communities. Feuds between Yemenis were nonsectarian in nature, and Zaydis attacked Ottoman officials not because they were Sunnis.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the divide between Shafi’is and Zaydis changed with the establishment of the Kingdom of Yemen. Shafi’i scholars were compelled to accept the supreme authority of Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, and the army “institutionalized the supremacy of the Zaydi tribesman over the Shafi’is”.

Unification period, 1918–1990
Before the 1990 Yemeni unification, the region had never been united as one country. In order to create unity and overcome sectarianism, the myth of Qahtanite was used as a nationalist narrative. Although not all ethnic groups of Yemen fit in this narrative, such as the Al-Akhdam and the Teimanim. The latter established a Jewish kingdom in ancient Yemen, the only one ever created outside Palestine. A massacre of Christians, executed by the Jewish king Dhu Nuwas, eventually led to the fall of the Homerite Kingdom. In modern times, the establishment of the Jewish state resulted in the 1947 Aden riots, after which most Teimanim left the country during Operation Magic Carpet.

Conflicting geopolitical interests surfaced during the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970). Wahhabist Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies supported Muhammad al-Badr, the deposed Zaydi imam of the Kingdom of Yemen. His adversary, Abdullah al-Sallal, received support from Egypt and other Arab republics. Both international backings were not based on religious sectarian affiliation. In Yemen however, President Abdullah al-Sallal (a Zaydi) sidelined his vice-president Abdurrahman al-Baidani (a Shaffi'i) for not being a member of the Zaydi sect. Shaffi'i officials of North Yemen also lobbied for "the establishment of a separate Shaffi'i state in Lower Yemen" in this period.

Contemporary Sunni-Shia rivalry
According to Lisa Wedeen, the perceived sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shias in the Muslim world is not the same as Yemen's sectarian rivalry between Salafists and Houthis. Not all supporters of Houthi's Ansar Allah movement are Shia, and not all Zaydis are Houthis. Although most Houthis are followers of Shia's Zaydi branch, most Shias in the world are from the Twelver branch. Yemen is geographically not in proximity of the so-called Shia Crescent. To link Hezbollah and Iran, whose subjects are overwhelmingly Twelver Shias, organically with Houthis is exploited for political purposes. Saudi Arabia emphasized an alleged military support of Iran for the Houthis during Operation Scorched Earth. The slogan of the Houthi movement is 'Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews'. This is a trope of Iran and Hezbollah, so the Houthis seem to have no qualms about a perceived association with them.

Tribes and political movements
Tribal culture in the southern regions has virtually disappeared through policies of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. However, Yemen's northern part is still home to the powerful tribal confederations of Bakil and Hashid. These tribal confederations maintain their own institutions without state interference, such as prisons, courts, and armed forces. Unlike the Bakils, the Hashids adopted Salafist tenets, and during the Sa’dah War (2004–2015) sectarian tensions materialized. Yemen's Salafists attacked the Zaydi Mosque of Razih in Sa’dah and destroyed tombs of Zaydi imams across Yemen. In turn, Houthis attacked Yemen's main Salafist center of Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'I during the Siege of Dammaj. Houthis also attacked the Salafist Bin Salman Mosque and threatened various Teimanim families.

Members of Hashid's elite founded the Sunni Islamist party Al-Islah and, as a counterpart, Hizb al-Haqq was founded by Zaydis with the support of Bakil's elite. Violent non-state actors Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia and Daesh, particularly active in southern cities like Mukalla, fuel sectarian tendencies with their animosity towards Yemen's Isma'ilis, Zaydis, and others. An assassination attempt in 1995 on Hosni Mubarak, executed by Yemen's Islamists, damaged the country's international reputation. The war on terror further strengthened Salafist-jihadist groups impact on Yemen's politics. The 2000 USS Cole bombing resulted in US military operations on Yemen's soil. Collateral damage caused by cruise missiles, cluster bombs, and drone attacks, deployed by the United States, compromised Yemen's sovereignty.

Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign
Ali Abdullah Saleh is a Zaydi from the Hashid's Sanhan clan and founder of the nationalist party General People's Congress. During his decades long reign as head of state, he used Sa'dah's Salafist's ideological dissemination against Zaydi's Islamic revival advocacy. In addition, the Armed Forces of Yemen used Salafists as mercenaries to fight against Houthis. Though, Ali Abdullah Saleh also used Houthis as a political counterweight to Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood. Due to the Houthis persistent opposition to the central government, Upper Yemen was economically marginalized by the state. This policy of divide and rule executed by Ali Abdullah Saleh worsened Yemen's social cohesion and nourished sectarian persuasions within Yemen's society.

Following the Arab Spring and the Yemeni Revolution, Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down as president in 2012. Subsequently, a complex and violent power struggle broke out between three national alliances: (1) Ali Abdullah Saleh, his political party General People's Congress, and the Houthis; (2) Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, supported by the political party Al-Islah; (3) Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by the Joint Meeting Parties. According to Ibrahim Fraihat, “Yemen’s conflict has never been about sectarianism, as the Houthis were originally motivated by economic and political grievances. However, in 2014, the regional context substantially changed”. The Houthi takeover in 2014-2015 provoked a Saudi-led intervention, strengthening the sectarian dimension of the conflict. Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah heavily criticized the Saudi intervention, bolstering the regional Sunni-Shia geopolitical dynamic behind it.

