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Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 4

Chapter 4 - The English Break into the Heligoland Bight
THE nightly cruises from the foremost patrol line by Heligoland were continued and extended. On August 12 the light cruisers Köln (Flagship of the First Flag Officer of the destroyer flotillas, Rear-Admiral Maass) and Hamburg went out with Flotilla VI; Köln and Stuttgart with Flotillas I and II on the 15th, and the light cruiser Mainz with the Flotilla VIII on the 16th. As no enemy was met on any of these enterprises the light cruisers Stralsund (Captain Harder) and Strassburg (Captain Retzmann) were sent out to the Hoofden against the destroyer patrol line, the existence of which had been reported by submarines.

They put to sea on the morning of August 11 with two U-boats, which stood by near Vlieland while the cruisers steamed south to about the line Lowestoft - Scheveningen. When this was reached they turned, early on the morning, of the 18th. Shortly afterwards the Strassburg sighted three enemy submarines, distant about 100 hm. (11,000 yards). These were fired on and one of them seemed to be hit. Soon after eight destroyers were sighted in a northerly direction and a light cruiser with another eight destroyers in an easterly direction, which were in a position to cut off the retreat of our cruisers. The range, howeyer, did not fall below 100 hm., so that no success was obtained on either side. The possibility that there might be other English forces not far off seemed to make it imperative for our ships not to lose time in manoeuvring for attack, for the sixteen destroyers of the enemy had an immense preponderance of gun-power over our cruisers armed only with 10.5 cm. guns. Both cruisers returned home without trouble.

In the second half of August the number of reports of submarines sighted at the mouth of the Ems and in the Heligoland Bight increased, and very heavy demands were made on the destroyers to drive them out. On August 21 the light cruisers Rostock and Strassburg with Flotilla VI made a sweep in the direction of the Dogger Bank with a view to searching the fishing-grounds for English fishing-smacks. They also met enemy submarines, one of which fired two torpedoes at the Rostock, but both missed. On this cruise six fishing-steamers were destroyed which were found, well separated, in a circle round Heligoland, and were suspected of working with English submarines.

As all these cruises pointed to the conclusion that we could not expect to find considerable enemy forces in the southern half of the North Sea, our two mine-laying cruisers, Albatros (Commander West) and Nautilus (Commander Wilhelm Schultz) received orders to lay a minefield at the mouths of the Humber and Tyne. By day their operations were covered by a light cruiser and a half-flotilla of destroyers, as mine-layers must be kept out of action if at all possible. Both ships were able to carry out their commission undisturbed and laid their mines accurately at the places indicated. The actual work began at midnight and was favoured by thick weather. On the way back another six fishing-steamers were sunk.

The previous raids had been favoured by luck inasmuch as the forces employed, which were anything but strong, had not been located and cut off by superior forces. Their safety lay in speed alone. Before support from units lying ready in the estuaries could reach them it might easily be too late. But for that purpose it was considered inadvisable to have proper supporting forces hanging about in the Heligoland Bight on account of the submarines reported there.

August 28th brought us the first serious collision with English cruisers. The reports taken back by the English submarines as to our offensive arrangements in the Heligoland Bight must have decided the English to roll up our patrol line. As the English dispatches on the events of this day have been published, a clear idea of the course of the action can be obtained (see plan, p. 44). My own observations from Squadron II, which lay in the Elbe, are confined to the wireless messages received. About nine o'clock in the morning the first of these came in. "In squares 142 and 131 [that is 20 sea miles north-west of Heligoland] enemy cruisers and destroyers are chasing the 5th Flotilla."

The Stettin and Frauenlob (light cruisers) were sent out to help. Two flotillas of U-boats took up station for attack. The remaining wireless messages from nine o'clock in the morning to five in the afternoon gave the following picture :

The ships which took part in the action comprised Destroyer Flotillas I and V, the light cruisers Mainz, Strassburg, Kbln, Stralsund, Ariadne, Kolberg and Danzig, and two mine-sweeping divisions.

On the enemy's side were several cruisers of the "Town" class, armoured cruisers of the "Shannon" type, four battle-cruisers under the command of Admiral Beatty in Lion, and about thirty destroyers and eight submarines.

About six o'clock in the morning one of these submarines had fired two torpedoes, which missed, at a ship of Destroyer Flotilla I, which was retiring to the day patrol line. We had no other information on our side of the further doings of the English submarines on that day; the weather was thick, and as there was hardly any wind, visibility in the neighbourhood of Heligoland was only three to four miles. The upper part of the island was completely shrouded in mist.

The marine artillery on the island saw nothing of the action which raged within range of the island in the morning. It was not possible for our battle-cruisers to put to sea before one o'clock owing to the state of the tide at the bar of the Outer Jade. Their intervention came too late. The orders which were issued by the Flag Officer of the German cruisers proceeded on the assumption that the same weather conditions prevailed outside as in the Jade, and the cruisers regarded the situation as such that they would be able to retire in time before a superior force. Unfortunately this was not the case. Mainz and Köln, all unsuspecting, thus came upon English battle-cruisers and fell victims to their guns. Our plan of surrounding the English forces which had penetrated by cutting off their retreat to the west with Mainz, which was in the Ems, while other light cruisers barred the way in the north, was actually put into execution before a general view of the whole situation had made it feasible.

Exceptionally high demands were made on the presence of mind of the Flag Officers in command when they saw themselves faced with more powerful ships than they had expected. The battle training of our light cruisers revealed a high standard of efficiency. In spite of the serious damage to the ships and heavy losses in personnel, the gun crews served their guns and overcame the confusion of action with exemplary calm and precision. The bold intervention of the other ships and the impulse to hasten to where the thunder of the guns called and bring help, cost us, in addition to the loss of Köln and Mainz, the loss of the light cruiser Ariadne, which had been so damaged by fire that the men had to throw themselves overboard. The question was put whether it would have been of any avail for our big ships to come out of the estuary. They could have had no success, and 1 this is obvious enough in view of the prevailing low visibility.

In the action between the cruisers and destroyers, the light cruiser Ariadne and the torpedo-boat "V 187," leader of Flotilla I, were sunk on our side. Most of the ship's company of Ariadne were saved by Stralsund and Danzig. Half of that of "V 187" were taken off by other ships of Flotilla I.

"Wireless communication with 'Köln and Mainz has stopped. They are both sunk. Two cruisers (Strassburg and Stettin) are damaged as well as the torpedo-boats D 8, V 1 and T33. Many dead and wounded. Nothing known of English losses."

After the first news arrived Squadron II was held ready to raise anchor in case battleships were required to go out in support. However, we received no order to intervene.

The surprise of our patrols by the two English cruisers Arethusa and Fearless, which were escorted by seventeen destroyers of the "I" class and fourteen of the "L" class (according to English reports), was a success for the enemy. The intervention of our two light cruisers Stettin and Frauenlob limited the losses on our side to one torpedo-boat, "V 187." As soon as the news of the break-through of light forces was received all other available light cruisers were sent out to meet them. In the action that now followed Arethusa and Fearless were seriously damaged and had to call in the help of the very strong English force held ready in support and not yet employed. Its intervention put our cruisers in an evil plight. Very thick weather made a survey of the whole situation difficult.

There are some who think that the way in which the light cruisers went out separately is open to criticism as a piece of temerity. With the safe withdrawal of Flotillas I and V and the driving off of the cruisers Arethusa and Fearless as the result of the prompt and resolute intervention of Stettin and Frauenlob, the English attack had lost the character of a surprise, and the plan, which involved a great show of force, had gained but a moderate success with the sinking of "V 187." On the other hand, was a baffled enemy to be allowed to withdraw from the Heligoland Bight un-pursued in broad daylight?

Four weeks had passed before the first occasion had presented itself of getting to close quarters with the enemy. Were our ships to content themselves, the first time enemy light forces appeared, with hiding in the estuaries and make no attempt to deal with the enemy, who might perhaps fall into our hands if he were badly damaged? The Flag Officers and commanders would have incurred a serious reproach if they had neglected to make the attempt to get to close quarters with the enemy. If the impression of the first meeting had been a feeling of inferiority and the conviction that we could do nothing but retire before the English, it would have had an unhappy effect on the spirit of the ships' companies and the further course of the operations. The effect produced was exactly the opposite, and we were all burning to avenge the slap in the face we had received.

The disintegration of the engagement into a number of detached actions which were fought at close range, owing to the poor visibility, produced such remarkable examples of the presence of mind and contempt of death of our men that they deserve better than to sink into oblivion. I shall therefore give a few extracts from war diaries.

