text:
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia

Preamble
WE, THE PEOPLE OF MICRONESIA, exercising our inherent sovereignty, do hereby establish this Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.

With this Constitution, we affirm our common wish to live together in peace and harmony, to preserve the heritage of the past, and to protect the promise of the future.

To make one nation of many islands, we respect the diversity of our cultures. Our differences enrich us. The seas bring us together, they do not separate us. Our islands sustain us, our island nation enlarges us and makes us stronger.

Our ancestors, who made their homes on these islands, displaced no other people. We, who remain, wish no other home than this. Having known war, we hope for peace. Having been divided, we wish unity. Having been ruled, we seek freedom.

Micronesia began in the days when man explored seas in rafts and canoes. The Micronesian nation is born in an age when men voyage among stars; our world itself is an island. We extend to all nations what we seek from each: peace, friendship, cooperation, and love in our common humanity. With this Constitution we, who have been the wards of other nations, become the proud guardian of our own islands, now and forever.

Section 1.
The FSM comprises the Districts of the Micronesian archipelago that ratified the Constitution. The inter-islandic waters are internal waters regardless of dimensions, and jurisdiction extends to a marine space of 200 miles measured outward from appropriate baselines, the seabed,subsoil water column, insular or continental shelves, airspace over land and water, and any other territory or waters belonging to Micronesia by historic right, custom or legal title.

Section 2.
Each federated state comprises the islands of each District as defined by the laws in effect right before the date the constitution obtains the Force of Law. A marine boundary between adjacent states is determined by law, applying the principle of equidistance. State boundaries may be changed by Congress with the consent of the state legislatures involved.

Section 3.
Territory may be added to the FSM upon approval of Congress, and by vote of the inhabitants of the area, if any, and by vote of the citizenry of the FSM. If the territory is to become part of an existing state, approval of the state legislature is required.

Section 4.
New States may be formed and admitted into the FSM by law. The new state is subject to the same rights, duties, and obligations outlined by the Constitution.

Section 1.
The Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the FSM People and is the supreme law of the FSM. An act of the FSM Government in conflict with the Constitution is invalid by law to the extent of the conflict.

Section 1.
A person who is a citizen of the Trust Territory immediately prior to the effective date of this Constitution and a domiciliary of a District ratifying this Constitution is a citizen and national of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Section 2.
A person born of parents one or both of whom are citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia is a citizen and national of the Federated States by birth.

Section 3.
A citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia who is recognized as a citizen of another nation shall, within 3 years of his 18th birthday, or within 3 years of the effective date of this Constitution, whichever is later, register his intent to remain a citizen of the Federated States and renounce his citizenship of another nation. If he fails to comply with this Section, he becomes a national of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Section 4.
A citizen of the Trust Territory who becomes a national of the United States of America under the terms of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands may become a citizen and national of the Federated States of Micronesia by applying to a court of competent jurisdiction in the Federated States within 6 months of the date he became a United States national.

Section 5.
A domiciliary of a District not ratifying this Constitution who was a citizen of the Trust Territory immediately prior to the effective date of this Constitution, may become a citizen and national of the Federated States of Micronesia by applying to a court of competent jurisdiction in the Federated States within 6 months after the effective date of this Constitution or within 6 months after his 18th birthday, whichever is later.

Section 6.
This Article may be applied retroactively.

Section 1.
No law may deny or impair freedom of expression, peaceable assembly, association, or petition.

Section 2.
No law may be passed respecting an establishment of religion or impairing the free exercise of religion, except that assistance may be provided to parochial schools for non-religious purposes.

Section 3.
A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 4.
Equal protection of the laws may not be denied or impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language, or social status.

Section 5.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 6.
The defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy public trial, to be informed of the nature of the accusation, to have counsel for his defense, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to compel attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Section 7.
A person may not be compelled to give evidence that may be used against him in a criminal case, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Section 8.
Excessive bail may not be required, excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended unless required for public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion.

Section 9.
Capital punishment is prohibited.

Section 10.
Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited except to punish crime.

Section 11.
A bill of attainder or ex post facto law may not be passed.

Section 12.
A citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia may travel and migrate within the Federated States.

Section 13.
Imprisonment for debt is prohibited.

Section 1.
Nothing in this Constitution takes away a role or function of a traditional leader as recognized by custom and tradition, or prevents a traditional leader from being recognized, honored, and given formal or functional roles at any level of government as may be prescribed by this Constitution or by statute.

Section 2.
The traditions of the people of the Federated States of Micronesia may be protected by statute. If challenged as violative of Article IV, protection of Micronesian tradition shall be considered a compelling social purpose warranting such governmental action.

Section 3.
The Congress may establish, when needed, a Chamber of Chiefs consisting of traditional leaders from each state having such leaders, and of elected representatives from states having no traditional leaders. The constitution of a state having traditional leaders may provide for an active, functional role for them.

Section 1.
A citizen 18 years of age may vote in national elections. The Congress shall prescribe a minimum period of local residence and provide for voter registration, disqualification for conviction of crime, and disqualification for mental incompetence or insanity. Voting shall be secret.

Section 1.
The three levels of government in the Federated States of Micronesia are national, state, and local. A state is not required to establish a new local government where none exists on the effective date of this Constitution.

Section 2.
A state shall have a democratic constitution.

Section 1.
A power expressly delegated to the national government, or a power of such an indisputably national character as to be beyond the power of a state to control, is a national power.

Section 2.
A power not expressly delegated to the national government or prohibited to the states is a state power.

Section 3.
State and local governments are prohibited from imposing taxes which restrict interstate commerce.

Section 1.
The legislative power of the national government is vested in the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Section 2.
The following powers are expressly delegated to Congress:

(a) to provide for the national defense;

(b) to ratify treaties;

(c) to regulate immigration, emigration, naturalization, and citizenship;

(d) to impose taxes, duties, and tariffs based on imports;

(e) to impose taxes on income;

(f) to issue and regulate currency;

(g) to regulate banking, foreign and interstate commerce, insurance, the issuance and use of commercial paper and securities, bankruptcy and insolvency, and patents and copyrights; (h) to regulate navigation and shipping except within lagoons, lakes, and rivers; (i) to establish usury limits on major loans; (j) to provide for a national postal system; (k) to acquire and govern new territory; (l) to govern the area set aside as the national capital; (m) to regulate the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of natural resources within the marine space of the Federated States of Micronesia beyond 12 miles from island baselines; (n) to establish and regulate a national public service system; (o) to impeach and remove the President, Vice-President, and justices of the Supreme Court; (p) to define national crimes and prescribe penalties, having due regard for local custom and tradition; (q) to override a Presidential veto by not less than a 3/4 vote of all the state delegations, each delegation casting one vote; and (r) to promote education and health by setting minimum standards, coordinating state activities relating to foreign assistance, providing training and assistance to the states and providing support for post-secondary educational programs and projects.

Section 3.
The following powers may be exercised concurrently by Congress and the states: (a) to appropriate public funds; (b) to borrow money on the public credit; and (c) to establish systems of social security and public welfare.

Section 4.
A treaty is ratified by vote of 2/3 of the members of Congress, except that a treaty delegating major powers of government of the Federated States of Micronesia to another government shall also require majority approval by the legislatures of 2/3 of the states.

Section 5.
National taxes shall be imposed uniformly. Not less than 50% of the revenues shall be paid into the treasury of the state where collected.

Section 6.
Net revenue derived from ocean floor mineral resources exploited under §2(m) shall be divided equally between the national government and the appropriate state government.

Section 7.
The President, Vice-President, or a justice of the Supreme Court may be removed from office for treason, bribery, or conduct involving corruption in office by a 2/3 vote of the members of Congress. When the President or Vice-President is removed, the Supreme Court shall review the decision. When a justice of the Supreme Court is removed, the decision shall be reviewed by a special tribunal composed of one state court judge from each state appointed by the state chief executive. The special tribunal shall meet at the call of the President.

Section 8.
The Congress consists of one member elected at large from each state on the basis of state equality, and additional members elected from congressional districts in each state apportioned by population. Members elected on the basis of state equality serve for a 4-year term, and all other members for 2 years. Each member has one vote, except on the final reading of bills. Congressional elections are held biennially as provided by statute.

Section 9.
A person is ineligible to be a member of Congress unless he is at least 30 years of age on the day of election and has been a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years, and a resident of the state from which he is elected for at least 5 years. A person convicted of a felony by a state or national government court is ineligible to be a member of Congress. The Congress may modify this provision or prescribe additional qualifications; knowledge of the English language may not be a qualification.

Section 10.
At least every 10 years Congress shall reapportion itself. A state is entitled to at least one member of Congress on the basis of population in addition to the member elected at large. A state shall apportion itself by law into single member congressional districts. Each district shall be approximately equal in population after giving due regard to language, cultural, and geographic differences.

Section 11.
A state may provide that one of its seats is set aside for a traditional leader who shall be chosen as provided by statute for a two-year term, in lieu of one representative elected on the basis of population. The number of congressional districts shall be reduced and reapportioned accordingly.

