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Richard O. Covey

Richard Oswalt Covey (born August 1, 1946) is a retired United States Air Force officer, former NASA astronaut, and a member of the United States Astronaut Hall of Fame.

Early life
Born August 1, 1946, in Fayetteville, Arkansas, he considers Fort Walton Beach, Florida, to be his hometown. He graduated from Choctawhatchee High School in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, in 1964; he received a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science with a major in Astronautical Engineering from the United States Air Force Academy in 1968, and a Master of Science degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Purdue University in 1969.

Military career
As a member of the U.S. Air Force, Covey was an operational fighter pilot from 1970 to 1974, flying the F-100 Super Sabre, A-37 Dragonfly and A-7 Corsair II. He flew 339 combat missions during two tours in Southeast Asia. At Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, between 1975 and 1978, he was an F-4 Phantom II and A-7D weapons system test pilot and joint test force director for electronic warfare testing of the F-15 Eagle.

He has flown over 5,700 hours in more than 30 different types of aircraft.

NASA career
Selected as an astronaut candidate by NASA in January 1978, Covey became an astronaut in August 1979. A veteran of four space flights, STS-51-I in 1985, STS-26 in 1988, STS-38 in 1990, and STS-61 in 1993, Covey has logged over 646 hours in space. He was the last member of his astronaut class—the 1978 NASA Group 8—to make his first spaceflight.

Prior to the first flight of the Space Shuttle, he provided astronaut support in Orbiter engineering development and testing. He was a T-38 chase pilot for the second and third Shuttle flights and support crewman for the first operational Shuttle flight, STS-5. Covey also served as Mission Control spacecraft communicator (CAPCOM) for Shuttle missions STS-5, 6, 61-B, 61-C, and 51-L (it was his voice that said the now infamous words, ", go at throttle up" shortly before the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster). During 1989, he was Chairman of NASA's Space Flight Safety Panel. He has held additional technical assignments within the NASA Astronaut Office, and has also served as Acting Deputy Chief of the Astronaut Office, and Acting Deputy Director of Flight Crew Operations.

Space flights

On his first mission, Covey was on the five-man crew of STS-51-I, which launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on August 27, 1985. During this seven-day mission, crew members deployed three communications satellites: the Navy SYNCOM IV-4, the Australian AUSSAT, and American Satellite Corporation's ASC-1. The crew also performed the successful on-orbit rendezvous and repair of the ailing 15,000 pound (6.8 t) SYNCOM IV-3 satellite. This repair activity involved the first manual grapple and manual deployment of a satellite by a spacewalking crew member. Mission duration was 170 hours. The completed 112 orbits before landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, on September 3, 1985.

He next served as pilot on STS-26, the first flight to be flown after the loss of Challenger. The five-man crew launched from the Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on September 29, 1988, aboard the Discovery. Mission duration was 97 hours during which crew members successfully deployed the TDRS-C satellite and operated eleven secondary payloads which included two student experiments. Discovery completed 64 orbits of the Earth before landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, on October 3, 1988.

On STS-38 Covey was the spacecraft commander of a five-man crew that launched at night from the Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on November 15, 1990. During the five-day mission crew members conducted Department of Defense operations. After 80 orbits of the Earth in 117 hours, Covey piloted the to a landing on the runway at the Kennedy Space Center on November 20, 1990. This was the first Shuttle recovery in Florida since 1985.

On his fourth flight, Covey commanded a crew of seven aboard the on the STS-61 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing and repair mission. STS-61 launched at night from the Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on December 2, 1993. During the 11-day flight, the HST was captured and restored to full capacity through a record five space walks by four astronauts. After having traveled 4,433,772 mi in 163 orbits of the Earth, Covey landed the Endeavour at night on the runway at the Kennedy Space Center on December 13, 1993.

Post-NASA career
On August 1, 1994, Covey retired from NASA and the Air Force. Covey is married and has two grown daughters. After the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, Covey, along with retired Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas Patten Stafford, headed the Stafford-Covey Commission in returning the Space Shuttle fleet to space, starting with the STS-114 mission. In 2005, Covey received the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award from the Boy Scouts of America—he became an Eagle Scout in 1960 when his father was stationed at an Air Force base in Florida. Covey was featured in a 2005 issue of Eagletter, a magazine for members of the National Eagle Scout Association. In January 2006, Covey was selected for the position of Chief Operating Officer of United Space Alliance. In September 2007, Covey succeeded fellow astronaut Michael J. McCulley as chief executive officer of United Space Alliance. Covey retired from United Space Alliance in March 2010. He served on the Board of Directors of Re/Max Holdings, LLC from 2005 until 2019.

Covey also appeared in an episode of the American TV show Home Improvement. Series 3, Episode 24, titled "Reality Bytes", aired May 18, 1994. The Hubble repair crew appeared on the fictional show-within-a-show Tool Time, where they showed some of the tools they used in space. During the closing credits, Covey also presented the cast and crew of Home Improvement with a frame containing a flag, crew patch and some photos. The flag and patch had flown around four million miles in space.

Special honors
Covey has been awarded 2 Defense Distinguished Service Medals, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, 5 Air Force Distinguished Flying Crosses, 16 Air Medals, the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement, the NASA Distinguished Service Medal, the NASA Distinguished Public Service Medal, the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, 4 NASA Space Flight Medals, the NASA Public Service Medal, the Johnson Space Center Certificate of Commendation, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Haley Space Flight Award for 1988, and the American Astronautical Society (AAS) Flight Achievement Award for 1988. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, received the Liethen-Tittle Award as the Outstanding Graduate of U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School Class 74B, and is a Distinguished Astronaut Engineering Alumnus of Purdue University. He has been inducted into the Astronaut Hall of Fame, the Arkansas Aviation Hall of Fame, and the Choctawhatchee High School Hall of Fame. Additionally, he is a Fellow of both the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Society of Experimental Test Pilots. Covey and his crew of STS-61 received the National Space Club's 1994 Goddard Trophy and the National Aeronautics Association's Collier Trophy for 1993.

Arkansas Aviation Historical Society inducted Covey into the Arkansas Aviation Hall of Fame in 1995.

title: Richard O. Covey


text:
Richard Covey

Richard Covey may refer to:

 * Richard O. Covey (born 1946), United States Air Force officer and former NASA astronaut
 * Richard Covey (composer) (born 1979), Canadian composer

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Richard Covey


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Lowell Weicker

Lowell Palmer Weicker Jr. (May 16, 1931 – June 28, 2023) was an American politician who served as a U.S. Representative, U.S. Senator, and the 85th Governor of Connecticut.

Weicker unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination for president in 1980. One of the first Republican members of Congress to express concerns about President Richard Nixon's role in the Watergate scandal, Weicker developed a reputation as a "Rockefeller Republican", eventually leading conservative activists to endorse his opponent Joe Lieberman, a New Democrat, in the 1988 Senate election which he subsequently lost. Weicker later left the Republican Party, and became one of the few third-party candidates to be elected to a state governorship in the United States at the time, doing so on the ticket of A Connecticut Party.

Early life
Weicker was born in Paris, the son of American parents Mary Hastings (née Bickford) and Lowell Palmer Weicker. His grandfather Theodore Weicker was a German immigrant who co-founded the E. R. Squibb corporation. Weicker graduated from the Lawrenceville School (class of 1949), Yale University (1953), and the University of Virginia School of Law (1958). He began his political career after serving in the United States Army between 1953 and 1955, reaching the rank of first lieutenant.

Career in Congress
Weicker served in the Connecticut State House of Representatives from 1963 to 1969 and as First Selectman of Greenwich, Connecticut, before winning election to the U.S. House of Representatives, in 1968 as a Republican. Weicker only served one term in the House before being elected to the U.S. Senate in 1970. Weicker benefited from a split in the Democratic Party in that election: two-term incumbent Thomas Dodd ran as an independent after losing the Democratic nomination to Joseph Duffey. Ultimately, Weicker won with 41.7 percent of the vote. Dodd finished third, with 266,500 votes—far exceeding Weicker's 86,600-vote margin over Duffey.

Weicker served in the U.S. Senate for three terms, from 1971 to 1989. He gained national attention for his service on the Senate Watergate Committee, where he became the first Republican senator to call for Richard Nixon's resignation. He recalled: "People in Connecticut were very much behind President Nixon, like the rest of the country. They thought he could do no wrong, and when I was in Connecticut, I would get flipped the bird all the time, whether it was on the streets or in the car, for the role that I was playing. After Watergate was over, then the needle goes all the way the other way, and I've got huge favorability ratings." Proving this, Weicker was convincingly reelected in 1976.

