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Air rage

Air rage is aggressive or violent behavior on the part of passengers and crew of aircraft, especially during flight. Air rage generally covers both behavior of a passenger or crew member that is likely caused by physiological or psychological stresses associated with air travel, and when a passenger or crew member becomes unruly, angry, or violent on an aircraft during a flight. Excessive consumption of alcohol is often a cause.

Landing to disembark the troublemaker cannot usually be done quickly and causes great delays to passengers. However, unlike large ships, there is insufficient room on board to hold the offender in an isolated area until arrival. Therefore, diversions or unscheduled stops do occur because of air rage.

Examples of air rage behavior include failure to follow safety regulations or behaving in a way that gives suspicion of a threat to flight safety.

An airline passenger's uncontrolled anger is usually expressed in aggressive or violent behavior in the passenger compartment, but air rage can have serious implications, especially if the offender decides to interfere with the aircraft's navigation or flight controls. Generally, such passengers do not intend to commit terrorist acts, but since the September 11 attacks, such incidents have been taken more seriously due to increased awareness of terrorism.

History
The first case of air rage was recorded in 1947 on a flight from Havana to Miami, when a drunk man assaulted another passenger and a flight attendant. Another early documented case involved a flight in Alaska in 1950.

At the time, applicable jurisdiction was unclear, so offenders often escaped punishment. It wasn't until the 1963 Tokyo Convention that laws of the country where the aircraft is registered were agreed to take precedence.

Air rage events have increased since International Air Transport Association (IATA) started collecting data on disruptive passenger behavior in 2007. No definite explanation for that trend has been established; possible explanations include heightened anxiety for one's safety and irritation with invasive security. In 2019, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) reported a c. 33% rise in air rage incidents on European flights between 2017 and 2018. EASA stated that every three hours, a passenger compromised the safety of a flight within the EU through misconduct, with at least 70% of these incidents involving aggression. Moreover, escalating air rage situations that necessitated an emergency landing happened once a month on average. A flight attendant representing the Vereniging Nederlands Cabinepersoneel (Dutch Aircrew Association) outlined several possible reasons for the rise: more seats per airplane, more and longer flights lead to more annoyance amongst passengers, and thus more aggression incidents.

After the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, an uptick in air rage was noted by media outlets and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. Most incidents involved the mandated use of face masks, scarves, or covering under federal law, resulting in attacks on other passengers or airline personnel. Dutch airlines KLM and Transavia noticed the same increase in air rage, and in September 2022, they established a joint blacklist for banned passengers.

Causes
Stressful situations, such as jet lag, flight delays, or other difficult or annoying passengers or crew members in one's vicinity, can lead passengers and crew members to an increased likelihood of becoming agitated and air rage. Passengers who are afraid of flying can easily panic.

Some research suggests that visible inequality between seat classes on flights (first class, business class, economy class) may be responsible for an increase in air rage incidents.

It is also suggested by some experts that the primary cause of air rage is the deterioration of economy class amenities and seating space over recent decades.

Air rage can be the result of a combination of factors. For example, a person who is already afraid of flying can be tipped over the edge by an overuse of alcohol, medication, a stressful situation, nicotine withdrawal, or disruptive behavior from others.

The availability of alcoholic beverages on airlines and at airports enables passengers and crew members to drink excessively before and during flights. Flight attendants have the ability to keep track of how many drinks are served to passengers while on board an aircraft, and are required by many countries to refuse further drinks to passengers who appear intoxicated, but have no way of knowing how many are consumed prior to boarding. An analysis of online media reports relating to air rage incidents occurring between 2000 and 2020 found that the United States and the United Kingdom were the most frequent countries of origin for the 228 cases found, with 127 cases involving alcohol consumption. According to one study by the School of Hotel and Tourism Management at Hong Kong Polytechnic University (HKPU), half of all air rage incidents on Western airlines involve alcohol.

Markus Schuckert, a co-author of the study, told SCMP that on Asian airlines, where air rage incidents are rarer, the air rage incidents that do occur arise from inexperience and lack of knowledge about the restrictions involved. In China, where Schuckert described some incidents of air rage as "legendary" due to pictures or video posted on social media, some passengers have been known to do things like open cabin doors while the plane was taxiing to let hot air out, or throw coins in the engines for good luck.

Sometimes, passengers are disruptive by failing to obey laws and rules that must be observed or arguing with flight attendants.

It is also possible in some cases, due to the fact that crew members have sole discretion to determine whether a passenger is being disruptive, that some incidents may be caused or exacerbated by intolerant or confrontational behavior on the part of crew members. For example, in 2020, the cabin crew of an American Airlines flight called the police on a "disruptive" passenger who complained that some airline employees had not been wearing COVID masks.

On 10 August 2022, just before take-off of a Transavia flight from Rotterdam The Hague Airport, an 18-year-old male passenger shared a photo of an airplane crash using the AirDrop mobile phone app, where it was seen by many crew members and passengers including children. Many passengers and personnel were upset, and the crew repeatedly ordered the passenger to identify themselves, with the captain saying the plane would not depart until they had done so. Although the 18-year-old (whom the Royal Marechaussee removed from the flight for questioning) said it was a "joke", the airline regarded it as "a kind of bomb threat"; the next day, it charged the passenger with intimidation and banned him from flying Transavia for 5 years.

Traits
Air rage generally covers both behavior of a passenger or airline employee on the aircraft or more generally speaking at the airport:

 * Violent, aggressive or disruptive behaviour.
 * Threatening flight safety, crew members or passengers.
 * Behaving in a way that gives suspicion of a threat to flight safety.
 * Failure to follow safety regulations.
 * Claiming to have a bomb on the flight or saying they are a terrorist with malignant intent.

Other related behavior that may interfere with the comfort of cabin crew or passengers include smoking on board the flight, viewing pornographic materials, performing sex acts ("mile high" club) in the aircraft cabin, making undue sexual advances towards other people, performing sex acts in the lavatory, the inappropriate groping and touching of crew members, loud or drunken behaviors, spitting, swearing, and wearing clothing that is inappropriate or offensive.

Handling air rage
Extremely unruly passengers or crew members who must be restrained are restrained using a variety of methods. Some airlines carry flexcuffs for this purpose. Others use seatbelts, adhesive tape, neckties, shoe laces, waist belts, or whatever is available on the aircraft. While the United States does not allow passengers to actually be confined to the seat or any other part of the aircraft, and only allows their individual body parts to be restrained, other countries, such as Iceland, do allow tying an unruly passenger to the seat.

In Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority reserves the right to use stun guns to subdue unruly passengers.

Sometimes a flight must be diverted to allow an aircraft to dispose itself of the offender as soon as possible.

Low-cost airlines usually have younger and less-trained, less-experienced personnel, who therefore struggle more to handle air rage incidents.

Consequences
In the United States, passengers who disrupt the duties of a flight crew member can face fines up to $25,000 and sometimes lengthy prison sentences. In addition, the airline can choose to ban the problem passenger from any future flights.

In Canada the Pilot-in-Command (Captain) of the aircraft is designated as a Peace Officer under the Criminal Code and as such, have the same powers of arrest as a Police Officer. The Pilot-in-Command is authorized to enforce all sections of the Criminal Code and all Acts of Parliament while the aircraft is in flight.

With the number of unlawful acts committed on airplanes in South Korea more than tripling from 2011 to 2016, Korean Air Lines issued guidelines allowing crew members to use stun guns on violent passengers and banning those with a history of unruly behavior.

On 29 September 2022, KLM and Transavia established a joint blacklist for banned passengers, meaning that any passenger misbehaving on a flight of either airline is banned from flying with both airlines for the duration of 5 years. The frequency of mid-air incidents involving unruly passengers increased significantly after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and put a heavy burden on personnel of both airlines, and they wished to prevent passengers banned by one airline from making trouble on another flight of the other. The exchange of KLM–Transavia banned passenger data, that had so far been hampered by legal obstructions, was said to be the first of its kind in the world. Back in August 2017, the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV) and other trade unions had already put forward the idea of a shared blacklist for banned passengers amongst all European airlines to prevent passengers prone to air rage from causing trouble from one airline to the next.

title: Air rage


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Michèle Flournoy

Michèle Angélique Flournoy (born December 14, 1960) is an American defense policy advisor who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy under President Bill Clinton and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President Barack Obama.

As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Flournoy was the highest-ranking woman in the history of the Department of Defense. In that position, Flournoy crafted the Obama administration's counter-insurgency policy in Afghanistan and helped persuade President Obama to intervene militarily in Libya.

In 2007, Flournoy co-founded the Center for a New American Security. She is a co-founder and the current managing partner of WestExec Advisors.

Early life and education
Flournoy was born on December 14, 1960, in Los Angeles, California. Her father, George Flournoy, was a cinematographer who worked on shows including I Love Lucy and The Odd Couple. He died of a heart attack when she was 14 years old. Flournoy attended Beverly Hills High School in Beverly Hills, California. She was an exchange student in Belgium, where she learned French, for one year.

Flournoy received a Bachelor of Arts degree in social studies from Harvard University in 1983. She received an M.Litt. in international relations in 1986 from Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum scholar at Balliol College. In 1986, she was a research analyst at the Center for Defense Information. Then, by 1989, Flournoy worked at the Arms Control Association. From 1989 until 1993, she was at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where she was a research fellow in its International Security Program.

