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Group attribution error

The group attribution error refers to people's tendency to believe either
 * 1) the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole, or
 * 2) a group's decision outcome must reflect the preferences of individual group members, even when external information is available suggesting otherwise.

The group attribution error shares an attribution bias analogous to the fundamental attribution error. Rather than focusing on individual's behavior, it relies on group outcomes and attitudes as its main basis for conclusions.

Type I
To demonstrate the first form of group attribution error, research participants are typically given case studies about individuals who are members of defined groups (such as members of a particular occupation, nationality, or ethnicity), and then take surveys to determine their views of the groups as a whole. Often the participants may be broken up into separate test groups, some of which are given statistics about the group that directly contradict what they were presented in the case study. Others may even be told directly that the individual in the case study was atypical for the group as a whole. Researchers use the surveys to determine to what extent the participants allowed their views of the individual in the case study to influence their views of the group as a whole and also take note of how effective the statistics were in deterring this group attribution error. Ruth Hamill, Richard E. Nisbett, and Timothy DeCamp Wilson were the first to study this form of group attribution error in detail in their 1980 paper Insensitivity to Sample Bias: Generalizing From Atypical Cases. In their study, the researchers provided participants with a case study about an individual welfare recipient. Half of the participants were given statistics showing that the individual was typical for a welfare recipient and had been on the program for the typical amount of time, while the other half of participants were given statistics showing that the welfare recipient had been on the program much longer than normal. The results of the study revealed that participants did indeed draw extremely negative opinions of all welfare recipients as a result of the case study. It was also found that the differences in statistics provided to the two groups had trivial to no effect on the level of group attribution error.

Type II
The second form of group attribution error was first reported by Scott T. Allison and David Messick in 1985. This form describes people's tendency to assume incorrectly that group decisions reflect group members' attitudes. In their study the researchers did multiple experiments presenting participants with group decisions made on the national, state, and local levels. Participants were presented with situations in which a matter of public policy was determined by a single leader with no popular vote, a popular vote of over 90% of the population, and a popular vote which included approximately 50% of the population. If no group attribution error were present, the participants would be expected to conclude that in the 90% vote the views of the individuals were reflective of the group decision, in the 50% vote they may or may not be, and in the leader decision there is no evidence that the individual views reflect the group outcome. Allison and Messick discovered instead, however, that the participants associated the individual views with the group outcome in all three cases.

Limitations and threats
Follow-up research by Leila Worth and Scott T. Allison attempted to identify the limits of the effect. These studies have shown that the error becomes stronger in perceptions of groups that are viewed as (a) more dissimilar to one's own group, (b) more monolithic, and (c) adversarial to one's own group. The error tends to disappear in perceptions of one's own group. Group members are more likely to attribute the decisions of their own group to structural constraints placed on the group, such as its decision rules, whereas members tend to attribute the decisions of another group to its members' attitudes.

In 2001, Corneille et al. conducted further studies that suggest that threatening groups are viewed as being both more extreme and more homogeneous.

Etymology
The group attribution error has been referred as a term since 1985 by Scott T. Allison and David M. Messick after evaluating numerous researches made between 1970-1985. These researches tie different attribution biases to an individual either 1) the individual's behavior or 2) the outcomes of the group that the individual belongs to. The first one is known as the fundamental attribution error, and the consequent one is known as the group attribution error.

Human development perception of group attribution
Infants develop the ability to categorize first by putting a gender label to other children. Then, the difference in color of the skin begins to play a role in their ability to distinguish different backgrounds. Consequently, group attribution biases towards members of different groups, either on race or gender, affect their ability to judge others. For example, the conception of children believing that "all boys are abusive" illustrates the influence of categorization and generalization to members of this group (boys).

Connections to different attribution errors
The fundamental attribution error is similar to the group attribution error in that it refers to the tendency to believe that an individual's actions are representative of the individual's preferences, even when available information suggests that the actions were caused by outside forces.

The group attribution error and the ultimate attribution error share the individual's tendency to draw different prejudiced conclusions between in-groups and out-groups. The individuals involved in an in-group would attribute positive conclusions about their group outcomes, yet they would attribute negative conclusions towards the out-group members.

title: Group attribution error


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Russification

Russification (русификация), or Russianization, is a form of cultural assimilation in which non-Russians, whether involuntarily or voluntarily, give up their culture and language in favor of the Russian culture and the Russian language.

In a historical sense, the term refers to both official and unofficial policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union concerning their national constituents and to national minorities in Russia, aimed at Russian domination and hegemony.

The major areas of Russification are politics and culture. In politics, an element of Russification is assigning Russian nationals to lead administrative positions in national institutions. In culture, Russification primarily amounts to the domination of the Russian language in official business and the strong influence of the Russian language on national idioms. The shifts in demographics in favour of the ethnic Russian population are sometimes considered a form of Russification as well.

Analytically, it is helpful to distinguish Russification, as a process of changing one's ethnic self-label or identity from a non-Russian ethnonym to Russian, from Russianization, the spread of the Russian language, culture, and people into non-Russian cultures and regions, distinct also from Sovietization or the imposition of institutional forms established by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union throughout the territory ruled by that party. In this sense, although Russification is usually conflated across Russification, Russianization, and Russian-led Sovietization, each can be considered a distinct process. Russianization and Sovietization, for example, did not automatically lead to Russification – a change in language or self-identity of non-Russian people to being Russian. Thus, despite long exposure to the Russian language and culture, as well as to Sovietization, at the end of the Soviet era, non-Russians were on the verge of becoming a majority of the population in the Soviet Union.

History
The Russification of Uralic-speaking people, such as Vepsians, Mordvins, Maris, and Permians, indigenous to large parts of western and central Russia had already begun with the original eastward expansion of East Slavs. Written records of the oldest period are scarce, but toponymic evidence indicates  that this expansion was accomplished at the expense of various Volga-Finnic peoples, who were gradually assimilated by Russians; beginning with the Merya and the Muroma early in the 2nd millennium AD.

In the 13th to 14th century, the Russification of the Komi began but it did not penetrate the Komi heartlands until the 18th century. However, by the 19th century, Komi-Russian bilingualism had become the norm and there was an increasing Russian influence on the Komi language.

After the Russian defeat in the Crimean War in 1856 and the January Uprising of 1863, Tsar Alexander II increased Russification to reduce the threat of future rebellions. Russia was populated by many minority groups, and forcing them to accept the Russian culture was an attempt to prevent self-determination tendencies and separatism. In the 19th century, Russian settlers on traditional Kazakh land (misidentified as Kyrgyz at the time) drove many of the Kazakhs over the border to China.

Russification was extended to non-Muscovite ethnographic groups that composed former Kievan Rus, namely Ukrainians and Belarusians, whose vernacular language and culture developed differently from that of Muscovy due to separation after the partitioning of Kievan Rus. The mentality behind Russification when applied to these groups differed from that applied to others, in that they were claimed to be part of the All-Russian or Triune Russian nation by the Russian Imperial government and by subscribers to Russophilia. Russification competed with contemporary nationalist movements in Ukraine and Belarus that were developing during the 19th century. Russian Imperial authorities as well as modern Russian nationalists asserted that Russification was an organic national consolidation process that would accomplish the goals of homogenizing the Russian nation as they saw it, and reversing the effects of Polonization.

In the Soviet Union
After the 1917 revolution, authorities in the USSR decided to abolish the use of the Arabic alphabet in native languages in Soviet-controlled Central Asia, in the Caucasus, and in the Volga region (including Tatarstan). This detached the local Muslim populations from exposure to the language and writing system of the Quran. The new alphabet for these languages was based on the Latin alphabet and was also inspired by the Turkish alphabet. By the late 1930s, the policy had changed. In 1939–1940, the Soviets decided that a number of these languages (including Tatar, Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Azerbaijani, and Bashkir) would henceforth use variations of the Cyrillic script (see Cyrillization in the Soviet union). Not only that, the spelling and writing of these new Cyrillic words must also be in accordance with the Russian language.

Some historians evaluating the Soviet Union as a colonial empire, applied the "prison of nations" idea to the USSR. Thomas Winderl wrote "The USSR became in a certain sense more a prison-house of nations than the old Empire had ever been."

Korenizatsiya
Stalin's Marxism and the National Question (1913) provided the basic framework for nationality policy in the Soviet Union. The early years of said policy, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s, were guided by the policy of korenizatsiya ("indigenization"), during which the new Soviet regime sought to reverse the long-term effects of Russification on the non-Russian populations. As the regime was trying to establish its power and legitimacy throughout the former Russian empire, it went about constructing regional administrative units, recruiting non-Russians into leadership positions, and promoting non-Russian languages in government administration, the courts, the schools, and the mass media. The slogan then established was that local cultures should be "socialist in content but national in form." That is, these cultures should be transformed to conform with the Communist Party's socialist project for the Soviet society as a whole but have active participation and leadership by the indigenous nationalities and operate primarily in the local languages.

Early nationality policies shared with later policy the object of assuring control by the Communist Party over all aspects of Soviet political, economic, and social life. The early Soviet policy of promoting what one scholar has described as "ethnic particularism" and another as "institutionalized multinationality", had a double goal. On the one hand, it had been an effort to counter Russian chauvinism by assuring a place for non-Russian languages and cultures in the newly formed Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was a means to prevent the formation of alternative ethnically based political movements, including pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. One way of accomplishing this was to promote what some regard as artificial distinctions between ethnic groups and languages rather than promoting the amalgamation of these groups and a common set of languages based on Turkish or another regional language.

