text:
Bo Xilai

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese former politician who was convicted on bribery and embezzlement charges. He came to prominence through his tenures as Mayor of Dalian and then the governor of Liaoning. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce. Between 2007 and 2012, he served as a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, a major interior municipality. He was generally considered the main political rival of Xi Jinping before Xi became the paramount leader of China.

He is the son of former Chinese Vice Premier Bo Yibo. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in a marked departure from Chinese political convention. In Chongqing, Bo initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture". Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality. However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about the image he cultivated, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the elite CCP Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. However, his political fortunes came to an abrupt end following the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu. Wang claimed to have information about the involvement of Bo Xilai and his wife Gu Kailai in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood, who allegedly had close financial ties to the two. In the fallout, Bo was removed as the CCP Committee secretary of Chongqing and lost his seat on the Politburo. He was later stripped of all his positions and lost his seat at the National People's Congress and eventually expelled from the party. In 2013, Bo was found guilty of corruption, stripped of all his assets and sentenced to life imprisonment. He is incarcerated at Qincheng Prison.

Early life
Bo Xilai was born on 3 July 1949. He was the fourth child and second son of prominent Communist Party leader Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Great Eminent Officials, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting more open trade relations with the West. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from his posts. He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guards in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.

Bo Xilai was seventeen years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing, one of the best in the country. In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo Xilai is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization and may have at one point denounced his father.

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo Xilai and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution was officially attributed to the Gang of Four, and Bo's father was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and, in 1979, became vice premier.

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau. He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history. In the second year of his studies, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, graduating with a master's degree in 1982. He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.

Early political career
During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence. Bo Yibo served successively as vice premier and vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The elder Bo came to be known as one of the "eight elders" (sometimes referred to as the "Eight Immortals") of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policies, the elder Bo was politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. After the 1989 crackdown, Bo Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s. Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007 and was influential in shaping his son's career.

After graduating from university, Bo Xilai was assigned to Zhongnanhai – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat and CCP Central Committee General Office. He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County (modern day Jinzhou District, Dalian, Liaoning). In an interview with People's Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. "For quite a long time people had reservations about me," he said. Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CCP Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990. In 1993, Bo became deputy party secretary and mayor of Dalian.

Mayor of Dalian
Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1993 and formally assumed the post later in the same year. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995. Bo was promoted to CCP Committee Secretary in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth. In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work. Since Bo's time in office, Dalian became known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from East Asian neighbours such as South Korea and Japan, as well as Western countries. In contrast to his colleagues, he held press conferences during the Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for "getting things done".

Bo spent seven years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to colleagues of the same rank, who are often transferred to different locales throughout their careers. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks. To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass". In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city. In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. The post went to Yu Youjun instead.

15th Party Congress
During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai's family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo's ambitions for his son were well-known. Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family's 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng, ostensibly because of Xilai's superior academic credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master's degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai's selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son's "achievements" as mayor of Dalian. They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana." Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped him gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.

In addition, Bo Xilai placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th CCP Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo Xilai was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment. Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party. Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province. His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.

Provincial Governor
In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement. Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-party general secretary Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997, which was intended to strengthen ideological conviction and promote internal unity in the Communist Party; however, the campaign was generally seen as lacklustre by observers and not universally embraced even inside the party leadership. The Bos' unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang, and was officially confirmed as governor in 2003. In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the Northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).

The Northeast was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning alone was twice that of the Guangdong. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while Guangdong and other provinces along the South and East China Sea coasts prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other regions, with high unemployment rates. The revitalisation plan aimed to address this by reviving the region's traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities. In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning, he was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping, the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives. Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure. Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing. In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior. Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa," and even held a party to celebrate Bo's departure from Liaoning in 2004.

Ethan Gutmann, citing Falun Gong allegations that Liaoning was the epicenter of organ harvesting from practitioners while Bo was governor, suggested that he may have used his involvement as a way of building up his political power. David Kilgour, who co-wrote the Kilgour–Matas report on organ harvesting, claimed Bo may have played a role. Separately, Falun Gong practitioners abroad filed over ten lawsuits against Bo alleging torture and crimes against humanity. In 2009, a Spanish court indicted Bo Xilai and four other officials for genocide against Falun Gong based on those allegations.

16th Party Congress
At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief competitors were seen as Xi Jinping, then party secretary of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of Henan. As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion. The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo Xilai remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi and Li remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as paramount leader.

Minister of Commerce
When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as CCP General Secretary in late 2002, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo also earned a seat on the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Bo's stint as Minister of Commerce significantly raised his international profile and generated media attention both in China and abroad. Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems, Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a "political star". Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy.

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe. The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy. Bo maintained a conciliatory but assertive attitude as he attended talks in Washington, D.C. On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, formed from the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies. He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within a domestic market that was quickly being crowded out by foreign competition.

17th Party Congress
At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Bo gained a seat on the 25-member Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. He was then tipped to leave the Ministry of Commerce and take over as CCP Committee secretary of Chongqing. Bo's predecessor, political rival Wang Yang, was reassigned as party secretary of Guangdong.

At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam. According to analysts, Hu Jintao wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified. Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was reportedly unhappy with his new assignment. He had hoped to become vice premier instead, but Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Wu Yi argued against Bo's promotion to vice-premiership. In particular, Wu was critical of Bo's penchant for self-promotion, and Wen cited international lawsuits against Bo by Falun Gong adherents as a barrier to his holding higher office.

Bo took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, even though Wang Yang had vacated the position on 13 November. Whilst some saw this transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view, others considered it a promotion since being the party secretary in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.

The Chongqing model
Although Bo was initially unhappy about his reassignment in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office. Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012, as all but two of the PSC members—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire. The transition would be an opportunity for Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the CCP Central Political and Legislative Committee, serving as the head of the party's security apparatus.

In Chongqing, Bo pioneered a new style of governance dubbed the "Chongqing Model" – a set of social and economic policies intended to address diverse challenges facing modern China following economic reforms. This made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.

The Chongqing model was characterized in part by increased state control and the promotion of a neo-leftist ideology. Along with his police chief Wang Lijun, Bo launched a sweeping campaign against organized crime, and increased the security and police presence in the city. Critics noted these policies were accompanied by the erosion of the rule of law, and allegations surfaced of political and personal rivals being victimized amidst Bo's anti-corruption drive. As a means of addressing declining public morality, Bo launched a "red culture" movement to promote Maoist-era socialist ethics. On the economic front, he actively courted foreign investment—much as he had done in Liaoning. The Chongqing model was also characterized by massive public works programs, subsidized housing for the poor, and social policies intended to make it easier for rural citizens to move to the city, thus reaping the benefits of urban status. An article compared Bo's governing style to that of Russian president Vladimir Putin.

The Chongqing model provided an alternate development paradigm that diverged from the policies preferred by those in the national leadership seen as favouring further reform such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Bo's leadership in Chongqing dramatically raised his profile, both nationally and internationally. In 2010, he was named as one of the 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010' by Time. Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral political system, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers essentially amounted to a public 'election campaign' for the top leadership. However, he drew the ire of some of the country's leaders; President Hu and Premier Wen were reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, ostensibly due to a discomfort over his leadership style.

Organized crime
Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against organized crime and corruption known as "". Between 2009 and 2011, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force, judges, government officials, and political adversaries. The campaign was overseen by Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun, whom Bo had worked with previously in Liaoning.

Wen Qiang, one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been a prominent municipal official since the days of party secretaries He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. Wen, the former executive deputy commissioner of the Chongqing police force Public Security for 16 years, was tried and convicted of a litany of crimes and sentenced to death in a sensational headline-grabbing trial. Contrary to the popular perception at the time that the campaign was part of Bo's perceived penchant for self-promotion, China observer Willy Lam suggested that such a large-scale crackdown will have received approval from central authorities, including Hu Jintao, and that Bo became careful to not let Chongqing appear to be trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.