In 1980, he made an unsuccessful bid for the Republican nomination for president.

Weicker was a liberal voice in an increasingly conservative Republican Party. For instance, in 1986, Americans for Democratic Action rated Weicker as by far the most liberal Republican in the Senate, and gave him a higher rating than Connecticut's other Senator, Democrat Chris Dodd. He was critical of the increasing influence of the Christian right on the party; he described the separation of church and state as "this country's greatest contribution to world civilization", and the party in 2012 as "swung off so far to the right that no moderate could've survived a primary." Weicker voted in favor of the bill establishing Martin Luther King Jr. Day as a federal holiday and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (as well as to override President Reagan's veto). Weicker voted against the nomination of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the United States, as well as the nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Weicker was a strong advocate for the rights of the disabled during his tenure in Congress, although he ultimately lost his seat before the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 passed. In later interviews, Weicker identified his work on the Americans with Disabilities Act, funding the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, increasing the funding for the National Institutes of Health, and funding research into AZT as his proudest achievements in the Senate.

Weicker's tense relations with establishment Republicans may have roots in receiving strong support from Nixon in his 1970 Senate bid, support repaid in the eyes of his critics by a vehement attack on the White House while serving on the Watergate Committee. Later, his relations with the Bush family soured, and Prescott Bush Jr. (the brother of the then Vice President) made a short-lived bid against Weicker to gain the 1982 Republican Senate nomination. Weicker's well-known Democratic sympathies increasingly alienated mainstream Republicans, particularly after an effort to prevent the nomination of conservatives to state office, which resulted in a poor showing during the 1986 local elections, and he was defeated in the 1988 Senate election by Joe Lieberman. Lieberman benefited from the support of National Review founder William F. Buckley Jr., and his brother, former New York Senator James Buckley; William F. Buckley ran columns in support of Lieberman and circulated bumper stickers with the slogan, "Does Lowell Weicker Make You Sick?"

Governor
Weicker's political career appeared to be over after his 1988 defeat, and he became a professor at the George Washington University Law School. However, he entered the 1990 gubernatorial election as the candidate of A Connecticut Party, running as a good government candidate and drew upon his coalition of liberal Republicans, moderate Democrats, and independent voters. The early 1990s recession had hit Connecticut hard, worsened by the fall in revenues from traditional sources such as sales tax and corporation tax. Connecticut politics had a tradition at the time of opposition to a state income tax—one had been implemented in 1971 but rescinded after six weeks under public pressure. Weicker initially campaigned on a platform of solving Connecticut's fiscal crisis without implementing an income tax. He won in a three-way race with Republican John G. Rowland and Democrat Bruce Morrison, taking 40% of the vote against Rowland's 37% and Morrison's 21%. Weicker lost Fairfield and New Haven County counties to Rowland, but won eastern Connecticut, drawing especially strong support from the Hartford metro area, where he had been strongly endorsed by the Hartford Courant and by many state employee labor unions. The Los Angeles Times wrote that support from Democrats was credited for Weicker's victory, reflected in Morrison's third-place finish.

After taking office, with a projected $2.4 billion deficit, Weicker reversed himself and pushed for the adoption of an income tax, a move that was very unpopular. He stated, "My policy when I came in was no income tax, but that fell apart on the rocks of fiscal fact." Weicker vetoed three budgets that did not contain an income tax, and forced a partial government shutdown, before the General Assembly narrowly passed it in 1991. The 1991 budget set the income tax rate at 6%, lowered the sales tax from 8% to 6% while expanding its base, reduced the corporate tax to 10.5% over two years, and eliminated taxes on capital gains, interest, and dividends. It also included $1.2 billion in line-by-line budget cuts, including the elimination of state aid to private and parochial schools, but held the line on social programs. His drastic measures provoked controversy. A huge protest rally in Hartford attracted some 40,000 participants, some of whom cursed at and spat at Governor Weicker.

Weicker earned lasting criticism for his implementation of the income tax; the conservative Yankee Institute claimed in August 2006 that after fifteen years the income tax had failed to achieve its stated goals. However, he earned national attention for his leadership on the issue, receiving the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation's Profile in Courage Award for taking an unpopular stand, then holding firm. Within two years, the state's budget was in surplus and he was well-regarded among voters. In retirement, he commented, "You've had 19 years to repeal it, and all you've done is spend it."

Despite his increasing popularity, he did not seek re-election as governor in 1994, citing wanting to spend time with his children as the reason. His last year in office was marked by a controversy over the firing of the state commissioner of motor vehicles, Louis Goldberg. In 2000, he endorsed Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) for President. In 2004, Weicker supported former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean's (D-VT) presidential bid. He expressed sympathy for the budget struggles of Governor Dannel Malloy, drawing a parallel with his own efforts to remedy a fiscal crisis.

In his book Independent Nation (2004), political analyst John Avlon describes Weicker as a radical centrist governor and thinker.

Later career

Weicker published a memoir entitled Maverick in 1995, co-written with Barry Sussman. The following year, he joined the board of directors for Compuware. In 1999, he became a member of the board of directors for the World Wrestling Federation (now known as WWE), and held this position until 2011. Despite the long professional relationship, Weicker did not support former WWE CEO Linda McMahon in either of her unsuccessful bids for the U.S. Senate in 2010 or 2012.

Weicker served from 2001 to 2011 as president of the board of directors of Trust for America's Health, a Washington, DC-based non-profit, non-partisan health policy research organization and was formerly a member of the board of directors of United States Tobacco. From 2003 on Weicker served on the board of Medallion Financial Corp., a lender to purchasers of taxi medallions in leading cities across the U.S. He was named to the board through his personal and business relationship with Andrew M. Murstein, president of Medallion.

Weicker considered a rematch against Senator Joe Lieberman in 2006. He objected to Lieberman's support for the Iraq War and told The New York Times in 2005, "If he's out there scot-free and nobody will do it [run against Senator Lieberman], I'd have to give serious thought to doing it myself, and I don't want to do it." Weicker ultimately did not run, but he endorsed Ned Lamont, who defeated Lieberman in the Democratic primary, causing Lieberman to run as an independent. The Lieberman campaign released an ad that borrowed from one aired during the 1988 Senate race, which depicted Weicker as a hibernating bear ignoring his Senate duties except at election time. In the 2006 ad, Weicker reappeared as a wounded bear while Lieberman's Democratic challenger, Lamont, was depicted as a bear cub sent and directed by Weicker. Lieberman ultimately defeated Lamont in November.

In 2015, despite criticizing Cuba for its lack of "human rights and democratic elections", Weicker described the country's free healthcare system as one of its most positive aspects.

During the 2016 Republican primaries, Weicker wrote an editorial in the Hartford Courant in which he criticized the repudiation of Rockefeller Republicans, the party's alienation of various population groups, and its obstructionist stance in Congress. He stated that the selection of Donald Trump as their presidential candidate "will complete their slow and steady descent into irrelevance."

In 2020, he filed an amicus brief on the side of Pennsylvania in the notable election case Texas v. Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania won the case and Biden was sworn in shortly after. Weicker had served with Biden in the U.S. Senate for 16 years.

Personal life and death
Weicker lived in Old Lyme, Connecticut, in his later years. He was married three times and had five sons. His first marriage, to Marie Louise Godfrey, lasted from 1953 to their divorce in 1977. He then married Camille Butler, his secretary. Their six-year marriage was described by The Connecticut Mirror as "tumultuous", and it ended in divorce. His third marriage, to Claudia Testa Ingram, lasted from 1984 until Weicker's death, at Middlesex Hospital in Middletown, Connecticut, on June 28, 2023, at age 92. By the time of his death, he was the final former member of the Senate Watergate Committee.

title: Lowell Weicker


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Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948, also known as the first Kashmir war, was a war fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four Indo-Pakistani wars between the two newly independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the war a few weeks after its independence by launching tribal lashkar (militias) from Waziristan, in an effort to capture Kashmir and to preempt the possibility of its ruler joining India.

Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, was facing an uprising by his Muslim subjects in Poonch, and lost control in portions of the western districts. On 22 October 1947, Pakistan's Pashtun tribal militias crossed the border of the state. These local tribal militias and irregular Pakistani forces moved to take the capital city of Srinagar, but upon reaching Baramulla, they took to plunder and stalled. Maharaja Hari Singh made a plea to India for assistance, and help was offered, but it was subject to his signing of an Instrument of Accession to India.

The war was initially fought by the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces and by militias from the frontier tribal areas adjoining the North-West Frontier Province. Following the accession of the state to India on 26 October 1947, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar, the state capital. British commanding officers initially refused the entry of Pakistani troops into the conflict, citing the accession of the state to India. However, later in 1948, they relented and Pakistan's armies entered the war shortly afterwards. The fronts solidified gradually along what later came to be known as the Line of Control. A formal ceasefire was declared effective 1 January 1949. Numerous analysts state that the war ended in a stalemate, with neither side obtaining a clear victory. Others, however, state that India emerged victorious as it successfully gained the majority of the contested territory.

Background
Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and six Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and invasions of Gorkhas, the hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh.

The First Anglo-Sikh war (1845–46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were made to surrender the valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and the Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 1.2 million rupees. Because they could not readily raise this sum, the East India Company allowed the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of 750,000 rupees to the company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly formed princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, founding a dynasty that was to rule the state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj, until India gained its independence in 1947.

Partition of India

The years 1946–1947 saw the rise of All-India Muslim League and Muslim nationalism, demanding a separate state for India's Muslims. The demand took a violent turn on the Direct Action Day (16 August 1946) and inter-communal violence between Hindus and Muslims became endemic. Consequently, a decision was taken on 3 June 1947 to divide British India into two separate states, the Dominion of Pakistan comprising the Muslim majority areas and the Dominion of India comprising the rest. The two provinces Punjab and Bengal with large Muslim-majority areas were to be divided between the two dominions. An estimated 11 million people eventually migrated between the two parts of Punjab, and possibly 1 million perished in the inter-communal violence. Jammu and Kashmir, being adjacent to the Punjab province, was directly affected by the happenings in Punjab.

The original target date for the transfer of power to the new dominions was June 1948. However, fearing the rise of inter-communal violence, the British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten advanced the date to 15 August 1947. This gave only six weeks to complete all the arrangements for partition. Mountbatten's original plan was to stay on as the joint Governor General for both of the new dominions till June 1948. However, this was not accepted by the Pakistani leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In the event, Mountbatten stayed on as the Governor General of India, whereas Pakistan chose Jinnah as its Governor General. It was envisaged that the nationalisation of the armed forces could not be completed by 15 August and hence British officers stayed on after the transfer of power. The service chiefs were appointed by the Dominion governments and were responsible to them. The overall administrative control, but not operational control, was vested with Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, who was titled the 'Supreme Commander', answerable to a newly formed Joint Defence Council of the two dominions. India appointed General Rob Lockhart as its Army chief and Pakistan appointed General Frank Messervy.

The presence of the British commanding officers on both sides made the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947 a strange war. The two commanding officers were in daily telephone contact and adopted mutually defensive positions. The attitude was that "you can hit them so hard but not too hard, otherwise there will be all kinds of repercussions." Both Lockhart and Messervy were replaced in the course of war, and their successors Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey tried to exercise restraint on their respective governments. Bucher was apparently successful in doing so in India, but Gracey yielded and let British officers be used in operational roles on the side of Pakistan. One British officer even died in action.

Developments in Jammu and Kashmir (August–October 1947)

With the independence of the Dominions, the British Paramountcy over the princely states came to an end. The rulers of the states were advised to join one of the two dominions by executing an Instrument of Accession. Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, along with his prime minister Ram Chandra Kak, decided not to accede to either dominion. The reasons cited were that the Muslim majority population of the state would not be comfortable with joining India, and that the Hindu and Sikh minorities would become vulnerable if the state joined Pakistan.

In 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had a wide range of ethnic and religious communities. The Kashmir province consisting of the Kashmir Valley and the Muzaffarabad district had a majority Muslim population (over 90%). The Jammu province, consisting of five districts, had roughly equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims in the eastern districts (Udhampur, Jammu and Reasi), and a Muslim majority in the western districts (Mirpur and Poonch). The mountainous Ladakh district (wazarat) in the east had a significant Buddhist presence with a Muslim majority in Baltistan. The Gilgit Agency in the north was overwhelmingly Muslim and was directly governed by the British under an agreement with the Maharaja. Shortly before the transfer of power, the British returned the Gilgit Agency to the Maharaja, who appointed a Dogra governor for the district and a British commander for the local forces.

The predominant political movement in the Kashmir Valley, the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah, believed in secular politics. It was allied with the Indian National Congress and was believed to favour joining India. On the other hand, the Muslims of the Jammu province supported the Muslim Conference, which was allied to the All-India Muslim League and favoured joining Pakistan. The Hindus of the Jammu province favoured an outright merger with India. In the midst of all the diverging views, the Maharaja's decision to remain independent was apparently a judicious one.

Operation Gulmarg plan
According to Indian military sources, the Pakistani Army prepared a plan called Operation Gulmarg and put it into action as early as 20 August, a few days after Pakistan's independence. The plan was accidentally revealed to an Indian officer, Major O. S. Kalkat serving with the Bannu Brigade. According to the plan, 20 lashkars (tribal militias), each consisting of 1,000 Pashtun tribesmen, were to be recruited from among various Pashtun tribes, and armed at the brigade headquarters at Bannu, Wanna, Peshawar, Kohat, Thall and Nowshera by the first week of September. They were expected to reach the launching point of Abbottabad on 18 October, and cross into Jammu and Kashmir on 22 October. Ten lashkars were expected to attack the Kashmir Valley through Muzaffarabad and another ten lashkars were expected to join the rebels in Poonch, Bhimber and Rawalakot with a view to advance to Jammu. Detailed arrangements for the military leadership and armaments were described in the plan.

The regimental records show that, by the last week of August, the 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) (PAVO Cavalry) regiment was briefed about the invasion plan. Colonel Sher Khan, the Director of Military Intelligence, was in charge of the briefing, along with Colonels Akbar Khan and Khanzadah. The Cavalry regiment was tasked with procuring arms and ammunition for the 'freedom fighters' and establishing three wings of the insurgent forces: the South Wing commanded by General Kiani, a Central Wing based at Rawalpindi and a North Wing based at Abbottabad. By 1 October, the Cavalry regiment completed the task of arming the insurgent forces. "Throughout the war there was no shortage of small arms, ammunitions, or explosives at any time." The regiment was also told to be on stand by for induction into fighting at an appropriate time.

Scholars have noted considerable movement of Pashtun tribes during September–October. By 13 September, armed Pashtuns drifted into Lahore and Rawalpindi. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan noted a scheme to send tribesmen from Malakand to Sialkot, in lorries provided by the Pakistan government. Preparations for attacking Kashmir were also noted in the princely states of Swat, Dir, and Chitral. Scholar Robin James Moore states there is "little doubt" that Pashtuns were involved in border raids all along the Punjab border from the Indus to the Ravi.

Pakistani sources deny the existence of any plan called Operation Gulmarg. However, Shuja Nawaz does list 22 Pashtun tribes involved in the invasion of Kashmir on 22 October.

Operation Datta Khel
Operation Datta Khel was a military operation and coup planned by Major William Brown along with the Gilgit Scouts, aimed at overthrowing the rule of the Dogra dynasty of Kashmir. The operation was launched shortly after the independence of Pakistan. By 1 November, Gilgit-Baltistan had been annexed from the Dogra dynasty, and was made part of Pakistan after a brief provisional government.

Rebellion in Poonch

Sometime in August 1947, the first signs of trouble broke out in Poonch, about which diverging views have been received. Poonch was originally an internal jagir (autonomous principality), governed by an alternative family line of Maharaja Hari Singh. The taxation is said to have been heavy. The Muslims of Poonch had long campaigned for the principality to be absorbed into the Punjab province of British India. In 1938, a notable disturbance occurred for religious reasons, but a settlement was reached. During the Second World War, over 60,000 men from Poonch and Mirpur districts enrolled in the British Indian Army. After the war, they were discharged with arms, which is said to have alarmed the Maharaja. In June, Poonchis launched a 'No Tax' campaign. In July, the Maharaja ordered that all the soldiers in the region be disarmed. The absence of employment prospects coupled with high taxation drove the Poonchis to rebellion. The "gathering head of steam", states scholar Srinath Raghavan, was utilised by the local Muslim Conference led by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan (Sardar Ibrahim) to further their campaign for accession to Pakistan.