REPORT OF THE ACTION OF THE FLOTILLA LEADER OF THE DESTROYER FLOTILLA I, WALLIS - "V 187"

(Drawn up by Lieutenant Jasper)

"The Flotilla leader 'V 187' was on patrol (at 16 knots) about 24 sea miles N.W. to W. of Heligoland on a W.N.W. course. Shortly after eight o'clock the ship on our right, 'G 194' (Lieutenant-Commander Buss) reported : 'Am chased by enemy armoured cruiser.' We turned and made for 'G 194.' At 8.20 a.m. in thick weather, two destroyers came in sight in N.W. about three miles off, and were reported to S.M.S. Köln by wireless. The ship bore S.E. to E. and put on speed. The destroyers were kept in sight. After a short time another four destroyers or cruisers were observed. Accurate observation impossible owing to failing visibility. 'V 187' now put on full speed and altered course for Heligoland.

"Meanwhile an order from Köln to Flotillas I and V had been received, 'Make for shelter of Heligoland.' Simultaneously, four destroyers, which stood between us and Heligoland, emerged from the mist on our port quarter about four degrees to 50 hm. away. At about 40 hm. they opened an intermittent fire. 'V 187' turned south and replied with her after 8.8 cm. gun. The destroyers' shooting was mostly very poor. Only at regular intervals one gun fired shells which passed close over our bridge. The Commander intended to make shooting difficult by altering course and reaching the Jade or Ems at top speed. The ship ran 28 or 29 miles. The destroyers had only caught up a little and were now shooting at about 30 hm. Suddenly an enemy cruiser with four funnels appeared four points on our starboard bow. She apparently made a signal with her searchlight to 'V 187' or her own destroyers. Immediately afterwards she fired a series of salvos at 35 to 40 hm. After the third salvo the shooting was good. As escape was no longer possible the officer in command decided to close. The whole ship's company with the exception of the stokers caught hold of firearms and lifebelts. 'V 187' ported her helm and tried to cut her way through.

"The running action was fought at 12 to 8 hm. The destroyers, apparently surprised, ceased fire at first, but then they subjected us to an extremely rapid fire. A shell fell close to the 8.8 cm. gun and put the crew out of action with the exception of a slightly wounded petty officer. The forward gun only fired a few rounds after that.

"Another shell fell in stokehold 4 and penetrated the bunkers. Splinters wounded the stokers, the lights went out, the steam escaped and the boiler would not fill any more.

"Simultaneously other shots and splinters fell on the bridge. I turned to starboard with a view to ramming the destroyer immediately behind us and clearing our way past it.

"Hits now followed one another with rapid succession. Shells and splinters rained down, and the ship was completely shrouded in smoke and fumes.

"The forward turbine was hit twice and stopped. Steam, mixed with black smoke, poured out of the hatches and ventilators.

"Boiler 2 was damaged and boiler 1 had also received hits.

"Some of the bridge personnel had fallen; the ship had little way on and was listing to port for no obvious reason. The officer in command, who had been seriously wounded, now gave the order to sink the ship. I took one of the four explosive charges which were on the bridge, set it and threw it in the forward turbine room. The bridge personnel put two others in the forward part of the ship.

"Meanwhile two other destroyers coming from the north had joined in the fight. After fixing up the charges I gave orders to leave the ship on the leeside of the firing.

"I jumped overboard just before (according to my calculations) the charges would take effect. The rest of the gun crew of the after gun, which had continued firing to the last (among them Lieutenant Braune), sprang simultaneously into the water. The destroyers now ceased fire and sent out boats. Several men were picked up with lines and buoys. After a few minutes' swimming about I myself was picked up by an English boat. Just as I was getting in 'V 187' went down by the bows. No one could Be seen on deck. The boat had three other men of the ship's company of 'V 187' on board.

"At that moment a German light cruiser (Stettin) opened fire on the destroyers. The English boat's crew went on board their destroyer. I refused to go on board with my three men as I did not want to be made prisoner. The English destroyer then started off at high speed. An English sailor had let go the hawser apparently in error.

"I then hauled another sixteen survivors into my English boat.

"Another English boat, under the command of an English officer, was left behind by the destroyers in the evening. It had on board Lieutenant Braune and several survivors.

"After a considerable time a partially submerged English submarine came from the east towards us.

"It came right up and took on board the English crew of one boat and Lieutenant Braune. At first I kept away from the submarine and took off my monkey jacket lest I should be recognised as an officer and taken prisoner. The submarine, which had the mark 'E 4' on the bows and the number '84' (as well as 'E 4' again) on the conning tower, dived and disappeared, half submerged, in the west.

"Another smaller English boat, which had on board five more survivors of 'V 187,' now came up to me. The three boats then rowed for some considerable time in an E.S.E. direction towards the German patrol line. They were subsequently picked up by 'G 4' and 'G 11.' The more severely wounded of our men were bandaged on board the destroyers while the boats were sunk. After the destroyers had picked up six dead and had tried to identify the spot at which 'V 187' went down from the remains of charts and books, they proceeded to Heligoland. From there the six dead and forty-four survivors, the latter including seven severely and about twenty slightly wounded men, were brought to Wilhelmshaven in the steamer Arngast."

The light cruiser Mainz (Captain Wilhelm Pasche) was sunk on this day. According to the record made by the First Officer, Lieutenant Tholens, who was taken as a prisoner to England, the action developed as follows:

"The order, 'Mainz immediately put to sea and take the reported English forces in the rear,' reached the ship at 10 a.m. in the Ems. Thanks to the previous wireless messages from the Wallis Flotilla, she had steam up in all her boilers and was ready for sea. Mainz could therefore put out immediately and develop full speed very quickly. A northerly course was taken at first to cut off the retreat of the enemy ships. The aeroplane at Borkum, which was placed at the ship's disposal, was sent on in the same direction. When the ship started from the Ems the weather was calm, the air clear and visibility good. The conditions for reconnaissance by the aeroplane appeared to be the best imaginable, but after a short flight it returned without any results to show. Meanwhile the Mainz had run into haze. This made a surprise by enemy forces possible. About half-past twelve the Arethusa, with eight destroyers, appeared in N.E., moving on a westerly course and distant about 70 hm. To such a degree had visibility already decreased!

"To bring the enemy under fire with the starboard guns we turned to port somewhat on a line of bearing N.N.W. Shortly after the first salvos, to which the enemy ships replied with some of his guns, the enemy turned off on a northerly course. The conditions for shooting were extremely unfavourable, as the enemy ships were very difficult to make out in the haze. All the same, several salvos were very well placed, and hits were certainly observed on two destroyers, one of which wrecked a bridge and put out of action everyone on it, including the commander. With a view to keeping the enemy in sight, Mainz herself gradually turned on a northerly course. At 12.45 masses of smoke were suddenly reported in N.W., and a few minutes later revealed three cruisers of the 'Birmingham' class. Mainz immediately turned hard to starboard, and even as she turned the salvos of the new enemy fell around her, and a few minutes later she received the first hits. The fire of Arethusa and the destroyers, which had now apparently passed out of sight, had been without result.

"Our own fire was now directed exclusively at the new enemy, and simultaneously the latter was reported by wireless. By 12.55 p.m. the enemy cruisers were only distinguishable by the flashes of their guns. Shortly afterwards even this had ceased, and with it the hail of enemy shells. Mainz ran 25 sea miles, approximately S.S.W. in the direction of the eastern Ems, and emitted large quantities of smoke. Meanwhile almost abreast on our port beam another cruiser of the ' Birmingham ' class (Fearless) had come into sight, as well as six destroyers close together and several others by themselves. In the course of the action which now developed with these ships and in which several torpedoes were fired at the Mainz, the helm suddenly jammed at 10° to starboard.

"The order, 'Steer from the wheelhouse,' came through at the very same moment as the signal from the quartermaster, 'Port your helm.' The helm remained jammed, however, as the result of an explosion under the wheelhouse. The result was that although the steering gear throughout the ship was in working order, all our efforts to steer the ship were without success. We could only conclude that a hit under water had given the whole rudder a bend to starboard. The port engine was stopped.

"Mainz slowly turned more and more to starboard, and thus came again within range of the first three cruisers of the 'Birmingham' class and the Arethusa, with her eight destroyers. At the same moment the report reached the bridge that three guns, with their crews, had been completely put out of action. In the stage of the action that followed, in which Mainz, with her helm jammed and going round in a circle to starboard, faced four cruisers of the 'Birmingham' class and about twenty destroyers, our own fire was directed exclusively at the enemy destroyers. Against these only was a success worth mentioning possible. As several of the destroyers came quite close, it was possible to observe several hits upon them.

"Meanwhile casualty had followed upon casualty on the Mainz. About 1.20 p.m. most of the guns and gun crews were already out of action. The decks were shot to pieces. The sending up of ammunition had come to a standstill, and more than once compartments under the armoured deck had to be cleared on account of the danger from smoke and gas. The starboard engine could only go half speed.

