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The Damned (1969 film)

The Damned (Götterdämmerung) (La caduta degli dei) is a 1969 historical-drama film directed and co-written by Luchino Visconti, and starring Dirk Bogarde, Ingrid Thulin, Helmut Berger, Helmut Griem, Umberto Orsini, Charlotte Rampling, Florinda Bolkan, Reinhard Kolldehoff and Albrecht Schönhals in his final film. Set in 1930s Germany, the film centers on the Essenbecks, a wealthy industrialist family who have begun doing business with the Nazi Party, and whose amoral and unstable heir, Martin (played by Berger in his breakthrough role), is embroiled in his family's machinations. It is loosely based on the German Krupp family of steel industrialists from Essen.

Principal photography of The Damned took place in locations throughout Italy, West Germany, and Austria. The film opened to widespread critical acclaim, but also faced controversy from ratings boards for its sexual content. In the United States, the film was given an X rating by the MPAA, which was lowered to a more marketable R after 12 minutes of offending footage were cut.

Visconti won the Nastro d'Argento for Best Director, and was nominated for a Best Original Screenplay Oscar with co-writers Nicola Badalucco and Enrico Medioli. Helmut Berger received a Golden Globe nomination for Most Promising Newcomer. The film won the Golden Peacock (Best Film) at the 4th International Film Festival of India.

Plot
In Germany in early 1933, the Essenbecks are a wealthy and powerful industrialist family who have, reluctantly, begun doing business with the newly-elected Nazi government. On the night of the birthday of the family's conservative patriarch, Baron Joachim von Essenbeck, a member of the old German nobility who detests the upstart Adolf Hitler, the family's children have prepared performances. Joachim's grandnephew Günther plays a classical piece on his cello, while his grandson Martin performs a drag performance, which is interrupted by news that the Reichstag is burning. Assuming Hitler will use this incident to seize even greater control, Joachim announces at dinner that he is replacing Herbert Thallman, an outspoken anti-Nazi who is married to Joachim's niece Elizabeth, with his boorish and unscrupulous nephew Konstantin, who is an officer in the SA, as vice president of the family steelworks.

Martin's possessive mother, Sophie, has been in a relationship with Friedrich Bruckmann, an ambitious executive of the steelworks, for some time, but he has not proposed because he worries Joachim would not approve of him as the husband of the widow of Joachim's beloved son. Friedrich is friendly with Aschenbach, an Essenbeck relation who has attained a high position in the SS, and, acting on Aschenbach's suggestions that things would be better for him if the anti-Nazi Joachim were to die, Friederich kills Joachim and frames Herbert for the crime by using his personal handgun. Herbert narrowly escapes abroad, but, in his haste, is forced to leave behind Elizabeth and their two daughters. Martin inherits the majority of shares in the steelworks, and Sophie manipulates him into placing Friedrich, rather than Konstantin, in charge.

Aschenbach convinces Friedrich and Martin to bar their company from selling weapons to the SA, in hopes of marginalizing the rival group and currying the favor of the army, whose might Hitler will need in order to conquer territories beyond the current German borders. Konstantin discovers Martin has been sexually abusing his nieces and Lisa Keller, a young Jewish neighbor of Martin's girlfriend who commits suicide, and he uses this information to resume providing the SA with weapons and get Martin to call a meeting to place him in charge of the company. Sophie finds Martin hiding in the attic of the family castle and, mostly for Friedrich's sake, agrees to help free him from Konstantin's blackmail. She meets up with Aschenbach, who reveals that Hitler is planning to purge the SA, as he feels its work securing Nazi power in Germany is done, but its leader, Ernst Röhm, is unlikely to quietly let it take a back seat to the SS and army.

Many high-ranking members of the SA, including Konstantin, gather at a hotel in Bad Wiessee. They have a drunken celebration, and the evening ends with the officers engaging in gay sex with one another. At dawn, the hotel is stormed by SS troops, who slaughter the SA members. Konstantin is personally executed by Friedrich, whom Aschenbach brought along to make him do his own dirty work.

Friedrich is now in control of the steelworks, and Sophie even gets Aschenbach to arrange a decree that gives him her father-in-law's last name and royal title of Baron so they will be able to marry as equals. He is affected by all of his newfound power, and Aschenbach begins to feel that he is not displaying the appropriate subservience to National Socialism, so Aschenbach offers to help Martin destroy Sophie and Friedrich. Martin accepts, as he is bitter that his mother has used him to benefit Friedrich and herself.

During a family dinner, Friedrich announces that Aschenbach, Günther, and Martin must submit themselves to his will and whims, since he is now the head of the family. Herbert surprises everyone when he enters and reveals that, although Sophie had supposedly made arrangements for Elizabeth and her daughters to join Herbert in exile, they were really arrested and sent to Dachau, where Elizabeth died. Now a broken man, Herbert has returned to confess to murdering Joachim, in exchange for the release of his daughters. Günther, upset by this news, is enraged when Martin reveals that Friedrich killed Konstantin, and Aschenbach is able to use his hate to radicalize him to the Nazi cause.

Martin sexually assaults his mother, and she falls into a catatonic state. Without her help to strategize against Aschenbach and Martin, Friedrich is lost. Martin, who is now part of the SS, gets Friedrich and Sophie to go through the motions of getting married before ordering them to take cyanide capsules, which they willingly consume, killing them both. He inherits control of the steelworks, and the Essenbeck empire, therefore, comes under Nazi control.

"The German Trilogy"
The Damned has been regarded as the first of Visconti's films described as "The German Trilogy", followed by Death in Venice (1971) and Ludwig (1973), and the character Aschenbach even shares the same name as the protagonist of Thomas Mann's Death in Venice. Author Henry Bacon, in his book Visconti: Explorations of Beauty and Decay (1998), specifically categorizes these films together in a chapter titled "Visconti & Germany".

Visconti's earlier films had analyzed Italian society during the Risorgimento and post-WWII periods. Peter Bondanella's Italian Cinema (2002) depicts the trilogy as a move to take a broader view of European politics and culture. He says that, stylistically, "they emphasize lavish sets and costumes, sensuous lighting, painstakingly slow camerawork, and a penchant for imagery reflecting subjective states or symbolic values."

Production
The film was shot on-location in West Germany and Austria, and at Cinecittà Studios in Rome. Locations included Düsseldorf, Essen, and Unterach am Attersee - the latter doubling for Bad Wiessee. The scenes of the Essenbeck steelworks were shot in Terni, Italy.

The Damned was the breakthrough film for Helmut Berger, who is given an "Introducing" credit, even though he had already appeared in Visconti's segment of the anthology film The Witches. At the time, Berger was in a romantic relationship with Visconti. Dirk Bogarde later expressed disappointment with Visconti for sacrificing his character's development to place a greater focus on Berger's Martin. In his memoirs, Bogarde specifically cites a long scene showing Friedrich becoming overwhelmed with guilt after murdering Joachim, which was filmed, but cut.

Composer Maurice Jarre was hired by the producers without the knowledge of Visconti, who originally wanted the film scored entirely with pre-existing classical music by Gustav Mahler and Richard Wagner. Visconti reportedly was dissatisfied with the composer's efforts, which he compared disparagingly to Jarre's work on Doctor Zhivago, but was forced to use the music due to contractual obligations.

In Visconti's preferred, primarily English-language version of the film, most of the cast members provide their own voices, but Umberto Orsini is dubbed by an uncredited actor, due to his accent.

Nazi war criminal Karl Hass appeared in the film as an extra. Hass was a perpetrator of the Ardeatine massacre, but was not charged or convicted until 1998, allegedly due to his work as an American agent against the Soviet Union in the 1950s. It's unknown if the filmmakers were aware of Hass' identity when he appeared in the film, though some sources suggest he was employed as a technical advisor. Hass did appear as an extra in several other Italian films during the 1960s and '70s, including two about the Ardeatine massacre.

Reception
The Damned was released to worldwide acclaim. It was nominated for Best Original Screenplay at the 42nd Academy Awards, and was named one of the Top Foreign Films of 1969 by the National Board of Review. Among the international cast, Helmut Berger was singled out for his performance as Martin, a vicious sexual deviant who uses his amoral appetites to achieve his own twisted ends. The film was the tenth-most popular release at the French box office in 1970.

Retrospectively, the film has appeared on such critics' lists as The New York Times Guide to the Best 1,000 Movies Ever Made and Halliwell's Top 1000: The Ultimate Movie Countdown.

The film's entry in the Lexikon des Internationalen Films praises its presentation of the connection between "moral decadence, sexual neurosis, aestheticist death wish, narcissist self-centeredness and political opportunism", but comments that this effect is weakened somewhat by the film's "decorative circuitousness and artificial stylisation".

Filmmaker Rainer Werner Fassbinder called The Damned his favorite film. He said it is "perhaps the greatest film, the film that I think means as much to the history of film as Shakespeare to the history of theater".

Censorship and ratings
After the first screening of the film, 12 minutes were cut, including the scene where Lisa hangs herself after being molested. For the initial American release, much of the Bad Wiessee/Night of the Long Knives sequence was cut.

In 1969, the film was given an "X" rating by the MPAA due to a nude incest scene. Warner Bros. submitted the film for re-classification before releasing it on DVD in 2004, and the rating was changed to "R".

The film was shown on CBS television late at night in the early 1970s. It had to be so heavily edited that one executive reportedly joked it should be retitled The Darned, but, technically, it was the first X-rated film to be shown on American network television.

