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Outside support during the Warsaw Uprising

The Warsaw Uprising, in 1944, ended in the capitulation of the city and its near total destruction by the German forces. According to many historians, a major cause of this was the almost complete lack of outside support and the late arrival of the support which did arrive. The only support operation which ran continuously for the duration of the Uprising were night supply drops by long-range planes of the Royal Air Force (RAF), other Commonwealth air forces, and especially units of the Polish Air Force (PAF), which had to use distant airfields in Italy (Brindisi and others) and so had very limited effect.

The Soviets made clear their view on the situation in Warsaw to United States Ambassador, W. Averell Harriman. On 15 August 1944, Harriman received a note from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinsky. In this note, Vyshinsky was instructed by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to inform Harriman that the Soviet Government "could not go along" with US plans to airdrop arms to resistance groups in Warsaw and that the "action in Warsaw into which the Warsaw populations had been drawn was a purely adventuristic affair and the Soviet Government could not lend its hand to it." Vyshinsky's note concluded that Stalin had pointed out to Churchill on 5 August that one could not imagine how a few Polish detachments of the so-called National Army possessing neither tanks, artillery, or aviation could "take" Warsaw when the Nazis had four tank divisions at their disposal for the defense of the city.

A major reason that has also emerged was Stalin had sought to colonize Poland and forming a communist state that worked as a Soviet satellite, and a successful uprising by the Polish Home Army could threaten Stalin's plan. Thus choosing to not support the uprising served Stalin's hegemonic ambitions. If judging Stalin's political intentions, there could be alternate logistic reasons why the Soviet forces could not provide aid to Warsaw. One alternate explanation which has been given for the lack of early support is that the uprising began too early and the nearby Soviet forces could not fight to the city to support the uprising. Before and at the time of uprising, the German army started a massive Panzer force counterattack near Warsaw.

Another possible explanation is that the Red Army was simply exhausted and hence unable to extend effective support to the Uprising. In support of this thesis, it is often claimed (mostly by Soviet sources) that since the opening of Operation Bagration many Red Army units had covered several hundred miles in a far-ranging offensive, and their advance elements were at the very end of their logistical tether. This, coupled with the presence of several Panzer divisions from the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht around Warsaw which administered a sharp reverse to the Soviet 2nd Tank Army in the final days of July, was, according to this view, sufficient to stop the Red Army in its tracks on the Warsaw front. However, the units which reached Warsaw in late July 1944 were not part of Bagration, but instead advanced from Western Ukraine as part of the Lublin-Brest Operation, covering a much smaller distance. Those units were in fact able to operate quite effectively against German forces to the south and north of Warsaw during August and September, successfully securing bridgeheads over the Vistula and Narew rivers in those sectors. Despite that Soviet success, they remained inactive during August and the first half of September on the most direct route of approach towards Warsaw, through the suburb of Praga. Furthermore, once the Soviet forces seized Praga in mid-September 1944, only poorly supported units of the inexperienced 1st Polish Army were assigned to attempt the crossing of the river Vistula to aid the insurgents. Those crossings failed to establish a durable foothold on the left bank of the river, and caused considerable casualties among the Polish units involved. It is an open question whether an earlier Soviet effort using more experienced units with adequate support would have been able to reach and cross the Vistula in the Warsaw sector, and provide timely and effective support to the Polish units fighting in the main part of the city. The continued difficulty in accessing Soviet and British documents of the time makes it difficult for historians to answer this question with any degree of certainty.

The airdrops
From August 4 the Western Allies begun supporting the Warsaw Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies. Initially the air raids were carried out mostly by 1586 Polish Flight of the PAF stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy flying Liberators, Halifaxes and Dakotas. Later on at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile they were joined by the Liberators of 2 Wing - 31 and 34 Squadrons of the SAAF based at Foggia in Southern Italy, and Halifaxes, flown by 148 and 178 Squadrons of the RAF. The drops continued until September 21, delivering a total of 104 tons of supplies.

The Soviet Union did not give permission to the Allies for use of its airports for those supply operations and thus the planes were forced to use bases in the United Kingdom and Italy which reduced their carrying weight and number of sorties. The Allies specific request for the use of landing strips made on 20 August was denied by Stalin on 22 August. He referred to the resistance as "a handful of criminals".