"It was in this condition that about 1.20 p.m. the ship was struck by a torpedo amidships on the port beam. The effect of this on the conning-tower was that the whole apparatus for transmitting orders, with the exception of the speaking-tube and telephones to the central and torpedo rooms, were put out of action. The commander thereupon gave the order, 'Abandon ship, ship's company get clear with life-belts,' and left the conning-tower. This order, however, only reached the nearest action-stations, and accordingly was only carried out in part. As the result of the torpedo we had stopped firing everywhere. At this moment the First Gunnery Officer and the Torpedo Officer were in the conning-tower. The First Officer, who thought that the Commander must have fallen and knew nothing of his last order, gave orders to resume firing, and tried to launch some torpedoes. The torpedoes he fired, one from port at a light cruiser and two from starboard at destroyers, had no luck, as the enemy ships kept out of torpedo range. On the enemy's side two battle-cruisers had now intervened in the action. Whether they also tried to get in a few hits has never been definitely ascertained. In the Mainz only the first and fifth starboard guns were now in action."

The picture of the scene below decks after the explosion of the torpedo is amplified by the following observations of the senior surviving engineer, whose action-station was by the pumps.

"1.15 p.m. - Hit by a torpedo. The ship staggered, heeled over quite sensibly and remained thus for a considerable time. Took even longer to right herself. The emergency lights went out. All the glass which was not already broken by concussion of the bursting, shells was now broken. The electric light became dim and gradually went out. In the end our electric torches were the only light we had. The engines ceased to revolve. The gauge already showed that the ship was slowly settling by the head. The efforts to ascertain where the hole was were without result, as we could no longer get a reply from any of the compartments. After a short pause we could hear that firing had been resumed, but when the firing, and shortly afterwards the hail of enemy shells ceased, we could not get into touch with any other part of the ship. The conning-tower, too, did not reply. The water that poured out of the speaking-tube showed that the water had reached the armoured deck, and therefore that the flooded compartments must be submerged.

"As the ship was bound to sink very soon, amidships was now cleared. Between-decks over the armoured deck was so full of smoke that you could not see a yard ahead. Both the companions leading up from there were shot to pieces. It was only by scrambling through the holes made by shells, over the relics of hatches and lockers, that we managed to get out. The space under the forecastle was also filled with smoke from right forward as far as over the second gun.

"As soon as the firing had ceased on all sides the English ships made the greatest efforts to pick up the survivors. At a summons from the Mainz, which had not listed at all until about 2 o'clock, a destroyer came alongside the stern to take the wounded on board. All the wounded whose cases did not seem perfectly hopeless were thus removed to the destroyer, assisted by everybody who had not yet left the ship. About 2.10 p.m. Mainz heeled over to port and sank."

For a last example I will give the report of the action prepared by Captain Seebohm, commanding the light cruiser Ariadne:

"On the 28th August S.M.S. Ariadne, flagship of the Harbour Flotilla of the Jade and Weser, was lying in the Outer Jade. On hearing the sound of guns about 9 o'clock, and more particularly on receiving a wireless from Stettin that cruiser support was requested, Ariadne set a course for Heligoland. Near the Outer Jade Lightship she met the cruiser Köln, flagship of Rear-Admiral Maass, which was making west at high speed. Ariadne then took much the same westerly course as Köln, which had soon disappeared in the haze. We received further wireless messages from Maim and Strassburg that they were in action with enemy destroyers.

"Avoiding a certain area where a minefield was suspected, we steered towards the position of the ships named. Judging by her wireless reports, Köln appeared to be taking the same course. About 10 o'clock an enemy submarine was sighted square on our port beam. It immediately dived, and seemed at first to be manoeuvring for position, but then suddenly disappeared, so that we had no chance to fire.

"Shortly afterwards gunfire was heard on our port bow, and we made straight in that direction. Shortly before 2 p.m. there emerged from the mist two ships, one of which, on our starboard bow, did not reply to our signal. It was recognised as an armoured cruiser so we immediately turned about. The second ship was Köln, which was being chased and would doubtless have got away if Ariadne had not appeared. The enemy immediately shifted his fire from Köln to Ariadne. Ariadne soon received a hit forward which started a fire in the coal, so that the stokehold had to be abandoned on account of the danger from smoke. Five boilers were thus put out of action and Ariadne's speed was reduced to fifteen knots. Behind the enemy, which, judging by its silhouette, was the English Flagship Lion, a second English armoured cruiser soon appeared and joined in the action, firing at Ariadne for about half an hour at a range of from 45 to 60 hm., at times even from 33 hm. This last distance is only an estimate, as by now all the recording instruments were out of action. Ariadne received many hits from heavy guns, among them a whole series aft, which was soon enveloped in flames. Such of the personnel there as made good their escape owed it entirely to luck. The fore part of the ship also received a number of serious hits, one of which penetrated the armoured deck and put the torpedo chamber out of action, while another destroyed the sick-bay and killed its personnel. Amidships and the bridge, strange to say, were almost entirely spared. It is perfectly impossible to say how many hits in all the ship received. Apparently many shells passed through the rigging and were thereby detonated. Others were observed to fall in the water without detonating. Many others passed to right and left as Ariadne was running away from the enemy and offered but a small target.

"The English salvos followed in succession with somewhat long pauses. The shells produced their effect mainly by starting fires. All the living quarters fore and aft were immediately in flames. The tremendous flames made it impossible to extinguish a fire which had once started. Further, the fire-extinguishers on the armoured deck had been utterly destroyed.

"About 2.30 the enemy suddenly turned west. I assume that he could no longer distinguish the Ariadne, which was enveloped in smoke from the fires. On the Ariadne the undamaged guns were still being worked and independently of the fire-control, as there were no means of transmitting orders. Further, the fumes from the ship made it impossible to see anything from the bridge.

"In spite of the enemy's annihilating fire the ship's company worked with the greatest calm, as if on manoeuvres. The wounded were carried down by the stretcher-bearers. All ratings tried to carry out such repairs as were possible by themselves. The First Officer was carried away by a shell while between decks with the repairing section.

"After the enemy turned away I first ordered 'all hands' to extinguish the fire. This turned out to be impossible as we could no longer get aft and the ship had to be cleared forward as well almost at once. On the order 'Flood the magazine,' the men ran to the forward magazine. It was ascertained that this was already under water. It was impossible to get to the magazine aft. A previous attempt to open the compartments 1 and 2 where some of the men were still imprisoned proved fruitless, as the deckplates had been bent by shells. The engine-room and the after boiler- room had remained uninjured throughout, and the same was true of the rudder. The telegraph apparatus failed. The cable was apparently cut by an explosion under the conning-tower.

"The heat and smoke made it more and more unpleasant to remain on the ship, and it was even worse when the ammunition piled round the guns began to go off. These explosions, however, did not do much damage. A large number of small splinters were scattered which, for example, penetrated the bridge from below.

"The ship's company assembled in perfect order on the fo'c'sle, whither the wounded also had been brought. I asked for three cheers for His Majesty and then the flag hymn and 'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles' was sung. Even the wounded joined in. One man asked for three cheers for the officers.

"Just before 3 o'clock S.M.S. Danzig (Captain Reiss) came up and sent boats to us. As has already been mentioned, we had not suffered so severely amidships and it was therefore possible to lower the Ariadne's cutters also. The first to be put in the boats were the wounded, who were lowered from the fo'c'sle with ropes. As it gradually became impossible to remain on the fo'c'sle the rest of the ship's company jumped into the sea at the word of command. Some of the stronger swimmers swam all the way to the Danzig and Stralsund (Captain Harder), which had also approached. The non-swimmers, who had lifebelts and rafts, were picked up by the boats. Meanwhile the fire on the ship - which was gutted - had died down somewhat, and the explosions were less frequent. I therefore betook myself to Stralsund with a few men who had returned in Ariadne's boat, in order to request her captain to take Ariadne in tow. However, just about this time Ariadne suddenly heeled over to port and then capsized to starboard. The keel was visible for some time above the water."

If it was already known that the Heligoland Bight was insufficiently protected, because our scouting did not extend far enough, this day brought us the knowledge that a determined raid of the enemy against our weak forward patrol must inflict loss upon us every time. By the repetition of such surprises it might gradually be worn away altogether, while the Fleet got very little value out of its patrolling operations. The continuous employment of personnel and material on patrol work in the lengthening nights weakened both and thereby prejudiced the efficiency for their main task - to fight the enemy fleet. The unmolested irruption of the enemy cruisers and destroyers and the complete freedom of movement they had enjoyed in the Heligoland Bight must be made much more difficult, as also must the perpetual harassing operations of English submarines, although the latter had not hitherto displayed any great skill in torpedo work.

Far-reaching changes were made in both directions. As regards the patrol service a large number of armed fishing steamers were secured and prepared with the utmost despatch. They had previously been employed only in the harbour flotillas, which looked after the security of the estuaries. Moreover, in the middle of September two large minefields were laid west of Heligoland, which increased the danger for the enemy and offered a safe retreat for our patrols when they were hard pressed.

