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80 deep. He had returned, like so many other credulous mariners, empty-handed, but he found his young second mate in a white heat of enthusiasm as he reported to his commander what he had learned, and finally, with the hopefulness of youth, declared his belief that “we can follow that Espirito Santo, and find her, too.” And they did, for in a few days she was discovered lying at anchor in a bay off the South Shetlands, islands at that time unknown in North America, though soon to become famous as the home of seals. The officers and crew of the Espirito Santo greeted them with surprise, while their admiration took the substantial form of assisting to load the Hersilia with ten thousand of the finest sealskins, with which she returned to Stonington.

This exploit spread like wildfire through New England whaling ports, and secured Captain Palmer at the age of twenty, command of the Stonington sloop Hero, “but little rising forty tons,” on board of which he sailed again for the Antarctic seas, as tender to the Hersilia, in 1819. Upon this voyage, after calling at the Falkland Islands for water and provisions, they again steered for the South Shetlands, and the Hersilia and Hero returned to Stonington with full cargoes of sealskins.

In 1821, Captain Palmer again sailed in the Hero upon an expedition to the South Shetlands, composed of six vessels commanded by Captain William Penning of the brig Alabama Packet. By this time, however, the seals had been nearly exterminated, and Captain Palmer sailed farther south in search of new sealing-grounds, until he sighted

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text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/Master Pfriem

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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Rh the pulpit at one or two crises. In the political conflict over the Bulgarian atrocities in 1876 he threw out a passionate warning of the moral and spiritual issues involved for England in a struggle between Christian and Mohammedan. He had been, as a young curate, hotly indignant with England's policy in the Crimean war. In October 1876 he and Canon McColl became implicated in a warm argument with the foreign office and the home press, owing to their united declaration that they had seen the body of an impaled Bulgarian on the banks of the Save, while journeying a few months earlier to visit Cardinal Strossmayer, archbishop of Bosnia. Liddon never doubted for a moment that he had seen what he said (cf. Times, 6 and 21 Oct. 1876).

In 1881, when the collision between the ritualists and the judicial authorities reached its climax in the imprisonment of Mr. Dale and Mr. Enraght for refusal to obey the judgment of Lord Penzance in the court of arches, Liddon preached four sermons during his month's residence in December (published under the title ‘Thoughts on Present Church Troubles,’ 1881), in which he stated with skill and force the duties and the anxieties of churchmen. In an elaborate preface he justified the rare occasions on which, in view of the religious and moral interests involved, he had spoken on contemporary controversies from the pulpit of St. Paul's, and he laid down at length his reasons for repudiating the final court of appeal, and the novel jurisdiction erected under the Public Worship Regulation Act. Against that act he had already delivered himself in two sermons in 1874, as well as in a speech for the English Church Union. He had also declared himself against the ecclesiastical authority of the privy council by a published letter written in 1871 in concert with Canon Gregory; there he challenged the Bishop of London to proceed against them for the adoption of the eastward position. He was summoned as a witness before the commission on ecclesiastical courts on 16 Aug. 1882, and was relieved to see the allegations made against the spiritual authority of the existing court amply justified by the commission's report.

In December 1889, his last month but one of residence at St. Paul's, he vehemently denounced an article on ‘Inspiration,’ written by Charles Gore, principal of the Pusey House, Oxford (afterwards Bishop of Birmingham), in a volume of essays called ‘Lux Mundi.’ The volume came from those who adhered to the theological school of which Liddon was himself the foremost interpreter, and the writer of the article belonged to the closest circle of his friends among the younger generation. But Liddon believed it illogical and impossible to permit criticism to dissect and redistribute the structure and materials of the Old Testament, and yet to hope to retain belief in the infallible authority of Jesus Christ. His last sermon, preached on Whitsunday 1890, before the university, at St. Mary's, Oxford, contained a final and measured pronouncement on this controversy.

Except at St. Paul's or at the university churches of Oxford and Cambridge, he preached only on urgent reasons; e.g., after the death of Bishop Wilberforce; at the opening of Keble College Chapel (1876); on behalf of the memorial to Dr. Pusey; and once, in Christ Church Cathedral, on behalf of the Christ Church mission in Poplar (1889). Although he was an admirable public speaker he very rarely appeared on the platform or joined committees, or took a public part in religious controversy. But in 1871 he publicly addressed letters to Sir John Coleridge and to the Bishop of London on the Purchas judgment; he also wrote a series of letters in the ‘Times’ on ‘Anglican Books of Devotion,’ in December 1874 and January 1875; and again in 1888 in the ‘Guardian,’ on the re-establishment of the Anglican bishopric in Jerusalem. One of the severest struggles in which he engaged dealt with the use or disuse of the Athanasian Creed (1871). He was willing to add an explanation of the damnatory clauses; but any further change he regarded as a breach with catholic order, continuity, and authority. On 31 Dec. 1871 he announced to the Archbishop of Canterbury his resolution to resign all ministerial office in the church of England if the creed were mutilated or degraded from its place in the prayer-book, and he said that Dr. Pusey agreed with him (cf. Life of Tait, ii. 137–9). It was in protest against any such action that he made one of his very few speeches, at a great meeting in St. James's Hall on 31 Jan. 1873. It was chiefly owing to its treatment of this creed that he was in vehement disagreement with the church of Ireland at the time of its revision of the prayer-book in 1875 (cf. Letters of Archbishop Trench, chaps. ix. and x.)

Liddon took the deepest interest in the Eastern churches, as well as in the Old Catholic movement. In the Bonn conferences (10–16 Aug. 1875) he took a leading part, and translated in 1876 Dr. Reusch's record of the proceedings, adding a preface addressed to Dr. Pusey. At Bonn he formed a close friendship with Dr. Döllinger. He was already intimate with Père Loyson.

Liddon lived to the end at Oxford, when out


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The New International Encyclopædia/Winkelmann, Hermann

WINKELMANN, (1845—). A German dramatic tenor, born in Brunswick. He adopted the profession of a singer after he had reached manhood. He made his début at Sondershausen, and then went to Darmstadt and Hamburg. He became identified with the Wagnerian drama in 1882, when he took the part of Parsifal at Bayreuth, with such success that he was engaged for the Imperial Opera at Vienna. Here he sang in Wagner's operas, with Madame Friedrich-Materna and Herr Scaria. The famous trio made a tour of the United States in 1884.


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Rh of residence at St. Paul's; and there he gave himself heart and soul to the foundation in 1870 of Keble College, and he interested himself in the Pusey House from its inception in 1883. Both institutions seemed to him to give the church new security in Oxford, now that her old habitations were withdrawn from her. In spite of his indignation at the work of the university commission of 1881 he found himself cheered by the sympathetic affection of the younger generation, whose devotion never swerved. From 1883 his spare time was spent on a ‘Life’ of Dr. Pusey. The doctor's immense and scattered correspondence involved infinite labour; and Liddon set about his task, on a scale and with an industry rarely given to work of this type. The labour seriously injured his health. He left three volumes practically complete. These, with a fourth by another hand, are now being prepared for publication.

In 1884–5 Liddon was select preacher at both Oxford and Cambridge, and at the latter university again in 1889. In June 1886 he was elected bishop of Edinburgh by a convention of episcopal clergy and laymen, but he declined to accept the charge. At the same date he was appointed chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral. At the end of the year he was recommended to winter in Egypt, and thence he visited the Holy Land. A record of this tour by his sister, Mrs. King, who accompanied him, was published in 1891. He came back with renewed vigour to his post at St. Paul's, but his health soon failed again. He aged rapidly, growing very grey, and in the autumn of 1889 he could hardly get through his residence at St. Paul's. He looked very ill in June, when he visited Cambridge to receive the honorary degree of LL.D. conferred on him by the university. Finally, he caught a severe chill at the funeral of his old friend, Lord Carnarvon (3 July 1890). After enduring great suffering at Christ Church, he seemed to be rallying, and was moved to his sister's house in Gloucestershire. Thence he went to Weston-super-Mare, where he died on 9 Sept. 1890. He was buried in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral.

In private life Liddon's companionship was an incomparable and unfailing delight. His conversation, which was restrained and guarded so long as he at all suspected the temper of his company, bubbled over with imaginative humour when once he was assured of full sympathy. He had intense dramatic vividness, and told a story to perfection. In politics he was popularly known as a liberal; but this was accidentally, rather than substantially, true. In all his natural instincts he was intensely conservative. But his natural instincts were dominated by spiritual convictions; and these spiritual convictions made him deeply suspicious of the worldly ties which knit the church to the state as an establishment, and they threw him on to the liberal side on the only occasion on which he actually showed himself on the political field, i.e. in the agitation respecting the Bulgarian atrocities and the Russo-Turkish war. He looked to character in politics, rather than to any particular measures, and lived on friendly terms both with Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone. A profound belief in the latter's moral character he had inherited from the Tractarian chiefs, but his inherent conservatism was often disturbed by Mr. Gladstone's public action. Each statesman when prime minister took steps to sound Liddon respecting his willingness to accept a bishopric, but Liddon resolutely refused to entertain either proposal.

