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Bohemond III of Antioch

Bohemond III of Antioch, also known as Bohemond the Child or the Stammerer (Bohémond le Bambe/le Baube; c. 1148–1201), was Prince of Antioch from 1163 to 1201. He was the elder son of Constance of Antioch and her first husband, Raymond of Poitiers. Bohemond ascended to the throne after the Antiochene noblemen dethroned his mother with the assistance of the lord of Armenian Cilicia, Thoros II. He fell into captivity in the Battle of Harim in 1164, but the victorious Nur ad-Din, atabeg of Aleppo released him to avoid coming into conflict with the Byzantine Empire. Bohemond went to Constantinople to pay homage to Manuel I Komnenos, who persuaded him to install a Greek Orthodox patriarch in Antioch. The Latin patriarch of Antioch, Aimery of Limoges, placed Antioch under interdict. Bohemond restored Aimery only after the Greek patriarch died during an earthquake in 1170.

Bohemond remained a close ally of the Byzantine Empire. He fought against the new lord of Armenian Cilicia, Mleh, assisting in the restoration of Byzantine rule in the Cilician plain. He also made alliances with the Muslim rulers of Aleppo and Damascus against Saladin, who had begun to unite the Muslim countries along the borders of the crusader states. Since Bohemond repudiated his second wife and married an Antiochene lady, Patriarch Aimery excommunicated him in 1180.

Bohemond forced the Armenian rulers of Cilicia to accept his suzerainty in the late 1180s. He also secured the County of Tripoli for his second son, Bohemond, in 1187. However, Saladin occupied almost the whole Principality of Antioch in the summer of 1188. To preserve the peace with Saladin, Bohemond did not provide military assistance to the crusaders during the Third Crusade. The expansionist policy of King Leo I of Armenia in the 1190s gave rise to a lasting conflict between Antioch and Cilicia. Bohemond was captured in 1194 by Leo, who tried to seize Antioch, but the burghers formed the Commune of Antioch and expelled the Armenian soldiers from the town. Bohemond was released only after he acknowledged Leo's independence.

New conflicts emerged after Bohemond's eldest son, Raymond, died in 1197. Raymond's widow, who was Leo's niece, gave birth to a posthumous son, Raymond-Roupen, but Bohemond's younger son, Bohemond of Tripoli, wanted to secure his succession in Antioch with the assistance of the commune. The elderly Bohemond seems to have supported his son during his last years. The War of the Antiochene Succession began with Bohemond's death and lasted until 1219.

Early life

Bohemond was the elder son of Princess Constance of Antioch and her first husband, Raymond of Poitiers. He was born around 1148. Prince Raymond died fighting against Nur ad-Din, atabeg of Aleppo, in the Battle of Inab on 29June 1149.

Neither Baldwin III of Jerusalem nor the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos could persuade the widowed Constance to take a new husband. Finally, she chose Raynald of Châtillon, a French knight who had recently settled in Syria. Raynald ruled the principality as Constance's husband from 1153 until he was captured by Majd al-Din, governor of Aleppo, in late November 1160 or 1161.

Urged by the Antiochene noblemen, Baldwin III proclaimed Bohemond the rightful ruler, charging Aimery of Limoges, Latin Patriarch of Antioch, with the administration of the principality during Bohemond's minority. However, Constance appealed to Manuel Komnenos, who confirmed her position as the sole ruler of Antioch. Constance wanted to retain power even after Bohemond reached the age of majority. However, the Antiochene noblemen rebelled against her with the assistance of Thoros II, Lord of Armenian Cilicia, forcing her to leave Antioch in February 1163.

First years

Bohemond was installed as prince after his mother was dethroned. Nur ad-Din laid siege to Krak des Chevaliers in the County of Tripoli in September 1163. Raymond III of Tripoli appealed to Bohemond for assistance. Bohemond and Constantine Kalamanos, Byzantine governor of Cilicia, hurried to the castle. The united Christian armies defeated the besiegers in the Battle of al-Buqaia.

Amalric of Jerusalem entrusted the government of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to Bohemond before departing for his campaign against Egypt in July 1164. Taking advantage of Bohemond's absence, Nur ad-Din attacked the fortress at Harenc in the Principality of Antioch (present-day Harem, Syria). Bohemond, RaymondIII of Tripoli, ThorosII of Armenian Cilicia, and Constantine Kalamanos joined their forces and marched to Harenc, compelling Nur ad-Din to retreat.

Reynald of Saint-Valery, Lord of Harenc, tried to convince Bohemond not to pursue the enemy, but Bohemond did not follow his advice. The armies clashed at the battle of Harim on 10August 1164. Nur ad-Din almost annihilated the Christian army. Most Christian commanders (including Bohemond) were captured. Two days later, Harenc fell to Nur ad-Din. Nur ad-Din took his prisoners to Aleppo. His advisors urged Nur ad-Din to proceed to Antioch, but he declined, fearing that an attack on Antioch could provoke Emperor Manuel into annexing the principality. Amalric of Jerusalem hurried to Antioch to start negotiations with Nur ad-Din. Before long, Nur ad-Din released Bohemond, along with Thoros II of Cilicia, for a ransom because he regarded them as vassals of the Byzantine emperor.

"The Muslims advised [Nur ad-Din] to proceed to Antioch and seize it because it was devoid of defenders and fighting men to hold it, but he did not do so. He said, "The city is an easy matter but the citadel is strong. Perhaps they will surrender it to the Byzantine emperor because its ruler is his nephew. To have Bohemond as a neighbor I find preferable to being a neighbour of the ruler of the Constantinople." He sent out squadrons in those areas and they plundered, seized and killed the inhabitants. Later he ransomed Prince Bohemond for a large sum of money and the release of many Muslim captives."

- Ali ibn al-Athir: The Complete History

Byzantine alliance
Soon after his release, Bohemond visited Emperor Manuel in Constantinople and paid homage to him. In return for monetary aid, Bohemond agreed to allow Athanasius, the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, to accompany him back to Antioch. The Latin Patriarch, Aimery, left Antioch and imposed an interdict on the city. Manuel's cousin, Andronicus Komnenus, who was made Byzantine governor of Cilicia in 1166, often visited Antioch to meet Bohemond's beautiful young sister, Philippa. Bohemond appealed to Manuel, who dismissed Andronicus, replacing him with Constantine Kalamanos.

Bohemond granted Apamea to the Knights Hospitaller in 1168. An earthquake destroyed most towns of northern Syria on 29June 1170. The Greek Patriarch, Athanasius, died when the edifice of the Cathedral of St.Peter collapsed on him during the Mass. Bohemond went to Qosair (present-day Altınözü, Turkey) and persuaded the exiled Latin Patriarch to return to his see.

Mleh, who had seized Cilicia with Nur ad-Din's help, besieged Bagras, the fortress of the Knights Templars near Antioch, in early 1170. Bohemond sought assistance from Amalric of Jerusalem, and their united army defeated Mleh, also forcing him to restore the towns of the Cilician plains to the Byzantine Empire. Bohemond's relationship with Armenian Cilicia remained tense, which prevented him from pursuing an active foreign policy until Mleh was dethroned in 1175.

Bohemond concluded an alliance with Gumushtekin, atabeg of Aleppo, against Saladin, the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt and Syria, in May 1176. On Bohemond's demand, Gumushtekin released his Christian prisoners, including Bohemond's stepfather, Raynald of Châtillon. To strengthen his alliance with the Byzantine Empire, in 1177 Bohemond married Theodora, who was closely related to Emperor Manuel.

