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CH. V And the True Gentleman is patriotic also. When one saw Coote lifting his hat to the National Anthem, then perhaps one got a glimpse of what patriotic emotions, what worship, the polish of a gentleman may hide. Or singing out his deep notes against the Hosts of Midian, in the St. Stylites choir; then indeed you plumbed his spiritual side.

But these were but gleams. For the rest, Religion, Nationality, Passion, Money, Politics; much more so those cardinal issues, Birth and Death, the True Gentleman skirted about, and became facially rigid towards and ceased to speak and panted and blew.

"One doesn't talk of that sort of thing," Coote would say with a gesture of the knuckly hand.

"O' course," Kipps would reply, with an equal significance.

Profundities. Deep as it were, blowing to deep.

One does not talk, but on the other hand one is punctilious to do. Actions speak. Kipps—in spite of the fact that the Walshinghams were more than a little lax—Kipps, who had formerly flitted Sunday after Sunday from one Folkestone church to another, had now a sitting of his own, paid for duly at Saint Stylites. There he was to be seen, always at the

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280 evening service, and sometimes of a morning, dressed with a sober precision, and with an eye on Coote in the chancel. No difficulties now about finding the place in his book. He became a communicant again—he had lapsed soon after his confirmation when the young lady in the costume-room, who was his adopted sister, left the Emporium—and he would sometimes go around to the Vestry for Coote after the service. One evening he was introduced to the Hon. and Rev. Densemore. He was much too confused to say anything, and the noble cleric had nothing to say, but indisputably they were introduced.…

No! you must not imagine our national ideal of a gentleman is without its "serious side," without even its stern and uncompromising side. The imagination no doubt refuses to see Coote displaying extraordinary refinements of courage upon the stricken field, but in the walks of peace there is sometimes sore need of sternness. Charitable as one may be, one must admit there are people who do things, impossible things; people who place themselves "out of it" in countless ways; people, moreover, who are by a sort of predestination out of it from the beginning, and against these Society has invented a terrible protection for its Cootery, the Cut. The cut is no joke for anyone. It is excommunication. You may be cut by an individual, you may be cut by a set or you may be—and this is so tragic that beautiful romances have been written about it—"Cut by the County." One figures Coote discharging this last duty and cutting

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CH. V, erect and pale, never speaking, going past with eyes of pitiless slate, lower jaw protruding a little, face pursed up and cold and stiff.…

It never dawned upon Kipps that he would one day have to face this terrible front, to be to Coote not only as one dead, but as one gone more than a stage or so in decay, cut and passed, banned and outcast for ever.

Yet so it was to be!

One cannot hide any longer that all this fine progress of Kipps is doomed to end in collapse. So far indeed you have seen him ascend. You have seen him becoming more refined and careful day by day, more carefully dressed, less clumsy in the ways and methods of social life. You have seen the gulf widening between himself and his former low associates. I have brought you at last to the vision of him, faultlessly dressed and posed, in an atmosphere of candlelight and chanting, in his own sitting in one of the most fashionable churches in Folkestone.… All the time I have refrained from the lightest touch upon the tragic note that must now creep into my tale. Yet the net of his low connections has been about his feet, and moreover there was something interwoven in his being.…

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text: Kipps/Book 2/Chapter 5

title: Kipps/Book 2/Chapter 5


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Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 33.djvu/204

Rh his chairmanship of the poor-law commission. He was a member of the commission upon the ‘Rebecca’ riots in Wales in 1843, and on 27 June 1846 he was rewarded with a baronetcy. He died at Harpton Court 22 Jan. 1855. He was twice married; first, on 10 March 1805, to Harriet, fourth daughter of Sir George Cornewall, bart., of Moccas Court, Hereford, by whom he had two sons, Sir George Cornewall Lewis [q. v.], and Gilbert, afterwards a prebendary of Hereford Cathedral; and, secondly, in 1839, to Mary Anne, daughter of John Ashton. M'Cullagh Torrens (Life of Lord Melbourne, i. 327) describes him as ‘a careful and accomplished man, but formal, verbose, and dull.’

 LEWIS, THOMAS TAYLOR (1801–1858), geologist and antiquary, was born at Ludlow in Shropshire in 1801. He was educated at Cheam school, Surrey, under the Rev. James Welchin, was admitted to St. John's College, Cambridge, 5 Oct. 1819, graduated B.A. in 1825, and proceeded M.A. in 1828. In 1826 he became curate of Aymestrey, Herefordshire; he was subsequently vicar of Bridstow, near Ross, and on 17 March 1832 he was appointed in addition perpetual curate of Leinthall Earls, all in the same county. He died at Bridstow on 28 Oct. 1858. Lewis was a diligent local antiquary, and formed large collections of fossils in the neighbourhood of Aymestrey, and especially investigated what was afterwards termed the Silurian system. He communicated the results of his researches to Sir Roderick Murchison [q. v.], and his memory has been preserved in the names of local fossils, such as the ‘Lingula Lewisii,’ ‘Spirorbis Lewisii,’ and ‘Cephalapis Lewisii.’ Lewis also edited for the Camden Society in 1853 the ‘Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley.’

 LEWIS, TITUS (1773–1811), baptist minister, son of Lewis Thomas, baptist minister at Cilfowyr, Pembrokeshire, was born at Cilgerran on 21 Feb. 1773. On 1 June 1794 he and thirty-two others were admitted as church members at Blaen-y-waun. In January 1798 he was set apart for the ministry by prayer and the laying on of hands of the elders. In 1800 he married Miss Howard of Carmarthen, and soon after removed to take charge of the baptist church in that town. He worked hard and travelled much, visiting the churches both in North and South Wales. He engaged in frequent controversy on the subject of baptism, exhibiting, according to his biographer, more of the fortiter in re than the suaviter in modo. He wrote simply and naturally. His last sermon was preached at the quarterly meeting of the denomination, held at Cwmifor on 1 Jan. 1811, and his death took place on 1 May of the same year. His remains were interred in what is now the burying-ground of the baptist church at Carmarthen.

