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Andrew Jackson Montague

Andrew Jackson Montague (October 3, 1862 – January 24, 1937; nickname "Jack") was a Virginia lawyer and American politician. He served as the 44th governor of Virginia, from 1902 to 1906, and a Congressman from 1912 until his death in 1937. A Democrat, Montague was the first Virginia governor since the American Civil War not to have served in the Confederate military. Initially a Progressive, Governor Montague expanded the state capitol building, supported public education and the Good Roads Movement and opposed the Martin Organization. However, later as U.S. Congressman, he became a Conservative Democrat and supporter of the Byrd Organization.

Early life and education
The son of prominent Confederate and later state judge Robert Latane Montague, Andrew Jackson Montague was born in 1862 in Campbell County near Lynchburg, Virginia. He was named after his father's youngest brother, a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute who died defending Richmond at the Battle of Gaines Mill months before during the American Civil War. After the war, his family returned to the Tidewater area; since their enslaved workers had been freed and many left, Montague worked on the family farm and attended schools in Middlesex County and Williamsburg.

After his father died in 1880, Montague left the farm and went to Richmond, Virginia. He attended Richmond College (predecessor to the University of Richmond), where he gained a reputation as a skilled orator and debater. After several years as a private tutor, Montague began legal studies at the University of Virginia, graduating with a law degree in 1885. He later received an honorary doctorate of laws degree from Brown University in 1905.

Career
After admission to the Virginia bar, Montague began his legal practice in Danville, while becoming increasing involved with the local Democratic party. In the presidential election campaign of 1892, Montague developed a relationship with Grover Cleveland, who then appointed Montague in 1893 as the United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia. Montague held that position five years, until, in 1898, he was elected as the Attorney General of Virginia.

Governor
While serving as attorney general, Montague became increasingly involved with the Virginia Progressive movement, which emphasized education reform and disfranchisement of black voters as a way to stem political corruption. Positioning himself as the independent alternative to Senator Thomas S. Martin's political machine, Montague determined to make a run in the upcoming Virginia gubernatorial election. Running on the independent platform, Montague solidly defeated Martin's candidate, Claude A. Swanson, for the Democratic nomination for Governor of Virginia.

Montague won 58.19% of the vote in the general election of 1901, easily defeating Republican John Hampton Hoge, as well as Prohibitionist O.C. Rucker, and Socialists Hugh Motter and John J. Quantz. He became the first Virginia governor since the Civil War who had not served with the Confederate Army.

Shortly after Montague's inauguration, and with his support, the Virginia Constitution of 1902 was enacted without a referendum. Its poll taxes and literacy tests effectively disenfranchised black and poor white voters. Ironically, the new Constitution created a smaller and more easily controlled electorate, thus strengthening the Martin machine.

As governor, Montague enunciated a progressive agenda, and he made speeches throughout the state calling for progress toward "good schools" and "good roads". His efforts on behalf of schools resulted in some tangible progress, particularly in terms of increased local funding, longer terms and school consolidation. For roads, he pressed for the creation of a state highway commission, which officially came into being two months after he left office. Montague also corresponded with progressives as varied as President Theodore Roosevelt, Clara Barton of the American Red Cross and Booker T. Washington of the Tuskegee Institute. He championed the primary process as a more open way to select political party candidates, which helped lead to the primary system being adopted for the first time in 1905. However, these accomplishments fell far short of Montague's legislative ambitions, for which he blamed a hostile legislature and the political machine run by his long-time foe, Senator Martin.

In 1905, while still governor, Montague determined to make a run for the United States Senate against the incumbent Martin. Martin and Montague represented the two main factions within the Virginia Democratic party, and their contest would effectively determine which would control Virginia politics. Martin responded to the challenge by publicly embracing Montague's main issues: good schools, good roads and the primary election process. Having minimized the differences between their positions and with a larger political organization, Senator Martin handily won re-election, leaving an embittered Montague to finish out his term as governor.

Internationalist
After leaving office as governor, Montague served as the dean of Richmond College Law School for three years, before returning to the private practice of law in 1909.

In July, 1906 Montague was among the American delegates at the Conference of American States meeting in Rio de Janeiro. He later was a delegate to the Third International Conference on Maritime Law at Brussels in 1909 and 1910, as well as a trustee of Carnegie Institute in Washington, D.C., and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He would become president of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in 1917, and serve as president of the American Peace Society (1920-1924). Montague was an "outspoken Anglophile" who was among a group of six Virginia congressmen consisting of himself as well as Patrick H. Drewry, S. Otis Bland, Joseph T. Deal, George C. Peery and Henry St. George Tucker III who spent much of the 1920s advocating closer relations between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Congressman
In 1912, Montague ran for the Richmond District seat in the United States House of Representatives. He defeated the Republican incumbent, and would retain for almost a quarter of a century.

A supporter of President Woodrow Wilson's internationalist agenda, Montague lost influence when the Republicans took control of Congress in the 1920s. Despite this, and a failed bid to gain appointment to the Supreme Court, Montague was respected by his colleagues, even acquiring the nickname "Judge". In 1926, he was selected by the House as one of the impeachment managers that served as the prosecution the impeachment trial of Judge George W. English.

Personal life
He married Elizabeth Lyne Hoskins (1868 - 1951), daughter of a Middlesex county doctor, on December 11, 1889. They had two sons (one of whom died young, the other served heroically in World War I and became Brig. Gen. Robert Latane Montague Jr. (1897-1972)), as well as two daughters, Matilda Gay Montague Moore (1891-1988) and Janet Roy Montague Nunnally (1895-1977). Betsy Montague was very active in historic preservation in Alexandria, Virginia and in Williamsburg, and Gov. Montague corresponded with philanthropist John D. Rockefeller Jr. who established Colonial Williamsburg. In 1934, the Montagues purchased Sandwich at Urbanna, Virginia.

Death and legacy
Congressman Montague died in office on January 24, 1937, after winning a narrow election against his first significant (primary) opposition in twenty-five years. He is interred in the family's section at the graveyard of Christ Church in Saluda, Virginia.

Electoral history

 * 1912; Montague was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives with 97.58% of the vote, defeating Independent Chase A. Haight and Socialist Labor H. Adolph Muller.
 * 1914; Montague was re-elected with 95.81% of the vote, defeating Socialist S.C. Weatherly and Socialist Labor Muller.
 * 1916; Montague was re-elected unopposed.
 * 1918; Montague was re-elected unopposed.
 * 1920; Montague was re-elected with 72.5% of the vote, defeating Republican Walker G. Decourcy, ColR (?) H.H. Price, Independent Republican John L. Grubbs, and Socialist Muller.
 * 1922; Montague was re-elected with 90.14% of the vote, defeating Republican Channing M. Ward.
 * 1924; Montague was re-elected with 99.97% of the vote, defeating Republican C.B. Jones.
 * 1926; Montague was re-elected unopposed.
 * 1928; Montague was re-elected with 75.89% of the vote, defeating Republican J.D. Peake and Independents James E. Maynard and Henry W. Anderson.
 * 1930; Montague was re-elected with 87.4% of the vote, defeating Independent Republican R. Houston Brett.
 * 1932; Montague was re-elected as part of the Democratic slate for Virginia at-large Congressional district.
 * 1934; Montague was re-elected with 80.45% of the vote, defeating Republican Roy C. Parks, Socialist Hilliard Bernstein, and Communist William H. Friend.
 * 1936; Montague was re-elected with 84.49% of the vote, defeating Republican Charles G. Wilson and Socialist Winston Dawson.

title: Andrew Jackson Montague


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Petre Dumitrescu

Petre Dumitrescu (18 February 1882 – 15 January 1950) was a Romanian general during World War II who led the Romanian Third Army on its campaign against the Red Army in the Eastern Front.

Early life and military career
Dumitrescu was born in Dobridor, Dolj County. He began his military training at the Artillery and Engineers Officers' School in 1901, graduating in 1903 with the rank of second lieutenant. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1906 and, five years later, to captain. That year, he was admitted into the Military Academy at Bucharest, graduating in 1913.

When World War I started, Dumitrescu was a major. Following the war, he climbed higher and higher in the military hierarchy, becoming a lieutenant colonel in 1920, a brigadier general in 1930, and a major general in 1937. Between 1937 and the beginning of World War II, Dumitrescu served as a military attaché in both Paris and Brussels. After returning to Romania from these postings, he was given command of the First Army.

Initial successes
On March 25, 1941, Dumitrescu was made commander of the Third Army, a post which he would hold for the duration of the war. On July 5, 1941, he attacked the Soviet forces in northern Bukovina and took Cernăuți (Chernivtsi), reclaiming territory occupied by Soviet troops since June 28, 1940. He then crossed the Prut to recover northern Bessarabia. The German Eleventh Army covered Dumitrescu's right flank while he advanced towards the Dniester. At that point his army and the German 11th army switched places, with Italians continuing advancement over the Dniester towards the Southern Bug river, and Dumitrescu remaining on recovered Romanian territory. In September of that year, Dumitrescu repulsed a Soviet attempt to cross the Dniester in the east, behind the Eleventh Army.

