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Battle of Shanghai

The Battle of Shanghai was a major urban battle fought between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China in the Chinese city of Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It lasted from August 13, 1937, to November 26, 1937, and was arguably the single largest and longest battle of the entire war, with it even regarded by some historians as the first battle of World War II. It resulted in Japanese capture of the city and heavy destruction to the city.

It was the first of the twenty-two major engagements fought between the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Republic of China (ROC) and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) of the Empire of Japan at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese eventually prevailed after over three months of extensive fighting on land, in the air and at sea. Both sides accused each other of using chemical weapons during the battle, with Japanese forces confirmed to have illegally deployed poison gas at least thirteen times. Historian Peter Harmsen stated that the battle "presaged urban combat as it was to be waged not just during the Second World War, but throughout the remainder of the twentieth century" and that it "signalled the totality of modern urban warfare". It has also been called "one of the most incredible defensive battles ever waged on this planet". It was the single largest urban battle prior to the Battle of Stalingrad, which occurred almost 5 years later.

Since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 followed by the Japanese attack of Shanghai in 1932, there had been ongoing armed conflicts between China and Japan without an official declaration of war. These conflicts finally escalated in July 1937, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident triggered the full advance from Japan. Shanghai was China's largest and most cosmopolitan city, with it being the world's fifth largest city at the time. Shanghai was known as the "Pearl of the Orient" and "Paris of the East", with it being China's main commercial hub and largest port. Dogged Chinese resistance at Shanghai was aimed at stalling the Japanese advance, giving much needed time for the Chinese government to move vital industries to the interior, while at the same time attempting to bring sympathetic Western powers to China's side. During the fierce three-month battle, the forces of China and Japan fought in downtown Shanghai, in the outlying towns, and on the beaches of the Yangtze River and Hangzhou Bay, where the Japanese had made amphibious landings.

Chinese forces were equipped primarily with small-caliber weapons against much greater Japanese air, naval, and armor power. In the end, Shanghai fell, and China lost a significant portion of its best troops, the elite Chinese forces trained and equipped by the Germans, while failing to elicit any international intervention. However, the resistance of Chinese forces over three months of battle shocked the Japanese, who had been indoctrinated with notions of cultural and martial superiority, and largely demoralized the Imperial Japanese Army, who believed they could take Shanghai within days and China within months.

The battle can be divided into three stages, and eventually involved around one million troops. The first stage lasted from August 13 to August 22, 1937, during which the NRA attempted to eradicate Japanese troop presence in downtown Shanghai in bloody urban fighting. The second stage lasted from August 23 to October 26, 1937, during which the Japanese launched amphibious landings on the Jiangsu coast and the two armies fought a house-to-house battle in the creek country north of Shanghai, with the Japanese attempting to gain control of the city and the surrounding regions. The last stage, ranging from October 27 to the end of November 1937, involved the retreat of the Chinese army in the face of Japanese flanking maneuvers, and the ensuing combat on the road to China's capital at the time, Nanjing. In addition to the urban combat, trench warfare was also fought in the outskirts of the city.

Ōyama Incident

On 9 August, Naval Sub-Lieutenant Isao Ōyama (大山勇夫), head of the Western Detachment of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces stationed in Shanghai and his driver, First-Class Seaman Saito Yozo, along with a guard from the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were found dead around the gate to Hongqiao Airport on Monument Road. Several accounts allege Ōyama and his driver were stopped by the Peace Preservation Corps Guard before Ōyama opened fire and killed them. The Sub-Lieutenant and his driver were then subsequently killed in returning fire from other guards at airport. Ōyama was however unarmed at the time of the shooting, having left his sidearm at the headquarters. Historian Peter Harmsen purported the so-called shootout to in fact be a staged scene to coverup the murder of the two Japanese naval personnel by Chinese soldiers masquerading as Peace Preservation Corps.

It is still unknown whether Ōyama attempted to enter the military airport under higher orders. The incident heightened the tensions between the Chinese and Japanese forces in Shanghai. On 10 August, the Japanese Consul General demanded that the Chinese withdraw the Peace Preservation Corps and dismantle their defense works around the city. He also made it clear that the Imperial Japanese Army regarded the shooting of a Japanese officer as humiliating, and that any further incident would escalate the situation. In response to the incident, the Japanese began sending in reinforcements to Shanghai. Facing the increasing Japanese military presence in Shanghai, Chinese troops were also being deployed to the Shanghai area beginning on 11 August.

Final efforts at negotiation
On 12 August, representatives from the United Kingdom, France, United States and Italy along with Japan and China participated in the joint conference held in Shanghai to discuss the ceasefire terms. Japan demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Shanghai, while the Chinese representative Yu Hung-chun dismissed the Japanese demand, stating that the terms of ceasefire have already been violated by Japan. The major powers did not wish to see another January 28 Incident, which greatly disrupted foreign economic activities in Shanghai. On the other hand, Chinese citizens feverishly welcomed the presence of Chinese troops in the city. In Nanjing, Chinese and Japanese representatives met for the last time for final efforts at negotiation. The Japanese demanded that the Chinese withdraw all Peace Preservation Corps from Shanghai and all regular troops from the vicinities of the city. The Chinese insisted that the Japanese demand of a unilateral Chinese withdrawal was unacceptable since the two countries were already fighting a war in North China. At last Mayor Yu made it clear that at most the Chinese government would concede that the Chinese troops would not fire unless fired upon. Japan on the other hand placed all responsibility on China because of Chinese deployment of troops around Shanghai. Negotiation was impossible and there was no alternative other than the spread of war into Central China.

Urban fighting

Around 9 am on August 13, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps exchanged small arms fire with Japanese troops in the Zhabei, Wusong, and Jiangwan districts of Shanghai. At about 3 pm the Japanese army crossed over the Bazi Bridge (八字橋) in Zhabei and attacked various centers in the city. The 88th Division retaliated with mortar attacks. Sporadic shooting continued through the day until 4 pm, when Japanese headquarters ordered ships of the Third Fleet stationed in the Yangtze and the Huangpu River to open fire on Chinese positions in the city. Late that night, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Zhang Zhizhong to begin Chinese offensive operations the next day. The next morning the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) began bombing various Japanese targets and Chinese ground forces attacked at 3 pm. On the same day, August 14, the Chinese government issued the Proclamation of Self-Defense and War of Resistance (自衛抗戰聲明書), explaining the government's resolution against Japanese aggression. The Battle of Shanghai had officially begun.

American correspondent Edgar Snow described the scenes of the battle while observing from the international zone, "It was as though Verdun had happened on the Seine, in full view of a Right Bank Paris that was neutral; as though a Gettysburg were fought in Harlem, while the rest of Manhattan remained a non-belligerent observer." An eyewitness at the battle stated that it was "no longer a war between armies, but between races. With mounting fury the two giants, like two men who have started a boxing match and who suddenly find themselves convulsed with hate, sprang at each other’s throat in a tussle in which the only prize was death." Zhang Zhizhong's initial plan was to have the numerically superior Chinese forces attack the Japanese by surprise and push them into the Huangpu River, then blockade the coast to deny the Japanese the opportunity to land reinforcements at the Huangpu wharves between Yangshupu and Hongkou. The 88th Division was to attack Japanese army headquarters near Zhabei, and the 87th Division was to attack the reinforced Kung-ta Textile Mill, where the Japanese naval command was located. Zhang estimated it would take one week to achieve these objectives; however, the operation ran into trouble when his troops were fought to a standstill just outside the Shanghai International Settlement. Japanese strongholds were fortified with thick concrete, barbed wire, machine guns and were resistant to 150mm howitzers, the only heavy weapons the Chinese possessed. Chinese troops could only advance, under the cover of machine gun fire, by getting close enough to the emplacements to kill those within with hand grenades. The Chinese advance was greatly slowed and the element of surprise was lost.

Lacking the heavy weapons to destroy the Japanese bunkers directly, Zhang Zhizhong decided to encircle them instead. On August 16, he ordered his men to take the streets surrounding the Japanese strongholds. Every time a street was successfully cleared, the Chinese would set up a sandbag blockade, gradually surrounding each stronghold and closing off all possible routes of escape. The tactic was successful at first and the Chinese were able to destroy many emplacements and outposts in a single day. However, the Japanese then deployed tanks in the broad streets, enabling them to easily repel Chinese attacks and defeat the encircling strategy. On August 18 the Chinese attack was called off.

On August 18, Chen Cheng reached the front lines to discuss the situation with Zhang Zhizhong. They decided to send the newly arrived 36th Division into the fray, attacking the Hueishan (匯山) docks on the northern side of the Huangpu River. Meanwhile, the 87th Division broke through Japanese lines at Yangshupu, and pushed onto the Hueishan docks along with the 36th Division. On August 22, the tanks of the 36th Division reached the docks, but were unable to hold the position for long. The Chinese troops were insufficiently trained in coordinating infantry-tank tactics, and the troops were unable to keep up with the tanks. Without sufficient infantry to protect them, the tanks were vulnerable to Japanese anti-tank weapons and artillery in close quarters and became useless when they entered the city center. The few troops who did manage to keep up with the tanks through the city blocks were then trapped by Japanese blockades and annihilated by flamethrowers and intense machine gun fire. While the Chinese almost succeeded in pushing the Japanese down the Huangpu River, the casualty rate was exceedingly high. During the night of August 22 alone, the 36th Division lost more than ninety officers and a thousand troops. 36th staff officer Xiong Xinmin saw a Chinese suicide bomber stop a Japanese tank column by exploding himself beneath the lead tank.

On August 22, the Japanese 3rd, 8th, and 11th Divisions made an amphibious assault under the cover of naval bombardment and proceeded to land in Chuanshakou (川沙口), Shizilin (獅子林), and Baoshan (寶山), towns on the northeast coast some fifty kilometers (31 miles) away from downtown Shanghai. Japanese landings in northeast Shanghai suburban areas meant that many Chinese troops, who were deployed in Shanghai's urban center, had to be redeployed to the coastal regions to counter the landings. Thus, the front line was lengthened from metropolitan Shanghai along the Huangpu River to the northeast coastal districts. The Chinese offensive in the urban center had ground to a halt, and the fighting in downtown Shanghai essentially became a stalemate with both sides suffering heavy losses and making minimal changes in the front line. The Chinese divisions were able to hold on to Zhabei, Jiangwan, and other downtown positions for three months, until situations in other areas made it strategically impossible to continue defending them.