Bohemond met Philip, Count of Flanders, who had come to the Kingdom of Jerusalem in September 1177. According to the contemporaneous William of Tyre, many crusaders blamed Bohemond and RaymondIII of Tripoli for dissuading Philip from participating in a military campaign against Egypt, preferring instead to take advantage of Philip's presence in their own realms. Indeed, in December Philip and Bohemond jointly laid siege to Harenc, a fortress of As-Salih Ismail al-Malik, Emir of Damascus, seizing the opportunity following a mutiny of the garrison. They lifted the siege soon after As-Salih informed them that Saladin (the common enemy of both As-Salih and Bohemond) had left Egypt for Syria. As-Salih paid 50,000 dinars and renounced half of the nearby villages in favor of Bohemond.

Bohemond and Raymond III of Tripoli marched to the Kingdom of Jerusalem in early 1180, according to William of Tyre. Baldwin IV of Jerusalem feared that the two princes (who were his father's cousins) had come to dethrone him, the symptoms of his leprosy having become "more and more evident" by that time. Historian Bernard Hamilton, who accepts William of Tyre's narration, says that Bohemond and Raymond came to Jerusalem to choose a husband for Baldwin's sister and heir, Sibylla, wishing to decrease the influence of the king's maternal relatives. However, Baldwin gave her in marriage to Guy of Lusignan, who was supported by their mother, Agnes of Courtenay. Sibylla's marriage contributed to the formation of two parties of noblemen. Bohemond, RaymondIII of Tripoli, and the Ibelin brothers became the leaders of the group that opposed Guy of Lusignan.

Conflicts

Manuel I Komnenos died on 24 September 1180. Bohemond soon repudiated his wife, Theodora, to marry an Antiochene lady of bad reputation, Sibylla. Patriarch Aimery accused Bohemond of adultery and excommunicated him. After Bohemond confiscated church property, Aimery imposed an interdict on Antioch and fled to his fortress at Qosair. Bohemond besieged the fortress, but Rainald II Masoir, Lord of Margat, and other noblemen who supported the patriarch rose up against him.

Baldwin IV sent Heraclius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, along with other bishops, and Raynald of Châtillon to Antioch to mediate. After preparatory negotiations with the envoys in Latakia, Bohemond and Aimery met in Antioch. Bohemond agreed to restore confiscated church property and Aimery lifted the interdict, but Bohemond's excommunication remained in force because he refused to return to Theodora. Peace was not fully restored, and the leaders of the opposition fled to Armenian Cilicia.

Bohemond made peace with Imad ad-Din Zengi II, the Zengid ruler of Aleppo, in May 1182. However, Imad ad-Din was forced to surrender Aleppo to Saladin on 11June 1183. Fearing an attack on Antioch, Bohemond sold Tarsus to Roupen III, Lord of Armenian Cilicia, to raise funds. BaldwinIV of Jerusalem promised to send 300 knights to Antioch. Saladin did not invade the principality and signed a peace treaty with Bohemond. Bohemond attended the assembly that BaldwinIV had summoned to discuss the administration of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in autumn 1183. At the meeting, Guy of Lusignan was dismissed as regent, and his five-year-old stepson, Baldwin, was proclaimed co-ruler. A charter shows that Bohemond was in Acre in April 1185, suggesting that he was present when the leper BaldwinIV died around that time.

Roupen III of Armenian Cilicia laid siege to Lampron, the seat of his rival, Hethum III of Lampron. Hethum sent envoys to Bohemond, seeking his assistance. Bohemond invited Roupen to a banquet to Antioch where he had Roupen captured and imprisoned in 1185. Bohemond invaded Cilicia, but he could not prevent Roupen's brother, Leo, from seizing Lampron. An Armenian nobleman, Pagouran of Barbaron, mediated a peace treaty. Roupen agreed to pay a ransom and to renounce Sarventikar, Tall Hamdun, Mamistra, and Adana. He also acknowledged Bohemond's suzerainty. After the ransom was paid in 1186, Bohemond released Roupen, who soon reconquered the fortresses and towns that he had ceded to Antioch.

Saladin's triumph

The child Baldwin V of Jerusalem died in late summer 1186. Raymond of Tripoli and his supporters could not prevent BaldwinV's mother, Sibylla, and her husband, Guy of Lusignan, from seizing the throne. Baldwin of Ibelin, who was the only Jerusalemite baron to refuse to pay homage to Sibylla and Guy after their coronation, moved to Antioch. Bohemond granted a fief to him.

Nomad Turkmen bands invaded Cilicia, forcing the new ruler, Leo, to swear fealty to Bohemond shortly after his ascension in 1186 or 1187. The Turkmens also broke into the Principality of Antioch, pillaging the lowlands around Latakia and the monasteries in the nearby mountains. Bohemond was forced to make a truce with Al-Muzaffar Umar, Saladin's governor in Syria, who joined Saladin's invasion of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in May. Even so, Bohemond sent 50 knights under the command of his elder son, Raymond, to Jerusalem after a Christian army was almost annihilated in the Battle of Cresson. The Turkmens continued their plundering raid until the Antiochene army defeated them and seized their booty.

Saladin launched a crushing defeat on the Christian army in the Battle of Hattin on 4July 1187. Bohemond's son was one of the few Christian leaders to flee from the battlefield. Within three months, Saladin captured almost all towns and fortresses of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. RaymondIII of Tripoli, who died before the end of the year, willed the County of Tripoli to Bohemond's elder son and heir, Raymond. Bohemond sent his younger son and namesake to take control of Tripoli, convinced that one ruler could not defend both Antioch and Tripoli. After his son was installed in Tripoli, Bohemond became "the greatest of the Franks and their most extensive ruler", according to Ibn Al-Athir. Bohemond offered to pay homage to William II of Sicily in exchange for military assistance.

Saladin started the invasion of northern Syria on 1July 1188. His troops captured Latakia on 22 or 23July, Sahyun six days later, and the fortresses along the Orontes River in August. After the Knights Templar surrendered their fortress at Bagras to Saladin on 26September, Bohemond pleaded for a truce, offering the release of his Muslim prisoners. Saladin granted the truce from 1October 1188 to 31May 1189. Bohemond managed to retain only his capital and the port of St Symeon. Saladin stipulated that Antioch was to be surrendered without resistance if no reinforcements came before the end of May 1189. Bohemond urged the Holy Roman emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, to come to Syria, offering him the suzerainty over Antioch.

"This summer the unspeakable Saladin totally destroyed the city of Tortosa except for the Templar citadel, burnt down the city of Valania before moving on to the region of Antioch where he claimed the famous cities of Jabala and Latakia, the strongholds of Saône, Gorda, Cavea and [Burzey] and the lands as far as Antioch. Beyond Antioch he besieged and captured Darbsak and [Bagras]. Thus, with the whole of the principality apart from our stronghold at Margat, more or less destroyed and lost, the prince and the people of Antioch made a pitiful agreement with Saladin, that if no help was forthcoming in the seven months from the beginning of that month of October they would formally surrender Antioch, alas without even a stone being thrown, a city acquired with the blood of valiant Christians."

- Letter by Armengarde of Aspe, Master of the Hospital, to Leopold V, Duke of Austria (November 1188)

Third crusade

Guy of Lusignan, who had recently been released, came to Antioch in July or August 1188. Bohemond did not provide him with military assistance, and Guy left for Tripoli.

