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The Guns of August

The Guns of August (published in the UK as August 1914) is a 1962 book centered on the first month of World War I written by Barbara W. Tuchman. After introductory chapters, Tuchman describes in great detail the opening events of the conflict. The book's focus then becomes a military history of the contestants, chiefly the great powers.

The Guns of August provides a narrative of the earliest stages of World War I, from the decisions to go to war up until the start of the Franco-British offensive that stopped the German advance into France. The result was four years of trench warfare. In the course of her narrative Tuchman includes discussion of the plans, strategies, world events, and international sentiments before and during the war.

The book was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction for publication year 1963, and proved very popular. Tuchman later returned to the subject of the social attitudes and issues that existed before World War I in a collection of eight essays published in 1966 as The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914.

Synopsis
The funeral of King Edward VII in May 1910 introduces Kaiser Wilhelm II and his relationship with the British monarchy, pivotal elements in the looming conflict. The remaining twenty one chapters of the book are grouped in three parts: "Plans", "Outbreak" and "Battle".

"Plans" delves into the prewar military strategies of the four major European powers:
 * Germany - Schlieffen's plan to avoid a two-front war involved attacking France through Belgium with a strong right wing, but his successor Moltke weakened the plan, leading to assumptions of a swift victory that were overly optimistic (chapter 4).
 * France - After decades of defensive strategies following their defeat at Sedan, France adopted General Joffre's offensive Plan XVII in 1913, emphasizing attack and broad operational plans (chapter 5).
 * Britain - The military cooperation with France evolved from informal arrangements to a formal naval agreement and Britain preparing to deploy the BEF but these initiatives were supported by a narrow and fragile political will (chapter 6).
 * Russia - Despite internal weaknesses and corruption, Russia's massive army planned an invasion of Eastern Prussia, prompting Germany to prepare reactive strategies to protect this critical territory (chapter 5).

"Outbreak" meticulously chronicles the events that led Europe into war, hour by hour, between August 1 and 4, 1914:
 * On August 1, Germany ordered general mobilization; its offensive might have taken a radically different direction if the Kaiser, on the basis of a misunderstood telegram from London, had managed to convince Moltke to change plans; but Moltke prevailed and Luxembourg was invaded (chapter 6).
 * France declared general mobilization on the same day in response to Germany's ultimatum to Russia while in London Asquith's divided Cabinet failed to move (chapter 7).
 * On August 2, 1914, Germany presented Belgium with an ultimatum, which King Albert rejected (chapter 8).
 * On August 3 and 4, political leaders in Germany, France, Belgium, and Britain unified their nations behind the war imperative; Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium, which triggered Britain's entry into the war, with only a few leaders foreseeing a prolonged conflict (chapter 9).

"Battle" extensively details three of the four European military fronts of August 1914:
 * the Western Front: the Battle of the Frontiers (chapters 11 to 14), the battle of ideas (chapter 17), and the fighting in France up to the beginning of the First Battle of the Marne (chapters 19 to 22)
 * the Eastern Prussia Front is covered in chapters 15 and 16;
 * the sea front: the Adriatic Campaign (chapter 10) and more generally the strategies of the three main naval forces: the UK, Germany and the US (chapter 18).

The afterword reflects on the First Battle of the Marne, highlighting the deadlock and immense human and material costs of the Western Front. Despite the Allies' eventual success in saving Paris, the war's initial battles failed to be decisive and resulted in a war of attrition. The next four years of war were mostly determined by the events that took place in August 1914.

Ch. 1 – A Funeral
On May 20, 1910, of the nine kings who led the funeral of King Edward VII, Kaiser Wilhelm II held conflicted views on his deceased uncle. In public, he was the gravest and most attentionate mourner. In private, he scorned Edward's personal diplomacy which supported Britain's shift from isolation to alliances with former foes France and Russia, calling his uncle "Satan" for plotting to encircle Germany. Wilhelm's inner tension reflected a wider polarisation around the question of Germany's rise, illustrated by two influential books. In "The Great Illusion" Norman Angell demonstrated that any war between large states was impossible because of its exorbitant cost whereas General von Bernhardi argued in "Germany and the Next War" that his nation had to either attack and annihilate France, or accept its downfall. On that May morning of 1910 "the sun of the old world was setting in a dying blaze of splendor never to be seen again."

Ch. 2 – "Let the Last Man on the Right Brush the Channel with His Sleeve"
To avert a two-front war, Schlieffen saw it as a "military necessity" to attack France via Belgium, whose perpetual neutrality was guaranteed internationally since 1839. If Germany threw seven-eighths of its 1.5 million soldiers against France, it could beat it in six weeks before turning to Russia. Influenced by Clausewitz and the recent decisive victories over Austria and France, Schlieffen's plan aimed to march 34 active and 20 reserve divisions through Belgium. Such a strong right wing would envelop the French armies and rake in the BEF. Schlieffen presumed Belgium would merely protest but the Kaiser, who wanted more assurance, unsuccessfully attempted to bribe King Leopold II by promising him French territories and money. Moltke, who succeeded Schlieffen in 1906, weakened the right wing at each new iteration of the war plan. His version of June 1914 saw Paris capitulate 39 days after mobilisation but assumed delusively that every possible contingency could be planned for.

Ch. 3 – The Shadow of Sedan
The humiliating defeat at Sedan set France on the defensive for forty years. Sixteen war plans were produced, each defensive. But her direction changed a few years to 1914 after it gradually regained confidence in itself as a nation and General Foch planted the seed of the mystique of the will in the military doctrine. The War Council, pressed by the War Minister Messimy, replaced in 1911 the defensive General Michel with General Joffre, who developed Plan XVII, the first offensive war plan adopted by the War Council in May 1913 and ready for distribution to generals in February 1914. Its bold goal – go to Berlin via Mainz – was not supported by a detailed operational war plan like Schlieffen's but instead emphasised the army's imperative – Attack! – and laid out war options that generals could implement depending on circumstances.

Ch. 4 – "A Single British Soldier …"
Russia's defeat to Japan in 1905 precipitated Germany in probing France in Morocco and Britain in developing military arrangements with France after Campbell-Bannerman authorised Wilson to open informal works with his French counterpart. But this embryonic military cooperation waned after the first Moroccan crisis subsided. It re-emerged in 1910 when Wilson used his new position of Director of Military Operations and his friendship with Foch to reinvigorate joint war plans, just in time for the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, whose aftermath was a shake up of the Royal Navy's top brass, a naval agreement between Britain and France and a non-binding mutual support of their armies. Wilson delivered "Plan W" by the spring of 1914. Britain's military was ready to deploy the BEF and 145,000 men to France but the British political leaders were not: only the few involved in the CID were aware of these military commitments.

Ch. 5 – The Russian steamroller
Not withstanding its defeats (Crimea in 1856, Manchuria in 1905) and defects, Russia's imposing 6.5 million men army unsettled Germany and reassured France and Britain, its Triple Entente allies. After the defeat to Japan, Grand Duke Nicholas, as chair of the Council of National Defence, initiated military reforms but these were thwarted in 1908 when the conservatives dissolved it. The same year, Sukhomlinov became Minister of War. Corrupt and inefficient, he froze the modernisation of the army and changed Chief of Staff six times by 1914. Still, despite these weaknesses, Russia planned to invade Eastern Prussia with two armies totalling 800,000 men. But Germany was determined to retain this vital territory. Max Hoffmann, anticipating that the Russian army would have to split around the Masurian lakes, considered two reactive tactics: a retreat or a frontal assault on either flank.

Outbreak
Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination on June 28, 1914, led Austria to seek Serbia's annexation, with German backing on July 5. Austria's ultimatum on July 23, followed by a declaration of war on July 28 and Belgrade's bombardment on July 29, provoked Russia to mobilize on July 30 to defend Slav interests and its prestige. Germany's ultimatum to Russia on July 31 intensified the crisis. "War pressed against every frontier."

Ch. 6 – August 1: Berlin
Kaiser Wilhelm decreed general mobilization at 5 PM on August 1, initiating the invasion of Luxembourg at 7 PM. However, an opportunity to change this course and the twentieth century emerged shortly after 5 PM when Foreign Minister Jagow and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg unexpectedly received a telegram from Ambassador Lichnowsky stating that Britain would remain neutral if Germany did not attack France. The Kaiser immediately sought to alter the war plan: "Now we can go to war against Russia only. We simply march the whole of our Army to the East!" But an apoplectic Moltke rebuked him: "Your Majesty, [the war plan] cannot be altered." Despite General von Staabs arguing in 1925 that technically four of the seven armies could have been deployed to the Eastern Front by August 15, temperamentally it is difficult to believe Germany would not have attacked France when Der Tag arrived. Lichnowsky's second telegram at 11 PM made this point moot: it clarified that Britain's neutrality required Germany to refrain from attacking both France and Russia. Admiral von Tirpitz pragmatically questioned the wisdom of serving an ultimatum to Russia if Germany did not intend to attack it, but diplomatic protocol and military schedules prevailed: the German die was cast.

Ch. 7 – August 1: Paris and London
On July 30, the French Cabinet, led by Premier Viviani, made the unprecedented decision "never before taken in history" to withdraw troops ten kilometers from its borders to avoid clashes with the German Army. Germany and Russia immediately sought France's stance in a potential conflict. On the evening of July 31, German Ambassador von Schoen posed the question through diplomatic channels, while Russian Ambassador Isvolsky pressed President Poincaré at 2 AM in his bedroom. Viviani responded to Schoen at 11 AM on August 1, stating, "France will act in accordance with her interests." Minutes later, Isvolsky informed the French of Germany's ultimatum to Russia. The Cabinet convened and decreed the general mobilization that Joffre had been advocating for since July 29. By 4 PM, the first mobilization posters appeared at Place de la Concorde, with mobilization starting at midnight.