Air operations

The frontline fighter aircraft of the Chinese Air Force at the beginning of full-scale hostilities consisted primarily of Curtiss Hawk IIs and Hawk IIIs (many license-built at the CAMCO plant at the Jianqiao Airbase) and the Boeing P-26 Model 281 Peashooter. The Chinese pilots in particular used the Hawk IIIs in various multi-role combat operations against Imperial Japanese positions in and around Shanghai, while the P-26 primarily provided escort cover.

On August 14, the ROCAF bombed the Japanese Navy flagship Izumo. In what became known as "Black Saturday", bombs from ROCAF aircraft fell in the Shanghai International Settlement. While the Chinese pilots were instructed not to fly over the Shanghai International Settlement, the Japanese flagship was berthed right in front of it in what may amount to using the civilian enclave as a human shield; 700-950 Chinese and foreign civilians were killed outright, with a total of 3,000 of civilian deaths and injuries resulting from the accidental release of the bombs, with most of the death occurring at the Great World entertainment centre, where civilian refugees had gathered after fleeing from the fighting. The bombing was not an intended attack on the International Settlement: the four errant bombs were intended for the Japanese cruiser Izumo, which was moored nearby in the Whangpoo (Huangpu) river, adjacent to the Bund. Two exploded in Nanking Road and two in front of the Great World Amusement Centre on Avenue Edward VII, killing an estimated 2,000 shoppers and passers-by. Japanese planes responded to the attack on Izumo and the 4th Flying Group of the ROCAF, based in Henan, under the command of Captain Gao Zhihang (高志航), shot down six Japanese planes, while suffering zero losses. (In 1940 the government announced August 14 would be Air Force Day to raise the morale of the Chinese populace.) From August 15 to 18, the Chinese fought the numerically superior Japanese air force in intense air battles that saw two Japanese squadrons destroyed. China was fighting the air war with every airplane in its possession, some of them purchased second-hand from various countries. It was not able to produce any planes of its own to replace those lost in combat and was always running low on replacement parts and supplies. Japan, in contrast, had a robust aviation industry able to design and manufacture technologically advanced planes and could easily make good their losses. Thus, it was impossible for China to sustain an air war with Japan, however, the Chinese Air Force were given a much-needed lifeline with many new replacement fighter aircraft under the new Sino-Soviet Treaty as the initial inventory of American-made aircraft were gradually lost through attrition. In the Shanghai campaign, the ROCAF is said to have shot down 85 Japanese airplanes and sunk 51 ships, while losing 91 of its own airplanes, just under half of its entire air force at the time.

Other developments
On August 15, the Japanese formed the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (SEF), composed of the 3rd and 11th Divisions, under the command of General Iwane Matsui. On August 19, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe announced that the Sino-Japanese conflict could only be resolved through war, regardless of any attempts at negotiation by third party nations. Konoe said that the initial plan of localized "containment" around the Shanghai region had now escalated to total war, with the ultimate goal of forcing the Chinese government to fully cooperate with the economic and political demands of Japan. On August 23, the Japanese began the bombing campaign over Nanjing, and various cities in Central China. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army also arrived on the same day.

At the beginning of the battle, Zhang Zhizhong, as the commander of the 5th Army and the Nanjing-Shanghai war zone, was responsible for conducting Chinese operations. The failure of the initial Chinese offensive greatly dismayed Chiang Kai-shek and his staff. Chiang criticized Zhang's failure to make sufficient preparations, especially the procurement of weapons capable of penetrating Japanese bunkers, before sending the troops in massive waves, which resulted in unsustainable casualties in many divisions right from the start. Zhang was also criticized for his overconfidence and his penchant for holding press conferences for both foreign and Chinese reporters in the cosmopolitan city. Chiang Kai-shek and his staff, the most prominent including Chen Cheng and Gu Zhutong, began taking over command duties from Zhang. Chiang Kai-shek himself would eventually become the commander of the third war zone which covers the entirety of Shanghai. Regardless, the Chinese offensives against the Japanese garrison failed despite outnumbering the Japanese troops, due to the lack of heavy weaponry and artillery support.

Second phase (23 August – 26 October)
As the Chinese forces began to withdraw from the Shanghai area, more Japanese troops began to land near Shanghai, inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese side. The fighting spread across from Shanghai metropolis all the way to the township of Liuhe, near the coast where the majority of the Japanese landings occurred. A manoeuvre Japan had also performed in the 1932 battle and therefore should have been expected.

The perceived strength of the Chinese response resulted in major reinforcement for Japanese units. The 9th, 13th, and 101st Divisions, the 5th Heavy Artillery Brigade, and a brigade-strength mixture of smaller units were ordered from Japan to Shanghai by Imperial General Headquarters on 11 September 1937.

Combat around Jiangyin (16 August – 30 October)
On 16 August, one-hundred kilometers (62 miles) northwest of Shanghai, the battle for Jiangyin began. Military preparations for the battle began on 7 August, when Chinese Secretary of the Navy Chen Shaokuan ordered a blockade at Jiangyin with a force of five light cruisers and one training cruiser along with several mines to prevent Japanese warships from entering the Yangtze River. Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa of the Japanese 3rd Fleet ordered aerial bombings of the forces at Jiangyin with carrier and ground-based aircraft, which led to the sinking of ten Chinese ships by 23 October. However, despite these losses, the Chinese navy recovered some of the naval guns from the sunken ships and deployed them on land as coastal batteries, thus maintaining a defensive position at Jiangyin. In early November, Jiangyin was eventually captured as Chinese forces retreated.

Japanese landing (23 August – 10 September)

On August 23, the SEF, led by Iwane Matsui, landed in Liuhe, Wusong (吳淞), and Chuanshakou. Chiang Kai-shek had expected these coastal towns to be vulnerable to Japanese landings and ordered Chen Cheng to reinforce the area with the 18th Army. However, the Chinese were no match for Japanese firepower. The Japanese almost always began their amphibious assaults with heavy naval and air bombardment of the Chinese coastal defense works and trenches. It was not unheard of for the Chinese to lose an entire garrison to such bombardments. However, the Chinese would reinforce almost immediately to counter the Japanese troops who had just made their landing after the bombardment.

In the two weeks that followed, the Chinese and Japanese troops fought bitter battles in the numerous towns and villages along the coast. The Chinese troops fending off the amphibious assaults had only their small-caliber weapons to depend on, and were not sufficiently supported by the ROCAF and the almost nonexistent Chinese navy. They paid heavily for the defense. An entire regiment could be reduced to just a few men in action. In addition, Chinese coastal defense works were hastily constructed and did not offer much protection against enemy attacks, as many trenches were newly constructed during lulls in fighting. Moreover, the sandy soil of the coastal region meant that it was difficult to construct sturdy fortifications. Many trenches would collapse due to rain. The Chinese raced against time to construct and repair these defense works despite constant Japanese bombardment. Logistics difficulty also meant it was hard to transport the necessary construction materials to the front line. The Chinese often had to turn to bombed-out houses to obtain bricks, beams, and other such materials. However, the Chinese fought against great odds and tried to hold on to the coastal villages as long as they could. It was commonplace for the Japanese to successfully occupy the towns in the day under heavy naval support, only to lose them during the night to Chinese counterattacks. Such attacks and counterattacks continued well into late August, when the fall of Baoshan, a vital coastal town, seemed imminent. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the remaining troops of the 98th Division to defend the walled town. One battalion, under lieutenant colonel Yao Ziqing (姚子青), was assigned to the task. The situation in Baoshan was grim, as the Japanese had surrounded the town by September 5. However, Yao ordered his men to defend to the death, pledging to die at his post. Several Japanese assaults on September 4 were repulsed with heavy casualties, but a Japanese tank assault with air support broke through the gate the next day. The Chinese defenders were gradually pushed into a shrinking perimeter, and only had 100 troops by sunset. Yao ordered a single soldier to escape the city and deliver news of the unit's impeding fate. The soldier succeeded in delivering his message, which was simply: "We are determined to continue fighting the enemy until each and every one of us is killed."

On the next day, September 6, Baoshan fell. By that point, Japanese artillery strikes had reduced the town to rubble, and Yao had been killed in house-to-house fighting. The entire battalion, except for the single soldier sent outside, was killed in action. The Chinese would continue to sustain this level of casualties throughout the Shanghai campaign.

Combat around Luodian (11 September – 30 September)
On September 11, with the fall of Baoshan, the Chinese Army moved into defensive positions around the small town of Luodian (羅店), the transportation center connecting Baoshan, downtown Shanghai, Jiading, Songjiang and several other towns with highways. The successful defense of Luodian was strategically paramount to the security of Suzhou and Shanghai; as early as August 29, German adviser Alexander von Falkenhausen had advised Chiang Kai-shek that the town must be held at all costs, as it was "the most crucial strategic point."

The Japanese had also recognized Luodian's importance, and had sent troops to attack the town on August 23. Two large assaults were repelled by the Chinese 11th Division, who overcame Japanese advantages in armor and artillery by harassing Japanese columns with small scale ambushes and engaging in close-quarters street fighting within Luodian.

To defend Luodian, the Chinese concentrated some 300,000 soldiers there, while the Japanese amassed more than 100,000 troops, supported by naval gunfire, tanks, and aircraft.

The carnage and intensity of the resulting battle earned the fight for Luodian the nickname "grinding mill of flesh and blood" (血肉磨坊). Japanese assaults typically began at daybreak with concentrated aerial bombing, followed by the release of observation balloons to pinpoint the exact location of remaining Chinese positions for artillery and naval strikes. Japanese infantry would then advance under smoke screens, with armored support. Japanese planes would also accompany the infantry and strafe Chinese reinforcements. The battle for Luodian was marked by bloody street fighting, with the close combat making the Chinese the equals of the Japanese. Chinese defense was stubborn even in the face of overwhelming firepower. During the night, Chinese soldiers mined the roads connecting the coastal towns to Luodian and engaged in night combat to cut off Japanese advance troops. At daybreak, the Chinese would garrison the foremost defensive lines with comparatively few troops in order to reduce casualties resulting from intense Japanese bombardments. The Chinese would then emerge from rear positions to engage the enemy when the Japanese land offensive started after naval and artillery strikes had ceased.

