text:
User talk:Mikebarry

Welcome!

Hello, and welcome to Wikipedia. Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers: I hope you enjoy editing here and being a Wikipedian! By the way, you can sign your name on Talk and vote pages using three tildes, like this: ~ ~ ~. Four tildes (~ ~ ) produces your name and the current date. If you have any questions, see the help pages, add a question to the village pump or ask me on my Talk page. Again, welcome!
 * How to edit a page
 * Editing tutorial
 * Picture tutorial
 * How to write a great article
 * Naming conventions
 * Manual of Style

Whosyourjudas (talk) 05:24, 7 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Copyright violation from Santa Rosa Junior College
I'm afraid I had to remove your article Santa Rosa Junior College due to copyright violation. All work submitted to Wikipedia should be either created by the person who submits it or be a public domain or GFDL resource. Please visit Copyright_FAQ for more information on Wikipedia's copyright policy. --Masterhomer 09:16, 7 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Fair use rationale for File:Sabaean-drachm.jpg
Thanks for uploading or contributing to File:Sabaean-drachm.jpg. I notice the file page specifies that the file is being used under fair use but there is not a suitable explanation or rationale as to why each specific use in Wikipedia constitutes fair use. Please go to the file description page and edit it to include a fair use rationale.

If you have uploaded other fair use media, consider checking that you have specified the fair use rationale on those pages too. You can find a list of 'file' pages you have edited by clicking on the "my contributions" link (it is located at the very top of any Wikipedia page when you are logged in), and then selecting "File" from the dropdown box. Note that any non-free media lacking such an explanation will be deleted one week after they have been uploaded, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you.  F ASTILYsock (T ALK ) 07:43, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Fair use rationale for File:Mysia.Silver.Hemidrachm.png
Thanks for uploading or contributing to File:Mysia.Silver.Hemidrachm.png. I notice the file page specifies that the file is being used under fair use but there is not a suitable explanation or rationale as to why each specific use in Wikipedia constitutes fair use. Please go to the file description page and edit it to include a fair use rationale.

If you have uploaded other fair use media, consider checking that you have specified the fair use rationale on those pages too. You can find a list of 'file' pages you have edited by clicking on the "my contributions" link (it is located at the very top of any Wikipedia page when you are logged in), and then selecting "File" from the dropdown box. Note that any non-free media lacking such an explanation will be deleted one week after they have been uploaded, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you.  F ASTILYsock (T ALK ) 07:44, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Unreferenced BLPs
Hello Mikebarry! Thank you for your contributions. I am a bot notifying you on behalf of the the unreferenced biographies team that 1 of the articles that you created  is currently tagged as an Unreferenced Biography of a Living Person. The biographies of living persons policy requires that all personal or potentially controversial information be sourced. In addition, to ensure verifiability, all biographies should be based on reliable sources. If you were to bring this article up to standards, it would greatly help us with the current Category:All_unreferenced_BLPs article backlog. Once the article is adequately referenced, please remove the unreferencedBLP tag. Here is the article:

Thanks!--DASHBot (talk) 07:04, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
 * 1) Dubee -

Proposed deletion of Prairie Dog Hunt (For Windows)

The article Prairie Dog Hunt (For Windows) has been proposed for deletion  because of the following concern:
 * There is no reason given for why this game might be notable, and the one external link may not count as a reliable source to prove notability. (See Wikipedia's policy on notability and guideline on reliable sources for more details.)

While all contributions to Wikipedia are appreciated, content or articles may be deleted for any of several reasons.

You may prevent the proposed deletion by removing the notice, but please explain why in your edit summary or on the article's talk page.

Please consider improving the article to address the issues raised. Removing will stop the proposed deletion process, but other deletion processes exist. In particular, the speedy deletion process can result in deletion without discussion, and articles for deletion allows discussion to reach consensus for deletion. —  Mr. Stradivarius ♫ 09:21, 2 October 2011 (UTC)

Replaceable fair use File:Prairedoghunt.jpg
Thanks for uploading File:Prairedoghunt.jpg. I noticed the description page specifies that the media is being used under a claim of fair use, but its use in Wikipedia articles fails our first non-free content criterion in that it illustrates a subject for which a freely licensed media could reasonably be found or created that provides substantially the same information or which could be adequately covered with text alone. If you believe this media is not replaceable, please:

 * 1) Go to the media description page and edit it to add, without deleting the original replaceable fair use template.
 * 2) On the image discussion page, write the reason why this image is not replaceable at all.