Section 12.
A vacancy in Congress is filled for the unexpired term. In the absence of provision by law, an unexpired term is filled by special election, except that an unexpired term of less than one year is filled by appointment by the state chief executive.

Section 13.
A member of Congress may not hold another public office or employment. During the term for which he is elected and three years thereafter, a member may not be elected or appointed to a public office or employment created by national statute during his term. A member may not engage in any activity which conflicts with the proper discharge of his duties. The Congress may prescribe further restrictions.

Section 14.
The Congress may prescribe an annual salary and allowances for members. An increase of salary may not apply to the Congress enacting it.

Section 15.
A member of Congress is privileged from arrest during his attendance at Congress and while going to and from sessions, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. A member answers only to Congress for his statements in Congress.

Section 16.
The Congress shall meet in regular, public session as prescribed by statute. A special session may be convened at the call of the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, or by the presiding officer on the written request of 2/3 of the members.

Section 17.
(a) The Congress shall be the sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its members, may discipline a member, and, by 2/3 vote, may suspend or expel a member. (b) The Congress may determine its own rules of procedure and choose a presiding officer from among its members. (c) The Congress may compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documents or other matters before Congress or any of its committees.

Section 18.
A majority of the members is a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and compel the attendance of absent members.

Section 19.
The Congress shall keep and publish a journal of its proceedings. A roll call vote entered on the journal shall be taken at the request of 1/5 of the members present. Legislative proceedings shall be conducted in the English language. A member may use his own language if not fluent in English, and Congress shall provide translation.

Section 20.
To become law, a bill must pass 2 readings on separate days. To pass first reading a 2/3 vote of all members is required. On final reading each state delegation shall cast one vote and a 2/3 vote of all the delegations is required. All votes shall be entered on the journal.

Section 21.
(a) The Congress may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill. The enacting clause of a bill is "BE IT ENACTED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA:" A bill may embrace but one subject expressed in its title. A provision outside the subject expressed in the title is void. (b) A law may not be amended or revised by reference to its title only. The law as revised or section as amended shall be published and re-enacted at full length.

Section 22.
A bill passed by Congress shall be presented to the President for approval. If he disapproves of the bill, he shall return it with his objections to Congress within 10 days. If Congress has 10 or less days remaining in its session, or has adjourned, he shall return the bill within 30 days after presentation. If the President does not return a bill within the appropriate period, it becomes law as if approved.

Section 1.
The executive power of the national government is vested in the President of the Federated States of Micronesia. He is elected by Congress for a term of four years by a majority vote of all the members. He may not serve for more than 2 consecutive terms.

Section 2.
The following powers are expressly delegated to the President:

(a) to faithfully execute and implement the provisions of this Constitution and all national laws; (b) to receive all ambassadors and to conduct foreign affairs and the national defense in accordance with national law; (c) to grant pardons and reprieves, except that the chief executive of each state shall have this power concurrently with respect to persons convicted under state law; and (d) with the advice and consent of Congress, to appoint ambassadors; all judges of the Supreme Court and other courts prescribed by statute; the principal officers of executive departments in the national government; and such other officers as may be provided for by statute. Ambassadors and principal officers serve at the pleasure of the President.

Section 3.
The President: (a) is head of state of the Federated States of Micronesia; (b) may make recommendations to Congress, and shall make an annual report to Congress on the state of the nation; and (c) shall perform such duties as may be provided by statute.

Section 4.
A person is ineligible to become President unless he is a member of Congress for a 4-year term, a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia by birth, and a resident of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years.

Section 5.
After the election of the President, the Vice-President is elected in the same manner as the President, has the same qualifications, and serves for the same term of office. He may not be a resident of the same state. After the election of the President and the Vice-President, vacancies in Congress shall be declared.

Section 6.
If the office of the President is vacant, or the President is unable to perform his duties, the Vice-President becomes President. The Congress shall provide by statute for the succession in the event both offices are vacant, or either or both officers are unable to discharge their duties.

Section 7.
The compensation of the President or Vice-President may not be increased or reduced during his term. They may hold no other office and may receive no other compensation from the Federated States of Micronesia or from a state.

Section 8.
Executive departments shall be established by statute.

Section 9.
(a) If required to preserve public peace, health, or safety, at a time of extreme emergency caused by civil disturbance, natural disaster, or immediate threat of war, or insurrection, the President may declare a state of emergency and issue appropriate decrees. (b) A civil right may be impaired only to the extent actually required for the preservation of peace, health, or safety. A declaration of emergency may not impair the power of the judiciary except that the declaration shall be free from judicial interference for 30 days after it is first issued. (c) Within 30 days after the declaration of emergency, the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia shall convene at the call of its presiding officer or the President to consider revocation, amendment, or extension of the declaration. Unless it expires by its own terms, is revoked, or extended, a declaration of emergency is effective for 30 days.

Section 1.
The judicial power of the national government is vested in a Supreme Court and inferior courts established by statute.

Section 2.
The Supreme Court is a court of record and the highest court in the nation. It consists of the Chief Justice and not more than 5 associate justices. Each justice is a member of both the trial division and the appellate division, except that sessions of the trial division may be held by one justice. No justice may sit with the appellate division in a case heard by him in the trial division. At least 3 justices shall hear and decide appeals. Decision is by a majority of those sitting.

Section 3.
The Chief Justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the approval of 2/3 of Congress. Justices serve during good behavior.

Section 4.
If the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties he shall appoint an associate justice to act in his stead. If the office is vacant, or the Chief Justice fails to make the appointment, the President shall appoint an associate justice to act as Chief Justice until the vacancy is filled or the Chief Justice resumes his duties.

Section 5.
The qualifications and compensation of justices and other judges may be prescribed by statute. Compensation of judges may not be diminished during their terms of office unless all salaries prescribed by statute are reduced by a uniform percentage.

Section 6.
(a) The trial division of the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases affecting officials of foreign governments, disputes between states, admiralty or maritime cases, and in cases in which the national government is a party except where an interest in land is at issue. (b) The national courts, including the trial division of the Supreme Court, have concurrent original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or treaties; and in disputes between a state and a citizen of another state, between citizens of different states, and between a state or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, citizen, or subject. (c) When jurisdiction is concurrent, the proper court may be prescribed by statute.

Section 7.
The appellate division of the Supreme Court may review cases heard in the national courts, and cases heard in state or local courts if they require interpretation of this Constitution, national law, or a treaty. If a state constitution permits, the appellate division of the Supreme Court may review other cases on appeal from the highest state court in which a decision may be had.

Section 8.
When a case in a state or local court involves a substantial question requiring the interpretation of the Constitution, national law, or a treaty, on application of a party or on its own motion the court shall certify the question to the appellate division of the Supreme Court. The appellate division of the Supreme Court may decide the case or remand it for further proceedings.

Section 9.
The Chief Justice is the chief administrator of the national judicial system and may appoint an administrative officer who is exempt from civil service. The Chief Justice shall make and publish and may amend rules governing national courts, and by rule may: (a) divide the inferior national courts and the trial division of the Supreme Court into geographical or functional divisions;

(b) assign judges among the divisions of a court and give special assignments to retired Supreme Court justices and judges of state and other courts;

(c) establish rules of procedure and evidence; (d) govern the transfer of cases between state and national courts; (e) govern the admission to practice and discipline of attorneys and the retirement of judges; and (f) otherwise provide for the administration of the national judiciary. Judicial rules may be amended by statute.

Section 10.
The Congress shall contribute to the financial support of state judicial systems and may provide other assistance.

Section 11.
Court decisions shall be consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social and geographical configuration of Micronesia. In rendering a decision, a court shall consult and apply sources of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Section 1.
(a) Public money raised or received by the national government shall be deposited in a General Fund or special funds within the National Treasury. Money may not be withdrawn from the General Fund or special funds except by law.

(b) Foreign financial assistance received by the national government shall be deposited in a Foreign Assistance Fund. Except where a particular distribution is required by the terms or special nature of the assistance, each state shall receive a share equal to the share of the national government and to the share of every other state.

Section 2.
(a) The President shall submit an annual budget to Congress at a time prescribed by statute. The budget shall contain a complete plan of proposed expenditures, anticipated revenues, and other money available to the national government for the next fiscal year, together with additional information that Congress may require. The Congress may alter the budget in any respect.

(b) No appropriation bills, except those recommended by the President for immediate passage, or to cover the operating expenses of Congress, may be passed on final reading until the bill appropriating money for the budget has been enacted.

(c) The President may item veto an appropriation in any bill passed by Congress, and the procedure in such case shall be the same as for disapproval of an entire bill by the President.

Section 3.
(a) The Public Auditor is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of Congress. He serves for a term of 4 years and until a successor is confirmed.

(b) The Public Auditor shall inspect and audit accounts in every branch, department, agency or statutory authority of the national government and in other public legal entities or nonprofit organizations receiving public funds from the national government. Additional duties may be prescribed by statute.

