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Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Introduction

Introduction
THE origin of the world-war lies in the opposition between the Anglo-Saxon and the German conceptions of the world. On the former side is the claim to the position of unrestricted primacy in sea-power, to the dominion of the seas, to the prerogative of ocean-trade and to a levy on the treasures of all the earth. "We are the first nation of the world" is the dogma of every Englishman, and he cannot conceive how others can doubt it.

English history supplies the proof of the application - just as energetic as inconsiderate - of this conception. Even one of the greatest eulogists of the English methods in naval warfare - which best reflect English history - the American, Captain Mahan, made famous through his book, " The Influence of Sea Power upon History," characterises it in his observations on the North American War of Independence, which ended in 1783": " To quote again the [French] summary before given, their [the Allies - America, France and Spain] object was ' to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical Empire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean.' The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica. The English fleet had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the Northern Powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English Empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than ever." Still, England has in process of time understood how to create an almost universal recognition of its claim. Its whole policy, based on the authority of its Fleet and the favourable situation of the British Isles, has always been adapted to the principle that all that may contribute "ad majorem gloriam Britanniae" is of advantage also to the progress of mankind.

The principal feature of the English character is markedly materialistic and reveals itself in a striving for power and profit. The commercial spirit, which animates the individual Englishman, colours the political and military dealings of the whole people. Their claims, to themselves a matter of course, went so far always that they never granted advantages to another, even if their utilisation was not possible to themselves at the time, but might perhaps be so later. That has manifested itself most clearly in the Colonial sphere.

The edifice of English world-importance and might has rested for a hundred years on the fame of Trafalgar, and they have carefully avoided hazarding it. They have besides, with skill and success, left untried no means of accentuating the impression of power and using it. What we should consider boastful was to the British only the expression of their full conviction and an obvious means to their end. In support of this we may mention such expressions as: "We have the ships, we have the men, we have the money, too," as well as ships' names, such as Irresistible, Invincible, Indomitable, Formidable, and many others.

This method, fundamentally, is really as the Poles asunder from ours, but still it does not fail to leave an impression on many Germans owing to its pomposity and the customary embroidery of commonplaces about promoting the happiness of mankind.

On the opposite side Prussia - Germany! Its whole history filled with struggle and distress, because the wars of Europe were carried on by preference on its territory. It was the nation of the Categorical Imperative, ever ready for privations and sacrifices, always raising itself again, till it seemed at last to have succeeded through the unification of the Empire in being able to reap the fruits of its hard-won position of power. The victory over the hard times it had to pass through was due to its idealism and to its tried loyalty to the Fatherland under the oppressions of foreign rule. The strength of our defensive power rested above all things on our conscientiousness and thoroughness acquired by strict discipline.

In contrast to the inaccessibility of the English island-position was our Continental situation in the heart of Europe, in many respects without natural defence on the frontiers, Instead of having wealth pouring in from all quarters of the globe, we had to toil in the sweat of our brows to support our people on the scanty native soil ; and yet we succeeded, in defiance of all difficulties, in elevating and advancing in undreamt-of fashion the economic status of the people while at the same time effecting their political unification.

In such a situation and after such experiences, schemes of conquest were utterly absent from the minds of the German people. They sought to find satisfaction for their need of expansion in peaceful fashion, so as not to hazard lightly their hard-won position of power. That we should be regarded as an unwelcome intruder in the circle of nations who felt themselves called upon to settle the fate of Europe and the world was due, apart from the deeply-wounded vanity of the French, to the mistrust of the British, to whose way of thinking our harmlessness appeared incredible.

In order to retain our position and to ensure the maintenance of our increasing wealth we had no other choice than to secure the ability to defend ourselves according to the old-established principle of the Wars of Liberation : by efficiency to compensate for what was lacking in numbers. How could we establish armies superior to those of our neighbours otherwise than by efficiency?

With the same fundamental motive we turned to the building-up of our sea power, as, owing to the increased dependence of our Administration on foreign countries and to the investment of vaster sums in German property on and oversea, our development unquestionably required protection.

The intention imputed to us of wishing to usurp British world-power never existed; our aims were much more simply explained by the provisions of the Navy Bills of a limited number of ships, which nowhere approached the English total. Nevertheless England considered herself threatened and saw in us a rival who must at any cost be destroyed. That this sentiment prevailed over there lay indeed less in the fact of the appearance of a sea Power of the second rank in a corner of the North Sea far removed from the world-oceans, than in the estimate of its worth. They foresaw the exercise in it of a spirit of progress which characterised the German nature, by which England felt herself hampered and prejudiced.

It is not disputed that through our fleet-construction a sharper note was introduced into our relations with England than would have resulted from peaceful competition alone, but it is not a just judgement, nor one going to the foundation of the German-English relations, if the disaster of the world-war or even of the unsuccessful result of the war is attributed simply to the building of the German Fleet. To that end it is necessary to consider the justification of our fleet-building and the reasons why the war was lost and what prospects existed for us of winning it. In that way we shall recognise the decisive role which fell to naval power after this struggle of nations grew into a world-war through England's accession to the side of Russia and France.

The mere apprehension of falling out with England could not and dare not form ground for refusing to such an important part of our national wealth as had accumulated in the undertakings bound up with our sea interests the necessary protection through a fleet, which the townsman, dependent on inland activities, enjoyed in the shape of our army and accepted as quite a matter of course.

The Empire was under an obligation to support and protect in their projects the shippers and merchants who undertook to dispose of the surplusage of our industrial energy in foreign lands and there establish new enterprises bringing profit to Germany. This connection with overseas was securing us universal benefit in so far as, by its means, the Homeland was enabled to employ and to feed all its inhabitants, so that, in spite of the great increase of population, emigration was no longer required as a safety-valve for the surplus man-strength. What the maintenance of the man-strength of a country means when converted into work, the last ten years and the war-years have shown us quite remarkably.

It is expected of every small State that it should make whatever efforts lie in its power to justify a claim to consideration of its independence. On this is based the guarantee, won in the international life of peoples with the advance of civilisation, that the weaker will not unjustifiably be fallen upon by the stronger.

The conduct of a Great Power which left its sea-interests without protection would have been as unworthy and contemptible as dishonourable cowardice in an individual; but it would have been most highly impolitic also, because it would have made it dependent on States more powerful at sea. The best army we could create would lose in value if Germany remained with the Achilles-heel of an unprotected foreign trade amounting to thousands of millions. Although the purpose of our competition on a peaceful footing followed from the modesty of our colonial claims, our policy did not succeed in removing England's suspicion ; but, considering the diversity of the claims of both peoples, having its roots in their world views, all the art of diplomacy could not have succeeded in so far bridging over the antagonisms that the recourse to arms would have been spared us.

Was there perchance still another method of creating, for ourselves the necessary protection against attacks at sea, which did not bear the provocative character that in England was attributed to the building of our High Sea Fleet ? Just as the desire for a German Fleet had for a long time been popular, so has the average German had little idea of the meaning of sea power and of its practical application. This is not to be wondered at, in view of the complete absence of national naval war-history. It will hence be necessary, in order to answer the question whether we chose the suitable naval armament for the condition of affairs in which the new Germany saw itself placed, to enter somewhat more closely into the peculiarities of naval warfare.

It has been held as an acknowledged axiom, proved from war-history, that the struggle at sea must be directed to gaining the mastery of the sea, i.e. to removing all opposition which stands in the way of its free and unhindered use.

The chief resisting strength lies in the enemy Fleet, and a successful struggle against it first renders possible the utilisation of the mastery of the seas, for thereupon one's own Fleet can go out with the object of attacking the enemy coasts or oversea possessions, of carrying out landings or preparing and covering the same on a larger scale (invasion). Finally, it can further shut off the enemy by means of a blockade from every sort of import from overseas and capture his merchant-ships with their valuable cargoes, until they are driven off the open sea. Contrary to the international usage in land warfare of sparing private property, there exists the principle of prize-right at sea, which is nothing more than a relic of the piracy which was pursued so vigorously in the form of privateering by the freebooters in the great naval war a hundred years ago.