The dahei campaign earned Bo national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing—all the more because of the city's historical reputation as a center for criminal activity. In contrast to often colourless and orthodox politicians, Bo gained the reputation as a party boss that "got things done." The apparent success of dǎhēi earned Bo 'rock star status', and resulted in calls to replicate the campaign on a nationwide scale. Through the campaign, Bo gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.

However, Bo's campaign was criticized for running roughshod over judicial due process and eroding the rule of law. Individuals targeted in the campaign were arbitrarily detained by the authorities, with an estimated 1,000 being sent to forced labour. Lawyers for the accused were intimidated and harassed, and in at least one case, sentenced to 18 months in prison. Allegations also surfaced over the use of torture to extract confessions. Moreover, assets seized during the campaign were allegedly redirected to help pay for Bo's popular social housing programs. The Wall Street Journal reported that US$11 billion went into government coffers through the campaign. Li Jun, a fugitive businessman, asserted that he became a target of Bo anti-corruption drive as a result of a land dispute with the government. When he refused government demands to give up the land, he claims that he was abducted and tortured, and that US$700 million worth of assets in his business were seized.

Red culture movement
During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture' and improve public morale, known as "". The initiative included the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programming and operas, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution. As part of the movement, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department, commercial enterprise, educational institution, state radio and TV stations begin singing 'red songs' praising the achievements of the Communist Party. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era.

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, for instance, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million mobile phone users. According to Xinhua, Bo's text messages were usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together," and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities." Bo and his team of municipal administrators also erected new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off. Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.

Reactions to the red culture movement were divided. Bo's revival of Mao-era culture and accompanying social welfare programs were popular within much of the middle to lower income strata of Chongqing society, and made Bo a star with both conventional Marxists and neo-leftists. Bo won praise for returning the city to what some called China's 'true socialist heritage' by de-emphasizing material wealth, and evoked nostalgia to the social egalitarianism that existed during Mao's time. Some retirees were particularly inspired and said they wanted to pass on "revolutionary spirit" to their children, while others participated as a means to praise the Communist Party for the country's economic progress.

The campaign also had many detractors. Some intellectuals and reformers criticized the campaign for being regressive, akin to "being drowned in a red sea", and bringing back painful memories from the Cultural Revolution. Several mid-level officials in the city committed suicide due to overwhelming pressure to organize events for the red songs campaign. Bo's critics derisively referred to him as "little Mao".

Social policies
A cornerstone of Bo's Chongqing model involved a series of egalitarian social policies aimed to lessen the gap between rich and poor, and ease the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing "red GDP"—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.

To that end, the city reportedly spent $15.8 billion on public apartment complexes for use by recent college graduates, migrant workers and low-income residents. In 2007, the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu were selected to run pilot projects intended to mitigate the rural-urban divide and ease integration of rural residents into the cities. Under China's hukou registration system at the time, citizens were classified as either rural or urban—a distinction that affected educational opportunities, health benefits, and social welfare, effectively making rural hukou holders "second class citizens". Of Chongqing's 32 million residents, only 27% held urban hukou as of 2007. The 2007 project made it easier for rural residents to obtain urban status, a policy intended not only to help balance inequality, but also to enable the government to develop underused rural land. Under Bo's leadership, Chongqing established "land exchanges" where rural villages could earn credits for maximizing farmland.

Bo's approach to social policy was demonstrated during the November 2008 taxi strikes, which saw over 8,000 taxi drivers take to the streets for two days in protests over high fees, unregulated competition and rising fuel costs. Similar protests in China were frequently suppressed—sometimes forcefully—with official media sometimes blaming labour unrest on criminal instigation. Bo's government instead held a televised roundtable dialogues with the protesters and citizens, and agreed to allow the formation of a trade union. His handling of the situation earned him praise as a comparatively restrained and progressive leader.

Economic policies
Another major component of Bo's Chongqing model concerned the city's economic policies. Just as he had done in Liaoning, Bo ambitiously pursued foreign investment in the city, lowering corporate income tax rates (15% compared to the 25% national average), and sought to stimulate rapid urbanization and industrialization. He also carried on with policies initiated by his predecessors which focused on domestic consumption, rather than export-led growth. During his tenure, Chongqing reported annual GDP growth far exceeding the national average. In 2008, for instance, nationwide GDP growth was reported at 8%, while Chongqing reported 14.3%; the same year, foreign trade rose by 28%, and bank loans were up 29%.

Bo's model of economic growth won national and international praise for seamlessly combining foreign investment and state-led growth. However, Bo's critics called the model of "red GDP" – subsidized infrastructure, housing and public works projects – unsustainable and a drain on the city's budget. Some civil servants complained that they were not getting salaries on time. Chongqing received a disproportionately high share (some US$34 billion) of stimulus money from Beijing in 2008. Political rivals such as Bo's predecessor Wang Yang also suggested that economic figures in Chongqing were "rigged"—artificially inflated through unnecessary construction and public works projects.

Leadership style
Although many of Bo's campaigns earned popular support, especially from the city's poor, his leadership style has been described as "propagandistic," "ruthless," and "arrogant" by subordinates and city officials, academics, journalists, and other professionals. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in a marked departure from Chinese political convention. Michael Wines of The New York Times wrote that although Bo was possessed of "prodigious charisma and deep intelligence," these qualities were offset by a "studied indifference to the wrecked lives that littered his path to power... Mr. Bo's ruthlessness stood out, even in a system where the absence of formal rules ensures that only the strongest advance." Bo placed onerous demands on government officials in the city, requiring them to be available to work all day and all night, seven days a week. He reportedly called subordinates to late-night meetings, publicly criticized and humiliated those with whom he disagreed, and even hit underlings who failed to meet his demands. According to a psychologist quoted by the Daily Telegraph, since Bo Xilai assumed power, "depression, burn out and suicides have all risen among officials... Officials now make up the largest share of patients [seeking] counselling in the city."

In late 2009, a popular investigative television show on China Central Television aired a critical story on Bo's anti-crime drive, expressing concern over the apparent disregard for legal due process. In response, Bo used his connections to have the show's host temporarily banned from the airwaves, and its producer moved to another program. Others who opposed Bo's initiatives were also met with retribution. Li Zhuang, a defense lawyer from Beijing, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison (later reduced to 18 months) in 2009 for attempting to defend one of the high-profile targets of Bo's crackdown. Cheng Li, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said that "Nobody really trusts [Bo]: a lot of people are scared of him, including several princelings who are supposed to be his power base."

Alleged eavesdropping operations
As part of Bo's efforts to fight crime and maintain social and political stability in Chongqing, he initiated a major electronic surveillance operation. Wang Lijun, Chongqing's police chief, served as the architect of the state-funded project, which was described in official media as a "comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet." The system involved wiretaps, eavesdropping, and monitoring of internet communications, and was designed with the help of cybersecurity expert Fang Binxing, known for his pivotal role in the construction of China's Great Firewall.

According to The New York Times, the eavesdropping operations did not only target local criminals, but also the communications of top Chinese leaders, including those of President Hu Jintao. One source connected to the Chinese leadership said that Bo tried to monitor nearly all central leaders who had visited Chongqing to better understand what they thought of him. In August 2011, a phone call between Hu Jintao and anti-corruption official Ma Wen was found to be wiretapped under Bo's orders. The revelations about the eavesdropping operation resulted in intense scrutiny from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. It was also said to have sowed distrust and played a role in the falling out of Bo and his police chief Wang Lijun, who allegedly began to use the same eavesdropping methods against Bo himself. The operations were believed to have contributed to Bo's downfall in 2012.

