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Communist Party of the Netherlands

The Communist Party of the Netherlands (Communistische Partij Nederland,, CPN) was a communist party in the Netherlands. The party was founded in 1909 as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and merged with the Pacifist Socialist Party, the Political Party of Radicals and the Evangelical People's Party in 1991, forming the GroenLinks. Members opposed to the merger founded the New Communist Party of the Netherlands.

Foundation
In 1907, Jan Ceton, Willem van Ravesteyn, and David Wijnkoop of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) founded De Tribune ("The Tribune"), a magazine in which they criticized the party leadership. They maintained orthodox Marxist views and expected a proletarian revolution. They opposed the leadership of the SDAP, who were more oriented towards more a revisionist ideology and a parliamentary and reformist political strategy. At a party congress in Deventer held on 14 February 1909, SDAP leaders demanded that they stop publishing De Tribune or be expelled from the party. Wijnkoop and Ceton refused; they and their supporters, including the poet Herman Gorter and the mathematician Gerrit Mannoury, left to form a new party. This was the first such split in a Western European socialist party, although others followed. There had already been a split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, and between the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party and the Tesnjaki ("Narrowist") group. On 14 March 1909 the dissenters founded the new Social Democratic Party (SDP). They had a membership of around 400 spread across different cities: Amsterdam (160), Rotterdam (65), The Hague (45), Leiden (56), Utrecht (25), Bussum (15).

1909–1922
In the 1910s, the SDAP paid much attention to attacking the newly formed SDP. The mobilization for World War I, which the SDAP supported and the SDP opposed, further strengthened the differences between the parties. In the 1917 general election the SDP was still unable to win any seats. In May 1918, the left wing founded the journal De Internationale, uniting four opposition groups within the SDP, with groups in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague plus the Zimmerwald Left Propaganda Union. This group did not favour the parliamentarianism of the majority.

The Russian Revolution fractured most European parties between their revolutionary and reformist factions; this had already happened in the Netherlands, but it profoundly changed the SDP. Previously a party of orthodox Marxist intellectuals with little working class support, the SDP saw an influx of members coming from the free socialist organisations, primarily the NAS.

The SDP entered the election again in July 1918, winning two seats that were occupied by Willem van Ravesteyn and Wijnkoop; Wijnkoop assumed the leadership of the party. The SDP formed a revolutionary parliamentary party with the League of Christian Socialists and the Socialist Party, both of which had one seat. In 1921, Willy Kruyt, the MP for the League of Christian Socialists, joined the SDP while the MP for the Socialist Party left the revolutionary parliamentary party.

As the German Revolution (and the related Brussels Soldiers' Council) developed across the borders in November 1918, the Netherlands was also affected by strikes and mutinies. On 10 November, the SDP called for the formation of soldiers' and workers councils with a view to forming a popular government. A week later at their Leiden Congress, the party name was changed to Communist Party Holland (CPH), to stress its identification with the workers councils. The following year, on 10 April 1919 the CPH joined the Comintern, which helped transform the party from a mix of anarchists, syndicalists and orthodox Marxists into a tightly-knit Leninist community.

In 1920, prominent left communists Gorter and Pannekoek left the party to form the Communist Workers' Party of the Netherlands which advocated council communism. In the 1922 general election the CPH retained its two seats. One of its unsuccessful candidates that year, Tan Malaka, was the first subject of the colonial Dutch East Indies to run for office in the Netherlands.

1922–1945
Before the 1925 general election, Wijnkoop was replaced as party leader by Louis de Visser under the pressure of the Comintern; this was the cause of heavy internal division within the party. Jacques de Kadt had already left the party in 1924 to help set up The League of Communist Struggle & Propaganda Clubs. In the background of several of these divisions was the conflict in the Soviet Union between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Wijnkoop, Henk Sneevliet (a prominent international communist and an ally of Trotsky), and other prominent members, were expelled from the party. Sneevliet founded the Revolutionary Socialist Union, which later became the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). In 1926, the entire Rotterdam branch was expelled. These expellees joined Wijnkoop to form a separate Communist Party of Holland-Central Committee. All three, the RSP, the CPH-central committee and the old CPH (which ran under the name "CPH – Dutch section of the Communist International"), contested the 1929 general election and both CPHs won one seat each, whilst the RSP failed to win any. In 1930, the CPHs were forced to merge by the Comintern.

After the mutiny on the Zeven Provinciën in the same year, the independence of the Dutch Indies became an important theme at the 1933 general election. The party performed particularly well at this election, doubling its seats to four. Among those elected was the Indonesian nationalist Rustam Effendi, the first subject from the Dutch Indies to enter parliament. At the 1937 general election, the party was able to retain its seats.

On 15 May 1940, immediately after the German occupation, the party decided to organize an underground movement. In July 1940, the Nazi occupation force banned the CPN; the party continued illegally. In 1940, together with the much smaller anti-Stalinist communist Revolutionary Socialist Party, the only pre-war organisation that had protested against the anti-Semitic measures by the German occupiers, it founded a resistance movement called  ("Resistance Council"). It published a resistance newspaper called De Waarheid (The Truth). Both took part in the February strike in 1941, the largest act of resistance in the Netherlands.

1945–1963
After the war, the party was led by Paul de Groot, who had a strong grip on the party's organization. In 1945 the CPN was offered one ministry in the Schermerhorn–Drees cabinet, mainly because of the CPN's role in the Dutch Resistance. The CPN refused, demanding a second ministry. In the 1946 general election, the CPN received nearly 11% of the vote and won 10 seats in the House of Representatives. The CPN also won seats in the Senate for the first time. This electoral success was linked to the role of the CPN in the Resistance.

The following period was characterized by decreasing popularity for Communism, the rise of internal divisions, and the methodical isolation of the CPN by other parties.

With the rise of the Cold War, the party began to lose popularity. The 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état tainted the reputation of Communism. In the 1948 general election, the party lost two seats. In 1949, a group of Frisian Communists were removed from the party ranks; they founded the Socialist Union, but they were unable to play a significant role in Dutch politics. In the 1952 general election, the party lost two additional seats. In 1956, the CPN lost votes again; however, because of the expansion of parliament it won an additional seat. The party supported the Russian intervention against the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. After the invasion, the party office, in Felix Meritis in Amsterdam, was attacked by opponents of the invasion.

Meanwhile, internal dissent against the strict leadership of De Groot was rising. In 1958, the Bruggroep ("Bridge group") left the CPN in a conflict over the role of the Communist Eenheidsvakcentrale (Unity Trade Union). Leaders of the Bruggroep were prominent Resistance figures like Gerben Wagenaar and Henk Gortzak. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) claimed to be behind the split, while the CPN leadership claimed that the dissenters were agents working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Bruggroep founded a new party, the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). In 1957, the Pacifist Socialist Party was founded. The PSP united former members of the CPN, including members of the Socialist Union, and the Labour Party (PvdA), and other left-wing independents. In the following 1959 general election the CPN lost all but three seats, while the PSP won two seats, and the SWP was unable to win any seats. Many SWP members, like Gortzak, later joined the PSP.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the CPN was methodically isolated by other parties. Civil servants were forbidden to become members of the CPN and it was not allowed separate time on public radio or television. The party's unequivocal support for decolonization of the Dutch East Indies isolated the party in parliament. Because of its anti-NATO and European Economic Community stances the party was blocked from the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Nuclear Energy committees in parliament. The AIVD kept close tabs on the party. All other parties in parliament were deeply anti-communist, especially the social democratic PvdA.

In the 1963 general election the party gained one seat. The developing students' movement was an important impetus for the party. In 1964, the international conflict between the People's Republic of China and the USSR also split the CPN. A group called Communist Unity Movement of the Netherlands (Marxist–Leninist) left the CPN in that year. They went through several intense splits based on ideological and personal conflicts. In 1971 one of the small groups formed the Socialist Party, which became a successful political party from the mid-1990s. The CPN took a rather ambiguous stance in the conflict between the USSR and the PRC.

1967–1989
Before the 1967 general election De Groot was replaced by Marcus Bakker. De Groot was made an honorary member of the CPN. The party won another seat, making the total five. The CPN condemned the Soviet intervention against the Prague Spring. In 1971 yet another seat was added, and in 1972 the party had seven seats. The 1977 general election saw a conflict between the social democrat Joop den Uyl and the Christian democrat Dries van Agt. Many CPN sympathizers voted for the social democratic PvdA and the CPN lost all but two seats. In 1978, under pressure from new young members, De Groot lost his honorary membership. In the 1981 general election, the placement of American nuclear weapons is a major issue. The CPN, which prominently led one of the campaigning groups, The Committee against the N-bomb, was rewarded with another seat.

