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Al-Muqtadir

Abu’l-Faḍl Jaʿfar ibn Ahmad al-Muʿtaḍid (أبو الفضل جعفر بن أحمد المعتضد) (895 – 31 October 932 AD), better known by his regnal name al-Muqtadir bi-llāh (المقتدر بالله, "Mighty in God"), was the eighteenth caliph of the Abbasid Caliphate from 908 to 932 AD (295–320 AH), with the exception of a brief deposition in favour of al-Qahir in 929.

He came to the throne at the age of 13, the youngest Caliph in Abbasid history, as a result of palace intrigues. His accession was soon challenged by the supporters of the older and more experienced Abdallah ibn al-Mu'tazz, but their attempted coup in December 908 was quickly and decisively crushed. Al-Muqtadir enjoyed a longer rule than any of his predecessors, but was uninterested in government. Affairs were run by his officials, although the frequent change of viziers—fourteen changes of the head of government are recorded for his reign—hampered the effectiveness of the administration. The Abbasid harem, where his mother, Shaghab, exercised total control, also exercised a frequently decisive influence on affairs, and especially on the advancement or dismissal of officials. After a period of consolidation and recovery under his father al-Mu'tadid and older half-brother al-Muktafi, al-Muqtadir's reign marks the onset of rapid decline. The full treasury inherited by al-Muqtadir was quickly emptied, and financial difficulties would become a persistent feature of the caliphal government. Ifriqiya fell to the Fatimids, although the commander-in-chief Mu'nis al-Muzaffar was able to repel their attempts to conquer Egypt as well. Nearer to Iraq, the Hamdanids became autonomous masters of the Jazira and the Qarmatians re-emerged as a major threat, culminating in their capture of Mecca in 929. The forces of the Byzantine Empire, under John Kourkouas, began a sustained offensive into the borderlands of the Thughur and Armenia. As a result, in February 929 a palace revolt briefly replaced al-Muqtadir with his brother al-Qahir. The new regime failed to consolidate itself, however, and after a few days al-Muqtadir was restored. The commander-in-chief, Mu'nis al-Muzaffar, was by then a virtual dictator. Urged by his enemies, al-Muqtadir attempted to get rid of him in 932, but Mu'nis marched with his troops on Baghdad, and in the ensuing battle on 31 October 932 al-Muqtadir was killed.

Birth and background
The future al-Muqtadir was born on 14 November 895, as the second son of Caliph al-Mu'tadid (r. 892–902). His mother was the Byzantine slave concubine Shaghab. Al-Mu'tadid was the son of al-Muwaffaq, an Abbasid prince who became the Caliphate's main military commander, and de facto regent, during the rule of his brother, al-Mu'tamid (r. 870–892). Al-Muwaffaq's power relied on his close ties with the ghilmān, the foreign-born "slave-soldiers" that now provided the professional mainstay of the Abbasid army. The ghilmān were highly proficient militarily, but also very expensive, and a potential political danger, as their first priority was securing their pay; alien to the mainstream of Muslim society, the ghilmān had no compunctions about overthrowing a vizier or even a caliph to secure their aims, as demonstrated during the "Anarchy at Samarra" (861–870), when five caliphs succeeded one another.

Caliphal authority in the provinces collapsed during the "Anarchy at Samarra", with the result that by the 870s the central government had lost effective control over most of the Caliphate outside the metropolitan region of Iraq. In the west, Egypt had fallen under the control of Ahmad ibn Tulun, who also disputed control of Syria with al-Muwaffaq, while Khurasan and most of the Islamic East had been taken over by the Saffarids, who replaced the Abbasids' loyal governor Muhammad ibn Tahir. Most of the Arabian peninsula was likewise lost to local potentates, while in Tabaristan a radical Zaydi Shi'a dynasty took power. Even in Iraq, the rebellion of the Zanj slaves threatened Baghdad itself, and further south the Qarmatians were a nascent threat. Until his death in 891, al-Muwaffaq was engaged in a constant struggle to avert complete collapse, but managed to suppress the Zanj and repel the Saffarids. Upon his death, his son assumed his powers, and when Caliph al-Mu'tamid died in 892, he usurped the throne from his sons. Al-Mu'tadid would prove to be the epitome of the "warrior-caliph", spending most of his reign on campaign. He managed to overthrow the local dynasts who had seized power during the Anarchy and restore control over the Jazira, the frontier towns of the Thughur, and the Jibal, but his attempts to capture Fars and Kirman were unsuccessful. In other areas, however, the fragmentation of the Islamic world continued: the Sajid dynasty was established in Adharbayjan, the Armenian princes became de facto independent, Yemen was lost to a local Zaydi dynasty, and a new radical sect, the Qarmatians, emerged and in 899 seized Bahrayn. His successor, al-Muqtadir's older half-brother al-Muktafi, was a more sedentary figure but continued al-Mu'tamid's policies, and was able to score a major victory over the Qarmatians, and reconquer the Tulunid domains.

All this came at the cost of gearing the state towards war: according to the historian Hugh N. Kennedy, based on a treasury document from the time of al-Mu'tadid's accession, "out of the total expenditure of 7915 dinars per day, some 5121 are entirely military, 1943 in areas (like riding animals and stables) which served both military and non-military and only 851 in areas like the bureaucracy and the harem which can be described as truly civilian (though even in this case, the bureaucrats’ main purpose seems to have been to arrange the payment of the army). It seems reasonable to conclude that something over 80 per cent of recorded government expenditure was devoted to maintaining the army." Paying the army thus became the chief concern of the government, but it became an increasingly difficult proposition as the outlying provinces were lost. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that in the remaining provinces, semi-autonomous governors, grandees and members of the dynasty were able to establish virtual latifundia, aided by the system of muqāṭa'a, a form of tax farming in exchange for a fixed tribute, which they often failed to pay. Even the revenues of the Sawad, the rich agricultural lands of Iraq, are known to have declined considerably at the time. Nevertheless, through stringent economy, and despite near-constant warfare, both al-Mu'tadid and al-Muktafi were able to leave a full treasury behind. Thus the restored Caliphate at the time of al-Muktafi's death was less than half the size than in its heyday under Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), but it remained a powerful and viable state, with an army that, "though it was very expensive, was probably the most effective in the Muslim world", and an almost unchallenged legitimacy as the true successors of Muhammad.

Accession and the revolt of Ibn al-Mu'tazz
In 908, al-Muktafi fell ill, and was evidently nearing his end. The issue of succession had been left open, and with the Caliph incapacitated, the vizier al-Abbas ibn al-Hasan al-Jarjara'i took it upon himself to seek out a successor. Two different versions are told of the events: Miskawayh reports that the vizier sought the advice of the most important bureaucrats (kuttāb, sing. kātib), with Mahmud ibn Dawud ibn al-Jarrah suggesting the older and experienced Abdallah ibn al-Mu'tazz, but Ali ibn al-Furat—who is usually portrayed as a villain by Miskawayh—proposing instead the thirteen-year-old Ja'far al-Muqtadir as someone weak, pliable, and easily manipulated by the senior officials. The vizier also consulted Ali ibn Isa al-Jarrah, who refused to choose, and Muhammad ibn Abdun, whose opinion has not been recorded. In the end, the vizier concurred with Ibn al-Furat, and on al-Muktafi's death Ja'far was proclaimed as heir and brought to the caliphal palace; when the testament of al-Muktafi was opened, he too had chosen his brother as his successor. A different story is reported by the Andalusi historian Arib, whereby the vizier dithered between the candidacies of Ibn al-Mu'tazz and another older Abbasid prince, Muhammad ibn al-Mu'tamid. The choice of the latter would represent a major political departure, in effect a repudiation of al-Mu'tadid's coup that had deprived the offspring of al-Mu'tamid from power, and of the officials and ghilmān that had underpinned al-Mu'tadid's regime. The vizier indeed inclined towards Muhammad, but the latter prudently chose to await al-Muktafi's death before accepting. Indeed, the Caliph recovered, and was informed that people were discussing both Ibn al-Mu'tazz and Ibn al-Mu'tamid as his possible successors. This worried al-Muktafi, who in the presence of the qāḍīs as witnesses officially nominated Ja'far as his heir, before dying. The two stories highlight different aspects of al-Muqtadir's accession: on the one hand, a cabal of officials choosing a weak and pliable ruler, "a sinister development" that inaugurated one "of the most disastrous reigns in the whole of Abbasid history [...] a quarter of a century in which all of the work of [al-Muqtadir's] predecessors would be undone", while on the other hand, the issue of dynastic succession, and especially the loyalty of al-Mu'tadid's ghilmān to his family, evidently also played an important role.

Al-Muqtadir's succession was unopposed, and proceeded with the customary ceremonies. The full treasury bequeathed by al-Mu'tadid and al-Muktafi meant that the donatives to the troops could easily be paid, as well as reviving the old practice of gifts to the members of the Hashimite families. The new caliph was also able to display his largess, and solicitude for his subjects, when he ordered the demolition of a suq erected by his predecessor near Bab al-Taq, where the merchants were forced to pay rent, instead of being able to offer their wares freely as before. This benefited the poor of the capital. Nevertheless, the intrigues surrounding his accession had not abated. The supporters of Ibn al-Mu'tazz in particular remained determined to get their candidate on the throne. According to Arib, the vizier al-Abbas had been one of the chief conspirators, but had begun to acquiesce to al-Muqtadir's rule, hoping to control him. His increasingly arrogant behaviour spurred the other conspirators on, and on 16 December 908, the Hamdanid commander al-Husayn ibn Hamdan led a group of men that killed the vizier as he was riding to his garden. The conspirators then sought to seize the young caliph as well, but the latter had managed to flee to the Hasani Palace, where he barricaded himself with his supporters. The ḥājib (chamberlain) Sawsan was the driving force behind the loyalists' resistance, urging the commanders Safi al-Hurami, Mu'nis al-Khadim, and Mu'nis al-Khazin, to defend the caliph. Al-Husayn tried the entire morning to gain entrance, but failed; and then abruptly, and without notifying his fellow conspirators, fled the city to his home of Mosul. In the meantime, the other conspirators, led by Mahmud ibn Dawud ibn al-Jarrah, had assembled in a house and proclaimed Ibn al-Mu'tazz as caliph. This had the support of some of the qāḍīs, who regarded al-Muqtadir's accession as illegal, but others were opposed, reflecting the uncertainty and indecision of the conspirators themselves. Along with Ibn Hamdan's departure, this indecision allowed al-Muqtadir's followers to regain the upper hand: Mu'nis al-Khadim led his ghilmān on boats across the Tigris to the house where Ibn al-Mu'tazz and the conspirators had gathered, and dispersed them—Arib records that Mu'nis' troops attacked the assembled supporters of Ibn al-Mu'tazz with arrows, while Miskawayh claims that they fled as soon as the troops appeared.