Home media
The film was released on DVD by Warner Home Video in 2004. A 2K restoration of the film by the Cineteca di Bologna and Institut Lumière was released on Blu-ray and DVD by The Criterion Collection on 28 September 2021. All of the previously-censored footage was restored to the film for both of these home video releases.

title: The Damned (1969 film)


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Talk:1936 Tupelo–Gainesville tornado outbreak

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Untitled
Text says: "This was very common up until around the mid-1950's." This what? I assume it's meaning is that the failure to mention blacks (mentioned in parentheses) was common. Please fix it to say what it means. &#37329 02:53, 28 May 2004 (UTC) - I removed the sentence claiming that this was the only instance of two large cities being struck a day apart. Obviously the Flint-Worcester tornadoes of 1953 prove that claim false.

I also removed the erroneous mileage in the fourth parargraph -- it is only 67 miles from Gainesville GA to Anderson SC, not "a couple of hundred." I am doubtful that "all the buildings hit collapsed and caught on fire"... seems rather unlikely, but I left it alone for now. Nick Storm 17:21, 3 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Removing the copyedit tag
I made a few edits. The article looks in good shape to me, so I am removing the tag. KarenAnn 21:18, 20 June 2006 (UTC)

Name change
Added year per WikiProject Severe weather/Tornado's naming convention. Also fixed double redirects. --Rosiestep (talk) 00:37, 4 February 2009 (UTC)

Dead link
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External links modified
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Gainesville (1936) - The forgotten Twin Tornado(es)???????
In at least a few ways the 1936 Gainesville, est. F4(+), tornadic event is similar to to both the 1965 Dunlap/Elkhart, Indiana event(s) and the 2014 Pilger, Nebraska event. All events caused damage that was at minimum rated F/EF4, all were killer tornadic events, and all involved twin funnels/tornadoes. But while all the data about "Pilger" showed it was two tornadoes from the start (due to current knowledge of tornadoes we didn't have before), the previous events were sometimes described as "double-funnel" tornadoes - and are officially called such. Even more interesting, is according to both Dr. Tom Grazulis (including in his book Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991) and Dr. Greg Forbes (over on The Weather Channel), Prof. Ted Fujita, when studying the Georgia and Indiana storms, at least suggested that Gainesville was hit with two tornadoes, if not twin tornadoes, that crossed paths at almost the same time. On the other hand, he first thought the Indiana storms were tornadoes with huge "double-funnel" vortexes, and then later believed them to also be twin tornado events. So the question is: due to how old the source material of the data is, is that the reason there's no possibility of the records for the 1936 and 1965 storms will change, and thus will always officially be considered "single tornadoes with double vortexes"? (This would probably also explain why the 1966 Candlestick Park tornado and 1905 Snyder tornado are each considered a single tornado instead of a tornado family.) Also why isn't the Gainsville storm brought up as much in such discussions (well other than how long its being since it happened)? And is it ok if we maybe at least mention it in this article? --Halls4521 (talk) 22:41, 28 January 2018 (UTC)

New Potential Picture
I have a picture of the monument in Gainesville when FDR came to visit after the tornado. Not sure if this is a good place to ask, but I was wondering if it would be good to add to this article somewhere or something. If so, let me know. — Preceding unsigned comment added by PeytonMan8275 (talk • contribs) 20:32, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Talk:Bambi

Budget
This 1989 Los Angeles Time article says "Back in 1942, the then-princely sum of $2 million was spent on the film". The article already has a budget figure of $858,000 with a source. Should this budget figure also be added?  Mike  Allen  17:23, 31 December 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 3 November 2023
Will you let me edit this page, plz? 109.53.39.70 (talk) 13:32, 3 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: this is not the right page to request additional user rights. You may reopen this request with the specific changes to be made and someone may add them for you, or if you have an account, you can wait until you are autoconfirmed and edit the page yourself. Cannolis (talk) 18:39, 3 November 2023 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request
In the Animation section, where it mentions the Los Angeles Zoo, please replace this with the Griffith Park Zoo as this is what the LA Zoo was know at the time. The current Los Angeles Zoo opened in 1966. 2600:100C:A218:92ED:950A:4F6F:705C:2067 (talk) 01:28, 16 January 2024 (UTC)
 * ✅ Liu1126 (talk) 12:17, 16 January 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Bambi


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U.S. Route 31

U.S. Route 31 or U.S. Highway 31 (US 31) is a major north–south U.S. highway connecting southern Alabama to northern Michigan. Its southern terminus is at an intersection with US 90/US 98 in Spanish Fort, Alabama. Its northern terminus is at an interchange with Interstate 75 (I-75) south of Mackinaw City, Michigan.

US 31 once crossed the Straits of Mackinac by car ferry to intersect US 2 north of St. Ignace, Michigan, in the Upper Peninsula and then formerly reached Mackinaw City along the southern approaches of the Mackinac Bridge (which has been taken over by I-75). It also formerly entered downtown Mobile, Alabama, via a long bridge over Mobile Bay.

The southern segment of US 31 connects the cities of Mobile, Montgomery, Birmingham, and Decatur in Alabama, and Nashville in Tennessee. The northern segment of US 31 connects Louisville in Kentucky, and Indianapolis in Indiana. From Nashville to Louisville, US 31 is signed U.S. Route 31W and U.S. Route 31E. From the Mobile Bay area in Alabama to Indianapolis, US 31 travels parallel to Interstate 65 (I-65).

Alabama
US 31 begins in Spanish Fort, Alabama at a junction with US 90 and 98. Formerly, the route originated in Mobile, co-routed with US 90 and 98. Whereas Interstate 65 leaves the Mobile Metropolitan Area via a route on the west side of the city, US 31 leaves the Mobile area via a route on the eastern side of the metro area, passing through Bay Minette. I-65 has effectively replaced US 31 as the preferred route for through traffic, making US 31 a local connecting route.

Near Atmore, the route passes extremely close to the Florida Panhandle's extreme northwestern corner, missing by approximately 1000 feet. At Flomaton, US 31 begins a 15-mile virtual east–west concurrency with US 29 that continues to Brewton. North of Brewton, US 31 assumes a northeast–southwest trajectory, passing through rural areas and small towns in Escambia and Conecuh Counties. In Evergreen, US 31 north and US 84 share a brief concurrency heading north and east out of town.

Although US 31 parallels Interstate 65 throughout Alabama, the two routes do not directly junction each other until they reach Pintlala in southern Montgomery County, which is 164 miles north of Mobile. The two routes do not junction each other again for another 22 miles. US 31 is routed along a bypass of Montgomery, the state capital. At Prattville, this route intersects U.S. Route 82.

North of Prattville, US 31 passes through rural areas of Autauga and Chilton Counties, primarily along two-lane roadways. Between Prattville and Alabaster, US 31 has three interchanges with I-65.

Between Saginaw and Warrior, US 31 is routed along multi-laned routes as it passes through the Birmingham-Hoover Metropolitan Area. It passes through suburbs such as Alabaster, Pelham, Hoover and Vestavia Hills. In Homewood, US 31 merges with U.S. Route 280 and is routed along the Elton B. Stephens Expressway, a 2.6-mile limited access highway that connects the south suburbs with downtown Birmingham. US 31 and 280 are co-routed until the expressway junctions I-20/ 59 just northeast of downtown. This interchange serves as the western terminus of US 280, and north of the interchange US 31 is routed along surface streets as it proceeds northwardly out of Birmingham.

US 31 continues to be routed along multi-lane streets and highways as it continues north of Birmingham, meeting the eastern terminus of I-22 just south of Fultondale, and passing through the small town, along with Gardendale, Morris and Kimberly, also closely paralleling I-65. At Warrior, the roadway shrinks to two lanes. Two miles north of Warrior, US 31 and I-65 begin a three-mile concurrency between the interstate route's Exits 284 and 287. The interstate route was constructed over US 31's roadway through this segment.

Between the split from I-65 and Garden City, US 31 is routed along a narrow two-lane route. North of Garden City, and passing through Cullman, Hartselle, Decatur and Athens, it is routed along multi-lane and often divided roadways. At Athens, I-65 and US 31 begin a concurrency that continues to just north of the Tennessee state line. In both states, US 31 is largely unsigned.

In addition to junctions previously cited, US 31 junctions U.S. Route 80 in Montgomery, Interstate 459 in Hoover, U.S. Route 78 in Birmingham, U.S. Route 278 in Cullman, U.S. Route 72 Alternate in Decatur, and U.S. Route 72 in Athens.

Given US 31's former importance as a major connecting route in Alabama, in several cities it is known by the name of the city it leads to. For example, south of Montgomery it is still named Mobile Highway, and northwardly it is referred to as the Birmingham Highway. Similarly, south of Birmingham it is referred to as Montgomery Highway, and northwardly it is referred to as the Decatur Highway. Throughout north Alabama plaques and signage refer to the route as the Beeline Highway.

US 31 is co-routed with unsigned State Route 3 (SR 3) throughout the state until its junction with I-65 north of Athens.

Tennessee
The first mile in Tennessee, US 31 runs concurrently with I-65, somewhat parallel to which it runs until it splits in downtown Nashville, to become US 31W and US 31E, a relatively uncommon occurrence in U.S. Highways, though not unlike that which occurs to US 49 and US 45 in Mississippi, U.S. Route 19 in North Carolina and Tennessee, and US 11 in Tennessee.

