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Basel German

Basel German or Baseldytsch (Standard German: Baseldeutsch) is the dialect of the city of Basel, Switzerland. The dialect of Basel forms a Low Alemannic linguistic exclave in the High Alemannic region.

Aspirated plosives
Basel German is characterised by aspirates which are absent or at least less common in other dialects. Compare Basel German Khind (usually spelled Kind), pronounced more or less as Standard German Kind, with Chind with initial, used in all other Swiss German dialects, with the exception of the dialect of Chur. Thus, Basel German did not complete the second Germanic sound shift (High German consonant shift). Nowadays, many speakers pronounce the (or [χ], to be more exact), however. There are nevertheless still words that are never pronounced with, for example kenne (Standard German kennen, 'to know') or Keenig/König (Standard German König). Typically, words from Standard German or Latin are pronounced with aspirated, too, which is not or only to a lesser extent done in other dialects.

Examples: phee or pee (name of letter), bhalte or phalte ('to keep'), Phaargg or Pargg ('park'); Thee or Tee ('tea' and name of letter), tholl or toll ('great, swell'); ka(a)/khaa, gghaa (name of letter; 'had'), Kaschte/Khaschte ('cupboard'), gheie or kheje ('to fall, throw').

Affricates
Like other dialects and forms of the standard, Basel German has as well as.

Examples: Pfanne ('pan'), Zaan ('tooth'), dütsch ('German'), Tschooli ('stupid person', traditional word), Tschoope "jacket" (a traditional word), tschegge ('to understand', from English to check).

Pronunciation of phoneme
A French-style pronunciation of as  is also used in Basel German, although many younger speakers—especially those with foreign parents—also use a tapped  which is more common in other Swiss German dialects. Traditionally, is voiceless, and it may sometimes be described as a lenis. The pronunciation per se seems to derive from French (originally Parisian), and was probably re-interpreted as a lenis according to Basel German phonology. Not surprisingly, French influence was for a long time dominant in Basel, with well-to-do families speaking French even at home. At least in clusters, the distinction between and  is neutralised, as is the distinction between lenis and fortis consonants in clusters.

Lenition of consonants
Basel German also has more lenis sounds in word-initial position—for example, Dag ('day'). This lenition is now often absent due to influence from other dialects, for example, the name of Santa Claus, Santiglaus, is now often pronounced with or, as is the word Graft (Standard German Kraft), which traditionally has a lenis sound, now also  and.

Lenis plosives
Lenis plosives are however all voiceless; whereas fortis plosives are long or geminated. They are (like other lenis or short consonants) always preceded by long vowels, with the possible exception of unstressed vowels. According to Pilch, vowel length is not distinctive; however, vowel length is not always predictable: 'to guess' has both a long vowel and a long/geminated consonant.

Examples: Dag ('day'), umme  ('around'), ane  ('there'), loose or lohse  ('listen'), Gaas  ('gas'). Phonemically speaking, may also be (more traditionally) transcribed, or as unvoiced.

Fortis consonants
Fortis or long consonants in general are more stable than in other dialects—'to swim' is always schwimme, whereas it is pronounced with only a short in other dialects. This is probably because in stressed words, short vowels only appear before double or geminated/long consonants. Hence, a word like is not possible in Basel German. As in other dialects, the difference between fortis and lenis is in length. Pilch (180) however interprets as alveolar, not long. Fortis consonants may also be transcribed, since lenis are often transcribed as. However, voicing is always absent.

Examples: schwimme ('to swim'), phagge ('to pack'), drugge ('to squeeze'), roott ('to guess' — note the long followed by fortis )

Unrounding of vowels
Unrounding was also typical, but now it has been abandoned by many speakers. Lengthening of vowels is also found, linking it more closely to Standard German than all other Swiss German dialects.

Examples: griezi ('good day'; grüezi in other dialects, still more common), Hell ('hell', now rounded form more common), greescht ('biggest, greatest'; now grööscht more common).

Lengthening and shortening of vowels
Lengthening always occurs before lenis (short) consonants, for example in words like Daag ('day'), loose ('listen'), miir ('we'). Shortening, on the other hand, always occurs before long or fortis consonants, for example in Baseldytsch, the name of the dialect: whereas other dialects have long in Baseldütsch or any other word with -dütsch ('German') in it, Basel German always has short  or. and (as well as ), however, are usually not shortened, probably because of the shift from earlier  to. Another reason may be the fact that those are the only vowels that exist as such only as long vowels, i.e. whereas can be shortened to, it is never possible to shorten  to  because * as such does not exist in Basel German. Some speakers, however, use short open vowels in a number of words, e.g. instead of  ('hook'). Those speakers who use this pronunciation lack one minimal pair, since also translates as 'crouch'. However, this shortening of    is not general. Note however that exists mainly in words of foreign origin such as.

Velarisation of MHG
Middle High German was velarised and appears as. For example, Strooss 'street'.

Vowels before
Typically (but not exclusively) open vowels occur before ; for example, Oor ('ear') has the allophone, not. Both and  only occur before  in native words.

Additionally, vowels before are always long, with the exception of loan words such as  'sorry',  'curry' as well as unstressed vowels.

Examples: Oor 'ear', Eer  'honour'.

Pronunciation of
The vowels and  traditionally are front, yet distinct from  and. Nowadays, a back pronunciation and  is more common. Examples: Sagg ('bag'), Baasel ('Basel').

Diphthongs
Modern pronunciation has, , [ɛj], , , ,  and ; traditional pronunciation lacks  which is partly , partly. In modern pronunciation, , , are ,  , , whereas traditional pronunciation has ,  etc. Suter (1992: 11) posits only one diphthong , pronounced. In exclamations and few other words, also exist.

Examples: eläi ('alone'), draaie ('to turn'), drei ('three'), baue ('to build'), blaau ('blue'), vier ('four'), zue ('shut'), nöi ('new'); nei ('traditional').

Sociolinguistics
Unlike other Alemannic dialects, Basel German features a rather strong dichotomy between the traditional form—Baseldytsch, used especially for the Carnival of Basel (Basler Fasnacht)—and normal spoken language. Some speakers prefer to use the more traditional variety in written form. The traditional variety is normally associated with the upper classes and with Fasnacht. Like other Swiss German dialects, Basel German has (at least in Basel) more prestige than Standard German, and it is now even used in churches.

Spelling
There is a lot of confusion especially when it comes to the use of the grapheme, which is often used for rounded sounds, i.e. or , whereas it is exclusively used for  traditionally. Typically, lenis stops are spelled, , , fortis stops are spelled , , sometimes (öpper, öbber, ebber 'someone'); , , sometimes  (Middi 'middle'); , rarely and mainly in loan-words , , etc. This use of  for the fortis, unaspirated consonant is used also in other varieties of Swiss German, but sometimes abandoned in favour of spellings more closely resembling Standard German spellings. Examples: drugge ('to push'), Läggerli (typical sweet cookie; but also Läckerli), Sagg ('bag'; but sometimes also Sack), Gugge ('bag', traditional word). The fortis is always spelled like lenis, namely $⟨ch⟩$. The same is true for.

Obviously, especially the typical use of and  leads to confusion, even among native speakers, since the dialect is not taught in schools. Aspirates are normally spelled as in Standard German, namely with, ,. However, words where the aspirates derive from a lenis consonant plus are usually written as lenis plus $⟨h⟩$, e.g., bhalte 'to keep', gheie 'to fall'.

Terminology
Baseldytsch reflects traditional pronunciation with, Baseldütsch reflects modern pronunciation with , whereas Baseldeutsch is the Standard German form. Baslerdüütsch may be used in other dialects.

title: Basel German


text:
Kuri

Kuri may refer to:

People

 * Aren Kuri (born 1991), a Japanese baseball player
 * Anuar Kuri, a Mexican drag queen and singer
 * Daniel Ludlow Kuri (born 1961), a Mexican politician
 * Emile Kuri (1907–2000), Mexican-American film set decorator
 * Ippei Kuri (1940–2023), a Japanese manga artist and businessman
 * Jean Succar Kuri (born 1944), convicted Mexican businessman
 * John A. Kuri, an American author and writer
 * Yōji Kuri (born 1928), a Japanese cartoonist and filmmaker
 * Kuri Kikuoka (Takagi Michinokuo, 1909–1970), pen-name of a Japanese author of poetry and novels
 * Kuri Prathap, an Indian film actor

Iran

 * Kuri, Bushehr
 * Kuri, Dashti, Bushehr Province
 * Kuri, Fars
 * Kuri, Kermanshah
 * Kuri, Khuzestan
 * Kuri Rural District, Bushehr Province

Other countries

 * Kuri, Estonia
 * Koru, Turkey (formerly known as Kuri)
 * Kuri, India
 * Kuri, Bhopalgarh, India
 * Kuri, Varanasi, India
 * Kuri railway station, Kollam district, Kerala, India
 * Kuri, ICT, Pakistan
 * Kuri Bay, Western Australia

Other uses

 * Kurī, the Māori name for the Polynesian dog
 * Kuri cattle, a breed of cattle
 * Kuri (kitchen), the kitchen of a Zen monastery
 * Kuri (栗), the Japanese Chestnut
 * Kuri language (disambiguation)
 * Red Kuri, a cultivar of winter squash.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Kuri


text:
Newfoundland Commission of Government

The Commission of Government was a non-elected body that governed the Dominion of Newfoundland from 1934 to 1949. Established following the collapse of Newfoundland's economy during the Great Depression, it was dissolved when the dominion became the tenth province of Canada on March 31, 1949. It was composed of civil servants who were directly subordinate to the British Government in London.