The British Cabinet was divided over whether to support France in case of war. The four Liberal Imperialists, Asquith, Grey, Haldane, and Churchill, believed Britain's national interest lay in supporting France, while the Little Englanders led by Morley, were suspicious of any foreign adventures. Asquith patiently balanced the mounting tensions. At the July 31 Cabinet meeting, Grey threatened to resign if Britain chose neutrality over supporting France. The next day, Lloyd George described Germany's potential attack on France as requiring only a "little violation" of Belgian territory. Four Little Englanders – Morley, Burns, Simon, and Harcourt – proposed to resign if Britain implemented the naval agreement with France, and the Cabinet did not authorize Grey and Churchill's actions. Nevertheless, Churchill, who "smelled battle afar off [like] the war horse in Job" had already ordered the British fleet to its war stations at Scapa Flow on July 28 and persuaded Asquith on July 29 to authorize the Warning Telegram, initiating the Precautionary Period. After the Cabinet denied him further authority, Churchill mobilized the fleet upon learning that Germany had declared war on Russia. Grey, sensing that the Little Englanders might only be persuaded if Belgian neutrality was violated, asked France and Germany on July 31 if they would respect Belgian neutrality. France responded positively within an hour, but Germany remained silent.

Ch. 8 – Ultimatum in Brussels
On the morning of August 2, 1914, German Minister assured Foreign Minister Davignon that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany, despite the invasion of Luxembourg. That evening, Below was asked to open the sealed envelope he had received from Berlin on July 29: it contained Germany's ultimatum. Dumbfounded, he presented it to Davignon at 7 PM, expecting a reply by 7 AM the next morning. This carefully crafted document asserted that France was about to enter Belgium to attack Germany, which in reaction would "anticipate this attack" to assert its self-defense rights and have to pass through Belgium. Were Belgium to resist, it would be treated as an enemy. King Albert was less surprised than Below. In November 1913, Kaiser Wilhelm and General Moltke had conveyed to him their readiness to wage war against France, citing constant provocations. Despite the poor state of its army, which consisted of only six infantry and one cavalry division, no heavy artillery, no clear war strategy, and four different mobilization plans, Albert remained resolute: "Our answer must be 'No' whatever the consequences." As the Belgian officials were busy drafting their reply, the German government had second thoughts. Fearing that Belgian resistance would disrupt the critical operational schedule towards Paris, it instructed Below to persuade the Belgians to comply. At 1:30 AM on August 3, during a surprise visit to the Foreign Office, he used the fake news of French dirigibles bombing Nuremberg to imply that France would next invade Belgium. Unconvinced by this last-minute logic, Belgium formally rejected the German demand on August 3 at 7 AM, being "firmly resolved to repel every attack upon its rights." That evening, angered by the Kaiser's dismissive reply to the last-minute appeal he had sent on August 1, Albert ordered the destruction of bridges and tunnels to impede any German advance.

Ch. 9 – "Home before the leaves fall"
August 3 and 4 were key action days: the German, French, Belgian and British political leaders crystallized into national unions the tensions that had been building up for months, and the German General Staff declared war on France and invaded Belgium.

On the political front: At 3 PM on August 3, Grey revealed to the House of Commons the existence of informal military talks with France and asked it not to stand by and witness the violation of Belgian neutrality and the "unmeasured aggrandizement of any power whatsoever." The House responded with overwhelming applause.

On August 4 at 9 AM, an hour after Belgium was invaded, King Albert’s question to the parliament, “Are you unalterably decided to maintain intact the sacred gift of our forefathers?" was met with resounding shouts of "Oui! Oui! Oui!” A few hours later, Viviani’s eloquent speech to the joint session of the French Senate and Chamber was greeted with cheers, especially after announcing Italy's choice to stay neutral. Simultaneously in Berlin, the Kaiser famously declared in his speech from the throne: “From this day on, I recognize no parties but only Germans.” At 3 PM, Bethmann-Hollweg informed the Reichstag that German troops had occupied were “perhaps already in Belgium" and admitted publicly this “invasion [was] contrary to international law”, after which it unanimously voted for a 5 billion mark war credit and adjourned for four months.

On the military front: On August 3 at 6:30 PM, Ambassador Schoen delivered to Viviani the German declaration of war on France on the ground of organized hostility, alleged French aviators bombarding Nuremberg and flying over neutral Belgium, all of which Viviani categorically denied.

On August 4, Germany invaded Belgium at Gemmerich at 8:02 AM after its ultimatum was rejected. Moltke, who had anticipated in 1912 that invading Belgium would trigger Britain’s entry into the war, was not surprised, contrary to the Kaiser and Beltmann-Hollweg, when Grey sent Britain’s ultimatum to Germany and demanded a reply by midnight.

The prevalent opinion in all belligerent countries was well captured by the Kaiser’s words to his departing troops: “You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees." Only Joffre, Moltke, and Kitchener foresaw a prolonged conflict, with Kitchener predicting the war would take “[at least] three years, [...such a long time that] no one living knows how long."

Ch. 10 – "Goeben ... An Enemy Then Flying"
Tuchman starts the "Battle" section by covering the search by Allied naval forces for the German battlecruiser SMS Goeben in the Mediterranean (chapter 10). The Goeben finally took refuge in the Dardanelles, waters of the then neutral Ottoman Empire. Such naval actions set off diplomatic maneuvers, but the event precipitated Turkey's entry into the war on the side of Germany. The development worked to block Russian import/export via its year-round ports on the Black Sea. That, in turn, led to the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign.

Ch. 11 – Liège and Alsace
As they crossed the Belgian frontier, the German armies were engaged by the Belgian army in front of Liège, five French armies in the east of France and four British divisions (known as the British Expeditionary Force) in the south of Belgium. The French were said to be labouring under the delusion that Gallic élan would be crucial in countering German attacks while the British fought hard at the Battle of Mons. In August, each side deployed its armed forces in order to effect its own strategies developed in advance of the war (discussed in "Plans").

Ch. 12 – BEF to the Continent
Tuchman describes the arrival in France of the British Expeditionary Force.

Ch. 13 – Sambre et Meuse
Although delayed by Belgian resistance, the German armies advance through Belgium and prepare their right wing for the outflanking manoeuvre. The French get ready for their main offensive in the Ardennes. The BEF advances towards the left flank of the French armies. The Germans enter Brussels on August 20th.

Ch. 14 – Debacle: Lorraine, Ardennes, Charleroi, Mons
The French High Command had made incomplete allowances for dealing with the large massed attack by the German army, which now came quickly bearing down on them. It was perhaps through the decisions of Charles Lanrezac, the French Fifth Army commander, who acted in a timely fashion before getting permission from Joseph Joffre, that the entire French line was eventually saved from envelopment and general collapse. Although his pleas were ignored, Lanrezac withdrew his forces at Charleroi from an untenable position and probable destruction, and he redeployed them more favorably. He was later relieved of command.

Ch. 15 – "The Cossacks Are Coming"
Chapter 15 centers on the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

Ch. 16 – Tannenberg
Chapter 16 presents Germany's reaction to the invasion which culminates at the Battle of Tannenberg, where the Russian advance is stopped, decisively. Tuchman covers the series of errors, faulty plans, poor communications, and poor logistics, which, among other things, decidedly helped the French in the west. For example, the Germans mistakenly transferred, from the west, two corps to defend against what the book refers to as the 'Russian Steam Roller'. The great misery that developed on the Eastern Front is noted.

Ch. 17 – The Flames of Louvain
Woven into the text about the battles in Belgium are threads of fact that Allied governments would employ in the formation of the West's eventual opinion that Germany had been the aggressor nation against Belgium. Such facts and conclusions would be repeated for the duration of the war and greatly affect the future involvement of the United States.

Also here in chapter 17 The Flames of Louvain, Tuchman places a selection of German views from a variety of sources as to the aims and desires of Germany. She cites Thomas Mann as saying the goal was "the establishment of the German idea in history, the enthronement of Kultur, the fulfillment of Germany's historical mission". She then conveys American reporter Irvin S. Cobb's account of an interview with a 'German scientist': "Germany [is] for progress. German Kultur will enlighten the world and after this war there will never be another." Yet further, a 'German businessman' opines that the war will give Europe "a new map, and Germany will be at the center of it" (aims similar to the Septemberprogramm). Such outspoken menace worked to solidify opposition to Germany, caused George Bernard Shaw to become "fed up" at Prussian Militarism, and H. G. Wells to condemn the German "war god" and hope for an end to all armed conflict.

Chapter 17's main focus is the German army's atrocities in Belgium, in particular against the historic university city of Louvain. Tuchman frames her remarks by describing the Schrecklichkeit, the German military's "theory of terror". Accordingly, in a failed attempt to suppress the "illegal" franc-tireur (civilians shooting at German troops), hundreds of nearby citizens at several Belgium towns had been executed. Her accounts of the ferocity of such German army reprisals against the general population and of the willful burning of Louvain, such as its university library make it obvious why the Western Allies might feel themselves justified to condemn Germany and Germans wholesale.

Ch. 18 – Blue Water, Blockade and the Great Neutral
Chapter 18 describes the British fear that since their island nation was dependent on overseas imports, the German navy could manage to disrupt their international trade. Although Britain's navy was superior in ships and experience, perhaps the German navy's "best opportunity for a successful battle was in the first two or three weeks of the war." However, the German High Seas Fleet remained in port and was ordered not to challenge the British warships watching the North Sea. Thus, a substantial control over the world's seaways was then exerted by the British Royal Navy.

Surrounding the neutral role of the United States, diplomatic politicking quickly intensified. On August 6, Washington formally requested the Europeans to agree to follow the 1908 Declaration of London, which "favored the neutrals' right to trade as against the belligerents' right to blockade." Germany agreed. Britain "said Yes and meant No" and supplemented an Order of Council on August 20 (the 100th anniversary of Britain's burning of Washington). Despite the equitable intent of international law, Britain sought to receive supplies from America while its naval blockade of Germany denied the supplies to Germany. Woodrow Wilson had already advised Americans on August 18 to be "neutral in fact as well as in name, impartial in thought as well as in action" so that America might become the "impartial mediator" that could then bring "standards of righteousness and humanity" to the belligerents in order to negotiate "a peace without victory" in Europe. Both wartime paper profits from a nearly fourfold increase in trade with Britain and France and "German folly" eventually would later work to cause American entry into World War I.

