text:
Page:Dissent of the Minority at the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention.djvu/1

T was not until after the termination of the late glorious contet, which made the people of the United States an Independent nation, that any defect was dicovered in the preent confederation. It was formed by ome of the ablet patriots in America. It carried us uccesfully through the war; and in the virtue and patriotim of the people, with their dipoition to promote the common caue, upplied the want of power in Congres.

The requiition of congres for the five per cent. impot was made before the peace, o early as the firt of February 1781, but was prevented taking effect by the refual of one tate; yet it is probable every tate in the union would have agreed to this meaure at that period, had it not been for the extravagant terms in which it was demanded. The requiition was new moulded in the year 1783, and accompanied with additional demand of certain upplementary funds for 25 years. Peace had now taken place, and the United States found themelves laboring under a coniderable foreign and dometic debt, incurred during the war. The requiition of 1783, was commenurate with the interet of the debt as it was then calculated; but it has been more accurately acertained ince that time. The dometic debt has been found to fall everal millions of dollars hort of the calculation, and it has lately been coniderably diminihed by large ales of the wetern lands. The tates have been called on by congres annually for upplies until the general ytem of finance propoed in 1783 hould take place.

It was at this time that the want of an efficient federal government was firt complained of, and that the powers veted in congres were found to be inadequate to the procuring of the benefits that hould reult from the union. The impot was granted by mot of the tates, but many refued the upplementary funds; the annual requiitions were et at nought by ome of the tates, while others complied with them by legilative acts, but were tardy in their payments, and congres found themelves incapable of complying with their engagements, and upporting the federal government. It was found that our national character was inking to the opinion of foreign nations. The congres could make treaties of commerce, but could not enforce the obervance of them. We were uffering from the retrictions of foreign nations, who had hackled our commerce, while we were unable to retaliate: and all now agreed that it would be advantageous to the union to enlarge the powers of congres; that they hould be enabled in the amplet manner to regulate commerce, and to lay and collect duties on the imports throughout the United States. With this view a convention was firt propoed by Virginia, and finally recommended by congres for the different tates to appoint deputies to meet in convention, "for the purpoes of reviing and amending the preent articles of confederation o as to make them adequate to the exigencies of the union." This recommendation the legilatures of twelve tates complied with o hatily as not to conult their contituents on the ubject; and though the different legilatures had no authority from their contituents for the purpoe, they probably apprehended the neceity would jutify the meaure; and none of them extended their ideas at that time further than "reviing and amending the preent articles of confederation." Pennylvania by the act appointing deputies expresly confined their powers to this object; and through it is probable that ome of the members of the aembly of this tate, had at that time in contemplation to annihilate the preent confederation, as well as the contitution of Pennylvania, yet the plan was not ufficiently matured to communicate it to the public.

The majority of the legilature of this commonwealth, were at that time under the influence of the members from the city of Philadelphia. They agreed that the deputies ent by them to convention hould have no compenation for their ervices, which determination was calculated to prevent the election of any member who reided at a ditance from the city. It was in vain for the minority to attempt electing delegates to the convention, who undertood the circumtances, and the feelings of the people, and had a common interet with them. They found a dipoition in the leaders of the majority of the houe to chue themelves and ome of their dependant—The minority attempted to prevent this by agreeing to vote for ome of the leading members, who they knew had influence to be appointed at any rate, in hopes of carrying with them ome repectable citizens of Philadelphia, in whoe principles and integrity they could have more confidence; but even in this they were diappointed, except in one member:—the eighth member was added at a ubequent eion of the aembly.

The Continental convention met in the city of Philadelphia at the time appointed. It was compoed of ome men of excellent characters; of others who were more remarkable for their ambition and cunning, than their patriotim; and of ome who had been opponents to the independence of the United States.—The delegates from Pennylvania were, ix of them, uniform and decided opponents to the contitution of this commonwealth. The convention at upwards of four months. The doors were kept hut, and the members brought under the mot olemn engagements of ecrecy. Some of thoe who oppoed their going o far beyond their powers, retired, hopeles, from the convention, others had the firmnes to refue igning the plan altogether: and many who did ign it, did it not as a ytem they wholly approved, but as the bet that could be then obtained, and notwithtanding the time pent on this ubject, it is agreed on all hands to be a work of hate and accommodation.

Whilt the gilded chains were forging in the ecret conclave, the meaner intruments of depotim, without, were buily employed in alarming the fears of the people, with dangers which did not exit, and exciting their hopes of greater advantages from the expected plan than even the bet government on earth could produce.

The propoed plan had not many hours iued forth from the womb of upicious ecrecy, until uch as were prepared for the purpoe, were carrying about petitions for people to ign, ignifying their approbation of the ytem, and requeting the legilature to call a convention. While every meaure was taken to intimidate the people againt oppoing it, the public papers teemed with the mot violent threats againt thoe who hould dare to think for themelves, and tar and feathers were liberally promied to all thoe who would not immediately join in upporting the propoed government be it what it would.—Under uch circumtances petitions in favor of calling a convention were igned by great numbers in and about the city, before they had leiure to read and examine the ytem, many of whom, now they are better acquainted with it, and have had time to invetigate its principles, are heartily oppoed to it. The petitions were peedily handed in to the legilature. Affairs were in this ituation when on the 28th of September lat, a reolution was propoed to the aembly by a member of the houe who had been alo a member of the federal convention, for calling a tate convention, to be elected within ten days for the purpoe of examining and adopting the propoed contitution of the United States, though at this time the houe had not received it from Congres. This attempt was oppoed by a minority, who after offering every argument in their power to prevent the precipitate meaure, without effect, abented themelves from the houe as the only alternative left them, to prevent the meaure taking place previous to their contituents being acquainted with the buines—That violence and outrage which had been o often threatened was now practied; ome of the members were eized the next day by a mob collected for the purpoe, and forcibly dragged to the houe, and there detained by force whilt the quorum of the legilature, o formed, compleated their reolution. We hall dwell no longer on this ubject, the people of Pennylvania have been already acquainted therewith. We would only further oberve that every member of the legilature, previouly to taking his eat, by olemn oath or affirmation, declares, "that he will not do or conent to any act or thing whatever that hall have a tendency to leen or abridge their rights and privileges, as declared in the contitution of this tate." And that contitution which they are o olemnly worn to upport cannot legally be altered but by a recommendation of the council of cenors, who alone are authoried to propoe alterations and amendments, and even thee mut be publihed at leat ix months, for the conideration of the people.—The propoed ytem of government for the United States, if adopted, will alter and may annihilate the contitution of Pennylvania; and therefore the legilature had no authority whatever to recommend the calling a convention for that purpoe. The proceeding could not be conidered as binding on the people of this commonwealth. The houe was formed by violence, ome of the members compoing it were detained there by force, which alone would have vitiated any proceedings, to which they were otherwie competent; but had the legilature been legally formed, this buines was abolutely without their power.

In this ituation of affairs were the ubcribers elected members of the convention of Pennylvania.—A convention called by a legilature in direct violation of their duty, and compoed in part of members, who were compelled to attend for that purpoe, to conider a contitution propoed by a convention of the United States, who were not appointed for the purpoe of framing a new form of government, but whoe powers were exprely confined to altering and amending the preent articles of confederation.—Therefore the members of the continental convention in propoing the plan acted as individuals, and not as deputies from Pennylvania. —The aembly who called the tate convention acted as individuals, and not as the legilature of Pennylvania; nor could they or the convention choen on their recommendation have authority to do any act or thing, that can alter or annihilate the contitution of Pennylvania (both of which will be done by the new contitution) nor are their proceedings in our opinion, at all binding on the people.

The election for members of the convention was held at o early a period and the want of information was o great, that ome of us did not know of it until after it was over, and we have reaon to believe that great numbers of the people of Pennylvania have not yet had an opportunity of ufficiently examining the propoed contitution.—We apprehend that no change can take place that will affect the internal government or contitution of this commonwealth, unles a majority of the people hould evidence a wih for uch a change; but on examining the number of votes given for members of the preent tate convention, we find that of upwards of eventy thouand freemen who are entitled to vote in Pennylvania, the whole convention has been elected by about thirteen thouand voters, and though two thirds of the members of the convention have thought proper to ratify the propoed contitution, yet thoe two thirds were elected by the votes on only ix thouand and eight hundred freemen.

In the city of Philadelphia and ome of the eatern counties, the junto that took the lead in the buines agreed to vote for none but uch as would olemnly promie to adopt the ytem in toto, without exerciing their judgement. In many of the counties the people did not attend the elections as they had not an opportunity of judging of the plan. Others did not conider themelves bound by the call of a et of men who aembled at the State-Houe in Philadelphia, and aumed the name of the legilature of Pennylvania; and ome were prevented from voting by the violence of the party who were determined at all events to force down the meaure. To uch lengths did the tools of depotim carry their outrage, that in the night of the election for members of convention, in the city of Philadelphia, everal of the ubcribers (being then in the city to tranact your buine) were grosly abued, ill-treated and inulted while they were quiet in their lodgings, though they did not interfere, nor had any thing to do with the aid election, but as they apprehend, becaue they were uppoe to be advere to the propoed contitution, and would not namely urrender thoe acred rights, which you had committed to their charge.