On September 13 an English submarine, "E 9," succeeded in torpedoing the cruiser Hela south of Heligoland. The ship took twenty minutes to sink, so that there was time to save the whole ship's company, and our losses were limited to three men killed where the torpedo exploded.

The minefields before Heligoland proved effective, and in conjunction with progressive defensive measures such as aeroplanes and the equipment of our patrols with weapons which could be employed offensively against submerged submarines (such weapons were wholly lacking at the beginning of the war), kept the inner area so clear that the danger from submarines came at last to be quite a rare and exceptional possibility.


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Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 5

Chapter 5 - The Autumn and Winter Months of 1914
THE affair of August 28, 1915, could be regarded as the preliminary of some enterprise on a larger scale, an enterprise in which our Fleet would start at a disadvantage if the enemy held the initiative. He would thus be able to make full use of his superiority while we had to undertake the difficult deployment from the estuaries of our rivers. By choosing his own moment the attacker had the advantage of previously sending out his submarines in large numbers to suitable stations. As the result of their frequent visits to the Heligoland Bight, as well as their experiences in the August action, they must have acquired sufficient data to be employed effectively.

The defensive attitude imposed on our Fleet was a direct help to such a plan. To anticipate it it was therefore obvious that our High Command would desire greater freedom of movement in order to have a chance of locating parts of the enemy's forces. This could only be done if the light forces sent out ahead could count on timely intervention by the whole High Sea Fleet. On the other hand, it was not the Fleet's intention to seek battle with the English Fleet off the enemy's coasts. The relative strength (as appeared from a comparison of the two battle lines) made chances of success much too improbable. Taking, battleships only, the superiority on the English side was seven compared with our total number of battleships, thirteen, and therefore more than fifty per cent. Our older ships of .Squadron II, which dated from the pre-Dreadnought period, would be opposed to an English squadron composed of ships of the "King Edward VII" class of equal fighting value.

The Supreme Command attached more importance to the security of the sea front, which was entrusted to the Fleet, in this early period of the war than to the damage which it might possibly be able to inflict on the enemy's fleet. The restrictions imposed on the Battle Fleet were therefore adhered to.

The attempts to damage the enemy by guerilla operations were continued, and in addition cruiser raids against the English coast and the Skagerrak were planned. The U-boats carried their operations ever farther afield, and at last they had their first success on September 8, when "U 21 " (Hersing) sank the light cruiser Pathfinder at the entrance to the Firth of Forth. This was fol- lowed by the great feat of Weddigen when, with "U 9," on September 22, he made a bag of the three armoured cruisers Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, twenty nautical miles N.W. of the Hook of Holland.

Weddigen's name was in everyone's mouth, and for the Navy in particular his achievement meant a release from the oppressive feeling of having done so little in this war in comparison with the heroic deeds of the army. But no such victory had been required to reveal completely the value of the submarine for our warlike operations, especially after it had given such unexpectedly convincing proof of its ability to remain at sea.

Favourable news came from abroad also. The Emden had begun her successful operations against English merchant ships in the Gulf of Bengal,- and in East Africa the light cruiser Konigsberg had sunk the Pegasus and so avenged the bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam.

About the middle of September the squadron of older ships which had been newly-formed at the beginning of the war had so far progressed in its training that it could be commissioned for service in the North Sea. The ships were not themselves fit to take part in a Fleet action, but they could take over part of the duties of patrolling the estuaries and keeping these open against attempts at interruption when the Fleet was at sea. However, they were never employed on this service, for they were not kept long in commission, as their ships' companies were needed urgently elsewhere later on. However, the work spent on them had not been wasted, for they gave the Fleet well-trained men for its new ships, and their presence in the Baltic in the first weeks) of the war had the effect of giving our Baltic forces much greater importance in the eyes of the Russians than was justified by the facts. This, and possibly, too, their lack of confidence in their own efficiency, may be responsible for the fact that the Russians refrained, from taking the offensive.

On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief had immediately taken the offensive himself, although all he could promise himself for a result was the intimidation of the Russian naval forces in the Baltic. In spite of the fact that at the outset he had only two light cruisers, Augsburg and Magdeburg, a few torpedo-boats and some steamers, converted into mine-layers, at his disposal, he did not wait for the Russians to attack, but, immediately after the declaration of war, put to sea and bombarded Libau. The bombardment did not do much damage, it is true, but it compelled the Russians to take a hand in the work of demolition. Moreover, mines were laid at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland.

Our purpose was completely attained and compensated for the loss of the light cruiser Magdeburg, which ran ashore in a haze on August 27 and had to be abandoned. On October n the armoured cruiser Pallada, which had distinguished itself by shooting at the Magdeburg when she was stuck fast, fell a victim to our "U 26" (Freherr von Berckheim). This success did not fail to have a paralysing effect on Russian enterprise.

Without going further into the details of the operations in the Baltic their effect on the general situation at home can be described as extremely important. Without depriving the Fleet of important forces and thereby weakening or quite paralysing it, the modest forces employed kept the Russians in check, so that there was no bombardment of the German coast from the sea, and traffic in the Baltic, which was absolutely vital for war purposes, was not interfered with. The observation and security of the southern exit of the Belt and Sound made it possible for us to use the western basin of the Baltic for the Fleet's battle practices. Without such a training area the exercising, of the new units which had been formed at the beginning of the war would have been very difficult. In the same way it would have been very doubtful whether we could have carried out trial trips and the first gunnery tests of newly commissioned ships.

As the war proceeded the importance of the western Baltic as an aid to keeping the Fleet ready to strike became a matter of life and death. Without constant training of an appropriate kind the standard of gunnery and navigation would have sunk to a precarious level. When navigating on a raid in the North Sea the attention of the Flag Officers was fully taken up with the possibility of enemy counter-measures and more especially with defence against underwater attack. Half the ship's company were on watch at action stations and the engine-room complement were on watch down below, and as their duties required their whole attention it was no good thinking of carrying out useful exercises of the whole ship's company under the direction of the commander. We could only expect victory in battle if we succeeded in maintaining that standard of training in which we saw our sole and overwhelming chance of beating the enemy. A suitable practice area for this purpose was the Baltic, with Kiel Haven as base. Without this area at our disposal the development which our submarine weapon subsequently underwent would have been quite unthinkable.

In view of the importance of this practice area for our operations and the valuable establishments at Kiel dockyards, especially the torpedo-establishments at Friedrichsort, on the efficiency of which the whole submarine war was later to depend, it appears incredible that the enemy made no efforts to open this vital vein. At the beginning of the war the mining by the Danes of the northern and central portions of the Great Belt was in accordance with the wishes of our Naval Staff that the safety of the Baltic should) be secured. There may be some question as to whether the Danes had the right to mine these waters, for they were an international strait, but the mining, was approved by the English also, apparently because it fitted in with their plan of not penetrating into the Baltic. Our Fleet regarded these mines as a great obstacle to their freedom of movement, for they deprived it of the possibility, when large ships were sent out on a distant raid in the North Sea, of bringing them back round the Skagen into the Baltic instead of keeping them on the single line of retirement to Heligoland. For political reasons the Naval Staff regarded it as unwise to demand the opening of the Great Belt by Denmark.

Of the different mine-laying enterprises of the High Sea Fleet in the autumn months of 1914 a special mention is due to a cruise which on October 17 began at the mouth of the Ems and had the south coast of England for its goal. Four ships of the 7th Half-Flotilla (Commander Thiele) "S" 115, 116, 117, 119 were employed. These older boats had been chosen with an eye to the possibilities of casualties, because they were no longer fit for other duties. The ships' companies had all volunteered for this dangerous raid. Their task consisted of laying mines at the entrance to the Downs, the Channel leading round the S.E. corner of England from Dover to the mouth of the Thames. The English Admiralty had announced that navigation of the area between Lat. 51 15' N. and 51 41' and Long. 1° 35' E. and 3° 0' E. (that means a strip 35 nautical miles broad from the English to the Dutch coast) was dangerous on account of mines. For this reason traffic was compelled to use the open channel close to the land. It was thus under English control, and the English found their inspection service easier. By mining the channel leading into the Thames we might expect practically a stoppage of London's supplies.

England's behaviour in laying mines in the open sea, a policy made public in this announcement, released us from the necessity of observing the limits we had hitherto imposed on ourselves of restricting mine-laying solely to the enemy's coasts, an operation which was naturally attended with greater danger to the mine- layer the nearer she approached within reach of the coastal patrol forces.

The half-flotilla had left the Ems in the early hours of the morning when it was still dark. Near Haaks Lightship, 15 miles W. of the southern point of the Island of Texel, it met the English cruiser Undaunted and four destroyers of the latest type, escape from which was impossible. As this was realised our ships attacked and, after a brave defence in an action which was carried on at a range of a few hundred yards, were sunk. The English saved as many of the survivors as was possible. After we received the first wireless message that action had begun, no further news of the torpedo-boats was forthcoming, and as we had therefore to assume that they had been lost, we sent out the hospital ship Ophelia to pick up any survivors. However, the English captured her and made her prize, charging us with having sent her out for scouting purposes, although she was obviously fitted up as a hospital ship and bore all the requisite markings.