Saudi Arabia
Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia is exemplified through the tensions with its Shi’ite population, who constitute up to 15% of the Saudi population. This includes the anti-Shi’ite policies and persecution of the Shi’ites by the Saudi government. According to Human Rights Watch, Shi’ites face marginalisation socially, politically, religiously, legally and economically, whilst facing discrimination in education and in the workplace. This history dates back to 1744, with the establishment of a coalition between the House of Saud and the Wahhabis, who equate Shi’ism with polytheism. Over the course of the twentieth century clashes and tensions unfolded between the Shi’ites and the Saudi regime, including the 1979 Qatif Uprising and the repercussions of the 1987 Makkah Incident. Though relations underwent a détente in the 1990s and the early 2000s, tensions rose again after the 2003 US-led election of Iraq (owing to a broader rise of Shi’ism in the region) and peaked during the Arab Spring. Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia has attracted widespread attention by Human Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, especially after the execution of Shi'ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, who was active in the 2011 domestic protests. Despite Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's reforms, Shi’ites continue to face discrimination today.

Lebanon
Sectarianism in Lebanon has been formalized and legalized within state and non-state institutions and is inscribed in its constitution. Lebanon recognizes 18 different sects, mainly within Muslim and Christian worlds. The foundations of sectarianism in Lebanon date back to the mid-19th century during Ottoman rule. It was subsequently reinforced with the creation of the Republic of Lebanon in 1920 and its 1926 constitution and in the National Pact of 1943. In 1990, with the Taif Agreement, the constitution was revised but did not structurally change aspects relating to political sectarianism. The dynamic nature of sectarianism in Lebanon has prompted some historians and authors to refer to it as "the sectarian state par excellence" because it is a mixture of religious communities and their myriad sub-divisions, with a constitutional and political order to match. Yet, the reality on the ground has been more complex than such a conclusion, because as Nadya Sbaiti has shown in her research, in the aftermath of the First World War, the “need of shaping a collective future that paralleled shifting conceptions of the newly territorialized nation-state of Lebanon” was clearly present. “Over the course of the Mandate, educational practitioners and the wide range of schools that proliferated helped shape the epistemological infrastructure en route to creating this entity. By ‘epistemological infrastructure’, one means the cast array of ideas that become validated as truths and convincing explanations.” In other words, contrary to the colonial sectarian education system, “students, parents, and teachers created educational content through curricula, and educational practices so as to produce new ‘communities of knowledge’. These communities of knowledge, connected as they were by worlds of ideas and networks of knowledge, often transcended confessional, sociopolitical, and even at times regional subjectivities.”

title: Sectarianism


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List of post-confederation New Brunswick general elections

This article provides a summary of results for the general elections to the Canadian province of New Brunswick's unicameral legislative body, the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick. Prior to 1892, New Brunswick had a bicameral legislature, but its Upper House – the Legislative Council – was not elected. The number of seats has varied over time – from 41 at the time of Canadian Confederation, to a high of fifty-eight from 1967 through 1991, to the level of 55 since the 1995 election. Changing again in 2013 to 49 seats at which it remains today.

Beginning with the 37th New Brunswick general election in 2010, elections in New Brunswick are – in general – held on fixed dates on the fourth Monday of September every four years. The date may be varied by one week earlier or later in cases of the fourth Monday of September being a date of cultural or religious significance and may be varied one month earlier or later in cases of a federal election being held during the same period. The Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick also has the power to call an election on another date in the event of a loss of confidence in the legislature.

The chart on the upper right shows the information graphically, with the most recent elections towards the right. It shows that New Brunswick has effectively a two-party system – the Liberals (red) and the Conservatives (blue); along with the one-off success of the Confederation of Regions party (green) in 1991. It also shows the Liberal party's clean sweep of seats in 1987, one of the few instances in history when a party won all the seats in a national or sub-national legislature. Since provincial parties were officially recognised, the Liberal party have won eleven out of twenty elections.

This article only covers elections since the province became part of the Canadian Confederation in 1867. Prior to becoming part of Canada, New Brunswick was a British colony; and the New Brunswick House of Assembly was first formed in 1784 – when New Brunswick separated from Nova Scotia.

1866–1934
New Brunswick joined the Canadian confederation in 1867. Between 1917 and 1935, party lines had developed, but were not recognized by electoral law. Before this, only "Government" and "Opposition" were used. The results are listed below.

1935–present
Between 1935 and 1974, some ridings were multi member seats – i.e., more than one Member of the Legislative Assembly was elected from certain ridings. Political parties were officially recognized and registered beginning in 1935. Since 1974, each riding (electoral district) has elected only one member to the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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BRD (Germany)

BRD ( B undes r epublik D eutschland ; English: FRG/Federal Republic of Germany) is an unofficial abbreviation for the Federal Republic of Germany, informally known in English as West Germany until 1990, and just Germany since reunification. It was occasionally used in the Federal Republic itself during the early Cold War; it was commonly used between 1968 and 1990 by the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), resulting in a strong deprecation of its use in West Germany. The East German regime had previously used the term "German Federal Republic" (Deutsche Bundesrepublik), which it abbreviated as "DBR", to refer to West Germany. The most widely used abbreviation for West Germany in the country itself was its ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code "DE", which has remained the country code of reunified Germany.