The convention met, and the ame dipoition was oon manifeted in conidering the propoed contitution, that had been exhibited in every other tage of the buines. We were prohibited by an expres vote of the convention, from taking any quetion on the eparate articles of the plan, and reduced to the neceity of adopting or rejecting in toto.—-'Tis true the majority permitted us to debate on each article, but retrained us from propoing amendments.—They alo determined not to permit us to enter on the minutes our reaons of dient againt any of the articles nor even on the final quetion our reaons of dient againt the whole. Thus ituated we entered on the examination of the propoed ytem of government, and found it to be uch as we could not adopt, without, as we conceived, urrendering up your dearet rights. We offered our objections to the convention, and oppoed thoe parts of the plan, which, in our opinion, would be injurious to you, in the bet manner we were able; and cloed our arguments, by offering the following propoitions to the convention.

Firt. The right of concience hall be held inviolable; and neither the legilative, executive nor judicial powers of the United States, hall have authority to alter, abrogate, or infringe any part of the contitution of the everal tates, which provide for the preervation of liberty in matters of religion.

Second. That in controveries repecting property, and in uits between man and man, trial by jury hall remain as heretofore, as well in the federal courts, as in thee of the everal tates.

Third. That in all capital and criminal proecutions, a man has a right to demand that caue and nature of this accuation, as well in the federal courts, as in thoe of the everal tates; to be heard by himelf and his counsel; to be confronted with the accuers and witnees; to all for evidence in his favor, and a peedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whoe unanimous conent, he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be compelled to give evidence againt himelf; and that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.

Fourth. That exceive bail ought not to be required, nor exceive fines impoed, nor cruel nor unuual punihments inflicted.

Fifth. That warrants unupported by evidence, whereby any officer or meenger may be commanded or required to earch upected places, or to eize any peron or perons, his or their property, not particularly decribed, are grievous and oppreive, and hall not be granted either by the magitrates of the federal government or others.

Sixth. That the people have a right to the freedom of peech, of writing and publihing their entiments, therefore, the freedom of the pres hall not be retrained by any law of the United States.

Seventh. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themelves and their own tate, or the United States, or for the purpoe of killing game, and no law hall be paed for diarming the people or any of them, unles for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as tanding armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military hall be kept under trict ubordination to and be governed by the civil powers.

Eighth. The inhabitants of the everal tates hall have liberty to fowl and hunt in eaonable times, on the land they hold, and on all other lands in the United States not incloed, and in like manner to fih in all navigable waters, and others not private property, without being retrained therein by any laws to be paed by the legilature of the United States.

Ninth. That no law hall be paed to retrain the legilatures of the everal tates, from enacting laws for impoing taxes, except impots and duties on goods imported or exported, and that no taxes except impots and duties on goods imported and exported, and potage on letters, hall be levied by the authority of Congres.

Tenth. That the houe of repreentatives be properly increaed in number; that elections hall remain free; that the everal tates hall have power to regulate the elections for enators and repreentatives, without being controuled either directly or indirectly by any interference on the part of the Congres; and that elections of repreentatives be annual.

Eleventh. That the power of organizing, arming and diciplining the militia (the manner of diciplining the militia to be precribed by Congre) remain with the individual tates, and that Congres hall not have authority to call or march any of the militia out of their own tate, without the conent of uch tate, and for uch length of time only as uch tate hall agree.

That the overeignty, freedom and independency of the everal tates hall be retained, and every power, juridiction and right, which is not by this contitution exprely delegated to the United States in Congres aembled.

Twelfth. That the legilative, executive, and judicial powers be kept eparate; and to this end, that a contitutional council be appointed, to advie and ait the preident, who hall be reponible for the advice they give, hereby the enators would be relieved from almot contant


text:
Page:Dissent of the Minority at the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention.djvu/2

 ; and alo that the judges be made completely independent.

Thirteenth. That no treaty which hall be directly oppoed to the exiting laws of the United States in Congres aembled, hall be valid until uch laws hall be repealed or made conformable to uch treaty; neither hall any treaties be valid which are in contradiction to the contitution of the United States, or the contitutions of the everal tates.

Fourteenth. That the judiciary power of the United States hall be confined to caes affecting ambaadors, other public miniters and conuls; to caes of admiralty and maritime juridiction; to controveries to which the United States hall be a party; to controveries between two or more tate—between a tate and citizens of different tate—between citizens claiming lands under grants of different tates; and between a tate or the citizens thereof and foreign tates; and in criminal caes to uch only as are exprely enumerated in the contitution, and that the United States in Congres aembled, hall not have power to enact laws, which hall alter the laws of decents and ditribution of the effects of deceaed perons, the titles of land or goods, or the regulation of contracts in the individual tates.

After reading thee propoitions, we declared our willingnes to agree to the plan, provided it was o amended as to meet thoe propoitions, or omething imilar to them: and finally move the convention to adjourn, to give the people of Pennylvania time to conider the ubject, and determine for themelves; but thee were all rejected, and the final vote was taken, when our duty to you induced us to vote againt the propoed plan, and to decline igning the ratification of the ame.

During the dicuion we met with many inults, and ome peronal abue; we were not even treated with decency, during the itting of the convention, by the perons in the gallery of the houe; however, we flatter ourelves that in contending for the preervation of thoe invaluable rights you have thought proper to commit to our charge, we acted with pirit becoming freemen, and being deirous that you might know the principles which actuated our conduct, and being prohibited from inerting our reaons of dient on the minutes of the convention, we have ubjoined them for your conideration, as to you alone we are accountable. It remains with you whether you will think thoe inetimable privileges, which you have o ably contended for, hould be acrificed at the hrine of depotim, or whether you mean to contend for them with the ame pirit that has often baffled the attempts of an aritocratic faction, to rivet the hackles of lavery on you, and your unborn poterity.

Our objections are compried under three general heads of dient, viz.

E DISSENT, Firt, Becaue it is the opinion of the mot celebrated writers on government, and confirmed by uniform experience, that very extenive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom, otherwie than by a confederation of republics, poeing all the powers of internal government; but united in the management of their general, and foreign concerns.

If any doubt could have been entertained of the truth of the foregoing principle, it has been fully removed by the conceion of Mr. Wilon, one of the majority on this quetion, and who was one of the deputies in the late general convention. In jutice to him, we will give his own words; they are as follows, viz. "The extent of country for which the new contitution was required; produced another difficulty in the buines of the federal convention. It is the opinion of ome celebrated writers, that to a mall territory, the democratical; to a middling territory (as Montequieu has termed it) the monarchical; and to an extenive territory, the depotic form of government, is bet adapted. Regarding then the wide and almot unbounded juridiction of the United States, at firt view, the hand of depotim eemed neceary to controul, connect, and protect it; and hence the chief embarrament roe. For, we knew that, although our contituents would chearfully ubmit to the legilative retraints of a free government, they would purn at every attempt to hackle them with depotic power."—And again in another part of his peech he continues.—"Is it probable that the diolution of the tate governments, and the etablihment of one conolidated empire would be eligible in its nature, and atifactory to the people in its adminitration? I think not, as I have given reaons to hew that o extenive a territory could not be governed, connected, and preerved, but by the upremacy of depotic power. All the exertions of the mot potent emperors of Rome were not capable of keeping that empire together, which in extent was far inferior to the dominion of America."

We dient, econdly, becaue the powers veted in Congres by this contitution, mut necearily annihilate and aborb the legilative, executive, and judicial powers of the everal tates, and produce from their ruins one conolidated government, which from the nature of things will be an iron handed depotim, as nothing hort of the upremacy of depotic way could connect and govern thee United States under one government.

As the truth of this poition is of uch deciive importance, it ought to be fully invetigated, and if it is founded to be clearly acertained; for, hould demontrated, that the powers veted by this contitution in Congres, will have uch an effect, as necearily to produce one conolidated government, the quetion then will be reduced to this hort iue, viz. whether atiated with the bleings of liberty; whether repenting of the folly of o recently aerting their unalienable rights, againt foreign depots, at the expence of o much blood and treaure, and uch painful and arduous truggles, the people of America are now willing to reign every privilege of freemen, and ubmit to the domination of an abolute government, that will embrace all America in one chain of depotim; or whether they will with virtuous indignation, purn at the hackles prepared for them, and confirm their liberties by a conduct becoming freemen.

That the new government will not be a confederacy of tates, as it ought, but one conolidated government, founded upon the detruction of the everal governments of the tates, we hall now hew.

The powers of Congres under the new contitution, are compleat and unlimited over the pure and the word, and are perfectly independent of, and upreme over, the tate government: whoe intervention in thee great points is entirely detroyed. By virtue of their power of taxation, Congres may command the whole, or any part of the property of the people. They may impoe what impots upon commerce; they may impoe what land-taxes, poll-taxes, excies, duties on all written intruments, and duties on every other article that may judge proper; in hort, every pecies of taxation, whether of an external or internal nature is compried in ection the 8th, of article the 1t, viz. "The Congres hall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, impots, and excies, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States."