Alternatively, you can also choose to replace this non-free media by finding freely licensed media of the same subject, requesting that the copyright holder release this (or similar) media under a free license, or by taking a picture of it yourself.

If you have uploaded other non-free media, consider checking that you have specified how these images fully satisfy our non-free content criteria. You can find a list of description pages you have edited by clicking on [ this link]. Note that even if you follow steps 1 and 2 above, non-free media which could be replaced by freely licensed alternatives will be deleted 2 days after this notification (7 days if uploaded before 13 July 2006), per our non-free content policy. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you. Melesse (talk) 21:59, 2 October 2011 (UTC)

Non-free rationale for File:The Realm Online (video game) screenshot.jpg
Thanks for uploading or contributing to File:The Realm Online (video game) screenshot.jpg. I notice the file page specifies that the file is being used under non-free content criteria, but there is not a suitable explanation or rationale as to why each specific use in Wikipedia is acceptable. Please go to the file description page, and edit it to include a non-free rationale.

If you have uploaded other non-free media, consider checking that you have specified the non-free rationale on those pages too. You can find a list of 'file' pages you have edited by clicking on the "my contributions" link (it is located at the very top of any Wikipedia page when you are logged in), and then selecting "File" from the dropdown box. Note that any non-free media lacking such an explanation will be deleted one week after they have been tagged, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If the file is already gone, you can still make a request for undeletion and ask for a chance to fix the problem. If you have any questions, please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you. Sfan00 IMG (talk) 22:38, 24 June 2012 (UTC)

Nomination of Feeder school for deletion
A discussion is taking place as to whether the article Feeder school is suitable for inclusion in Wikipedia according to Wikipedia's policies and guidelines or whether it should be deleted.

The article will be discussed at Articles for deletion/Feeder school until a consensus is reached, and anyone is welcome to contribute to the discussion. The nomination will explain the policies and guidelines which are of concern. The discussion focuses on high-quality evidence and our policies and guidelines.

Users may edit the article during the discussion, including to improve the article to address concerns raised in the discussion. However, do not remove the article-for-deletion template from the top of the article. -- nonsense ferret  21:44, 7 February 2013 (UTC)

title: User talk:Mikebarry


text: Talk:Smith Richardson Foundation

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Smith Richardson Foundation


text:
David Turnbull (politician)

David Turnbull (born March 17, 1942) is a former Canadian politician in Ontario, Canada. He was a Progressive Conservative member of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario from 1990 to 2003 and was a candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada in the federal election of 2004.

Background
Turnbull was educated at the Edinburgh College of Domestic Sciences, and worked as a hotel manager in Scotland, Switzerland and Germany. Upon moving to Canada, he continued his education at the Canadian Institute of Management. Before entering public life, he served as a manager for Xerox Canada Ltd. and as President of Turnbull Luetolf Ltd. He also became involved in conservative citizens' groups, including the Ratepayers' Association and the Citizens for Property Tax Reform.

Politics
Turnbull was elected to the provincial legislature in the 1990 provincial election, defeating incumbent Liberal Brad Nixon by about 3,000 votes in the North York riding of York Mills. The election was won by the New Democratic Party, and Turnbull sat in the opposition benches for the next five years.

The Tories won a majority government in the provincial election of 1995, and Turnbull was re-elected by more than 11,000 votes over his nearest opponent. He was appointed Government Whip in 1995, and retained this position on being named a Minister without Portfolio in Mike Harris's government on October 10, 1997.

In 1999, Turnbull was re-elected in the redistributed Don Valley West riding, outpolling Liberal candidate Paul Davidson by over 3,000 votes.

On June 17, 1999, Turnbull was promoted to Minister of Transportation, and on February 8, 2001, was named to the position of Solicitor General. In the latter capacity, he was responsible for creating the province's first Sex Offender Registry.

When Ernie Eves succeeded Harris as Premier of Ontario on April 15, 2002, he named Turnbull as his Associate Minister of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation. Turnbull held this position until the defeat of the Eves government in the 2003 provincial election.