While the English equivalent FRG was used as an IOC country code and a FIFA trigramme, the use of BRD was strongly discouraged by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany itself from the 1970s, because it was considered to be a derogatory communist term following its widespread use in East Germany since 1968; thus the term was regarded as a possible expression of an extremist, anti-constitutional and anti-democratic sentiment by West German authorities. The term was not banned by law, but its use was discouraged or forbidden in schools in West Germany from the 1970s, and treated as an error. As a result of its use by East Germany and the war on the abbreviation by the West German government, far-left terrorists such as the Red Army Faction tended to use the term as a way to attack West Germany; additionally the term "BRD" has been used by some far-right groups for the same purpose. After German reunification, the country is usually referred to simply as Germany (Deutschland), and hence the need for abbreviations is greatly diminished; if an abbreviation is used at all, the uncontroversial standard abbreviation "DE" for "Deutschland" is often used. However, since the end of the Cold War the term "BRD" has lost some of its potency as an insult intended to attack the Federal Republic of Germany, as it was used by East Germany and far-left terrorists such as the Red Army Faction, and the term "BRD" has been listed in the German dictionary Duden as an "unofficial abbreviation" for the Federal Republic of Germany since the 1990s, and is occasionally used by national newspapers across the political spectrum.

Background
The official name was and is Bundesrepublik Deutschland ("Federal Republic of Germany"). The name, even though in the beginning referring only to the republic established in the Trizone, was to reflect a name for all of Germany, therefore it was particularly to include the term Deutschland ("Germany"). This corresponded to the spirit of the then West German constitution, the Basic Law, allowing all states or Länder, then under Allied control, to join the new Federal Republic. In 1949 the original eleven states in the Trizone and West Berlin did so. However the latter was prevented by Allied objection on account of the city being a quadripartite allied occupation area. The Saarland joined with effect from 1 January 1957, while the "new states" of the East did so with effect from 3 October 1990, including reunited Berlin.

Therefore, the term Germany had an importance as part of the official name, which is reflected in the naming conventions which developed in the Cold War. Starting in June 1949 the abbreviation was sometimes used in the Federal Republic of Germany without any special connotations. The initialism BRD began to enter into such regular usage in West German scientific and ministerial circles, that it was added to the western edition of the German language dictionary Duden in 1967. The German Democratic Republic at first used the name Westdeutschland or "West Germany" (abbreviated "WD") for the Federal Republic of Germany, but since the 1950s the East German government insisted on calling West Germany Deutsche Bundesrepublik or "German Federal Republic" (abbreviated "DBR"), because they also considered East Germany part of Germany, and thus would not permit the West German government to use the name "Germany".

Use in East Germany
This changed in 1968 with the new constitution of the German Democratic Republic. The communists no longer strove for German reunification, and the name BRD was introduced as a propaganda counter-term to the term DDR, trying to express the equality of the states. The West would speak of the sogenannte DDR or "so-called 'DDR'" when intending to belittle East German statehood.

At that time, the initialism BRD had been adopted by Neues Deutschland, the ruling Socialist Unity Party's daily newspaper, while East German official sources adopted that initialism as standard in 1973.

The East German decision to abandon the idea of a single German nation was accompanied by omitting the terms Deutschland ("Germany") and deutsch ("German") in a number of terms, for example:
 * The governing National Front of Democratic Germany became the National Front of the German Democratic Republic in 1973
 * The words of the national anthem, Auferstanden aus Ruinen, which referred to Deutschland, einig Vaterland ("Germany, united fatherland") ceased to be sung following Erich Honecker succeeding Walter Ulbricht as party leader in 1971
 * The state television service, Deutscher Fernsehfunk became "Fernsehen der DDR" in 1972, its radio counterpart having always been called Rundfunk der DDR or "Radio of the GDR"
 * The North German Plain, covering the north of East and West Germany, appeared in East German atlases as Nördliches Tiefland der DDR (Northern Plain of the GDR).
 * The GDR sent a separate team to the 1972 Summer Olympics, at which its flag and anthem were used for the first time Until 1959, the GDR had used an identical flag to that of the Federal Republic, before adopting a version with the national emblem in the centre.

However, the ruling party's full name, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or "Socialist Unity Party of Germany" remained unchanged, as did that of its newspaper Neues Deutschland ("New Germany").

Therefore, using the abbreviation BRD fitted perfectly into the official East German policy of downplaying the concept of a united Germany. In 1974, the GDR had replaced the vehicle registration code D, hitherto shared with the Federal Republic, for DDR and demanded that West Germany recognise the division by likewise accepting BRD. This was rejected by the West, where some motorists displayed bumper stickers with the slogan BRD - Nein Danke! ("BRD? No Thanks!"). Thus in the West the initialism became even more objectionable and using it was often considered either unreflecting or even expressing naïve Communist sympathies. As a result, the initialism reached only occasional frequency in West German parlance. In order to be precise West Germans increasingly used the terms Bundesrepublik or Bundesgebiet ("Federal Republic", or "Federal Territory") to refer to the country and Bundesbürger ("Federal Citizen[s]") as to its citizens, with the pertaining adjective bundesdeutsch (federally German).

Opposition to use in West Germany
To distance themselves from the term BRD, until German reunification, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and media sometimes used the abbreviations BR Deutschland, BR-Dt., BRDt., BR Dtld. or simply Dtld. After the newly established states of the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic, Deutschland ("Germany") has always been used as the official short name.

West Germany had always claimed to be the Germany, and did not like the comparison to DDR, or two separate German states. This claim was also reflected in the Hallstein Doctrine determining its foreign and interior policy until the early 1970s. Named after Walter Hallstein, State secretary at the Foreign Office, this was a key doctrine in the foreign policy of West Germany after 1955, which prescribed that the Federal Republic of Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR. Although this changed after 1973, with the Federal Republic no longer asserting an exclusive mandate over the whole of Germany, West Germany only established de facto diplomatic relations with East Germany. Under the terms of the Basic Treaty in 1972, Bonn and East Berlin exchanged "permanent missions", headed by "permanent representatives", rather than de jure embassies headed by ambassadors. Similarly, relations with the GDR were not conducted through the Foreign Office, but through a separate Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations, to which the East German mission was accredited.