While upon crossing the state line from Alabama into Tennessee, US 31 (also State Route 7 [SR 7] at this point) runs to the east of I-65, it crosses over I-65, changing names from Main Street to Elkton Pike on the overpass. According to this name change, US 31 runs through Elkton shortly after making this crossing.

After passing through Elkton, US 31 wanders, away from I-65, towards the city of Pulaski. On its way to Pulaski, US 31 intersects with US 64 and does so once again in the center of the city. In Pulaski, US 31 serves as 1st Street in the downtown area. Just north of the downtown area of Pulaski, US 31 Alternate (US 31A) branches off US 31, serving first as East Grigsby Street, then as Lewisburg Highway, never to be visible from US 31 again until reaching downtown Nashville.

Continuing north, US 31 meanders, following Richland Creek for a portion of the way, named Columbia Highway; naturally, as follows the typical naming trend for former connecting routes, halfway to Columbia, the name changes to Pulaski Highway. US 31 runs by Lynnville in this process.

As US 31 enters Columbia, upon crossing James Campbell Boulevard (also SR 50), it is named Carmack Boulevard, at this point a decently wide road with two lanes on each side. While in Columbia, US 31 changes names two more times, once to South Garden Street (also temporarily sharing routes with US 412 and SR 99 in this area), and then to Nashville Highway while SR 7 departs from the street. It is a short stretch until US 31 hits an intersection with Bear Creek Pike. This is the northern terminus of US 43, and also the point at which US 412/SR 99 resumes its eastern trajectory, away from US 31. US 31 also picks up the path of SR 6 here, in addition to the historical significance of being the former warpath of the Confederate forces during 1863 and 1864, during the American Civil War.

Upon leaving Columbia, US 31 develops a median and a speed limit not too dissimilar from that on I-65, which is still only a few miles to the east of the highway. On the way up to Spring Hill, US 31 passes straight through a small, corner town little-known to be called Neapolis. At this location, there is an on-ramp onto Saturn Pkwy (SR 396), named as such because it was once a highway connecting I-65 to the assembly plant belonging to Saturn Corporation, which no longer acts independently from its parent company, General Motors. No more than two miles further up the highway, Saturn Pkwy has looped back around to begin its trajectory toward I-65, and there are more on and off ramps between SR 396 and US 31.

At this point, US 31 returns to its original two-lane, narrow road format, and has entered the rapidly-growing city of Spring Hill, where it serves as Main Street, then as Columbia Pike in the adjacent Thompson's Station.

North of Thompson's Station, US 31 intersects I-840, serving as exit 28 for the southern loop around Nashville. Further up the highway, US 31 shares an interchange with Goose Creek Pike, a direct route to I-65. US 31 continues up through historic Franklin, as Columbia Avenue. In the middle of Franklin, US 31 comes to a five-point intersection with the routes of US 431 and SR 96, and a roundabout two blocks further north which continues the route of SR 96 to the east. US 31 then proceeds out of Franklin and to the northeast.

As US 31 passes through Brentwood, the road widens, again to two lanes per side, and intersects with SR 254 at the point where it reaches less than a half of a mile from I-65 once again. At this point, US 31 remains within this distance from I-65 until reaching its split in downtown Nashville, traveling through the sites of the Battle of Franklin and the Battle of Nashville in the process.

Entering Nashville, US 31 first shares an interchange with SR 155 (at this point Thompson Lane / Woodmont Boulevard), and, immediately afterwards, travels under an interchange between I-65 and I-440. After passing through Berry Hill, US 31 yet again travels under an interchange, this time between I-65 and I-40. Then, US 31 reaches another roundabout, where it intersects with US41, US 31A, and US 70S. Going through Nashville, US 31 retains several names: 8th Avenue South, Rosa L Parks Boulevard, James Robertson Pkwy, and 4th Avenue North, respectively as US 31 progresses northward. After making a semi-circle, crossing the Cumberland River, and passing under I-24, US 31 makes the split into US 31W and US 31E.

Kentucky
US 31E stays east of I-65, passing through Glasgow and Bardstown. It enters Louisville from the southeast, where it is named Bardstown Road for most of its length in the city, while US 31W closely follows I-65 from the Tennessee state line, through Bowling Green, to Elizabethtown. From here, it diverges to the west and passes through Fort Knox. North of Fort Knox, US 31W joins with US 60 in Kentucky and it roughly follows the Ohio River into Louisville. In southwestern Louisville, US 31W is called Dixie Highway. It is the major commercial street in this area.

In Downtown Louisville at Second Street, US 31E and US 31W rejoin to form US 31 and immediately crosses the Ohio River on the Clark Memorial Bridge only traveling 0.912 mi before the route crosses into Indiana.

Indiana
US 31 travels concurrent with I-65 in Jeffersonville, after having crossed the Ohio River from Kentucky. It splits off north of Jeffersonville at Clarksville and proceeds to Indianapolis. At I-465 on the south side of Indianapolis, US 31 is now routed onto I-465 on the east side of the city. US 31 exits I-465 in extreme southern Hamilton County, and continues northward. US 31 then passes through or near Carmel, Kokomo, Rochester, Plymouth and Lakeville, often following a historic Native American trail to what was once a French fur-trading outpost on Mackinac Island and later the British Fort Holmes. As it passes Potato Creek State Park and approaches southern South Bend, US 31 travels concurrent with US 20 in Indiana and proceeds west then northward on the St. Joseph Valley Parkway, bypassing South Bend and proceeding into Michigan.

Michigan
US 31 follows the St. Joseph Valley Parkway northward into southern Michigan to an interchange with I-94 near Benton Harbor–St. Joseph, then runs concurrently north to I-196. US 31 then runs concurrently with I-196 along the shore of Lake Michigan north to the Holland area. US 31 departs from I-196 as a divided highway with many Michigan lefts north to Grand Haven, where it becomes a freeway again. This freeway continues northward through the Muskegon area until Ludington, where the freeway ends and US 31 turns east concurrently with US 10 to Scottville before turning northward again toward Manistee.

At Beulah, US 31 runs eastward into Grand Traverse County. South of Traverse City, US 31 turns northward along M-37, running concurrently into the city. Next to Grand Traverse Bay, US 31/M-37 turns easterly along M-72; the three highways run together along the bay before separating. M-37 turns northward up the Old Mission Peninsula, and M-72 turns easterly at Acme. US 31 continues northward along the eastern shore of Grand Traverse Bay, running eastward through Charlevoix and along Little Traverse Bay into Petoskey. There, US 31 intersects the northern end of US 131 before rounding the bay and heading northward and inland toward Mackinaw City. US 31 ends at a directional interchange with I-75 south of Mackinaw City.

History
In the 1930s, US 31 continued from St. Ignace across the Straits of Mackinac, and intersected US 2 (Mackinac Trail and what later became M-123).

Before the Interstate era, US 31 was a major north–south highway. I-65 supplanted US 31 and either US 31W or US 31E as a through route between Mobile and Indianapolis. South of Indianapolis, all segments of US 31 not traveling concurrently with I-65 have been reduced to roads largely of local use. I-196 now carries the route of US 31 between Holland, and St. Joseph, Michigan. All of US 31 between Indianapolis and Ludington, Michigan, is divided highway—some of it is freeway, including a bypass route of South Bend, Indiana. The segment between Indianapolis and South Bend is scheduled for upgrade or replacement with Interstate-standard freeway. Environmental impact studies have shown that the fifth phase of the then-to-be-constructed freeway segment between Napier Avenue near Benton Harbor, Michigan, and I-94 would be completed in mid-November 2022; the segment officially opened on November 9.

The portion of I-75 north of US 31's northern terminus toward the Mackinac Bridge was designated part of US 31 prior to the 1990s and was US 31's northernmost portion to be built to freeway status. Since its truncation at the I-75 interchange, however, the northernmost segment of the US 31 freeway ends near Ludington.

Until 1975, the split of US 31 into US 31E and US 31W took place in Sellersburg, Indiana about 10 mi north of its current split at the Kentucky end of the Clark Memorial Bridge.

In Alabama, US 31 follows portions of the Pulaski Pike beginning at the Alabama–Tennessee State line at Ardmore, and was originally routed on what is now called Alabama State Route 251 (SR-251). It follows roughly along the Decatur Stage Road to the site of Rhodes Ferry in Decatur, and also intersected and follows portions of the Stouts Road to Birmingham. From Birmingham, it follows portions of the Columbiana Road and roughly parallels it in Hoover along the present widened route and intersects with the Ashville-Montevallo Road or the Cahaba Trail (SR-119) and follows it on a branch to Calera. US 31, beginning in Chilton County, follows a branch of the Talladega-Montgomery Stage Road, a road that went from Talladega and went south from Columbiana to near present-day Clanton, Verbena, and Montgomery, and was operated by Jemison, Ficklin, & Powell, who operated stagecoaches on the road. US 31 in Prattville came to the site of Reese's Ferry on the Alabama River, where it was replaced by the present bridge near Prattville. From Montgomery, US 31 follows parts of the Federal Road, and is presently routed on the Greenville Branch of the Federal Road, and follows the Montgomery-Mobile Road through Conecuh, and Escambia Counties and also intersects with the Pensacola Trading Path or the "Old Wolf Trail" from Burnt Corn.