He published besides tracts the following works (all in Welsh): 1. ‘Mawl i'r Oen a laddwyd’ (a hymn-book), Caerfyrddin, 1802. 2. ‘Testament Newydd ein Harglwydd,’ &c. (a New Testament for the Sunday school), Carmarthen, 1802, 12mo. 3. ‘Geirlyfr Cymraeg a Saesneg’ (a Welsh and English Dictionary), Carmarthen, 1805, 8vo; 2nd edit. Carmarthen, 1815, 8vo. 4. ‘Llyfr Rhyfeddodau, neu Amlygiadau o Waredigaethau Rhyfeddol Duw i'w Weision’ (‘A Book of Wonders, or Examples of God's Wonderful Deliverances of his Servants’), Carmarthen, 1808, 8vo. 5. ‘Hanes Wladol a Chrefyddol Prydain Fawr’ (‘The Political and Religious History of Great Britain’), Carmarthen, 1810, 8vo; 2nd edit., with introduction by the Rev. Owen Williams, and edited and continued from 1800 to 1850 by Dr. John Emlyn Jones, Carmarthen, 1855–7. 6. ‘Esponiad ar y Cyffelybiaethau a roddir yn yr Ysgrythyrau Sanctaidd i Dduw 'r Tad’ (based chiefly on the ‘Tropologia, or Key to open Scripture Metaphors,’ by Benjamin Keach [q. v.]), Carmarthen, 1811, 12mo; another edition, 8vo, Carnarvon [1820?]. 7. ‘A Translation of Dr. Gill on the Gospels and Book of Acts,’ Carmarthen, 1811, 12mo; 2nd edit., edited and completed by Dr. J. Emlyn Jones, Cardiff, 1854. In this work Joseph Harris and Christmas Evans were associated with Lewis.

 LEWIS, WILLIAM (1592–1667), master of the hospital of St. Cross, Winchester, and canon of Winchester, born in 1592, was son of Richard Lewis, D.D., of Merionethshire. He matriculated at Hart Hall, Oxford, where his maternal uncle, Theodore Price, was master. He graduated B.A. from Hart Hall 20 April 1608, and was elected fellow of Oriel in the same year, proceeding M.A. 2 July 1612. He afterwards took holy orders, became chaplain to Bacon, the lord chancel-


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Lewis, Titus


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/King, Edward (1612-1637)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/King, William (1786-1865)


text: User:Enquire

title: User:Enquire


text:
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 12

Chapter 12 - Airship Attacks
ON the outbreak of war the Navy had at its disposal only three airships, "L 3," "L4" and "L5," of 15,000 cb.m. capacity. The last Zeppelin built during the war bore the number "L 71," and its capacity was 62,000 cb.m. These figures express the gigantic development which the airships underwent. The airships placed at the service of the Fleet were almost all of the Zeppelin type. The firm of Schiitt-Lanz built a few ships as well, which at first were only used experimentally, but subsequently were put to practical use.

Probably no arm of any service has suffered such severe losses as our airships, with the exception of the U-boats. Out of 61 Zeppelins which were assigned to the Fleet in the course of the war, 17, with their whole crews, were destroyed by the enemy, namely "L" 7, 10, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 39, 43, 44, 48, 53, 59, 62 and 70.

Twenty-eight airships were lost through stranding and other accidents, such as the burning of sheds in consequence of explosion. The crews of these were all saved, though in six instances they were made prisoner. Six ships had to be placed out of service as being useless; at the end, ten were still left in a condition fit for use.

Owing to the ever-increasing defensive measures of the enemy the airships at the front were built in two sizes, the types being "L50" and "L 70."

The chief distinctive features of the former were five motors, each of 260 h.p., and such as could develop sufficient speed even in the highly rarefied atmosphere of the upper strata of the air; four propellers, all coupled directly to the shafts (the two rear motors are coupled to one propeller); a central gangway, 196.5 m. long; a breadth of 239 m.; a gas capacity of 55,000 cb.m.; a speed of 30 metres per second (about 1 10 km. per hour); a load of 38 tons.

Type "L 70": Seven motors, each of 260 h.p.; six propellers; central gangway, 21 1.5 m.; greatest diameter, 239 m.; volume of gas, 62,000 cb.m.; speed, 35 metres per second (equal to 130 km. per hour); load, 43 tons.

The "L50 " carried a crew of 21, and "L 70" one of 25, among whom were 1 Commander, 1 Officer of the Watch, 1 Quarter-Master, 1 Chief Artificer-Engineer, 2 men for lifting gear (Yeomen of Signals,) 2 men for the balancing gear (Boatswains), 2 Motormen (stoker petty officers) for each motor, 1 Sailmaker, 1 Petty Officer Telegraphist, and 1 Ordinary Telegraphist for the wireless installation.

They carried two machine-guns, and later on a 2-cm. gun as well. The supply of bombs consisted of incendiary bombs of 11.4 kilo weight, and explosive bombs of 50, 100, and 300 kilos.

In order to gain some idea of the difficulties encountered by airships, it may not be out of place to make a few general remarks on the navigation of these ships.

Their main task was scouting. That is why they were retained during the war as a weapon by the Navy; the Army had no use for them. The development of the aeroplane produced a keen competitor and a dangerous opponent. The Flying Service could not, at first, overcome the difficulty of covering the great distances which scouting at sea entailed. It was a question of flying over large sea areas, such as the North Sea, and providing the Fleet with trustworthy information and reports. Flights of twenty-four hours and longer had to be reckoned with, and no flying-man could hold out for so long.

The great load that the airship could carry, combined with its high speed, made it especially suitable for purposes of attack. The dangers to which the airship itself was exposed were best overcome by assigning to the crews some definite task for furthering the war, for which they gladly risked their lives. Any activity which did not bring them into contact with the enemy would not have satisfied them for so long a period as the duration of the war, and this would have hindered the development of this arm of the service.

When navigating on the water you steer for a goal which lies in a horizontal plane, on the surface of the water; the airship has to negotiate a second dimension due to differences in height. And this it is which presents such great difficulties in aerial navigation. In contradistinction to the aeroplane, the load, including its own weight, carried by an airship is not borne by motor power, dynamic lifting power, but by gas-tight cells filled with a gas lighter than air.