In 1965 the Federal Minister of All-German Affairs (later Intra-German Relations) issued the Directives for the appellation of Germany recommending that the use of BRD be avoided. On 31 May 1974 the heads of the federal and state governments recommended that the full name should always be used in official publications. In November 1979 the federal government informed the Bundestag that the West German public broadcasters ARD and ZDF agreed not to use the initialism.

Under the West German federal system, the states were generally responsible for school education, and by the 1970s, some of them had either already recommended omitting the initialism, or, in the case of Bavaria, forbidden it. Similarly, a decree by the educational authorities in the state of Schleswig-Holstein of 4 October 1976 declared the term to be nicht wünschenswert or "undesirable". The conference of all the states ministers for school education decided on 12 February 1981 to not print the initialism in books, maps, and atlases for schools. with pupils being required to write Bundesrepublik Deutschland in full and use of the term being deemed an error. The different usages were so ingrained that one could deduce a person's or source's political leaning from the name used for West Germany, with far-left movements in the country using BRD.

However, as the Association for the German Language found, this debate on the initialism had little influence on changing the West German parlance with the usage of the initialism - in any event limited - unaffected by the debate.

Naming difficulties over Berlin and East Germany
A similar ideological question was the question whether to use "Berlin (West)" (the officially preferred name) or "West Berlin", and even whether to write "West Berlin" in German as two hyphenated words - West-Berlin - or as one word - Westberlin.

Most Westerners called the Western sectors "Berlin", unless further distinction was necessary. The West German Federal government initially called West Berlin Groß-Berlin or "Greater Berlin", but changed this "Berlin (West)", although it also used the hyphenated "West-Berlin". However, the East German government commonly referred to it as "Westberlin". Starting from 31 May 1961, East Berlin was officially called Berlin, Hauptstadt der DDR (Berlin, Capital of the GDR), replacing the formerly used term Democratic Berlin, or simply "Berlin", by East Germany, and "Berlin (Ost)" by the West German Federal government. Other names used by West German media included Ost-Berlin and Ostberlin (both meaning "East Berlin") as well as Ostsektor or "Eastern Sector". These different naming conventions for the divided parts of Berlin, when followed by individuals, governments, or media, commonly indicated their political leanings, with the centre-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung using "Ost-Berlin" and the centre-left Süddeutsche Zeitung using "Ostberlin".

The naming of the German Democratic Republic was also a controversial issue, West Germans at first preferring the names Mitteldeutschland ("Middle Germany") and Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Soviet Occupation Zone) abbreviated as SBZ. This only changed under Willy Brandt when West German authorities started using the official name, Deutsche Demokratische Republik or DDR, but many conservative German newspapers, like Bild, owned by the Springer company, always wrote "DDR" in scare quotes until 1 August 1989.

Similar naming difficulties
In 1995, a disagreement arose between reunified Germany and newly independent Slovakia, as Germany objected to the use of the Slovak language name Nemecká spolková republika (literally "German Federal Republic") owing to its Cold War connotations, instead of Spolková republika Nemecko. This was almost identical to the equivalent Spolková republika Německo in Czech, a language closely related to Slovak, but the Slovak authorities claimed that "Federal Republic of Germany" could not be translated grammatically into Slovak. However, the Slovak government had used it until the previous year, leading to suggestions in the Bratislava newspaper Narodna Obroda that they were using "German Federal Republic" to show their displeasure with German attitudes to the country.

title: BRD (Germany)


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Talk:List of post-confederation Nova Scotia general elections

Pre-1867?
Is there a pre-Confederation list or article? 70.29.210.174 (talk) 10:58, 10 June 2009 (UTC)
 * I was just wondering that myself as the legislature was established some decades before the 1860s. Paul MacDermott (talk) 17:32, 2 January 2014 (UTC)

External links modified
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PC/Conservative Labeling
The info box currently has the party listed as Conservative, with a footnote saying that it includes Progressive Conservative results. Shouldn't this be the other way around, as the PCs are the current iteration of the provincial party? It's possible the provincial party is being falsely conflated with the federal Conservatives. Not a big deal, but something to consider for accuracy.

142.163.87.0 (talk) 13:47, 30 May 2023 (UTC)


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Corvus (boarding device)

The corvus (Latin for "crow" or "raven") was a Roman ship mounted boarding ramp or drawbridge for naval boarding, first introduced during the First Punic War in sea battles against Carthage. The name is figurative after the beak-like iron hook that is said to have sat at the far end of the bridge, intended to anchor the enemy ship.

Description
In Chapters 1.22-4-11 of his History, Polybius describes this device as a bridge 1.2 m (4 ft) wide and 10.9 m (36 ft) long, with a small parapet on both sides. The engine was probably used in the prow of the ship, where a pole and a system of pulleys allowed the bridge to be raised and lowered. There was a heavy spike shaped like a bird's beak on the underside of the device, which was designed to pierce and anchor into an enemy ship's deck when the boarding bridge was lowered. This allowed a firm grip between the vessels and a route for the Roman legionaries (who served as specialized naval infantry called marinus) to cross onto and capture the enemy ship.

In the 3rd century BCE, Rome was not a naval power and had little experience in sea combat. Before the First Punic War began in 264 BCE, the Roman Republic had not campaigned outside the Italian Peninsula. The Republic's military strength was in land-based warfare, and its main assets were the discipline and the courage of the Roman soldiers. The boarding bridge allowed the Romans to use their infantry advantage at sea, therefore helping to overcome the Carthaginians' superior naval experience and skills. The Romans' application of boarding tactics worked by winning several battles, most notably those of Mylae, Sulci, Tyndaris and Ecnomus.