Background
Newfoundland's economic difficulties were exacerbated by debt incurred during the First World War and the collapse of fish prices during the Depression. In 1933, following a prolonged period of economic crisis and severe budgetary deficit, and civil unrest culminating in a riot which brought down the previous government, the government of Prime Minister Frederick C. Alderdice asked the British and Canadian governments to establish a royal commission (the Newfoundland Royal Commission) to investigate the dominion's continuing crisis and to suggest a solution to its problems.

The commission (commonly known as the "Amulree Commission") was chaired by Lord Amulree, appointed by the British government, and also included Charles Alexander Magrath, appointed by the Canadian government, and Sir William Ewen Stavert, who represented the Newfoundland government.

The commission recommended the temporary suspension of responsible government in Newfoundland, and replacing it with a Commission of Government made up of the British-appointed Governor and six commissioners appointed by the Crown made up of three British officials and three Newfoundland-born appointees.

Alderdice was in favour of this recommendation and accordingly put it to the House of Assembly, which duly approved the proposals and thus voted itself out of existence.

Governance by the Commission
The Commission of Government was sworn in on 16 February 1934, with Alderdice as vice-chairman, and immediately set about reforming the administration of the country in hopes of balancing the government's budget. With the help of grants in aid from the United Kingdom, the Commission attempted to encourage agriculture and reorganize the fishing industry. While it did much to expand government health services to rural areas, for example, it could not solve the basic economic problems of a small export-oriented country during a time of worldwide economic stagnation.

American and Canadian military spending in Newfoundland during the 1940s caused an economic boom and allowed the Commission of Government to consider how to reintroduce a system of democratic government. However, the British government believed that wartime prosperity would be short-lived. So it established the Newfoundland National Convention in 1946 to debate constitutional options, which were submitted to the people in two referendums in 1948. By a slender majority, Newfoundlanders chose to become a province of Canada, rather than return to the status of a self-governing dominion. The Commission of Government continued to govern Newfoundland until March 31, 1949, when Newfoundland joined Canada.

title: Newfoundland Commission of Government


text:
List of presidents of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists

The president of the General Conference is the head of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, the governing body of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. The president's office is within the offices of the General Conference, located in Silver Spring, Maryland. As of June 2010, the current president is Ted N. C. Wilson.

Traditionally, the post has been held by an American. Of the 17 presidents, 13 were born in the United States, 1 born in Puerto Rico to North American missionaries, 1 born in Australia and 2 born in Norway, of whom one emigrated to the U.S. at age 5.


text:
Enthymeme

An enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, enthýmēma) is an argument with a hidden premise. Enthymemes are usually developed from premises that accord with the audience's view of the world and what is taken to be common sense. However, where the general premise of a syllogism is supposed to be true, making the subsequent deduction necessary, the general premise of an enthymeme is merely probable, which leads only to a tentative conclusion. Originally theorized by Aristotle, there are four types of enthymeme, at least two of which are described in Aristotle's work.

Aristotle referred to the enthymeme as "the body of proof", "the strongest of rhetorical proofs...a kind of syllogism" (Rhetoric I, 1.3,11). He considered it to be one of two kinds of proof, the other of which was the paradeigma. Maxims, Aristotle thought, were a derivative of enthymemes. (Rhetoric II.XX.1). Aristotle discusses two types of enthymemes: demonstrative [deiktika] and refutative [elentika or rézoi (ῥέζοι)]. (Rhetoric II.XXII.14). Demonstrative enthymemes are of the fact that something is or is not the case; they draw a conclusion from what is agreed. Refutative enthymemes draw conclusions that are not agreed to by the opponent. (Rhetoric II.XXII.15). According to Aristotle, refutative enthymemes are better liked by audiences because the inconsistencies or opposing arguments are clearer when placed side by side. (Rhetoric II.XXIII.30). Enthymemes are derived from probabilities, or what happens for the most part, and signs, which sometimes point to a necessary conclusion and other times are refutable.

Syllogism with an unstated premise
The first type of enthymeme is a truncated syllogism, or a syllogism with an unstated premise.

Here is an example of an enthymeme derived from a syllogism through truncation (shortening) of the syllogism:
 * "Socrates is mortal because he's human."

 * The complete formal syllogism would be the classic:

 * All humans are mortal. (major premise – unstated)
 * Socrates is human. (minor premise – stated)
 * Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (conclusion – stated)

While syllogisms lay out all of their premises and conclusion explicitly, these kinds of enthymemes keep at least one of the premises or the conclusion unstated.

Syllogism based on signs
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that some enthymemes are derived from syllogisms that are based on signs (semeia) instead of absolute facts. In this context, signs are "things [that] are so closely related that the presence or absence of one indicates the presence or absence of the other." Examples are given below.

 * "He is ill, since he has a cough."
 * "Since she has a child, she has given birth."
 * "He is yawning; therefore, he is sleepy."

In the examples, 'having a cough', 'having a child', and 'yawning' are signs of illness, giving birth, and sleepiness, respectively. In those cases, the enthymeme is only probably true because there are other sources of coughs besides pathogens, children besides parturition, and reasons for yawning besides sleepiness, such as allergies, adoption, and fatigue from exercising, respectively.

Syllogism where the audience supplies a premise
The third kind of enthymeme consists of a syllogism with a missing premise that is supplied by the audience as an unstated assumption. In the words of rhetorician William Benoit, the missing premise is: "assumed by rhetor when inventing and by audience when understanding the argument."

Some examples of this kind of enthymeme are as follows:
 * "Candide is a typical French novel; therefore it is irreverent."
 * "Many customers go to Starbucks; therefore, these customers enjoy coffee."

In the first case, the missing term of the syllogism is "French novels are irreverent" and might be an assumption held by an audience that would make sense of the enthymematic argument. In the second case, the missing term of the syllogism is "Starbucks customers all enjoy coffee" and this might be another assumption held by audiences to make sense of that particular argument. Such unstated premises can also rise to the level of axioms (statements so commonly accepted as to be thought universally true) and logical fallacies.

Visual enthymemes
Another kind of enthymeme is the visual enthymeme. Scholars have argued that words are not the only form of expression that can be understood to form enthymematic arguments. Pictures can also function as enthymemes because they require the audience to help construct their meaning. Modern-day internet memes are a good example of this, their meaning being inherited through the input and adaptations of the collective group of users who come across them, share them, and (unsurprisingly) create them.

Criticism
Some scholars argue that our understanding of the enthymeme has evolved over time and is no longer representative of the enthymeme as originally conceived by Aristotle. This is obviously true of the visual enthymeme, only conceived in the early twenty-first century and may also be true of the enthymeme as truncated syllogism. Carol Poster argues that this later interpretation of the enthymeme was invented by British rhetoricians such as Richard Whately in the eighteenth century.

title: Enthymeme


text:
Talk:Roger B. Taney

Ambiguous Sentences
This sentence is ambiguous: "In 1819, he defended a Methodist minister who had been indicted for inciting slave insurrections by denouncing slavery in a camp meeting." Does this mean that Taney denounced slavery in a camp meeting, or the minister did? I'm assuming the latter, but I read it as the former the first time around and it gives a VASTLY different perspective on Taney's attitudes to read it that way... -JSoules — Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.162.158.6 (talk) 17:33, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Another one: Taney "manumitted" his slaves. In fact, he freed them upon inheriting them. Why not say that? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.62.231.70 (talk) 03:06, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

 * The topic doesn't say when or under what circumstances he freed his slaves; perhaps you have in mind a reliable source to support that change. Tedickey (talk) 10:42, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
 * There is no evidence he did this and in fact, he owned the slaves. Sure, inherited, but "freeing" people then not signing their paperwork for another decade doesn't really deserve that credit. I just updated to include the manumittance papers that were found dating his "freeing" at nearly a decade later. Jwisloski (talk) 01:37, 30 October 2022 (UTC)
 * He obviously was a slave owning racist. He didn't free anybody in his slave charge. He was In fact complicit in the practice of slavery and all of it's bias and ugliness and I doubt if he paid any pension to slaves. This author attempts to soften the attitude of this hypocrite to present him in a better light. Illuminating him as an intellectual or anything more then a privilege laden, racist hypocrite is inaccurate and disingenuous. He owned slaves, he bought and sold slaves he benefitted from slave labor. President Lincoln was absolutely right to develop a spine and a conscious to challenge this disgraceful person. 2601:CA:C300:2F50:50D2:8AA:7B4D:165D (talk) 02:10, 17 January 2024 (UTC)

Another one: In the discussion of the Dred Scott decision, the introductory sentence starts as follows: "Five years later came the Supreme Court case that destroyed Taney's historical reputation . . . "  I cannot determine what event is being referred to as occurring five years before the Dred Scott decision (which was delivered in 1857).Sltax (talk) 16:14, 14 December 2008 (UTC)

(That was removed in 23:16, November 17, 2008 by Malplaquet) Tedickey (talk) 16:41, 14 December 2008 (UTC)
 * I see that one is because someone deleted the contextual information. Here's the relevant chunk: "The Taney Court extended the rule from Prigg ten years later in Moore v. Illinois (1852), which held that "any state law or regulation which interrupts, impedes, limits, embarrasses, delays or postpones the right of the owner to the immediate possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his service, is void.""