Clinton administration (1996–2000)
Flournoy served in the Clinton administration in the United States Department of Defense, where she was both Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy.

Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1996, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000.

While serving under the Clinton administration as a deputy assistant secretary of defense, Flournoy was the principal author of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which argued that "determined U.S. forces must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously".

She was a primary contributor to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Public policy research
Flournoy then joined the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) as a research professor, founding and leading NDU's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group.

Flournoy then moved to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she worked as a senior advisor on a range of defense policy and international security issues. In 2002, a year before the US invasion of Iraq, she argued for preemptive strikes by the US against foreign weapons stockpiles. Flournoy told The Washington Post, "In some cases, preemptive strikes against an adversary's [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities may be the best or only option we have to avert a catastrophic attack against the United States."

Founder of CNAS (2007)
In 2007, Flournoy co-founded the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) with Kurt M. Campbell. She was named CNAS's president. Flournoy and Campbell wrote a 2007 policy paper called "The Inheritance and the Way Forward" that advocated for a US foreign policy "grounded in a common-sense pragmatism rather than ideology".

Obama's first term (2009–2012)
After the 2008 presidential election, Flournoy was selected as one of the review team leads for the Obama transition at the Department of Defense. On January 8, 2009, President-elect Obama announced that he was nominating her as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to serve under Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. When the United States Senate confirmed her nomination on February 9, 2009, she became the highest-ranking woman in the history of the Department of Defense.

In 2009, Flournoy told The New York Times that she had spent much of her adult life steeped in the practice of war. "We're trying to recognize that warfare may come in a lot of different flavors in the future," she said.

While serving in the Obama administration, Flournoy crafted the administration's policy of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. She supported the surge of troops in Afghanistan and helped to design the administration's policy in that regard. In 2009, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, she also supported a US "civilian surge" in Afghanistan, coupling increased economic aid with at least 400 new counter-insurgency experts, and doubling the US military presence to 68,000 troops by the end of the year.

From February 2009 to February 2012, Flournoy was a principal advisor to U.S. Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta.

On December 12, 2011, Flournoy announced that she would step down in February 2012 to return to private life and contribute to President Barack Obama's re-election bid.

Libya
In 2011, Flournoy, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, helped persuade President Obama to intervene militarily in Libya, despite opposition from members of Congress and key White House advisors, such as Joe Biden, Vice President; Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor; and Robert Gates, Defense Secretary. Flournoy supported the NATO-led imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya to oust resistant leader Muammar Gaddafi, accused of ordering the killing of demonstrators and promising to "hunt the rebels down and show no mercy." Flournoy said imposition of a no-fly zone necessitated first destroying Libya's air defenses with US and British cruise missiles targeting the Libyan missile defense system, and US B-2 bombers attacking Libyan airfields.

Rainmaker and think-tanker (2012–present)
After leaving the Obama administration, Flournoy joined Boston Consulting Group as a senior advisor to its Washington D.C.-based public sector practice. It was reported that under Flournoy's direction the Boston Consulting Group's military contracts went "from $1.6 million in 2013 to $32 million in 2016".

In a 2013 conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, Flournoy said she had supported US military intervention on humanitarian grounds. Critics who disagreed with Flournoy described the war on Libya as "disastrous" in its destabilization of entire regions in the Middle East and North Africa, facilitating the transfer of arms to extremists across countries. Two years after the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi, Flournoy defended the US military intervention in Libya, telling the Council on Foreign Relations: "I think we were right to do it."

As well as being, for a time, a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and a member of the CIA Director’s External Advisory Board, Flournoy was, in 2014, a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

At least in 2014 Flournoy sat on the board of the Atlantic Council.

Hypothetical role in Clinton administration (2016)
In June 2016 while she was rumoured to be "Hillary Clinton's Likely Defense Secretary", Flournoy advocated regime change in Syria, supporting "limited military coercion" to remove President Bashar al-Assad from office.

Co-founder WestExec Advisors (2017)
Flournoy co-founded WestExec Advisors where she holds the post of managing partner. In 2017, Flournoy, along with Antony Blinken, US Deputy Secretary of State in the Obama administration, co-founded WestExec Advisors, a consulting firm.

As corporate director
In 2018, Flournoy joined the board of Booz Allen Hamilton, receiving $440,000, mostly in company stock options during the first two years since her appointment. She has received some criticism for her role as a director at Booz Allen Hamilton, including by authors affiliated with the Project on Government Oversight (POGO).

As of December 1, 2020, Flournoy was an advisor to Pine Island Capital, a private equity firm. In December 2020, Pine Island raised $218 million to pay for investments in military and aerospace and other industries. In its September 2020 S.E.C. filing, Pine Island forecast that the Defense Department "will prioritize rapid technological advancements" in artificial intelligence and other technologies.

Flournoy was in 2018 on the board of directors of Amida Technology Solutions.

Hypothetical role in Biden administration (2020)
Flournoy was widely speculated to be a leading contender to serve as Secretary of Defense under President Joe Biden. She was tarnished by liberal critics for her international consulting and private equity associations whereas her colleague, Antony Blinken was not.

During the 2020 presidential transition of Joe Biden, Flournoy had been viewed as being "at the top of Biden's list" to be Secretary of Defense. In December 2020, Gen. Lloyd Austin was reported to have been chosen instead.

In a webinar hosted by the Israel Policy Forum in June 2020, Flournoy expressed concern that Israel's proposed unilateral annexation of the West Bank could lead Congress to deny almost $4 billion in annual US aid to Israel. "I would hate to see some in Congress decided they are going to hold hostage our security assistance to Israel as a way of protesting their policies in the West Bank." Flournoy added that a fraying of the US-Israel relationship would be disastrous for US interests.

During the 2020 US presidential election, Flournoy stated that she opposed lifting economic sanctions against North Korea and Iran, though might support waivers for medical supplies during the global COVID-19 pandemic.

In an August 2020 interview with Defense News, Flournoy stated that she favored shifting money from more traditional military expenditures to unmanned systems "that dramatically improve ... our ability to project power to defend an interest or an ally who's under threat".

In November 2020, when Flournoy was under consideration for Secretary of Defense, she wrote, “the department and Congress may want to consider a new type of funding authority that supports both the development and testing of new digital technologies." The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) criticized Flournoy for using "opaque" language to skirt government oversight.

In June 2020 Flournoy argued that the US must invest in new military technologies and more long-range missiles, escalate US troop deployment to the South China Sea area, and step up roving war games in Asia to deter Chinese aggression. Without such ramped-up US military activity and absent the technology to ward off a Chinese cyber attack on US navigation systems, Flournoy asserted the US could stumble into a nuclear confrontation with China over Taiwan sovereignty.

In a November 2020 CNAS report, "Sharpening the U.S. Military Edge: Critical Steps for the Next Administration," Flournoy argued the U.S. military must be more competitive with China "to keep its military-technological edge." She called for prioritizing artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, unmanned and autonomous weapons systems.

Political positions
Spencer Ackerman has described Flournoy as a centrist. Van Jackson, a former colleague, described her approach as that of a "classic liberal internationalist".

Flournoy's 2020 Asia essay was criticized by historian Andrew Bacevich, who said goading China into a high-tech arms race was not prudent when other areas, such as addressing the climate crisis and COVID-19 pandemic, demanded collaboration, not competition. Bacevitch added that Flournoy's call for increased spending on unmanned space systems rested on premises that advanced technology always wins wars and that military might equals security, saying "The immediate threats to our collective safety and well-being—perhaps even to our Republic—are ... not on the other side of the planet."

Code Pink co-founder Medea Benjamin argued in December 2020 that Flournoy would be the wrong choice for Secretary of Defense because she would "steer the American empire farther down its current path of lost wars, corrupt militarism and terminal decline".

Other affiliations
She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

In 2012, Flournoy was elected as a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.

, Flournoy is a member of the board of directors of Spirit of America.

As of October 2023, she serves on the Special Competitive Studies Project's board of advisors.

Personal life
Flournoy's husband, W. Scott Gould, is a retired captain who served for 26 years in the United States Navy Reserve. He was a vice president at IBM before becoming United States Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The couple has three children and reside in Bethesda, Maryland.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Michèle Flournoy


text:
Thomas Lyon-Bowes, Master of Glamis (born 1821)

Thomas Lyon-Bowes (born and died 21 October 1821) was the first child of Thomas Lyon-Bowes, Lord Glamis, and his wife Charlotte Lyon-Bowes née Grimstead, great-grandparents of Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon, who became queen consort in 1936. Although Thomas is recorded in Robert Douglas' Peerage of Scotland as "born and died, October 21, 1821," rumours began to circulate during the late 19th century that the child had been born deformed, and had therefore been brought up in seclusion hidden away in Glamis Castle in Angus, Scotland, giving rise to the soubriquet of the Monster of Glamis, or the Horror of Glamis.