After Adolf Hitler convinced Ion Antonescu to continue the war beyond Romania's pre-1940 borders, Dumitrescu then led the Third Army to the Crimea, taking part in the Battle of the Sea of Azov. By October 10, the Third Army had marched 1,700 kilometres from Romania, fought four major battles and 42 minor engagements.

By this time, Dumitrescu's Third Army had inflicted casualties of over 20,000 killed and 40,000 wounded and also captured 15,565 prisoners of war, 149 tanks, 128 artillery pieces, and more than 700 machine guns, while suffering 10,541 casualties (2,555 dead, 6,201 wounded, and 1,785 missing in action.)

For his effort in this campaign, Dumitrescu was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, the second Romanian to receive the award after Ion Antonescu. Later on he was even given the Oak Leaves. In October, he was awarded the Order of Michael the Brave, 3rd class.

On July 18, 1942 he was made a general, thus becoming Antonescu's second-in-command. Shortly after his promotion, Dumitrescu advanced towards the Taman Peninsula, between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, creating a vital bridge between Axis forces in Europe and those deeper inside the Soviet Union.

Retreat
The German forces in Stalingrad were in dire need of assistance, and the German High Command transferred many of its troops to the besieged city, which meant the Third Army now had fewer troops to defend an increasingly large front. This was ameliorated, to a certain degree, by the High Command's decision to incorporate all Romanian forces in the southwest of the Soviet Union into the Third Army. The High Command, however, chose to ignore Dumitrescu's reports about a Soviet troop buildup in the southwest, as they did with his repeated suggestions to attack the Soviet bridgehead at Kletskaya.

In November 1942 the Red Army launched a devastating attack in the southwest, breaking through the Romanian line and forcing Dumitrescu into retreat. For a brief period, the Third Army dug in near the Chir River, but Soviet troops pushed them back. In December 1942, the decision was made to strategically retreat westwards.

Between 26 March and 24 August 1944, he commanded "Army Group Dumitrescu" which was composed of the German 6th Army, under command of Maximilian de Angelis and later Maximilian Fretter-Pico, and his own Romanian 3rd Army.

After the Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive, Dumitrescu's plan was to reach Bucharest and avoid any engagements with the Red Army along the way. However, Red Army troops ambushed Dumitrescu. When what remained of the Third Army arrived in Bucharest, the Soviets had captured more than 130,000 Romanian soldiers.

By this time, however, as with the rest of Romania, Dumitrescu turned against Nazi Germany and captured more than 6,000 German prisoners of war. He retired in early September, 1944, as the Romanian Army and the Red Army retook Northern Transylvania and advanced into Hungary.

After the war
In 1946, Dumitrescu was put under house arrest and put on trial for war crimes by the new communist government, but was eventually acquitted because of a lack of evidence. He died of natural causes at his Bucharest home in 1950.

Awards and decorations

 * Iron Cross 2nd Class (28 July 1941) & 1st Class (12 August 1941)
 * Order of Michael the Brave 3rd Class (17 October 1941) & 2nd Class (19 February 1944)
 * Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (1 September 1942)
 * Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (4 April 1944)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Petre Dumitrescu


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United Ulster Unionist Party

The United Ulster Unionist Party (UUUP) was a unionist political party which existed in Northern Ireland between 1975 and 1984.

It emerged from a division in the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party in the late 1970s. Vanguard had traditionally opposed the concept of compulsory power sharing with nationalists enshrined in the Sunningdale Agreement, but after the failure of Sunningdale, the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention was set up to provide a forum with the aim of finding a new settlement for Northern Ireland. During the proceedings the leader of Vanguard, William Craig, proposed a voluntary coalition with the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party. Many in Vanguard found this anathema, including the party's deputy leader Ernest Baird, Mid Ulster MP John Dunlop and East Belfast Convention member (and future Ulster Unionist Party leader) Reg Empey. They left Vanguard and formed the United Ulster Unionist Movement. Initially Baird denied that this was a party since the original aim was to create a single Unionist party. When this aim proved unattainable the UUUM relaunched as the United Ulster Unionist Party led by Baird with Empey as Deputy Leader.

Many critics highlighted the irony of the name, given that the UUUP was a breakaway from Vanguard, itself a breakaway from the Ulster Unionist Party and there were many other Unionist parties in existence.

The UUUP did not prosper long. In the 1979 general election Dunlop held his seat but only due to an agreement with other unionist parties to not divide the unionist vote where a nationalist might get elected. Elsewhere Baird stood in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, dividing the unionist vote but polling poorly. It has been argued that it was Baird's candidacy that ensured a victory for Frank Maguire in the seat.

The decline was evident even before the local government elections of 1981 as 4 of the 12 UUUP councillors elected in 1977 had defected to other Unionist parties (2 to UUP, 1 to DUP and 1 to the Ulster Popular Unionist Party). The party had a miserable showing in the 1981 elections with its overall vote share declining from 2.8% in 1977 to 0.7% in 1981. It only won 5 council seats (a decline of 7 seats) and even then one of these was purely due to a quirk of the electoral system, as the party only polled 105 votes (1.6%) in Lisburn 'E' against 1,909 (30.0%) for the DUP and 1,830 (28.7%) for the UUP. However they benefited from the other two Unionist parties only putting up one candidate each and benefitted from hefty transfers to win an unlikely seat.

In 1982 a new Northern Ireland Assembly was established to provide a degree of scrutiny over the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The UUUP got a derisory vote, with even Dunlop getting barely 3% of the vote in his Mid Ulster constituency. The party soon folded. Dunlop remained as MP for Mid Ulster until the 1983 general election but did not contest his seat. The formal end came in May 1984 when Baird dissolved the party and left it to individual members to choose which Unionist party to join in its wake.

title: United Ulster Unionist Party


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Indo-Parthian Kingdom

The Indo-Parthian Kingdom was a Parthian kingdom founded by Gondophares, and active from 19 CE to c. 226 CE. At their zenith, they ruled an area covering parts of eastern Iran, various parts of Afghanistan and the northwest regions of the Indian subcontinent (most of modern Pakistan and parts of northwestern India). The rulers may have been members of the House of Suren, and the kingdom has even been called the "Suren Kingdom" by some authors.

The kingdom was founded in 19/20 when the governor of Drangiana (Sakastan) Gondophares declared independence from the Parthian Empire. He would later make expeditions to the east, conquering territory from the Indo-Scythians and Indo-Greeks, thus transforming his kingdom into an empire. The domains of the Indo-Parthians were greatly reduced following the invasions of the Kushans in the second half of the 1st. century. They managed to retain control of Sakastan, until its conquest by the Sasanian Empire in c. 224/5. In Baluchistan, the Paratarajas, a local Indo-Parthian dynasty, fell into the orbit of the Sasanian Empire circa 262 CE.

The Indo-Parthians are noted for the construction of the Buddhist monastery Takht-i-Bahi (UNESCO World Heritage Site) in Mardan, Pakistan.

Gondophares I and his successors
Gondophares I originally seems to have been a ruler of Seistan in what is today eastern Iran, probably a vassal or relative of the Apracarajas. He may have replaced previous Parthian governors of Seistan, such as Cheiroukes or Tanlismaidates. These Parthian satraps had been ruling the region of Sakastan since the time when Mithridates II (124–88 BC) had vanquished the Sakas of the region.

Around 20–10 BC, he made conquests in the former Indo-Scythian kingdom, perhaps after the death of the important ruler Azes. Gondophares became the ruler of areas comprising Arachosia, Seistan, Sindh, Punjab, and the Kabul valley, but it does not seem as though he held territory beyond eastern Punjab. Gondophares called himself "King of Kings", a Parthian title that in his case correctly reflects that the Indo-Parthian empire was only a loose framework: a number of smaller dynasts certainly maintained their positions during the Indo-Parthian period, likely in exchange for their recognition of Gondophares and his successors. These smaller dynasts included the Apracarajas themselves, and Indo-Scythian satraps such as Zeionises and Rajuvula, as well as anonymous Scythians who struck imitations of Azes coins. The Ksaharatas also held sway in Gujarat, perhaps just outside Gondophares' dominions.

After the death of Gondophares I, the empire started to fragment. The name or title Gondophares was adapted by Sarpedones, who become Gondophares II and was possibly son of the first Gondophares. Even though he claimed to be the main ruler, Sarpedones’ rule was shaky and he issued a fragmented coinage in Sind, eastern Punjab and Arachosia in southern Afghanistan. The most important successor was Abdagases, Gondophares’ nephew, who ruled in Punjab and possibly in the homeland of Seistan. After a short reign, Sarpedones seems to have been succeeded by Orthagnes, who became Gondophares III Gadana. Orthagnes ruled mostly in Seistan and Arachosia, with Abdagases further east, during the first decades AD, and was briefly succeeded by his son Ubouzanes Coin. After 20 AD, a king named Sases, a nephew of the Apracaraja ruler Aspavarma, took over Abdagases’ territories and became Gondophares IV Sases. According to Senior, this is the Gondophares referred to in the Takht-i-Bahi inscription.