The Soviet nationalities policy from its early years sought to counter these two tendencies by assuring a modicum of cultural autonomy to non-Russian nationalities within a federal system or structure of government, though maintaining that the ruling Communist Party was monolithic, not federal. A process of "national-territorial delimitation" (ru:национально-территориальное размежевание) was undertaken to define the official territories of the non-Russian populations within the Soviet Union. The federal system conferred the highest status to the titular nationalities of union republics, and lower status to the titular nationalities of autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and autonomous okrugs. In all, some 50 nationalities had a republic, province, or okrug of which they held nominal control in the federal system. Federalism and the provision of native-language education ultimately left as a legacy a large non-Russian public that was educated in the languages of their ethnic groups and that identified a particular homeland on the territory of the Soviet Union.

World War II
By the late 1930s, policies had shifted. Purges in some of the national regions, such as Ukraine, had occurred already in the early 1930s. Before the turnabout in Ukraine in 1933, a purge of Veli İbraimov and his leadership in the Crimean ASSR in 1929 for "national deviation" led to the Russianization of government, education, and the media and to the creation of a special alphabet for Crimean Tatar to replace the Latin alphabet. Of the two dangers that Joseph Stalin had identified in 1923, now bourgeois nationalism (local nationalism) was said to be a greater threat than Great Russian chauvinism (great power chauvinism). In 1937, Faizullah Khojaev and Akmal Ikramov were removed as leaders of the Uzbek SSR, and in 1938, during the third great Moscow show trial, convicted and subsequently put to death for alleged anti-Soviet nationalist activities.

After Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, became the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union, the Russian language gained greater emphasis. In 1938, Russian became a required subject of study in every Soviet school, including those in which a non-Russian language was the principal medium of instruction for other subjects (e.g., mathematics, science, and social studies). In 1939, non-Russian languages that had been given Latin-based scripts in the late 1920s were given new scripts based on the Cyrillic script.

Before and during World War II, Joseph Stalin deported to Central Asia and Siberia many entire nationalities for their alleged and largely disproven collaboration with the German invaders: Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, and others. Shortly after the war, he deported many Ukrainians, Balts, and Estonians to Siberia as well.

After the war, the leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet family of nations and nationalities was promoted by Stalin and his successors. This shift was most clearly underscored by Communist Party General Secretary Stalin's Victory Day toast to the Russian people in May 1945:

"I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, before all, the Russian people.

I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the nationalities of our country."

The view was reflected in the new State Anthem of the Soviet Union which started with: "An unbreakable union of free republics, Great Russia has sealed forever." Anthems of nearly all Soviet republics mentioned "Russia" or "Russian nation" singled out as "brother", "friend", "elder brother" (Uzbek SSR) or "stronghold of friendship" (Turkmen SSR).

Although the official literature on nationalities and languages in subsequent years continued to speak of there being 130 equal languages in the USSR, in practice a hierarchy was endorsed in which some nationalities and languages were given special roles or viewed as having different long-term futures.

Educational reforms
An analysis of textbook publishing found that education was offered for at least one year and it was also offered to children who were in at least the first class (grade) in 67 languages between 1934 and 1980. Educational reforms were undertaken after Nikita Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party in the late 1950s and launched a process of replacing non-Russian schools with Russian ones for the nationalities that had lower status in the federal system, the nationalities whose populations were smaller and the nationalities which were already bilingual on a large scale. Nominally, this process was guided by the principle of "voluntary parental choice." But other factors also came into play, including the size and formal political status of the group in the Soviet federal hierarchy and the prevailing level of bilingualism among parents. By the early 1970s schools in which non-Russian languages served as the principal medium of instruction operated in 45 languages, while seven more indigenous languages were taught as subjects of study for at least one class year. By 1980, instruction was offered in 35 non-Russian languages of the peoples of the USSR, just over half the number in the early 1930s.

In most of these languages, schooling was not offered for the complete ten-year curriculum. For example, within the Russian SFSR in 1958–59, full 10-year schooling in the native language was offered in only three languages: Russian, Tatar, and Bashkir. And some nationalities had minimal or no native-language schooling. By 1962–1963, among non-Russian nationalities that were indigenous to the RSFSR, whereas 27% of children in classes I-IV (primary school) studied in Russian-language schools, 53% of those in classes V-VIII (incomplete secondary school) studied in Russian-language schools, and 66% of those in classes IX-X studied in Russian-language schools. Although many non-Russian languages were still offered as a subject of study at a higher class level (in some cases through complete general secondary school – the 10th class), the pattern of using the Russian language as the main medium of instruction accelerated after Khrushchev's parental choice program got underway.

Pressure to convert the main medium of instruction to Russian was evidently higher in urban areas. For example, in 1961–62, reportedly only 6% of Tatar children living in urban areas attended schools in which Tatar was the main medium of instruction. Similarly in Dagestan in 1965, schools in which the indigenous language was the medium of instruction existed only in rural areas. The pattern was probably similar, if less extreme, in most of the non-Russian union republics, although in Belarus and Ukraine, schooling in urban areas was highly Russianized.

Rapprochement
The promotion of federalism and of non-Russian languages had always been a strategic decision aimed at expanding and maintaining Communist Party rule. On the theoretical plane, the Communist Party's official doctrine was of eventual national differences and nationalities as such would disappear. In official party doctrine as it was reformulated in the Third Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union introduced by Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, although the program stated that ethnic distinctions would eventually disappear and a single common language would be adopted by all nationalities in the Soviet Union, "the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially language distinctions, is a considerably more drawn-out process than the obliteration of class distinctions." At the time, Soviet nations and nationalities were further flowering their cultures and drawing together (сближение – sblizhenie) into a stronger union. In his Report on the Program to the Congress, Khrushchev used even stronger language: that the process of further rapprochement (sblizhenie) and greater unity of nations would eventually lead to a merging or fusion (слияние – sliyanie) of nationalities.

Khrushchev's formula of rapprochement-fusing was moderated slightly when Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964 (a post he held until his death in 1982). Brezhnev asserted that rapprochement would lead ultimately to the complete unity of nationalities. "Unity" is an ambiguous term because it can imply either the maintenance of separate national identities but a higher stage of mutual attraction, similarity between nationalities or total disappearance of ethnic differences. In the political context of the time, rapprochement-unity was regarded as a softening of the pressure toward Russification that Khrushchev had promoted with his endorsement of sliyanie.

The 24th Party Congress in 1971 launched the idea that a new "Soviet people" was forming on the territory of the USSR, a community for which the common language – the language of the "Soviet people" – was the Russian language, consistent with the role that Russian was playing for the fraternal nations and nationalities in the territory already. This new community was labeled a people (народ – narod), not a nation (нация – natsiya), but in that context the Russian word narod ("people") implied an ethnic community, not just a civic or political community.

Thus, until the end of the Soviet era, doctrinal rationalization had been provided for some of the practical policy steps that were taken in the areas of education and the media. First of all, the transfer of many "national schools" (schools based on local languages) to Russian as a medium of instruction accelerated under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and continued into the 1980s.

Second, the new doctrine was used to justify the special place of the Russian language as the "language of inter-nationality communication" (язык межнационального общения) in the USSR. Use of the term "inter-nationality" (межнациональное) rather than the more conventional "international" (международное) focused on the special internal role of Russian language rather than on its role as a language of international discourse. That Russian was the most widely spoken language, and that Russians were the majority of the population of the country, were also cited in justification of the special place of the Russian language in government, education, and the media.

At the 27th CPSU Party Congress in 1986, presided over by Mikhail Gorbachev, the 4th Party Program reiterated the formulas of the previous program:

"Characteristic of the national relations in our country are both the continued flourishing of the nations and nationalities and the fact that they are steadily and voluntarily drawing closer together on the basis of equality and fraternal cooperation. Neither artificial prodding nor holding back of the objective trends of development is admissible here. In the long term historical perspective, this development will lead to complete unity of the nations....

The equal right of all citizens of the USSR to use their native languages and the free development of these languages will be ensured in the future as well. At the same time learning the Russian language, which has been voluntarily accepted by the Soviet people as a medium of communication between different nationalities, besides the language of one's nationality, broadens one's access to the achievements of science and technology and of Soviet and world culture."

During the Soviet era, a significant number of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians migrated to other Soviet republics, and many of them settled there. According to the last census in 1989, the Russian 'diaspora' in the non-Russian Soviet republics had reached 25 million.

Linguistics

Progress in the spread of the Russian language as a second language and the gradual displacement of other languages was monitored in Soviet censuses. The Soviet censuses of 1926, 1937, 1939, and 1959, had included questions on "native language" (родной язык) as well as "nationality." The 1970, 1979, and 1989 censuses added to these questions one on "other language of the peoples of the USSR" that an individual could "use fluently" (свободно владеть). It is speculated that the explicit goal of the new question on the "second language" was to monitor the spread of Russian as the language of internationality communication.

Each of the official homelands within the Soviet Union was regarded as the only homeland of the titular nationality and its language, while the Russian language was regarded as the language for interethnic communication for the whole Soviet Union. Therefore, for most of the Soviet era, especially after the korenizatsiya (indigenization) policy ended in the 1930s, schools in which non-Russian Soviet languages would be taught were not generally available outside the respective ethnically based administrative units of these ethnicities. Some exceptions appeared to involve cases of historic rivalries or patterns of assimilation between neighboring non-Russian groups, such as between Tatars and Bashkirs in Russia or among major Central Asian nationalities. For example, even in the 1970s schooling was offered in at least seven languages in Uzbekistan: Russian, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Karakalpak.