Mystery of Glamis
Rumours of Thomas Lyon-Bowes' survival, as recounted by James Wentworth Day in his 1967 book The Queen Mother's Family Story, appear to have started in local villages as the result of an account by the midwife, whose name is unrecorded. The deformed child was alleged to have been in good health when the midwife left, causing suspicion when his death was announced a day or two later. The story was discussed during the latter half of the 19th century, when "Miss M. Gilchrist, writing in 1885, was not only confident that such a monster did actually exist, but even described him – half frog, half man!!", also claiming he was the rightful earl. Details published about the mystery of Glamis during the reign of Queen Victoria scarcely mention a monster and are instead focused on the possibility of members of a rival clan dying while locked in the secret room. The earliest surviving reference dates from 1908, in which it was claimed that "in the Castle of Glamis is a secret chamber. In this chamber is confined a monster, who is the rightful heir to the title and property, but who is so unpresentable that it is necessary to keep him out of sight and out of possession." The child Thomas has no gravestone; as the child had been baptised as a Christian at birth, this has been used to support the conjecture of survival. However, the fact that Thomas Lyon-Bowes, as a child who died in infancy, has no individual gravestone is in keeping with the funeral customs of the time, when – owing to high rates of infant mortality – usually only adults were commemorated in this way. While dedicated funerary monuments for children do exist, they are comparatively rare.

During a visit to Glamis the Queen Mother's biographer Michael Thornton was allegedly told by the sixteenth Earl that the entrance to the chamber where Thomas lived had been bricked up after his death. Some accounts also came from singer and composer Virginia Gabriel, who stayed at the castle in 1870. According to Raymond Lamont Brown, a folklorist writing an account of tales associated with Glamis, while stories of a concealed chamber are likely to have a factual basis, he asserts the family emphatically deny rumours about a monster.


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Talk:Greater China

Examples
Since the term is controversial as to its coverage and even legitimacy, I think it'd better provide examples of the usage. I haven't found examples that include Singapore. If there are any out there, please add them to the page. Thank you. --LiuJiageng (talk) 18:09, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

At the moment, I see the term used often with regard to travel due to the corona-virus outbreak. Meaning some special handling of people who have visited "Greater China" recently. In those contexts, I think it is intentionally vague and has no irredentist or any other political intent. It is simply a vague shorthand to avoid having to write out so many place-names. Whether it is used often enough to deserve its own Wikipedia page is another question. Jlhollin (talk) 14:27, 18 March 2020 (UTC)

There are pages for this term in 23 different languages so it should deserve an English page.--LiuJiageng (talk) 07:44, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

Greater China
How about this picture of a statue of Chiang Kai-shek with two maps of China behind him? Geographyinitiative (talk) 09:01, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * This article is not about the definitive boundary of China. A photo which features that person is even more off-topic. --Matt Smith (talk) 09:08, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Let me know if there's anything specific wrong with the map. On Wikipedia, you edit and then discuss. You're so anti-Chiang Kai-shek you can't let a historical map be presented on the page? Sounds like Baidu Baike logic, not Wikipedia logic. Geographyinitiative (talk) 09:11, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Policy WP:Consensus says: "If an edit is reverted and further edits seem likely to meet the same fate, create a new section on the associated talk page to discuss the issue." You are trying to add a photo which features a controversial person.
 * This term is ambiguous and some people even consider that the term includes Singapore. Please desist from adding any map until we have a consensus. --Matt Smith (talk) 09:21, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * My edit is a map of Greater China. Wikipedia is not about blunting controversy. Please desist from removing maps of Greater China. Geographyinitiative (talk) 09:25, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Is there any map of Greater China including Singapore? Geographyinitiative (talk) 09:26, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * If you keep reverting the article to your version without caring about consensus, you will be reported for disrupting Wikipedia. This article is about a term whose definition is ambiguous, we don't have a consensus on adding a map yet. --Matt Smith (talk) 09:27, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * In order to protect my account from spurious claims of edit warring, I must totally disengage from this discussion. Geographyinitiative (talk) 09:31, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Please desist from defaming an editor whose opinion is different from yours. --Matt Smith (talk) 09:36, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

I don't think "Greater China" is truly a term that is solely used to describe a broader cultural region. The reason? Well, this article exists — East Asian cultural sphere (Sinosphere). In fact, the real "Chinese cultural sphere" includes not only China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau but also Japan, N/S Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, etc. So, what is "Greater China", in actuality? It is simply the irredentist claims of either the PRC or the ROC based on the historical territory of the Qing dynasty (though, there are differences between the two claims since the PRC has renounced Outer Mongolia, Outer Manchuria, and various minor territories, whereas the ROC hasn't). All territories within Greater China were once part of the Qing dynasty or were claimed by the Qing dynasty with little opposition at the time (such as eastern Taiwan). If various individuals want to evoke a sense of a "Chinese cultural sphere", then the term "Sinosphere" is probably much more appropriate to use than "Greater China". "Greater China" is an irredentist term referring strictly to territorial sovereignty, whereas "Sinosphere" refers to China's historical, social, cultural, political, military, economic, etc. sphere of influence. Jargo Nautilus (talk) 11:29, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

WP:Lead
Thanks User:LiuJiageng's concern.

WP:LEAD:It should be written in a clear, accessible style with a WP:neutral point of view.

Clearly, current lead written by User:LiuJiageng from China doesn't meet standards of WP:LEAD and WP:NPOV. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Reciprocater (talk • contribs) 07:13, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

Would you mind elaborating on what you see as "clearly"? A term exists for what it is used to mean. --LiuJiageng (talk) 07:26, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

 * A term exists for what it is used to mean. I strive to make sure every contentious articles meets WP:V especially WP:RS:"Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published sources, making sure that all majority and significant minority views that have appeared in those sources are covered (see Wikipedia:Neutral point of view)." --Reciprocater (Talk)  07:30, 5 April 2020 (UTC)
 * WP:LEAD: The lead serves as an introduction to the article and a summary of its most important contents. "Greater China" is a term, so its most important contents is what it means: "a word or expression that has a precise meaning," not who described it.

The current lead, which says the term is "firstly described by some Chinese scholars" (in 2016) runs exactly the opposite to the History part that reads "The English term subsequently re-emerged in the 1980s"--LiuJiageng (talk) 07:32, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

The part on Taiwan
The island of Taiwan is under the effective jurisdiction of the Republic of China, which officially claims to be the sole legitimate government of the entire China according to its constitution. As such, the phrasing “it gives the impression that Taiwan is part of China” is problematic and awkward. I propose two ways to improve this statement: either change “China” to the “People’s Republic of China”, or to explain the phenomenon that is Taiwanese nationalism that some islanders who do not identify with the ruling Republic of China support. This issue is about political orientation that extends beyond the mere divide of islanders and mainlanders in Taiwan. Morrisonjohn022 (talk) 17:22, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

 * Well, this Constitution was imposed on Taiwanese after 1949 by authoritarian government. People have been forced to accept that. It's not really a Constitution born through a domocratic process. --Reciprocater (Talk) 17:29, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

A constitution need not be born through democratic process to be legally valid. The fact is that Taiwan is under the rule of the Republic of China since 1945, and the expression “it gives the impression that Taiwan is part of China” is problematic from the official/constitutional point of view of the Republic of China. Again, whether or not a constitution is adopted through democratic procedures has nothing to do with its legality. Morrisonjohn022 (talk) 17:36, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

 * Yes, what you say makes sense. I appreciate your insight. But I think the expression “it gives the impression that Taiwan is part of China” is in line with WP:OR. --Reciprocater (Talk) 17:40, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

Adding on to my point, explaining the Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan independence movement does not violate the WP:NPOV policy. In fact, I’m quite sure it provides essential information to the debate regarding why some Taiwanese do not identify with their government, the Republic of China, or why they do not consider Taiwan a part of Greater China. Simply stating “gives the impression that Taiwan is a part of China” is factually inaccurate (according to ROC constitution) and misleading for an encyclopaedic entry. Morrisonjohn022 (talk) 17:43, 5 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Thank you. Whereas WP:NPOV is bound with WP:Verification. You may wish to find some WP:Reliable sources that focus on Greater China that also directly support your points. Thank you! --Reciprocater (Talk)  17:47, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

Non-NPOV?
Perhaps you may wish to restore an earlier version supported by the WP:Consensus? Also, may you explain your edit summary that says "non-WP:NPOV" ? I appreciate your time and consideration. --Reciprocater (Talk) 04:22, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * My reading of this talk page so far lead me to conclude there is no definitive consensus for or against your additions, so I chose by default to restore the last revision before them. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 04:38, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Silence_and_consensus, there did have consensus. --Reciprocater (Talk) 04:49, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * WP:IMPLICITCONSENSUS: "Except in cases affected by content policies or guidelines, most disputes over content may be resolved through minor changes rather than taking an all-or-nothing position. " Therefore, may you consider again to revert your latest edit on this article to reflect the consensus which would be a better dispute resolution, please? I appreciate you taking time to take part in the discussion! --Reciprocater (Talk) 04:54, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Actually, was voicing concerns on your Taiwan additions as late as yesterday. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 04:56, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * As I said, Talk_page_guidelines: "There is reasonable allowance for speculation, suggestion, and personal knowledge on talk pages, with a view to prompting further investigation, but it is usually a misuse of a talk page to continue to argue any point that has not met policy requirements. " So I assumed Morrisonjohn022 good faith at best. So could you please restore the article to the earlier version? --Reciprocater (Talk)  05:08, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * This was phrased so poorly that I did not understand any of it. You did not address his concern, and resumed inserting the exact language that he cautioned against. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 21:32, 6 April 2020 (UTC)
 * WP:OR and I already explained to the respected good faith editor above. Regards. --Reciprocater (Talk)  05:38, 7 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I was not explicit enough...You restored some Taiwanese don't believe themselves to be a part of greater China as it gives impression that Taiwan is part of China (it isn't even in the amcham.com.tw source I read), when explained why that is terrible phrasing here. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 16:06, 7 April 2020 (UTC)
 * This is Morrisonjohn's version: "However, some Taiwanese do not consider themselves to be a part of Greater China due to the rise of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan independence movement." The problem of this version is that it assume Taiwanese originally identified themselves as Chinese at the early age, which is not accurate. --Reciprocater (Talk) 16:20, 7 April 2020 (UTC)
 * No, that is not the intent of Morrisonjohn's formulation and there is no such logical implication. Your typification "originally identified themselves as Chinese at the early age" literally implies they have both 1) heard of the term "Greater China" at an early age 2) and either supported the term or identified as Chinese in the sense of 中國人 at an early age . There is no WP:RS so far that has demonstrated both 1) and 2).
 * There is another group which you overlooked, but will not explain for now unless asked. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 16:37, 7 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Well, are you Morrisonjohn?--Reciprocater (Talk) 16:43, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

