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Wikisource:Copyright discussions/Archives/2012-09

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2012 Democratic National Convention/Michelle Obama's Address
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Statement of Eric Rudolph
{{closed|Deleted, OTRS ticket 2012051110005522 received "the message was not sufficient to confirm permission for this file". Jeepday (talk) 20:02, 8 September 2012 (UTC) |text= No release for this work, per statement on authors web page http://www.armyofgod.com/EricRudolphHomepage.html "Eric Rudolph's writings are copyrighted. They may only be reproduce for personal or non-profit use." would seem to copyrighted. Not sure there is any reason to keep the page Author:Eric Rudolph if this single work is deleted. Jeepday (talk) 23:14, 12 April 2012 (UTC)

 * {{vd}} Agreed. Carl Lindberg (talk) 15:15, 16 April 2012 (UTC)

 * Note, A new editor disagrees with the copyvio status of this work, I posted a note at User talk:Egg Centric inviting them to bring their rational here. Jeepday (talk) 11:04, 9 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Please put on hold - I am going to contact the person behind that web site (Donald Spitz) who is in touch with Rudolph and ask if we can get permission to host the thing per applicable license. Thanks to Jeepday for pointing me to the process to do so. Egg Centric (talk) 13:14, 11 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Further to the above, I have permission granted. I have reverted and am forwarding details to OTRS. If I have been too hasty in doing the reversion then of course feel free to put it back but I think it's fine in this case. Egg Centric (talk) 14:08, 11 May 2012 (UTC)

 * There is a substantial discussion at Administrators'_noticeboard which will need to be included here when this discussion closes. Jeepday (talk) 23:29, 28 May 2012 (UTC)

This is Donald Spitz who host the website with Eric Rudolph's writings. I have been in communication with Paul Jordon and Eric Rudolph about permission for his writings, in this case the statement. Eric Rudolph sent me specific written permission regarding this, which I snail mailed to Paul Jordon a couple of weeks ago. {{unsigned|70.161.233.91}}

Second look at OTRS and copyright

 * The following was moved from Administrators' noticeboard. JeepdaySock (talk) 11:07, 11 July 2012 (UTC)