Pronunciation
The lead gives the pronunciation as /ˈtɔːni/; that is, using the same vowel as in "sore". Does anyone really say it that way? Many Americans, even those who pronounce "cot" and "caught" identically, still make a distinction between "Don" and "Dawn", I think, and I gather that the purpose here is to say that we should use the "Dawn" vowel. But for very few Americans is that the same vowel as in "sore". Maybe we should say /ˈtɒni/ or something, instead? --Trovatore (talk) 17:32, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

 * His descendants indeed pronounce their name to rhyme with sore knee. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=YpDRBiDUZsE&pp=ygUWSGlzdG9yaWMgYXBvbG9neSB0YW5leQ%3D%3D
 * Likewise Tawneytown and, from a brief browse of YouTube, a majority of academics.
 * I don’t think ˈtɒni is quite right, but it’s vastly better than the current ipa pronunciation up there. Jamesofengland (talk) 08:18, 30 April 2023 (UTC)

Clarification
The second sentence of the article states: "Although an opponent of slavery, believing it to be an evil practice, Taney believed that it was not the place of the Court or the Federal Government to remedy the issue and that it was the Constitutional right of the states to deal with slavery individually and gradually." However, later in the lead section it also says: "Despite emancipating his own slaves and giving pensions to those who were too old to work, Taney supported slavery, was outraged by Northern attacks on the institution, and sought to use his Dred Scott decision to permanently end the slavery debate." I think the lead should be edited in order to more properly communicate Taney's complicated opinion on slavery. InspectorWhy (talk) 19:50, 21 September 2022 (UTC)

 * I'm glad to see someone else noticed this! I change it to omit the second sentence entirely; the legacy he leaves is not one of a compassionate irresolute person who cared genuinely about the country and humankind and there is no reason to qualify his actions and legacy in the second sentence giving credit where none is due. Jwisloski (talk) 01:44, 30 October 2022 (UTC)

"Opponent of slavery" that believes it to be an "evil practice"?
"Although an opponent of slavery, believing it to be an evil practice, Taney believed that it was not the place of the Court or the Federal Government to remedy the issue and that it was the Constitutional right of the states to deal with slavery individually and gradually."

This information in the introduction conflicts heavily with the rest of the content and the actual history of Taney.

Additionally, the linked citation for that block says nothing about this. At most, it says: "As chief justice, [Taney] was best known for the 1857 Dred Scott decision regarding slavery, which helped set the stage for the Civil War (1861-1865), not the first time — or the last — that a Catholic justice has chosen to act on the court in a manner contrary to the teachings of the Church." 97.87.139.148 (talk) 14:28, 29 December 2022 (UTC)

 * After doing some lookomg, I can see that user @Antiok 1pie is constantly reinserting that phrase after it’s been removed and without any citation, so I added a citation needed instead of removing it this time. 97.87.139.148 (talk) 14:46, 29 December 2022 (UTC)

 * Why not remove it completely? LinesInk (talk) 19:17, 27 January 2023 (UTC)

title: Talk:Roger B. Taney


text:
Talk:Enthymeme

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 23 August 2021 and 10 December 2021. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): JalilDixon93.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 20:39, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Not logically valid
The 2nd example is not logically valid. Evercat 21:22, 9 Mar 2004 (UTC)

 * Fixed now. Evercat 21:24, 9 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Misuse?
The "Misuse" example doesn't seem to be logically valid, regardless of whether or not it is funny.
 * It doesn't seem to have anything to do with the nature of an enthymeme, either. It's just a non sequitur. Removing it on these grounds. 82.92.119.11 17:04, 24 Dec 2004 (UTC)

 * I think he meant to say: All men are mortal. Socrates is mortal. Therefore, all men are Socrates. Poromenos 17:28, 14 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Bentsen/Quayle
Uh, it had nothing to do with whether Quayle was a "great man" or not, only that he had implicitly compared himself to Kennedy.204.161.5.90 15:30, 4 November 2006 (UTC)

Mark Twain example
The Mark Twain example is not valid, unless one considers that absence of proof for a hypothesis is equivalent to proof of its opposite. The premises there is no law against composing music when one has no ideas whatsoever and Wagner has no ideas do not lead to the conclusion the music of Wagner is perfectly legal, because there may be other factors which render it illegal (in Turkmenistan, for instance, it is illegal simply by virtue of being Opera). See Association fallacy and Reductio ad Hitlerum for further discussion and examples of this kind of logical fallacy. DES 13:29, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

Good page!
I just wanted to leave a note to say that as a regular visitor to wikipedia - and minor contributor of spelling corrections - this page is 10/10. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 59.101.232.82 (talk) 08:10, 7 February 2007 (UTC).

Incorrect Example
The example with O.J. and Johnny Cochran, as it is fleshed out in the article, is not an enthymeme. It has 3 premises and therefore is not even a syllogism. It is a good example of an argument with implicit premises, but doesn't belong in an article on enthymemes. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Pleebloo (talk • contribs) 14:04, 21 February 2007 (UTC).

popular usage
I'm not expert on Facebook, but the popular usage section appears to be completely irrelevant to the topic. The 'enthymeme' referenced appears to owe nothing but its name to the incomplete syllogism. Eris Discord | Talk 00:00, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

Agreed. This has nothing to do with enthymeme as an argument style. Request for deletion? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.225.219.97 (talk) 20:45, 4 October 2008 (UTC)

Citation Not Needed
This section "Many enthymemes may fit into two broad categories.[citation needed] The implied premise is obvious The implied premise is dubious"

Does not need a citation. It is not exhaustive as it is not an exclusive statement. The two categories offered are clearly categories. The cognitive information is not conveyed here but below, this is merely good communication and therefore, in my opinion, needs no citation. Too Lazy to Log In. 70.69.191.94 (talk) 20:31, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Dead Link
The link pointed to by "Extensive bibliography of enthymeme in scholarly literature" at the bottom is a dead link. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.125.232.127 (talk) 06:12, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

"Free trade is good"
If enthymemes are arguments, how is this an enthymeme? It's just an assertion. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.169.156.66 (talk) 02:44, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

 * Precisely. The argument is implied within the statement. Free trade is not inherently and logically good. Instead a whole series of values and implied arguments are contained within the statement. This as a maxim would only work with an audience already assuming a certain set of values. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Etherfire (talk • contribs) 23:34, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

No. By this logic, any sentence that expresses a proposition would count as an enthymeme. In fact, "Free trade is good" is not an argument, and it doesn't imply any argument. It's a just a claim.

"Aristotle stresses that the sentence “There is no man among us who is free” taken for itself is a maxim, but becomes an enthymeme as soon as it is used together with a reason such as “for all are slaves of money or of chance (and no slave of money or chance is free).” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/#enthymeme

Further, enthymemes are intended to be deductive arguments, not based on statistics or "less than 100%." The whole section entitled "Maxim, or a less-than-100% argument" is spurious and should be deleted.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.107.177.75 (talk) 05:38, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

The fact that this incorrect and misleading "Free trade is good" example has not yet been deleted--despite that it has been shown to be in direct contradiction of the professionally-researched Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online--says a lot about how much the people in charge of this page care about its upkeep. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dicktar (talk • contribs) 21:53, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

 * The current version of the Enthymeme Wikipedia article does not argue that "Free trade is good". Rather, that is merely a quotation from a reliable source that illustrates and supports the second sense of what Enthymeme might mean.  But more than that, it is not even an assertion that the scholars who wrote that paper are making.  It is merely an example they used to illustrate an enthymemic statement that is a maxim, and not a syllogistic argument.

 * I am not sure if the previous commenters are objecting to the "free trade is good" idea itself, or to the idea of this second (but also Aristotelian) sense of what an enthymeme is being covered in the article, or something else entirely. Please clarify and we can continue the discussion from there.N2e (talk) 07:09, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

ENTHYMEMES ARE ARGUMENTS. All of them. Everything that is an enthymeme is an argument. I don't know what an "enthymic statement" is, unless it is an enthymeme, and if it is, it's an argument.

An argument is a set of claims, some of which are meant to support the others. By itself, the sentence "Free trade is good" is not an argument, and therefore not an enthymeme. This example is false, and bound to mislead information-seekers about the actual meaning the word enthymeme. I realize that example appears in an article from something called "The Post-Autistic Economic Review." I presume those in charge of deleting spurious wikipedia pages realize that not every source is reliable.