His recreation was travelling, and he was an inveterate sightseer. He was possessed of private means, and was a generous giver. Intensely domestic and lovable, and unaffected by any worldly ambition, he was totally free from the peculiar moral weakness to which a great popular preacher is proverbially liable. His most striking characteristics were a passionate chivalry, a burning courage, and a delicious humour.

A fine portrait, painted by Mr. G. Richmond in 1866, is at Keble College. Another by Professor Herkomer is in Christ Church Hall.

In addition to the works mentioned, numerous separate sermons, and prefaces contributed to the works of others, Liddon published: 1. ‘Some Words for God; being Sermons preached before the University of Oxford in 1863–5,’ London, 1865; 2nd ed. 1866, with the title ‘Sermons preached before the University of Oxford;’ 8th ed. 1884. A second series, 1868–79, was published London, 1879; this reached a fourth edition in 1887. A new edition containing both series appeared London, 1891. 2. ‘Some Elements of Religion: Lent Lectures, 1870,’ London, 1872, 8vo; 7th ed. 1890. 3. ‘Evening Communions contrary to the Teaching and Practice of the Church in all ages,’ 4th thousand, London, 1876, 8vo; reprinted from ‘The Christian Remembrancer’ for July 1860 and January 1861. 4. ‘Easter in St. Paul's: Sermons bearing chiefly on the Resurrection of our Lord,’ 2 vols., London, 1885; 1 vol. 1890. 5. Four series of sermons on various subjects, all published London, 1886. The second series included the ‘Two Lectures on the Life of St. Paul.’ 6. ‘Advent in St. Paul's:


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Mary Stuart terference with Mary was that she was in subjection to Bothwell.

When Bothwell on 10 June made his escape from Borthwick Castle the lords, who had surrounded it with a view to his capture, assailed Mary with ' evil and unseemly speeches,' which, ' poor princess,' says Drury, ' she did with her speech defend, wanting other means for her revenge ' (12 June, Cal. State Papers, For. Ser. 1566-8, entry 1289). On their departure towards Edinburgh, she left at evening in 'man's clothes, booted and spurred,' and joining Bothwell, rode with him to Dunbar (James Beaton, 17 June, in Laino, ii. 107 ; Captain of Inchkeith, Teulet, ii. 303 ; Buchanan, Hist. bk. xviii.) She brought no female apparel with her, but on reaching Dunbar obtained a dress, described by Drury as 'after the fashion of the women of Edinburgh, in a red petticoat [as she was of the 'largest size,' it reached only to her knees], sleeves tied with points, a "partlyte," a velvet hat and muffler' (17 June, Cal State Papers, For. Ser. entry 1313). It was in this attire that she confronted the lords at Carberry Hill on Sunday, 15 June, and the delay in coming to blows was due originally to the desire of the lords to avoid a conflict, and to the expectation of reinforcements on the part of Bothwell and Mary. The proposed single combat between Bothwell and Lindsay was negatived by the queen, who affirmed that the quarrel was hers even more than Bothwell's. It was only when she saw that the majority of her followers were unprepared to support him that she agreed to his leaving the field and to deliver hersel f to the enemy. His safety was her first concern, but she expected, when he had left her, to be treated as a sovereign, and hoped even yet either to effect his return or find the means of escape to him. When speedily undeceived by the brutal contumely of the troops, she assailed her captors with violent menaces. She talked of nothing ' but hanging and crucifying them air (De Croc, 17 June, in Teulet, ii. 310), the chief object of her wrath being Lindsav, the challenger of Bothwell (Captain of Inchkeith, ifl.p.308), to whom she swore, by his right hand held in hers, 'I will have your head for this, and therefore assure you' (Drury, 18 June, but ' the graphic episodes are omitted in Cal. State Papers, For. Ser. 1566-8, entry 1313). About ten o'clock in the summer twilight she entered Edinburgh, 'her face all disfigured with dust and tears,' amid the almost unbroken silence of the throng of citizens which so crowded the streets that two could scarce walk abreast (Buchanan, bk. xviii. Calderwood, ii. 365). She was lodged all night and all next day in the provost's house opposite the cross, and in the extremity of her despair showed herself all dishevelled at the window calling for help (Beaton, 17 June, in Laing, ii. 114; Captain of Inchkeith, in Teulet, ii. 308; De Croc, 17 June, id. p. 313). Seeing Maitland passing she prayed him for the love of God to come and speak to her (ib.), and inveighed against the attempt to separate her from her husband, ' with whom she hoped to live and die with the greatest content on earth ' (ib. p. 31 1 ). Her determination to stand by Bothwell and the knowledge that she was already in communication with him induced the lords, after bringing her to Holy rood, to send her, originally partly for her own protection, to Lochleven. borne of the extremists were for her summary execution, but the more responsible nobles were opposed to this, and deemed it impolitic meanwhile even to accuse her of the murder. On 20 June, if Morton's declaration is to be believed, the casket containing Mary's letters to Bothwell and other incriminating documents fell into the hands of the lords. Their production at such an early period, even apart from the names of those attesting the manner of their discovery (see Morton's declaration in Henderson's Casket Letters, pp. 113-16), renders still more difficult the acceptance of any of the theories of their forgery that have yet been propounded, and additional importance attaches to Morton's declaration from the fact that the French ambassador was furnished with a copy of the letters some time before 12 July (Cal State Papers, Spanish Ser. 1558-67,' p. 65). The first and original aim of the loras was not to accuse Mary of Darnley's murder but to obtain her consent to a divorce (Answer, 21 July, Keith, ii. 577-583 ; Cal. State Papers, For. Ser. 1566-8, entry 1485). 'They do not intend,' wrote Throckmorton, 'to touch the queen in surety or honour ' (21 July, ib. entry 1484). To have done so would have exposed them to the vengeance of other sovereigns, to the opposition of those catholic nobles who had supported them against Bothwell, and to the possibility of awkward revelations as to the relation of some of them to the murder. But Mary would not consent to a divorce. Rather than renounce Bothwell she was prepared to sacrifice 'kingdom and dignity ' (ib.) For this she gave as a cardinal reason that she was seven weeks gone with child (18 July, ib. entry 1468). Neither the statement of Claude Nau, possibly on her own authority, that she had a miscarriage of twins, nor that of Castelnau, that she gave birth to a daughter who was educated as a religieuse in the convent of Soissons,


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Mary Stuart altogether incredible; but her pregnancy, if it existed, was rather an excuse than a reason. She was adverse to a divorce even after her escape from Lochleven. Ultimately at Lochleven the choice was given her of a divorce, a trial at which the Casket letters were to be adduced as evidence (, 25 July, ib. entry 1509;, ii. 699), or an abdication; and she finally consented, after the undoubted use of some kind of threats, to the last.

Mary's demission was signed on 24 July (Reg. P. C. Scotl. i. 531–3), and she also at the same time signed an act nominating the Earl of Moray regent (ib. pp. 539–40). An act of parliament was passed on 15 Dec. that the action taken against her was ‘in her own default,’ inasmuch as it was clearly evident, both by her letters and by her marriage to Bothwell, that ‘she was privie art and part of the actual device and deed’ of the ‘murder of the king.’

Mary's deliverance from Lochleven was owing primarily to new marriage intrigues on the part of others, if not of herself. Any marriage proposals entertained by herself were merely intended to aid her escape. That Moray wished to arrange a marriage to Henry Stewart, lord Methven [q. v.] (Drury, 20 March 1568, Cal. State Papers, For. Ser. 1566–8, entry 2072), is not impossible; but even if she listened to his proposal, she had arranged otherwise. Her ‘over-great familiarity’ with George Douglas, brother to the laird of Lochleven, is mentioned as early as 18 Oct. 1567 (Drury, ib. entry 1792), and she is stated to have told his mother that ‘she had broken with the regent to marry him’ (2 April 1568, ib. entry 2106). He was ‘in a phantasy of love’ with her (ib. entry 2172), and the only question is as to how far his mother—bribed with hopes of the alliance—secretly connived at Mary's escape. It was also with similar hopes that the Hamiltons were taking up her cause, their intention being to secure her hand for the abbot of Arbroath (Foster, 30 April, ib. entry 2151, Drury to Cecil, 12 May;, p. 200; see , first ). With the aid of George Douglas, who acted in concert with the Hamiltons, she escaped from Lochleven on the evening of 2 May 1568, and by sunrise arrived at Hamilton Palace (see especially, viii. 307–11). Several powerful nobles having joined her standard, she was soon at the head of six thousand men, but so distrustful was she of the Hamiltons that she would have preferred not to risk a battle, and desired to proceed to Dumbarton Castle. Here she could have awaited in some security the issue of events, and the result of her appeal for aid to England and France. The disaster at Langside on 13 May was primarily caused by the determination of the Hamiltons to frustrate, if possible, her purpose of escape from them, and to snatch a victory which would place her in their power (, p. 200). In company with John, fifth lord Fleming [q. v.], and Robert, fourth lord Boyd [q. v.], and a son of Lord Herries, she watched the result from an eminence commanding a full view of the engagement, and as soon as she saw that all was lost galloped away, with the intention of making for Dumbarton. Soon discovering, however, that flight in this direction was too hazardous, she, under the guidance of Lord Herries, turned southwards, not drawing bridle until she reached Sanquhar. On the 16th she crossed the Solway in a fishing-boat to Workington in Cumberland [see ]. While her rapid flight may be partly accounted for by horror of the possibility of a second imprisonment, her resolve to pass into England may perhaps be best explained by her ‘readiness to expose herself to all perils in hope of victory’ (, iv. 71). Her constitutional recklessness had only been augmented by misfortune. For mere protection she would probably have never sought Elizabeth; she became a suitor solely that she might humiliate her enemies. It must also be remembered that Elizabeth had strongly condemned the lords' proceedings, and had actually intended—though chiefly to prevent French interference—to come to Mary's help.