There were other minor kings: Sanabares was an ephemeral usurper in Seistan, who called himself Great King of Kings, and there was also a second Abdagases Coin, a ruler named Agata in Sind, another ruler called Satavastres Coin, and an anonymous prince who claimed to be brother of the king Arsaces, in that case an actual member of the ruling dynasty in Parthia.

But the Indo-Parthians never regained the position of Gondophares I, and from the middle of the 1st century AD the Kushans under Kujula Kadphises began absorbing the northern Indian part of the kingdom.

Rulers of Turan and Sakastan (160-230 AD)
The Indo-Parthians managed to retain control of Turan and Sakastan, which they ruled until the fall of the Parthian Empire at the hands of the Sasanian Empire circa 230 CE. Pahares I (160-230 AD) was a ruler of Turan following the partition of the remains of the Indo-Parthian kingdom. The kingdom of Sakastan was ruled by a second king with the name Sanabares II (160-175 AD). The Kingdoms of Turan and Sakastan ended when they submitted to the Sasanian ruler Ardeshir I circa 230 CE. These events were recorded by Al-Tabari, describing the arrival of envoys to Ardeshir at Gor:

"“Then he [Ardashir] marched back from the Sawad to Istakhr, from there irst to Sagistan, then to Gurgan, then to Abrasahr, Merv, Balkh, and Khwarizm to the farthest boundaries of the provinces of Kohrasan, whereupon he returned to Merv. Ater he had killed many people and sent their heads to the Fire temple of Anahedh he returned from Merv to Pars and settled in Gor. Then envoys of the king of the Kushan, of the kings of Turan and Mokran came to him with declarations of their submission.""

- Al-Tabari

Archaeology and sources
The city of Taxila is thought to have been a capital of the Indo-Parthians. Large strata were excavated by Sir John Marshall with a quantity of Parthian-style artifacts. The nearby temple of Jandial is usually interpreted as a Zoroastrian fire temple from the period of the Indo-Parthians.

Some ancient writings describe the presence of the Indo-Parthians in the area, such as the story of Saint Thomas the Apostle, who was recruited as a carpenter to serve at the court of king "Gudnaphar" (thought to be Gondophares) in India. The Acts of Thomas describes in chapter 17 Thomas' visit to king Gudnaphar in northern India; chapters 2 and 3 depict him as embarking on a sea voyage to India, thus connecting Thomas to the west coast of India.

As Senior points out, this Gudnaphar has usually been identified with the first Gondophares, who has thus been dated after the advent of Christianity, but there is no evidence for this assumption, and Senior's research shows that Gondophares I could be dated even before 1 AD. If the account is even historical, Saint Thomas may have encountered one of the later kings who bore the same title.

The Greek philosopher Apollonius of Tyana is related by Philostratus in Life of Apollonius Tyana to have visited India, and specifically the city of Taxila around 46 AD. He describes constructions of the Greek type, probably referring to Sirkap, and explains that the Indo-Parthian king of Taxila, named Phraotes, received a Greek education at the court of his father and spoke Greek fluently:

The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea is a surviving 1st century guide to the routes commonly being used for navigating the Arabian Sea. It describes the presence of Parthian kings fighting with each other in the area of Sindh, a region traditionally known at that time as "Scythia" due to the previous rule of the Indo-Scythians there:

 * "This river (Indus) has seven mouths, very shallow and marshy, so that they are not navigable, except the one in the middle; at which by the shore, is the market-town, Barbaricum. Before it there lies a small island, and inland behind it is the metropolis of Scythia, Minnagara; it is subject to Parthian princes who are constantly driving each other out." Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, Chap 38

An inscription from Takht-i-Bahi bears two dates, one in the regnal year 26 of the Maharaja Guduvhara (again thought to be a Gondophares), and the year 103 of an unknown era.

Religion of the Indo-Parthians
We do not know the religion of the House of Suren although we know they were in religious conflict with the Zoroastrian Arsacid dynasty. Unlike the Indo-Greeks or Indo-Scythians, there are no explicit records of Indo-Parthian rulers supporting Buddhism, such as religious dedications, inscriptions, or even legendary accounts. Also, although Indo-Parthian coins generally closely follow Greek numismatics, they never display the Buddhist triratna symbol (apart from the later Sases), nor do they ever use depictions of the elephant or the bull, possible religious symbols which were profusely used by their predecessors. They are thought to have retained Zoroastrianism, being of Iranian extraction themselves. This Iranian mythological system was inherited from them by the later Kushans who ruled from the Peshawar-Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan.

Coins of the Hindu deity Shiva have also been found issued in the reign of Gondophares I.

Representation of Indo-Parthian devotees
On their coins and in the art of Gandhara, Indo-Parthians are depicted with short crossover jackets and large baggy trousers, possibly supplemented by chap-like over-trousers. Their jackets are adorned with rows of decorative rings or medals. Their hair is usually bushy and contained with a headband, a practise largely adopted by the Parthians from the 1st century AD.

Individuals in Indo-Parthian attire are sometimes shown as actors in Buddhist devotional scenes. It is usually considered that most of the excavations that were done at Sirkap near Taxila by John Marshall relate to Indo-Parthian layers, although more recent scholarship sometimes relates them to the Indo-Greeks instead. These archaeological researches provided a quantity of Hellenistic artifacts combined with elements of Buddhist worship (stupas). Some other temples, such as nearby Jandial may have been used as a Zoroastrian fire temple.

Buddhist sculptures
The statues found at Sirkap in the late Scythian to Parthian level (level 2, 1–60 AD) suggest an already developed state of Gandharan art at the time or even before Parthian rule. A multiplicity of statues, ranging from Hellenistic gods, to various Gandharan lay devotees, are combined with what are thought as some of the early representations of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas. Today, it is still unclear when the Greco-Buddhist art of Gandhara exactly emerged, but the findings in Sirkap do indicate that this art was already highly developed before the advent of the Kushans.

Stone palettes
Numerous stone palettes found in Gandhara are considered as good representatives of Indo-Parthian art. These palettes combine Greek and Persian influences, together with a frontality in representations which is considered as characteristic of Parthian art. Such palettes have only been found in archaeological layers corresponding to Indo-Greek, Indo-Scythian and Indo-Parthian rule, and are essentially unknown the preceding Mauryan layers or the succeeding Kushan layers.

Very often these palettes represent people in Greek dress in mythological scenes, but a few of them represent people in Parthian dress (head-bands over bushy hair, crossed-over jacket on a bare chest, jewelry, belt, baggy trousers). A palette from the Naprstek Museum in Prague shows an Indo-Parthian king seated crossed-legged on a large sofa, surrounded by two attendants also in Parthian dress. They are shown drinking and serving wine.

Silk Road transmission of Buddhism
Some pockets of Parthian rule remained in the East, even after the takeover by the Sassanids in 226. From the 2nd century several Central-Asian Buddhist missionaries appeared in the Chinese capital cities of Luoyang and sometimes Nanjing, where they particularly distinguished themselves by their translation work. The first known translators of Buddhist texts into Chinese are actually Parthian missionaries, distinguished in Chinese by their Parthian surname "An", for "Anshi", "country of the Arsacids".
 * An Shih Kao, was a Parthian prince, who made the first known translations of Hinayana Buddhist texts into Chinese (148–170).
 * An Hsuan, was a Parthian merchant who became a monk in China 181 AD.
 * Tan-ti (c. 254), a Parthian monk.
 * An Fajin (281–306), a monk of Parthian origins.

Main Indo-Parthian rulers

 * Gondophares I (c. 19 – 46) Coin
 * Gondophares II Sarpedones (first years AD – c. 20 AD)Coin
 * Abdagases I (first years AD – mid-1st century AD) Coin
 * Gondophares III Gudana, previously Orthagnes (c. 20 AD – 30 AD)
 * Gondophares IV Sases, (mid-1st century AD)
 * Ubouzanes, (late-1st century AD)
 * Pacores (late 1st century AD) Coin

title: Indo-Parthian Kingdom


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Antonio Monteiro

Antonio Monteiro is the name of:

 * António Monteiro (politician) (born 1944), former foreign minister of Portugal
 * António Mascarenhas Monteiro (1944–2016), former President of Cape Verde
 * Antônio Monteiro Dutra (born 1973), Brazilian footballer
 * António Monteiro (canoeist) (born 1972), Portuguese sprint canoer
 * António Isaac Monteiro, former foreign minister of Guinea-Bissau
 * Antônio Monteiro (actor) (born 1956), Brazilian actor, director and writer
 * Antonio Monteiro (mathematician) (1907–1980), mathematician born in Portuguese Angola

title: Antonio Monteiro


text: User talk:81.172.108.12

title: User talk:81.172.108.12


text:
AlterNIC

AlterNIC was an unofficial, controversial Internet domain name registry that relied on an alternative DNS root. The primary purpose of the project was to challenge the monopoly of InterNIC, the official governing body for generic top-level domains (gTLDs) until the creation of the ICANN in 1998. AlterNIC offered second level domain registration in its own TLDs at lower prices than InterNIC. However, these domain names could only be resolved by name servers that were specifically configured to use the AlterNIC root zone. The project is now defunct; the domain name alternic.net is parked and no longer associated with AlterNIC.