Frederick Barbarossa departed from the Holy Roman Empire in May 1189. The defence of Antioch was a principal aim of his crusade, but he died unexpectedly near Seleucia in Asia Minor (present-day Silifke in Turkey) on 10June 1190. His son Duke Frederick VI of Swabia took over the command of the army, but most crusaders decided to return to Europe. The remnants of the German crusaders reached Antioch on 21June 1190. Bohemond paid homage to Frederick of Swabia. Barbarossa's body, which had been carried to Antioch, was buried in the cathedral before the duke continued his crusade toward the Holy Land.

In May 1191 Bohemond sailed to Limassol along with Guy of Lusignan and Leo of Cilicia to meet King Richard I of England, who had arrived to reconquer the Holy Land from Saladin. He once again met Richard during the siege of Acre in summer 1191, but he did not provide military support to the crusaders. Bohemond's relationship with Leo of Cilicia became tense when Leo captured Bagras and refused to cede it to the Knights Templar.

After Richard of England left the Holy Land, Bohemond met Saladin in Beirut on 30October 1192. According to Ibn Al-Athir, Bohemond "did obeisance" and Saladin "bestowed a robe of honour upon him" at their meeting. They signed a ten-year truce that included both Antioch and Tripoli but did not cover Armenian Cilicia even though Leo of Cilicia was Bohemond's vassal.

Last years
Bohemond's wife, Sibylla, wanted to secure Antioch for her son, William, with the assistance of Leo of Cilicia (whose wife, Isabel, was her niece). Leo invited Bohemond and his family to Bagras, saying that he wanted to start negotiations regarding the surrender of the fortress either to Antioch or to the Templars in early 1194. The meeting was a trap: Bohemond was captured and taken to Leo's capital, Sis.

Bohemond was compelled to surrender Antioch to Leo. He appointed his marshal, Bartholomew Tirel, to accompany the Armenian troops, which were under the command of Hethoum of Sason, to Antioch. The Antiochene noblemen allowed Leo's soldiers to enter the town, but the mainly Greek and Latin burgers opposed Leo's rule. An Armenian soldier's rude remark about Saint Hilary, to whom the royal chapel was dedicated, provoked a riot, forcing the Armenians to withdraw from the town. The burghers assembled in the cathedral to form a commune under the auspices of Patriarch Aimery. They declared Bohemond's eldest son, Raymond, regent for his imprisoned father. Raymond's younger brother, Bohemond, also hurried from Tripoli to Antioch, and the Armenian forces had to return to Cilicia.

Henry I of Jerusalem came to Antioch to mediate a peace treaty in early 1195. After Bohemond renounced his claim to suzerainty over Cilicia and acknowledged Leo's possession of Bagras, Leo released him and his retainers. Before long, Bohemond's son, Raymond, married Leo's niece and heir, Alice.

Raymond died in early 1197, but his widow gave birth to a posthumous son, Raymond-Roupen. The elderly Bohemond sent her and her infant son to Cilicia wanting either to secure Antioch for his son by Sibylla, or to guarantee their security. Bohemond assisted Duke Henry I of Brabant in capturing Beirut in October 1197. Before long, he decided to besiege Jabala and Latakia, but he had to return to Antioch to meet the papal legate, Conrad of Wittelsbach, the archbishop of Mainz. The archbishop had come to Antioch to secure Raymond-Roupen's right to succeed Bohemond. On Conrad's demand, Bohemond summoned the Antiochene noblemen, who swore fealty to his grandson.

Bohemond of Tripoli regarded himself his father's lawful heir, because he was Bohemond's elder surviving son. He came to Antioch at the end of 1198 and persuaded the commune to accept his rule. Before long, the younger Bohemond returned to Tripoli, enabling his father to re-take control of state affairs, suggesting that the elder Bohemond had tacitly supported his son's coup. LeoI of Cilicia appealed to the Holy See to protect Raymond-Roupen's interest, but the Knights Templar submitted a complaint against him for refusing to restore Bagras to them.

Bohemond died in April 1201. His son hurried to Antioch to attend his funeral. The commune proclaimed him prince, but many noblemen who remained loyal to Raymond-Roupen fled to Cilicia. The ensuing War of the Antiochene Succession lasted for years, until the death of Leo in May 1219.

Family
Bohemond's first wife, Orgueilleuse of Harenc, was first mentioned in charters issued in 1170, suggesting that Bohemond married her in or before that year. She was last mentioned in February or March 1175. She was the mother of Bohemond's two eldest sons, Raymond and Bohemond.

Bohemond's second wife, Theodora (whom the Lignages d'Outremer mentioned as Irene) was a relative of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos. Historian Charles M. Brand identifies her as the daughter of Manuel's nephew, John Doukas Komnenos. According to the Lignages d'Outremer, Theodora gave birth to a daughter, Constance, who was not mentioned in other sources.

William of Tyre described Sibylla, the third wife of Bohemond, as a witch who "practised evil magics" to seduce Bohemond. Michael the Syrian stated that Sibylla was a whore. Her sister was the wife of Bohemond's vassal, the lord of Burzey, and Ali ibn al-Athir described this sister as a spy who was "in correspondence with Saladin and exchanged gifts with him." Bohemond and Sibylla's daughter, Alice, became the wife of the wealthy Lord Guy I Embriaco of Jabala. William, the son of Bohemond and Sibylla, may have been named for William II of Sicily. In his fourth marriage, Bohemond married Isabella of Farabel, with whom he had Bohemond of Botron, who married Isabelle, heiress to the Lordship of Botrun.

title: Bohemond III of Antioch


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Definition of terrorism

There is no consensus, scholarly or legal, on the definition of terrorism.

Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of terrorism, and governments have been reluctant to formulate an agreed-upon legally-binding definition. Difficulties arise from the fact that the term has become politically and emotionally charged. A simple definition proposed to the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) by terrorism studies scholar Alex P. Schmid in 1992, based on the already internationally accepted definition of war crimes, as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes", was not accepted.

Scholars have worked on creating various academic definitions, reaching a consensus definition published by Schmid and A. J. Jongman in 1988, with a longer revised version published by Schmid in 2011, some years after he had written that "the price for consensus [had] led to a reduction of complexity". The Cambridge History of Terrorism (2021), however, states that Schmid's "consensus" resembles an intersection of definitions, rather than a bona fide consensus.

The United Nations General Assembly condemned terrorist acts by using the following political description of terrorism in December 1994 (GA Res. 49/60): "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them."

Etymology
The term "terrorism" comes from French terrorisme, from terror, "great fear", "dread", related to the Latin verb terrere, "to frighten".

The French National Convention declared in September 1793 that "terror is the order of the day". The period 1793–94 is referred to as La Terreur (Reign of Terror). Maximilien Robespierre, a leader in the French Revolution proclaimed in 1794 that "Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible." The Committee of Public Safety agents that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were referred to as "Terrorists". The word "terrorism" was first recorded in English-language dictionaries in 1798 as meaning "systematic use of terror as a policy".

Although the Reign of Terror was imposed by the French government, in modern times "terrorism" usually refers to the killing of people by non-governmental political activists for political reasons, often as a public statement. This meaning originated with Russian radicals in the 1870s. Sergey Nechayev, who founded the People's Reprisal (Народная расправа) in 1869, described himself as a "terrorist". German radicalist writer Johann Most helped popularize the modern sense of the word by dispensing "advice for terrorists" in the 1880s.

According to Myra Williamson (2009): "The meaning of 'terrorism' has undergone a transformation. During the reign of terror a regime or system of terrorism was used as an instrument of governance, wielded by a recently established revolutionary state against the enemies of the people. Now the term 'terrorism' is commonly used to describe terrorist acts committed by non-state or subnational entities against a state".