Despite their numerical superiority, the defense of Luodian would prove impossible for the Chinese. The Japanese superiority of firepower forced the Chinese into a passive position, from which they could not mount counter-attacks until the Japanese were practically on top of them. Because of this, the decision was made to defend the entire town to the death, a tactic which greatly accelerated the attrition rate within the Chinese ranks. The casualty rate of General Chen Cheng's army group was more than fifty percent. By the end of September, the Chinese had been almost bled dry and were forced to give up Luodian.

Battle for Wusong Creek and Dachang (1 October – 26 October)
By October 1, the Japanese had increased troop strength in the Shanghai region to more than two hundred thousand. Japanese troops also invaded the town of Liuhang (劉行), south of Luodian. Thus, the frontline moved further south onto the banks of the Wusong River. The Japanese aim was to cross the Creek and take the walled town of Dachang (大場), which was the communications link between Chinese troops in downtown Shanghai and the northwest outlying towns. If Dachang fell, Chinese troops would have to forfeit their positions in downtown Shanghai and regions east of the Huangpu River to avoid encirclement by the Japanese. The defense of Dachang was vital to how long the Chinese army could continue fighting in the Shanghai war zone; for this, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized whatever remaining troops he could find.

To compensate for artillery shortages, Matsui massed four Japanese divisions, some 60,000 men, in a 6 mile front to break through the Chinese lines via brute frontal assaults.

The Chinese focused their defensive line on the Wusong Creek, a natural defensive position with a six-foot tall embankment and a width of up to three hundred feet across. The Chinese, learning from the lessons of their German advisors, had fortified the southern bank with a dense network of defenses, including barbed wire, machine gun nests, artillery emplacements, pillboxes and trenches. The local buildings and farmhouses were reinforced with sandbags and barbed wire, and trees had been cut down to ensure open fields of fire.

On October 5, the Japanese forces smashed into the Chinese defenses across the Wusong Creek, but were immediately confronted by fierce resistance. The Chinese resisted the assault, pummeling the Japanese bridgeheads with concentrated and coordinated artillery fire from six artillery battalions, which were reinforced with 2cm and 3.7cm anti-aircraft guns to protect against Japanese aircraft.

The two armies would engage in seesaw battles, with little changes in the frontline. House to house fighting was common, and in the most intense moments these positions would change hands up to five times a day. In this brutal combat, Chinese soldiers regularly fought to the death even when surrounded, a byproduct of the Japanese Army's habit of taking no prisoners. In overrun positions, Japanese soldiers frequently found dead Chinese, some with childlike features, clutching weapons as though "their ghosts had returned to continue resistance." In one case, the village of Tangbeizhai was defended against a Japanese column by a single Chinese soldier, as the rest of his battalion had already been destroyed.

From September 11 to October 20, the Japanese army was able to advance only five kilometers. It was in this fighting where the Japanese suffered their heaviest losses of the entire campaign, estimated at 25,000 casualties with some 8,000 killed in action over a 20-day period between October 5 and October 25. The 101st Division alone suffered 3,000 casualties in four days of combat around Wusong Creek, and the 9th division suffered some 9,556 casualties for an advance of 2.5 miles. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese would eventually breach the Wusong Creek line, seizing the Tangqiaozhan bridge from the Chinese Tax Police Division after two days of intense fighting. However, even though the Japanese penetrated the Wusong Creek line, they were confronted with further belts of similar defenses built around a series of creeks anchored by Zoumatang Creek. The two armies became bogged down in trench warfare around a mostly stagnant frontline, with heavy rains transforming the terrain into a muddy landscape.

On October 21, the Guangxi Army under Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi finally arrived to join Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army in the battle for Shanghai. These Guangxi units, four divisions in total, then staged a final counteroffensive in an attempt to fully consolidate Chinese positions around Dachang and retake the banks of the Wusong Creek. However, the counteroffensive was poorly coordinated with little reconnaissance, and quickly bogged down despite some initial success. The Japanese would counterattack with artillery, tanks and poison gas on October 23, with Japanese aircraft wreaking havoc on Chinese divisions throughout daytime. The operation was halted, and had cost the Guangxi divisions over 2,000 casualties including dozens of officers. Following the failed counteroffensive, Matsui ordered his divisions to push to Zoumatang Creek. The Chinese, having been exhausted by the combat through October, had begun withdrawing their troops to a defensive line behind Suzhou Creek. The Japanese, aided by their tanks and aircraft, seized two bridges across the Zoumatang Creek and pushed the remaining Chinese forces back to Dachang. The Japanese then utilized some 700 artillery pieces and 400 aircraft including 150 bombers for the assault on Dachang and reduced the town to rubble. They then followed up with an armored spearhead of some 40 tanks. The Chinese defenders, having withdrawn their artillery to safer positions beforehand, were outgunned and overwhelmed. The fighting continued until October 26, when Dachang finally fell. By then, Chinese troops had no option but to withdraw from downtown Shanghai, which they had held for almost three months.

Chinese withdrawal from Shanghai city

Starting the night of October 26, the Chinese began withdrawing from Shanghai's urban center. Because Dachang and other vital suburban towns had been lost already, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Chinese troops to retreat from Zhabei, Jiangwan (江灣), and other positions that the troops had held for seventy-five days without faltering. However, Chiang ordered one battalion of the 88th Division remain in Zhabei to defend the Sihang Warehouse on the northern bank of the Suzhou Creek.

Battle of the Sihang Warehouse
Under the leadership of Whampoa Colonel Xie Jinyuan, the 1st battalion of the 524th regiment rallied some 411 men and officers to make a stand in the five-story "Four Banks" Warehouse (Sihang Warehouse). The building was situated on the Suzhou Creek across from the International Settlement, and was reinforced with rifle slots, machine gun nests and sandbags. Between October 27th and November 1st, the 524th battalion defended Sihang Warehouse against multiple attacks from the Japanese. The warehouse's ten-foot thick walls and proximity to the International Settlement nullified Japanese advantages in firepower, as the Japanese feared accidentally hitting the foreign concessions. As a result, the Chinese managed to beat back several Japanese attacks, which were witnessed by crowds of tens of thousands Westerners and Chinese across the creek. At one point, girl guide Yang Huimin swam across the creek to smuggle a Chinese Nationalist flag into the warehouse, which the defenders then raised as a symbol of defiance.

Eventually, Chiang ordered the battalion to retreat into the nearby International Settlement, where they were interned by British authorities. Most of the 1st battalion survived intact: 34 Chinese defenders had been killed in action. The attacking Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces suffered one fatal casualty around Sihang Warehouse among some forty wounded during the takeover of Zhabei. Colonel Xie initially told newspaper Zhongyang Ribao that his men had killed an excess of 100 Japanese troops before retreating. Historian Stephen Robinson has claimed the Japanese lost some 200 men in their effort to take the warehouse.

Chiang wanted the Chinese military presence to remain in Shanghai as long as possible to have a positive reflection on the ongoing Nine-Power Treaty conference that was in session in Brussels, with the hopes for possible intervention from Western powers. The rest of the Chinese troops crossed the Suzhou Creek and regrouped to engage the Japanese troops.

Fighting around Suzhou Creek

Chiang's original plan was to fight in areas south of the Suzhou Creek and inflict as many Japanese casualties as possible. However, through three months of intense fighting, Chinese troop strength had been greatly reduced. Most units had their strength halved, and as a result a division had the fighting capability of less than two regiments. By now, the Chinese army needed between eight and twelve divisions to match the fighting strength of just one Japanese division. Thus, Chinese commanders were pessimistic about the outcome of the Suzhou Creek combat.

Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Fakui and other commanders insisted that the Chinese troops should enter the Wufu and Xicheng defense lines to protect Nanjing, but Chiang wanted the Chinese troops to continue fighting on the southern bank of Suzhou Creek. On October 28, Chiang arrived in the battlefield to boost the morale of his troops. However, the situation was bleak. On October 30, the Japanese crossed Suzhou River and the Chinese troops were in danger of encirclement. The Chinese army was at its limit of endurance.

Japanese landings at Jinshanwei

As early as October 12, the Japanese chiefs of staff had already formulated plans to force a landing in Jinshanwei (金山衛), a town located on the northern bank of Hangzhou Bay, south of the Shanghai region. The Jinshanwei landings would facilitate a northward push into Shanghai, to complement the landings in northeastern towns, such as the ones around Baoshan between late August and mid-September, which brought about a southward push.

Chiang Kai-shek was aware of the Japanese plan to encircle his army in Shanghai from the north and the south, and had already ordered his commanders to take precautions of the possible Japanese landings at Jinshanwei. However, the impending fall of Dachang in late October forced Chiang to redeploy the Chinese divisions originally stationed along the northern coast of Hangzhou Bay.

As a result, the lack of Chinese defenses allowed the Japanese 10th Army Corps, composed of units diverted from the Battle of Taiyuan in the North China Theater, to land easily in Jinshanwei on November 5. Jinshanwei was only forty kilometers away from the banks of Suzhou River where the Chinese troops had just retreated from the fall of Dachang.

Decision to take Nanjing
In October, the SEF was reinforced by the Japanese 10th Army commanded by Lieutenant General Heisuke Yanagawa. On 7 November, Japanese Central China Area Army (CCAA) was organized by combining the SEF and the 10th Army, with Matsui appointed as its commander-in-chief concurrently with that of the SEF. After winning the battles around Shanghai, the SEF suggested the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to attack Nanking.

The CCAA was rearranged and Lieutenant General Prince Asaka (Yasuhiko), an uncle of Emperor Hirohito, was appointed as the commander of the SEF, while Matsui stayed as the commander of CCAA overseeing both the SEF and the 10th Army. The real nature of Matsui's authority is however difficult to establish as he was confronted with a member of the imperial family directly appointed by the Emperor. In anticipation of the attack on Nanking, Matsui issued orders to his armies that read:

"Nanjing is the capital of China and the capture thereof is an international affair; therefore, careful study should be made so as to exhibit the honor and glory of Japan and augment the trust of the Chinese people, and that the battle in the vicinity of Shanghai is aimed at the subjugation of the Chinese Army, therefore protect and patronize Chinese officials and people, as far as possible; the Army should always bear in mind not to involve foreign residents and armies in trouble and maintain close liaison with foreign authorities in order to avoid misunderstandings."