Whatever the true events, the coup collapsed swiftly. Ali ibn al-Furat, the only one among the leading kuttāb to not have had any contact with the conspirators, was named vizier. Muhammad ibn al-Jarrah remained a fugitive and a price was placed on his head. Ibn al-Furat tried to limit retaliations and several of the prisoners were released, but many of the conspirators were executed. The troops, whose loyalty had been decisive, received another donative equal to that of the accession. The ḥājib Sawsan, however, was soon purged, as he grew arrogant and overbearing: he was arrested by Safi al-Hurami and died under house arrest a few days later.

The queen-mother Shaghab and the harem

Al-Muqtadir was the first underage Caliph in Muslim history, and as such during the early years of his reign, a regency council (al-sāda, "the masters") was set up, comprising, according to al-Tanukhi, his mother Shaghab, her personal agent (qahramāna) Umm Musa, her sister Khatif, and another former concubine of al-Mu'tadid's, Dastanbuwayh. Saghab, usually known simply as al-Sayyida ("the Lady"), utterly "dominated her son to the exclusion of the other women in his harem, including his wives and concubines"; al-Muqtadir would spend much of his time in his mother's quarters. As a result, government business came to be determined in the private quarters of the sovereign rather than the public palace dominated by the bureaucracy, and Saghab became one of the most influential figures of her son's reign, interfering in the appointments and dismissals of officials, making financial contributions to the treasury, and undertaking charitable activities. Indeed, a common feature of all accounts by medieval sources is that "mentions of al-Muqtadir are indissolubly tied to mentions not only of his viziers, but also of his female household", and this was one of the main points of criticism for subsequent historians. Thus the contemporary historian al-Mas'udi condemned al-Muqtadir's reign as one where "those who had power were women, servants and others", while the Caliph himself "did not concern himself with State affairs", leaving his officials to govern the state. Likewise, the 13th-century chronicler Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, regarded al-Muqtadir as a "squanderer" for whom "matters concerning his reign were run by women and servants, while he was busy satisfying his pleasure". Shaghab in particular is usually portrayed as a "rapacious and short-sighted schemer" by later historians.

Shaghab spent most of her life confined in the harem, where she had her own parallel bureaucracy, with her own kuttāb devoted to both civil and military affairs. Her power was such that when her secretary Ahmad al-Khasibi was appointed vizier in 925 due to her own and her sister's influence, he regretted the appointment, since his post as kātib to the queen-mother was more beneficial to himself. The most important members of her court were the stewardesses or qahramāna, who were free to exit the harem and act as her agents in the outside world. These women wielded considerable influence, especially as intermediaries between the harem and the court; their influence with Shaghab could lead to the dismissal of even the viziers. The first incumbent was one Fatima, who drowned in the Tigris when her boat was caught in a storm. She was followed by Umm Musa, a descendant of one of the Abbasid clan's junior branches. Her plotting for her favourites, the corruption of her family, and her hostility towards the "good vizier" Ali ibn Isa al-Jarrah, who was dismissed due to her machinations in 917, are underlined in the chronicles of the period. However, when she married her niece to Abu'l-Abbas, a grandson of al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861), her rivals were quick to accuse her of aspiring to overthrow the Caliph and place her nephew on the throne. In 922/3, she was arrested and replaced by Thumal, who tortured Umm Musa, her brother, and her sister, until they had revealed where her treasure—reportedly valued at one million gold dinars—was hidden. Thumal enjoyed a reputation for cruelty; her first master, Abu Dulaf, had used her to punish servants who displeased him. Another qahramāna, Zaydan, was the antithesis of Thumal: her house was used to jail several senior officials after they were dismissed, but it was a comfortable captivity, and she often provided refuge to those persecuted by their political rivals.

Policies and events
The stand that had been made during the last four reigns to stay the decline of the Abbasid power at last came to an end. From al-Muqtadir's reign on, the Abbasids would decline. Yet, at the same time, many names that would become famous in the world of literature and science lived during this and the following reigns. Among the best known are: Ishaq ibn Hunayn (d. 911) (son of Hunayn ibn Ishaq), a physician and translator of Greek philosophical works into Arabic; ibn Fadlan, explorer; al Battani (d. 923), astronomer; al-Tabari (d. 923), historian and theologian; al-Razi (d. 930), a philosopher who made fundamental and lasting contributions to the fields of medicine and chemistry; al-Farabi (d. 950), chemist and philosopher; Abu Nasr Mansur (d. 1036), mathematician; Alhazen (d. 1040), mathematician; al-Biruni (d. 1048), mathematician, astronomer, physicist; Omar Khayyám (d. 1123), poet, mathematician, and astronomer; and Mansur al-Hallaj, a mystic, writer and teacher of Sufism most famous for his self-proclaimed attainment of unity with God (which was misunderstood and disputed as divinity), his poetry, and for his execution for heresy by al-Muqtadir.

By the time of al-Muqtadir's reign, there had been war for some years between the Muslims and the Greeks in Asia, with heavy losses for the most part on the side of the Muslims, many of whom were taken prisoner. The Byzantine frontier, however, began to be threatened by Bulgarian hordes. So the Byzantine Empress Zoe Karbonopsina sent two ambassadors to Baghdad with the view of securing an armistice and arranging for the ransom of the Muslim prisoners. The embassy was graciously received and peace restored. A sum of 120,000 golden pieces was paid for the freedom of the captives. All this only added to the disorder of the city. The people, angry at the success of the "Infidels" in Asia Minor and at similar losses in Persia, complained that the Caliph cared for none of these things and, instead of seeking to restore the prestige of Islam, passed his days and nights with slave-girls and musicians. Uttering such reproaches, they threw stones at the Imam, as in the Friday service he named the Caliph in the public prayers.

Some twelve years later, al-Muqtadir was subjected to the indignity of deposition. The leading courtiers having conspired against him, he was forced to abdicate in favour of his brother al-Qahir, but, after scenes of rioting and plunder, and loss of thousands of lives, the conspirators found that they were not supported by the troops. Al-Muqtadir, who had been kept in safety, was again placed upon the throne. The state's finances fell after this event into so wretched a state that nothing was left with which to pay the city guards. Al-Muqtadir was eventually slain outside the city gate in 320 AH (932 AD).

Al-Muqtadir's long reign had brought the Abbasids to their lowest ebb. Northern Africa was lost and Egypt nearly. Mosul had thrown off its dependence and the Greeks could make raids at pleasure along the poorly protected borders. Yet in the East formal recognition of the Caliphate remained in place, even by those who virtually claimed their independence; and nearer home, the terrible Carmathians had been for the time put down. In Baghdad, al-Muqtadir, the mere tool of a venal court, was at the mercy of foreign guards, who, commanded for the most part by Turkish and other officers of foreign descent, were frequently breaking out into rebellion. Because of al-Muqtadir's ineffective rule, the prestige which his immediate predecessors had regained was lost, and the Abbasid throne became again the object of contempt at home and a tempting prize for attack from abroad.

Rivalry between his Court officials
At court, Mu'nis was an early and staunch opponent of Ibn al-Furat, and an ally of the latter's main rival, Ali ibn Isa al-Jarrah and his faction. The conflict between the two came to a head during Ibn al-Furat's third vizierate, in 923–924. This was a troubled period, which saw Mu'nis sent to quasi-exile in Raqqa, the widespread torture of the Banu'l-Furat's political opponents, as well as the resurgence of the Qarmatian threat with the sack of Basra and the destruction of the Hajj caravan returning from Mecca. All this culminated in a military coup, the deposition of Ibn al-Furat, the recall of Mu'nis, and the subsequent execution of the aged vizier and his son.

This marked the apogee of Mu'nis's career: he was now in virtual control of the government and a decisive voice in the appointment of Ibn al-Furat's successors as viziers. At the same time, however, his power created a widening rift between him and the Caliph, with al-Muqtadir even plotting to assassinate his leading general in 927. In the summer of the same year, Mu'nis led an army to the border around Samosata, which the Byzantines had sacked. The Byzantines managed to catch the Abbasid army by surprise and inflicted a defeat upon them, killing 400 men. In the same year Mu'nis, with Hamdanid help, successfully defended Baghdad itself against a determined Qarmatian invasion. The Qarmatian raids were particularly troublesome: not only did they devastate the fertile districts of the Sawad—the government's chief source of revenue—but also diminished the prestige of the Caliph and the dynasty, especially after the Qarmatians sacked Mecca in 930 and carried off the Black Stone, precipitating the power struggle in Baghdad between Mu'nis and the court faction.

Unsuccessful coup against him
In 928, following the dismissal of his favourite, Ali ibn Isa, from the vizierate, Mu'nis launched a coup and deposed al-Muqtadir and installed his half-brother al-Qahir in his place, but reneged after a few days. Mu'nis now possessed virtually dictatorial authority over the Abbasid government.

Assassination and succession
In 931, al-Muqtadir rallied enough support to force him to leave Baghdad, but in 932, after gathering troops, Mu'nis marched onto Baghdad and defeated the caliphal army before the city walls, with al-Muqtadir falling in the field. Triumphant, Mu'nis now installed al-Qahir as caliph, but the two quickly became estranged. The new caliph resumed contacts with the defeated court faction, and found himself soon under confinement in his palace. Nevertheless, in August 933 al-Qahir managed to lure Mu'nis and his main lieutenants to the palace, where they were executed.

Family
Al-Muqtadir's only wife was Hurra. She was the daughter of Commander-in-Chief, Badr al-Mut'adidi. He was generous towards her. After his death, she remarried a man of lower status. Al-Muqtadir had numerous concubines. One of his concubines was Zalum. She was a Greek, and the mother of al-Muqtadir's eldest son, the future caliph al-Radi and Prince Harun. Another concubine was Dimna. She was the mother of Prince Ishaq, and the grandmother of the future caliph al-Qadir. Another concubine was Khalub also known as Zuhra. She was a Greek, and was the mother of the future caliph al-Muttaqi. Another concubine was Mash'ala. She was a Slavic, and the mother of the future caliph al-Muti'. Another concubine was Khamrah. She was the mother of Prince Isa, and is described as having been very charitable to the poor and the needy. She died on 3 July 988, and was buried in Rusafah Cemetery. Another concubine was the mother of Prince Ibrahim. Another concubine was the mother of a son, born in 909. She was buried in Rusafah Cemetery. Al-Muqtadir had two daughters. One died in 911, and was buried beside the grave of her grandfather caliph al-Mu'tadid in the Dar of Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Tahir. The second died in 917, and was buried in Rusafah Cemetery.

The children of al-Muqtadir are:
 * Children
 * al-Radi was born on 20 December 909, to the caliph al-Muqtadir ((r. 908 – 932)) and a Greek slave concubine named Zalum. He was nominated Heir by his father.
 * al-Muttaqi, also known as Abu Ishaq Ibrahim.
 * al-Muti', was born in 913/14 as al-Fadl, a son of Caliph al-Muqtadir and a Slavic concubine, Mash'ala.
 * Harun ibn al-Muqtadir, was the younger son of al-Muqtadir and Zalum.
 * Ishaq ibn al-Muqtadir, He was one of the younger son of al-Muqtadir. He died in March 988.
 * Isa ibn al-Muqtadir
 * Ibrahim ibn al-Muqtadir, youngest son of al-Muqtadir.

title: Al-Muqtadir


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Al-Qahir

Abu Mansur Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Mu'tadid (أبو المنصور محمد بن أحمد المعتضد), usually known simply by his regnal title al-Qahir bi'llah (القاهر بالله), was the nineteenth caliph of the Abbasid Caliphate from 932 to 934. He was born 286 AH (899 C.E.) and died 339 AH (950 C.E.).