Would someone take a look at this increasing complex issue. The page Statement of Eric Rudolph is unlicensed and is proposed for deletion at WS:COPYVIO and a mostly wikipedian editor has removed the tag several times between conversations at User_talk:Jeepday and w:User_talk:Jeepday. There is a posting at w:Wikipedia:Administrators'_noticeboard/Incidents that implies the wikipedian not the actual copyright owner submittted the OTRS ticket. I am at a loss for what the urgency or rational for keeping this up until the copyright is sorted. Jeepday (talk) 10:36, 12 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Pending an actual OTRS materializing at some point, you were right to tag it CopyVio in the meantime. Restoring tag and if he reverts it again I am going to Admin protect it - fair consideration and warning has been given already by you, imho, and the User did not care to respect that. -- George Orwell III (talk) 11:02, 12 May 2012 (UTC)
 * FWIW... It appears Mr. Rudolph is not free and clear of all liens and/or liabilities against him. A civil-case in 2000 against him awarded $115 mllion to his victims which limits his ability to exercise his right as copyright holder to waiver of any, all, or in part of the copyright protections afforded to all authors without a.) mutual consent of the victims named in the civil-case (not-likely) or b.) payment of the lien in full (not likely). -- George Orwell III (talk) 11:50, 12 May 2012 (UTC)
 * I guess China really screwed up, huh? Instead of trying to ban their dissidents, they should have fined them and removed their ability to exercise their rights as copyright holder until the lien was satisfied. Again, nobody has said that Eric Rudolph can't distribute this statement, and it would be a horrific violation of his human rights to stop him.--Prosfilaes (talk) 18:07, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * China practices good copyright & trademark policies eh? That's laughable.
 * Rudolph can't practice his copyright rights because he lost them in court of law, under the law, and by an operation of law when he was convicted of blowing people up. His right to free speech remains unaltered and he can practice it as much as his 6 by 8 cell will stand for. -- George Orwell III (talk) 19:20, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * What does China's current practices matter? You're saying that a simple lien can legally silence anyone worldwide. You're saying that someone with a lien on them for child support has no right to write to the newspaper and complain. This is classic free speech for me and not for thee behavior.--Prosfilaes (talk) 06:56, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Hey, you're the one who used a Chinese dissident lawyer who values the letter of the law to make boo-hoo over a jailed U.S. murderer to start with - not I.
 * And yes - if a lien is discovered for $115 million in child support in the U.S. - I'd block that instance too because it is within reason to expect that lien will never be repaid, so it is safe to apply the law without having to check the legal news every other week. A $150, $1,500, $15,000, or even a $150,000 lien is not so unreasonable so that the chances the lien could be satisfied at any time are much much higher; so high that it would be unreasonable to argue for blocking that individuals right to exercise copyright-holder benefits (especially if they aren't jailed for life for multiple murders or something just as straight forward [i.e. in a perpetual coma]).
 * Finally, it is not my fault the servers are in the U.S. or that English was lumped into one happy but somewhat retarded family but that is the rules we must play by. Move it Wikivres or your own blog if you like - Wikisource is but one online entity, right? -- George Orwell III (talk) 08:07, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Again, the fact that he's a murderer is irrelevant. You don't get to censor people you don't like, whether they be murderers or dissidents. You've never established that in general a lien can be used as a gag order, that a lien prevents people from communicating to the public.--Prosfilaes (talk) 20:29, 25 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Being sentenced to life+ in prison prevents people from communicating normally with the public-at-large, not any lien. A lien only prevents the further publication, reproduction, and any other normally independent authorship-right afforded to copyright right-holders of any such communication without either satisfying the lien first or the consent of the lien holders at the same time. Ownership remains with the author but the ability to exercise any of the rights normally afforded automatically to free and clear works becomes limited with the introduction of a lien. One can't sell the story to movie-makers, take on a licensee to co-author a tell-all book or even waive all rights in the attempt to release a work into the public-domain. These are all examples of exercising what would normally be unfettered copyright right-holder rights & benefits if the lien was not awarded and in place. The fact the crimes perpetrated where so grievous in nature that the dollar amount awarded was so astronomically large that it couldn't be repaid in seven lifetimes of freedom much less a single lifetime in prison or the fact the victims were so violated and thier rights so trampled upon that even the prospect of making a fraction of that award back through consenting to sell the rights for profit would be too unbearable to ever agree to as human being is not our problem. Our problem is that these works retain a measure of more-than-reasonable copyright doubt, nor qualify as transmittable free-content, and therefor unhostable on Wikisource. We are not the public-at-large. We are the free-online library that hosts copyright free works. -- George Orwell III (talk) 00:47, 26 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Let's see some citation for this. Under your interpretation, someone under a lien could not send a letter to a newspaper for publication; under your interpretation, a lien designed to further the payment of a debt could be used to silence the lienor in ways that in no way further the payment of the debt. Looking at If I Did It, I see no evidence the Goldman family routinely censored Simpson's publications; a court specifically awarded them the copyright for a work that Simpson was commercializing in partial payment for the debt.--Prosfilaes (talk) 19:17, 26 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Beside the Unabomber discussion, this (at page 448) outlines the applicable laws for most every lien when copyright is an issue in one simple paragraph. The reason the dollar amount is set so high is to insure the individual has no possible means to ever repay the lien - in effect - silencing the possibilities for the convicted while allowing some measure of peace & quiet from further reliving whatever crime it was for the victim(s). Note that the lien holder does not obtain control (ownership) but a transfer of rights, and thus, a say in executing them if ever. The lien-holders would still typically need the consent of the remaining right-holders (i.e. the author) to fully exercise a right. The satisfaction of a lien is not always the motivation behind either party's behavior mind you. I suspect it is possible if not normal for victims to seek to obtain substantial monetary compensation in civil court instead of "silence" from a criminal court. But please remember, O.J. was never convicted of a federal crime let alone multiple murders and the likelihood of him meeting a high dollar award amount comes with his celebrity status (his situation is quite different than some "regular" person). Plus we still can't host a letter sent to a newspaper here because they would still need to be able to release claim to it if I'm not mistaken regardless of a lien being in place or not. -- George Orwell III (talk) 20:02, 26 May 2012 (UTC)
 * And according to that link: In order to obtain a lien on a particular piece of property, a creditor who has received a money judgment in the form of a writ of execution must prepare a notice of levy that specifically identifies the property to be encumbered [...] So, if the copyright is not specifically claimed, there is no lien it would seem.  Has anyone made a claim on the copyright of this letter?  Secondly, that link also says that the creditor may only be entitled to any proceeds as they become available -- not really sure they get the ability to license it.  But, if there is such a written claim, that may make the status ambiguous.  Without a written claim to the copyright though, I can't see an issue.  If it's not specifically claimed, then there is no lien, per that reference. Carl Lindberg (talk) 06:24, 27 May 2012 (UTC)
 * That case overall dealt with a lien established as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding (Title 11). Page 448, however, specifically laid out the rationale behind the premise of the transfer of copyright rights taking place via an operation of law to lien holders upon the judgement for a lien taking place - the fact it dealt with a commercial bankruptcy is irrelevant in our discussion here since Title 17 saw no distinction there (i.e. it's broad definition of transfer) between default copyright right-holders (i.e. the creditors), licensed copyright right holders (i.e. the purchasers) or any other sub-type of possible copyright right-holder(s) that might ever come into question. The point was to support the fact liens can & do transfer copyright rights to lien-holders - not necessarily the full control of those rights, granted - upon the imposition of a lien. Also, the case in question for this discussion deals with criminal convictions with ordered awards (Title 18); not just a civil bankruptcy proceeding arising from fraud or default (Title 11) resulting in a lien. The lien(s) in play here are more akin to Federal tax evasion liens (Title 26) which are all inclusive (see the Unabomber discussion's links) when it comes to the scope, type or right to property the lien is put against since it is established or awarded through an order of restitution (i.e. for victims specifically not swindled lenders or buyers nor dead-beat dads behind on thier child support agreements). So again, if the author is specifically prevented from selling his story for profit (or not) thanks to a lien, then isn't the author is also prevented from exercising any of the other rights or sub-rights normally afforded to such authors? ...and wouldn't that include the exercise of waiving of all the author's rights with the intent for the work to fall (no right to place has ever existed btw) into the public domain? -- George Orwell III (talk) 12:39, 27 May 2012 (UTC)
 * To my mind, no, not necessarily. They may be prevented from making a profit -- so if there are any copyrights demonstrably earning money, I agree those could be a problem, in order to prevent licensing once-profitable works in a way to deprive debtees of potential money -- but overall you can't prevent somebody from expressing themselves.  If there is no profit in a copyright, there's really no point to a lien, since that is primarily a financial instrument.  It's not a mechanism to prevent someone's freedom of speech; your argument amounts to saying that the copyright to anything someone in that situation produces is automatically transferred to someone else, regardless if there is any profit or not, and that entity then controls all distribution -- that is taking a whole lot more than just money, and I just don't think the concept stretches that far.  The laws certainly don't prevent *other* people from making a profit, and freely licensing something is basically further ensuring that that person won't be making much of a profit on the copyright.  Rudolph's statement is already public record; I really can't imagine any financial considerations ever coming out of it, and I can't fathom a lien being able to prevent him licensing away the rights he does have.  Secondly, a lien of that sort can only exist once somebody is *convicted*; any copyright transfers or licenses or loss of copyright due to lack of notice or whatever which occurred prior to that could not be subject to the lien (since they were no longer that person's property).  Carl Lindberg (talk) 15:19, 27 May 2012 (UTC)
 * I'm afraid I have not made it clear enough - whatever the particular exercise in question may be of a [normally] exclusive right or the sub-division(s) of a [normally] exclusive right (17 U.S.C. 106) makes no difference for us or even in general; they all [normally] remain vested with the author as the "copyright owner" as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101. I just used the "for profit" logic tree for illustrative purposes primarily to end with a hypothetical question & not a basis for supporting the relevant argument. That illustration was a complete and total failure on my part it seems. Let's focus on the 'not-normal' situation, how it became that way and what it means for us instead. First, Rudolph is not prevented from doing any of actions outlined in the six sub-sections under the introductory clause of 17 U.S.C. 106 whatsoever. If there is any notion here that free speech or freedom of expression is somehow being curtailed or prevented by the conditions of a lien imposed against all his property or rights to property, it would be a baseless one. The liability he voluntarily introduced at the moment of his overt and/or covert actions against his victims & their sets-of-rights, resulting in a criminal conviction with monetary awards being granted to those victims as restitution in accordance with well-established legal process, and that led to his eventual life-long incarceration is what is really behind any percieved censorship or general inability to do any of those things with any measurable degree of effectiveness, success or satisfaction. His current situation leaves him with only one other option when it comes to those exclusive rights and that is to authorize, in one form or another, a third party to exercise those rights on his behalf (also 17 U.S.C. 106). This where the circumstances at hand inject the deviation away from the 'normal'.  It is here is where a lien (an operation of law) resulting from an order to pay restitution or from a settlement awarded for damages causes the transfer of ownership from Rudolph to the victims to occur. The rights transfered cannot be considered as being 'made-in-full' or 'for total-ownership' since at least the to do portions of Section 106 will always remain with the copyright owner. At the same time, once a lien arises and the transfer occurs, any exercise of the remaining to authorize portions are no longer exclusive to the copyright owner -- the sub-section pertaining to the further distribution of copies of a work in particular & the reproduction of fixed print mediums by publication via a third party or parties in Rudolph's case specifically. Whether or not either endeavor, the to do portion or the to authorize portion of Section 106, ever returns a nickle for anyone is irrelevant to the analysis of the law and one should not typically expect to ever see a result where the satisfaction of such a lien ever takes place in the first place. Taking the ridiculously high dollar amounts being awarded into account and given the methods carried out in creating / applying / enforcing the liens themselves, leaves me to suspect this more about limiting any possible further notoriety, popularity or infamy gained or generated off of the crimes committed for the sake of the victims, their families and any mental or physical rehabilitation they may still suffer from more so than anybody involved actually lawyering up with the intent of getting any money out of all this.  This is not any normal circumstance in most any sense of the term where controlling ones ability to copyright (or express themselves) is somehow taking place arbitrarily without comparable justifications or caused by government malcontents behind closed doors - it comes directly as a result of violations-of or injuries-to other persons and their rights which Rudolph voluntarily engaged in or acted upon prior to being held accountable before those acts in a court of law. One suit, for example, was brought 3 years before Rudolph's actual capture & conviction and 5 years before this statement was allegedly made. The only difference between the Unabomber and Rudolph was the years of anonymity & deferment the Unabomber enjoyed before his capture. The liabilities each created depended on the acts that took place irregardless of "knowing" who committed them at any given moment in time. Rudolph was sloppy enough to get fingered early on; Teddy was arrogant enough to admit to his transgressions after the fact. Nobody here should care about what or when either bomber managed to create in relation to thier crimes or otherwise. In order to host works here, they need to be well enough free & clear of any copyright claim or liabilty that might exist against them otherwise they cannot lawfully fall into the public domain for our re-use. That just is not the case in these narrow instances where for us it boils down to a matter of the lawful execution of the right to further distribution by reproduced publication or not (folks delinquent on their alimony payments and the like need not worry as well).  -- George Orwell III (talk) 19:36, 27 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Well, I'll just have to see I'll need to see it in an actual case before I believe it. Liens like you describe can't exist until someone is convicted and actually fined; any private liens need to have the copyright *specifically spelled out* as something the creditor is putting a lien on.  If there is documentation a creditor specifically listed a copyright as property they are trying to control, or made a copyright complaint here, then yes, I'd remove it from Wikisource.  But you are describing, as far as I know, a completely theoretical situation extrapolated from narrow specific situations.  It is possible for a lien to be put on a copyright, yes, but I don't think that necessarily would automatically apply to *all possible* copyrights.  Short of an actual court case which demonstrates loss of copyright control for all works of an author, when not spelled out in a lien and when not of a commercial nature to begin with, I wouldn't believe a court would rule that way.  So, not sure how much it's worth to continue debating ;-) Carl Lindberg (talk) 04:01, 28 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Disagree; only attempts to lay claim to corporeal property need to be listed in the case of private (Title 11) liens (read the paragraph(s) before the one you quoted for example - incorporeal is different). Plus, it is nearly impossible to fully list all existing intellectual property in the same way as tangible property because many times the works or creations have not been shared with anyone else (for the law - incorporeal property is much like porn - 'it knows it when it sees it' afterwards and not before). At any rate, a defendant is typically oblidged to provide the status or change in status that might affect his her finances. I'll get to the role that valuation would play here regardless of which Title the lien arises from in a bit. Second, the assertion of detailed listing as some requirement is a convolution of Title 11 with Title 18. Based on 18 U.S.C. 3613, it can be said ...Under the law, liens arising as a result of a criminal conviction with an order/settlement of restitution can be considered and treated as any other unpaid fine, delinquent settlement or outstanding tax-assessment, but not every lien arising against an unpaid fine, delinquent settlement or outstanding tax-assessment is a result of a criminal conviction with an order/settlement of restitution! Next, there is no debtor or creditor and the like in play - only victim and perpetrator; stipulations of Title 11 do not apply here (no financial agreement, contract or vehicle between Rudolph and his victims to breach or defaullt on here).  Finally, if one has no appreciation of potential & valuation, it is easy to say any non-profit generating act, such as attempting to waive rights in order to let a work fall into the public domain, is somehow a bridge to far as when it comes to inclusion under the conditions of a lien. The free 90-day trial software, the free first three chapters of an e-book and the free first 5 minutes of a pay-per-view movies are all examples that do not generate revenue but do have a measure of valuation in the eyes of the law. It is the possible potential of these actions to generate revenue at some point in the future by convincing you buy the full version, download the free e-book or pay for that movie on demand that makes the "free tease" a valuation. The same can be said for the possible further notoriety, popularity or infamy gained or generated off of the crimes. Folks typically pay for marketing and advertising in the hopes of generating increases in supply side distribution. The same valuation holds true for folks unable to pay for such services when seeking the same distribution effect but from demand side circulation instead (creating a buzz has value even though profits have not materialized yet). This why a lien would apply to the exercise of copyright rights even when they appear to be "free" or monetarily worthless to some. The act of giving away a work still has value even if it is only to the author's personal gratification.  ... and I still don't understand how a lien arising in 2000, amended and adjudicated in 2003 upon Rudolph's capture and conviction, would not apply to this (2005) statement by him? -- George Orwell III (talk) 05:33, 28 May 2012 (UTC)
 * liens arising as a result of a criminal conviction with an order/settlement of restitution.  18 USC 3613 is specifically about unpaid fines, so such a lien could not exist until a fine is actually imposed, which means at sentencing.  Anything that happens before that point would not be subject to it.  And yes, there is a creditor -- someone to whom the monetary fine is owed, with a set amount.  The point of that type of lien is purely financial to me; it does not go any further than that -- that may well give a creditor the right to prevent actions which would reduce expected income, and of course may give them the right to some or all of the generated income.  However, as you say, it could only apply to works which might have a measure of valuation in the eyes of the law.  I therefore don't think the potential control of the creditors in this situation would extend to any work where there is no realistic opportunity for financial gains (i.e. potential to actually pay the fine in question).  For works where you can make a reasonable case for possible financial returns (and where relevant actions take place after sentencing), I would agree with you.  However a statement upon pleading guilty (in a subsequent court case) would not meet that definition, and I think it's unreasonable to think that it might.  Again, is there any court case which has ruled that the lien went any further than financial considerations, and ended up affecting a work of that nature?   I do see there was a civil judgment against Rudolph in 2003, though I don't see one from earlier, but again I see this work as (well) outside any potential financial considerations and therefore outside the scope of that lien.  If Emily Lyons has even made any specific claims to the contrary, that may bear consideration, but short of that, I don't think the lien has any real effect on the ability to license it. Carl Lindberg (talk) 06:00, 29 May 2012 (UTC)