The abrogation of the right of prize has hitherto always been frustrated by the opposition of England, although she herself possesses the most extensive merchant-shipping trade. For she looks for the chief effect of her sea power to the damaging of the enemy's sea-trade. In the course of time England, apparently yielding to the pressure of the majority of the other maritime States, has conceded limitations of the blockade and naval prize-rights - with the mental reservation, however, of disregarding them at pleasure - which suited the predominant Continental interest of these States. It deserves especially to be noticed that England has held inflexibly to this right to damage enemy (and neutral) trade because she was convinced of her superiority at sea. When our trade-war began, unexpectedly, to be injurious to the island-people they set all the machinery possible in motion to cause its condemnation.

It is possible in certain circumstances for the less powerful maritime States, according to position, coast-formation and ocean traffic, to protect themselves at their sensitive and assailable points by measures of coast-defence.

With us this course has found its zealous champions, first on account of cheapness, partly from a desire not to provoke the more powerful States, and finally on the ground of strategical considerations which lay in the same direction as those of the jeune ecole in France. The idea was to check an opponent by means of guerilla warfare and through direct attack on enemy trade, but the only result of the jeune ecole in France has been that the French Navy has sunk into insignificance. A system of guerilla warfare remains a struggle with inadequate means, which does not guarantee any success. England rightly did not at all fear the cruiser-war on her shipping trade, otherwise she would have given way on the question of the naval prize-right. As regards coast defence, we did not consider that policy, as it could not hinder the English from harming us, while it in no way affected them, seeing that our coasts do not impinge on the world-traffic routes, and did not come within the range of operations.

If the damage caused to one's own sea-trade (including that of the Colonies) becomes intolerable, as in our own case, means of coast-defence provide no adequate protection.

If it comes to the point that one must decide antagonisms by arms, the foremost consideration is no longer "how can I defend myself?" but "how can I hit the enemy most severely?" Attack, not defence, leads most quickly to the goal.

The best deterrent from war is, moreover, to impress on the enemy the certainty that he must thereby suffer considerably.

The method adopted by us of creating an efficient battle-fleet, an engagement with which involved a risk for England, offered not only the greatest prospect of preventing war, but also, if war could not be avoided, the best possibility of striking the enemy effectively. Of the issue of a fleet action it could with certainty be stated that the resultant damage to the English supremacy at sea would be great and correspond proportionately with our losses. Whilst we at need could get over such a sacrifice, it must exercise an intolerable effect on England, which relied on its sea power alone. How far these considerations, on which the construction of our Fleet was based, were recognised as correct on the English side, can be judged from the tactics of England's Fleet in the world-war, which throughout the struggle were based on the most anxious efforts to avoid suffering any real injury.

How our Fleet conducted itself in opposition to this, and succeeded in making the war at sea an effective menace to England will be evident from the following account of the war.


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User talk:Avantman42

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48 Conversation below water is carried on either by touch when the conversers are close enough together, or by sight or sound when they are at a distance.

In the former case, the speaker applies his forefinger to any part of the body of the person he is speaking to, and, by a rapid succession of gentle taps and strokes, conveys to him a sensible perception of what he wishes to say. While accompanying my Instructor, he was frequently accosted by persons whose business or pleasure brought them to where we were, and I was astonished at the rapidity and animation with which they seemed to converse by means of the tactile language I have attempted to describe.

When they wished to converse without coming in contact they took from their pockets two thimble-like instruments which they placed on their thumb and middle finger, and, by knocking them together, would produce a clicking noise, which could be distinctly heard at a considerable distance, and which conveyed what they wanted to say by means of slight and louder, rapid or more prolonged taps and pauses, perfectly comprehensible to those familiar with the language.

Or they would converse with equal facility by merely moving their fore-finger hither and thither with a rapidity the unaccustomed eye could scarcely follow, but which was equally efficacious in conveying a meaning to the initiated. As with our deaf and dumb people the conversation was much aided by shrugs, nods, and conventional signs which conveyed a great deal of meaning without the necessity for spelling out each word.

By diligent study of the elementary books I found in the Instructor's house, I soon acquired tolerable

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Rh proficiency in the language; and, as one common principle lay at the root of these three modes of conversing, in acquiring one I learned all three.

I was complimented by my instructor on the facility with which I had mastered all the accomplishments required to make me feel at my ease in the society of the subaqueous community, among whom he proposed to introduce me, when his duties as instructor would cease, and I might become practically acquainted with the institutions, the manners and the customs of my adopted country.

Hitherto we had seen but few of the inhabitants, as the spot where we had been sojourning was a sort of reserved space, not open to the general community, and only visited occasionally by persons who had some official connexion with my tutor, and who came thither to transact business with him.

I burned with eager desire to escape from the narrow limits to which I had all this time been confined, and to see and mingle with the word beyond. I was beginning to weary of the irksome discipline of study and exercise which my instructor imposed on me, and I felt quite capable of taking care of myself in a more extensive field of operations.

It was, therefore, with much satisfaction that I learned from my tutor that he considered my education sufficiently advanced to enable me to dispense with his further services.

"You are not, of course," he said, "by any means perfect in the accomplishments needed in your new abode, but you have obtained a smattering of them sufficient to enable you to mingle in society without much awkwardness, and your further development will 5em

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 Olden Times in Colorado - Types of Leadville Young Men in 1879.jpg TYPES OF LEADVILLE YOUNG MEN IN 1879

Lower Row (left to right)—Clinton Bennett, John Niblock, Wm. R. Day, Chas. Hendrie, Archie Martin, Fred Knolle. Second Row (left to right)—George Skinner, Robert Shipley, M. McNary, P. T. McClorky, Wm. Niblock. Upper Row (left to right)—Lew Rucker, Sam Warfield, John W. Ten Eyck and Mac Rucker.

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 Outlines of European History - Fig. 59.png

The view at the top shows the ruins of the great walled city which covered a group of hills like those of Rome. A modern village close by called Boghaz-Köi, has given the place its modern name; but the Hittites called the city Khatti. The view below shows a portion of the masonry walls of the city as they once were, when the Hittite kings lived here in the thirteenth century 113


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 MY FATHER AND MOTHER


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 J. E., R, W., AND R. F.


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25


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 A DINNER TABLE FOR SIX PERSONS.

114


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 CHINA AND EARTHENWARE.

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"If you have any raw ponies, always play them in big matches; it gets them accustomed to the crowd, and the band, and things."


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Major Bunker (who has been persuaded to join in a game of hockey for the first time, absent-mindedly preparing to drive). "Fore."


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Little Jones (to lady who has just collided with him). "I-I-I-I beg your pardon! I-I-I hope I haven't hurt you!"


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GENUINE ENTHUSIASM

(A Thaw Picture.)

What matter an inch or two of surface-water, if the ice be still sound underneath!


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—The annual football match between the Old Red Sandstone Rovers and the Pilocene Wanderers was immensely and deservedly popular!!


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.—Matches that strike upon the box.


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.—Football match. Romulus Rovers v. Nero Half-Backs.


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A MOTOR-HORSE STEEPLE-CHASE


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"NON EST INVENTUS"

(A Derby Problem.)

Ostler (on the Downs, after the races). "Don't you even remember 'is colour, guv'nor?"


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PREHISTORIC PEEPS

Even the "Derby" had its primeval counterpart.


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PREHISTORIC PEEPS

During a considerable portion of the year the skating was excellent, and was much enjoyed by all classes.


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Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 2

Chapter 2 - Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation
OUR High Sea Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. Since February, 1913, it had been under the command of Admiral von Ingenohl, who was flying his flag in the battleship Friedrich der Grosse. The High Sea Fleet was composed of three squadrons, cruisers and destroyers :

SQUADRON I

Vice-Admiral von Lans (In Command). Rear-Admiral Gaedecke (Second in Command).

Battleships

Ostfriesland. Thuringen. Helgoland. Oldenburg. Posen. Rheinland. Nassau. Westfalen.

SQUADRON II

Vice-Admiral Scheer (In Command). Commodore Mauve (Second in Command).

Battleships

Preussen. Schlesien. Hessen. Lothringen. Hannover. Schleswig-Holstein. Pommern. Deutschland.