United States Army Air Forces planes did not join the operation. On August 6, the Polish Ambassador called on the Lt. General McNarney to present an urgent request from the president of Poland for supplies to be furnished to the Polish Underground Army fighting the Germans in Warsaw. The Polish request asked that either General Eisenhower be authorized to send in supplies by air or that German munitions captured from the enemy by Soviet forces be sent to Warsaw from the United States bases in the Soviet Union. The Ambassador's memorandum also stated that arms and ammunition which Churchill had promised to parachute to Warsaw had not been sent because of technical difficulties. A response letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 7 stated that it "believed the Polish Ambassador should be informed that his appeal has been given most sympathetic consideration by the United States military authorities and that the matter has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for such action as is possible under the circumstances." In the annexes to the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it stated that in accordance with the agreed policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that supplies and equipment for the Polish Underground Forces is a British responsibility, and that the Polish request should be referred to the British Chiefs of Staff for such action as they may deem necessary and desirable. After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on August 25 and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on August 26: 'I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe'.

Although German air defence over the Warsaw area itself was almost non-existent, about 12% of the 296 planes taking part in the operations were lost because they had to fly 1,600 km out over heavily defended enemy territory and then back over the same route. Most of the drops were made during night, at no more than 100–300 feet altitude, and poor accuracy left many parachuted packages stranded behind German-controlled territory.

From September 13 on the Soviets began their own airdrop raids with supplies, and dropped about 55 tons in total. The drops continued until September 28. Finally on September 18 the Soviets allowed one USAAF flight of 110 B-17s of the 3 division Eighth Air Force to re-fuel and reload at Soviet airfields used in Operation Frantic, but it was too little too late. On their return flight to Foggia and then back to England the B-17's bombed the rail yards in Budapest, Hungary, which was still in German-occupied territory.

Soviet participation: Berling landings on Powiśle
The role of the Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising remains controversial and is still disputed by some historians. The Uprising started when the Red Army appeared on the city's doorstep, and the Poles in Warsaw were counting on Soviet aid coming in a matter of days. This basic scenario of an uprising against the Germans launched a few days before the arrival of Allied forces played out successfully in a number of European capitals, notably Paris and Prague. However, despite standing for about 40 days less than 10 km from Warsaw's city center, and then moving even closer, to the right bank of the Vistula river a few hundred meters away from the main battle of the uprising during its last two weeks, the Red Army did not extend effective aid to the desperate city. Some Western historians, as well as the official line of the Communist regime in Poland before 1989, claimed that the Red Army, exhausted by its long advance on its way to Warsaw, lacked sufficient fighting power to overcome the German forces around Warsaw and extend effective aid to the Uprising. However, the consensus among most historians is that Stalin did not want to aid the Home Army in Warsaw, made up of likely opponents of the Communist regime that he wanted to impose on Poland after the war, and other Allied powers were reluctant to intervene against Stalin's will.

The Red Army reached the outskirts of Warsaw in the final days of July, 1944. The Soviet units belonged to the 1st Belorussian Front, participating in the Lublin-Brest Operation, between the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation on its left and Operation Bagration on its right. These two operations were colossal defeats for the German army and completely destroyed a large number of German formations. As a consequence, the Germans at this time were desperately trying to put together a new force to hold the line of the Vistula river, the last major river barrier between the Red Army and Germany proper, rushing in units in various stages of readiness from all over Europe. These units included a few high quality Panzer and SS Panzer divisions pulled from their refits, but also many infantry units of poor quality. In terms of combat power this scratch force was considerably inferior to what the Soviets had available. On the other hand, after their long advances in June and July the Soviet suffered from the usual difficulties with supply accompanying any long-range Soviet offensive that has advanced far beyond its starting line. The Soviet plan was to seize bridgeheads across the Vistula and the Narew rivers as jumping off points for the next offensive and then stop to resupply their units. This put Warsaw, straddling the river Vistula, right at the limit of planned Soviet advance. From the operational viewpoint seizing Warsaw was not a major priority for the Soviets, though clearly having possession of the city would be advantageous to them, especially if it could be captured with its infrastructure intact. However, it was not essential, as the Soviets already seized a series of convenient bridgeheads to the south of Warsaw, and were concentrating on defending them against vigorous German counterattacks. The Red Army was also gearing for a major thrust into the Balkans through Romania at around this time and a large proportion of Soviet resources was being sent in that direction.