On receipt of a piteous letter from Mary on 19 May (, ii. 73–7) Elizabeth gave orders that the Scottish queen, who on the 18th had been removed to Carlisle, should be treated with all respect, but closely guarded to prevent her escape (Cal. State Papers, For. Ser. 1566–8, entry 2214). It was, however, less her escape that was dreaded than the possibility that she might raise the north in her own behalf. To the letters of condolence sent by Lady Scrope and Knollys, Mary replied that her affairs were urgent, and requested that Elizabeth would vouchsafe her an interview (, ii. 79–84). This was refused, until she had cleared herself of the accusations against her in connection with Darnley's murder. On 29 June Elizabeth assured Catherine de Medici ‘of the safety of her life and honour’ whatever might happen; but explained that, from considerations which she would rather have her imagine than ‘suffer her pen to write,’ she ‘could not treat her with such pomp and ceremony as she would otherwise desire’ (Cal. State


text:
Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Goose-Girl at the Well

Die Gänsehirtin am Brunnen (1857) Elektitaj fabeloj de la Fratoj Grimm/Paŝtistino de anseroj apud puto Contos de Grimm/A pastora de gansos junto à fonte Гусятница у колодца (Гримм/Полевой)


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Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

During most of the time that petitioner Ledbetter was employed by respondent Goodyear, salaried employees at the plant where she worked were given or denied raised based on performance evaluations. Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March 1998 and a formal EEOC charge in July 1998. After her November 1998 retirement, she filed suit, asserting, among other things, a sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court allowed her Title VII pay discrimination claim to proceed to trial. There, Ledbetter alleged that several supervisors had in the past given her poor evaluations because of her sex; that as a result, her pay had not increased as much as it would have if she had been evaluated fairly; that those past pay decisions affected the amount of her pay throughout her employment; and that by the end of her employment, she was earning significantly less than her male colleagues. Goodyear maintained that the evaluations had been nondiscriminatory, but the jury found for Ledbetter, awarding backpay and damages. On appeal, Goodyear contended that the pay discrimination claim was time barred with regard to all pay decisions made before September 26, 1997—180 days before Ledbetter filed her EEOC questionnaire—and that no discriminatory act relating to her pay occurred after that date. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on allegedly discriminatory events that occurred before the last pay decision that affected the employee's pay during the EEOC charging period, and concluding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions during that period, denials of raises in 1997 and 1998.

Held: Because the later effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an EEOC charge, Ledbetter's claim is untimely. Pp. 623-643.

(a) An individual wishing to bring a Title VII lawsuit must first file an EEOC charge within, as relevant here, 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1). In addressing the issue of an EEOC charge's timeliness, this Court has stressed the need to identify with care the specific employment practice '''[p. 619]''' at issue. Ledbetter's arguments—that the paychecks that she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise denial each violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC charging period—fail because they would require the Court in effect to jettison the defining element of the disparate-treatment claim on which her Title VII recovery was based, discriminatory intent. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, and National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, clearly instruct that the EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. But if an employer engages in a series of separately actionable intentionally discriminatory acts, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Ledbetter makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory decisions occurring before that period were not communicated to her. She argues simply that Goodyear's nondiscriminatory conduct during the charging period gave present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination. Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory employment decision was made and communicated to her. Her attempt to shift forward the intent associated with prior discriminatory acts to the 1998 pay decision is unsound, for it would shift intent away from the act that consummated the discriminatory employment practice to a later act not performed with bias or discriminatory motive, imposing liability in the absence of the requisite intent. Her argument would also distort Title VII's "integrated, multistep enforcement procedure." ''Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC'', 432 U.S. 355, 359. The short EEOC filing deadline reflects Congress' strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Id., at 367–368. Nothing in Title VII supports treating the intent element of Ledbetter's disparate-treatment claim any differently from the employment practice element of the claim. Pp. 623–632.

(b) Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam), which concerned a disparate-treatment pay claim, is entirely consistent with Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan. Bazemore 's rule is that an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure. It is not, as Ledbetter contends, a "paycheck accrual rule" under which each paycheck, even if not accompanied by discriminatory intent, triggers a '''[p. 620]''' new EEOC charging period during which the complainant may properly challenge any prior discriminatory conduct that impacted that paycheck's amount, no matter how long ago the discrimination occurred. Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay system in order to discriminate based on sex or that it later applied this system to her within the charging period with discriminatory animus, Bazemore is of no help to her. Pp. 633–640.

(c) Ledbetter's "paycheck accrual rule" is also not supported by either analogies to the statutory regimes of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the National Labor Relations Act, or policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay claims. Pp. 640–643.

421 F.3d 1169, affirmed.

Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 643.

Kevin K. Russell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Amy Howe, Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., and Jon C. Goldfarb.

Glen D. Nager argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael A. Carvin, Shay Dvoretzky, and Jay St. Clair.

Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, and Dennis J. Dimsey.

title: Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.


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Mary Stuart Papers, Foreign Ser. 1660-8, entry 2306). Although expressing willingness to discuss her case with Elizabeth, Mary affirmed that she would rather die than appear as a party to a suit with her own subjects (13 June, , ii. 98). By implication she confessed the necessity of explaining her conduct, and in withholding explanation, except in the presence of Elizabeth, she seemed more careful of her dignity than her honour. Ultimately she somewhat modified her resolution, but only in the expectation that the accusation would be abandoned. After she had been transferred on 13 July from Carlisle to Bolton an arbitration with a view to an amicable arrangement was proposed. Darnley's murder was to be inquired into, but Mary was led to believe that both Elizabeth and the English commissioners, especially Norfolk, were favourably inclined (Examination of the Bishop of Ross in Murdin, p. 52). Norfolk, who was president of the conference which met at York on 4 Oct., had been secretly led by Maitland to cherish hopes of a marriage to her. Norfolk therefore privately laboured to prevent Moray giving in his accusation, by representing that if the queen were dishonoured, the Scottish right to the succession would be endangered. Moray was thus induced, while privately exhibiting the Casket documents to Norfolk and others, to content himself at the conference with justifying the queen's imprisonment merely on the ground of her marriage to Bothwell, his hope being that if he 'did nothing upon the worst charges the Queen of Scots would be induced to a reasonable composition,' It was Elizabeth alone who prevented a compromise, and compelled him to ' utter all he could to the Queen's dishonour,' To prevent ' sic rigorous and extreme dealing,' Mary offered free and full pardon to her rebels (22 Nov., Labanoff, ii. 23), but declined to be a party to any inquiry unless permitted to make her defence before Elizabeth and the ambassadors of the foreign powers (id.) At the opening of the second conference on 25 Nov. at Westminster, the Bishop of Ross protested in her name that while ready to treat for an arrangement, she would submit to no form of judgment. On the threat of losing Elizabeth's favour, Moray was required to give in his accusations. Lennox also appeared in support of the charges against the queen of Scots, producing certain special evidence. Mary's commissioners now demanded that she should be allowed to appear in person, and that her accusers should be arrested, but Elizabeth declined to do so until she had heard the proofs of their allegations. After the evidence against Mary had been given, the presumption of her guilt was declared to be so great that Elizabeth could not without 'manifest blemish of her own honour receive her into her presence,' Mary was informed that the evidence would be transmitted to her if she would give a direct answer to it ; but declining to acknowledge Elizabeth's jurisdiction, she contented herself with a vigorous denial of the charges, and a denunciation of Moray and his adherents as themselves the 'authors and inventors, and some of them even executors,' of the crime. For a second time proposal was made for Mary's abdication ; she replied ' that she would rather die I than demit her crown, and that the last words she would utter on earth would be those of a Queen of Scotland' (ib. ii. 274). A formal verdict, ostensibly ia favour of both parties, was recorded. Nothing had, it was declared, been adduced against Moray and his adherents 'that might impair their honour or allegiance,' and nothing had been ' sufficiently proven or shown by them against the Queen their sovereign whereby the Queen of England should conceive any evil opinion of her good sister,' But while Moray obtained Elizabeth's support in the regency, the queen of Scotland was retained in captivity. On 26 Feb. 1568-9 Mary was removed to Tutbury, and placed under the charge of the Earl of Shrewsbury. Subsequently she was transferred to Wingfield. Here in June a proposal was renewed to her through Leicester for a marriage with Norfolk, which was accepted. At her suggestion an attempt was also made at the Perth convention on 31 July to secure assent to her divorce, but the motion was lost (Reg. P. C. Scotl. ii. 8-9). Had the Scots been favourable, there was some intention to ask Elizabeth's consent to the marriage, but it was now conjoined with a plot for Mary's escape and a catholic rising in her favour. Though Norfolk in October was sent to the Tower, the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland determined to proceed, and on 14 Nov. began their advance to Tutbury, whence Mary had again been removed, with the view of effecting her liberation. She was therefore hastily transferred to Coventry, orders being given for her execution should there be immediate danger of her escape.