History
Eugene Kashpureff and Diane Boling created AlterNIC in 1995, defining it as a privately developed and operated Internet network information center and domain name registry service, with the purpose of enhancing the Internet with new information services.

In the mid-1990s, the Internet was in a governance transition phase. Until then, the organizational structure of the network was still heavily influenced by its military, academic and governmental origins. At the same time, there was a rapidly increasing interest of private companies, followed by the general public, to gain access to the Internet. Domain names began to play a crucial role in business visibility, and the number of registrations grew exponentially.

Initially, registration of new domain names and their maintenance involved no direct costs for the registrant. In 1995, the National Science Foundation authorized Network Solutions (NSI), the private company that they had mandated to maintain and operate the registries, to begin charging registrants an annual fee. Some perceived this move as unfair, given that the market was closed to competitors.

Eugene Kashpureff and company were among them and they decided to create an alternative registry to challenge the monopoly of NSI.

Alternative TLDs
AlterNIC started operating their registries even though their name servers were not included in the Internet official root zone. As a result, only users of manually reconfigured name servers were able to resolve AlterNIC names.

AlterNIC offered several dozens of alternative TLDs, such as

 * .alt
 * .biz (unrelated to the subsequent, official .biz gTLD created by the ICANN)
 * .corp
 * .eur (European name services, by NetName)
 * .fam
 * .fcn (Free Community Network - no cost DNS for charities & non-profits. Inactive.)
 * .free
 * .sex
 * .usa (designed as a competitor to the official .us)
 * .wtv (World Tele Virtual Network commercial Internet TV. Inactive.)
 * .xxx (unrelated to the .xxx that was first approved, then revoked by the ICANN, and then approved again)

During the experimental phase, domains could be registered without fees using the .exp and .lnx TLDs. Some TLDs such as .ltd, .med or .xxx were operated directly by AlterNIC. The setup fee for AlterNIC registries was $50. The annual fee was $24, half of the $50 that were charged yearly by NSI for a .com or .net domain ($15 of the $50 were retained for a US Government fund).

A notable feature of AlterNIC was the possibility to request a new custom TLD for the same price as for registrations in existing TLDs. Established publishing groups had requested their own names: Wired magazine had reserved .wired and IDG's affiliate in Europe has reserved .idg

Controversy
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Talk:Philosophy of mathematics/Archive 1

Early discussion
I don't think this page should be used for people to argue which philosophical line of thought they endorse, instead this forum should be used to constructively coordinate the fruition of this article as one that is coherent and representative of the discipline of philosophy of mathematics as endorsed by the various experts in the field.

What does Julius Caesar=2 mean? Someone needs to patch that up because it doesn't really make sense.

heh. this is going to be *so* weird to people who think math is real...

It's also a total mess as an encyclopedia article.

This article should describe the various different philosophies of mathematics.

 * it describes three extreme points of view, those being that it is fundamental physical and unchangeable, that it arises entirely from the proof process followed by mathematicians, and that it arises entirely from the structure of the human mind. A fourth extreme point of view, that it is entirely a colonizing process, I didn't deal with, as it's so postmodern.

Also, I doubt it should be "weird" to anyone. Anyone who works with math pretty soon hits some philosophical issues.

 * yeah but they breeze past them - of 150 mathematicians in one graduating class I know, only two of them paid any attention to the field proper, and they disagree sharply, falling one each into the "embodied mind" and "part of the physical universe" camps. This is not an easy subject to really explain.

A lot of scientists (particularly if you get into the social sciences) don't consider mathematics neutral.

If anyone needs proof that mathematics is not a social construct, look no further than the computer you're sitting at right now.

 * It differs from the philosophy of science by not taking mathematics as a neutral point of view - rather, investigating such subjects as the willingness to accept mathematical proofs, the validity of induction or analogy, what combination of metaphors constitutes an isomorphism, mathematicians' social capital and the meaning of the well-known collaboration graph.

 * A lot of 'hard scientists' don't consider 'social science' to be science -- they point to the lack of falsifiability in many of their theories, and assert that abandoning objective standards of mathematical and logical proof removes the basis for falsifiability, leaving only opinion, fashion, and popularity contests.

 * There are physicists who do think that. But that's a relatively small minority opinion (something like 10% or so). My experience with "math-fetishists" is that they actually tend to be social scientists. Very few physicists (or even mathematicians) seem to believe that an idea that can't be expressed in mathematics isn't an idea at all, however I've known/read a number of social scientists that seem to think that. The problem is that regarding mathematics in social science *greatly* limits the hypothesis that you can form and the theories that you can test. Also, pretty much anyone who does qualitative research would disagree with non-mathematical means non-falsifible, and I'm pretty sure that most physicists don't think this (even though I know of a few who do).

 * The problem is that regarding mathematics in social science *greatly* limits the hypothesis that you can form and the theories that you can test.

 * That's probably the attraction for us math-fetishists. Science must be so easy for the math-challenged: you simply have to think of things, write papers and win the support of your peers, without any real chance of bumping up against nasty cold non-human reality.

 * The trouble is that just because something is stated in terms of mathematics doesn't automatically make it more objective, precise, testable, falsibility or correct. I get *REALLY* annoyed at people who think it does. (I should point out that I have a Ph.D. in physics.)

 * all of this is what leads to "reasonable method" ideas. Science itself, hard or soft, is basically in doubt at the moment... neutrality of its process is questioned for a lot of reasons... Falsifiability as a doctrine has little or no applicability to basic mathematical axioms... which are too abstract to falsify....

-- This article is still a mess. It's confusing, misleading, and in some places, downright wrong....

 * Wrong? Where?  Your strange misreading seems to be the problem here:

I guess I'll start by removing the most egregious errors

 * asks what makes one theory more acceptable than another despite imperfect empirical validation and limits of the scientific method - and assumes mathematics as a neutral point of view.

I'm not sure what neutral point of view means in this context. If the statement is that mathematics doesn't influence how scientists view the world, then its false.

 * other way around - are you actually *reading* this or just reacting to it? it is quite true that scientists assume mathematics as a neutral point of view, and that philosophy of science has no basic critique of mathematics itself, except for some of the social sciences as above.

 * No it's not (and I'm speaking as a former physicist). Scientists do *NOT* generally assume that mathematics has a neutral point of view, and a large part of the "working knowledge" of being a physicist, is to be able to critique when math is being used appropriately and when one is better off dispensing with using math all together.

This is gibberish. It's also inaccurate

 * and collaborators, actually mapped onto the physicists' particle physics foundation ontology or if they were simply another sacred geometry like that of Plato - a useful but limited model that awaited understanding of some deeper ontology.

 * Explain then why various commentators refer to "Platonic neorealism" in both physics and in mathematics, both arising seemingly from overbelief in Euler's Identity...

Overbelief in Euler's identity? It has nothing to do with Euler's identity. Such a philosophy existed long before Euler's identity. If you haven't noticed, neo-Platonism arose in ROMAN times (around 1500 years before Euler was even born, if you don't know), and has its foundation in far more holistic views of reality than Euler's identity... Perhaps YOUR view arises from the possibility that at least a large portion of your right hemisphere was excised at some point in your life. Khranus

So did Erdös really do work on foundations? Or the 'fundamentals' of number theory? It's not a field I associate with his name. Anyone? Matthew Woodcraft

 * Agreed. Erdos' program was to re-prove many basic proofs in number theory without any reliance on complex analysis whatsoever... that in itself changed the fundamentals, as it removed reliance on a whole set of methods and assumptions.  The well known graph of Erdos' collaborators drives new work in graph theory and research into collaboration on research.  "Paul Erdos, more than anyone else, did the most to make mathematics into a social activity"

I see. Did he do any work on foundations? In Erdoös's lifetime, number theory wasn't at the foundation of mathematics; it was typically built up from set theory, yes? Matthew Woodcraft

 * this was one of the things that changed as a consequence of Erdos' extensive work - someone (I forget who) said Erdos "more than anyone, turned mathematics into a social activity" - literally moving its assumed basis from set theory to proots collaboration by the sheer volume of this work. Few people even in Erdos' early career believed in set theory as the basis of arithmetic...

Various people who understand nothing of the modern theories are hacking this. No one says that scientists aren't influenced by mathematics, quite the other way around, they believe in it overmuch, and in "falsifiability" overmuch, and that ideology is clearly guiding the commentary in the above.

 * Scientists don't *believe* mathematics any more than you or I *believe* words. Mathematics is a communications device.  It is perfectly capable to expressing ideas which are incorrect or non-sense.  There are a number

of postmodern theorists who talk about science, but have the unfortunate habit of ascribing beliefs to scientists that they simply do not have.