In the initial Battle of Radzymin Soviet advance armored units of the 2nd Tank Army suffered a setback which prevented them from taking Warsaw from the march. It was the presence of Soviet tanks in nearby Wołomin that sealed the decision of the Home Army leaders in Warsaw to launch the uprising. As a result of the battle, the Soviet tank army was pushed out of Wołomin to the east of Warsaw and pushed back about 10 km. However, the defeat did not change the fact of the overwhelming Soviet superiority over the Germans in the sector. The Soviets retained their positions to the south-east of Warsaw along the Vistula river, barely 10 km away from the city center, at the outskirts of the Warsaw right bank suburb Praga. The Poles fighting in the Uprising were counting that the Soviet forces would seize Praga in a matter of days and then be in a position to have Red Army units cross to the left bank where the main battle of the Uprising was occurring and come to its aid.

However, on that line along the outskirts of Praga, on the most direct route of advance towards Warsaw, the Soviets stopped their advance and the front line did not move for the next 45 days. The sector was held by the understrength German 73rd Infantry Division, destroyed many times on the Eastern Front and recently reconstituted. The division, though weak, did not experience significant Soviet pressure during that period. At the same time, the Red Army was fighting intense battles to the south of Warsaw, to seize and maintain bridgeheads over the Vistula river, and to the north, to gain bridgeheads over the river Narew. It was on those sectors that the best Panzer and armored divisions that the Germans had were fighting. Despite that, both of these objectives have been mostly secured by early September. The inactivity of the Red Army directly in front of Warsaw elicited this reaction of amazement from Germans, recorded in the operations journal of German 9th Army on 16 August 1944: Contrary to our expectations, the enemy has halted all of their offensive actions alongside the entire front of the 9th Army.

Finally, on September 11, the Soviet 47th Army began its advance into Praga. The resistance by the German 73rd Division was weak and collapsed quickly, with the Soviets gaining control of the suburb by September 14. With the taking of Praga, the Soviet forces were now directly across the river from the Uprising fighting in left-bank Warsaw. If the Soviets had reached this stage in early August, the crossing of the river would have been easy, as the Poles then held considerable stretches of the riverfront. By mid-September a series of German attacks had reduced the Poles to holding one narrow stretch of the riverbank, in the district of Czerniakow. Nevertheless, the Soviets now made an attempt to aid the Uprising, but not by using Red Army units.

In the Praga area Polish units under command of General Zygmunt Berling (thus sometimes known as 'berlingowcy' - 'the Berling men'), the 1st Polish Army (1 Armia Wojska Polskiego) were in position. On the night of September 14/September 15 three patrols from landed on the shore of Czerniaków and Powiśle areas and made contacts with Home Army forces. Under heavy German fire only small elements of main units made it ashore (I and III battalions of 9th infantry regiment, 3rd Infantry Division). At the same time the commanders of the Red Army declined to support the Polish troops with artillery, tanks or bombers.

The Germans intensified their attacks on the Home Army positions near the river to prevent any further landings, which could seriously compromise their line of defence, but weren't able to make any significant advances for several days, while Polish forces held those vital positions in preparation for new expected wave of Soviet landings. Polish units from the eastern shore attempted several more landings, and during the next few days sustained heavy losses (including destruction of all landing boats and most of other river crossing equipment). Other Soviet units limited their assistance to sporadic and insignificant artillery and air support.

Shortly after the Berling landings, the Soviets decide to postpone all plans for a river crossing in Warsaw "for at least 4 months" and soon afterwards general Berling was relieved of his command. On the night of September 19, after no further attempts from the other side of the river were made and the promised evacuation of wounded did not take place, Home Army soldiers and landed elements of Wojsko Polskie were forced to begin a retreat from their positions on the bank of the river.

Out of approximately 3,000 men who made it ashore only around 900 made it back to the eastern shores of Vistula, approximately 600 of them seriously wounded.

Closed or destroyed military archives
Research into the lack of support of the Warsaw Uprising is (according to historians such as Norman Davies) currently very difficult due to lack of access to archives. For records relating to the period, currently both the United Kingdom archives and Russian archives (where the majority of Soviet archives are kept) remain mostly closed to the public. Further complicating the matter is the United Kingdom's claim that they accidentally destroyed the archives of the Polish Government in Exile.