Death of Neil Heywood
On 14 November 2011, British citizen Neil Heywood was found dead in his Chongqing hotel room. At the time, local authorities declared he had died from alcohol over-consumption, though his family noted that he was not a heavy drinker. The official cause of death was not scrutinized until several months later, when revelations emerged that Heywood's death was a homicide, and Bo Xilai was implicated.

Heywood served as an intermediary linking Western companies to powerful Chinese politicians. He was a long-time associate of the Bo family: he reportedly shared a close personal relationship with Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, and had helped the couple's son Bo Guagua earn admission to Harrow School in England. Heywood also allegedly served as a middleman for the family, helping them clandestinely move large sums of money overseas.

In October 2011, Heywood reportedly had a business dispute with Gu Kailai when he demanded a higher commission for his services. The dispute escalated, with Heywood ultimately threatening to reveal the family's business dealings and overseas assets, estimated to total in excess of US$136 million. Heywood was then allegedly poisoned by Gu and an assistant. Gu would be convicted of the murder and receive a suspended death sentence in August 2012.

Wang Lijun incident
In early 2012, the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection bolstered its presence within Chongqing as the city's leaders came under investigation. Much of the attention focused on Bo's police chief, Wang Lijun, who may have been under investigation for his role in a corruption case in Liaoning. Growing scrutiny over the city's wiretapping operation against senior leaders also likely fell mainly on Wang. Although details are scarce, several sources have suggested that Wang's resentment against Bo grew amidst the investigations—resentment that was compounded when Wang realized that he and his wife had also been targets of wiretapping under Bo's orders.

Moreover, Wang was privy to details of Neil Heywood's death, and had reportedly attempted to voice his concerns to Bo about alleged poisoning. Around 16 January, Wang is believed to have confronted Bo over evidence that implicated Bo's wife in the murder. Although Bo initially agreed to allow an inquiry, he then changed course and sought to obstruct investigations. Wang was abruptly demoted on 2 February to the far less prestigious position of Vice-mayor overseeing education, science, and environmental affairs. Bo placed Wang under surveillance, and several of his close associates were reportedly taken into custody. Some reports allege that Bo may have been plotting to have Wang assassinated.

On 6 February 2012, apparently fearing for his life, Wang traveled to the U.S. consulate in the nearby city of Chengdu, bringing evidence implicating Bo and his family in the Neil Heywood murder. According to reports, Wang sought and was denied asylum in the United States. He remained in the consulate for approximately 24 hours before leaving "of his own volition" and being taken into the custody of state security officials dispatched from Beijing. Local media in Chongqing announced that he was on a mental health-related sick leave.

A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption. Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him. Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".

Removal from posts
On 15 March 2012, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party secretary and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter. The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which secretary of the CPLC Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote (and Bo Xilai had been earmarked to gain a position on in the future). On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference. Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture". Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also represented a political triumph for the 'liberal reformer' wing of the Communist Party.

On 10 April 2012, Bo was suspended from the CCP Central Committee and Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was named a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood. The announcement, carrying criminal implications, was the death knell for Bo's political career.

On 28 September 2012, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a decision to expel him from the party. The decision was ratified by a full plenary session of the Central Committee on 4 November. He was accused of major disciplinary violations and corruption charges during his tenure in Dalian, the Ministry of Commerce and Chongqing, including in relation to the Gu Kailai case.

On 26 October 2012, the Standing Committee of the 11th National People's Congress expelled him as a deputy to the national legislature, removing his final public post and setting the stage for his trial. When he was ejected from the Communist Party, the official announcement also mentioned that he had "had or maintained improper sexual relations with multiple women." Rumors also spread that he had an affair with the star actress of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Zhang Ziyi; Zhang racked up significant legal bills attempting to sue the sources of the rumour for defamation. During the trial, Bo admitted that he had fallen out with his wife because of an affair he had in the 1990s, prompting her to move to the United Kingdom to be near their son, Bo Guagua.

Public reactions
Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum. Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after. Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign'; Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored. Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor. The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive. Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development. Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution. Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, and exposing internal conflicts within the Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case. In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup. In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of "rumourmongering".

Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of Bo's removal from office. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece People's Daily issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision". The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao. Bo's downfall also affected his ally Zhou Yongkang, who had reportedly relinquished his operational control over Chinese security institutions and lost the right to influence who would succeed him at the 18th Party Congress.

Trial
In July 2013, Chinese prosecution authorities charged Bo with bribery, abuse of power and corruption, paving the way for his trial. In the build-up to the trial, Song Yangbiao, a prominent leftist supporter of Bo was detained by police after he urged people to protest against the trial. The verdict and sentence brought to close one of the most lurid political scandals in the history of China under Communist rule. A few days before the trial, Wang Xuemei, a prominent forensic scientist who was vice director of the Chinese Forensic Medicine Association and of the Supreme Court's Prosecutorial Research Center, resigned from her positions. Wang had publicly questioned the forensic evidence used in the trial of Bo's wife Gu Kailai. Defense counsel for Bo was Beijing-based DeHeng Law Offices, a corporate law firm with deep political connections to the state. The Wall Street Journal article on the law firm's role in the trial described it as acting as an "intermediary" that facilitated between Bo, his relatives and prosecutors the negotiation of "an outcome acceptable to all sides in the run-up to the trial—and to help ensure that the trial itself goes according to plan".

Beginning on 22 August 2013, the Jinan Intermediate People's Court heard Bo's case. The proceedings of the trial were relayed in real-time by the court's official microblog account, though journalists covering the trial needed to belong to a pre-approved list. Bo faced three charges: bribery, abuse of power, and embezzlement. The prosecutors alleged that Bo received the equivalent of some 21.79 million yuan (US$3.56 million) in bribes from businessmen Xu Ming and Tang Xiaolin. At the trial Xu Ming testified that he gave Bo's wife Gu Kailai $3.23 million in 2000 to buy the villa Fontaine St-Georges in Nice, France, and that he paid for their son Bo Guagua's travel and credit card bills. Bo Xilai cross-examined Xu and denied knowledge of many of the payments.

Bo's trial, which featured a testy exchange between Bo and his former lieutenant Wang Lijun, concluded on 26 August 2013. During the trial, Bo recanted a series of confessions he had made during the investigation, denying all charges against him. On 22 September, the court found him guilty on all counts, including accepting bribes and abuses of power, stripped him of all his personal assets, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Not long after the trial, on 6 November, citizen activist Wang Zheng established the Zhi Xian Party, which supports Communist Party rule but criticizes it failing to uphold the constitution. Bo Xilai was elected the party's "Chairman for life". Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau banned Zhi Xian Party on 2 December 2013 and Wang Zheng was later arrested by the authority in 2017.

Chinese attempts to confiscate a €6.95 million villa in Cannes, bought and held for Bo through intermediaries, are ongoing.

Aftermath and epilogue
After Bo was jailed, the aftermath of the events set off by the Wang Lijun incident continued to reverberate across the Chinese political landscape. Xi Jinping's accession to power resulted in a series of major political changes with significant consequences. Bo's former supporter Zhou Yongkang retired in 2012, but was caught up in Xi Jinping's anti-corruption dragnet in 2013, detained for investigation, and eventually sentenced to life in prison. In addition, Zhou was unable to select the successor to his office, possibly as a result of his role in the Bo Xilai scandal. The head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which Zhou headed, no longer held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee following the 18th Party Congress, as the number of seats on the body were reduced from nine to seven. The anti-corruption campaign following the 18th Party Congress became the biggest of its kind in the history of China under Communist rule. By 2014, Bo had been branded by some media outlets outside of China as part of a so-called "New Gang of Four" composed of disgraced officials Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Ling Jihua.