(c) The Public Auditor shall be independent of administrative control except that he shall report at least once a year to Congress. His salary may not be reduced during his term of office.

(d) The Congress may remove the Public Auditor from office for cause by 2/3 vote. In that event the Chief Justice shall appoint an acting Public Auditor until a successor is confirmed.

Section 1.
The national government of the Federated States of Micronesia recognizes the right of the people to education, health care, and legal services and shall take every step reasonable and necessary to provide these services.

Section 2.
Radioactive, toxic chemical, or other harmful substances may not be tested, stored, used, or disposed of within the jurisdiction of the Federated States of Micronesia without the express approval of the national government of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Section 3.
It is the solemn obligation of the national and state governments to uphold the provisions of this Constitution and to advance the principles of unity upon which this Constitution is founded.

Section 4.
A noncitizen, or a corporation not wholly owned by citizens, may not acquire title to land or waters in Micronesia.

Section 5.
A lease agreement for the use of land for an indefinite term by a noncitizen, a corporation not wholly owned by citizens, or any government is prohibited.

Section 6.
The national government of the Federated States of Micronesia shall seek renegotiation of any agreement for the use of land to which the Government of the United States of America is a party.

Section 7.
On assuming office, all public officials shall take an oath to uphold, promote, and support the laws and the Constitution as prescribed by statute.

Section 1.
An amendment to this Constitution may be proposed by a constitutional convention, popular initiative, or Congress in a manner provided by law. A proposed amendment shall become a part of the Constitution when approved by 3/4 of the votes cast on that amendment in each of 3/4 of the states. If conflicting constitutional amendments submitted to the voters at the same election are approved, the amendment receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall prevail to the extent of such conflict.

Section 2.
At least every 10 years, Congress shall submit to the voters the question: "Shall there be a convention to revise or amend the Constitution?". If a majority of ballots cast upon the question is in the affirmative, delegates to the convention shall be chosen no later than the next regular election, unless Congress provides for the selection of delegates earlier at a special election.

Section 1.
A statute of the Trust Territory continues in effect except to the extent it is inconsistent with this Constitution, or is amended or repealed. A writ, action, suit, proceeding, civil or criminal liability, prosecution, judgment, sentence, order, decree, appeal, cause of action, defense, contract, claim, demand, title, or right continues unaffected except as modified in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

Section 2.
A right, obligation, liability, or contract of the Government of the Trust Territory is assumed by the Federated States of Micronesia except to the extent it directly affects or benefits a government of a District not ratifying this Constitution.

Section 3.
An interest in property held by the Government of the Trust Territory is transferred to the Federated States of Micronesia for retention or distribution in accordance with this Constitution.

Section 4.
A local government and its agencies may continue to exist even though its charter or powers are inconsistent with this Constitution. To promote an orderly transition to the provisions of this Constitution, and until state governments are established, Congress shall provide for the resolution of inconsistencies between local government charters and powers, and this Constitution. This provision ceases to be effective 5 years after the effective date of this Constitution.

Section 5.
The Congress may provide for a smooth and orderly transition to government under this Constitution.

Section 6.
In the first congressional election, congressional districts are apportioned among the states as follows: Kusaie - 1; Marianas - 2; Marshalls - 4; Palau - 2; Ponape - 3; Truk - 5; Yap - 1. If Kusaie is not a state at the time of the first election, 4 members shall be elected on the basis of population in Ponape.

Section 1.
This Constitution takes effect 1 year after ratification unless the Congress of Micronesia by joint resolution specifies an earlier date. If a provision of this Constitution is held to be in fundamental conflict with the United Nations Charter or the Trusteeship Agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations, the provision does not become effective until the date of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.


text:
Translation:Catullus 48

Poésies de Catulle/48 Le poesie di Catullo/48 Carmina (Catullus)/48

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Translation:Catullus 48


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colvile, George


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colvile, James William


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colvill, Alexander


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, Alexander (1530?-1597)


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, Alexander (1620-1676)


text:
Page:Our Philadelphia (Pennell, 1914).djvu/159

Rh III

Youth is brave out of sheer ignorance. When the moment came, it never occurred to me to hesitate or to consider the manner of my introduction to the world. I was content that my Brother should be my sole chaperon. I rather liked myself in my home-made white tarlatan, feeling very much dressed in my first low neck. I entertained no misgivings as to the fate awaiting me, imagining it as inevitable for a girl who was "out" to dance and have a good time as for a bird to fly once its wings were spread. If there were men to dance with, what more was needed?—it never having entered into my silly head that it was the girl's sad fate to have to wait for the man to ask her, and that sometimes the brute didn't.

I had to go no further than the dressing-room at the Natatorium, where the Dancing Class then met, to learn that society was not so simple as I thought. I have since been to many strange lands among many strange people, but never have I felt so much of a stranger as when I, a Philadelphian born, doing conscientiously what Philadelphia expected of me, was suddenly dropped down into the midst of a lot of Philadelphia girls engaged in the same duty. There was a freemasonry among them I could not help feeling right away—the freemasonry that went deeper than the chance of birth and the companionship of duty—the freemasonry that came from their all having grown up together since their perambulator days in


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, Charles


text:
Page:Elementary Chinese - San Tzu Ching (1900).djvu/41

Rh was used until the introduction of 字 tzŭ (see ), and literature, and by extension civilian (see ). [Eitel and Père Zottoli have both missed the point of these two lines. For the latter Eitel has "and understand the several appellatives" whatever that may mean. P. Zottoli has "scias aliquot notiones," the scias following an ut erroneously inserted as a conjunction between lines and .]

I stands for Unity, the cosmogonical abstraction which was ultimately subdivided into two forces, the resultant being the visible material universe. It is the number of heaven; see and.

Erh originally meant whiskers. It is now used as a conjunction, sometimes disjunctive, and also as the pronoun you.

Shih is composed of one line pointing east and west and another pointing north and south; it therefore represents the hub of the universe, also numerical completeness, the Chinese system being decimal.

Shih see.

Erh see.

Pai (or pŏ) was composed, according to the Shuo Wên, of a contraction of 自 tzŭ nose as radical, and 一 i unity. In K'ang Hsi's dictionary, however, it is regarded as composed of 一 i one and 白 pai or pŏ white as radical, though i would be an intelligible radical and pai would be a perfect phonetic. The functions of radical and phonetic are often thus arbitrarily interchanged. Pai is much used by synecdoche for all, every; e.g. 百


text:
Page:Elementary Chinese - San Tzu Ching (1900).djvu/67

 word he had already used for 倫 lun in. [The difficulty is to make out the ten. Wang Hsiang in his commentary enumerates them as follows:—2 in line, 2 in , 1 in , 1 in , 2 in , , 1 in , 1 in , which taken in groups of two are known as the 五倫 wu lun five moral relationships of man. That is to say, he blends lines, , and extracts two obligations therefrom. Any other course is fatal. Père Zottoli assigns one obligation to elders and youngers and one to friends. But "friends" is one of the wu lun, and requires two obligations all to itself. Eitel has only eight obligations to show, including the two spurious ones mentioned under .]

Jen see.

So see.

T'ung is composed of 口 k'ou mouth, now its radical, and an obsolete word which formerly played that part. It originally meant to come together; hence, with, same, identical, etc.

Fan is composed of 二 êrh two, a pair, and an old form of 及 chi to reach, to arrive. It originally meant to embrace fully, hence all, mankind, the world, earthly, etc.; and it is now classed under radical 几 chi a table or bench. Its literal sense may be allowed to vanish here, though of course its influence remains.

Hsün is composed of 言 yen words as radical, and 川 ch'uan streams (四川 ssŭ ch'uan the province of that name) as phonetic.


text:
Page:Elementary Chinese - San Tzu Ching (1900).djvu/33

Rh the old form was 丁 ting a cyclical character, a man, a nail, etc. It means to accomplish, to complete.

Ch'i is composed of four 口 k'ou mouths with 犬 ch'üan dog in the middle. It originally meant receptacles for food etc., the mouths of which are represented as guarded by a dog. It also means anything which can be put to some definite use. Confucius said 君子不器 chün tzŭ pu ch'i the superior man is not a thing, i.e. of restricted use; mathematically, he is not a function of one variable but of many.

Jen see.

Pu see.

Hsüeh see.

Pu see.

Chih is composed of 矢 shih the arrow or bolt in a crossbow as radical and phonetic, and 口 k'ou mouth. It is defined in the Shuo Wên as language, the outward expression of inward ideas; but from the earliest times it is found meaning to know, to perceive.

I see. It has here a variant, 理 li eternal principles, found in inferior editions.

Wei see.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, Elizabeth


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, James


text:
Beauharnais v. Illinois/Dissent Jackson

MR. Justice JACKSON, dissenting.