Sorry, that isn't convincing, as you inserted your own (illogical) interpretation of Morrisonjohn's formulation above. Caradhras Aiguo ( leave language ) 16:48, 7 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Furthermore, originally identified themselves as Chinese at the early age" doesn't show up in the article. Why're you asking me to provide WP:RS to support my phrasing in the talk page for communication purpose? --Reciprocater (Talk)
 * as you inserted your own (illogical) interpretation of Morrisonjohn's formulation above. Well, Morrisonjohn didn't say that... --Reciprocater (Talk) 16:53, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

As what CaradhrasAiguo has mentioned, the interpretation of my edit by Reciprocater is not in line with my intent. I believe the phrasing I used in my edit does not convey the ideas as interpreted by Reciprocater. Morrisonjohn022 (talk) 06:21, 8 April 2020 (UTC)

The correct Chinese translation of the phrase Greater China
I noticed that someone is confused about the Chinese translation of the phrase Greater China. The word "China" here should be translated as "中华" (Zhōng Huá, imply cultural China) instead of "中国" (Zhōng Guó, imply physical China). A similar example is the phrase "Chinese Taipei", the correct Chinese translation is "中华台北" (Zhōng Huá Tái Běi), not "中国台北" (Zhōng Guó Tái Běi), the latter version would imply that Taiwan is a part of China. So, the correct Chinese translation of "Greater China" should be "大中华" (Dà Zhōng Huá), not "大中国" (Dà Zhōng Guó, literally "Bigger China"). I have never seen an English or Chinese article written about "Bigger China" or "大中国" (Dà Zhōng Guó), it is either China or Greater China. If you google "Greater China", all the articles will refer the phrase to "大中华" (Dà Zhōng Huá) instead of "大中国" (Dà Zhōng Guó).

I hope I've explained this translation problem clearly. 2001:8003:9008:1301:780A:CF5:F4B:EC87 (talk) 08:38, 8 April 2020 (UTC)

 * No, I don't know what are you talking about? I am sorry, but I am not bilingual proficiency neither Wikipedia is a language forum. --Reciprocater (Talk) 09:02, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * By the way, I don't think your explanation really help foreigners distinguish between "China" here should be translated as "中华" (Zhōng Huá, imply cultural China) instead of "中国" (Zhōng Guó, imply physical China).. --Reciprocater (Talk)  09:05, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Chinese Taipei literally refers to "Taipei of China". Using different domestic translation to convince Taiwanese of their difference is controversial. From a foreigner standpoint, they're the same because they all read "China". --Reciprocater (Talk)  09:09, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * When one thinks of China, one will link to China and Chinese which are not representative of Taiwan chiefly composed of Han people who migrated to the Formosa in 16th century by the time China is not even established yet. --Reciprocater (Talk)  09:17, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I am a Chinese Singaporean here, let's ignore Taiwan for awhile since Greater China is more than just Taiwan. What the IP editor says essentially is correct. "Greater China" is a concept that the Chinese culture being more dominant in locations/regions/countries outside China as noted in the article here. Hence, using the more cultural term, 大中华, would be more appropriate than 大中国 as the latter may denote that China has significant political and/or economic control over the said locations/regions/countries. As for Google Translate, it is known to make mistakes as Google Translate relies on user inputs to correct machine generated translations which are usually transliterations. In some sense, Google Translate is not WP:RS, since it depends on user inputs and that's why even when we translate articles from sister wikis to English wiki here, we don't accept machine translations most of the time (I have done 2-way translations for EN-ZH, and one-way from FR to EN. I use machine translated sentences as tool to write the final content in the targeted language). There are thesis and dissertations out there will the term mentioned in both English and Chinese (i.e., the title here: Tourism Demand Modeling and Forecasting: A Review of Literature Related to Greater China 旅游需求建模与预测—关于大中华区的文献述评, with the bold words/characters my emphasis for you to pick out the translation). I hope this helps.robertsky (talk) 12:29, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I am sorry but the source you provided here might not be an independent, secondary reliable sources because it's grouped under Original Articles. --Reciprocater (Talk) 16:07, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Taylor & Francis Online peer review every paper submitted in this journal, even if it is an "original article". I suppose that qualifies it for WP:RS. See https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?show=instructions&journalCode=wctr20#peers. (Did you even check on entry requirement for the journal?) Take it to WP:RSN if you want to discuss on the reputability of the journal and/or paper. robertsky (talk) 18:10, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Hi, Lancet also reviews every primary research they publish. So it's about the property of the source itself.--Reciprocater (Talk) 18:17, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * "Original article" is simply a type of research paper that journals generally accept. From Springer:
 * "This is the most common type of journal manuscript used to publish full reports of data from research. It may be called an Original Article, Research Article, Research, or just Article, depending on the journal. The Original Research format is suitable for many different fields and different types of studies. It includes full Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion sections."
 * (source: https://www.springer.com/gp/authors-editors/authorandreviewertutorials/writing-a-journal-manuscript/types-of-journal-articles/10285504)
 * By your logic, we would be invalidating a lot of cited sources, be it from Taylor & Francis, Springer or Lancet throughout Wikipedia. robertsky (talk) 18:21, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * How to tell if it is a secondary source? Reciprocater (Talk) 18:25, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I suggest that you read up on No_original_research. It contains the answers you seek. You are rather new here, aren't you? robertsky (talk) 18:40, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Hey, anyway, I was just concerned about the fact that foreigners can't distinguish 大中华 from 大中国. I was just curious about the reliablility of your source but I am not doubting that some people translate greater China to 大中华.  I just hope the article can help readers to distinguish 大中华 from 大中国 and reflect their difference in spite of the identical phrasing. Cheers. Reciprocater (Talk)  18:35, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Thank you for projecting your concerns for the foreigners? 1. If the foreigners have an issue, they can always ask in the Talk page. Unfortunately, an IP editor, and a few other editors here have to explain to you the imaginary foreigners here. 2. We can always point readers to the Chinese wikipedia article, which is listed in the sidebar under Languages for the same effect actually: 大中華. robertsky (talk) 18:50, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * , If the foreigners have an issue, they can always ask in the Talk page. This is not the purpose of Talk page. We can always point readers to the Chinese wikipedia article, foreigners can't read Chinese. Reciprocater (Talk) 18:53, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * The purpose of the talk page is to iron out any issues such as your misunderstanding of the term (as perceived by, IP editor, and myself honestly), which indirectly clarifies which Chinese term to use. And like you say foreigners can't read Chinese. Why are you so hard up on 大中华 vs 大中国 then? From the conversation here, it is clear that you have understood the differences. As for why the general preferences for one term over another, this is something that should be examined by, preferably a language scholar in a published paper. Until then, I suggest refraining including anything about the preference in the main article as it would construe as WP:OR. robertsky (talk) 19:11, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I think your misunderstanding of Greater China has caused many problem on your version of this article. You said that " In recent era, this term is often employed by those who are determined to push forward the reunification of China and Taiwan by advocating the 'superiority of Chinese culture'". However, Google has a position called "managing director of Greater China sales and operations", translated as "大中华区总裁" . IBM has a position called "chief of Greater China Group" , translated as "大中华区总裁" . Microsoft has a position called "Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Microsoft Greater China Region" , translated as "大中华区CEO" . Apple has a position called "Vice President and Managing Director of Greater China" , translated as "大中华区董事总经理" . Are you sure that Google, Microsoft, Apple, IBM are all determined to push forward the reunification of China and Taiwan? In my understanding, "Greater China" is the geographic area that shares commercial and cultural ties to the Han Chinese. I believe in that this definition is the definition used by Google, Microsoft, Apple, IBM and other multinational corporations because it was translated by them into the cultural China "大中华" rather than the country China "大中国". PE fans (talk) 13:53, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Please don't bully the newbies for fun. I fully agree with what the IP editor said about the proper translation of Greater China. First of all, Taiwan has accepted both Chinese Taipei (English) and "中华台北" (Chinese, pinyin: Zhōng Huá Tái Běi) as a compromised term to use in international events (because China oppose heavily against anyone using the word Taiwan to represent the island nation internationally). In fact, when the representatives from China and Taiwan met and negotiated about the acceptable term for Taiwan to use internationally, both parties agreed on the use of the English term Chinese Taipei quite smoothly, but there was a big clash over which Chinese term should be used. China initially proposed "中国台北" (Zhōng Guó Tái Běi), Taiwan opposed heavily about the use of this term because they believe that it will imply that Taiwan is a part of China politically. After few rounds of tough negotiation, in the end, both parties agreed to use the term "中华台北" (Zhōng Huá Tái Běi) instead, both Chinese terms will translate to Chinese Taipei in English but the second term implies that Taiwan is related to China culturally rather than politically. The phrase Greater China is also a cultural term, therefore, the cultural China "大中华" should be used instead of the political China "大中国".
 * Furthermore, I wonder why you have inserted Bigger China into the article? Bigger China is a very weird word to use, both in English and Chinese. If you google Bigger China you will only get one result: your version of this Wikipedia article. Kenwick (talk) 14:53, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * WP:AGF and WP:FORUM. I have stated that it's literally bigger China. --Reciprocater (Talk)  16:50, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Conversely, one can also say it is original research. robertsky (talk) 18:10, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Well, the rationale behind my original edit was on the premise of WP:Common knowledge.--Reciprocater (Talk) 18:24, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I don't see how this fits WP:Common knowledge. Please enlighten us. 's argument, at face level, supports the assertion that 'bigger China' is original research. robertsky (talk) 18:30, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * , The literal meaning of "greater" encompasses "stronger, outstanding" while "big" generally refers to the geographic fact without any underlying advocacy. Reciprocater (Talk)  18:39, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * that's your interpretation, based on geographical understanding unfortunately, this is a cultural topic. which your understanding would be interpreted as original research. robertsky (talk) 18:42, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * , We should assume readers don't have any cultural background related to China. Reciprocater (Talk) 18:46, 12 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I checked the three sources you cited in support of your sentence "However, many Taiwanese don't believe themselves to be a part of greater China as it gives impression that Taiwan is part of China". I saw the following sentences: "Mixing business and politics is risky", "Integration of national economies and polities is a tricky business", "However, it is striking to observe that this apolitical framework has gradually been embedded in a more political sense, under circumstances that hint at the unification of these places". Therefore, according to the sources you provided, many Taiwanese don't reject of the idea of apolitical framework "Greater China", but reject the usage of this term in a more political sense. PE fans (talk) 15:20, 8 April 2020 (UTC)
 * The guy named Reciprocater is an infamous troll, he is now blocked indefinitely: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_investigations/It%27s_gonna_be_awesome&diff=prev&oldid=950873063 2001:8003:9008:1301:B9F6:33CE:1491:37AB (talk) 17:25, 15 April 2020 (UTC)