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SS Ceramic

SS Ceramic was an ocean liner built in Belfast for White Star Line in 1912–13 and operated on the Liverpool – Australia route. Ceramic was the largest ship serving the route until P&O introduced RMS Mooltan in 1923.

In 1934 Shaw, Savill & Albion Line absorbed White Star's Australia service and acquired Ceramic. The liner served as a troopship in both World Wars. In 1942 a U-boat sank her, leaving only one survivor from the 656 people aboard.

This was the first of two ships to be called Ceramic. The second was a Shaw, Savill & Albion refrigerated cargo steamship that was built in England in 1948 and scrapped in 1972.

Building
Harland and Wolff built Ceramic as hull 432 on the Number One slipway of its Belfast yard, launching her on 11 December 1912 and completing her on 5 July 1913. Her total cost was £436,000.

Ceramic's engines were what was called "combination machinery". She had three propellers, with a pair of four-cylinder triple expansion engines driving her port and starboard props and exhaust steam from their low pressure cylinders powering a single low-pressure steam turbine that drove her middle screw. Harland and Wolff and White Star Line had successfully tested this arrangement in 1908 on SS Laurentic (1908) and had since applied it to the three giant Olympic-class ocean liners. Between them Ceramic's three engines were rated at 9000 ihp and gave her a speed of 16 kn.

Ceramic's registered length was 655.1 ft. Her beam was 69.4 ft and her depth was 43.8 ft. As built, she had three decks and her tonnages were and. Some of her holds were refrigerated. In later years her refrigerated cargo capacity was cited as 321340 cuft in 1930 and 321306 cuft in 1936.

White Star Line registered Ceramic at Liverpool. Her UK official number was 135474 and her code letters were JCNK. She carried wireless telegraphy equipment, operated by the Marconi Company on the standard 300 and 600 metre wavelengths. Her original call sign was MCP.

White Star service
Ceramic's maiden voyage began on 24 July 1913 when she left Liverpool for Australia. At the time she was the largest liner on the route between the two countries. In 1914 she was requisitioned for the First Australian Imperial Force as the troopship HMAT (His Majesty's Australian Transport) Ceramic, with the pennant number A40.

She was armed with two stern-mounted QF 4.7 inch (120mm) naval guns. Her navigation equipment included wireless direction finding by 1930 and echo sounding by 1933.

In 1916 Ceramic took the Territorial Army 25th (County of London) Cyclist Battalion to India, leaving Devonport on 3 February and reaching Bombay on 25 February.

Ceramic survived a number of attacks. In May 1916 she was in the Mediterranean carrying 2,500 troops when two torpedoes from an unidentified attacker missed her. On 9 June 1917 she was in the English Channel when again a torpedo from an unidentified attacker missed her. On 21 July in the North Atlantic off the Canary Islands a surfaced U-boat chased her for 40 minutes. Ceramic fired on the U-boat with her 4.7 inch stern guns and outran her attacker.

In May 1917 Ceramic was transferred from Australian control to the UK Shipping Controller under the Liner Requisition Scheme. In 1919 she was returned to White Star Line and in 1920 Harland and Wolff refitted her as a civilian liner. The refit slightly increased her tonnage to. She resumed civilian service on 18 November 1920 when she left Liverpool for Glasgow and Sydney.

Ceramic ran aground on the River Clyde at Glasgow on 12 January 1925. She later was refloated and dry docked.

On 18 December 1930, Ceramic collided with the Pacific Steam Navigation Company's cargo motor ship Laguna in the River Thames near Gravesend. Both ships were slightly damaged.

Shaw, Savill and Albion peacetime service
In 1934 White Star merged with Cunard. Ceramic was sold to Shaw, Savill and Albion but kept the same route and name. She started her first voyage for her new owner on 25 August, when she left Liverpool for Brisbane. From 1930 her three-letter wireless call sign was superseded by the four-letter call sign GLST.

In June 1936 Harland and Wolff's yard in Govan, Glasgow began a refit to modernise Ceramic. Her forward bridge deck was glassed in, a verandah café was added aft. The refit changed her tonnages to and. Despite being 23 years old, she remained a popular ship on the route between the UK and Australia.