In the 1982 elections, the party got its first mayor in the Communist stronghold of Beerta. Before the general election of the same year Marcus Bakker stepped down in favour of Ina Brouwer. With her a new generation of younger, often female MPs entered politics. She was able to keep the three seats. The CPN tried to renew its political program, emphasizing New Left issues like feminism and gay rights. In reaction to this working class-oriented members founded the Horizontal Council of Communists (called so because they were members from different local branches, breaking the vertical organization of democratic centralism). The group tried to pressure the CPN into returning to its Old Left course. In 1983 they left the party and formed the League of Communists in the Netherlands (VCN,Verbond van Communisten In Nederland). In 1986, both the CPN and VCN contested the elections. Neither won a seat in the House of Representatives. The CPN still had two senators. As one of the last acts of the party, the party leadership attended the festivities surrounding 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.

Dissolution
In 1989, the party merged with three other small left-wing parties, namely the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), the left-wing Christian Political Party of Radicals (PPR) and the Evangelical People's Party (EVP) to form the GroenLinks. In 1991, the party officially disbanded; the VCN was joined by other former members of the CPN, who left because they disagreed with the new course, and founded the New Communist Party of the Netherlands (NCPN), which still exists today.

There is no influence left of the old Marxist wing of the CPN in GroenLinks. The "new" generation has been very prominent: Ina Brouwer led the party in the 1994 general election and one of the party's senators Jos van der Lans was a member of the CPN. The former party chair who was very influential in the formulation of the new liberal course, Herman Meijer, was one of the gay rights activists who joined the CPN in the 1970s.

Name
The CPN changed its name two times. It was founded as Sociaal-Democratische Partij (Social-Democratic party; SDP). It followers were commonly known as "Tribunists" after their main organ. After the Russian Revolution the term social-democracy became linked to the reformist socialists, while the term communist was linked to Leninist revolutionary socialism. All sections of the Comintern were obliged to adopt the name 'Communist Party'. In 1919 the party changed its name to Communistische Partij Holland (Communist Party Holland; CPH). The name implied that the CPH was the Dutch section of the worldwide Communist International. In 1935 the party changed its name to Communistische Partij van Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands; CPN), to express its allegiance to the Netherlands and Dutch institutions.

Ideological development
The SDP was founded as an orthodox Marxist party advocating an economic and social revolution that would overthrow the capitalist economic and political system, in favour for a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, which would in turn evolve into a classless, communist society. They broke away from the SDAP, when the reformist leadership blocked their publication of an autonomous journal.

After the Russian Revolution, the party adopted the name Communist. With the departure of the left-wing grouped around De Internationale, the party adopted Marxism–Leninism, the official ideology of the USSR and the Comintern. This advocated the overthrow of the state by a vanguard party, which would lead the country towards socialism. The party remained faithful to the USSR's version of Marxism–Leninism during the 1920s, when Trotsky's interpretation became an important ideological competitor of Joseph Stalin's. This led to a split when a group around a prominent ally of Trotsky, Henk Sneevliet, left the party to form the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP).

In the 1960s, the party did not choose sides in the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the USSR. Nevertheless, a Maoist group, called the Communist Unity Movement of the Netherlands split from the Party. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Party began to move away from its Marxist/Leninist roots and began embrace a more libertarian and Eurocommunist programme with a strong emphasis on feminism.

Social policy
The Communist Party has always been an advocate of the interests of the working class as shown by their advocacy of higher wages and lower prices. They also campaigned for work conditions in factories should be improved, that child labour should be banned completely, that the work day should be regulated and that laws against striking should be repealed.

The CPN advocated a strong role of the state in the economy. They believed the state should supply cheap housing, free and neutral education and health care insurance. They felt that important industries should be nationalized in the short term and in the long term the entire economy should be planned, that taxation should be progressive and that those without jobs should receive benefits.

Foreign policy
The Communist movement emerged from other strands of the workers movement because of their vigorous opposition to World War I. After 1918, the recognition of the USSR and the independence of Indonesia became important issues. During World War II the party was active in the resistance movement. After the war, its foreign policy was explicitly anti-West German and pro-USSR. It favoured Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and sought Dutch recognition of East Germany. It opposed Dutch membership of NATO and the European Economic Community. In the 1970s and 1980s its policy became more critical of the USA, supporting the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in the Vietnam War. It played an important role in the popular opposition against the placement of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands.

Domestic issues
The party also emphasised the radical democratisation of the Dutch political system. It opposed monarchy. It sought to abolish the Council of State and the Senate. A referendum and trial by jury should be implemented. Citizens should appoint civil servants.

In the 1970s and 1980s the party began to embrace New Left issues like the fight for women's and gay rights.

Representation
This table shows the CPN's results in elections to the House of Representatives, Senate, provincial councils, and the European Parliament Also shown is the party's political leadership: the parliamentary leader and the lead candidate; these posts are normally taken by the party leader. The total membership of the CPN is also given.

* separate CPH-Central Committee party.

** estimate of the seats in combined CPN/PSP/(PPR) lists.

*** chair of the parliamentary party in the Senate.

Municipal and provincial government
Although the CPN was particularly strong in several provinces, especially Groningen, it never cooperated in any provincial executive.

The party supplied only one mayor, namely Hanneke Jagersma in the CPN stronghold of Beerta. In the late 1940s the CPN participated in several municipal executives but after the USSR's intervention in Hungary, these all fell. In the 1950s the party got an absolute majority in the municipal council of Finsterwolde the municipality was consequently put under control of the national government. In the 1980s the party again started to cooperate in local executives.

The following table shows the results of the provincial election of 1962 by province. It shows the areas where the CPN was strong, namely North Holland and to a lesser extent Groningen and South Holland. The party was very weak in rural and Catholic Limburg and Brabant.

Electorate
The support for the SDP, which was founded before the introduction of universal suffrage, was strong among left-wing intellectuals and educated working class circles. This was mainly limited to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the SDP, and later CPH began to branch out to the poorest circles of the working classes. In the Zaanstreek, around Zaandam and the port cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam the party was especially strong. After the Second World War, the CPN branched out to the poor rural province of Groningen and other poor rural areas like West Friesland. In some Groningen municipalities like Finsterwolde, Beerta, the party won near absolute majorities. In these municipalities, which now form Reiderland the refounded CPN, NCPN still performs particularly well. In the 1950s the general support for the CPN weakened with the rise of Cold War. In the 1960s and 1970s the CPN began to gain support form students. In the 1980s the party lost its working class support.

Organizational structure
The party was organized on the principle of democratic centralism. The party's board was the highest organ of the party, it decided the order of candidates on election lists for the Senate, House of Representatives and European Parliament, had the final say over the party program and had the ability to expel members. It was elected by the party's Congress. The party saw its political unity and strong discipline as conditions for its ideological zeal.

Between 1946 and 1980, the party's headquarters was in Felix Meritis in Amsterdam.

Linked and pillarized organisations
The party had a small, but strong communist pillar around it. Important organizations were the communist trade union, the Rode Vakcentrale (Red Trade Union) before 1940 and the Eenheidsvakcentrale (Unity Trade Union) between 1945 and 1960, and the party's paper, De Tribune (the Tribune) before 1940 and De Waarheid (The Truth), which was founded as a resistance paper and named after its Soviet counterpart after 1940. The party's youth organization was the formally independent General Dutch Youth League. The party's scientific organization was the Instituut voor Politiek en Sociaal Onderzoek (Institute for Political and Social Research) which published Politiek en Cultuur (Politics and Culture). The CPN had its own publisher called Pegasus (Dutch publisher).

International organisations
Since 1918 the party was a member of the Third International, first in the form of the Comintern, and after 1947 in the Cominform.

Relationships to other parties
For a long time the Communists were methodically isolated, partially because of its revolutionary ideology and partially because of the antagonistic style of its politics. The communists used this style to prevent its electorate from moving to its competitors.

The relationship between the Social Democratic Workers' Party (before World War II) and the Labour Party (PvdA, after World War II) was always troublesome. The SDP split from the SDAP over ideological differences, orthodox Marxist, revolutionary politics versus revisionist and reformist politics. The social democrats saw the communists as insignificant while the communists taunted the social democrats by calling them "servants to capitalism" and "social fascists". During the Cold War, the PvdA embraced Atlanticism, NATO and the alliance with the United States, while the CPN advocated stronger links with the USSR. The PvdA had the strongest anti-communists in its ranks. During the 1970s when a more radicalized PvdA advocated a large progressive coalition, they still excluded the CPN.

The relationship between left-wing splinter groups and the communists was notoriously bad. The CPH ignored the Revolutionary Socialist Party during its four-year term in the 1930s. The Pacifist Socialist Party, which was partially composed of those expelled from the CPN, was denounced as a party of agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The CPN methodically voted against proposals of the PSP, even when they supported them. In the 1980s the PSP and the CPN grew closer as they both campaigned against nuclear armament and both began to embrace New Left and libertarian politics. In 1984 they formed a common list for the European Election together with the green Political Party of Radicals (PPR) and the Greens. In the 1989 the CPN, PSP and PPR were joined by the left-wing Christian Evangelical People's Party in the formation of the GroenLinks.