Reciprocater's edits
I agree with some of Reciprocater's edits, e.g. changing the reference from news report to academic research. I think it deserves talking about putting them back.--LiuJiageng (talk) 19:57, 15 April 2020 (UTC)
 * Reciprocater is a troll, but for some weird reasons AnomieBOT just reverted everything to a much earlier version, some of the edits weren't done by Reciprocater at all (we should never rely on the bots). I think we should revert to the last accepted version and manually edit the article if deemed necessary. 2001:8003:9008:1301:ED94:8653:DE31:73A1 (talk) 14:05, 16 April 2020 (UTC)
 * It wasn't a bot, but who did it. I would rather work from when  did not work on the article and pick the non-controversial edits instead. The last few versions was honestly mutilated in my opinion, and I was already tempted to rework the article back to closer to the version before Reciprocater started on this article. See also: Dealing_with_sock_puppets robertsky (talk) 14:30, 16 April 2020 (UTC)

Greater China Map Image

Of course it will be contentious what images represent Greater China. But we need something, and we need something representative of views of the relevant parties involved. The Wuqiu monument to Chiang Kai-shek has two maps of an ROC conception of Greater China that include Taiwan and Hainan, islands not included on the English language black and white map already on this page. I once tried to make a gallery of images on this page of the Greater China concept, but it was removed. Yeah it's a contentious topic by its very nature, but it's odd not to show any maps or even artistic depictions of any Greater China concept here. Geographyinitiative (talk) 17:56, 31 October 2020 (UTC)
 * If I remember the comments you made, I think you once said that this image had some kind of problem. I am of the opinion that an artistic depiction of Mao Tse-tung in front of a map of Greater China (presumably minus Mongolia?) would be equally relevant here. Anyway, I guess you think this image isn't good enough because there's no Singapore. Do we need an image with Sakhalin too? I ask you, is there only one conception of Greater China? Isn't this map a legitimate artistic depiction of one understanding of Greater China on some level, minus the islands not actually controlled by Taiwan or the PRC? Geographyinitiative (talk) 18:08, 31 October 2020 (UTC)
 * What definition of Greater China are you taking here? In my opinion, since there are at least four definitions of Greater China, there should be multiple images used to depict these different definitions. [1. Claimed territory of the PRC; 2. Claimed territory of the ROC; 3. Countries with Chinese ethnic majorities, i.e. Greater China + Singapore; 4. Chinese sphere of influence, i.e. Chinese-majority countries + Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, etc.] The fourth definition seems to already be loosely covered by the article "East Asian cultural sphere". Singapore is not part of China's claimed territory, whether the PRC or the ROC, but it's the only other country in the world aside from PRC, ROC (Taiwan), Hong Kong and Macau with a Chinese ethnic majority. Jargo Nautilus (talk) 19:54, 31 October 2020 (UTC)
 * Your definitions are incorrect. Greater China only includes mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (i.e. areas under the administration of either the PRC or the ROC). Southeast Asian countries with a significant Chinese population, including Singapore, the only other country in the world aside from those areas administered by the PRC or the ROC with a Chinese ethnic majority (other notable examples include Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia) and other Asian countries under significant influence of Chinese culture (i.e. Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam) are part of the Sinosphere, not Greater China. I was the Sales Director for Greater China of a Western company and the area under my responsibility only included mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 2001:8003:9008:1301:91FF:190E:A800:1B4D (talk) 06:05, 7 December 2021 (UTC)
 * That image is a bad example. The map is partially covered by other off-topic objects, so readers can't really see the whole map. And the purpose of the image itself is intended to be used as an example of the landmark of a small groups of islands (its file name is "烏坵嶼地標", which means "Landmark of the Wuqiu Islands") rather than an example of the map of China or "Greater China" at all. --Matt Smith (talk) 01:21, 1 November 2020 (UTC)
 * The maps (there are two, not just the one you are talking about- look "up" in the image) are an artistic representation of Greater China in a mural and are not meant to be scientifically accurate. This is an example of how the concept is portrayed or understood in some parts of Taiwan culture. There's no reason to exclude artistic representations just because one of the maps is sightly obstructed. The point is is that the maps of a Greater China concept are connected with patriotic or nationalistic feeling in this memorial and, regardless of the obstruction, you can clearly see what Greater China is being represented as in these two maps. Just because it's called 烏坵嶼地標 doesn't mean these aren't relevant to this page. Geographyinitiative (talk) 11:13, 1 November 2020 (UTC)
 * This article is not for including an off-topic image such as "territories claimed by the Republic of China" which even has some important parts of the territories obstructed. --Matt Smith (talk) 03:02, 2 November 2020 (UTC)
 * There are two maps in the image. One is not obstructed. The territories claimed by the Republic of China is one of the conceptions of Greater China, otherwise the other image on this page shouldn't be here. Geographyinitiative (talk) 14:54, 7 November 2020 (UTC)
 * We are not talking about the other image. We are talking about the first one, which is off-topic and is a bad example because it has some important parts of the territories obstructed. --Matt Smith (talk) 08:36, 8 November 2020 (UTC)
 * There are two maps in the image we are discussing- one on the wall, and then one above it, on the globe. Geographyinitiative (talk) 18:42, 11 November 2020 (UTC)
 * Do you expect all readers to also notice that small one? Also, the ROC has abandoned its claim over Outer Mongolia since 2012 so the maps are no longer accurate. --Matt Smith (talk) 03:05, 12 November 2020 (UTC)
 * You wrote: "Also, the ROC has abandoned its claim over Outer Mongolia since 2012 so the maps are no longer accurate." Okay, that could be a great point. It's unclear if they can actually drop the claim according to the Constitution, but yeah. Anyway- do we need to ignore their claims before that point? Answer: No. In fact, the historical conception is pretty important to this page. Geographyinitiative (talk) 11:22, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
 * No. It's not an accurate claim and is also off-topic. I disagree with using that image in the article. --Matt Smith (talk) 13:37, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
 * All of you are making too much fuss about these, you may present any map with proper explanation, if the issue has history (of course it should not just present today claims, etc.).(KIENGIR (talk) 01:29, 13 November 2020 (UTC))

The term can be generalized to encompass "linkages among regional Chinese communities"?