Early life
Al-Qahir was a son of the 16th Abbasid caliph, al-Mu'tadid ((r. 892 – 902)), and brother of the 18th Caliph, al-Muqtadir ((r. 908 – 932)). The mother of al-Qahir was a concubine called Fitnah. (She was the mother of al-Mu'tadid's third son, al-Qahir). His full name was Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Mu'tadid al-Qahir bi'llah, and his was Abu Mansur.

Rise to the throne
Al-Qahir came to the throne as part of his brother's conflict with the increasingly powerful commander-in-chief, Mu'nis al-Muzaffar. He was first chosen as Caliph in March 929, when Mu'nis launched a coup and deposed al-Muqtadir. Although al-Muqtadir was restored after a few days, Mu'nis now possessed virtually dictatorial authority over the Abbasid government.

In 932, after another breach with al-Muqtadir, Mu'nis marched on Baghdad. Al-Muqtadir tried to confront him, and was killed in the ensuing battle. However, in the subsequent assembly of dignitaries, Mu'nis' candidacy of al-Muqtadir's son Ahmad (the future al-Radi) was rejected in favour of al-Qahir (31 October 932). He was then 35 years old.

Caliphate
The new caliph had a pronounced "headstrong and vindictive personality", according to Dominique Sourdel, which made itself felt soon after his accession, when he tortured his brother's sons and officials, as well as al-Muqtadir's mother Shaghab, to extract their fortune. He was more energetic than his predecessor and cultivated an image of austerity and puritanism at his court, in deliberate contrast to the extravagantly dissolute life led by al-Muqtadir, but behind the scenes he too indulged in drunkenness.

Trying to counteract the influence of Mu'nis and of the vizier Ibn Muqla, who controlled government, and re-assert the power of his office, al-Qahir resumed contacts with the defeated court faction through Muhammad ibn Yaqut. This alarmed Mu'nis and his supporters, but they were too late. In July 933, al-Qahir struck: the plans of the chamberlain Ibn Yalbaq to depose him were thwarted, and he and Mu'nis were arrested and executed, while Ibn Muqla was forced to flee the capital.

Al-Qahir appointed Muhammad ibn al-Qasim ibn Ubayd Allah as vizier. Al-Qahir embarked on a firmly anti-Shi'a policy, declaring himself the "Avenger of the enemies of the Faith" (al-muntaqim min aʿdāʾ dīn Allāh), a slogan which he even put on his coins. Despite his support of the Caliph's anti-Shi'a policies, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim was soon dismissed in favour of Ahmad al-Khasibi. Like his predecessor, however, al-Khasibi was unable to overcome the mounting financial crisis of the state.

The contemporary Baghdadi historian al-Mas'udi, in his Meadows of Gold, reports that "His fits of violence made him the fear and terror of his subjects". He went about armed with a lance, striking down those who displeased him. However, the very "inconstancy of his behaviour and the horror inspired by his rages" alienated the populace and the court alike, and prepared the ground for his downfall.

Downfall and death
The exiled vizier Ibn Muqla continued plotting against al-Qahir; he won over the caliphal guard, which on 24 April 934 staged a coup and took the Caliph prisoner while the latter was drunk.

Refusing to abdicate in favour of al-Radi ((r. 932 – 940)), he was blinded and cast into prison. According to al-Mas'udi, al-Radi "kept news of him hidden", so that he vanished from common knowledge. He was not freed until eleven years later, when al-Mustakfi ((r. 944 – 946)) came to the throne and discovered him locked away in a remote room in the palace. He lived the remainder of his life as a beggar, dying in October 950.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Al-Qahir


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Category:Shipbuilding companies

This is the category of companies engaged in shipbuilding.

For individual persons in this activity, see Category:Shipbuilders and List of shipbuilders and shipyards, for shipyards, see Category:shipyards.

title: Category:Shipbuilding companies


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Temporary protection visa

A Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) is an Australian visa category issued to persons who had been recognised as refugees fleeing persecution. TPVs are issued to persons who apply for refugee status after making an unauthorised arrival in Australia, and is the main type of visa issued to refugees when released from Australian immigration detention facilities. TPVs were initially introduced by the Howard government on 20 October 1999, abolished by the Rudd government in August 2008, reintroduced by the Abbott government in October 2013, before being abolished again by the Albanese government in February 2023.

After being granted a TPV, refugees are required to reapply after three years, in case conditions change in their homeland. TPV holders are eligible for only some of the special settlement services funded by the Commonwealth to assist new arrivals in Australia. Unlike permanent visa (PV) holders, TPV recipients have no family reunion rights and no right to re-enter the country if they depart Australia. TPV holders do have the right to work and have access to job matching by Centrelink. They are also eligible for Special Benefit, Rent Assistance, Family Tax Benefit, Child Care Benefit, Medicare, Early Health Assessment and Intervention Program, torture and trauma counselling, and English as a second language classes (for TPV minors only).

Criticism and abolition
The scheme was controversial, with the government claiming it was a necessary response to the misuse of the asylum process by unauthorised arrivals. Refugee advocates described TPVs as a cruel way to treat people which left asylum seekers with an uncertain future. The granting of a TPV prevents a refugee from applying for permanent protection.

The Rudd government committed itself to abolition of TPVs as part of its Budget 2008-09 announcements made in May 2008. The regulations providing for the granting of permanent protection visas (PPVs) to all refugees who had established a claim for protection in Australia were introduced into the federal Parliament in August 2008. From that date, a person applying in Australia for refugee protection was granted a PPV. Individuals who held a TPV became eligible to apply for a Resolution of Status Visa, which was akin to a PPV, which was granted subject to the TPV applicant undergoing health and ASIO/AFP security checks.

Re-instatement
On 18 October 2013, the Abbott government announced the re-instatement of the TPVs. On 2 December 2013, Labor and the Greens voted in the Senate to disallow the return of TPVs.

On 11 September 2014 the High Court ruled the issuing of TPVs without the appropriate legislative powers invalid. To overcome the High Court objections, on 5 December 2014, legislation was passed to reintroduce TPVs to specifically deal with the backlog of 30,000 asylum seekers yet to be processed left by the former Labor government. The legislation was passed by the Coalition government with support of the cross bench in the Senate.

title: Temporary protection visa


text:
Al-Radi

Abu'l-Abbas Muhammad ibn Ja'far al-Muqtadir (أبو العباس أحمد (محمد) بن جعفر المقتدر; 1 January 909 – 13 December 940), usually simply known by his regnal name al-Radi bi'llah (الراضي بالله), was the twentieth Caliph of the Abbasid Caliphate, reigning from 934 to his death. He died on 23 December 940 at the age of 31. His reign marked the end of the caliph's political power and the rise of military strongmen, who competed for the title of amir al-umara.

Early life
The future al-Radi was born on 20 December 909, to the caliph al-Muqtadir ((r. 908 – 932)) and a Greek-born slave concubine named Zalum. At the age of four, he received the nominal governorship of Egypt and the Maghreb, and was sent with the commander-in-chief Mu'nis al-Muzaffar to Egypt, who became his tutor.

When Mu'nis and al-Muqtadir fell out in 927, Abu'l-Abbas and the vizier Ibn Muqla tried to mediate between his father and the powerful commander-in-chief, but to no avail. In 930, Abu'l-Abbas received the governorship over Syria from his father, although he remained in Baghdad, residing in his palace in the Muharrim quarter of the city. In the next year, rumours circulated that Mu'nis intended to abduct Abu'l-Abbas, take him to Syria, and declare him caliph there. This alarmed al-Muqtadir, who had his son brought to reside with him in the caliphal palace.

When his father was killed in 932, Abu'l-Abbas was proposed as a successor, but eventually his uncle al-Qahir ((r. 932 – 934)) was chosen. Abu'l-Abbas was imprisoned as a dangerous rival, and his properties confiscated. He remained confined until the deposition of al-Qahir, when he was freed and raised to the throne (24 April 934).

Caliphate
The contemporary historian al-Masudi describes him as pleasing in appearance, using scents in large amounts, and of a generous nature, being notable for the lavish gifts he gave his courtiers. According to al-Masudi, the caliph "enjoyed talking of the men and things of the past and sought out scholars and men of letters and frequently summoned them to his presence and lavished marks of his liberality upon them". Unlike the forceful al-Qahir, he quickly became a figurehead ruler, while ambitious men seized authority in the state.

After the distinguished former vizier Ali ibn Isa al-Jarrah declined to be reappointed to the office on account of his advanced age, Ibn Muqla, who had led the conspiracy against al-Qahir, received the post. However, for the first months of the reign, Muhammad ibn Yaqut continued to be the most powerful member of the court until his downfall in April 935; only then did Ibn Muqla truly gain control of the administration. In 935, the government was forced to take measures to confront the turmoil in Baghdad because of the behaviour of some Hanbali fanatics. Supported by popular sentiment, they accosted people in the streets, forced their way into private dwellings, emptied vessels of wine wherever found, broke musical instruments and mistreated female singers, pried into the details of trade, beat up their Ash'ari rivals, and generally acted in an arbitrary manner against anyone who transgressed against their strict interpretation of Islamic law and custom.

By this time, the greatest threat faced by the Caliphate was the increasing independence of the regional governors, who had taken advantage of the internal quarrels in the Abbasid court to strengthen their own control over their provinces and withheld the taxes due to Baghdad, leaving the central government crippled. Ibn Muqla resolved to reassert his control over the neighbouring provinces by military force, and chose the Hamdanid-controlled Jazira as his first target: in 935 he launched a campaign that took the Hamdanid capital, Mosul, but he was forced to return to Baghdad. Another attempt in 936 to launch a campaign against the rebellious governor of Wasit, Muhammad ibn Ra'iq, failed to even get started. Coupled with his failure to counter the mounting financial crisis, this last disaster led to Ibn Muqla's downfall. In April 936, Ibn Muqla was arrested by Muhammad ibn Yaqut's brother, al-Muzaffar, who forced al-Radi to dismiss him as vizier.

Ibn Muqla's dismissal marked the end of the independence of the Abbasid caliphs, for, shortly thereafter, al-Radi appointed Ibn Ra'iq to the new post of amir al-umara ("commander of commanders"), a military office that became the de facto ruler of what remained of the Caliphate. The caliph retained only control of Baghdad and its immediate environs, while all government affairs passed into the hands of Ibn Ra'iq and his secretary. The name of the amir al-umara was even commemorated in the khutba of the Friday prayer, alongside that of the caliph.