Hydrogen of specific gravity 0.07, which was used for filling, gave a ship of 55,000 cub.m. capacity a lifting power of 64,000 kilos. Of these, 26,000 kilos, in round numbers, were taken up by the weight of the unloaded airship itself, so that the load she could carry would be 38,000 kilos, i.e. 38,000 kilos can be packed into the ship before she will float in the air, being neither heavier nor lighter than air. The weight of the crew, stores of benzine and oil, spare parts, supplies of oxygen for the passage through high altitudes, and bombs amounted to about 10,000 kilos; the remainder, about 26,000 kilos, is available for water ballast. This is most essential in order to neutralise such influences as affect unfavourably the carrying power of the ship. At first, when ascending, the upward pressure of the atmosphere ceases; the gas pressure in the cells becomes proportionately greater. In order to equalise the pressure, every gas-cell is provided with a safety-valve through which the superfluous gas escapes; in this event, carrying power is consequently diminished; the ship becomes too heavy. To remedy this, a proportionate weight of water must be thrown out, so that the ship recovers her equilibrium. As a standard of measurement, we may state that for every 100 m. that she rises the ship loses 1 per cent, of her carrying power, that is 640 kilos.

Temperature, both of the air and the gas, also exerts an influence. Cold air is heavier than warm, whereas the lifting power of the gas, on the contrary, is increased by warmth and diminished by cold. In this respect the following law obtains: a change of one degree in the temperature increases or diminishes the carrying power by about 240 kilos. The commander must, therefore, constantly keep an eye on the temperature and judge by the changes what the behaviour of his ship is likely to be.

The weight is also affected by the amount of moisture that collects on the ship's envelope when passing through clouds; ice is also easily formed if the temperature becomes sufficiently low. The additional weight on the ship due to rain may amount to 3,000 kilos, and owing to ice as much as 5 - 6,000 kilos. The heat of the sun's rays and the strong draught caused by rapid progress soon make the deposit due to rain disappear. Ice has the further disadvantage that pieces of it may be hurled through the envelope by the revolving propellers and may possibly pierce the cells so that gas escapes.

Further, since hydrogen is highly explosive, and when mixed in certain proportions with air becomes very dangerous, care must be taken to prevent fire or electric sparks from coming into contact with escaping gas. But the gas escapes of its own accord when the cells are deflated - when in rising the limit of elasticity of the cells is reached, and when the cells are injured, either by pieces of ice or by hostile projectiles. If the hostile missiles generate flames, as incendiary weapons do, then the ship is inevitably destroyed.

Care is needed, too, in thunderstorms. It is best to avoid clouds charged with electricity. If you cannot go round them you should go under or over them. When rising to get over them, in no circumstances must you rise to such a height that the gas completely fills the cells, for owing to the diminished pressure of the air the superfluous gas is bound to escape and a flash of lightning striking this gas mixture will immediately destroy the ship by fire. There is no danger if the ship is struck by lightning if no gas is escaping, so long as the framework is intact. The framework of aluminium is connected throughout the ship, and acts as a conductor for lightning, which passes out by the stern." Instances in which this has happened have been quite frequent; but such experiences, of course, are better avoided if it is possible to do so.

As regards the height at which the gas completely fills the cells, the following should be noted: When a ship has risen above this height and has let off gas and then descended again, the remaining gas is insufficient to fill the cells completely; it only fills the upper part of them, while the lower part remains empty. The ship is then no longer buoyant. The higher the ship has risen, the less gas the cells contain upon descent; it is forced to come down to earth. In this case more water-ballast must be discharged. The water is distributed in ballast-bags along the entire length of the ship. The valves of these bags are connected by wires with the steering car. Every bag holds 1,000 kilos. The commander is in a position to release any quantity of water desired, from whatever part of the ship he thinks proper. Fore and aft of the ship there are another four bags each containing 250 kilos, which can also be opened from the steering car. These differ from the others in that when opened they discharge their contents instantaneously, whereas the others let the water run out slowly. When the ship needs to be lightened suddenly, the containers fore and aft are used, e.g. for a sharp rise when attacked by aeroplanes, or when a cell has been emptied owing to damage by a missile or some other accident, and one end of the ship suddenly becomes heavy; and also when landing with a "heavy" ship.

Below the ship and at the sides the cars are hung. The foremost and largest of these contains the steering-gear in front, next to that the wireless installation, and at the rear a motor. The last car, which hangs on the central line of the ship, carries two motors which both connect with one propeller. The cars at the side each carry one motor.

As soon as there are no guiding objects in sight, such as land, lightships, or one's own warships, by which the ship's position may be ascertained, navigation becomes very difficult, because of the leeway when the wind blows at an angle to the course of the ship. That is where wireless telegraphy comes in; the installation is such that the ships can be called up by directing stations, their whereabouts calculated, and their position reported to them by wireless.

The airship stations were so placed that they lay as near as possible to the coast, and had a sufficient extent of level ground for ascending and landing; but they had to be placed sufficiently inland to obviate the danger of an unexpected attack from the sea. The Navy possessed the following airship stations on the coast of the North Sea: Nordholz near Cuxhaven, Ahlhorn near Oldenburg, Wittmundshaven (East Friesland), Tondern (Schleswig-Holstein). Hage, south of Norderney, was abandoned.

The ideal airship hangar is a revolving shed which can be turned according to the direction of the wind. Unfortunately, we possessed only one such shed, that of Nordholz, as it involves a great deal of time and uncommonly large expense to build them. The problem of building material had also to be faced in the course of the war. Most of the sheds were placed in a position suitable to the prevailing wind in the neighbourhood. It is not possible to take an airship into or out of a shed if the wind blows across its path at a speed of more than 8 metres per second.

This consideration, and the fact that airship attacks had to be made during the time of the new moon, occasioned the long pauses between the raids, pauses which often gave rise to the impression that other influences had led to the abandonment of these activities. This was not so. From the date of the first airship raid on England, on January 15, 1915, no regulations were made limiting the offensive action of the airships. So far as London was concerned, we had orders at first only to attack such establishments as were immediately connected with military work, such as arsenals, docks, batteries and so forth. But this limitation could not be adhered to in the long run, partly because of the difficulty of discovering, these particular places, partly because just round London the defences were especially intense. But it never was the object of an airship raid to attack defenceless dwelling-places. Their aim always was to destroy those establishments which, either directly or indirectly, served some military purpose: munition factories, arsenals, stores, docks, wharves, etc. Airships frequently returned from their expeditions with their full complement of bombs, because they had not been able to make out such targets with sufficient certainty. It would have been easy enough for them before returning to get rid of their bombs and drop them on any place over which they happened to fly, if they had wanted to kill harmless citizens.