The assassination of Moray on 23 Jan. 1569-70, which aroused wild hopes of the near triumph of Catholicism, proved fatal rather than helpful to the cause of Mary. It put an end to compromise and kindled the embers of civil war. On learning of the murder Mary wrote to Beaton that she was only the more indebted to the assassin that he


text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/Eve's Various Children


text:
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co./Opinion of the Court

'''[p. 621]''' Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case calls upon us to apply established precedent in a slightly different context. We have previously held that the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) begins when the discriminatory act occurs. We have explained that this rule applies to any "[d]iscrete ac[t]" of discrimination, including discrimination in "termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire." National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Because a pay-setting decision is a "discrete act," it follows that the period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the act occurs. Petitioner, having abandoned her claim under the Equal Pay Act, asks us to deviate from our prior decisions in order to permit her to assert her claim under Title VII. Petitioner also contends that discrimination in pay is different from other types of employment discrimination and thus should be governed by a different rule. But because a pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a particular point in time, these arguments must be rejected. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I
Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter) worked for respondent Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear) at its Gadsden, Alabama, plant from 1979 until 1998. During much of this time, salaried employees at the plant were given or denied raises based on their supervisors' evaluation of their performance. In March 1998, Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC alleging certain acts of sex discrimination, and in July of that year she filed a formal EEOC charge. After taking early retirement in November 1998, '''[p. 622]''' Ledbetter commenced this action, in which she asserted, among other claims, a Title VII pay discrimination claim and a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. §206(d).

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear on several of Ledbetter's claims, including her EPA claim, but allowed others, including her Title VII pay discrimination claim, to proceed to trial. In support of this latter claim, Ledbetter introduced evidence that during the course of her employment several supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that as a result of these evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly, and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment. Toward the end of her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues. Goodyear maintained that the evaluations had been nondiscriminatory, but the jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her backpay and damages.

On appeal, Goodyear contended that Ledbetter's pay discrimination claim was time barred with respect to all pay decisions made prior to September 26, 1997—that is, 180 days before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire. And Goodyear argued that no discriminatory act relating to Ledbetter's pay occurred after that date.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on any pay decision that occurred prior to the last pay decision that affected the employee's pay during the EEOC '''[p. 623]''' charging period. 421 F.3d 1169, 1182–1183 (2005). The Court of Appeals then concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions that occurred within that time span, namely, a decision made in 1997 to deny Ledbetter a raise and a similar decision made in 1998. Id., at 1186–1187.

Ledbetter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari but did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' holdings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the 1997 and 1998 pay decisions. Rather, she sought review of the following question:

"'Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period.' Pet. for Cert. i."

In light of disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper application of the limitations period in Title VII disparate-treatment pay cases, compare 421 F.3d 1169 with Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565 (CA2 2005); Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (CADC 2005), we granted certiorari, 548 U.S. 903 (2006).

II
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an "unlawful employment practice" to discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation...because of such individual's...sex." 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(a)(1). An individual wishing to challenge an employment practice under this provision must first file a charge with the EEOC. §2000e–5(e)(1). Such a charge must be filed within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the State) '''[p. 624]' "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," ibid.'', and if the employee does not submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may not challenge that practice in court, §2000e–5(f)(1).

In addressing the issue whether an EEOC charge was filed on time, we have stressed the need to identify with care the specific employment practice that is at issue. Morgan, 536 U.S., at 110–111. Ledbetter points to two different employment practices as possible candidates. Primarily, she urges us to focus on the paychecks that were issued to her during the EEOC charging period (the 180-day period preceding the filing of her EEOC questionnaire), each of which, she contends, was a separate act of discrimination. Alternatively, Ledbetter directs us to the 1998 decision denying her a raise, and she argues that this decision was "unlawful because it carried forward intentionally discriminatory disparities from prior years." Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. Both of these arguments fail because they would require us in effect to jettison the defining element of the legal claim on which her Title VII recovery was based.

Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central element of which is discriminatory intent. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[A] disparate-treatment challenge focuses exclusively on the intent of the employer"). However, Ledbetter does not assert that the relevant Goodyear decisionmakers acted with actual discriminatory intent either when they issued her checks during the EEOC charging period or when they denied her a raise in 1998. Rather, she argues that the paychecks were unlawful because they would have been larger if she had been evaluated in a nondiscriminatory manner prior to the EEOC charging period. Brief for Petitioner 22. Similarly, she maintains that the '''[p. 625]''' 1998 decision was unlawful because it “carried forward” the effects of prior, uncharged discrimination decisions. Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. In essence, she suggests that it is sufficient that discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the charging period had continuing effects during that period. Brief for Petitioner 13 ("[E]ach paycheck that offers a woman less pay than a similarly situated man because of her sex is a separate violation of Title VII with its own limitations period, regardless of whether the paycheck simply implements a prior discriminatory decision made outside the limitations period"); see also Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. This argument is squarely foreclosed by our precedents.

In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), we rejected an argument that is basically the same as Ledbetter's. Evans was forced to resign because the airline refused to employ married flight attendants, but she did not file an EEOC charge regarding her termination. Some years later, the airline rehired her but treated her as a new employee for seniority purposes. Id., at 554–555. Evans then sued, arguing that, while any suit based on the original discrimination was time barred, the airline's refusal to give her credit for her prior service gave "present effect to [its] past illegal act and therefore perpetuate[d] the consequences of forbidden discrimination." Id., at 557.

We agreed with Evans that the airline's "seniority system [did] indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits," id., at 558, but we noted that "the critical question [was] whether any present violation exist[ed]," ibid. (emphasis in original). We concluded that the continuing effects of the precharging period discrimination did not make out a present violation. As Justice Stevens wrote for the Court:

"'United was entitled to treat [Evans' termination] as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then allowed by §706(d). A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a [p. 626] timely charge...is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.' Ibid."

It would be difficult to speak to the point more directly.

Equally instructive is Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), which concerned a college professor, Ricks, who alleged that he had been discharged because of national origin. In March 1974, Ricks was denied tenure, but he was given a final, nonrenewable 1-year contract that expired on June 30, 1975. Id., at 252–253. Ricks delayed filing a charge with the EEOC until April 1975, id., at 254, but he argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the date of his actual termination rather than from the date when tenure was denied. In rejecting this argument, we recognized that "one of the effects of the denial of tenure," namely, his ultimate termination, "did not occur until later." Id., at 258 (emphasis in original). But because Ricks failed to identify any specific discriminatory act "that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment," id., at 257, we held that the EEOC charging period ran from "the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks," id., at 258.

This same approach dictated the outcome in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), which grew out of a change in the way in which seniority was calculated under a collective-bargaining agreement. Before 1979, all employees at the plant in question accrued seniority based simply on years of employment at the plant. In 1979, a new agreement made seniority for workers in the more highly paid (and traditionally male) position of "tester" depend on time spent in that position alone and not in other positions in the plant. Several years later, when female testers were laid off due to low seniority as calculated under the new provision, they filed an EEOC charge alleging that the 1979 scheme had been adopted with discriminatory intent, namely, to protect incumbent male testers when women with sub- '''[p. 627]''' stantial plant seniority began to move into the traditionally male tester positions. Id., at 902–903.

We held that the plaintiffs' EEOC charge was not timely because it was not filed within the specified period after the adoption in 1979 of the new seniority rule. We noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the new seniority rule treated men and women differently or that the rule had been applied in a discriminatory manner. Rather, their complaint was that the rule was adopted originally with discriminatory intent. Id., at 905. And as in Evans and Ricks, we held that the EEOC charging period ran from the time when the discrete act of alleged intentional discrimination occurred, not from the date when the effects of this practice were felt. 490 U.S., at 907–908. We stated:

"'Because the claimed invalidity of the facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied tester seniority system is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality of signing the underlying agreement, it is the date of that signing which governs the limitations period.' Id., at 911."

'''[p. 628]''' Our most recent decision in this area confirms this understanding. In Morgan, we explained that the statutory term "employment practice" generally refers to "a discrete act or single 'occurrence'" that takes place at a particular point in time. 536 U. S., at 110–111. We pointed to "termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire" as examples of such "discrete" acts, and we held that a Title VII plaintiff "can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that 'occurred' within the appropriate time period." Id., at 114.

The instruction provided by Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan is clear. The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. But of course, if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. See Morgan, supra, at 113.

Ledbetter's arguments here—that the paychecks that she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise denial each violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC charging period—cannot be reconciled with Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan. Ledbetter, as noted, makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory decisions that occurred prior to that period were not communicated to her. Instead, she argues simply that Goodyear's conduct during the charging period gave present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period. Brief for Petitioner 13. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination; as we held in Evans, such effects in themselves have "no present legal consequences." 431 U.S., at 558. Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her. She did not do so, '''[p. 629]''' and the paychecks that were issued to her during the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge do not provide a basis for overcoming that prior failure.