SQUADRON III

Rear-Admiral Funke (In Command).

Battleships

Kaiser. Kaiserin. König Albert. Prinz Regent Luitpold.

Cruisers

Rear-Admiral Hipper (In Command). Rear-Admiral Maass (Second in Command). Rear-Admiral Tapken.

Battle-Cruisers

Seydlitz. Moltke. Von der Tann.

Light Cruisers.

Koln. Mainz. Stralsund. Kolberg. Rostock. Strassburg.

Seven Destroyer Flotillas

(In peace these were only occasionally under the orders of the High Sea Fleet.)

Tenders

Hela (small cruiser of no fighting value). Pfeil. Blitz. At this point I must say something about the organisation of the Fleet in order to present a picture of its fighting value. As is well known, our Navy Bills had provided for a total of 41 battleships, 20 battle-cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 12 destroyer flotillas and 4 submarine flotillas. This fleet was divided into the Home Fleet and the Foreign Fleet. The nucleus of the Home Fleet was the High Sea Fleet which was principally concerned with preparing itself for battle in case of war. In order to devote ourselves wholly to that purpose and be in a condition to be sent wherever required - that is, be permanently mobile - it was relieved of all other tasks and these were assigned to special ships (Training, Gunnery, and Specialist). The result of this was that a continuously high standard of preparedness in battle-practice was not to be attained under our system because every year a portion of each crew went to the Reserve and had to be replaced by recruits who for the most part came to the sea service as utter novices. The most varied efforts to tide over the period of weakness that was thus involved every autumn had hitherto led to no conclusive results. From our point of view the fact that this war broke out in summer was thus peculiarly unfavourable. The training, gunnery and specialist ships were used for the education of the rising generation of officers and embryo officers (cadets and midshipmen) and the training of gunnery, torpedo, and mine specialists, as well as coast survey and fishery protection. As a rule, these duties were assigned to older ships which were no longer fit to take their place in the first battle line. For example, the old armoured cruisers Herta, Hansa, Freya, Vineta, and Viktoria Luise were employed as training ships. It had not been found possible to avoid calling on the modern ships for the special purpose of gunnery and torpedo practice, although the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was very reluctant to part with them because the training of these ships for war purposes was limited to a very short period of the year. Our weakness in cruisers with the High Sea Fleet - for the requirements of foreign stations had to be satisfied as well - was particularly deplorable. We had abroad a cruiser squadron in Eastern Asia and two cruisers (Goeben and Breslau) in the Mediterranean, in addition to a few old gunboats stationed permanently at various places. The cruiser squadron under Count Spee consisted of the two battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the light cruisers Niimberg, Emden, Dresden, and Leipzig. In this connection importance was attached to sending the best that we had in the way of light cruisers to foreign seas. As regards battle-cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which were a match for any pre-Dreadnought cruiser, had to suffice, while we had only three battle-cruisers in home waters, as Goeben was in the Mediterranean, and Derfflinger and Liitzow were not yet ready. Another battle-cruiser, Bliicher, was being employed in gunnery practice. With her twelve 21-cm. guns and the speed of 25 knots, she was considerably inferior in fighting value to the first of the English battle-cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which dated from two years later and carried eight 30.5-cm. guns.

Besides the ships commissioned for training and experimental purposes there were a certain number of other ships in home waters which, as provided by the Navy Bills, were to form the Reserve Fleet. As the provisions of the Navy Bills had not yet been worked out, of these formations only a nucleus in the shape of the battleship Wittelsbach could be kept permanently in commission. Another ship of the same class, the Wettin, was used as a gunnery training school, while the rest were docked and received only as much attention as was required to keep their engines, structure, and armaments in proper condition.

On mobilisation, all training and experimental ships stopped their work and passed under the command of the High Sea Fleet. Out of the ships in reserve in dock, Squadrons IV, V and VI were formed. The battleships of the "Wittelsbach" class formed Squadron IV under the former Inspector of Gunnery, Vice-Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt ; the ships of the older "Kaiser" class made up Squadron V (Vice-Admiral Grepow); while the old coast defence cruisers of the "Siegfried" class formed Squadron VI (Rear-Admiral Eckermann).

Thanks to careful preparation, the ships were put on a war footing without the slightest hitch. Of course, it took some further time before the ships' companies of Squadrons IV, V, and VI were so advanced in training, either as individual units or in combination, that they could be used for war purposes. With a view to increasing the peace establishment, the crews of the High Sea Fleet received on mobilisation an extra quota of men, who joined the ships in the first days and were a very welcome reinforcement.

While steaming at full speed was seldom permitted in peace time, in order to economise coal and save the engines, in war a ship must be in a condition, as soon as she gets to sea, to develop the utmost capacity of her engines, and so all the boilers must be used continuously. With a crew of about a thousand men, which is normal for battleships and battle-cruisers, it is essential to make allowance for a certain percentage of sick and other casualties. Such deficiencies were made good by the mobilisation "supplement," which amounted to about 10 per cent, of the peace establishment. As the war proceeded, the system proved its usefulness by enabling us to let the men go on leave without lowering the standard of the ships' readiness for battle to a disadvantageous degree. The reinforcement was particularly important to the battle-cruisers, which, in view of their enormous consumption of coal in order to attain the very highest speed, were not in a position, with the engine-room complement allowed by establishment, to bring the coal from the. more distant bunkers to the stokehold, so that help had to be requisitioned from the sailors. As far as possible, the bunkers in the immediate vicinity of the stokehold were left untouched, in readiness for action, when not a man on board could be spared from his action station.

The system of command is a question of special importance to the organisation of a navy. The bulk of the ships in home waters were under the command of a single authority, the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet. Of course, the ships at distant stations abroad could not be under his command, and certain ships in home waters, operating in a theatre which had no absolutely direct connection with the operations in the main theatre, had a Commander-in-Chief of their own. The number of ships combined under one command must not be so large that their commander cannot control and lead them in action, for one of the most material differences between fighting on land and at sea is that in the latter case the commander himself goes into the firing line. But command goes hand in hand with responsibility for the execution of all plans, and it was therefore a doubtful policy to establish an authority above the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet who had the most important forces under his command. In view of the peculiarities of naval warfare, the higher authority cannot be in a position to settle beforehand the details of time and method of any particular enterprise which has been decided upon, in the same way as this is both possible and essential for the command of operations on land.

However, the demands of the various theatres in which fighting took place in this war made some central authority necessary which could distribute the number of ships required for all purposes, and which could also have strong influence on the conduct of operations in the individual theatres. The authority for this purpose was the Naval Staff, in which the preliminary work on the plan of operations had already been done. The Chief of the Naval Staff had the duty of laying the proposed orders for the operations before the Supreme War Lord, to whom the Constitution gave the supreme command over all our forces on land and sea. After these orders had received the Imperial approval, the Chief of the Naval Staff had to transmit them to the Fleet.

The functions of the Naval Staff assumed particular importance in this war, in which the closest co-operation of the Fleet and Army for the common end was of quite special importance. The development of the Navy, which had grown to the status of a great war machine in the last decades, had not, however, admitted of the simultaneous satisfaction of the requirements in personnel which made themselves felt in all quarters. The working of the Naval Staff had suffered from this cause in peace time and it produced its effect in war. In peace the influence of the State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Administration was paramount, especially when that office was held by a personality like Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who by his outstanding abilities had gained an influence which no naval officer had ever before exercised in the history of our Navy. In war, on the other hand, he had no direct influence on the conduct of operations.

The development of our Navy had not taken place without numerous differences of opinion about the best method of its construction. At the front and in the Naval Staff the principal requirement was considered to be that the existing Fleet should be so complete in all its details, and therefore so ready for war, that all differences would be made good. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, who had a great programme in mind and steadily pursued its realisation, attached more importance to having all the essential elements ready, and as regards secondary matters, trusting more or less to improvisation if war came before the final development of the Fleet had been realised. He accordingly promoted the construction of battleships and destroyers primarily, bearing in mind the root principle from which our Navy Bills had sprung, that with the Fleet we should create a weapon which should be strong enough to fight against a superior hostile fleet. The course of the war has proved the soundness of that principle.