Once the airship was in the air there were no further difficulties except such as arose from thunderstorms or very high winds; just as at sea, very bad weather hinders and circumscribes the activities of ships. The revolving shed is a factor of the utmost importance for the future of the airship.

While the U-boats were at full swing at their work of destroying English commerce, the airships with dogged perseverance did their best to contrive their attacks on the island. In March, 1917, a raid was made by five airships. Two of them reached London. In consequence of a considerable freshening of the wind, the return journey became very difficult. "L 2" was forced to descend in Juteborg, "L 35" in Dresden, "L 40" and "L 41" came down to their shed at Ahlhorn. "L 39" (Commander, Lieutenant-Commander Rob. Koch) was driven by the storm to the south-west, passed over the enemy lines in France, and, according to a wireless message from the Eiffel Tower, was shot down at Compiegne. Her crew perished in the flames.

A raid which was started in April had to be abandoned because on the outward journey the weather became unfavourable.

May again presented an opportunity for a successful raid which took place in the night of May 23 - 24. The following took part in it: 'L 40,"L 42," "L 43," "L 44" and "L 45." Captain Strasser, the Head of the Airship Service, was on board the "L 44." The officer commanding the airships made the following report:

 * "Towards 1.45 a.m. we crossed the coast near Harwich; cloudy sky with breaks in it. A number of searchlights tried in vain to pick up the ship. Very little gunfire; no aeroplanes. In consequence of three motors missing simultaneously, did not carry out attack on London, as ship lost height rapidly, but dropped bombs to amount of 2,000 kilos on Harwich. Shortly after attack all engines began to miss, ship travelled like a balloon for three-quarters of an hour over enemy country and fell from 5,700 m. to 3,900 m. After this till 10 a.m. travelled with one motor only going, from 10 A.M. with 2-3 motors; landed at Nordholz 7.20 p.m. 'L 43' had to pass through severe thunderstorms with extraordinarily heavy hail-showers on return journey. Lightning struck ship in forepart and ran along the framework without doing any damage."

The next attack was on June 17. "L42," "L43," "L44" and "L45" took part in it. The raid on London was again prevented owing to the shortness of the night, because detours had to be made to avoid several thunderstorms. "L42" could not reach London, and at 3 a.m. expended her entire ammunition on Dover. There was severe gunfire during the attack, but the searchlights could not hold the ship for long owing to heavy mist. The bombs fell on their targets. Violent explosions at intervals of 10 minutes followed one detonation; whole districts of houses seemed to be hurled into the air; fires could be observed for a long time afterwards. Shortly after the raid the ship was pursued and violently bombarded by light craft, apparently torpedo-boats or small cruisers.

From "L 42" it was observed that one of our ships was being attacked by an airman. The airship was at a height of 4,500 - 5,000 metres, with the airman 300 - 500 metres above her. As "L 43" (Lieutenant-Commander Kraushaar) did not return from this journey, we were forced to assume that the airman had destroyed her. Later reports from England confirmed this.

On August 30 the Ordre pour le Merite was conferred on Captain Strasser. I took the opportunity of handing him this distinction personally, and for that purpose went to the airship station at Ahlhorn, 20 km. south of Oldenburg, which had been erected during the war and was now the chief base of the airships.

It is to Captain Strasser's credit that he developed Count Zeppelin's invention to military perfection, and made the airship a weapon of great efficiency, besides rousing the enthusiasm of the crews of the airships by his example. He was the life and soul of the whole and made everyone under his command share his conviction that airships had a great future before them. He was particularly gifted in estimating meteorological conditions. He had an almost prophetic instinct for the weather. How often we have had to apologise mentally to him, when in apparently favourable weather the airships did not go out; for he was always right, and shortly afterwards there was invariably a change in the weather which would have endangered the ships and made their return impossible. But he recognised no such thing as insurmountable difficulties; the stronger the enemy's defence grew, the more energetically did he concentrate on counter-measures. Thus he sent his ships up higher and higher, and ultimately they worked at an altitude of 6,000 metres - a height which was considered impossible at the beginning of the war. For this he needed elbow-room and sympathetic co-operation in his technical suggestions. His organisation of the airship service did not immediately place him in such a position as to get his demands satisfied quickly enough. Moreover, he was hampered by all sorts of difficulties connected with technical administration. Those in command of the Fleet, however, did not rest until the organisation had been changed so that he could have free play in the conduct and development of the airship service.

Captain Strasser took part in most of the airship raids, although permission was often given him very grudgingly. The loss of airships was so considerable that I was always afraid that one of these days he would not come back, and he was too valuable to the airship service for such a risk. But just because the difficulties always grew, I had to admit that he was right in considering it necessary to see for himself what conditions were like on the other side, so as to judge what he could demand of his crews and how he could improve the efficiency of the ships.

An attack in October, 1917, brought about the loss of five airships out of the eleven which set out. This was due to such a strong head wind setting in that four ships were blown far over into France, and one, though it reached Middle Germany, was lost in landing. The six others, thanks to their timely recognition of the change in the weather conditions, came home safely. The individual ships had more than the usual difficulty in determining their positions, because the angles from the directing stations became very steep when the ships were over the South of England, and consequently the calculation of their positions was less accurate.

Another very painful set-back for navigation by airships occurred in January, 1918, when owing to the spontaneous combustion of one of the airships in Ahlhorn, the fire spread by explosion to the remaining sheds, so that four Zeppelins and one Schiitt-Lanz machine were destroyed. All the sheds, too, with one exception, were rendered useless.

After this the Fleet had, for the time being, only 9 airships at its disposal. From the autumn of 1917 onwards, the building of airships had been restricted, because the material necessary for the building of aircraft was needed for aeroplanes for the army. From that date only one ship was placed on order every month. But even this did not prevent us from repeating our attacks on England from time to time, though we had to be careful to incur no further losses, so as not to be without airships for scouting which was so important for the other activities of the Fleet.

On August 5, 1918, the airships of the Navy attacked England for the last time. Captain Strasser was on board the "L70," the latest ship, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander von Lotznitzer. He did not return from this journey; his ship was the only one of those that took part in the raid that was shot down over England. Thus this leader followed his comrades who had preceded him and to whom he had always given a glowing example.

The value of airships as a weapon has been much called into question.