 * some, yes, others no. Lakoff is disciplined about this.  Zerzan less so.  And they often talk about "normal science" only, i.e. "corporate science" etc.

Falsifiability is ideology. Other than strict followers of Popper, it's hard to find anyone who believes that cognitive bias and infrastructural prior investment don't play huge roles in determining what constitutes a "disproof".

 * In science yes. In mathematics no.  In mathematics, you get to define what truth is.  You can argue

that social factors influence how much effort there is in disproving a theorem, but I don't think one can plausibly argue that a proof or disproof of a mathematical theorem itself is affected by cognitive bais. Keep in mind that scientists and mathematics use the term "disproof" in radically different ways.

 * true - cognitive bias in mathematics seems to be all-or-nothing, i.e. either all mathematicians buy into it, or none do. That's one reason why Erdos' work was so important in foundations... you can actually *trace* this spreading of beliefs...

''I think that's going a little too far. Certainly over history, the idea of what constitutes a valid proof, or a valid counterexample to a proof, has changed.'' Matthew Woodcraft

 * It may be that you have more knowledge in this field, but it seems to me that constitutes a mathematical proof or mathematical disproof is exactly the same now as it was in the time of Euclid. If you can give some examples of mathematical statements and proofs which would be accepted at one time, but not another then I would be appreciative.

''Euclid provides a perfectly good example. For a long time, his proofs were thought to be complete. But a couple of hundred years ago, the expected standard of rigour increased, and extra axioms were added that he'd 'missed out'.'' Matthew Woodcraft

 * If you are referring to non-Euclidean geometry, then this isn't what happened (if you are referring to something else let me know). What happened was that for a long time, people believed that Euclid's axioms were the only ones that were possible, but they couldn't prove it.  They couldn't prove it because it wasn't true.  In the 19th century, it was proven that you could change one of the axioms and end up with a system that was consistent.  This didn't change the nature of proof, or their rigor, or the validity of any of the proofs.

 * Actually, this paragraph above is a common misunderstanding of the evolution of proof from Euclid's time. The controversy over non-Euclidean geometry was NOT because people didn't believe you could logically deduce some statement from others, but because Euclidean geometry was seen as true BECAUSE it accurately reflected "reality".  In the end, your proof (back in the early 19th century and before) was "true" if it accurately reflected "reality".  Of course, logic played a role, but you were allowed to use any kind of starting assumptions that seemed reasonable.

 * The nature of proof *has* changed, partially because the notion of "truth" has changed. A mathematical statement nowadays is considered "true" as long as you exhibit a model in which it holds.  The idea that consistency is what's important and not whether your theory accurately reflects reality is a 20th century notion.  Consider another controversy: complex numbers.  It took quite a while for their use to be accepted, mainly because of philosophical difficulties people had over them.  Eventually mathematicians realized that as long as the use of complex number didn't lead to a contradiction, it was ok to use them; however, the pre-20th century mathematicians weren't able to quite take the plunge and say it was ok to use *anything* which was consistent with the basic foundations of mathematics.  Of course, this might have had something to do with the fact that the foundations of mathematics were not as clearly delineated as today.

 * Which goes to my point that mathematicians and scientists mean something completely different when they talk about disproof. If something in science is "disproven" then its possible that people will change their minds with more evidence.  If something in mathematics is "disproven" then that's the end of the story, it won't ever change.  Conversely, in mathematics unlike science you have "prove" something to be true. Going back to Euclid, there are a number of things in mathematics that people believe to be true or believe to be false but haven't been proven one way or the other, and sometimes there are surprises.  But once something in math has been proven or disproven, then its the end of the story.  Science is different.  In math, something is true or false because you've defined it to be so.

 * Again, this is entirely misleading. In addition to my reasons above, let me comment some more on rigor.  Some of the proofs in Euclid are nowadays seen as *wrong*.  Euclid assumed certain things that were not postulated, such as the fact that circles intersected in zero or two points.  However, a closer examination of Euclid, especially his definitions of point, line, etc., indicates that Euclid probably did not have a notion of "axiomatic method".  It is debatable whether he actually thought he was setting up a logical system of deduction, as some assume today.

 * So I stand by my statement. The nature of proof in mathematics hasn't changed since Euclid. The nature of disproof in science can change from decade to decade, and the whole notion of the scientific method happened centuries after Euclid.

''No, I'm not talking about non-Euclidean geometry, I'm talking about changes in the standards of rigour. http://www.marco-learningsystems.com/pages/kline/johnny/johnny-chapt5-6.html is the best reference I can find on the Web (it's mostly about other things; the first few paragraphs are relevant). [Heh - I just found a rather clearer explanation right here, at Euclidean geometry.''' Matthew Woodcraft

---

Why is "metaphysics" relevant, and "ethics" not? Philosophy of mathematics is often framed in more theological terms of ontology, morals, and cosmology... which is not the ethics/epistemology/metaphysics distinction used in philosophy. In particular Godel neatly moved from one to the other, and Wittgenstein and Russell... most of the major figures. Erdos has some very strange compilations of conventional cosmology, which are called Erdosisms.

''That's certainly not the usual referent of the term 'Erdösism'. And I don't believe that either morals or cosmology 'often' come up in discussion of the philosophy of mathematics.'''

 * Erdos had his own strange minimal cosmology where God was a "supreme fascist", men who got married were "captured", divorced were "escaped", who stopped doing mathematics were "dead", and who died had "left", etc... Godel had an ontological proof of God, a quite rigorous one... this is cosmology as conventionally understood. So is the study of sacred geometry.  Russell and Wittgenstein's famous "elephant dialogue" is more a debate on the morality of doing something versus doing nothing and claiming uncertainty as an excuse... but all right, I'll mostly agree, and say that this just highlights the central role of ontology... theology might be theology because it *does* debate morals and cosmology a lot, and math might be math because it only concerns itself with ontology (minimal set of operations and constants to describe everything else with).

Perhaps it is more correct to say there is a "philosophy of science" but a "theology of mathematics"...?

 * ontology of mathematics? as one of several foundation ontologies?  i.e. we cna say that the particle physics foundation ontology is basic, or that the euler's identity foundation ontology is basic, or that something else explains them both (like human cognition).  As Judea Pearl points out this is all part of the "algebra of seeing", and has nothing to do with an "algebra of doing" which he proposes we need, like the other body philosophers.

Snipped from article - the quote preceding them suffices, and these just add blur:
 * In terms of which, the reasonable method is the best description we can make of the best human mind, and the foundation ontology is the best description we can make of "reality, something out there to be discovered."

 * As use of mathematics is not confined to scientists making predictions, but is employed also in law and economics and political science, most researchers find it appropriate that "we" be a somewhat larger (some say less disciplined) group than physical scientists, and that reasonable method be perhaps more inclusive than feasible method or scientific method.

I have this concern that this article is written by someone who doesn't have a working knowledge of how mathematicians and scientists think. While there isn't anything wrong with an outside point of view, I'm getting this impression that a lot of the statements assume a world view by mathematicians and scientists that they simply do not hold.

In particular there seems to this assumption that physicists regard math as objective and the preferred means of expressing ideas. In fact, most of the physicists I've worked with regard math as a necessary evil, and if you use an equation to explain something you can uses words to explain, they will nail you to the wall.

 * it's common to require people in any science to explain something in words first - exposing the idea to a larger number of people using metaphors - and only afterwards to go to the bother of rigorous prediction with an equation. That is the same in economics and political science.

The trouble with the article is that these stereotypes about what physicists actually think are scattered throughout the article, and there is no where where you can say "but many/most/some scientists don't think that."

 * physicists vary in my experience - some are very aware of foundations problems, others not. But the question of "who's we" in mathematics stands:  math is used in very different ways in economics or finance, logic used very differently in law.  A complete article would get into the role of math in each and how various standards of proof rely on it, or not... but perhaps a separate article on standards of proof would actually be the answer here?

http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/maths/index.htm looks to be a very good site on this subject. Certainly it gives a broader range of topics than our current page.

More comprehensive, yes, it should be listed as a reference. It gives special attention to foundations, as it should, pays maybe too much to logicism which is an old view of mathematics. It's got its own slant.

However, it totally fails to lay out the extreme points of the foundations debate which the current article (despite other failings) does well. If you can fit the material from rbjones into the general framework of the existing article, adding topic lists, etc., more links to new pages on the specific debates, that's ideal I think...

--

 * If you can fit the material from rbjones into the general framework of the existing article, adding topic lists, etc., more links to new pages on the specific debates, that's ideal I think...

I agree!

 * It gives special attention to foundations, as it should, pays maybe too much to logicism which is an old view of mathematics. It's got its own slant.

That's the whole point -- we've all got our own slant. So let's represent older as well as newer ideas, and try fairly to represent all the slants. Even today's brave new ideas will one day be out of fashion -- and old ones may even get their day in the sun again.