 * The article links to some nationalistic references, which use the argument that if there is a significant "Chinese community" in a foreign country then the whole country counts as part of "Greater China". This is very nationalistic usage of the term. For example, there are big communities of people of British ancestry in the United States, Australia and Canada. However, the United Kingdom does not count the USA as "Greater Britain" since it is a sovereign republic and most of those US citizens see themselves as American. Secondly, those areas were not ruled by any dynasty in China proper. Artanisen (talk) 19:23, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Unless you have WP:RS which say otherwise those "nationalistic references" are what we've got. Horse Eye's Back (talk) 19:32, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Those "nationalistic references" that are used in the article does not make it a generally accepted nor proper usage of the term. - Artanisen (talk) 19:48, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * They look like top tier academic WP:RS to me, you calling them nationalistic does not change that. Horse Eye's Back (talk) 19:49, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Top tier "nationalistic" academics do exist. Such as the Nine-dash line in the South China sea dispute. "top tier" academics published research papers about it, but that doesn't justify the imperialistic land grabs. The term "Greater" with countries generally means places that are or were occupied/colonized. "Proper" is the core area of a country. -Artanisen (talk) 19:55, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * These academics don't appear to be nationalists at all. Horse Eye's Back (talk) 21:19, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Cyclicity in History?
 * PIN - Figura's Joi . With the so - called Pin - Figures.
 * Political leadership of the People's Democratic Republic of China.PIN FiguraNr.234567890 (talk) 14:54, 6 September 2022 (UTC)

title: Talk:Greater China


text:
William C. Potter

William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Founding Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS). He also directs the MIIS Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Dr. Potter is the author, editor, or co-editor of over 20 books and has authored more than 125 articles and book chapters, including in Arms Control Today, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Organization, International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Problems of Communism, Slavic Review, Survival, and the Washington Quarterly. He has served as a consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the RAND Corporation, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. He has been a member of several committees of the National Academy of Sciences and currently serves on the National Academy of Sciences Nonproliferation Panel.

His present research focuses on nuclear terrorism and proliferation issues involving the post-Soviet states. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and served for five years on the United Nations' Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Board of Trustees of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. He currently serves on the International Advisory Board of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (Moscow). He was an advisor to the delegation of Kyrgyzstan to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and to the 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007 sessions of the NPT Preparatory Committee, as well as to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences. Dr. Potter has also participated as a delegate at every NPT Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meeting since 1995.

In 2019, Dr. Potter was elected as a Foreign Member to the Russian Academy of Sciences. Dr. Potter is one of a limited number of non-Russian nationals honored by the Academy, and only the second American—after Henry Kissinger in 2016—ever elected to the RAS Global Issues and International Relations Section.

Works

 * (ed.) Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception (1980)
 * Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (1982)
 * (co-edited) Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (1984)
 * (ed.) Verification and Arms Control (1985)
 * (co-edited) The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation (1985)
 * (co-edited) Continuity and Change in Soviet-East European Relations (1989)
 * Soviet Decisionmaking for Chernobyl: An Analysis of System Performance and Policy Change (1990)
 * (ed.) International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation (1990)
 * Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States (1993)
 * (co-edited) International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (1994)
 * (co-edited) Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (1997)
 * (co-edited) Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States (1999)
 * Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (2000)
 * (as co-author) The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)
 * (co-edited) Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament (2009)
 * (co-edited) The Global Politics of Combating Nuclear Terrorism: A Supply Side Approach (2009)
 * (co-edited) Forecasting Nuclear Nonproliferation in the 21st Century (2 volumes, 2010)
 * (co-edited) The Global Politics of Combating Nuclear Terrorism (2010)
 * Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism (2012)
 * (co-edited) Preventing Black-Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (2018)
 * (co-edited) Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (2018)

title: William C. Potter


text:
Road rage

Road rage is aggressive or angry behavior exhibited by motorists. These behaviors include rude and verbal insults, yelling, physical threats or dangerous driving methods targeted at other drivers, pedestrians or cyclists in an effort to intimidate or release frustration. Road rage can lead to altercations, damage to property, assaults, and collisions that result in serious physical injuries or even death. Strategies include (but are not limited to) cutting motorists off, inappropriate honking, using obscene gestures, flipping off another driver, swerving, tailgating, brake checking, and attempting to fight.

According to a study by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety that examined police records nationally, there were more than 1,250 incidents of road rage on average reported per year between 19901996 in the United States. Many of these incidents have ended with serious injuries or fatalities. These rates rose yearly throughout the six years of the study. A number of studies have found that individuals with road rage are predominantly young (33 years old on average) and 96.6% male.

Legal status
In some jurisdictions, there can be a legal difference between "road rage" and "aggressive driving". In the U.S., only a few states have enacted special aggressive driving laws, where road rage cases are normally prosecuted as assault and battery (with or without a vehicle), or as vehicular homicide.

The legal definition of road rage encompasses a group of behaviors expressed while driving, or stemming from traffic-related incidents. The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration defines road rage as when "[t]he operation of a motor vehicle in a manner that endangers or is likely to endanger persons or property." This definition makes the distinction that aggressive driving is a traffic violation and that road rage is a criminal offense.

Types
Road rage can include:
 * Shouting, excessive use of a horn or obscene gestures and threats.
 * Actions such as cutting off another vehicle, driving closely, blocking another vehicle so that it can not use a traffic lane, brake checking, chasing another vehicle or running it off the road, or deliberately slamming into a vehicle.
 * Stopping a vehicle on the side or in the middle of the road, exiting the vehicle to threaten, attack, fight, or injure another motorist, passenger, pedestrian, bicyclist, or any other person.

Effects on drivers

A stressed driver's behavior depends on that driver's coping abilities. Generally, drivers who score high on aggression tests use direct confrontation strategies when faced with stress while driving. Many drivers who experience road rage have admitted that they believe they commit more traffic violations. Driving presents many stresses because of high speeds and the actions of other drivers. As stress increases, the likelihood of a person exhibiting road rage increases dramatically. Typically, younger males are most susceptible to road rage. Most reported cases of road rage occur because of cutting in and out of traffic, lane changes, disputes over parking spots or rude gestures. A report found that 6.8% of road rage incidents result in death.

According to one study, people who customize their cars with stickers and other adornments are more prone to road rage. In the study, the number of territory markers predicted road rage better than did vehicle value or condition. Only the number of bumper stickers, not their content, predicted road rage.

Common targets of road rage are driving instructors and learner drivers; as these road users tend to follow road regulations very closely, with learners prone to making more mistakes, they are often antagonized by aggressive drivers. In 2019, a survey by British insurance provider Young Marmalade found that 77% of driving instructors face regular abuse and intimidation from other road users while teaching students, and that 8% of learner drivers have abandoned learning to drive as a result of road rage they have experienced.

Road rage is not an official mental disorder recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). However, according to an article published by the Associated Press in June 2006, the behaviors typically associated with road rage can be the result of a disorder known as intermittent explosive disorder that is recognized in the DSM. This conclusion was drawn from surveys of 9,200 adults in the United States between 2001 and 2003. The surveys were funded by the National Institute of Mental Health.

Penalties
Road rage is a potentially serious act, and it may be seen as an endangerment of public safety. However, it is not always possible to judge intent by observation, so "road ragers" who are stopped by police may be charged with other offenses such as careless or reckless driving, or may be fined or arrested. Some consider road ragers to be criminals.

Australia
In New South Wales, Australia, road rage is considered an extremely serious act. Any person who "engages in a course of conduct that causes or threatens an impact involving the other vehicle" while intending to cause a person bodily harm can be charged with predatory driving, a serious offense that can send the culprit to jail for up to five years. Offenders can also be fined A$100,000 and disqualified from driving, regardless of intent to physically harm the victim. If the predatory driving results in physical assault or harm, and/or the victim's car is intentionally damaged, penalties can be much more severe.

Most common-law countries prohibit common assault, which could apply to road rage in which the personal safety of the victim is seen to be threatened. The common law regards assault as both a criminal and civil matter, leading to both public criminal penalties and private civil liabilities.

Germany
Road rage, insults, and rude gestures in traffic can lead to fines and prison sentences for drivers who shout insults or make offensive gestures while driving.

New Zealand
In New Zealand, road rage in itself is not an offense, but drivers are usually charged with other offences committed during an act of road rage (usually assault or unlawful possession of an offensive weapon). Drivers have a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid endangerment of human life when operating a vehicle (s 156 Crimes Act 1961); failure to discharge this duty, such as an act of aggressive driving, can give rise to liability in criminal nuisance (s 146 Crimes Act 1961). Ramming a vehicle constitutes intentional or reckless damage to property, a criminal offense, with a maximum penalty of seven years of imprisonment (s 269 Crimes Act 1961). New Zealand courts currently have no powers to disqualify drivers who physically assault another road user.

Singapore
Road rage is a crime in Singapore. Offenders found guilty of road rage may be liable to an imprisonment term of up to two years and / or a fine of up to $5,000 for causing damage.

United Kingdom
In the UK, road rage can result in criminal penalties for assault or more serious offenses against the person. The Public Order Act 1986 can also apply to road rage. Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act prohibit public acts likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. Section 4 also prohibits threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior with intent to cause a victim to believe that violence will be used against himself or another.

United States
In some jurisdictions, such as the Commonwealth of Virginia, it is easier to prosecute road rage as reckless driving instead of aggressive driving simply because the burden of proof does not require intent to successfully convict.

It is likely that those causing serious injury or death during road-rage incidents will suffer more serious penalties than those applicable to similar outcomes from simple negligence. In April 2007, a Colorado driver was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms for causing the deaths of two motorists in November 2005.