In the beginning of the war, when seaplane-flying was quite undeveloped, they were indispensable to us. Their wide field of vision, their high speed, and their great reliability when compared with the possibilities of scouting by war-ships, enabled the airships to lend us the greatest assistance. But only in fine weather. So the Fleet had to make its activities dependent on those of the airships, or do without them.

A weakish fleet needs scouts to push as far in advance as possible; scouts, too, which can make observations without being driven off. The airships could do this. The danger from aeroplanes only arose later, and was never very serious at sea; but over the land it was extremely unpleasant. Although as a rule an airship can mount more quickly than an aeroplane, yet it has far less chance of hitting its opponent. Ultimately the airships were forced up so high that it was beyond the power of human endurance (altitudes of more than 6,000 m.). That meant the end of their activities as an attacking force. But for far-reaching scouting they retained their importance and their superiority to other aircraft, for they can remain in the air much longer and are independent of assistance from other ships. But the bigger they grew the rarer grew the opportunities for them to go on expeditions, because of the difficulties of getting them out of the sheds, and later on of their landing.

We have no reliable information as to the results of their attacks. They were the first war-engines which scared the English out of their feeling of security on their island, and they forced them to organise a strong defence. To judge by this, their visits must have been regarded as a very considerable menace.

It was our business to make as much use as possible of our superiority in airships, and to increase their efficiency so that fear of them might be a contributory cause in inducing England to make peace possible.

Such an ideal of perfection can only be attained if it is perseveringly sought in spite of the set-backs we endured, and although the opposition we had to overcome was increasingly great.

That is the right warlike spirit - not to give in, but to redouble one's efforts as our airship men did in an exemplary way.

We may probably look upon the military career of the airship as over and done with. But the technical side of airship navigation has been developed in such a high degree by our experience in war, that airship traffic in peace times will derive great advantages from it, and the invention of Count Zeppelin will be preserved as a step in the progress of civilisation.


text:
Internal Security Act, 1982/1986-06-26

as amended by

Internal Security Amendment Act, No. 55 of 1986

 50A. (1) If a police officer of or above the rank of warrant officer is of the opinion that the detention of a particular person will contribute to the termination, combating or prevention of public disturbance, disorder, riot or public violence at any place within the Republic, he may without warrant arrest that person or cause him to be arrested and cause him to be detained without a warrant of detention for a period not exceeding 48 hours in a prison as referred to in section 20 (1) of the Prisons Act, 1959 (Act No. 8 of 1959), including a police cell or lock-up.

(2) If a commissioned officer as defined in section 1 of the Police Act, 1958 (Act No. 7 of 1958), of or above the rank of lieutenant-colonel is of the opinion that the further detention of a person referred to in subsection (1) will contribute to the termination, combating or prevention of public disturbance, disorder, riot or public violence at any place within the Republic, such officer may, under a written order signed by him, have such person so detained for the further period ordered in the written order or until that person’s earlier release is ordered by any such officer: Provided that no such person shall, on any particular occasion when he is being detained in terms of the provisions of this section, be so detained for a period exceeding 180 days as from the date of his arrest.

(3) Any person detained under an order referred to in subsection (2) may at any time make representations in writing to the Minister relating to his detention, and the Minister may at any time order the release of such a person.

(4) Any person being detained under an order referred to in subsection (2) may be removed, in custody, from the prison in which he is being detained, to and be detained in any other prison, should the Minister, or a person authorized thereto by the Minister, so order in writing.

(5) The Minister of Justice may make regulations to regulate the circumstances in which persons referred to in subsections (1) and (2) may be detained.

(6) In case of a conflict between any regulation made under subsection (5) and any provision of the Prisons Act, 1959 (Act No. 8 of 1959), or any regulation or Prisons Service Order made under the said Act, or any official instruction, order or other act of or by the Commissioner of Prisons, the said regulation shall apply.

(7) (a) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any regulation made under subsection (5), shall be guilty of an offence.

(b) The provisions of sections 52 (a) and 54 of the Prisons Act, 1959 (Act No. 8 of 1959), with reference to an offence, and a contravention of or failure to comply with a regulation referred to therein, respectively, shall mutatis mutandis apply with respect to an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(8) The Commissioner shall, as soon as possible after the arrest of any person in terms of the provisions of subsection (1), notify the Minister of the name of that person and the place where he is being detained unless such person has in terms of the provisions of this section been released from detention before the Commissioner could reasonably have effected such notification.

(9) (a) If a person detained under an order referred to in subsection (2) has at the expiration of a period of three months as from the date of his arrest not yet been released from detention in terms of this section, the Commissioner in person or a police officer designated by him for that purpose shall adduce reasons before a board of review as to why the said person shall not be released.

(b) At proceedings for the hearing of reasons adduced before it in terms of paragraph (a), the board of review shall consider such written representations, if any, as the person whose further detention in terms of this section is in issue, wishes to submit in connection with the matter, and may in its discretion also hear oral evidence or representations from that person.

(c) At the conclusion of the proceedings referred to in paragraph (b), the board of review shall submit to the Minister a written report with regard to the proceedings and its findings.

(d) The provisions of section 8 (8) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the proceedings of the board of review as contemplated in paragraph (b).

(10) (a) This section shall only be applied if the State President by proclamation in the Gazette declares the provisions thereof to be applicable.

(b) Any proclamation referred to in paragraph (a) may from time to time be issued by the State President and may at any time in like manner be withdrawn by him.

(c) Any proclamation issued under paragraph (a) shall be tabled in Parliament within 14 days after publication thereof in the Gazette if Parliament is then in ordinary session or, if Parliament is not then in ordinary session, within 14 days after the commencement of its next ensuing ordinary session. [S. 50A inserted by s. 1 of Act No. 66 of 1986.]

title: Internal Security Act, 1982/1986-06-26


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Johnson, Samuel (1709-1784)


text:
Internal Security Act, 1982/1990-02-03

as amended by

Internal Security Amendment Act, No. 55 of 1986

Proclamation No. R. 21 of 1990

[Contents of Schedule 4 deleted by Proclamation No. R. 21 of 1990 made in terms of section 69 (7) (b).]

title: Internal Security Act, 1982/1990-02-03


text:
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 16

Chapter 16 - The Conquest of the Baltic Islands and the Capture of Helsingfors
IN September, 1917, after the taking of Riga, the Supreme Army Command asked for the co-operation of the Fleet to conquer the Baltic Islands. This offered a welcome diversion from the monotony of the war in the North Sea. The Navy's task was to take a landing corps, consisting of a reinforced infantry division, under the orders of the General Officer of the 23rd Regimental Command, to Oesel, and to land them there.