Relationships with the other parties whether liberal or Christian democratic were very poor.

International comparison
The CPN is one of the few Communist parties to be formed before the Russian Revolution. It lies between the Northern European Communist Parties, like the Communist Party of Sweden and the Southern European communist parties, like the Italian Communist Party. Like its Italian counterparts, and unlike its Swedish counterparts it was methodically isolated in parliament. Like its Swedish counterparts, but unlike its Italian counterparts, it gained around 5% of the vote. Like its Italian counterpart it was closely linked to Moscow until the 1960s. In the 1970s it became involved in New Left politics, like its Swedish counterpart.

title: Communist Party of the Netherlands


text: User talk:213.255.107.33

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: User talk:213.255.107.33


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Talk:Agriculture in the Soviet Union

I created this article by cutting pieces from Therefore, See also: Mikkalai 20:33, 16 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * Economy of the Soviet Union
 * Collectivisation in the USSR
 * Talk:Collectivisation in the USSR
 * Talk:Collectivisation in the USSR
 * Talk:Collectivisation in the USSR

To do
Virgin Lands Campaigns, Khrushchev's maize campaign, MTS == Machinery-Tractor Stations (машинно-тракторная станция), agriculture during perestroika

productivity
"However, despite immense land resources, extensive machinery and chemical industries, and a large rural work force, Soviet agriculture was relatively unproductive, hampered in many areas by the climate (only 10 percent of the Soviet Union's land was arable), and poor worker productivity."

I disagree with this. "Extensive machinery....relatively unproductive...poor worker productivity". Unproductive relative to what? Depending on how one would want to do the comparisons, USSR agriculture was often more productive than Western European agriculture. The machinery was never as extensive as the US's of course, so lack of worker productivity could be blamed on lack of capital investment as much as lack of Taylorism. Ruy Lopez 09:56, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Relative to what? Relative to Canada and the United States and other modern agricultural operations. Interestingly it wasn't lack of capital, vast resources were poured into agriculture beginning in the Khrushchev years and accelerated in the Breshnev era. The Soviet government aspired to US standards not to the standards of the French peasantry.

I can provide a lot of quotes and authority for the above, but I will for now just quote a paragraph from Maurice Hindus's book, The Kremlin's Human Dilemma:Russia after Half a Century of Revolution, (1967), page 194:

"I recall the bolshevik argument during the tempetuous years of collectivization. Merge the 24 million small peasant holdings, it ran, into collectives of large acreages that can be worked with tractors and other machines, and the land will be more productive than it ever had been. It sounded logical. But emphasis was on the machine, and as the years ground on and on, it became increasingly evident that the machine alone performs no miracles, that the man on the land must be engaged too, no only his muscle but his mind and heart. But once the peasant lost ownership of the land, he had no mind and heart for land, and his wisdom in keeping peace with nature, in taming it to his own needs and purposes, did not count anymore. Hence the loss of millions of acres of meadow and plow land to wild nature; dust storms blowing off the top soil, rains washing it into the river. Hence the enormous waste and loss incurred through failure to gather and process crops on time, which, one must re-emphasize, the muzhik in the old days would never have allowed to happen."

This is just another observation of the general cynicism and alienation that pervaded later Soviet society, often expressed by workers in the joke, "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work." Fred Bauder 13:38, Nov 8, 2004 (UTC)

 * Relative to the US? If the USSR is in Europe, why is it being measure relative to a country across the ocean instead of European countries - in fact, why is it being measured relative to anything other than itself?  Russia's economy was comparable to Brazil's in 1917, the US was light-years ahead of Russia the day of the October revolution.  I don't see why the absence of some deus ex machina on that day, to magically compress the decades of a head-start the US had on industrialization over Russia, means there was a lack of productivity.

 * The US also did not suffer any destruction during capitalist World War II. The USSR, on the other hand, lost more than 20 million people and a third of its assets. Shorne 11:00, 11 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * As far as your "source", I see no facts or data about productivity or capital expenditures, just more soporific Cold War propaganda. You'd get the impression reading that that in the countryside, most farmers tended land that they and their families owned for centuries, before the Bolsheviks came and collectivized everything.  The reality is the majority of Russian farmers worked on land someone else owned, and the small plots a small number of peasants got most of them got just a few decades prior to the Bolshevik takeover.  And it was stated openly then that that was done so as to try to bring about a more conservative class in the countryside. Ruy Lopez 00:59, 9 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Quite so. Where were the "mind and heart for land" of the landless peasants working for kulaks? Take this crap with you to church on Sunday. It doesn't belong in a scientific discussion. Shorne 11:00, 11 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * And even if we were to do the ridiculous US/USSR comparison, Russian cotton yield was often better than American cotton yield. How is that "relatively unproductive"? Ruy Lopez 02:08, 9 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Please check your sources. Cotton is not grown in Russia, it's grown primarily in Uzbekistan. Correct, the raw yied there is higher than in he US, but that's because the climate there is better for cotton. On the other hand, the yied in the US grew steadily through decades. In Uzbekistan it did not grow. The yields in Greece, OZ or Turkey are higher than in Uzbekistan. You seem to be carried by pro-soviet propaganda.
 * Comparing raw yields is not a good measure. You need to compare what was actually harvested, including numbers per worker. Keep in mind that stats for SU are not always true - the falsification of statistical numbers was systematic. Also remember that the present article covers about 70 years.
 * Shortages of bread in Moscow (which was supplied a lot better than the rest of the country) during Khruschev era are well documented. That alone should tell you about agricultural productivity in the USSR. --Gene s 09:21, 11 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * It is true that Ruy Lopez should have said "Soviet" instead of "Russian". It is also true that yields vary for reasons of climate and other factors that have little to do with the economic system.
 * I am sure he can speak for himself.