Only in one material point were our strategical views based on an assumption which proved unfounded, the assumption that the English Fleet, which had kept ahead of ours in its construction at every stage, would seek battle in the German Bight in the North Sea, or would force its way to wherever it hoped to find the German Fleet. On that account we had attached particular importance to the greatest defensive and offensive powers, and considered we might regard speed and radius of action as secondary matters. The difference between our type of ships and that of the English shows that in both Fleets strategic ideas governed the method of construction. The English were content with less armour, but attached importance to higher speed and the largest possible calibre of gun so that they could impose on their opponent their own choice of battle area.

Side by side with the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet a special command was introduced for the Baltic forces. The commanders of ships in foreign waters! were of course independent and received their orders through the Chief of the Naval Staff, whose co-operation in the business of procuring coal and supplies for the conduct of cruiser warfare could not be dispensed with.

Thus for the first time in German history sea power also was to play a mighty part in the great fight for existence with which our nation was faced. As regards the handling of our Fleet, we had not only to consider how we could bring about the most favourable opportunity of winning the victory, but also what tasks, within the framework of the combined operations, fell to our share. The strategical plans of the Army had a decisive influence on the functions of the Fleet. The Navy had the duty of supporting the Army in its uphill task of fighting a superior enemy on two fronts in such a way that its rear was unconditionally secured against any danger threatening from the north. So long as it was only a question of fighting the Dual Alliance the Army was relieved of all anxiety from that direction, as the Fleet was quite equal to its task. The Army had made its plans in such a way that victory could be expected from an offensive, and the full weight of that offensive would at first be directed to one spot. It followed from this that at the outset a defensive attitude would be adopted on the other front, and all preparations for defence would have to be made in that quarter.

The third front, the sea front, acquired a special importance when England joined the ranks of our opponents. But so far as can be seen from the course of the war no material change was made in the fundamental principles underlying our strategic operations on land. As I was then only holding the position of commander of a squadron, I did not know whether, in view of the increasing hostility of England, the idea was considered of adopting a fresh joint plan of operations for the Army and the Fleet, which would be based on the notion of improving our defensive prospects against England. This could have been obtained by the speediest possible acquisition of the sector of the French coast which commanded the Dover-Calais line. In this way the English cross-Channel transport service, as well as the trade routes to the Thames, would have been seriously threatened. If only we had realised from the start that the influence of England's sea power on the course of the war would be as great as it turned out to be later, to our disadvantage, a higher importance would have been attached to this question at the outset. As it happened, the course of the campaign in France forced us into a position in which we were nothing but the flank protection of the right wing of our Army which stretched to the sea and therefore brought us the Flemish coast as our starting point, though nothing like so valuable, for attacks against England. The Navy had to spring into the breach and take up the defence against English sea power. It appeared obvious that the entry of England into the ranks of our enemies would not divert the Army from its task. The Army considered it much more obvious that the Navy should support it by hindering the passage of transports across the Channel. The protection of these transports was one of the principal functions of the English Fleet. We could only interfere with it at the price of a decisive battle with the English Fleet, and even if the encounter took a favourable course there was no guarantee that we should attain our end of permanently and effectively interrupting supplies from overseas. We shall have to go into the feasibility of such plans at a later stage.

Even without the inauguration of a comprehensive and detailed plan of operations for the Army and Navy the military situation required that the movements of the Navy should be adapted to the progress of the Army's operations lest the failure of some naval undertaking should put the Army in the dilemma of having to relax its own offensive or perhaps break it off altogether.

The enemy, too, cannot have failed to realise the importance of the German Fleet for a favourable development of the war on land. If the enemy ever succeeded in securing the command of the Baltic and landing Russian troops on the coast of Pomerania our Eastern front must have collapsed altogether and brought to naught our plan of campaign, which consisted of a defensive attitude in the East and the rapid overthrow of the French Army. The command of the Baltic rested on the power of the German Fleet. If we had destroyed the Russian Fleet our danger from the Baltic would by no means have been eliminated, as a landing could have been carried out just as easily under the protection of English naval forces if the German Fleet no longer existed to hinder it. For such a purpose the English Fleet had no need to venture into the Baltic itself. They had it in their power to compel us to meet them in the North Sea immediately they made an attack upon our coast. In view of such an eventuality we must not weaken ourselves permanently, as we could not help doing if we attempted to eliminate the danger which the Russian Fleet represented for us in the Baltic.

It was all the more probable that the English Fleet would attack because the combined enemy fleets would then have a free hand against our coasts. It was improbable that England would seek battle with the German Fleet - which she was bound to regard as her primary naval objective - in the Baltic where all the advantages were on our side.

For this reason the concentration area of our Fleet mas the North Sea. It was from there that we could threaten the east coast of England and therefore tie up the English Fleet in the North Sea. We could always deal in time (by using the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal) with any attempt of the English to penetrate into the Baltic. At the outset somewhat weak observation forces had to suffice against the Russians, and these forces had to try to intimidate the Russians into the same course of action by adopting offensive methods wherever possible. Mines could do us good service in that respect. This method of intimidation, however, could only be effective so long as we could still employ a superior force against the Russians, and we should abandon that superiority out of hand if we attempted to seek battle with the English Fleet under unfavourable circumstances, because, to say the least of it, the result was doubtful. In view of the high state of preparedness and the superiority of the English Fleet probabilities pointed to a failure for us which would have a fateful effect on the final result of the war.

Apart from the fact that these considerations urged caution, at the beginning of the war we were without any certain data as to the whereabouts of the English Fleet, and could only acquire some by observation of the movements of the enemy. We had to expect an attack in the greatest possible strength because our unfavourable strategic situation, which was due to the geographical formation of the North Sea theatre, put us at a disadvantage at the outset. Our position in the North Sea suffered from the fact that for any enterprise we had only one point of exit : in that far corner which faces the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. From it alone could the Fleet emerge for an attack, and to it must return again to seek the shelter of our bases in the estuaries of the Jade and Elbe. The route round Skagen and the Belt was closed to us, as the Danes had laid minefields in these waters. The sides of the "Wet Triangle," the apex of which can be imagined at Heligoland, ended at Sylt in the north and the mouth of the Ems in the west. The left bank of the Ems is in Dutch, and therefore neutral, territory. All movements of ships there could accordingly be observed and the observation brought to the knowledge of the enemy in the shortest time. The channel at Sylt is navigable solely for destroyers and light cruisers, and then only in favourable conditions of wind and tide.

On the other hand, the east coast of England offered a whole series of safe anchorages for large ships, indeed for the whole Fleet. As appears from the map, the English coast takes a westerly direction the farther north it gets, so that on our attacks against the northern bases our distance from home is increased, to the great advantage of the enemy.

While we could be taken in flank from the south if we attacked the English Fleet, thinking it to be in the north, and taken in the flank from the north if we made our attack in the south, the English were in the favourable position that as they approached our coast they need expect danger from only one quarter immediately ahead, the German Bight. They could send out submarines against the one base from which we should have to emerge, to do us all the damage they could on our way out and home, and need only keep that one point under observation. That relieved them of the obligation of detaching special observation forces.

THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET

FLAGSHIP

Iron Duke.

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

Marlborough. St. Vincent. Colossus. Hercules. Neptune. Vanguard. Collingwood. Superb.

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

King George V. Orion. Ajax. Audacious. Centurion. Conqueror. Monarch. Thunderer.

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

King Edward VII. Hibernia. Commonwealth. Zealandia. Dominion. Africa. Britannia. Hindustan.

FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

Dreadnought. Temeraire. Bellerophon. Agincourt. Erin. Queen Elizabeth. War spite. Valiant. Barham.

FIRST BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON

Battle-Cruisers

Lion. Princess Royal. Queen Mary. New Zealand. Invincible. Inflexible. Indomitable. Indefatigable.

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON.

Shannon. Achilles. Cochrane. Natal.

THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON.

Antrim. Argyll. Devonshire. Roxburgh.

FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

Southampton. Birmingham. Nottingham. Lowestoft.