The right flank of the landing troops had to be protected from the sea by quickly sending ships to the Gulf of Riga; and the attack on the bridgehead of Orissa on the Island of Oesel, to make it possible to cross to the Island of Moon, had to be supported with all the means at our disposal. So long as the Straits of Irben were commanded by the heavy enemy guns at Zerch, the bays of the Island of Oesel in the Gulf of Riga were useless for landing. Consequently, the Bay of Tagga was chosen for the troops' disembarkation. This is the only bay in the north or west of Oesel that can hold a large number of transports and offer them protection From the west winds which prevail there in the autumn.

After the warning example of the landing of the Franco-British army in Gallipoli in the spring of 1915, the attempt to carry the war on land overseas by the help of the Fleet had to be made with the greatest care, and such strong defensive measures were taken that a reverse appeared to be out of the question. We had to prepare ships for the transport of 23,000 men, 5,000 horses, and much material.

The warships had to clear the approaches of mines, so that none of the transports with the troops on board might be lost, also to send flying-men to find out the position of the enemy beforehand, so as to ascertain the most favourable circumstances for the landing, which had to be a surprise. The Russians had recognised the danger which threatened them, and had tried to ward it off by placing batteries on Cape Handsort and Ninnast, at the two entrances to Tagga Bay. Heavy batteries had been strongly built on the peninsula of Sworbe, in the south of Oesel, some time previously.

The warships set aside for this undertaking were placed under the orders of Vice-Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, the Commander of Squadron I. He had a special Staff for the occasion, made up of officers of the Fleet and Admiralty Staffs. Captain von Levetzow was nominated Chief of the Staff; the battle-cruiser Moltke was the flagship.

Under the orders of Admiral Schmidt were: Squadron III - Vice-Admiral Behncke: Battleships König, Bayem, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz and Markgraf; Squadron IV - Vice-Admiral Souchon: Battleships Friedrick der Grosse, König Albert, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold and Kaiser; Scouting Division II, under Rear-Admiral von Reuter: Second and third class cruisers Königsburg, Karlsruhe, Numberg, Frankfurt, Danzig and the light cruisers of the Baltic Fleet, Kolberg, Strassburg and Augsberg, under Vice-Admiral Hopman. Commodore Heinrich was in command of the following torpedo-boats, he himself being on board the second-class cruiser Emden: Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II (Commander Heinecke) with 10 boats; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VI (Commander Tillesen) with a half-flotilla; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VIII (Commander Nieden), with u boats; further, the 7th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla; the 13th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX (Commander Hundertmark) the latter with 1 1 boats; besides these 6 U-boats of the Kurland U Flotilla (Lieut.-Commander Heinrich Schott); Mine-Sweeper Flotilla II (Lieut-Commander Doflein); the Mine-Sweeper Division IV, and a half-flotilla of mine-seekers that numbered a little more than 60 motor-boats. In addition to these there was Captain von Rosenberg's flotilla, who had at his disposal 72 boats - trawlers, and other craft of similar size. Nineteen steamers were requisitioned as troop-transports, the tonnage of which amounted to 153,664 tons.

The enterprise was first mooted on September 12. On October 9 the troops embarked; on October 11 the transport fleet put to sea under the protection of the battleships and small cruisers. The preparatory work of mine-sweeping had been delayed by the bad weather during the end of September and beginning of October, so that those in command waited with impatience for operations to start.

This delay was an advantage for the transports, as it enabled us to drill the troops in embarkation and disembarkation, which materially facilitated the landing afterwards. The number of steamers was not sufficient to transport the troops and all the baggage in one journey; two echelons had to be formed. This circumstance also made it advisable not to start the expedition until the mine-sweeping operations in the Irben Straits were nearing their close, so that the second echelon might be transported in safety to Arensburg without running risks from submarines.

The manifold preparations for the embarkation of the troops and for carrying out the operations on land in conjunction with the Fleet had been completed, and there had been the most exemplary harmony between the leaders of the Army and those of the Navy. Thanks to them, the conquest of the islands of Oesel, Moon and Dago was carried out according to plan, with the most perfect success.

On October 10 everything was in trim; the fleet of transports lay ready in the naval port of Libau to proceed to sea; the Moltke, with Squadrons III and IV, lay in the Bay of Danzig, behind the peninsula of Hela; the small cruisers and torpedo-boats were at Libau.

The battleships were to silence the batteries at the entrance to the Bay of Tagga before the landing was effected, as well as to force the passage of the fortified straits between the islands of Dago and Oesel, and of Soelo Sound, which leads into the Kassar Wick. It was necesssary to command the Kassar Wick, which owing to the depth of the water can only be used by torpedo-boats, so as to secure the passage to Moon from the north, and to prevent Russian warships from leaving the Gulf of Riga and making for the north.

The batteries of the Bay of Tagga were attacked by Squadron III and the Moltke; Squadron IV was to destroy the batteries on Sworbe. It was important to land an advance guard in Tagga Bay as soon as possible after the silencing of the batteries in the north, so as to occupy the coast-line and thereby ensure the safe passage of the main transport fleet. The warships and the transports left harbour on the morning of October n. The night journey through the mine-field passed without incident. The lightships placed by the Rosenberg Flotilla marked the track that the search flotilla had reported clear of mines. It was not until towards midnight that a check in the advance occurred, which threatened to be critical; the leading squadron had approached so closely to the mine-sweeping flotilla that speed had to be slackened. At first the delay was accepted, but finally it was realised that by slackening speed the punctual landing of the advance guard would be jeopardised and at the same time the element of surprise, which underlay the whole undertaking, threatened to be lost. Consequently Admiral Schmidt gave orders to the mine-sweepers to remove their gear and make room for the Fleet; he preferred taking the risk of negotiating the rest of the passage without the security afforded by the mine-sweepers to endangering the success of the whole enterprise. Fortune favoured this decision, for the Fleet succeeded without accident in reaching the positions from which the bombardment was to take place. They passed through a gap in the belt of mines right in front of the Bay of Tagga, the existence of which was only definitely ascertained later on. While taking up their positions to bombard the batteries on the Sound of Soelo, the Bayern and the Grosser Kurfürst struck mines, which, however, did not hinder them from completing their task.