Notable definitions of terrorism
Definitions include:

Bruce Hoffman notes that terrorism is "ineluctably about power".
 * "the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders" (Michael Walzer, 2002).
 * "the organized use of violence to attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their property for political purposes" (C. A. J. Coady, 2004).
 * "the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take" (Igor Primoratz, 2004).
 * "the use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of society as a whole through the causation of fear and the targeting of specific parts of society in order to affect the entire society" (Arthur H. Garrison, 2004).
 * "The premediated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims" (Todd Sandler, 2010).
 * "a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence... [as well as] a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties" (Schmid, 2011).

General criteria
Terrorism has been described as:
 * The use of violence or of the threat of violence in the pursuit of political objectives
 * Acts committed by non-state actors (or by undercover personnel serving on the behalf of their respective governments)
 * The intentional use of lethal force against civilians, and/or destructive force against civilian areas, buildings or infrastructure.
 * Acts reaching more than the immediate target victims and also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society
 * Both mala prohibita (i.e., crime that is made illegal by legislation) and mala in se (i.e., crime that is inherently immoral or wrong)

Definitions of terrorism typically emphasize one or more of the following features:

 * 1) Its effect of extreme fear
 * 2) Whether it targeted the state from within
 * 3) Its strategic goals
 * 4) Its random or indiscriminate nature
 * 5) Who it targeted
 * 6) Whether it was planned and prepared in secret

The following criteria of violence or threat of violence usually fall outside of the definition of terrorism:
 * Wartime (including a declared war) or peacetime acts of violence committed by a nation state against another nation state regardless of legality or illegality and are carried out by properly uniformed forces or legal combatants of such nation states
 * Reasonable acts of self-defense, such as the use of force to kill, apprehend, or punish criminals who pose a threat to the lives of humans or property
 * Legitimate targets in war, such as enemy combatants and strategic infrastructure that form an integral part of the enemy's war effort such as defense industries and ports
 * Collateral damage, including the infliction of incidental damage to non-combatant targets during an attack on or attempting to attack legitimate targets in war

Scholar Ken Duncan argues the term terrorism has generally been used to describe violence by non-state actors rather than government violence since the 19th-century Anarchist Movement.

The need to define terrorism in international criminal law
Schmid (2004) summarised many sources when he wrote: "It is widely agreed that international terrorism can only be fought by international cooperation". If states do not agree on what constitutes terrorism, the chances of cooperation between countries is reduced; for example, agreement is needed so that extradition is possible.

Ben Saul has noted (2008): "A combination of pragmatic and principled arguments supports the case for defining terrorism in international law". Reasons for why terrorism needs to be defined by the international community include the need to condemn violations to human rights; to protect the state and its constitutional order, which protects rights; to differentiate public and private violence; to ensure international peace and security, and "control the operation of mandatory Security Council measures since 2001".

Carlos Diaz-Paniagua, who coordinated the negotiations of the proposed United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (proposed in 1996 and not yet achieved), noted in 2008 the need to provide a precise definition of terrorist activities in international law: "Criminal law has three purposes: to declare that a conduct is forbidden, to prevent it, and to express society's condemnation for the wrongful acts. The symbolic, normative role of criminalization is of particular importance in the case of terrorism. The criminalization of terrorist acts expresses society's repugnance at them, invokes social censure and shame, and stigmatizes those who commit them. Moreover, by creating and reaffirming values, criminalization may serve, in the long run, as a deterrent to terrorism, as those values are internalized." Thus, international criminal law treaties that seek to prevent, condemn and punish terrorist activities, require precise definitions:

"The definition of the offence in criminal law treaty plays several roles. First and foremost, it has the symbolic, normative role of expressing society's condemnation of the forbidden acts. Second, it facilitates agreement. Since states tend to be reluctant to undertake stringent obligations in matters related to the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction, a precise definition of the crime, which restricts the scope of those obligations, makes agreement less costly. Third, it provides an inter-subjective basis for the homogeneous application of the treaty's obligations on judicial and police cooperation. This function is of particular importance in extradition treaties because, to grant an extradition, most legal systems require that the crime be punishable both in the requesting state and the requested state. Fourth, it helps states to enact domestic legislation to criminalize and punish the wrongful acts defined in the treaty in conformity with their human rights' obligations. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires, in particular, that states define precisely which acts are prohibited before anyone can be prosecuted or punished for committing those same acts."

Saul noted in this sense that, missing a generally agreed, all-encompassing, definition of the term: "'Terrorism' currently lacks the precision, objectivity and certainty demanded by legal discourse. Criminal law strives to avoid emotive terms to prevent prejudice to an accused, and shuns ambiguous or subjective terms as incompatible with the principle of non-retroactivity. If the law is to admit the term, advance definition is essential on grounds of fairness, and it is not sufficient to leave definition to the unilateral interpretations of States. Legal definition could plausibly retrieve terrorism from the ideological quagmire, by severing an agreed legal meaning from the remainder of the elastic, political concept. Ultimately it must do so without criminalizing legitimate violent resistance to oppressive regimes – and becoming complicit in that oppression."

Obstacles to a comprehensive definition
There are many reasons for the failure to achieve universal consensus regarding the definition of terrorism, not least that it is such a "complex and multidimensional phenomenon". In addition, the term has been used broadly, to describe so many different incidents and events that scholar Louise Richardson has said that the term "has become so widely used in many contexts as to become almost meaningless". An analysis of 73 different definitions in 2004 came up with only five common elements, which excluded any reference to victims, fear/terror, motive, non-combatant targets or the criminal nature of the tactics used.

Historically, the dispute on the meaning of terrorism arose since the laws of war were first codified in 1899. The Martens Clause was introduced as a compromise wording for the dispute between the Great Powers who considered francs-tireurs to be unlawful combatants subject to execution on capture, and smaller states who maintained that they should be considered lawful combatants.

More recently the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, which applies in situations Article 1. Paragraph 4 "... in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes...", contains many ambiguities that cloud the issue of who is or is not a legitimate combatant.

In a briefing paper for the Australian Parliament in 2002, Angus Martyn stated:

"The international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations attempts to define the term floundered mainly due to differences of opinion between various members about the use of violence in the context of conflicts over national liberation and self-determination."

Diaz-Paniagua (2008) has noted that, to "create an effective legal regime against terrorism, it would be necessary to formulate a comprehensive definition of that crime that, on the one hand, provides the strongest moral condemnation to terrorist activities while, on the other hand, has enough precision to permit the prosecution of criminal activities without condemning acts that should be deemed to be legitimate". Nonetheless, due to major divergences at the international level on the question of the legitimacy of the use of violence for political purposes, either by states or by self-determination and revolutionary groups, this has not yet been possible." In this sense, M. Cherif Bassiouni (1988) notes: "to define 'terrorism' in a way that is both all-inclusive and unambiguous is very difficult, if not impossible. One of the principle difficulties lies in the fundamental values at stake in the acceptance or rejection of terror-inspiring violence as means of accomplishing a given goal. The obvious and well known range of views on these issues are what makes an internationally accepted specific definition of what is loosely called 'terrorism,' a largely impossible undertaking. That is why the search for and internationally agreed upon definition may well be a futile and unnecessary effort." Sami Zeidan, a diplomat and scholar, explained the political reasons underlying the current difficulties to define terrorism as follows (2004): "There is no general consensus on the definition of terrorism. The difficulty of defining terrorism lies in the risk it entails of taking positions. The political value of the term currently prevails over its legal one. Left to its political meaning, terrorism easily falls prey to change that suits the interests of particular states at particular times. The Taliban and Osama bin Laden were once called freedom fighters (mujahideen) and backed by the CIA when they were resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Now they are on top of the international terrorist lists. Today, the United Nations views Palestinians as freedom fighters, struggling against the unlawful occupation of their land by Israel, and engaged in a long-established legitimate resistance, yet Israel regards them as terrorists [...] The repercussion of the current preponderance of the political over the legal value of terrorism is costly, leaving the war against terrorism selective, incomplete and ineffective."