While formally all languages were equal, in almost all Soviet republics the Russian/local bilingualism was "asymmetric": the titular nation learned Russian, whereas immigrant Russians generally did not learn the local language.

In addition, many non-Russians who lived outside their respective administrative units tended to become Russified linguistically; that is, they not only learned Russian as a second language but they also adopted it as their home language or mother tongue – although some still retained their sense of ethnic identity or origins even after shifting their native language to Russian. This includes both the traditional communities (e.g., Lithuanians in the northwestern Belarus (see Eastern Vilnius region) or the Kaliningrad Oblast (see Lithuania Minor)) and the communities that appeared during Soviet times such as Ukrainian or Belarusian workers in Kazakhstan or Latvia, whose children attended primarily the Russian-language schools and thus the further generations are primarily speaking Russian as their native language; for example, 57% of Estonia's Ukrainians, 70% of Estonia's Belarusians and 37% of Estonia's Latvians claimed Russian as the native language in the last Soviet census of 1989. Russian replaced Yiddish and other languages as the main language of many Jewish communities inside the Soviet Union as well.

Another consequence of the mixing of nationalities and the spread of bilingualism and linguistic Russification was the growth of ethnic intermarriage and a process of ethnic Russification—coming to call oneself Russian by nationality or ethnicity, not just speaking Russian as a second language or using it as a primary language. In the last decades of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russification (or ethnic assimilation) was moving very rapidly for a few nationalities such as the Karelians and Mordvinians. Whether children born in mixed families to one Russian parent were likely to be raised as Russians depended on the context. For example, the majority of children in North Kazakhstan with one of each parent chose Russian as their nationality on their internal passport at age 16. Children of mixed Russian and Estonian parents living in Tallinn (the capital city of Estonia), or mixed Russian and Latvian parents living in Riga (the capital of Latvia), or mixed Russian and Lithuanian parents living in Vilnius (the capital of Lithuania) most often chose as their own nationality that of the titular nationality of their republic – not Russian.

More generally, patterns of linguistic and ethnic assimilation (Russification) were complex and cannot be accounted for by any single factor such as educational policy. Also relevant were the traditional cultures and religions of the groups, their residence in urban or rural areas, their contact with and exposure to the Russian language and to ethnic Russians, and other factors.

In the Russian Federation (1991–present)
The enforced Russification of Russia's remaining indigenous minorities continued in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in connection with urbanization and the declining population replacement rates (particularly low among the more western groups). As a result, several of Russia's indigenous languages and cultures are currently considered endangered. E.g. between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, the assimilation numbers of the Mordvins have totalled over 100,000, a major loss for a people totalling less than one million in number.

On 19 June 2018, the Russian State Duma adopted a bill that made education in all languages but Russian optional, overruling previous laws by ethnic autonomies, and reducing instruction in minority languages to only two hours a week. This bill has been likened by some commentators, such as in Foreign Affairs, to the policy of Russification.

When the bill was still being considered, advocates for minorities warned that the bill could endanger their languages and traditional cultures. The law came after a lawsuit in the summer of 2017, where a Russian mother claimed that her son had been "materially harmed" by learning the Tatar language, while in a speech Putin argued that it was wrong to force someone to learn a language that is not their own. The later "language crackdown" in which autonomous units were forced to stop mandatory hours of native languages was also seen as a move by Putin to "build identity in Russian society".

Protests and petitions against the bill by either civic society, groups of public intellectuals or regional governments came from Tatarstan (with attempts for demonstrations suppressed), Chuvashia, Mari El, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Karachays, the Kumyks, the Avars, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. Although the Duma representatives from the Caucasus did not oppose the bill, it prompted a large outcry in the North Caucasus with representatives from the region being accused of cowardice. The law was also seen as possibly destabilizing, threatening ethnic relations and revitalizing the various North Caucasian nationalist movements. The International Circassian Organization called for the law to be rescinded before it came into effect. Twelve of Russia's ethnic autonomies, including five in the Caucasus called for the legislation to be blocked.

On 10 September 2019, Udmurt activist Albert Razin self-immolated in front of the regional government building in Izhevsk as it was considering passing the controversial bill to reduce the status of the Udmurt language. Between 2002 and 2010 the number of Udmurt speakers dwindled from 463,000 to 324,000. Other languages in the Volga region recorded similar declines in the number of speakers; between the 2002 and 2010 censuses the number of Mari speakers declined from 254,000 to 204,000 while Chuvash recorded only 1,042,989 speakers in 2010, a 21.6% drop from 2002. This is attributed to a gradual phasing out of indigenous language teaching both in the cities and rural areas while regional media and governments shift exclusively to Russian.

In the North Caucasus, the law came after a decade in which educational opportunities in the indigenous languages was reduced by more than 50%, due to budget reductions and federal efforts to decrease the role of languages other than Russian. During this period, numerous indigenous languages in the North Caucasus showed significant decreases in their numbers of speakers even though the numbers of the corresponding nationalities increased, leading to fears of language replacement. The numbers of Ossetian, Kumyk and Avar speakers dropped by 43,000, 63,000 and 80,000 respectively. As of 2018, it has been reported that the North Caucasus is nearly devoid of schools that teach in mainly their native languages, with the exception of one school in North Ossetia, and a few in rural regions of Dagestan; this is true even in largely monoethnic Chechnya and Ingushetia. Chechen and Ingush are still used as languages of everyday communication to a greater degree than their North Caucasian neighbours, but sociolinguistics argue that the current situation will lead to their degradation relative to Russian as well.

In 2020, a set of amendments to the Russian constitution was approved by the State Duma and later the Federation Council. One of the amendments enshrined Russian nation as the "state-forming nationality" (Russian: государствообразующий народ) and Russian the “language of the state-forming nationality”. The amendment has been met with criticism from Russia's minorities who argue that it goes against the principle that Russia is a multinational state and will only marginalize them further. The amendments were welcomed by Russian nationalists, such as Konstantin Malofeev and Nikolai Starikov. The changes in Constitution were preceded by "Strategy of government's national policy of Russian Federation" issued in December 2018, which stated that "all-Russian civic identity is founded on Russia cultural dominant, inherent to all nations of Russian Federation".

With the release of the latest census in 2022, results showed a catastrophic decline in the number of many ethnic groups, particularly peoples of the Volga region. Between 2010 and 2022, the number of people identifying as ethnic Mari dropped by 22.6%, from 548,000 to 424,000 people. Ethnic Chuvash and Udmurts dropped by 25% and 30% respectively. More vulnerable groups like the Mordvins and Komi-Permyaks saw even larger declines, dropping by 35% and 40% respectively, the former of which resulted in Mordvins no longer being among the top ten largest ethnic groups in Russia.

Azerbaijan
Russia was introduced to the South Caucasus following its colonisation in the first half of the nineteenth century after Qajar Iran was forced to cede its Caucasian territories per the Treaty of Gulistan and Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1813 and 1828 respectively to Russia. By 1830 there were schools with Russian as the language of instruction in the cities of Shusha, Baku, Yelisavetpol (Ganja), and Shemakha (Shamakhi); later such schools were established in Kuba (Quba), Ordubad, and Zakataly (Zaqatala). Education in Russian was unpopular amongst ethnic Azerbaijanis until 1887 when Habib bey Mahmudbeyov and Sultan Majid Ganizadeh founded the first Russian–Azerbaijani school in Baku. A secular school with instruction in both Russian and Azeri, its programs were designed to be consistent with the cultural values and traditions of the Muslim population. Eventually, 240 such schools for both boys and girls, including a women's college founded in 1901, were established prior to the "Sovietization" of the South Caucasus. The first Russian-Azeri reference library opened in 1894. In 1918, during the short period of Azerbaijan's independence, the government declared Azeri the official language, but the use of Russian in government documents was permitted until all civil servants mastered the official language.

In the Soviet era, the large Russian population of Baku, the quality and prospects of education in Russia, increased access to Russian literature, and other factors contributed to the intensive Russification of Baku's population. Its direct result by the mid-twentieth century was the formation of a supra-ethnic urban Baku subculture, uniting people of Russian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Jewish, and other origins and whose special features were being cosmopolitan and Russian-speaking. The widespread use of Russian resulted in a phenomenon of 'Russian-speaking Azeris', i.e. an emergence of an urban community of Azerbaijani-born ethnic Azeris who considered Russian their native language. In 1970, 57,500 Azeris (1.3%) identified Russian as their native language.

Belarus
Russian and Soviet authorities conducted policies of Russification of Belarus from 1772 to 1991, interrupted by the Belarusization policy in the 1920s.

When the pro-Russian president Alexander Lukashenko gained power in 1994, the Russification policy was renewed.

Finland
The Russification of Finland (1899–1905, 1908–1917), sortokaudet ("times of oppression" in Finnish) was a governmental policy of the Russian Empire aimed at the termination of Finland's autonomy. Finnish opposition to Russification was one of the main factors that ultimately led to Finland's declaration of independence in 1917.