In an effort to circumvent the need to prove discriminatory intent during the charging period, Ledbetter relies on the intent associated with other decisions made by other persons at other times. Reply Brief for Petitioner 6 ("Intentional discrimination...occurs when...differential treatment takes place, even if the intent to engage in that conduct for a discriminatory purpose was made previously").

Ledbetter's attempt to take the intent associated with the prior pay decisions and shift it to the 1998 pay decision is unsound. It would shift intent from one act (the act that consummates the discriminatory employment practice) to a later act that was not performed with bias or discriminatory motive. The effect of this shift would be to impose liability in the absence of the requisite intent.

Our cases recognize this point. In Evans, for example, we did not take the airline's discriminatory intent in 1968, when it discharged the plaintiff because of her sex, and attach that intent to its later act of neutrally applying its seniority rules. Similarly, in Ricks, we did not take the discriminatory intent that the college allegedly possessed when it denied Ricks tenure and attach that intent to its subsequent act of terminating his employment when his nonrenewable contract ran out. On the contrary, we held that "the only alleged discrimination occurred—and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced—at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks." 449 U.S., at 258.

Not only would Ledbetter's argument effectively eliminate the defining element of her disparate-treatment claim, but it would distort Title VII's "integrated, multistep enforcement procedure." ''Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC'', 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977). We have previously noted the legislative compromises that preceded the enactment of Title VII, '''[p. 630]' Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819–821 (1980); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co.'', 486 U.S. 107, 126 (1988) (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., dissenting). Respectful of the legislative process that crafted this scheme, we must "give effect to the statute as enacted," Mohasco, supra, at 819, and we have repeatedly rejected suggestions that we extend or truncate Congress' deadlines. See, e. g., Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236–240 (1976) (union grievance procedures do not toll EEOC filing deadline); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47–49 (1974) (arbitral decisions do not foreclose access to court following a timely filed EEOC complaint).

Statutes of limitations serve a policy of repose. ''American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah'', 414 U.S. 538, 554–555 (1974). They

"'represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.'' United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))."

The EEOC filing deadline "protect[s] employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past." Ricks, supra, 256–257. Certainly, the 180-day EEOC charging deadline, 42 U.S.C. §2000e–5(e)(1), is short by any measure, but "[b]y choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination." Mohasco, supra, at 825. This short deadline reflects Congress' strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allega- '''[p. 631]''' tions through voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Occidental Life Ins., supra, at 367–368; Alexander, supra, at 44.

A disparate-treatment claim comprises two elements: an employment practice, and discriminatory intent. Nothing in Title VII supports treating the intent element of Ledbetter's claim any differently from the employment practice element. If anything, concerns regarding stale claims weigh more heavily with respect to proof of the intent associated with employment practices than with the practices themselves. For example, in a case such as this in which the plaintiff's claim concerns the denial of raises, the employer's challenged acts (the decisions not to increase the employee's pay at the times in question) will almost always be documented and will typically not even be in dispute. By contrast, the employer's intent is almost always disputed, and evidence relating to intent may fade quickly with time. In most disparate-treatment cases, much if not all of the evidence of intent is circumstantial. Thus, the critical issue in a case involving a long-past performance evaluation will often be whether the evaluation was so far off the mark that a sufficient inference of discriminatory intent can be drawn. See Watson, 487 U.S., at 1004 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that in a disparate-treatment claim, the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), factors establish discrimination by inference). See also, e. g., Zhuang v. Datacard '''[p. 632]' Corp., 414 F.3d 849 (CA8 2005) (rejecting inference of discrimination from performance evaluations); Cooper v. Southern Co.'', 390 F.3d 695, 732–733 (CA11 2004) (same). This can be a subtle determination, and the passage of time may seriously diminish the ability of the parties and the factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened.

Ledbetter contends that employers would be protected by the equitable doctrine of laches, but Congress plainly did not think that laches was sufficient in this context. Indeed, Congress took a diametrically different approach, including in Title VII a provision allowing only a few months in most cases to file a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §2000e–5(e)(1).

Ultimately, "experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law." Mohasco, supra, at 826. By operation of §§2000e–5(e)(1) and 2000e–5(f)(1), a Title VII "claim is time barred if it is not filed within these time limits." Morgan, 536 U.S., at 109; Electrical Workers, 429 U.S., at 236. We therefore reject the suggestion that an employment practice committed with no improper purpose and no discriminatory intent is rendered unlawful nonetheless because it gives some effect to an intentional discriminatory act that occurred outside the charging period. Ledbetter's claim is, for this reason, untimely. '''[p. 633]'''

A
In advancing her two theories Ledbetter does not seriously contest the logic of Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan as set out above, but rather argues that our decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam), requires different treatment of her claim because it relates to pay. Ledbetter focuses specifically on our statement that "[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII." Id., at 395. She argues that in Bazemore we adopted a "paycheck accrual rule" under which each paycheck, even if not accompanied by discriminatory intent, triggers a new EEOC charging period during which the complainant may properly challenge any prior discriminatory conduct that impacted the amount of that paycheck, no matter how long ago the discrimination occurred. On this reading, Bazemore dispensed with the need to prove actual discriminatory intent in pay cases and, without giving any hint that it was doing so, repudiated the very different approach taken previously in Evans and Ricks. Ledbetter's interpretation is unsound.

Bazemore concerned a disparate-treatment pay claim brought against the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service (Service). 478 U.S., at 389–390. Service employees were originally segregated into "a white branch" and "a 'Negro branch,'" with the latter receiving less pay, but in 1965 the two branches were merged. Id., at 390–391. After Title VII was extended to public employees in 1972, black employees brought suit claiming that pay disparities attributable to the old dual pay scale persisted. Id., at 391. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, which it interpreted to be that the "'discriminatory difference in salaries should have been affirmatively eliminated.'" Id., at 395.

This Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, id., at 386–388, but all of the Members of the Court joined Justice Bren- '''[p. 634]' nan's separate opinion, see id.'', at 388 (opinion concurring in part). Justice Brennan wrote:

"'The error of the Court of Appeals with respect to salary disparities created prior to 1972 and perpetuated thereafter is too obvious to warrant extended discussion: that the Extension Service discriminated with respect to salaries prior to the time it was covered by Title VII does not excuse perpetuating that discrimination after the Extension Service became covered by Title VII. To hold otherwise would have the effect of exempting from liability those employers who were historically the greatest offenders of the rights of blacks. A pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a violation upon Title VII's effective date, and to the extent an employer continued to engage in that act or practice, it is liable under that statute. While recovery may not be permitted for pre-1972 acts of discrimination, to the extent that this discrimination was perpetuated after 1972, liability may be imposed.' Id., at 395 (emphasis in original)."

Far from adopting the approach that Ledbetter advances here, this passage made a point that was "too obvious to warrant extended discussion," ibid.; namely, that when an employer adopts a facially discriminatory pay structure that puts some employees on a lower scale because of race, the employer engages in intentional discrimination whenever it issues a check to one of these disfavored employees. An employer that adopts and intentionally retains such a pay structure can surely be regarded as intending to discriminate on the basis of race as long as the structure is used.

Bazemore thus is entirely consistent with our prior precedents, as Justice Brennan's opinion took care to point out. Noting that Evans turned on whether "'any present violation exist[ed],'" Justice Brennan stated that the Bazemore '''[p. 635]''' plaintiffs were alleging that the defendants "ha[d] not from the date of the Act forward made all their employment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way," 478 U.S., at 396–397, n. 6 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)—which is to say that they had engaged in fresh discrimination. Justice Brennan added that the Court's "holding in no sense g[ave] legal effect to the pre-1972 actions, but, consistent with Evans...focuse[d] on the present salary structure, which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the pre-1965 discriminatory pay structure." Id., at 397, n. 6 (emphasis added).

The sentence in Justice Brennan's opinion on which Ledbetter chiefly relies comes directly after the passage quoted above, and makes a similarly obvious point:

"'Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.' Id., at 395–396."

'''[p. 636]''' In other words, a freestanding violation may always be charged within its own charging period regardless of its connection to other violations. We repeated this same point more recently in Morgan: "The existence of past acts and the employee's prior knowledge of their occurrence...does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed." 536 U.S., at 113. Neither of these opinions stands for the proposition that an action not comprising an employment practice and alleged discriminatory intent is separately chargeable, just because it is related to some past act of discrimination.

Ledbetter attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistencies between her interpretation of Bazemore and the Evans/Ricks/Lorance/Morgan line of cases on the ground that none of the latter cases involved pay raises, but the logic of our prior cases is fully applicable to pay cases. To take Evans '''[p. 637]''' as an example, the employee there was unlawfully terminated; this caused her to lose seniority; and the loss of seniority affected her wages, among other things. 431 U.S., at 555, n. 5 ("[S]eniority determine[s] a flight attendant's wages; the duration and timing of vacations; rights to retention in the event of layoffs and rights to re-employment thereafter; and rights to preferential selection of flight assignments"). The relationship between past discrimination and adverse present effects was the same in Evans as it is here. Thus, the argument that Ledbetter urges us to accept here would necessarily have commanded a different outcome in Evans.