In the same vein, Jason Burke (2003), a British reporter who writes about radical Islamist activity, said: "There are multiple ways of defining terrorism, and all are subjective. Most define terrorism as 'the use or threat of serious violence' to advance some kind of 'cause'. Some state clearly the kinds of group ('sub-national', 'non-state') or cause (political, ideological, religious) to which they refer. Others merely rely on the instinct of most people when confronted with innocent civilians being killed or maimed by men armed with explosives, firearms or other weapons. None is satisfactory, and grave problems with the use of the term persist. Terrorism is after all, a tactic. The term 'war on terrorism' is thus effectively nonsensical. As there is no space here to explore this involved and difficult debate, my preference is, on the whole, for the less loaded term 'Militancy'. This is not an attempt to condone such actions, merely to analyse them in a clearer way."

The political and emotional connotation of the term "terrorism" makes difficult its use in legal discourse. In this sense, Saul (2004) notes that: "Despite the shifting and contested meaning of 'terrorism' over time, the peculiar semantic power of the term, beyond its literal signification, is its capacity to stigmatize, delegitimize, denigrate, and dehumanize those at whom it is directed, including political opponents. The term is ideologically and politically loaded; pejorative; implies moral, social, and value judgment; and is 'slippery and much-abused.' In the absence of a definition of terrorism, the struggle over the representation of a violent act is a struggle over its legitimacy. The more confused a concept, the more it lends itself to opportunistic appropriation."

As scholar Bruce Hoffman (1998) has noted: "terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. (...) Hence the decision to call someone or label some organization 'terrorist' becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, an ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism." For this and for political reasons, many news sources (such as Reuters) avoid using this term, opting instead for less accusatory words like "bombers", "militants", etc.

The term has been depicted as carrying racist, xenophobic and ethnocentric connotations when used as an ethnic slur aimed at Arabs or Middle Easterners, or at someone of Arab or Greater Middle Eastern descent or when used by white supremacists.

These difficulties led Pamala Griset (2003) to conclude that: "the meaning of terrorism is embedded in a person's or nation's philosophy. Thus, the determination of the 'right' definition of terrorism is subjective".

While discussing the definitional and ethical difficulties of terrorism, philosopher Jenny Teichman argues that "it ought not to be impossible to find an agreed definition, and then ask whether one wants to condemn or applaud all or some of the things that fall under that description". Experts disagree on "whether terrorism is wrong by definition or just wrong as a matter of fact; they disagree about whether terrorism should be defined in terms of its aims, or its methods, or both, or neither; they disagree about whether states can perpetrate terrorism; they even disagree about the importance or otherwise of terror for a definition of terrorism".

The sectoral approach
To elaborate an effective legal regime to prevent and punish international terrorism—rather than only working on a single, all-encompassing, comprehensive definition of terrorism—the international community has also adopted a "...'sectoral' approach aimed at identifying offences seen as belonging to the activities of terrorists and working out treaties in order to deal with specific categories thereof". The treaties that follow this approach focus on the wrongful nature of terrorist activities rather than on their intent:

"On the whole, therefore, the 'sectoral' conventions confirm the assumption that some offences can be considered in themselves as offences of international concern, irrespective of any 'terrorist' intent or purpose. Indeed, the principal merit of the 'sectoral approach' is that it avoids the need to define 'terrorism' of 'terrorist acts' ... So long as the 'sectoral' approach is followed, there is no need to define terrorism; a definition would only be necessary if the punishment of the relevant offences were made conditional on the existence of a specific 'terrorist' intent; but this would be counter-productive, inasmuch as it would result in unduly restricting their suppression."

Following this approach, the international community adopted 12 sectoral counter-terrorism conventions, open to the ratification of all states, between 1963 and 2005 (see below), relating to types of acts (such as aboard an aircraft, taking hostages, bombings, nuclear terrorism, etc.).

Analyzing these treaties, Andrew Byrnes observed that: "These conventions – all of which are described by the United Nations as part of its panoply of anti-terrorist measures – share three principal characteristics:

(a) they all adopted an 'operational definition' of a specific type of terrorist act that was defined without reference to the underlying political or ideological purpose or motivation of the perpetrator of the act – this reflected a consensus that there were some acts that were such a serious threat to the interests of all that they could not be justified by reference to such motives;

(b) they all focused on actions by non-state actors (individuals and organisations) and the State was seen as an active ally in the struggle against terrorism – the question of the State itself as terrorist actor was left largely to one side; and

(c) they all adopted a criminal law enforcement model to address the problem, under which States would cooperate in the apprehension and prosecution of those alleged to have committed these crimes."

Byrnes notes that "this act-specific approach to addressing problems of terrorism in binding international treaties has continued up until relatively recently. Although political denunciation of terrorism in all its forms had continued apace, there had been no successful attempt to define 'terrorism' as such in a broad sense that was satisfactory for legal purposes. There was also some scepticism as to the necessity, desirability and feasibility of producing an agreed and workable general definition." Nonetheless, the same committee of the United Nations General Assembly which authored the 1997 Bombing Convention and the 1999 Financing Convention has been working on a proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, given renewed impetus by the September 11 attacks in 2001.

Comprehensive conventions
The international community has worked on two comprehensive counter-terrorism treaties, the League of Nations' 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which never entered into force, and the United Nations' proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which has not yet been finalized.

League of Nations (1930s)
In the late 1930s, the international community made a first attempt at defining terrorism. Article 1.1 of the League of Nations' 1937 Convention for the prevention and punishment of Terrorism defined "acts of terrorism" as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public". Article 2 included as terrorist acts, if they were directed against another state and if they constituted acts of terrorism within the meaning of the definition contained in article 1, the following: "1. Any willful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to:
 * a) Heads of State, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of the State, their hereditary or designated successors;
 * b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons;
 * c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when the act is directed against them in their public capacity.

2. Willful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to the authority of another High Contracting Party.

3. Any willful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public.

4. Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing provisions of the present article.

5. The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with the view to the commission in any country whatsoever of an offence falling within the present article."

These articles never entered into force, owing to lack of support.

UN Comprehensive Convention (1997–present)
Since 1994, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly condemned terrorist acts using the following political description of terrorism: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them."

In 1996 an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was set up, with the remit of drafting several conventions condemning various aspects of terrorism, with the intention of producing a final Comprehensive Convention which would either supplement or replace the series of sectoral conventions.

Since January 1997, the United Nations General Assembly has been negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The definition of the crime of terrorism on the negotiating table reads as follows (GA Resolution 51/210, Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, December 1996; adopted January 1997 ): "1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
 * (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
 * (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
 * (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."

Among the negotiators, the 1996/7 definition is not controversial in itself; the deadlock in the negotiations arises instead from the opposing views on whether such a definition would be applicable to the armed forces of a state and to self-determination movements. Thalif Deen described the situation as follows: "The key sticking points in the draft treaty revolve around several controversial yet basic issues, including the definition of ´terrorism´. For example, what distinguishes a "terrorist organisation" from a 'liberation movement'? And do you exclude activities of national armed forces, even if they are perceived to commit acts of terrorism? If not, how much of this constitutes 'state terrorism'?"