As there is no one article of taxation reerved to the tate governments, the Congres may monopolie every ource of revenue, and thus indirectly demolih the tate governments, for without funds they could not exit, the taxes, duties and excies impoed by Congres may be o high as to render it impracticable to levy further ums on the ame articles; but whether this hould be the cae or not, if the tate governments hould preume to impoe taxes, duties or excies, on the ame articles with Congres, the latter may abrogate and repeal the laws whereby they are impoed, upon the allegation that they interfere with the due collection of their taxes, duties or excies, by virtue of the following claue, part of ection 8th, article 1t, via. "To make all laws which hall be neceary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers veted by this contitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." The congres might glos over this conduct by contruing every purpoe for which the tate legilatures now lay taxes, to be for the "general welfare," and therefore as of their juridiction. And the upremacy of the laws of the United States is etablihed by article 6th, viz. "That this contitution and the laws of the United States, which hall be made in puruance thereof, and all treaties made, or which hall be made, under the authority of the United States, hall be the upreme law of the land, and the judges in every tate hall be bound thereby, any thing in the contitution or laws of any tate to be contrary notwithtanding." It has been alledged that the words "puruant to the contitution," are a retriction upon the authority of Congres; but when it is conidered that by other ections they are inveted with every efficient power of government, and which may be exercied to the abolute detruction of the tate governments, without any violation of ever the forms of the contitution, this eeming retriction, as well as every other retriction in it, appears to us to be nugatory and deluive; and only introduced as a {Omitted text} nd upon the real nature of the government. In our opinion, "puruant to the contitution," will be co-extenive with the will and pleaure of Congres, which, indeed, will be the only limitation of their powers. We apprehend, that two co-ordinate overeignties would be a olecim in politics. That therefore there is no line of ditinction drawn between the general, and tate governments; as the phere of their juridiction is undefined; it would be contrary to the nature of things, that both hould exit together, one or the other would necearily triumph in the fullnes of dominion. However the contet could not be of long continuance, as the tate governments are diveted of every means of defence, and will be obliged by "the upreme law of the land" to yield at dicretion. It has been objected to this total detruction of the tate governments, that the exitence of their legilatures is made eential to the organization of Congres; that they mut aemble for the appointment of the enators and preident general of the United States. True, the tate legilatures may be continued for ome years, as boards of appointment, merely, after they are diveted of every other function; but the framers of the contitution foreeeing that the people will oon be diguted with this olemn mockery of a government without power and uefulnes, have made a proviion for relieving them from the impoition, in ection 4th, of article 1t, viz. " The times, places, and manner of holding elections for enators and repreentatives, hall be precribed in each tate by legilature thereof;but the Congres may at any time, by law make or alter uch regulations; except as to the place of chuing enators. As Congres have the controul over the time of the appointment of the preident general, of the enators and of the repreentatives of the United States, they may prolong their exitence in office, for life, by potponing the time of their election and appointment, from period to period, under various pretences, uch, as an apprehenion of invaion, the factious dipoition of the people, or any other plauible pretence that the occaion may ugget; and having thus obtained the life-etates in the government, they may fill up the vacancies themelves, by their controul over the mode of appointment; with this exception in regard to the enators, that as the place of appointment for them, mut, by the contitution, be in the particular tate, they may depute ome body in the repective tates, to fill up the vacancies in the enate, occaioned by death, until they can venture to aume it themelves. In this manner, may the only retriction in this caue, be evaded. By virtue of the foregoing ection, when the pirit of the people hall be gradually broken; when the general government hall be firmly etablihed, and when a numerous tanding army hall render oppoition vain, the Congres may compleat the ytem of depotim, in renouncing all dependance on the people, by continuing themelves, and children in the government. The celebrated Montequieu, in his Spirit of Laws, vol. 1, page 12th, ays " That in a democracy there can be no exercie of overeignty, but by the uffrages of the people, which are their will; now the overeigns will is the overeign himelf; the laws therefore, which etablih the right of uffrage, are fundamental to this government. In fact it is as important to regulate in a republic in what manner, by whom, and concerning what, uffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarch to know who is the prince, and after what manner he ought to govern." The time, mode, and place of the election of repreentatives, enators and preident general of the United States, ought not to be under the controul of Congres, but fundamentally acertained an etablihed. The new contitution, conitently with the plan of conolidation, contains no reervation of the rights and priviledges of the tate governments, which was made in the confederation of the year 1778, by article the 2d, viz. "That each tate retains its overeignty, freedom and independence, and every power, juridiction and right, which is not by this confederation exprely delegated to the United States in Congres aembled." The legilative power veted in Congres by the foregoing recited ections, is o unlimited in its nature; may be o comprehenive and boundles in its exercie, that this alone would be amply ufficient to annihilate the tate governments, and wallow them up in the grand vortex of general empire. The judicial powers veted in Congres are alo o various and extenive, that by legal ingenuity they may be extended to every cae, and thus aborb the tate judiciaries, and when to conider the deciive influence that a general judiciary would have over the civil polity of the everal tates, we do not heitate to pronounce that this power, unaided by the legilative, would effect a conolidation of the tates under one government. The powers of a court of equity, veted by this contitution, in the tribunals of Congres; powers which do not exit in Pennylvania, unles o far as they can be incorporated with jury trial, would, in this tate, greatly contribute to this event. The rich and wealthy uitors would eagerly lay hold of the infinite mazes, perplexities and delays, which a court of chancery, with the appellate powers of the upreme court in fact as well as law would furnih him with, and thus the poor man being plunged in the bottomles pit of legal dicuion, would drop his demand in depair. In hort, conolidation pervades the whole contitution. It begins with an annunciation that uch was the intention. The main pillars of the fabric correpond with it, and the concluding paragraph is a confirmation of it—The preamble begins with the words, "We the people of the United States," which is the tyle of a compact between individuals entering into a tate of ociety, and not that of a confederation of tates. The other features of conolidation, we have before noticed. Thus we have fully etablihed the poition, that the powers veted by this contitution in Congres, will effect a conolidation of the tates under one government, which even the advocates of this contitution admit, could not be done, without the acrifice of all liberty. 3. We dient, Thirdly, Becaue if it were practicable to govern o extenive a territory as thee United States, includes, on the plan of a conolidated government, conitent with the principles of liberty and the happines of the people, yet the contruction of this contitution is not calculated to attain the object, for independent of the nature of the cae, it would of itelf, necearily, produce a depotim, and that not by the uual gradations, but with the celerity that has hitherto only attended revolutions affected by the word. To etablih the truth of this poition, a curory invetigation of the principles and form of this contitution will uffice. The firt conideration that this review uggets, is the omiion of a BILL OF RIGHTS, acertaining and fundamentally etablihing thoe unalienable and peronal rights of men, without the full, free and ecure enjoyment of which there can be no liberty, and over which it is not neceary for a good government to have the controul. The principal of which are the rights of concience, peronal liberty by the clear and unequivocal etablihment of the writ of habeas corpus, jury trial in criminal and civil caes, by an impartial jury of the vicinage or county, with the common law proceedings, for the afety of the accued in criminal proecutions; and the liberty of the pres, that courge of tyrants, and the grand bulwark of every other liberty and privilege: the tipulations heretofore made in favour of them in the tate contitutions, are entirely uperceded by this contitution. The legilature of a free country hould be o formed as to have a competent knowledge of its contituents, and enjoy their confidence.—To produce thee eential requiites, the repreentation ought to be fair, equal and ufficiently numerous, to poes the ame interets, feelings, opinions and views, which the people themelves would poes, were they all aembled; and o numerous as to prevent bribery and undue influence, and o reponible to the people, by frequent and fair elections, as to prevent their neglecting, or acrificing the views and interets of their contituents, to their own puruits. We will now bring the legilature under this contitution to the tet of the foregoing principles, which will demontrate, that it is deficient in every eential quality of a jut and afe repreentation. The houe of repreentatives is to conit of 65 members; that is one for every 50,000 inhabitants, to be choen every two years. Thirty-three members will form a quorum for doing buines, and eventeen of thee, being the majority, determine the ene of the houe. The enate, the other contituent branch of the legilature, conits of 26 members, being two from each tate, appointed by their legilatures every ix year—fourteen enators make a quorum; the majority of whom, eight, determines the ene of that body: except in judging on impeachments, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, when two thirds of the enators preent, mut concur. The preident is to have the controul over the enacting of laws, o far as to make the concurrence of two thirds of the repreentatives and enators preent neceary, if he hould object to the laws. Thus it appears, that the liberties, happines, interets, and great concerns, of the whole United States, may be dependent upon the integrity, virtue, widom. and knowledge of 25 or 26 men. How inadequate and unafe a repreentation! Inadequate, becaue the ene and views of 3 or 4 millions of people diffued over o extenive a territory, compriing uch various climates, products, habits, interets, and opinions, can not be collected in o mall a body; and beides, it is not a fair and equal repreentation of the people, even in proportion to its number, for the mallet tate has as much weight in the enate as the larget, and from the mallet of the number to be choen for both branches of the legilature; and from the mode of election and appointment; which is under the controul of Congres; and from the nature of the thing, men of the mot elevated rank in life, will alone be choen. The other orders in the ociety, uch as farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent number of their bet informed men in the legilature, will be totally unrepreented. The repreentation is unafe, becaue in the exercie of uch great powers and truts, it is o expoed to corruption and undue influence, by the gift of the numerous places of honor and emolument, at the dipoal of the executive; by the arts and addres of the great and deigning; and by direct bribery. The repreentation is moreover inadequate and unafe, becaue of the long terms for which it is appointed, and the mode of its appointment, by which congres may not only controul the choice of the people, but may o manage as to divet the people of this fundamental right, and become elf-elected. The number of members in the houe of repreentatives may be encreaed to one for every 30,000 inhabitants. But when we conider, that this cannot be done without the conent of the enate, who from their hare i the legilative, in the executive, and judicial departments, and permanency of appointment, will be the great efficient body in this government, and whoe weight and predominancy would be abridged by an encreae of the repreentatives, we are peruaded that this is a circumtance that cannot be expected. On the contrary, the number of repreentatives will probably be continued at 65, although the population of the country may well to treble what it now is; unles a revolution hould effect a change. We have before noticed the judicial power as it would effect a conolidation of the tates into one government; we will now examine it, as it would affect the liberties and welfare of the people, upporting uch a government were practicable and proper. The judicial power, under the propoed contitution, is founded on the well-known principles of the civil law, by which the judge determines both on law and fact, and

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Page:Dissent of the Minority at the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention.djvu/3

 appeals are allowed from the inferior tribunals to the uperior, upon the whole quetion; o that facts, as well as law, would be re-examined, and even new facts brought forward in the court of appeals; and to ue the words of a very eminent Civilian, " The caue is many times another thing before the court of appeals, than what it was at the time of the firt entence."