On the other hand,the section cited on this talk page from the SEPO (which actually is a reliable source) explains the difference between maxims (claims taken to be true) and enthymemes (arguments with unstated premises), and makes it clear that claims alone do not qualify as enthymemes. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dicktar (talk • contribs) 20:48, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

Enthumiem
Is "enthumiem" a proper pronunciation? I was thinking it was "en-thuh-meem" or something. --Ajkochanowicz (talk) 23:38, 8 May 2010 (UTC)

Is this really an enthymeme?
This article needs something about the fact that the precise definition of enthymeme is under question. For example, in Jeffery Walker's "The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme" he suggests that the definition of the enthymeme as a syllogism lacking a premise is incorrect--at least as far as Aristotle's definition would suggest. Instead, he suggests that an enthymeme is an argument that is socially embedded and deals with uncertainties. There is a little of this here but I think it needs to be elaborated on. Etherfire (talk) 23:39, 23 November 2010 (UTC)etherfire

 * Wikipedia is "there" for anyone to edit. If you have a reliable source, and can provide a citation for whatever it is you want to say, you should just go ahead and write it.  Add your sense of the word enthymeme, and how or who uses it that way, to the article and see what happens in the grand emergent process that is Wikipedia.  N2e (talk) 07:18, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

 * On the substance of your assertion however, I might phrase it differently. It isn't so much that a "precise definition of enthymeme" even exists; rather it is what one, or what several, senses of enthymeme are used in various literatures, and can be supported by verifiable, reliable secondary source citations of that usage in that particular literature.  Hope this helps.  Cheers.  N2e (talk) 07:18, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

Semantic tableaux?!?
Even if (and that's a big IF) Beth actually has an argument from modal logic showing that even arguments with "incorrect logical inferences" count as enthymemes, that detail is about four orders of magnitude more arcane than the average Wikipedia reader needs to be able to define the word "enthymeme."

For some reason, the Wiki page for this very simple concept continues to be fly-paper for amateur obscurantists. How would a layperson read this page and come away with an accurate or even coherent idea of what the word means? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.107.179.223 (talk) 02:21, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

New editor, feedback?
Hi, I'm a university student majoring in communications rhetoric. For my rhetorical process class we had to choose a rhetor or rhetorical term and contribute to the wikipedia page. I just added information to this page. If I could get any feedback on both the content and the formatting (it's my first time editing a wikipedia page) that would be very helpful! Mlevin48 (talk) 03:48, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

Substantial Revision
I've revised the article to make it more readable and to reflect more accurately the state of scholarship on the enthymeme. Even if subsequent editors change my revision, I suggest you follow the structure I have established, where I discuss different types of enthymeme. The article's previous state reflected an abortive attempt at following this structure, I hope I have suitably refined it. Here are the specific changes I have made and my justifications for them. Major changes Minor changes I hope you find these changes suitable. I welcome any subsequent edits to refine what I have written. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Rhaetor (talk • contribs) 06:49, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
 * I have edited the introduction to provide a more succinct description of the enthymeme. I have also incorporated primary sources and attributed the enthymeme to its theorist Aristotle.
 * I have cut entirely the paragraph beginning with "In some philosophy classes." The humor is apparently local, I could find no sources suggesting this is a common joke made about the enthymeme. It is also inappropriate to an introduction.
 * I have eliminated the examples from James Geary and George Bernard Shaw because they required excessive explanation and did not add anything useful to the section they were in.
 * I have eliminated the section "Maxim or less than 100% argument" which was inappropriate for the following reasons. 1) It did not delimit properly the nature of the relationship between the enthymeme and the maxim. 2) It cited a source that was only tangentially concerned with the enthymeme (and a scholar that was an economist and ipso facto not an expert on enthymemes - a proper expert might be a philosopher or a rhetorician). I have also entirely discarded the block quote from Klamer et al (which added nothing to the article of value). In any case, I have replaced it with more pertinent sources.
 * I have also recycled the section "arguments" and its sources into my existing sections.
 * I have also added the section on the "visual enthymeme" and added an image. I welcome alternative image suggestions.
 * I have changed the heading "informal syllogism" because it could describe all enthymemes except the visual one. I have subdivided some of the material from this section into three distinct types of enthymemes. Thus, there was a need for a new outline header.
 * I have added scholarly sources. The article was previously reliant almost exclusively on publicly available sources (most of which I have retained).
 * I have added links at the end and throughout to appropriate persons and concepts (Richard Whately and the Paradeigma)

 * I have reverted the good faith major change referenced above, per WP:BRD, and suggest we discuss it on the Talk page first and gain consensus. One of the challenges is that although many aspects of the changes will likley gain consensus rather straightforwardly, and all changes were meant well, they were made in a single mongo-eidt that makes it quite difficult to parse the individual piece/parts of the major edit.

 * Which changes were, in your mind, the most essential, and most uncontroversial. I suspect we could start by discussing, and gaining consensus on, those first, and then continue from there.  N2e (talk) 13:00, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

I think it's very strange that Wikipedia editors are putting politics (e.g. whose version gets published) before the value of the content of the article. What changes do you object to N2e? Rhaetor (talk) 17:58, 26 August 2015 (UTC)rhaetor

Re: Substantial Revision
Given no response to my previous reply N2e, I've reverted to my revision, which as you admit is likely worth making. We cannot gain consensus if no one speaks and in the meantime misinformation is being propagated by the article. Additionally, WP:BRD is a suggestion, not a rule, as I'm sure you know. Please do not continue to troll this page for your own ego's sake. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Rhaetor (talk • contribs) 23:24, 31 August 2015 (UTC)

title: Talk:Enthymeme


text:
Naturally aspirated engine

A naturally aspirated engine, also known as a normally aspirated engine, and abbreviated to N/A or NA, is an internal combustion engine in which air intake depends solely on atmospheric pressure and does not have forced induction through a turbocharger or a supercharger.

Description
In a naturally aspirated engine, air for combustion (Diesel cycle in a diesel engine or specific types of Otto cycle in petrol engines, namely petrol direct injection) or an air/fuel mixture (traditional Otto cycle petrol engines), is drawn into the engine's cylinders by atmospheric pressure acting against a partial vacuum that occurs as the piston travels downwards toward bottom dead centre during the intake stroke. Owing to innate restriction in the engine's inlet tract, which includes the intake manifold, a small pressure drop occurs as air is drawn in, resulting in a volumetric efficiency of less than 100 percent—and a less than complete air charge in the cylinder. The density of the air charge, and therefore the engine's maximum theoretical power output, in addition to being influenced by induction system restriction, is also affected by engine speed and atmospheric pressure, the latter of which decreases as the operating altitude increases.

This is in contrast to a forced-induction engine, in which a mechanically driven supercharger or an exhaust-driven turbocharger is employed to facilitate increasing the mass of intake air beyond what could be produced by atmospheric pressure alone. Nitrous oxide can also be used to artificially increase the mass of oxygen present in the intake air. This is accomplished by injecting liquid nitrous oxide into the intake, which supplies significantly more oxygen in a given volume than is possible with atmospheric air. Nitrous oxide is 36.3% available oxygen by mass after it decomposes as compared with atmospheric air at 20.95%. Nitrous oxide also boils at -127.3 F at atmospheric pressures and offers significant cooling from the latent heat of vaporization, which also aids in increasing the overall air charge density significantly compared to natural aspiration.

Applications
Most automobile petrol engines, as well as many small engines used for non-automotive purposes, are naturally aspirated. Most modern diesel engines powering highway vehicles are turbocharged to produce a more favourable power-to-weight ratio, a higher torque curve, as well as better fuel efficiency and lower exhaust emissions. Turbocharging is nearly universal on diesel engines that are used in railroad, marine engines, and commercial stationary applications (electrical power generation, for example). Forced induction is also used with reciprocating aircraft engines to negate some of the power loss that occurs as the aircraft climbs to higher altitudes.

Advantages and disadvantages
The advantages and disadvantages of a naturally aspirated engine in relation to a same-sized engine relying on forced induction include:

Advantages

 * Easier to maintain and repair
 * Lower development and production costs
 * Increased reliability, partly due to fewer separate, moving parts
 * More direct throttle response than a turbo system due to the lack of turbo lag (an advantage also shared with superchargers)
 * Less potential for overheating and or uncontrolled combustion (pinging/ knocking)

Disadvantages

 * Decreased efficiency
 * Decreased power-to-weight ratio
 * Decreased potential for tuning
 * Increased power loss at higher elevation (due to lower air pressure) compared to forced induction engines

title: Naturally aspirated engine


text:
The Theory of Moral Sentiments

The Theory of Moral Sentiments is a 1759 book by Adam Smith. It provided the ethical, philosophical, economic, and methodological underpinnings to Smith's later works, including The Wealth of Nations (1776), Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795), and Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms (1763) (first published in 1896).

Sympathy
Smith departed from the "moral sense" tradition of Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume, as the principle of sympathy takes the place of that organ. "Sympathy" was the term Smith used for the feeling of these moral sentiments. It was the feeling of understanding the passions of others. It operated through a logic of mirroring, in which a spectator imaginatively reconstructed the experience of the person he watches:

"As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation..."

However, Smith rejected the idea that Man was capable of forming moral judgements beyond a limited sphere of activity, again centered on his own self-interest:

"The administration of the great system of the universe ... the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension: the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country.... But though we are ... endowed with a very strong desire of those ends, it has been entrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our reason to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them"

"The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species."