According to state government sources, the rebellious militias gathered in the Naoshera-Islamabad area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. A battalion of state troops was dispatched, which cleared the roads and dispersed the militias. By September, order was reestablished. The Muslim Conference sources, on the other hand, narrate that hundreds of people were killed in Bagh during flag hoisting around 15 August and that the Maharaja unleashed a 'reign of terror' on 24 August. Local Muslims also told Richard Symonds, a British Quaker social worker, that the army fired on crowds, and burnt houses and villages indiscriminately. According to the Assistant British High Commissioner in Pakistan, H. S. Stephenson, "the Poonch affair... was greatly exaggerated".

Pakistan's preparations, Maharaja's manoeuvring

Scholar Prem Shankar Jha states that the Maharaja had decided, as early as April 1947, that he would accede to India if it was not possible to stay independent. The rebellion in Poonch possibly unnerved the Maharaja. Accordingly, on 11 August, he dismissed his pro-Pakistan Prime Minister, Ram Chandra Kak, and appointed retired Major Janak Singh in his place. On 25 August, he sent an invitation to Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of the Punjab High Court to come as the Prime Minister. On the same day, the Muslim Conference wrote to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan warning him that "if, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League do not act, Kashmir might be lost to them". This set the ball rolling in Pakistan.

Liaquat Ali Khan sent a Punjab politician Mian Iftikharuddin to explore the possibility of organising a revolt in Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan cut off essential supplies to the state, such as petrol, sugar and salt. It also stopped trade in timber and other products, and suspended train services to Jammu. Iftikharuddin returned in mid-September to report that the National Conference held strong in the Kashmir Valley and ruled out the possibility of a revolt.

Meanwhile, Sardar Ibrahim had escaped to West Punjab, along with dozens of rebels, and established a base in Murree. From there, the rebels attempted to acquire arms and ammunition for the rebellion and smuggle them into Kashmir. Colonel Akbar Khan, one of a handful of high-ranking officers in the Pakistani Army, with a keen interest in Kashmir, arrived in Murree, and got enmeshed in these efforts. He arranged 4,000 rifles for the rebellion by diverting them from the Army stores. He also wrote out a draft plan titled Armed Revolt inside Kashmir and gave it to Mian Iftikharuddin to be passed on to the Pakistan's Prime Minister.

On 12 September, the Prime Minister held a meeting with Mian Iftikharuddin, Colonel Akbar Khan and another Punjab politician Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. Hayat Khan had a separate plan, involving the Muslim League National Guard and the militant Pashtun tribes from the Frontier regions. The Prime Minister approved both the plans, and despatched Khurshid Anwar, the head of the Muslim League National Guard, to mobilise the Frontier tribes.

The Maharaja was increasingly driven to the wall with the rebellion in the western districts and the Pakistani blockade. He managed to persuade Justice Mahajan to accept the post of Prime Minister (but not to arrive for another month, for procedural reasons). He sent word to the Indian leaders through Mahajan that he was willing to accede to India but needed more time to implement political reforms. However, it was India's position that it would not accept accession from the Maharaja unless it had the people's support. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru demanded that Sheikh Abdullah should be released from prison and involved in the state's government. Accession could only be contemplated afterwards. Following further negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September.

Nehru, foreseeing a number of disputes over princely states, formulated a policy that states "'wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be.'" The policy was communicated to Liaquat Ali Khan on 1 October at a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. Khan's eyes are said to have "sparkled" at the proposal. However, he made no response.

Operations in Poonch and Mirpur
Armed rebellion started in the Poonch district at the beginning of October 1947. The fighting elements consisted of "bands of deserters from the State Army, serving soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave, ex-servicemen, and other volunteers who had risen spontaneously." The first clash is said to have occurred at Thorar (near Rawalakot) on 3–4 October 1947. The rebels quickly gained control of almost the entire Poonch district. The State Forces garrison at the Poonch city came under heavy siege.

In the Kotli tehsil of the Mirpur district, border posts at Saligram and Owen Pattan on the Jhelum river were captured by rebels around 8 October. Sehnsa and Throchi were lost after some fighting. State Force records reveal that Muslim officers sent with reinforcements sided with the rebels and murdered the fellow state troops.

Radio communications between the fighting units were operated by the Pakistan Army. Even though the Indian Navy intercepted the communications, lacking intelligence in Jammu and Kashmir, it was unable to determine immediately where the fighting was taking place.

Accession of Kashmir
Following the rebellions in the Poonch and Mirpur area and the Pakistan-backed Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Maharaja asked for Indian military assistance. India set the condition that Kashmir must accede to India for it to receive assistance. The Maharaja complied, and the Government of India recognised the accession of the princely state to India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it. The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference volunteers aided the Indian Army in its campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders.

Pakistan refused to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India, claiming that it was obtained by "fraud and violence." Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah ordered his Army Chief General Douglas Gracey to move Pakistani troops to Kashmir at once. However, the Indian and Pakistani forces were still under a joint command, and Field Marshal Auchinleck prevailed upon him to withdraw the order. With its accession to India, Kashmir became legally Indian territory, and the British officers could not a play any role in an inter-Dominion war. The Pakistan Army made available arms, ammunition, and supplies to the rebel forces who were dubbed the "Azad Army". Pakistan Army officers "conveniently" on leave and the former officers of the Indian National Army were recruited to command the forces.

In May 1948, the Pakistan Army officially entered the conflict, in theory to defend the Pakistan borders, but it made plans to push towards Jammu and cut the lines of communications of the Indian forces in the Mehndar Valley. In Gilgit, the force of Gilgit Scouts under the command of a British officer Major William Brown mutinied and overthrew the governor Ghansara Singh. Brown prevailed on the forces to declare accession to Pakistan. They are also believed to have received assistance from the Chitral Scouts and the Bodyguard of the state of Chitral, one of the princely states of Pakistan, which had acceded to Pakistan on 6 October 1947.

Initial invasion
On 22 October the Pashtun tribal attack was launched in the Muzaffarabad sector. The state forces stationed in the border regions around Muzaffarabad and Domel were quickly defeated by tribal forces (Muslim state forces mutinied and joined them) and the way to the capital was open. Among the raiders, there were many active Pakistani Army soldiers disguised as tribals. They were also provided logistical help by the Pakistan Army. Rather than advancing toward Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the captured cities in the border region engaging in looting and other crimes against their inhabitants. In the Poonch valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.

Records indicate that the Pakistani tribals beheaded many Hindu and Sikh civilians in Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian operation in the Kashmir Valley
After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar under the command of Lt. Col. Dewan Ranjit Rai, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence perimeter and defeated the tribal forces on the outskirts of the city. Initial defense operations included the notable defense of Badgam holding both the capital and airfield overnight against extreme odds. The successful defence included an outflanking manoeuvre by Indian armoured cars during the Battle of Shalateng. The defeated tribal forces were pursued as far as Baramulla and Uri and these towns, too, were recaptured.

In the Poonch valley, tribal forces continued to besiege state forces.

In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the Gilgit Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby obtained control of this northern region of the state. The tribal forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose ruler, Muzaffar ul-Mulk the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan.

Attempted link-up at Poonch and fall of Mirpur
Indian forces ceased pursuit of tribal forces after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent a relief column southwards, in an attempt to relieve Poonch. Although the relief column eventually reached Poonch, the siege could not be lifted. A second relief column reached Kotli, and evacuated the garrisons of that town and others but were forced to abandon it being too weak to defend it. Meanwhile, Mirpur was captured by the tribal forces on 25 November 1947 with the help of Pakistan's PAVO Cavalry. This led to the 1947 Mirpur massacre where Hindu women were reportedly abducted by tribal forces and taken into Pakistan. They were sold in the brothels of Rawalpindi. Around 400 women jumped into wells in Mirpur committing suicide to escape from being abducted.

Fall of Jhanger and attacks on Naoshera and Uri
The tribal forces attacked and captured Jhanger. They then attacked Naoshera unsuccessfully, and made a series of unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the south a minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this stage of the war the front line began to stabilise as more Indian troops became available.

Operation Vijay: counterattack to Jhanger
The Indian forces launched a counterattack in the south recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the tribal forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north, Skardu was brought under siege by the Gilgit Scouts.