That this mode of proceeding is the one which mut be adopted under this contitution, is evident form the following circumtances; 1t. That the trial by jury; which is the grand characteritic of the common law is ecured by the contitution, only in criminal caes.--2d. That the appeal from both law and fact is exprely etablihed, which is utterly inconitent with the principles of the common law, and trials by jury. The only mode in which an appeal from law and fact can be etablihed, is by adopting the principles and practice of the civil law; unles the United States hould be drawn into the aburdity of calling and wearing juries, merely, for the purpoe of contradicting the verdicts, which would render juries contemptible and wore than ueles.--3d. That the courts to be etablihed would decide on all caes of law and equity, which is a well known characteritic of the civil law, and thee courts would have conuance not only of the laws of the United States and treaties, and of caes affecting ambaadors, but of all caes of admiralty and maritime juridiction, which lat are matters belonging excluively to the civil law, in every nation in Chritendom. Not to enlarge upon the los of the invaluable right of trial by an unbiaed jury, o dear to every friend of liberty, the montrous expence and inconveniences of the mode of proceedings to be adopted, are uch, as will prove intolerable to the people of this country. The lengthy proceedings of the civil law courts in the chancery of England, and in the courts of Scotland and France, are uch that few men of moderate fortune can endure the expence of; the poor man mut therefore ubmit to the wealthy. Length of pure will too often prevail againt right and jutice. For intance, we are told by the learned judge Blacktone, that a quetion, only on the property of an ox, of the value of three guineas, originating under the civil law proceedings in Scotland, after many interlocutory orders and entences below, was carried at length from the court of eions, the highet court in that part of Great Britain, by way of appeal to the houe of lords, where the quetion of law and fact was finally determined. He adds, that no pique or pirit, could in the court of king's bench or common pleas at Wetminter, have given continuance to uch a caue for a tenth part of the time, nor have cot a twentieth part of the expence. Yet the cots in the courts of king's bench and common pleas in England, are infinitely greater than thoe which the people of this country have ever experienced. We abhor the idea of loing the trancendant privilege of trial by jury, with the los of which, it remarked by the ame learned author, that in Sweden, the liberties of the commons were extinguihed by an aritocratic enate; and that trial by jury and the liberty of the people went out together. At the ame time we regret the intolerable delay, the enormous expences and infinite vexation to which the people of this country will be expoed from the voluminous proceedings of the courts of civil law and epecially from the appellate juridiction, by means of which a man may be drawn from the utmot boundaries of this extenive country to the eat of the upreme court of the nation to contend, perhaps, with a wealthy and powerful adverary. The conequence of this etablihment will be an abolute confirmation of the power of aritocratical influence in the courts of jutice; for the common people will not be able to contend or truggle againt it. Trial by jury in criminal caes may alo be excluded by declaring that the libeller for intance hall be liable to an action of debt for a pecified um; thus evading the common law proecution by indictment and trial by jury. And the common coure of proceeding againt a hip for breach of revenue laws by information (which will be claed among civil caues,) will, at the civil law be within the reort of a court, where no jury intervenes. Beides, the benefit of jury trial, in caes of a criminal nature, which cannot be evaded, will be rendered of little value by calling the accued to anwer far from home; there being no proviion that the trial be by a jury of the neighbourhood or country. Thus an inhabitant of Pittburgh; on a charge of crime committed on the banks of the Ohio, may be obliged to defend himelf at the ide of the Delaware, and o vice vera. To conclude this head: We oberve that the judges of the courts of Congres would not be independent, as they are not debarred from holding other offices, during the pleaure of the preident and enate, and as they may derive their upport in part from fees, alterable by the legilature. The next conideration that the contitution preents, is the undue and dangerous mixture of the powers of government; the ame body a poeing legilative, executive, and judicial powers. The enate is a contituent branch of the legilature, it has judicial power in judging on impeachments, and in this cae unites in ome meaure, the characters of judge and party, as all the principal officers are appointed by the preident-general, with the concurrence of the enate, and therefore they derive their offices in part from the enate. This may bias the judgements of the enators and tend to kreen great delinquents from punihment. And the enate has, moreover, various and great executive powers, viz. in concurrence with the preident-general, they form treaties with foreign nations that may controul and abrogate the contitutions and laws of the everal tates. Indeed, there is no power, privilege or liberty of the tate governments, or of the people, but what may be affected by virtue of this power. For all treaties, made by them, are to be the "upreme law of the land, any thing in the contitution or laws of any tate, to the contrary notwithtanding." And this great power may be exercied by the preident and 10 enators, (being two-thirds of 14, which is a quorum of that body) what an inducement would this offer to the miniters of foreign powers to compas by bribery uch conceions, as could not otherwie be obtained. It is the unvaried uage of all free tates, whenever treaties interfere with the poitive laws of the land, to make the intervention of the legilature neceary to give them operation. This became neceary and was afforded by the parliament of Great Britain, in conequence of the late commercial treaty between that kingdom and France.- As the enate judges on impeachments, who is to try the members of the enate for the abue of this power! And none of the great appointments to office can be made without the conent of the enate. Such various, extenive, and important powers combined in one body of men, are inconitent with all freedom; the celebrated Montequieu tells us, that "when the legilative and executive powers are united in the ame peron, or in the ame body of magitrates, there can be no liberty, becaue apprehenions may arie, let the ame monarch or {Omitted text} e hould enact tyrannical laws, to execute them [in?] a tyrannical manner." "Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not eparated rom the legilative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legilative, the life and liberty of the ubject, would be expoed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would then be legilator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppreor. There would be an end of everything, were the ame man, or the ame body of the nobles, or of the people, to exercie thee three powers; that of enacting laws; that of executing the public reolutions; and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals." The preident general is dangerouly connected with the enate, his coincidence with the views of the ruling junto in that body,is made eential to his weight and importance in the government, which will detroy all independency and purity in the executive department, and having the power of pardoning without the concurrence of a council, he may kreen from punihment the mot treaonable attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when intigated by his coadjutors in the enate. Intead of this dangerous and improper mixture of the executive with the legilative and judicial, the upreme executive powers ought to have been placed in the preident, with a mall independent council, made peronally reponible for every appointment to office, or other act, by having their opinions recorded; and that without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the preident hould not be capable of taking any tep. We have before conidered internal taxation, as it would effect the detruction of the tate governments, and produce on conolidated government. We will now conider that ubject as it affects the peronal concerns of the people. The power of direct taxation applies to every individual, as congres under this government is exprely veted with the authority of laying a capitation or poll-tax upon every peron to any amount. This is a tax that, however oppreive in its nature, and unequal in its operation, is certain as to its produce and imple in it collection; it cannot be evaded like the objects of impots or excie, and will be paid, becaue all that a man hath will he give for his head. This tax is o congenial to the nature of depotim, that it has ever been a favorite under uch governments. Some of thoe who were in the late general convention from this tate, have long labored to introduce a poll-tax among us. The power of direct taxation will further apply to every individual, as congres may tax land, cattle, trades, occupations, &c. to any amount, and every object of internal taxation is of that nature, that however oppreive, the people will have but this alternative, either to pay the tax, or let their property be taken for all reitance will be vain. The tanding army and elect militia would enforce the collection. For the moderate exercie of this power, there is no controul left in the tate governments, whoe intervention is detroyed. No relief, or redres of grievances can be extended, as heretofore by them. There is not even a declaration of RIGHTS to which the people may appeal for the vindication of their wrongs in the courts of jutice. They mut therefore, implicitly, obey the mot arbitrary laws, as the wort of them, will be puruant to the principles and form of the contitution, and that tronget of all checks upon the conduct of adminitration,reponibility to the people, will not exit in this government. The permanency of the appointments of enators and repreentatives, and the controul the congres have over their election, will place them independent of the entiments and reentment of the people, and the adminitration having a greater interet in the government than in the community, there will be no conideration to retrain them from oppreion and tyranny. In the government of this tate, under the old confederation, the members of the legilature are taken from among the people and their interets and welfare are o ineparably connected with thoe of their contituents, that they can derive no advantage from oppreive laws and taxes, for they would uffer in common with their fellow citizens; would participate in the burthens they impoe on the community, as they mut return to the common level, after a hort period; and notwithtanding every exertion of influence, every means of corruption, a neceary rotation excludes them from permanency in the legilature. This large tate is to have but ten members in that congres which is to have the liberty, property and dearet concerns of every individual of this vat country at abolute command; and ever thee ten perons, who are to be our only guardians; who are to upercede the legilature of Pennylvania, will not be of the choice of the people, nor amenable to them. From the mode of their election and appointment they will conit of the lordly and high-minded; of men who will have no congenial feelings with the people, but a perfect indifference for, and contempt of them, they will conit of thoe harpies of power, that prey upon the very vitals; that riot on the mieries of the community. But we will uppoe, although in all probability it may never be realied in fact, that our deputies in congres have the welfare of their contituents at heart, and will exert themelves in their behalf, what ecurity could even this afford; what relief could they extend to their oppreed contituent? To attain this, the majority of the deputies of the twelve other tates in congres mut be alike well dipoed; mut alike forego the weets of power, and relinquih the puruits of ambition, which from the nature of things is not to be expected. If the people part with a reponible repreentation in the legilature, founded upon fair, certain and frequent election, they have nothing left they can call their own. Mierable is the let of that people whoe every concern depends on the WILL and PLEASURE of their rulers. Our oldiers will become Janiaries, and our officers of government Bahaws; in the hort the ytem of depotim would oon be compleated. From the foregoing invetigation, it appears that the congres under this contitution, will not poes the confidence of the people, which is an eential requiite in a good government; for unles the laws command the confidence and repect of the great body of the people, o as to induce them to upport them, when called on by the civil magitrate, they mut be executed by the aid of a numerous tanding army, which would be inconitent with every idea of liberty; for the ame force that may be employed to compel obedience to good laws, might and probably would be ued to wret from the people their contitutional liberties. The framers of this contitution appear to have been aware of this great deficiency; to have been enible that no dependence could be placed on the people for their upport: but on the contrary, that the government mut be executed by force. They have therefore, made a proviion for this purpoe in a permanent STANDING ARMY, and a MILITIA that may be ubjected to a trict dicipline and government. A tanding army in the hands of a government placed o independent of the people, may be made a fatal intrument to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the mot oppreive taxes, and to carry into execution the mot arbitrary meaures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his devotion, may tep up into the throne, and eize upon abolute power. The abolute unqualified command that congres have over the militia may be made intrumental to the detruction of all liberty, both public and private; whether of a peronal, civil, or religious nature. Firt, The peronal liberty of every man probably from ixteen to ixty years of age, may be detroyed by the power congres have in organizing and governing of the militia. As militia they may be ubjected to fines to any amount, levied in a military manner; they may be ubjected to corporal punihments of the mot digraceful and humiliating kind, and to death itelf by the entence of a court martial: To this our young men will be more immediately ubjected, as a elect militia, compoed of them, will bet anwer the purpoes of government. Secondly, The rights of concience maybe violated, as there is no exemption of thoe perons, who are concientiouly crupulous of bearing arms. Thee compoe a repectable proportion of the community in the tate. This is the more remarkable, becaue even when the ditrees of the late war, and the evident diaffection of many citizens of that decription, inflamed our paions, and when every peron, who was obliged to rique his own life, mut have been exaperated, againt uch as on any account kept back from the common danger, yet even then, when outrage and violence might have been expected, the rights of concience were held acred. At this momentous criis, the framers of our tate contitution, made the mot expres and decided declaration and tipulations in favor of the rights of concience: but now when no neceity exits, thoe dearet rights of men are left inecure. Thirdly, the abolute command of congres over the militia, may be detructive of public liberty; for under the guidance of an arbitrary government, they may be made the unwilling intruments of tyranny. The militia of Pennylvania may be march to New-England or Virginia to quell an inurrection occaioned by the mot galling oppreion, and aided by the tanding army, they will, no doubt, be ucceful in ubduing their liberty and independency; but in o doing, although the magnanimity of their minds will be extinguihed, yet the meaner paions of reentment and revenge will be encreaed, and thoe in turn will be the ready and obedient intruments of depotim to enlave the others; and that with an irritated vengeance. Thus may the militia be made the intruments of cruhing the lat efforts of expiring liberty, of rivetting the chains of depotim on their fellow citizens and on one another. This power can be exercied not only without violating the contitution but in trict conformity with it, it is calculated for this expres purpoe, and will doubtles be executed accordingly. As this government will not enjoy the confidence of the people, but be executed by force, it will be a very expenive and burthenome government. The tanding army mut be numerous, and as a further upport, it will be the policy of this government to multiply officers in every department; judges, collectors, tax-gathers, exciemen, and the whole hot of revenue officers will warm over the land, devouring the hard earnings of the indutrious. Like the locuts of old, impoverihing and deolating all before them. We have not noticed the maller, nor many of the coniderable blemihes, but have confined our objections to the great and eential defects; the main pillars of the contitution; which we have hewn to be inconitent with the liberty and happines of the people, as its etablihment will annihilate the tate governments, and produce one conolidated government that will eventually and peedily iue in the upremacy of depotim. In this invetigation, we have not confined our view to the interets or welfare of this tate, in preference to the others. We have over looked all local circumtance--we have conidered this ubject on the broad cale of the general good; we have aerted the caue of the preent and future ages; the caue of liberty and mankind. Nathaniel Breading,..........John Ludwig, John Smilie,..........Abraham Lincoln, Richard Baird,..........John Bihop, Adam Orth,..........Joeph Heiter, John A. Hanna,..........Joeph Powel, John Whitehill,..........James Martin, John Harris,..........William Findley, Robert Whitehill,..........John Baird, John Reynolds,..........James Edgar, Jonathan Hoge,..........William Todd, Nicholas Lutz, The yeas and nays upon the final vote were as follows, viz. YEAS...........YEAS. George Latimer,..........John Hubley, Benjamin Ruh,..........Japer Yates, Hilary Baker,..........Henry Slagle, James Wilon,..........Thomas Campbell, Thomas M'Kean,..........Thomas Hartley, William M'Pheron,..........David Grier, John Hunn,..........John Black, George Gray,..........Benjamin Pedan, Samuel Ahmead,..........John Arndt, Enoch Edwards,..........Stephen Balliott, Henry Wynkoop,..........Joeph Horefield, John Barclay,..........David Dehler, Thomas Yardley,..........William Wilon, Abraham Stout,..........John Boyd, Thomas Bull,..........Thomas Scott, Anthony Wayne,..........John Nevill, William Gibbons,..........John Allion, Richard Downing,..........Jonathan Roberts, Thomas Cheyney,..........John Richards John Hannah,..........F.A. Muhlenberg, Stephen Chambers,..........James Morris, Robert Coleman,..........Timothy Pickering, Sebatian Graff,..........Benjamin Elliot, ..........46 NAYS. NAYS. John Whitehill,..........William Findley, John Harris,..........John Baird, John Reynolds,..........William Todd, Robert Whitehill,..........James Marhall, Jonathan Hoge,..........James Edgar, Nicholas Lutz,..........Nathaniel Breading. John Ludwig,..........John Smilie, Abraham Lincoln,..........Richard Baird, John Bihop,..........William Brown, Joeph Heiler,..........Adam Orth, James Martin,..........John Andre Hannah, Joeph Powell,..........23 Philadelphia, December 12, 1787. [Philadelphia: Printed by E. Owald, at the [Coffee-Houe.]