As refitted, she had 36 corrugated furnaces with a combined grate area of 725 sqft. The furnaces heated six double-ended boilers with a combined heating surface of 30090 sqft. The boilers supplied steam at 215 lbf/in2 to Ceramic's two triple-expansion engines. Her three engines were now rated at 1,692 NHP. Ceramic resumed service on 15 August 1936.

Second World War service
When the Second World War broke out on 1 September 1939 Ceramic was at Tenerife on her regular route to South Africa and Australia. She continued as scheduled, unescorted, reaching Australia in October. She left Sydney on 1 November and returned unescorted until she reached Freetown, Sierra Leone, where she joined Convoy SL 13F, becoming the convoy vice-commodore's ship. SL 13F left port on 19 December and reached Liverpool on 3 January 1940.

In February 1940 Ceramic was commissioned as a troop ship. She kept her usual route, leaving Liverpool unescorted on 19 February and reaching Sydney on 14 April. She left Sydney for home on 20 April, and after her regular calls in Australia and South Africa she put into Freetown on 2 June. If she was seeking a home-bound convoy she found none, for she sailed the next day unescorted and reached Liverpool on 13 June.

Collision with Testbank
On 20 July 1940 Ceramic left Liverpool with Convoy OB 186. This dispersed at sea two days later as scheduled.

In the South Atlantic in the small hours of 11 August 1940 the Bank Line cargo ship SS Testbank sighted Ceramic about a mile and a half ahead. Under wartime navigation regulations both ships were sailing without navigation lights. Ceramic's lookout failed to see Testbank until the two ships were about 350 yd from each other. Both ships took avoiding action but were too late to avoid a collision.

About 0200 hrs Testbank rammed Ceramic's starboard bow. The combined speed of the collision was about 25 kn. It shortened the cargo ship's bow by about 20 ft and opened a hole about 40 ft wide in the liner's Number One Hold, but both ships stayed afloat. Testbank's cargo was 9,000 tons of iron ore, which would have sunk her very quickly if she had shipped enough water. In the event she was able to return to Cape Town under her own power.

As a precaution, Ceramic's 279 passengers were taken off and transferred by boats to the P&O liner RMS Viceroy of India. Ceramic reached Walvis Bay in South West Africa with the aid of a tug and escorted by a Royal Navy warship. She arrived on 16 August and stayed for emergency repairs until 24 September. She reached Cape Town on 27 September and stayed there for almost £50,000 worth of further repairs. On 10 December Ceramic resumed her passage to Australia, reaching Sydney on 18 January 1941. Apart from a visit to Newcastle, New South Wales Ceramic stayed in Sydney until 21 March, when she left for home. She made her usual calls in South Africa at the end of April and reached Liverpool on 28 May.

Further war service
On 28 or 29 June 1941 Ceramic left Liverpool with Convoy WS 9B, which reached Freetown on 13 July. She continued unescorted via South Africa as usual, reaching Sydney on 4 September, where she stayed until 1 October. She then visited Newcastle and Brisbane before leaving Sydney for home on 12 October. Instead of returning by her usual route Ceramic turned east across the Tasman Sea, called at Wellington, New Zealand 19–27 October and then crossed the Pacific. In November she passed through the Panama Canal and reached Halifax, Nova Scotia. There she joined Convoy HX 163, which left on 3 December and reached Liverpool on 19 December.

In January 1942 Ceramic left Liverpool with Convoy ON 59 until it dispersed as scheduled in the North Atlantic. Because of the threat of enemy attack her Atlantic route from Liverpool to Cape Town was extended westwards. She steamed west unescorted across the North Atlantic to Halifax, arriving on 7 February. On 15 February she left Halifax and under naval escort to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, arriving on 5 March. She continued unescorted via South Africa to Australia, reaching Sydney on 29 April.

Again she continued east to return home, this time calling at Lyttelton, New Zealand on 2 June before crossing the Pacific and the passing through Panama Canal. In Cristóbal, Colón she joined Convoy Convoy CW 2/1, which left on 3 July and reached Key West on 12 July, where most of its ships including Ceramic joined Convoy KN 119. This left Key West the same day and reached Hampton Roads, Virginia on 17 July. Ceramic continued unescorted, calling at New York 24–27 July and continuing to Halifax where she joined Convoy HX 201. This left on 2 August and reached Liverpool on 14 August. On this voyage Ceramic carried 372 passengers to Liverpool.