Ch. 19 – Retreat
On August 25, Joffre issued a General Order to form a Sixth Army, which was transported to Amiens to support the British and the French Fourth and Fifth Armies. On August 26, at the Battle of Le Cateau, the 75,000 strong BEF led by Smith-Dorrien lost over 8,000 men but managed to delay the Germans. The French Fifth Army, under Lanrezac, struggled to retreat, regroup, and establish a defensive line; coordination issues and miscommunications with Field Marshall French added to the chaos and confusion. By August 28, German commanders, particularly von Kluck, shifted their focus from cutting off the British to enveloping both the British and French forces, significantly impacting the German campaign's progress. By September 2, the French armies had fallen back 150 miles from their starting positions on August 24; soldiers retreated haggard, hungry, and exhausted, marching past their own homes which they knew Germans would occupy the next day.

Ch. 21 – Von Kluck's Turn
The French and British forces, united at last, fell on Alexander von Kluck's exposed right flank in what would be the first successful offensive by the Allies. In the subsequent attack, the Germans were forced back north, with both sides suffering terrible losses.

Ch. 22 – "Gentlemen, We Will Fight on the Marne"
While Paris had been saved, the war took on a new cast, with both sides settling into a defensive trench system, which cut across France and Belgium from the Channel to Switzerland. That became known as the Western Front, and over the next four years, it would consume a generation of young men.

Afterword
Tuchman briefly offers reflections on the First Battle of the Marne and on the war in general. The war's opening "produced deadlock on the Western Front. Sucking up lives at the rate of 5,000 and sometimes 50,000 a day, absorbing munitions, energy, money, brains, and trained men," it ate up its contestants. "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit."

The Battle of the Frontiers was brutal. The Belgian army was rushed against the German army, but the Allies were forced to retreat slowly under the German onslaught until the Germans were within 40 miles (64 km) of Paris. The city was saved through the courage and verve of a semiretired territorial general, Joseph Gallieni, who marshalled his limited resources and saved the day. The city was preparing for siege and possible complete destruction, and the government had fled south, when two divisions of reserves suddenly arrived and were rushed to the front by the city's fleet of 600 taxi cabs.

Tuchman cynically notes that Joffre later took complete credit for saving Paris and the French army after having the commander who ordered the tactical retreat, Lanrezac, relieved of duty and the old commander and his former superior, Gallieni, pushed back into obscurity.

Tuchman is also careful to point out that although many of Joffre's actions were shameful, when he was finally pushed into action, he showed great skill in guiding the hastily improvised counterblow that crashed into the invader's flank. The Germans greatly contributed to their own undoing by outrunning their supply lines, pushing their infantry to the point of physical collapse and deviating from the original invasion plan, which called for the right flank to be protected from counterattack. At that stage of its offensive, the German army lacked the troops used by the siege of the fortress of Antwerp, held by the Belgian army. Both sides were plagued by poor communication and general staffs that were heavily invested with politics and sycophancy. Dire warnings from commanders in the field were ignored when they did not fit preconceived notions of quick victory at low cost.

With time, such a war would become intolerable. "Men could not sustain a war of such magnitude and pain without hope–the hope that its very enormity would ensure that it could never happen again."

Style / Genre
Robert K. Massie, author of the 1994 foreword to the book, attributes its "enormous reputation" to four qualities: "a wealth of vivid detail which keeps the reader immersed in events almost as an eyewitness; a prose style which is transparently clear, intelligent, controlled and witty; a cool detachment of moral judgement – Mrs. Tuchman is never preachy or reproachful: she draws on skepticism, not cynicism, leaving the reader not so much outraged by human villainy as amused and saddened by human folly. These first three qualities are present in all of Barbara Tuchman's work, but in The Guns of August, there is a fourth, which makes the book, once taken up, almost impossible to set aside. Remarkably, she persuades the reader to suspend any foreknowledge of what is about to happen[;] so great is Mrs. Tuchman's skill that the reader forgets what he knows. [...] Mrs. Tuchman's triumph is that she makes the events of August 1914 as suspenseful on the page as they were to the people living through them."

Tuchman knows to find and express "the vivid specific fact which would imprint on the reader's mind the essential nature of the man or event." Some examples follow.

Key players
Tuchman references almost four hundred actors in The Guns of August, General Joffre being cited the most on 125 different pages. Thirty of them receive a development of their characteristics or background.

The four excerpts below illustrate Robert K. Massie's remark that Tuchman can "imprint the essential natural of the man": Aside these four men, Tuchman characterises or gives the background of twenty-seven actors: It is worth noting those actors Tuchman cites often but does not characterise, if only with a few well chosen words:
 * Joseph Joffre was "massive and paunchy in his baggy uniform, with a fleshy face adorned by a heavy, nearly white mustache and bushy eyebrows to match with a clear youthful skin, clam blue eyes and a candid, tranquil gaze, Joffre looked like Santa Claus and gave an impression of benevolence and naïveté – two qualities not noticeably part of his character." "Joffre's supreme confidence in himself was expressed [in 1912] when his aide, Major Alexandre, asked him if he thought war was shortly to be expected. "Certainly I think so," Joffre replied. "I have always thought so. It will come. I shall fight and I shall win. I have always succeeded in what I do – as in the Sudan. It will be that way again." "It will mean a Marshal's baton for you," his aide suggested with some awe at the vision. "Yes." Joffre acknowledged the prospect with laconic equanimity."
 * "The short, stocky and florid Sir John French, about to take command in the field, was keyed to a pitch of valour and combativeness. His normally apoplectic expression, combined with the tight cavalryman's stock which he affected in place of collar and tie, gave him an appearance of being perpetually on the verge of choking, as indeed he often was emotionally if not physically."
 * Vladimir Sukhomlinov was "artful, indolent, pleasure-loving, chubby [...] with an almost feline manner, who, smitten by the twenty-three year old wife of a provincial governor, contrived to get rid of the husband by divorce on framed evidence and marry the beautiful residue as his fourth wife."
 * "Tall, heavy, bald and sixty-six years old, Moltke habitually wore an expression of profound distress, which led the Kaiser to call him der traurige Julius (for what might be rendered "Gloomy Gus"; in fact, his name was Helmuth). Poor health, for which he took an annual cure at Karlsbad, and the shadow of a great uncle were perhaps cause for gloom."
 * France: Joseph Gallieni, Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, Augustin Dubail, Adolphe Messimy, Raymond Poincaré, Noël de Castelnau, Michel-Joseph Maunoury and de Fernand de Langle de Cary;
 * Germany: Eric Ludendorff, Alfred von Schlieffen ("of the two classes of Prussian officer, the bullnecked and the wasp-waisted, he belonged to the second"), Max Hoffmann, Friedrich von Bernhardi, Alexander von Kluck, Crown Prince Rupprecht, Crown Prince Wilhelm, Paul von Hindenburg, Maximilian von Prittwitz and Hermann von François;
 * Britain: Jackie Fisher, Sir Edward Grey, Sir Henry Wilson and Ernest Troubridge;
 * Russia: Grand Duke Nicholas, Nicholas II and Alexander Samsonov;
 * Belgium: King Albert.
 * France: Ferdinand Foch, Charles Lanrezac
 * Germany: Kaiser Wilhelm II ("possessor of the least inhibited tongue in Europe"), Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Max von Hausen, Karl von Bülow, Wilhelm Souchon
 * Britain: Winston Churchill, Kitchener, H. H. Asquith, Richard Haldane, Archibald Murray.

Key events
The introductory paragraph of A funeral, the first chapter of The Guns of August, took Barbara Tuchman "eight hours to complete and became the most famous passage in all her work". The Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan "was gripped from her wonderful first sentence":

"So gorgeous was the spectacle on the May morning of 1910 when nine kings rode in the funeral of Edward VII of England that the crowd, waiting in hushed and black-clad awe, could not keep back gasps of admiration."

One of the key events took place on August 1. "In Berlin just after five o'clock a telephone rang in the Foreign Office. [...] "Moltke wants to know whether things can start." At that moment, [...] a telegram, from Prince Lichnowsky, ambassador in London, reported an English offer, as Lichnowsky understood it, "that in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's neutrality." [...] The Kaiser clutched at Lichnowsky's passport to a one-front war. Minutes counted. Already mobilization was rolling inexorably toward the French frontier. The first hostile act [...] was scheduled within an hour. It must be stopped, stopped at once. But how? Where was Moltke? Moltke had left the palace. An aide was sent off with siren screaming, to intercept him. He was brought back. The Kaiser was himself again, the All-Highest, the War Lord, blazing with a new idea, planning, proposing, disposing. He read Moltke the telegram and said in a triumph: "Now we can go to war against Russia only. We simply march the whole of our Army to the East!" Aghast at the thought of his marvelous machinery of mobilization wrenched into reverse, Moltke refused point-blank. For the past ten years, first as assistant to Schlieffen, then as his successor, Moltke's job had been planning for this day. The Day, Der Tag, for which all Germany's energies were gathered, on which the march to final mastery of Europe would begin. It weighed upon him with an oppressive, almost unbearable responsibility. [...] "Your Majesty," Moltke told him now, "it cannot be done. The deployment of millions cannot be improvised. [...] Those arrangements took a whole year of intricate labor to complete" – and Moltke closed upon that rigid phrase, the basis for every major German mistake, the phrase that launched the invasion of Belgium and the submarine war against the United States, the inevitable phrase when military plans dictate policy – "and once settled it cannot be altered."