title: User:Tomtomn00


text: Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography/Howard, Oliver Otis


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/9

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/9


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/8

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/8


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/7

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/7


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/6

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/6


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/5

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/5


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/4

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/4


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/3

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/3


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/2

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/2


text: Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/154


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/1

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/1


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/267

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/267


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/268

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/268


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/155

 This is all very circumstantial, obviously the work of an eye-witness, but it is not supported by the evidence of any coin struck to commemorate the event. The Adventus Augusti shows the Emperor riding into the city laurelled and habited in military accoutrements. Nor is the scandal mentioned by either Lampridius or Dion, which means that, at least as far as Lampridius goes, his source, Marius Maximus, the then City Praefect, who would certainly be an eye-witness, had not noticed anything unusual. This, one imagines, he would have been only too anxious to do, since he appears to have vacated this office immediately afterwards in favour of the Emperor's friend Eutychianus, which circumstance was not likely to be specially pleasing to Marius, and ought to have encouraged him to keep his eyes open for indecencies. Dion, too, as we have said, is silent, and he has lost no other chance of recording Antonine's frailties. Surely, then, it is at least allowable to relegate this record of inexcusable folly to the limbo of other picturesque lies, and proceed to sift the similar accumulation which Lampridius has collected for our amusement.

Undoubtedly, the first act was to make an alliance with the daughter of the well-known jurist, Julius Paulus, and to celebrate the event with a colossal magnificence. All the authors, with the exception of Lampridius, who ignores the marriage entirely, furnish picturesque details. They describe the games, in which only one elephant and, to balance him, fifty-one tigers were killed (the numbers


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/269

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/269


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/270

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/270


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/271

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/271


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/272

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/272


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/10

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/10


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/156

112 are peculiar, but incapable of verification); the general distribution of wheat, the unusual magnificence of the whole scene, and the congiary in which even the wives of Senators took part. The sums of money given are most noticeable ; every one in Rome received 150 drachmae per head, except the soldiers, who only got 100, or very slightly more—a diminution of the promised privileges formerly granted by Caracalla, which could scarcely have been pleasing to the Lords of Rome, especially if, as Lampridius says, the Emperor had already begun to lose his popularity with the army. It almost presupposes a change of idea in the body politic, and argues that the new government was bent on the same reforms which had ruined Macrinus, a circumstance which would not turn out advantageously for all concerned. Certainly it was neither wise nor conducive to peace thus to reduce the donative on such an occasion; but of this more must be said later.