The auxiliary cruiser Berlin was sent out into the North Sea the same night. Her commission was to lay mines off the most northerly point of Scotland, as we had reason to suspect a lively movement of warships there. The cruise of the Berlin was favoured by better luck, for it was one of her mines to Which the battleship Audacious fell a victim about a week later. She was so damaged that she had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The English succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable time the loss of this great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success for our efforts at equalisation. When the news leaked out at last its truth was definitely and decisively denied.

The following points deserve to be remembered in considering these two enterprises: (1) Mine-laying in the open seas. (2) The capture of a hospital ship which was engaged in the work of saving life from the best of motives and observing all the regulations. (3) The suppression of the news that an important ship had) been lost in the case of the Audacious.

The behaviour of the English was inspired at all points by consideration for what would serve their military purposes, and was not troubled by respect for international agreements. But this did not prevent England from raising loud cries later on when we also considered ourselves released from our obligation and with far more justification took action against hospital ships which, under cover of the Red Cross Flag, were patently used for the transport of troops. In the case of the Audacious we can but approve the English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy, because accurate information about the other side's strength has a decisive effect on the decisions taken.

The complete loss of the 7th Half-Flotilla was very painful, and the Commander-in-Chief has been freely criticised for having sent it out insufficiently supported. The reply to that is that it is extremely difficult to decide what "sufficient support" is. Suppose, in relation to the case under consideration, we say in the light of after events that if we had had two more cruisers we should have had a superiority, such a method of reasoning involves a knowledge beforehand of the strength of the enemy ; otherwise you might have to bring up your whole fleet at every alarm if you wished to feel perfectly safe. Besides, risk is of the very essence of war. The idea is implied even in Moltke's phrase, "Think first." On the other hand, our failure revealed the importance to our" operations of the base on the Flemish coast, from which enterprises of this kind were much more feasible and indeed led to a permanent threat to the English trade route in the Channel.

In October the enemy submarines outside the Ems and in the Heligoland Bight were very active. There was hardly a day on which reports were not received that enemy submarines had been sighted. Although a good many of these turned out to be false alarms, their presence was frequently confirmed by the fact that torpedoes were fired. Apart from the loss of the Hela on September 13, which has already been mentioned, the torpedo-boat "G 116" was sunk by a torpedo north of Schiermonnikoog on October 6. It was possible to save most of the men. On the other hand, the torpedo-boat "G7" and an incoming auxiliary cruiser which were attacked in the neighbourhood of Amrum had better luck, as all the torpedoes fired at them missed.

The annoyance from submarines increased our determination to master them. In October, after the English "E 3" had fallen a victim to one of our U-boats, which had been lying in wait all day for this exceptionally well-handled ship, and several other English submarines had had unpleasant experiences with our mines in the neighbourhood of Heligoland, the area of the Bight inside Heligoland was given a wider berth. Beyond the island, however, we had perpetually to deal with the watchful activities of English submarines. Moreover, during the autumn storms the neighbourhood of the coasts was particularly unfavourable for navigation. Our own submarine cruises extended farther and farther afield as the commanders continued to gain experience, and by exchanging notes these operations became increasingly effective.

On October 15 "U16" passed Heligoland after a cruise of fifteen days, and on her return reported that she was still perfectly effective. This month also witnessed the first cruise round the British Islands. "U 20 " (Lieutenant-Commander Droescher), which had been sent out against transports in the English Channel, found itself compelled, by damage to the diving apparatus, to avoid the Channel, which was closely patrolled, and therefore returned round Ireland and Scotland. The cruise took eighteen days in all.

On November 1 the English cruiser Hermes was sunk off Dunkirk by the U-boats which were commissioned to hinder the transport of English troops to the French ports. Unfortunately no success in this particular direction was achieved.

To assign this task of interrupting the English troopship service to the Fleet was to make a totally impossible demand, as the losses it would inevitably involve would be out of all proportion to the advantage the army would derive from the disturbance to the transport of English troops such a Fleet action might cause. Even if the presence of our Fleet in these waters held up one or more ships, the way would be open the minute our Fleet left, and nothing could be easier than to arrange for ships to put out as soon as news was received that the enemy had gone. However important a factor in the war on land England's effort might be, the best way of neutralising it would have been the occupation of the French Channel coast.

If our Fleet went into the English Channel by the Dover-Calais Straits its tactical situation would be simply hopeless. It would have no room to manoeuvre against torpedo and mine attack. Our own destroyers would not have enough fuel, as their radius of action only just reached as far, and they would then find themselves compelled to return. The Fleet would then have had to do without them or return with them. There could be no question of the former alternative on account of the danger from submarines, defence against which was the work of the destroyers, and also because the destroyers were indispensable for battle. The Fleet was therefore dependent upon the radius of action of the destroyers. The appearance of the submarine as a defensive weapon has made it a necessity in modern times to screen the approach of a fleet with destroyers. Moreover, it is so important to increase the offensive powers of a fleet which is inferior in numbers by the employment of destroyers that these cannot possibly be dispensed with. If one compares, simply on a map, the position of a fleet which ventures into the Channel from the Heligoland Bight with that of a fleet making for the Heligoland Bight from the English coast - from the Firth of Forth, for example - the advantages and disadvantages of the prospects on either side are at once apparent. One fleet is placed as if it were corked in a bottle, while the other has freedom of movement over the whole area in its rear.

At the end of October Squadron II had visited Kiel dockyard to effect certain important improvements in armament and the comfort of the ships, which had suffered very much from the removal of everything which was likely to catch fire. This was in the interests of the health of the ships' companies during the winter. The compartments throughout the ship were insulated in the same way as those in the newer ships by the use of fireproof material. Living in ships in which every noise came as a shock from one end to the other became a severe trial to the nerves as time went by, and in view of the strenuous hours on watch, was prejudicial to the short period allowed for rest. The victims will never forget those weeks of the war in which the tapping of hammers and the scraping of chisels never ceased from first thing in the morning to last thing at night, and mountains of wood and superfluous paint vanished from the ship.

This first visit of a squadron to the Baltic was also to be employed in various exercises in which cruisers and destroyers were to participate. It appeared advisable, in view of this, to take advantage of the presence of the ships for a great enterprise against Libau which might be very unpleasant as a winter base for enemy submarines, as it was the only Russian ice-free harbour. While the orders for this enterprise were being settled with the Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic and everyone was burning for the chance of at last firing his first shot, the news reached us from the North Sea that the bombardment of English coast towns had successfully been carried out on November 3. Early that morning our battle-cruisers had appeared off Yarmouth to bombard the harbour and its fortifications while mines were being laid under their protection. The absence of Squadron II had not restrained the Commander-in-Chief from taking advantage of the favourable weather and long nights for this raid, from which we could anticipate an effect on the defensive attitude of the enemy as well as the direct influence which the damage to a hostile base would have on the enemy's operations. It was not found necessary to send the Fleet out to take up an advanced station at sea in the case of the short raid to Yarmouth, because the plan was to be based entirely on surprise under cover of darkness. After returning from this raid the old armoured cruiser Yorck ran on a mine in a mist in the Jade and was capsized by the explosion. It was found possible to save the larger part of the crew.

The raid against Libau was cancelled at the last moment as the result of an order from the Naval Staff to Squadron II, which was already on its way. The frequent reports of the activity of English submarines in the Baltic, which had come in of late, seemed to point to the wisdom of abandoning the enterprise, as the bombardment by ships of land targets would certainly offer submarines their very best chances of attack. The submarine danger was taken very seriously because we had not yet had sufficient experience and training in the defence.

On November 6 we received the news of the victory of our cruiser squadron on November 1 off Coronel on the coast of Chile. Vice-Admiral Count von Spee had defeated in fair and open fight the English cruisers Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and the auxiliary cruiser Otranto with his ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the light cruisers Leipzig and Dresden. The two hostile armoured cruisers were destroyed by a superior fire, while Glasgow and Otranto escaped under cover of falling night. Great was the enthusiasm over the fact that the brave admiral had succeeded, in spite of all obstacles, in leading his ships to a victory which dealt a severe blow to the tradition of English superiority at sea. This news filled us in the Fleet with pride and confidence, and we thought in gratitude of those who, left to their resources in distant oceans, had gained immortal laurels for the German flag. Unfortunately fate was not to permit them to see their homeland again. Those who, with their leaders, rest in the ocean depths by the Falkland Islands, gave us a shining example of heroism, of devotion to duty.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/MacCabe, William Bernard


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text: Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind Volume 1.djvu/3


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Page:Letters of Daniel Webster (1902).djvu/778

 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX


text: Page:Letters of Daniel Webster (1902).djvu/779


text: Page:Letters of the Late Lord Lyttleton.djvu/303


text: Page:Lewis - Babbitt.djvu/1

title: Page:Lewis - Babbitt.djvu/1


text: Page:Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, v5.djvu/313


text: Page:Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, v8.djvu/329


text: Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/46

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text: Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/171

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text: Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/180

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text: Page:Life of John Boyle O'Reilly.djvu/413


text:
Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/322

 Beautiful Plume on the World of Swift.