Bo's chief ideological rival, former Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang, went on to become Vice-Premier in 2013 and eventually joined the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017, the party's top leadership council. Wen Jiabao, who was seen as Bo's foremost critic in the top leadership, suffered significant public embarrassment himself over a New York Times article about his family's vast empire of wealth whose release coincided closely with Bo's dismissal. Huang Qifan, the mayor of Chongqing long seen as an ally of Bo, continued serving in his position as Mayor of Chongqing until his resignation in 2016. Wang Lijun was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for defection, corruption, and abuse of power.

Political alignment and affiliations
In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin. He is thus associated with Jiang's faction, sometimes referred to as the "elitists," that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of "princelings" (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique". By contrast, the "populist" coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocated more balanced economic development and improvements to China's social safety net. The populist faction comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.

While Bo was initially identified with the elitist bloc during his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies typically associated with the conservative left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth. Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups. Bo's campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn allegedly funneling these funds into his own personal wealth, as well as (more publicly) state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth. He also sought to promote "red culture," and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking memories that were romantic to the conservative left, but painful to the liberal right of Chinese politics.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists, and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives. Bo's anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment. Bo's policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform. To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal jousting over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.

Family
Bo's first wife was Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. They wed in September 1976 and had a son, "Brendan" Li Wangzhi, the following year. Their son graduated from Columbia University in 2001. Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce from Bo Xilai in 1984. Li Wangzhi was reportedly low-key and modest and was not commonly associated with his father during the latter's political heyday. Li Wangzhi obtained a master's degree in media studies and worked for a few years at Citibank, then worked for a law firm in Beijing; he eventually went into private equity. Li had remarked publicly that his father's arrest "destroyed his life". In 2014, Li released a statement on his microblog feed revealing that his father was doing well in prison and that medical treatment is available to him should he need it. Li wrote, "life is short... if the law allows, I would like to see him more. Come to think of it, the only times I've seen him [since 2007] was at funerals, in the courtroom, or in prison."

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu was a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai law firm in Beijing. She was said to have overcome a trying childhood during nationwide strife and worked her way to become a well-regarded lawyer and prominent politician's wife. Gu's father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother, Fan Chengxiu, is a descendant of the renowned Song dynasty chancellor and poet Fan Zhongyan. In 2013, Gu was convicted of the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood after a dispute over money which purportedly escalated until he threatened her son's life. She was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, which is typically commuted to life imprisonment.

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm. Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me." Jiang Weiping claimed that Gu served as Bo's "gatekeeper" when Bo was the mayor of Dalian, regularly accepting gifts and bribes from property developers seeking access to him, and from party officials seeking government appointments. There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife prior to the Wang Lijun incident.

Bo and Gu have one son, Bo Kuangyi, who is better known as Bo Guagua. He attended Harrow School in the United Kingdom, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study public administration at Harvard Kennedy School. Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle, including luxury cars and frequent social events, has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media. Both Guagua and his father had repeatedly denied allegations that Guagua was the 'playboy prince' that he was often portrayed, claiming that Guagua got by on a modest allowance and attended social events to only to "broaden his horizons." Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000, Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions. However, the veracity of this assertion has been questioned by several sources. Maclean's reported that Bo's family associate Heywood pulled strings to have Guagua accepted into Harrow, shortly after becoming involved with Bo.

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed Everbright International, but he was purportedly listed under a pseudonym, Li Xueming. The company declined to confirm if Li Xueming and Bo Xiyong are one and the same.

Popular culture
In the 2019 film The Laundromat, Bo was portrayed by actor Jesse Wang.

title: Bo Xilai


text:
Lucida Sans Unicode

Lucida Sans Unicode is an OpenType typeface from the design studio of Bigelow & Holmes, designed to support the most commonly used characters defined in version 1.0 of the Unicode standard. It is a sans-serif variant of the Lucida font family and supports Latin, Greek, Cyrillic and Hebrew scripts, as well as all the characters used in the International Phonetic Alphabet.

It is the first Unicode encoded font to include non-Latin scripts (Greek, Cyrillic, Hebrew). It was designed by Kris Holmes and Charles Bigelow in 1993, and was first shipped with the Microsoft Windows NT 3.1 operating system.

The font comes pre-installed with all Microsoft Windows versions since Windows 98. A nearly identical font, called Lucida Grande, shipped as the default system font with Apple's Mac OS X operating system, until switching to Helvetica Neue in 2014 with OS X Yosemite; Lucida Grande added support for Arabic and Thai scripts.

Letters in the International Phonetic Alphabet, particularly upside down letters, are aligned for easy reading upside down. Thus, the font is among the most ideal for upside-down text, compared to other Unicode typefaces, which have the turned "t" and "h" characters aligned with their tops at the base line and thus appear out of line.

The typeface has a flaw in the combining low line character (U+0332) and the combining double low line character (U+0333), which are rendered as a blank or as a simple tiny underline when font-size is less than 238 point or so in word processors.

Other well-known Unicode fonts include Code2000, Arial Unicode MS, and the various Free software Unicode typefaces.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Lucida Sans Unicode


text:
Law of Russia

The primary and fundamental statement of laws in the Russian Federation is the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Statutes, like the Russian Civil Code and the Russian Criminal Code, are the predominant legal source of Russian laws.

Constitutionism
Adopted by national referendum on 12 December 1993 with 54.5% of the vote, the Constitution took effect on the day it was published – 25 December of the same year. It set out the fundamentals of government as well as proclaiming the rule of law, the ideological neutrality of the state, political pluralism, competitive elections and a separation of power, guaranteeing fundamental human rights to the Russian people. The Constitution establishes a semi-presidential system that encompasses strong executive power and increased independence for the president. Since its adoption in a 1993 referendum the Russian Constitution is considered to be the supreme law of the land. Article 15 of the Constitution reads that it "shall have supreme legal force and have direct effect, and shall be applicable throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation." Courts are guided by the Constitution and it trumps federal and local laws.

Amendments
Few amendments have been made to the Constitution since its adoption. The most significant of these was made in 2008. It concerned the term of office to be held by the President of the Russian Federation, which was increased from four to six years.

Presidential System of the Russian Federation
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation came into being as an independent state in 1991 and it is described as a "democratic, federal, rule-based republic" in its constitution which is adopted in 1993, includes many universal principles such as human rights and freedoms, free elections, political and ideological pluralism and judicial independence. According to the Constitution of Russia, the President of Russia is head of the state, and of a multi-party system with executive power exercised by the government, headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President with the parliament's approval. Legislative power is vested in the two houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, while the President and the government issue numerous legally binding by-laws. However, even some academics who accept that Russia has a constitutional semi-presidential model, describe the system as "presidential" and even "super presidential" due to the strong and central position of the president.

Constitutional laws
Constitutional laws cannot become part of the constitution or amend parts of it absent a special legal act on constitutional amendment. They are typically enacted in important areas of constitutional law, such as Article 56 which allows for the passage of the constitutional laws necessitated by a state of emergency

Statutes
Statutes are the predominant legal source of Russian law, and may only be enacted through the legislative process. Codes are the basis for law on a matter, and they are usually supplemented with legislation to develop certain provisions. There are gaps in some of the codes, but even so the judges will find a basis for deciding the case in a given code. Codes are interpreted flexibly, and interpretation may be based on enumeration of "general principles" of the codes. General principles are usually articulated at the beginning of the codes in the first chapter to outline the reason for the legislation. Reasoning by analogy is also allowed.