An Illinois Act, construed by its Supreme Court to be a "group libel" statute, has been used to punish criminally the author and distributor of an obnoxious leaflet attacking the Negro race. He answers that, as applied, the Act denies a liberty secured to him by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. What is the liberty which that clause underwrites? The spectrum of views expressed by my seniors shows that disagreement as to the scope and effect of this Amendment underlies this, as it has many another, division of the Court. All agree that the Fourteenth Amendment does confine the power of the State to make printed [343 U.S. 250, 288]  words criminal. Whence we are to derive metes and bounds of the state power is a subject to the confusion of which, I regret to say, I have contributed - comforted in the acknowledgment, however, by recalling that this Amendment is so enigmatic and abstruse that judges more experienced than I have had to reverse themselves as to its effect on state power. The assumption of other dissents is that the "liberty" which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against denial by the States is the literal and identical "freedom of speech or of the press" which the First Amendment forbids only Congress to abridge. The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the Fourteenth Amendment did not "incorporate" the First, that the powers of Congress and of the States over this subject are not of the same dimensions, and that because Congress probably could not enact this law it does not follow that the States may not. I. As a limitation upon power to punish written or spoken words, Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" in its context of state powers and functions has meant and should mean something quite different from "freedom" in its context of federal powers and functions. 1  This Court has never sustained a federal criminal libel Act. One section of the Sedition Act of 1798 was close to being a "group libel" Act. 2 While there were convictions [343 U.S. 250, 289]  under it, no attack on its validity reached this Court. I think today's better opinion regards the enactment as a breach of the First Amendment and certainly Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis thought so. 3 But even in the absence of judicial condemnation, the political disapproval of the Sedition Act was so emphatic and sustained that federal prosecution of the press ceased for a century. It was resumed with indictment of The Indianapolis News and The New York World for disclosures and criticisms of the Panama Canal acquisition. Both were indicted in the District of Columbia and under the District Code, on the ground that some copies circulated there. That prosecution collapsed when Judge Anderson refused the Government's application to remove the Indiana defendants to the District of Columbia for trial. 4  The World, circulated at West Point, was indicted in New York on the theory that an 1825 Act to protect [343 U.S. 250, 290]   fortifications assimilated the New York State law punishing criminal libel. That venture likewise came to grief when Judge Hough rejected that construction of the federal statute and was upheld by this Court. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911). While there has been a demand from official sources for a resumption of criminal libel prosecution, it has not been acceded to. 5 Thus, while the jeopardy of such federal prosecutions has never been removed by any decision of this Court, I should think the validity of a federal enactment such as this would be extremely doubtful, to say the least. The effect of the First Amendment on congressional power to make seditious utterance criminal did receive consideration in the aftermath of the First World War. In such a case, Mr. Justice Holmes formulated for the Court as "the question in every case" the "clear and present danger" test. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. He and Mr. Justice Brandeis adhered to it as a "rule of reason," dissenting when they thought the rest of the Court apostate. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627, 628; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482. Only after research and deliberation in these cases had sharpened their perception did these Justices face the free-speech issue as to state power which Mr. Justice Holmes first adverted to, but left undecided, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454. In 1922 they joined the Court's first decision on the subject, which declared that ". . . neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of [343 U.S. 250, 291]  the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about `freedom of speech' . . . ." Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543. However, these two Justices, who made the only original contribution to legal thought on the difficult problems bound up in these Amendments, soon reversed and took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did impose some restrictions upon the States. But it was not premised upon the First Amendment nor upon any theory that it was incorporated in the Fourteenth. What they wrote, with care and circumspection, I accept as the wise and historically correct view of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was: "The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word `liberty' as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States." (Emphasis supplied.) Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672. That reasoning was echoed so recently as 1937, when the Court explicitly rejected the theory of incorporation and, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, announced a view, unanimous except for Mr. Justice Butler, that the Fourteenth did not deflect against the States the literal language of amendments designed to circumscribe federal power but qualified state power only by such general restraints as are essential to "the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 -325. It is clear that these do not proscribe state criminal libel Acts. Justices Holmes and Brandeis in 1931 joined Chief Justice Hughes, who spoke for the Court, in striking down a state Act because it authorized restraint by injunction [343 U.S. 250, 292]  previous to publication. He said: "For whatever wrong the appellant has committed or may commit, by his publications, the State appropriately affords both public and private redress by its libel laws." This was amplified: "But it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the public, and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions. . . . The law of criminal libel rests upon that secure foundation." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715. So recently as 1942, a unanimous Court, speaking of state power, said that punishment of libelous words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" has never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572. More than forty State Constitutions, while extending broad protections to speech and press, reserve a responsibility for their abuse and implicitly or explicitly recognize validity of criminal libel laws. 6 We are justified [343 U.S. 250, 293]  in assuming that the men who sponsored the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, and those who ratified it in the State Legislatures, knew of such provisions then in many of their State Constitutions. Certainly they were not consciously canceling them or calling them into question, or we would have some evidence of it. Congresses, during the period while this Amendment was being considered or was but freshly adopted, approved Constitutions of "Reconstructed" States that expressly mentioned state libel laws, 7 and also approved similar Constitutions for States erected out of the federal domain. 8  [343 U.S. 250, 294] Certainly this tolerance of state libel laws by the very authors and partisans of the Fourteenth Amendment shows either that they were not intending to incorporate the First Amendment or that they believed it would not prevent federal libel laws. Adoption of the incorporation theory today would lead to the dilemma of either confining the States as closely as the Congress or giving the Federal Government the latitude appropriate to state governments. The treatment of libel powers corroborates the conclusions against the incorporationist theory reached by the most comprehensive and objective studies of the origin and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9  The inappropriateness of a single standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and duties in relation to those freedoms. Criminality of defamation is predicated upon power either to protect the private right to enjoy integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquillity. Neither of these are objects of federal cognizance except when necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated power, such as [343 U.S. 250, 295]  protection of interstate commerce. When the Federal Government puts liberty of press in one scale, it has a very limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquillity to weigh against it in the other. But state action affecting speech or press can and should be weighed against and reconciled with these conflicting social interests. For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the Federal Government such latitude as I think a State reasonably may require for orderly government of its manifold concerns. The converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of the State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power. As the principle by which to judge the constitutionality of this statute, I accept the dissent in Gitlow and the decision in Palko. II. What restraints upon state power to punish criminal libel are implied by the "concept of ordered liberty"? Experience by Anglo-Saxon peoples with defamation and laws to punish it extends over centuries and the statute and case books exhibit its teachings. If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression. Oppressive application of the English libel laws was partially checked when Fox's Libel Act of 1792 allowed the jury to determine whether an accused publication was libelous in character and more completely when Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843 allowed truth to be proved as a defense. American experience teaches similar lessons. The leading state case is People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 337. [343 U.S. 250, 296]  Since, as the opinion of this Court now points out, the Jeffersonian's objection to federal sedition prosecutions was largely fear of federal usurpation of state powers over the subject, it was consistent for them to prosecute libels under state law. Croswell, publisher of the aptly named Wasp, was indicted for libeling Thomas Jefferson by representing him as unworthy of the confidence, respect, and attachment of the people. The trial judge pronounced his statements libelous as a matter of law and allowed the jury to decide no question except whether the accused had published them. The defendant was convicted and on his appeal, argued by Alexander Hamilton, the appellate court divided equally. Justice Kent, however, filed a characteristically learned and vigorous opinion that the trial court must submit the libelous character of the article and libelous intent of its printer to decision by the jury, which was entitled to determine both law and fact. The public response was such that an early session of the Legislature substantially enacted Kent's contentions. Inasmuch as no judgment had been entered upon the earlier equal division, the court at its August 1805 Term, "in consequence of this declaratory statute," unanimously awarded a new trial. 10  The New York Constitution at that time contained no free speech provision but the case led to a provision included in the Constitution of 1821 which both followed Fox's Libel Act and anticipated Lord Campbell's Act and has remained in the several Constitutions of that State since: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments [343 U.S. 250, 297]  for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact." 11  It would not be an exaggeration to say that, basically, this provision of the New York Constitution states the common sense of American criminal libel law. Twenty-four States of the Union whose Constitutions were framed later substantially adopted it. 12 Twelve States provide that press and speech shall be free but there shall be responsibility for the abuse. 13 Five others provide substantially the same but add that truth may be given in evidence in a libel prosecution. 14 Only five States, whose Constitutions were framed earlier, were content with the generality about the free press similar to that of Massachusetts. 15 But all of these States, apart from constitutional [343 U.S. 250, 298]  provision, have by decisional law recognized the validity of criminal libel prosecutions. 16  Because of these safeguards, state libel laws have presented no threat to a free press comparable to that from federal sources and have not proved inconsistent with fundamental liberties. Attacks on the press by States which were frustrated by this Court in Near v. Minnesota, supra, and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, were not by libel laws. For near a century and a half this Court's decisions left state criminal libel prosecutions entirely free of federal constitutional limitations. It is a matter of notoriety that the press often has provoked hostility, that editors have been mobbed and horse-whipped, but criminal libel prosecutions have not been frequent and, as safeguarded by state law, they have been so innocuous that chronicles of American journalism give them only passing mention. 17  This Court, by construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, has imposed but one addition to the safeguards voluntarily taken upon the States by themselves. It is that where expression, oral or printed, is punished, although it has not actually caused injuries or disorders but is thought to have a tendency to do so, the likelihood of such consequence must not be remote or speculative. That is the "clear and present danger" test which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, eventually with support of the Court, thought implied in both the First 18 and Fourteenth Amendments, 19 although the former was [343 U.S. 250, 299]  not bodily bound up in the latter. Any superficial inconsistency between applying the same standard but permitting a wider range of action to the States is resolved upon reference to the latter part of the statement of the formula: clear and present danger of those substantive evils which the legislature has a right to prevent. The evils at which Congress may aim, and in so doing come into conflict with free speech, will be relatively few since it is a government of limited powers. Because the States may reach more evils, they will have wider range to punish speech which presents clear and present danger of bringing about those evils. In few subjects so much as libel does local law, in spite of varying historical influences, afford a consensus of American legal opinion as to what is reasonable and essential to the concept of ordered government. The boundaries are roughly outlined, to be sure, and cannot be stated or applied with mathematical precision, but those widely accepted state constitutional provisions on which is superimposed the "clear and present danger" test for "tendency" cases seem to be our best guide. I agree with the Court that a State has power to bring classes "of any race, color, creed, or religion" within the protection of its libel laws, if indeed traditional forms do not already accomplish it. 20 But I am equally clear that in doing so it is essential to our concept of ordered liberty that the State also protect the accused by those safeguards the necessity for which is verified by legal history. III. The Illinois statute, as applied in this case, seems to me to have dispensed with accepted safeguards for the accused. Trial of this case ominously parallels the trial of [343 U.S. 250, 300]  People v. Croswell, supra, in that the Illinois court here instructed the jury, in substance, that if it found that defendant published this leaflet he must be found guilty of criminal libel. Rulings of the trial court precluded the effort to justify statements of fact by proving their truth. The majority opinion concedes the unvarying