Turnbull was among the Tory incumbents defeated in the 2003 election, falling to Liberal candidate Kathleen Wynne by over 6,000 votes. He sought election to House of Commons of Canada for the federal Don Valley West riding the following year, but was defeated by Liberal incumbent John Godfrey.

title: David Turnbull (politician)


text:
Chinese people in Myanmar

Chinese Burmese, also Sino-Burmese or Tayoke (တရုတ်), are Burmese citizens of Han Chinese ethnicity. They are a group of overseas Chinese born or raised in Myanmar (Burma). As of 2012, the Burmese Chinese population is estimated to be as high as 3 per cent of the country's population.

Burmese Chinese are a well established middle class ethnic group and are well represented in all upper levels of Burmese society. Burmese Chinese also play a leading role in Burma's business sector and dominate the Burmese economy. In addition, Burmese Chinese have a strong presence in Burma's political scene with several people such as San Yu, Khin Nyunt, and Ne Win having been major political figures.

Etymology
In the Burmese language, the Chinese are called Tayoke (MY တရုတ်, tarut, ) and formerly spelt MY တရုပ် (tarup). The earliest evidence of this term dates to the Bagan Era, in the 13th century, during which it referred to the territory and a variety of peoples to the north and northeast of Myanmar. Various scholars have proposed that it comes from the Chinese term for "Turk" (突厥, Tūjué / tú jué); from the name of Dali (大理國, Dàlǐguó), the capital of the Kingdom of Nanzhao; a Chinese corruption of the term Dàyuèzhī (大月支 or 大月氏), a Chinese term referring to Mongol-speaking Kushan Huns. The adoption of Tayoke as an exonym for the Han Chinese was not an established practice until the 19th century.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the term paukphaw (, lit. 'sibling') was co-opted as an affectionate term for the Chinese, and is now typically used in the context of diplomatic ties between China and Myanmar. The term itself purportedly originates from a Burmese myth about the Chinese and Burmese peoples as being descendants of the same parents, a dragon princess and a sun god.

In the Mon language, the Chinese are known as Krawk (MY ကြုက်, ); in Shan, they are called Khe (MY ၶႄႇ, ). In the Wa language, spoken in the borderlands between Yunnan Province and Shan State, the word for Chinese is Hox/Hawx, pronounced.

Ancestral origins
The Hakkas, Hokkiens and Cantonese comprised 45 per cent of the ethnic Chinese population. The Yunnanese comprised 30 to 40 per cent of the ethnic Chinese population.

Hokkien

 * Hokkiens (Burmese: eingyi shay, MY အင်္ကျီရှည် or let shay, MY လက်ရှည်, lit. 'long-sleeved jackets') from Fujian Province. Most of the Hokkien were traders.

Cantonese

 * Cantonese (Burmese: eingyi to, MY အင်္ကျီတို or let to, MY လက်တို, lit. 'short-sleeved jackets') from Central Guangdong Province. Most migrants from Guangdong Province were artisans.

Hakkas

 * Hakkas (Burmese: zaka, MY စက, lit. 'mid-length sleeve') from Fujian and Guangdong provinces.

The Hakkas are further subdivided into those with ancestry from Fujian Province and Guangdong Province, called eingyi shay haka (MY အင်္ကျီရှည်ဟကာ) and eingyi to haka (MY အင်္ကျီတိုဟကာ) respectively.

Kokang
In Upper Myanmar and Shan Hills, the Kokang people predominate there.

Panthay
The Panthay have long been considered distinct from the Han Chinese diaspora community. They are Chinese Muslims who are called Hui in China.

Finally, there are the tayoke kabya (MY တရုတ်ကပြား) of mixed Chinese and indigenous Burmese parentage. The kabya (MY ကပြား, meaning "hybrid") have a tendency to follow the customs of the Chinese more than of the Burmese. Indeed, tayoke kabya who follow Burmese customs are absorbed into and largely indistinguishable from mainstream Burmese society. A large portion of Burmese Chinese is thought to have some kabya blood, possibly because immigrants could acquire Burmese citizenship through intermarriage with the indigenous Burmese peoples.