At 5.30 a.m. the landing was begun. It was a complete surprise to the enemy, and met with little opposition, which was quickly overcome by the fire of the torpedo-boats, supported by the troops. The disembarkation of the advance troops which were on board the ships of Squadron III, was carried out by the motor launches of the ships and three small steamers, one of which was the Corsica. The leader of the Torpedo-Boat Flotilla steamed ahead with his boats. The batteries at Hundsfort and Ninnast were quickly silenced and at 8 a.m. in the hands of our troops. The Toffri battery on the southern point of Dago was destroyed by the Bayern and the Emden, Commodore Heinrich's flagship. At 6.45 A.M. the transports received orders to enter the bay, and the disembarkation was proceeding apace at 10 a.m. On entering the bay, the steamer Corsica struck a mine. She was run aground and her crew taken on board by torpedo-boats and landed. This incident showed us that the main part of the Fleet must have passed in safety through a gap in the belt of mines.

The second part of the Fleet's activities consisted in quickly penetrating into the Kassar Wick, and invading the Gulf of Riga. On the very day of the landing, Captain von Rosenberg, with his flotilla, had pushed through the Sound of Soelo, and so proved that it was navigable for torpedo-boats. Under the command of Commodore Heinrich the boats of Flotilla II and of the 12th and 13th Half-Flotillas then drove the enemy back into the Moon Sound. In this they were supported and covered by the fire of the Kaiser and the Emden, which lay before Soelo Sound. On this occasion, October 14, the destroyer Grom was captured and a gunboat was Sunk. We suffered no losses in battle, but three boats were damaged and.one was sunk by mines. In many cases boats ran aground in these badly surveyed waters, and in so doing injured the blades of their propellers.

The boats of the Rosenberg Flotilla established communication with the bridgehead at Orissa, and this was maintained until the troops had crossed. The flotilla brought bread and munitions to the pioneers, and later on undertook their transport across to Moon.

It was impossible for our light craft to push on into Moon Sound from the Kassar Wick, on account of the heavy guns of the Russian battleship Slava, which bombarded them from the south; consequently Moon Sound had to be taken from the south. For this purpose we had first to destroy the fortifications of Zerel. This task was assigned, on October 14, to the officer commanding Squadron IV, with the battleships Friedrich der Grosse, König Albert, and Kaiserin. The Russian batteries opened fire on them, and our ships returned it until darkness fell. The next morning the Russians had abandoned the position and destroyed the batteries. The landing troops had meanwhile continued their march towards Sworbe and Onesa. It was imperative that our ships should quickly penetrate into the Gulf of Riga, so as to hold the Russians on the Island of Oesel and prevent them from crossing to Moon. The mine-sweeping operations in the Straits of Irben, conducted by Vice-Admiral Hopman, had made good progress by October 13, although they were under the fire of the batteries at Zerel, and came upon belt after belt of mines. But when there was danger that the Russians might retire too soon to Moon and thence to the mainland, the passage to Arensburg had to be forced. Vice-Admiral Behncke, commanding Squadron III, received orders to support Admiral Hopman's light craft in this undertaking. Thanks to the energy of the officers, he carried these orders out with a celerity that surpassed all expectations. When Sworbe fell on the morning of the 16th, our warships lay before Arensburg, and on the evening of the same day before the southern extremity of Moon Sound. In this way our warships had completely surrounded the Island of Oesel, and made it impossible for the enemy, who had been driven by our troops to the south-east of the island, to escape by water.

On the morning of October 17 Moon Sound was reached; the batteries there were destroyed, the Russian ships driven off to the north, and the Russian battleship Slava sunk. This success deserves the highest appreciation; it was gained under difficult conditions, in waters bristling with mines. The officer commanding Squadron III particularly commended the conduct of the mine-sweepers, who worked admirably under heavy fire.

While the commanding officer of Squadron III forced Moon Sound from the east, Admiral Hopman, with the Kolberg and the Strassburg, penetrated the Little Sound, ready to render the Army the assistance it required for crossing. In the night of October 17-18 our troops crossed to Moon, and this island, too, was surrounded by our ships on the east, south, and north-west. It was no longer possible for the enemy to escape to the mainland.

As the operations had been so successful, we proceeded to take Dago, which had not been included in the original plan. The Rosenberg Flotilla landed 300 men on the southern point of Dago, and occupied a bridgehead there for the subsequent landing of an infantry regiment. It maintained its position against attack until the troops arrived. For the conquest of Dago 3,700 men, 500 horses, 140 wagons, and a field battery with munitions were landed, and the landing party from the flotilla was withdrawn.

After Tagga Bay had been cleared of mines, an essentially necessary proceeding, the Fleet still had to perform the task of cutting off the Russian retreat from the north part of Moon Sound. Up till then this had been left to the U-boats. They received orders when Squadron III invaded the Gulf of Riga, to assemble before Moon Sound and to attack any Russians who should attempt to get out. "U-C 58" torpedoed the armoured cruiser Bogatyr, and "U-C 60" sank a transport steamer. It was not till October 18 that the torpedo-boats could be withdrawn from the Kassar Wick, and the necessary mine-sweepers liberated, both being needful for the protection of big ships.

On October 17 Squadron IV, with Scouting Division II, two torpedo-boat half-flotillas, and the necessary mine-sweepers, was to push forward to the northern exit of Moon Sound. But the weather made mine-sweeping impossible. Consequently the advance through the mine-fields north of Dago could not be earned out. Five boats had simultaneously reported that the enemy was retiring to the north, so it followed that the whole of Moon Sound must be clear of hostile craft; the enterprise was therefore abandoned. The damage that the large ships would probably have sustained from mines was out of proportion to anything that might have been gained by pushing on farther.

This completed the operations of the Fleet. The conquest of the islands attained by this co-operation of the Army and Navy represents a military achievement which was as unique as it was successful. The Navy is especially proud of it, as it gave them an opportunity of lending valuable aid to the Army.