On December 2, Emperor Showa nominated one of his uncles, Prince Asaka, as commander of the invasion. It is difficult to establish if, as a member of the imperial family, Asaka had a superior status to general Iwane Matsui, who was officially the commander in chief, but it is clear that, as the top-ranking officer, he had authority over division commanders, lieutenant-generals Kesago Nakajima and Heisuke Yanagawa.

Japanese advance toward Nanjing
After securing control of Shanghai, the Japanese army began its advance towards Nanjing on November 11, 1937, approaching the city from different directions.

The Japanese advance to Nanjing can be characterized as a "forced march". Almost all units covered the distance of almost 400 kilometers in about a month. Assuming that capture of the Chinese capital would be the decisive turning point in the war, there was an eagerness to be among the first to claim the honor of victory.

The Japanese army was engaged by Chinese soldiers on a number of occasions on the way to Nanjing. As a general rule, they were heavily outnumbered. As the Japanese came closer to Nanjing, the fighting grew in both frequency and severity.

Chinese retreat from Shanghai
Japanese landings at Jinshanwei meant that the Chinese army had to retire from the Shanghai front and attempt a breakout. However, Chiang Kai-shek still placed some hope that the Nine-Power Treaty would result in a sanction against Japan by Western powers. It was not until November 8 that the Chinese central command issued a general retreat to withdraw from the entire Shanghai front. All Chinese units were ordered to move toward western towns such as Kunshan, and then from there enter the final defense lines to stop the Japanese from reaching Nanjing.

By then, the Chinese army was utterly exhausted, and with a severe shortage of ammunition and supplies, the defense was faltering. Kunshan was lost in only two days, and the remaining troops began moving toward the Wufu Line fortifications on November 13. The Chinese army was fighting with the last of its strength and the frontline was on the verge of collapse.

In the chaos that ensued many Chinese units were broken up and lost contact with their communications officers who had the maps and layouts to the fortifications. In addition, once they arrived at Wufu Line, the Chinese troops discovered that some of the civilian officials were not there to receive them as they had already fled and had taken the keys with them. The battered Chinese troops, who had just emerged from the bloodbath in Shanghai and were hoping to enter the defense lines, found that they were not able to utilize these fortifications.

The Wufu Line was penetrated on November 19, and the Chinese troops then moved toward Xicheng Line, which they were forced to give up on November 26 in the midst of the onslaught. The "Chinese Hindenburg Line", which the government had spent millions to construct and was the final line of defense between Shanghai and Nanjing, collapsed in only two weeks. The Battle of Shanghai was over. However, fighting continued without a pause on the road to China's capital and the ensuing combat immediately led into the Battle of Nanjing.

By early December, Japanese troops had reached the outskirts of Nanking.

After its success in the Battle of Shanghai, Japan did not immediately occupy the Shanghai International Settlement or the Shanghai French Concession, areas which were outside of China's control due to the treaty port system. Japan moved into these areas after its 1941 declaration of war against the United States and the United Kingdom. It seized most of the banks in these areas of Shanghai and declared that the Nationalist currency fabi had to be exchanged for bank notes of the Wang Jingwei regime.

Casualties
The battle saw both sides suffer an enormous amount of casualties, especially the Chinese forces, who had inferior armaments as compared to the Japanese. A Chinese historian at the time stated that it was "the bloodiest battle . . . since Verdun." There are differing estimates and reports of the number of casualties each side suffered.

According to historians Peter Harmsen, Rana Mitter and Richard Frank, China suffered 187,200 killed and wounded defending the city per an official Chinese report on November 5, although Benjamin Lai claims this number is just the dead, with the estimated injured being 83,500 for a total of 270,700. Contemporary Japanese estimates for Chinese military casualties were roughly 250,000 killed and wounded. Hsi-Sheng Chi stated that China suffered some 300,000 casualties during the battle. The high Chinese casualties were due to a combination of factors, including tactical reliance on costly frontal assaults, Japanese superiorities in airpower and naval artillery, poor medical services, and the near-fanatical resistance of Chinese defenders who were willing to fight to the death on numerous occasions.

According to Japanese military records, the five divisions most involved in combat (3rd, 9th, 11th, 13th, 101st) suffered 42,202 casualties including 11,072 killed in action, although this number doesn't include losses from the Special Naval Landing Forces or any of the divisions deployed in October. Richard Frank also states these figures fail to convey the extent of Japanese losses sustained during the campaign, especially the four most heavily engaged divisions such as the 9th division, which suffered a 94% casualty rate. Jonathan Fenby claims the Japanese suffered some 70,000 casualties in the battle.

Lai estimates the Japanese suffered a total of 93,000 to 99,000 casualties, including 17,000 combat deaths plus about 1,800 illness-induced deaths, making a total of almost 19,000 deaths, also, there were 35,000–40,000 wounded and 40,000 sick, for a combined total of 363,700 to 369,700 causalties. According to research done by James Paulose, the Japanese suffered 92,640 casualties and the Chinese suffered over 333,500 casualties, for a combined total of at least 426,140 casualties.

Atrocities
Numerous atrocities were committed during the Shanghai Campaign, especially by the Japanese forces. Japanese troops rarely took prisoners, if ever. Captives, including civilians accused of spying, were interrogated and disposed of once they had no more information to offer. According to Iwane Matsui's diary, every single one of the 500 Chinese POWs captured around Wusong was shot. Executions were typically conducted by decapitation with swords, but it was not uncommon for more gruesome methods to be used: injured Chinese prisoners were often tied together face-down, doused in gasoline, and then burned alive.

Civilians and non-combatants were also targeted. For example, the Japanese machine gunned crowds of refugees by the Jessfield Railway Bridge, and deliberately strafed refugee columns near Brenan road. To compensate for supply shortages, Japanese troops often looted from local towns and villages, frequently massacring their civilian inhabitants in the process. Japanese aircraft deliberately targeted anything that bore the Red Cross, frequently strafing or bombing ambulances transporting wounded Chinese soldiers, civilians and medical personnel.

Chinese forces also committed atrocities. Several hundred civilians were also killed on August 14 when stray bombs dropped by the ROCAF exploded in densely packed areas during an attack on the Japanese cruiser Izumo. In addition, the Chinese implemented scorched earth tactics to deny Japanese forces local resources. This meant burning buildings and fields, destroying harvests, killing animals and poisoning wells, causing massive property damage to Shanghai.

Loss of Central Army military strength

Even though the Battle of Shanghai was only the first of the twenty-two major battles fought between China and Japan, Chiang Kai-shek's decision to send his best troops into the battle had significant repercussions. At the outbreak of the war, the Chinese NRA boasted a standing army of some 1.75 million troops, but the combat strength was significantly lower as the majority of the Chinese troops were poorly trained and poorly equipped. Only about 300,000 were comparatively better trained. These troops were reorganized into some 20 newly formed divisions. Of these, around 80,000 had belonged to the German-trained divisions that composed the elite units of Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army. However, even these divisions were not sufficiently supported by combined arms or modern logistics. Thus, out of a grand total of almost two million men-in-arms, less than one hundred thousand Chinese troops were able to fight Japan on more or less equal terms.

Chiang Kai-shek's decision to commit his elite divisions to fight in Shanghai caused his elite units to suffer some sixty percent disproportionate casualties in the three-month bloodbath. In one single blow, Chiang also lost some 10,000 of the 25,000 junior officers trained by the Whampoa Military Academy between 1929 and 1937, in addition to some tens of thousands of potential military officers. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army was never to recover from these devastating losses. By the time the 88th Division, arguably the best of these elite divisions, began its defense of Nanjing, it had been reduced to seven thousand men, of whom three thousand were new recruits to replace the losses.

Losses to the Nationalist army's very small stock of armor were also significant. The Chinese deployed three tank battalions in the battle and its immediate aftermath. The 1st Battalion had 32 VCL Amphibious Tanks and some 6-ton Vickers Mark E tanks. The 2nd Battalion also in Shanghai had 20 Vickers Mark E tanks, 4 VCL Tanks and Carden Loyd tankettes. The 3rd Battalion had 10 Panzer I light tanks, 20 CV35 tankettes, and some Leichter Panzerspähwagen armored cars. Almost all of these were lost during the battles in Shanghai and later on in Nanjing.

The heavy casualties inflicted on Chiang's own military strength forced him to rely more on non-Whampoa generals, who commanded the provincial armies and many of whom had questionable loyalty to Chiang. Because of the reduction in his military power, Chiang lost some of his political leverage over local warlords. In effect, Chiang Kai-shek was effectively only the head of a loose coalition, rather than the commander-in-chief of a united fighting force. The sapping of China's best fighting men also made the planning and execution of subsequent military operations difficult. In essence, Chiang Kai-shek's concerted pre-war effort to build a truly effective, modernized, national army was greatly devastated by the sacrifices made in the Battle of Shanghai.

International response
A major reason that the Chinese army held onto the city as long as it did, even though it was on the brink of collapse, was that China was hoping for Western intervention in the Sino-Japanese War. Western nations had been paying little attention to China's plight since they were preoccupied with the situation in Europe. In addition, most Western nations had little prospect that their intervention would help China in the long run because they believed that China would eventually lose. If China was deemed militarily weak, economically backward, and politically disunited by Western powers, it would not make sense for them to help China when it seemed bound for defeat by Japan.

Thus, Chiang Kai-shek had to devote everything China had to offer to make sure the Western powers knew that the present conflict between China and Japan was a major war, not a collection of inconsequential "incidents" as had been the case previously. Based on this political strategy, Chiang Kai-shek had to order his troops to fight to the death in an attempt to arouse international sympathy and cause the international community to adopt measures that would help China and sanction Japan.

On September 12, one month after the Battle of Shanghai began, China formally brought the case against Japan to the League of Nations. Again, the League was not able to formulate any effective sanctions against Japan other than an October 4 statement that gave China "spiritual support". The United States was not a member of the League and Great Britain and France were reluctant to challenge Japan. Of all the major Western powers, only the United States seemed able to act more since it was not embroiled in the volatile European affairs.