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Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/264

 The Most Horrible Auction in our Universe.

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text:
Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/47

 Visiting a City on the Moon.

title: Page:Life in a thousand worlds.djvu/47


text:
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Conclusion

Conclusion
"I HAVE no longer a Navy."

With these words the Emperor repudiated my objections when on the afternoon of November 9 I urged that if he resigned the Navy would be without a leader. Deep disappointment sounded in these words, the last that I heard from His Majesty.

In the evening of the same day the Armistice conditions were published, among which was the demand for the surrender of the German Fleet and of all the U-boats. No opposition could be expected from the Revolutionary Government. It consented to everything in order to get rid of the hated "Militarism," and delivered the defenceless German people into the hands of its enemies. A curse lies on the Navy because out of its ranks Revolution first sprang and spread over the land ; and many who regarded its deeds with pride are to this day at a loss to know how such a change can have been possible.

The conditions of life on the large ships, the close quarters in which the men lived, favoured the propagation of this agitation, which was spread by any and every means. Further, the crews were most easily exposed to temptation because of their close connection with the Homeland. But the most important and the decisive cause was this: the war-weariness of the whole nation, increased by hunger and all sorts of privations, had become so widespread that even the righting forces had lost faith in a happy end to the war.

On the day when the German National Assembly accepted that fatal peace which perpetuates hatred the deed accomplished at Scapa Flow once more gave evidence of the spirit which inspired the Navy, as it did the Army, in the days when they rejoiced in battle. However much we are bowed down, we can still do justice to all the great things that were achieved. That is the only comfort that we can take in regarding the dark future that awaits us; it is the foundation-stone upon which to build up new hopes. The strength which the German people developed enabled us to withstand the onslaught of overwhelmingly superior forces for four and a half years, to keep the enemy out of our own country, to fell the giant Russia, and even to bring England, who thought herself unassailable, to the brink of destruction; this strength of ours was so mighty that our downfall could only be accomplished by extraordinary means: we had to inflict defeat upon ourselves.

The credit of inventing this expedient belongs to England, and the surrender of our Fleet appears as the great triumph which her sea power has won. History will not find much that is worthy of praise in the way England waged the war at sea; it may laud her ultimate success, but not the means by which it was achieved. The very surrender of our ships is the best proof that we were not defeated until in the Homeland the will to continue the struggle had been so sapped by hunger and privation that the people were susceptible to the poisonous ideas spread by enemy propaganda, of which an unscrupulous Revolutionary party made use to attain its selfish ends. It was England's privilege to extend the war to the economic sphere in an unheard-of manner. The fight for sea commerce was to lead to the strangling of the whole German people. For that purpose violence had to be done to the rights of the neutrals, whose power, compared with that of the ring of our enemies, was of no avail. England's policy of alliance placed her in a position to carry out her plan of starvation, without any fear of a protest from civilised society. She cleverly diverted attention from the enormity of her proceedings by simultaneously opening a campaign of lies about Germany's atrocities and Hun-like behaviour. Widespread financial operations, moreover, united American with English interests.

It was the task of our Fleet to defeat the English blockade, or to neutralise the effects of it by the damage it inflicted on the enemy. The latter method was chosen. The U-boat proved to be a suitable means to this end. We must be grateful that the technical development of the U-boat had reached such perfection, just in the nick of time, that these craft could be sent out to such distances and for such length of time as the war against commerce demanded. Fault-finding is an objectionable quality of the German. Many a time he has scorned and belittled the great work of twenty years of building a Navy which should be able to meet the English Fleet in battle. The accusations made are false and prove nothing but the ignorance or the ill-will of those who make them. No doubt our ships had faults - no naval authorities can make a claim to infallibility - but they were of absolutely no account compared with the fact that the material, as well as the spirit and training of the crews, were so good that our Fleet was able to hold its own against the English. Only a ship-building industry like that of Germany, which, as the German Fleet developed, produced such super-excellent ships, could have helped to supplement our Fleet during the war by the construction of a new U-boat fleet. The reliability of the material, and the manner in which the boats were built, increased the courage of the crews who, with full trust in their weapon, could dare all.

In view of England's plan of campaign, there was no alternative but to inflict direct injury upon English commerce. We could not build a sufficiently great number of additional large ships to compensate for the inevitable losses which we were bound to suffer in the long run in a conflict with the numerically superior English Fleet. In carrying out their blockade, that Fleet had the advantage of choosing its field of action in the Northern waters, far removed from our bases. After their experiences in action, the English left the southern part of the North Sea for us to deploy in, and contented themselves with warding off the U-boat danger. Throughout they were forced to be on the defensive. We ought to have tried earlier what the result of a victory by our Fleet would be. It was a mistake on the part of the naval leaders not to do so. It was only after we had been proved in battle that we gained sufficient confidence to send the U-boats permanently into the North Sea to wage war on commerce against England, and in the teeth of the resistance of her Fleet.

The earlier the U-boat campaign was started in full earnest, the greater was the prospect of being able to go through with it; it was wrong to wait until the endurance of our people had been tried to the utmost by the effects of the blockade. The number of boats at the beginning of 1916 would have been amply sufficient for the purpose. The success of a U-boat campaign does not depend solely on the number of the boats, but rather upon their quality and the skill of their navigators. U-boats of great speed and unlimited powers of remaining at sea, which could not be caught, would soon paralyse the sea traffic of an Island State like England. As such an ideal was not capable of full attainment, the greater number of boats had to make up for the lack of perfection. The results achieved fulfilled, and even surpassed, expectation, even though a criminally long time was allowed the enemy to organise his defence. That we did not reach the limit of England's endurance in time was due, not to the ill-success of the U-boats, but to the encouragement which the enemy found in his hour of need in our political attitude and that of our Allies. Why should he lower his colours when in July, 1917, we cried to him : "We want peace," - which in his ears sounded like "We need peace" - and when we let Austria and our enemies know that the country could not continue the war longer than the autumn of that year? The worse the enemy fared, the more boldly he bore himself. We, unfortunately, adopted the opposite attitude.

From the very first a large proportion of the people had been nervous as to the disadvantageous effects of the U-boat campaign. This had become a party question, owing to its treatment in Parliament and the Press. The leading statesman's dislike of it was openly acknowledged everywhere ; he left the decision to the Supreme Army Command, who were to fix the date in accordance with the general military situation, and he put the responsibility on their shoulders. True, the nation had absolute confidence in the Supreme Army Command, because the generals in command had earned this confidence. In this question of life and death, too, they formed an opinion in common with the Naval Staff, and decided upon action when no other means of breaking the enemy's resistance was to be found. But to succeed we had need of the confidence and co-operation of the whole nation, so that they might hold out until success was ensured. The Reichstag resolution of July, 1917, must have been viewed by the enemy as a proof that this confidence did not exist.

From then onwards there was no question of the enemy's yielding. Now, a year after the conflict has ceased, we get indications from England every day of how hopeless the situation seemed there. But realising their weakness, they were able to weather the critical period in the autumn of 1917 by seizing enemy shipping for their own ends, and they strove zealously to intensify the disintegrating forces which were at work amongst us. This war has taught us to what an extent a nation can limit its economic needs. For more than a year after the conclusion of the Armistice we bore the burden of the blockade although huge quantities of supplies had to be left in enemy hands, or were idly squandered, when our troops retreated.

Our situation would not have been worse had the war continued, while the enemy would have kept on losing an amount of tonnage that could not be replaced.

But his will to endure was stronger than ours, for he recognised the weakness of our Government, whose leaders, unlike those of the enemy Cabinets, did not have the whole-hearted support of representatives of the majority of the people.

The World War was to be a test for the German nation, whether it could hold its own as a factor of civilisation overseas. The British tried with might and main to oust it from its position, when the might of the German Empire was behind it. They felt the danger that lay in our superior diligence, the excellence of German work, and the sterling qualities of German education and culture as compared with the shallow civilisation of the Anglo-Saxons meant for nothing but effect. Our peaceful penetration was met with violence. How great they thought the danger is shown by the mighty efforts of our enemies to crush us.

They have attained their object, because our leading statesmen at the outbreak of war did not recognise the magnitude of our task, or - which is worse - looked upon it as beyond our strength. If the great aim had been rightly realised then, if it had been pursued with all the forces and strength at our disposal, and if the nation's will to victory had been continually directed towards it, we might have been sure of success.