Despite its advantages, the boarding bridge had a serious drawback in that it could not be used in rough seas; the stable connection of two bobbing ships endangered both ships' structures. When operating in rough conditions, the device became useless as a tactical weapon. The added weight on the prow may have also compromised the ship's navigability, and it has been suggested that this instability led to Rome losing almost two entire fleets during storms in 255 and 249 BCE. Those losses may have contributed to Rome abandoning the boarding bridge in ship design over time.

However, a different analysis suggests that the added weight did not threaten ship stability. JW Bonebakker, formerly Professor of Naval Architecture at TU Delft, used an estimated corvus weight of one ton to conclude that it was "most probable that the stability of a quinquereme with a displacement of about 250 m3 would not be seriously upset" when the bridge was raised.

Regardless of the reasons, it appears that Rome was no longer using the corvus at the end of the First Punic War. As Rome's ship crews became more experienced, Roman naval tactics also improved; accordingly, the relative utility of using the corvus as a weapon may have diminished. The device is not mentioned in period sources after the Battle of Ecnomus, and apparently, the Battle of the Aegates Islands decided the war in 241 BCE and was won without it. By 36 BCE, at the Battle of Naulochus, the Roman navy had been using a different kind of device to facilitate boarding attacks, a harpoon and winch system known as the harpax, or harpago.

Modern interpretations
The design of the corvus has undergone many transformations throughout history. The earliest suggested modern interpretation of the corvus came in 1649 by German classicist Johann Freinsheim. Freinsheim suggested that the bridge consisted of two parts, one section measuring 24 ft and the second being 12 ft long. The 24 ft section was placed along the prow mast and a hinge connected the smaller 12 ft piece to the mast at the top. The smaller piece would have been the actual gangway as it could swing up and down, and the pestle was attached to the end.

The classical scholar and German statesman B.G. Niebuhr ventured to improve the interpretation of the corvus and proposed that the two parts of Freinsheim’s corvus simply needed to be swapped. By applying the 12 ft side along the prow mast, the 24 ft side could be lowered onto an enemy ship by means of the pulley.

The German scholar K.F. Haltaus hypothesized that the corvus was a 36 ft long bridge with the near end braced against the mast via a small oblong notch in the near end that extended 12 ft into the bridge. Haltaus suggested that a lever through the prow mast would have allowed the crew to turn the corvus by turning the mast. A pulley was placed on the top of a 24 ft mast that raised the bridge in order to use the device.

The German classical scholar Wilhelm Ihne proposed another version of corvus that resembled Freinsheim’s crane with adjustments in the lengths of the sections of the bridge. His design placed the corvus twelve feet above the deck and had the corvus extend out from the mast a full 36 ft with the base of the near end connected to the mast. The marines on deck would then be forced to climb a 12 ft ladder to access to the corvus.

The French scholar Émile de St. Denis suggested the corvus featured a 36 ft bridge with the mast hole set 12 ft from the near end. The design suggested by de St. Denis, however, did not include an oblong hole and forced the bridge to travel up and down the mast completely perpendicular to the deck at all times.

The next step in that direction occurred in 1956, when the historian H.T. Wallinga published his dissertation The Boarding-Bridge of the Romans. It suggested a different full-beam design for the corvus, which became the most widely accepted model among scholars for the rest of the twentieth century. Wallinga's design included the oblong notch in the deck of the bridge to allow it to rise at an angle by the pulley mounted on the top of the mast.

Not everybody, however, has accepted the idea that the Romans invented and used the corvus as a special device. In 1907, William W. Tarn postulated that the corvus never existed. Tarn believed that the weight of the bridge would be too much for the design of the Roman ships to remain upright. He suggested that once the corvus was raised, the ship would simply roll over and capsize by the weight added by the corvus. Tarn believed that the corvus was simply an improved version of an already-existing grapnel pole, which had been used in Greece as early as 413 BC.

title: Corvus (boarding device)


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Paw

A paw is the soft foot-like part of a mammal, generally a quadruped, that has claws.

Common characteristics
The paw is characterised by thin, pigmented, keratinised, hairless epidermis covering subcutaneous collagenous and adipose tissue, which make up the pads. These pads act as a cushion for the load-bearing limbs of the animal. The paw consists of the large, heart-shaped metacarpal or palmar pad (forelimb) or metatarsal or plantar pad (rear limb), and generally four load-bearing digital pads, although there can be five or six toes in the case of domestic cats and bears (including giant panda). A carpal pad is also found on the forelimb which is used for additional traction when stopping or descending a slope in digitigrade species. Additional dewclaws can also be present.

The paw also includes a horn-like, beak shaped claw on each digit. Though usually hairless, certain animals do have fur on the soles of their paws. An example is the red panda, whose furry soles help insulate them in their snowy habitat.

Animals with paws

 * Felids, such as cats and tigers; some of these animals may have toe tufts
 * Canids, such as dogs and foxes
 * Rabbits and other lagomorphs have paws with very sharp nails and have no pads underneath them
 * Bears and raccoons
 * Weasels and other mustelids
 * Rodents

title: Paw


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List of Quebec general elections

This article provides a summary of results for the general elections to the Canadian province of Quebec's unicameral legislative body, the National Assembly of Quebec (and its predecessor, the Legislative Assembly of Quebec). The number of seats has generally increased over time, from 65 for the first six elections, to the current high of 125.

The chart on the upper right shows the information graphically, with the most recent elections towards the right.