Al-Radi is commonly spoken of as the last of the real Caliphs: the last to deliver orations at the Friday service, to hold assemblies with philosophers to discuss the questions of the day, or to take counsel on the affairs of State; the last to distribute largess among the needy, or to interpose to temper the severity of cruel officers.

And yet, with all this he was the mere dependent of another. Beyond the Wasir's shadow, there was little left at home. And abroad, even less: the rich East was gone, Berber Africa and Egypt also, along with the greater part of Syria and Mesopotamia; Mosul was independent; peninsular Arabia was held by Carmathians and native chieftains; even Basra and Wasit rose in revolt. The advance of the 'Greeks' (Byzantine Empire) was stayed only by the brave Hamdanid prince who was deservedly styled Sayf al-Daula 'Sword of the Nation'.

title: Al-Radi


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Rashid Karami

Rashid Karami (رشيد كرامي; 30 December 1921 – 1 June 1987) was a Lebanese statesman. He is considered one of the most important political figures in Lebanon for more than 30 years, including during much of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), and he served as prime minister eight times, making him the most democratically elected prime minister in history according to the Guinness Book of World Records 2005. He was assassinated in 1987.

Early life and education
Rashid Karami was born in Tripoli, North Lebanon, on 31 December 1920 into one of Lebanon's most prominent Sunni political families. He was the eldest son of Abdul Hamid Karami, an architect of Lebanese independence from France. His father was also the Grand Mufti, or supreme religious judge, of Tripoli, and served as Prime Minister in 1945. Rashid Karami graduated from Cairo University with a law degree in the 1946.

Career
Following his graduation, Karami practiced law in Cairo for three years. On his return to Lebanon, he established a legal practice in Tripoli. He was first elected to the National Assembly in 1951 to fill a vacancy caused by the death of his father. He retained this seat until his death in 1987. One month after being elected he was appointed minister of justice in the government led by Prime Minister Hussein Al Oweini. In 1953, he was also appointed minister of the economy and social affairs in Abdallah El-Yafi's government.

From 1955 to 1987 Karami held office eight times as prime minister, under every President. These terms were from 1955 to 1956, 1958 to 1960, 1961 to 1964, 1965 to 1966, 1966 to 1968, 1969 to 1970, 1975 to 1976, and from 1984 until his death. Karami was thirty-four years old when he first became Prime Minister in 1955. He was the Minister of Finance from 1958 to 1960, 1961 to 1964, 1965 to 1966, 1966 to 1968, 1969 to 1970 and 1975 to 1976. He was the Minister of Defense from 1958 to 1960, 1965, 1975 to 1976. He also served as Minister of Foreign Affairs several times.

He had a stormy relationship with Lebanon's Presidents, who appointed him because of his political connections, despite substantial political differences. He was popularly known as a man for all crises because of a penchant of Lebanon's presidents to turn to him in times of major national strife or political upheaval.

Personality
What made the lawyer from the northern port city of Tripoli so often the man of the hour was a talent for leading the opposition without burning his bridges with the Lebanese president. Mr. Karami enjoyed political prominence, and an unparalleled popularity. Unlike Nabih Berri of the Shiite Muslims and Walid Jumblat, the Druse leader, he had no militia. While his public statements were often in the florid style common among Arab politicians, he was a skillful practitioner of the intricacies of Lebanese politics. He repeatedly strove to remain as leader of the Government until he decided it was useless to carry on amid the turmoil and violence of Lebanese politics. While he was fluent in French and had a good command of English, he was always accompanied by an interpreter in interviews with foreign correspondents, because he insisted on speaking Arabic. He was celebrated for being a Statesman with courtly manners, soft-spokenness and taste in clothes. He [...] was often described in the Lebanese press as al effendi - the gentleman.

Policies

Karami was a strong proponent of increasing political power of Lebanon's Muslim community, which in his time increased to outnumber the Christian population for the first time in Lebanese history, causing major ripples in the social fabric of the country. He attempted, without success, to gain greater representation for Muslims in the National Assembly, where they were allocated 45 percent of the seats, a figure that was not adjusted to take account of changing demographics. In 1976, Karami helped broker an agreement to provide for equal parliamentary representation of Christians and Muslims, but this agreement was never implemented. One concession that was made by Christian politicians was to allow legislation signed by the President to be countersigned by the Prime Minister, from 1974 onward, giving the Prime Minister (always a Sunni Muslim) an effective veto.

Karami was a part of the Muslim-Leftist faction in Lebanese politics. During the 1950s, he was a political follower of the Pan-Arabism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was first appointed Prime Minister by President Camille Chamoun on 19 September 1955. By the following year, however, he had seriously fallen out with Chamoun over the latter's refusal to sever diplomatic relations with the western powers that had attacked Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis of 1956. He again opposed Chamoun in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, a Nasserist uprising with considerable support in the Muslim community which erupted in May 1958 and attempted to topple the government and join Egypt and Syria in the new United Arab Republic. By September, when Chamoun had quelled the uprising with the aid of United States Marines, Karami formed a government of national unity under the new president, Fuad Chehab.

The Arab–Israeli conflict
Karami served four more times as prime minister throughout the 1960s. During this time, he championed the Palestinian cause, and is believed to have argued for Lebanon to play a more active role against Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967, a position which was unpopular with many Christians. Increasing clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization forced his resignation in April 1970, but he returned to office in 1975 after an accord had been signed between Lebanon and the PLO. In August that year, however, Suleiman Frangieh, an enemy of Karami, was elected president. Karami resigned and was succeeded by Saeb Salam.

Civil war
The Civil war erupted in Lebanon in April 1975. Multiple factions were involved and the political and military situation was extremely complex, but broadly speaking, the civil war was fought mainly between right-wing, mainly Christian militias (the most prominent of which was the Phalange), and leftist, mainly Muslim militias and their Palestinian allies. Desperate to stabilize the situation, Frangieh dismissed Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh and called on his old adversary Karami to form a government on 1 July. He retreated somewhat from his previous strong support for the Palestinians and supported the Syrian military intervention of June 1976. Despite Karami's political connections and many years of experience, he was unable to end the war, however, and on 8 December 1976 he resigned. Elias Sarkis, who had succeeded Frangieh as president in September 1976, appointed Selim Hoss as the new Prime Minister.

Karami had his militia in Tripoli. He was reconciled to his old enemy, Suleiman Frangieh, in the late 1970s, after Frangieh had fallen out with the Phalangist militia leader, Bachir Gemayel. Together with Frangieh and Walid Jumblatt, Karami founded the National Salvation Front, pro-Syrian coalition of Sunni Muslim, Druze, and some Christians, mainly in the north of Lebanon in July 1983. The National Salvation Front stood in opposition to the presidency of Amine Gemayel and the pact between Lebanon and Israel that was financially supported by the US.

In April 1984, following conferences in Switzerland, Karami became Prime Minister for the eighth time, heading government of national reconciliation. This period saw increasing Syrian influence in the wake of the partial Israeli withdrawal following their invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which Karami had strongly opposed. In 1986 he rejected the National Agreement to Solve the Lebanese Crisis, which had been drafted with minimal Sunni Muslim participation. This opposition created a tense relationship with President Amine Gemayel. Continuing problems led Karami to resign on 4 May 1987, but Gemayel, seeing no viable alternative, refused to accept his resignation.

Personal life and death
Karami never married.

On 1 June 1987, Karami was killed after a bomb was placed in his Aérospatiale Puma helicopter en route to Beirut. The bomb weighed about 300 gm. Its remote control trigger had a range of 10 km. It was fixed to the back of his seat and exploded shortly after taking off from an army airfield while flying from Tripoli to Beirut. Karami was the only one killed in the blast. Interior Minister Abdullah Rasi and at least three of a dozen other aides and crew members aboard the helicopter were reported wounded. Maronite militia leader Samir Geagea was accused in 1994 for this assassination.

Burial
Rashid Karami was buried in a cemetery in the Bab al Raml neighborhood of Tripoli.

The condolences were received in the International fair of Tripoli, a project designed by Oscar Niemeyer.

Perpetrators
Following the assassination, a man claimed responsibility for killing on behalf of the previously unknown Lebanese Secret Army, calling to a Western news agency in Beirut.

In 1999, Samir Geagea and ten other members of the Lebanese Forces were found guilty of the assassination. Soon after Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Samir Geagea and the others were provisionally pardoned and released from jail. However, it has been suggested, by Ashraf Rifi, that a Syrian officer purposely led Karami to the booby-trapped helicopter to assassinate him.

title: Rashid Karami


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Al-Muttaqi

Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Jaʿfar al-Muqtadir (أبو إسحاق إبراهيم بن جعفر المقتدر) better known by his regnal title al-Muttaqi (908 – July 968, المتقي) was the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad from 940 to 944. His reign marked the start of the 'later Abbasid period' (940–1258).

Biography
Al-Muttaqi was the son of al-Muqtadir and his concubine named Khalub also known as Zuhra. She was a Greek, and was the mother of Ibrahim (the future Caliph al-Muttaqi). His full name was Ibrahim ibn Jaʿfar al-Muqtadir and his Abu Ishaq.

Of such little importance the Caliphate had become by now that when the previous Caliph al-Radi died, Bajkam, amir al-umara (Amir of Amirs), contented himself with despatching to Baghdad his secretary, who assembled the chief men to elect a successor. The choice fell on the deceased Caliph's brother al-Muttaqi, who assumed the office after it had been some days vacant; and whose first act was to send a banner and dress of honor to Bajkam, a needless confirmation of his rank.

Bajkam, before returning to Wasit, where he now held his court, went out on a hunting party, and met his death at the hands of a band of marauding Kurds. The Capital again became the scene of renewed anarchy.

Rivalry between officials
With vizier Abu Abdallah al-Baridi gone, on 3 July Kurankij was appointed as amir al-umara by the powerless caliph al-Muttaqi. On the same night, the Turk Takinak was arrested and drowned. Kurankij chose Abu'l-Faraj ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Isfahani as his secretary (katib), and called on Ali ibn Isa ibn al-Jarrah and his brother Abd al-Rahman to become heads of the administration, but without the title of vizier. This arrangement did not last long, however: within a few days, the Banu'l-Jarrah brothers were dismissed, and Abu Ishaq Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qarariti appointed vizier. As al-Baridi had gathered new forces and come up from his base in Basra to Wasit, Kurankij sent his own troops under another Daylamite commander, Ispahan, to confront them. On the news of their approach, the Baridis abandoned Wasit and retreated to Basra.

In the meantime, a previous amir al-umara, Muhammad ibn Ra'iq, who had fled to Syria, was strengthened by an influx of Turkic commanders leaving Baghdad, and received a letter from al-Muttaqi inviting his return to the Abbasid capital. When Kurankij received news of Ibn Ra'iq's march on Baghdad, he recalled Ispahan from Wasit, which almost immediately was captured by the Baridis. On 22 August, he also dismissed the vizier al-Qarariti and replaced him with Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Qasim al-Karkhi.