The enormity and baseness of the methods with which our downfall had been planned, inflamed the sense of antagonism in our people to a degree which it could not otherwise have attained. The nation, however, could not fail to grow weary of its efforts when the only aim that was left to it after long years of fighting and Starvation was that of self-preservation; it was deluded by enemy craft and wiles into thinking that this could be secured by other means.

Thus dissension arose at home, and our strength was exhausted in internecine strife for a phantom of national freedom; and the only palpable result of all this, brought about by the Revolution, is the helplessness of that freedom, deprived as it is of the power to defend itself from foreign aggression.

Toil and labour must start afresh to raise the honour of the German Navy. In this task the Fatherland) will feel the lack of many capable men, who cannot live in the straitened circumstances that have been forced upon us, and who will migrate elsewhere. But our hopes are centred on these, that they will not deny their love of home, but will preserve their loyalty to their enslaved Fatherland and will cherish it in their descendants until the vitality of Germany, oppressed and overwhelmed as it now is, has won through to a new development.

The Englishman may now think himself entitled to look down upon us with scorn and contempt, yet in his feelings of superiority there will always be the sting that he was not victorious in battle, and that his method of waging war is one that must recoil upon his own head.

Other World Powers will appear upon the scene who will only concede a prerogative at sea to him who, as in Nelson's days, can assert his pre-eminence in open conflict.


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Rh Sussex County Hospital, and went thence to Guy's Hospital, where he obtained several prizes. He became a member of the College of Surgeons in 1872, and soon after became resident medical officer at the London Fever Hospital. In 1875 he was elected medical tutor at St. Mary's Hospital, and shortly after medical registrar at Guy's Hospital. While discharging the very laborious duties of this office he entered at Caius College, Cambridge, and used to go to Cambridge every evening by the last train in order to perform the pernoctation essential for keeping a term, returning to London by an early morning train. He had taken the degree of M.D. at Brussels, and in 1881 he graduated M.B. at Cambridge, taking no other degree, and in the same year he was elected assistant physician to Guy's Hospital. In 1880 he was elected a fellow of the College of Physicians of London. He was the chief mover in the establishment of a system of obtaining information on diseases by means of replies to printed papers of questions forwarded to practitioners of medicine throughout the country, and worked most laboriously at this ‘collective investigation.’ He made many contributions to the ‘Transactions of the Pathological Society’ (vols. xxvi. xxviii. xxxii. xxxiv. xxxv. xxxvi. xxxvii. xxxviii.), of which the most important is one on the sphygmographic evidence of arterio-capillary fibrosis; and he wrote a long series of papers on the results of the use of the sphygmograph in the investigation of disease in the ‘British Medical Journal.’ To the ‘Transactions of the Medico-Chirurgical Society’ he contributed a valuable paper on the early stages of scarlatinal nephritis, and also published many observations in the Guy's Hospital ‘Reports.’ He died of enteric fever on 22 Nov. 1884, at his house in Manchester Square, London. He had been married twice. He was a tall, muscular man, of a dark complexion, impulsive in manner, and possessed of extraordinary powers of work.

 MAHON, Viscount (1805–1875), historian. [See, fifth .]

MAHON, CHARLES JAMES PATRICK, better known as (1800–1891), Irish politician, was born at Ennis, co. Clare, on 17 March 1800. His father, Patrick Mahon, had taken part in the rebellious movements of 1798. His mother was the daughter of James O'Gorman of Ennis. Educated at a small clerical school in Dublin, and afterwards at Trinity College, where he matriculated in 1819 and graduated M.A. in 1826, The O'Gorman Mahon had barely attained his majority when in 1821, upon his father's death, he became a J.P. for co. Clare. A boldness of demeanour, rare in those days among Roman catholics, combined with a singularly handsome face and imposing stature to attract attention to him as a young man. Before 1826 he had become acquainted with O'Connell's famous lieutenant, Tom Steele, who introduced him to the Catholic Association, of which he soon became a member. He was one of the first to impress upon O'Connell the desirability of wresting Clare from William Vesey Fitzgerald [q.v.] on the latter's accepting office as president of the board of trade in the Duke of Wellington's administration in 1828, and, as soon as O'Connell had decided on the struggle, Mahon spared no pains to secure his victory. Not content with ordinary electioneering tactics, he exploited to the full the eccentric resources of his own picturesque personality. On the opening of the polling in the court-house, he suspended himself from a gallery over the heads of the gaping crowd below, attired in an extravagant national costume, and with a medal of the ‘Order of the Liberators’ on his breast. In a whimsical speech he declined to obey the high sheriff's direction that he should remove the badge. O'Connell was returned triumphantly at the head of the poll, 5 July 1828. On 17 Aug. 1830 he was himself elected M.P. for Clare along with Major William Nugent m'Namara, but was unseated on petition on a charge of bribery. Next year this place was filled by Maurice O'Connell. In the following general election in May 1831 The O'Gorman once more appeared as candidate in opposition to Major m'Namara, in whose interest O'Connell threw his influence. The O'Gorman was defeated, and the contest, which was conducted with some bitterness, resulted in a quarrel, never healed, between him and O'Connell. He now took up his residence at Mahonburgh, became a D.L. for his county, and a captain in the West Clare militia. In 1834 he was called to the Dublin bar, but did not practise, and in 1835 he set out on foreign travel. Paris was his first destination, and there he made the acquaintance of Talleyrand, and became a favourite at the court of Louis-Philippe. From Paris he proceeded to one European capital after another; and he travelled in Africa and the East, and was for a short time in South America before he returned to Ireland in 1846. He represented Ennis in parliament from 1847 until 1852, when on again offering himself as candidate he was defeated by Lord Fitzgerald.


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Rh The following years also were devoted to foreign travel. At Paris he interested himself in financial, literary, and journalistic projects, and proceeding thence to St. Petersburg he attracted the notice of the czar, who appointed him a lieutenant in his international bodyguard. Subsequently he hunted bears in Finland with the czarevitch, fought against the Tartars, travelled in China and India, and served under the Turkish and Austrian flags. About 1862 he returned to Paris, and afterwards made his way to South America. He served as general under the government during the civil war in Uruguay, had command of a Chilian fleet in the war with Spain, held the post of colonel under the emperor of Brazil, and took part in the American war on the side of the north. On returning once more to Paris, in 1866, he obtained a colonelcy in a regiment of chasseurs from Louis Napoleon, but, always restless, proceeded in 1867 to Berlin, where he became intimate with Bismarck and the crown prince, and mixed much in society. He reappeared in Ireland in 1871, and took part in the home rule conference of 1873. As a supporter of Charles Stewart Parnell [q.v.] he was in 1879 elected member for Clare, and was re-elected in 1880. In June 1887, after two years' absence from parliament, he was returned for Carlow, and that constituency he continued to represent until his death in Sidney Street, Chelsea, London, on 15 June 1891. In spite of his great age he retained all his faculties to the end, and his last public act was to repudiate Mr. Parnell, of whose treachery to the Irish cause he was convinced. He was buried in Glasnevin cemetery, within the O'Connell circle, on 21 June 1891. An oil portrait is in the possession of Mr. Charles Mahon Hagan of New Park, co. Clare.

The O'Gorman married in 1830 Christina, daughter of John O'Brien of Dublin, and had an only son, St. John, whose death on 22 Sept. 1883 was perhaps the greatest affliction of his life.

The O'Gorman Mahon was one of the last of the old race of dare-devil Irish gentlemen, and was more in his element upon the famous ‘fifteen acres’ than on the floor of the House of Commons. He fought thirteen duels in all; in how many the result proved fatal is not known. One of his duelling pistols bears two notches that seem significant, but he was able to say that he had never done anything to provoke a challenge; and to his gentleness of demeanour, in times of peace, all who knew him have borne testimony.

 MAHONY, CONNOR, CORNELIUS, or CONSTANTINE, called also (fl. 1650), Irish jesuit, was born in Muskerry, co. Cork. He resided at Lisbon, and Patrick Plunkett, titular bishop of Ardagh, and subsequently of Meath, made his acquaintance there between 1650 and 1660. John Serjeant, an English secular priest, who studied at Lisbon, also met him there. Both to Plunkett and Serjeant Mahony owned himself author of the small book which has alone preserved his memory, and to the former he gave a copy. The title-page of this volume is ‘Disputatio Apologetica de Jure Regni Hiberniæ pro Catholicis Hibernis adversus hæreticos Anglos. Authore C. M. Hiberno Artium et Sacræ Theologiæ Magistro. Accessit ejusdem authoris ad eosdem Catholicos exhortatio. Francofurti Superiorum permissu typis Bernardi Govrani. Anno Domini 1645,’ 4to.