In 2002, the coordinator of the negotiations, supported by most western delegations, proposed the following exceptions to address those issues: "1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international humanitarian law.

2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention.

3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.

4. Nothing in this article condones or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor precludes prosecution under other laws."

In November 2004, a Secretary-General of the United Nations report described terrorism as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act".

The state members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference proposed instead the following exceptions: "2. The activities of 'the parties' during an armed conflict, 'including in situations of foreign occupation', as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention.

3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, 'inasmuch as they are in conformity' with international law, are not governed by this Convention."

Sectoral conventions (1963–2005)
The various sectoral counter-terrorism conventions, or treaties, define as terrorist particular categories of activities. These include:

 * The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
 * The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
 * The 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
 * The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
 * The 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
 * The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
 * The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
 * The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
 * The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification
 * The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
 * The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
 * The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

1997: Terrorist Bombings Convention
Article 2.1 of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings defines the offence of terrorist bombing as follows: "Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
 * a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
 * b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such a destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss."

Article 19 expressly excluded from the scope of the convention certain activities of state armed forces and of self-determination movements as follows: "1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States, and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international humanitarian law. 2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention."

1999: Terrorist Financing Convention
Article 2.1 of the 1999 sectoral United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention) defines the crime of terrorist financing as the offence committed by "any person" who "by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out" an act "intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."

2005: Nuclear Terrorism Convention
The 2005 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism defines the crime of nuclear terrorism as follows: "Article 2 1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device:
 * (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
 * (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment;

(b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material:
 * (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
 * (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or
 * (iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act."

Article 4 of the convention expressly excluded from the application of the convention the use of nuclear weapons during armed conflicts without, though, recognizing the legality of the use of those weapons: "1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law.

2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of the present article shall not be interpreted as condoning or making lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or precluding prosecution under other laws.

4. This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States."

Definitions of terrorism in other UN decisions
In parallel with the criminal law codification efforts, some United Nations organs have put forward some broad political definitions of terrorism.

The United Nations did not focus any debate on terrorism until 1972, after the terrorist attack at the Olympic Games in Munich.

UN General Assembly Resolutions (1972, 1994/6)
In 1972 the General Assembly passed a resolution titled "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts ofviolence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes". An Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, consisting of three sub-committees, was established, but no consensus was reached on the various draft proposals submitted, and the matter was again put aside until the Cold War had ended (1991).

In 1994, the General Assembly agreed on a declaration that terrorism was "criminal and unjustifiable", condemning all such acts "wherever and by whomever committed", in its Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (GA Res. 49/60).

A 1996 non-binding United Nations Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (which described terrorism as "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them" ) annexed to the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, described terrorist activities in the following terms: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them."

Antonio Cassese has argued that the language of this and other similar UN declarations "sets out an acceptable definition of terrorism."

Each year, a legal committee of the General Assembly meets to discuss international cooperation to counter terrorism, and in 2019 the committee "reaffirmed the importance of the negotiations on and successful conclusion of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism" and the need for consensus for this and in particular stressed "the importance of negotiating an internationally agreed definition of terrorism".

UN Security Council (1999, 2004)
In 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1269 unanimously, which "unequivocally condemn[ed] all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation".

In 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 condemned terrorist acts as: "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."

High-Level Panel (2004)
Also in 2004, a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change composed of independent experts and convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations called states to set aside their differences and to adopt, in the text of a proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the following political "description of terrorism": "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."

The following year, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan endorsed the High Level Panel's definition of terrorism and asked states to set aside their differences and to adopt that definition within the proposed comprehensive terrorism convention before the end of that year. He said: "It is time to set aside debates on so-called 'State terrorism'. The use of force by states is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse fully the High-level Panel's call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. I believe this proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly."

The suggestion of incorporating this definition of terrorism into the comprehensive convention was rejected. Some United Nations' member states contended that a definition such as the one proposed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and endorsed by the Secretary General, lacked the necessary requirements to be incorporated in a criminal law instrument. Diaz-Paniagua stated that a comprehensive definition of terrorism to be included in a criminal law treaty must have "legal precision, certainty, and fair-labeling of the criminal conduct - all of which emanate from the basic human rights obligation to observe due process".

European Union
The European Union defines terrorism for legal/official purposes in Art. 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). This provides that terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list consisting largely of serious offences against persons and property that: "...given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO defines terrorism in the AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Edition 2019 as "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives".

Australia
, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (known as the Criminal Code), representing the federal government's criminal law and including Australia's laws against terrorism, defines "terrorist act" in Section 5.3. The definition, after defining in (a) the harms that may be caused (and excluding accidental harm or various actions undertaken as advocacy) defines a terrorist act as: "(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and

(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:

(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or

(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public."

Within the Criminal Code, a variety of offences are defined with reference to the definition of a terrorist act, for example financing terrorism, activities which advocate violent terrorist acts, etc.

Argentina
The Argentine National Reorganization Process dictatorship, which lasted from 1976 to 1983, defined "terrorist" as "not only who set bombs and carry guns, but also those who spread ideas opposite to Christian and western civilization".

Brazil
In 2016, Brazil passed a law that defines acts of terrorism and establishes punishment for committing, planning, enabling, sponsoring, inciting and participating in terrorist acts. The bill lists a series of acts that provoke social and general terror or endanger people, property, infrastructure, or public peace, for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice of race, color, ethnicity and religion. Shortly after the creation of the law, Federal Police's Operation Hashtag arrested eleven suspects of planning a terrorist attack in the run-up to the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

Canada
In Canada, section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as an act committed "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause" with the objective of intimidating the public "with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act."

France
In 1986, France adopted its first "anti-terrorism" law. The French legal definition of "acts of terrorism" as in force since 2016 is to be found in the French Code pénal, article 421. The article starts with: "Acts of terrorism – provided they are intentional, connected to either an individual or a collective enterprise, and intended to gravely disturb the public order by way of intimidation or terror – are: 1º deliberate assaults on life or on personal integrity; the hijacking of an aeroplane, ship or other means of transport; 2º theft, extorsion, destruction, degradation, deterioration; infractions on computerized information; ... [etc.]"

India
The Supreme Court of India quoted Alex P. Schmid's definition of terrorism in a 2003 ruling (Madan Singh vs. State of Bihar), "defin[ing] acts of terrorism veritably as 'peacetime equivalents of war crimes.'"

The now lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act specified the following definition of terrorism:

"Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act."

Pakistan
The Pakistan Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999 states:

A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he,

(a) in order to, or if the effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or such fire-arms or other lethal weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury to, any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property on a large scale, or a widespread disruption of supplies of services essential to the life of the community, or threatens with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties; or

(b) commits a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, or to adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people; or

(c) commits an act of gang rape, child molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as specified in the Schedule to this Act; or

(d) commits an act of civil commotion as specified in section &A."

Philippines
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, officially designated as Republic Act No. 11479, is a counter-terrorism law intended to prevent, prohibit, and penalize terrorism in the Philippines. The law was passed by the 18th Congress and signed by President Rodrigo Duterte on July 3, 2020, effectively replacing the Human Security Act of 2007 on July 18, 2020.

The Act defines terrorism as:

 * Engaging in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or endangers a person's life;
 * Engaging in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place, or private property;
 * Engaging in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage, or destruction to critical infrastructure;
 * Developing, manufacturing, possessing, acquiring, transporting, supplying, or using weapons; and
 * Releasing dangerous substances or causing fire, floods or explosions when the purpose is to intimidate the general public, create an atmosphere to spread a message of fear, provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures in the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety.