The Civil Code of Russia is the "constitution" of the market economy, and is special in the hierarchy of codes, since it will supplant contradictory text in other codes. New codes and laws supersede old ones, unless a statute expressly preserves the old law.

The Criminal Code of Russia (UGKRF, 63-ФЗ) is the penal statute. It lays out conduct impermissible in Russia. The first and most recent UGKRF came into force on 1 January 1997. On 8 January 1997, President Yeltsin signed the Criminal Correctional Code to regulate the conditions of the sentences. The new Criminal Code replaced the Soviet analogue of 1960. The main changes deal with economic crimes and property crimes.

Presidential decrees and directives
The President has power to issue normative and non-normative decrees, provided they do not contravene the constitution and federal laws. "On the basis and for the sake of implementation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, normative decrees of the President of the Russian Federation" Government may also issue directives having "normative" character.

Agency regulations
Agencies may enact regulations through their general competency, but these are limited to the extent of the constitution and relevant codes. If these limits are not strictly defined, then the president may use agencies to get around the legislative process. Consequently, agencies may have their powers limited by statutes. The Civil Code purposely authorizes supplementary rules by "statute" rather than the broader term "legislation" which could encompass other secondary law.

Judicial decisions, judicial practice and explanations of supreme courts
Russia is a civil law country; and, strictly speaking, decisions rendered by courts are not binding on other courts. However, the lower courts generally follow the principles established by the supreme courts. Moreover, according to Art.308.8 of the Code of Procedure in Commercial Courts, the Supreme Court can set aside a decision of a lower court on the grounds that this decision contravenes uniformity in interpretation of law as established by case law. In practice, but not in theory, precedents of the higher courts are becoming an important Russian law.

Judicial explanations of law
The Russian Supreme Court have no authority to issue general "explanations" of the substantive law and procedural issues, absent a relevant "case or controversy" in front of them. Legal scholars also take part in these discussions, and the opinions of the judges and commentators are published and used as persuasive authority. This process is somewhat analogous to the discussion that scholars take in American Law Reports or in law reviews. The judges and scholars may codify what is practice, or more importantly address new issues of law to the lower courts and instruct them how to interpret these issues. The texts of the explanations of the law are published, and cited by many courts. In contrast, only selected judicial opinions are published. It is not clear which explanations are binding to lower courts, as there is a tension between the Constitution and federal law versus guiding explanatory principles. Still, lower courts that ignore relevant explanations will probably get reversed.

Judicial review of laws for constitutionality by the constitutional court
Judicial Review allows courts to declare unconstitutional laws void. Constitutional Courts are therefore negative legislators. The interpretations of the constitution in the decisions of the Constitutional Court are also authoritative and binding on the political branches. The ordinary or lower courts may also apply judicial review. Courts of general jurisdiction may decline to apply (1) any law that violates the Constitution and (2) any normative regulations, in particular subordinate regulations that contravene statutes. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of regulations issued by government agencies. The Supreme Court has held that lower courts must evaluate the contents of applicable laws or other normative acts for their conformity to the constitution, and to apply the constitution where they conflict.

USSR legislation
USSR legislation fills gaps as the new system is being put in place, and is purely transitional until the Russian parliament can add new laws. It cannot contradict legislative acts of RF.

Analogy
Judges often reason by analogy, using the general principles of the law the codes to interpret provisions broadly.

Legal consciousness, natural law, good faith and general principles
Judges don't rely on natural law, but rather legal positivism combined with general principles of law. They may rely on "the requirements of good faith, reasonableness, and justice since Civil Code and other codes tell specific principles within the code. Other principles are equity and fairness, general principles of law, etc.

Custom
The Russian Civil Code explicitly mentions custom as a separate source of law. Traditions may establish rules of decision where there is no dispositive language in statute or other written law.

Academic commentary
Individual scholars may be influential by drafting legislation or debating proposed legislation. Unlike in some civil-law systems, academic treatises or learned commentary is not considered a separate source of law or cited by judges, but judges and attorney rely on it for their arguments.

International law
All international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation are part of Russian domestic legal system. Domestic law gives way to international law according to Article 15 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has the greatest expertise in applying international law.

Type of legal system
During the Soviet period, Russian law was considered to be socialist law. Since the fall of the Soviet Union that is no longer the case, and most scholars have classified the Russian legal system as a civil law system. However, there are problems with this new classification (similar to the ones that plagued Russia's classification as a socialist law country). Some legal branches could be considered as the mix of civil law and common law. For, example civil procedural law is considered by Dmitry Maleshin as a mix of civil law and common law.

Publications
The Constitution of Russia instructs the president either to reject the laws passed by parliament, or to sign and publish them.

The Constitution of Russia and the Federal Law "On the Procedure for the Publication and Entry into Force of Federal Constitutional Laws, Federal Laws, Acts of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly" dated 14.06.1994 No. 5-FZ establish that laws that have not been officially published are not applied.

Federal laws, federal constitutional laws and acts (usually resolutions) of the chambers of Parliament are subject to publication. International treaties ratified by the Parliament are published together with the laws on ratification.

Laws are published within 7 days after being signed by the President and come into force after another 10 days, unless otherwise provided in the law itself.

The official publication of the law in Russia is the first publication of the full text:

 * in the "Parliamentary Newspaper" (Парламентская газета) — the official printing body of the Federal Assembly;
 * in Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Российская газета) — the official publication of the government;
 * in the "Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation" (Собрание законодательства Российской Федерации);
 * on the Official Internet portal of legal information (www.pravo.gov.ru) (Официальный интернет-портал правовой информации) (since 2011).

Legal education
Legal education has traditionally begun with the specialist degree in law (специалист по правоведению).

title: Law of Russia


text:
Kingmaker scenario

In game theory, a kingmaker scenario in a game of three or more players is an endgame situation where a player who is unable to win has the capacity to determine which player among others will win. This player is referred to as the kingmaker or spoiler. No longer playing for themselves, they may make game decisions to favor a player who played more favorably (to them) earlier in the game. Except in games where interpersonal politics, by design, play a decisive role, this is undesirable.

Gladiator example
Consider this simple game: Three gladiators are playing, with strengths 3, 4, 5. In each turn, each gladiator must engage another, and they begin combat. The result of combat is that the weaker player is eliminated, and the stronger player loses strength equal to that of the weaker player. (For example, if "5" attacks "3", "3" will die and "5" will have strength 2.) The winning gladiator is the last one standing.

Each round of combat eliminates one gladiator, so there will be two rounds of combat. The first round of combat will eliminate one participant and weaken the other to a strength no greater than 2. The nonparticipant's strength is at least 3, so they are guaranteed to win the second round of combat, and the entire contest. Therefore, the game collapses: The winning gladiator is the one not involved in the first battle.

Hence, the gladiator whose turn comes first is the kingmaker. They must be involved in the first battle, hence cannot win, but with the liberty of choosing their opponent in that battle, can elect either of the other two players to be the winner of the contest.

In practice
Because they allow the outcome of the game to be determined by a player of (presumably) inferior strategy, kingmaker scenarios are usually considered undesirable, although to some extent they may be unavoidable in strategy games. Of course the argument can be made that this means the winner, chosen by the kingmaker, played with the additional restriction of not annoying the other players as much, presumably a more difficult task. In these games, the game mechanics, players' outcomes and strategies are often so interconnected that to eliminate all possibilities of this situation is almost impossible.

In tournament situations where, for instance, only a few teams proceed to the next round, a player who is already guaranteed to proceed can experience a situation similar to a kingmaker. They can sometimes influence who of the remaining players comes in second (when 2 players proceed). For such a player it can be profitable to make sure the weakest player proceeds, because this reduces his competition in subsequent rounds.However, this is often seen as undesirable because it conflicts with the concept that the strongest few are allowed to proceed to the next round.