In a published lecture, Vernon L. Smith further argued that Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations together encompassed:

"one behavioral axiom, 'the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,' where the objects of trade I will interpret to include not only goods, but also gifts, assistance, and favors out of sympathy ... whether it is goods or favors that are exchanged, they bestow gains from trade that humans seek relentlessly in all social transactions. Thus, Adam Smith's single axiom, broadly interpreted ... is sufficient to characterize a major portion of the human social and cultural enterprise. It explains why human nature appears to be simultaneously self-regarding and other-regarding."

The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Edition 6
Consists of 7 parts:
 * Part I: Of the propriety of action
 * Part II: Of merit and demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment
 * Part III: Of the foundations of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.
 * Part IV: Of the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation.
 * Part V: Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.
 * Part VI: Of the character of virtue
 * Part VII: Of systems of moral philosophy

Part I: Of the propriety of action
Part one of The Theory of Moral Sentiments consists of three sections:
 * Section 1: Of the sense of propriety
 * Section 2: Of the degrees of which different passions are consistent with propriety
 * Section 3: Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than the other

Part I, Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety
Section 1 consists of 5 chapters:
 * Chapter 1: Of sympathy
 * Chapter 2: Of the pleasure of mutual sympathy
 * Chapter 3: Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men by their concord or dissonance with our own
 * Chapter 4: The same subject continued
 * Chapter 5: Of the amiable and respectable virtues

Part I, Section I, Chapter I: Of Sympathy
According to Smith, people have a natural tendency to care about the well-being of others for no other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. He calls this sympathy, defining it "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever" (p. 5). He argues that this occurs under either of two conditions:
 * We see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another person
 * The fortune or misfortune is vividly depicted to us

Although, this is apparently true, he follows to argue that this tendency lies even in "the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society" (p. 2).

Smith also proposes several variables that can moderate the extent of sympathy, noting that the situation that is the cause of the passion is a large determinant of our response: An important point put forth by Smith is that the degree to which we sympathize, or "tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels", is proportional to the degree of vividness in our observation or the description of the event. When observing the anger of another person, for example, we are unlikely to sympathize with this person because we "are unacquainted with his provocation" and as a result cannot imagine what it is like to feel what he feels. Further, since we can see the "fear and resentment" of those who are the targets of the person's anger we are likely to sympathize and take side with them. Thus, sympathetic responses are often conditional on—or the magnitude for understanding another person is determined by—the causes of the emotion the person is experiencing. Specifically, emotions such as joy and grief tell us about the "good or bad fortune" of the person we are observing them in, whereas anger tells us about the bad fortune with respect to another person. It is the difference between intrapersonal emotions, such as joy and grief, and interpersonal emotions, such as anger, that causes the difference in sympathy, according to Smith. That is, intrapersonal emotions trigger at least some sympathy without the need for context whereas interpersonal emotions are dependent on context.
 * The vividness of the account of the condition of another person
 * Knowledge of the causes of the emotions
 * Whether other people are involved in the emotion

He also proposes a natural 'motor' response to seeing the actions of others: If we see a knife hacking off a person's leg we wince away, if we see someone dance we move in the same ways, we feel the injuries of others as if we had them ourselves.

Smith makes clear that we sympathize not only with the misery of others but also the joy; he states that observing an emotional state through the "looks and gestures" in another person is enough to initiate that emotional state in ourselves. Furthermore, we are generally insensitive to the real situation of the other person; we are instead sensitive to how we would feel ourselves if we were in the situation of the other person. For example, a mother with a suffering baby feels "the most complete image of misery and distress" while the child merely feels "the uneasiness of the present instant" (p. 8).

Part I, Section I, Chapter II: Of Pleasure and mutual sympathy
Smith continues by arguing that people feel pleasure from the presence of others with the same emotions as one's self, and displeasure in the presence of those with "contrary" emotions. Smith argues that this pleasure is not the result of self-interest: that others are more likely to assist oneself if they are in a similar emotional state. Smith also makes the case that pleasure from mutual sympathy is not derived merely from a heightening of the original felt emotion amplified by the other person. Smith further notes that people get more pleasure from the mutual sympathy of negative emotions than positive emotions; we feel "more anxious to communicate to our friends" (p. 13) our negative emotions.

Smith proposes that mutual sympathy heightens the original emotion and "disburdens" the person of sorrow. This is a 'relief' model of mutual sympathy, where mutual sympathy heightens the sorrow but also produces pleasure from relief "because the sweetness of his sympathy more than compensates the bitterness of that sorrow" (p. 14). In contrast, mocking or joking about their sorrow is the "cruelest insult" one can inflict on another person: To seem to not be affected by the joy of our companions is but want of politeness; but to not wear a serious countentance when they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity (p. 14). He makes clear that mutual sympathy of negative emotions is a necessary condition for friendship, whereas mutual sympathy of positive emotions is desirable but not required. This is due to the "healing consolation of mutual sympathy" that a friend is 'required' to provide in response to "grief and resentment", as if not doing so would be akin to a failure to help the physically wounded.

Not only do we get pleasure from the sympathy of others, but we also obtain pleasure from being able to successfully sympathize with others, and discomfort from failing to do so. Sympathizing is pleasurable, failing to sympathize is aversive. Smith also makes the case that failing to sympathize with another person may not be aversive to ourselves but we may find the emotion of the other person unfounded and blame them, as when another person experiences great happiness or sadness in response to an event that we think should not warrant such a response.

Part I, Section I, Chapter III: Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men by their concord or dissonance with our own
Smith presents the argument that approval or disapproval of the feelings of others is completely determined by whether we sympathize or fail to sympathize with their emotions. Specifically, if we sympathize with the feelings of another we judge that their feelings are just, and if we do not sympathize we judge that their feelings are unjust.

This holds in matters of opinion also, as Smith flatly states that we judge the opinions of others as correct or incorrect merely by determining whether they agree with our own opinions. Smith also cites a few examples where our judgment is not in line with our emotions and sympathy, as when we judge the sorrow of a stranger who has lost her mother as being justified even though we know nothing about the stranger and do not sympathize ourselves. However, according to Smith these non-emotional judgments are not independent from sympathy in that although we do not feel sympathy we do recognize that sympathy would be appropriate and lead us to this judgment and thus deem the judgment as correct.

"Utopian" or Ideal Political Systems: "The man of system . . . is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder."

— Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759

Next, Smith puts forth that not only are the consequences of one's actions judged and used to determine whether one is just or unjust in committing them, but also whether one's sentiments justified the action that brought about the consequences. Thus, sympathy plays a role in determining judgments of the actions of others in that if we sympathize with the affections that brought about the action we are more likely to judge the action as just, and vice versa:

If upon bringing the case home to our own breast we find that the sentiments which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily approve of them as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion (p. 20).

Part I, Section I, Chapter IV: The same subject continued
Smith delineates two conditions under which we judge the "propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person":
 * 1 When the objects of the sentiments are considered alone
 * 2 When the objects of the sentiments are considered in relation to the person or other persons

When one's sentiments coincide with another person's when the object is considered alone, then we judge that their sentiment is justified. Smith lists objects that are in one of two domains: science and taste. Smith argues that sympathy does not play a role in judgments of these objects; differences in judgment arise only due to difference in attention or mental acuity between people. When the judgment of another person agrees with us on these types of objects it is not notable; however, when another person's judgment differs from us, we assume that they have some special ability to discern characteristics of the object we have not already noticed, and thus view their judgment with special approbation called admiration.

Smith continues by noting that we assign value to judgments not based on usefulness (utility) but on similarity to our own judgment, and we attribute to those judgments which are in line with our own the qualities of correctness or truth in science, and justness or delicateness in taste. Thus, the utility of a judgment is "plainly an afterthought" and "not what first recommends them to our approbation" (p. 24).

Of objects that fall into the second category, such as the misfortune of oneself or another person, Smith argues that there is no common starting point for judgment but are vastly more important in maintaining social relations. Judgments of the first kind are irrelevant as long as one is able to share a sympathetic sentiment with another person; people may converse in total disagreement about objects of the first kind as long as each person appreciates the sentiments of the other to a reasonable degree. However, people become intolerable to each other when they have no feeling or sympathy for the misfortunes or resentment of the other: "You are confounded at my violence and passion, and I am enraged at your cold insensibility and want of feelings" (p. 26).

Another important point Smith makes is that our sympathy will never reach the degree or "violence" of the person who experiences it, as our own "safety" and comfort as well as separation from the offending object constantly "intrude" on our efforts to induce a sympathetic state in ourselves. Thus, sympathy is never enough, as the "sole consolation" for the sufferer is "to see the emotions of their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his own, in the violent and disagreeable passions" (p. 28). Therefore, the original sufferer is likely to dampen his feelings to be in "concord" with the degree of sentiment expressible by the other person, who feels only due to the ability of one's imagination. It is this which is "sufficient for the harmony of society" (p. 28). Not only does the person dampen his expression of suffering for the purpose of sympathizing, but he also takes the perspective of the other person who is not suffering, thus slowly changing his perspective and allowing the calmness of the other person and reduction of violence of the sentiment to improve his spirits.