In addition, on October 5, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave the Quarantine Speech, calling for the United States to help nations fight against aggressor nations. This speech had a tremendous effect on raising China's morale. Because America seemed willing to confront Japan, the British representative suggested to close the League case and convene the Nine Power Treaty Conference. Since the Nine-Power Treaty was signed as a result of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, the opening of the Conference automatically brought the United States into the effort to rein in Japanese aggression.

American entry into the international response brought new hope to the Chinese, and Chiang Kai-shek again reiterated the need for his troops to hold on to Shanghai to prove that China was indeed worth fighting for. By mid-October, the Chinese situation in Shanghai had become increasingly dire and the Japanese had made significant gains. The vital town of Dachang fell on October 26 and the Chinese withdrew from metropolitan Shanghai.

However, because the Nine Power Treaty Conference was to begin in early November, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his troops to stay in the Shanghai battlefield, instead of retreating to the Wufu and Xicheng Lines to protect Nanjing. He also left one lone battalion to defend the Sihang Warehouse in metropolitan Shanghai. Chiang also visited the frontlines to encourage his troops.

Because Shanghai was the most important Chinese city in Western eyes, the troops had to fight and hold on to the city as long as possible, rather than moving toward the defense lines along nameless towns en route to Nanjing. On November 3, the Conference finally convened in Brussels. While the Western powers were in session to mediate the situation, the Chinese troops were making their final stand in Shanghai and had all hopes for a Western intervention that would save China from collapse.

Effects
In terms of its long-term effects on the war of attrition, the Battle of Shanghai bought enough time for the Chinese government to move some of its vital industries to Wuhan and Xi'an, and from there to Chongqing, China's wartime capital after the fall of Nanjing and Wuhan. The difficulty in dismantling and relocating thousands of tons of machinery and factory equipment, especially in the heat of Japanese bombing campaigns, meant that the Chinese government fell short of its goal of moving the entire industrial base from the Shanghai region.

Many factories were destroyed during the fighting and ceased to be functional. Of the nearly twelve hundred factories and workshops of all sizes, only slightly more than ten percent were moved out of Shanghai. However, as insignificant as they were, these factories formed the core of China's wartime industry, especially in the bleak days of the blockade of the entire Chinese coast, the closure of the Burma Road, and the low tonnage of supplies flown over the Hump.

Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of bringing the fight to Shanghai to force Japan to adopt an east-to-west direction of attack also prevented Japan from cutting right into Central China. As a result, the Battle of Wuhan was delayed for almost a year, and the time bought gave the Chinese government breathing space to recuperate and relocate more resources to Chongqing. Overall, even though Chinese losses were irreparable, the strategy of trading "space for time" proved its worth.

The Battle of Shanghai was a military defeat but a high point for Chinese nationalism. The beginning of full-scale war meant that China would no longer stand idly and allow Japan to conquer its territories piece by piece as it had done in the past. It also demonstrated China's resolve not to surrender even in the face of overwhelming firepower. However, Chiang Kai-shek's order to have his troops make one death stand after another greatly sapped his strength and directly caused his army's inability to defend Nanjing for even two weeks.

In his memoir, General Li Zongren pointed out that Chiang's staff had proposed that the Chinese army reserve around ten divisions along the Wufu Line to protect Nanjing and felt it made no difference if Shanghai could be held for a few months longer at the expense of huge casualties. However, as China was not able to defeat Japan single-handedly, Chiang believed the best option was to bring the western powers into the war by eliciting international sympathy being committed to the resistance in Shanghai.

In his correspondence with Hu Shih, Chiang wrote that China was capable of withstanding six months of combat before changes in the international situation would have to end the war. This may have also caused Chiang to devote all of his best troops in the first battle of what would eventually become a prolonged war. However, while Chiang's initial assessment was overly optimistic, China continued to fight for eight more years until Japan finally surrendered after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

title: Battle of Shanghai


text:
M24 Sniper Weapon System

The M24 Sniper Weapon System (SWS) or M24 is the military and police version of the Remington Model 700 rifle, M24 being the model name assigned by the United States Army after adoption as their standard sniper rifle in 1988. The M24 is referred to as a "weapon system" because it consists of not only a rifle, but also a detachable telescopic sight and other accessories.

The M24 SWS has the "long action" bolt version of the Remington 700 receiver but is chambered for the 7.62×51mm NATO "short action" cartridge that has an overall length of 2.750 in. The "long action" allows the rifle to be re-configured for dimensionally larger cartridges up to 3.340 in in overall length.

The M24 originally came tapped for the Leupold Ultra M3A 10×42mm fixed-power scope, which came with a circle-shaped mil-dot glass-etched reticle. This was later replaced in 1998 by the Leupold Mk 4 LR/T M1 10×40mm fixed-power scope with an elongated-shaped mil-dot wire reticle. The rifle also comes with a detachable Harris 9–13" 1A2-LM or Harris 9–13" 1A2-L bipod unit.

The M24 SWS was to be replaced with the M110 Semi-Automatic Sniper System, a contract awarded to Knight's Armament Company. However, the Army still continued to acquire M24s from Remington until February 2010 and upgraded to the A2 and M24E1 standard in many cases, continuing to serve. The Army chose to upgrade all its M24 rifles in the arsenals to the M2010 Enhanced Sniper Rifle, with the final M24 being converted in April 2014.

Specifications

Scope: Leupold Ultra M3A 10×42mm fixed power, or Leupold Mk 4 LR/T M3 10×40mm fixed power scope. Detachable emergency Redfield-Palma International back-up iron sights, they are attached to iron sight bases that are screwed into drilled and tapped holes machined into the front of the barrel and back on the left side of the receiver. In 2001 when Remington had the second contract to the U.S. military, minor changes were done to the M24. These changes included two piece Leupold Mark 4 scope ring bases instead of the one piece on the first series rifles, and a switch from Redfield-Palma International iron sights to another manufacturer OK Weber. Redfield was out of business by then, necessitating a change.

Barrel: Made of 416R stainless steel. The bore twist is 1-turn-in-11.25 inches [1:285.75 mm] and the rifling is five radial lands and grooves (5-R) with a right-hand (RH) twist. Because of the odd number of lands, none of the lands are 180° apart, i.e. in direct opposition. This results in less bullet deformation, which (at least in theory) produces more consistent point of impact. In 5-R rifling, the "side" of the land is cut at a 65° angle, rather than 90° in conventional rifling. This results in less barrel fouling, and more consistent point of impact, compared to conventional rifling when relatively high numbers of rounds are fired between cleaning, as might be expected in military applications.

Stock: H-S Precision PST-024, the model with the fixed cheek piece, adjustable LOP and hinged floorplate. The stock secures the action via an aluminum bedding block to keep it rigid. The barrel is free floating. A twin-strut extension that pulls out of the butt allows a 2 in adjustment to length-of-pull, as well as allowing for the weapon to fit inside the M-1950 Weapon Container for Airborne Operations. This is effected by a thick wheel on a central grooved pillar for adjusting the length and a thin locking ring behind it locks the thick wheel in place. The stock is primarily made from a polymer foam reinforced with fiberglass, carbon fiber, and Kevlar to reduce weight and then painted with a heavy duty polane paint. They were rigorously tested before being approved by Remington and the military.

Accuracy: According to MIL-R-71126(AR), 3.15.7 Targeting and Accuracy, The rifle shall achieve the dispersion set forth below when fired from a Government approved machine rest. The average mean radius shall be less than or equal to the values stated below. The minimum rate of fire for conducting this test shall be three rounds per minute.

Range / Average Mean Radius (AMR) — Mean Radius (MR) expresses the average distance of all the shots from the center of the shot group. AMR averages the MR of several shot groups. The radial distance from the calculated center of impact of the first target compared to the calculated center of impacts of the subsequent targets shall be less or equal to 1.086 MOA (3.3 inches @ 300 yards, 2.2 inches @ 200 yards, 2.4 inches @ 200 meters) on an average basis.
 * 200 yd: 1.3 inches
 * 273 yd: 1.4 inches
 * 300 yd: 1.9 inches

The actual rifle requirements for accuracy were .35 MOA from a machine rest and according to Major John Mende (ret.), this accuracy had to be maintained to 10,000 rounds. He stated, "Interesting side note was there was a 10,000 round requirement for the barrel to maintain the original accuracy. In fact after some 10,000 round tests we discovered the accuracy improved. A few barrels were tested past 20,000 and accuracy never went below the original accuracy requirement."

Maximum effective range is given as 800 m, but record shots have been made with the M24 at over 1000 m. Meanwhile, the standard optical sight has a maximum elevation adjustment of 1000 m.

XM24A1
An experimental variant re-chambered for the .300 Winchester Magnum (7.62×67mm) round. It was not adopted by the US Army due to concerns that operators would not be able to acquire the special ammo. Also, the available .300 Winchester Magnum ammo that was procured sometimes misfired due to incompletely-burned propellant in the longer cartridge. Redick Arms Development further researched this concept, which eventually grew into the RAD M91A1 (7.62x51mm NATO) and M91A2 (.300 Winchester Magnum). These rifles were adopted by the US Navy SEALs.

M24A2
Remington has developed an improved version of the M24 rifle, known as the M24A2. The A2 model features a detachable 5-round magazine, top-mounted and adjustable side-mounted Picatinny rails (advertised by Remington as "MARS", or Modular Accessory Rail System), barrel modifications designed to accommodate a sound suppressor, and an improved H-S Precision PST-026 stock with adjustable cheek height and length of pull. Existing M24s can also be converted into M24A2s, which replaces the stock and adds the new detachable magazine feed. The conversion requires a re-barreling of the weapon so it can take the OPS silencer.

M24A3
Remington developed the M24A3 SWS, a variant of the M24 chambered for the .338 Lapua Magnum round (8.58×70mm) and feeding from a 5-round detachable box magazine. It comes tapped for the Leupold Mk 4 M1LR/T 8.5–25×50mm Variable Power day scope. It can also use detachable front and rear Back-Up Iron Sights in an emergency (BUIS units are standard accessories that can be fitted to the Picatinny Rail that runs on the top of the receiver and along the barrel).