recognition by the States that truth plus good motives is a defense in a prosecution for criminal libel. But here the trial court repeatedly refused defendant's offer of proof as to the truth of the matter published. Where an offer to prove the dominant element of a defense is rejected as immaterial, we can hardly refuse to consider defendant's constitutional question because he did not go through the useless ceremony of offering proof of a subsidiary element of the defense. If the court would not let him try to prove he spoke truth, how could he show that he spoke truth for good ends? Furthermore, the record indicates that defendant was asked to state what he had meant by the use of certain phrases, and the reason for forming the White Circle League - statements which apparently bore on the issue of motive and ends. But the trial court sustained a sweeping objection "to this whole line of examination." The Supreme Court of Illinois noted the offer of proof of truth and its exclusion, and apparently went on to rule as a matter of law that the statement was not published for justifiable ends. At all events, it is clear that the defense was ruled out as matter of law and defendant was never allowed to present it for decision by either court or jury upon the facts, a practice which I think is contrary to the overwhelming verdict of Anglo-Saxon history and practice. I do not intimate that this defendant stood even a remote chance of justifying what impresses me, as it did the trial court, as reckless and vicious libel. But the point is that his evidence, proffered for that purpose, was excluded instead of being [343 U.S. 250, 301]  received and evaluated. Society has an interest in preserving truth as a justification, however obnoxious the effort may be. A publication which diffuses its attack over unnamed and impersonal multitudes is likely to be harder to justify than one which concentrates its attack on named individuals, but the burden may properly be cast on an accused and punishment follow failure to carry it. The same may be said of the right to comment upon matters of public interest insofar as the statement includes matters of opinion, a point, however, which the defense may have inadequately raised. When any naturally cohesive or artificially organized group possesses a racial or sectarian solidarity which is or may be exploited to influence public affairs, that group becomes a legitimate subject for public comment. Of course, one can only deplore the habitual intemperance and bitter disparagement which characterizes most such comment. While I support the right of a State to place decent bounds upon it, I am not ready to hold that group purposes, characteristics and histories are to be immunized from comment or may be discussed only at the risk of prosecution free of all usual safeguards. Another defense almost universally recognized, which it seems the jury were not allowed to consider here, is that of privilege. Petition for redress of grievances is specifically privileged by many State Constitutions. I do not think we should hold this whole document to be constitutionally privileged just because, in part, it simulates a petition for redress of grievances. A court or jury could have found that its primary purpose was not to petition but to appeal for members and contributions to the White Circle League. If some part of it were privileged, that, so it has been held, does not extend constitutional protection to unprivileged matter. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52. But the question of privilege seems [343 U.S. 250, 302]  not to have been specifically passed on by the court and certainly was not submitted for the jury's consideration. In this case, neither the court nor jury found or were required to find any injury to any person, or group, or to the public peace, nor to find any probability, let alone any clear and present danger, of injury to any of these. Even though no individuals were named or described as targets of this pamphlet, if it resulted in a riot or caused injury to any individual Negro, such as being refused living quarters in a particular section, house or apartment, or being refused employment, certainly there would be no constitutional obstacle to imposing civil or criminal liability for actual results. But in this case no actual violence and no specific injury was charged or proved. The leaflet was simply held punishable as criminal libel per se irrespective of its actual or probable consequences. No charge of conspiracy complicates this case. The words themselves do not advocate the commission of any crime. The conviction rests on judicial attribution of a likelihood of evil results. The trial court, however, refused to charge the jury that it must find some "clear and present danger," and the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained conviction because, in its opinion, the words used had a tendency to cause a breach of the peace. Referring to the clear and present danger doctrine in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568, I said: "I would save it, unmodified, for application as a `rule of reason' in the kind of case for which it was devised. When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity of the judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of [343 U.S. 250, 303]  substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for the danger in such cases has matured by the time of trial or it was never present. The test applies and has meaning where a conviction is sought to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly advocate a crime but to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by construction or by implication from external circumstances. The formula in such cases favors freedoms that are vital to our society, and, even if sometimes applied too generously, the consequences cannot be grave. . . ." Not the least of the virtues of this formula in such tendency cases is that it compels the prosecution to make up its mind what particular evil it sought or is seeking to prevent. It must relate its interference with speech or press to some identifiable evil to be prevented. Words on their own account are not to be punished in such cases but are reachable only as the root of punishable evils. Punishment of printed words, based on their tendency either to cause breach of the peace or injury to persons or groups, in my opinion, is justifiable only if the prosecution survives the "clear and present danger" test. It is the most just and workable standard yet evolved for determining criminality of words whose injurious or inciting tendencies are not demonstrated by the event but are ascribed to them on the basis of probabilities. Its application is important in this case because it takes account of the particular form, time, place, and manner of communication in question. "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself . . . ." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97. It would consider whether a leaflet is so emotionally exciting to immediate action as the spoken word, especially [343 U.S. 250, 304]  the incendiary street or public speech. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295. It will inquire whether this publication was obviously so foul and extreme as to defeat its own ends, whether its appeals for money - which has a cooling effect on many persons - would not negative its inflammatory effect, whether it would not impress the passer-by as the work of an irresponsible who needed mental examination. One of the merits of the clear and present danger test is that the triers of fact would take into account the realities of race relations and any smouldering fires to be fanned into holocausts. Such consideration might well warrant a conviction here when it would not in another and different environment. Group libel statutes represent a commendable desire to reduce sinister abuses of our freedoms of expression - abuses which I have had occasion to learn can tear apart a society, brutalize its dominant elements, and persecute, even to extermination, its minorities. While laws or prosecutions might not alleviate racial or sectarian hatreds and may even invest scoundrels with a specious martyrdom, I should be loath to foreclose the States from a considerable latitude of experimentation in this field. Such efforts, if properly applied, do not justify frenetic forebodings of crushed liberty. But these acts present most difficult policy and technical problems, as thoughtful writers who have canvassed the problem more comprehensively than is appropriate in a judicial opinion have well pointed out. 21  No group interest in any particular prosecution should forget that the shoe may be on the other foot in some prosecution tomorrow. In these, as in other matters, our [343 U.S. 250, 305]  guiding spirit should be that each freedom is balanced with a responsibility, and every power of the State must be checked with safeguards. Such is the spirit of our American law of criminal libel, which concedes the power to the State, but only as a power restrained by recognition of individual rights. I cannot escape the conclusion that as the Act has been applied in this case it lost sight of the rights. [ Footnote 1 ] First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Fourteenth Amendment: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." [ Footnote 2 ] 1 Stat. 596 (1798) 2: "And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, [343 U.S. 250, 289]  or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute . . . such person . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years." Section 3: ". . . it shall be lawful for the defendant . . . to give in evidence in his defense, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases." [ Footnote 3 ] Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630. [ Footnote 4 ] United States v. Smith, 173 F. 227. In discharging the defendants, Judge Anderson said: "To my mind that man has read the history of our institutions to little purpose who does not look with grave apprehension upon the possibility of the success of a proceeding such as this. If the history of liberty means anything, if constitutional guaranties are worth anything, this proceeding must fail. "If the prosecuting officers have the authority to select the tribunal, if there be more than one tribunal to select from, if the [343 U.S. 250, 290]  government has that power, and can drag citizens from distant states to the capital of the nation, there to be tried, then, as Judge Cooley says, this is a strange result of a revolution where one of the grievances complained of was the assertion of the right to send parties abroad for trial." 173 F., at 232. [ Footnote 5 ] Riesman, Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727, 748. See also 87 Cong. Rec. 5830-5841. [ Footnote 6 ] The following is a list of such state constitutional provisions, coupled with the year of the adoption of the Constitution in which they are contained: Alabama (1901), Art. I, 4, 12; Arizona (1912), Art. II, 6; Arkansas (1874), Art. II, 6; California (1879), Art. I, 9; Colorado (1876), Art. II, 10; Delaware (1897), Art. I, 5; Florida (1887), Decl. Rts., 13; Georgia (1877), Art. I. 1, par. 15; Idaho (1890), Art. I, 9; Illinois (1870), Art. II, 4; Indiana (1851), Art. I, 9; Iowa (1857), Art. I, 7; Kansas (1861), Bill Rts., 11; Kentucky (1891), 8, 9; Louisiana (1921), Art. I, 3; Maine (1876), Art. I, 4; Maryland (1867), Decl. Rts., Art. 40; Michigan (1909), Art. II, 4; Minnesota (1857), Art. I, 3; Mississippi (1890), Art. III, 13; Missouri (1945), Art. I, 8; Montana (1889), Art. III, 10; Nebraska (1875), Art. I, 5; Nevada (1864), Art. I, 9; New Jersey (1947), Art. I, 6; New Mexico (1912), Art. II, 17; New York (1938), Art. I, 8; North Carolina (1876), Art. I, [343 U.S. 250, 293]  20; North Dakota (1889), Art. I, 9; Ohio (1851), Art. I, 11; Oklahoma (1907), Art. II, 22; Oregon (1859), Art. I, 8; Pennsylvania (1874), Art. I, 7; Rhode Island (1843), Art. I, 20; South Dakota (1889), Art. VI, 5; Tennessee (1870), Art. I, 19; Texas (1876), Art. I, 8; Utah (1895), Art. I, 15; Virginia (1902), Art. I, 12; Washington (1889), Art. I, 5; West Virginia (1872), Art. III, 7; Wisconsin (1848), Art. I, 3; Wyoming (1889), Art. I, 20. [ Footnote 7 ] Congress required that Reconstructed States approve State Constitutions consistent with the Federal Constitution, and also that each State ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Examples of state constitutional provisions expressly referring to libel, but which Constitutions were nevertheless approved by Congress, follow: Arkansas: Const. 1868, Art. I, 2 provides that truth coupled with good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; Arkansas readmitted by 15 Stat. 72 (1868); Florida: Const. 1868, Art. I, 10 provides that truth coupled with good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; Florida readmitted by 15 Stat. 73 (1868); Mississippi: Const. 1868, Art. I, 4 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; Mississippi readmitted by 16 Stat. 67 (1870); South Carolina: Const. 1868, Art. I, 8 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance, and provides that truth and good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; South Carolina readmitted by 15 Stat. 73 (1868); Texas: Const. 1868, Art. I, 6 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; Texas readmitted by 16 Stat. 80 (1870). [ Footnote 8 ] In the case of States erected out of the public domain, one of two procedures was generally followed. Either Congress would itself enact a statute admitting a particular State, stating therein that the [343 U.S. 250, 294]  Constitution of the State in question was consistent with the Federal Constitution; or else the Congressional Act would provide that the State would be admitted upon its adoption of a Constitution consistent with the Federal Constitution. In the latter case the actual admission occurred by proclamation of the President. Colorado: Art. II, 10 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance, and provides that truth and good motives shall constitute a complete defense in a libel prosecution; admitted by 18 Stat. 474 (1875), 19 Stat. 665 (1876); Montana: Art. III, 10 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; admitted by 25 Stat. 676 (1889), 26 Stat. 1551 (1889); New Mexico: Art. II, 17 provides that truth and good motives shall constitute a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; admitted by 36 Stat. 557 (1910), 37 Stat. 39 (1911); Utah: Art. I, 15 like Colorado provisions; admitted by 28 Stat. 107 (1894), 29 Stat. 876 (1896); Wyoming: Art. I, 20 like Colorado provisions; admitted by 26 Stat. 222 (1890). [ Footnote 9 ] See Fairman and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5-173. [ Footnote 10 ] 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 337, 413. [ Footnote 11 ] Const. 1821, Art. VII, 8; Const. 1846, Art. I, 8; Const. 1894, Art. I, 8; Const. 1938, Art. I, 8. [ Footnote 12 ] Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 13 ] Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington. The Georgia provision (Const. 1877, Art. I, 1, par. 15), representative of the rest, reads: ". . . any person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 14 ] Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 15 ] Connecticut, Const. 1818, Art. I, 6; New Hampshire, Const. 1784, Part I, Art. 22; South Carolina, Const. 1895, Art. I, 4; Vermont, Const. 1793, c. I, Art. 13. The Massachusetts provision (Const. 1780, Part I, Art. XVI) reads as follows: "The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this commonwealth." [ Footnote 16 ] State v. Gardner, 112, Conn. 121, 151 A. 349; Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 254 Mass. 424, 150 N. E. 190; Noyes v. Thorpe, 73 N. H. 481, 62 A. 787; State v. Gurry, 163 S. C. 1, 161 S. E. 191; State v. Colby, 98 Vt. 96, 126 A. 510. Decisional law of other States is collected in Note, 1 Bflo. L. Rev. 258. [ Footnote 17 ] Lee, A History of American Journalism (Garden City, 1923). [ Footnote 18 ] Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. [ Footnote 19 ] Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672. [ Footnote 20 ] It appears that group libel was not unknown to common law. See Scott, Publishing False News, 30 Can. B. Rev. 37, 42-43. [ Footnote 21 ] Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261; Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727; see also Note, 1 Bflo. L. Rev. 258. [343 U.S. 250, 306]