Different games deal with the kingmaker problem in different ways:

 * In the 2002 board game Puerto Rico, players conceal their victory point totals. This makes it unclear (unless players are especially attentive) which player is in the lead.
 * By introducing randomness, games can make sure that everyone in the game still has a chance of winning the game, no matter how bad their situation may be. Obscuring victory points can also accomplish this, for not knowing whether one can still win can have the same effect as still having a chance to win. For example, in the group stages of tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup, the final set of games in the group are often played at the same time. This results in fewer situations where one team has no chance of proceeding.
 * Games can have rules that eliminate players who have no chance of winning the game, so they can not influence the game further (poker and Risk are examples of this).
 * Games, especially in a tournament setting, can attribute value to places other than the first place. The potential kingmaker would be able to play for their own benefit even if they can no longer win. In the example of the gladiators, if the gladiator with strength 4 has to be involved in the first round, they will choose the gladiator with strength 3 as opponent instead of being indifferent.
 * Most games prohibit—with penalties greater than match loss (for example, ostracism, disqualification)—questionable or unsportsmanlike conduct geared toward effecting a kingmaker scenario.
 * Stalling, or intentionally slowing game play in timed games, for personal advantage or to that of a currently leading player, is normally treated as unsportsmanlike conduct.
 * The use of revokes, or intentional rules violations, in trick-taking card games, to void a round and effect a kingmaker scenario is discouraged by use of severe penalties. In tournaments, doing this can be classified as cheating.
 * In the later rounds of a Magic: The Gathering tournament, the rules permit a player to concede defeat for any reason other than bribery. Many players follow a practice of conceding to anyone who has a strong chance of winning one of the eight playoff spots, thereby avoiding as far as possible even the appearance of engaging in unsportsmanlike collusion with any party in preference over any other.
 * In chess, the FIDE handbook recommends drawing lots such that players of the same national chess federation do not meet in the last few rounds. In the Candidates Tournament for example, players of the same national federation are made to play each other in the first round.

Other games may explicitly encourage a kingmaker scenario. An example of this is the television series Survivor, where the last seven to ten contestants voted out form a jury that chooses a winner from the final two contestants.

title: Kingmaker scenario


text:
User talk:David Hunter

What the hell is this?

title: User talk:David Hunter


text:
Freeter

In Japan, a freeter (フリーター) is a person aged 18 to 34  who is unemployed, underemployed,  or otherwise lacks full-time paid employment. The term excludes housewives and students.

Freeters do not start a career after high school or university, but instead earn money from low-paid jobs.

The word freeter or freeta is thought to be a portmanteau of the English word free (or perhaps freelance) and the German word Arbeiter ("labourer"). Arubaito is a Japanese loanword from Arbeiter, and perhaps from Arbeit ("work"). As German (along with English) was used in Japanese universities before World War II, especially for science and medicine, arubaito became common among students to describe part-time work for university students.

This term was coined by part-time job magazine From A editor Michishita Hiroshi in 1987 and was used to depict a "free" worker that worked less hours, earned pay hourly instead of a monthly paycheck like regular full time workers, and received none of the benefits of a regular full time worker (holiday pay, sick pay, bonus pay, paid leave).

The meaning of the term switched connotations from positive to negative after the Japanese asset price bubble broke resulting in a recession in the 1990s. In the 1980s, the term was seen in a positive light signifying the freedom to explore other alternative options for employment for fun when the economy of Japan was prosperous with many different job opportunities. In the 1990s and 2000s, the term switched to a negative connotation and Freeters were seen as burdens on society.

History
The increase of Freeters in the 1990s and 2000s is associated with the subsequent rapid changes that the nation has undergone since the bursting of the economic bubble at the beginning of the 1990s and the increasing neoliberalization of the economy. The almost two decade recession urged companies to change their workforce policies to stay relevant in the global market. Companies halted hiring graduates for permanent employment, rolled back bonuses, incentivized senior employees to retire, and created a strong policy of hiring temporary staff for more flexibility and company savings with over a third of the workforce moving onto contractual work.

The relaxation of protective labor laws and the deregulation of recruitment practices in 1998 allowed companies to employ larger numbers of flexible workers for longer periods of time.

The increase in private secondary schools is leading to a lower number of public school students getting enrolled into elite universities resulting in more demand for part-time work as full-time work is becoming less available to public school graduates.

About 10% of high school and university graduates could not find steady employment in the spring of 2000, and a full 50% of those who could find a job left within three years after employment. The employment situation is worse for the youngest freeters.

From 2000 to 2009, the number of freeters increased rapidly. In 1982 there were an estimated 0.5 million freeters in Japan, 0.8 million in 1987, 1.01 million in 1992 and 1.5 million in 1997. The number for 2001 is 4.17 million freeters according to one estimate, and 2 million in 2002 according to another estimate.

Many Japanese people worry about the future impact of freeters on society. If they work at all, freeters often work at convenience stores, supermarkets, fast food outlets, restaurants, and other low paying jobs. According to a survey by the Japan Institute of Labor in 2000, the average freeter works 4.9 days per week and earns ¥139,000 per month (ca. $1,300 U.S.). Two thirds of freeters have never had a regular, full-time job.

The rise of internet business has allowed some freeters to work from home and be self-employed. Some experts predict that Japan's aging population will create a labor shortage that will increase career options for freeters.

Causes
The Japan Institute of Labor classifies freeters into three groups: the "moratorium type" that wants to wait before starting a career, the "dream pursuing type", and the "no alternative type".
 * The moratorium type of freeter wants to enjoy life, and deliberately chooses not to join the rat race of the Japanese work environment.
 * The dream pursuing type has specific dreams incompatible with a standard Japanese career.
 * The no alternative type could not find a decent job before high school or university graduation in the system called "simultaneous recruiting of new graduates" (新卒一括採用), which is unique to Japanese society. Those left behind by Shinsotsu-Ikkatsu-Saiyō are forced to take low paying irregular jobs. This usually has to do with their dropout status from previous educational institutes. Those who dropped out of high school have the worst prospects.

Difficulties starting their own household
Many freeters live for free with their parents as what is described by some media outlets as parasite singles. Parents in Japan usually do not force their offspring out of the house. Once the parents die, the children will have to pay for their housing themselves. Even if they inherit the house or apartment, they still have to bear the costs of ownership.

Japanese housing is compact, and is too small for two families. If freeters want to marry, then they have to find their own housing, usually at their own expense.

Women have fewer financial incentives to marry (such as salary increases) than men do, and women are traditionally seen as the caregivers of older family members, which is becoming increasingly difficult due to the growing number of senior citizens. If women marry, then the burden gets doubled with them having to take care of their parents, spouses parents, husband, and potential children. These issues, along with wanting to work for money and not marrying may lead to stigmas of being not only parasite singles but also "unfeminine".

Work and marriage are seen as the two main identifiers for adulthood and are the normative ideals of masculinity. Men deal with comparisons to the salaryman, also known as a "corporate warrior", the idolized ideal job for men during economic growth from the 1960s associated with Japan's rebuilding of its nation and economy after WWII. The dominant masculine hegemonic discourse of the 1960s and after of the ideal man being self-sacrificing for work and the bread winner of the family has created a stigma where male freeters are seen less masculine and have a harder time with relationships, marriage, and eventually finding full-time work. Many men have seen their fathers in salaryman positions and do not want to fulfill that role because they want to spend more time with family and focus on hobbies.

Difficulties starting a career
Starting a career becomes more difficult the longer somebody is a freeter, as Japanese companies prefer to hire new workers fresh out of high school or university. While the employment situation is changing, large traditional companies still see a new employee as a lifetime investment. They much prefer to hire a young person who offers a longer period of service, and who will be easier to mold.