 * You are still focusing on victims recieving money when recieving money was not likely (impossible in my opinion) especially when somebody plea bargains away any chance of parole at the same time they are being spared from execution. 18 U.S.C. 3613(c) is about more than just fines per 18 U.S.C. 3613(f) thanks to 18 U.S.C. 3664(m)(1)(A) (just like it was all laid out in the Unabomber rulings). Section 3664, among others, is the one that allows almost any portion of the law, within reason, when it comes to the enforcement of such liens, ordered or otherwise. That is why the introduction of the liability and entry of judgement are paramount more so than actual date of conviction in these cases. 18 U.S.C. 3613(c) highlights the point that ALL property or rights to property are subject to the lien - doing away with any notion of listing stuff lifted from Title 11's apparent stipulations. The point in these rare instances is to provide a remedy that seeks to insure no financial and/or "philosophical" gain, personal or otherwise, is ever reaped from these particular type of crimes. Its all about the victims (123 injured, 3 dead - one off-duty police officer, a super-Federal crime, - over four known bombings in Rudolph's case). To one degree, yes, the settlements/orders are indeed all about "silencing Rudolph" but just not in the so-called "Government censorship of the freedom of expresion" sense being expressed earlier in this discussion by someone else. These types of relief can be viewed to be about minimizing the so-called "ideas" that lead to bombings being justified by God's bible or whatever his cosmically assigned axe to grind it was that lead to indiscriminate explosive devices being set & going off in public settings. Nobody reasonable wanted to martyr Rudolph by executing him nor do they want "disciples" of that same twisted philosophy to further his actions by his example or from his "teachings" (i.e. what I consider this statement to be - 'don't believe my plea bargain, I'm just snookering the government here in order to...' blah, blah, etc. etc.). You're totally not looking at the nature of the crimes & resulting sentences against the the toll they do (valuation) or could (potential) exact on the victims now and their rehabilitation in the future both under the law proper. At the same time this attempt to "buffer" one from the other does not last forever either; only 20 years from the point of conviction (in Rudolph's case, plea bargained to boot so it is not a involuntary transfer in any sense just like the Unabomber) or Rudolph's natural death - whichever comes first. THAT is what the determinations are concerned with - not so much the money. Movies, etc. about these kind of incidents can and do eventually get made - but the names and places are changed enough so that they skirt both the real crimes and need to compensate the real people actually being portrayed in a so-called newly created dramatic work. But this 'statement' is not such a work - one that is in the vein of literature or creativity and thus "normal" copyright... and that is problem with manifestos and the like, in general, when they are born during these narrow instances where other human beings have been violated under the law along the way to their fruition. -- George Orwell III (talk) 16:57, 29 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Yes, I am focusing on victims receiving money, because from everything I see, that (and also ensuring that victims do not profit from their crimes) is the strict limit of the government's interest. Anything further squarely interferes with the First Amendment, and such things must be interpreted narrowly, not the very expansive definition that you state above.  18 U.S.C. 3664(m) is also primarily financial, given the language there and section (n), so that does not change anything to me.  The Supreme Court, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., ruled the original Son of Sam law unconstitutional, because it got into areas concerning the content of the criminal's speech.  That was over the Henry Hill case and the book Wiseguys.   It actually did basically say that such laws must consider *all* sources of income as avenues to satisfy the fine, as you have noted.  However, they repeatedly state that anything that goes beyond that specific interest is a problem, and no such law can be based on the content of the speech itself, even if it's not intended to injure the freedom of speech -- if it violates First Amendment rights, it's still unconstitutional. Laws in this area must be narrowly tailored to meet the government's interest.
 * However, the Board’s assertion that discriminatory financial treatment is suspect only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas is incorrect, since this Court has long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights under the Amendment. Furthermore, the Board’s claim that the law is permissible under the Amendment because it focuses generally on an “entity” rather than specifically on the media falters, first, on semantic grounds, since any entity that enters into a contract with a convicted person to transmit that person’s speech becomes by definition a medium of communication, and, second, on constitutional grounds, since the governmental power to impose content-based financial disincentives on speech does not vary with the identity of the speaker. Accordingly, in order to justify the differential treatment imposed by the law, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
 * The State has a compelling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime. Cf. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 629. However, contrary to the Board’s assertion, the State has little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoer’s speech about the crime. The Board cannot explain why the State should have any greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of criminals’ “storytelling” than from any of their other assets, nor offer any justification for a distinction between this expressive activity and any other activity in connection with its interest in transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims. Cf., e. g., Arkansas Writers’ Project, supra, at 231. Like the governmental entities in the latter and similar cases, the Board has taken the effect of the statute and posited that effect as the State’s interest.
 * The New York law is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s objective of compensating victims from the profits of crime. The law is significantly overinclusive, since it applies to works on any subject provided that they express the author’s thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally, and since its broad definition of “person convicted of a crime” enables the Board to escrow the income of an author who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not he was ever actually accused or convicted. These two provisions combine to encompass a wide range of existing and potential works that do not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while a victim remains uncompensated.
 * That decision does recognize a compelling interest in compensating victims, but is purely a financial interest, and is the interest which could create a lien of the type you mention. But that needs to be narrowly interpreted; any interpretation which goes beyond financial interests is outside the scope of that lien.  They even explicitly note there can be absolutely no interest in trying  to shield victims from any descriptions of the crime, nor anything which tries to "silence" the criminal because it is deemed offensive.  Those squarely violate the First Amendment, and seem to be your interpretations.  As despicable as his crimes were, and no matter how noxious you or I find his "justifications", it's still protected speech and anything which intentionally or accidentally impinges on that is unconstitutional. To wit:
 * The Board disclaims, as it must, any state interest in suppressing descriptions of crime out of solicitude for the sensibilities of readers. See Brief for Respondents 38, n. 38. As we have often had occasion to repeat: “ ‘[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.’” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 55 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978)). “ ‘If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’ ” United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310, 319 (1990) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989)). The Board thus does not assert any interest in limiting whatever anguish Henry Hill’s victims may suffer from reliving their victimization.
 * The court did note the interest in compensating victims: There can be little doubt, on the other hand, that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them. That I agree with you on, and from the links you've given, if there is property (even intellectual property) which could reasonably be used to compensate victims based on the adjucated fine, then yes it could be subject to that sort of lien, and does not need to be listed somewhere. If a criminal appears to be licensing something in order to destroy its financial value, i.e. to deprive victims of potential income since the criminal would no longer benefit, I agree that could be a problem.  The court also says: The State likewise has an undisputed compelling interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes.  However, in looking, the "profit" is again primarily financial -- We need only conclude that the State has a compelling interest in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes, and in using these funds to compensate victims.  Addtionally, that interest would not create a general lien of any kind, just that the State can prevent money going to the criminal (or possibly the criminal's family or close friends), so that is strictly limited to money headed for the criminal.  Most of the time, of course, there is an unpaid fine as well, so that would be where the funds would be directed (and maybe the distributed funds could even exceed the fine).  However, licensing something freely is still in line with that "can't profit from crime" interest, as it helps ensure that the criminal will not profit from the material -- others may profit, but that is OK.  So you are back to the interest in financially compensating the victims as the only one which could create a lien.  Any statute implementing that interest must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest, and go no further -- to me, you are instead reading that quite expansively, which is not permitted.  While not directly challenged to date, this note in the U.S Attorney's Manual indicates that a couple of bits of federal law (18 USC 3681 and 3682) are generally deemed to be unconstitutional due to that decision.  I ask, again, to cite a court case which actually ruled along the lines of your "philosophical profit" interpretation, because I don't believe they can. That smacks directly of a content-based restriction to me.  While I can understand your revulsion at the content of Rudolph's message, it's exactly the type of thing the First Amendment is there to protect.  In the end, the Supreme Court in that case did escrow the actual payments made to Henry Hill from the publisher, but that was the limit.  Even the Kaczynski ruling made explicit mention of this: the principal purpose of which shall be to maximize monetary return to the victims and their families. Those sales did not involve any intellectual property, just the physical items.   Carl Lindberg (talk) 05:37, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
 * While I cannot speak for the victims and why they don't go after their right to exercise against the copyright rights they are awarded (maybe they don't have the mean$ ?), I disagree that the narrow stipulation has not been met in these cases. What you are saying amounts to the way I read the law as not only is it OK to scream "fire" in a crowded room when there is no fire, but it is also OK to exercise copyright on that scream even when it turns out it is a known arsonist screaming it and the crowd is made up of his/her arson victims. That seems counter intuitive to me since there is no chance of ever satisfying the financial amounts being awarded at jump. So I interpret that impossibility as meeting the State ... show[ing] that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. - the interest being solely for maximizing the rehabilitation of victims, within a reasonable time period, from these crimes. If what you argue is true, why set the restitution so high for someone so unlike Henry Hill who has no chance of ever getting out of jail? Why have the 20 year or convict's death, whichever comes first, time limit? Nor is there any restriction on freedom of expression here, the to do part of 17 U.S.C. 106 always remains with the author; it's the to authorize part that is narrowly in focus and relevant to us here on WS. I can agree with almost everything else you've just cited -- especially since the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132) came about partly as a response to those types of cited rulings and rewrote the restitution procedures to un- narrow (broaden) the stipulations to include 'all other available and reasonable means' -- save the fact nothing there makes me believe these works are free and clear of ALL claim or liability enough to allow for the lawful waiving of all copyright-holder rights in order for the work to fall into the public domain either before or after the enactment of the 1996 act. We'll see if Rudolph's "agent" meets OTRS standards so that avenue of "licensing" becomes legitimized or not in a few weeks time and as you've argued is suppose to be too broad to fall under restriction. I'll accept that if and when that happens. I will not accept any '... because he said its PD, that makes it PD and therefor OK to host here' argument(s) however. It is too much of question to be settled by what amounts to laymen here and I can't believe the right to further distribution, for profit or otherwise, would ever be considered or guaranteed as part of the right to freedom of expression. Or at least something that can't be lawfully included or excluded by further narrow interpretation while we're at it. And please remember, the Kaczynski ruling was narrowly defined in order to prevent what normally would be the return of evidence gathered during an investigation to its owner once the trial has ended under the guise of "... maximizing monetary return to the victims and their families". An available and reasonable means narrowly designed to serve a singular purpose. It's ugly to read and I don't personally agree with such circumventions but that is what we must abide by here nevertheless. -- George Orwell III (talk) 13:18, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Kennedy had a concurring opinion in that case where he listed the narrow areas that speech can be restricted, noting that the New York law went beyond that: Here, a law is directed to speech alone where the speech in question is not obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, not an impairment of some other constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless action, and not calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the substantive power to prevent. No further inquiry is necessary to reject the State’s argument that the statute should be upheld. You can't restrict things more than those examples.  Shouting "fire" in a crowded theater is not protected speech, because the immediate reaction would cause a stampede, injuring and likely killing several people.  [In the context of the times when that quote was from, theaters generally used real flame lanterns for lighting, and theater fires were common, so people were especially panicky about fires in theaters, and the result of yelling "fire" in that context was easily predictable.]  That is therefore "calculated to bring about imminent harm" -- you can't use a First Amendment defense if you are charged in people's deaths in that situation.  But once the prospect of imminent harm is gone, then yes, of course the copyright would still stand (well, short phrases aren't copyrightable, so not in the case of a yell or the word "Fire").  If Rudolph was directly inciting people to commit crimes, it might be different -- that would be a further crime on his part -- but he is just discussing why he committed his own crimes.  Those are his ideas, plain and simple, and they have no common ground whatsoever with the "fire" situation.  Nobody in the courtroom was in imminent harm due to his words.  If someone else reads those words and afterwards commits further crimes, that is solely on that other person -- the government cannot prevent the words though just because that is a possibility.  It's free speech, for better or worse.  (And in some ways, it can be better -- the more you understand people like that, perhaps the more you can prevent others from going down the same path.) The fines are high more as a symbol, true, but also there in case something does happen where he does come into money -- maybe he unexpectedly inherits a lot of money, or something like that.  A low fine may result in a publisher being willing to pay him a greater amount for his story -- the state's interest does get dicier once the amount goes above the actual fines, though there still may be an interest in escrowing those funds, but at that point you'd have to show the profit was a result of his crimes.  You want to make sure the victims are compensated if it ever does become possible for whatever reason.  It's unlikely that the victims will ever see those funds, but that does not mean there is a non-financial intent to them (and such intent, along the lines that you are suggesting, would be unconstitutional I'm fairly sure). If your interpretation is correct, there should be an example somewhere.  I think if victims did have the right to go after copyrights, they would have at least once by now, but I don't think they can. It's still Rudolph's copyright, to me.  As a public record, he doesn't have *that* much control over distribution, since it's already OK to copy in many circumstances because of that.  But he could still need to authorize derivative works, or something like that, and the government trying to interfere with that (or any other distribution where he does not profit) would face significant First Amendment issues I'm rather sure.   I have no opinion on the OTRS permission.  If that's not valid, then it's not licensed.  Carl Lindberg (talk) 15:47, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Look you say this and similar works are not an enticement to cause or further criminal acts - I say they are the very essence of furthering them, especially in this information & internet intensive new world we live in (not the 70's, 80's or even early 90's). I don't think either one of us are qualified to make that determination to be honest no matter how much we cite and that is why too much of an unanswered question remains when it comes matter at hand; hosting. If he's not able to exercise the right to profit what right remains to exercise anything at all when an argument of valuation and/or potential exists? You say authorizing to distribute is OK'd under the First Amendment, I say then authorizing with the intent to profit should also be OK'd in spite the fact that is clearly not always the case. Its one or the other the way I read it - not split up or on a case by case basis. Either you have the First Amendment right or not. They can fine, assess, penalize or limit that right once an exercise of free speech encrouches upon the rights of others afterward, then why not before or why not before the further reproduction of that speech to be more accurate?  You are arguing exercising the right or rights to distrubute is enshrined as part of freedom of expression, I beg to differ regardless; admittedly in light that I cannot find a case that specifically deals with the domestic not-for-profit transfer of rights via an opertation of law at the moment - only for profit examples are readily available (but even that was not accepted at the begining of this discussion mind you as well). The insistance that the absence of case evidence is by no means the same as the evidence of an absence of validity to my arguments however.  You portray the government as not only the mediator & enforcer on the behalf of the victims but somehow the beneficiary of both the monetary and further enticement portions when limiting such exercise when I say its all done for the benefit of the victims & their rehabilitation. Government intervention was suppose to lessen the burden of the victims when it came to restitution the way I've understood the changes to the law since the Son of Sam & similar rulings. Also, I had thought the government dreaming up the Unabomber auction would suffice to illustrate how no stone is exempt from being overturned nowadays but it seems we're stuck on real property vs. intangible rights to property in spite of the language to the contrary in the law there.  All I want enforce here is that manifestos and the like are all fine for hosting when law abiding citizens create them without infringing upon the rights of others in the process. When they do violate the rights of others, all bets are off because this and similar questions become a part of the discussion and what could have once been black and white suddenly turns to nothing but shades of gray in my view. Sorry, this was and is not free and clear of all claim or liability as long as there are victims and not just citizens at large involved. -- George Orwell III (talk) 18:06, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
 * It's crystal clear in my mind that legally these are not enticement to commit criminal acts. The right to distribute is fairly explicit in the constitution; the First Amendment includes in its don'ts "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" with the second clause being all about the right to distribute. I don't see what "law abiding citizens create them without infringing upon the rights of others in the process" has to do with anything; if you want to argue scope, argue scope. Right now, we're talking about people with large liens placed against them.--Prosfilaes (talk) 22:23, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
 * No, I'm afraid the discussion has indeed progressed to scope at this point. The idea that a transfer of rights per an operation of law such as a lien can and does occur and it occurs against both tangible real property as well as incorporeal rights to property, such as copyright, is no longer in question so much anymore. The question at hand is how many of the possibilities to exercise, or the scope, listed under 17 U.S.C. 106 are limited-by or subject-to a lien when one arises and which ones are not. The crux being if an argument for the so called not-profitable copyright right-holder exercise differs in some wway from the "normal" for profit copyright right-holder exercise. I say this work is not free and clear of all claims or liability against it so it can't lawfully fall into the public domain. The other view is that it is OK to reproduce this here in spite of the ArmyofGod.com website's disclaimer of copyright because we would be in effect licensing the reproduction based on a valid OTRS. I cannot ascertain the profit or not-for profit status of the website since a lot pf its pages timeout before they fully open. -- George Orwell III (talk) 02:25, 31 May 2012 (UTC)