Miscalculations leading to war
Throughout the aforementioned narrative, Tuchman constantly brings up a theme: the numerous misconceptions, miscalculations, and mistakes that she believed resulted in the tragedy of trench warfare, such as:
 * Economic miscalculation: Tuchman says both European intellectuals and leaders overestimated the power of free trade. They believed that the interconnectedness of European nations through trade would stop a continent-wide war from breaking out, as the economic consequences would be too great. However, the assumption was incorrect. For example, Tuchman noted that Moltke, when warned of such consequences, refused to even consider them in his plans, arguing he was a "soldier," not an "economist."
 * Unfounded belief in quick warfare: except for a very few politicians (who were at the time ridiculed and excluded because of their views, with only Lord Kitchener having the authority to act on his anticipation of a long war), all the leaders of the major combatants believed the war would be concluded in a matter of weeks, certainly by the end of 1914. Tuchman recounted the story of a British statesman who, after he warned others that the war might last two or three years, was branded a "pessimist." That false assumption had disastrous effects, especially on logistics (see below).
 * Over-reliance on morale and the offensive: Tuchman details, in depth, how the leaders of the major powers, before the war, developed a philosophy of warfare based almost entirely on morale, a constant offensive, and retaining the initiative. Joffre, in particular, refused to consider going on the defensive/or even to slow the offensive, even when the realities of the battlefield demonstrated that his approach was not working.
 * Failure to consider political backlash: many war planners did not take into consideration the political and treaty-based consequences of their offensive actions. As Tuchman argues, the German leaders in particular refused to consider the consequences of moving their armies into Belgium despite that country's neutrality. Despite Moltke's concerns, German generals insisted on moving through Belgium because they needed to maneuver. They failed (or refused) to realize that by invading Belgium, they effectively forced Britain to declare war because of existing treaties and national honor.
 * Failure to consider adverse societal moral effects: this war as many others produced its fair amount of individual vanity and insubordination. However, the German political leaders failed to consider that some military acts can have a wider moral repercussion, which in turn can translate adversely on the military front; this is clear from the sack of Louvain, which led to public outrage and contributed to the US entering the war.
 * Outdated forms of wartime etiquette: although the technology, aims, methods, and plans of World War I were significantly different from earlier wars, military leaders in occupied territories continued to have an expectation of a form of martial etiquette from civilians, regarding co-operation and obedience of instructions, as a reciprocal part of non-combatant status; which increased resentment between the citizens of the opposing nations. To illustrate, Tuchman repeatedly uses quotes from the diaries of German generals who commandeered the homes and supplies of civilians. One recurrent theme in their diary entries was that they simply could not understand why the property owners refused full co-operation, in line with traditional wartime courtesy. In a somewhat comical passage, Tuchman even quotes from a general who criticized the master of a Belgian house for failing to sit with him at dinner and observe proper mealtime etiquette despite the fact that the Germans had violated his country's neutrality, taken over his house, and stolen or destroyed much of his property. Similar problems occurred in the practical application of submarine, and later aerial, warfare.

Overall, Tuchman argues that while some of the war's major combatants looked forward to a war, specifically Germany and Austria-Hungary, all of them expected it to be a short one, and none of them desired or anticipated a prolonged war. Likewise, she argues that even successes, such as the First Battle of the Marne, a French victory, were to some extent accidental victories that were won despite, and not because of, military leadership or strategy.

Development
The Guns of August is Tuchman's third book, after Bible and Sword, published in 1956, and the Zimmermann Telegram, in 1958, and by her own account "the genesis of this book lies in [these] two earlier books I wrote, of which the First World War was the focal point of both. […] I had always thought that 1914 was the hour when the clock struck, so to speak, the date that ended the nineteenth century and began our own age, "the Terrible Twentieth" as Churchill called it. I felt that 1914 was it. But I did not know what should be the gateway or the framework." She was approached by Cecil Scott of MacMillan who asked her to write a book on 1914, particularly on the battle of Mons and on "how had the BEF thrown back the Germans [and whether] they [had] really seen the vision of an angel over the battlefield." But Tuchman was more interested in writing a book on the escape of the German cruiser Goeben from Royal Navy's Gloucester, an event that would precipitate the Ottoman Empire into the war and for which she had personal affinity since she was present, although aged only two, with her parents on a small steamer from which they witnessed this naval pursuit. But Mr Scott was not interested in that episode. In the end, "I formed the plan of keeping to the war's first month, which contained all the roots, including the Goeben and Battle of Mons, to make us both happy."

Tuchman had a personal connection to the Goeben episode since she was present, as a child aged two, on a small boat nearby the pursuit: "That morning [August 10, 1914] there arrived in Constantinople the small Italian passenger steamer which had witnessed the Gloucester's action against Goeben and Breslau. Among its passengers were the daughter, son-in-law and three grandchildren of the American ambassador Mr. Henry Morgenthau." Being the grandchild of Henry Morgenthau, she is referring to herself as she confirmed in 1981 in her book Practicing History, in which she tells the story of her father, Maurice Wertheim, who was traveling from Constantinople to Jerusalem on August 29, 1914, to deliver funds to the Jewish community there. This connection, and her initial desire to write a book on the episode, might explain why two academic reviewers found this chapter "long and somewhat awkward" and "out of context".

Tuchman creates by combining the standard method of academic history, which is to read authentic, original material with activities more readily associated with journalism, such as field trips. Thus, to write the Guns of August, she read "letters, telegrams, diaries, memoirs, cabinet documents, battle orders, secret codes, and billets-doux [found in] the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the British Library and Public Record Office, the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Sterling Library at Yale and the Widener Library at Harvard, [and] rented a small Renault and toured the battlefield of Belgium and France ."

Reception
In 1988, in her preface to the twenty-sixth anniversary of the book's second edition, Tuchman recounts how positive the reviews were when the book was published in 1962. Since she was "hardly known to the critics […] with no reputation for them to enjoy smashing, the book received instead the warmest reception." One review in particular brought her to tears because it "elicit[ed] perfect comprehension": Clifton Fadiman's critic in the Book-of-the-Month Club Bulletin. He wrote that The Guns of August had "a fair chance [to] turn to be a historical classic" by displaying "almost Thucydidean virtues: intelligence, concision, weight, detachment. […] It is [Tuchman's] conviction that the deadlock of the terrible month of August determined the future course of the war and the terms of the peace, the shape of the inter-war period and the conditions of the Second Round. […] [O]ne of the marks of the superior historian is the ability to project human beings as well as events." In 1962, Publishers Weekly predicted the book "will be the biggest new nonfiction seller in your winter season", which greatly surprised Tuchman but "as it turned out, they were right."

Indeed, all reviewers have praised her narrative style, even the academic historians who have raised a few pointed critiques to The Guns of August because Tuchman had erected a rigid, deterministic thesis by relying too heavily on sources that corroborated it, ignoring, misrepresenting or downplaying factors that undermined it and veiling it with an anti-German veneer, which could be partially explained by the context of her writing as 1962 was probably the height of the Cold War.

A unanimous praise of Tuchman's narrative style
The academic reviews of The Guns of August were published in two waves: for the first edition in 1962–63, and in 2013–14 on the hundredth anniversary of the start of the war and the associated 2014 re-edition of the book. Over these fifty years, Tuchman's narrative style has been constantly praised:
 * In 1962, the American historian Harold J. Gordon points out half a dozen major flaws but imparts in closing that Tuchman "brings together materials from a great many sources and binds them skilfully into a clear and understandable account." Fellow Samuel J. Hurwitz lauds her for writing "imaginatively, vividly, and even passionately, [with] a talent for making scenes of the past come alive, and the result is perhaps even larger than life." Professor John W. Oliver praises her ability to put the "reader [in] a box seat as he watches the opening drama." In 1963, Ulrich Trumpener, Professor at the University of Alberta, despite writing a very critical review of her book, notes that "in terms of sheer narrative power, The Guns of August is an admirable work."
 * The American historian Samuel R. Williamson Jr. starts his 2013 critical review by praising "her narrative style [which] gives the reader a sense of intimacy with the events" and closes it by quoting Harvard Professor Sidney Fay's: "she had got the history wrong, but historians need to write like Tuchman or we will be out of business." In 2014, the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan, Professor of International History at the University of Oxford, "was gripped from her wonderful first sentence. "So gorgeous was the spectacle on the May morning of 1910 when nine kings rode in the funeral of Edward VII of England that the crowd, waiting in hushed and black-clad awe, could not keep back gasps of admiration." She adds further "When I first read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August in the autumn of 1963 it was as though history went from black and white to Technicolor", Tuchman has this "ability to bring the past to life, in part using what she called the corroborative detail" and is a "wonderful storyteller"; lastly MacMillan loves her "acerbic wit" and "sharp character sketches."

A deterministic thesis erected on biased views framed by the Cold War
The determinism of Tuchman's thesis has been best expressed by two academic historians fifty years apart. In 1962, Professor Oron J. Hale of the University of Virginia was concerned by how Tuchman connects in a deterministic manner events that are several years, even several decades apart. He provides two such examples:
 * "The naval side is inadequate [with] a chapter [out of context] on the British navy's hunt for the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean and their escape to Constantinople. In a dubious chain of causation we are told that the Russian declaration of war on Turkey, in November, followed by Gallipoli, Suez, Palestine, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and "the subsequent history of the Middle East, followed from the voyage of the Goeben."
 * He concludes his review by noting that Tuchman's "thesis that the failure of Plan 17 and the Schlieffen Plan, which produced stalemate in the West, was the mold that determined the future course of the war, the conditions of peace and of the inter-war period, as well as the "Second Round," is much too deterministic. The First World War – indeed all major wars – had many turning points. The year 1917, which brought Russian withdrawal and United States entry, was more decisive for the military outcome and the nature of the peace than was 1914."

In 2014, Margaret MacMillan, who was greatly influenced by the book, ends her positive review on a similar note: "her main argument that entangling alliances and rigid military timetables caught Europe in a grip that led the powers inexorably towards catastrophe is no longer accepted by most historians."

This determinism is the result of four biases: i) the sources and historical research Tuchman relies upon, ii) the events she decided to exclude from her book, iii) the factors that she downplayed as they were weakening the strength of her thesis and iv) the bias she had against Germans, which is partially explained by v) the timing of the book, written in 1962 at the height of the Cold War.