The Conservative party (blue) in 1936 merged into the Union Nationale (now defunct). The 1970s saw the arrival of the sovereignist Parti Québécois, to be followed by Québec Solidaire and the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) in 2006 and 2011, respectively.

This article only covers elections since the Canadian confederation in 1867, when Quebec was created as one of Canada's provinces. For Quebec's first 15 elections as Lower Canada from 1792 to 1840, see Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada. For the 8 joint elections of Ontario and Quebec as the Province of Canada, from 1840 to 1867, see list of elections in the Province of Canada.

Summary of results
The table below shows the total number of seats won by the political parties in each election. It also shows the percentage of the vote obtained by each party. The winning party's totals are shown in bold. There have been five elections (1998, 1966, 1944, 1892 and 1886) in which the winning party did not have the largest share of the popular vote. Full details on any election are linked via the year of the election at the start of the row.

title: List of Quebec general elections


text:
Talk:Alfred Bester

Splitting the page
OK, so what do we call the new pages. I suggest: Any different suggestions?
 * Alfred Bester (author)
 * Alfred Bester (fictional character) already there but REDIRECTs here

--Phil | Talk 10:47, Jun 25, 2004 (UTC)

Alfred Bester (fictional character) moved to Alfred Bester (Babylon 5) --wwoods 19:16, 27 Jun 2004 (UTC)

1987 Worldcon
The article says that Doris Lessing stepped in to replace Bester at the 1987 Worldcon (Conspiracy in Brighton, UK). In fact Lessing had already been announced as the UK guest of honour before Bester dropped out. There were a large number of official guests for that convention, also including the Strugatsky brothers from the USSR.

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title: Talk:Alfred Bester


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List of Manitoba general elections

The Canadian province of Manitoba hold elections to its unicameral legislative body, the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba. The normal period between general elections of the assembly is five years, but the Lieutenant Governor is able to call one at any time. The number of seats has increased over time, from 24 for the first election, to the present 57.

The chart on the upper right shows the information graphically, with the most recent elections towards the right. It show the dominance of the Conservative party (blue) and Liberal party (red) prior to World War I; the inter-war wins of the United Farmers party (yellow); and the post-World War II rise of the NDP (orange), which mirrors the decline of the Liberal Party. The narrow wins of the Progressive Conservative Party (blue) in the 1960s and 1980s can also be made out.

Summary of results
The table below shows the total number of seats won by the major political parties at each election. The winning party's total is shown in bold. Full details on any election are linked via the year of the election at the start of the row.

 * Notes
 * Includes results for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1936 to 1959), Independent Labour Party (1922 to 1936), Labour (1920), Socialists (1920) and Social Democrats (1915 and 1920).
 * Includes results for Progressive Conservatives, and also the Independent Conservative candidate elected in 1903.
 * Includes results for the Liberal-Progressive party.
 * Includes results for the Progressive party in 1927.
 * Includes the two Liberal-Conservatives elected, who were members of the government.
 * Includes those of unknown party status.

Elections prior to provincial political parties
Until the 1879 election, political parties were not active in the province. However, some candidates declared their support for (or opposition to) the administration of the time. Full details on any election are linked via the year of the election at the start of the row.

title: List of Manitoba general elections


text:
Halfling

Halflings are a fictional race found in some fantasy works. They tend to be depicted as physically similar to humans, except about half as tall and not as stocky as the similarly sized dwarves. Halflings are often depicted as having slightly pointed ears along with leathery-soled feet which are covered with curly hair. They tend to be portrayed as stealthy and lucky. The term is derived for the word used in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Northern England for a child who is not yet fully grown. Halflings are found in many fantasy novels and games, including as an alternative term for hobbits in J. R. R. Tolkien's Middle-earth and as playable humanoid races in Dungeons & Dragons.

Description
The members of the fictional halfling race are often depicted as similar to humans except about half as tall, and are not quite as stocky as the similarly sized dwarves. Similar to the depiction of hobbits in the works of J. R. R. Tolkien, which are sometimes called halflings, they have slightly pointed ears, their feet are covered with curly hair with leathery soles, and they tend to be portrayed as stealthy and lucky.

Etymology
Halfling is a word used in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Northern England for a boy or girl who is not yet fully grown; a youth, an adolescent, and formerly sometimes a boy or young man employed in a junior role in domestic, agricultural, or industrial work. Halflin derives from the Scot word hauflin, which was used before both The Hobbit and Dungeons & Dragons and has the synonyms hobbledehoy and hobby.

Usage in fantasy fiction
Haflings are found in some fantasy novels and games. In The Lord of the Rings, J. R. R. Tolkien occasionally used the term "halfling" to describe hobbits, since they are beings that are half the height of men. For instance, when the hobbit Pippin Took appears in a royal guard's uniform in Minas Tirith, the people of that city call him the "Prince of Halflings". The term has since been used in other fiction works as an alternate name for hobbit-like peoples inspired by Tolkien's legendarium.

Halflings have long been one of the playable humanoid races in Dungeons & Dragons (D&D), starting with the original 1974 Men & Magic, where the term hobbit was used. Later editions of the original D&D box set began using the name halfling as an alternative to hobbit for legal reasons. Besides licensed D&D novels, halfling characters have appeared in various tabletop and video games.

Some fantasy stories use the term halfling to describe a person born of a human parent and a parent of another race, often a female human and a male elf. Terry Brooks describes characters such as Shea Ohmsford from his Shannara series as a halfling of elf–human parentage. In Jack Vance's Lyonesse series of novels, "halfling" is a generic term for beings such as fairies, trolls and ogres, who are composed of both magical and earthly substances. In Clifford D. Simak's 1959 short story "No Life of Their Own", halflings are invisible beings in a parallel dimension who, like brownies or gremlins, bring good or bad luck to people.