 * I think that argument amounts to thinking that convicted criminals lose their First Amendment rights. I don't see that to be the case at all.  That statement is definitely not incitement to crime; if it was, they would have charged him immediately.  It takes something very specific, knowing that there would be a criminal outcome, or really making someone in particular fear for their life.  One state's definition is here; you'll note that the crime really means that the speech would have to likely result in a crime being committed in very short order.  Rudolph's statement doesn't come anywhere close to this.  Maybe some of his other stuff crosses the line; no idea.  For an example of someone who did, just Googling around (not even heard of this guy before), there is this guy, who ratcheted up the rhetoric for years, before crossing the line and getting convicted.  He was acquitted in a later case, so the line is around there somewhere.  Nasty stuff.  Anyways, even for incitement, the copyright is probably still valid -- it's just that the First Amendment can't be a blanket defense; you can still go to jail.  But once the imminent threat is past, the copyright still remains, unless such speech is deemed ineligible for copyright in the first place (under the theory the person should not profit from it).  Manifestos etc. are fine for hosting if they meet scope requirements, and they are licensed (or public domain).  Does not matter if the copyright owner is a law-abiding citizen or a criminal.  I agree that if there is a fine in place, the government has an interest in satisfying that fine, so if there is a copyright which could reasonably used to pay restitution (up to the fine amount), then it may well be encumbered by the lien you speak of.  But that's it -- financial considerations only.  If you can find cases where judges allowed copyrights to be taken outside of that interest, then perhaps we would reconsider.  But I'm a pretty big believer in following actual court judgements, and not trying to think up theoretical situations which *might* be a problem, but also might not because of other legal arguments we hadn't thought of.  If you can only find financial restitution as part of these liens, there is probably a very good reason for that.  And while I'm also a bit troubled by some of the Kaczynski arguments about selling his stuff -- even the judge was repulsed by some of their behavior it seemed -- in the end, that was the actual ruling, and there are Supreme Court decisions backing it up, so you can't contest it much.  But as for anything further than pure financial restitution reasons, it's outside the scope of the lien I think, and it's a simple copyright which needs to be licensed to be here.  If the Rudolph statement's permission is OK (no idea on that), then we can host it.  [Emily Lyons' own site has a copy, for goodness' sake.]  If the Unabomber manifesto became PD by normal operation of law, then we can host that too, in my opinion.  Ugly stuff to be sure, but trying to hide it is not the answer. Carl Lindberg (talk) 05:07, 1 June 2012 (UTC)