Indian spring offensive
The Indians held onto Jhanger against numerous counterattacks, who were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces. In the Kashmir Valley the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The Gilgit scouts made good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring Leh under siege, capturing Kargil and defeating a relief column heading for Skardu.

Operations Gulab and Eraze
The Indians continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and Gurais (Operation Eraze). They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Teetwal. In the Jammu region, the forces besieged in Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up with the outside world again. The Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the Chitral Scouts and Chitral Bodyguard under Mata ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the help of artillery were able to take Skardu. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh.

Operation Bison
During this time the front began to settle down. The siege of Poonch continued. An unsuccessful attack was launched by 77 Parachute Brigade (Brig Atal) to capture Zoji La pass. Operation Duck, the earlier epithet for this assault, was renamed as Operation Bison by Cariappa. M5 Stuart light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in dismantled conditions through Srinagar and winched across bridges while two field companies of the Madras Sappers converted the mule track across Zoji La into a jeep track. The surprise attack on 1 November by the brigade with armour supported by two regiments of 25-pounder gun-howitzers and a regiment of 3.7-inch mountain guns, forced the pass and pushed the tribal and Pakistani forces back to Matayan and later Dras. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing from Leh while their opponents eventually withdrew northwards toward Skardu. The Pakistani attacked the Skardu on 10 February 1948 which was repulsed by the Indian soldiers. Thereafter, the Skardu Garrison was subjected to continuous attacks by the Pakistan Army for the next three months and each time, their attack was repulsed by the Colonel Sher Jung Thapa and his men. Thapa held the Skardu with hardly 250 men for whole six long months without any reinforcement and replenishment. On 14 August, Thapa had to surrender Skardu to the Pakistani Army and raiders after a year long siege.

Operation Easy; Poonch link-up
The Indians now started to get the upper hand in all sectors. Poonch was finally relieved after a siege of over a year. The Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who had previously made good progress, were finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far as Kargil before being forced to halt due to supply problems. The Zoji La pass was forced by using tanks (which had not been thought possible at that altitude) and Dras was recaptured.

At 23.59 hrs on 1 January 1949, a United Nations-mediated ceasefire came into effect, bring the war to an end.

Aftermath

The terms of the ceasefire, laid out in a UN Commission resolution on 13 August 1948, were adopted by the commission on 5 January 1949.This required Pakistan to withdraw its forces, both regular and irregular, while allowing India to maintain minimal forces within the state to preserve law and order. Upon compliance with these conditions, a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the territory. Owing to disagreements over the demilitarisation steps, a plebiscite was never held and the cease-fire line essentially became permanent. Some sources may refer to 5 January as the beginning of the ceasefire.

Indian losses in the war totalled 1,104 killed and 3,154 wounded; Pakistani, about 6,000 killed and 14,000 wounded.

Numerous analysts state that the war ended in a stalemate, with neither side obtaining a clear victory. Others, however, state that India emerged victorious as it successfully gained the majority of the contested territory.

India gained control of about two-thirds of the Jammu and Kashmir princely state, including the Kashmir Valley, the Jammu province and Ladakh. Pakistan had control of one-third of the state: three western districts later named Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the northern areas including the Gilgit district, the Gilgit Agency and the Baltistan tehsil of the Ladakh district (later renamed Gilgit-Baltistan).

India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement in July 1949 and established a ceasefire line to be supervised by observers. After the termination of the UNCIP, the Security Council passed Resolution 91 (1951) and established a United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to observe and report violations of ceasefire.

The resentment over Pakistani defeat in the war resulted in a failed coup led by General Akbar Khan in 1951 against the government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Army officers thought the government's acceptance of UN mediation and ceasefire was weak and squandered an opportunity to capture the entirety of Kashmir.

After two further wars in 1965 and 1971, only minor changes in the ground situation had been effected. After the last war, the two countries reached the 1972 Simla Agreement, converting the cease-fire line into a Line of Control and disavowing the use of force across it. In 1984, India gained Siachen after launching a short military action.

Battle honours
After the war, a total of number of 11 battle honours and one theatre honour were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable amongst which are:

 * Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48 (theatre honour)
 * Gurais
 * Kargil
 * Naoshera
 * Punch
 * Rajouri
 * Srinagar
 * Teetwal
 * Zoji La

Gallantry awards
For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider:

 * India
 * Major Som Nath Sharma (Posthumous)
 * Lance Naik Karam Singh
 * Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane
 * Naik Jadu Nath Singh (Posthumous)
 * Company Havildar Major Piru Singh Shekhawat (Posthumous)

 * Pakistan
 * Captain Muhammad Sarwar
 * Naik Saif Ali Janjua

title: Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948


text:
Opening

Opening may refer to:

 * Al-Fatiha, "The Opening", the first chapter of the Qur'an
 * The Opening (album), live album by Mal Waldron
 * Backgammon opening
 * Chess opening
 * A title sequence or opening credits
 * , a term from contract bridge
 * , a term from contract bridge
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 * Hole
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 * Opening sentence
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title: Opening


text:
United States intervention in Chile

United States intervention in Chilean politics started during the War of Chilean Independence (1812–1826). The influence of United States in both the economic and the political arenas of Chile has since gradually increased over the last two centuries, and continues to be significant.

Chilean independence
The arrival of Joel Roberts Poinsett, in 1811, marked the beginning of U.S. involvement in Chilean politics. He had been sent by President James Madison in 1809 as a special agent to the South American Spanish colonies (a position he filled from 1810 to 1814) to investigate the prospects of the revolutionaries, in their struggle for independence from Spain.

War scare of 1891
During the 1891 Chilean Civil War, the U.S. backed President José Manuel Balmaceda, as a way to increase their influence in Chile, while Britain backed the successful Congressional forces.

Itata incident
The Itata incident concerned an attempted shipment of 5000 rifles in 1891 by the ship Itata of arms purchased in California from Remington. The US Navy with a fleet made up of a multi-national ships some from the Royal navy and Kriegsmarine. This Fleet went to the port of Iquique and 'convinced' the port authorities to hand over the weapons

Baltimore crisis
Washington sent a warship to Chile to protect American interests. The crew of the Baltimore took shore leave at Valparaiso. During the US sailors' shore leave on 16 October 1891, a mob of enraged Chileans angry about the Itata's capture, attacked them. Two American sailors were killed, 17 were wounded and 36 others were jailed. That Valparaiso riot prompted saber rattling from enraged US officials. A war between the U.S. and Chile was remotely possible. Chile's foreign minister escalated the tension but in Washington Secretary of State James G. Blaine cooled off the hotheads. The crisis ended when the Chilean government bowed, and while maintaining that the seamen were to blame for the riot paid an indemnity of $75,000 to the victims' families.

First half of the 20th century
United States involvement in Chilean affairs intensified in the early decades of the 20th century. After World War I, the United States replaced Britain as the leading superpower controlling most of Chile's resources, as most economic activity in the country lay in US hands. Such a change prevented Chile from profiting as a result of the war and gaining its financial independence. The dependence on the United States formally began in the early years of the 1920s as two major US companies Anaconda and Kennecott took control of the valuable resources. Up until the 1970s, "both industries controlled between 7% to 20% of the country's Gross Domestic Product".

The conclusion of World War II brought more of the same as Chile could not even exploit the "excess of copper they produced as almost all the copper was marketed through subsidiaries of United States copper firms established in Chile for whom the allied government fixed a ceiling price upon copper products during the course of the war."

As the working class demanded an improvement in their standard of living, higher wages and improved working conditions, the notion that a leftist government could be the solution for the people began to take form.

1950s and 1960s
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States put forward a variety of programs and strategies, ranging from funding political campaigns to funding propaganda, aimed at impeding the presidential aspirations of leftist candidate Salvador Allende, who served as President of the Senate (1966–1969) before running a final time to become the 28th President of Chile, which lasted until his death in 1973. Throughout these two decades, left-wing parties in Chile failed to gain power, in part due to the fact that the United States was, verifiably, impeding the left wing parties through various means. In the 1958 presidential election, Jorge Alessandri – a nominal independent with support from the Liberal and Conservative parties – defeated Allende by nearly 33,500 votes to claim the presidency. His laissez-faire policies, endorsed by the United States, were regarded as the solution to the country's inflation problems. Under recommendations from the United States, Alessandri steadily reduced tariffs starting in 1959, a policy that caused the Chilean market to be overwhelmed by American product. These governmental policies angered the working class of Chile, who demanded higher wages, and the repercussions of this massive discontent were felt in the 1961 congressional elections. The president suffered terrible blows, sending the message that laissez-faire policies were not desired. As the "grand total of $130 million from the U.S. banking Industry, the U.S. Treasury Department, the IMF and the ICA" accepted by Alessandri illustrates, laissez-faire policies may have induced the opposite of the intended effect – making Chile more dependent on the United States, not less.