Ignoring historical sources and research, and relying solely on key actors' memories
Tuchman has ignored the major works on the origins of the war written by Sidney Fay, Luigi Albertini, Pierre Renouvin, Bernadotte Schmitt, George Gooch and William Langer. As Professor Gordon notes: "Forty years of historical research are ignored as the hundreds of thousands of documents that have been published by the governments of Europe." He is echoed by Professor Trumpener: "A wider utilization of primary sources would have been desirable. For example, neither the Russian and Italian document collection published since 1918 nor the captured German government files, a valuable new source, seem to have been consulted." Instead, as Professor Hale concludes, she relied on "controversial sources, which in many instances are not evaluated critically, [i.e. the retrospective works by statesmen and soldiers] rather than upon the solid general staff operational histories of the respective military establishments."

Misrepresenting key military events
There is a noticeable disbalance between the minimal treatment, when mentioned at all, of the key diplomatic and military events that took place in the Balkans and on the Austro-Russian fronts on one side, and the over-emphasis of the naval chases in the Mediterranean on the other. When it comes to the first Tuchman has disregarded in particular three developments:
 * The Galician front – Although Tuchman recognizes that omitting the Austro-Hungarian / Serbian / Russian front was "not entirely arbitrary" and resulted from her decisions to strictly confine the book to August 1914, preserve "unity" and avoid "tiresome length", a few historians deplored these choices. For Professor Williamson, this "seems unforgivable [for] there would have been no war in the West if the Russians had not decided [...] to intervene in the war on behalf of Serbia and thus attack the Habsburg monarchy." Professor Hale challenges Tuchman on the rigidity of her time frame: "[d]uring the first week of September, concurrently with the battle of the Marne, massive Russian-Austrian engagements were fought in Galicia, with results as decisive and casualties equal to those of the campaigns in France or East Prussia. All this is excluded with consequent distorsion."  Professor Trumpener even wonders whether it is "not obscuring some crucial issues to treat the opening Austro-Hungarian campaigns against Serbs and Russians [...] as mere side shows."
 * The Austrian war plan – As a direct consequence of voluntarily ignoring the Galician front "[t]he Austrian war plan is entirely ignored and the Russian merely touched upon."
 * The outbreak of the war – Oron J. Hale was "disturbed [by] the fragmented treatment of the outbreak of war. [...] The war originated in the Balkans [...] and from a local crisis grew into a general European war through the reckless diplomatic and military actions of Austrian and Russian authorities."

On the other hand, the chapter 10 dedicated to the Gloucester's chase of the Goeben and the Breslau in the Mediterranean is "long and somewhat awkward", "inadequate", "out of context" and contains "numerous inaccuracies and over-simplifications."

Downplaying key factors
Professor Gordon points out that Tuchman's excessive focus on Germans' villainy led her to pay "[l]ittle more than passing mention, if that, [..] to universally operating forces as nationalism, imperialism, trade rivalries, and militarism, in creating a situation where war was an increasingly acceptable solution for the problems of Europe." Professor Williamson adds: "Issues of civil-military relations, alliance structures, and the coordination of military planning receive Tuchman's modest attention at most. The role of the public opinion is only fleetingly mentioned, and economic preparation for war, though noted, gets nothing more."

An anti-German bias
For Professor Trumpener, Tuchman's "treatment of Imperial Germany is blatantly one-sided." She "[transforms] the Germans of 1914 into a nation of barbarians [...] invariably unpleasant, hysterical, or outright brutish". Their "[a]rmies [march] like "predatory ants" across Belgium, soon reveal "the beast beneath the German skin". The Germans [...] prefer "fearful models" [...] when they invade their neighbors. Suffice is to add that one of the German generals, Alexander von Kluck, duly emerges as a "grim-visaged Attila" and that that Prussian officer corps is, in any case, composed exclusively of "bullnecked" or "wasp-waisted" types."

Professor Gordon echoes Trumpener's assessment: "The impression given is that the war was half the result of the fecklessness of the Kaiser and half the result of the unbelievably vicious character of the German people, who forced the war upon an innocent and peace-loving civilized world. [...] Mrs Tuchman's hostility to all things German also seems to have led her to ignore such crucial developments as the Russian agreement not to mobilize against Germany and its violation."

Benefitting from fifty years of hindsight, Professor MacMillan is less stringent in her criticism of Tuchman's negative preconceived opinion of Germans, merely stating that "[s]he is prone at times to absurd overstatements, for example that the German people were gripped by the idea that divine providence had destined them to be masters of the universe."

The context of the Cold War
Professor MacMillan continues explaining Tuchman's anti-German bias as a consequence of "[h]er view that the Germans somehow wanted to impose their culture on the world [which] is surely a reflection of that great ideological struggle of her own time between the west and the Soviet bloc." Indeed, as professor Williamson, concurs: "By 1962 America's strategic position had been significantly altered. The Soviet arsenal of nuclear missiles made the possibility of war increasingly likely. [...] Later in 1962, the Cuban crisis showed just how dangerous the chances of war might be. Not surprisingly leaders, writers and commentators looked back to 1914 to analyze what had gone wrong. [...] The American public firmly believed that the Germans were solely responsible for the Great War [...] a view of course reaffirmed by German behavior in the Second World War. "

Publication
The first edition was published by MacMillan the last week of January 1962 and it stayed on the best seller list for more than forty weeks. A second edition came out in 1988, for the seventieth anniversary of the armistice, with the author's preface. In 1994, a third edition was published for the eightieth anniversary of the start of the war; Robert K. Massie wrote the foreword; it was published in the US by Random House and in Great Britain by Penguin Books.

By April 2024, The Guns of August has been translated in (at least) 19 languages: Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish.

Cultural impact
The book was an immediate bestseller and was on the bestseller list of The New York Times for 42 consecutive weeks. The Pulitzer Prize nomination committee was unable to award it the prize for outstanding history because Joseph Pulitzer's will specifically stated that the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for History must be a book on American history. Instead, Tuchman was given the prize for general nonfiction.

According to the cover notes of an audio version of The Guns of August, "[President John F. Kennedy] was so impressed by the book, he gave copies to his cabinet and principal military advisers, and commanded them to read it." In his book One Minute to Midnight about the Cuban Missile Crisis, Michael Dobbs notes the deep impression Guns had on Kennedy. He often quoted from it and wanted "every officer in the Army" to read it as well. Subsequently, "[t]he secretary of the Army sent copies to every U.S. military base in the world. Kennedy drew from The Guns of August to help in dealing with the crisis in Cuba, including the profound and unpredictable implications a rapid escalation of the situation could have. Robert S. McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense during Kennedy's presidency, recalled that "[e]arly in his administration, President Kennedy asked his cabinet officials and members of the National Security Council" to read The Guns of August. McNamara related that Kennedy said The Guns of August graphically portrayed how Europe's leaders had bungled into the debacle of World War I, and that Kennedy told later his cabinet officials that "We are not going to bungle into war."

The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who had served on the Western Front during the First World War, was also profoundly affected by the book. In his diary for Monday, 22 October 1962, he wrote:

"Washington, in a rather panicky way, have been urging a NATO 'alert' with all that this implies (in our case, a Royal Proclamation and the call up of Reservists). I told him that we do not repeat not agree at this stage. N. [General Norstad] agreed with this and said he thought NATO powers would take the same view. I said that 'mobilization' had sometimes caused war. Here it was absurd since the additional forces made available by 'Alert' had no military significance."

Graham Allison, a political scientist who covered the Cuban Missile Crisis in Essence of Decision, noted the effect of Tuchman's book on Kennedy, but also its implications for the proper study of decision-making and warfare. Allison created an entire model of decision-making, which he called the Organizational Process Model, based on such issues as those covered by Tuchman, a model that directly countered game theory and other rationalistic means of explaining events.

Film adaptation
The book was the basis for a 1964 documentary film, also titled The Guns of August. The 99-minute film, which premiered in New York City on December 24, 1964, was produced and directed by Nathan Kroll and narrated by Fritz Weaver, with the narration written by Arthur B. Tourtellot. It used film footage found in government archives in Paris, London, Brussels, Berlin, and Washington, DC.

title: The Guns of August


text:
User talk:Taoster/Power Station

Was this by Davy Chan? Isn't the singer Sandy Lam?

Thinking of this song makes me feel like going to the karaoke! Mandel 16:36, 2 Jun 2004 (UTC)

 * Yeah, it might be. It's one of the better songs on CD 1 of Power Station's 就是红光辉全纪录, and I think it's listed as Davy Chan in the credits. --Taoster 21:45, 16 Sep 2004 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: User talk:Taoster/Power Station


text:
Heckler & Koch G36

The Heckler & Koch G36 (Gewehr 36) is an assault rifle designed in the early 1990s by German weapons manufacturer Heckler & Koch. It is chambered in 5.56×45mm NATO, and replaced the heavier G3 battle rifle chambered in 7.62×51mm. The G36 was accepted into service with the Bundeswehr in 1997. Since then, it has been a popular export, and has seen active service in military and police units in several countries, including Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The G36 is gas-operated and feeds from a 30-round detachable box magazine or 100-round C-Mag drum magazine.

In 2012, the G36 was found to suffer from significant accuracy issues due to thermal expansion of the barrel, prompting a search for a replacement. In 2017, the Bundeswehr launched the System Sturmgewehr Bundeswehr, a program designed to field a replacement for the G36. The weapons put forth were the Heckler & Koch HK416, Heckler & Koch HK433, and the Haenel MK 556. The G95A1 and G95KA1, both variants of the HK416, were selected in 2022.

Development
Work on a successor for the venerable G3 rifle had been ongoing in Germany since the late 1970s. These efforts resulted in the innovative 4.73mm G11 assault rifle (developed jointly by a group of companies led by Heckler & Koch) that used caseless ammunition (designed by the Dynamit Nobel company). This weapon was intended to replace the G3, therefore further development of Heckler & Koch's series of firearms chambered for the 5.56×45mm NATO cartridge had been halted. Heckler & Koch, having no incentive to pursue a new 5.56mm weapon system, was content with the export-oriented HK33 and G41 rifles. However, the G11 program came to an abrupt end when the Bundeswehr cancelled its procurement due to defence budget cuts resulting from the unification of East and West Germany, and Heckler & Koch's 1991 acquisition by British Aerospace's Royal Ordnance division (known today as BAE Systems).