U.S. Army 2009 solicitation for an M24 reconfiguration
The U.S. Army put out a solicitation in May 2009 for reconfiguring M24 Sniper Weapon Systems currently available in Army inventory consisting of a:
 * Rebarreling/rechambering the SWS's barrel optimized to accommodate Mk 248 (DODIC A191) .300 Winchester Magnum ammunition.
 * Replacement of existing weaver rails with a MIL-STD-1913 rail capable of accommodating both a day optic and in-line forward mounted, AN/PVS-26 (NSN 5855-01-538-8121) image intensified (I2) night vision device.
 * Reconfiguring the stock with a stock that incorporates a detachable box magazine, adjustable comb and length of pull.
 * Addition of a detachable sound suppressor as well as any necessary barrel modifications required for a sound suppressor interface.
 * Replacement of the existing day optic sight (DOS) and rings with an Army specified variable power day optic and compatible rings.

The US government purchased MK 248 MOD 1 .300 Winchester Magnum match-grade ammunition in 2009 for use in .300 Winchester Magnum sniper rifles like the U.S. Navy Mk.13 MOD 5 rifle or reconfigured M24 SWSs. This ammunition was developed as a .300 Winchester Magnum Match Product Improvement (PIP) and uses the 14.26 g (220 gr) Sierra MatchKing Hollow Point Boat Tail (HPBT) very-low-drag bullet fired at a nominal muzzle velocity of 869 m/s ± 15.2 m/s. According to the U.S. Navy, this ammunition should increase the maximum effective range of .300 Winchester Magnum sniper rifle systems to 1,370 m, decrease wind deflection on bullets in flight and use a reduced muzzle flash propellant that remains temperature stable across an operational temperature range of -32 to 74 C.

2010 M24E1 Enhanced Sniper Rifle reconfiguration competition

In September 2010, the United States Army's Joint Munitions and Lethality Contracting Center awarded Remington a Firm Fixed Price Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract (W15QKN-10-R-0403) for the upgrade of up to 3,600 M24 Sniper Weapon Systems currently fielded to the Army pending type classification as the M24E1 Enhanced Sniper Rifle (ESR). Later, the Enhanced Sniper Rifle was classified as the XM2010. The major configuration change for this system is the conversion from 7.62×51mm NATO to dimensionally larger .300 Winchester Magnum ammunition exploiting the M24's "long action" bolt to provide additional precision and range.

The M24E1/XM2010 is considered a "total conversion upgrade", by which the barrel, stock, magazines, muzzle brake, suppressor, and even the optics will be changed. Besides the rechambering and rebarreling with a 610 mm (24 in) long, 254 mm (1 in 10 inch) twist rate (5R) hammer-forged barrel the main reconfiguration changes compared to 7.62×51mm NATO chambered M24 rifles are:
 * Fitting a new chassis (stock) assembly, which maximizes the amount of physical adjustments for the sniper to provide a better user customized fit. The chassis has a folding buttstock that shortens the system for easier transport and better concealment during movement and accommodates the mounting of accessories via removable MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny Rails.
 * Fitting a 5-round detachable box magazine.
 * Fitting a quick-attachable/detachable Advanced Armament Corp. sound suppressor with muzzle brake.
 * Fitting a Leupold Mark 4 6.5–20×50mm ER/T M5 Front Focal variable power telescopic sight featuring a 30 mm tube diameter, first focal plane Horus Vision H-37 grid system range estimation reticle and Bullet Drop Compensation.
 * Applying advanced corrosion resistant coatings throughout the system.

According to Remington Arms, each rifle is tested to meet (and typically exceeds) the requirement to fire ≤ 1 MOA (less than a 2-inch shot group at 200 yards) before being released for fielding.

Based on the results and feedback from troops, the U.S. Army decided in May 2011 to replace its entire fleet of M24s, ordering a total of 2,558 M2010 Enhanced Sniper Rifles. By September 2012, the Army had fielded more than 1,400 systems as part of an urgent material release. The M2010 achieved Type Classification-Standard in July 2013 and Full Materiel Release in September 2013, supporting procurement for the balance of the Army requirement. On April 25, 2014, the 2,558th M2010 Enhanced Sniper Rifle was completed.

IDF modernized M24
In 2019, the Israel Defense Forces started to upgrade the M24 and replace the stock and receiver of the old M24 rifles with a modern MDT Defense M24 Chassis stock assembly with AR15/M16 pistol grip that increases the number of physical adjustments to individual ergonomic preferences, magazine feeding and an M-LOK forend with attachable MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny rails around the barrel. The modernized M24 entered service in 2021.

Differences between M24 and M40
The U.S. Marine Corps also uses the Remington 700/40x action as the basis for its M40 Sniper Weapon System. The primary difference between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps rifles is that while the U.S. Marine Corps M40 variants use the short-action version of the Remington 700/40x (which is designed for shorter cartridges such as the .308 Winchester/7.62×51 mm NATO), the U.S. Army M24 uses the Remington 700 Long Action. Despite the fact that the M24 comes fitted with a 7.62×51mm NATO barrel upon issue, retaining the longer action allows them to reconfigure the rifle in dimensionally larger cartridge chamberings if necessary (which has been the case during the longer engagement distances during Operation Enduring Freedom). Long actions also increase reliability and reduce jamming by reducing the angle of cartridges leaving the magazine and permit long, low-drag heavy-for-caliber bullets to be loaded in short-action cartridges that otherwise would not fit in short-action cartridges, magazines and receivers.

The U.S. Army reconfigured their M24 rifles to M2010 Enhanced Sniper Rifles rechambering the original M24 rifles to .300 Winchester Magnum. The USMC M40A3 uses a 25 in Schneider barrel and the U.S. Army M24 used a 24 in Rock Creek 5R barrel.

Users

 * 🇩🇿 Algeria: Used by the People's National Army.
 * 🇧🇩 Bangladesh
 * 🇧🇷 Brazil: Used by Brazilian Special Operations Brigade and BOPE.
 * 🇨🇴 Colombia: Used by the Colombian Army, Colombian Navy and Colombian Air Force.
 * 🇸🇻 El Salvador
 * Georgia
 * 🇭🇺 Hungary: Bercsény László Különleges Műveleti Zászlóalj.
 * 🇮🇶 Iraq: Iraqi Army, Iraqi special forces and Popular Mobilisation Units.
 * 🇮🇱 Israel: Israel Defense Forces.
 * 🇯🇵 Japan: Used by the JGSDF snipers, the paratroopers of the 1st Airborne Brigade, and the Special Forces Group as its main sniper rifle. Being replaced by the HK G28.
 * Kosovo
 * 🇱🇧 Lebanon
 * 🇲🇽 Mexico: Cuerpo de Fuerzas Especiales and Federal Police of Mexico.
 * 🇵🇭 Philippines: Philippine Army and Philippine Marine Corps.
 * 🇺🇦: Part of the United States military aid.
 * 🇺🇸 United States: Used by the United States Army and United States Air Force. Also used by various police SWAT teams.

Former users

 * Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Standard issue sniper rifle of the Afghan National Army.

Non-state actors

 * Used by ISIL fighters in the Philippines as captured weapons.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: M24 Sniper Weapon System


text:
Chardon Lagache station

Chardon Lagache is a station on the Paris Métro in the 16th arrondissement, serving line 10 (eastbound only). It is named after the nearby rue Chardon Lagache, which was named after a local retirement home. It is one of the few métro stations to have been named after a woman, after Bagneux–Lucie Aubrac, Barbara, Barbès–Rochechouart, Boucicaut, Louise Michel, Madeleine, and Pierre et Marie Curie.

History
The station opened on 30 September 1913 as part of the extension of line 8 from Charles Michels (then known as Beaugrenelle ) to Porte d'Auteuil. On 27 July 1937, the section of line 8 between La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle and Porte d'Auteuil, including Michel-Ange–Molitor was transferred to line 10 during the reconfiguration of lines 8, 10, and the old line 14. However, service between Porte d'Auteuil and Jussieu was not provided until two days later, on July 29, with service initially limited to La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle. Line 10 was also extended from Duroc to La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle on the same day.

As part of the "Renouveau du métro" programme by the RATP, the station's corridors was renovated and modernised on 18 May 2006.

In 2019, the station was used by 692,665 passengers, making it the 295th busiest of the Métro network out of 302 stations.

In 2020, the station was used by 331,901 passengers amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, making it the 295th busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

In 2021, the station was used by 482,053 passengers, making it the 296th busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

Access
The station has a single Guimard entrance, rue Chardon Lagache Hôpital Sainte-Périne. It was listed as a historical monument on 12 February 2016. The corridors from the entrance to the mezzanine are unusually adorned with green ceramic friezes, typically seen on métro stations built by the Nord-Sud Company.

Platform
The station has a single curved side platform with a single tracks, only serving trains towards Gare d'Austerlitz.

Other connections
The station is also served by lines 22 and 62 of the RATP bus network, and at night, by lines N12 and N61 of the Noctilien network.

title: Chardon Lagache station


text:
Mirabeau station

Mirabeau is a rapid transit station on Line 10 of the Paris Métro system. Located in the 16th arrondissement of the city, it is served solely by eastbound trains to Gare d'Austerlitz. It is located in close proximity to Église d'Auteuil (with their accesses are less than 100 m apart), and as such, the two stations can be considered twins, with Mirabeau serving eastbound traffic and Église d'Auteuil serving westbound traffic, albeit with separate entrances and exits. The station is named after the nearby rue Mirabeau, under which it runs. It was in turn named after Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, the Count of Mirabeau, a leader during the early stages of the French Revolution. The station is near the Pont Mirabeau.

History
The station opened on 30 September 1913 as part of the extension of line 8 from Charles Michels (then known as Beaugrenelle) to Porte d'Auteuil. On 27 July 1937, the section of line 8 between La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle and Porte d'Auteuil, including Mirabeau was transferred to line 10 during the reconfiguration of lines 8, 10, and the old line 14. However, service between Porte d'Auteuil and Jussieu was not provided until two days later, on July 29, with service initially limited to La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle.

As part of the "Renouveau du métro" programme by the RATP, the station's corridors was renovated and modernised on 15 September 2006.

In 2019, the station was used by 1,377,611 passengers, making it the 281st busiest of the Métro network out of 302 stations.