Germany
In 1945, the Red Army conquered the northern part of the German province East Prussia. It was annexed by the Soviet Union. While the non-refugee population was expelled or forcibly deported to the Soviet Union for forced labor until 1949, a systematic settlement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with Russians took place. Almost all cultural assets reminiscent of the Germans (e.g., churches, castles, palaces, monuments, library collections, drainage systems, etc.) were demolished or left to decay, and all towns, bodies of water, and forests were given names in the Russian language. Northern East Prussia was completely russified.

Latvia
On September 14, 1885, an ukaz was signed by Alexander III setting the mandatory use of Russian for Baltic governorate officials. In 1889, it was extended to apply to official proceedings of the Baltic municipal governments as well. By the beginning of the 1890s, Russian was enforced as the language of instruction in Baltic governorate schools.

After Soviet re-occupation of Latvia in 1944, Russian became the language of State business, and Russian served as the language of inter-ethnic communication among the increasingly urbanized non-Russian ethnic groups, making cities major centres for the use of the Russian language and making functional bilingualism in Russian a minimum necessary for the local population.

In an attempt to partially reverse the Soviet Russification policies and give the Latvian language more equal positions to Russian, the so-called Latvian national communist faction within the Communist Party of Latvia passed a bill in 1957 that made the knowledge of both Latvian and Russian obligatory for all Communist Party employees, government functionaries, and service sector staff. The law included a 2-year deadline for gaining proficiency in both languages.

In 1958, as the two-year deadline for the bill was approaching, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set out to enact an education reform, a component of which, the so-called Thesis 19, would give parents in all of the Soviet Republics, with the exception of Russian SFSR, a choice for their children in public schools to study either the language of the republic's titular nation (in this case Latvian) or Russian, as well as one foreign language, in contrast, to the previous education system, where it was mandatory for school children to learn all three languages.

Due to strong opposition from the Latvian national communists and the Latvian public, Latvian SSR was only one of two of the 12 Soviet Republics that did not yield to the increasing pressure to adopt Thesis 19 and excluded its contents from their ratified statutes. This led to the eventual purge of the Latvian national communists from the Communist Party ranks between 1959 and 1962. A month after the removal of the Latvian National Communist leader Eduards Berklavs All-Union legislation was implemented in Latvia by Arvīds Pelše.

In an attempt to further widen the use of Russian and reverse the work of the national communists, a bilingual school system was established in Latvia, with parallel classes being taught in both Russian and Latvian. The number of such schools increased dramatically, including regions where the Russian population was minimal, and by July 1963 there were already 240 bilingual schools.

The effect of the reform was the gradual decline in the number of assigned hours for learning Latvian in Russian schools and the increase in hours allocated for learning Russian in Latvian schools. In 1964–1965 the total weekly average of Latvian language classes and Russian language and literature classes in Latvian schools across all grades was reported to be 38.5 and 72.5 hours respectively, in comparison with 79 hours being devoted to the Russian language and 26 hours being devoted to Latvian language and literature in Russian schools. The reform has been attributed to the persistence of poor Latvian language knowledge among Russians living in Latvia and the increasing language gap between Latvians and Russians.

In 1972, the Letter of 17 Latvian communists, was smuggled outside the Latvian SSR and circulated in the Western world, accusing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of "Great Russian chauvinism" and "progressive Russification of all life in Latvia":

The first main task is to transfer from Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine as many Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians as possible, and to resettle them permanently in Latvia (...) Now the republic already has a number of large enterprises where there are almost no Latvians among the workers, engineering-technical personnel, and directors (...); there are also those where most of the workers are Latvians, but none of the executives understands Latvian (...) About 65% of the doctors working in municipal health institutions do not speak Latvian (...) Demands of the newcomers to increase Russian-language radio and television broadcasts in the republic are being satisfied. At the present time one radio program and one television program is broadcast entirely in Russian, and the other program is mixed. Thus about two-thirds of the radio and television broadcasts in the republic are in Russian. (...) about half of the periodicals published in Latvia are in Russian anyway. Works of Latvian writers and school textbooks in Latvian cannot be published, because there is a lack of paper, but books written by Russian authors and school textbooks in Russian are published. (..) There are many collectives where Latvians have an absolute majority. Nevertheless, if there is a single Russian in the collective, he will demand that the meeting be conducted in Russian, and his demand will be satisfied. If this is not done, then the collective is accused of nationalism.

Lithuania and Poland

In the 19th century, the Russian Empire strove to replace the Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian languages and dialects with Russian in those areas, which were annexed by the Russian Empire after the Partitions of Poland (1772–1795) and the Congress of Vienna (1815). Imperial Russia faced a crucial critical cultural situation by 1815:

"Large sections of Russian society had come under the foreign influence as a result of the Napoleonic wars and appeared open to change. As a consequence of absorbing so much Polish territory, by 1815 no less than 64 percent of the nobility of the Romanov realm was of Polish descent, and since there were more literate Poles than Russians, more people within it could read and write Polish than Russian. The third largest city, Vilnius, was entirely Polish in character and its university was the best in the Empire."

Russification in Congress Poland intensified after the November Uprising of 1831, and in particular after the January Uprising of 1863. In 1864, the Polish and Belarusian languages were banned in public places; in the 1880s, Polish was banned in schools, on school grounds, and in the offices of Congress Poland. Research and teaching of the Polish language, Polish history, or Catholicism were forbidden. Illiteracy rose as Poles refused to learn Russian. Students were beaten for resisting Russification. A Polish underground education network was formed, including the famous Flying University. According to Russian estimates, by the start of the 20th century, around one-third of the inhabitants in the territory of Congress Poland participated in secret teaching with use of Polish literary works.

Starting in the 1840s, Russia considered introducing Cyrillic script for spelling the Polish language, with the first school books printed in the 1860s; the reform was eventually deemed unnecessary because of the introduction of school education in the Russian language.

A similar development took place in Lithuania. Its Governor General, Mikhail Muravyov (in office 1863–1865), prohibited the public use of spoken Polish and Lithuanian and closed Polish and Lithuanian schools; teachers from other parts of Russia who did not speak these languages were moved in to teach pupils. Muravyov also banned the use of Latin and Gothic scripts in publishing. He was reported as saying, "What the Russian bayonet didn't accomplish, the Russian school will." ("Что не додѣлалъ русскій штыкъ – додѣлаетъ русская школа.") This ban, lifted only in 1904, was disregarded by the Knygnešiai, the Lithuanian book smugglers, who brought Lithuanian publications printed in the Latin alphabet, the historic orthography of the Lithuanian language, from Lithuania Minor (part of East Prussia) and from the United States into the Lithuanian-speaking areas of Imperial Russia. The knygnešiai came to symbolise the resistance of Lithuanians against Russification.

The Russification campaign also promoted the Russian Orthodox faith over Catholicism. The measures used included closing down Catholic monasteries, officially banning the building of new churches and giving many of the old ones to the Russian Orthodox church, banning Catholic schools and establishing state schools that taught only the Orthodox religion, requiring Catholic priests to preach only officially approved sermons, requiring that Catholics who married members of the Orthodox church convert, requiring Catholic nobles to pay an additional tax in the amount of 10% of their profits, limiting the amount of land a Catholic peasant could own, and switching from the Gregorian calendar (used by Catholics) to the Julian one (used by members of the Orthodox church).

Most of the Orthodox Church property in the 19th century Congress Poland was acquired at the expense of the Catholic Church of both rites (Roman and Greek Catholic).

After the 1863 January Uprising, many manors and great chunks of land were confiscated from nobles of Polish and Lithuanian descent who were accused of helping the uprising; these properties were later given or sold to Russian nobles. Villages where supporters of the uprising lived were repopulated by ethnic Russians. Vilnius University, where the language of instruction had been Polish rather than Russian, closed in 1832. Lithuanians and Poles were banned from holding any public jobs (including professional positions, such as teachers and doctors) in Lithuania; this forced educated Lithuanians to move to other parts of the Russian Empire. The old legal code was dismantled and a new one based on the Russian code and written in the Russian language was enacted; Russian became the only administrative and juridical language in the area. Most of these actions ended at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but others took longer to be reversed; Vilnius University re-opened only after Russia had lost control of the city in 1919.

Bessarabia/Moldova
Bessarabia was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. In 1816 Bessarabia became an autonomous state, but only until 1828. In 1829, the use of the Romanian language was forbidden in the administration. In 1833, the use of the Romanian language was forbidden in churches. In 1842, teaching in Romanian was forbidden in secondary schools; it was forbidden in elementary schools in 1860.

The Russian authorities encouraged the migration of Moldovans to other provinces of the Russian Empire (especially in Kuban, Kazakhstan, and Siberia), while foreign ethnic groups (especially Russians and Ukrainians, called in the 19th century "Little Russians") were encouraged to settle there. Though the 1817 census did not record ethnicity, Romanian authors have claimed that Bessarabia was populated at the time by 86% Moldovans, 6.5% Ukrainians, 1.5% Russians (Lipovans), and 6% other ethnic groups. 80 years later, in 1897, the ethnic structure was very different: only 56% Moldovans, but 11.7% Ukrainians, 18.9% Russians, and 13.4% other ethnic groups. During 80 years, between 1817 and 1897, the share of the Moldovan population dropped by 30%.

After the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia in 1940, the Romanian population of Bessarabia was persecuted by Soviet authorities, especially in the years following the annexation, based mostly on social, educational, and political grounds; because of this, Russification laws were imposed again on the Romanian population. The Moldovan language promoted during the Interwar period by the Soviet authorities first in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and after 1940 taught in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, was actually the Romanian language but written with a version of the Cyrillic script derived from the Russian alphabet. Proponents of Cyrillic orthography argue that the Romanian language was historically written with the Cyrillic script, albeit a different version of it (see Moldovan alphabet and Romanian Cyrillic alphabet for a discussion of this controversy).