 * But defining efficiency in terms of output per worker reflects a capitalist POV. A socialist system will have priorities other than profit, such as universal employment, that may make maximising the output per worker undesirable.
 * Well, if you define productivity in some other way then commonly accepted, then you should make your definition explicit. You obviously agree that the per-worker productivity in the USSR was relatively low. Then what other productivity was high?
 * In any case, it is inappropriate to call Soviet agriculture "unproductive" because it did not match that of the US and Canada according to certain yardsticks. The Soviet Union did not exterminate the indigenous population of an entire continent,
 * I don't think extermination (or not) is relevant to the article titled Agriculture
 * import slaves from another, and profit from broad expanses of stolen arable land in conditions very favourable to agriculture.
 * It's funny that you brought up the subject of slave labor. USSR practiced forced agricultural labor for people living in the cities. Students, clerks, soldiers were forced to work in the fields, often on Saturdays without extra pay and without being able to refuse. You may also read on trudoden for kolkhoz workers and how they had to moonlight on private plots just to have something to eat, how they were not allowed to migrate. That was happenning in the second half of the 20th century, not 19th as in the US.
 * Nor, for that matter, did most capitalist countries. Why choose the US as the benchmark rather than Bolivia or Nigeria?
 * Because USSR leaders chose such comparison? Because by other standards USSR was not considered a developing country? But you can compare to Finland or Canada if you like.
 * Ruy Lopez correctly pointed out that the USSR should be compared to a country like Brazil, which was comparably backward in 1917, or to pre-Soviet Russia (or even to post-Soviet Russia). Shorne 11:00, 11 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * You believe a comparison of USSR to tropical Brazil is meaningful? That's really odd. Comparison with Finland would be a lot more interesting. --Gene s 11:40, 11 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Regarding your comment on reconciling differences, I seek to do so. VeryVerily, who has been banned before, who has broken the three revert rule within the past 24 hours, and who goes through my (and others) edit history and reverts everything we do, and who is currently in arbitration, makes it a little more difficult for me as he is trying to drive articles into a revert war, but hopefully a consensus can be come to despite what I consider VeryVerily's attempts at sabotage of that.
 * I suggest we keep the discussion strictly on the subject of agriculture in the USSR.
 * You're correct about my comments above, I should have said Soviet cotton yield rather than Russian cotton yield. Yes, Khruschev, bread, Virgin Lands, yes that had a lot of problems, more soil erosion than anticipated.
 * Regarding your second paragraph, you say raw yields are not a good measure, what is harvested has to be compared, including number of workers. And then on top of that this article covers 70 some odd years.  I agree that there are many variables at play.  What year are we talking about, what condition was the USSR in relative to whoever is being compared against in 1917, what variables are we talking about - capital investment, number of workers, yield per acre and so on and so forth.
 * The second paragraph of the introduction, which was reverted the most, offers something like a summary and thus (in my opinion) covers the extended period from collectivization to the second half of the 80s.
 * I meant your second paragraph in the discussion. I just summarized it and said I agreed with much of it, especially the idea that it was still a question what variables constituted productivity.
 * That's why I said at the top "Unproductive relative to what?" I'm told that USSR agriculture was relatively unproductive but I'm not told what it's unproductive relative to.  Itself?  Western Europe?  The US?  Russia was more like Brazil than the US in 1917, a US which, as you said, was of course not standing still at its 1917 level.  What is the basis for worker productivity?  As you say, there are many variables and many years being discussed.  Which variables are meant, which years are being discussed?
 * OK, fair enough. Let's compare to Finland, 1917-1985. Finland was a poorer province of the Russian Empire until the revolution. The climate in Finland is worse than an average Russian climate.
 * We can compare to Finland, and other countries as well. If Finnish workers were more productive, we can say the USSR was less productive than these countries, and more productive than these countries.  This seems like a solution to me, just place the USSR in a comparison to multiple countries.  Of course then the question of what the variables are arises.
 * USSR usually claimed to be a developed country, just like the West. The total GDP and the per-capita GDP were reasonable close to European numbers. But the agricultural productivity lagged substantially. It was closer to the developing nations. This is my understanding of the productivity in the USSR in the last ~30 years of its existence.
 * This page states at the top that Soviet workers were unproductive, and then states they were relatively unproductive.
 * I am not sure what you refer to. The word "unproductive" is used two times in the article, both in the second paragraph of the introduction.
 * I don't feel this is a correct assessment of Soviet agriculture. With so many factors at play, from when to where to what, I don't even see how such a summation could be made.  I seek to make a statement regarding Soviet agriculture that is different. Ruy Lopez 07:15, 12 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * Yes, there is a large number of factors. A lot of them are hard to account for. But look at the overall picture. In 1914 Russia was exporting grain. In 1980 USSR was the largest importer of grain. In 2003 Russia was exporting grain again, as well as Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In 1980s, use of unpaid students, clerks, and soldiers in the fields was wide spread, and crops were still insufficient. Today crops cover domestic demand and some is exported. No unpaid people work in the fields. That should tell about productivity.
 * It's hard for me to see why unpaid worker would be more productive than a paid one. --Gene s 08:49, 12 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * Well, I think the focus should be more on production than consumption or trade, although it's two sides of the same coin. As far as Agriculture of the Soviet Union and production, the bread shortages in Moscow in 1963 don't matter much although the soil erosion and failure of the Virgin Lands program and harvest of 1963 do matter.  So since this is an article about agriculture and production, the latter is the focus, and the former might fall within the scope of the article, but is not central to it, as this is more about agriculture production than consumer products.  In other words, for an example, the problems with the Virgin Lands campaign and soil erosion is part of the subject of this article, the effects of it might be mentioned but are more peripheral.
 * You wrote: bread shortages in Moscow in 1963 don't matter much. I think it should not be discounted. The "management" (Khruschev) of a "business" (Soviet agriculture) made bad decisions, which almost bankrupted the business. The overall productivity suffered. The Soviet system allowed him to make such bad decisions. These are two sides of the same coin.
 * You wrote: more about agriculture production than consumer products. Let me give you an example. In the late 70s-early 80s the potato yields in central Russia were reasonable - 10-15 tons/hectare. But kolkhozes/sovkhozes lacked storage facilities. So, the potatoes were left in the field in piles. The idea was to cover piles with dirt and soil and let them stay through the winter. Some potatoes would rot and provide natural heat, so the pile would not freeze through. In the spring, when snow thawed students or soldier would go through the piles and pick good potatoes from the rot. I don't know the actual statistics because it was never made public (AFAIK), but by witness accounts usually from 50 to 90% of potatoes rotted.
 * If you count just the initial yield, then the productivity was a reasonable 10-15 tons/hectare. If you counted what became consumer products, you get a low 1-7.5 tons/hectare.
 * I also think the article should mention the use of forced labor during 1960-1980s. Right now it's missing from the article completely.
 * Trade and consumer goods really does not tell me much about production at all - under Stalin a lot of production went into making more production facilities (capital goods), while under Khruschev more went into making consumer goods, and after Khruschev, more certainly went into making agricultural consumer goods for domestic consumption. In a command economy like the Soviet Union, more consumer goods means less productivity, since capital went into making consumer goods instead of making capital goods. Ruy Lopez 23:36, 12 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * Correct. It would be very interesting to compare the fraction of consumer/capital for USSR and other developed countries. I vaguely remember reading an article from early 90s where such numbers were given, with the USSR fraction of spending on consumer goods some 2-3 times less, than in the US. --Gene s

What has been happening now is that while productivity on large farms, former Kolhotzes, remains very low, (many are bankrupt and have no reliable outlet for their product and, by the way, are sometimes not able to pay money wages or pay months late), the shortfall is being met by imports. During Soviet times imports were sold only in dollar stores. Another reason for the endemic shortages then is that food was being diverted by employes of state markets into private markets or sold under the counter. So in many cases there was no actual shortfall, just artificial restriction of volume at state mandated prices so there were long lines at state shops, but the identical product, perhaps from the same farm. could be purchased at a markup in the farmers market or at the back door of the state store. Fred Bauder 05:19, Nov 13, 2004 (UTC)

 * I actually agree with you, Fred, to some extent. Corruption and capitalist subversion of the economy did distort the picture somewhat. My main criticism of your comments is that they speak to distribution or consumption rather than to production. But you are obviously aware of that. Also, I think you're being too vague in painting the entire Soviet era—more than seventy years—with the same brush.
 * "During Soviet times imports were sold only in dollar stores" is incorrect. Like every other country, the Soviet Union did engage in trade, and plenty of food and other products were available to the public alongside Soviet commodities. Indeed, one major leftist criticism of the USSR in the post-war era (especially after Stalin) is that it became the hegemon of the Second World, turning entire countries into banana republics that produced what the USSR needed. Shorne 08:31, 13 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Fred Bauder wrote: the shortfall is being met by imports. I wrote a paragraph about raw grain. The raw grain is not currently imported in a significant amount (just some varieties like durum), it's exported, just like in 1913. It was imported in large quantities during the Soviet times.
 * You wrote: During Soviet times imports were sold only in dollar stores. That's incorrect. Imports sometimes were sold through normal stores (assembling huge lines), sometimes they were distributed by subscription to employees of various organizations.
 * You wrote: being diverted by employes of state markets into private markets or sold under the counter. Yes, it was. It was covering some of the shortages of the official economy, some but not all by far. Also, not everyone had access to the black market.
 * You wrote: in many cases there was no actual shortfall, just artificial restriction of volume at state mandated prices. OK, you say in many places and that could be correct, it's like saying some people suffer during wars and being correct at that. Maybe, just maybe there was a case of an artificial restriction, but I personally know nothing of it. Could you provide an example?
 * You wrote: long lines at state shops, but the identical product, perhaps from the same farm. could be purchased at a markup in the farmers market or at the back door of the state store.. And you think people were stupid to stand in long lines instead of getting the same product elsewhere? They were standing in lines because they could not get things elsewhere. In the late 70s and 80s outside of Moscow & Leningrad meat was hard to find. The official price was RUR2.00/kg, but it was not sold in stores at all. Not sold. Not even at the back entrance since shop employees did not have it too. In the bigger cities it was sold maybe once per month. One had to know someone at the shop personally to be able to buy even at a higher price. The farmer's market price cap was RUR3.50/kg. Everything was sold at that top price - fat, meat, bones, everything @ 3.50 (good salary was RUR 150/month, some people were getting 80, retirement payments started about 45). There was no first or second grade meat, just "meat". In small towns market worked once or twice per week, usually on weekends. If one came at 6:30 am, it was often too late, everything was already sold out. And there was no guarantee there would be meat at all. I could write similar stories about pretty much everythng else - food, clothes, shoes, soap. Getting staples was almost a full time job by itself.
 * --Gene s 12:54, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I'm back after a few days, although if I'm banned for a week this will have to start and stop again. Anyhow, I don't care if people don't want to say Soviet workers are very productive, as long as they don't say they are unproductive. I don't think Soviet workers were relatively unproductive. By different measurements, they could be considered more productive than American farmers, and certainly more than the European farmers that they should be compared with. If a country which just began industrializing should be compared to industrial countries at all. Ruy Lopez 03:21, 21 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think this had beed discussed before. I can't claim I know about productivity of the Soviet agriculture in 1920-1940s compare to Brazil. But I can certainly say that they were seriously unproductive in 1960s-80s compare to developed nations. I would be interested in seeing statitical data regarding kolkhozes being more productive than american farms.
 * Regarding statistics. There was a joke in the USSR in Brezhnev era: A journalist comes to a kolkhoz to take an interview from a particularly productive milker. J: "You show such great results milking 50 liters per cow. But what if the party asks you to increase productivity? Can you milk 60 liters per cow?" M: "Sure", J: "How about 70 liters?". M: "Well, if I try harder, perhaps I can". J: "80 liters?". M: "That would be very difficult, but not impossible". J: "100 liters?". M: "Nah, impossible. Otherwise everyone would see already that it's water".