The object of these treatises, which were really printed at Lisbon, is to claim Ireland for the Irish in the strictest sense, and to show that the kings of England had no right to it. ‘The Irish Catholics,’ says Mahony (p. 98), ‘had a perfect right to cast off the heretic government as they did in 1641, and are still doing while I write. … The Portuguese did the same thing for the same reason in 1640, and chose for themselves King John IV, hitherto Duke of Braganza.’ And he strongly advises the Irish (p. 103) ‘never again to admit the yoke of English heretics, but to elect a Catholic King for themselves, who should also be a vernacular or aboriginal Irishman—vernaculum seu naturalem Hibernum.’ The natives were exhorted to kill heretics, and to drive out even Irishmen who gave them any help.

In 1647, or perhaps earlier, some copies of this inflammatory book reached Ireland through France or direct from Portugal. One was found with John Bane, parish priest of Athlone, and the nuncio Rinuccini was called upon by the confederate catholics at Kilkenny to punish him. This the nuncio refused to do; but they had the book burned by the common hangman, and rigorous search for copies was made at Galway. Peter Walsh, by command of the supreme council, preached nine sermons running against it in Kilkenny Cathedral, all on the text Jer. ix. 12: ‘Who is the wise man, that may understand this? and who is he to whom the mouth of the Lord hath spoken, that he may declare it, for what the land perisheth?’ Rinuccini says (1 Oct. 1647): ‘The great out-


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Mahon, Charles James Patrick


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Major, Richard Henry


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Majendie, Henry William


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GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 9 JUNE 1982

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To provide for the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

(Afrikaans text signed by the State President.) (Assented to 1 June 1982.)

E IT ENACTED by the State President and the House of Assembly of the Republic of South Africa, as follows:―

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

1. In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates—

“authorized officer” means a person designated as such under section 6 (1), and includes any person acting under his written authority; (vii)

“board of review” means a board of review established under section 35; (ix)

“Commissioner” means the Commissioner of the South African Police; (xii)

“communism” means any doctrine, ideology or scheme—

which is based on, has developed from or is related to the tenets of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin or Mao Tse-Tung, or of any other recognized theorist in connection with or exponent of those tenets, and which aims at the establishment of any form of socialism or collective ownership;

which aims at the establishment, by means of a class or group polarization of the community and


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GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 9 JUNE 1982

Rh

the subsequent assumption of power by a particular class or group, of a despotic form of government under which one political party, group or organization only is recognized and all others are eliminated or prohibited; or

which aims at bringing about any political, economic, industrial or social change within the Republic in accordance with the directions or under the guidance of or in cooperation with any foreign government or any foreign or international institution or organization whose purpose or one of whose purposes (whether professed or not) is to bring about the establishment within the Republic of any economic or social system as contemplated in paragraph (a) or any form of government as contemplated in paragraph (b); (xiii)

“Director” means the person appointed in terms of section 2 (2) to the office of Director of Security Legislation; (v)

“document” includes any book, pamphlet, record, list, placard, poster, drawing, photograph or picture, or a film as defined in section 47 (1) of the Publications Act, 1974 (Act No, 42 of 1974); (vi)

“gathering” means, for the purposes of—

sections 20 (ii), 46 (1) (b) and (3) (b) and 48 (1) (b), any gathering, concourse or procession of any number of persons; any other provision of this Act, a gathering, concourse or procession of any number of persons having a common purpose, whether such purpose is lawful or unlawful; (iv)

“Inspector of Detainees” means any person appointed as such under section 44 (l); (xi)

“liquidator” means a person designated as such under section 13 (1) (b), and includes any person acting under his written authority; (iii)

“Minister” means the Minister of Law and Order; (xiv)

“office-bearer”, in relation to any organization, means member of the governing or executive body of—

the organization; any branch, section or committee of the organization; or any local, regional or subsidiary body forming part of the organization; (i)

“officer”, in relation to any organization, means any person working for the organization or for any branch, section or committee of the organization, or for any local, regional or subsidiary body forming part of the organization; (ii)

“organization” means any association of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, and whether or not it has been established or registered in accordance with any statute; (xviii)

“periodical publication” means any publication appearing at intervals; (xix)

“place” means any place, whether or not it is a public place, and includes any premises, building, dwelling, flat, room, office, shop, structure, vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and any part of a place; (xx)

“police” means any body of men established or enrolled under any law and exercising or carrying out the powers, duties and functions of a police force, and includes any portion of the South African Defence Force when used for the prevention or suppression of terrorism or internal disorder; (xxi)

“police officer” means any member of the Force as defined in section 1 of the Police Act, 1958 (Act No. 7 of 1958), and includes any member of the South African Railways Police Force referred to in section 43 of


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Maguire and was ordained priest in September 1816 in the parish church of Templeport. After acting as curate to his uncle, Dr. Maguire, he was parish priest of Drumreilly from July 1818 till September 1825, when he was promoted to the parish of Ennismagrath. In 1827 he engaged with the Rev. Richard T. P. Pope in the lecture-room of the Dublin Institution in a public discussion respecting the distinctive doctrines of the Roman church. As usual on such occasions both sides claimed the victory. He succeeded Hugh O'Reilly as parish priest of Ballinamore in August 1835, and he was also dean of Kilmore. In 1838 he engaged in another polemical discussion, of nine days' duration, at Dublin with the Rev. Tresham D. Gregg. He died at Ballinamore on 2 Dec. 1847.

‘He used to boast that he was the best shot, the best courser, the best quoit-player, the best breeder of greyhounds, pointers, and spaniels, and the best brewer of “scaltheen” in the whole county of Leitrim. He is supposed to have been poisoned by his housekeeper, together with his brother and sister-in-law’ (Gent. Mag. March 1848, p. 334).

‘Authenticated Reports’ of his platform discussions appeared at Dublin in 1827 and 1839 respectively. The accuracy of the earlier report is attested by both the disputants. The second was published by Gregg. Maguire published his ‘Lectures delivered in SS. Michael and John's Church, Lower Exchange Street, during the Lent of 1842,’ 2nd edit. Dublin, 1842, 12mo.

 MAGUIRE, THOMAS (1831–1889), classical scholar and metaphysician, first Roman catholic fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, born in Dublin 24 Jan. 1831, was the son of Thomas Maguire, a Roman catholic merchant, subsequently stipendiary magistrate in Mauritius. Young Maguire, after attending a school in Dublin, went at the age of fifteen with his family to the colony, but returned to enter Trinity College, Dublin, in 1851. He obtained a sizarship, but being a Roman catholic he could not hold a scholarship or fellowship. He gained high honours in classics and metaphysics, including the Wray prize in the latter (1853), and the Berkeley medal in Greek literature and composition (1857). In 1855 he graduated B.A. as senior moderator in classics and in philosophy. In the same year the board of Trinity College endowed non-foundation scholarships for the relief of those labouring under religious disabilities. Maguire competed, and was elected. In 1861 he obtained the law studentship at Lincoln's Inn, and in 1862 was called to the English bar. Although highly commended by Lord Westbury, he soon ceased to practise, and, returning to Dublin about 1866, set up as a private teacher in Trinity College. In 1868 he was presented by the college with the degree of LL.D., the payment of the usual fees being remitted as a mark of favour. In 1869 the chair of Latin in Queen's College, Galway, became vacant, and Maguire was appointed to it. In 1873 ‘Fawcett's Act’ for the removal of religious disabilities in Trinity College and the university of Dublin was passed, and Maguire at once prepared to compete for a fellowship. He was elected on Trinity Monday, 24 May 1880, being then forty-nine years and five months old. His accession to the fellowship was hailed with universal rejoicing. He was personally known to all the fellows and to most of the students who had passed through college since 1851. He was held in high esteem for the courtesy of his manners, and was socially a charming companion. A special chair of classical composition was forthwith created for him, and in 1882 he vacated this to take the professorship of moral philosophy. Although no active politician, Maguire took some part in the transfer to the ‘Times’ newspaper of the ‘Pigott’ letters, which were published by the ‘Times’ in a series of articles called ‘Parnellism and Crime’ in 1887 [see ], and he came to London early in 1889 to give evidence before the commission appointed by parliament to inquire into the truth of the statements made in those articles. He was fully convinced of the authenticity of the ‘Pigott’ letters. Before his examination in court took place he died in London on 26 Feb. 1889. Maguire was a thorough idealist in philosophy, Plato and Berkeley being his chosen masters. His published works are: 1. ‘Essays on the Platonic Idea,’ 1866. 2. ‘Essays on the Platonic Ethics,’ 1870. 3. ‘The Parmenides, with Notes, &c.,’ Dublin University Press Series, 1882. 4. ‘Lectures on Philosophy,’ 1885. He contributed largely to ‘Hermathena’ and ‘Kottabos;’ and many of his translations in the latter have appeared in the volume of ‘Dublin Translations,’ edited by Professor Tyrrell.

 MAHOMED, FREDERICK HENRY HORATIO AKBAR (1849–1884), physician, son of the keeper of a Turkish bath, was born at Brighton in April 1849. He began medical studies at an early age at the


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