At its southern end, US 31 originally traveled further west than it currently does, passing through Spanish Fort, Alabama. It crossed Mobile Bay via several narrow bridges, including the Admiral Raphael Semmes Bridge, a drawbridge spanning the Tensaw River. It turned north along the east bank of the Mobile River, crossing the river into Plateau, over the former Cochrane Bridge, another old drawbridge where the current Cochrane–Africatown USA Bridge is now located. It then turned south to end at US 90. It now officially ends at US 98 in Spanish Fort.

Major intersections

 * Southern segment
 * Alabama
 * in Spanish Fort
 * in Flomaton. The highways travel concurrently to Brewton.
 * southwest of Evergreen. The highways travel concurrently to east of Evergreen.
 * on the Hope Hull-Montgomery line
 * in Montgomery.
 * in Prattville
 * north of Prattville
 * in Clanton
 * in Calera
 * in Alabaster
 * in Hoover
 * on the Hoover-Vestavia Hills city line
 * in Homewood. The highways travel concurrently to Birmingham.
 * in Birmingham
 * in Birmingham
 * in Birmingham
 * near Fultondale
 * in Birmingham
 * in Smoke Rise. The highways travel concurrently through the town.
 * in Cullman
 * south-southeast of Lacon
 * in Athens
 * in Athens. The highways travel concurrently to Ardmore, Tennessee.
 * Tennessee
 * in Pulaski
 * in Pulaski
 * in Columbia
 * in Columbia
 * in Thompson's Station
 * in Franklin. The highways travel concurrently through the city.
 * in Nashville. US 31A joins US 41 and US 70S to intersect with US 31. US 41 and US 70S travel concurrently through the city.
 * in Nashville. US 31/US 431 travels concurrently through the city.
 * in Nashville

 * Northern segment
 * Kentucky
 * in Louisville
 * Indiana
 * in Jeffersonville. The highways travels concurrently to west of Jeffersonville.
 * south-southeast of Crothersville
 * in Seymour
 * in Taylorsville
 * in Indianapolis. I-74/US 31/US 36/US 40 travels concurrently through the city. I-465/US 31 travels concurrently to Carmel.
 * in Indianapolis
 * in Indianapolis. US 31/US 421 travels concurrently to Carmel.
 * in Indianapolis. The highways travel concurrently to Carmel.
 * in Indianapolis
 * in Indianapolis
 * in Carmel
 * east of Kokomo. The highways travel concurrently to north-northeast of Kokomo.
 * in Peru
 * east of Plymouth
 * southeast of La Paz
 * in South Bend. The highways travel concurrently through the city.
 * in South Bend
 * Michigan
 * in Bertrand Township
 * in Benton Township. The highways travel concurrently through the township.
 * in Benton Township. I-196/US 31 travels concurrently to Laketown Township.
 * in Norton Shores
 * in Amber Township. The highways travel concurrently through the township.
 * in Petoskey
 * in Mackinaw Township

title: U.S. Route 31


text:
Johannes Tinctoris

Jehan le Taintenier or Jean Teinturier (Latinised as Johannes Tinctoris; also Jean de Vaerwere; c. 1435 – 1511) was a Renaissance music theorist and composer from the Low Countries. Up to his time, he is perhaps the most significant European writer on music since Guido of Arezzo.

Life and career
He is known to have studied in Orléans, and to have been master of the choir there; he also may have been director of choirboys at Chartres. Because he was paid through the office of petites vicars at Cambrai Cathedral for four months in 1460, it has been speculated that he studied with Du Fay, who spent the last part of his life there; certainly Tinctoris must at least have known the elder Burgundian there. Tinctoris went to Naples about 1472 and spent most of the rest of his life in Italy.

Tinctoris was also known as a cleric, a poet, a mathematician, and a lawyer; there is even one reference to him as an accomplished painter.

Works
Tinctoris published many volumes of writings on music. While they are not particularly original, borrowing heavily from ancient writers (including Boethius, Isidore of Seville, and others) they give an impressively detailed record of the technical practices and procedures used by composers of the day. He wrote the first dictionary of musical terms (the Diffinitorium musices); a book on the characteristics of the musical modes; a treatise on proportions; and three books on counterpoint, which is particularly useful in charting the development of voice-leading and harmony in the transitional period between Du Fay and Josquin. The writings by Tinctoris were influential on composers and other music theorists for the remainder of the Renaissance.

While not much of the music of Tinctoris has survived, that which has survived shows a love for complex, smoothly flowing polyphony, as well as a liking for unusually low tessituras, occasionally descending in the bass voice to the C two octaves below middle C (showing an interesting similarity to Ockeghem in this regard). Tinctoris wrote masses, motets and a few chansons.

Tinctoris' eight rules of composition
From his third book on counterpoint.

Rule #1 Begin and finish with perfect consonance. It is, however, not wrong if the singer is improvising a counterpoint and ends with imperfect consonance, but in that case, the movement should be many-voiced. Sixth or octave doubling of the bass is not allowed.

Rule #2 Follow together with ténor up and down in imperfect and perfect consonances of the same kind. (Parallels at the third and sixth are recommended, fifth and octave parallels are forbidden.)

Rule #3 If ténor remains on the same note, you can add both perfect and imperfect consonances.

Rule #4 The counterpointed part should have a melodic closed form even if ténor makes big leaps.

Rule #5 Do not put cadence on a note if it ruins the development of the melody.

Rule #6 It is forbidden to repeat the same melodic turn above a cantus firmus, especially if the cantus firmus contains that same repetition.

Rule #7 Avoid two or more consecutive cadences of the same pitch even if cantus firmus allows it.

Rule #8 In all counterpoint, try to achieve manifoldness and variety by altering measure, tempo, and cadences. Use syncopes, imitations, canons, and pauses. But remember that an ordinary chanson uses fewer different styles than a motet and a motet uses fewer different styles than a mass.

Sacred music
Masses:
 * Missa sine nomine #1 (3 v)
 * Missa sine nomine #2
 * Missa sine nomine #3 (missing Kyrie and Agnus Dei)
 * Missa L'homme armé

Motets:
 * O Virgo miserere mei
 * Virgo Dei throno digna
 * Alleluya
 * Fecit potentiam
 * Lamentatio Jeremiae

Secular music

 * Helas
 * Vostre regart
 * O invida fortuna
 * Le souvenir (4v)
 * Le souvenir (2v)
 * Tout a par moy
 * De tous biens playne
 * D'ung aultre amer
 * Comme femme

Notable writings

 * the first dictionary of musical terms (Diffinitorum musices, c. 1475)
 * an introduction to the elements of musical pitch and rhythmic notation (Expositio manus and Proportionale musices); examples show how rhythmically elaborate extemporization may have been practiced
 * a thorough exposition of the modal system (Liber de natura et proprietate tonorum)
 * Liber de arte contrapuncti – his main exposition of intervals, consonance and dissonance, and their usage. He devised strict rules for introducing dissonances, limiting them to unstressed beats and syncopations (suspensions) and at cadences.
 * a broad survey of the origins and evolution of music, its theological and metaphysical roots and ramifications, and vocal and instrumentation practice (De inventione et usu musice).

Writings

 * Tinctoris, Johannes, Liber de arte contrapuncti, tr. Oliver Strunk, in Source Readings in Music History. New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1950.
 * Tinctoris, Johannes, Opus musices. Naples, c. 1483. Digitized codex at Somni
 * Tinctoris, Johanni, Opera Omnia, Corpus Mensurabilis Musicae 18, ed. William Melan, American Institute of Musicology, 1976

title: Johannes Tinctoris


text:
Talk:Robert Wise

Growing up
Wise grew up in Connersville, Indiana.
 * wouldn't this be better suited to WikiProject Film?--64.12.117.13 11:51, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
 * ah, which doesn't exist--64.12.117.13 11:51, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

Game of Death
Game of Death redirects to Bruce Lee movie. Fixed this. Wise's picture is dated 1945, while Lee's is 1973. Master Redyva  ♠

Assessment comment
Substituted at 04:42, 30 April 2016 (UTC)

External links modified
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Edit request at help desk
I can't find anything that says she or the surname is Jewish. The book may not say Jewish - if anyone has the book they can confirm this. TimTempleton (talk) (cont)  19:16, 10 August 2021 (UTC)

title: Talk:Robert Wise


text:
Austerity

In economic policy, austerity is a set of political-economic policies that aim to reduce government budget deficits through spending cuts, tax increases, or a combination of both. There are three primary types of austerity measures: higher taxes to fund spending, raising taxes while cutting spending, and lower taxes and lower government spending. Austerity measures are often used by governments that find it difficult to borrow or meet their existing obligations to pay back loans. The measures are meant to reduce the budget deficit by bringing government revenues closer to expenditures. Proponents of these measures state that this reduces the amount of borrowing required and may also demonstrate a government's fiscal discipline to creditors and credit rating agencies and make borrowing easier and cheaper as a result.

In most macroeconomic models, austerity policies which reduce government spending lead to increased unemployment in the short term. These reductions in employment usually occur directly in the public sector and indirectly in the private sector. Where austerity policies are enacted using tax increases, these can reduce consumption by cutting household disposable income. Reduced government spending can reduce gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the short term as government expenditure is itself a component of GDP. In the longer term, reduced government spending can reduce GDP growth if, for example, cuts to education spending leave a country's workforce less able to do high-skilled jobs or if cuts to infrastructure investment impose greater costs on business than they saved through lower taxes. In both cases, if reduced government spending leads to reduced GDP growth, austerity may lead to a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than the alternative of the government running a higher budget deficit. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, austerity measures in many European countries were followed by rising unemployment and slower GDP growth. The result was increased debt-to-GDP ratios despite reductions in budget deficits.