---

Speaking of which, I keep wanting to deal with theological and ontological methods more generally than just mentioning the current Pope's opinion. A lot of theorists think that "starting from Euler's Identity, taken on faith, and proving that all the rest of reality conspires to make it seem true" is identical methodologically to "starting from God, taken on faith, and proving that all the rest of reality conspires to make Him seem real", i. theology...

A flame war
Axel's most recent edit is highly suspect. What is the justification for removing the list of significant 20th century figures in the Philosophy of Mathematics? Is there any doubt whatsoever about this list?

 * Yes. most people on the list were not philosophers of mathematics,

 * they *redefined* and *reframed* the field. Read Alfred North Whitehead on civilization and algebra sometime.  The field as you have laid it out is pre-Principia-Mathematica (1911 or so), plus embodied mind tagged on the end, which is not bad as far as it goes, but it hardly lays out the endpoints, and is incomprehensible to newcomers.  The TT quote was important for laying out the traditional debate.  But never mind, I can work with your basic framework, if you will add these characters that you say were left out:

 * and the most influential philosophers of mathematics were left out. So I scrapped the whole list. Especially your insistence on Erdos is ridiculous. He may have had his personal philosophy of mathematics, like many

 * his personal philosophy of mathematics was that it was "a social activity", and
 * That's crap. Erdos was a Platonist with a capital P. He believed that there's a "Book" out there which contains the most beautiful proofs of all theorems, and it's our job to find those proofs. Erdos was a uniquely social mathematician, that's all. AxelBoldt
 * Quite true. But what the man *DID* is not relevant to what he *BELIEVED*.  Like Einstein effectively proved that God *did* play dice...

 * he uniquely succeeded in propagating that view into the community of all working mathematicians. Your insistence on cutting him out is ridiculous, as the school of "research into collaboration of research" foundationists who cultishly extend the Erdos Number (which is hardly "tongue in cheek" now) proves.
 * This is not a school in the philosophy of mathematics, and Erdos has absolutely nothing to do with it, except that his name is attached to the Erdos number. AxelBoldt
 * "absolutely nothing, except"... and what is the significance of the Erdos Number to the philosophy of mathematics? "absolutely nothing"?  There is not one school that would agree with that.

 * He did not contribute one iota to *YOUR VIEW OF THAT FIELD* because you have consistently denied that proof process or cosmology can matter at all - hardly the view of the three billionth user. So you have cut out the whole view that mathematics is created by social consensus of certain disciplined people - which is the closest to being proven as true.

 * Erdos had a personal cosmology,
 * I'm sure he did. And I don't care what it is, nor would any reader of an article about the philosophy of mathematics. AxelBoldt
 * and by eliminating complex analysis completely from number theory, he built a new ontology for mathematics that was much simpler than the one before, and could be used as part of any foundation ontology that wanted to omit the use of "i".
 * That's crap. He did no such thing. He proved the prime number theorem with elementary methods, that's it. He never attempted to eliminate complex numbers, and he certainly never tried to build a new foundation ontology. AxelBoldt

 * he didn't *TRY* to do it - he just *DID* it - it's called "the well-known collaboration graph" - and it has certainly expanded and grown as a study on its own, and is now driving new research into pure graph theory. Your view of his contribution differs from that of "The Man Who Loved Only Numbers", his biography, although I agree he did not *completely* eliminate the "i".

 * mathematicians do, but he did not contribute one iota to the field. AxelBoldt
 * I just noted the contribution. If you would rather credit this to me as original, and not to Erdos or his followers, you are going to make me very very famous, and I should thank you.

Boys, boys! Stop this futile wrangling. You make the Middle East seem peaceful :-) Ed Poor

If you keep using your axe on him, he may bolt from the project. Is that what you want? Please, my esteemed colleague AxelBoldt, make a bit more effort to elevate the level of civility in our learned discourse.

 * I prefer him revealing his obvious ideological biases and political agenda.

And you, Mr. 24, try to be a little less confrontational.

 * no, the confrontation is useful. check the meta again.  There's a lot more there.

Have you ever considered using phrases like, "It seems to me that..." or "It might be a good idea to keep X in the article"?

 * no. This is a debate about truth itself.  We might as well keep it up to the point just before bodily harm is expected.  If every male in the world punched one other in the nose hard enough to almost break it, once a day, there'd be no war.  And we'd get much better at setting our priorities.

I expect better of you both, as Bush might say. :-) Ed Poor

 * and Bush is responsible for green-lighting the present disaster by choosing the absurd War on Terror rhetoric, which is actually a "War on Terra". Ed, the right answer here is for Axel and I to keep hacking at articles alternately until only that bare minimum that we cannot defend excising remains... at which point we will know what other articles must be written.  The process works, unless we curtail it by cowardice or some "civility" or "authority" (both highly destructive to "truth")

Axel, thanks for sticking at this. I can see why you subordinate philosophers to schools, as opposed to the laundry list approach I took originally. What's missing from this article is a sense of how the schools relate or what common assumptions they make. For instance, it's pretty obvious that an embodied mind theory must relate to a theory in social constructivism - as cognitive bias must relate to culture bias - these schools are connected in non-obvious ways all of which deny Platonism, thus our argument re Erdos. The schools that have been concerned about notation and notation bias, e.g. what counting in base 10 might do to our conclusions or the ease or difficulty of reaching certain conclusions, or the infamous "||-|=|" example, are also inseparable from the proof process or "proof by computer" debates.

One way to deal with this is to add a list of questions at the end, with one or two at the beginning, that the layman can read and comprehend.

Another is to laundry list philosophers of mathematics, as I did earlier, with one-liners about their views or contributions.

But I like the "single phenomenon seen by many schools" approach, something like:

"||-|=|" demonstrates one of the key issues - notation bias. Depending on the number base or whether the phrase is seen this way or upside down as "|=|-||", and depending again on whether counting is in absolute numbers, it becomes true or false entirely depending on its orientation or interpretation.

I know of no shorter example to demonstrate why a philosophy of mathematics is necessary. Or why decisions like how to count, whether to distinguish directions in counting or only distance, and what social conventions to follow in sharing truth mathematically, need treatment outside mathematics.

It would be worthwhile to explain how each school sees this little gem, and to incidentally remark on where they think Euler's Identity, "+" or "i" came from. Those to me all seem to be central questions that differentiate the schools, and to set apart those who question the external consistency of the proof process itself (which only the social constructivists seem to do, claiming it as no more than metaphorical, as you say, just like a science) 24

I have removed these two paragraphs:
 * The main problem with Formalism is that it doesn't provide a criterion for which axiom systems to study. Why these axioms and not some others? For the formalist, all games are alike, except that some might be more fun or more useful than others. How is it possible that games played with paper and pencil could have any predictive powers over physical reality?

 * A major problem for Formalism is given by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem: when investigating a sufficiently interesting axiom system, we can never be sure whether the axiom system is inconsistent, i.e. completely pointless

I don't see how these two problems are any different for formalism than for platonism and logicism.
 * they aren't. Only embodied mind, social constructivism, state definite opinions about these problems, but previous attempts at this article that tried to lay out their views of consistency and metaphor vs. isomorphism were "unpopular".  See the history for the edit that mentions Turing's biology investigations, more on Erdos, and other potential answers to this question.  Restore any of that text that you find relevant to this issue, although it may require reworking.  24

In all three, mathematicians study those systems they find interesting, but they can't necessarily give a "criterion" for which axiom systems to study.
 * most mathematicians would say that such criteria are not their job I think, part of the "professionalization" and segementation of the field that has plagued it since Whitehead. 24

In all three, it's impossible to be sure that a sufficiently powerful system is consistent, which is unfortunate. (Also, that last sentence was wrong: we can never know for sure that such systems are consistent, but we can sometimes know that they are inconsistent).
 * how? inconsistent with what ?  There's an intersection with philosophy of science and another intersection with economics, notably Amartya Sen who asked "is internal consistency of choice bizarre?"  in a paper in the 80s.  If it is, then there's no point investigating internal consistency... except insofar as if affects tolerances of infrastructural systems, e.g. test equipment, technology in general.24