Destroyer Flotillas (number and composition unknown).

The above ships formed The Grand Fleet under the command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

THE SECOND BRITISH FLEET.

Flagship

Lord Nelson

FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON.

Battleships

Prince of Wales. Agamemnon. Bulwark. Formidable. Implacable. Irresistible. London. Queen. Venerable.

SIXTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

Russell. Cornwallis. Albemarle. Duncan. Exmouth. Vengeance.

FIFTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Light Cruisers

Carnarvon. Falmouth. Liverpool.

SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON.

Drake. Good Hope. King Alfred. Leviathan.

THE THIRD BRITISH FLEET

Seventh Battle Squadron Eighth Battle Squadron Eight ships of the "Majestic" class. Six ships of the "Canopus" class.

Seventh Cruiser Squadron Ninth Cruiser Squadron Tenth Cruiser Squadron Eleventh Cruiser Squadron Twelfth Cruiser Squadron

They comprised older cruisers, such as:

Cressy. Aboukir. Hogue. Hawke. Theseus. Crescent. Edgar. Endymion. Gibraltar. Grafton. Royal Arthur.

The Second and Third British Fleets were combined into the Channel Fleet under a special Commander-in-Chief.

With these enormous forces England was certainly in a position to make us feel the weight of her sea power. The most effective method of doing so would be the destruction of our Fleet. This was also the view of the English Commander-in-Chief at that time, who put it in these words:

"The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by destroying the enemy's armed naval forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve victory."

The English Fleet did not live up to these proud words, in spite of its strength and the geographical position. Yet our belief that it would act thus was thoroughly justified, and we had to decide our attitude accordingly.

In the War Orders which were issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet the task before him was framed as follows: The objective of the operations must be to damage the English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been got ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our Fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. Of course, if a favourable occasion for battle presented itself before, it must be exploited. Further, operations against enemy merchant ships were to be conducted in accordance with Prize Court regulations, and the ships appointed to carry out such operations in foreign waters were to be sent out as soon as possible.

The order underlying this plan of campaign was this: The Fleet must strike when the circumstances are favourable; it must therefore seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of equality has been achieved by the methods of guerilla warfare.

It thus left the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet freedom of action to exploit any favourable opportunity and put no obstacles in his way, but it required of him that he should not risk the whole Fleet in battle until there was a probability of victory. Moreover, it started from the assumption that opportunities would arise of doing the enemy damage when, as was to be expected, he initiated a blockade of the German Bight which was in accordance with the rules of International Law. It is also to be emphasised that a submarine offensive was only required "whenever possible." The achievements of our U-boats absolutely exceeded all expectations, thanks to the energy with which the command faced the most difficult problem and the resolution of the commanders and crews, on their own initiative, to do more than was required of them.

As regards operations in the Baltic, the War Orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet contained no instructions, as a special Commander-in-Chief had been appointed for this area. If the English Fleet tried to carry the war into the Baltic, the condition precedent (a favourable opportunity for attack) laid down in the War Orders to the High Sea Fleet would materialise in the simplest fashion.


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Maltravers, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Malvern, William of


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Malverne, John


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Malvoisin, William


text:
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 3

Chapter 3 - Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive
ON August 2 the Commander-in-Chief had summoned all the commanders of the three battleship squadrons, cruisers, destroyers and submarines to the flagship, and there explained to them the task set in the War Orders and his intentions with regard to it. Instructions had just been received from the Naval Staff that on the express wish of the Foreign Office no hostile action should be taken against English warships and merchant ships, as all hope of England's neutrality had not yet been abandoned. In his desire to keep England out of the war the Imperial Chancellor had gone so far as to enter into an obligation, through our ambassador in London, not to conduct operations in the Channel or against the north coast of France if England remained neutral. In this way she would be released from her own obligation to protect the north coast of France with the English Fleet. The same day, however, we received subsequent instructions that the English cable communications with the Continent had been broken off, and that we had to anticipate hostile action on the part of England.

How universal was the conviction that the English Navy would immediately take the offensive is illustrated by the fact that after the conference with the Commander-in-Chief the Commander of Squadron I advised me very strongly to take Squadron II to the Elbe during the night, instead of waiting till next morning as had been arranged, as otherwise we might arrive too late. However, we adhered to the original decision to take up the anchorage appointed for us in the Elbe the next day (August 3), and, as the necessary precautions were taken by sending a mine-sweeping division ahead, the movement was carried out without any mishap.

To take up its anchorage in the Altenbruch Roads, between Cuxhaven and Brunsbuttel, Squadron II had to pass through the minefield which had meanwhile been laid at the mouth of the Elbe. In this river there was a dangerous congestion of vessels which were trying to get out as fast as they could. Among them were some English steamers which would not pay attention to the warnings of the pilot ship, so that there was a dangerous crush in this difficult and narrow channel. The English steamer Wilfred paid for its temerity by running on the mines and was sunk by two explosions following closely on each other. We thus had an opportunity of observing a practical demonstration of the effect of mines. After this occurrence the Commandant of the fortress of Cuxhaven, who was responsible for the security of the estuary, gave orders that all ships were to be sent back to Hamburg so that their knowledge of the position of the minefield should not be turned to the advantage of the enemy.

The next day brought us the English declaration of war. A few hours later the first English submarine was reported in the German Bight. The security of the Heligoland Bight required prompt information of the enemy's intentions so that we could meet him in strength with our naval forces without ourselves suffering from the enemy's counter-measures on our way out. This object could be attained by submarines or mine-layers of which the latter could slip out under cover of darkness and sow the exits from the estuaries with mines. We had also to expect that floating mines would be sown in the mouths of the rivers with a view to their drifting up stream with the tide and endangering our ships lying at anchor. We knew of one type of English mine which drifted with the rising tide only, sank to the bottom when the tide ebbed and then rose again and floated farther up stream. Mines of this kind would have been able to get much farther - in fact to the anchorage of our ships - instead of drifting backwards and forwards in a limited area through the action of ebb and flow, and thereby being stranded in due course.

We had also to anticipate that enemy submarines would penetrate into the rivers. Although the depth of water was not great the passage of submarines, when submerged, was by no means impossible. It was only later, when the depth charge had been evolved, that submarines needed greater depth to escape their effect. Even if the enemy shrank somewhat from such venturesome enterprises as these, it was enough for him to haunt the neighbourhood of the estuaries to operate against our big ships the moment we attempted to gain the open sea.

It is true that we had two types of protection against these dangerous possibilities; first, the initiation of technical defence measures such as mines, nets and so forth, and secondly, the sharpest lookout on the part of the ships engaged in observation duties. If the enemy tried to bring on an action in the neighbourhood of Heligoland - and we assumed he would - we suffered from the outset under a disadvantage if we had to deploy for it out of the estuaries. The narrow exits from the Elbe and the Jade prescribed the line of deployment and compelled the ships to follow in line ahead, a formation which provides splendid opportunities for lurking submarines. For this reason prompt knowledge of the enemy's approach as well as his strength was of particular importance in enabling us to go out and meet him in the open sea with the necessary forces. In the first days of August we attained such a state of preparedness that all the big ships were kept under steam all day, ready to weigh anchor at any moment. We could not concentrate in the outer roads because the submarine obstructions had not yet been laid.

The time from the receipt of a report about the enemy to the issue of the appropriate orders, and then again from the first execution of those orders to the arrival at the appointed rendezvous at sea, was not inconsiderable. According to the state of readiness of the ships and the choice of anchorage it might take hours, during which the enemy would continue his approach unimpeded. Thus arose the necessity of getting the report as soon as possible. But the greater the distance from Heligoland of the arc which had to be covered by our reconnaissance and observation patrols, the less carefully could it be watched. The greater distance either demanded more ships or involved less reliable information when the line was held too thinly.

The use of wireless telegraphy came in extraordinarily handy for intelligence purposes. Unfortunately a large number of the older destroyers which had now been attached to the mine-sweeping division had not yet been fitted with this highly ingenious piece of equipment. The result was that in certain circumstances very valuable time might be lost.