title: Beauharnais v. Illinois/Dissent Jackson


text:
Who You Are and What You Stand For

[CROWD CHEERS]

THE FIRST LADY: Oh, wow. Thank you guys. Wow. It sounds like you all are already fired up and ready to go. This is amazing. It is truly amazing. And you know what? Being here with all of you today...let me tell you: I'm feeling pretty fired up and ready to go myself. I really am. But there is a reason why we're here today. And–

[MAN IN CROWD]: We love you!

THE FIRST LADY: And we love you too! And it's not just because we support one extraordinary man. Although I'll admit I'm a little biased, because I think our President is awesome. And it's not just because we want to win an election. We are here because of the values we believe in. We're here because of the vision for this country that we all share. We're here because we want all our children to have a good education, right? Schools that push them, and inspire them; prepare them for good jobs. We want our parents and our grandparents to retire with dignity, because we believe that after a lifetime of hard work, they should enjoy their golden years.

We want to restore that basic middle-class security for our families, because we believe that folks shouldn't go bankrupt because they get sick. They shouldn't lose their home because someone loses a job. We believe that responsibility should be rewarded, and hard work should pay off. And, truly, these are basic American values. They're the same values that so many of us were raised with, including myself. You see, my father was a blue-collar city-worker at the city water plant, and my family lived in a little-bitty apartment on the South Side of Chicago. And neither of my parents had the chance to go to college.

But let me tell you what my parents did do. They saved. They sacrificed. I mean, they poured everything they had into me and my brother. They wanted us to have the kind of education they could only dream of. And, while pretty much all of my college tuition came from student loans and grants, my dad still paid a little-bitty portion of that tuition himself. And let me tell you: every semester, my dad was determined to pay that bill right on time, because he was so proud to be sending his kids to college. And he couldn't bear the thought of me or my brother missing that registration deadline because his check was late.

Like so many people in this country, my father took great pride in being able to earn a living that allowed him to handle his responsibility to his family, to pay all of his bills, and to pay them on time. And, truly, more than anything else, that is what's at stake. It's that fundamental promise, that no matter who you are or how you started out, if you work hard, you can build a decent life for yourself and, yes, an even better life for your kids. And it is that promise that binds us together as Americans. It's what makes us who we are. And whether it's equal pay for women, or health care for our kids; whether it's tax-cuts for middle-class families, or student loans for our young people; that is what my husband has been fighting for every single day as President. Every single day.

And let me tell you something: as First Lady, I have had the chance to see, up-close and personal, what being President looks like. Right? I have seen how the issues that come across a President's desk are always the hard ones.

[WOMAN IN CROWD]: You're beautiful, Michelle!