 * As far as productivity in the 1960s, putting aside the devasatation wreaked on the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which was not helped by a Marshall Plan (in fact, the USSR had to have a military buildup due to the Cold War), the US had a massive head start on the USSR. Even if the USSR stayed constant with the US's growth rate from 1917-1960, the US would still be far ahead due to its enormous head start in 1917.  Which is the same for other countries.  The USSR had to industrialize when the Bolsheviks took over, somethign Western countries had already done long ago.
 * Beyond that is the question of despite the enormous head start, if USSR productivity ever outstripped Western productivity. As posted above, are examples such as Soviet cotton yield, which was often better than American cotton yield, including the period of the second half of the 20th century. Ruy Lopez 22:57, 22 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Mechanization of Soviet Agriculure
I once came across a book that contained some interesting information about Soviet farm equipment. The info was from the mid-late '70s. One thing it mentioned was that the Soviets were manufacturing 3-4 times as many tractors as the U.S. It also stated that the average age of the Soviet tractor was about 3 years versus 20 years for the U.S. The problem was that the Soviet tractors were of such poor quality, they didn't last very long and needed to be replaced quite often. I'll have to see If I can locate that book again. 71.38.174.228 (talk) 03:57, 4 November 2009 (UTC)

 * How could they get reliable information on such things in the middle of the cold war?108.131.122.159 (talk) 02:34, 2 September 2015 (UTC)

References rather than opinions
With respect to the question of productivity we need to move away from opinions based on our preferences to statistics and reports of actual situations. For example, from page 183 to 191 of Age of Delerium: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union, ISBN 0394529340 are journalistic reports of agricultural life, at page 186, "In fact, the atmosphere on the collective farm was that of a permanent general strike. The farmers were drunk at least half of the time, and each one did everything possible to avoid work while maintaining a keen interest in the shirking of others." At page 187, "The group drinking usually began a short time later as the collective farmers gathered in the woods or behind bushes or in a garage where tractors were being prepared. Elsewhere on the territory, tractor drivers met in the fields to drink. Life on the collective farm soon fell under an alcoholic cloud as scores of people swayed as they walked through the villages, and there were violent scenes in the stores." I'm not sure how to handle these anecdotal reports, but they reflect the viewpoint of western observers of collective farm life. Fred Bauder 14:57, Nov 22, 2004 (UTC)
 * I completely agree, we need references, not opinions. But then you give some anecdotal stories, which even you question the worth of.  Some type of anecdotal material is fine, but the entire article can't be composed of that.  Regarding things like productivity, we need to talk about yield per acre, yield per capital invested and that sort of thing more than anecdotes.  I've used various sources such as "Soviet Agriculture: A critique of the myths constructed by Western critics" written by an American liberal.
 * No disagreement with you here, I completely agree. Ruy Lopez 23:02, 22 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * Just in case if you are interested - I was born in 1966 and though I lived in Moscow, I am somewhat familiar with the situation in agriculture. My familiarity comes from two sources: (a) I consmed their products and (b) Every year they were mobilizing people from the city to go to the kolhozes and sovhozes to help out with the harvest. I worked on the milk farm and potato farms. Now, as for the things they produced - there was an opinion somewhere here that it is wrong to compare state sector with private one becase state sector has been working only on "low-value" crops. Wrong. They were supposed to work on everything. Problem was - they could not even produce basic staples. Also, it is quite wrong to proclaim that in the USSR people consumed more milk then in the US and still they were dissatisfied. You know - in Chukotka they consume more meat then anywhere in the world - but this is only because meat is all they have! We did not have fresh produce, fuits, vegetables during the most of the year. In the second half of Winter and Spring the only potatoes, carrots and onions left in stores were frost-bitten and partially rotten. We had a handfull of types of canned fish, bologna with unknown recipe (I once worked on a meat-packing plant and saw rats running between meat-grinders - on top of whatever went there by design) and two-three kinds of cheese. Now, (b) - working on collective farm. However much you read about drunkenness there - you won't believe the scale of the problem. Nobody cared. Barely anybody worked. Barely any equipement worked. There were few "Potemkin farms" to be shown to the West and on TV - but that was all. People worked on their small private lots that were usually 600 square meters per family (that means that one builds a small hous on 200-300 and grows some vegetables on the rest). People from Moscow were getting lots that sometimes were 100 kilometers away - 2-4 hours commute on trains, busses and such. And those were the lucky ones. My mom was a teacher - and schools were neither rich nor important to get lots for their faculties. It also worth mentioning that USSR operated on the soils that were the best for the agricultural purposes. Probasbly the best in the World and the most abundant ones. For the USSR to import wheat from Canada was as a defeat as for Saudi Arabia to start importing oil from Germany. last, but not the least, I think you should mention that during Stalin agriculture workers were not allowed to leave theier kolhozes and sovhozes. They were not issued internal passports. They were practically slaves.

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A source cited was rejected by an academic journal.
I've been doing research for one of my own papers, and used one of the sources cited in this article. The source, "Soviet Agriculture: A Critique of the Myths Constructed by Western Critics," by Joseph E. Medley, Ph.D, was written with the intention of being published, however the link goes to a forum about the history of the Soviet Union rather than an academic article. I recently got into contact with Medley, and found out that the paper was rejected for publication. I understand that the article is cited as valid criticisms of the classical Western beliefs of communism and its effectiveness (which I disagree with myself, but that's besides the point).

I'm just wondering what the protocol for this might be.

For completeness, here's Medley's response to when I asked him for a more formal source:
 * Sorry. Politics. Rejected for publication. No suggested revisions.

Discflame (talk) 02:40, 5 December 2017 (UTC)

Soviet Agriculture: A Critique of the Myths Constructed by Western Critics
Hey, regarding the source being self-published, note that the full url is www.usm.maine.edu/eco/joe/works/Soviet.html. Universities commonly give (gave?) their professors direct ftp access to a personal subdirectory of the university website on the understanding it will be more or less used for work purposes. Aside from the url, the blank html format of the page is a dead giveaway of that too. For all intents and purposes that's his personal website that just happens to be hosted by his employer.

There's also the claim in the section above that the article was rejected for publication.

Medley is a Associate Professor of Economics at the University of South Maine, however all of his published articles seemed to be on Aid and Development or South Asia. He doesn't appear to have published anything about the Soviet Union, so I can't see him qualifying as an expert. --RaiderAspect (talk) 04:32, 31 May 2019 (UTC)
 * Looking at citaitons of Medley's work, I've found two. One is here https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/36119 "Small Is Beautiful: Soviet Classical and American Inverted Totalitarianism in the Malthusian Century and the Post-Growth Paradigm". Kent just cites a statistic from Medley's article without discussing his central thesis. The second is "Ideas for a study on the politics of the Russian Federation in the area of the Black Sea 1991-2013" https://etd.adm.unipi.it/t/etd-09192014-004054/ which cites his article to make the case that agricultural policy during the Perestroika was unsuccessful. These citing sources are both masters theses, which are not self-published, though iffy per WP:SCHOLARSHIP. Do you think Calafiore's work is a more reviewed version of this perspective (sadly my English translation is based off of Google translate, so forgive me if I'm missing part of her claim)? I wouldn't want to entirely remove this perspective from the page, but I also don't want to give undue weight to one source, and I see your concern about Medley likely not being a peer reviewed source. --HighFlyingFish (talk) 07:58, 1 June 2019 (UTC)
 * Other sources I've found like this one https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/278252/ ("Efficiency and Growth in Agriculture: A Comparative Study of the Soviet Union, United States, Canada, and Finland") also show academic perspectives that question the inefficiency thesis the article attributes to Smith. Koopman instead makes the case that slow technological development, rather than economic differences, accounts for the differences in growth. A number of academic sources (e.g. http://stasykon.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Publ_Wos_2017_Praha_Konts_Alb_paper_eng.pdf) "MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING AND AGRICULTURAL EFFICIENCY CONTROL IN RUSSIA" also make statements similar to Calafiore's, that agriculture collapsed during and after the breakup of the USSR but I haven't yet found anything peer-reviewed quantifying that paritcular claim in terms of efficiency. --HighFlyingFish (talk) 08:22, 1 June 2019 (UTC)
 * Sadly I'm monolingual and just as dependent on google translate as you are with Calafiore. Regarding "Efficiency and Growth in Agriculture: A Comparative Study of the Soviet Union, United States, Canada, and Finland", I believe the author is using the term "technical efficiency" to mean something other than "use of technology". Note in particular this analysis from p33:

 * "If these conclusions are correct, what the Soviet Union might need to improve economic performance is more flexibility and incentives to innovate,rather than improvements in a system that is statically efficient in the allocation and use of resources but causes dynamic inefficiency by inhibiting innovation and change."