As a friend is likely to engage in more sympathy than a stranger, a friend actually slows the reduction in our sorrows because we do not temper our feelings out of sympathizing with the perspective of the friend to the degree that we reduce our sentiments in the presence of acquaintances, or a group of acquaintances. This gradual tempering of our sorrows from the repeated perspective-taking of someone in a more calm state make "society and conversation...the most powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquility" (p. 29).

Part I, Section I, Chapter V: Of the amiable and respectable virtues
Smith starts to use an important new distinction in this section and late in the previous section:
 * The "person principally concerned": The person who has had emotions aroused by an object
 * The spectator: The person observing and sympathizing with the emotionally aroused "person principally concerned"

These two people have two different sets of virtues. The person principally concerned, in "bring[ing] down emotions to what the spectator can go along with" (p. 30), demonstrates "self-denial" and "self-government" whereas the spectator displays "the candid condescension and indulgent humanity" of "enter[ing]into the sentiments of the person principally concerned."

Smith returns to anger and how we find "detestable...the insolence and brutality" of the person principally concerned but "admire...the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator" (p. 32). Smith concludes that the "perfection" of human nature is this mutual sympathy, or "love our neighbor as we love ourself" by "feeling much for others and little for ourself" and to indulge in "benevolent affections" (p. 32). Smith makes clear that it is this ability to "self-command" our "ungovernable passions" through sympathizing with others that is virtuous.

Smith further distinguishes between virtue and propriety:

Part I, Section II: Of the degrees of which different passions are consistent with propriety
Section 2 consists of 5 chapters:
 * Chapter 1: Of the passions which take their origins from the body
 * Chapter 2: Of the passions which take their origins from a particular turn or habit of the imagination
 * Chapter 3: Of the unsocial passions
 * Chapter 4: Of the social passions
 * Chapter 5: Of the selfish passions

Smith starts off by noting that the spectator can sympathize only with passions of medium "pitch". However, this medium level at which the spectator can sympathize depends on what "passion" or emotion is being expressed; with some emotions even the most justified expression of cannot be tolerated at a high level of fervor, at others sympathy in the spectator is not bounded by magnitude of expression even though the emotion is not as well justified. Again, Smith emphasizes that specific passions will be considered appropriate or inappropriate to varying degrees depending on the degree to which the spectator is able to sympathize, and that it is the purpose of this section to specify which passions evoke sympathy and which do not and therefore which are deemed appropriate and not appropriate.

Part I, Section II, Chapter I: Of the passions which take their origins from the body
Since it is not possible to sympathize with bodily states or "appetites which take their origin in the body" it is improper to display them to others, according to Smith. One example is "eating voraciously" when hungry, as the impartial spectator can sympathize a little bit if there is a vivid description and good cause for this hunger, but not to a great extent as hunger itself cannot be induced from mere description. Smith also includes sex as a passion of the body that is considered indecent in the expression of others, although he does make note that to fail to treat a woman with more "gaiety, pleasantry, and attention" would also be improper of a man (p. 39). To express pain is also considered unbecoming.

Smith believes the cause of lack of sympathy for these bodily passions is that "we cannot enter into them" ourselves (p. 40). Temperance, by Smith's account, is to have control over bodily passions.

On the contrary, passions of the imagination, such as loss of love or ambition, are easy to sympathize with because our imagination can conform to the shape of the sufferer, whereas our body cannot do such a thing to the body of the sufferer. Pain is fleeting and the harm only lasts as long as the violence is inflicted, whereas an insult lasts to harm for longer duration because our imagination keeps mulling it over. Likewise, bodily pain that induces fear, such as a cut, wound or fracture, evoke sympathy because of the danger that they imply for ourselves; that is, sympathy is activated chiefly through imagining what it would be like for us.

Part I, Section II, Chapter II: Of the passions which take their origins from a particular turn or habit of the imagination
Passions which "take their origins from a particular turn or habit of the imagination" are "little sympathized with". These include love, as we are unlikely to enter into our own feeling of love in response to that of another person and thus unlikely to sympathize. He further states that love is "always laughed at, because we cannot enter into it" ourselves.

Instead of inspiring love in ourselves, and thus sympathy, love makes the impartial spectator sensitive to the situation and emotions that may arise from the gain or loss of love. Again this is because it is easy to imagine hoping for love or dreading loss of love but not the actual experience of it, and that the "happy passion, upon this account, interests us much less than the fearful and the melancholy" of losing happiness (p. 49). Thus, love inspires sympathy for not for love itself but for the anticipation of emotions from gaining or losing it.

Smith, however, finds love "ridiculous" but "not naturally odious" (p. 50). Thus, we sympathize with the "humaneness, generosity, kindness, friendship, and esteem" (p. 50) of love. However, as these secondary emotions are excessive in love, one should not express them but in moderate tones according to Smith, as: All these are objects which we cannot expect should interest our companions in the same degree in which they interest us. Failing to do so makes bad company, and therefore those with specific interests and "love" of hobbies should keep their passions to those with kindred spirits ("A philosopher is company to a philosopher only" (p. 51)) or to themselves.

Part I, Section II, Chapter III: Of the unsocial passions
Smith talks of hatred and resentment next, as "unsocial passions." According to Smith these are passions of imagination, but sympathy is only likely to be evoked in the impartial spectator when they are expressed in moderate tones. Because these passions regard two people, namely the offended (resentful or angry person) and the offender, our sympathies are naturally drawn between these two. Specifically, although we sympathize with the offended person, we fear that the offended person may do harm to the offender, and thus also fear for and sympathize with the danger that faces the offender.

The impartial spectator sympathizes with the offended person in a manner, as emphasized previously, such that the greatest sympathy occurs when the offended person expresses anger or resentment in a temperate manner. Specifically, if the offended person seems just and temperate in coping with the offense, then this magnifies the misdeed done to the offended in the mind of the spectator, increasing sympathy. Although excess anger does not beget sympathy, neither does too little anger, as this may signal fear or uncaring on the part of the offended. This lack of response is just as despicable to the impartial spectator as is the excesses of anger.

However, in general, any expression of anger is improper in the presence of others. This is because the "immediate effects [of anger] are disagreeable" just as the knives of surgery are disagreeable for art, as the immediate effect of surgery is unpleasant even though long-term effect is justified. Likewise, even when anger is justly provoked, it is disagreeable. According to Smith, this explains why we reserve sympathy until we know the cause of the anger or resentment, since, if the emotion is not justified by the action of another person, then the immediate disagreeableness and threat to the other person (and by sympathy to ourselves) overwhelm any sympathy that the spectator may have for the offended. In response to expressions of anger, hatred, or resentment, it is likely that the impartial spectator will not feel anger in sympathy with the offended but instead anger toward the offended for expressing such an aversive. Smith believes that there is some form of natural optimality to the aversiveness of these emotions, as it reduces the propagation of ill will among people, and thus increases the probability of functional societies.

Smith also puts forth that anger, hatred, and resentment are disagreeable to the offended mostly because of the idea of being offended rather than the actual offense itself. He remarks that we are likely able to do without what was taken from us, but it is the imagination which angers us at the thought of having something taken. Smith closes this section by remarking that the impartial spectator will not sympathize with us unless we are willing to endure harms, with the goal of maintaining positive social relations and humanity, with equanimity, as long as it does not put us in a situation of being "exposed to perpetual insults" (p. 59). It is only "with reluctance, from necessity, and in consequence of great and repeated provocations" (p. 60) that we should take revenge on others. Smith makes clear that we should take very good care to not act on the passions of anger, hatred, resentment, for purely social reasons, and instead imagine what the impartial spectator would deem appropriate, and base our action solely on a cold calculation.

Part I, Section II, Chapter IV: Of the social passions
The social emotions such as "generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem" are considered overwhelmingly with approbation by the impartial spectator. The agreeableness of the "benevolent" sentiments leads to full sympathy on the part of the spectator with both the person concerned and the object of these emotions and are not felt as aversive to the spectator if they are in excess.

Part I, Section II, Chapter V: Of the selfish passions
The final set of passions, or "selfish passions", are grief and joy, which Smith considers to be not so aversive as the unsocial passions of anger and resentment, but not so benevolent as the social passions such as generosity and humanity. Smith makes clear in this passage that the impartial spectator is unsympathetic to the unsocial emotions because they put the offended and the offender in opposition to each other, sympathetic to the social emotions because they join the lover and beloved in unison, and feels somewhere in between with the selfish passions as they are either good or bad for only one person and are not disagreeable but not so magnificent as the social emotions.

Of grief and joy, Smith notes that small joys and great grief are assured to be returned with sympathy from the impartial spectator, but not other degrees of these emotions. Great joy is likely to be met with envy, so modesty is prudent for someone who has come upon great fortune or else suffer the consequences of envy and disapprobation. This is appropriate as the spectator appreciates the lucky individual's "sympathy with our envy and aversion to his happiness" especially because this shows concern for the inability of the spectator to reciprocate the sympathy toward the happiness of the lucky individual. According to Smith, this modesty wears on the sympathy of both the lucky individual and the old friends of the lucky individual and they soon part ways; likewise, the lucky individual may acquire new friends of higher rank to whom he must also be modest, apologizing for the "mortification" of now being their equal: He generally grows weary too soon, and is provoked, by the sullen and suspicious pride of the one, and by the saucy contempt of the other, to treat the first with neglect, and the second with petulance, till at last he grows habitually insolent, and forfeits the esteem of them all... those sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute much to happiness (p. 66). The solution is to ascend social rank by gradual steps, with the path cleared for one by approbation before one takes the next step, giving people time to adjust, and thus avoiding any "jealousy in those he overtakes, or any envy in those he leaves behind" (p. 66).