Ukraine
Russian and Soviet authorities conducted policies of Russification of Ukraine from 1709 to 1991, interrupted by the Korenizatsiya policy in the 1920s. Since Ukraine's independence, its government has implemented Ukrainization policies to decrease the use of Russian and favour Ukrainian. The Russification policy included various instruments, most notably an explicit ban on using Ukrainian language in print or importing literature, staging plays or lectures in Ukrainian from 1876 (Ems Ukaz).

A number of Ukrainian activists died by suicide in protest against Russification, including Vasyl Makukh in 1968 and Oleksa Hirnyk in 1978.

Following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the emergence of unrecognized Russian-backed entities in Eastern Ukraine, a subtle form of Russification was initiated, despite these areas being predominantly Russian-speaking.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Russification


text:
User talk:Tappyea

Bad man. Owen&rob 22:33, 7 Mar 2004 (UTC)

You are a very silly boy.

Just to let you know the correct place for listing speedy deletions is Speedy deletions. -- Graham :) 00:07, 9 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Hello mate.

Image:Manc_skyline.jpg listed for deletion
An image or media file that you uploaded or altered, Image:Manc_skyline.jpg, has been listed at Images and media for deletion. Please see the to see why this is (you may have to search for the title of the image to find its entry), if you are interested in it not being deleted. Thank you. User:Gay Cdn (talk) (Contr) 01:52, 21 June 2007 (UTC)

Nomination of Heald Green Ratepayers for deletion
A discussion is taking place as to whether the article Heald Green Ratepayers is suitable for inclusion in Wikipedia according to Wikipedia's policies and guidelines or whether it should be deleted.

The article will be discussed at Articles for deletion/Heald Green Ratepayers until a consensus is reached, and anyone is welcome to contribute to the discussion. The nomination will explain the policies and guidelines which are of concern. The discussion focuses on high-quality evidence and our policies and guidelines.

Users may edit the article during the discussion, including to improve the article to address concerns raised in the discussion. However, do not remove the article-for-deletion notice from the top of the article. QueenCake (talk) 20:08, 4 May 2017 (UTC)

title: User talk:Tappyea


text:
Bahrain Grand Prix

The Bahrain Grand Prix (جائزة البحرين الكبرى), officially known as the Gulf Air Bahrain Grand Prix for sponsorship reasons, is a Formula One motor racing event in Bahrain. The first race took place at the Bahrain International Circuit on 4 April 2004. It made history as the first Formula One Grand Prix to be held in the Middle East, and was given the award for the "Best Organised Grand Prix" by the FIA. The race has in the past been the second, third, or fourth race of the Formula One calendar. However, in the season, Bahrain swapped places with the traditional opener, the Australian Grand Prix, which was pushed back to avoid a clash with the Commonwealth Games. In 2010, Bahrain staged the opening race of the season and the cars drove the full 6.299 km "Endurance Circuit" to celebrate F1's 'diamond jubilee'. In, the Bahrain Grand Prix was the season opener again because the 2021 Australian Grand Prix was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The 2011 edition, due to be held on 13 March, was cancelled on 21 February due to the 2011 Bahraini protests after drivers including Damon Hill and Mark Webber had protested. Human rights activists called for a cancellation of the 2012 race due to reports of human rights abuses committed by the Bahraini authorities. Team personnel also voiced concerns about safety, but the race, nonetheless, was held as planned on 22 April 2012.

In 2014, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the first staging of the Bahrain Grand Prix, the race was held as a night event under floodlights. In so doing it became the second Formula One night race after the Singapore Grand Prix in 2008. Bahrain's inaugural night event was won by Lewis Hamilton. Subsequent races have also been night races.

History
The construction of the Bahrain International Circuit in Sakhir began in 2002. Bahrain had fought off fierce competition from elsewhere in the region to stage a F1 race, with Egypt, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates all hoping for the prestige of hosting a Formula One Grand Prix.

The race has been held in every Formula One season since 2004, with the exception of 2011, due to the 2011 Bahraini uprising. The first Bahrain Grand Prix was won by Michael Schumacher, driving for Ferrari. The following two editions, in 2005 and 2006, were won by Fernando Alonso, racing for Renault, and Felipe Massa won the 2007 and 2008 editions of the race for Ferrari. Jenson Button won the 2009 Bahrain Grand Prix driving for Brawn GP, and Fernando Alonso won his third Bahrain Grand Prix in 2010 driving for Ferrari. Following the cancellation of the 2011 Bahrain Grand Prix, Sebastian Vettel and Red Bull won the 2012 and 2013 Grands Prix, followed by Lewis Hamilton and Mercedes winning in 2014 and 2015. Hamilton's teammate Nico Rosberg won in 2016, and Sebastian Vettel won another two editions of the race for Ferrari in 2017 and 2018. Lewis Hamilton then proceeded to win the following three Grands Prix, in 2019, 2020, and 2021, setting the record for the most Bahrain Grand Prix wins, with five. The 2022 round was won by Charles Leclerc, giving the Scuderia Ferrari their record seventh Bahrain Grand Prix victory. The most recent edition, held in 2024, was won by Max Verstappen of Red Bull Racing, with the previous year's event their first Bahrain Grand Prix victory in over ten years.

The 2010 edition of the race saw a different circuit configuration used for the Grand Prix. The "Endurance Circuit" layout was used instead of the "Grand Prix Circuit" layout, extending the lap length to 6.299 km. The track was planned to revert back to its original layout for the 2011 edition, and did so for the 2012 edition.

In February 2022, it was reported that the event's contract had been extended to last until the 2036 Formula One season.

Characteristics
One notable characteristic of the course is its large run-off areas, which have been criticised for not punishing drivers who stray off the track. However, they tend to prevent sand getting onto the track. The circuit is regarded as one of the safest in the world.

Although alcoholic beverages are legal in Bahrain, the drivers do not spray the traditional champagne on the podium, instead spraying a non-alcoholic rosewater drink known as Waard.

2011 cancellation
On 21 February 2011, it was announced that the 2011 Bahrain Grand Prix scheduled for 13 March was cancelled due to the 2011 Bahraini protests. On 3 June, FIA decided to reschedule the race for 30 October. World champion racer Damon Hill called on Formula One not to reschedule saying that if the race went ahead "we will forever have the blight of association with repressive methods to achieve order". Bernie Ecclestone told the BBC in an interview: "Hopefully there'll be peace and quiet and we can return in the future, but of course it's not on. The schedule cannot be rescheduled without the agreement of the participants – they're the facts." A week after its decision to reschedule the race, Formula One announced the cancellation of the race for 2011.

2012 controversy
Human rights activists called for a cancellation of the 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix, which took place on 22 April, because of reports of ongoing use of excessive force by authorities and torture in detention. That includes the killing of activist Salah Abbas Habib during a demonstration on the eve of the Grand Prix, as well as the earlier fatal shooting of photojournalist Ahmed Ismael Hassan al-Samadi, who was covering a protest against the Bahrain Grand Prix.

On 9 April 2012, The Guardian reported that according to an unnamed leading member of one of the teams who said his views were representative, "the Formula One teams want the sport's governing body to cancel – or at least postpone – the Bahrain Grand Prix ..., because of increasing safety concerns amid ongoing protests in the kingdom ... I feel very uncomfortable about going to Bahrain. If I'm brutally frank, the only way they can pull this race off without incident is to have a complete military lockdown there. And I think that would be unacceptable, both for F1 and for Bahrain. But I don't see any other way they can do it".

In that context, Anonymous launched on 21 April 2012 the operation opBahrain, threatening the Formula 1 representatives of a cyberattack in case they go on with the Grand Prix. Hours later, Anonymous hackers took down the f1-racers.net website after launching a distributed denial-of-service attack. Despite these protests, the Grand Prix was held as planned.

Continuing controversy
Since the global media attention over the large scale demonstrations in 2011 and 2012, there have been continued reports from human rights groups about abuses and jailings in Bahrain relating to F1 protests. Among them are photographer Ahmed Humaidan, who was one of about 30 people jailed for roles in the 2012 protest, and activist Najah Ahmed Yousif, who is in prison, and has been physically and sexually abused, for criticising the Bahrain F1 on social media. Rights organisations continue to criticise the Formula One Group and Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) for refusing to follow their own Statement of Commitment to Respect for Human Rights, saying that by not leveraging their position of power to take action against such political crackdown, the F1 organisers are complicit to the dissidents' suffering. In 2018, F1 "admitted concern" for Yousif, after continued public and media pressure; however, there has been no known follow up since.

A collection of human rights groups, led by the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), have claimed that the Bahrain Grand Prix has become a focal point of popular protests and serious human rights abuses committed by Bahraini security forces against protesters. The NGOs accuse F1 of performing invaluable PR for Bahrain's government and that it risked further normalizing of the human rights violations in the country. In letters to Lewis Hamilton, three Bahraini political prisoners praised his commitment towards human rights issues, and requested him as an F1 world champion to bring their plight in notice of a wider audience. The Grand Prix has been cited as an example of sportswashing.