Directly after the festivities in honour of the arrival, and, as has been suggested, of the marriage as well, because we can only trace one congiary and one set of rejoicings during this year—which circumstance rather leads one to suppose that the extraordinary generosity cited did duty for the two occasions—the Emperor set to work to provide a shelter for his God. In point of fact, he provided two. The first and most magnificent, was on the Palatine; the other, almost as vast and beautiful, was a sort of summer resting-place in the suburbs. Wissowa considers that this second was


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/11

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/11


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/157

 in the eastern part of the city, near the site of Sta. Croce, near also to the Porta Praenestina, and that it was built on a tract of land known as " Ad Spem Veterem " ; in other words, in the garden belonging to Varius Marcellus, the Empress Soaemias' late husband, and, therefore, imperial property.

Concerning the position of the first temple, we have more certain evidence. Baumeister has identified certain ruins on the Palatine as the Eliogabalium, and though his conclusions are not generally accepted, all the Greek authors agree as to the Palatine being the centre of the cult. Victor tells us that the God was established in " Palatii penetralibus," and Sextus Rufus corroborates Lampridius' statement that it was on the site of a temple of Orcus (Pluto) on the Circus Maximus side of the Palatine Hill.

Some idea of its general magnificence may be gathered from a coin struck in the year 222, which is described by Studniczka. " The temple," he says, " rises to a great height in a glorious symmetry of columns, and is partly covered by the figure of the Emperor and his attendant. Below the group appears the entrance to the temple courtyard, which is crowned with statues." On either side of the entrance are wing -halls, singularly reminiscent of the Bramante porticoes at St. Peter's, eagles taking the place of statues as acroteria.

We must not suppose, despite Xiphilinus' statement, that the cult of this Sun God was first heard of in Rome at this period. All the imperial money coined at Emesa had borne his temple, stone, and


text: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/12

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/12


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/158

 eagle on the obverse for many years past, besides which the worship of Mithra, the Persian Sun God, is considered by Cumont to have been the most popular religion in Rome at this time. Septimius Severus had built a temple on the Palatine in his honour, doubtless with the help and counsel of the family of Elagabal worshippers, and there seem to have been many others in the city ; a fact which would tend to pave the way for Antonine's scheme. This however could not develop itself until the temple was completed, which from the evidence that can be gathered from coins and inscriptions does not seem to have been an accomplished fact until the late autumn of the next year, 220.

No sooner was the temple finished than the scheme for the unifying of churches, which the Emperor had himself conceived, and intended to promote with the full strength of imperial command, was put into operation. As we have said, Antonine had no more idea of making Elagabal a mere rival to the Roman Deities than Constantine had of putting Christ into that unenviable position. He intended that the Lord should swallow up all other Deities, should make captive all the gods of old Rome. To do this it was necessary, first, to impress the world with the splendour, the beauty, the power, and the magnificence of that being who had so miraculously delivered the family of Bassianus from Phoenician obscurity, and brought them into the fierce light of the Roman noonday; secondly, he had to make some alliance with the head and centre of the old Roman worship of Vesta, the


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/160

 another, of course) that they infinitely preferred the tents of ungodliness to all and sundry offices of divine religion, especially in its Semitic forms. From the very outset Elagabal was unpopular with the upper classes. They had cause to dislike this insensate show. With the populace it was probably different, at least for a time. One can imagine their joy at beholding, tier upon tier, the Conscript Fathers assembled each morning as most unwilling spectators of a show which they abominated.

As we have already pointed out, other Eastern cults were making considerable headway in Rome amongst all classes, and had attracted not a few of that august body. We have mentioned the worship of the Sun God Mithra, which, with other similar religions, had constantly increased in importance since the year 204 B.C, the date of its introduction into the city.

Now the Eastern cults were popular because they supplied a felt want, namely, a personal spiritual religion, whereas the religion of Rome, though fine, virile and strong, was purely political. The God of Rome was Rome, and concerned itself solely with patriotism. With the individual, with his happiness or aspirations, it concerned itself not at all. It was the prosperity of the Empire, its peace and immortality, for which sacrifices were made and libations offered. The antique virtues, courage in war, moderation in peace, and honour at all times, were civic, not personal. It was the state that had a soul, not the individual. Man was ephemeral, it


text:
Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/13

apology for preparing an English edition of the “Beowulf” is perhaps hardly necessary. The earlier English editions are long since out of print, and the poem has therefore been almost unobtainable, except in the German editions of Heyne and Holder. Excellent as these may be in several ways, they are ill adapted for the average English student, besides having one or more very marked defects. Holder’s foot-notes are as unreliable as his text is reliable. Heyne’s glossary, like that of most German editions, stands self-condemned, in that he frequently forgets the absurd, artificial order of letters on which it is based. Furthermore, his glossary amounts to a translation; and this of itself tends to rob the work of much of its educative value for the serious student.

It has been felt therefore that an English edition was needed—for after all the “Beowulf” is essentially an English poem—which should give the readings of the MS. in foot-notes wherever they were departed from in the

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/13


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/159

 one religion which symbolised Rome, its perpetuity, and its undying fame ; thirdly, he had to acquire all the objects of sacred devotion, and transfer them to Elagabal's temple, as well to attract worshippers as to stimulate devotion.

For the accomplishment of the first of these objects he ordained the most magnificent worship that had as yet been devised. He, as High Priest, used to descend daily from the palace in order to sacrifice vast quantities of oxen and sheep upon innumerable altars laden with spices and odours. The libations were more ample and more costly than any that had yet been heard of. Herodian further tells us how the rare and costly wines mingling with the blood of the victims made great streams in every direction ; but even this waste was insufficient : with Davidic persistency the Emperor danced, encircling the altars, followed by the Syrians, men and women, who formed his court, while the display and waste of energy was accompanied by the clashing of cymbals and other instruments of music which had been brought from the God's home in the East. At these orgies the Senate sat in a great semicircle, and were, fortunately, mere spectators of the show. It was the generals of armies, the governors of provinces, and court officials of all sorts who were less fortunate. These worthies Antonine habited in a replica of his own trailing garments, and ordered to perform menial offices about the altars of God, a proceeding which caused them to gnash with their teeth and run about the city declaring very plainly (to one


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/161

 was the nation that endured. Naturally, this was unsatisfying to the uneducated ; their Rome was the abridgment of every superstition, their Pantheon an abattoir of the Gods who presided over death and whose worship was gore.

Added to this had come the worship of Isis, the secrets of Mithra, of which the chief note was one of mysticism. There was something terrifying and yet alluring about the abluent functions, the initiations, the secrets that it was death to divulge. Now, the rites that Antonine introduced were entirely blatant, Semitic, Syrian. They contained, as far as we can judge, nothing specially mysterious, either in the way of initiation or progression, little which could even attract the curiosity of the devout. All that Elagabal could appeal to was the public curiosity ; his worship was, in fact, designed to appeal to such and nothing more, at the outset ; even with such an end in view it might have become popular had it not been that Antonine made this all-embracing deity too easy of access, in consequence of which he became too cheap. The Emperor seems to have recognised this early, and to have evolved a scheme for uniting the already popular mysteries of all other Gods with his own ; to which resolve we may attribute the stories of his initiation into the priesthood of Cybele and the rest ; he thought that it would enhance his God's attractiveness and assure his popularity in the eyes of the mob.


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/162

 As far as we can judge from the evidence of coins and medals, there was little or no parade of Antonine's religious ideals or his comprehensive cult until the later part of the year 220, until, in fact, the temple was ready and the necessary adjuncts to hand. With its opening came the transference thither of the most venerable objects of Roman superstition : all the sacred stones, even the Palladium from the temple of Minerva, the sacred fire which was the symbol of Rome's existence, even the shields which had fallen from heaven, and to which the oracles had attached the very destinies of the city itself But of this more in its proper place.

Certainly, for all his attempts, Elagabal did not become a popular divinity. Men began to fear his propensity for swallowing other cults. His rapacity in absorbing the deities of centuries made the superstitious uneasy for the continued existence of Gods whom, they believed vaguely, they might some day need, and who would then have lost their power and authority. But there was yet another reason for Elagabal's unpopularity, namely, the Emperor's attempt to unite the Hebraic and Christian mysteries with those of his own God.

Neither Christian nor Hebrew was ever popular in old Rome. Their characters, their rites, and their machinations were sincerely disapproved of both by the rulers and the governed ; they were generally known as robbers, thieves, liars, lawbreakers, cannibals even, men who were lacking in every virtue that Rome held dear ; men who set up


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/163

 their own specimen of a creed to the exclusion of all others, the which was, generally speaking, subversive of government, law and order. They were men entirely displeasing to the high Gods, and therefore to be spared only when the master of Rome refused consent to kill.

Now, Antonine clearly protected these atheistic vagabonds, citizens of no state, troublers of every nation; nay more, he attempted to tolerate their blasphemies by uniting them with his own religion. As we have said, Rome was probably familiar with Elagabal through the Syrian house and Emesan coins, but with the other Judean religion they had not a few disagreements, and had certainly no wish to amalgamate it with the venerated cults of the city, as Antonine seemed bent on doing. It was certainly a bad day for the house of Severus when the Emperor decided to mix himself up with the hated Judaism.