Small joys of everyday life are met with sympathy and approbation according to Smith. These "frivolous nothings which fill up the void of human life" (p. 67) divert attention and help us forget problems, reconciling us as with a lost friend.

The opposite is true for grief, with small grief triggering no sympathy in the impartial spectator, but large grief with much sympathy. Small griefs are likely, and appropriately, turned into joke and mockery by the sufferer, as the sufferer knows how complaining about small grievances to the impartial spectator will evoke ridicule in the heart of the spectator, and thus the sufferer sympathizes with this, mocking himself to some degree.

====Part I, Section III: Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other==== Section 3 consists of 3 chapters:
 * Chapter 1: That though our Sympathy with Sorrow is generally a more lively Sensation than our Sympathy with Joy, it commonly falls much more short of the Violence of what is naturally felt by the Person principally concerned
 * Chapter 2: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
 * Chapter 3: Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is occasioned by this Disposition to admire the Rich and the Great, and to despise or neglect Persons of poor and mean Condition

=
Part I, Section III, Chapter I: That though our Sympathy with Sorrow is generally a more lively Sensation than our     Sympathy with Joy, it commonly falls much more short of the Violence of what is naturally felt by the Person principally concerned =====

Part I, Section III, Chapter II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him. At the thought of this, his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it procures him. The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. Great King, live for ever! is the compliment, which, after the manner of eastern adulation, we should readily make them, if experience did not teach us its absurdity. Every calamity that befalls them, every injury that is done them, excites in the breast of the spectator ten times more compassion and resentment than he would have felt, had the same things happened to other men. A stranger to human nature, who saw the indifference of men about the misery of their inferiors, and the regret and indignation which they feel for the misfortunes and sufferings of those above them, would be apt to imagine, that pain must be more agonizing, and the convulsions of death more terrible to persons of higher rank, than to those of meaner stations.

Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Even when the people have been brought this length, they are apt to relent every moment, and easily relapse into their habitual state of deference to those whom they have been accustomed to look upon as their natural superiors. They cannot stand the mortification of their monarch. Compassion soon takes the place of resentment, they forget all past provocations, their old principles of loyalty revive, and they run to re-establish the ruined authority of their old masters, with the same violence with which they had opposed it. The death of Charles I brought about the Restoration of the royal family. Compassion for James II when he was seized by the populace in making his escape on ship-board, had almost prevented the Revolution, and made it go on more heavily than before.

=
Part I, Section III, Chapter III: Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is occasioned by this Disposition to admire the Rich and the Great, and to despise or neglect Persons of poor and mean Condition ===== This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages. We desire both to be respectable and to be respected. We dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned. But, upon coming into the world, we soon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous. We see frequently the vices and follies of the powerful much less despised than the poverty and weakness of the innocent. To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity. the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and more exquisitely beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious and careful observer. They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a select, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness. n the superior stations of life the case is unhappily not always the same. In the courts of princes, in the drawing-rooms of the great, where success and preferment depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals, but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors; flattery and falsehood too often prevail over merit and abilities. In such societies the abilities to please, are more regarded than the abilities to serve. In quiet and peaceable times, when the storm is at a distance, the prince, or great man, wishes only to be amused, and is even apt to fancy that he has scarce any occasion for the service of any body, or that those who amuse him are sufficiently able to serve him. The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator. All the great and awful virtues, all the virtues which can fit, either for the council, the senate, or the field, are, by the insolent and insignificant flatterers, who commonly figure the most in such corrupted societies, held in the utmost contempt and derision. When the duke of Sully was called upon by Lewis the Thirteenth, to give his advice in some great emergency, he observed the favourites and courtiers whispering to one another, and smiling at his unfashionable appearance. 'Whenever your majesty's father,' said the old warrior and statesman, 'did me the honour to consult me, he ordered the buffoons of the court to retire into the antechamber.'

It is from our disposition to admire, and consequently to imitate, the rich and the great, that they are enabled to set, or to lead what is called the fashion. Their dress is the fashionable dress; the language of their conversation, the fashionable style; their air and deportment, the fashionable behaviour. Even their vices and follies are fashionable; and the greater part of men are proud to imitate and resemble them in the very qualities which dishonour and degrade them. Vain men often give themselves airs of a fashionable profligacy, which, in their hearts, they do not approve of, and of which, perhaps, they are really not guilty. They desire to be praised for what they themselves do not think praise-worthy, and are ashamed of unfashionable virtues which they sometimes practise in secret, and for which they have secretly some degree of real veneration. There are hypocrites of wealth and greatness, as well as of religion and virtue; and a vain man is as apt to pretend to be what he is not, in the one way, as a cunning man is in the other. He assumes the equipage and splendid way of living of his superiors, without considering that whatever may be praise-worthy in any of these, derives its whole merit and propriety from its suitableness to that situation and fortune which both require and can easily support the expence. Many a poor man places his glory in being thought rich, without considering that the duties (if one may call such follies by so very venerable a name) which that reputation imposes upon him, must soon reduce him to beggary, and render his situation still more unlike that of those whom he admires and imitates, than it had been originally.

Section I. Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
Chap. I. That whatever appears to be the proper Object of Gratitude, appears to deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, whatever appears to be the proper Object of Resentment, appears to deserve Punishment

Chap. II. Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment

Chap. III. That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who confers the Benefit, there is little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who suffers it

Chap. V. The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit

Section II. Of Justice and Beneficence
Chap. I. Comparison of those two virtues

Chap. II. Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit

Chap. III. Of the utility of this constitution of Nature

Chap. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters

Section III. Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions
Chap. I. Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune

Chap. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune

Chap. III. Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments

Part V, Chapter I: Of the influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Approbation and Disapprobation
Smith argues that two principles, custom and fashion, pervasively influence judgment. These are based on the modern psychological concept of associativity: Stimuli presented closely in time or space become mentally linked over time and repeated exposure. In Smith's own words: When two objects have frequently been seen together, the imagination requires a habit of passing easily from one to the other. If the first is to appear, we lay our account that the second is to follow. Of their own accord they put us in mind of one another, and the attention glides easily along them. (p. 1) Regarding custom, Smith argues that approbation occurs when stimuli are presented according to how one is accustomed to viewing them and disapprobation occurs when they are presented in a way that one is not accustomed to. Thus, Smith argues for social relativity of judgment meaning that beauty and correctness are determined more by what one has previously been exposed to rather than an absolute principle. Although Smith places greater weight on this social determination he does not discount absolute principles completely, instead he argues that evaluations are rarely inconsistent with custom, therefore giving greater weight to customs than absolutes: I cannot, however, be induced to believe that our sense of external beauty is founded altogether on custom...But though I cannot admit that custom is the sole principle of beauty, yet I can so far allow the truth of this ingenious system as to grant, that there is scarce any one external form to please, if quite contrary to custom...(pp. 14–15).

Smith continues by arguing that fashion is a particular "species" of custom. Fashion is specifically the association of stimuli with people of high rank, for example, a certain type of clothes with a notable person such as a king or a renowned artist. This is because the "graceful, easy, and commanding manners of the great" (p. 3) person are frequently associated with the other aspects of the person of high rank (e.g., clothes, manners), thus bestowing upon the other aspects the "graceful" quality of the person. In this way objects become fashionable. Smith includes not only clothes and furniture in the sphere of fashion, but also taste, music, poetry, architecture, and physical beauty.

Smith also points out that people should be relatively reluctant to change styles from what they are accustomed to even if a new style is equal to or slightly better than current fashion: "A man would be ridiculous who should appear in public with a suit of clothes quite different from those which are commonly worn, though the new dress be ever so graceful or convenient" (p. 7).

Physical beauty, according to Smith, is also determined by the principle of custom. He argues that each "class" of things has a "peculiar conformation which is approved of" and that the beauty of each member of a class is determined by the extent to which it has the most "usual" manifestation of that "conformation": Thus, in the human form, the beauty of each feature lies in a certain middle, equally removed from a variety of other forms that are ugly. (pp. 10–11).

Part V, Chapter II: Of the influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments
Smith argues that the influence of custom is reduced in the sphere of moral judgment. Specifically, he argues that there are bad things that no custom can bring approbation to: But the characters and conduct of a Nero, or a Claudius, are what no custom will ever reconcile us to, what no fashion will ever render agreeable; but the one will always be the object of dread and hatred; the other of scorn and derision. (pp. 15–16). Smith further argues for a "natural" right and wrong, and that custom amplifies the moral sentiments when one's customs are consistent with nature, but dampens moral sentiments when one's customs are inconsistent with nature.