As Ibn Ra'iq approached Baghdad, Kurankij exited the city and made for Ukbara. The two armies fought for several days, but Ibn Ra'iq was unable to secure victory. Nevertheless, on 23 August a detachment of Ibn Ra'iq's army under Ibn Muqatil entered Baghdad, followed two days later by the bulk of Ibn Ra'iq's army, with Kurankij following behind a day later. Kurankij and his men were reportedly contemptuous of their opponent, and Ibn Ra'iq himself is said to have contemplated returning to Syria. But in a fight that broke out in the city itself, some of Ibn Ra'iq's men managed to attack the Daylamites from behind. The Daylamites panicked and were routed, as they were also being attacked by the populace. Kurankij went into hiding, and Ibn Ra'iq's ascendancy was secured. On 22 September, Ibn Ra'iq had the surviving Daylamites executed, and on the next day, he was raised to amir al-umara. Kurankij was discovered and imprisoned in the palace.

Muhammad ibn Ra'iq, Caliph's amīr al-umarāʾ, persuaded the Caliph to flee with him to Mosul.

Al-Muttaqi was welcomed there by the Hamdanid dynasty, who organized a campaign to restore him to the capital. However, their ends were purely selfish; they assassinated Ibn Ra'iq, and having added his Syrian government to their own, turned their ambition towards Baghdad. The Hamdanid chief, with the title of Nasir al-Dawla, advanced on Baghdad with the Caliph.

But, however powerful the Hamdanid chiefs were at home amongst their Arab brethren, and splendid their victories over the Greeks, they found it a different thing to rule at Baghdad, due to foreign mercenaries and the well-organised Turkish forces in the city.

And so in less than a year, the Hamdanid chieftains had to return to Mosul; for a Turkish general called Tuzun entered Baghdad in triumph, and was saluted as amir al-umara. However, fresh proceedings against his enemy obliged Tuzun to quit the capital; and during his absence a conspiracy broke out which placed the Caliph in danger, and obliged him again to appeal to the Hamdanid prince for help. Troops sent in response enabled him to escape; he fled to Mosul and after that to Nusaybin.

Shortly after, peace being restored between Tuzun and the Hamdanid chiefs, al-Muttaqi took up his residence at Raqqa — a fugitive in the city which had so often been the proud court of his illustrious ancestors.

Downfall and succession
Later, al-Muttaqi threw himself into the hands of Tuzun, who swore with the most sacred oaths that he would render true and faithful service. But he soon after deposed him and had him blinded. The same day, Tuzun installed the ex-caliph's cousin as his successor, with the title of al-Mustakfi, "For whom the Lord suffices".

title: Al-Muttaqi


text:
Talk:Federal Court of Australia

Possible Wiki Links
I am currently testing an automated Wikipedia link suggester. Here are the results of running it on this article:

 * Can link federal law: ...me summary criminal matters governed by federal law are decided. It is on the same position...
 * Can link Federal Court: ...ourt was established in 1976 by the Federal Court of Australia Act....
 * Can link Australia Act: ...hed in 1976 by the Federal Court of Australia Act....
 * Can link original jurisdiction: ...and other tribunals are also within the original jurisdiction of the Court....
 * Can link appellate jurisdiction: ...The Federal Court of Australia also has appellate jurisdiction from the Federal Magistrates Court ...

Notes: The article text has not been changed in any way; Some of these links may be wrong, some may be right; You can leave positive feedback or negative feedback; Please feel free to delete this section from the talk page. -- Nickj 04:18, 22 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Why all those judges?
This article is, at the moment, a bit imbalanced. Do we really need a list of all those judges? Is anyone really going to write articles about them? Some judges do have interesting careers (eg Tony North seems to attract some doozies: the waterfront conspiracy case, the MV Tampa habeas corpus case, etc), but most of them will rise and fall unnoticed by anyone in particular. Possible additions (which I might be able to get to at some stage - i'm going to invest most of my wiki-energies on australian law for a while) would be the story about how the Court came to be established, and a list of significant cases. -- SilasM, 13 Jan 2005

Selective deletion
I am about to delete from the article history those revisions whose content and/or edit summaries libel Xtra, per Wikipedia's libel policy. Selective deletion requires full deletion followed by selective restoration. Therefore this article will be deleted for a very brief period of time. Snottygobble 02:24, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Complete. Snottygobble 18:28, 9 April 2006 (UTC)

Family Court
The article is incorrect in that it states "On the federal level, it is above the Family Court of Australia..." No appeal lies from the Family Court to the Federal Court or the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Family Court has its own appelate division, the Full Court of the Family Court, from which the only avenue of appeal is to the High Court with leave. The Family Court is essentially the same as the Federal Court - it is a Commonwealth court of superior record. Its jurisdiction is just limited to family matters.

Regarding the article Court of Appeals
Please see my move proposal at Talk:Court of Appeals. --Mathew5000 19:55, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

title: Talk:Federal Court of Australia


text:
Talk:Burger King

Scratch pad
There is a sand box to play in.

 * Restaurant News gallery of BK articles
 * , name="Sullivan-obesity"
 * , name="Byrnes"
 * , name="Burrows"
 * , name="LaCourte"
 * , name="Ellis"
 * , name="Leonheardt"
 * , name="WSJ-Gray"
 * , name="Garber-Salads"
 * , name="Horovitz-USAT 4"
 * name="Brady-Bloomberg"
 * , name="NWI-International"
 * NYT archive
 * , name="Reuters Public again"
 * , name="Nocera-NYT Cash"
 * , name="Wong-BB BK-McDs"
 * , name="Vieira-WSJ Hortons"
 * , name="Leonard-BB CEO"
 * , name="Jargon-WSJ coaches"
 * Delivery
 * , name="Vieira-WSJ Hortons"
 * , name="Leonard-BB CEO"
 * , name="Jargon-WSJ coaches"
 * Delivery

Pancake King
Is there a good reason why Pancake King redirects here?

Semi-protected edit request on 8 May 2023
Memesohw (talk) 16:54, 8 May 2023 (UTC) (burger kings is not recommended for young kids and pregnant woman)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate.  — Paper9oll  (🔔 • 📝)  17:00, 8 May 2023 (UTC)
 * @Memesohw 75.89.198.12 (talk) 17:19, 19 August 2023 (UTC)

Lede is TOO Long
120.29.111.3 (talk) 08:38, 13 September 2023 (UTC)

Please fix this grammar, the following: "to, to"
Current version

A related issue involving members of the Islamic faith over the interpretation of the Muslim version of canon law, Shariah, regarding the promotional artwork on a dessert package in the United Kingdom raised issues of cultural sensitivity,[149] and, with the former example, posed a larger question about the lengths that companies must go to, to ensure the smooth operation of their businesses in the communities they serve.[131]

Correction suggested:

"A related issue emerged among members of the Islamic faith regarding the interpretation of the Muslim version of canon law, Shariah, in relation to the promotional artwork on a dessert package in the United Kingdom. This raised concerns about cultural sensitivity [149] and, similar to the previous example, posed a broader question about the measures companies must take to ensure the smooth operation of their businesses in the communities they serve [131]."

My Comment

Additionally, why is this article locked? (this is a rhetorical question) If Wikipedia encourages users to edit and fix grammar, this premise seems false, as I am unable to edit it. Gameking69 (talk) 18:04, 28 December 2023 (UTC)

— Urro[ talk ] [ edits ] ⋮ 18:02, 13 March 2024 (UTC)
 * ✅: I made the change.
 * P.S. Did you have an edit request open? Why was it removed? That's where I was notified, and this isn't an improper usage.
 * P.P.S. Pages are locked for a variety of reasons. Most often, it's an action against vandalism. Wikipedia does encourage users to contribute in different ways, including to "edit and fix grammar" -- Like you have just done. Thank you for the edit!

Semi-protected edit request on 17 June 2024
This request went unresolved for several years so I'm repeating it.

The founders of Insta-Burger King were Matthew Burns and Keith G. Cramer, not Keith J. Kramer as written in the article. Please change all "Keith J. Kramer" to "Keith G. Cramer", etc.

Sources for the name:
 * McLamore, Jim; The Burger King: A Whopper of a Story on Life and Leadership (2020): "Keith G. Cramer and Matthew L. Burns"
 * Cooley, Angela Jill; To Live and Dine in Dixie: The Evolution of Urban Food Culture in the Jim Crow South (2015): "Matthew L. Burns [...] and his son-in-law, Keith G. Cramer"
 * Smith, Andrew F.; Encyclopedia of Junk Food and Fast Food (2006): "Matthew Burns of Long Beach, California, invited his stepson, Keith G. Cramer"
 * Jakle, John A. et al; Fast Food: Roadside Restaurants in the Automobile Age (1999): "Matthew Burns of Long Beach, California, and Keith G. Cramer, Burns' stepson"
 * Langdon, Philip; Orange Roofs, Golden Arches: The Architecture of American Chain Restaurants (1986): "Cramer and Burns went to Jacksonville"

Furthermore, here is a scan of an advertising pamphlet from the time, it reads "Owned by Keith Cramer and Matthew Burns" 147.147.59.174 (talk) 12:34, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Charliehdb (talk) 15:15, 17 June 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Burger King


text:
Fourier operator

The Fourier operator is the kernel of the Fredholm integral of the first kind that defines the continuous Fourier transform, and is a two-dimensional function when it corresponds to the Fourier transform of one-dimensional functions. It is complex-valued and has a constant (typically unity) magnitude everywhere. When depicted, e.g. for teaching purposes, it may be visualized by its separate real and imaginary parts, or as a colour image using a colour wheel to denote phase.

It is usually denoted by a capital letter "F" in script font ($$\mathcal{F}$$), e.g. the Fourier transform of a function $$g(t)$$ would be written using the operator as $$\mathcal{F}g(t)$$.

It may be thought of as a limiting case for when the size of the discrete Fourier transform increases without bound while its spatial resolution also increases without bound, so as to become both continuous and not necessarily periodic.

Visualization
The Fourier operator defines a continuous two-dimensional function that extends along time and frequency axes, outwards to infinity in all four directions. This is analogous to the DFT matrix but, in this case, is continuous and infinite in extent. The value of the function at any point is such that it has the same magnitude everywhere. Along any fixed value of time, the value of the function varies as a complex exponential in frequency. Likewise along any fixed value of frequency the value of the function varies as a complex exponential in time. A portion of the infinite Fourier operator is shown in the illustration below.

Any slice parallel to either of the axes, through the Fourier operator, is a complex exponential, i.e. the real part is a cosine wave and the imaginary part is a sine wave of the same frequency as the real part.

Diagonal slices through the Fourier operator give rise to chirps. Thus rotation of the Fourier operator gives rise to the fractional Fourier transform, which is related to the chirplet transform.

title: Fourier operator


text:
Al-Mustakfi

Abu’l-Qāsim ʿAbdallāh ibn Ali (أبو القاسم عبد الله بن علي; 908 – September/October 949), better known by his regnal name al-Mustakfī bi’llāh (المستكفي بالله) was the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad from 944 to 946.