Presidential candidate Salvador Allende was a top contender in the 1964 election. The US, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), covertly spent three million dollars campaigning against him, before and after the election, mostly through radio and print advertising. The Americans viewed electing Christian Democratic contender Eduardo Frei Montalva as vital, fearing that Alessandri's failures would lead the people to support Allende. Allende was feared by the Americans because of his warm relations with Cuba and his open criticism of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Furthermore, clandestine aid to Frei was put forward through John F. Kennedy's Latin American Alliance for Progress, which promised "$20 billion in public and private assistance in the country for the next decade."

The 1970 election
According to a U.S. Senate select committee, publishing a Church Commission Report in 1975 to describe international abuses committed by the CIA, NSA, and FBI, covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was "extensive and continuous". The CIA spent $8 million in the three years between 1970 and the military coup of September 1973, with over $3 million allocated toward Chilean intervention in 1972 alone. Covert American activity was present in almost every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973, but its tangible effect on electoral outcomes is not altogether clear. Chile, more than any of its South American neighbors, had a long-standing democratic tradition dating back to the early 1930s, and it has been difficult to gauge how successful CIA tactics were in swaying voters.

A declassified file from August 19, 1970, reveals the minutes of high-level officials in the CIA known as the "Special Review Group." It was chaired by Henry Kissinger and was sanctioned by then-president Nixon. This was one of several documents released as part of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series dedicated toward US-Chilean interventionalism – collectively known as Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973 – that revealed a detailed account of correspondences between each of these officials, telegrams from the Chilean embassy, memorandums, and "Special Reports" concerning the state of affairs in Chile. For instance, a National Intelligence Estimate from January 28, 1969, stated the problems and conclusions that senior officials in Washington identified over the proliferating crisis in Chile. The document indicates that the 1970 election stood above all other issues as of critical importance, with Chile's political and economic stability depending heavily on that particular election's outcome; the document notes the possibility of out of control economic stagnation and inflation in Chile as concerns. The conclusions of the document suggest that factionalism needed to be addressed, and expounded on United States interests in copper extraction companies operating in Chile. The election represented the potential for important economic relations to collapse or continue. The document further focuses on potential ramifications if the election outcome were to not align with US interests.

At a 8 September 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee, the chairman of the committee asked for an analysis of where the US/CIA stood in terms of taking action to prevent Allende from becoming President of Chile. William Broe, a high-ranking CIA officer, said Eduardo Frei Montalva, the 29th President of Chile, was essential to the situation in Chile, regardless of the type of involvement — military or congressional. The 40 Committee asked that the CIA collect information and create more intelligence reports to see what could be further done in Chile. The committee decided it was unlikely they were going to be able to influence the 24 Oct, congressional election to go against Allende. Helms was also concerned about Allende supporters in the Chilean military, as it seemed they would support Allende in the event of a coup. As a result of all this information, the Committee decided they wanted a full analysis of two things: (1.) a cost versus benefit analysis of organizing a military (Chilean) coup; (2.) a cost versus benefit analysis of organizing future oppositions to Allende to topple his influence. This presented two options for Henry Kissinger: political maneuvering or outright force.

Four days after the 8 September 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee, a cable between Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger discussed the lack of morale that the US embassy had in Chile according to the American Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry. Kissinger stated in response that he would call another 40 Committee Meeting for the following Monday. Kissinger further noted: "We will not let Chile go down the drain."

Allende presidency
Salvador Allende ran again in the 1970 presidential election, winning a narrow victory plurality vote (near 37%). U.S. president Richard Nixon feared that Chile could become "another Cuba" and cut off most foreign aid to Chile. The U.S. government believed that Allende would become closer to socialist countries such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. They feared that Allende would push Chile into socialism, resulting in the loss of all the U.S. investments made in Chile.

On 15 September 1970, before Allende took office, Richard Nixon gave the order to overthrow him. According to a declassified document from the NSA, the handwritten notes from Richard Helms (CIA director at the time) state: "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!; worth spending; not concerned; no involvement of embassy; $10,000,000 available, more if necessary; full-time job—best men we have; game plan; make the economy scream; 48 hours for plan of action." These notes came from a meeting Helms had with President Nixon, indicating the administration's willingness to stage a coup in Chile and the extent to which Nixon was willing to go to do so. On 5 November 1970, Henry Kissinger advised President Nixon against peaceful coexistence with the Allende administration and instead advocated one of two positions. "Track I" was a State Department initiative designed to thwart Allende by subverting Chilean elected officials within the bounds of the Chilean constitution, excluding CIA involvement. Track I expanded to encompass some policies whose ultimate goal was to create the conditions that would encourage a coup. "Track II" was a CIA operation overseen by Henry Kissinger and Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's director of covert operations. Track II excluded the State Department and Department of Defense. The goal of Track II was to find and support Chilean military officers who would support a coup.

Immediately after the Allende government came into office, Nixon's administration sought to place pressure on it to limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests, such as the total nationalization of several U.S. corporations operating in Chile. Nixon directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile. The U.S. supported Allende's opponents in Chile during his presidency, intending to encourage either Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the election of 1976. The Nixon administration also covertly funded independent and non-state media and labor unions.

Track I
Track I was a U.S. State Department plan designed to persuade the Chilean Congress, through outgoing Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva, to confirm conservative runner-up Jorge Alessandri as president. Alessandri would resign shortly after, rendering Frei eligible to run against Allende in new elections. As part of the Track I strategy to block Allende from assuming office after the election, the CIA needed to influence a Congressional run-off vote required by the Constitution since Allende did not win the absolute majority. Their tactics were political warfare, economic pressure, propaganda, and diplomatic hardball as they aimed to buy enough Chilean senatorial votes to block Allende's inauguration. Should that plan not succeed, U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry would attempt to persuade President Frei to create a constitutional coup. Their last resort was to have the U.S. "condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, forcing Allende to adopt the harsh features of a police state," Korry told Kissinger. To aid in this mission, the CIA station chief in Brazil, David Atlee Phillips, was brought in along with twenty-three foreign reporters who worked to stir up international opinion against Allende, the centerpiece of this part of the operation being the strong anti-Allende story on the front cover of Time magazine.

Track II
The CIA had also drawn up a second plan, Track II, in which the agency would find and support military officers willing to participate in a coup. They could then call new elections in which Allende could be defeated.

In September 1970, Nixon authorized the expenditure of $10 million to stop Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. As part of the Track II initiative, the CIA used false flag operatives with fake passports to approach Chilean military officers and encourage them to carry out a coup. A first step to overthrowing Allende required removing General René Schneider, the chief commander of the army. As a constitutionalist, Schneider would oppose a coup d'état. On 18 October 1970, the CIA station in Santiago addressed the logistics of secret weapons and ammunitions for the use in a plot to kidnap Schneider. The CIA provided "$50,000 in cash, three submachine guns, and a satchel of tear gas, all approved at headquarters ..." The submachine guns were delivered by diplomatic pouch.

A group was formed, led by the retired General Roberto Viaux. Considered unstable by the U.S., Viaux had been discouraged from attempting a coup alone. The CIA encouraged him to join forces with an active duty general, Camilo Valenzuela, who had also been approached by CIA operatives. They were joined by Admiral Hugo Tirado, who had been forced into retirement after the Tacnazo insurrection. On 22 October, Viaux went ahead with a plan to kidnap Schneider, but Schneider drew a handgun to protect himself from his attackers, who then shot him in four vital areas. He died in Santiago's military hospital three days later. The attempted kidnapping and Schneider's subsequent death shocked the public and increased support for the Chilean Constitution, the exact opposite of the expected outcome of the planned coup. The Chilean people rallied around their government which, in turn, overwhelmingly ratified Allende on 3 November 1970.