THE FIRST LADY: But in all seriousness. These problems: they're always the hard ones. The problems with no clear solutions. The judgment calls where the stakes are so high and there's no margin for error. And as President, you can get all kinds of advice from all kinds of people, but at the end of the day, when it comes time to make that decision, all you have to guide you are your life experiences. Your values. And your vision for this country. That's all you have. In the end, when you're making those impossible choices, it all boils down to who you are and what you stand for.

And we all know what Barack Obama is. Who he is. We all know what our President stands for, right? He is the son of a single mother who struggled to put herself through school, and pay the bills. That's who he is. He's the grandson of a woman who woke up before dawn every day to catch a bus to her job at the bank. And even though Barack's grandmother worked hard to help support his family – and she was good at her job – like so many woman, she hit that glass ceiling, and men no more qualified than she was were promoted up the ladder ahead of her. So believe me: Barack knows what it means when a family struggles. He knows what it means when someone doesn't have a chance to fulfill their potential. And what you need to know, America: those are the experiences that have made him the man and the President he is today.

But I have said this before, and I will say it again and again: Barack cannot do this alone. And fortunately, he never has. We have always moved this country forward together. And today, more than ever before, Barack needs your help. He needs your help. He needs your help. He needs every single one of you. Every single one of you to give just a little part of your life each week to this campaign. He needs you to register those voters, right? And to all of the college students out there, all of you: if you're going to be moving over the summer, remember to register at your new address in the fall, you got that? Get that done!

Barack needs you to join one of our neighborhood teams, and start organizing in your community. And just let me say: if there have ever been any doubts about the difference that you can make, I just want you to remember that in the end, this all could come down to those few thousand people who register to vote. Think about it. It could all come down to those last few thousand votes who get out to the polls on November the sixth. And when you average that out over this entire state, it might mean registering just one more person in your town. It might mean helping just one more person in your community get out and vote on election day.

So know this – with every door you knock on, with every call you make, with every conversation you have – I want you to remember that this could be the one that makes the difference. This could be the one. Remember that. That is exactly the kind of impact that each of you can have. Now, I am not going to kid you: this journey is going to be long, and it is going to be hard. But know that that is how change always happens in this country. And if we keep showing up, if we keep fighting the good fight, then eventually we get there. We always do. Maybe not in our lifetimes, but maybe in our childrens' lifetimes. Maybe in our grandchildrens' lifetimes.

Because in the end, that's what this is all about. That is what I think about when I tuck my girls in at night. I think about the world I want to leave for them, and for all of our sons and our daughters. I think about how I want to do for them what my dad did for me. I want to give them a foundation for their dreams. I want to give them opportunities worthy of their promise. I want to give them that sense of limitless possibility, that belief that here in America, there is always something better out there if you're willing to work for it. So we just cannot turn back now, right?

We have come so far, but we have so much more to do. And if we want to keep on moving forward, then we need to work our hearts out for the man that I have the pleasure of introducing here today. Are you ready? It is my privilege to introduce my husband, and our President. President Barack Obama!

[CROWD CHEERS AS PRESIDENT ENTERS]

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Ohio!

title: Who You Are and What You Stand For


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colville, William


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Colvin, John Russell


text:
Page:Homes of the London Poor.djvu/54

 covering the same ground whilst ignorant of each other's proceedings; or to dwell on the cruelty of the utter want of system which has hitherto prevailed,—to point to poor families assisted by three or four agencies at times when they needed help least, and others neglected by all at times when they needed it most. It would not be difficult to give examples of these evils, and to show that they are inseparable from the condition of large towns wherever nothing is done to secure unity of action amongst those who are trying to assist the poor.

Much has been done. The evils of overlapping, on the one hand, and of neglect on the other, are being swept away wherever organization committees, with their machinery for thorough investigation, and relief societies, with their power to assist, are in existence. By means of this system of inquiry into the merits of cases a great degree of uniformity in dealing with them is secured; no relief is given without due consideration, no poor person who chooses to apply can fail to have a hearing for his case, and similar needs will meet with a similar response. All this is no small gain. But now a new danger seems to me to be arising; a danger lest, rushing from one extreme to another, we should leave to committees, with their systems of rules, the whole work of charity, and deprive this great organizing movement of all aid from what I may call the personal element. The value of this element seems to me to be inestimable. Charity owes all its graciousness to the sense of its coming from a real friend. We want to bring the rich and poor, the educated and uneducated, more and more into direct communication. We want to enlist the thought, knowledge, sympathy, foresight, and gentleness of the educated in the service of the poor, and must beware of raising up barriers of committees between those who should meet face to face. There is beyond all doubt in almost every town a great amount of volunteer work to be had, which, were it organized and concentrated, would achieve infinitely more than its best efforts can now

title: Page:Homes of the London Poor.djvu/54


text:
Page:Homes of the London Poor.djvu/55

. There is always, however, a difficulty in calculating to any great extent on volunteer work, inasmuch as it is apt to be disconnected, desultory, and untrained.

It is true that where an energetic body of visitors is gathered together under able and vigilant guidance—where their districts are small, their visits frequent, their written records simple and complete, and gaps in their ranks quickly filled up, so that their work is not intermittent—they form a powerful agency for good. Such societies are usually the first to see the importance of putting themselves into communication with other charitable bodies; and when they do this, little improvement in the machinery is requisite. But it is also sadly true that the work of a number of earnest and devoted volunteers is thrown away because their districts are too large, their duties indefinite, and their work unconnected with that of others laboring according to any definite plan.

Several things, then, appear to me to be evident—(1), that if the poor are to be raised to a permanently better condition, they must be dealt with as individuals and by individuals; (2), that for this hundreds of workers are necessary; and (3), that this multitude of helpers is to be found amongst volunteers—whose aid, as we arrange things at present, is to a great extent lost. The problem to be solved, therefore, is how to collect our volunteers into a harmonious whole—the action of each being free, yet systematized; and how thus to administer relief through the united agency of corporate bodies and private individuals; how, in fact, to secure all the personal intercourse and friendliness, all the real sympathy, all the graciousness of individual effort, without losing the advantage of having relief voted by a central committee, and according to definite principles. The way in which this problem has been dealt with in one small district of London will be seen in the following pages. Every district will, no doubt, have to deal with the question in a somewhat different way, which must be determined by its special

title: Page:Homes of the London Poor.djvu/55


text:
Page:Weird Tales volume 28 number 03.djvu/76

342 to him, the very old and the very young, bound and hurled from the wall. Hasten! Olmec has taken Valeria to the Chamber of the——"

His head slumped down and he was dead before it came to rest on the floor.

ONAN sprang up, his eyes like live coals. So that was Olmec's game, having first used the strangers to destroy his foes! He should have known that something of the sort would be going on in that black-bearded degenerate's mind.

The Cimmerian started toward Tecuhltli with reckless speed. Rapidly he reckoned the numbers of his former allies. Only twenty-one, counting Olmec, had survived that fiendish battle in the throneroom. Three had died since, which left seventeen enemies with which to reckon. In his rage Conan felt capable of accounting for the whole clan single-handed.

But the innate craft of the wilderness rose to guide his berserk rage. He remembered Techotl's warning of an ambush. It was quite probable that the prince would make such provisions, on the chance that Topal might have failed to carry out his order. Olmec would be expecting him to return by the same route he had followed in going to Xotalanc.

Conan glanced up at a skylight under which he was passing and caught the blurred glimmer of stars. They had not yet begun to pale for dawn. The events of the night had been crowded into a comparatively short space of time.

He turned aside from his direct course and descended a winding staircase to the floor below. He did not know where the door was to be found that let into the castle on that level, but he knew he could find it. How he was to force the locks he did not know; he believed that the doors of Tecuhltli would all be locked and bolted, if for no other reason than the habits of half a century. But there was nothing else but to attempt it.

Sword in hand, he hurried noiselessly on through a maze of green-lit or shadowy rooms and halls. He knew he must be near Tecuhltli, when a sound brought him up short. He recognized it for what it was—a human being trying to cry out through a stifling gag. It came from somewhere ahead of him, and to the left. In those deathly-still chambers a small sound carried a long way.

Conan turned aside and went seeking after the sound, which continued to be repeated. Presently he was glaring through a doorway upon a weird scene. In the room into which he was looking a low rack-like frame of iron lay on the floor, and a giant figure was bound prostrate upon it. His head rested on a bed of iron spikes, which were already crimson-pointed with blood where they had pierced his scalp. A peculiar harness-like contrivance was fastened about his head, though in such a manner that the leather band did not protect his scalp from the spikes. This harness was connected by a slender chain to the mechanism that upheld a huge iron ball which was suspended above the captive's hairy breast. As long as the man could force himself to remain motionless the iron ball hung in its place. But when the pain of the iron points caused him to lift his head, the ball lurched downward a few inches. Presently his aching neck muscles would no longer support his head in its unnatural position and it would fall back on the spikes again. It was obvious that eventually the ball would crush him to a pulp, slowly and inexorably. The victim was gagged, and above the gag his great black ox-eyes rolled wildly toward the man in the doorway, who stood in silent amazement. The man on the rack was Olmec, prince of Tecuhltli.


text:
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Rh

HY did you bring me into this chamber to bandage my legs?" demanded Valeria. "Couldn't you have done it just as well in the throneroom?"