 * 24, an axiom system is called "inconsistent" if you can derive a contradiction from it, which means that you can derive anything from it. AxelBoldt
 * yes, of course, but that doesn't answer the question. There is still both internal and external consistency, and axiomatic inconsistency is normally considered "internal" (by the Platonist, Formalist, and Logicist schools, which frankly to me seem to be defying Goedel).  What is traditionally meant by an "inconsistent" system is that the axioms, after a derivation process, yield a contradiction - proof of consistency is traditionally showing that an axiom set cannot remain consistent if any of the axioms are contradicted or removed, e.g. arithmetic relies on certain axioms and doesn't work if any of them are omitted.  However, different fields of mathematics rely on different sets of axioms, and only through relatively intense procedures can they be reconciled, e.g. elliptic equations - modular forms equivalence.  Basically all of mathematics is a bunch of islands relying on different sets of axioms.  So, the embodied and social-construction (or proof-construction) schools argue that the thing that was traditionally believed to be internal consistency is in fact external (relying on validation by other human senses, other mathematicians), and that the thing that was traditionally believed to be external (the application of mathematics in science) is in fact internal consistency of choice as per a "paradigm", a self-reinforcing belief system of the validating mathematicians or a validating process.  Then you have Sen's perspective, which is that any internal consistency of choice is bizarre and that (economic) isomorphism is just more metaphor on internal grounds.  True to form, his economics is about refusing to measure the value of human time, simply maximizing the amount of it freed.  This guy hit a chord somehow - his whole economic philosophy is lauded in India and in the anti-globalization movement - and he has the 1998 Swedish Bank Prize and the ear of the World Bank.  So, there is some weight to this inside-out view of consistency and how one would discover a system to be "inconsistent" by external-to-proofs means - if a community of people cannot live by a system, as Erdos did, it becomes in some way socially inconsistent, and if cognitive science and neurobiology cannot be reduced to instructions capable of generating the mathematics-proving system (i.e. the mathematician's brain), it becomes in some way instructionally inconsistent.  Turing was on this track when he studied limits on the expression of neurons.  Anyway, all of this is secondary to the core issue of notation bias...(reinforcing this next line)...24

 * also, I repeat, if you can't explain "||-|=|", you simply cannot explain.24

I think those two problems apply uniquely to Formalism for the following reasons:

Platonists don't study axiom system, they study mathematical entities. If the axioms happen to be inconsistent, than the axioms are simply wrong and we pick new ones that describe the entities better. The entities come first, the axioms are just a crutch. For the formalist, axiom systems are the central object of study. A platonist can reject an axiom system as pointless, a formalist can never do that. The question which axiom systems to study is trivial for the Platonist: those that describe mathematical reality. Formalists don't have such a criterion. I'm not sure about Logicism though, how they find their axiom systems.
 * It could be argued that formalists try to study consistent systems, just as Platonists study mathematical entities. When a system is discovered to be inconsistent, the Platonists reject it as pointless, and the formalists reject it as trivially uninteresting.  Then, the Platonists try to change it to be consistent, so it can better approximate the truth.  The formalists try to change it to be consistent, so that it becomes interesting again.

I maintain that Goedel's results are a much more devastating blow to Formalism than to Platonism: the Platonist will simply say "See, I told you so, axiom systems never capture the whole truth that's out there. They are merely a (defective) presentational device."
 * It might be useful to make a distinction in the article between modern Formalists and those preceding Goedel. It's true that Goedel's results were a blow to the programs of people like Hilbert.  But modern Formalists are no longer pursuing a powerful, complete, consistent theory of all mathematics, because they know that is impossible.  A modern Formalist is more likely to describe his work as exploring interesting axiom systems, and would say that a system loses interest once it's found to be inconsistent.   For the modern Formalists and Platonists, Goedel's theorems are equally inconvenient.
 * I agree with this more or less as stated. I think both schools must be rejected, or Goedel must be rejected.
 * First, that is not what was said, and second, Goedel was a Platonist. AxelBoldt
 * And, if you look carefully at Goedel, especially his ontological proof of God, it's apparent that he considered the "big Book of theorems" (Erdos-speak) to be something more organic than textual, as seemingly did Turing.24
 * Goedels ontological proof was intended as a study of the precise assumptions inherent in one of Leibniz' arguments, not as an absolute and convincing proof of God's existence.

 * I will attempt to phrase a statement about Goedel's impact on Platonists and Formalists. AxelBoldt, Monday, April 15, 2002

Regarding the last comment: it is true that we can sometimes know that certain system are inconsistent, but the sentence only referred to interesting axiom systems, which arguably only includes ones whose inconsistency hasen't been established. AxelBoldt, Sunday, April 14, 2002
 * If a system is said to be interesting today if its inconsistency hasn't been established yet, then the sentence in question was incorrect, because it says we will never know.
 * yes, agreed again. Perhaps thought the question is not so much "interesting" as "committed" or "actionable", i.e. do we choose to test the proofs or axioms for errors or inconsistency?  If so, how?  What motivates this?  Is it the reputation of the mathematician(s) involved?  The degree of investment in technologies or experimental apparatus that are proposed relying on the proofs?  There are presumably many systems that are relied upon today that will be proven inconsistent under certain conditions or assumptions in future - i.e. the "islands" in mathematics will have "bridges" between them but will not necessarily form "land masses".  Well, this is interesting, as it now appears to have touched on all the issues from my article which weren't covered in Axel's.  However there is a question of how far to go here, since we're coming from three different universes.  That's why I suggested "||-|=|" as a way to describe the issues to the layman, and then the theories' varying attitudes to logic, set theory, Euler's Identity, consistency and validation of proofs or reputation of mathematicians, could be sketched for those theories that consider it important. 24

Is it fair to say that the philosophy of mathematics is concerned generally with the question of what completeness, consistency, and proof actually are? Or, deepening that, why mathematicians of different schools think that certain things are "interesting" and others not? How an isomorphism differs from a metaphor, and why we would expect in the "technical" (mathematical and scientific) professions a higher degree of trust in a mathematically-stated theory than in a theory stated in other ways? There's also not enough of a relationship between this article and other philosophy articles, e.g. on metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, ethics - each of which has its own influence or parallel in how we view mathematics as a field. I don't think it's a reach to say that Euler and Galois represented two quite different ethics, and that their work reflects that to no small degree. 24

I removed the following:
 * Some common concerns variously divide and unify the schools, but there are few broadly-accepted 'universal truths' about mathematics. 20th century efforts tended to focus on the foundations problem in mathematics, and where characterized by such programs as David Hilbert's proposal to re-found mathematics as logic.  After Kurt Godel demonstrated the futility of this approach, other foundations approaches were attempted.  Debate at the end of the 20th century focused on quasi-empiricism in mathematics, spurred in large part by prominent mathematicians like Putnam who defended a non-Platonic form of mathematical realism using quasi-empirical arguments.  Thomas Tymoczko and others noted the acceptance of quasi-empirical proofs and extended Putnam's analysis to mathematical practice (proving theorems, publishing papers).  This further led to some attempts to more strictly define mathematics itself as a consequence of human internal cognitive structure, of emergent human psychology, or of social organization.  At the end of the 20th century, most mathematicians would be likely to accept the statement 'mathematics is a language' but would argue about its special status or the necessity and universality of that language, e.g. to alien species, which had been a key point in Godel's analysis.

 * There is significant room for debate about the naming of the schools. Many mathematical realists (including Putnam) reject the name 'Platonism' as it assumes Plato's ontology is valid.  Those described as 'social constructivist' would argue that they represent the quasi-empirical schools as a whole, and are 'social' only insofar as they recognize the importance of an ongoing debate and consensus-seeking among them.  Finally, those mathematicians who focus on lateral unifying or bridging efforts between different fields of mathematics, e.g. the Langlands program of conjectures of isomorphisms between several different fields, may find themselves unrepresented in this list of 'schools'.  The quasi-empirical (social constructivist) and empirical (embodied mind) theorists are more concerned with linkages between schools or subfields of mathematics, and would reject the term 'school' as implying some curriculum with a foundation ontology (e.g. what is taught first to the students of mathematics).  Nonetheless, early to mid 20th century debates did tend to neatly divide neatly into 'schools', so for historical accuracy and ease of reference, the various positions will be presented in that form here:

 * 1) Hilbert was a formalist, not a logicist. His program of proving the consistency of the basic axioms with finitary means was ended by Goedel, nothing else. Formalism is alive and well.
 * 2) It is unfair to skip in this introduction over all the intervening schools and go right to quasi-empiricism, whatever that is.
 * 3) Godel's analysis has nothing to do with universality of mathematics to aliens.
 * 4) The Langlands program is not a part of the philosophy of mathematics.

There is really nothing I can save here. This is clearly written by 24. AxelBoldt 23:24 Dec 19, 2002 (UTC)


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University of South Carolina Upstate

The University of South Carolina Upstate (USC Upstate) is a public university in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Founded in 1967 and formerly known as University of South Carolina Spartanburg, the institution changed its name in the summer of 2004. It offers bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees for students in the Upstate and surrounding areas. It is part of the University of South Carolina System and home to approximately 5,200 students and 340 full-time faculty. It is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

History
After the Spartanburg General Hospital decided to discontinue its degree program for nurses, local politicians, led by G.B. Hodge, decided to create a separate university for the region. In 1967 the Spartanburg Regional Campus was opened as a two-year college with an initial enrollment of 177 students. Because of increased popularity, the school became a four-year institution in 1975 and was renamed as the University of South Carolina Spartanburg. During the following years, both the campus and the scope of the University expanded.

In the summer of 2004 USC's board of trustees voted to change the name to the University of South Carolina Upstate to better reflect its mission to educate the people of South Carolina's upstate region. It has become the largest educational provider in the University Center Greenville, a consortium of seven institutions of higher learning in Greenville, South Carolina and the immediate surrounding area.