Theoretically in some cases, particularly when the output gap is low, austerity can have the opposite effect and stimulate economic growth. For example, when an economy is operating at or near capacity, higher short-term deficit spending (stimulus) can cause interest rates to rise, resulting in a reduction in private investment, which in turn reduces economic growth. Where there is excess capacity, the stimulus can result in an increase in employment and output. Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi argue that austerity can be expansionary in situations where government reduction in spending is offset by greater increases in aggregate demand (private consumption, private investment, and exports).

History
The origin of modern austerity measures is mostly undocumented among academics. During the United States occupation of Haiti that began in 1915, the United States utilized austerity policies where American corporations received a low tax rate while Haitians saw their taxes increase, with a forced labor system creating a "corporate paradise" in occupied Haiti. Another historical example of contemporary austerity is Fascist Italy during a liberal period of the economy from 1922 to 1925. The fascist government utilized austerity policies to prevent the democratization of Italy following World War I, with Luigi Einaudi, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Umberto Ricci and Alberto de' Stefani leading this movement. Austerity measures used by the Weimar Republic of Germany were unpopular and contributed towards the increased support for the Nazi Party in the 1930s.

Justifications
Austerity measures are typically pursued if there is a threat that a government cannot honour its debt obligations. This may occur when a government has borrowed in currencies that it has no right to issue, for example a South American country that borrows in US dollars. It may also occur if a country uses the currency of an independent central bank that is legally restricted from buying government debt, for example in the Eurozone.

In such a situation, banks and investors may lose confidence in a government's ability or willingness to pay, and either refuse to roll over existing debts, or demand extremely high interest rates. International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may demand austerity measures as part of Structural Adjustment Programmes when acting as lender of last resort.

Austerity policies may also appeal to the wealthier class of creditors, who prefer low inflation and the higher probability of payback on their government securities by less profligate governments. More recently austerity has been pursued after governments became highly indebted by assuming private debts following banking crises. (This occurred after Ireland assumed the debts of its private banking sector during the European debt crisis. This rescue of the private sector resulted in calls to cut back the profligacy of the public sector.)

According to Mark Blyth, the concept of austerity emerged in the 20th century, when large states acquired sizable budgets. However, Blyth argues that the theories and sensibilities about the role of the state and capitalist markets that underline austerity emerged from the 17th century onwards. Austerity is grounded in liberal economics' view of the state and sovereign debt as deeply problematic. Blyth traces the discourse of austerity back to John Locke's theory of private property and derivative theory of the state, David Hume's ideas about money and the virtue of merchants, and Adam Smith's theories on economic growth and taxes. On the basis of classic liberal ideas, austerity emerged as a doctrine of neoliberalism in the 20th century.

Economist David M. Kotz suggests that the implementation of austerity measures following the 2007–2008 financial crisis was an attempt to preserve the neoliberal capitalist model.

Theoretical considerations
In the 1930s during the Great Depression, anti-austerity arguments gained more prominence. John Maynard Keynes became a well known anti-austerity economist, arguing that "The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury."

Contemporary Keynesian economists argue that budget deficits are appropriate when an economy is in recession, to reduce unemployment and help spur GDP growth. According to Paul Krugman, since a government is not like a household, reductions in government spending during economic downturns worsen the crisis.

Across an economy, one person's spending is another person's income. In other words, if everyone is trying to reduce their spending, the economy can be trapped in what economists call the paradox of thrift, worsening the recession as GDP falls. In the past this has been offset by encouraging consumerism to rely on debt, but after the 2008 crisis, this has looked like a less and less viable option for sustainable economics.

Krugman argues that, if the private sector is unable or unwilling to consume at a level that increases GDP and employment sufficiently, then the government should be spending more in order to offset the decline in private spending. Keynesian theory is proposed as being responsible for post-war boom years, before the 1970s, and when public sector investment was at its highest across Europe, partially encouraged by the Marshall Plan.

An important component of economic output is business investment, but there is no reason to expect it to stabilize at full utilization of the economy's resources. High business profits do not necessarily lead to increased economic growth. (When businesses and banks have a disincentive to spend accumulated capital, such as cash repatriation taxes from profits in overseas tax havens and interest on excess reserves paid to banks, increased profits can lead to decreasing growth.)

Economists Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart wrote in April 2013, "Austerity seldom works without structural reforms – for example, changes in taxes, regulations and labor market policies – and if poorly designed, can disproportionately hit the poor and middle class. Our consistent advice has been to avoid withdrawing fiscal stimulus too quickly, a position identical to that of most mainstream economists."

To help improve the U.S. economy, they (Rogoff and Reinhart) advocated reductions in mortgage principal for 'underwater homes' – those whose negative equity (where the value of the asset is less than the mortgage principal) can lead to a stagnant housing market with no realistic opportunity to reduce private debts.

Multiplier effects
In October 2012, the IMF announced that its forecasts for countries that implemented austerity programs have been consistently overoptimistic, suggesting that tax hikes and spending cuts have been doing more damage than expected and that countries that implemented fiscal stimulus, such as Germany and Austria, did better than expected.

The IMF reported that this was due to fiscal multipliers that were considerably larger than expected: for example, the IMF estimated that fiscal multipliers based on data from 28 countries ranged between 0.9 and 1.7. In other words, a 1% GDP fiscal consolidation (i.e., austerity) would reduce GDP between 0.9% and 1.7%, thus inflicting far more economic damage than the 0.5 previously estimated in IMF forecasts.

In many countries, little is known about the size of multipliers, as data availability limits the scope for empirical research.

For these countries, Nicoletta Batini, Luc Eyraud and Anke Weber propose a simple method—dubbed the "bucket approach"—to come up with reasonable multiplier estimates. The approach bunches countries into groups (or "buckets") with similar multiplier values, based on their characteristics, and taking into account the effect of (some) temporary factors such as the state of the business cycle.

Different tax and spending choices of equal magnitude have different economic effects:

For example, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimated that the payroll tax (levied on all wage earners) has a higher multiplier (impact on GDP) than does the income tax (which is levied primarily on wealthier workers). In other words, raising the payroll tax by $1 as part of an austerity strategy would slow the economy more than would raising the income tax by $1, resulting in less net deficit reduction.

In theory, it would stimulate the economy and reduce the deficit if the payroll tax were lowered and the income tax raised in equal amounts.

Crowding in or out
The term "crowding out" refers to the extent to which an increase in the budget deficit offsets spending in the private sector. Economist Laura Tyson wrote in June 2012, "By itself an increase in the deficit, either in the form of an increase in government spending or a reduction in taxes, causes an increase in demand". How this affects output, employment, and growth depends on what happens to interest rates:

When the economy is operating near capacity, government borrowing to finance an increase in the deficit causes interest rates to rise and higher interest rates reduce or "crowd out" private investment, reducing growth. This theory explains why large and sustained government deficits take a toll on growth: they reduce capital formation. But this argument rests on how government deficits affect interest rates, and the relationship between government deficits and interest rates varies.

When there is considerable excess capacity, an increase in government borrowing to finance an increase in the deficit does not lead to higher interest rates and does not crowd out private investment. Instead, the higher demand resulting from the increase in the deficit bolsters employment and output directly. The resultant increase in income and economic activity in turn encourages, or "crowds in", additional private spending.

Some argue that the "crowding-in" model is an appropriate solution for current economic conditions.

Government budget balance as a sectoral component
According to economist Martin Wolf, the U.S. and many Eurozone countries experienced rapid increases in their budget deficits in the wake of the 2008 crisis as a result of significant private-sector retrenchment and ongoing capital account surpluses.

Policy choices had little to do with these deficit increases. This makes austerity measures counterproductive. Wolf explained that government fiscal balance is one of three major financial sectoral balances in a country's economy, along with the foreign financial sector (capital account) and the private financial sector.

By definition, the sum of the surpluses or deficits across these three sectors must be zero. In the U.S. and many Eurozone countries other than Germany, a foreign financial surplus exists because capital is imported (net) to fund the trade deficit. Further, there is a private-sector financial surplus because household savings exceed business investment.

By definition, a government budget deficit must exist so all three net to zero: for example, the U.S. government budget deficit in 2011 was approximately 10% of GDP (8.6% of GDP of which was federal), offsetting a foreign financial surplus of 4% of GDP and a private-sector surplus of 6% of GDP.

Wolf explained in July 2012 that the sudden shift in the private sector from deficit to surplus forced the U.S. government balance into deficit: "The financial balance of the private sector shifted towards surplus by the almost unbelievable cumulative total of 11.2 per cent of gross domestic product between the third quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009, which was when the financial deficit of US government (federal and state) reached its peak. ... No fiscal policy changes explain the collapse into massive fiscal deficit between 2007 and 2009, because there was none of any importance. The collapse is explained by the massive shift of the private sector from financial deficit into surplus or, in other words, from boom to bust."

Wolf also wrote that several European economies face the same scenario and that a lack of deficit spending would likely have resulted in a depression. He argued that a private-sector depression (represented by the private- and foreign-sector surpluses) was being "contained" by government deficit spending.

Economist Paul Krugman also explained in December 2011 the causes of the sizable shift from private-sector deficit to surplus in the U.S.: "This huge move into surplus reflects the end of the housing bubble, a sharp rise in household saving, and a slump in business investment due to lack of customers."