We must here leave for a moment the history of Antonine's religious changes and aspirations to recount the secular work accomplished between the summer of the year 219 and the autumn or winter of the year 220, it may be even up to the early weeks of the year 221, when the Emperor made that vital mistake in policy which threw him into the hands of his family, to his undoing.

Amongst the "facts" recorded by Lampridius concerning this period, we have two mutually exclusive statements concerning the admission of the Emperor's mother and grandmother to the Senate, and their governmental position in the State. The


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/164

 first (in Sec. 4) states that at the very first meeting of that august assembly Antonine sent for his mother; that on her arrival he called her to take a place alongside the Consuls; and that with them she signed decrees, Senatus Consulta, and other documents, an enormity which no other woman had ever perpetrated, and which was certainly never heard of again. He finishes with the remark that she obtained the title of Clarissima, the only woman who has ever had this honour conferred upon her — altogether a most circumstantial account.

A few sections farther on (Sec. 12) he recounts how Antonine always took his grandmother Varia with him whenever he went to the camp or to the Senate, in order to give him the authority and dignity which he lacked, adding, that before her no woman had been admitted into the Senate either to give her opinion or append her signature. It is significant, by the way, that Varia never was and never could have been Maesa's name — so much for Lampridius' ignorance of the family history.

Now, either Antonine took one, both, or neither; Lampridius says both — each to the exclusion of the other, as each was first, each the only woman, but Soaemias was alone Clarissima. Cannot one see the jealous wrath of the grandmother, the real politician, at the promotion of her absolutely incapable daughter over her head by means of that coveted title (a title, by the way, which would have bored Soaemias' temperament inexpressibly), while she was relegated to an inferior position?

The only conclusion to be drawn is that which is


text:
Page:The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus.djvu/165

 recorded by all the inscriptions, namely, that Maesa was the predominant factor, since her name always occurs first where she and Soaemias are mentioned together. Maesa, in all probability, did slip into the Senate; she would have appreciated the dignity of the position enormously, and the fact would give a basis to some story or other that had got about. Antonine would certainly have had no objection; the Senate was no longer the government properly so called; Maesa could do no harm there, and it would be a sop to her for the small power she was exercising in the actual development of events.

Soaemias, we can quite believe, was president of the assembly on the Quirinal which Lampridius sneers at as a foundation of Antonine's, and yet tells us had existed before his time. It was called the Senaculum or Conventus Matronarum. Friedlander says that it was an ancient and honourable assembly as early as the year 394, when its members voted their jewels to help raise the tithe in connection with the spoils of Veii. Seneca refers to it in his treatise De matrimoniis as a regular assembly. Again, in the year 209, the matrons met, in consequence of omens, to decide on expiation; even in imperial times Suetonius says that the Assembly met to reprove Agrippina for her vagaries; and Hieronymus counts amongst the distractions of Roman life the daily attendance at the Matronarum Senatus. What, therefore, this petulant and carping critic can find to grumble about in this permanent assembly meeting to carry out the provisions of the Lex Appia, one simply cannot


text:
Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/14

vi text, should provide an alphabetical glossary, and should furnish a due amount of help in difficult passages and no more. This need I have attempted to supply. I have of course made abundant use of the labours of my predecessors. The debt of an editor of “Beowulf” to the glossaries of Grein and Heyne is necessarily great. At the same time nothing has been accepted on mere authority. A glance at the glossary will suffice to show that it is no translation from the German. Of the text, in the same way, every line, every stop, almost every word, has been carefully considered. The genealogical tables and the index of proper names give, in a concise form, information that in many cases has hitherto had to be sought from various sources.

The Manuscript. The excellent edition, with autotypes and transliteration of every folio of the MS., prepared for the Early English Text Society by Prof. Zupitza, is almost of equal authority with the MS. itself, and is therefore quite invaluable to the editor, the autotypes being above criticism. Upon these the present work is based. The transliteration of a few lines here will serve to show some of the more marked characteristics of the unique extant MS. (Cott. Vitellius A. xv. in the British Museum), and to make apparent how far and in what particulars, besides those indicated in the foot-notes, the edited text differs from the MS.:—

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/14


text:
Page:EB1911 - Volume 20.djvu/465

  The sixteenth letter of the English alphabet, the fifteenth in the Latin and the sixteenth in the Greek alphabet, the latter in its ordinary form having the symbol for x before o. In the Phoenician alphabet, from which the Western alphabets are directly or indirectly derived, its shape, written from right to left, is. In the Greek alphabet, when written from left to right, it takes the form or, the second form being much rarer in inscriptions than the first. Only very rarely and only in inscriptions of the 7th and 6th centuries are rounded forms, found. In Italy the Etruscan and Umbrian form (written from right to left), though more angular than the Phoenician symbol, resembles it more closely than it does the Greek. The earliest Roman form—on the inscription found in the Forum in 1899—is Greek in shape, though the second leg is barely visible. The Oscan is identical with the rarer Greek form. As time goes on the Roman form becomes more and more rounded, but not till Imperial times is the semicircle completed so as to form the symbol in the shape which it still retains. The Semitic name Pē became in Greek, and has in the course of ages changed but little. The sound of p throughout has been that of the breathed labial stop, as in the English pin. At the end of English words like lip the breath is audible after the consonant, so that the sound is rather that of the ancient Greek , i.e. p-h, not f, as is ordinarily now pronounced. This sound is found initially also in some dialects of English, as in the Irish pronunciation of pig as p-hig. For a remarkable interchange between p and qu sounds which is found in many languages, see under .

 PAARL, a town of the Cape Province, South Africa, 36 m. by rail E.N.E. of Cape Town. Pop. (1904), 11,293. The town is situated on the west bank of the Berg river, some 400 ft. above the sea. It stands on the coast plain near the foot of the Drakenstein mountains. West of the town the Paarl Berg rises from the plain. The berg is crowned by three great granite boulders, known as the Paarl, Britannia and Gordon Rock. The town is beautifully situated amid gardens, orange groves and vineyards. The chief public buildings are the two Dutch Reformed churches, the old church being a good specimen of colonial Dutch architecture, with gables, curves and thatched roof. Paarl is a thriving agricultural and viticultural centre, among its industries being the manufacture of wine and brandy, wagon and carriage building and harness making. South-east of the town are granite quarries. The wines produced in the district are among the best in South Africa, ranking second only to those of Constantia.

The Paarl is one of the oldest European towns in South Africa. It dates from 1687, the site for the new settlement being chosen by the governor, Simon van der Stell. It was named Paarl by the first settlers from the fancied resemblance of one of the boulders on the top of the hill, when glistening in the sun, to a gigantic pearl. Shortly afterwards several of the Huguenots who had sought refuge at the Cape after the revocation of the edict of Nantes were placed in the new settlement. The present inhabitants are largely descended from these Huguenots.  PABIANICE, a town of Russian Poland, in the government of Piotrkow, 30 m. N.W. of the town of Piotrkow, and 10 m. S.S.W. from Lodz railway station. Pop. (1897), 18,251. It lies amidst extensive forests round the head-waters of the Nér, which were the hunting-grounds of the Polish kings. It has woollen, cloth and paper mills, and manufactures agricultural implements.  PABNA, or a town and district of British India, in the Rajshahi division of Eastern Bengal and Assam. The town is situated on the river Ichhamati, near the old bed of the Ganges. Pop. (1901), 18,424. The district of Pabna has an area of 1839 sq. m. Pop (1901), 1,420,461, showing an increase of 4·8% in the decade. It is bordered along its entire east face by the main stream of the Brahmaputra or Jamuna, and along its south-west face by the Ganges or Padma. It is entirely of alluvial origin, the silt of the annual inundations overlying strata of clay on sand. Apart from the two great bordering rivers, it is intersected by countless water-channels of varying magnitude, so that during the rainy season every village is accessible by boat and by boat only. Almost the whole area is one green rice-field, the uniform level being broken only by clumps of bamboos and fruit-trees, which conceal the village sites. The district is a modern creation of British rule, being first formed out of Rajshahi district in 1832, and possesses no history of its own. The two staple crops are rice and jute. Sirajganj, on the Brahmaputra, is the largest mart for jute in Bengal. The Eastern Bengal railway cuts across the south-west corner of the district to Sara, where a bridge crosses the Ganges. The district was affected by the earthquake of the 12th of June 1897, which was most severely felt at Sirajganj.  PABST, FREDERICK (1836–1904), American brewer, was born at Nicholausreith, in Saxony, on the 28th of March 1836. In 1848 he emigrated with his parents to Chicago. There he became, first a waiter in an hotel, then a cabin-boy on a Lake Michigan steamer, and eventually captain of one of these vessels. In this last capacity he made the acquaintance of a German, Philip Best, the owner of a small but prosperous brewery at Milwaukee, and married his daughter. In 1862 Pabst was taken into partnership in his father-in-law’s brewery, and set himself to work to study the details of the business. After obtaining a thorough mastery of the art of brewing, Pabet turned his attention to extending the market for the beer, and before long had raised the output of the Best brewery to 100,000 barrels a year. The brewery was eventually converted into a public company, and its capital repeatedly increased in order to cope with the continually increasing trade.  PACA, the Brazilian name for a large, heavily-built, short-tailed rodent mammal, easily recognized by its spotted fur. This rodent, Coelogenys (or Agouti) paca, together with one or two other tropical American species, represents a genus near akin to the agoutis and included in the family Caviidae. Pacas may be distinguished from agoutis by their heavier and more compact build, the longitudinal rows of light spots on the fur, the five-toed hind-feet, and the peculiar structure of the skull, in which the cheek-bones are expanded to form large capsules on the sides of the face, each enclosing a cavity opening on the side of the cheek. Their habits are very similar to those of agoutis, but when pursued they invariably take to the water. The young, of which seldom more than one is produced at a birth, remain in the burrows for several months. The flesh is eaten in Brazil. Males may be distinguished from females by the skull, in which the outer surface of the cheek-bones is roughened in the former and smooth in the latter sex. The paca-rana (Dinomys branicki), from the highlands of Peru, differs, among other features, by its well-developed tail and the arrangement of the spots. (See .)  PACATUS DREPANIUS, LATINUS (or ), one of the Latin panegyrists, flourished at the end of the 4th century He probably came from Aginnum (Agen), in the south of France, in the territory of the Nitiobriges, and received his education in the rhetorical school of Burdigala (Bordeaux). He was the contemporary and intimate friend of Ausonius, who dedicated two of his minor works to Pacatus, and describes him as the greatest Latin poet after Virgil. Pacatus attained the rank of proconsul of Africa ( 390) and held a confidential position at the imperial court. He is the author of an extant speech (ed. E. Bährens in Panegyrici latini, 1874, No. 12) delivered in the senate house at Rome (389) in honour of Theodosius I. It contains an account of the life and deeds of the emperor, the special subject of congratulation being the complete defeat of the usurper Maximus. The speech is one of the best of its