 * I am seeing a lot of discussion on freedom of speech and first amendment rights in this discussion and I am unsure how any decision on Wikisource could have any relationship to a persons freedom of speech. In my understanding our only decision is if content meets WS:WWI and if having met inclusion expectations, it meets licensing. JeepdaySock (talk) 10:40, 31 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Arguing the various points of view seems to necessitate the reaching of their logical conclusions resting in the end with the principles laid out in the Constitution. I hope everybody can walk their statements back to what I've always believed to be the ultimate matter at hand here - hostability on WS or not. -- 11:01, 31 May 2012 (UTC)\
 * It's hostable, unless you want to argue that we should second-guess the presumable copyright holder based on what a court might possibly say in the future.--Prosfilaes (talk) 19:39, 31 May 2012 (UTC)
 * The First Amendment does come into play; George Orwell is trying to claim that a lien effectively acts as a gag order on the creditor, and the First Amendment says that in absence of a court ruling to that effect, we shouldn't interpret the law that way.--Prosfilaes (talk) 19:39, 31 May 2012 (UTC)
 * What I argued has no bearing on whether on not the work is hostable here or not. Extraneous arguments about freedom of speech, valuation, potential and similar were simply a means to an end. All I ever wanted to do here was draw out the fact that a lien, as an operation of law, can and does cause a transfer of rights to lien holders and affects the 6 principle "to do" &/or "to authorize" exclusive copyright rights and any sub-divisions thereof (17 U.S.C. 106) in the process. If one cannot waive All of those rights outlined in 17 U.S.C. 106 so that a work is Totally free and clear of All possible claims & liabilities against it in order for the work to fall into the negative space refered to as the Public Domain lawfully, then the only real means left to exercise is to license the work without a profit motive. If we can license ontop of the license already stated at the ArmyofGod website where this work originates from with an OTRS approval - I say fine - its their problem. If a license ontop of an existing license doesn't cut the mustard with the OTRS folks then all I ever wanted to make clear here was that neither will any notion the work is then somehow PD when its been shown throughout, by both pro & and con sides if you like, that a lien prevents that option from ever happening so long as the lien is in force. Freedom of speech, Chinese dissidents or deadbeat dads never had anything to do with actual inclusion or hosting. -- George Orwell III (talk) 20:09, 31 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Again, from everything I've seen, the lien is only there for financial restitution. If a copyright can't help with that, then it's outside the scope of the lien, so we are back to normal copyright. Carl Lindberg (talk) 05:07, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Either this work is PD or it is not. The copyright disclaimer reserving Rudolph's rights with caveats of either personal or non-commercial re-use is at the very beginning of the Army of God website so it can't be PD now can it? There was no voluntary waiving of rights by Rudolph never mind one from being prohibited by a transfer of rights thanks to a lien arising or not. The author's intent indicates a reservation of rights. PD is not a moment in time vehicle where you can license for free at one given moment and then possibly change licensing parameters for revenue generating later on. All the rights must be lawfully waived in a singke shot all at the same time for anything to fall into PD properly; I say that can't be done thanks to a lien; you now say otherwise -- but I've never know the waiving of rights to be anything other than a zero sum option. You've shown that the only avenue left is to do the same as the website has done and license the work with a non-profit caveat (enter the OTRS request to do just that). I will accept their ruling if that is case. What you are saying rewrites the fundamental principle in waiving all exclusive copyright rights irregardless of any financial incentive being in play or not. I do not need case law to support that principle; it is and has always been a given. -- George Orwell III (talk) 06:42, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Rudolph's statement is not PD, no, unless he placed it into the public domain. [It's a public record, which is not the same thing.] The armyofgod website permission is not enough to host it here, no.  That is why I voted delete on the initial nomination on the copyright violations page.  In my opinion there is no lien on the copyright, since it is not going to be used to financially compensate the victims.  So, Rudolph owns the copyright free and clear.  If he chooses to license it freely, that's up to him.  If that permission can be obtained somehow, such that OTRS is satisfied, then so be it, and we can host it.  If OTRS is not satisfied, then my delete vote stands. Carl Lindberg (talk) 07:24, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * With all due respect, You don't get to arbitrarily determine what has financial worth, valuation or potential and what does not. Neither do I - thats why I argued more along the lines of remedying "unjust enrichment" instead of straight-up "pay the fine" monetary restitution (though monetary payment is admittedly the most common vehicle cited). Nor can you can say the work is absolutely free and clear for the same reason(s). Nobody here can make those determinations fairly, leaving us with questions we will never answer well enough either way to meet our inclusion guideline let alone licensing. Second, as I'm sure you already know but repeat it here for the sake of others, there is no such thing as "place" or "public domain" anywhere in the Copyright Law. The only thing that the law recognizes is the 'negative space' left once all the legal options to exercise exclusive rights are in the free and clear and waived in full by the holder with a discernable clear statement reflecting the owner's intentions to do so first. I can "place" something that is 100% completely plagarized into the so called public domain with a well-constructed clear statement waiving all my rights and recieve the automatic protections normally afforded to all authors under copyright but in no way, shape or form can that ever be considered a lawful waiver (or your 'placement into PD'). Any author's assertions must ultimately be backed by lawfully actions. -- George Orwell III (talk) 08:12, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * No, but you can make some reasonable assumptions based on court guidance. All guidance to this point, from what I have seen, is purely financial in nature, and nobody has any right to go further than that -- since that is the limit of the state's interest, as ruled.  The fines are nine years old, and the statement is seven years old, and nobody has made a move to use it for financial purposes.  If he ever does earn money from it somehow, it would get escrowed, but I can't imagine that ever happening.  As a public record, there are wide rights to copy it already (though it's still not "free".)  I don't see a problem with making reasonable assumptions; the alternative is to basically declare all criminal's works unlicenseable (provided they have an outstanding fine), and I do not agree with that approach at all, particular as there is no supporting jurisprudence whatsoever (and what is there indicates otherwise).  If any entity has made some sort of actual claim on the copyright, then reconsider in light of that.  If there is apparent financial value, then I'd also hold off.  Otherwise, I would assume the person still owns the full copyright in all respects.  As for "public domain", yes, that concept is in the law, albeit used in the context of normal expiration (or lack of copyright notice, etc.).  "placing in the public domain" is not a process defined in copyright law, no, but common-law concepts like abandonment still apply to intellectual property, and a statement such as that which explicitly gives up their rights under copyright should have that same basic effect.   But yes, that statement has to come from the copyright owner -- nobody else has the ability to do that.  I think Rudolph does have that ability, though no idea if he has done so.  Or he could simply license the copyright under a free license -- public domain is not a requirement.  Carl Lindberg (talk) 08:45, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * But you are making those so-called reasonable assumptions on outdated 1991, 1978 and similar pre MVRA of 1996 Act rulings and yes every criminal with an order to provide restitution against them has the potential to be unlicenseable (M = Mandatory) here. Not every lien is a result of an order of restitution but every order of restitution results in an order to pay or provide in-kind restitution. It is the inability to satisfy the judgement in a timely manner that causes a lien to arise. The order and the lien are not one in the same, just another available and resonable means to an end like fine, penalty, assessment, etc. Their is no need for any so called claim - its all inclusive and not just about ownership but assets owned as well as assets controlled at the time of arrest. The exercise of... is subject to the Order which may or may not include a lien. Again, the reason unjust enrichment is more applicable than straight montetary restitution. The only reason lien ever became the phrase of the day over order was the fact he couldn't ever never ever ever repay it!!! Not every other judgment ordered is so steep to make the victims "whole" again but the Act always imposes something (even if it is just an in-kind service performed) for every Title 18 crime. -- George Orwell III (talk) 09:50, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Supreme Court rulings do not get outdated, when it comes to constitutional matters, unless undone by a later ruling. Rather, the laws must conform to those rulings.  That court made clear that the limit was financial restitution; beyond that the First Amendment comes into play.  Anything outside of that specific area is outside the government's ability to regulate.  Until and unless an actual example of what you are suggesting takes place, I think it is assuming far, far too much.  It's an unproven theory, and I think the courts would have a big problem with it if the government tried to prevent licensing like you say, outside of a fairly obvious intent to reduce actual monetary income.  Carl Lindberg (talk) 12:57, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Again not in question and goes to the content itself not the issue of hostability. The issue I still have with your premise is that You are now determining what has value and what does not when there should be no assumptions being made whatsoever, no possible future potential and no arbitrary valuations on anyone's part here. Otherwise, I believe we've crossed a line when it comes to hosting. -- George Orwell III (talk) 17:21, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Because we have to interpret court rulings all the time to the best of our ability. If he wants to license it, and the government has a problem with it and think they have a case, then step up and do something.  If he licenses it, then it's licensed.  I don't think they would have a case, because they would have to explain exactly how preventing the licensing was going to financially benefit the victim.  You can't put stuff like that on indefinite hold indiscriminately.  That's a severe First Amendment issue, to me -- the government's interest must be construed narrowly, and something like this is interpreting it about as expansively as possible.  The government would have to prove value in order to enforce the lien, and they have not in the past seven years.  They can deal with any income as he gets it, but if he actually had anything of financial value they were going after, they should have dealt with it by now.  Katie Lyons I think got a check for about $60, the grand sum of the $2 million she's owed -- so they did find *something*.   Carl Lindberg (talk) 18:21, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The problem with interpreting what I know & consider to be an "old" ruling (1991), even to the utmost of one's abilities when attempting to support a current day position with what amounts to past [re]statement of existing principles, is when it comes with the frequent absence of a full and proper statutory review to see if legislative measures since the ruling have remained statutorily static or have been amended in some way in reponse to that ruling all at once. What was a Constitutional issue with New York State's SoS law where it specifically “... singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it place[d] on no other speech and no other income” while accepting 'that compensating victims and preventing criminals from profiting were compelling interests [for the State]' at the same time, New York's legislative body, as well as the majority of other States, have since responded to that ruling by amending their relevant statutory code starting in 1992 on forward. These newly revised or enacted laws figured out how to achieve both of the compelling interests recognized by the Court back in 1991 that were, arguably, sufficiently narrow and content-neutral in moving forward. The MVRA of 1996 only eased and/or facilitated the types of changes being made at the State level in a further response not to violate the 1991 ruling but at the Federal level. So yes, the principle being argued supporting First Amendment protections is 100% as sound today as it was in 1991 - the legislative changes made since that ruling, however, have made the singling out of certain content and/or the income that may be generated from it no longer relevant under current day circumstances and statute. We don't have to go digging for a case supporting anything different from the 1991 ruling; the law(s) on the books have changed instead to not only to account for those concerns but to add many other nuances that have been upheld as well.  The new models, as well as the Federal statute, generally keeps the any-profits-from-a-crime provisions as they did before 1991 and adds the-assets-of-the-convicted provisions to complement it; now all types of property, intellectual and otherwise, are considered to have value and assessed as such (usually in an aggregate dollar amount). By including everything & anything and treating the portions equally with indifference by the narrow State interest at hand rather than listing bits and pieces of one type property or the other or singling out one specific work or another, victim restitution no longer comes with any infringement on the defendant's freedoms (of expression or otherwise).  Again, while I personally believe to know that the law recognizes the increase or decrease of any person's notoriety as a valuation that not only can be reasonably assessed (as well as monetized if need be) but can be conferred upon that individual directly or indirectly just as well - affecting that person's possible potential accordingly - I do not want to fall into the same trap of claiming to be a definitive assessor or dismisser of such valuations or pretend to known with absolute certainty what potential gains the future might bring. Yet those considerations can & do exist ....and not just in theory. Given that "unknown", I can't in good conscience believe these type of works are not subject to those remaining legal questions well enough to be considered for hosting here. -- George Orwell III (talk) 00:48, 2 June 2012 (UTC)
 * And to me, the ruling quite explicitly said that the government's interest is purely financial, and must be construed narrowly. If the government can identify a financial interest at present, then fine, but otherwise I cannot imagine that the Constitution allows the government to prevent somebody exercising their rights simply under the remote possibility that someday there may be a financial interest.  That to me is anything but a narrow interpretation. I cannot believe the government has that right unless proven in a court of law, and in good conscience do not want to prevent those works from being hosted here under such assumption.  If a court case ever proves otherwise, then fine, but we could delete just about any work hosted here under assumption that someday a court ruling could change things.  To this point, it does not appear that the government has ever tried to do such a thing, nor has any court ruled that such a thing is possible, and given the very narrow exceptions afforded to encroachments on the First Amendment, I don't feel that it's likely that the government would be able to do this.  So I guess at this point, we just see the situation differently ;-)  [I can't see the link you posted above; there seems to be a temporary error on the site.  Okay, can see it now -- most of the Son of Sam laws are trying to ensure the criminal does not profit from the crime; licensing something freely is perfectly in line with that goal, so I don't see how those affect the situation.]  Carl Lindberg (talk) 15:08, 3 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The ruling said that "... in order to justify the differential treatment imposed by the law, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.". Since "... the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them." was never in question, the ruling, at the time, specifically dealt with striking the practice of differential treatment based on the improper manner that "... the law singles out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income and, thus, is presumptively inconsistent with the [First] Amendment." in light of the fact "... the law is significantly over inclusive, since it applies to works on any subject provided that they express the author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally, and since its broad definition of 'person convicted of a crime' enables the Board to escrow the income of an author who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not he was ever actually accused or convicted." - the person in question in the preceding being Henry Hill, who was never convicted of any of the newly revealed crimes he claimed to directly take-part-in or informed-upon during in his court testimony in return for witness protection by the way. The legislative changes to the relevant law(s) made as response to the 1991 ruling did away with the high Court's two major concerns, both as it related to the differential treatment in the singling out of content-based speech for a specific financial burden constituting a First Amendment violation as well as the over-inclusiveness brought about by focusing purely on the aspects of THE crime by anyone convicted of A crime (e.g. - not necessarily the same crime or crimes caused a conviction as the specific crime or crimes where victims deserve compensation as a result for being 'harmed' in some way as defined by law). Taking the second concern first, the obvious change(s) made to the law since the 1991 ruling was to move away from how the law then "... define[d] [a} 'person convicted of a crime' to include 'any person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted'." as a primary stipulation that must be met when it came to ordering or enforcing restitution to one that need only qualify the existence and identification of a victim, defined as a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which orders of restitution are available or mandated during the sentencing proceedings for the convictions of, or the plea agreements relating to any charges for, that offense. No more overinclusiveness.  The other batch of changes to the law since the ruling do away with differential treatment . The Court said "... the State should {not] have any greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of criminals' "storytelling" than from any of their other assets, nor offer any justification for a distinction between this expressive activity and any other activity in connection with its interest in transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims."  The revised laws no longer focus on just "profiting from one's crimes", they now target all assets irregardless of any relation to the crime or offense in question. 18 U.S.C. 3613(c) highlights the point that ALL property or rights to property are subject to a lien arising from unsatisfied fines (not applicable for this discussion) or an order of restitution (applicable for this discussion and mandatory in this particular case to boot). Intellectual property is still property owned and controlled by its creator no matter how you slice it. The laws no longer focus on just "speech" related to aspects of a crime and the income that it may or may not generate either. It treats all assets with the same indifference as the next. Its the very idea that one can ascertain what is valuable and what is not valuable which introduces differential treatment all over again here that would also be contrary to the principles laid out in the 1991 ruling. Rudolph can try to make money on any story, including one that deals with his crimes, today by selling it for a dollar amount but that would be money subject to a lien arising from an unsatisfied order of restitution as a change in his assets afterward & once realized; not necessarily the direct profiting from his crimes in particular as before. He can license his works for free and not be subject to the lien because that is not a change in his Assets - he still "owns" the works; no increase or decrease in net assets has taken place, thus no differentiation in treatment. Trying to transfer ownership or exercising a transfer of ownership of rights, for profit or otherwise, however, is still subject to the lien because it is affects his Assets. To say that would be increase or decrease in the net value of his Assets would not only be an unfair differentiation in the treatment against any & all property or rights to property (i.e. all his assets), but also a purely subjective determination as to the valuation and/or the future potential being made on our part & our part alone. The waiving of all copyright rights as opposed to a contractual transfer would still be, in end effect, a transfer in ownership, effecting one's assets, and thus not possible under the current laws enforcing restitution -- just as one can not dis-own an asset simply by giving it away to family or friends for free in order to circumvent them from being included as part of one's owned property or rights to property here.  Again, if OTRS says licensing this statement is OK, then fine by me. But if not - in no way, shape or form does that mean this statement or any other attempt to waive all, or transfer ownership of just some, copyright rights of some work while an order of restitution exists is possible under the current law. If it is property owned or controlled by the defendant, it is subject to the order of restitution as well as any lien arising from that order if restitution remains outstanding. To differentiate now between types of property based on percieved value or the lack thereof would be just as contrary to the ruling as was when they tried to differentiate treatment based on particular content and its percieved income back then. -- George Orwell III (talk) 03:03, 5 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Its the very idea that one can ascertain what is valuable and what is not valuable The idea that one can't is what leads people to be hoarders. I've never seen anything that says that people under such a lien outside prison cannot transfer ownership of physical property twice a week to the trashman.--Prosfilaes (talk) 00:23, 6 June 2012 (UTC)