She sat on a couch with her wounded leg extended upon it, and the Tecuhltli woman had just bound it with silk bandages. Valeria's red-stained sword lay on the couch beside her.

She frowned as she spoke. The woman had done her task silently and efficiently, but Valeria liked neither the lingering, caressing touch of her slim fingers nor the expression in her eyes.

"They have taken the rest of the wounded into the other chambers," answered the woman in the soft speech of the Tecuhltli women, which somehow did not suggest either softness or gentleness in the speakers. A little while before, Valeria had seen this same woman stab a Xotalanca woman through the breast and stamp the eyeballs out of a wounded Xotalanca man.

'"They will be carrying the corpses of the dead down into the catacombs," she added, "lest the ghosts escape into the chambers and dwell there."

"Do you believe in ghosts?" asked Valeria.

"I know the ghost of Tolkemec dwells in the catacombs," she answered with a shiver. "Once I saw it, as I crouched in a crypt among the bones of a dead queen. It passed by in the form of an ancient man with flowing white beard and locks, and luminous eyes that blazed in the darkness. It was Tolkemec; I saw him living when I was a child and he was being tortured."

Her voice sank to a fearful whisper: "Olmec laughs, but I know Tolkemec's ghost dwells in the catacombs! They say it is rats which gnaw the flesh from the bones of the newly dead—but ghosts eat flesh. Who knows but that——"

She glanced up quickly as a shadow fell across the couch. Valeria looked up to see Olmec gazing down at her. The prince had cleansed his hands, torso and beard of the blood that had splashed them; but he had not donned his robe, and his great dark-skinned hairless body and limbs renewed the impression of strength bestial in its nature. His deep black eyes burned with a more elemental light, and there was the suggestion of a twitching in the fingers that tugged at his thick blue-black beard.

He stared fixedly at the woman, and she rose and glided from the chamber. As she passed through the door she cast a look over her shoulder at Valeria, a glance full of cynical derision and obscene mockery.

"She has done a clumsy job," criticized the prince, coming to the divan and bending over the bandage. "Let me see——"

With a quickness amazing in one of his bulk he snatched her sword and threw it across the chamber. His next move was to catch her in his giant arms.

Quick and unexpected as the move was, she almost matched it; for even as he grabbed her, her dirk was in her hand and she stabbed murderously at his throat. More by luck than skill he caught her wrist, and then began a savage wrestling-match. She fought him with fists, feet, knees, teeth and nails, with all the strength of her magnificent body and all the knowledge of hand-to-hand fighting she had acquired in her years of roving and fighting on sea and land. It availed her nothing against his brute strength. She lost her dirk in the first moment of contact, and thereafter found herself powerless to inflict any appreciable pain on her giant attacker.

The blaze in his weird black eyes did not alter, and their expression filled her


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344 with fury, fanned by the sardonic smile that seemed carved upon his bearded lips. Those eyes and that smile contained all the cruel cynicism that seethes below the surface of a sophisticated and degenerate race, and for the first time in her life Valeria experienced fear of a man. It was like struggling against some huge elemental force; his iron arms thwarted her efforts with an ease that sent panic racing through her limbs. He seemed impervious to any pain she could inflict. Only once, when she sank her white teeth savagely into his wrist so that the blood started, did he react. And that was to buffet her brutally upon the side of the head with his open hand, so that stars flashed before her eyes and her head rolled on her shoulders.

Her shirt had been torn open in the struggle, and with cynical cruelty he rasped his thick beard across her bare breasts, bringing the blood to suffuse the fair skin, and fetching a cry of pain and outraged fury from her. Her convulsive resistance was useless; she was crushed down on a couch, disarmed and panting, her eyes blazing up at him like the eyes of a trapped tigress.

A moment later he was hurrying from the chamber, carrying her in his arms. She made no resistance, but the smoldering of her eyes showed that she was unconquered in spirit, at least. She had not cried out. She knew that Conan was not within call, and it did not occur to her that any in Tecuhltli would oppose their prince. But she noticed that Olmec went stealthily, with his head on one side as if listening for sounds of pursuit, and he did not return to the throne chamber. He carried her through a door that stood opposite that through which he had entered, crossed another room and began stealing down a hall. As she became convinced that he feared some opposition to the abduction, she threw back her head and screamed at the top of her lusty voice.

She was rewarded by a slap that half stunned her, and Olmec quickened his pace to a shambling run.

But her cry had been echoed, and twisting her head about, Valeria, through the tears and stars that partly blinded her, saw Techotl limping after them.

Olmec turned with a snarl, shifting the woman to an uncomfortable and certainly undignified position under one huge arm, where he held her writhing and kicking vainly, like a child.

"Olmec!" protested Techotl. "You cannot be such a dog as to do this thing! She is Conan's woman! She helped us slay the Xotalancas, and——"

ITHOUT a word Olmec balled his free hand into a huge fist and stretched the wounded warrior senseless at his feet. Stooping, and hindered not at all by the struggles and imprecations of his captive, he drew Techotl's sword from its sheath and stabbed the warrior in the breast. Then casting aside the weapon he fled on along the corridor. He did not see a woman's dark face peer cautiously after him from behind a hanging. It vanished, and presently Techotl groaned and stirred, rose dazedly and staggered drunkenly away, calling Conan's name.

Olmec hurried on down the corridor, and descended a winding ivory staircase. He crossed several corridors and halted at last in a broad chamber whose doors were veiled with heavy tapestries, with one exception—a heavy bronze door similar to the Door of the Eagle on the upper floor.

He was moved to rumble, pointing to it: "That is one of the outer doors of Tecuhltli. For the first time in fifty years it is unguarded. We need not guard it now, for Xotalanc is no more."


text:
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Rh "Thanks to Conan and me, you bloody rogue!" sneered Valeria, trembling with fury and the shame of physical coercion. "You treacherous dog! Conan will cut your throat for this!"

Olmec did not bother to voice his belief that Conan's own gullet had already been severed according to his whispered command. He was too utterly cynical to be at all interested in her thoughts or opinions. His flame-lit eyes devoured her, dwelling burningly on the generous expanses of clear white flesh exposed where her shirt and breeches had been torn in the struggle.

"Forget Conan," he said thickly. "Olmec is lord of Xuchotl. Xotalanc is no more. There will be no more fighting. We shall spend our lives in drinking and love-making. First let us drink!"

He seated himself on an ivory table and pulled her down on his knees, like a dark-skinned satyr with a white nymph in his arms. Ignoring her un-nymphlike profanity, he held her helpless with one great arm about her waist while the other reached across the table and secured a vessel of wine.

"Drink!" he commanded, forcing it to her lips, as she writhed her head away.

The liquor slopped over, stinging her lips, splashing down on her naked breasts.

"Your guest does not like your wine, Olmec," spoke a cool, sardonic voice.

Olmec stiffened; fear grew in his flaming eyes. Slowly he swung his great head about and stared at Tascela who posed negligently in the curtained doorway, one hand on her smooth hip. Valeria twisted herself about in his iron grip, and when she met the burning eyes of Tascela, a chill tingled along her supple spine. New experiences were flooding Valeria's proud soul that night. Recently she had learned to fear a man; now she knew what it was to fear a woman.

Olmec sat motionless, a gray pallor growing under his swarthy skin. Tascela brought her other hand from behind her and displayed a small gold vessel.

"I feared she would not like your wine, Olmec," purred the princess, "so I brought some of mine, some I brought with me long ago from the shores of Lake Zuad—do you understand, Olmec?"

Beads of sweat stood out suddenly on Olmec's brow. His muscles relaxed, and Valeria broke away and put the table between them. But though reason told her to dart from the room, some fascination she could not understand held her rigid, watching the scene.

Tascela came toward the seated prince with a swaying, undulating walk that was mockery in itself. Her voice was soft, slurringly caressing, but her eyes gleamed. Her slim fingers stroked his beard lightly.

"You are selfish, Olmec," she crooned, smiling. "You would keep our handsome guest to yourself, though you knew I wished to entertain her. You are much at fault, Olmec!"

The mask dropped for an instant; her eyes flashed, her face was contorted and with an appalling show of strength her hand locked convulsively in his beard and tore out a great handful. This evidence of unnatural strength was no more terrifying than the momentary baring of the hellish fury that raged under her bland exterior.

Olmec lurched up with a roar, and stood swaying like a bear, his mighty hands clenching and unclenching.

"Slut!" His booming voice filled the room. "Witch! She-devil! Tecuhltli should have slain you fifty years ago! Begone! I have endured too much from you! This white-skinned wench is mine! Get hence before I slay you!"

The princess laughed and dashed the blood-stained strands into his face. Her laughter was less merciful than the ring of flint on steel.