Often the only option left for freeters is to continue working at low income part-time jobs, making it difficult to establish their own household. Some join the many homeless in Japan.

Health and pension insurance
Part-time jobs usually do not include any health or retirement benefits. Freeters' low income makes payment of medical expenses onerous.

The biggest problem for freeters is that the Japanese pension system is based on the number of years a person has paid into the system. The freeter usually has little or no pension insurance or savings, which may force him or her to work beyond the usual retirement age.

Japan faces the problem of an aging population. The pension system will be under increasing strain as the ratio of pensioners to workers increases.

Freedom of choice
The advantage of being a freeter is that one has more freedom of choice, and more time for hobbies, volunteering, and community service. If they are living with their parents, they can spend their entire income on themselves.

Effect on Japanese society
Freeters lack the benefits of union membership, which would give them some legal protection against firing.

While they are young, freeters commonly live with their parents and have disposable income that would otherwise go towards rent. Their spending helps the manufacturing sector of the Japanese economy.

By living in the same house as their parents and often not owning a car, freeters have a much lower impact on the natural environment than "high consumption" members of society owning cars.

Large numbers of workers trying to start careers in their thirties may have a significant impact on the current corporate culture of Japan. It may change hiring and employment practices, particularly since demographers predict a future labor shortage due to the Japan's aging population.

Many male freeters have difficulties marrying because of their low income. They may thus have children later in life, or not at all. This will further aggravate the low birth rate in Japan and compound social and economic problems related to the aging population, such as underfunding of the Japanese pension system. As of today, freeters pay little or no money into the pension system.

The Japanese government has established a number of offices called Young Support Plaza to help young people find jobs. These offices offer basic training for job hunting: teaching young people how to write a résumé, and how to conduct themselves during interviews. The demand for their services has been fairly low so far.

Freeters in popular culture and mass media
Starting in the 1980s, television shows romanticized the role of Freeters in programs like Shomuni. Freeters in popular culture are mainly depicted as women and the jobs shown are of more prestigious freelance work like anime illustrating or software development, largely ignoring men, fast food workers, and other service-oriented jobs.

Mass media either portrays Freeters as lazy and irresponsible youth or casualties of the economic problems of corporate restructuring and recession. These issues are still being disputed among various media platforms.

title: Freeter


text:
Lygon Street

Lygon Street is located in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, running through the inner northern suburbs of Carlton, Carlton North, Princes Hill and Brunswick East. Lygon Street is synonymous with the Italian community of Melbourne, forming the nexus point of Little Italy. It is home to many Italian restaurants and alfresco cafés.

Geography
Lygon Street runs north–south through the inner northern suburbs of Melbourne. At its southernmost end, it connects to Russell Street in the Hoddle Grid; it then proceeds northward, through Carlton, Carlton North, and Brunswick East, to its intersection with Albion Street. Although the roadway itself continues, it is renamed Holmes Street for the stretch between Albion Street and Moreland Road, and later renamed again to Nicholson Street for the stretch between Moreland Road and the street's terminus at Bell Street. (Note that this is not continuous with the Nicholson Street which runs through the Melbourne CBD, Fitzroy, Carlton and Brunswick East.) North of Park Street, the street numbers restart at 1.

Tram routes 1 and 6 run along Lygon Street between Elgin Street, Carlton, and Albion Street, Brunswick East.

Italian restaurant district
The Italian restaurant district synonymous with Lygon Street occupies the few blocks between Queensberry Street and Elgin Street in Carlton. It is populated by the Italian families which migrated here in the 1950s, and holds the record of being the first place to install an espresso machine in Australia. It is also considered the birthplace of the 'Aussie' pizza. The area is heavily European in nature, and is the home of the yearly Lygon Street Festa, one of Australia's largest outdoor street festivals. The La Mama Theatre and Courthouse Theatre are also in this area, as is the heritage-listed neon sign at Borsari's Corner, named after Italian cyclist Nino Borsari, on the corner of Grattan Street. Toto's Pizza House, the first pizzeria established in Australia, has been located at the southern end of Lygon Street continuously since its opening in 1961.

Cinema Nova
Cinema Nova is an independent cinema with 16 screens, that shows Australian, indie, and arthouse films. It was established in 1992, when the Longford Cinema in South Yarra and the Valhalla Cinema in Richmond and Westgarth collaborated to open it as a twin cinema. The cinema hosts film festivals such as Melbourne Queer Film Festival, Monster Fest, Melbourne Documentary Film Festival, and Transitions Film Festival.

Cinema Nova formerly sponsored the Cinema Nova Award for Best Fiction Short Film, an AACTA-accredited award worth A$3,000 cash, at the Melbourne International Film Festival, but the cinema has since dropped that sponsorship.

Other points of interest
The two blocks running between Grattan Street and Elgin Street are known for shopping and boutiques.

Melbourne Trades Hall occupies the corner of Lygon Street and Victoria Street.

Melbourne General Cemetery is situated on the western side of Lygon Street in North Carlton, between Cemetery Road and Macpherson Street.

The East Brunswick Club opened its doors as a music venue at the northern end of the street in May 2006.

Lygon Street was the main headquarters of an Italian Australian criminal organisation called The Carlton Crew.

title: Lygon Street


text:
Paul Soles

Paul Robert Soles (August 11, 1930 – May 26, 2021) was a Canadian character actor, voice artist and television personality. He voiced the title character in Spider-Man (1967), and portrayed Hermey in the 1964 television special Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer; Soles was one of the last surviving participants of the special's voice cast.

Soles first screen appearance was on CFPL in 1953, and he continued to perform over 60 years later, performing as of 2016 in the comedy web series My 90-Year-Old Roommate on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's online comedy channel, CBC Comedy.

Early life
Soles was born in Toronto, the son of Lillian (Goodfellow) and Arthur L. Soles. His family were Jewish emigrants from Poland and Lithuania. He had two siblings.

Soles is the cousin of Bernard "Bunny" Cowan, and they both worked on the original 1960s Spider-Man animated series and the 1967 children's series Max, the 2000-Year-Old Mouse.

Acting roles
Soles was the voice of Hermey the misfit elf in Rankin/Bass' Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer from 1964. He also voiced Marvel superhero Spider-Man and various characters in the original animated television series also from the 1960s, and he played "The Lawbreaker" on the CBC panel quiz show This Is the Law in the 1970s, and played Costas Stavros on the Canadian soap opera Riverdale. In 2001, Soles took over the role of Shylock the Jew in the Stratford Festival of Canada production of The Merchant of Venice after Al Waxman, who was originally scheduled to play the part, died. Soles played Stanley the pizza shop owner in The Incredible Hulk (2008), and his other film appearances have included roles in Ticket to Heaven (1981), Just the Way You Are (1984) and The Gunrunner (1989) opposite Kevin Costner. He also played Danny, the Montreal Customs House janitor in the 2001 crime thriller The Score.

Soles won a 2006 Gemini Award for his role in the television series Terminal City, and a 2017 Canadian Screen Award for Best Performance by an Actor in a Digital Production for My 90-Year-Old Roommate. On the appointed evening of the awards ceremony, the ever-humble Soles was so overcome with emotion that he had to contain himself more than once on the way to the stage, resulting in another thunderous applause from the audience, before he accepted the trophy and gave his speech.

Voice work
Soles also did voices on various animated television shows and films such as Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer, Rocket Robin Hood, The Smokey Bear Show, The Little Brown Burro, King of the Beasts, The Marvel Super Heroes, the original Spider-Man cartoon, The Trolls and the Christmas Express, Take Me Up to the Ball Game, Willy McBean and His Magic Machine, Festival of Family Classics, JoJo's Circus, The Reluctant Dragon & Mr. Toad Show, Noah's Animals, Iron Man, The King Kong Show, and Spider-Woman.