Al-Mustakfi was a younger son of Caliph al-Muktafi, and hence a rival to the line of Caliph al-Muqtadir that reigned in 908–944, a period during which the Abbasid Caliphate nearly collapsed, and caliphs became puppets at the hands of rival warlords. Al-Mustakfi himself was installed on the throne by Tuzun, a Turkish general who deposed and blinded the previous caliph, al-Muttaqi. In the power vacuum left after Tuzun's death in August 945, al-Mustakfi tried to regain some of his freedom of action, initiating anti-Shi'a measures, but the same vacuum allowed the Buyids to capture Baghdad. Al-Mustakfi was forced to recognize the Buyids as legitimate rulers and awarded them regnal titles, but was soon accused of plotting against them and deposed in January (or March) 946. He spent the final years of his life in prison. His son attempted to claim the caliphate in c. 968, but failed.

Early life and character
Al-Mustakfi was born on 11 November 908, a son of Caliph al-Muktafi ((r. 902 – 908)) and a Greek concubine, Ghusn. He is described by the chroniclers as being fond of sports and games, partial to nabīdh (fermented drinks). He is said to have been sympathetic to the Shi'a, and maintained close contact with the ayyārūn (urban vagabonds and fighters) of Baghdad. His ties to the ayyārūn, and his participation in 'vulgar' games was an affront to the more pious sections of society.

Background: the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate
By the 930s, the once mighty Abbasid Caliphate had fallen into decline: its outlying provinces lost to local dynasts, its finances in ruin, and warlords—the Hamdanids of Mosul, the Baridis of Basra, the Buyids of western Iran, as well as various military strongmen—competing for control of the very capital of the caliphate, Baghdad, and the title of amīr al-umarāʾ (commander-in-chief), which carried with it the de facto control over the Abbasid government. At the same time, the Abbasid dynasty itself was consumed by rivalries and infighting, chiefly between the descendants of al-Muktafi on the one hand and those of his brother and successor, al-Muqtadir ((r. 908 – 932)), on the other. Under al-Muqtadir's son al-Radi ((r. 934 – 940)), three of al-Muktafi's sons were executed or imprisoned, while the Caliph faced challenges from two of his own brothers and other collateral lines of Abbasid princes as well.

Al-Radi's brother, al-Muttaqi ((r. 940 – 944)), was raised to the throne by the amīr al-umarāʾ Bajkam. He tried to exploit the rivalries of the regional warlords to recover the independence and authority of his office, but his attempts failed, and he was deposed and blinded by the amīr al-umarāʾ Tuzun in September 944. For the 11th-century historian al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, this unprecedented deed signalled the final collapse of caliphal authority. In al-Muttaqi's stead, al-Mustakfi was raised to the throne, at the age of 41.

Al-Mustakfi's caliphate
Al-Mustakfi's accession meant the restoration of the line of al-Muktafi's line to the throne after 36 years, and from the start the new caliph made deliberate allusions to his father: the chosen regnal name deliberately echoed that of al-Muktafi, and he is said to have worn his father's ceremonial headdress (the qalansuwa) on his entry in Baghdad. This, and the quick appointment of his son, Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad, as heir-apparent, show that al-Mustakfi confidently intended to emulate his father's successful reign, but in reality, the new caliph was a puppet of the Turkic troops, facing an empty treasury, and with the resulting chaos and poverty threatening even Baghdad with famine. The only freedom for political manoeuvre remaining to the caliphs of this period was to choose which of the neighbouring warlords to ally with. For the warlords, the caliph was a source of legitimacy, and an astute caliph might be able rotate his support among the different warlords in the same way his predecessors had previously changed their viziers.

At the same time, al-Mustakfi persecuted potential rivals, in the person of al-Fadl, the chief of the remaining sons of al-Muqtadir and brother of the two previous caliphs, al-Muttaqi and al-Radi. Al-Mustakfi and al-Fadl were said to have hated each other already during their stay in the Tahirid Palace as young princes. When al-Mustakfi was enthroned, al-Fadl prudently went into hiding, and the vengeful al-Mustakfi had his house burned down. The new regime in Baghdad was threatened from the east and south by the Buyids, who had allied themselves with the Baridis of Basra. A Buyid attempt to capture Wasit in spring 944 failed, as did a thrust on Baghdad while Tuzun was preoccupied in the north in the summer 944. In spring 945, the Buyids managed to occupy Wasit, but after Tuzun concluded peace with the Hamdanids, they were forced to retreat.

Tuzun was able to fend off various challengers to retain control of Baghdad, but he died in August 945 and was replaced by his secretary Ibn Shirzad, who did not enjoy the same authority with the troops. Ibn Shirzad's weakness was quickly exploited by the Caliph, who assumed a new title, that of 'Rightful Imam' (Imam al-Haqq), to bolster his claim to Islamic leadership. He also took measures against Shi'a followers, imprisoning the Shi'a leader al-Shafi'i, and dismissed corrupt judges, including the chief qadi, Muhammad ibn Abi al-Shawarib.

Finding himself unable to control affairs, Ibn Shirzad requested the aid of the Hamdanid Nasir al-Dawla from Mosul. Just then the governor of Wasit surrendered to the Buyid leader Ahmad ibn Buya, and joined him in his march on Baghdad. Left leaderless, the Turkic troops of the capital made no preparations to resist. Ibn Shirzad and the Caliph went into hiding, emerging only when the Turks had left the city to join the Hamdanids. When a messenger of Ahmad ibn Buya arrived at the capital, al-Mustakfi pretended to be delighted at their arrival.

Downfall and death
The Buyid forces entered Baghdad without opposition, and on 21 December, al-Mustakfi was forced to recognize the Buyids' authority. Ahmad was granted the honorific title of Mu'izz al-Dawla ("Magnifier of the Dynasty"); similar titles were granted to his two brothers, Hasan (Rukn al-Dawla, "Pillar of the Dynasty") and Ali (Imad al-Dawla, "Prop of the Dynasty"). In accordance with the family-based Buyid system, the title of amīr al-umarāʾ passed not to Mu'izz al-Dawla, but to the oldest brother, Imad al-Dawla, who was the chief Buyid emir. As al-Mustakfi was now under Buyid control, the Hamdanids promptly stopped recognizing him as caliph, and proclaimed their allegiance to the former caliph al-Muttaqi.

Al-Mustakfi himself reportedly intrigued with some of the Buyids' Daylamite officers against Mu'izz al-Dawla. As a result, he was deposed on 29 January 946 (or 9 March, according to other accounts) on Mu'izz al-Dawla's orders. The reason given for al-Mustakfi's deposition was likely a mere pretext; historian Harold Bowen called the act a "political necessity" that also was highly symbolic, making clear where power now resided.

Although the Buyids and their followers were Shi'a sympathizers, Mu'izz al-Dawla preferred not to risk installing a Shi'a caliph (or recognizing the Isma'ili Fatimid caliphs), for fear of his men obeying the caliph rather than him. Instead, he raised al-Fadl, who emerged from hiding, to the caliphate with the name al-Muti. Lacking any real power, the new caliph was effectively a puppet ruler who granted the Buyid regime legitimacy. Following the conclusion of a peace agreement in summer 946, the Hamdanids acknowledged al-Muti as caliph, but in the east, the Samanids continued to recognize al-Mustakfi as caliph until 955.

Al-Mustakfi was also blinded, apparently as a revenge act initiated by al-Muti, and spent the rest of his life as a prisoner in the caliphal palace, where he died in September 949. Some attempts were made to reclaim the caliphate from al-Muti by members of al-Muktafi's line, but these were unsuccessful. One of al-Mustakfi's nephews, Abu'l-Nasr Ishaq, tried to raise a revolt in Adharbayjan in 960, taking the caliphal name al-Mustajir bi'llah ("Seeking Support in God"), but was defeated by the local Musafirid rulers. After the death of Mu'izz al-Dawla in 967, al-Mustakfi's son and designated heir, Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad, came to Iraq and managed to gather a considerable following by hiding his identity and claiming to be the Mahdi, but eventually he was discovered and captured. Although he managed to escape, his hopes of seizing the throne were never realized. This marked the end of the caliphal pretensions of the line of al-Mustakfi as well.

title: Al-Mustakfi


text:
Talk:Girolamo Frescobaldi

Untitled
I removed this paragraph from the article:

 * Frescobaldi invented the tempo, making a compromise between the ancient white mensural notation with a rigid tactus and the modern notion of tempo, which is characterized by acceleration and deceleration within a piece.

I can find no evidence that this is true. The replacement of "tactus" and the old system of mensuration in use since the 15th century, or before, with the modern concept of tempo and its correponding system of meter and time signature took place gradually throughout the 17th century, and can be seen in the work of a number of composers. Frescobaldi was certainly one of the innovators (for instance check out his time signatures of "4/6" and "8/12") but calling him the inventor of tempo is just going too far. If I am wrong please present your evidence; I'd be quite happy to see it! Antandrus 04:21, 22 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Talk:Girolamo Frescobaldi
Dear Antandrus,

I called Frescobaldi the inventor of tempo not because he was using proportions in his pieces, which is a very common procedure even during the 14th and 15th century, but because he made it clear himself that the tactus is no longer an isochrone value and therefore is subject to acceleration and deceleration.

As far as I know he was the first to make it clear textually. I am refering to his own 'Avvertimenti' in the preface to the Capricci (1624) where he states :

Perché il sonare queste opere potrebbe riuscire ad alcuni di molta fatica, vedendole di diversi tempi, et variationi [...] ho voluto avvertire che in quelle cose, che non paressero regolate, con l'uso del contrapunto, si debba primieramente cercar l'affetto di quel passo et il fine dell'Autore circa la dilettatione dell'udito et il modo che si ricercar nel sonare. [...] e nelle trippole, o sesquialtere, se saranno maggiori si portino adagio, se minori alquanto più allegre, se di tre semiminime, più allegre, se saranno sei per quattro si dia il lor tempo con far caminare la battuta allegra [...] Il che sia detto con ogni modestia, et con rimettermi al buon giuditio degli studiosi."

Since this is a very tricky and complex problem of notation and musical paleography, I invite you to read the study of Etienne Darbellay in the supplement to the critical editions of the Capricci and Toccate, where the problem is cleary explained :

Le Toccate e i Capricci di Frescobaldi : Genesi delle edizioni e apparato critico. Milano, Suvini-Zerboni, 1985. (Monumenti musicali italiani, suppl. ai voll. IV, V, VIII) (Girolamo Frescobaldi, Opere complete ; suppl ai voll. II-IV)

If you know of some other musician or theoretician writing about this before Frescobaldi, I would very much love to know of him.

Christine

 * Thanks Christine. Your evidence looks good and I put the paragraph back (it could use a little more explanation but I don't have time to tackle it now).  By the way, if you like contributing here I suggest you make yourself a logon!  We can use people with specialized knowledge in this and other areas.  :-)  Antandrus 17:15, 26 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * I see many references in places like http://www.bartleby.com/61/imagepages/A4halfno.html to notation for notes that refer to Frescobaldi's piece "Fra Jacobino". Was this an innovation used to publish the music for this piece? Does anyone know?