The establishment of a protective system was entrusted to the Commander of the scouting forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, and all the destroyer flotillas, U-boats, mine-sweeping divisions, aero- planes and airships were placed under his orders. From these forces a protective zone was formed which by day consisted of several circles at varying distances from the lightship "Elbe I." The outermost line, 35 nautical miles (of 1,852 metres) was held by destroyers. Six nautical miles behind there were submarines, and a further six miles back the inmost line was patrolled by mine-sweeping divisions. Two to four light cruisers were distributed behind the two wings of this protective zone, east and south of Heligoland. At night the U-boats and the destroyers on the outermost line were withdrawn, and only the inner one was held. The result of this was that we had all the more destroyers at hand for nocturnal enterprises.

This whole system, however, was more useful for protection than for reconnoitring. It did not extend far enough for the latter purpose. Even if the approach of serious enemy forces at a distance of fifteen miles was reported from the outermost line, these ships, by steaming at full speed, could be within range of the fortress of Heligoland in about an hour and a half. In that time only the ships lying in the outer Jade could gain the open sea. The ships lying in the Elbe at Cuxhaven or in the Wilhelmshaven Roads in the Jade needed longer. If we had depended on this system alone we should have found ourselves in the condition either of being surprised by the enemy and having to meet him in insufficient strength, or having to keep the whole Fleet in a perpetual state of readiness. The latter alternative was impossible in the long run. The duties of the destroyers and cruisers in the protective zone and the necessity of relieving them every few days (for the strain of this anxious service on the personnel at sea would otherwise have worn them out) absorbed such a large force of light units that their principal task of seeking out and attacking the enemy far away in the North Sea before he got to close quarters with us was seriously affected.

Our commanders were therefore faced with a many-sided problem which was made more difficult by the limited resources at our disposal : to avoid any chance of surprise, to prevent the safety of the Bight being endangered by mines or submarines in such a way that the Fleet would not have the necessary freedom of movement to get out of harbour, and finally to seek out the enemy himself in the North Sea and do him as much damage as possible by guerilla operations. It was, therefore, a very proper decision to entrust all these tasks to one commander who had to make his dispositions with an eye to wind and weather, breakdowns, injuries and the absences these involve, and question of coaling, as well as the multifarious duties laid upon him. In view of the relatively little bunker capacity of the smaller ships, it was continuously necessary to replenish supplies. Their ships' companies also suffered from heavy weather far more than those of the big ships, and therefore required relief sooner.

Nor was it a simple matter .to regulate the system of transmission of orders and intelligence by wireless in such a way as to be certain of getting messages accurately and promptly, and avoiding confusion through the operations of other stations, especially such as were in a different sphere of command.

In our situation aeroplanes and airships played a particularly important part. Unfortunately, their number was very small at the start. Heligoland was fitted up as an aviation station, but at first disposed of only five aeroplanes. The number was subsequently increased to eight. In the early days we had only the one airship, "L 3," for distance reconnaissance. The most zealous efforts were made to cruise in all kinds of weather, and so praiseworthy was the persistence shown that these cruises often extended to within sight of the Norwegian coast.

Side by side with the organisation of the protective zone, the organisation of the defences of the North Sea islands, the most important of which was Heligoland, was completed under the direction of the Headquarters of the North Sea Naval Stations, Vice-Admiral von Krosigk, at Wilhelmshaven. It was also the duty of this authority to carry out the evacuation of the native population, who did not at all like leaving their island, and arranging their transfer to the mainland. They had been previously prepared for this eventuality, and their transport presented no special difficulties. The establishment of minefields and the substitution of buoys to mark the war channels for those of the peace-time channels was also the business of the Naval Stations Headquarters.

Another of its duties was the removal of landmarks which could be seen far out to sea, and would thus be known to the enemy and might enable him to find his bearings.

One victim of this bitter necessity was the venerable old church tower of Wangeroog, the island adjacent to the Jade channel. From time immemorial it had been an object of affectionate familiarity to seafarers. It had stood so long that the whole island had gradually slid past beneath its feet, in consequence of the movement from west to east which is peculiar to the sands of the North Sea. It was now so close to the west side of the island that its walls were washed by the waves.

Harbour flotillas were formed to watch the minefields and guard the entrances to our own rivers. These flotillas were within the sphere of action of the fortresses, and therefore were likewise under the command of the Naval Stations Headquarters. The release of the Fleet from such duties definitely proved a sound idea, and thanks to the understanding and co-operation of all services, all further requirements which cropped up as time went by were generously met.

The organisation of the lightship system was of great importance. As soon as war threatened, all the lights in the lightships were extinguished, and the light-buoys removed, so that the whole coast was in darkness. It was impossible to do without lights at night altogether when cruising by the dangerous North Sea coast and navigating the strong current off the mouths of the Elbe, Weser and Ems. Further, lights that were easily recognisable had to be shown to indicate the position of the minefields and the channels through them. Yet in spite of the difficulties of navigation, darkness had the immense advantage that it enabled us to slip out unnoticed, and therefore without great risk, so that night time was preferred for such operations. Of course, the lights must not be shown a moment longer than was necessary for the purposes of navigation. Further, it must be possible for incoming ships to show their lights and be safe against any tricks on the part of the enemy. The main thing was that the light should be shown exactly at the right moment. The outer lightships at the mouths of the Jade and Elbe, which also served as observation stations and had military personnel, certainly had no easy task in the long and stormy nights of the four and a half years' war. We depended on their reliability just as much as on that of all the other posts which existed to assist the navigation of our Fleet, whether the safety of a single steamer or that of a whole squadron was at stake. Special thanks are due to the officers of the Imperial Pilot Service and its chief, Commander Krause. They were always reliable advisers to the commanders of squadrons and ships.

Our view of the whole situation and the War Orders issued to the Fleet made it imperative to get at the outset data as to the movements of the enemy. While the North Sea islands and the estuaries were being put into a state of defence, the primary requirement was security against surprise. The battleship squadron and battle-cruisers (at their anchorages) used these few days to prepare for action. With Squadron II, in the construction of whose ships less importance had been attached to the use of fireproof material than in the later ships, it was a question of removing everything that was dangerous from that point of view and could at all be dispensed with. This had a very adverse effect on the comfort of the wardrooms and cabins as well as the men's quarters, in which all the wooden beams were removed from the thin sheet-iron partitions as well as the sides of the ship.

The removal of wooden chairs, tables, curtains, tablecloths, easy chairs and such like, the scraping off of paint which was too thick, the transfer of clothes and supplies of all kinds to the space under the armoured decks where they could not easily be got at, took up a lot of time and produced a good deal of noise and discontent. However, the work of destruction was carried out with as much devotion as if it were the enemy himself who was being destroyed, and in the certain expectation that we should not have to wait long for the actual meeting.

Although in peace time everything possible had been thought of which might prove useful or necessary in the emergencies of action, there were always fresh possibilities of perfecting measures and preparing for all conceivable occurrences with things such as rafts, steel nets, anchor cables, lifebelts, and so on. As the Flag Officers of .the squadron passed from ship to ship in order to supervise the work that was in progress and make further suggestions, they noted what seemed to them useful on any particular ship and handed the information on to the others.

In this work were associated the newly-joined seamen ratings, mostly reservists, who had served on the same ships not long before, and among whom I recognised many old acquaintances, for, with the exception of a break of one year, I had been with the Fleet continuously since 1907. My pleasure at meeting them again was mingled with a feeling of pride at the sight of the manly, healthy, and robust figures which had developed out of the former recruits or ordinary seamen. It went to my heart to see with what a straightforward sense of duty these men, whose resolve to stand on their own feet through industry and efficiency was plain to the eyes, had left behind them everything they loved and cherished in order to be present when the day came to meet the foe.

We spent the first days of suspense and expectation in this essential work. The opening days of the war gained a particular interest from the varying reports of home-coming steamers or our patrols, the series of false alarms about aeroplanes and submarines, firing at night, or the showing of lights in improbable directions, the explosion of mines in shallow spots in the Elbe (phenomena which subsequently found a natural explanation, though at first attributed to enemy activity), our isolation from all human intercourse - although we could see the cows grazing peacefully on the banks of the Elbe 300 yards away - and the organisation of the watches. In the further distance there was no visible sign of any change in the wonted scenes of peace, for there was still a lively movement of ships in the Elbe, and every incoming German steamer had a particularly warm welcome for having succeeded in getting safely home. But the wireless messages flashing to and fro might at any moment summon us out to meet the foe.