 * From my reading the article would seem to support rather than contradict the mainstream view that the problems with Soviet agriculture were managerial in nature. I'll see if I can decipher Calafiore or find another source. --RaiderAspect (talk) 06:24, 2 June 2019 (UTC)

Sorry I haven't been in contact. I've looked at a few sources, but I haven't had much time. While I think its not NPOV to leave Smith's view as the only one in the article long-term, I can see a case for Medley currently getting undue weight since his piece wasn't peer reviewed, and the people citing him aren't referring to his main conclusion. So if you remove it I won't object again. I'll look for a good source to replace him as a counterpoint when I have more time, likely over the weekend. Russian wikipedia, speeks pretty positively about Soviet agriculture, but it just has a bunch of yield statistics, without really looking at how much it cost to produce that yield. Two things I've found so far: this source mentions that Soviet authorities cited higher wages to explian inefficiency https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668137908411266?journalCode=ceas19 ("Soviet agricultural specialization and efficiency") however independent analysis shows that this doesn't explain all the observed costs. This article https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668137908411266?journalCode=ceas19 ("Agricultural Output and Productivity in the Former Soviet Republics"), and many others say that agricultural output fell when the USSR collapsed, but its very possible for output to fall while efficiency increases, e.g. because less efficient operations don't withstand market forces. I did find a paper showing that in Central Asia efficiency increased after the USSR fell (so this supports Smith's view with some newer, post-cold war data, at least for that region) but I've lost it rn. I'll try to find it again. All these sources are paywalled. I can get to a university campus where I can access them, but I just need more time to do that, and I don't have much right now. The last thing I'll note is that efficiency in economics has many meanings, so we get papers like this https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139008411866?journalCode=ceas19 "Why does the Soviet economy appear to be allocatively efficient?" which are quite criticial of the soviet economy, but still call it "efficient". Once again, I'll understand what that means once I have time to get the whole article. --HighFlyingFish (talk) 02:17, 5 June 2019 (UTC)

I've accessed and read through "Agricultural Output and Productivity in the Former Soviet Republics". My understanding of it is as follows: their measure of productivity is the difference between calculated value of inputs and calculated value of outputs. They also talk about output per worker. Their conclusions are that from 1990-1995 output per worker, along with total agricultural output and a variety of other variables, declined percipitously in all republics. From 1995 to 1997, efficiency and productivity improved over 1992 levels in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldovia, Armenia and Georgia and continued to decline in Latvia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgistan. If your interested, I think I can send you the article "(h) on an ad hoc basis and without commercial gain or in a manner that would substitute for direct access to the Content via services offered by JSTOR, sharing discrete portions of Content for purposes of collaboration, comment, or the scholarly exchange of ideas" (https://about.jstor.org/terms/). I think noting that efficiency often fell after the USSR fell in the new market economies, and sometimes took more than 5 years to recover would be a pretty solid counterpoint to the western cold war historian's take so we can put that in and remove Medley's article or mention it briefly. I am a bit unsure how they're defining efficiency, because they never quantify it directly, they just describe it in relation to productivity ((Output-input)/worker), but I think they're using the two words interchangably. I'll look at the other articles later, because there's definitely more to this (for one I'm pretty sure I've seen literature saying Kazakhstan does recover and do better eventually). --HighFlyingFish (talk) 03:14, 11 June 2019 (UTC)

Here's my source for Kazakhstan eventually recovering https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/44664101/Csaki_CorvinusConferencePaper.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DAgricultural_Recovery_and_Individual_Lan.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20190706%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20190706T201102Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=844656230f46ad88bd9867f4baeedba7a644e4798c2594114d161497dd5930de ("Agricultural Recovery and Individual Land Tenure: Evidence from Central Asia"). Do you happen to know what GAO index is? --HighFlyingFish (talk) 20:21, 6 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Medley's argument, if correct, begs the question of why this strongly ideological regime continued to allow private plots throughout its entire history (except during initial collectivisation). Why did Stalin allow it? Why did Khrushchev expand it? Why didn't Brezhnev eliminate it entirely? And how exactly did Russia go from being a big exporter of agricultural product to an importer despite mechanisation? If Medley addressed this, perhaps what he said could be added to the paragraph on his claims. LastDodo (talk) 11:51, 4 June 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Agriculture in the Soviet Union


text:
Ghedi

Ghedi (Brescian: Ghét) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy, Italy. It received the honorary title of city with a presidential decree on November 24, 2001.

Ghedi is known for a base of the Italian Air Force, Ghedi Air Base. It was also the site of the Palazzo Orsini, now demolished, a c.1515 doorway from which survives in the collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London.

Climate
Ghedi experiences a four-season humid subtropical climate (Köppen: Cfa).

History
The town has been founded during the Early Middle Ages by the Longobards, as a small village defended by a fortified enclosure. This area is called Castle of Ghedi, in which arose the ancient Early Christian church, some small shacks and, since the High Middle Ages, the town hall. During the 14th century, the construction of structures outside the walls began and were formed four suburbs: Bazzina, Gazzolo, Borgonuovo and Malborgo.

The town, due to its location and its citadel, soon gained much strategic importance and, on August 15, 1453, it was the theater for the Battle of Ghedi, between Republic of Venice and Duchy of Milan. During this century, in the town opened a Franciscan convent (1465). In 1498, Venice granted in fief the town to Niccolò Orsini, count of Pitigliano and of Nola and commander of the Venetian army, which commanded to erect Palazzo Orsini and to place a funeral monument in the convent's church.

Due to the development of increasingly powerful weapons, during the 16th century, Ghedi and its castle lost their strategic importance, and the town began to decline. During the 18th century, Palazzo Orsini, in state of decay, collapsed; its access portal was bought by the Victoria and Albert Museum of London, where it is still located. In the same century, the Niccolò Orsini's funeral monument was bought by Santa Giulia Museum, where it is still located.

During the 20th century, Ghedi experienced economic growth, favored by construction of the Train Station (1893) and of the Ghedi Air Base (1909). In this period, the Cotonificio del Mella cotton mill opened with around 500 workers and became the largest factory in the town.

title: Ghedi


text:
Citi Private Bank

Citi Private Bank is the private banking division of Citibank; it provides banking services to high-net-worth individuals, family offices, law firms, and other institutions. According to the company's website, it has a minimum investment level of $10 million and a total net worth requirement of $25 million; however, in some cases, these minimums are waived.

title: Citi Private Bank


text:
Gianico

Gianico (Camunian: Jànec) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy.

title: Gianico


text: Category:Olympic table tennis players for Denmark


text:
Gottolengo

Gottolengo (Otalènch) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy. As of 2011 Gottolengo had a population of 5,368.

title: Gottolengo


text:
Gussago

Gussago (Brescian: Gösàch) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy. The town is situated in Franciacorta, an area known for its precious wines. There are also many other cookery specialities, as spiedo (where meat such as pork, beef, chicken and rabbit is skewered with potato slices and sage leaves), meat products and wines.

The most important monument is Santissima, an old cloister situated on the summit of Barbisone Hill. The patroness Saint of Gussago is St. Mary.

Twin towns
Gussago is twinned with:

 * 🇸🇸 Aliap, South Sudan, since 2005

title: Gussago


text:
USS Flying Fish (SS-229)

USS Flying Fish (SS/AGSS-229), a Gato-class submarine, was the first submarine and second ship of the United States Navy to be named for the flying fish. Flying Fish is credited with having sunk a total of 58,306 tons of Japanese shipping and received 12 battle stars for World War II service.

Construction and commissioning
The keel of Flying Fish was laid down on 6 December 1940 by the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard at Kittery, Maine. She was launched on 9 July 1941, sponsored by Mrs. Dorothy K. Kimmel, wife of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Flying Fish was commissioned 10 December 1941, Lieutenant Commander Glynn "Donc" Donaho in command.

December 1941–May 1942
After shakedown training, Flying Fish transited the Panama Canal and departed Balboa in the Panama Canal Zone on 17 April 1942 bound for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During her voyage, a United States Army Air Forces plane mistook her for a Japanese submarine and dropped depth charges on her, but she submerged and avoided damage. She arrived at Pearl Harbor on 2 May 1942.

First war patrol - Battle of Midway
On 17 May 1942, Flying Fish was ordered out to patrol west of Midway Atoll in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, which was threatened by an expected Japanese attack. During the Battle of Midway of 3–7 June 1942, she and her sisters fanned out to scout and screen the atoll, at which she refitted from 9 to 11 June. Continuing her first full war patrol, she searched major shipping lanes in the seas around Japan and scored a hit on a Japanese destroyer off Formosa during the night of 3 July 1942. She returned to Midway to refit on 25 July 1942.