Examples
An example of a noteworthy halfling character featured in a series of novels based on the Forgotten Realms, a D&D campaign setting, is Regis, a halfling rogue member of the Companions of the Hall led by Drizzt Do'Urden. While he behaves in the stereotypical manner of Tolkien's hobbits, Bricken from io9 noted that Regis "set himself apart a bit by carrying a crystal pendant he can use to charm people", though he also finds himself in dangerous situations and ends up saving the day in the final battle of The Crystal Shard (1988) in a manner not unlike Bilbo Baggins.

title: Halfling


text:
Talk:Rothschild family

Their role in slave trade
For some reason it is omitted in this entry

https://www.ft.com/content/92d13310-6284-11de-b1c9-00144feabdc0 https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-slavery-idUSL171535320090701OutoeSky (talk) 05:19, 13 October 2021 (UTC)

 * The solution is simple: just write about it. The article is semi-protected, that is, this page cannot be edited by unregistered users (IP addresses), as well as accounts that are not confirmed or automatically confirmed (accounts that are at least four days old and have made at least ten edits to Wikipedia) . Semi-protection is useful when there is a significant amount of disruption or vandalism from new or unregistered users. By registering, you can edit. PrazerCambraia (talk) 14:04, 29 October 2023 (UTC)

RFC: re previous change in lede to "European" from "Ashkenazi Jewish"
@Yedaman54 @Tol @Saturnalia04

We're always extremely specific about ancestry, if mentioned at all as being notable, and exclude the ethnicity otherwise, per WP:ETHNICITY. We should either be specific or not say it at all. DarmaniLink (talk) 02:47, 6 January 2024 (UTC)

 * (Noting also user talk discussion (permalink)) I believe the Rothschild family is primarily known for their banking activities, not their ethnicity; their ethnicity should be mentioned, but I don't think the lead sentence is appropriate placement. I would support opening with something along the lines of "The Rothschild family is a wealthy banking family originally from Frankfurt..." and moving the mention of their ethnicity to somewhere else in the lead. Tol  (talk | contribs) @ 02:55, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Sure, lets do that. I'll leave you to change it how you deem appropriate and tell you if I agree, or touch it up if I don't. DarmaniLink (talk) 02:57, 6 January 2024 (UTC)

 * They are well known in antisemitic conspiracy theories https://www.britannica.com/story/where-do-anti-semitic-conspiracy-theories-about-the-rothschild-family-come-from and reliable sources do give them ample coverage for this. New editors trying to change it, are you being paid by anyone, or part of any organizing trying to remove things from Wikipedia that make Israel or Jews look bad?  I just saw a video of a group doing that.   D r e a m Focus  03:46, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Should we keep their ethnicity in the lede sentence, or move it elsewhere to the lede?
 * I'm fine with leaving it as is, for the record, I was against its removal in the first place, and just opened this as a forum to curb potential edit warring. DarmaniLink (talk) 03:51, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * It should be there since that is what they are well known for. Wikipedia does not censor the truth.   D r e a m Focus  03:52, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Not trying to censor the truth :)
 * I'm trying to stop edit warring over this sentence before it becomes a big problem.
 * If their ethnicity is part of their notability, then we should leave it there. DarmaniLink (talk) 03:57, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Rothschild’s are Jewish. Very simple. No debate here Saturnalia04 (talk) 04:41, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I don't think anybody is disputing that; the discussion is on how important and relevant their ethnicity is, and how prominently placed in the article it should thus be. Tol  (talk | contribs) @ 04:49, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I do agree that their ethnicity is widely covered in RS, and that it should be included; I just don't think that it's important enough to put in the lead sentence. What would you think about the change I proposed above? (Also, I don't see how changing "Ashkenazi Jewish" to "European" would be pro-Jewish or pro-Israel; am I missing something?) Tol  (talk | contribs) @ 04:28, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * From MOS:ETHNICITY
 * The first sentence should usually state:
 * Name(s) and title(s), if any . Handling of the subject's name is covered below in.
 * Dates of birth and death, if found in secondary sources (do not use primary sources for birth dates of living persons or other private details about them).
 * Context (location, nationality, etc.) for the activities that made the person notable.
 * One, or possibly more, noteworthy positions, activities, or roles that the person is mainly known for, avoiding subjective or contentious terms.
 * The main reason the person is notable (key accomplishment, record, etc.)
 * However, try to not overload the first sentence by describing everything notable about the subject; instead, spread relevant information over the lead paragraph.
 * So the main question seems to be
 * Is it a distinct type of family, warranting specification, and distinct from other families or nobility, where valuable information would be lost if it were not specified?
 * Well, Noble is in the type field in the infobox. However, I don't know if Ashkenazi Jewish nobility is duly different enough from other nobility to demand distinction. Would we do the same for other nobility that isn't Ashkenazi Jewish? I think it depend on how notable their ethnicity or nationality is to the family's identity.
 * Are they strongly associated with Judaism, or the Ashkenazi Jewish community?
 * Well, based on RS coverage, and their own description of themselves, that does seem to be the case. Going strictly off wikipedia's manual of style, it should likely be in the lede sentence. However, per WP:IAR it could be moved to elsewhere in the lead if it stylistically seems worse in the first sentence. DarmaniLink (talk) 05:10, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I agree with a lot of what you're stating, @DarmaniLink; I'm just relying somewhat heavier on the guideline (from the MoS section you linked) that "Ethnicity, religion, or sexuality should generally not be in the lead unless relevant to the subject's notability" (here, this is referring to the opening paragraph and not just the lead sentence, given placement under the section "Opening paragraph"). So, if we're following the biography guidelines (as this article is on a family as a whole, ethnicity may be more relevant), the question at hand should likely be to what extent the Rothschild family's ethnicity is "relevant to [their] notability", and, based on that, where to discuss it. As I've stated, I think characterising them in this manner in the lead sentence is an overemphasis on ethnicity (for example, Britannica does not mention their ethnicity anywhere in its opening paragraph), but should be covered somewhere in the lead paragraphs. I definitely think "banking family" is more important to their notability than "Ashkenazi Jewish family", and so should be given more weight in the lead. Tol  (talk | contribs) @ 07:54, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Maybe we could do what the old shortdesc and type used to say, and say something like "Jewish Noble Banking Family"? Merge all that into one description. Based on some of the other arguments I've seen it does seem that it is centrally notable to them, but, I do also agree that being a banking family is also extremely notable, both factoids being extremely notable. DarmaniLink (talk) 08:09, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * "Jewish noble banking family" sounds good to me (both as the shortdesc and as the primary descriptor in the lead sentence). Tol  (talk | contribs) @ 08:12, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Went ahead and made the change :) DarmaniLink (talk) 08:16, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * No I am not paid by the Israeli government lmao. I was using the same logic as what Tol stated. Also kinda a low blow to assume that we are paid by Israel. Thats a bold accusation to be even questioning people about. Yedaman54 (talk) 04:50, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * If there was a family line of gay frenchmen that had amassed a large fortune over hundreds of years, it would be important to identify their unique status as a wealthy gay french family.
 * There are many wealthy family lines, such as the royal British family, and there's no attempt to list the ethnically british (or german if you want to go that far) royals as European.
 * The fact is that weather Jewish or British, or even Saudi ethnicity is a factor of the subject matter,  it is important to be precise. Family Wealth of this magnitude is cultivated over generations within a narrow ethnicity, therefore ethnicity is a crucial detail to include in the first sentence. The wealth is a function of the family's lineage. ACiD GRiM (talk) 05:21, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