 * Please address this statement "If he ever does earn money from it somehow, it would get escrowed, but I can't imagine that ever happening" by User:Clindberg 08:45, 1 June 2012 (UTC). If the work is published on Wikisource as GFDL, that allows for the work to commercialized.  How could the GFDL license be compatible with the need to escrow profits on this particular work? JeepdaySock (talk) 15:22, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * If *he* earns money from it. If someone else earns money, that's different, and is fine.  It's just that he can't benefit from his crimes, and if he earns any income, then he still owes a fine, so the money is really owed to someone else.  This whole thing is about a statement made in court though.  It's about as purely a non-financial type of speech as you can get, and is absolutely protected by the First Amendment.  Trying to prevent its dissemination via the lien theory is pretty disingenuous, and I'm not aware of any instances of the government actually going after a copyright, so it's far from a sure thing, particularly when they can't identify an actual, present financial value to it.  The government has no valid interest in trying to prevent his message, only in using his assets to raise funds.  You can't just prevent him from exercising his rights over everything he's ever written just because he's a criminal, and there is a 0.00000000000001% chance that it can earn a little money in the next 20 years.  The only way licensing something freely is a problem to me is if it could realistically deprive a victim of the income they are owed via the fine.  If there was a realistic chance this could earn money, they would have gone after it by now.  It may well be that only copyrights designed to make money -- something there is an obvious market for -- fall under this type of lien.  Statements in court is not one of them; there is zero expectation of any income from that. Carl Lindberg (talk) 18:21, 1 June 2012 (UTC)