One reason why austerity can be counterproductive in a downturn is due to a significant private-sector financial surplus, in which consumer savings is not fully invested by businesses. In a healthy economy, private-sector savings placed into the banking system by consumers are borrowed and invested by companies. However, if consumers have increased their savings but companies are not investing the money, a surplus develops.

Business investment is one of the major components of GDP. For example, a U.S. private-sector financial deficit from 2004 to 2008 transitioned to a large surplus of savings over investment that exceeded $1 trillion by early 2009, and remained above $800 billion into September 2012. Part of this investment reduction was related to the housing market, a major component of investment. This surplus explains how even significant government deficit spending would not increase interest rates (because businesses still have access to ample savings if they choose to borrow and invest it, so interest rates are not bid upward) and how Federal Reserve action to increase the money supply does not result in inflation (because the economy is awash with savings with no place to go).

Economist Richard Koo described similar effects for several of the developed world economies in December 2011: "Today private sectors in the U.S., the U.K., Spain, and Ireland (but not Greece) are undergoing massive deleveraging [paying down debt rather than spending] in spite of record low interest rates. This means these countries are all in serious balance sheet recessions. The private sectors in Japan and Germany are not borrowing, either. With borrowers disappearing and banks reluctant to lend, it is no wonder that, after nearly three years of record low interest rates and massive liquidity injections, industrial economies are still doing so poorly. Flow of funds data for the U.S. show a massive shift away from borrowing to savings by the private sector since the housing bubble burst in 2007. The shift for the private sector as a whole represents over 9 percent of U.S. GDP at a time of zero interest rates. Moreover, this increase in private sector savings exceeds the increase in government borrowings (5.8 percent of GDP), which suggests that the government is not doing enough to offset private sector deleveraging."

Framing of the debate surrounding austerity
Many scholars have argued that how the debate surrounding austerity is framed has a heavy impact on the view of austerity in the public eye, and how the public understands macroeconomics as a whole. Wren-Lewis, for example, coined the term 'mediamacro', which refers to "the role of the media reproducing particularly corrosive forms of economic illiteracy—of which the idea that deficits are ipso facto 'bad' is a strong example." This can go as far as ignoring economists altogether; however, it often manifests itself as a drive in which a minority of economists whose ideas about austerity have been thoroughly debunked being pushed to the front to justify public policy, such as in the case of Alberto Alesina (2009), whose pro-austerity works were "thoroughly debunked by the likes of the economists, the IMF, and the Centre for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP)." Other anti-austerity economists, such as Seymour have argued that the debate must be reframed as a social and class movement, and its impact judged accordingly, since statecraft is viewed as the main goal.

Further, critics such as Major have highlighted how the OECD and associated international finance organisations have framed the debate to promote austerity, for example, the concept of 'wage-push inflation' which ignores the role played by the profiteering of private companies, and seeks to blame inflation on wages being too high.

Empirical considerations
According to a 2020 study, austerity increases the risk of default in situations of severe fiscal stress, but reduces the risk of default in situations of low fiscal stress.

Europe
A typical goal of austerity is to reduce the annual budget deficit without sacrificing growth. Over time, this may reduce the overall debt burden, often measured as the ratio of public debt to GDP.

Eurozone
During the European debt crisis, many countries embarked on austerity programs, reducing their budget deficits relative to GDP from 2010 to 2011.

According to the CIA World Factbook, Greece decreased its budget deficit from 10.4% of GDP in 2010 to 9.6% in 2011. Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, France, and Spain also decreased their budget deficits from 2010 to 2011 relative to GDP but the austerity policy of the Eurozone achieves not only the reduction of budget deficits. The goal of economic consolidation influences the future development of the European social model.

With the exception of Germany, each of these countries had public-debt-to-GDP ratios that increased from 2010 to 2011, as indicated in the chart at right. Greece's public-debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 143% in 2010 to 165% in 2011 Indicating despite declining budget deficits GDP growth was not sufficient to support a decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio for these countries during this period.

Eurostat reported that the overall debt-to-GDP ratio for the EA17 was 70.1% in 2008, 80.0% in 2009, 85.4% in 2010, 87.3% in 2011, and 90.6% in 2012. Further, real GDP in the EA17 declined for six straight quarters from Q4 2011 to Q1 2013.

Unemployment is another variable considered in evaluating austerity measures. According to the CIA World Factbook, from 2010 to 2011, the unemployment rates in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK increased. France and Italy had no significant changes, while in Germany and Iceland the unemployment rate declined. Eurostat reported that Eurozone unemployment reached record levels in March 2013 at 12.1%, up from 11.6% in September 2012 and 10.3% in 2011. Unemployment varied significantly by country.

Economist Martin Wolf analyzed the relationship between cumulative GDP growth in 2008 to 2012 and total reduction in budget deficits due to austerity policies in several European countries during April 2012 (see chart at right). He concluded, "In all, there is no evidence here that large fiscal contractions budget deficit reductions bring benefits to confidence and growth that offset the direct effects of the contractions. They bring exactly what one would expect: small contractions bring recessions and big contractions bring depressions."

Changes in budget balances (deficits or surpluses) explained approximately 53% of the change in GDP, according to the equation derived from the IMF data used in his analysis.

Similarly, economist Paul Krugman analyzed the relationship between GDP and reduction in budget deficits for several European countries in April 2012 and concluded that austerity was slowing growth. He wrote: "this also implies that 1 euro of austerity yields only about 0.4 euros of reduced deficit, even in the short run. No wonder, then, that the whole austerity enterprise is spiraling into disaster."

Greece
The Greek government-debt crisis brought a package of austerity measures, put forth by the EU and the IMF mostly in the context of the three successive bailouts the country endured from 2010 to 2018; it was met with great anger by the Greek public, leading to riots and social unrest. On 27 June 2011, trade union organizations began a 48-hour labour strike in advance of a parliamentary vote on the austerity package, the first such strike since 1974.

Massive demonstrations were organized throughout Greece, intended to pressure members of parliament into voting against the package. The second set of austerity measures was approved on 29 June 2011, with 155 out of 300 members of parliament voting in favor. However, one United Nations official warned that the second package of austerity measures in Greece could pose a violation of human rights.

Around 2011, the IMF started issuing guidance suggesting that austerity could be harmful when applied without regard to an economy's underlying fundamentals.

In 2013, it published a detailed analysis concluding that "if financial markets focus on the short-term behavior of the debt ratio, or if country authorities engage in repeated rounds of tightening in an effort to get the debt ratio to converge to the official target", austerity policies could slow or reverse economic growth and inhibit full employment. Keynesian economists and commentators such as Paul Krugman have suggested that this has in fact been occurring, with austerity yielding worse results in proportion to the extent to which it has been imposed.

Overall, Greece lost 25% of its GDP during the crisis. Although the government debt increased only 6% between 2009 and 2017 (from €300 bn to €318 bn) — thanks, in part, to the 2012 debt restructuring —, the critical debt-to-GDP ratio shot up from 127% to 179% mostly due to the severe GDP drop during the handling of the crisis. In all, the Greek economy suffered the longest recession of any advanced capitalist economy to date, overtaking the US Great Depression. As such, the crisis adversely affected the populace as the series of sudden reforms and austerity measures led to impoverishment and loss of income and property, as well as a small-scale humanitarian crisis. Unemployment shot up from 8% in 2008 to 27% in 2013 and remained at 22% in 2017. As a result of the crisis, Greek political system has been upended, social exclusion increased, and hundreds of thousands of well-educated Greeks left the country.

France
In April and May 2012, France held a presidential election in which the winner, François Hollande, had opposed austerity measures, promising to eliminate France's budget deficit by 2017 by canceling recently enacted tax cuts and exemptions for the wealthy, raising the top tax bracket rate to 75% on incomes over one million euros, restoring the retirement age to 60 with a full pension for those who have worked 42 years, restoring 60,000 jobs recently cut from public education, regulating rent increases, and building additional public housing for the poor. In the legislative elections in June, Hollande's Socialist Party won a supermajority capable of amending the French Constitution and enabling the immediate enactment of the promised reforms. Interest rates on French government bonds fell by 30% to record lows, fewer than 50 basis points above German government bond rates.

Latvia
Latvia's economy returned to growth in 2011 and 2012, outpacing the 27 nations in the EU, while implementing significant austerity measures. Advocates of austerity argue that Latvia represents an empirical example of the benefits of austerity, while critics argue that austerity created unnecessary hardship with the output in 2013 still below the pre-crisis level. While Anders Åslund maintains that internal devaluation was not opposed by the Latvian public, Jokubas Salyga has recently chronicled widespread protests against austerity in the country.

According to the CIA World Fact Book, "Latvia's economy experienced GDP growth of more than 10% per year during 2006–07, but entered a severe recession in 2008 as a result of an unsustainable current account deficit and large debt exposure amid the softening world economy. Triggered by the collapse of the second largest bank, GDP plunged 18% in 2009. The economy has not returned to pre-crisis levels despite strong growth, especially in the export sector in 2011–12. The IMF, EU, and other international donors provided substantial financial assistance to Latvia as part of an agreement to defend the currency's peg to the euro in exchange for the government's commitment to stringent austerity measures.