2020 postponement
Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, event organisers announced that no spectators would be permitted to attend the race that had been due to take place on 22 March. However, a fortnight before the race was due to take place, the race was indefinitely postponed. The race was rescheduled to 29 November, and it was one of two events held around the Bahrain International Circuit across two weekends, with the second race taking place on the outer layout and being named the Sakhir Grand Prix.

2020 controversy
According to the rescheduled F1 calendar, Bahrain was announced as hosting two races back to back November 2020. However, the event received backlash not only from human rights organizations, but also from F1's newly crowned, seven-time world champion Lewis Hamilton. Hamilton issued a warning to F1 and called on the sport to face its responsibilities and confront / deal with the human rights issues in the countries it visits. A consortium of human rights organizations led by the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) wrote to Formula One CEO, Chase Carey that the race in Bahrain became a focal point of protests in the country and human rights abuses carried out by Bahraini security against demonstrators. The government of Bahrain, on the other hand, denied allegations of sportswashing.

Legal complaint over Bahrain contract
On 27 October 2022, the F1 was hit with a legal complaint that it turned a blind eye to human rights violations when it announced in February that the Bahrain GP will stay on the calendar until 2036. The claim said F1 breached Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines. The complaint, made through the British government’s UK National Contact Point (NCP), was served by the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (Bird) and two alleged torture survivors from Bahrain, Najah Yusuf and Hajer Mansoor.

Repeat winners (drivers)
Drivers in bold are competing in the Formula One championship in the current season.

Repeat winners (constructors)
Teams in bold are competing in the Formula One championship in the current season.

Repeat winners (engine manufacturers)
Manufacturers in bold are competing in the Formula One championship in the current season.

title: Bahrain Grand Prix


text:
Gila River

The Gila River (O'odham [Pima]: Keli Akimel or simply Akimel, Quechan: Haa Siʼil, Maricopa language: Xiil ) is a 649 mi tributary of the Colorado River flowing through New Mexico and Arizona in the United States. The river drains an arid watershed of nearly 60000 mi2 that lies mostly within the U.S., but also extends into northern Sonora, Mexico.

Indigenous peoples have lived along the river for at least 2,000 years, establishing complex agricultural societies before European exploration of the region began in the 16th century. European Americans did not permanently settle the Gila River watershed until the mid-19th century.

During the 20th century, development in the Gila River watershed prompted the construction of large diversion and flood control structures on the river and its tributaries, and consequently the Gila contributes only a small fraction of its historic flow to the Colorado. The historic natural discharge of the river was around 1900 cuft/s, but has declined to only 247 cuft/s. The engineering projects transformed much of the river valley and its surroundings from arid desert into irrigated land, and supply water to more than five million people in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas who live in the watershed.

Geography
The Gila River has its source in western New Mexico, in Sierra County on the western slopes of the Continental Divide in the Black Range. It flows southwest through the Gila National Forest, the Gila Wilderness, and the Gila Cliff Dwellings National Monument, then westward into Arizona, past the town of Safford. After flowing along the southern slope of the Gila Mountains in Graham County through a series of canyons, the Gila is impounded by Coolidge Dam in San Carlos Lake south of Peridot.

It emerges from the mountains into the valley southeast of Phoenix, Arizona, where it crosses the Gila River Indian Reservation as an intermittent stream due to large irrigation diversions, primarily at the Hayden Ashurst Diversion Dam. Well west of Phoenix, the river bends sharply southward along the Gila Bend Mountains, then it swings westward again near the town of Gila Bend. It flows southwestward between the Gila Mountains to the south and the Languna and Muggins ranges to the north in Yuma County, and finally it empties into the Colorado at Yuma, Arizona.

The Gila is joined by many tributaries, beginning with the East and West Forks of the river, which combine to form the main stem near Gila Hot Springs in New Mexico. Above Safford, it is joined by the San Francisco River and the intermittent San Simon River. Further downstream, it is joined by the San Carlos River from the north in San Carlos Lake. At Winkelman, Arizona, it picks up the San Pedro River and then is joined by the Santa Cruz River south of Casa Grande. The Salt River, its main tributary, joins in the Phoenix metropolitan area, and further west the Gila receives its last two major tributaries, the Agua Fria and Hassayampa Rivers, from the north.

Although the Gila River flows entirely within the United States, the headwaters of two tributaries – the San Pedro and Santa Cruz Rivers – extend into Mexico. About 1630 mi2, or 2.8% of the Gila's 58200 mi2 watershed, is in Mexico. A further 3300 mi2 or 5.7% lies within New Mexico, while the remaining majority, 53270 mi2 or 91.5%, is in Arizona.

History
A band of Pima (autonym "Akimel O'odham", river people), the Keli Akimel O'odham (Gila River People), have lived on the banks of the Gila River since before the arrival of Spanish explorers. Popular theory says that the word "Gila" was derived from a Spanish contraction of Hah-quah-sa-eel, a Yuma word meaning "running water which is salty". Their traditional way of life (himdagĭ, sometimes rendered in English as Him-dak) was and is centered at the river, which is considered holy. Traditionally, sand from the banks of the river is used as an exfoliant when bathing (often in rainstorms, especially during the monsoon). Indigenous peoples such as the Hohokam were responsible for creating large, complex civilizations along the Middle Gila River and Salt River between 600 and 1450 AD. These native civilizations depended largely on irrigated agriculture, for which they constructed over 200 mi of canals. The upper Gila was inhabited by the Mogollon culture over most of the same time period, in settlements like those at Gila Cliff Dwellings National Monument in the later period.

The first European to see the Gila River was possibly Spanish explorer and missionary Juan de la Asunción. Asunción reached the Gila in 1538 after traveling northwards along one of its tributaries, either the San Pedro or Santa Cruz. In 1540, Hernando de Alarcón sailed up the Colorado and Gila Rivers; maps drawn by his expedition show the river as the Miraflores or Brazos de la Miraflores.

During the Mexican–American War, General Stephen Watts Kearny marched 100 cavalrymen from the 1st U.S. Dragoons along the Gila River in November 1846. This detachment was guided by Kit Carson. The Mormon Battalion followed Kearny's troops, building a wagon trail roughly following the river from December 1846 to January 1847.

After the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848, the Gila River served as a part of the border between the United States and Mexico until the 1853 Gadsden Purchase extended American territory well south of the Gila. The confluence of the Gila with the Colorado River was also used as a reference point for the southern border of California. Beginning in 1871, mainly Mormon settlers populated the Gila River valley around modern Phoenix, using the Gila, Salt, and San Pedro Rivers for irrigation and establishing at least six major settlements.

In 1944, 25 German prisoners of war pulled off the largest and most spectacular escape from an American compound during the war, digging a 178 ft tunnel out of the Navy’s Papago Park Prisoner of War Camp in Arizona. All of the men were eventually captured, though some remained at large for more than a month. Among the last to be captured were three German soldiers who had based their audacious but ill-fated escape plans on a stolen highway map of Arizona, which showed the Gila River leading to the Colorado River, which in turn led to Mexico. Devising a scheme to flee by water, the Germans constructed a collapsible kayak under the noses of their American captors, tested it in a makeshift pool within the prison compound, then sneaked it out through the tunnel. Their plan was perfect – except for the map. The Gila, shown as a healthy blue waterway, turned out to be little more than a dry rut.

Hydrology

The only major dam on the Gila River is Coolidge Dam, 31 mi southeast of Globe, Arizona, which forms San Carlos Lake. The Painted Rock Dam crosses the Gila near Gila Bend, although the river is intermittent at that point. The majority of the water is diverted at the Ashurst-Hayden Diversion Dam near Florence, Arizona. A number of minor diversion dams have been built on the river between the Painted Rock Dam and the Coolidge Dam, including the Gillespie Dam, which was breached during a flood in 1993.

Many dams have been built on tributaries to the Gila River, including Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Horse Mesa Dam, and Mormon Flat Dam on the Salt River, New Waddell Dam on the Agua Fria River, and Bartlett Dam on the Verde River.

Many major dams in the Gila River system were built and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which also constructed most of the large dams throughout the Colorado River basin. Others, such as Coolidge Dam, are owned by local water supply agencies, irrigation districts, or Native American tribes.

The Gila River and its main tributary, the Salt River, were both perennial streams carrying large volumes of water – the Gila was once navigable by large riverboats from its mouth to near Phoenix, and by smaller craft from Phoenix nearly to the Arizona-New Mexico border – until irrigation and municipal water diversions turned both into usually dry rivers which carry water only after local downpours create flooding. Below Phoenix to the Colorado River, the Gila is usually either a trickle or completely dry, as is also the lower Salt from Granite Reef Diversion Dam downstream to the Gila, but both rivers can carry large volumes of water following rainfall.

The historic width of the Gila River varied from 150 to 1200 ft with a depth of 2 to 40 ft. Its natural discharge was roughly 1300000 acre feet per year, with a mean flow of about 1800 cuft/s at the mouth. The river's modern discharge near the mouth is less than 180000 acre feet per year, with an average flow of just 247 cuft/s. Overdraft from the Gila River system prompted the construction of the Central Arizona Project, which delivers some 1500000 acre feet annually from the Colorado River to supplement water supplies in the basin.

The upper Gila River, including its entire length within New Mexico, is a free-flowing one. Recent efforts to allow for damming or otherwise diverting this stretch have met with stiff political resistance, having been named as one of the nation's most endangered rivers due to proposed dam projects such as Hooker Dam. During his time in office, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had promised to block any such attempt during his term, and he had even considered pushing for a statutory prohibition against any such projects on the state's portion of the river.