 * Also when I listen to the piece, it sounds somewhat like Frere Jacques. Given that "Fra Jacobino" is Italian for Frere Jacques, is there any connection? User:Filll 7 Oct 2006

Dear Christine,

I very much appreciate your point, and as a Frescobaldi lover like you, I wish I could credit him with so much more than the modern conception of tempo; just a couple punctualizations. ;-)

Firstly, Frescobaldi's statement of (essentially) the theory of musical affections even predates 1624, since it first appears in the 1615 edition of the Primo Libro di Toccate, Niccolo' Borboni Edition, Rome.

"Premieramente, che non dee questo modo di sonare stare soggetto a battuta, come veggiamo farsi nei Madrigali moderni, i quali quantunque difficili si agevolano per mezzo della battuta portandola hor languida hor veloce, e sostenendola etiandio in aria secondo i loro affetti o senso delle parole."

This, as far as I know (although I'm fairly certain) is the earliest instance when Frescobaldi expressed that thought in a publication, and he clearly refers this idea not to his own invention, but to contemporary vocal music, which brings us to a second point.

This sentiment (and the explicit theory behind it) dates back to the Camerata Fiorentina of a quarter-century earlier, with its notions on Recitar Cantando. For instance, if we look at Giulio Caccini's preface to Le Nuove Musiche (1601), the composer says:

"Avvenga che nobile maniera sia cosi' appellata da me quella, che va usata, senza sottoporsi a misura ordinaria, facendo molte volte il valore delle note la meta' meno secondo i concetti delle parole [...], senza misura quasi favellando in armonia colla suddetta sprezzatura."

An idea paraphrased by Aquilino Coppini six years later while giving recommendations on the execution of Monteverdi's madrigals:

"[I madrigali di] Monteverdi richiedono, durante l'esecuzione, piu' ampi respiri e battute non proprio regolari, talora incalzando o abbandonandosi a rallentamenti, talora anche affrettando. Tu stesso stabilirai il tempo."

I know there are also other instances where this theory is articulated in print prior to Frescobaldi's doing so, but these are the ones that come to mind. So I think that crediting old Girolamo for being the inventor of tempo for essentially embracing the Camerata's theory well over a quarter century after it was first expressed, may be a bit of a stretch. ;-) I think a more cautious statement would be that Frescobaldi may have been the first author who popularized (or legitimized) the Camerata's conception of tempo for keyboard works.

I didn't edit your wording, though, since (as I said), I would credit Frescobaldi with the invention of the wheel, if I could, let alone tempo!

Please write back if you have time!

Tom

Frisky Bald Guy
I'm removing this bit from the Trivia section: "Sometimes jovially referred to as 'Frisky Bald Guy' in musicological circles. A play on his name, it is a fitting description of his characteristically sporadic style of composition, and the receding hairline that is evident in his later portraits." For one thing, I've never ever heard anyone call him that. Google Books and Google Scholar have no results, and all Google results seem to be either Wikipedia mirrors or people who read the article here. For another, it is insulting, really. And finally, the "reasons" provided aren't reasons at all. There are no "later portraits", only one chalk drawing and two engravings probably based on that (and noone really knows when the chalk drawing was done). And the "characteristically sporadic style of composition".. what? So until (and if) a reliable published source backs this up, I suggest keeping the notice out. --Jashiin (talk) 20:12, 11 July 2009 (UTC)

Date of birth
Most external sources that aren't mirrors of WP say he was born "in mid-September". A couple say 9 September; traditionally 9 September was recorded as his date of baptism, meaning a birth no later than that date. So, where does this precise date of 13 September come from? I note the Italian WP article also has that date. Did we just copy them, or did we rely on an actual source? --  Jack of Oz   [your turn]  00:45, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

 * Interesting question. The article by Frederick Hammond and Alexander Silbiger in the current online New Grove just says "mid-September", referencing the baptismal entry (with disputed interpretation; a 1983 article by A. Cavicchi -- 'Per far più grande la meraviglia dell'arte', Frescobaldi e il suo tempo (Venice, 1983), 15–39 -- gives some details, but I don't have it).  In the 1980 New Grove, there is a bit more detail, but Anthony Newcomb's writeup may have been superseded by Cavicchi's findings.  He says, "Although the record of Frescobaldi's birth survives there is no unanimity of opinion as to how to read it.  9 September (Haberl, 1887), 13 September (Bennati) and 15 September (Cametti, 1927, and Casimiri, 1937) have been proposed.  The last date should probably be accepted."  The Casimiri reference is:  R. Casimiri: ‘Tre “Girolamo Frescobaldi” coetanei negli anni 1606–1609’, NA, xiv (1937), 1–10, if anyone would like to chase it down (I don't have JSTOR at home) ("NA" is Note d'archivio per la storia musicale).  I think we are safe with "mid-September" if we'd like to reference the current New Grove. Antandrus  (talk) 02:50, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

 * Thanks for the prompt and thorough reply, Ant. You're always good value.  Well, given the diversity of opinion, I'd rather leave it as simply "September", and have a footnote mentioning the various proposed dates (9th, 13th, 15th).  New Grove seems to be favouring the 13th-15th part of the month, but even they can't be categorical about it.  Slonimsky says (or did say) baptised 9 September, and I'd discard that with considerable reluctance.  Maybe best to wait for access to the sources your mention before we get any more precise (or any less imprecise) than just the month.  --   Jack of Oz   [your turn]  03:15, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

 * Thank you! Looks fair to me; since we really don't know, and there are diverse opinions, "September" is fine. Antandrus  (talk) 04:34, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

 * I see that his gravestone (I can't link it; blacklisted) says 2 September. How much credence we can give to that is an open question. The original tomb disappeared apparently, and this is a later addition. --  Jack of Oz   [pleasantries]  01:49, 23 July 2021 (UTC)

Aria detta
Quote from the article: Facsimile of Aria detta la Frescobalda (1627), the earliest known set of variations on an original theme

What does it mean mean exactly? It is a very strong claim. Renaissance/baroque was the period of variations. Many compositions from that time are based on repeating the same theme over and over and playing with it -- basically what you do in variations. In what sense Aria detta la Frescobalda can be called the first then? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.31.182.184 (talk) 21:07, 24 October 2011 (UTC)

title: Talk:Girolamo Frescobaldi


text:
Category:Tort law

A tort is a civil wrong for which the law provides a remedy

title: Category:Tort law


text:
Al-Muti'

Abū ʾl-Qāsim al-Faḍl ibn al-Muqtadir (أبو القاسم الفضل بن المقتدر; 913/14 – September/October 974), better known by his regnal name of al-Mutīʿ li-ʾllāh (المطيع لله), was the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad from 946 to 974, ruling under the tutelage of the Buyid emirs.

Al-Muti's reign represented the nadir of the Abbasid caliphate's power and authority. In previous decades, the secular authority of the caliphs had shrunk to Iraq, and even there had been curtailed by powerful warlords; with the Buyid conquest of Baghdad, it was now abolished entirely. Al-Muti' was raised to the throne by the Buyids and was effectively reduced to a rubber-stamp figurehead, albeit with some vestiges of authority over judicial and religious appointments in Iraq. The very fact of his subordination and powerlessness helped restore some stability to the caliphal institution: in stark contrast to his short-lived and violently deposed predecessors, al-Muti' enjoyed a long and relatively unchallenged tenure, and was able to hand over the throne to his son al-Ta'i'.

Al-Muti's prestige as the nominal leader of the Muslim world sharply declined during his tenure. Regional rivals to the Buyids delayed their recognition of al-Muti's caliphate, seeing in him only a Buyid puppet, and his inability to respond effectively to Byzantine advances tarnished his reputation. More importantly, the rise of Shi'a regimes across the Middle East directly challenged Sunni and Abbasid predominance. The Buyids themselves were Shi'a, but they retained the Abbasid caliphate out of expedience. Further west, the expanding Fatimid Caliphate posed a direct ideological and political challenge to the Abbasids. During al-Muti's reign, the Fatimids conquered Egypt and started to expand into the Levant, threatening Baghdad itself.

Early life
The future al-Muti' was born in Baghdad in 913/14 as al-Fadl, a son of the Abbasid caliph, al-Muqtadir ((r. 908 – 932)), and a Slavic concubine, Mash'ala. He was the brother of caliphs al-Radi ((r. 934 – 940)) and al-Muttaqi ((r. 940 – 944)). Al-Muti' grew up in a time of crisis. Al-Muqtadir's reign was marked by factional strife, attacks by the Qarmatians, economic decline and revenue shortages that led to military unrest, culminating in the murder of the caliph in 932. During the subsequent reigns of al-Radi and al-Muttaqi, the Abbasid central government lost control of the provinces to regional military strongmen. Even in the Abbasid metropolitan region of Iraq, military strongmen deprived the caliphs of real authority, and vied with one another for the title of amir al-umara (commander-in-chief, lit. 'chief emir') and the attendant control of the Abbasid government apparatus in Baghdad, that would allow them to pay their restive troops. Al-Muttaqi himself had been raised to the throne by the amir al-umara Bajkam, but attempted to play off the regional warlords—notably the Hamdanids of Mosul—to recover the independence and authority of his office. These attempts ended in failure, and resulted in his deposition and blinding by the amir al-umara Tuzun in September 944.

As the chief of the remaining sons of al-Muqtadir and brother of the two previous caliphs, al-Fadl was an obvious candidate for the throne. Tuzun instead chose al-Mustakfi ((r. 944 – 946)), a son of Caliph al-Muktafi ((r. 902 – 908)). The medieval sources report that al-Mustakfi and al-Fadl hated each other, and quarreled already during their stay in the Tahirid Palace as young princes. Not only were they members of two rival lines of succession, but their characters were diametrically opposed: though al-Fadl, like his father, was renowned for his piety, al-Mustakfi offended pious opinion by his association with the ayyarun militia—drawn from the poorer urban classes, they were often decried as troublemakers and suspected for their association with heterodox and sectarian groups like the Sufis—and his participation in 'vulgar' games. Once al-Mustakfi was enthroned, he sent his agents to capture al-Muti', but the latter had already gone into hiding, and the caliph had to satisfy himself with demolishing his house. This futile act only served to mark al-Fadl as a serious rival; on hearing of it, the veteran vizier, Ali ibn Isa, is said to have remarked that "This day he [al-Fadl] has been acknowledged heir to the throne."

Rise to the throne
In December 945, the Daylamite troops of the Buyid ruler Mu'izz al-Dawla ((r. 945 – 967)) seized Baghdad. Mu'izz al-Dawla became the de facto 'protector' of the Abbasid caliph, although the title of amir al-umara apparently passed to his older brother, Imad al-Dawla, who was reckoned as the chief Buyid emir. On 29 January 946 (or 9 March, according to other accounts), al-Mustakfi was deposed, and on the same day, Mu'izz al-Dawla raised al-Fadl to the caliphate, with the regnal name of al-Muti' li-'llah. The sudden reappearance of al-Muti', and his rise to the throne, was apparently a surprise to contemporaries, and led to stories that he had conspired with the Buyids already since the time of al-Muktafi's accession.