Second war patrol, August – September 1942
On 15 August 1942, Flying Fish departed on her second war patrol, bound for a patrol area north of Truk. On 28 August, only three days after arriving on station, Flying Fish sighted the masts of a Japanese battleship (now known to be Yamato), guarded by two destroyers and air cover. She launched four torpedoes at this prime target, and two hits were detected by sonar. Immediately the counterattack began, and as Flying Fish prepared to launch torpedoes at one of the destroyers, rapidly closing to starboard, her commanding officer was blinded by a geyser of water thrown up by a bomb. Flying Fish went deep for cover. A barrage of 36 depth charges followed. When Flying Fish daringly came up to periscope depth 2 hours later, she found the two destroyers still searching, aided by two harbor submarine chasers and five aircraft. A great cloud of black smoke hung over the scene, persisting through the remaining hours of daylight. As Flying Fish upped periscope again a little later, a float plane dropped bombs directly astern, and the alert destroyers closed in. A salvo of torpedoes at one of the destroyers missed, and Flying Fish went deep again to endure another depth charging. Surfacing after dark, she once more attracted the enemy through excessive smoke from one of her engines, and again she was forced down by depth charges. Early in the morning of 29 August, she at last cleared the area to surface and charge her batteries. Possibly the torpedo explosions were premature; Japanese records show no warships lost on 28 August 1942.

Unshaken by this long day of attack, Flying Fish closed on Truk once more 2 September 1942, and attacked a 400-ton patrol vessel, only to see the torpedoes fail to explode upon hitting the target. The patrol ship ran down the torpedo tracks and began a depth charge attack, the second salvo of which damaged Flying Fish considerably. A second patrol ship came out to join the search; Flying Fish successfully evaded both opponents and cleared the area. Determinedly, she returned to the scene late the next night, and finding a single patrol vessel, sank her with two torpedoes just after midnight early on 4 September. Two hours later a second patrol craft came out, and as Flying Fish launched a stern shot, the Japanese ship opened fire, then swerved to avoid the torpedo. Flying Fish dived for safety, enduring seven depth charge runs by the patrol vessel. Two destroyers joined the patrol craft, and all three kept the submarine under attack for five hours. At last able to get clear, Flying Fish sailed for Pearl Harbor, where she arrived 15 September.

Third and fourth war patrols, October 1942 – February 1943
Flying Fish cleared Pearl Harbor 27 October, headed for her patrol area south of the Marshall Islands. Three times on this third patrol she launched bold attacks on Japanese task forces, only to suffer the frustration of poor torpedo performance, or to score hits causing damage which postwar evaluation could not confirm. She arrived at Brisbane for refit on 16 December 1942.

On 6 January 1943, Flying Fish started her fourth war patrol, a reconnaissance of the Marianas. Along with gaining much valuable intelligence, she damaged the Japanese troop transport Tokai Maru (8359 tons) in Apra harbor, Guam, on 26 January, hit the Japanese troop transport Nagizan Maru (4391 tons)  in Tinian's Sunharon Roadstead 6 February, and sank the freighter Hyuga Maru (994 tons) in the presence of patrolling aircraft and surface escorts 16 February. She returned to Pearl Harbor 28 February.

Crew casualties in Honolulu, 9 March 1943
On March 9, 1943, three crewmen of the Flying Fish - Lyman Darol Williams, Leonard Mathis Sturms, and Harley Albert Kearney died after drinking wood alcohol at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Waikiki during their rest and recreation in Honolulu, Hawaii. The three seamen were the only casualties the crew of Flying Fish suffered during World War II.

Fifth war patrol, March 1943 – May 1943
Flying Fish stood out of Pearl Harbor 24 March for her fifth war patrol, this one to the coast of Honshū, where the submarine was battered by foul weather. On 12 April, she closed the northern coast to make a daring attack on the cargo vessel Sapporo Maru No.12 (2865 tons) which she sank, again in the presence of scout planes and armed trawlers. Moving north to Hokkaidō, Flying Fish damaged a large freighter on 13 April, and two days later torpedoed the inter-island transport ship Seiryu Maru (1904 tons) which beached itself in a mass of flames. Continuing her bold inshore attacks, on 19 April Flying Fish sank the Japanese army cargo ship Amaho Maru (2774 tons), and in the Tsugaru Strait on 24 April, sent cargo ship Kasuga Maru (1374 tons) the bottom. On 1 May a small inter-island freighter was sunk, but an alert enemy antisubmarine group shook Flying Fish considerably before she could clear the area. She returned to Midway from this highly successful patrol 11 May.

Sixth war patrol, June – July 1943
After five grueling patrols Lieutenant Commander Donaho turned command over to Captain Frank T. Watkins. On her sixth patrol (2 June – 27 July), Flying Fish patrolled in the Volcano Islands and off Taiwan. Her first attacks, two against the same convoy, resulted in unconfirmed damage, but off Taiwan on 2 July, she blasted the stern off of the merchant passenger/troop transport Canton Maru (2822 tons) watching it sink. While Pearl Harbor-bound from her patrol area, she made a two-day chase for a fast convoy, but was forced by her dwindling fuel supply to break off the hunt. On 11 July she destroyed the 125 foot sailing vessel Japanese guard boat Takatori Maru No.8 (51 tons) with gunfire, leaving it aflame from stem to stern.

Seventh war patrol, October – November 1943
After a major overhaul at Pearl Harbor from 27 July to 4 October 1943, Flying Fish sailed on her seventh war patrol, again with her original skipper, bound for the Palaus. Her first attack, 18 October, scored at least one hit on Japanese aircraft carrier Chūyō. A two-day tracking of a well-escorted convoy from 26 – 28 October resulted in the sinking of troop transport ship Nanman Maru (6550 tons), on 27 October and the damaging of two merchantmen before Flying Fish ran out of torpedoes. She arrived at Midway 6 November.

Eighth, ninth, and tenth war patrols, November 1943 – July 1944
Flying Fish's eighth war patrol, the first to be commanded by Lieutenant Commander R. D. Risser, between Taiwan and the China coast from 30 November 1943 to 28 January 1944, found her sinking the passenger/cargo ship Ginyo Maru (8613 tons) laden with 6880 tons of maize, 600 tons of rice, 50 tons of beans, and 195 passengers on 16 December, taking 66 crewmen, 3 IJN gunners, and 118 passengers to the bottom, and fleet tanker Kyuei Maru (10,171 tons – entering service on 6 September 1943.) from convoy Hi-27 on 27 December. Her refit and retraining between patrols were held once more at Pearl Harbor.

Flying Fish sailed for her ninth war patrol 22 February for the waters off Iwo Jima. On 12 March, she sent the merchantman Taijin Maru (1924 tons) to the bottom, then closed the Okinawa shore and attacked a convoy in the early morning darkness of 16 March. The passenger/cargo ship Anzan Maru (5493 tons) was sunk and the tanker Teikon Maru (ex-German Winnetou), was damaged in this attack. Pressing on with her chase for six hours in the hope of finishing off the tanker, the submarine was detected and held down by aircraft and destroyers while the tanker escaped. On the afternoon of 31 March, Flying Fish was attacked by a Japanese submarine, whose torpedoes she skillfully evaded. Bound for Majuro at the close of her patrol, on April Fool's Day 1944, the submarine torpedoed and sank the freighter Minami Maru (2398 tons – formally the Norwegian Solviken). at Kitadaitōjima. Flying Fish closed out her patrol and arrived at Majuro 11 April 1944.

Clearing Majuro harbor 4 May, Flying Fish sailed for her tenth war patrol, coordinated with the assault on the Marianas scheduled to open the next month. First she covered shipping lanes between Ulithi, Yap, and Palau, coming under severe attack after one of her torpedoes exploded just outside the tubes on the night of 24 – 25 May when she was detected while attacking a four-ship convoy. At dawn, however, she had got back into position to sink the Japanese troop transport Taito Maru (4466 tons) loaded with 5,300 aviation gasoline cans, 2,500m3 of arms and 500-tons of cement, and the passenger/cargo ship Osaka Maru (3740 tons). The Osaka Maru was also out of Saipan bound for Palau in the same convoy, carrying 824 passengers and materials for the war effort. 97 passengers and all of the cargo went down with the ship.

Along with other American submarines, she then headed to take up a patrol station between the Palaus and San Bernardino Strait, from which she could scout any movement by the enemy fleet out of its base at Tawi in the Sulus while the Marines were landed on Saipan. On 15 June, the day of the invasion, Flying Fish spotted a Japanese carrier force emerging from San Bernardino Strait bound eastward. Her prompt report of this movement enabled a sister submarine, USS Cavalla (SS-244), to sink the carrier Shōkaku four days later while American carrier aircraft broke the back of Japanese naval aviation in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Flying Fish remained on her scouting station until 23 June, then sailed for Manus and Brisbane, arriving there 5 July.

Eleventh war patrol, October – November 1944
On 1 August 1944, Flying Fish was escorted out to sea from Brisbane, Australia, to begin her eleventh war patrol, this one taking her to Davao Gulf, the coast of Celebes, and along the shipping lanes from the Philippines to Halmahera. She departed Brisbane in the company with the submarine USS Flounder (SS-251), which was to share a patrol area with her. On 8 August, Flying Fish and Flounder arrived in the Admiralty Islands and moored alongside the submarine tender USS Euryale (AS-22) to take on fuel. As Flying Fish proceeded to her patrol area on 9 August 1944, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cogswell (DD-651) depth-charged her after she submerged to a depth of 250 ft as Cogswell approached and did not respond to Cogswell's sonar recognition signals. Cogswell set her depth charges to explode at 150 ft and halted her attack after Flying Fish responded to the recognition signals. Flying Fish suffered no damage.