Recreation
The Gila River between Virden, New Mexico, and Solomon, Arizona, is navigable during spring snowmelt and after summer and autumn storms. The river passes through many scenic canyons and stretches of Class I to III whitewater. Due to its desert surroundings, the river is characterized by erratic flows and flash floods that reach high peaks and drop off just as quickly. The Gila's Salt River tributary has even more difficult whitewater, ranging up to Class IV in places, and often has higher and more dependable flows than the Gila.

Boating and fishing are popular on San Carlos Lake and other basin reservoirs, including Lake Pleasant and Theodore Roosevelt Lake. The river system has 36 fish species, including largemouth bass, sunfish, channel catfish, flathead catfish, and Gila trout (Oncorhynchus gilae gilae).

Variant names
The Gila River has also been known as:

 * Akee-mull
 * Apache de Gila
 * Brazo de Miraflores
 * Cina`ahuwipi (Chemehuevi language)
 * Hah-quah-sa eel (Yuma language)
 * Hela River
 * Jila River
 * Rio Azul
 * Rio Gila
 * Rio de las Balsas
 * Rio del Nombre Jesus
 * Rio del los Apostoles
 * Zila River
 * Xila River
 * Keli Akimel

title: Gila River


text:
New Brunswick Route 8

New Brunswick Route 8 is a major highway in the province of New Brunswick, Canada. It is 261 km long and connects Fredericton to the south with Miramichi and Bathurst to the north.

Route description
Route 8 begins at Trans-Canada Highway 2 in Fredericton. It uses the old alignment of the TCH between there and Route 7 before heading north on the Princess Margaret Bridge.

After a roundabout with Route 105, Route 8 becomes a two-lane limited access highway. First named the Barkers Point Bypass, it becomes the Marysville Bypass following the intersection with Route 10.

After the Marysville Bypass, Route 8 generally follows the Southwest Miramichi River up until Miramichi, where it has an overlap with Route 11 on the Centennial Bridge before heading north on its own as a two-lane expressway, later ending at Route 11 in Bathurst.

History
Route 8 was one of the original New Brunswick routes in the 1920s. Its route saw little changes until bypasses were constructed in the Fredericton area in the 1980s and 1990s. It would also see an extension south on part of the old Trans-Canada Highway 2 bypass of Fredericton in 2001.

In 2006, Route 8 was realigned on a two-lane bypass of part of Newcastle in Miramichi.

On January 12, 2008, a van carrying the basketball team from Bathurst High School collided with a semi-trailer truck on Route 8 near Bathurst, killing eight and injuring four. This prompted the government of New Brunswick to ban the use of 15-passenger vans for student transport.

Marysville Bypass
A bypass for the Fredericton suburbs of Marysville and South Portage, north of Taymouth, was started in 2007 before officially opening August 26, 2014. The estimated cost of the bypass was CA$124 million. The old alignment of Route 8 became Route 148 upon completion of the bypass.

Major intersections
From south to north:

title: New Brunswick Route 8


text:
Profibus

Profibus (usually styled as PROFIBUS, as a portmanteau for Pro cess Fi eld Bus ) is a standard for fieldbus communication in automation technology and was first promoted in 1989 by BMBF (German department of education and research) and then used by Siemens. It should not be confused with the Profinet standard for Industrial Ethernet. Profibus is openly published as type 3 of IEC 61158/61784-1.

Origin
The history of PROFIBUS goes back to a publicly promoted plan from Marco Todaro for an association which started in Germany in 1986 and for which 18 companies and institutes devised a master project plan called "fieldbus". The goal was to implement and spread the use of a bit-serial field bus based on the basic requirements of the field device interfaces. For this purpose, member companies agreed to support a common technical concept for production (i.e. discrete or factory automation) and process automation. First, the complex communication protocol Profibus FMS (Field bus Message Specification), which was tailored for demanding communication tasks, was specified. Subsequently, in 1993, the specification for the simpler and thus considerably faster protocol PROFIBUS DP (Decentralised Peripherals) was completed. Profibus FMS is used for (non-deterministic) communication of data between Profibus Masters. Profibus DP is a protocol made for (deterministic) communication between Profibus masters and their remote I/O slaves.

There are two variations of PROFIBUS in use today; the most commonly used PROFIBUS DP, and the lesser used, application specific, PROFIBUS PA:
 * PROFIBUS DP (Decentralised Peripherals) is used to operate sensors and actuators via a centralised controller in production (factory) automation applications. The many standard diagnostic options, in particular, are focused on here.
 * PROFIBUS PA (Process Automation) is used to monitor measuring equipment via a process control system in process automation applications. This variant is designed for use in explosion/hazardous areas (Ex-zone 0 and 1). The Physical Layer (i.e. the cable) conforms to IEC 61158-2, which allows power to be delivered over the bus to field instruments, while limiting current flows so that explosive conditions are not created, even if a malfunction occurs. The number of devices attached to a PA segment is limited by this feature. PA has a data transmission rate of 31.25 kbit/s. However, PA uses the same protocol as DP, and can be linked to a DP network using a coupler device. The much faster DP acts as a backbone network for transmitting process signals to the controller. This means that DP and PA can work tightly together, especially in hybrid applications where process and factory automation networks operate side by side.

In excess of 30 million PROFIBUS nodes were installed by the end of 2009. 5 million of these are in the process industries.

Application layer (OSI-Layer 7)
To use these functions, various service levels of the DP protocol were defined:
 * DP-V0 for cyclic exchange of data and diagnosis
 * DP-V1 for acyclic data exchange and alarm handling
 * DP-V2 for isochronous mode and data exchange broadcast (slave-to-slave communication)

Data link layer (OSI-Layer 2)
The data link layer FDL (Field bus Data Link) services and protocols work with a hybrid access method that combines token passing with a master/slave method. In a PROFIBUS DP network, the controllers or process control systems are the masters and the sensors and actuators are the slaves.

Each byte has even parity and is transferred asynchronously with a start and stop bit. There may not be a pause between a stop bit and the following start bit when the bytes of a telegram are transmitted. The master signals the start of a new telegram with a SYN pause of at least 33 bits (logical "1" = bus idle).

Various telegram types are used. They can be differentiated by their start delimiter (SD):

No data
SD1 = 0x10

Variable length data
SD2 = 0x68

Fixed length data
SD3 = 0xA2

Token
SD4 = 0xDC

Bit-transmission layer (OSI-Layer 1)
Three different methods are specified for the bit-transmission layer:
 * With electrical transmission pursuant to EIA-485, twisted pair cables with impedances of 150 ohms are used in a bus topology. Bit rates from 9.6 kbit/s to 12 Mbit/s can be used. The cable length between two repeaters is limited from 100 to 1200 m, depending on the bit rate used. This transmission method is primarily used with PROFIBUS DP.
 * With optical transmission via fiber optics, star-, bus- and ring-topologies are used. The distance between the repeaters can be up to 15 km. The ring topology can also be executed redundantly.
 * With MBP (Manchester Bus Powered) transmission technology, data and field bus power are fed through the same cable. The power can be reduced in such a way that use in explosion-hazardous environments is possible. The bus topology can be up to 1900 m long and permits branching to field devices (max. 60 m branches). The bit rate here is a fixed 31.25 kbit/s. This technology was specially established for use in process automation for PROFIBUS PA.

For data transfer via sliding contacts for mobile devices or optical or radio data transmission in open spaces, products from various manufacturers can be obtained, however they do not conform to any standard.

PROFIBUS DP uses two core screened cable with a violet sheath, and runs at speeds between 9.6 kbit/s and 12 Mbit/s. A particular speed can be chosen for a network to give enough time for communication with all the devices present in the network. If systems change slowly then lower communication speed is suitable, and if the systems change quickly then effective communication will happen through faster speed. The RS485 balanced transmission used in PROFIBUS DP only allows 31 devices to be connected at once; however, more devices (up to 126) can be connected or the network expanded with the use of hubs or repeaters (4 hubs or repeaters to reach 126). A Hub or a Repeater is also counted as a device.

PROFIBUS PA runs at fixed speed of 31.25 kbit/s via blue sheathed two core screened cable. The communication may be initiated to minimise the risk of explosion or for the systems that intrinsically need safe equipment. The message formats in PROFIBUS PA are identical to PROFIBUS DP.

Note: PROFIBUS DP and PROFIBUS PA should not be confused with PROFINET.

Profiles
Profiles are pre-defined configurations of the functions and features available from PROFIBUS for use in specific devices or applications. They are specified by PI working groups and published by PI. Profiles are important for openness, interoperability and interchangeability, so that the end user can be sure that similar equipments from different vendors perform in a standardised way. User choice also encourages competition that drives vendors towards enhanced performance and lower costs.

There are PROFIBUS profiles for Encoders, Laboratory instruments, Intelligent pumps, Robots and Numerically Controlled machines, for example. Profiles also exist for applications such as using HART and wireless with PROFIBUS, and process automation devices via PROFIBUS PA. Other profiles have been specified for Motion Control (PROFIdrive) and Functional Safety (PROFIsafe).

Organization
The PROFIBUS Nutzerorganisation e.V. (PROFIBUS User Organisation, or PNO) was created in 1989. This group was composed mainly of manufacturers and users from Europe. In 1992, the first regional PROFIBUS organisation was founded (PROFIBUS Schweiz in Switzerland). In the following years, additional Regional PROFIBUS & PROFINET Associations (RPAs) were added.