Medieval sources tended to justify this change on religious grounds. The Buyids and their followers were Shi'a sympathizers, and two later chroniclers, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Malik al-Hamadhani (d. 1127) and Ibn al-Athir (d. 1233), report that Mu'izz al-Dawla toyed with the idea of deposing the Abbasids outright and installing an Alid on the throne of Baghdad, only to be dissuaded by his secretary, Abu Ja'far al-Saymari, who pointed out that in a clash between himself and a Shi'a caliph, the Daylamite soldiery were likely to side with the latter. This is clearly a later anachronistic interpolation, and the historian John Donohue disclaims any religious motivation in al-Mustakfi's deposition. Other chroniclers provide different reasons, such as the caliph's intrigues with the Hamdanids, or al-Fadl's emerging from hiding and inciting the Buyid ruler against his cousin, but the chief reason was likely simply that Mu'izz al-Dawla wished to have a caliph who was under his full control with no external sources of support.

The deposed al-Mustakfi was blinded, apparently as a revenge act initiated by al-Muti', and spent the rest of his life as a prisoner in the caliphal palace, where he died in September 949.

Role and relations with the Buyids
Al-Muti' was a weak figure, for all intents and purposes a puppet ruler of the Buyid ruler of Iraq, first Mu'izz al-Dawla, and then his son, Izz al-Dawla ((r. 967 – 978)). As a result of his lack of real power, al-Muti' himself barely figures in the chronicles of his reign, and medieval historians generally considered his tenure as the lowest ebb of the Abbasid caliphate, an opinion shared by modern scholars as well.

In theory, the Buyids and all their officials in Iraq continued to act in the name of the Abbasid caliph, and all appointments and legal acts continued to be made in his name. In practice, al-Muti' was deprived of any meaningful authority. In exchange for being allowed to lead a comfortable and secure life in the vast caliphal palaces, he served to provide legitimacy to the upstart Buyid regime in the eyes of the Muslim world. The options of abolishing the caliphate or installing an Alid as caliph were quickly rejected, if they were ever seriously entertained: such an act would cause widespread opposition, another Sunni caliphate might easily be set up elsewhere, but a docile caliph under Buyid control would help maintain the obedience of the Sunni majority to the new regime, as well as lend its symbolic weight to the Buyids in their relations with the other Muslim princes. Furthermore, there was a lack of suitable Alid candidates: the last imam of the Twelver Shi'a, who represented the main strand of Shi'a followers in the Buyid domains, was held to have gone into occultation seventy years earlier, and Zaydi doctrine held that the imams had to seize power themselves if they were to be legitimate.

The Buyids quickly integrated themselves into the traditional Abbasid system and eagerly sought the legitimacy conferred by the caliph, in the form of honorific titles and diplomas of governorship, or in his signature in treaties. At the same time, al-Muti' was effectively reduced to a salaried state official, and his responsibility was curtailed to the oversight over the judiciary, religious institutions, and the affairs of the members of the wider Abbasid clan. The caliph's chief secretary was no longer termed 'vizier' (wazir), but merely 'secretary' (katib), and his role was limited to the management of the diwan al-khilafa, a department managing the caliph's properties, the formal conferment of titles and offices and certificates in the name of the caliph, and the appointment of judges and jurors. In reality, judicial appointments too were under the purview of the Buyid emir, but at least for the more senior ones, such as the chief qadi of Baghdad, the caliph was expected to provide his assent, the robe of honour and the requisite diploma. With one known exception, al-Muti' generally complied with the emir's appointments.

The Buyids kept a close watch on the caliph, especially during their periodic conflicts with the Hamdanids, lest he might try to defect to them, as al-Muttaqi had done. During the battles of summer 946, when the Hamdanids briefly occupied East Baghdad, he was kept under house arrest in a church in West Baghdad, and not released until he had sworn an oath of loyalty to the Buyids. Whenever Mu'izz al-Dawla campaigned against rebels south of Baghdad, al-Muti' was forced to accompany the Buyid ruler, lest he defect north to the Hamdanids. Conversely, when the Buyid amir al-umara campaigned against the Hamdanids in the north, al-Muti' was left behind in Baghdad. In 948/49, Ispahdost, Mu'izz al-Dawla's brother-in-law, was arrested on suspicion of conspiring with al-Muti' (or with an unnamed Alid).

Upon taking power, Mu'izz al-Dawla distributed the former caliphal crown domains for the upkeep of the army, and al-Muti' had to content himself with a daily salary of 2,000 silver dirhams. When Basra was recovered from the Baridi family shortly after, he was assigned extensive possessions there, raising his income to 200,000 gold dinars per year. Although the general decline of Iraq later reduced his income by three quarters of its original value, this allowed the caliph to financially support members of the Abbasid clan in need, and to make rich gifts to the Kaaba. The income also sufficed for the construction of a series of pavilions in the caliphal palace grounds: the Peacock Palace (Dar al-Tawawis), the Octagon House (Dar al-Muthammana) and the Square House (Dar al-Murabba'a).

The troubled relations between the caliph and the Buyids gradually assumed a more regular and tranquil character: the Buyids at least formally respected the caliph's remaining responsibilities, and al-Muti' apparently accepted his subservient role, regained some freedom of action, and maintained cordial relations with Mu'izz al-Dawla. In 955/56, Mu'izz al-Dawla even appointed his 13-year-old son, the future Izz al-Dawla, as the caliph's chamberlain. The most notable exception to the good relationship between the caliph and the amir al-umara was the latter's attempt to rent out the appointment of chief qadi of Baghdad to Abdallah ibn Abi al-Shawarib for 200,000 dirhams per year between 961 and 963. This was opposed by both Sunni and Shi'a scholars as illegal, and al-Muti' refused to sign the appointments made by Mu'izz al-Dawla during this period. This is also almost the only reference in the sources to al-Muti's activity in the religious or judicial sphere; otherwise his reign is passed over in silence.

A positive corollary of this subservience was stability. Although of a sickly disposition, al-Muti' reigned as caliph for 29 Hijri years and four months, in stark contrast to his short-lived predecessors, and unlike them had to contend with remarkably few rival pretenders to the caliphate. A grandson of al-Muktafi rebelled in Armenia in 960 and claimed the caliphate as al-Mustajir Billah before being defeated by the local Sallarid rulers. In 968, Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad, a son of al-Mustakfi, who had fled to the Ikhshidid court in Egypt, gained considerable support in Iraq by hiding his identity and posing as the Mahdi (the Islamic messiah). The leading convert to his cause was a Buyid commander, the Turk Sübüktegin al-Ajami, who gave him protection and was preparing to mount a coup in his name, before his identity was uncovered and he was handed over to al-Muti'. The caliph did not severely punish him, other than ordering his nose cut off, thereby disqualifying him from the succession; although Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad eventually managed to escape, his hopes of seizing the throne were never realized, and the caliphal succession henceforth firmly remained with the line of al-Muqtadir.

Facing the Shi'a and Byzantine challenges
Outside the Buyid domains, on the other hand, the Abbasid caliph's authority over the wider Muslim world declined. Until the conclusion of a peace with the Buyids in 955, the Samanids of Khurasan refused to acknowledge his caliphate, and, in the west, the rival Isma'ili Shi'a Fatimid Caliphate was growing more and more powerful, conquering Egypt in 969 and beginning its expansion into the Levant. Even in Baghdad, the pro-Shi'a sympathies of the Buyids meant that Shi'a influence, although numerically small, was growing. Shi'a practices were introduced in the city, such as the ritual condemnation of the Umayyad caliph Mu'awiya, or the celebration of the Ghadir Khumm festival, attested since 963. Alids assumed the leadership of the annual Hajj caravans, and street clashes between Sunni and Shi'a partisans are recorded in several years during this period.

At the same time, al-Muti' played a leading role as a mediator in the formation of an anti-Fatimid coalition that included the Qarmatians under al-Hasan al-A'sam and the Hamdanid ruler of Mosul, Abu Taghlib, with the backing of the Buyids. This coalition managed to stop the Fatimid expansion into the Levant until 973/74. In the process, the Qarmatians recognized al-Muti's suzerainty in the khutbah (Friday sermon) and their coins, and denounced the Fatimids as impostors. In 951, when the Qarmatians returned the Black Stone to the Kaaba in Mecca, whence they had taken it in 930, al-Muti' is rumoured to have paid them 30,000 gold dinars as the Stone's ransom.

Another source of danger was the Byzantine advance against the Hamdanids in Upper Mesopotamia and northern Syria. In the 960s the Byzantines broke the centuries-old border at the Taurus Mountains and seized Cilicia and Antioch, reducing the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo to a tributary vassal in the process. In 972, the Byzantine raids reached Nisibis, Amida, and Edessa. Muslim refugees from these cities flooded to Baghdad and clamoured for protection. Unwilling and unable to help, Izz al-Dawla pointed them to al-Muti', since the jihad was still formally the caliph's responsibility. Bereft of any military or financial resources, al-Muti' was powerless to help them, and his prestige suffered accordingly; the riots engulfed the Shi'a quarter of Karkh, which went up in flames. Izz al-Dawla used the opportunity to pressure al-Muti' into selling off his valuables and providing 400,000 dirhams, ostensibly to be used to employ soldiers against the Byzantines. Al-Muti' protested in a much-quoted letter, but had no option but to comply; the money was soon squandered by the profligate Buyid ruler. This act proved to be a costly political mistake for Izz al-Dawla, further alienating Sunni sympathies in Baghdad, where his control grew even more tenuous.

Abdication and death
Over the years, Izz al-Dawla increasingly alienated his Turkic soldiery, under their commander Sabuktakin, culminating in a failed assassination attempt on the latter. The Turks had also gained the support of the Sunni populace in Baghdad after putting down the riots in 972. As a result, on 1 August 974, Sabuktakin seized control of Baghdad from Izz al-Dawla.

When the coup happened, al-Muti' left Baghdad along with the members of the Buyid clan, but Sabuktakin forced him back and confined him to his palace. Of advanced years, and with his right side paralyzed following a stroke in 970, al-Muti' was induced to abdicate with his health as a pretext, and was replaced by his son Abd al-Karim, as al-Ta'i ((r. 974 – 991)), on 5 August. This was the first father-to-son succession of the caliphate since al-Muktafi in 902.

Sabuktakin had himself appointed amir al-umara by the new caliph, and left Baghdad to campaign against the Buyids, accompanied by both al-Muti' and al-Ta'i. Al-Muti' died on the way, at Dayr al-Aqul, on 12 October 974. He was buried at the mausoleum of his paternal grandmother, Shaghab, in the Baghdad quarter of al-Rusafa, where his brother al-Radi had also been buried.

title: Al-Muti'