The departure so far east of such a large portion of the Fleet, and its sojourn there for several weeks, was bound to give us a definite idea as to whether the English Fleet would feel called upon to interfere in this enterprise, or to take advantage of the absence of the ships to make a strong advance in the North Sea. In the latter case we should have had to take the risk of our remaining warships in the North Sea being able to ward off an attack that would probably aim at destroying the U-boat base at Wilhelmshaven, or the airship sheds on the coast. On the other hand, if the English Fleet had decided to make a demonstration on a large scale against the Baltic, we should have been forced either to abandon the enterprise in the east, or to oppose the English with very small forces in the west of the Baltic. But the English Fleet did not deem it desirable to pursue either course to divert us from the conquest of the Islands.

The fact that our Main Fleet was thus occupied presented a favourable opportunity for us to make an advance with light craft into the northern waters of the North Sea, since under the circumstances the enemy would least expect it. We, therefore, dispatched the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse to harry the merchant ships plying between Norway and England, or, should none be met with there, to extend the expedition to the west coast of the British Isles. This enterprise will be described later.

The Capture of Helsingfors
Once again our Fleet had occasion to support our Army in the east, when, after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, urgent cries for help against the Russian Red Guards were raised by the Finnish Government. A special division was formed under the command of Rear-Admiral Meurer, which consisted of the battleships Westfalen and Rheinland (to which the Posen was added later), a number of light cruisers, mine-sweepers, as well as barrier-breakers, ice-breakers, and outpost ships. They were to convoy seventeen steamers to the Finnish coast, and to establish a base for them on the Aaland Islands. The chief difficulty of the undertaking lay in the fact that there was so much ice.

On February 28 the voyage to the north was begun, and on March 5 the ships anchored off Eckero on the Aaland Islands. One ice-breaker was lost owing to a mine explosion.

It turned out that the ice made it impossible for ships to approach the Finnish coast from the Aaland Islands at that time of the year, and the advance had to be made in a direct line from the south.

On April 3 our ships appeared before Russaro, the strongly-fortified island before the harbour of Hango on the south-west coast of Finland. The Russians declined to oppose us, so that it was unnecessary to fight and demolish the fortifications; the landing of the Baltic Division could proceed without difficulty. From this point they set out on their march to Helsingfors. The warships were to penetrate into the harbour of Helsingfors from the sea; it had been a strongly fortified base of the Russian Fleet.

On April 12 the ships entered Helsingfors, and landed their troops under cover of their guns; there was heavy street fighting with the Red Guards in the town. At the threat of a bombardment, the latter ceased their resistance and capitulated, so that about 2,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Navy. The taking of the city brought timely relief to an advance guard of troops which had penetrated into the town and was very hard pressed.

When the Baltic Division itself arrived, the Navy had to safeguard the lines of communication between Helsingfors and Reval. According to the treaty stipulations, the Russian Fleet retired into the inner Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt, and thus there was no longer any necessity for the presence of our battleships, as our Baltic light craft seemed to suffice for the assistance of the Baltic Division in their task of liberating Finland.

On April u the battleship Rheinland, which had remained near the Aaland Islands, ran on the rocks in a fog, when she was going to Danzig to coal; her situation at first seemed very grave, but the bad leak she had sprung was successfully stopped, and the ship was got off and taken into Kiel Harbour. The repairs were so extensive that the Rheinland was of no further use for war purposes.

As help to the Finns in their need could only be taken by sea, and as such help must be immediate if if was not to be too late to be of any avail, the liberation of Finland was only possible if we could succeed in overcoming the difficulties presented by the ice, which made operations by sea impossible. A further hindrance was that the battleships had to make a way for themselves, and that no previous sweeping of mines could take place. Admiral Meurer's energy succeeded in overcoming all the hindrances which were due in part to the ice conditions and in part to the difficulties of navigation in these rock-infested waters. The Navy regarded it as a particularly beautiful and elevating task to render timely help to the seafaring nation of the Finns.


text:
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 Rh other navigators. In 1845-46 Captain Waterman made one more voyage to China in the Natchez, from New York direct to Hong-kong in 104 days, and returned to New York in 83 days.

A series of voyages such as these, by a ship of the type and character of the Natchez, would probably have established the reputation of any one commanding her, and when we consider that "Bob" Waterman, for so he was known, was at this time a young captain of an unusually attractive personality, it is not difficult to understand the pride and admiration with which he was regarded by his friends, of whom he had many, both in New York and in the various foreign ports to which he had sailed. The owners of the Natchez, Howland & Aspinwall, were so favorably impressed not only by his ability as a seaman and navigator, but by his loyalty to their interests, that, as we have seen, they built the clipper ship Sea Witch for him in 1846. While she was building, Captain Waterman married Cordelia, a daughter of David Sterling, of Bridgeport, and Mrs. Waterman was present as a bride when the ship was launched.

In 1849, Captain Waterman resigned from the Sea Witch to take the Pacific Mail steamship Northerner from New York to San Francisco. During the three years that he had commanded the Sea Witch, she had made a large amount of money for her owners, and Captain Waterman had added to his reputation,—so much so, indeed, that certain good people began to say unpleasant things of him. It was alleged that Captain Waterman carried sail

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text:
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 76 too hard, that he exceeded the bounds of prudence in this respect, and kept padlocks on the topsail sheets and packings on the topsail halliards fore and aft; also that he maintained a standard of discipline far more severe than was necessary.

It is probable that Captain Waterman did carry sail rather hard—most American captains who wanted to get anywhere in those days usually did—and as to the padlocks and packings, more than one captain used these precautions to prevent villainous or cowardly sailors from letting go sheets and halliards by the run, when according to their ideas the ship had too much canvas on her. The fact, however, remains that in the eighteen years during which Captain Waterman commanded various ships, he never lost a spar or carried away rigging of any importance, and never called on underwriters for one dollar of loss or damage. The record shows that six of the men before the mast sailed with him upon all his voyages in the Natchez and the Sea Witch, a rare occurrence at that period, or at any other time of which we have Knowledge, and creditable alike to the sailors, the ships, and their commander.

The truth is that Captain Waterman was a humane, conscientious, high-minded man, who never spared himself nor any one else when a duty was to be performed. There are, and always have been, lazy, incompetent, mutinous sailors, a type of men that Captain Waterman detested. They found no comfort in sailing with him, and were glad when the voyage was ended, so that they might scramble ashore and relate their woes to the sympathetic

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