Fourteen U.S. states have passed laws against aggressive driving. Only one state, California, has turned "road rage" into a legal term of art by giving it a particular meaning. In Virginia, aggressive driving is punished as a lesser crime (Class 2 misdemeanor) than is reckless driving (Class 1 misdemeanor).

United Kingdom
In the UK, most aggressive driving occurs in the East Riding of Yorkshire, while the least occurs in Durham, according to 2022 surveys.

United States
A 2007 study of the largest U.S. metropolitan areas concluded that the cities with the least courteous drivers (most road rage) are Miami, Phoenix, New York, Los Angeles and Boston. The cities with the most courteous drivers (least road rage) are Minneapolis, Nashville, St. Louis, Seattle and Atlanta. In a 2009 AutoVantage survey, New York, Dallas/Fort Worth, Detroit, Atlanta and Minneapolis/St. Paul were rated the top five American cities for road rage.

According to the Texas Department of Transportation, there were 2,510 road rage-related accidents in Texas in 2022, with the largest number occurring in the cities of San Antonio and Houston. The cities with the highest per capita rates were Midlothian, San Antonio and New Braunfels.

General sources

 * Controlling Road Rage: A Literature Review and Pilot Study Prepared for The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety By Daniel B. Rathbone, Ph.D. Jorg C. Huckabee, MSCE June 9, 1999
 * Road Rage: Causes and Dangers of Aggressive Driving (transcript of a portion of the official hearing record of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure – 1997)
 * Summary Table on Aggressive Driving Laws, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
 * Survey of the States – Speeding, Governors Highway Safety Association

title: Road rage


text:
Iain Dowie

Iain Dowie (born 9 January 1965) is a football manager, former professional footballer and sports television pundit.

He played as a striker from 1983 until 2001, notably in the Premier League for Southampton, Crystal Palace and West Ham United. He earned 59 caps for Northern Ireland, scoring 12 goals. He also played in the Football League for Luton Town, Fulham and Queens Park Rangers, and in Non-league for Cheshunt, St Albans City and Hendon.

After retiring from playing he went on to manage Oldham Athletic, Crystal Palace, Charlton Athletic, Coventry City, Queens Park Rangers before joining Hull City in a football management consultant. He has since worked as a pundit largely for Sky Sports.

Club career
Born in Hatfield, Hertfordshire, Dowie was rejected by Southampton aged 16 and later went to the University of Hertfordshire to study for a MEng degree in engineering. On completion he became an employee of British Aerospace, whilst keeping up football at non-League level playing for Cheshunt alongside his brother Bob. He left Cheshunt to improve his fitness and signed for St Albans City, then moved on to Hendon. While playing for Hendon, Dowie was spotted by Luton Town who signed him in the 1988–89 season, when they were in the First Division. An old-fashioned centre-forward, he then moved in quick succession to Fulham (a brief loan spell), before establishing himself as a first team player in the 1989–90 season when his eight goals in 29 league games helped Luton finish seventeenth.

On 22 March 1991, with Luton still in the First Division and Dowie still a first team regular with seven goals from 29 games that season, Dowie agreed to join Second Division promotion chasers West Ham United for a fee of £480,000. He proved himself to be a competent deputy for the injured Trevor Morley as his four goals in the final 12 league games of the season secured the team's promotion as Second Division runners-up. But when the 1991–92 season began, Morley had returned to fitness and Dowie found himself on the sidelines until his £500,000 move to Southampton on 3 September 1991 after less than six months at Upton Park.

He played alongside Alan Shearer and Matthew Le Tissier – two of the country's highest regarded strikers in the early 1990s – and scored nine goals in 30 league games to ensure that the team finished high enough for a place in the newly formed FA Premier League. His good form continued in the 1992–93 season, despite the loss of Shearer, as he scored 11 league goals. His tally dropped to five goals in 39 games during the 1993–94 season, though the club avoided relegation again, and he managed another five goals from 17 league games in the 1994–95 season before manager Alan Ball decided that he wanted younger partners for Le Tissier in attack, signing Gordon Watson and Neil Shipperley while dropping Craig Maskell and selling Dowie to Crystal Palace for £400,000 on 13 January 1995.

His spell at Palace was a frustrating one; he was cup-tied for the League Cup semi-finals against Liverpool, and Palace reached the FA Cup semi-finals where they lost to Manchester United after a replay. Lastly, despite a dynamic fightback after being three goals down to Newcastle United on the final day of the season, they still lost 3–2 and were relegated from the Premier League one season after promotion.

He then spent nearly three years back at West Ham. During his time back at West Ham, he came under fire from the supporters for going long periods without scoring at a time when the team were struggling for goals and had a crisis in attack. In fact, Dowie is probably best remembered by West Ham fans for scoring a bizarre headed own goal in an infamous defeat to Stockport County in the League Cup in front of the live Sky cameras at Edgeley Park. Dowie then moved across London to Queens Park Rangers (QPR), where he ended his days playing in defence, and being player-manager of QPR's reserve team. Dowie also had a brief spell as caretaker manager of QPR in the autumn of 1998, between the dismissal of Ray Harford and appointment of Gerry Francis.

International career
Dowie's father was born in Belfast, thus qualifying him to play for Northern Ireland, for whom Dowie gained 59 caps and scored 12 goals.

Oldham Athletic
After retirement from playing, Dowie then became assistant manager of Oldham Athletic. However, following the dismissal of manager Mick Wadsworth, Dowie became manager and led the club into the Second Division play-offs in the 2002–03 season after spending heavily. However, financial trouble hit Oldham and Dowie lost much of his first team squad. Funds were so hard for the club at the time that Dowie along with the remaining members of the squad were not paid for several months. Dowie tried to stick out the post for as long as possible until he decided to move on citing the need to support his family as a reason.

Crystal Palace
On 21 December 2003, Dowie was appointed manager of Crystal Palace, inheriting a squad with low morale and occupying 19th place in Division One. However, under his leadership, the club went on an impressive run that included 17 wins from 23 games after he took over, until the end of the season, enabling the club to finish in sixth place in the First Division, just scraping into the play-off places. This feat was attributed to complete change in the atmosphere and training regime at the club, including a tougher disciplinary regime, introduced by Dowie. After beating Sunderland in the semi-final, on a penalty shootout, the club beat Dowie's former club West Ham by a single goal in the Final for a place in the FA Premier League. Dowie's squad contained some promising footballers, including Andrew Johnson. Dowie made a couple of signings to the Crystal Palace squad: he signed goalkeeper Gabor Kiraly to challenge Julián Speroni for the number 1 top. Kiraly was first choice throughout the season. The club lasted only one season there, being relegated on the final day of the season when Charlton Athletic scored a late equaliser in a 2–2 draw.

He remained at Palace when the club was relegated to the Championship despite rumours that he was approached by other Premier League clubs to take over. The only actual report of a club approaching Palace to speak to Dowie was when Portsmouth chairman Milan Mandarić approached Palace chairman Simon Jordan to speak to Dowie, in November 2005. Jordan refused this approach, and for the meantime Dowie remained at Selhurst Park.

After losing the play-off semi final to eventual winners Watford, Dowie left Crystal Palace by "mutual consent" on 22 May 2006 following discussions with chairman Jordan. He had been allowed to leave without compensation being paid to Crystal Palace as he had wanted to be nearer to his family in Bolton. Jordan was infuriated when just eight days later, on 30 May 2006, Premier League club Charlton unveiled Dowie as their new manager.

Jordan then issued Dowie with a writ, claiming that he had misled him about his reasons for leaving Crystal Palace. Dowie, however, insisted this was not the case, and was publicly backed by both Charlton Chief Executive Peter Varney, who branded the writ "a sad and pathetic publicity stunt", and chairman Richard Murray, who was adamant that his legal team could find no grounds for the writ to be upheld, and suggested that there may be more personal reasons behind the writ being issued. The case was heard in the London High Court in the summer of 2007, and on 14 June The Hon. Mr Justice Tugendhat ruled that Dowie had "deceived" Jordan and made "false representations" in conversations with Crystal Palace on 20 and 22 May, stating he had had no contact with Charlton when he had in fact spoken to them on 17 and 22 May. Dowie was ordered to pay Palace's legal bill, estimated at up to £400,000 and a similar amount to his own legal team in addition to compensation due to Crystal Palace. In 2008 an out-of-court agreement between Dowie and Crystal Palace was reached "on terms acceptable to Crystal Palace Football Club".

Charlton Athletic
When Dowie took over at the Valley, he was given more money than any previous manager to spend on players. He signed Jimmy Floyd Hasselbaink, and Scott Carson on loan, but was unable to prevent the team suffering a disastrous start to the Premier League season. Despite this, the team reached the quarter-final of the League Cup for the first time in their history. However, Dowie was unable to lift the team away from the relegation zone of the Premier League and build on the success of former manager Alan Curbishley, resulting in him and the club parting company on 13 November 2006, after just 15 games in charge.

Soon after his departure from Charlton, in December 2006, he was linked with the vacant managers job at Hull City, but he turned down the position.

Coventry City
Dowie was unveiled as Coventry City manager on 19 February 2007. He found immediate success at the club with a number of wins but towards the end of the season their form dropped off and the Sky Blues finished 17th in the Championship table.