}}

Rick Snyder's First Inaugural Address
=Other=


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1896. the financial year ending the thirty-first day of March one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six shall instead of being applied as provided by the above-mentioned Act, be set apart in the Exchequer account and applied by the Treasury at such times as they direct, as follows:

 * (a) in paying off with interest any sum borrowed under the Naval Works Act, 1896;
 * (b) in repaying to the Consolidated Fund any sums issued in pursuance of the Naval Works Act, 1895, and not already repaid;
 * (c) in paying any sums authorised by this or any future Act to be issued out of the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of the works specified in the schedule to this Act.

5.—(1.) The Admiralty shall cause to be made out an account in the form required by the Treasury, showing-:—
 * (a) the aggregate amount of money expended for any purpose of this Act or of the Naval Works Act, 1895, and the purposes on which that money was expended, distinguishing the expenditure under each of the heads in the schedule to this Act;

 * (b) the aggregate amount of money borrowed and repaid, and securities (if any) created for borrowing the same and discharged; and
 * (c) the balance (if any) of the sums authorised to be issued for any such purpose.

(2.) The accounts of expenditure under this Act shall be audited and reported upon by the Comptroller and Auditor-General as appropriation accounts in manner directed by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866

6. This Act may be cited as the Naval Works Act, 1896.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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8

  An Act to apply a sum out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the year ending on the thirty-first day of March one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven. [21st May 1896.]

Most Gracious Sovereign,

E, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, towards making good the supply which we have cheerfully granted to Your Majesty in this session of Parliament, have resolved to grant unto Your Majesty the sum herein-after mentioned; and do therefore most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

2. The Treasury may issue out of the Consolidated Fund of the out of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and apply towards making good the supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of


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1896. the year ending on the thirty-first day of March one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven the sum of twenty-seven million four hundred and forty-two thousand two hundred and seven pounds.

2. The Treasury may borrow from any person, and the Bank of England may advance to the Treasury on the credit of the said sum, any sum or sums not exceeding in the whole the sum of twenty-seven to borrow, million four hundred and forty-two thousand two hundred and seven pounds, and the Treasury shall repay the moneys so borrowed with interest not exceeding five pounds per centum per annum, out of the growing produce of the Consolidated Fund at any period not later than the next succeeding quarter to that in which the said moneys were borrowed-

Any moneys so borrowed shall be placed to the credit of the account of the Exchequer, and shall form part of the said Consolidated Fund, and be available in any manner in which such fund is available.

3. This Act may be cited as the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Act,1896.

  An Act to enable Life Assurance Companies to pay Money into Court in certain Cases.[21st May 1896. E it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :

1. This Act may be cited as the Life Assurance Companies (Payment into Court) Act, 1896.

2. In this Act —
 * The expression "life assurance company" means any corporation, company, or society carrying on the business of life assurance, not being a society registered under the Acts relating to friendly societies;
 * The expression "life policy" includes any policy not foreign to the business of life assurance.

3. Subject to rules of court any life assurance company may Power to pay into the High Court, or where the head office of the company is situated within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster either into that court or into the High Court, any moneys payable by them under a life policy in respect of which, in the opinion of their board of directors, no sufficient discharge can otherwise be obtained.

4. The receipt or certificate of the proper officer shall be a sufficient discharge to the company for the moneys so paid into court, and such moneys shall, subject to rules of court, be dealt with according to the orders of the High Court or the Palatine Court, as the case may be.

5. This Act does not extend to Scotland.


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 TABLE II.

A

TABLE

OF The of the of a Local Character passed during the Session which are placed amongst the Local Acts.

59 & 60 VICTORIA— A.D. 1896.

ii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Education Department under the Elementary Education Act 1870 to enable the School Board for Tottenham to put in force the Lands Clauses Acts, (Education Department Provisional Order Confirmation (Tottenham).)

iii. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts 1882 and 1888 relating to a portion of the Parish of Kensington St. Mary Abbotts and to the St. Olave and Strand Districts in the County of London. (Electric Lighting Orders Confirmation (Notting Hill &c.).)

iv. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order for forming a Compensation District and establishing a Compensation Board under the Brine Pumping (Compensation for Subsidence) Act 1891. (Brine Pumping (Compensation for Subsidence) Provisional Order Confirmation.)

V. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order under the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892 relating to Cupar Water. (Cupar Water Order Confirmation.)

vi. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Secretary for Scotland under Part I. of the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 relating to the City and Royal Burgh of Aberdeen. (Aberdeen Improvement Scheme Provisional Order Confirmation.)

vii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order under the Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Act 1863 and the Acts amending the same relating to the Bunkey Drainage District in the Counties of Limerick and Tipperary. (Drainage and Improvement of Lands Supplemental (Ireland).)


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viii xxviii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order of the Local Government Board relating to the Parish of Saint Matthew Bethnal Green. (Local Government Board's Provisional Order Confirmation (Poor Law).)

xxix. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to Clitheroe Goole Halifax Llandudno Plymouth Stratford upon-Avon Swansea and Wallasey. (''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 4).'')

xxx. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the Brighouse Fulstone-and-Hepworth Hanley-Stoke-and-Fenton Hertford-and-Ware Isle-of-Thanet Sittingbourne-and-Milton Stone Stroud and Wallsend-and-Willington-Quay Joint Hospital Districts.(''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 5).'')

lxxiv. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the Borough of Bridgwater and to the Counties of Cambridge and Heitford. (''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 1).'')

lxxv. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the Counties of Devon Dorset Gloucester Somerset Warwick Wilts and Worcester. (''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 3).'')

lxxvi. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the City of Oxford and the Parish of Whitechapel. (''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (Poor Law) (No. 2).'')

lxxvii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order under the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867 and any Acts amending the same relating to Bonnybridge Dennyloanhead Parkfoot Longcroft Haggs and Hollandbush Water. (Bonnybridge &c. Water Order Confirmation.)

lxxviii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 containing the Classification of Merchandise Traffic and the Schedule of Maximum Rates Tolls and Charges applicable thereto for the Strabane Canal. (Canal Rates Tolls and Charges (Strabane Canal) Order Confirmation.)

lxxix. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 containing the Classification of Merchandise Traffic and the Schedule of Maximum Tolls and Charges applicable thereto for the Caledonian and Crinan Canals. (Canal Tolls and Charges (Caledonian and Crinan Canals) Order Confirmation.)

lxxx. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 containing the Classification of Merchandise Traffic and the Schedule of Maximum Tolls and Charges applicable thereto for the Canals of the Burwell Fen Drainage and


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A.D. 1896.] Navigation Commissioners and certain other Canals. (Canal Tolls and Charges (Burwell Fen &c.) Order Confirmation.)

lxxxi. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State under the Metropolitan Police Act 1886 relating to lands in the parishes of St. John the Evangelist Westminster and All Saints Poplar. (Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation.)

lxxxii. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts 1882 and 1888 relating to Cowes Folkestone Gloucester Huddersfield King's Lynn Manchester and Wells. (''Electric Lighting Orders Confirmation (No. 1).'')

lxxxiii. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts 1882 and 1888 relating to Colwyn Bay and Colwyn Devon port Godalming Kettering Kingstown and Sliddleton. (''Electric Lighting Orders Confirmation (No. 2).'')

lxxxiv. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts 1882 and 1888 relating to Ashton-on-Mersey and Bucklow and Keswick. (''Electric Lighting Orders Confirmation (No. 6).'')

lxxxv. An Act to confirm two Provisional Orders made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Urban Sanitary Districts of Londonderry and Ballinasloe. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 3).'')

lxxxvi. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Rural Sanitary District of the Belfast Union. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 4).'')

lxxxvii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Town of Portrush. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 5).'')

lxxxviii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Urban Sanitary District of Coleraine. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 6).'')

lxxxix. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Rural Sanitary District of the Sligo Union. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 7).'')

xc. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Sanitary Districts of Queenstown Larne Manorhamilton and Donegal. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 8).'')


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x xci. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Rural Sanitary District of the Sligo Union. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 10).'')

xcii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland under the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878 relating to the Rural Sanitary District of Mullingar. (''Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 12).'')

xciii. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order under the Land Drainage Act 1861 relating to the Langley Chedgrave and Toft Monks Marahos in the Parishes of Langley Chedgrave Toft Monks Stockton Haddiscoe Loddon Raveningham and Reedham in the county of Norfolk. (Land Drainage Supplemental.)

xciv. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the General Pier and Harbour Act 1861 relating to Birchington Bexhill Herno Bay Penzance Porthgain Stonehaven and Studland. (''Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2).'')

xcv. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Gas and Water Works Facilities Act 1870 relating to Chester-le-Street and Pelton Gas Maidstone Gas and Settle Gas. (Gas Orders Confirmation.)

xcvi. An Act to transfer the Upper and Lower Boyne Navigations to the Boyne Navigation Company (Limited). (Boyne Navigation Transfer.)

xcvii An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 relating to the London and English Channel Pilotage District. (Pilotage Order Confirmation.)

xcviii. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Gas and Water Works Facilities Act 1870 relating to Fort William Gas and Laindon Gas and Water. (Gas and Water Orders Confirmation.)

xcix. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order under the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867 and any Acts amending the same relating to Kelty Water. (Kelty Water Order Confirmation.)

c. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order of the Local Government Board relating to the Ports of Colchester Newcastle North Shields Plymouth South Shields and Weymouth. (Local Government Board's Provisional Order Confirmation (Ports).)

ci. An Act to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to Axbridge Basford Bath Cambridge Carlisle Hanwell Richmond (Surrey) Southall-Norwood Stocksbridge Waltham-Holy-Cross and Woking. (''Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 6).'')


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Rh only to the subject itself but to my appreciation of the subject which at the time was unbounded. I do not know whether to be more amazed at my failure in it to say what I wanted to say, or at the Editor's amiability in publishing it. The article may not have lost all its eloquence for me, since between the halting lines I can read the story I did not know how to tell, but for others it would prove a dull affair and it is best left where it is, forgotten in the old files of a popular magazine.

The story I read is one of a series of discoveries with a romance in each. The way the article came about was that J. had made etchings of Philadelphia, and the Editor, who had wisely arranged to use them, thought they could not be published without accompanying text. When he asked me, as a young Philadelphian just beginning to write, to supply this text, he advised me to consult with J., whom I did not know and whose studio address he gave me.

I was thrilled by the prospect, never having been in a studio nor met an artist, and when it turned out not half so simple as it looked on paper, when the first catching my artist was attended with endless delays and difficulties, it did not lessen the thrill or take away from the sense of adventure.

J.'s studio, which he shared with Mr. Harry Poore, was at the top of what was then the Presbyterian Building on Chestnut Street above Thirteenth, quite new and of tremendous height at a time when the sky-scraper


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272 had not been invented nor the elevator become a necessity of Philadelphia life. Day after day, varying the hour with each attempt, now in the morning, now at noon, now toward evening, I toiled up those long flights of stairs, marvelling at the strange, unaccountable disclosures through half-opened studio doors, for it was a building of studios; glad of the support of my Uncle who was seeing me through this, as he saw me through all my earliest literary enterprises; arriving at the top, breathless and panting, only to be informed by a notice, written on paper and pinned on the tight-locked door, that J. was out and would be back in half an hour. My Uncle and I were inclined to interpret this literally, once or twice waiting trustingly on the dark landing some little while beyond the appointed time. On one occasion I believe the door was opened, when we knocked, by Mr. Poore who was not sure of the length of a half hour as J. reckoned it, but had an idea it might vary according to circumstances, especially now that J. was out of town. I went away not annoyed as I should be to-day, but more stirred than ever by the novelty of the adventure.

At last I tied J. down by an appointment, as I should have done at the start, and he, having returned to town, kept it to the minute. I think from first to last of this astonishing business I had no greater shock of astonishment than when I followed him into his studio. We were in the Eighteen-Eighties then, when American magazines and newspapers were making sensational copy out of the


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Rh princely splendour of the London studios, above all of Tadema's, Leighton's, Millais': palatial interiors, hung with priceless tapestries, carpeted with rare Oriental rugs, shining with old brass and pottery and armour, opening upon Moorish courts, reached by golden stairs, fragrant with flowers, filled with soft couches and luxurious cushions—flamboyant, exotic interiors that would not have disgraced Ouida's godlike young Guardsmen but that scarcely seemed to belong to men who made their living by the work of their hands. Indeed, it was their splendour that misled so many incompetent young men and women of the later Victorian age into the belief that art was the easiest and most luxurious short cut to wealth. But there was nothing splendid or princely about J.'s studio. It was frankly a workshop, big and empty, a few unframed drawings and life studies stuck up on the bare walls, the floors carpetless, for furniture an easel or two and a few odd rickety chairs—a room nobody would have dreamed of going into except for work. But then, my first impression of J. was of a man who did not want to do anything except work.

My experience had been that people—if I leave out my Uncle—worked, not because they wanted to but because they had to and that, sceptical as they might be on every other Scriptural point, they were not to be shaken out of their belief in work as a curse inherited from Adam. J., evidently, would have found the curse in not being allowed to work. And as new to me was the enthusiasm with