In 1995, all the RPAs joined together under the international umbrella association Profibus and Profinet International (PI). Today, PROFIBUS is represented by 25 RPAs around the world (including PNO) with over 1400 members, including most if not all major automation vendors and service suppliers, along with many end users.

title: Profibus


text:
Parenting plan

A parenting plan is a child custody plan that is negotiated by parents, and which may be included in a marital separation agreement or final decree of divorce. Especially when a separation is acrimonious to begin with, specific agreements about who will discharge these responsibilities and when and how they are to be discharged can reduce the need for litigation. Avoiding litigation spares parties not only the financial and emotional costs of litigation but the uncertainty of how favorable or unfavorable a court's after-the-fact decision will be. Moreover, the agreement itself can authorize the employment of dispute-resolution methods, such as arbitration and mediation, that may be less costly than litigation.

Drafting a parenting plan
A well-drafted parenting plan addresses both the custodial rights and responsibilities of parents who share custody of a minor child or children, and the logistical and other procedures for carrying out its substantive requirements. Parents can agree to a plan that takes into consideration their children's ages and needs and, if they continue to co-parent effectively, can adjust their plans over time to ensure that their plan remains in the best interest of their children.

Guidelines
Some jurisdictions have guidelines, either default rules (i.e., rules that apply only in the absence of provisions to the contrary) or hard-and-fast requirements to which all agreements must adhere, addressing the content of parenting plans. Moreover, courts in some communities offer proposed templates whose terms take into account community-specific factors such as availability of day-care services, school-bus routes and schedules, and schedules of school and community athletics and other activities.

Content
Topics addressed in a parenting plan may include, but are not limited to:

 * Physical custody (how the child's time is to be divided between the separating parents and their separate households; a well-drafted plan will specifically contemplate holidays and school vacations)
 * Transferring the child from one parent to the other: schedule, method, and location
 * Departures from the typical custody schedule (e.g., overnight stays with the other parent or with other relatives during a given parent's normal custody time)
 * Restrictions, as needed, on places visited and/or persons associated with while the child is present

 * Legal custody (decision-making authority and rights to information)
 * Authority over physical and mental health-care decisions; access to health records
 * Authority to change the place at which a child resides while in the physical custody of a given parent
 * Authority over educational decisions such as where the child attends school; access to educational records
 * Authority to take the child on travel, especially travel outside the geographic jurisdiction of the court adjudicating the separation or divorce
 * Authority to claim the child as a dependent for income-tax purposes

 * Financial support obligations:
 * Provision for basic needs
 * Payment for education
 * Payment of health-insurance premiums and other medical expenses
 * Inclusion of the other parent and/or the child in a given parent's estate planning, including both the probate process (disposition of assets by will) and procedures outside of probate (payout of life-insurance policies, distribution of survivor benefits, etc.)

 * Communication between parents:
 * Obligation to keep the other parent apprised of contact information both of a given parent and of the child while with that parent
 * Right of the other parent to information about circumstances and events affecting the child's well-being

 * Procedures for resolving disputes, including but not limited to disputes about the meaning of the plan's language and disputes alleging improper performance of the plan's provisions
 * Provisions, if desired, for alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration and mediation

In some cases, parenting plans may be established through the combined effect of multiple agreements each addressing a different subject. For example, one agreement may address physical custody while another addresses financial support.

Entry by a court
A parenting plan agreed upon by the parties in an out-of-court setting is often termed "endorsed", "stipulated" or "on consent." A judge who finds a stipulated parenting plan to be consistent with the child's best interest may be able approve the plan without requiring the parties or the child to be present in court, sparing the parents inconvenience and the child the emotional stress of dealing with authority figures in an unfamiliar setting.

Australia
Parenting Plans in Australia are a written agreement between two parents and are made without the assistance or endorsement of a court, but can be made with the assistance of a mediator. Parenting plans can include as many or as few considerations about the child or children as both parents agree to. However child support payments are not generally included as payable child support is calculated by the Australian Government Child Support Agency (CSA).

Parenting plans are non-binding and not legally enforceable but may be written in such a way that they can submitted to a court for endorsement. Once endorsed the parenting plan becomes a binding consent order. Even if not endorsed by a court so as to be legally enforceable, if legal action is initiated after a parenting plan has been agreed between the parents, the court will give careful consideration and considerable weight to the agreed plan as it shows the intent of each parent at the time of signing.

There is no such thing as a "standard" parenting plan as each one is unique, but unofficial example parenting plans are available.

Belgium & the Netherlands
The parental plan is introduced in the legislation in the Netherlands and there is a law project in Belgium to introduce it is, as well.

Great Britain
In England and Wales the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, a non-departmental public body, produces a booklet Parenting Plans Putting your children first: a guide for separating parents.

Romania
Upon the introduction of the joint-custody in the national legislation in Romania, a standard parenting plan was released with the public. Parental plans appeared for the first time with the mediation law, which provided in Articles 2 and 64 that parents may be mediated about how to raise children after divorce. Thus, although in Romania, in 2006-2011, only the notion of single custody was actually applicable in fact through mediation agreements, mediators have implemented legal arrangements for joint legal custody. The plan was adapted to the specific of Romania and it is now being used by the mediators across the county. Due to the introduction (as of October 2011) of the joint parental authority, the notion of parental plan has legal support through, Article 506 of the new Civil Code. There is a proposal of non-governmental associations to implement the parental plan in tertiary legislation (implementation guide under the aegis of authorized institutions), but also to introduce this plan into primary legislation (these are amendments to Law 272/2004 initiated by the DGPC).

United States
In the United States of America, many state courts require that separating or divorcing couples who have children include a parenting plan among the terms of their separation agreement and/or their eventual divorce decree. Separated or unmarried parents may enter into a parenting plan of their own creation without going to court, but that plan won't be enforceable in court.

Parenting plans are usually initiated as part of a divorce decree or custody case between unmarried parents. Divorced parents whose child custody is governed by a parenting plan can request that a court amend the plan or replace it with a new one. In jurisdictions whose laws permit the practice, some plans permit the parties to amend certain provisions, such as those specifying where a parent will live during that parent's time with the child, by agreement without court approval.

A court reviewing a petition for amendment or replacement of a court-ordered parenting plan will employ the "child's best interest" standard in light of circumstances or changes in circumstances such as a parent's relocation, the presence or absence of child abuse in one or both parents' households, and health problems of a parent or the child. If the parents in a custody dispute request, many states allow children who are old enough to state an informed preference, to testify about their own preferences as to custody and parenting time, with their opinion taken into consideration by the court along with all other evidence relating to their best interest. The weight assigned by the court to a child's testimony will vary with factors such as the child's intellectual and psychological maturity, for which the child's age is often used as a proxy; the child's level of insight into his or her situation; and the credibility of the child's testimony as affected by factors ranging from the child's level of honesty to any undue influence on the child by either or both parents.

Most states require that court-ordered parenting plans set forth the minimum amount of parenting time and access to which a noncustodial parent is entitled. In these states, an agreement's failure to specify the non-custodial parent's minimum level of access can constitute grounds for appeal of the adjudicating court's approval of the plan. In cases where separated or divorced parents live near each other, most U.S. states' family courts follow a default rule of granting the non-custodial parent the right of visitation on every second weekend and some holidays. Where parents live farther apart, states such as Florida, Oregon, New Hampshire and New York allow the combination of these visits into longer stretches of time to reduce traveling.

title: Parenting plan


text:
Baron Darwen

Baron Darwen, of Heys-in-Bowland in the West Riding of the County of York, is a title in the Peerage of the United Kingdom. It was created on 12 February 1946 for John Davies, a prominent cotton manufacturer. He served as a Lord-in-waiting (government whip in the House of Lords) from 1949 to 1950 in the Labour administration of Clement Attlee. the title is held by his great-grandson, the fourth Baron, who succeeded his father in 2011.

Barons Darwen (1946)

 * John Percival Davies, 1st Baron Darwen (1885–1950)
 * Cedric Percival Davies, 2nd Baron Darwen (1915–1988)
 * Roger Michael Davies, 3rd Baron Darwen (1938–2011)
 * Paul Davies, 4th Baron Darwen (b. 1962)

The heir apparent is the present holder's elder son, Hon. Oscar Kamen Davies (b. 1996)

title: Baron Darwen


text:
Talk:Cartesian closed category

"In cartesian closed categories, a "function of two variables" can always be represented as a "function of one variable". In other contexts, this is known as currying; it has lead to the realization that lambda calculus can be formulated in any cartesian closed category."

 * Could you please elaborate? Phys 21:09, 7 Mar 2004 (UTC)

I've added a Discussion section and a bit to the Application section; does this help? Adandrews 21 Apr 2005

vector spaces
I'd suggest to add the remark that vector spaces are monoidal closed (i.e. wrt to the tensor product). --Thorsten 20:35, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

Heyting algebra
Are Heyting algebras ccc's? I agree that complete Heyting algebras are complete and cocomplete posetal ccc's, but I do not see how to recover the disjunction in the general case, but that may just be me. 130.54.16.83 (talk) 07:24, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

"Equations"
Cartesian-closed categories are still categories. While these "equations" might make sense when we are talking about algebras, it is quite unusual to introduce "equations" into categorical context. And... they are not equations anyway. I think I'll reformulate it properly into categorical language.

Vlad Patryshev (talk) 14:33, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

title: Talk:Cartesian closed category