In 2020, the station was used by 724,167 passengers amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, making it the 277th busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

In 2021, the station was used by 1,001,302 passengers, making it the 284th busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

Access
The station has 2 accesses divided amongst 3 access points:

 * Access 1: avenue de Versailles (with a Guimard entrance – it was listed as a historical monument on 12 February 2016 )
 * Access 2: rue Mirabeau (with a rare Val d'Osne totem)

Platforms
The station has a unique configuration in which it only has a single side platform that serves only one track – the eastbound track for trains heading towards Javel–André Citroën. The westbound track, however, does not have a platform that serves it. Instead, it has an ascending ramp for trains heading towards Église d'Auteuil and diverges at the western end of the station. This ramp enables the westbound track to stay near the surface to reach Église d'Auteuil as Mirabeau is relatively deep underground due to the tunnels between it Javel–André Citroën needing to pass under the Seine.

Other connections
The station is also served by lines 22, 62 and 72 of the RATP bus network, and at night, by lines N12 and N61 of the Noctilien network.

title: Mirabeau station


text:
Porte d'Auteuil station

Porte d'Auteuil is a métro station serving Line 10 (westbound only). It is situated in the 16th arrondissement.

History
The station opened on 30 September 1913 as part of the extension of line 8 from Beaugrenelle (now Charles Michels). On 29 July 1937, line 10 was extended from Duroc to La Motte-Picquet - Grenelle and the section of line 8 between La Motte-Picquet - Grenelle and Porte d'Auteuil, including Porte d'Auteuil was transferred to line 10. Prior to 3 October 1980, when the line was extended to Boulogne - Jean Jaurès, trains ran on to Michel-Ange - Molitor to return to the east. The station is named after the Porte d'Auteuil, a gate in the nineteenth century Thiers wall of Paris, which was located in the district of Auteuil, which was mostly incorporated in the 16th arrondissement in 1860, with the remainder absorbed into the commune of Boulogne-Billancourt.

Tourism

 * Stade Roland Garros, home to the French Open tennis tournament.
 * Parc des Princes
 * Stade Jean-Bouin
 * Jardin des Serres d'Auteuil
 * Auteuil Hippodrome
 * Bois de Boulogne

title: Porte d'Auteuil station


text:
Who (pronoun)

The pronoun who, in English, is an interrogative pronoun and a relative pronoun, used primarily to refer to persons.

Unmarked, who is the pronoun's subjective form; its inflected forms are the objective whom and the possessive whose. The set has derived indefinite forms whoever, whomever, and whoseever, as well as a further, earlier such set whosoever, whomsoever, and whosesoever (see also "-ever").

Etymology
The interrogative and relative pronouns who derive from the Old English singular interrogative hwā, and whose paradigm is set out below: It was not until the end of the 17th century that who became the only pronoun that could ask about the identity of persons and what fully lost this ability.

"The first occurrences of wh-relatives date from the twelfth century (with the possible exception hwær (see Kivimaa 1966: 35)). The wh- form does not become frequent, however, until the fourteenth century." Today, relative whose can still refer to non-persons (e.g., the car whose door won't open).

The spelling 'who' does not correspond to the word's pronunciation ; it is the spelling that represents the expected outcome of hwā, while the pronunciation represents a divergent outcome – for details see Pronunciation of English ⟨wh⟩. The word is cognate with Latin quis and Greek ποιός.

As interrogative pronoun
"Who" and its derived forms can be used as interrogative pronouns, to form questions:

 * "Who did that?"
 * "Who did you meet this morning?" (formal: "Who(m) did you meet this morning?")
 * "Who did you speak to?" (formal: "To whom did you speak?" or "Whom did you speak to?")
 * "Whoever could have done that?" (emphatic form, expressing disbelief)
 * "Whose bike is that?" (use of 'whose' as possessive determiner/adjective; see possessive and English possessive)
 * "Whose do you like best?" (use of 'whose' as possessive pronoun)

The same forms (though not usually the emphatic ones) are used to make indirect questions:

 * "We don't know who did that."
 * "I wonder who(m) she met this morning."

The corresponding form when referring to non-humans is "what" (which has the emphatic form "whatever", and no possessive form). Another similar interrogative is "which" – this can refer to either humans or non-humans, normally implying selection from a particular set, as either interrogative pronoun ("Which do you prefer?") or interrogative determiner (adjective) ("Which man should I choose?"). 'What' can also be used as a determiner ("What book are you reading?"), but 'who' cannot.

"Which", "who", and "what" as interrogatives can be either singular or plural ("Which is the highest hill?", "Which are the highest hills?", "Who was born in 1920?" or "Who were king and queen in 1920?"). "Who" and "what" often take a singular verb regardless of any supposed number. The questions "Who wants some cake?" and "What's in the bag?" do not presuppose anything about number in possible responses: "I want some cake", or "All of us want some"; and "A rabbit is in the bag", or "Five coins and a bus ticket".

As relative pronoun
The other chief use of "who" and its derivatives are in the formation of relative clauses:
 * "These are the men who work upstairs."
 * "This is Tom, who(m) I believe you have already met."
 * "I helped some lads whose car had broken down."

The corresponding form for non-humans is "which", although "whose" can be used as a possessive in relative clauses even when referring to non-humans: "I will have to fix the car whose engine I ruined."

In restrictive relative clauses, when not preceded by a preposition, both "who(m)" and "which" can be replaced by "that", or (if not the subject of the clause) by zero. In relative clauses, "who" (like other relative pronouns) takes the number (singular or plural) of its antecedent. "Who" also takes the person (first, second or third) of its antecedent:

 * "I, who 'am' having a hard time right now, won't be able to help you."
 * "I, a tired old man who 'is' fed up with all your nonsense, refuse to help you."

"Who" and "whom" can also be used to form free relative clauses (those with no antecedent). The emphatic forms are often used for this purpose: informal: "I'll take whoever you choose"; formal: "I'll take whomever/whomsoever you choose". This corresponds to the use of "what(ever)" when referring to non-humans. (For the choice between "who(ever)" and "whom(ever)" in formal English, see below.)

The emphatic forms can also be used to make adverbial clauses, as in "Whomever/Whoever you choose, I'll be satisfied".

For more details, see English relative clauses.

Tendency to replace "whom" with "who"
According to traditional prescriptive grammar, "who" is the subjective (nominative) form only, while "whom" is the corresponding objective form (just as "him" is the objective form corresponding to "he"). It has long been common, particularly in informal English, for the uninflected form "who" to be used in both cases, thus replacing "whom" in the contexts where the latter was traditionally used.

In 1975, S. Potter noted in Changing English that, "nearly half a century ago Edward Sapir predicted the demise of "whom", showing at great length that it was doomed because it was 'psychologically isolated' from the objective pronouns me, us, him, her, them on the one hand, and the invariables which, what, that and where, when, how, why on the other." By 1978, the 'who'–'whom' distinction was identified as having "slipped so badly that [it is] almost totally uninformative". According to the OED (2nd edition, 1989), "whom" is "no longer current in natural colloquial speech". Lasnik and Sobin argue that surviving occurrences of "whom" are not part of ordinary English grammar, but the result of extra-grammatical rules for producing "prestige" forms.

According to Mair, the decline of "whom" has been hastened by the fact that it is one of relatively few synthetic (inflected) remnants in the principally analytical grammar of Modern English. It has also been claimed that the decline of "whom" is more advanced in the interrogative case than in the relative case, this possibly being related to the degree of complexity of the syntax.

Some prescriptivists continue to defend "whom" as the only "correct" form in functions other than the subject. Mair notes that: "'whom' is moribund as an element of the core grammar of English, but is very much alive as a style marker whose correct use is acquired in the educational system [, where it is taught]. [The use of "whom"] is highly restricted, but rather than disappear entirely, the form is likely to remain in use for some time to come because of its overt prestige in writing."

Whom is also sometimes used by way of hypercorrection, in places where it would not even be considered correct according to traditional rules, as in "Whom do you think you are?" For more examples see the section below.

Retention of the 'who'–'whom' distinction often co-occurs with another stylistic marker of formal or "prestige" English – avoidance of the stranded preposition. This means that "whom" can frequently be found following a preposition, in cases where the usual informal equivalent would use who and place the preposition later in the sentence. For example:

 * Formal: "To whom did you give it?"
 * Informal: "Who did you give it to?"

In relative clauses, movement of the preposition further allows "who" to be replaced by "that" or removed entirely:

 * Formal: "He is someone to whom I owe a great deal."
 * Informal: "He is someone who I owe a great deal to", or "He is someone that I owe a great deal to", or "He is someone I owe a great deal to..."

Difference between "who" and "whom"
In the types of English in which "whom" is used (which are generally the more formal varieties, as described in the section above), the general grammatical rule is that "who" is the subjective (nominative) form, analogous to the personal pronouns "I", "he", "she", "we", "they", while "whom" is the objective (oblique) form, analogous to "me", "him", "her", "us" and "them". Thus, "who" is used as a verb subject, while "whom" is used as an indirect or direct object of a verb or as the object (complement) of a preposition.

Examples:
 * As verb subject: "Who is waiting over there? Tom is someone who works hard" (original sentence, before being changed to a clause: "'He' works hard.")
 * As verb object: "Whom do you support? She is someone whom many people admire." (original sentence, before being changed to a clause: "Many people admire 'her'.")
 * As preposition complement: "On whom do you plan to rely? These are the players of whom I am most proud." (original sentence, before being changed to a clause: "I am most proud of 'them'.")

Notice that in a relative clause, the form depends on the role of the pronoun in the relative clause, not that of its antecedent in the main clause. For example, "I saw the man who ate the pie" – not "whom", since "who" is the subject of "ate" (original sentence, before being changed to a clause: "'He' ate the pie"); it makes no difference that its antecedent "(the) man" is the object of "saw".

In the position of predicative expression, i.e. as the complement of forms of the copula "be", the form "who" is used, and considered correct, rather than "whom". (Compare the case of the personal pronouns, where the subjective form is traditionally considered correct, although the objective forms are more commonly used – see .)

 * "Who were those people?"
 * "Who is this?", or "Who is it?" Compare: "It is I" (formal, and traditionally correct) to "it is me" (informal, but now common usage).