The definition states that "advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights" shall not be considered as terrorist acts only if they "are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety."

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Interior Ministry issued a set of anti-terrorist laws in 2014. According to Article 1 and 2:

"Calling for atheist thought in any form, or calling into question the fundamentals of the Islamic religion on which this country is based" and anyone who questions the King or the government or supports any group, party, organization other than that of the ruling elite inside or outside the Kingdom is a terrorist.

References to atheism were absent from Saudi Arabia's public draft of Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism as of October 2023.

Syria
After the United States attack on Abu Kamal, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem defined terrorism as "Killing civilians in international law means a terrorist aggression."

Turkey
The definition of "Terrorism" in Article 1 of Anti-Terror Law 3713 is: "Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as follows: "(1) In this Act 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where:
 * (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
 * (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and
 * (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
 * (a) involves serious violence against a person,
 * (b) involves serious damage to property,
 * (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
 * (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or
 * (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system."

Section 34 of the Terrorism Act 2006 amended sections 1(1)(b) and 113(1)(c) of Terrorism Act 2000 to include "international governmental organisations" in addition to "government".

Successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation (most recently in a report of July 2014) have commented on the UK's definition of terrorism.

U.S. Code (U.S.C.)
Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656f, of the United States Code (regarding the Department of State) contains a definition of terrorism in its requirement that annual country reports on terrorism be submitted by the Secretary of State to Congress every year. It reads: "[T]he term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

Title 18 of the United States Code (regarding criminal acts and criminal procedure) defines international terrorism as: "(1) [T]he term 'international terrorism' means activities that —
 * (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
 * (B) appear to be intended —
 * (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 * (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 * (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
 * (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum'."

Commenting on the genesis of this provision, Edward Peck, former U.S. Chief of Mission in Iraq (under Jimmy Carter) and former ambassador to Mauritania said: "In 1985, when I was the Deputy Director of the Reagan White House Task Force on Terrorism, [my working group was asked] to come up with a definition of terrorism that could be used throughout the government. We produced about six, and each and every case, they were rejected, because careful reading would indicate that our own country had been involved in some of those activities. […] After the task force concluded its work, Congress [passed] U.S. Code Title 18, Section 2331 ... the US definition of terrorism. […] one of the terms, 'international terrorism,' means 'activities that,' I quote, 'appear to be intended to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.' […] Yes, well, certainly, you can think of a number of countries that have been involved in such activities. Ours is one of them. […] And so, the terrorist, of course, is in the eye of the beholder."

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).

U.S. Department of Defense
The U.S. Department of Defense recently changed its definition of terrorism. Per Joint Pub 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, (24 November 2010), the Department of Defense defines it as "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political."

The new definition distinguishes between motivations for terrorism (religion, ideology, etc.) and goals of terrorism ("usually political"). This is in contrast to the previous definition which stated that the goals could be religious in nature.

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contains a definition of terrorism, which reads:

"Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to:
 * Create fear among the public.
 * Try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism.
 * Get immediate publicity for their causes."

The new definition does not require that the act needs to be politically motivated. The FEMA also said that terrorism "include threats of terrorism; assassinations; kidnappings; hijackings; bomb scares and bombings; cyber attacks (computer-based); and the use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons" and also states that "[h]igh-risk targets for acts of terrorism include military and civilian government facilities, international airports, large cities, and high-profile landmarks. Terrorists might also target large public gatherings, water and food supplies, utilities, and corporate centers. Further, terrorists are capable of spreading fear by sending explosives or chemical and biological agents through the mail."

U.S. National Counterterrorism Center
The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) define terrorism the same as United States Code 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2). The Center also defines a terrorist act as a "premeditated; perpetrated by a sub-national or clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a non-combatant target."

U.S. national security strategy
In September 2002, the U.S. national security strategy defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents." This definition did not exclude actions by the United States government and it was qualified some months later with "premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents".

USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 defines domestic terrorism as "activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S."

Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Section 102(1)(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act contains a definition of terrorism in order for insurance companies to provide coverage to all prospective policy holders at time of purchase and to all current policyholders at renewal and requires that the federal government pay 90 percent of covered terrorism losses exceeding the statutorily established deductible paid by the insurance company providing the coverage. It reads: "(1) ACT OF TERRORISM-
 * (A) CERTIFICATION- The term 'act of terrorism' means any act that is certified by the Secretary [of Treasury], in concurrence with the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United States--
 * (i) to be an act of terrorism;
 * (ii) to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to--
 * (I) human life;
 * (II) property; or
 * (III) infrastructure;
 * (iii) to have resulted in damage within the United States, or outside of the United States in the case of--
 * (I) an air carrier or vessel described in paragraph
 * (5)(B); or
 * (II) the premises of a United States mission; and
 * (iv) to have been committed by an individual or individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion."

Insurance coverage
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., many insurers made specific exclusions for terrorism in their policies, after global reinsurers withdrew from covering terrorism. Some governments introduced legislation to provide support for insurers in various ways.

 * In Australia, the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003 created a scheme to administer reinsurance scheme for insurance, relating to commercial properties and enterprises, but excluding residential properties, travel insurance, vehicles, and others. This legislation uses the same definition as specified in the Criminal Code (see above). The act's definition has only been applied once, when in 2015 the Federal Treasurer declared the 2014 Lindt Café siege as a "declared terrorist incident" under the act, although there was some debate about the classification of this incident. Twenty insurers made 92 claims, for a total of A$2.3 million, for various losses caused by the siege.
 * In the U.S., the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (2002) provides a government reinsurance backstop in case of large-scale terrorist attacks, requiring that commercial insurers offer terrorism coverage for the types of insurance included in the act. This Act includes a definition of terrorism (see above).

Some insurance companies exclude terrorism from general property insurance. An insurance company may include a specific definition of terrorism as part of its policy, for the purpose of excluding at least some loss or damage caused by terrorism. For example, RAC Insurance in Western Australia defines terrorism thus: "terrorism – includes but is not limited to the use of force or violence and/or threat, by any person or group of persons done for or in connection with political, religious, ideological or similar purposes including the intention to influence any government and/or to put the public, or any section of the public, in fear."

It is noted the term Stochastic terrorism began as a method to corelate measurements of violent rhetoric to probability of a terrorists attack. While this term is still used in the technical sense in risk management and insurance assessments, a more populist connotation has developed that is used to characterize the nature of certain terrorist acts in the context of social media influence.