Increasing demand for a modern service rifle chambered in the NATO-standard 5.56mm cartridge led Heckler & Koch to offer the German armed forces the G41 rifle, which, too, was rejected. Design work was initiated on a completely novel, modern 5.56mm assault rifle; it would later be designated Project 50 or HK50. During testing, prototypes were rated higher than the Austrian competition (the Steyr AUG system). The final version of the G36 was completed in 1995, and production began in 1996. The G36C was first adopted as the standard-issue rifle of US special forces unit TF23.

Production
The HK50 rifle was selected for service and an initial order was placed for 33,000 rifles under the Bundeswehr designation Gewehr G36. The order included an option for a further 17,000 rifles. Deliveries were first made to the Bundeswehr's NATO Quick Reaction Force during quarter four of 1997. The G36's production line was started in early 1996.

In July 1998, it was announced that the G36 had been selected as the service rifle for the Spanish Armed Forces, replacing the Spanish-designed 5.56mm CETME Model L and LC rifles. Deliveries started at the end of 1999. From 1999 to 2005, 75,219 rifles were manufactured in Spain under license by General Dynamics' Santa Bárbara Sistemas at the Fábrica de Armas de La Coruña (FACOR) facility in Coruña, Galicia.

The rifle has been licensed for local production in Saudi Arabia by the Military Industries Corporation (MIC). Technology transfer was granted by Germany to Saudi Arabia on 30 June 2008. The first Saudi-made G36 was produced at MIC's factory on 30 June 2009. However, some components of their own G36s are supplied by Heckler & Koch.

Replacement
In April 2012, reports surfaced that G36 rifles used in Afghanistan would overheat during prolonged firefights after several hundred rounds were fired. Overheating affected the accuracy of the G36, making it difficult to hit targets past 100 metres, ineffective past 200 metres, and incapable of effective fire past 300 metres. The G36 has been called unsuitable for long battles. Operational commanders advised allowing the weapon to cool between periods of rapid shooting.

In February 2014, the German Federal Ministry of Defence announced that the overheating deficiencies of the G36 were not a result of weapon design, but of the ammunition. A report by the Bundeswehr on 21 February 2014 revealed that the issues were not the fault of the rifle, but that one manufacturer of ammunition was making bullets with copper-plated jackets that were too thin. The manufacturer of the ammunition confirmed this, although experts disagreed, and also said the accuracy problems were already known to the defence ministry by 2010.

On 22 June 2014, it was reported that Germany's defense ministry had temporarily halted new orders worth €34 million ($ million) over accuracy concerns for the rifle. The Bundeswehr consulted the Fraunhofer Institute for High-Speed Dynamics (Ernst Mach Institut) and the Federal Criminal Police Office. On 30 March 2015, Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen told Associated Press that the weight-saving design was the root of the issues. This was based on a letter from Inspector General Volker Wieker advising the Stewards of Defence and Budget Committee of the Bundestag and the troops in advance of publication of the report. The report was released by the Fraunhofer Ernst Mach Institut and Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 91 on 19 April 2015. According to their 372-page report, the observed hit rate of the predominantly plastic weapon with the unsupported free-floating barrel drops down to a mere 7% at 100 metres when the temperature increases by 30 C or more, whereas the Bundeswehr required a hit rate of 90% at that distance.

On 22 April 2015, von der Leyen announced that the G36 would be phased out of the German army due to these concerns and stated that "The Heckler & Koch G36 has no future in the German army in its current state of construction." Von der Leyen considered the weapon to be useless and stated that the German military would stop using an assault rifle that could not shoot straight when temperatures increased or the rifle heated up during a firefight.

In 2016, the Ministry of Defence attempted to sue Heckler & Koch, saying they were legally obligated to repair the subpar G36 rifles. Because the Bundeswehr did not make its specifications for the weapon clear enough in the beginning of the procurement process, the District Court of Koblenz rejected claims from the Bundeswehr procurement office, and ruled that Heckler & Koch did not have to pay damages on the 167,000 rifles still in use out of more than 176,000 G36 rifles Germany had originally purchased.

The Bundeswehr began the System Sturmgewehr Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Assault Rifle System) effort to replace the G36 in 2017. Initially, C.G. Haenel won the competition in September 2020 offering their Haenel MK 556. However, German authorities cancelled the contract the next month amid allegations that the MK 556 infringed on Heckler and Koch patents, and the G95A1 (known as the HK416 A8 during field testing) was selected in early 2021. Haenel sued to attempt to reverse the decision, but a German court dismissed the lawsuit in June 2022. In December 2022, the Bundestag approved initial funding to begin procuring the rifles. The Bundeswehr expected to purchase 118,718 rifles, designated G95A1 (with a 16.5 in barrel) and G95KA1 (with a shorter 14 in barrel). Fielding is planned to start in 2024.

Design details
The G36 is chambered in 5.56×45mm NATO and fires from a closed rotary bolt. The rifle body has a conventional layout and a modular component design. While modifications can vary, all G36 variants share an identical receiver, buttstock assembly, bolt carrier group, return mechanism, and guide rod. The receiver contains the barrel, carry handle with integrated sights, trigger group with pistol grip, handguard and magazine socket.

The G36 employs a free-floating barrel, meaning the barrel does not make contact with the handguard. The barrel is fastened to the receiver with a special nut, which can be removed with a wrench. The barrel is forged using a cold hammer process. It features a chrome-lined bore with 6 right-hand grooves and a 1 in 178 mm (1:7 in) rifling twist rate. The barrel features a collar and lug permitting attachment of a bayonet; it can also be used to attach rifle grenades and a flash suppressor.

Fire selector
The fire and safety selector is ambidextrous and has controls on both sides of the receiver; this feature is inherited from the design of the original G3. Selector settings are described with letters: "S"—safe ("Sicher"), "E"—semi-automatic fire ("Einzelfeuer") and "F"—automatic fire ("Feuerstoß"). The three-position fire selector has a 0°/45°/90° rotation pattern between the settings. HK offers several other trigger options, including the "Navy" trigger group with illustrated pictograms for each setting. An exclusively semi-automatic trigger is also available.

Magazine
The G36 uses a proprietary 30-round magazine moulded with translucent shock-resistant plastic. The sides have interlocking studs that allow the magazines to be attached jungle-style.

An empty G36 magazine weighs 127 g, while a fully loaded magazine weighs 483 g.

While STANAG magazines are not normally compatible with the G36, adapters and modifications exist that enable cross-compatibility. Certain types of Beta C-Mags, which hold 100 rounds, can also be used with the stock G36, and are employed by the MG36 variant.

Stock
The G36 features a folding stock, which can shorten the overall length of the weapon for close-quarters combat. The stock also incorporates holes in which assembly pins can be stored during weapon cleaning and maintenance.

Material
The G36 employs a number of lightweight, corrosion-resistant synthetic materials in its design. The receiver housing, stock, trigger group (including the fire control selector and firing mechanism), magazine well, handguard and carry handle are all made of a carbon fibre-reinforced polyamide. The receiver has an integrated steel barrel trunnion (with locking recesses) and a nylon 66-based, steel-reinforced receiver.

Sights
The standard German Army versions of the G36 are equipped with a ZF 3×4° dual optical sight, which includes a 3× magnified telescopic sight and an unmagnified reflex sight mounted slightly higher. The reflex sight is illuminated by ambient light during the day and uses battery-powered illumination for use at night. Electric illumination is activated automatically by a built-in photoresistor and can be manually activated to boost the brightness of the reticle in low contrast situations. The main reticle is sighted in at 200 m and includes crosshairs and a range-finding scale. It also features bullet drop compensation markings for 200 ,.

Export versions have a single telescopic sight with 1.5× magnification and a fixed 300 m reticle. All rifles are adapted to use the Hensoldt NSA 80 third-generation night sight, which clamps into the G36 carry handle adaptor in front of the optical sight housing and mates with the rifle's standard optical sight. The sighting bridge also functions as a carrying handle and features auxiliary open sights moulded on top of the handle that consist of a forward blade and rear notch, but these can only be used with the reflex sight removed, as in the G36V. The optical sight system is produced by Hensoldt AG (a subsidiary of Carl Zeiss AG).

Operating mechanism
The G36 uses a short-stroke piston system from which HK later developed the HK-416's impingement system. Unlike direct impingement, the system uses gas trailing the bullet to operate the piston instead of pushing directly on the bolt. The G36's bolt is operated by a cam that guides the bolt carrier by its respective cut-out. Then, when fully pushed forward, 7 radial locking lugs fully enclose the chamber.

The design includes several features that are commonplace in modern military firearms. The bolt locks back after the last round is spent, although this can be deactivated using the bolt catch button on front end of the trigger guard. The charging handle folds and unfolds automatically via a spring when firing; the handle can also be operated from either side of the firearm. The handle also doubles as a forward assist in the event of a failure to feed. The ejection port has a brass deflector that helps left-handed users avoid being struck by casings. The bolt also acts as a dust cover.

Accessories
The rifle can be fitted with a 40mm AG36 (AG—Anbau-Granatwerfer) under-barrel grenade launcher, which loads via a side-tilting break action.

Standard equipment supplied with the G36 includes: spare magazines, a cleaning and maintenance kit, sling, speedloader and sometimes modified AKM type II blade bayonets (many of which are left over in Germany from stocks of the former National People's Army).

G36
Introduced in 1996, the G36 is chambered in 5.56×45mm NATO. It features a 18.9 in barrel.

The G36V (V—Variante "variant") is the export variant of the G36, previously known as the G36E (E—Export). The G36V features an altered sight setup and bayonet mount. It is fitted with a 1.5x or 3x sight and lacks the integrated reflector sight. It features a standard NATO bayonet mount. The G36V was first produced for the Spanish and Latvian National Armed Forces.