 * Keep it as it is - The Rothschild family is notable for being a wealthy Jewish family so this description provides the reader with useful information straight away. 2405:DA40:435D:4500:68EB:62AA:E941:276E (talk) 05:34, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Well that's saying we should play into anti-semitic stereotypes. OJ Simpson is still known for murder but the introduction paragraph for him at least establishes that he got famous as a football player before discussing the trial. Kylenielsen (talk) 07:33, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * WP:NOTCENSORED. Even if it did "play into antisemetic stereotypes", it wouldn't matter in the first place.
 * Also how is them being jewish remotely comparable to someone being a football player before being on trial for murder? DarmaniLink (talk) 07:46, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * @Kylenielsen Excuse me, but what exactly is malicious about describing them as they have been previously described?
 * Don't change information actively under discussion, especially dont edit war it back in WP:BRD. And don't accuse people of malicious intent WP:AGF. DarmaniLink (talk) 05:53, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I didn't change information, I simply removed a part in the introduction that was further expanded upon later in the article. I noticed that it was causing a fuss on social media in addition to the pointlessness and just took initiative Kylenielsen (talk) 07:30, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * With all due respect, you absolutely did change information, by changing the meaning of a sentence. Not changing information is a spelling fix or adding punctuation, or clarifying something. Also seeing it on social media doesn't explain or justify why you would accuse someone of malicious intent in the edit summary.
 * If you weren't changing information, why would you claim that the change was to remove something you believed to be maliciously added or that undoing your change would play into antisemitic stereotypes? DarmaniLink (talk) 07:54, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Should the shortdesc and the type be reverted back to Jewish Noble Banking Family, or should the change to Noble Banking family be kept? DarmaniLink (talk) 06:46, 6 January 2024 (UTC)

Original name?
Was the original Jewish surname ‘Mayer’ before it was changed to the more German-sounding ‘Rothschild’? I’ve heard that claim before and it would make sense given all the family members who have ‘Mayer’ as part of their name. Overlordnat1 (talk) 07:07, 24 January 2024 (UTC)

Head
Why there is no head of the family in the infobox? --95.24.68.30 (talk) 14:13, 26 February 2024 (UTC)
 * The template used,, has as options 'current head' and 'final head'. The Rothschilds exist to this day, with several branches; there is no single head of the family. Hope this helps. soetermans . ↑↑↓↓←→←→ B A TALK

Jacob passed away I guess
Soo in the "Prominent descendants of Mayer Amschel Rothschild" section...

 * Current: Nathaniel Charles Jacob Rothschild, 4th Baron Rothschild, of Tring in the County of Hertford (born 1936)
 * Proposed: Nathaniel Charles Jacob Rothschild, 4th Baron Rothschild, of Tring in the County of Hertford (1936–2024)

2603:6011:9600:52C0:14ED:5E37:E028:EBB9 (talk) 04:35, 27 February 2024 (UTC)

 * For future note, WP:GOFORIT :) DarmaniLink (talk) 07:17, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

Alliance Assurance (1824)
The date this company was founded was 1827. And it had as its main and exclusive object the assurance of [any kind of] ships (fact used today against the Rothschild family with regard to slavery, for among those ships were slave-ships). The source of this information, although official, is in Portuguese language though (here). 2804:214:829F:23B7:EA1C:2BDD:E2FA:69AF (talk) 20:52, 15 May 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Rothschild family