Flying Fish arrived in her patrol area off Manado, Celebes, on 14 August 1944 Flying Fish was held down much of the time by Japanese aircraft. After refueling at Mios Woendi from 29 August to 1 September 1944, she closed Celebes, where on 7 September she detected a concealed Japanese airstrip. Her report led to the airfield's bombardment by Allied aircraft 11 days later. Through the remainder of her patrol she served on lifeguard duty for air strikes on Celebes. She concluded her patrol with her arrival at Midway on 18 October 1944.

October 1944–May 1945
Flying Fish departed Midway and proceeded to San Francisco, California, where she was equipped with naval mine detection and clearance equipment to enable her to penetrate the Sea of Japan. After testing her new gear she proceeded to Guam, which she reached on 18 May 1945.

Twelfth war patrol, May – July 1945
At Guam, Flying Fish joined a submarine task group for her 12th war patrol. She departed on 29 May 1945 for the heavily mined Tsushima Strait, entering the Sea of Japan 7 June. Then each of the task group's submarines headed for her own assigned area, Flying Fish setting course north for the coast of Korea. On 10–11 June, in separate attacks, she sank two cargo ships, Taga Maru (2,220 tons) on the 10th and Meisei Maru (3,095 tons) on the 11th, taking aboard one survivor. Five days later she sank ten small craft with gunfire and forced two others to beach themselves. She completed her patrol at Pearl Harbor on 4 July 1945. Hostilities with Japan ended on 15 August 1945.

Post-World War II service
Flying Fish returned to Naval Submarine Base New London on 21 September 1945 to become flagship of Commander, Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet ( COMSUBLANT ). During the next eight years, from her base at New London, Flying Fish conducted United States Naval Reserve training cruises in Long Island Sound and Block Island Sound, exercised off the Virginia Capes, trained men of foreign navies, joined in major operations in the Caribbean, and cruised to Canadian ports. She was reclassified as an auxiliary submarine, AGSS-229, on 29 November 1950.

On 11 January 1951, Flying Fish completed her duty as flagship and began to serve the Underwater Sound Laboratory in sonar experiments, notably testing a passive GHG sonar salvaged from the former German heavy cruiser GERMAN CRUISER Prinz Eugen in a large array surrounding her conning tower. On 29 February 1952, at 10:53, Flying Fish became the first American submarine to make 5,000 dives. On board for the event was a distinguished party headed by United States Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball.

Decommissioning and disposal
Placed in commission in reserve on 31 December 1953, Flying Fish was decommissioned at New London on 28 May 1954 and was sold for scrapping 1 May 1959.

Honors and awards
Of Flying Fish's twelve war patrols, all save the 11th were designated as "successful". She is credited with having sunk a total of 58,306 tons of enemy shipping. She received 12 battle stars for World War II service.

Awards

 * American Campaign Medal ribbon.svg American Campaign Medal
 * Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with 12 battle stars
 * World War II Victory Medal ribbon.svg World War II Victory Medal
 * National Defense Service Medal ribbon.svg National Defense Service Medal

title: USS Flying Fish (SS-229)


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Idro, Lombardy

Idro (Brescian: Ider) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy. It is situated near the southwestern end of Lake Idro, and at the northeastern end of the Valle Sabbia. Bordering communes are Anfo, Bagolino, Bondone, Capovalle, Lavenone, Treviso Bresciano and Valvestino.

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Category:Military tactics

Military tactics are the collective name for methods used by units up to a division in strength in engaging and defeating an enemy in combat. Changes in philosophy and technology over time have been reflected in changes to military tactics. Tactics should be distinguished from military strategy, which is concerned with the overall means and plan for achieving a long-term outcome, and operational art, an intermediate level in which the aim is to convert the strategy into tactics. See also Category:Military doctrines and Category:Military strategy

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Ansty, Warwickshire

Ansty is a village and civil parish in the Rugby Borough of Warwickshire, England, about 5 mi northeast of Coventry city centre and 7 miles (13 km) south of Hinckley. Ansty is on the B4065, which used to be the main road between Coventry and Hinckley. The junction between the M6 and M69 motorways and A46 road is 1 mi southwest of the village. The parish had a population of 299 at the 2021 Census.

The northern section of the Oxford Canal, once a major coal-carrying network and now a popular leisure resource, passes through the village. Ansty has been cited as "the most boater-hostile village on the canals" because of the huge number of "no mooring" signs.

History
The Domesday Book of 1086 mentions Anestie as part of the hundred of Brinklow. The main landowner was Lady Godiva. Ansty was part of the County of the City of Coventry from 1451 until that county was dissolved in 1842.

The Church of England parish church of Saint James has a 13th-century chancel. The arcade between the nave and north aisle is 14th century. Sir George Gilbert Scott rebuilt the rest of the church in 1856.

Ansty Hall, just outside the village, was built in 1678 for Richard Taylor, who had been on the Parliamentarian side in the English Civil War. The house is arranged in seven bays and built of brick with stone quoins and pediment. It is now the Ansty Hall Hotel.

A cottage industry of weaving developed in the parish from early in the 18th century. This grew into a substantial ribbon-making trade early in the 19th century, but declined in the 1830s.

James Brindley completed the section of the Oxford Canal through Ansty in 1771. In November 1963 a 30 ft high embankment on the towpath side gave way, spilling 10,000 tons of sand and clay onto adjoining land.

RAF Ansty, a Royal Air Force training base, operated nearby between 1936 and 1953. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, Armstrong Siddeley Motors had its development plant for gas turbines and aircraft rocket motors as well as the Gamma rocket motors used in the Black Knight and Black Arrow launchers. The plant is now the Ansty engineering works of Rolls-Royce. In 2013, Rolls-Royce announced the closure of the military part of the plant. The civil part of the plant remains unaffected.

In 2012, Ansty erected its first War Memorial, a black obelisk, after the hard work of local villagers headed by Chief Petty Officer Dean Bateman.

In 2017 Geely Commercial Vehicles (London Electric Vehicle Company) established a major production facility for EV taxis and vans 1.5 miles south of the village at Ansty Park (separated by the M6 motorway).

Amenities
Ansty has a gastropub restaurant, The Rose and Castle just beside the canal and The Ansty Club on Grove Road. There is also The Ansty Golf Club which is open to none members.

title: Ansty, Warwickshire


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Dieter Wisliceny

Dieter Wisliceny (13 January 1911 – 4 May 1948) was a member of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and one of the deputies of Adolf Eichmann, helping to organise and coordinate the wide scale deportations of the Jews across Europe during the Holocaust.

Crimes against humanity
Joining the Nazi Party in 1933 and enlisting in the SS in 1934, Wisliceny eventually rose to the rank of SS-Hauptsturmführer (captain) in 1940; he worked in the Reich Security Head Office Referat IV B4 under Adolf Eichmann. During implementation of the Final Solution, his task was the ghettoization and liquidation of several important Jewish communities in Nazi-occupied Europe, including those of Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. Wisliceny also re-introduced the yellow star in occupied countries; the yellow star being used to distinguish Jews from non-Jews. He was involved in the deportation of the Hungarian Jews in 1944.

Wisliceny was an important witness at the Nuremberg trials. His testimony would later prove important in the successful prosecution of Eichmann for his complicity in the Holocaust in Israel in 1961.

Wisliceny was extradited to Czechoslovakia, where he was tried and hanged for war crimes in 1948.

title: Dieter Wisliceny


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Incudine

Incudine (Camunian: Incüzen) is a town and comune in the province of Brescia, in Lombardy, northern Italy.

Religious architecture
The churches in Incudine are:

 * San Maurizio Church, built in the 16th century with the tower bell dating back to the 18th century. The building was expanded at the beginning of the 20th century.
 * San Bernardino Church, located in Vago; it dates back to the 17th century.
 * San Vito e Sant'Anna, located at the bottom of San Vito peak at 1860m. Its dimensions are relevant to the environmental context in which it is situated.

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Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees

The Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE, often stylized UNITE!) was a labor union in the United States clothing industry from 1995-2004.

UNITE-ILGWU/ACTWU Merger
UNITE was formed in 1995 as a merger between the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU).

UNITE's core industries were textile and apparel manufacturing, distribution, and retailing, but they also had locals involved in industrial laundry, and manufacturing in other industries.

Jay Mazur served as president of UNITE from its inception until his retirement in 2001. Bruce Raynor was later elected president, where he served until the HERE merger.

UNITE HERE Merger
In 2004, UNITE announced that it would merge with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) to form UNITE HERE. In 2009 most of the apparel and laundry workers in UNITE HERE broke away to form a separate union known as Workers United, which affiliated with the Service Employees International Union.


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