Bazemore stands for the proposition that an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure. But a new Title VII violation does not occur and a new charging period is not triggered when an employer issues paychecks pursuant to a system that is "facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied." Lorance, 490 U.S., at 911. The fact that precharging period discrimination adversely affects the calculation of a neutral factor (like seniority) that is used in determining future pay does not mean that each new paycheck constitutes a new violation and restarts the EEOC charging period.

Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay system in order to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later applied this system to her within the charging period with any discriminatory animus, Bazemore is of no help to her. Rather, all Ledbetter has alleged is that Goodyear's agents discriminated against her individually in the past and that this discrimination reduced the amount of later paychecks. Because Ledbetter did not file timely EEOC charges relating to her employer's discriminatory pay decisions in the past, she cannot maintain a suit based on that past discrimination at this time. '''[p. 638]'''

B
The dissent also argues that pay claims are different. Its principal argument is that a pay discrimination claim is like a hostile work environment claim because both types of claims are "'based on the cumulative effect of individual acts,'" post, at 648, but this analogy overlooks the critical conceptual distinction between these two types of claims. And although the dissent relies heavily on Morgan, the dissent's argument is fundamentally inconsistent with Morgan 's reasoning.

Morgan distinguished between “discrete” acts of discrimination and a hostile work environment. A discrete act of discrimination is an act that in itself "constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice'" and that is temporally distinct. 536 U.S., at 114, 117. As examples we identified "termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire." Id., at 114. A hostile work environment, on the other hand, typically comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which "may not be actionable on its own." In addition, a hostile work environment claim "cannot be said to occur on any particular day." Id., at 115–116. In other words, the actionable wrong is the environment, not the individual acts that, taken together, create the environment.

Contrary to the dissent's assertion, post, at 648–649, what Ledbetter alleged was not a single wrong consisting of a succession of acts. Instead, she alleged a series of discrete dis- '''[p. 639]' criminatory acts, see Brief for Petitioner 13, 15 (arguing that payment of each paycheck constituted a separate violation of Title VII), each of which was independently identifiable and actionable, and Morgan is perfectly clear that when an employee alleges "serial violations," i.e.'', a series of actionable wrongs, a timely EEOC charge must be filed with respect to each discrete alleged violation. 536 U.S., at 113.

While this fundamental misinterpretation of Morgan is alone sufficient to show that the dissent's approach must be rejected, it should also be noted that the dissent is coy as to whether it would apply the same rule to all pay discrimination claims or whether it would limit the rule to cases like Ledbetter's, in which multiple discriminatory pay decisions are alleged. The dissent relies on the fact that Ledbetter was allegedly subjected to a series of discriminatory pay decisions over a period of time, and the dissent suggests that she did not realize for some time that she had been victimized. But not all pay cases share these characteristics.

If, as seems likely, the dissent would apply the same rule in all pay cases, then, if a single discriminatory pay decision made 20 years ago continued to affect an employee's pay today, the dissent would presumably hold that the employee could file a timely EEOC charge today. And the dissent would presumably allow this even if the employee had full knowledge of all the circumstances relating to the 20-year-old decision at the time it was made. The dissent, it appears, proposes that we adopt a special rule for pay cases based on the particular characteristics of one case that is '''[p. 640]''' certainly not representative of all pay cases and may not even be typical. We refuse to take that approach.

IV
In addition to the arguments previously discussed, Ledbetter relies largely on analogies to other statutory regimes and on extrastatutory policy arguments to support her "paycheck accrual rule."

A
Ledbetter places significant weight on the EPA, which was enacted contemporaneously with Title VII and prohibits paying unequal wages for equal work because of sex. 29 U.S.C. §206(d). Stating that "the lower courts routinely hear [EPA] claims challenging pay disparities that first arose outside the limitations period," Ledbetter suggests that we should hold that Title VII is violated each time an employee receives a paycheck that reflects past discrimination. Brief for Petitioner 34–35.

The simple answer to this argument is that the EPA and Title VII are not the same. In particular, the EPA does not require the filing of a charge with the EEOC or proof of intentional discrimination. See §206(d)(1) (asking only whether the alleged inequality resulted from "any other factor other than sex"). Ledbetter originally asserted an EPA claim, but that claim was dismissed by the District Court and is not before us. If Ledbetter had pursued her EPA claim, she would not face the Title VII obstacles that she now confronts.

'''[p. 641]''' Ledbetter's appeal to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) is equally unavailing. Stating that it is "well established that the statute of limitations for violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the [FLSA] runs anew with each paycheck," Brief for Petitioner 35, Ledbetter urges that the same should be true in a Title VII pay case. Again, however, Ledbetter's argument overlooks the fact that an FLSA minimum wage or overtime claim does not require proof of a specific intent to discriminate. See 29 U.S.C. §207 (establishing overtime rules); cf. §255(a) (establishing 2-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims, except for claims of a "willful violation," which may be commenced within 3 years).

Ledbetter is on firmer ground in suggesting that we look to cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) since the NLRA provided a model for Title VII's remedial provisions and, like Title VII, requires the filing of a timely administrative charge (with the National Labor Relations Board) before suit may be maintained. Lorance, 490 U.S., at 909; Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226, n. 8 (1982). Cf. 29 U.S.C. §160(b) ("[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board").

Ledbetter argues that the NLRA's 6-month statute of limitations begins anew for each paycheck reflecting a prior violation of the statute, but our precedents suggest otherwise. In Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416–417 (1960), we '''[p. 642]''' held that "where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice[,] the use of the earlier unfair labor practice [merely] serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful." This interpretation corresponds closely to our analysis in Evans and Ricks and supports our holding in the present case.

B
Ledbetter, finally, makes a variety of policy arguments in favor of giving the alleged victims of pay discrimination more time before they are required to file a charge with the EEOC. Among other things, she claims that pay discrimination is harder to detect than other forms of employment discrimination.

We are not in a position to evaluate Ledbetter's policy arguments, and it is not our prerogative to change the way in which Title VII balances the interests of aggrieved employees against the interest in encouraging the "prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination," Mohasco, 447 U.S., at 825, and the interest in repose.

Ledbetter's policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay claims find no support in the statute and are inconsistent with our precedents. We apply the statute as written, '''[p. 643]''' and this means that any unlawful employment practice, including those involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the period prescribed by statute.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.


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Rh land not laid down on any chart. He cruised along the coast for some days and satisfied himself that it was not an island, and after anchoring in several bays without finding any seals, although the high cliffs and rocks were covered by multitudes of penguin, he steered away to the northward with light winds and fog.

One night the Hero lay becalmed in a dense fog, the cold, penetrating mist drenching her sails and dripping from the main boom along her narrow deck. At midnight Captain Palmer relieved his mate and took the deck for the middle watch. When the man at the helm struck one bell, the captain was somewhat startled to hear the sound repeated twice at short intervals, for he knew, or thought he knew, that the only living things within many leagues were whales, albatross, penguin, and the like, nor did he recall ever hearing that these harmless creatures carried bells with them. The men of the watch on deck were really alarmed, for in those days superstition had not by any means departed from the ocean. The crew had heard of the fierce Kraken of northern seas, and suddenly remembered all about the doomed and unforgiven Vanderdecken, to say nothing of mythical local celebrities, renowned in all the barrooms of coast towns between Cornfield Point and Siasconset Head, nor were their fears assuaged when at two bells the same thing happened again, and so on through the watch.

Captain Palmer, however, concluded that, strange as it seemed, he must be in company with other vessels, and so at four o’clock he left the mate in

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text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Nix of the Mill-Pond


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Mary Stuart had acted without her instigation, and promised to reward him with a pension (, iii. 354) ; but to Moray's widow, whom she threatened with her direst vengeance unless the royal jewels were delivered up, she affirmed that the murder had been done 'agains our will,' and would not have been done 'if we micht have stopped the same' (letters in Hist. MSS. Comm. 6th Rep. i. 636-8).

Meanwhile the Norfolk marriage scheme was still persisted in, and as a preliminary to a further conspiracy a papal bull was obtained dissolving the marriage to Bothwell, on the ground of the rape previously committed (Norris, 29 Nov., Cal. State Fapers, For. Ser. 1569-71, entry 1412). In May 1570 Mary was transferred to Chatsworth, and ' here, in September, Elizabeth, chiefly with a view to relieve her immediate difficulties with France and Spain, commenced negotiations which probably were never meant seriously, and were finally broken off in April. On 28 Nov. Mary was removed to : Shrewsbury's home at Sheffield. The Ridolfi conspiracy [see Baillie, Charles], with which the Norfolk marriage scheme was conjoined, terminated in the execution of Norfolk on Tower Hill, 2 June 1572. The houses of parliament memorialised Elizabeth that Mary should share his fate. To this, more from prudence than generosity, Elizabeth demurred, but on the receipt of the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew on 24 Aug. she endeavoured to entice the Scots into assuming the responsibility of disposing of her, the scheme being only frustrated by Morton's firmness in requiring that Elizabeth should at least commit herself to approval of the deed. From the time of the French massacre Mary was for five months guarded with special care, and kept in close confinement in her room ; but when the overthrow of her cause was assured, by the surrender of Edinburgh Castle, 29 May 1573, she was allowed as much liberty as was compatible with her detention.