title: Page:EB1911 - Volume 20.djvu/465


text:
Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/16

viii truth of what he himself says: “It is often very difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether the scribe intended one or more words.”

Several things are obvious from a perusal of the above passages:—

(1) That the lines of the MS. do not correspond with the verse-lines of the poem.

(2) That the punctuation of the MS. is meagre and unreliable.

(3) That proper names are not written with capital letters. On the other hand, the first word after a full-stop is not infrequently written with a capital.

(4) That vowel-length is not marked as a rule.

(5) That one word is sometimes written as two or even three words, and that two words are sometimes written as one word.

(6) That hyphens are unknown to the scribes.

(7) It would seem that the scribes were mere copyists, not writing from memory nor from dictation, and that sometimes at least they did not understand what they were copying.

It is impossible to illustrate, by the quotation of passages like the above, the divergences of the MS. in the method of writing and spelling the same word. One or two illustrations must suffice. The word ond, “and,” is written in full only three times, in ll. 600, 1148, 2040. Elsewhere it is represented by the symbol ⁊. The word ondlong occurs in the form “⁊langne” (acc. m.) in l. 2115, “andlongne” (acc. m.) in l. 2695, “ondlonge” (acc. f.) in l. 2938. The word mon-cynn occurs as “mancynne” (dat.) in l. 110, “moncynnes” (gen.) in l. 196, “mon cynnes” (gen.) in l. 1955. These are only a few examples of the inconsistencies with which the MS. teems.

title: Page:Beowulf (Wyatt).djvu/16


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/P

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/P


text:
The New International Encyclopædia/Breymann, Hermann

BREYMANN, brī'mȧn, (1843—). A German philologist. He was born at Oker, near Harzburg, and studied philology at the universities of Göttingen, Bonn, Marburg, and Paris. In 1875 he was appointed professor of the French and English languages at the University of Munich. He is one of the foremost authorities on pedagogical questions affecting instruction in modern languages. In addition to the Münchener Beiträge zur romanischen und englischen Philologie, of which he is the editor, Breymann has published the following important works: Les deux livres des Macchabées (1868); Marlowe's Dr. Faustus (1889); Bearing of the Study of Modern Languages on

at Large (1872); Diez, sein Leben, seine Werke; On Provençal Literature (1875); Die neusprachliche Reform-Litteratur 1876-93 (1895).


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Paarl

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Paarl


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Pabianice

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Pabianice


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Pabna

title: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Pabna


text: 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Pabst, Frederick


text:
The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Congress, Continental

CONGRESS, Continental. The first recognition of a solidarity of interests among the English colonies in America, and attempts at joint action against a common foe, were made in 1690, by Jacob Leisier, revolutionary dictator of New York; and his efforts were stimulated by the fact that New York bore the first brunt of Canadian invasion, and needed help. He invited the other colonies to send delegates to New York and contribute men and money for a counter-invasion; but none farther south than Maryland responded. A much more comprehensive plan was devised by Franklin in 1754 (see ), but fell through. In 1765, on occasion of the ../Stamp Act/ (q.v.), a colonial congress from all the North except New Hampshire, and only South Carolina of the South below Maryland, met at New York 7-25 October, but took no action except to petition Parliament. In 1773, when the Revolution was impending, Franklin renewed his former suegestion in a letter to the assembly of Massachusetts, whose agent in London he was, but still nothing was done.

The next year, however, on receiving news of the Boston Port Bill, Virginia proposed to the other colonies a Continental Congress in the fullest sense; that is, including Canada, for it was not doubted that this recently subjugated province would gladly join in a revolt against its conqueror. Massachusetts responded 7 June, others followed, and the first real American Congress met in Philadelphia, 5 Sept. 1774, sitting till 26 October. Canada, however, was not represented; nor was Georgia, though it shared in all succeeding Congresses. The instructions to the delegates did not contemplate separation or forcible resistance, but only the proposal of measures to “restore harmony” with Great Britain; and the Congress merely drafted addresses to the king and the people of that country, to the Canadians, and to their own constituents, and recommended non-importation and non-exportation agreements, and the forcible resistance to any forcible attempt to carry out the Parliament's taxation measures. It also advised the immediate election of delegates to a fresh Congress in Philadelphia 10 May 1775; which was carried out by various bodies — legislative assemblies in some cases, popular conventions or committees of safety (q.v.) in others. None of these had any legal power to act for this purpose, and the title of all alike was the will of the force majeure of the people; for the loyalist section had equal right to oppose the elections, and it was tacit acceptance of superior fighting force that gave the title. The fact that this Congress was considered necessary at all, and was to have power to organize combined resistance to Great Britain, would be conclusive evidence that the

leaders of public opinion had determined on independence unless highly improbable concessions were made, were it not for the extreme reluctance the Congress displayed in declaring it, only doing so under irresistible urgency from public opinion. A parallel case is the memory of the hopes of accommodation and conciliation by Union leaders not only in 1860-61, but all through the Civil War. The frequent charge of hypocrisy against the Revolutionary leaders involves one against all the patriotic statesmen of the decade before 1860.

As soon as war was actually proclaimed by Great Britain the second Congress assumed the fullest powers of sovereignty; much greater than those of the British Parliament, for it combined the powers of that body with those of the king, being itself both executive and legislative head of the nation. It raised military and naval forces and directed belligerent operations with them, authorized privateering, contracted treaty alliances, issued national currency, etc., in both capacities. This was by no usurped power, but by the urgency of the people who were far more anxious to have it take the powers than it was to exercise them. The provincial congresses appealed to it for authorization, and the people urged it to more energetic action. Its crowning act was the Declaration of Independence; its business from 12 July to 20 August the debating of the scheme of government it had drafted (see — ), but which was not put in force for five years, and for which it was perhaps slight misfortune to have waited. It sat till 12 Dec. 1776.

The session of 20 Dec. 1776 has been hesitantly called the third Continental Congress; for the delegates were selected entirely by the State legislatures, and the body as a whole had a title more definite and regular, though not in reality more legal. But in fact, the second Congress, from the opening on 10 May 1775, was a continuing body in perpetual session; with no definite term of sitting or terms of membership; the State legislatures which had selected members did not specifically send new ones for the new session, but each chose them for such terms as it pleased — Congress exercising no right of control in this matter — and recalled them at will. Each State had but one vote, all being thus equal, as in the Senate, where each has two; but in the Senate the members have individual votes. This provision in the Continental Congress was avowedly made only because a census could not then be taken to ascertain the relative populations. As under the Confederation, the Congress dealt with States, not individuals; and much of the impotence with which it is reproached in the Revolution was involved in this, though not all of its follies are thus excusable. Some of its worst performances, however — as the misdealing with the officers which drove some of them from the service permanently and others temporarily, and deeply injured the cause — were directly due to the tenacious individuality of the States, which claimed their share of the military patronage then as they do of the civil patronage now.

A history of the Congress is a history of the country during its lifetime; but some of its migrations are significant of military reverses and recoveries. From 20 Dec 1776 to 4 March

1777 it sat at Baltimore; 4 March to 18 Sept. 1777, at Philadelphia; 27 Sept. 1777, at Lancaster, Pa.; 30 Sept 1777 to 27 June 1778, at York, Pa.; 2 July 1778 to 21 June 1783, at Philadelphia. But before this it had ceased to be the Continental Congress, and had become the Congress of the Confederation, on 2 March 1781, after the ratification of the Articles by Maryland. Consult Histories of the United States by Bancroft, Hildreth, Schouler, Von Holst, etc.; Fiske, ‘Critical Period of American History’ (1888).