The IMF/EU program successfully concluded in December 2011. The government of Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis remained committed to fiscal prudence and reducing the fiscal deficit from 7.7% of GDP in 2010, to 2.7% of GDP in 2012." The CIA estimated that Latvia's GDP declined by 0.3% in 2010, then grew by 5.5% in 2011 and 4.5% in 2012. Unemployment was 12.8% in 2011 and rose to 14.3% in 2012. Latvia's currency, the Lati, fell from $0.47 per U.S. dollar in 2008 to $0.55 in 2012, a decline of 17%. Latvia entered the euro zone in 2014. Latvia's trade deficit improved from over 20% of GDP in 2006 to 2007 to under 2% GDP by 2012.

Eighteen months after harsh austerity measures were enacted (including both spending cuts and tax increases), economic growth began to return, although unemployment remained above pre-crisis levels. Latvian exports have skyrocketed and both the trade deficit and budget deficit have decreased dramatically. More than one-third of government positions were eliminated, and the rest received sharp pay cuts. Exports increased after goods prices were reduced due to private business lowering wages in tandem with the government.

Paul Krugman wrote in January 2013 that Latvia had yet to regain its pre-crisis level of employment. He also wrote, "So we're looking at a Depression-level slump, and 5 years later only a partial bounceback; unemployment is down but still very high, and the decline has a lot to do with emigration. It's not what you'd call a triumphant success story, any more than the partial US recovery from 1933 to 1936—which was actually considerably more impressive—represented a huge victory over the Depression. And it's in no sense a refutation of Keynesianism, either. Even in Keynesian models, a small open economy can, in the long run, restore full employment through deflation and internal devaluation; the point, however, is that it involves many years of suffering".

Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis defended his policies in a television interview, stating that Krugman refused to admit his error in predicting that Latvia's austerity policy would fail. Krugman had written a blog post in December 2008 entitled "Why Latvia is the New Argentina", in which he argued for Latvia to devalue its currency as an alternative or in addition to austerity.

Post war austerity
Following the Second World War the United Kingdom had huge debts, large commitments, and had sold many income producing assets. Rationing of food and other goods which had started in the war continued for some years.

21st century austerity programme
Following the financial crisis of 2007–2008 a period of economic recession began in the UK. The austerity programme was initiated in 2010 by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, despite some opposition from the academic community. In his June 2010 budget speech, the Chancellor George Osborne identified two goals. The first was that the structural current budget deficit would be eliminated to "achieve cyclically-adjusted current balance by the end of the rolling, five-year forecast period". The second was that national debt as a percentage of GDP would fall. The government intended to achieve both of its goals through substantial reductions in public expenditure. This was to be achieved by a combination of public spending reductions and tax increases. Economists Alberto Alesina, Carlo A. Favero and Francesco Giavazzi, writing in Finance & Development in 2018, argued that deficit reduction policies based on spending cuts typically have almost no effect on output, and hence form a better route to achieving a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio than raising taxes. The authors commented that the UK government austerity programme had resulted in growth that was higher than the European average and that the UK's economic performance had been much stronger than the International Monetary Fund had predicted. This claim was challenged most strongly by Mark Blyth, whose 2014 book on austerity claims that austerity not only fails to stimulate growth, but effectively passes that debt down to the working classes. As such, many academics such as Andrew Gamble view Austerity in Britain less as an economic necessity, and more as a tool of statecraft, driven by ideology and not economic requirements. A study published in The BMJ in November 2017 found the Conservative government austerity programme had been linked to approximately 120,000 deaths since 2010; however, this was disputed, for example on the grounds that it was an observational study which did not show cause and effect. More studies claim adverse effects of austerity on population health, which include an increase in the mortality rate among pensioners which has been linked to unprecedented reductions in income support, an increase in suicides and the prescription of antidepressants for patients with mental health issues, and an increase in violence, self-harm, and suicide in prisons.

United States
The United States' response to the 2008 economic crash was largely influenced by Wall Street and IMF interests, who favored fiscal retrenchment in the face of the economic crash. Evidence exists to suggest that Pete Peterson (and the Petersonites) have heavily influenced US policy on economic recovery since the Nixon era, and presented itself in 2008, despite austerity measures being "wildly out of step with public opinion and reputable economic policy...[and showing] anti-Keynesian bias of supply-side economics and a political system skewed to favor Wall Street over Main Street". The nuance of the economic logic of Keynesianism is, however, difficult to put across to the American Public, and compares poorly to the simplistic message which blames government spending, which might explain Obama's preferred position of a halfway point between economic stimulus followed by austerity, which led to him being criticized by economists such as Joseph Stiglitz.

Controversy
Austerity programs can be controversial. In the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) briefing paper "The IMF and the Third World", the ODI addresses five major complaints against the IMF's austerity conditions. Complaints include such measures being "anti-developmental", "self-defeating", and tending "to have an adverse impact on the poorest segments of the population".

In many situations, austerity programs are implemented by countries that were previously under dictatorial regimes, leading to criticism that citizens are forced to repay the debts of their oppressors.

In 2009, 2010, and 2011, workers and students in Greece and other European countries demonstrated against cuts to pensions, public services, and education spending as a result of government austerity measures.

Following the announcement of plans to introduce austerity measures in Greece, massive demonstrations occurred throughout the country aimed at pressing parliamentarians to vote against the austerity package. In Athens alone, 19 arrests were made, while 46 civilians and 38 policemen had been injured by 29 June 2011. The third round of austerity was approved by the Greek parliament on 12 February 2012 and met strong opposition, especially in Athens and Thessaloniki, where police clashed with demonstrators.

Opponents argue that austerity measures depress economic growth and ultimately cause reduced tax revenues that outweigh the benefits of reduced public spending. Moreover, in countries with already anemic economic growth, austerity can engender deflation, which inflates existing debt. Such austerity packages can also cause the country to fall into a liquidity trap, causing credit markets to freeze up and unemployment to increase. Opponents point to cases in Ireland and Spain in which austerity measures instituted in response to financial crises in 2009 proved ineffective in combating public debt and placed those countries at risk of defaulting in late 2010.

In October 2012, the IMF announced that its forecasts for countries that implemented austerity programs have been consistently overoptimistic, suggesting that tax hikes and spending cuts have been doing more damage than expected and that countries that implemented fiscal stimulus, such as Germany and Austria, did better than expected. These data have been scrutinized by the Financial Times, which found no significant trends when outliers like Germany and Greece were excluded. Determining the multipliers used in the research to achieve the results found by the IMF was also described as an "exercise in futility" by Professor Carlos Vegh of the University of Michigan. Moreover, Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley and Kevin H. O'Rourke of Oxford University write that the IMF's new estimate of the extent to which austerity restricts growth was much lower than historical data suggest.

On 3 February 2015, Joseph Stiglitz wrote: "Austerity had failed repeatedly from its early use under US president Herbert Hoover, which turned the stock-market crash into the Great Depression, to the IMF programs imposed on East Asia and Latin America in recent decades. And yet when Greece got into trouble, it was tried again." Government spending actually rose significantly under Hoover, while revenues were flat.

According to a 2020 study, which used survey experiments in the UK, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany, voters strongly disapprove of austerity measures, in particular spending cuts. Voters disapprove of fiscal deficits but not as strongly as austerity. A 2021 study found that incumbent European governments that implemented austerity measures in the Great Recession lost support in opinion polls.

Austerity has been blamed for at least 120,000 deaths between 2010 and 2017 in the UK, with one study putting it at 130,000 and another at 30,000 in 2015 alone. The first study added that "no firm conclusions can be drawn about cause and effect, but the findings back up other research in the field" and campaigners have claimed that cuts to benefits, healthcare and mental health services lead to more deaths including through suicide.

Balancing stimulus and austerity
Strategies that involve short-term stimulus with longer-term austerity are not mutually exclusive. Steps can be taken in the present that will reduce future spending, such as "bending the curve" on pensions by reducing cost of living adjustments or raising the retirement age for younger members of the population, while at the same time creating short-term spending or tax cut programs to stimulate the economy to create jobs.

IMF managing director Christine Lagarde wrote in August 2011, "For the advanced economies, there is an unmistakable need to restore fiscal sustainability through credible consolidation plans. At the same time we know that slamming on the brakes too quickly will hurt the recovery and worsen job prospects. So fiscal adjustment must resolve the conundrum of being neither too fast nor too slow. Shaping a Goldilocks fiscal consolidation is all about timing. What is needed is a dual focus on medium-term consolidation and short-term support for growth. That may sound contradictory, but the two are mutually reinforcing. Decisions on future consolidation, tackling the issues that will bring sustained fiscal improvement, create space in the near term for policies that support growth."

Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke wrote in September 2011, "the two goals—achieving fiscal sustainability, which is the result of responsible policies set in place for the longer term, and avoiding creation of fiscal headwinds for the recovery—are not incompatible. Acting now to put in place a credible plan for reducing future deficits over the long term, while being attentive to the implications of fiscal choices for the recovery in the near term, can help serve both objectives."

"Age of austerity"
The term "age of austerity" was popularised by UK Conservative Party leader David Cameron in his keynote speech to the Conservative Party forum in Cheltenham on 26 April 2009, in which he committed to end years of what he called "excessive government spending". Theresa May claimed that "Austerity is over" as of 3 October 2018, a statement which was almost immediately met with criticism on the reality of its central claim, particularly in relation to the high possibility of a substantial economic downturn due to Brexit.

Word of the year
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary named the word austerity as its "Word of the year" for 2010 because of the number of web searches this word generated that year. According to the president and publisher of the dictionary, "austerity had more than 250,000 searches on the dictionary's free online [website] tool" and the spike in searches "came with more coverage of the debt crisis".