On 25 November 1970, Henry Kissinger issued a memorandum that detailed the Covert Action Program that the U.S. would undertake in Chile. In the memorandum, Kissinger stated that there were five principles of the program. The U.S. would continue to maintain contacts in the Chilean military, take steps to divide Allende's supporters, cooperate with the media to run anti-Allende propaganda campaigns, support non-communist political parties in Chile, and publish materials stating that Allende did not adhere to the democratic process and also wanted to form connections with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

A CIA and White House cover-up obscured American involvement, despite Congressional investigative efforts. The Church Committee, which investigated U.S. involvement in Chile during this period, determined that the weapons used in the kidnapping attempt "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators."

After Schneider's death, the CIA recovered the submachine guns and money it had provided. Both Valenzuela and Viaux were arrested and convicted of conspiracy after Schneider's assassination. One of the coup plotters who escaped arrest requested assistance from the CIA and was paid $35,000, so "The CIA did, in fact, pay 'hush' money to those directly responsible for the Schneider assassination—and then covered up that secret payment for thirty years."

In 1970, the U.S. manufacturing company ITT Corporation owned 70 percent of Chitelco, the Chilean Telephone Company, and funded El Mercurio, a Chilean right-wing newspaper. The CIA used ITT as a conduit to financially aid opponents of Allende's government. On 28 September 1973, ITT's headquarters in New York City were bombed by the Weather Underground for the alleged involvement of the company in the overthrow of Allende.

On 10 September 2001, a suit was filed by Schneider's family accusing former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging an assassination because Schneider would have opposed a military coup. CIA documents indicate that while the agency had sought to kidnap him, his death was never intended. Kissinger said he had declared the coup "hopeless" and had "turned it off". However, the CIA claimed that no such "stand-down" order was ever received.

1973 coup
On 11 September 1973, Augusto Pinochet rose to power, overthrowing the democratically elected president Salvador Allende. A subsequent September 2000 report from the CIA, using declassified documents related to the military coup, found that the CIA "probably appeared to condone" the 1973 coup, but that there was "no evidence" that the US actually participated in it. This view has been challenged by some authors, who have stated that the covert support of the United States was crucial to the preparation for the coup, the coup itself, and the consolidation of the regime afterwards. It seemed to the CIA that, even if this coup did not come together, Allende would still have a very difficult political future. This point of view has been supported by non-scholarly commentary.

According to the CIA document "CIA Activities in Chile", dated 18 September 2000, the local CIA station suggested during late summer 1973 that the US commit itself to support a military coup. In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the station that "there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup."

On the issue of CIA involvement in the 1973 coup, the CIA document is equally explicit:

"On 10 September 1973 – the day before the coup that ended the Allende government – a Chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup was being planned and asked for US government assistance. He was told that the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly an internal Chilean matter. The Station Officer also told him his request would be forwarded to Washington. CIA learned of the exact date of the coup shortly before it took place. During the attack on the Presidential Palace and its immediate aftermath, the Station's activities were limited to providing intelligence and situation reports."

The report of the Church Committee, published in 1975, stated that during the period leading up to the coup, the CIA received information about potential coup plots.

"The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader."

"Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973."

The Church report also considered the allegation that the US government involved itself in the 1973 coup:

"Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The Committee has found no evidence that it was.""There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid. Rather the United States – by its previous actions during Track II, its existing general posture of opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts with the Chilean military – probably gave the impression that it would not look with disfavor on a military coup. And U.S. officials in the years before 1973 may not always have succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it."Ultimately, the CIA may not have a direct hand in the military coup, as some declassified documents do not establish a direct hand of the CIA role in the military coup, the information gleaned from some of these documents is enough to establish a close connection between the CIA and various fashions of the coup plotting, and emphasis its indirect hand to at least end the tenured of Allende. One such document dated September 7, 1973, shared an in-depth knowledge the CIA had on the road map to the immediate day of the coup. In the document, a CIA officer informed the White House that a coup was imminent and was going to take effect on September 8, 1973. The CIA officer whose name was kept hidden in the document, in updating the White House on the situation and current development in Chile, reported some level of a consensus among “three services” including the military, and opposing parties to the Allende government, to force him out of power through Self-Resignation as pressure asserted on him from the “rightist National Party”. In the event that Allende resisted such an attempt, which he eventually did, the Militantly then “finalized” its “decision” to force him out of office through a coup. In another breadth, the CIA showcased its close connection with the coup plotters, through its knowledge about a change in the military plan in which “some armed forces units wanted to” carried out “as early as the 8th ” “but were dissuaded by higher-ranking officers” who said “could not possibly be put together until 10 September”, as “the need for a coordinated effort”  was lacking from both ranks.

The CIA in their report, was confident that Allende was definitely going to be ousted from office, and that a “coup appears to have the support of all the service commanders”, which neither Allende nor his supporters could resist. And that Allende was aware that any attempt “to oppose the military could result in heavy casualties.” The CIA informed the White House about the National Police of Chile's knowledge about an imminent coup, who were in “contact with plotters and have agreed not to resist the military if a coup is attempted.” This level of knowledge the CIA shared with the White House not only demonstrated an effective way the agency deployed in picking intelligence, but also its closed network or otherwise indirect involvement in the coup.

On one breadth, the CIA entrusted in the non-friendly political atmosphere in Chile at the time which opposed Allende's government would eventually force him out of office, “should no coup develop.” The CIA reported that the “rightist National Party” was a step further “demanding Allende’s resignation” on the backdrop of his “incompetence.” This incompetence and non-friendly opposed political atmosphere were a direct economic orchestration by the CIA that made Chile ungovernable, a situation the National Parties aimed to use to their advantage.

Transcripts of a phone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon reveal that they did not have a hand in the final coup. They do take credit for creating the conditions that led to the coup. Kissinger says that "they created the conditions as great as possible." Nixon and Kissinger also discussed how they would play this event with the media and lamented the fact that, if this were the era of Eisenhower, then they would be seen as heroes. There was a PDB that had a section on Chile dated 11 September 1973 that is still completely censored, as was an entire page on Chile provided to Nixon on 8 September 1973. Additionally, a cable from CIA operative Jack Devine dated 10 September 1973, confirmed to top U.S. officials that the coup would take place the following day. In collaboration with the coup, a Defense Intelligence Agency summary, also dated on 8 September and classified "Top Secret Umbra", provided detailed information on an agreement among the Chilean Army, Navy, and Air Force to move against Allende on 10 September. As the CIA denies its involvement in the coup, another cable sent from the agency on 8 September classified "Secret" had information on the Chilean Navy time and date to overthrow the government of President Allende. The cable also identified key Chilean officials who were supporting the coup. The cables from around this time with another one stating that the coup was postponed in order to improve tactical coordination and would attempt the coup on 11 September.

Following the coup on 12 September, "The President's Daily Brief," written as a top secret briefing paper by the CIA for Nixon, reported on the events of the coup as that day's first principal development. In this briefing, there is no indication that the U.S. played any significant role in the coup. The CIA only reported the known facts of the situation, such as the state of the Chilean government and the unconfirmed reports of Allende committing suicide. In the last paragraph of the section on Chile, the CIA reported that "The only strong reaction from among Latin American governments has come from Cuba."

A CIA intelligence report 25 October 1973, concerning General Arellano Stark, noted that Arellano had ordered the deaths of 21 political prisoners. Also, the disappearances of 14 other prisoners were also believed to be on the order of Arellano. General Arellano was considered Pinochet's right-hand man after the coup.

Historian Peter Winn has argued that the role of the CIA was crucial to the consolidation of power that followed the coup; the CIA helped fabricate a conspiracy against the Allende government, which Pinochet was then portrayed as preventing. He states that the coup itself was possible only through a three-year covert operation mounted by the United States. He also points out that the US imposed an "invisible blockade" that was designed to disrupt the economy under Allende, and contributed to the destabilization of the regime. Peter Kornbluh, director of the National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project, argues in his book The Pinochet File that the US was extensively involved and actively "fomented" the 1973 coup. Authors Tim Weiner, in his book, Legacy of Ashes, and Christopher Hitchens, in his book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger similarly argue the case that US covert actions actively destabilized Allende's government and set the stage for the 1973 coup. Joaquin Fermandois criticized Kornbluh's "black and white" and "North American centered conception of world affairs", stating that a variety of internal and external factors also played a role and that a careful reading of the documentary record reveals the CIA was largely "impotent".