The G36A2 is an upgraded variant of the G36 also in service with in the German Army. It is equipped with a quick-release Zeiss RSA reflex red dot sight mounted on a Picatinny rail, replacing the original red dot sight. The G36A2 includes the shorter G36C stock, a new handguard made of aluminium (permitting better heat dissipation during sustained fire), an optional four Picatinny rails, and a vertical foregrip with an integrated switch for the LLM01 laser light module. Throughout its service life, it has received further modernisation upgrades, designated as the G36A3 and G36A4.

Some G36A1 rifles were given the same modernisation upgrades as the G36A3 while reusing the original, cheaper A1 receiver. These variants are known as the G36A1.1.

G36K

Introduced in 1997, the G36K (K—kurz "short") is a carbine variant with a shorter barrel, an open-type flash suppressor, a shorter forend, and a bottom rail. The carbine's barrel lacks the ability to launch rifle grenades and does not support a bayonet. The weapon retains compatibility with the AG36 grenade launcher. G36Ks in service with German special forces are issued with a 100-round C-Mag drum. The G36K has multiple slight variations. One includes a x3 scope/carry handle attached to the top, while the second only includes iron sights and a rail.

The G36KV (formerly G36KE) is the export variant of the G36K, using the sights on the G36V.

The G36KA4 is a modernised variant of the G36K made for German special forces. It adds the proprietary HKey mod system to the handguard, a heavier barrel, and a carry handle with a MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny rail. The stock was also replaced with an IdZ adjustable stock for better handling while using body armour.

G36C
Introduced in 2001, the G36C (C="Compact") is a compact variant and a further development of the G36K. It has a shorter barrel than the G36K and either a four-prong open-type flash hider or a birdcage type flash hider. The extremely short barrel forced designers to move the gas block closer to the muzzle end and reduce the length of the gas piston operating rod. The handguard and stock were also shortened, and it includes the carrying handle from the G36KA4 The dual optical sight found on the standard G36 and G36K models was replaced with a set of rail-mounted detachable iron sights that consist of a semi-shrouded front post and a flip-up rear sight with two apertures of different diameter. The short handguard has four accessory attachment points, one of which could be used for a vertical grip. The G36C was developed and produced in January 2001.

MG36
The MG36 (MG—Maschinengewehr "machine gun") is an automatic rifle variant of the G36 equipped with a heavier barrel for increased thermal performance and cook-off resistance. The MG36 and MG36E (E—Export) are no longer offered by Heckler & Koch.

Sporting and civilian variants
Heckler & Koch also created the semi-automatic SL8 rifle and the straight-pull, bolt-action R8, which are offered to the civilian sport shooting markets, both are loosely based on the G36. The SL8 is substantially different from the G36, it has a modified receiver and a thumbhole stock with a cheek rest, which is integral with the trigger group. The SL8 has a heavy profile, extended, 510 mm barrel that does not have a flash hider or bayonet lug. The rifle uses a 10-round single-stack magazine and an extended top rail used to mount a wide variety of Picatinny-standard optics. Mounted to the rail are a set of iron sights with a hooded foresight and adjustable flip rear aperture. The SL8 can also mount the G36 carry handle and integrated sight assembly, after removing the mechanical iron sights. The SL8 has an unloaded weight of 4.3 kg, overall length of 980 – and a trigger rated at 20 N.

In November 2013, Heckler & Koch applied for permission from the German Government to sell a new civilian-legal version of the G36. Known as the HK243 in Europe and the HK293 in America, it is more similar to the G36 assault rifle than previous civilian models. The main difference is the bolt is redesigned not to allow a conversion to fully automatic fire. It has quad picatinny rails and accepts STANAG magazines. Four different barrel lengths from 230 mm to 480 mm and four stock models (short fixed, long fixed and two adjustable) will be offered.

In November 2020, semi-automatic only G36 rifles became available for sale on the civilian market in Canada. They were sold with match grade barrels by Lothar Walther for CAD $5,999, or with a Heckler & Koch barrel for CAD $7,998.

Steyr G62
In May 2021, Steyr Arms introduced the G62 upgrade for G36 rifles. According to Steyr, the components of this upgrade kit (metal receiver, barrel and magazine well) can be mounted independently on existing G36 arms without any modifications. German media speculated this might be a relatively inexpensive way to extend the service life of the G36 in the Bundeswehr pending the outcome of legal procedures regarding a new system assault rifle tender for the Bundeswehr.

TommyBuilt Tactical T36
The TommyBuilt Tactical T36 is an American-made clone receiver based on the G36, which was started in 2007 by Tom Bostic based on converting a SL8 to a G36. In February 2021, the BATF classified it as a machine gun.

1990s

 * Kosovo War (1998–1999)

2000s

 * Afghanistan War (2001–2021)
 * Iraq War (2003–2011)
 * Mexican Drug War (2006–present)
 * Russo-Georgian War (2008)

2010s

 * Rio de Janeiro security crisis (2010)
 * Libyan Civil War (2011)
 * Lahad Datu standoff (2013)
 * War in Iraq (2013–2017)

title: Heckler & Koch G36


text:
Knoxville College

Knoxville College is a historically black liberal arts college in Knoxville, Tennessee, United States, which was founded in 1875 by the United Presbyterian Church of North America. It is a United Negro College Fund member school.

A slow period of decline began in the 1970s, and by 2015, the school had an enrollment of just 11 students. In May 2015, the college suspended classes until Fall 2016 term in hopes of reorganizing. On May 17, 2018, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission gave its approval for Knoxville College to once again reopen its doors and offer classes.

On July 1, 2018, Knoxville College website announced resumption of enrolling students for fall 2018 semester. In May 2022, only three students graduated.

Establishment
Knoxville College is rooted in a mission school established in Knoxville in 1864 by R. J. Creswell of the United Presbyterian Church to educate the city's free Black and formerly enslaved people. This school initially met in the First Baptist Church building (which at the time was located on Gay Street) before moving to a permanent facility in East Knoxville in 1866. In spite of general apathy from the city's leaders and threats from poor whites, the school's enrollment gradually grew to over 100. In addition to black students, the school also had many white students until 1901, when Tennessee passed a law forcibly segregating all schools.

In the 1870s, the church's Freedmen's Mission, which had established mission schools for freed slaves across the South, decided to refocus its efforts on building a larger, better-equipped school in Knoxville, in part due to stiff competition from other denominations in Nashville. In 1875, the church sold its East Knoxville property and purchased its current property, which at the time consisted of a hill that had been occupied by a Confederate battery during the Civil War. The school's first building, McKee Hall, named for the Reverend O.S. McKee, was completed in 1876, and the school opened in December of that year. Former governor William G. Brownlow and gubernatorial candidate William F. Yardley spoke at the opening ceremonies.

The Reverend John Schouller McCulloch was named the school's first principal, and Eliza B. Wallace was named the school's principal of female students. The new school was primarily a normal school, which trained teachers, but also operated an academy for the education of local children. In 1877, the school was designated a college by the state, to the surprise of McCulloch, as few of the school's students were ready for a college-level curriculum. In 1890, the state designated the school the recipient of its Morrill Act funds for blacks, with which the school established mechanical and agricultural departments.

Medical department (1895–1900)
There were no medical schools for African Americans prior to the American Civil War, which lasted to 1865. Knoxville College had an early medical department for black students, open from 1895 until 1900. The Knoxville College medical department was created through the donation of the "Colored Department" at the University of Tennessee; the "Colored Department" had been founded by the United Presbyterian Church in 1887 for the use of medical training. William Wallace Derrick had been an African American faculty member at Knoxville College and helped establish the short lived medical department. The Knoxville College Hospital was opened in 1907 at 1825 College Street.

After the department closure, the city of Knoxville organized as a replacement black medical school in winter 1900, named the Knoxville Medical College; which was led by the city physician, Henry Morgan Green.

Early 20th-century growth

In 1901, Knoxville College finally received a charter from the State of Tennessee. Six years later, the school established the Eliza B. Wallace Hospital, which served a dual purpose of training nurses and tending to the health needs of the local black community. This proved invaluable during the city's Influenza outbreak of 1918.

In 1913, John Henry Michael, the head of the school's mechanical department, designed the "Negro Building" for the National Conservation Exposition, which was held across town at Chilhowee Park. The building, which is no longer standing, was constructed with the help of Knoxville College students.

During World War I, Knoxville College students helped raise money for liberty bonds and the Red Cross. In the aftermath of the Riot of 1919, one of the city's worst racial episodes, the school's administration (comprising black and white members) staunchly defended the city's African American community, and praised its students' restraint. In 1925, Knoxville College students staged a month-long boycott of classes to protest the school's strict behavioral code, culminating in an all-night negotiating session between student leaders and the school's dean, Herbert Telford. Telford agreed to relax some rules, and allowed the creation of a student council.

In 1957, Knoxville College became one of the first group of predominantly black institutions admitted to full membership in the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). Throughout the summer of 1960, Knoxville College students engaged in a series of sit-ins to protest segregation at lunch counters in downtown Knoxville, eventually convincing most downtown businesses to end the practice. The school's charter was amended in 1962 to allow the admission of white students.

Accreditation loss, reorganization attempts, and closure
Beginning in the 1970s, Knoxville College began to struggle financially, leading to a gradual decline. In 1997, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools withdrew Knoxville College's accreditation; enrollment dropped precipitously and the school's financial situation became dire. As enrollment plummeted, the school's debt skyrocketed and it was soon unable to pay its faculty or electric bills. Throughout the rest of the 1990s, as enrollment plummeted, most campus buildings were shuttered and abandoned, with most degree programs being discontinued. In August 2005, the school's Board of Trustees fired the school's president, Barbara Hatton.

Following Hatton's removal, the school's alumni association embarked on an aggressive fundraising campaign in 2006 and 2007 to save the college and return it to solvency. In January 2010, the school hired Dr. Horace A. Judson as interim president. Judson implemented a new strategic plan with the following goals: (1) regain accreditation, (2) achieve fiscal stability, (3) develop academic program distinctiveness, (4) develop a department of enrollment management, (5) develop a quality student-centered living and learning environment, and (6) establish new relationships and strengthen former ones among key constituents.