On 29 August, Dowie was linked with the vacant manager's position at Leicester City following the dismissal of Martin Allen. Coventry City dismissed claims that an approach was made and that any approach would be "firmly rebuffed". These rumours renewed again on 24 October when Gary Megson left Leicester to manage Bolton Wanderers. Dowie refused to comment on the speculation. On 11 February 2008, Dowie was released from his contract as Coventry manager, which was officially cited as being due to significant differences of opinion between the management team and the Board as to how the club should be going forward.

Queens Park Rangers
On 14 May 2008, Queens Park Rangers appointed Dowie as their new first team coach following the previous week's departure of Luigi de Canio. He was sacked as manager of QPR after just 15 games in charge on 24 October, with the team in ninth position in the league.

Newcastle United
On 1 April 2009, Newcastle United appointed Alan Shearer as manager until the end of the season, with Dowie being appointed to his coaching staff.

Hull City
Dowie was named as the temporary "Football Management Consultant" of Premier League team Hull City on 17 March 2010, after manager Phil Brown was placed on gardening leave. He was faced with the challenge of guiding the Yorkshire club to Premier League safety in order to secure them a third season in the top flight; however, the challenge was effectively ended on 24 April 2010 when Hull were beaten 1–0 at home by Sunderland and fellow relegation battlers West Ham United (a club that Dowie served twice as a player) won their game 3–2 against a Wigan Athletic side still faced with an outside chance of relegation. Hull City were relegated on 3 May 2010 after an injury time equaliser from Wigan Athletic's Steve Gohouri made their game 2–2, ending Hull's hopes of survival with one game to go.

Personal life
Dowie worked as a commentator for Sky Sports News.

His niece Natasha Dowie is an international footballer who played for Charlton Athletic Women while he was manager of the men's team. Dowie has two sons, Oliver and William. Dowie's brother, Bob, was a semi-professional footballer and manager and worked alongside Iain as Director of Football at Crystal Palace.

In March 2016, Dowie was employed as Regional Sales Manager for "Go To Surveys".

He coined the word 'bouncebackability' which entered the Oxford English Dictionary in 2005.

Dowie suffered a cardiac arrest in March 2024 during an exercise class in Chorley.

International goals
Scores and results list Northern Ireland's goal tally first.

Managerial

 * Updated 9 May 2010

As a player

 * Southampton
 * Full Members Cup finalist: 1992

Individual

 * Football League First Division Manager of the Month: Winner (January 2004 )

title: Iain Dowie


text:
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text:
Eden, Wisconsin (disambiguation)

Eden is the name of some places in the U.S. state of Wisconsin:
 * Eden, Wisconsin, a village
 * Eden (town), Fond du Lac County, Wisconsin, a town
 * Eden, Iowa County, Wisconsin, a town

title: Eden, Wisconsin (disambiguation)


text:
User talk:Immerc

Welcome to the Wikipedia
Here are some links I thought useful:

 * Tutorial
 * Help desk
 * Foundation issues
 * Policy Library
 * Utilities
 * Cite your sources
 * Verifiability
 * Wikiquette
 * Civility
 * Conflict resolution
 * Brilliant prose
 * Neutral point of view
 * Pages needing attention
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 * Village pump
 * Boilerplate text
 * IRC channel
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Feel free to ask me anything the links and talk pages don't answer. You can sign your name by typing 4 tildes, like this: ~.

Be Bold!

Sam [Spade] 18:32, 11 Aug 2004 (UTC)

title: User talk:Immerc


text:
The Vampire Armand

The Vampire Armand (1998) is a vampire novel by American writer Anne Rice, the sixth in her The Vampire Chronicles series.

Plot summary
With Lestat de Lioncourt still in slumber since Memnoch the Devil, the vampire coven is reunited around the "brat prince" and the vampire David Talbot asks Armand to tell his life story.

Born somewhere in the Kievan Rus in the late 15th century, Armand (at this time called Andrei) becomes an icon painter in a monastery. He is forcefully taken out of this life of prayer and devotion by slave traders, who transport him to Constantinople and then to a brothel in Venice. Soon after his arrival, he is purchased by the vampire Marius de Romanus, who names him Amadeo.

Marius lives the extravagant life of a respected Renaissance painter, and mentors many boys who serve as his apprentices. Marius provides them with education, shelter, and food, and he assists them in finding respectable positions once they are grown. Over time, Amadeo's relationship with Marius develops and they become much closer than Marius is with any of the other boys. In addition to developing a sexual relationship, Amadeo sleeps in Marius' bed, is privy to special privileges, and becomes something of a "head boy" in the household. Still, Marius maintains strict control over Amadeo, and expects industriousness from him in all things.

When Amadeo comes of age, Marius begins Amadeo's education in sexuality and coupling. He takes Amadeo to a brothel, where he remains for several days. Amadeo later visits a male brothel, and makes several observations about the difference in sexual activities with the different genders. There is a distinct bisexuality to Amadeo's nature, as he enjoys activity with either sex. He later has a brief affair with an Englishman called Lord Harlech, who develops an unrequited obsession with Amadeo. During this period, Amadeo befriends and ultimately seduces Bianca Solderini, a wealthy debutante and courtesan whose primary role in life seems to be to throw nightly parties.

Marius eventually divulges his vampire nature to Amadeo, who almost immediately begins asking to be turned. Marius shows Amadeo some of what it means to be immortal, and allows him to join him in the hunt on several occasions. He tells Amadeo that they must always focus on killing evildoers; they assist Bianca by murdering her kinsmen who have been forcing her to poison those from whom they have borrowed money.

Eventually, on a night when Marius is out of the country, Harlech breaks into Marius's palazzo and attacks Amadeo, murdering two apprentices in the process. Amadeo kills Harlech, but not before the Englishman wounds him with a poisoned sword. Amadeo falls critically ill, and over several days falls into fever and delusions. Upon returning and finding Amadeo on his deathbed, Marius heals Amadeo's external wounds, cleans and grooms him, then gives him the Dark Gift, turning him into a vampire.

Marius sets out to train Amadeo, retaining high expectations of him, and forces him to continue his education in the arts. Amadeo's transition to vampire is relatively easy for him, although the Dark Gift brings about nightmares of his childhood. Marius and Amadeo return to Ukraine, where Amadeo visits his old school and home. He finds his elderly parents, reveals that he is alive, and leaves them with all the money and jewels he has with him.

Shortly after returning to Venice, the vampire Santino and his coven attack Marius' home, kidnap Amadeo and the apprentices, and burn the villa. Marius is burned and thought to be destroyed; his boys are taken to a bonfire and thrown in one by one by the coven as Amadeo watches. Santino spares Amadeo and educates him in the laws of the coven. Amadeo later goes to Paris, changes his name to Armand, and creates his own coven under the Cimetière des Innocents, which Lestat would years later drastically impact, thus resulting in the creation of the Théâtre des Vampires.

In the final segment of the book, Armand explains what occurred to him after the final chapters of Memnoch the Devil. At the end of Memnoch the Devil, Armand rushes into the open daylight and appears to be destroyed in a conflagration. Armand explains to David that by some means beyond his understanding he survived, and ended up on a rooftop in a stairwell protected from further exposure to the sun. However, he is badly burned and unable to move or fully function. While in this delirious state, he makes a mental connection to two children in a nearby apartment—Sybelle and Benji. The connection is forged through Sybelle's constant piano playing.

Eventually, Armand is able to reach out to the children and lead them to him. They believe he is an angel, but are moderately unsurprised when Armand divulges his true nature to them. Armand cannot hunt, so the two agree to trick a drug dealer up to the apartment so that Armand may feed on him. The plan works, and ultimately Armand is fully healed. He becomes friends with Sybelle and Benji and ultimately falls in love with them. He shares his wealth with them without limit, mirroring the relationship Marius had with him to a certain degree.

Armand brings them to see Lestat, which he has some concerns about since vampires are traditionally not safe for mortals to be around. After trying to wake Lestat from his catatonic state, Armand returns to Marius's house to discover that Marius has given Benji and Sybelle the Dark Gift. Armand is at first furious at Marius because he wanted Sybelle and Benji to have full, mortal lives. The fact that Benji is ecstatic about the prospect of eternal life, only serves to fuel his anger. Marius explains to Armand that he did it since Armand never could without the two coming to hate him for it. Marius is willing to take the burden of Sybelle and Benji's eventual anger.

title: The Vampire Armand


title: User:Roodog2k


text:
User talk:Thebodyczech

Welcome to the Wikipedia
Here are some links I thought useful:

 * Tutorial
 * Help desk
 * Foundation issues
 * Policy Library
 * Utilities
 * Cite your sources
 * Verifiability
 * Wikiquette
 * Civility
 * Conflict resolution
 * Brilliant prose
 * Neutral point of view
 * Pages needing attention
 * Peer review
 * Bad jokes and other deleted nonsense
 * Village pump
 * Boilerplate text
 * IRC channel
 * Mailing lists
 * Current polls

Feel free to ask me anything the links and talk pages don't answer. You can sign your name by typing 4 tildes, like this: ~.

Be Bold!

Sam [Spade] 18:34, 11 Aug 2004 (UTC)

title: User talk:Thebodyczech