Soles was also the narrator of The Wonderful Stories of Professor Kitzel, the voice of The Commissioner in the 2005 animated television series Funpak and has also supplied the voice of Dr. Reboux in the 2005 animated film version of the Johanna Spyri novel Heidi.

Soles also voiced the Academy Award-nominated animated documentary The Colours of My Father: A Portrait of Sam Borenstein.

In 2011, Soles started voicing the recurring character Maxwell Finnwich on Detentionaire and he voiced a character, Barnabas Dinklelot, in the 2017-2018 animated series, Mysticons.

Television hosting
He was the host of the short-lived CBC Television late-night comedy talk show Canada After Dark, and co-hosted the public affairs show Take 30 for 18 seasons with hosts such as Anna Cameron and Adrienne Clarkson. He also hosted the CFPL television game show Take Your Choice for one year in the early 1960s.

Documentary producer
Paul Soles was also a producer of documentaries while he was an on-air talent at CFPL-TV in London, Ontario. He worked on a series called, The World Around Us, and travelled with film crews in Great Britain in the early 1960s, filming many aspects of British life. He even got on a soap-box in Hyde Park in London to speak his mind. Soles has worked with people like Dennis Goulden (a long-time documentarian who still produces television specials in the States) and Jim Plant and Tom Ashwell and Jon Boynton.

Death
Soles died of natural causes in his sleep at his home in Toronto, Ontario, on May 26, 2021, at the age of 90.

title: Paul Soles


text:
User:Vlado~enwiki

Vlado is a wikinewbie that accidentally came across wikipedia while surfing for fotos of his favorite place in the world, the Adriatic. I'll have to contribute a few soon.

I'm interested in contributing pages on Istra and the Adriatic. Let me know if you're already working on any and want a second pair of eyes.

title: User:Vlado~enwiki


text:
User:Humus sapiens/todo

Slanted POV

 * Middle East Media Research Institute - staff members
 * Israeli violence against Palestinian children - Summerfield & Co

William of Norwich syndrom

 * Rania Iyad Aram - unsubstantiated links to state terrorism
 * Ibrahim Muhammad Ismail - unsubstantiated links to state terrorism
 * Ghadeer Jaber Mkheemar - unsubstantiated links to state terrorism

Template
Template:Wikiportal:Israel/In_the_news

title: User:Humus sapiens/todo


text:
North American T-2 Buckeye

The North American T-2 Buckeye was the United States Navy's intermediate training aircraft, intended to introduce U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps student naval aviators and student naval flight officers to jets. It entered service in 1959, beginning the replacement process of the Lockheed T2V SeaStar, and was itself replaced by the McDonnell Douglas T-45 Goshawk in 2008.

Design and development
In 1956, the US Navy issued a requirement for a jet-powered basic trainer to replace its T-28 piston-engined aircraft. (Primary training for the US Navy remained the responsibility of the piston-engined Beechcraft T-34 Mentor while the jet-powered Lockheed T2V SeaStar provided more advanced training). North American Aviation won the US Navy's competition for the new training aircraft in mid-1956 with its NA-241 design. North American's design, designated the T2J-1 by the US Navy, was a mid-winged monoplane with trainee and instructor sitting in tandem on North American-built ejection seats, with the rear (instructor's) seat raised to give a good view over the trainee's head. The aircraft's unswept wing's structure was based on that of the FJ-1 Fury, while its control system was based on the T-28C. It was powered by a single Westinghouse J34-WE-46/48 turbojet, rated at 3400 lbf. While it had no built-in armament, the T2J-1 could accommodate two .50-inch gun pods, 100 lb practice bombs, or 2.75-inch rockets beneath the wings. The T-2's performance was between that of the U.S. Air Force's Cessna T-37 Tweet and the U.S. Navy's TA-4J Skyhawk.

The first T2J-1 flew on 31 January 1958, and the type entered service with Basic Training Group Seven, soon to become VT-7 at Naval Air Station Meridian in 1959. A second training group, VT-9 formed at Meridian in 1961.

The first version of the aircraft entered service in 1959 as the T2J-1. It was redesignated the T-2A in 1962 under the joint aircraft designation system. The aircraft was subsequently redesigned, and the single engine was replaced with two 3000 lbf Pratt & Whitney J60-P-6 turbojets in the T-2B. The T-2C was fitted with two 2950 lbf thrust General Electric J85-GE-4 turbojets. The T-2D and T-2E were export versions for the Venezuelan Air Force and Hellenic Air Force, respectively. The T-2 Buckeye (along with the TF-9J Cougar) replaced the T2V-1/T-1A SeaStar, though the T-1 continued in some uses into the 1970s.

All T-2 Buckeyes were manufactured by North American at Air Force Plant 85, located just south of Port Columbus Airport in Columbus, Ohio. A total of 609 aircraft were built during the production run. The name Buckeye refers to the state tree of Ohio, as well as the mascot of Ohio State University.

Every jet-qualified Naval Aviator and virtually every Naval Flight Officer from the late 1950s until 2004 received training in the T-2 Buckeye, a length of service spanning over four decades. The aircraft first exited the Naval Aviator strike pipeline (where it saw its final carrier landings) in 2004, and the Naval Flight Officer tactical jet pipeline in 2008. In the Naval Aviator strike pipeline syllabus and the Naval Flight Officer strike and strike fighter pipeline syllabi, the T-2 has been replaced by the near-sonic McDonnell Douglas T-45 Goshawk (the U.S. Navy version of the BAE Systems Hawk), which is more comparable to other high-performance, subsonic trainers, or the supersonic U.S. Air Force Northrop T-38 Talon. More recently, the T-2 has been used as a director aircraft for aerial drones. Several T-2 Buckeyes, although still retaining their USN markings, are now registered as civilian-owned aircraft with FAA "N" numbers; they regularly appear at airshows.

Variants

 * T-2A
 * Two-seat intermediate jet training aircraft, powered by a 3,400-lb (1542-kg) thrust Westinghouse J34-WE-46/48 turbojet, original designation T2J-1 Buckeye, 217 built

 * YT-2B
 * Two T-2As were converted into T-2B prototype aircraft.

 * T-2B
 * Improved version, it was powered by two 3,000-lb (1360-kg) thrust Pratt & Whitney J60-P-6 turbojets; 97 were built.

 * YT-2C
 * One T-2B was converted into a T-2C prototype aircraft.

 * T-2C
 * Final production version for the U.S. Navy, it was powered by two 2,950-lbf thrust General Electric J85-GE-4 turbojets; 231 were built.

 * DT-2B and DT-2C
 * Small numbers of T-2Bs and T-2Cs were converted into drone directors.

 * T-2D
 * Export version for Venezuela, 12 built

 * T-2E
 * Export version for Greece, 40 built

Current operators
🇬🇷

 * Hellenic Air Force

Former operators
🇺🇸

 * United States Navy

🇻🇪

 * Bolivarian Military Aviation

Aircraft on display

 * T-2A Bu.147474 North American Buckeye at Planes of Fame Air Museum in Chino Ca.
 * T-2A Bu.156697 North American Buckeye on board USS Midway Museum in San Diego Ca.
 * T-2C Bu.157050 North American Buckeye at Pima Air & Space Museum in Tucson Az.
 * T-2C Bu.158327 North American Buckeye at National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola Fl.
 * T-2 Buckeye at the TAM.jpg. 158599 North American Buckeye - on static display at the [[Texas Air Museum]] in Slaton, Texas on loan from the National Naval Aviation Museum.

title: North American T-2 Buckeye