Preparations for the offensive were not neglected during the days in which England was making up her mind what her attitude was to be, and when at 7.47 p.m. on August 4 we received the message, "Prepare for war with England," we also heard the order to the auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm to put to sea immediately. At 9.30 P.M. the auxiliary minelayer Konigin Luise also left the Ems on the way to the Thames estuary. Thus began the first essay in cruiser warfare and the introduction of guerilla operations on the English coast. In the wireless room of the Flagship we listened hopefully for further news of the progress of the first two enterprises against the enemy. Would the great ocean greyhound be forced back, or would she succeed in getting unchallenged into the ocean? She remained dumb, and that could justly be taken as a favourable sign.

The wireless message to the Konigin Luise had run: "Make for sea in Thames direction at top speed. Lay mines near as possible English coasts, not near neutral coasts, and not farther north than Lat 53." The task assigned to the Konigin Luise gave little ground for the hope that she could escape the watchfulness of the English; but, with a supreme contempt of death, the ship, under the command of Commander Biermann, held on her way. The steamer which usually plied in summer to the watering-places of the North Sea islands was engaged about 11 a.m. next morning by enemy cruisers and destroyers, and was sunk by a torpedo.

She had had time to sow her mines, however, with the result that the cruiser Amphion (3,500 tons, launched 1911), which was pursuing her, fell a victim to them and followed the Konigin Luise to the bottom with a loss of 131 men. Thus the first day of the war (August 5) had brought losses to both sides, and the first attack on the English coast had been a success for us.

However, the sacrifice it had involved had not been incurred in vain. It was not merely that it had cost the enemy a new cruiser. Far more important was the impression that this proof of a bold spirit of enterprise must have made on friend and foe alike. The situation at the outset thus appeared in such a light that in view of these aggressive operations the enemy thought that he could best protect himself by withdrawing to northern waters, and did not take the other alternative of closing our sally ports himself. Throughout the whole war not a single mine was sown in our estuaries, notwithstanding the thousands upon thousands which were employed in the open waters of the North Sea.

As the next few days passed without incident, and aeroplanes and airships had made no discoveries, while incoming steamers reported that English battleships were only to be seen at a great distance (by Aberdeen) from the German Bight, our business was now to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and get to close quarters with him if we were to bring about an equalisation of strength. For this purpose we had at our disposal the destroyers and submarines which could be spared from the defensive organisation of the Heligoland Bight.

Commander Bauer, in command of the U-boats, was convinced that the defensive employment of submarines in a narrow circle round Heligoland was useless, as there was only a slight probability that the enemy would approach so close, and even if he did it was doubtful whether the boats would get a chance to shoot. The necessity of perpetually coming in and going out of the harbour of Heligoland, a difficult process in view of the methods employed in the defensive system, led to a useless strain on the material and injury to the boats. He therefore represented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet that only the offensive use of U-boats could bring about a change. The number of boats employed must certainly be larger, but the prospects of success would be greater still.

The justice of this argument was recognised, and a decision was taken which was extremely important for the further course of the war. Nor was there much hesitation in carrying it into execution, for the U-boats received orders to proceed on August 6 against English battleships, the presence of which was suspected in the North Sea. These ships were supposed to be about 200 nautical miles from Heligoland and charged with the duty of intercepting some of our battleships which ought to be on their way from Kiel round Skagen into the North Sea because the passage of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal presented too great difficulties Ten U-boats were assigned to this enterprise, and six days were allowed for it.

This cruise was to carry the ships across the entire North Sea and as far north as the Orkneys. The boats were left to their own devices, as the cruisers Hamburg and Stettin, parent ships of the U-boat flotilla, could, of course, not accompany it the whole way. They were only to cover the first run of the boats, a hundred miles or so, and endeavour to draw off any enemy light craft from the U-boats in the direction of Heligoland. The submarines themselves were not to pay any attention to such ships, as their goal was the enemy battleships. It was only for the return journey that the boats were left a free hand to do the enemy all the damage they could. The weather being thick and rainy, and the visibility poor, was not favourable for the enterprise, and indications pointed to its becoming worse. As the latter eventuality did not materialise, however, the commander gave the order to put to sea.

In so great an area, and taking into account the rapid) changes which experience shows may be expected, it is very difficult to forecast the weather in the North Sea. The decision was, therefore, a brilliant tribute to the fiery enthusiasm of the new weapon, which had never been faced with a task of such magnitude in peace. The course was to be taken in such a way that the submarines, in line ahead with seven-mile intervals between them, first negotiated a stretch of 300 nautical miles in a north-westerly direction, then turned and went back to a line directly between Scapa Flow and Stavanger, which they were to reach about seventy-two hours after putting to sea. They were to remain on this line until 6 o'clock in the evening of the next day - in all about thirty-nine hours - and then return to Heligoland. One boat had to return when 225 nautical miles from Heligoland, on account of trouble in her Diesel engines. Two others, commanded by Lieutenant-Commanders Count Schweinitz and Pohle, were lost. All the rest carried out their allotted task and were back by August 11.

Nothing was seen of the enemy, with the exception of a four-funnelled cruiser which emerged out of the mist for a short time. All that was known of the lost boats was that one of them was still in wireless communication early on August 8. On the 9th the region in which the U-boats were lying was shrouded in mist, and the wind was blowing with force 6. It was only on August 15 that we learnt that a large part of the English Fleet had been in the same area and had there destroyed six German herring-boats after taking their crews on board. Fog and the amount of sea that wind of a force 6 means are the most unfavourable conditions conceivable for a submarine, in view of the fact that the conning-tower is so low down in the water. It is to be assumed that the missing boats had been surprised by English cruisers in weather of this kind and rammed before they had time to dive.

It was certainly regrettable that at the very moment of meeting the English Fleet was protected by mist, that two of our boats had fallen victims, and that this first enterprise, so smartly carried out, had not been crowned by the success it deserved. The loss of two boats had no depressing effect whatever on the crews. It rather increased their determination to do even better.

The course of this six-day cruise cleared the way for the further exploitation of the U-boat weapon, the great importance of which lay in its power of endurance and its independence, two characteristics which appeared at their true value for the first time in this cruise under war conditions. In these two respects the U-boats were superior to all surface vessels in the Fleet. The destroyers, in particular, were not to be compared with them for their ability to remain at sea. Their fuel capacity was too small for that purpose, and when going at high speed the consumption of coal increased out of all proportion. Further, as the big ships needed the co-operation of the smaller as submarine-screens and mine-sweepers, these, too, were dependent on their smaller consorts for the length of time they could remain at sea, especially when they were in areas in which regard had to be paid to the submarine danger.

Our naval operations took a decisive turn as a result of this cruise, and though the change was gradually introduced, it dates from this enterprise. For that reason it has been described in rather more detail than would be justified, seeing that a tangible success was not achieved. The first proof of the ability of the submarine to remain at sea for a long time had been given, and progress was made along the lines I have mentioned, thanks to the greatest perseverance, so that the submarine, from being merely a coastal-defence machine, as was originally planned, became the most effective long-range weapon.

The other splendid quality of the submarine is its independence, by which I mean that it is not dependent on the support and co-operation of ships or craft of other types. Whilst a force of surface ships comprises various classes, according to the presumed strength of the enemy, the submarine needs no help to attack, and in defence is not so dependent on speed as the surface ships, as it has a sure protection in its ability to dive. This again increases its radius of action, for whereas a surface ship, meeting a superior enemy, has no other resource but to make use of its speed - and that means a large consumption of fuel - diving means a very great economy in engine-power. In the submarine there is no question of driving the engines too hard in such a situation, as the boat can escape from the enemy by diving. The engines need not therefore be constructed to stand perpetual changes of speed.