Conservative scholar Mark Falcoff alleged that Cuba and the Soviet Union supplied several hundred thousand dollars to the socialist and Marxist factions in the government. Additionally, documents transcribed and provided by KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin detail the relationship between Allende and the KGB starting in 1953. Allende's KGB file documents "systematic contact" starting in 1961. KGB support for Allende's 1970 campaign included $400,000 in initial financing, with additional funding including a "personal subsidy" of $50,000 to Allende, as well as bribing a left wing Senator $18,000 to persuade him not to stand as a presidential candidate and to remain within the Unidad Popular coalition. Peter Winn noted that "the Chilean revolution always kept to its peaceful road, despite counterrevolutionary plots and violence." Moreover, this strong emphasis on nonviolence was precisely to avoid revolutionary terror which had blemished the reputations of the French, Russian and Cuban revolutions.

Allende later committed suicide, with an article in The Atlantic stating "he committed suicide under mysterious circumstances as troops surrounded his place, ushering in more than 15 years of military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet". Former CIA agent Jack Devine, who was active in the CIA agency during the time of the coup, told The Atlantic that overthrowing Allende's government was not the CIA's decision, but rather the decision of the White House, particularly President Nixon. The coup and U.S. involvement remain an important episode, as a New York Times report in October 2017 indicates.

Pinochet regime
The U.S. provided material support to the military regime after the coup, although criticizing it in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, titled "CIA Activities in Chile", revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses.

CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras (paid asset from 1975 to 1977 according to the CIA in 2000). Some have alleged that the CIA's one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile. The CIA's official documents state that at one time, some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras' poor human rights track record, but a single payment was made due to a miscommunication. In the description of the CIA's activities in Chile, it is acknowledged that one of their high-level contacts was more predisposed to committing abuse: "although the CIA had information indicating that a high-level contact was a hard-liner and therefore more likely to commit abuses, contact with him was allowed to continue in absence of concrete information about human rights abuses."

A report dated 24 May 1977 also describes the newfound human rights abuses that may have been occurring in Chile: "reports of gross violation of human rights in Chile, which had nearly ceased earlier this year, are again on the rise...the Pinochet government is reverting to the practices that jeopardized its international standing since the 1973 coup." The document also details how these human rights violations could have caused a worsening of Chile's status on the international stage. It seems that the United States was unable to plan around these violations, as is referred to with the document's mention of high-ranking officials taking parts in the abuses also.

On 6 March 2001, the New York Times reported the existence of a recently declassified State Department document revealing that the United States facilitated communications for Operation Condor. The document, a 1978 cable from Robert E. White, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, was discovered by Professor J. Patrice McSherry of Long Island University, who had published several articles on Operation Condor. She called the cable "another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor."

In the cable, Ambassador White relates a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay's armed forces, who told him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor ''"keep in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America". '' This installation is "employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries." White, whose message was sent to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was concerned that the U.S. connection to Condor might be revealed during the then ongoing investigation into the deaths of the 44 year old former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt. Her husband Michael Moffit was in the car during the bombing, but was the only survivor. "It would seem advisable," he suggests, "to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in U.S. interest."

The document was found among 16,000 State, CIA, White House, Defense, and Justice Department records released in November 2000 on the nearly 17-year long Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and Washington's role in the violent coup that brought his military regime to power. The release was the fourth and final batch of records released under the Clinton Administration's special Chile Declassification Project.

During the Pinochet regime, four American citizens were killed: Charles Horman, Frank Teruggi, Boris Weisfeiler, and Ronni Karpen Moffit. Later on, in late August 1976, the United States Government stated in a State Department Secret Memorandum, that the United States Government did play an indirect role in the death of one of the four American citizens, Charles Horman. The Secret Memorandum states:

"Based on what we have, we are persuaded that: The GOC sought Horman and felt threatened enough to order his immediate execution. The GOC might have believed this American could be killed without negative

from the USG. There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest: U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman's death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia."- Department of State, Secret Memorandum, "Charles Horman Case," 25 August 1976 (uncensored version)

On 30 June 2014, a Chilean court ruled that the United States played a key role in the murders of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi. According to Judge Jorge Zepeda, U.S. Navy Capt. Ray E. Davis, who commanded the U.S. Military Mission in Chile, gave information to the Chilean government about Horman and Teruggi that resulted in their arrest and execution in the days following the coup. The Chilean Supreme Court sought to have Davis extradited from Florida to stand trial, but he was secretly living in Santiago and died in a nursing home in 2013.

In a document declassified under the Obama administration's Chilean declassification project, documents were released stating that the CIA suspected Pinochet himself of personally giving the order for the assassination of Ronni Moffitt and Orlando Letelier. Although they were unable to gather enough intelligence that proved that he gave the order, they received shocking evidence from the Chilean Major, Armando Fernandez, who they convinced to come to the capital to provide them information, that Pinochet was directly involved in covering up the incident. Another declassified copy of a CIA special intelligence assessment on Pinochet's role in the Letelier and Moffitt assassinations were presented to the Chilean President Bachelet in 2016. That document asserts the CIA believed that Pinochet, "personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder." Even with the evidence that they had, the Secretary of State George Shultz did not feel that there was enough to indict Pinochet but instead used the information to try to convince Reagan to change their policy with Chile. Pinochet stepped down from power in 1990 and died on 10 December 2006, without facing trial.

Politics in the 21st century
U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered the release of numerous documents relating to U.S. policy and actions toward Chile. The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were opened to the public by the U.S. State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup.

Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA concluded in a report issued in 2000 that: "The CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende but did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency." However, the 2000 report also stated that: "The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier in 1970 in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the Presidency. Nonetheless, the U.S. Administration's long-standing hostility to Allende and its past encouragement of a military coup against him were well known among Chilean coup plotters who eventually took activities of their own to oust him."

A White House press release in November 2000 acknowledged that "actions approved by the U.S. government during this period aggravated political polarization and affected Chile's long tradition of democratic elections"

In a 2003 town hall with students, high school student James Doubek asked Secretary of State Colin Powell about the United States support for the coup, to which Powell replied that "it is not a part of American history that we're proud of".

During U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Chile in 2011, the center-left coalition of Chilean political parties asked Obama to apologize for past U.S. support of Pinochet. An interview with the Associated Press, Mr Piñera said his government was "categorically committed to contribute to the search for truth so that justice is done in all of these human rights cases". Obama did not respond to requests for an apology but said during a press conference that U.S. relations with Latin America had at times been "extremely rocky," and that people needed to learn from and understand history, but not be trapped by it.

In February 2018, in an effort to create a "lasting counterpoint", a statue honoring the slain Chilean diplomat and think tank policy analyst Orlando Letelier was erected on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C., near the location where Letelier was killed in a 1976 car bombing on the orders of Pinochet. The attack also claimed the life of Ronnie Karpen Moffitt, Letelier's 25-year-old American co-worker. Michael Moffitt, husband of Ronnie Moffitt and also in the vehicle, survived the attack. The Chilean-orchestrated assassination had brought state-sponsored terrorism by an American-backed ally to the cradle of American dominion. Three of Letelier's sons and a granddaughter whom Letelier had never been afforded the opportunity to meet attended the unveiling. The unveiling of Letelier's commemorative statue came less than two years after the Obama administration had released a "long classified CIA analysis...[that] cited 'convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder.'" Letelier had served as Chile's ambassador to the United States under Chile's democratically elected Allende government. After Pinochet's 1973 coup, Letelier became a political prisoner and sought political asylum in the United States, where he eventually came to spearhead the economic policy mission of a D.C.-based think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies, as well as organize international condemnation of Pinochet's regime. The Institute for Policy Studies has long incorporated the advancement of human rights into the core of its mission.

title: United States intervention in Chile


text:
Talk:Orthocentric system

Proof of a common nine point circle
If four points form an orthocentric system, then each of the four points is the orthocenter of the other three. These four possible triangles will all have the same nine point circle. Can you provide a simple way to prove this? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.152.49.127 (talk) 11:46, 5 March 2004 (UTC)
 * sure. Fix 3 points and draw the triangle. The nine point circle will pass through the height feet (they're three out of the 9 points). Now, choose any other three, the lines are the same, so the height feet for the new triangle will be the same, thus the new ninepoint will pass throught the same 3 points (the height feet) and will be therefore the same. -- ( drini's page   ☎  ) 22:34, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

title: Talk:Orthocentric system


text: User talk:216.56.3.210

title: User talk:216.56.3.210