Loss
On 3 November 1942 Ceramic left Liverpool for Australia via Saint Helena and South Africa. She was carrying 377 passengers, 264 crew, 14 DEMS gunners and 12,362 tons of cargo. 244 of the passengers were military or naval, including at least 145 British Army, 30 Royal Navy, 14 Royal Australian Navy and 12 Royal Marines. 30 of her British Army passengers were QAIMNS nursing sisters. The other 133 passengers were fare-paying civilians. 12 were children, the youngest being a one-year-old baby girl. Six were doctors, five of whom were South African. One passenger was Rudolph Dolmetsch (1906–42), classical musician and composer, then serving as Regimental Bandmaster with the Royal Artillery.

Ceramic sailed with Convoy ON 149 until it dispersed as scheduled in the North Atlantic. She then continued unescorted as planned. As on her previous departure in January, she first headed west because of the threat of enemy attack.

At midnight on 6–7 December, in cold weather and rough seas in the mid-Atlantic, GS U-515 hit Ceramic with a single torpedo. These were followed two or three minutes later by two more that hit Ceramic's engine room, stopping her engines and her electric lighting. The liner radioed a distress signal, which was received by the Emerald-class cruiser HMS Enterprise (D52). The crippled liner stayed afloat and her complement abandoned ship in good order, launching about eight lifeboats all full of survivors.

About three hours later U-515 fired two more torpedoes, which broke the ship's back and sank her immediately. By now it was very stormy and raining. The heavy sea capsized some of the lifeboats and left many people struggling in the water. Those boats that were not capsized stayed afloat only by constant baling.

Next morning the BdU ordered U-515 to return to the position of the sinking to find out the ship's destination. About noon the U-boat commander, Kapitänleutnant Werner Henke, decided to rescue the Ceramic's skipper. In heavy seas, he sighted one of the lifeboats and its occupants waved to him. The storm was now almost Force 10 and almost swamping U-515's conning tower, so Henke ordered his crew to make do with the first survivor they could find. This turned out to be Sapper Eric Munday of the Royal Engineers, whom they rescued from the water and took prisoner aboard the submarine.

No other occupants of the lifeboats survived. The storm was too severe for neutral rescue ships from São Miguel Island in the Azores to put to sea. On 9 December the Portuguese Douro-class destroyer NRP Dão was sent to search for survivors, but found none.

Munday was kept prisoner aboard U-515 for a month, including Christmas and New Year, until she completed her patrol. When she returned to Lorient, Brittany on 6 January 1943 he was landed at Lorient U-boat base and sent to Stalag VIII-B in Upper Silesia, where he remained a prisoner of war until 1945.

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title: SS Ceramic


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Haran

Haran or Aran (הָרָן Hārān) is a man in the Book of Genesis in the Hebrew Bible. He died in Ur of the Chaldees, was a son of Terah, and brother of Abraham. Through his son Lot, Haran was the ancestor of the Moabites and Ammonites.

Haran and his family
Terah, a descendant of Shem son of Noah, was the father of Abram/Abraham, Sarai/Sarah, Nahor, and Haran. Their home's location is not certain, but it is usually supposed to have been in Mesopotamia. Besides Lot and Milcah, Haran fathered a daughter Iscah.

After Haran died in Ur of the Chaldees 'before his father Terah', his family travelled towards Canaan, the Promised Land. However, Terah stopped at Charan (or Haran [Hebrew חָרָן, Ḥārān]) and settled there, as did Nahor and Milcah, whereas Lot accompanied Abraham and others onwards to Canaan.

Etymology
The name Haran possibly comes from the Hebrew word har, = "mountain", with a West Semitic suffix appearing with proper names, anu/i/a. Thus, it has been suggested that Haran may mean "mountaineer". Personal names which resemble Haran include ha-ri and ha-ru, from texts of second millennium BC Mari and Alalakh, and ha-ar-ri, from one of the Amarna letters—but their meanings are uncertain. The initial element of Haran can be found in the Phoenician personal name hr-b`l, and also in the Israelite personal name hryhw from Gibeon.

Others called Haran
Haran is the English name of two other people mentioned in the Bible.
 * Haran, son of Caleb (חָרָן – Ḥārān).
 * Haran, son of Shimei (הָרָן – Hārān). He was a Levite who lived in the time of David and Solomon.

title: Haran