In the examples that follow, notice how, when the verb is a form of "be", the question "Who is the captain of the team?" or the noun clause "who the captain of the team is" (we know it is a noun clause because it replaces the word "something") is the same regardless of whether the original placement of the unknown person was before or after "be" (is):

 * She asked something. John is captain of the team.
 * Interrogative: She asked, "'Who' is captain of the team?"
 * Noun clause: She asked "who the captain of the team is".
 * She asked something. The captain of the team is John.
 * Interrogative: She asked, "'Who' is captain of the team?"
 * Noun clause: She asked "who the captain of the team is".

Ambiguous cases
A problem sometimes arises in constructions like this:

 * "Beethoven, 'who' you say was a great composer, wrote only one opera."

Use of "who" here is normal, and to replace it with 'whom' would be grammatically incorrect, since the pronoun is the subject of "was", not the object of "say". (One would write "You say [that] 'he' [not 'him'] was a great composer".) Nevertheless, "whom" is quite commonly encountered, and even defended, in sentences of this type. It may arise from confusion with a form like:

 * "Beethoven, whom you believe [or "whom you believe to be"] a great composer, wrote only one opera."

In this case, "whom" is used correctly according to the traditional rules, since it is now the object of the verb "believe". (One would write "You believe him [not 'he'] (to be) a great composer.")

The use of "whom" in sentences of the first type ("Beethoven, whom you say was a great composer...") – referred to as "subject 'whom' – can therefore be regarded as a hypercorrection, resulting from awareness of a perceived need to correct "who" to "whom" in sentences of the second type. Examples of this apparently ungrammatical usage can be found throughout the history of English. The OED traces it back to the 15thcentury, while Jespersen cites even earlier examples from Chaucer. More examples are given below:

 * Young Ferdinand, whom they suppose is drown'd, [...] (Shakespeare, The Tempest, III, 3)
 * [...] going to seek the grave / Of Arthur, whom they say is kill'd to-night / On your suggestion. (Shakespeare, King John, IV, 2)
 * [...] the rest of their company rescued them, and stood over them fighting till they were come to themselves, all but him whom they thought had been dead; [...] (Defoe, The Further Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Chapter 6, Part 1. Use of whom here may be due partly to the proximity of him.)
 * But if others were involved, it was Harris and Klebold whom students said seemed the tightest, who stood apart from the rest of their clique. (From The Age newspaper, Melbourne, Australia, April 1999, in an article syndicated from the Washington Post. The original article had the "correct" who. Note that the continuation with the parallel construction who stood apart illustrates how the use of subject whom can lead to inconsistencies.)
 * He saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am? (King James Bible, Matthew 16:15. Technically whom here is not a subject, but the complement of the copula am; but in this position too it is who that would be expected according to the traditional grammatical rules as given in the section above, as it would be in Who am I?)

Doubts can also arise in the case of free relative clauses, formed with who(m), who(m)ever or who(m)soever. Modern guides to English usage say that the relative pronoun should take the case appropriate to the relative clause, not the function performed by that clause within an external clause. For example, it is correct to write I'll talk to whoever [not whomever] will listen, since whoever is the subject of will listen (regardless of the fact that the entire clause whoever will listen serves as the object of the preposition to). On the other hand, Whomever you choose will suit me is correct, since whomever is now the object of choose (despite the fact that the entire relative clause is the subject of will suit).

Similarly: In sentences of this type, as with the "subject whom" examples above, use of whom(ever) is sometimes found in places where it would not be expected grammatically, due to the relative complexity of the syntax. In fact in Middle English it was standard for the form of the pronoun to depend on the function in the external clause; the modern rule came about through re-analysis of the pronoun as primarily an element of the internal clause.
 * Let whoever is without sin cast the first stone. (In the internal clause, whoever is the subject of is.)
 * Whom you choose will be placed on this list. (In the internal clause, whom is the object of choose.)

Usage of "whose"
"Whose" is the genitive case of "who".
 * The boy whose name I don't remember came from Japan.

Unlike the other forms of "who", relative "whose" (but not interrogative "whose") can still refer to non-persons, in the way that all forms of the word could in Old and Middle English.

 * The cars whose door won't open.

title: Who (pronoun)


text:
Charles Michels station

Charles Michels is a station on Line 10 of the Paris Métro. It is located in the 15th arrondissement.

History
The station opened as Beaugrenelle on 13 July 1913 as part of the initial section of line 8 as its temporary southern terminus, and with Opéra as its northern terminus. The line was then extended to Porte d'Auteuil on 30 September that same year, becoming its new southern terminus. It was then named after Place Beaugrenelle (now known as Place Charles Michels). Beaugrenelle ("beautiful Grenelle") was a name given by property developers in the Grenelle district during its urbanisation.

On 27 July 1937, the section of line 8 between La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle and Porte d'Auteuil, including Beaugrenelle, was transferred to line 10 during the reconfiguration of lines 8, 10, and the old line 14. On 29 July 1937, line 10 was extended from Duroc to La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle. On 14 July 1945, both the station as well as the nearby Place Beaugrenelle were renamed Charles Michels and Place Charles Michels respectively, in honour of Charles Michels (1903–1941), a trade unionist, communist militant, and deputy of the 15th arrondissement in Paris. He was held hostage and shot during the Occupation by the Nazis in retaliation for the assassination of Karl Hotz, amongst 44 other people. Hence, the station, along with 7 other stations, were renamed after the Second World War to honour the resistance fighters who had died for France. The other stations were: Colonel Fabien, Corentin Cariou, Corentin Celton, Guy Môquet, Jacques Bonsergent, Marx Dormoy, and Trinité - d'Estienne d'Orves.

As part of the "Renouveau du métro" programme by the RATP, the station's platforms were renovated and modernised in 2009.

In 2019, the station was used by 4,601,730 passengers, making it the 93rd busiest of the Métro network out of 302 stations.

In 2020, the station was used by 2,198,392 passengers amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, making it the 194th busiest of the Métro network out of 108 stations.

In 2021, the station was used by 3,079,569 passengers, making it the 102nd busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

Access
The station has 2 accesses:

 * Access 1: Place Charles-Michels
 * Access 2: rue des Entrepreneurs

Platforms
The station has a standard configuration with 2 tracks surrounded by 2 side platforms.

Other connections
The station is also served by lines 42, 70, and 88 of the RATP bus network, and at night, by lines N12 and N61 bus of the Noctilien network.

Nearby

 * A replica of the Statue of Liberty on the Île aux Cygnes.
 * Beaugrenelle shopping mall
 * Front de Seine
 * square Pau-Casals

title: Charles Michels station


text:
Avenue Émile Zola station

Avenue Émile Zola is a station on line 10 of the Paris Métro. Located in the 15th arrondissement, it is situated at the eastern end of avenue Émile Zola, at the intersection of the rue du Commerce and rue Fondary. The station is named after the nearby avenue Émile Zola, which in turn is named after Émile Zola (1840-1902), a prolific French writer during the 19th century.

History
The station opened on 13 July 1913 with the name Commerce as part of the initial section of line 8 from Beaugrenelle (now Charles Michels) and Opéra. It was initially named after the nearby rue du Commerce which was the main shopping street of the former commune of Grenelle which was merged into the city of Paris in 1859.

On 27 July 1937, the section of line 8 between La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle and Porte d'Auteuil, including Avenue Émile Zola, was transferred to line 10 during the reconfiguration of lines 8, 10, and the old line 14. On the same day, the station was renamed Avenue Émile Zola to distinguish it from a new station also named Commerce that had opened on line 8, 300 metres south of the station. It is the last of three stations on the network that had its name changed as its original name hd been used for a newer station, after Saint-Placide (line 4) and Picpus (line 6). Initially, service between Porte d'Auteuil and Jussieu was not provided, with it being limited to La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle until the underground connection for line 10 was opened two days later, linking La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle and Duroc.

As part of the "Un métro + beau" programme by the RATP, the station's corridors and platform lighting were renovated and modernised on 13 November 2003.

In 2019, the station was used by 1,479,759 passengers, making it the 280th busiest of the Métro network out of 302 stations.

In 2020, the station was used by 823,178 passengers amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, making it the 263rd busiest of the Métro network out of 304 stations.

In 2021, the station was used by 1,041,233 passengers, making it the 280th busiest of the Métro network out of 304 stations.

Access
The station has 2 accesses:

 * Access 1: rue Fondary
 * Access 2: rue du Commerce

Platforms
The station has a standard configuration with 2 tracks surrounded by 2 side platforms.

Other connections
The station is also served at night by lines N12 and N61 of the Noctilien bus network.

title: Avenue Émile Zola station


text:
Ségur station

Ségur is a station on Line 10 of the Paris Métro. It is located on the border of the 7th arrondissement and 15th arrondissement. It is named after avenue de Ségur located 100 m northeast of the station. It was in turn named after Marquis Philippe Henri de Ségur, a Marshall of France and Secretary of State for War from 1780 to 1787. The name Ségur is better known by the novels of his granddaughter by marriage, the Countess of Ségur (1799-1874), best known for her novel, Les Malheurs de Sophie.

History
The station opened on 29 September 1937 when line 10 was extended from Duroc to La Motte-Picquet (now known as La Motte-Picquet–Grenelle), two months after the opening of the section between La Motte-Picquet and Duroc and trains skipped the station. The nameplates on the platforms are subtitiled UNESCO, due to the location of the station near its headquarters. It, however, does not appear on maps published by the RATP.

As part of the "Renouveau du métro" programme by the RATP, the station's platforms and lights were renovated and modernised on 4 January 2006.

In 2019, the station was used by 1,662,452 passengers, making it the 269th busiest of the Métro network out of 302 stations.

In 2020, the station was used by 804,110 passengers amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, making it the 267th busiest of the Métro network out of 108 stations.

In 2021, the station was used by 1,100,151 passengers, making it the 277th busiest of the Métro network out of 305 stations.

Access
The station has 2 accesses:

 * Access 1: avenue de Suffren UNESCO - Fontenoy
 * Access 2: boulevard Garibaldi UNESCO - Miollis

Platforms
The station has a standard configuration with 2 tracks surrounded by 2 side platforms.

Other connections
This station is not served by any buses from the RATP bus network.

Nearby

 * avenue de Breteuil, a famous avenue leading to the Invalides.
 * École Militaire
 * UNESCO Headquarters

title: Ségur station