Colleges and schools

 * College of Arts, Social Science, and Humanities
 * College of Science and Technology
 * Mary Black College of Nursing
 * George Dean Johnson Jr., College of Business and Economics
 * College of Education, Human Performance, and Health

Student life
University of South Carolina Upstate has many clubs and organizations as well as academic teams whose main goals are the intellectual and interpersonal growth of students through community service and wide-ranging cultural activities.

Greek life
There are several fraternities and sororities on campus.

Athletics

University of South Carolina Upstate sponsors 15 collegiate teams known as the Spartans. The athletic department colors are green, white, and black. The teams compete in the Big South Conference and Division I of the NCAA. These sports are men's and women's basketball, men's and women's soccer, men's and women's golf, baseball, softball, track and field, cross country, and women's volleyball.

title: University of South Carolina Upstate


text:
Coat of arms of Estonia

The coat of arms of Estonia is a golden shield which includes a picture of three left-facing blue lions with red tongues in the middle, with golden oak branches placed on both sides of the shield. The insignia derive(s) from the coat of arms of Denmark, which ruled northern Estonia in the 13th-14th centuries and parts of western Estonia in the 16th-17th century.

Description
The coat of arms of Estonia depicts a golden shield, which includes three slim blue lions passant gardant with red tongues in the middle and golden oak branches along both sides of the shield. The lesser coat of arms lacks these oak branches. The Estonian national emblem of three lions originate from the arms of Danish king Valdemar II who conquered northern Estonia in 1219. The lions became part of the greater coat of arms of Tallinn (Reval), the centre of Danish government in Estonia, and the fiefdoms (German: Ritterschaften) of Harria and Viru.

In 1346, Denmark sold its Estonian dominion to the State of the Teutonic Order. The three lions, however, remained the central element of the greater coat of arms of Tallinn. In later centuries, the motif of the three lions transferred to the coats of arms of the Duchy of Estonia, the Estonian Knighthood, the Governorate of Estonia, and incorporated into the greater coat of arms of the Russian Empire. The Riigikogu (parliament) of the newly independent country officially adopted the national coat of arms of Estonia on 19 June 1925.

The display of the coat of arms, as well as of any other national symbols of Estonia, was officially banned following the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940. The symbols were gradually replaced with Soviet-inspired emblems. The Stalinist Soviet authorities persecuted anyone using the coat of arms or the national colours of Estonia. After World War II the coat of arms remained in use in the Western Bloc non-communist countries by a number of surviving diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Estonia and by the Estonian government-in-exile. The coat of arms along with other national symbols were readopted on 7 August 1990, this marked one of the high points in the struggle for the restoration of the independent Estonian state which was eventually achieved on 20 August 1991. The use of the coat of arms is regulated by the Law on State Coat of Arms, passed on 6 April 1993.

title: Coat of arms of Estonia


text:
Category:Mood disorders

Mood disorder is the term given for a group of diagnoses in the DSM IV TR classification system where a disturbance in the person's emotional mood is hypothesised to be the main underlying feature. The classification is known as mood (affective) disorders in ICD 10.

English psychiatrist Henry Maudsley proposed an overarching category of affective disorder. The term was then replaced by mood disorder, as the latter term refers to the underlying or longitudinal emotional state, whereas the former refers to the external expression observed by others.

Two groups of mood disorders are broadly recognized; the division is based on whether the person has ever had a manic or hypomanic episode. Thus, there are depressive disorders, of which the best known and most researched is major depressive disorder commonly called clinical depression or major depression, and bipolar disorder, formerly known as "manic depression" and described by intermittent periods of manic and depressed episodes.

title: Category:Mood disorders


text:
Juan Rodríguez

Juan Rodríguez may refer to:

Arts and entertainment

 * Juan Rodríguez de la Cámara del Padrón (1390–1450), Spanish poet
 * Juan Rodríguez Freyle (1566-1642), early Colombian writer of El Carnero
 * Juan Rodríguez Botas (1880–1917), Canarian impressionist

Politics and law

 * Juan Manuel Rodríguez (1771–1847), Salvadoran revolutionary against Spain and later president of the State of El Salvador (briefly in 1824)
 * Juan Rodríguez Ballesteros ( fl. 1808), Spanish colonial administrator as regency Governor of Chile and Panama
 * Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra (born 1948), Spanish politician

Association football (soccer)

 * Juan Rodríguez Vega (1944–2021), Chilean football manager and former defender
 * Juan Carlos Rodríguez Moreno (born 1965), known as Juan Carlos, Spanish football left-back
 * Juan José Rodríguez (born 1967), Costa Rican football left-back
 * Juan Pablo Rodríguez (born 1979), Mexican football midfielder
 * Juan Rodríguez (footballer, born 1982), Spanish football defensive midfielder
 * Juan Josué Rodríguez (born 1988), Honduran football forward
 * Juan Rodríguez (Argentine footballer) (born 1994), Argentine football centre-back
 * Juan Rodríguez (footballer, born 1995), Spanish football centre-back
 * Juan Manuel Rodríguez (football manager), Spanish football manager

Combat sports

 * Juan Francisco Rodríguez (1949–2019), Spanish boxer
 * Juan Rodríguez (wrestler) (born 1958), Cuban Olympic wrestler
 * Juan Carlos Rodríguez (boxer) (born 1990), Venezuelan boxer

Other sports

 * Juan Rodríguez (rower) (1928–2019), Uruguayan rower
 * Chi-Chi Rodríguez (Juan Antonio Rodríguez, born 1935), American Puerto Rican golfer
 * Juan Miguel Rodríguez (born 1967), Cuban sports shooter
 * Juan Rodríguez (beach volleyball) (born 1979), Mexican beach volleyball player & medalist in 2002 Central American and Caribbean Games
 * Juan Ignacio Rodríguez, (born 1992), Spanish archer
 * Juan Francisco Rodríguez (baseball), Mexican baseball player and manager

Others

 * Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca (1451–1524), Spanish religious leader and government administrator
 * Juan Rodríguez the Deaf (fl. c. 1520), Spanish sailor and survivor of Magellan expedition
 * Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo (died 1543), Portuguese sailor and soldier
 * Juan Rodriguez (trader) (1500s–1600s), first non-native resident of Manhattan Island
 * Juan Manuel Rodriguez (writer) (born 1945), Ecuadorian professor and author

title: Juan Rodríguez


text:
Juan Esteban Montero

Juan Esteban Montero Rodríguez (February 12, 1879 – February 25, 1948) was a Chilean political figure. He served twice as president of Chile between 1931 and 1932.

Early life
He was born in Santiago, the son of Benjamín Montero and of Eugenia Rodríguez. Juan Esteban Montero studied at the colegio de San Ignacio and at the Universidad de Chile. He graduated as a lawyer on September 16, 1901, and soon after became professor of civil and Roman law at his alma mater. He also worked as a government lawyer and in private practice. He married Graciela Fehrman Martínez, with whom he had four children: Juan Esteban, Pedro, Benjamín and Carmen.

Presidency
Montero's first incursion in politics was in 1931, when President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo named him Minister of the Interior and Social Welfare. After the resignation of president Ibáñez on July 26, 1931 he reluctantly agreed to serve in similar position to Ibáñez's successor, Pedro Opazo; just to find himself promoted to president the very next day, after Opazo's resignation. Montero, as a way out of the political impasse, immediately called for presidential elections. In the meanwhile he assumed as vice president.

Very soon after, Montero accepted the presidential nomination of the Radical Party, and in order to qualify, he resigned his vicepresidency on August 20, 1931. The position was assumed by Manuel Trucco. The Trucco administration was only supposed to be a caretaker one, keeping order in the country until the presidential elections. Nonetheless it was faced with very difficult moments such as the Sailors' mutiny in the navy, caused by the reduction of the salaries of the enlisted men (September 1–5, 1931), which was controlled only after an aerial bombing of the fleet and presaged difficult times ahead.

Supported by the Liberals and Conservatives as well as the Radicals, Juan Esteban Montero was the clear winner of the presidential elections, obtaining almost 64% of the popular vote, defeating leftist José Santos Salas, a protégé of former President Carlos Ibáñez. He took over on November 15, in the midst of a political and economic chaos that resulted from the market crash of 1929. His program called for the implementation of an austerity program that involved the reduction of public expenditures and public salaries, a downsizing of the public administration and an increase of the foreign debt. Notwithstanding these harsh measures, the depreciation of the currency continued, and inflation soared while the Central Bank reserves were at an all-time low. This economic program only managed to cause widespread discontent, while in no way improving the economy, and in turn led to his downfall.

On June 4, 1932, colonel Marmaduke Grove staged a coup d'état by taking over the Air Force base of El Bosque, in Santiago, and demanding the resignation of President Montero. Montero refused to call on the army to put down the coup, and instead chose to resign. That same night, the victorious revolutionaries organized a Government Junta composed of retired General Arturo Puga, Eugenio Matte and Carlos Dávila, with colonel Grove as their minister of Defense. After this episode, Montero retired completely from politics, and went back to private practice and business. He died in Santiago, on February 25, 1948, at the age of 69.

title: Juan Esteban Montero