Fashion also has an effect on moral sentiment. The vices of people of high rank, such as the licentiousness of Charles VIII, are associated with the "freedom and independency, with frankness, generosity, humanity, and politeness" of the "superiors" and thus the vices are endued with these characteristics.

title: The Theory of Moral Sentiments


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David Murray Anderson

Admiral Sir David Murray Anderson, (11 April 1874 – 30 October 1936) was a British naval officer and governor. Anderson served in the Royal Navy from the age of 13 and served in many colonial wars and was given various Empire postings, rising to the rank of admiral in 1931. He retired a year later and took up the posting as Governor of Newfoundland, where he also took up the role of Chairman of the Government following the suspension of self-government in the Dominion of Newfoundland. Leaving Newfoundland in 1935, he was appointed as Governor of New South Wales but served only briefly due to his ill health. He died while in office aged 62.

Early life and career
Anderson was born on 11 April 1874, the second son of General David Anderson, Colonel of the Cheshire Regiment, and his wife Charlotte Christina, née Anderson in Newton-by-Chester in Cheshire, England. His elder brother was Lieutenant General Sir Warren Hastings Anderson. In 1887, as a 13-year-old, he became a naval cadet in the training ship Britannia at Dartmouth. Seeing action against King Koko slave traders on the Niger River, he became a lieutenant on 23 February 1895 at age 20. Anderson saw further action against West-African rebels and in the Ashanti Campaign. In May 1902, he was posted as first and gunnery lieutenant to the cruiser HMS Brilliant (1891) on the Channel Squadron.

In 1905 Anderson was promoted to commander and was posted to the Royal Yacht HMY Victoria and Albert in 1908. That year, he married a New Zealander, Edith Teschemaker. On 29 July 1910 Anderson was appointed a Member of the Fourth Class of the Royal Victorian Order. On 11 August 1911, he was promoted to captain and posted as Flag Captain on HMS Hyacinth (1898) from 1913 to 1917.

When the First World War broke out Anderson took part in the operations that resulted in the destruction of the SMS Königsberg (1905) in German East Africa, and was mentioned in despatches in 1915. For his actions leading to the capture of Dar es Salaam he was appointed a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George on 1 January 1918. He was also invested by the Sultan of Zanzibar with the Order of the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar, Second Class. From 1918 to 1919 Anderson was posted to command the battleship HMS Ajax (1912) in the Grand Fleet. In May 1921 he was appointed as an aide-de-camp (ADC) to King George V, which he held until April 1922. After a posting in England, he was promoted to rear admiral in 1922. On 2 June 1923 he was invested as a Companion of the Order of the Bath. He was later posted from August 1923 to October 1925 as the Senior Naval Officer, Yangtze, and briefly served as temporary Commander-in-Chief China Station in 1925. While in China, he was called upon on three separate occasions to command a multi-national force of Japanese, British, American, Portuguese and Italian sailors to help protect the Shanghai International Settlement. For his efforts in China, he was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class, by Emperor Hirohito of Japan.

Further promoted to vice admiral in 1927, Anderson was appointed to command the Africa Station. From June to September 1928 he served as High Commissioner to the Union of South Africa. Being fluent in French, he was further appointed to Geneva as the Admiralty representative to the League of Nations permanent advisory commission from 1929 to 1931. On 3 June 1930 he was appointed as a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, and was promoted to admiral in 1931. He retired at his own request on 5 July 1932.

Governor of Newfoundland

Anderson was then appointed on 20 October 1932 as the Governor of Newfoundland. He became His Majesty's Representative at a time of great instability in the Dominion of Newfoundland. Newfoundland had been hit badly by the Great Depression, leaving most of the banks on the verge of insolvency, saved only by emergency loans from Britain, the state Treasury was empty and the political process was discredited by corruption and incompetence.

The Government, led by Prime Minister Frederick C. Alderdice, called upon the British government to take direct control until Newfoundland could become self-sustaining. The United Kingdom, concerned over Newfoundland's likelihood of defaulting on its loans, asked the government to establish the Newfoundland Royal Commission, headed by a Scottish peer, Lord Amulree. Its report, released in 1933, assessed Newfoundland's political system as institutionally corrupt and its economic future as bleak, recommending the abolition of responsible government, and its replacement by a Commission of the British Government. Acting on the report's recommendations, Alderdice's government voted itself out of existence in December 1933. Appointed as chair of the Commission of Government in 1934, Anderson found his role as Governor with significantly expanded powers and proved himself up to the job, constantly sending reports back to the Dominions Office and giving advice to the Dominions Secretary on how to deal with the Commission members.

Despite his new-found powers, Anderson took the position of neutral mediator, intervening only when there was a dispute in the commission. He was nevertheless involved with restructuring the administration of the state, including government departments, social services, the health system and the postal system. His approach proved to be not enough to bring the Commission out of petty arguments and disputes and in October 1935 it was announced that he would be replaced by another Naval officer, Sir Humphrey Walwyn. Anderson and his wife departed from Newfoundland the following January.

Governor of New South Wales
In November 1935 it was announced that Anderson was to become the Governor of New South Wales, a relatively quieter post. He was invested by King Edward VIII as a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George on 5 May 1936, and as a Knight of Grace of the Venerable Order of St John of Jerusalem on 23 June 1936.

En route to Australia Anderson was taken ill, and had to spend six weeks in hospital in Perth, Western Australia. He was sworn in at Sydney on 6 August 1936. Because of his recurring illness, Lady Anderson undertook many official duties on his behalf, while the Lieutenant Governor of New South Wales, Sir Philip Street, carried out his legislative and ceremonial duties. On 29 October he collapsed and died of a cerebral haemorrhage early in the morning the next day at Government House. His body was laid in state in St. Andrew's Cathedral, Sydney and was shipped back to England for burial.

Lady Edith Muriel Anderson was appointed Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire (DBE) on 11 May 1937 for public service in New South Wales.

title: David Murray Anderson


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Joseph Klausner

Joseph Gedaliah Klausner  (יוסף גדליה קלוזנר; 20 August 1874 – 27 October 1958), was a Lithuanian-born Israeli historian and professor of Hebrew literature. He was the chief redactor of the Encyclopedia Hebraica. He was a candidate for president in the first Israeli presidential election in 1949, losing to Chaim Weizmann. Klausner was the great uncle of Israeli author Amos Oz.

Biography
Joseph Klausner was born in Olkeniki, Vilna Governorate in 1874. At the turn of the 20th century, the Klausners left Lithuania and settled in Odessa. Klausner was active in the city's scientific, literary and Zionist circles. He was a committed Zionist who knew Theodor Herzl personally and attended the First Zionist Congress.

In 1912, Klausner visited Palestine for the first time, and settled there in 1919. In 1925, he became a professor of Hebrew literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He specialized in the history of the Second Temple period. Although not an Orthodox Jew, he observed Sabbath and the dietary laws. He had a wide grasp of the Talmud and Midrashic literature. Joseph Klausner was a member of the circle of Russian Zionist political activists from Odessa, which included Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Menachem Ussishkin. Although not a 'party man,' he supported Revisionist Zionism. In 1919 he helped organize the Ruslan, a ship carrying Jewish refugees and immigrants to Jaffa from Odessa. In July 1929, Klausner established the Pro-Wailing Wall Committee to defend Jewish rights, and resolve problems over access and arrangements for worship at the Western Wall. His house in Talpiot neighborhood of Jerusalem was destroyed in the 1929 Palestine riots.

Despite his Zionist ideology, Klausner had numerous disagreements with Chaim Weizmann. The two were candidates in the presidential election of 1949; Weizmann was declared the first President of Israel.

Academic career
Klausner earned his PhD in Germany. One of his most influential books was about Jesus. The book Jesus of Nazareth, and its sequel, From Jesus to Paul, gained him fame. In it, Klausner described how Jesus was best understood as a Jew and Israelite who was trying to reform the religion, and died as a devout Jew. Herbert Danby, an Anglican priest, translated the work from Hebrew into English so that English scholars might avail themselves of the information. A number of clergymen, incensed at Danby for translating the book, demanded his recall from Jerusalem. Later in his career, he was given a chair in Jewish history.

Amos Oz described his childhood visits to Klausner's house in Talpiot and his impression of Klausner's erudition in his memoir, A Tale of Love and Darkness.

Awards and recognition
In both 1941 and 1949, Klausner was awarded the Bialik Prize for Jewish thought. In 1958, he was awarded the Israel Prize in Jewish studies. In 1982, in recognition of his scholarly achievements, the State of Israel issued a stamp with his picture on it.

title: Joseph Klausner


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Talk:Working Title Films

Untitled
what about my 40 days+nights?

Outside the UK
"...in 2005, made its first feature film set outside the UK, The Interpreter."

What about Bean? -- jeffth  e  jiff  07:25, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

Name?
Has any one got an idea why working title, are called what they are? Was it a 'working title' that some how stuck, or is there more of a back storry to it? I would love to hear more! --Amckern 11:21, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

Share Holders
Is Rowan Atkinson a share holder? I dont know if this is a rumour or not.HappyWanderer (talk) 14:20, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

Eric Fellner and Bevan are now the co-owners of the company
How can they be the owners of the company if the company is a subsidiary of Universal Studios?--Allthestrongbowintheworld (talk) 10:23, 20 January 2013 (UTC)

title: Talk:Working Title Films