Mary's remaining years were spent in scheming for her liberation. Her plans might have been more successful had they been more consistent. By her readiness to make terms either with Elizabeth or the catholics she only succeeded in effectually alienating both. In the midst of her efforts to conciliate the goodwill of Elizabeth by specimens of her needlework and other presents, and to secure the friendship of Leicester and Cecil, she was discovered in communication with the pope and Philip for a conquest of England, to be followed by her marriage to Don John of Austria, a preliminary being the capture of the young prince, her son, who was to be placed in Philip's keeping (, iv. 845). Should she die before her purposes were achieved, her rights in England or elsewhere were to pass to the catholic king unless her son should be brought back to the catholic fold (ib. pp. 354-5). The execution of Morton, 2 June 1581, through the intrigues of Esm6 Stuart, created Duke of Lennox, led to a revival of catholic hopes, and to a plot for an invasion under the Duke of Guise, which was suspended by the raid of Ruthven, 22 Aug. 1582, and the expulsion of Lennox from Scotland. On learning that her son was in the hands of the protestant nobles Mary wrote a passionate letter to Elizabeth protesting that she now looked for no other kingdom than that of heaven, and beseeching that she might be allowed to leave England and retire to some place of rest where she might prepare her soul for God (ib. v. 318-38) : but the worth of these professions was subsequently shown by the confessions of Throckmorton, revealing her superintendence of all the details of the resumed project for the invasion of England. In the autumn of 1583 Mary became aware of the scandalous assertion by the Countess of Shrewsbury of a criminal intrigue between her and Shrewsbury. As a consequence of them Mary was on 25 Aug. transferred from the care of Shrewsbury to that of Sir Ralph Sadler, and on 3 Sept. she was removed from Sheffield to Wingfield. Lady Shrewsbury was then in the Tower, and Shrewsbury, in an interview with Elizabeth after resigning his charge of Mary, sincerely thanked Elizabeth for having freed him from two devils, his wife and the Queen of Scots (Teflet, v. 345). In a letter to Mauvissiere, 18 Oct., Mary expressed her determination, unless the calumnies were withdrawn, to make known to all the princes of Christendom the stories which Lady Shrewsbury had told her about Elizabeth (, vi. 36-42), and in November penned to Elizabeth the extraordinary letter in which she recited with scarce concealed gusto every minutest item of Lady Shrewsbury's nauseous narrative (ib. pp. 51-7). It has been doubted whether Elizabeth received the letter, and it may have been intercepted by Cecil. Subsequently the council obtained from Lady Shrewsbury and her daughters a denial of the truth of the rumours of criminal intercourse between Shrewsbury and Mary. In the autumn of 1584 the Master of Gray [see, sixth ] also began his negotiations for a defensive league between England and Scotland, in connection with which James VI, at the instance of Gray, repudiated any desire to include his


text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Little Folks' Presents


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Mary Stuart mother in the treaty. Thereupon she expressed her resolve to grant his rights to the crown, which he had usurped, to his greatest enemy rather than that he should enjoy them (12 May 1585,, vi. 126). Among the papers subsequently seized at Chartley was a will by her bequeathing her crown to Philip II of Spain.

In the beginning of 1585 Mary was subjected to more rigorous treatment. She was again removed to the cold and unhealthy castle of Tutbury, her retinue was reduced, and in April she was placed under the harsh and morose guardianship of Sir Amyas Paulet [q. v.] In January 1585-6 she was transferred to the neighbouring house of Chartley. Shortly after, through the contrivance of Walsingham, facilities were afforded her for fatally entangling herself in the Babington conspiracy [see ; ; and ]. As soon as she had unconsciously supplied sufficient evidence against herself to incur capital punishment, she was arrested at Tixall Park, whither she had been allowed to go on pretence of a hunting party, and detained there till her papers at Chartley had been searched.

She was removed to the castle of Fotheringay on 25 Sept., and was there brought to trial on 14 and 15 Oct. The skill with which she parried the most dangerous points of the evidence against her, and her complete command of all the resources of advocacy, are alone sufficient testimony to her great personal gifts (see State Trials, i. 1162-1227). Since, however, she denied having any communication with Babington, a supposition which cannot be entertained, her denial of any knowledge of that part of the conspiracy touching Elizabeth's life was necessarily robbed of all value. Besides, it was her usual habit to approve the assassination of her prominent enemies, and on Elizabeth she had the wrongs of a lifetime to revenge. She knew also that Elizabeth had more than once meditated her death, and was only restrained from carrying out her purpose by considerations of prudence. She had therefore in Elizabeth's case the justification that she was acting in self-defence. In truth Elizabeth or her ministers had no reason to suppose, and scarcely any right to expect, that Mary would interfere to save Elizabeth from the worst that Elizabeth's enemies might contrive against her.

After much hesitation and uncertainty, and an attempt to induce the keepers to assume the responsibility of putting Mary to death, Elizabeth signed the warrant for the execution, and it took place in the great hall of Fotheringay on the morning of 8 Feb. 1586-7. Mary was only informed of the fate that was in store for her on the previous day, but she must from the time of her trial have contemplated such a possibility, and she expressed her joy that her miseries were so near an end, and that the grace had been granted her by God to 'die for the honour of his name and of his Church, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman.' By all her words and bearing it was her purpose to impress on the spectators of her last moments, and on the world to whom the story of her execution would be told, her royal andn sacred dignity, as the sole rightful queen, not only of Scotland but of England, and vicegerent, of the catholic church in Britain. But although she met her fate with unsurpassable courage, and acted her part with appropriate dignity and grace, her preparations lacked the essential virtue of simplicity. Elizabeth strenuously maintained that she never intended the execution to take place, and conferred on her victim the honour of a royal burial in Peterborough Cathedral on 1 Aug. The body was transferred by her son, on his accession to the English throne, to Henry VII's Chapel in Westminster Abbey, where he erected to her memory a monument with recumbent effigy (for description of the execution see especially 'Reporte of the Manner of the Execution of the Scots Queene' in, Original Letters, 2nd ser. iii. 113-18; 'Examvnacioun and Death of Mary the Queen of Skottes, Ao 1586, 8 Feb., by R. W.,' the original manuscript of which was exhibited at Peterborough in 1887, and was, it appears, written by R. Wynkfielde, not by Richard Wigmore, as previously supposed: ' Le Rapport de la Manière de l'Execution de la Royne d'Écosse,' by Thomas Andrewes, in , Lettres Inédites de Marie Stuart, pp. 246-7; 'La Mort de la Royne d'Écosse,' 1589, republished in , ii. 609-70; and the very minute 'Le vray rapport' in, iv. 153-64, on which the narrative of Mr. Froude is chiefly founded. The matter is also discussed in Notes and Queries, especially 7th ser. vols. iv. v.)

The religious issues involved in the fate of Mary Stuart are in themselves sufficient to assign her a place in the first rank of historic personages. In her were concentrated the last hopes of catholicism in Britain. Still the story of her life will probably attract the attention of the world when the ecclesiastical questions with which it was associated are forgotten. It is as a woman, rather than a queen or a religious champion, that she specially appeals to the interest of mankind. Her story is, in truth, one of the most moving of human tragedies.


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Mary Stuart actress though she occasionally proved herself to be, nature in all the great emergencies of her life asserted its supremacy. Her heart, in almost every variation of its moods, has been bared to the world; and if the views of both classes of extremists, blinded by religious or political prepossessions, be set aside, there is a pretty general consensus of opinion as to her main aims and characteristics. She cared comparatively little for the mere trappings of state, and her tastes were simple and natural, yet without question her ruling passion was the passion for sovereignty. It had been carefully nurtured in her from childhood, and it was specially whetted by her loss of the French crown, by her rivalry with Elizabeth, and by the contumacy of the Scots. It was all the stronger that it was unassociated with any kind of patriotism. It was undoubtedly stronger than her devotion to catholicism. When the Cardinal of Lorraine and the pope himself sought to limit her ambitions, she declined to be influenced by their entreaties. She also sacrificed her catholicism, not merely by implication but openly, to her passion for Bothwell. The Darnley and Bothwell episodes, though important from their bearing on certain aspects of her character, were rather the occasions than the causes of her misfortunes. Her position in Scotland was really all along so perilous, and, notwithstanding her skilful manoeuvring and subtle tact, she was at once so daring in ambition and so fickle and impulsive, so liable to be blinded by her passionate desires and to be dominated by personal likes and hates, that disaster was sooner or later inevitable.

The only extant specimens of Mary's poetry, in addition to the reputed sonnets to Bothwell, are the verses on the death of her husband Francis II, printed by Brantôme in his 'Memoirs,' reprinted in Laing, ii. 217-219; a sonnet to Elizabeth in Italian and French (Cotton Lib. Calig. D. i. fol. 316), printed in Laing, ii. 220-1; 'Meditation fait par la Reyne d'Escosse Dovarière de France, recuellie d'un Livre des Consolations Divines, composez par l'evesque de Ross,' published in a rare volume — 'Lettres et Traitez Chrestiens,' by David Home at Bergerac in 1613, republished in 'Bannatyne Miscellany,' i. 343-7; and a sonnet written at Fotheringay, in the State Paper Office. Bishop Montague, in his Preface to the 'Works' of King James, 1616, states that 'she wrote a book of verses in French of the "Institution of a Prince," all with her owne hand, and wrought the cover of it with her needle,' and that the volume was then in the possession of the king. In the catalogue of books presented by Drummond of Hawthornden to the university of Edinburgh there appears under the name of Mary 'Tetrasticha ou Quatrains a son fils M. S.' Some verses written by her on her 'Book of Hours' are printed in Labanoff, vii. 346-52. The lines beginning 'Adieu plaisant pays de France,' at one time attributed to her, were written by Meusnier de Querlon, who published them as hers in 1765.