It is not surprising that the special importance of these technical advantages was not recognised until the war came, for they first came to light thanks to the energy of the personnel, who seemed to despise all difficulties, although going to sea in these small craft involves incredible personal discomforts of all kinds. The advantages of the submarine service first became of practical value through the fact that human strength of will brought men voluntarily to display such endurance as was shown in our boats. Patriotism was the motive-power of the ships' companies.

The fact that an English offensive did not materialise in the first weeks of the war gave cause for reflection, for with every day's grace the enemy gave us he was abandoning some of the advantage of his earlier mobilisation, while our coast defences were improved. The sweep of light-cruisers and destroyers which, starting out star-wise from Heligoland, had scoured the seas over a circumference of about 100 sea miles had produced nothing. Yet while the U-boats were on that cruise to the north which has already been discussed, four other U-boats went on a patrol about 200 miles west, until they were on a level with the Thames estuary. They discovered several lines of destroyers patrolling on about Lat. 52, but of larger ships nothing was seen. The impression must have been forced on the Commander-in-Chief, as indeed all of us, that the English Fleet was following a strategic plan other than that with which we were inclined to credit it. It appeared probable that the 2nd and 3rd Fleets were concentrated to protect the transport of troops in the English Channel.

The bulk of the 1st English Fleet must be supposed to be in the northern part of the North Sea, to which our light forces had not yet penetrated. Further, we had not yet heard anything from the ten U-boats sent out in that direction, so apparently they too had seen nothing. Should we now attempt to bring the English 1st Fleet to action? We had at our disposal 13 "Dreadnoughts," 8 older battleships, 4 battle-cruisers (counting in Blücher), a few light cruisers, and 7 destroyer flotillas. With these the Commander-in-Chief intended to give battle, with full confidence in victory. What held him back was the reflection that the whereabouts of the 1st English Fleet was absolutely unknown, and it was therefore questionable whether it could be found in the time at pur disposal - which could not be more than two days and nights on account of the fuel capacity of the destroyers. In the meantime, the German Bight would be without any protection against minelaying and other enterprises, and there would be no flank protection on the west. On the other hand, our ships might suffer losses from the operations of enemy submarines, for which there would be no compensation in the way of victory if the English Fleet were not found. We knew from various sources that we had to reckon with English submarines. Such an attempt was therefore abandoned, and in its place a series of patrolling and minelaying operations were set on foot which carried the war right to the English coast in the following weeks.

With this decision began the trying period of waiting for the battleship squadrons, and a start was made with the operations intended to equalise the opposing forces, operations which, apart from mine successes, rested on the anticipation that our destroyers would find opportunities for attack in their nocturnal raids. The lack of scouts - for the new battle-cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann could not be put to such uses if they were to be held ready for battle - made it essential that U-boats should be employed on reconnaissance duties.

As early as August 14 new tasks were assigned to the U-boats which had returned from their cruise to the West on the 11th; and, indeed, the boats under the command of Lieutenant-Commanders Gayer and Hersing were to cross the North Sea from the Norwegian Coast (by Egersund) in the direction of Peterhead, while a third U-boat (Hoppe) observed the English forces patrolling before the Humber with a view to securing data for mine-laying. They brought valuable information about the enemy's defensive measures, but they had not seen any large ships. The length of time they had spent under water was remarkable. For instance, Gayer's ship had been compelled by destroyers to remain under water six and a quarter hours on August 16, eleven and three-quarters on the 17th, and eleven and a quarter on the 18th.

Let us now cast a glance at the chances for attack which presented themselves to the enemy. It could not possibly be unknown to him that the German Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. The reports of spies from Holland and Denmark could not have left any doubt about that. If the English Fleet made a demonstration against Sylt or the East Frisian Island's it would have compelled our Fleet to come out of the estuaries unless we were prepared to allow them a bombardment without retaliation, and they would thus have an opportunity of using their submarines which were patrolling at the mouths of the Jade and Elbe. A success for their submarines would be satisfaction enough for them if we did not follow them out to sea. They could arrange their approach in such a way that they took up a favourable position in the early morning hours to offer battle to our fleet as it came up, or if they appeared with only part of their forces they could promptly retire before a superior German force and limit themselves to the operations of their submarines. The only danger in such an attack lay In the possibility of a nocturnal meeting with our destroyers. This danger was not to be overestimated, as the English could plan their entrance into the German Bight in such a way that our destroyers, which were dependent on darkness, would be already on their way back to the Bight at the time the enemy was approaching. Further, no very serious danger was to be anticipated from our U-boats, as most of them were away on distant enterprises.

The English High Command, however, must have had a much higher estimate of the damage our destroyers and U-boats could do than was actually the case. It appears also that their confidence in the achievements of their own submarines, which were the foundation for the execution of any such plan, was not very great. At the outset, therefore, considerations prevailed on both sides which led, the Commands to hold back their fleets from battle. The over-estimate of the submarine danger played a most important role.

The German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, gave expression to his view of the general situation on August 14 in the following Order of the Day :-
 * "All the information we have received about the English naval forces points to the fact that the English Battle Fleet avoids the North Sea entirely and keeps far beyond range of our own forces. The sweep of our brave U-boats beyond the Lat. 6o° in the north and as far as the entrance to the English Channel in the south, as well as the raids of our destroyers and aeroplanes, have confirmed this information. Only between the Norwegian and Scottish coasts and off the entrance to the English Channel are English forces patrolling. Otherwise in the rest of the North Sea not a single English ship has been found hitherto.
 * "This behaviour on the part of our enemy forces us to the conclusion that he himself intends to avoid the losses he fears he may suffer at our hands and to compel us to come with our battleships to his coast and there fall a victim to his mines and submarines.
 * "We are not going to oblige our enemy thus. But they must, and will, come to us some day or other. And then will be the day of reckoning. On that day of reckoning we must be there with all our battleships.
 * "Our immediate task is therefore to cause our enemy losses by all the methods of guerilla warfare and at every point where we can find him, so that we can thus compel him to join battle with us.
 * "This task will fall primarily to our light forces (U-boats, destroyers, mine-layers and cruisers) whose prospects of success increase the darker and longer the nights become.
 * "The bold action of our mine-layer Kbnigin Luise, which did the enemy material damage before she came to her glorious end, and the audacious cruises of our U-boaits have already made a beginning. Further enterprises will follow.
 * "The duty of those of us in the battleships of the Fleet is to keep this, our main weapon, sharp and bright for the decisive battle which we shall have to fight. To that end we must work with unflinching devotion to get our ships perfectly ready in every respect, to think out and practise everything that can be of the slightest help and prepare for the day on which the High Sea Fleet will be permitted to engage a numerically superior enemy in battle for our beloved Emperor who has created this proud Fleet as a shield for our dear Fatherland, in full confidence in the efficiency whioh we have acquired by unflagging work in time of peace.
 * "The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit which animates all our ships' companies as it animates our army also, a spirit which impels us to instant action.
 * "The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall find us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe the time and place for us but ourselves choose what is favourable for a complete victory.
 * "It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
 * "The bold action of our mine-layer Kbnigin Luise, which did the enemy material damage before she came to her glorious end, and the audacious cruises of our U-boaits have already made a beginning. Further enterprises will follow.
 * "The duty of those of us in the battleships of the Fleet is to keep this, our main weapon, sharp and bright for the decisive battle which we shall have to fight. To that end we must work with unflinching devotion to get our ships perfectly ready in every respect, to think out and practise everything that can be of the slightest help and prepare for the day on which the High Sea Fleet will be permitted to engage a numerically superior enemy in battle for our beloved Emperor who has created this proud Fleet as a shield for our dear Fatherland, in full confidence in the efficiency whioh we have acquired by unflagging work in time of peace.
 * "The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit which animates all our ships' companies as it animates our army also, a spirit which impels us to instant action.
 * "The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall find us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe the time and place for us but ourselves choose what is favourable for a complete victory.
 * "It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
 * "The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit which animates all our ships' companies as it animates our army also, a spirit which impels us to instant action.
 * "The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall find us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe the time and place for us but ourselves choose what is favourable for a complete victory.
 * "It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
 * "It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
 * "It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."


text: Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Mann, Robert James


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