Examples of austerity

 * Albania — 1962
 * Argentina — 1952, 1985, 1998–2003, 2012, 2018–2019, 2023–
 * Australia — 2014
 * Brazil — 2003–2006, 2015–2018
 * Canada — 1994
 * China — 2013
 * Cuba — 1991–2000, 2008
 * Czech Republic — 2010
 * Ecuador — 2017– ,
 * Estonia — 2007–2009
 * European countries — 2012
 * Finland — 1991–1999, 2011–2015, 2015–2019, 2023–
 * France — 1926–1929, 1932, 1934–1936, 1938–1940, 1958, 1976–1981, 1982–1986, 1995, 2010, 2014, 2024
 * Germany — 1930, 2011
 * Greece — 2010–2018
 * Haiti — 1915–1934 (American occupation)
 * Ireland — 2010–2014
 * Israel — 1949–1959
 * Italy — 1922–1925, 2011–2013
 * Japan — 1949 (American Occupation), 1997–1998, 2010
 * Latvia — 2009–2013
 * Mexico — 1985, 2020
 * Netherlands — 1982–1990, 2003–2006, 2011–2014
 * Nicaragua — 1997, 2018
 * Palestinian Authority — 2006
 * Portugal — 1977–1979, 1983–1985, 2002–2015,
 * Puerto Rico — 2009–2018
 * Romania — Ceaușescu's 1981–1989 austerity, 2010
 * Spain — 1979, 2010–2014
 * Sweden — 1995-1997
 * United States — 1921, 1937, 1946, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
 * United Kingdom — during and after the two World Wars, 1976–1979, 2011–2019
 * Venezuela — 1989, 2016

Criticism
According to economist David Stuckler and physician Sanjay Basu in their study The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills, a health crisis is being triggered by austerity policies, including up to 10,000 additional suicides that have occurred across Europe and the U.S. since the introduction of austerity programs.

Much of the acceptance of austerity in the general public has centred on the way debate has been framed, and relates to an issue with representative democracy; since the public do not have widely available access to the latest economic research, which is highly critical of economic retrenchment in times of crisis, the public must rely on which politician sounds most plausible. This can unfortunately lead to authoritative leaders pursuing policies which make little, if any, economic sense.

An analysis by Hübscher et al. of 166 elections across Europe since 1980 demonstrates that austerity measures lead to increased electoral abstention and a rise in votes for non-mainstream parties, thereby exacerbating political polarization. Their detailed examination of specific austerity episodes reveals that new, small, and radical parties are the primary beneficiaries of such policies.

A study by Gabriel et al., analyzing elections in 124 European regions from eight countries between 1980 and 2015, found that fiscal consolidations increased the vote share of extreme parties, lowered voter turnout, and heightened political fragmentation. Notably, after the European debt crisis, a 1% reduction in regional public spending resulted in an approximate 3 percentage point rise in the vote share of extreme parties. The findings suggest that austerity measures diminish trust in political institutions and encourage support for more extreme political positions.

According to a 2020 study, austerity does not pay off in terms of reducing the default premium in situations of severe fiscal stress. Rather, austerity increases the default premium. However, in situations of low fiscal stress, austerity does reduce the default premium. The study also found that increases in government consumption had no substantial impact on the default premium.

Clara E. Mattei, assistant professor of economics at the New School for Social Research, posits that austerity is less of a means to "fix the economy" and is more of an ideological weapon of class oppression wielded by economic and political elites in order to suppress revolts and unrest by the working class public and close off any alternatives to the capitalist system. She traces the origins of modern austerity to post-World War I Britain and Italy, when it served as a "powerful counteroffensive" to rising working class agitation and anti-capitalist sentiment. In this, she quotes British economist G. D. H. Cole writing on the British response to the economic downturn of 1921:

"'The big working-class offensive had been successfully stalled off; and British capitalism, though threatened with economic adversity, felt itself once more safely in the saddle and well able to cope, both industrially and politically, with any attempt that might still be made from the labour side to unseat it.'"

DeLong–Summers condition
J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence Summers explained why an expansionary fiscal policy is effective in reducing a government's future debt burden, pointing out that the policy has a positive impact on its future productivity level. They pointed out that when an economy is depressed and its nominal interest rate is near zero, the real interest rate charged to firms $$ r^{f} $$ is linked to the output as $$ \frac{\partial r^{f} }{\partial Y} = - \delta $$. This means that the rate decreases as the real GDP increases, and the actual fiscal multiplier $$ \mu $$ is higher than that in normal times; a fiscal stimulus is more effective for the case where the interest rates are at the zero bound. As the economy is boosted by government spending, the increased output yields higher tax revenue, and so we have
 * $$ \frac{\partial D}{\partial G} = 1 - \mu \tau \;,   $$

where $$ \tau $$ is a baseline marginal tax-and-transfer rate. Also, we need to take account of the economy's long-run growth rate $$ g $$, as a steady economic growth rate may reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio. Then we can see that an expansionary fiscal policy is self-financing:
 * $$ (r - g) dD - \tau dY =  (r - g )(1 - \mu \tau) dG - \tau \eta \mu dG $$
 * $$ \frac{\partial B}{\partial G} = (r-g) (1 - \mu \tau) - \tau \eta \mu  \;, $$

as long as $$ \frac{\partial B}{\partial G} $$ is less than zero. Then we can find that a fiscal stimulus makes the long-term budget in surplus if the real government borrowing rate satisfies the following condition:
 * $$ (r-g) (1 - \mu \tau) < \tau \eta \mu $$

Impacts on short-run budget deficit
Research by Gauti Eggertsson et al. indicates that a government's fiscal austerity measures actually increase its short-term budget deficit if the nominal interest rate is very low. In normal time, the government sets the tax rates $$ \tau_{s}, \tau_{i} $$ and the central bank controls the nominal interest rate $$ i $$. If the rate is so low that monetary policies cannot mitigate the negative impact of the austerity measures, the significant decrease of tax base makes the revenue of the government and the budget position worse. If the multiplier is
 * $$ \frac{\partial Y}{\partial G} > \gamma

= \frac{1 + \tau_{s} + \theta \sigma^{-1} \psi }{\tau_{i} + \tau_{s} + \theta} $$ then we have $$ \frac{\partial D}{\partial G} < 0 \; $$, where
 * $$ \theta =  \frac{b}{Y } (1+i)   \frac{  \kappa }{ (1-\beta \mu) }   \; . $$

That is, the austerity measures are counterproductive in the short-run, as long as the multiplier is larger than a certain level $$ \gamma $$. This erosion of the tax base is the effect of the endogenous component of the deficit. Therefore, if the government increases sales taxes, then it reduces the tax base due to its negative effect on the demand, and it upsets the budget balance.

No credit risk
For a country that has its own currency, its government can create credits by itself, and its central bank can keep the interest rate close to or equal to the nominal risk-free rate. Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan says that the probability that the US defaults on its debt repayment is zero, because the US government can print money. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis says that the US government's debt is denominated in US dollars; therefore the government will never go bankrupt, though it may introduce the risk of inflation.

Alternatives to austerity
A number of alternative plans have been used and proposed as an alternative to implementing austerity measures, examples include:

Alternatives to implementing austerity measures may utilise increased government borrowing in the short-term (such as for use in infrastructure development and public work projects) to attempt to achieve long-term economic growth. Alternately, instead of government borrowing, governments can raise taxes to fund public sector activity.
 * Infrastructure-based development
 * New Deal (a series of programs, public work projects, financial reforms, and regulations enacted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States between 1933 and 1939 in response to the Great Depression in the United States).

title: Austerity


text:
Alza

Alza Corporation was an American pharmaceutical and medical systems company.

Background
Founded in 1968 by Dr. Alejandro Zaffaroni; the company's name is a portmanteau of his name. Alza was a major pioneer in the field of drug delivery systems, bringing over 20 prescription pharmaceutical products to market, and employing about 10,000 people during 20 years. In 2001, Alza was acquired by Johnson & Johnson via a stock-for-stock transaction worth US$10.5 billion.

Drug delivery platforms
The company owns the patents on the following delivery platforms:
 * Alzamer Depot
 * D-Trans
 * DUROS implant
 * E-Trans electrotransport
 * OROS (Osmotic Release Oral System)
 * Macroflux transdermal system
 * Stealth liposomal

Marketed Alza products
• Catapres-TTS – now marketed by Janssen Pharmaceuticals

• Concerta – now marketed by Janssen Pharmaceuticals

•  Covera HS – with G.D. Searle

• Ditropan XL

• Duragesic

• Doxil

• Jurnista / Exalgo

•  Glucotrol XL – with Pfizer

• Nicoderm CQ

•  Procardia XL – with Pfizer

• Efidac/24 – marketed by CIBA Consumer Pharmaceuticals

•  Spirolactone

• Viadur – licensed to Bayer after approval in 2000, but marketing was discontinued in 2008

Locations
Alza built its first corporate headquarters in 1971, at 950 Page Mill Road in Palo Alto, California. In 1990, Alza moved its headquarters to Shoreline Business Park, where it remained until late 2007, a few years after Alza was acquired by Johnson & Johnson. The remaining employees were relocated to two buildings elsewhere in the Shoreline Business Park.

Alza operated a large-scale manufacturing facility in Vacaville, California, but it was announced that this facility would shut down by 2022. They also previously operated a large-scale facility in Cashel, Ireland.

Google's Googleplex is located just east of Alza Plaza. In August–September 2008, Google moved into the Alza plaza buildings.

title: Alza