A large number of the reputed portraits of the queen of Scots are fictitious; and various portraits of other royal Marys have been catalogued as portraits of her. For special information reference may be made to the paper by Mr. George Scharf in 'Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries,' 2nd ser. vii. 58-86; Labanoff's 'Notice sur la Collection des Portraits de Marie Stuart,' pp. 246-7; and the Preface to Chalmers's 'Life of Mary Queen of Scots.' The catalogues of the Peterborough Exhibition, 1887, and of the Stuart Exhibition, 1889, may also be consulted for a list of portraits and relics. Mr. Scharf specially mentions as genuine and characteristic a miniature by Janet with Francis II in the royal library at Windsor; a portrait by Janet in a widow's dress ('Le Deuil Blanc'), formerly at Hampton Court and now at Windsor; a portrait painted at Sheffield in 1578 by D. Mytens at Hardwick Hall (the original of the Morton portrait and others); and the memorial pictures, with the execution in the background, at Windsor, Cobham Hall, and Blairs College. [In addition to the various documents and letters in the State Paper Office, which have been nearly all calendared, there are in the British Museum a large number of manuscripts connected with the Marian period of Scottish history, which, although in part utilised by different historians from Robertson downwards, and partly published by them, and in different collections, have never been systematically sifted and examined. The volumes in which selections from them have been published include: Anderson's Collections, 4 vols. 1727-8; the appendices to the histories of Keith, Robertson, Laing, and Tytler; Ellis's Original Letters; Illustrations of the Reign of Mary (Maitland Club); Wright's Queen Elizabeth and her Times; Hardwicke State Pacers, &c. The important manuscripts at Hatfield have either been published in the Collections of Haynes, 1740, or Murdin, 1759. or summarised in the Calendar of the Hatfield MSS., published by Hist. MSS, Comm. The various Reports of the Hist. MSS. Comm. may also be referred to. The manuscripts in the various foreign archives have nearly all been published or calendared, with the exception of those in the Vatican. Specially important are Teulet's Relations politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse


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he made his awful discovery, Larry dropped the hose pipe and fell back a few steps. To get out of danger is, instinctively, the first thought of every one, and in a vague way it flashed over his mind that he must flee or be annihilated.

Then another thought came, swift on the track of the first. If the gun was discharged with the breech unlocked, all his companions, and perhaps many others, would be killed, while there was no telling how much the Olympia would suffer.

All this passed through his mind with the rapidity of a lightning flash. As he thought, he tried to yell to Barrow, but the words would not come. His very jaws were set in horror, while his eyes bulged from their sockets. His hands went up, and he shook them appealingly at the head gunner.

But Barrow was looking another way, as was natural when the piece was to be discharged. Larry

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text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Giant and the Tailor


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Rh felt it was all over. In that moment he virtually suffered the pang of being killed.

But now came a chance to stop the impending catastrophe. Prompted by curiosity, Barrow turned, to take another squint at the enemy before letting drive. But his hand still retained its hold on the connection used for firing purposes.

"Oh, God, help me!" was the thought which forced its way to Larry's lips, and he made one wild, agonizing leap to the head gunner's side. "Don't fire! don't fire!"

"What's that?" asked Barrow, coolly, as he turned. Then as he caught sight of the boy's set face and staring eyes, he added, "Why, lad, what ails you? Got a fit?"

"Don't fire! don't fire! " repeated Larry, and with rigid finger pointed to the unlocked breech.

It was now Barrow's turn to be struck dumb. He still held the connection, and threatened in his consternation to set off the gun anyway. But suddenly he realized the situation more fully, and dropped the connection as though it were a coal of fire.

"Where is Castleton?" he thundered. "Does he want to blow us all to kingdom come?"

For answer, Larry pointed to the prostrate man.

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text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Nail


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264 "He's knocked out by the heat," he answered, in a voice that did not sound in the least like his own.

"Humph! he ought to have given us some warning!" grumbled Barrow, doing what he could to steady his own tones. "Why, if the gun had gone off standing like that, the whole gun-room would have been knocked out of sight, to say nothing of the rest of the ship."

He began to lock up the breech, and Larry turned again to poor Castleton. The fellow soon regained his consciousness, but could not continue his work, and was sent to the hospital quarters, while an extra man from another gun came to take his place.

"I must give you credit for what you did, Larry," said Barrow, when the excitement was over. "Many a boy, and man, too, for that matter, would have thought of nothing but getting away. You saved us all, and I, for one, sha'n't forget it," and he cracked the youth good-naturedly upon the shoulder.

Striker now came back, but the work was getting so vigorous that he was not told of the incident until some time after. From the bridge, the commodore had discovered a torpedo boat sneaking out from below the fort, with the evident intention of making a circuit and coming up back of the American ships.

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Rh Captain Gridley was ordered to train the guns of the Olympia upon this craft, and the gunners went at it with a will, each vying with the others in making the best shot. The gun our friends were at hit the torpedo boat on the stern, disabling her steering gear, and two other shots sent her scurrying for land. When close to shore a final shot fairly lifted her out of the water and cast her on the sands, a total wreck.

By the time the Olympia was coming along on her third course before the line of the enemy, it was found that the new flagship, the Reina Cristina, was again in flames, while the other ships were suffering more or less in the same way. The new flagship fought desperately, and two shots whizzed through the Olympia's upper rigging again, while a third fairly clipped the American flagship's stern. But the Reina Cristina could not hold out, and retired in a thick cloud of smoke, burning fiercely.

In the mean time, however, the Don Antonio de Ulloa came to the front with a heavy fire, directed principally at the Olympia and the Baltimore. Her captain, E. Robino, was known to be one of the greatest fighters in the Spanish navy, and he kept his guns at it so long as it was possible for him to do so.

"He is hot as pepper," said Striker, as they drew

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106.] got up and clambered out of the cave, went into the forest, and thought, "Here I am quite alone and deserted, how shall I obtain a horse now?" Whilst he was thus walking full of thought, he met a small tabby-cat which said quite kindly, "Hans, where are you going?" "Alas, thou canst not help me." "I well know your desire," said the cat. "You wish to have a beautiful horse. Come with me, and be my faithful servant for seven years long, and then I will give you one more beautiful than any you have ever seen in your whole life." "Well, this is a wonderful cat!" thought Hans, "but I am determined to see if she is telling the truth." So she took him with her into her enchanted castle, where there were nothing but cats who were her servants. They leapt nimbly upstairs and downstairs, and were merry and happy. In the evening when they sat down to dinner, three of them had to make music. One played the bassoon, the other the fiddle, and the third put the trumpet to his lips, and blew out his cheeks as much as he possibly could. When they had dined, the table was carried away, and the cat said, "Now, Hans, come and dance with me." "No," said he, "I won't dance with a pussy cat. I have never done that yet." "Then take him to bed," said she to the cats. So one of them lighted him to his bed-room, one pulled his shoes off, one his stockings, and at last one of them blew out the candle. Next morning they returned and helped him out of bed, one put his stockings on for him, one tied his garters, one brought his shoes, one washed him, and one dried his face with her tail. "That feels very soft!" said Hans. He, however, had to serve the cat, and chop some wood every day, and to do that he had an axe of silver, and the wedge and saw were of silver and the mallet of copper. So he chopped the wood small; stayed there in the house and had good meat and drink, but never saw any one but the tabby-cat and her servants. Once she said to him, "Go and mow my meadow, and dry the grass," and gave him a scythe of silver, and a whetstone of gold, but bade him deliver them up again carefully. So Hans went thither, and did what he was bidden, and when he had finished the


text: Grimm's Household Tales, Volume 2/The Poor Boy in the Grave


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266 closer to the Ulloa. "But we'll down him, see if we don't." And Striker was right, for it was not long after this that the Ulloa went down, many of her men with her, but with her colors nailed to her mast. It was now seen that nearly all the other ships were burning. A few more shots from the Olympia were delivered, and the flagship drew off, signalling the others to follow. To go close in shore after the enemy was an impossibility for the large members of the squadron, the water being too shallow.

The terrific heat of the day, and the forced fighting, had almost exhausted every man on the ships, and seeing the fight was his own. Commodore Dewey wisely decided to give his men a breathing spell and something to eat. Accordingly, as soon as they were out of range, orders came to quit the guns and get breakfast. The battle had now raged for about three hours.

"We've got 'em on the run!" shouted Striker, enthusiastically. "I hope the commodore sends us back to finish 'em up."

"He'll do that all right enough," replied a brawny marine standing by. "You never saw Commodore Dewey doing things by halves."

"Three cheers for our commodore!" suddenly

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