Timeline of political definitions
Listed below are some of the historically important understandings of terror and terrorism, and enacted but non-universal definitions of the term:

"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them;..."
 * 1795. "Government intimidation during the Reign of Terror in France." The general sense of "systematic use of terror as a policy" was first recorded in English in 1798.
 * 1916. Gustave LeBon: "Terrorization has always been employed by revolutionaries no less than by kings, as a means of impressing their enemies, and as an example to those who were doubtful about submitting to them...."
 * 1937. League of Nations convention language: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public."
 * 1972, after the terrorist attack at the Olympic Games in Munich. UN General Assembly passed a resolution entitiled "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts ofviolence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in anattempt to effect radical changes". No consensus was reached.
 * 1987. A definition proposed by Iran at an international Islamic conference on terrorism: "Terrorism is an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt (mufsid) objective, and involving [a] threat to security of any kind, and violation of rights acknowledged by religion and mankind."
 * 1989. United States: premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.
 * 1992. A definition proposed by Alex P. Schmid to the United Nations Crime Branch: "Act of Terrorism = Peacetime Equivalent of War Crime."
 * 1994/1996 United Nations General Assembly's 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, and 1996 Supplement, Paragraph 3:

"...given their nature or context, [acts which] may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population."
 * 1996. UN General Assembly sets up an Ad Hoc Committee with the responsibility of drafting several conventions condemning various aspects of terrorism, as well as a final Comprehensive Convention to either supplement or replace the series of sectoral conventions.
 * 2002. European Union:

"Any act carried out by an offender in furtherance of an individual or collective project, directly or indirectly, intended to disturb the public order of the state, or to shake the security of society, or the stability of the state, or to expose its national unity to danger, or to suspend the basic law of governance or some of its articles, or to insult the reputation of the state or its position, or to inflict damage upon one of its public utilities or its natural resources, or to attempt to force a governmental authority to carry out or prevent it from carrying out an action, or to threaten to carry out acts that lead to the named purposes or incite [these acts]."
 * 2003. India: Referencing Schmid's 1992 proposal, the Supreme Court of India described terrorist acts as the "peacetime equivalents of war crimes."
 * 2014. Contained in a Saudi Arabia terrorism law taking effect 1 February 2014, the following definition has been criticized by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for being overly broad:

"Terrorism consists in the practice, by one or more individuals, of the acts listed in this article for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice of race, color, ethnicity and religion, when committed with the objective of provoking social or generalized terror, exposing people, property, the public peace or the public safety."
 * 2016. Brazilian anti-terrorism law:

Academic definitions by scholars
Numerous scholars have proposed working definitions of terrorism.

Schmid and Jongman (1988) counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements, and Walter Laqueur counted over 100 definitions, concluding that the "only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence". This is clearly inadequate, as many other actions involve both elements.

Bruce Hoffman (2006) has thus noted that: "It is not only individual agencies within the same governmental apparatus that cannot agree on a single definition of terrorism. Experts and other long-established scholars in the field are equally incapable of reaching a consensus. In the first edition of his magisterial survey, Political terrorism: A Research Guide, Alex Schmid devoted more than a hundred pages to examining more than a hundred different definitions of terrorism in an effort to discover a broadly acceptable, reasonably comprehensive explication of the word. Four years and a second edition [2005] later, Schimd was no closer to the goal of his quest, conceding in the first sentence of the revised volume that the 'search for an adequate definition is still on' Walter Laqueur despaired of defining terrorism in both editions of his monumental work on the subject, maintaining that it is neither possible to do so nor worthwhile to make the attempt. 'Ten years of debates on typologies and definitions,' he responded to a survey on definitions to conducted by Schmid, 'have not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree.' Laqueur's contention is supported by the twenty-two different word categories occurring in the 109 different definition that Schmid identified in survey. At the end of this exhaustive exercise, Schmid asks 'whether the above list contains all the elements necessary for a good definition. The answer,' he suggests' is probably 'no'.' If it is impossible to define terrorism, as Laqueur argues, and fruitless to attempt to cobble together a truly comprehensive definition, as Schmid admits, are we to conclude that terrorism is impervious to precise, much less accurate definition? Not entirely. If we cannot define terrorism, then we can at least usefully distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristics that make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is."

Hoffman believes it is possible to identify some key characteristics of terrorism. He proposes that: "By distinguishing terrorists from other types of criminals and terrorism from other forms of crime, we come to appreciate that terrorism is: and
 * ineluctably political in aims and motives;
 * violent – or, equally important, threatens violence;
 * designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
 * conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders;
 * perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity."

A common trait that Terrorists often possess is having persistent childhood disobedience. After surveying the various academic definitions of terrorism, Rhyl Vallis and others (2004) concluded that: "Most of the formal definitions of terrorism have some common characteristics: a fundamental motive to make political/societal changes; the use of violence or illegal force; attacks on civilian targets by 'nonstate'/'Subnational actors'; and the goal of affecting society. This finding is reflected in Blee's listing of three components of terrorism:
 * 1) Acts or threats of violence;
 * 2) The communication of fear to an audience beyond the immediate victim, and;
 * 3) Political, economic, or religious aims by the perpetrator(s)."

A definition proposed by Carsten Bockstette (2008), a German military officer serving at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, underlines the psychological and tactical aspects of terrorism: "Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). Such acts are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states."

Academics and practitioners may also be categorized by the definitions of terrorism that they use. A distinction can be made between "act-centric" and "actor-centric" definitions. Actor-centric definitions of terrorism emphasize the characteristics of the groups or individuals who use terrorism. Whilst act-centric definitions emphasize the unique aspects of terrorism from other acts of violence. Max Abrahms (2010) introduced the distinction between what he calls "terrorist lumpers" and "terrorist splitters." Lumpers define terrorism broadly, brooking no distinction between this tactic and guerrilla warfare or civil war. Terrorist splitters, by contrast, define terrorism narrowly, as the select use of violence against civilians for putative political gain. As Abrahms notes, these two definitions yield different policy implications: "Lumpers invariably believe that terrorism is a winning tactic for coercing major government concessions. As evidence, they point to substate campaigns directed against military personnel that have indeed pressured concessions. Salient examples include the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984, and the French withdrawal from Algeria in 1962. Significantly, terrorist splitters do not regard these substate campaigns as evidence of terrorism's political effectiveness. Rather, they contend that disaggregating substate campaigns directed against civilian targets versus military ones is critical for appreciating terrorism's abysmal political record."

In 2011 Alex Schmid published an updated academic consensus definition in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, which includes additional discussion of the UN struggle to find a legal definition, and 260 other definitions. The revised definition includes 12 points, the first of which is: "1. Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;..."

Academic vs legal definition
Schmid returns to the problem of legal definition in an October 2020 article in Contemporary Voices, in which he reviews the history of the efforts to arriving at agreement on a common legal definition of terrorism and names six reasons underlying the challenges faced in achieving this. In a new major work edited by Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness (2020–2021), he states: "...the broader a definition, the more terrorism there is that ought to be countered and the more difficult it becomes to prevent it. If countries have different definitions of terrorism, extradition of terrorist suspects and mutual legal assistance become more difficult and often impossible..."

In contrast to a consensus on the legal definition however, the 2011 academic definition of terrorism, which is social-scientific rather than legal in nature, has gained a fair degree of acceptance among scholars.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Definition of terrorism


text:
Jefferson Park

Jefferson Park may refer to several places:

 * Jefferson Park, Los Angeles, California, a neighborhood
 * Jefferson Park (Bakersfield), California, a city park
 * Jefferson Park, Pasadena, California, a neighborhood
 * Jefferson Park, Denver, Colorado, a neighborhood and park
 * Jefferson Park, Chicago, Illinois, a neighborhood
 * Jefferson Park (Chicago), Illinois, a city park
 * Jefferson Park Transit Center, a bus terminal and railroad station
 * Jefferson Park, New Jersey, an unincorporated community
 * Jefferson Park (Seattle), Washington, a city park
 * Jefferson Park (Oregon), meadows north of Mount Jefferson in the Oregon Cascades
 * Thomas Jefferson Park, New York City, a city park

title: Jefferson Park


text:
List of optical telescopes

 * List of largest optical reflecting telescopes – List of large optical telescopes
 * List of largest optical refracting telescopes
 * List of space telescopes
 * List of solar telescopes
 * List of telescope types
 * List of largest optical telescopes historically
 * List of largest optical telescopes in the 20th century
 * List of largest optical telescopes in the 19th century
 * List of largest optical telescopes in the 18th century

title: List of optical telescopes