However, Judson soon left and the college continued to struggle. On June 9, 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency seized control of the long-shuttered A.K. Stewart Science Hall to conduct an emergency clean-up of toxic chemicals that the college had improperly stored in laboratories; In early 2015 state accreditation for the college was withdrawn, further complicating the college's already strained finances. In April 2015, the school announced it was suspending classes for the Fall 2015 term in hopes of reorganizing. Enrollment had dwindled to just 11 students, and the college was struggling to pay back a $4.5 million loan from 2003 and more than $425,000 to the federal government for the Stewart Science Hall cleanup. In May 2015, the school announced classes would resume in the Fall 2016 term.

In May 2016, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation recommended the college become a state Superfund site due to ongoing contamination concerns from the Stewart Science Hall. In September 2016, the City of Knoxville demanded that Knoxville College make repairs to fourteen of its buildings within 90 days or face condemnation. City crews subsequently boarded up the buildings. The Knoxville Fire Department responded to between four and five fires at abandoned buildings on campus in 2016, and estimated that since the buildings began falling into disuse after 1997, they had responded to twenty or thirty such fires there.

, most of the campus sits abandoned, in an advanced state of disrepair. Most buildings are open to vagrants and vandals. This has caused severe damage to the buildings. The former college center has been set on fire twice. Since early 2018, the college administrative offices are back on campus again, occupying the college Annex which is next to McMillan Chapel. Plans have been made to renovate McMillan Chapel and the Alumni Library.

In 2023, Knoxville College's Vice President Dasha Lundy has been on a team working in collaboration with the University of Tennessee, Morris Brown College in Atlanta and other schools, to regain their accreditation by 2024 which is Knoxville College’s main priority now.

Campus
Knoxville College is situated on a 17-building, 39 acre campus, located atop a hill overlooking the Mechanicsville neighborhood, just northwest of Knoxville's downtown area. Along with administration and classroom buildings, the campus includes a performing arts center, a gymnasium, a library, a chapel, and a student center. The school maintains dormitories for on-campus students, as well as a president's house, and cottages and apartments for faculty.

Knoxville College Historic District
In 1980, eight buildings on the Knoxville College campus received recognition for having a role in minority education on the National Register of Historic Places as a historic district. Many of the earliest buildings were constructed using student labor, student-made bricks, and lumber donated by alumni. The district includes the following buildings:

 * McKee Hall, the oldest building on campus, originally built in 1876, largely rebuilt in 1895 following a fire. The building is named for the Reverend O.S. McKee, who had established the first school for African-American children in Nashville in 1862.  This building currently houses administration offices.
 * The President's House, built in the late 1880s. The house was originally built of wood, but brick siding was added in 1905.
 * Wallace Hall, built in 1890 as an orphanage. This building is named for Eliza B. Wallace, the school's principal of female students, 1877–1897.
 * Elnathan Hall, built in 1898 following the destruction by fire of the original Elnathan Hall, and altered in 1905 and 1971. This building has served variously as a women's dorm, administration building, and classroom building.
 * Two Faculty cottages, 1005 and 1009 College Street, both built in the Bungalow style in 1906.
 * McMillan Chapel, built in 1913, designed by Knoxville College alumnus, William Thomas Jones. Along with church services, the chapel served as the campus's primary performance venue.  Notable guests who have delivered speeches at the chapel include George Washington Carver, Countee Cullen, W. E. B. Du Bois, Jesse Owens, William H. Hastie and Jackie Robinson.
 * Giffen Memorial Gymnasium, built in 1929.

In 2016, the preservationist group Knox Heritage placed the Knoxville College Historic District on its "Fragile Fifteen," a list of endangered Knoxville-area historic properties.

Freedmen's Mission Historic Cemetery
The Freedmen's Mission Historic Cemetery, at the corner of Booker and College, is a historic African-American burial ground on the campus.

Administration
A 16-member Board of Trustees oversees Knoxville College. Its chairman is Dr. Michael V. Bowie. The board includes representatives from the Knoxville College National Alumni Association.

The Board of Trustees appoints the president, who is the school's chief administrator. The most recently appointed president, Jacob Savage, was fired by the Board of Trustees on January 23, 2015, three months after he had been hired to replace Evelyn Hallman. He had agreed to take no salary for his position. In July 2017, the Board of Trustees appointed Dr. Keith E. Lindsey as Interim President to guide the rebuilding of the college. The president is assisted by the academic dean, dean of students, director of admissions, and recruitment officer.

Academics
, Knoxville College offered two degrees: the four-year Bachelor of Liberal Studies, and the two year Associate of Arts. The Bachelor of Liberal Studies includes one of four areas of concentration: Humanities, Business and Computer Sciences, Natural Sciences and Mathematics, or Social and Behavioral Sciences. The curriculum further requires 15 to 18 semester hours of specialization within each concentration, providing for a more in-depth understanding of a particular field.

Knoxville College followed a debt-free policy that allowed students to complete the degree program without the accumulation of debt. This was accomplished primarily through its College Work Program, which allowed students to offset much of their tuition costs by working for several hours per week. This program involved a mix of performing various tasks around campus, community involvement, and internship programs.

Student life
Knoxville College's Student Government Association (SGA), which was elected by the student body, acted as a liaison between students and campus administration. The SGA was led by a president, elected for one term.

Student activities included a dance team, a debate team, a choir, and a trivia team (which competed with other HBCUs in the Honda Bowl Competition). The school's newspaper, The Aurora, was published for over a century. The college also maintained a student ambassador program and wellness program that provided volunteer services for the surrounding community.

After 1997, Knoxville College dropped most athletics programs due to declining enrollment, but as part of its reorganization, hopes to re-establish men's and women's basketball teams, as well as a cheerleading squad.

title: Knoxville College


text:
Heaven and Hell (Vangelis album)

Heaven and Hell is a studio album by Greek electronic composer Vangelis, released in November 1975 on RCA Records. It is the first album recorded at his Nemo Studios in London that he used until 1987. It is a concept album based on duality.

The album marks Vangelis' departure from the progressive rock sound on his previous album Earth (1973), with adoption of a more classical synthesized sound, as well his UK chart debut.

Overview
In 1975, Vangelis moved to London where he set up his own Nemo Studios. The album was his first record made at the studio. He recalls that "I was trying to put together the studio while recording my first album, Heaven and Hell, at the same time. In fact, the studio was Hell because there was unmixed concrete everywhere, builders all over the place making a lot of noise, and next to all that, there I was, trying to finish my album. There was no limit as to how much time I could spend working on the album, but I felt I just had to do it, and in any case, the only way you can complete the construction of a studio quickly is to start working in it before it's actually finished".

Vangelis recalls "I don't like to prepare for a long, long, long time an album. It's more exciting for me to sit down and to play whatever comes. So this is the way that Heaven and Hell happens. I spent six weeks to make this album but I spent maybe two weeks to put down the first tracks". Vangelis played all the instruments except the choir.

The album marked Vangelis' first collaboration with singer Jon Anderson, who sings on "So Long Ago, So Clear", the closing section of Part One. Vangelis recalls how they "sat down one day and I start to play the melody and he felt so comfortable that immediately he started to write the words".

Release
Heaven and Hell entered the UK Albums Chart on January 10, 1976 and reached #31. The album gained further recognition when "Movement 3" became the theme for the American television documentary series, Cosmos: A Personal Voyage by Carl Sagan. In 1981 it was released as a single titled "Heaven and Hell (Theme from 'The Cosmos')", and reached #48 in the UK Singles Chart on 18 July 1981.

In 2011 the album was included along with Albedo 0.39 and Spiral in a 3-CD box set series "Original Album Classics" by Sony, RCA and Legacy Recordings. In 2013 the album was released as a remastered and reissued digipak edition by Esoteric Recordings. The same label in September 2014 released a remastered gatefold vinyl limited edition.

Composition
It is one of the most important works by Vangelis as it demonstrated for the first time his combination of synthesizer, percussion and a chorus in a rich orchestral style of electronic music. It is one of many thematic albums by Vangelis, contrasting images of Heaven, expressed with a more tranquil sound, and Hell, which sounds more avant-garde.

Reception
Steven McDonald of AllMusic described it as a "dark, thundering album" which "massed Gothic choirs and a musical depiction of all the tortures of the damned, with an impressive amount of string-driven shrieking", concluding "... it's a brilliant piece of work that should not be absent from any Vangelis collection". Henri Stirk from Background Magazine rated the 2013 edition by Esoteric Recordings 3/5 stars.

LP
Note: Early pressings of the LP include a more detailed track listing. "So Long Ago, So Clear" is listed separately on the sleeve in all editions, as opposed to the other listed tracks.

 * Side one
 * 1) "Heaven and Hell Part I"
 * "Bacchanale" — 4:40
 * "Symphony to the Powers B" (Movements 1 and 2) — 8:18
 * "Movement 3" (from "Symphony to the Powers B") — 4:03
 * "So Long Ago, So Clear" — 5:00

 * Side two
 * 1) "Heaven and Hell Part II"
 * "Intestinal Bat" — 3:18
 * "Needles & Bones" — 3:22
 * "12 O'Clock" (in two parts) — 8:48
 * "Aries" — 2:05
 * "A Way" — 3:45

CD

 * 1) "Heaven and Hell Part I" — 21:58
 * 2) * includes "So Long Ago, So Clear" — 4:58
 * 3) "Heaven and Hell Part II" — 21:16

Personnel

 * Vangelis — synthesizers, Bösendorfer grand piano, percussion
 * Jon Anderson — lead vocals and lyrics on "So Long Ago, So Clear"
 * Vana Verouti — lead vocals on "12 O'Clock"
 * English Chamber Choir — choir
 * Guy Protheroe — conductor

 * Production
 * Vangelis — producer, arranger
 * Alan Lucas — sound engineer
 * Geoff Halpin — logo design
 * Mike Doud — sleeve concept
 * Paul Wakefield — photographer

title: Heaven and Hell (Vangelis album)


text:
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