Education
The Burmese Chinese place a high importance on education and represent a disproportionately high share of those with advanced (medical, engineering or doctorate) degrees in Myanmar. The figure would be higher still had it not been for the longstanding ban on those without Burmese citizenship from pursuing advanced degrees when Ne Win instigated the 1982 Citizenship Law further restricted Burmese citizenship for Burmese Chinese (as it stratified citizenship into three categories: full, associate, and naturalised) and severely limited Burmese Chinese, especially those without full citizenship and those holding FRCs, from attending professional tertiary schools, including medical, engineering, agricultural and economics institutions. Many wealthy Sino-Burmese families send their children to the city's English language schools for primary and secondary education and Chinese and Singaporean Universities for education. Presently, many wealthy Burmese Chinese send their children overseas — in particular to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, for advanced studies. Taiwan is also a major destination, as the Taiwanese government offers aid and scholarship incentives to 'returning' overseas Chinese to study and settle there.

Until vast nationalisation by the Ne Win's government happened in 1963, most Burmese Chinese were enrolled in schools where Mandarin Chinese was the medium of instruction with Burmese as a second language. Notable Chinese schools at that time include:
 * Burma-Chinese High School (緬甸華僑中學)
 * Nanyang High School (緬甸南洋中學)- now Basic Education High School No. 2 Bahan
 * Rangoon Chinese Elementary School (仰光華僑小學)
 * Kee Mei Elementary School (仰光集美小學)

Employment
Historically, Burmese Chinese have made their livelihoods as merchants, traders, and shopkeepers as well as manual labourers such as indentured labourers (pejoratively called "coolies"); dockers, municipal workers, rickshaw men, and pony cart drivers. They were also heavily represented in certain professions such as civil servants, university lecturers, pharmacists, opticians, lawyers, engineers, and doctors.

Trade and industry
Like much of Southeast Asia, Chinese entrepreneurs dominate Burmese commerce and industry at every level of society. Entrepreneurial savvy Chinese literally taken over the country's entire economy. Although the modern Chinese community in Myanmar amounts to less than 3 percent of the country's entire population, the contemporary Burmese Chinese are estimated to effectively control approximately 76 percent of the nation's entire economy. Burmese Chinese who play a critical role in maintaining the country's economic vitality, vigour, and prosperity wield tremendous economic clout and influence over their indigenous Burman majority counterparts. Entire Chinese enclaves have sprung up across major cities throughout the country. Burmese Chinese, a disproportionate wealthy, market-dominant minority not only form a distinct ethnic community, they also form, by and large, an economically advantaged social class: the commercial middle and upper class in contrast to their poorer indigenous Burmese majority working and underclass counterparts around them.

Since the country's post-1988 shift of transitioning into a liberalized free-market oriented capitalist system begun to root, large numbers of Chinese migrants in search of economic opportunity to seek and build a better life have poured into the country, not only having provided the country with much needed talent, skills, goods and services, and capital, but having also purchased most of the shops and real estate in the centre of Mandalay, which has transformed the character dynamics of the city. Today, Mandalay is now the financial nerve centre of Upper Myanmar and is considered the epicentre of contemporary Burmese Chinese business culture and economic life. An influx of poor Han Chinese immigrants hailing from Southern China, mostly tracing their ancestry to the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan have dramatically changed the dynamics of the economy throughout the entire nation having transformed Mandalay into the meretriciously prosperous trading centre that it is today. Established Burmese businessmen of Chinese ancestry continue to remain at the helm of Burma's economy, where the once impoverished Han Chinese minority have been transformed almost overnight into a garishly distinctive prosperous business community. Much of the influx of foreign investment capital into the Burmese economy has been backed by expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese investors and channelled through the bamboo network for the purpose of launching new startup companies and executing potential business acquisitions. Many members of the Burmese Chinese business community act as operating agents, doing business and carrying out investment biddings on behalf of Mainland and Overseas Chinese investors outside of Burma. In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power, and gradually loosened the government's role in the economy, encouraging private sector growth and foreign investment. This liberalization of the state's role in the economy, if slight and uneven, nonetheless gave Chinese-owned Burmese businesses extra leeway to expand and ultimately assert their economic clout. Today, virtually all of Burma's retailer, wholesale, and shipping agencies are Chinese-owned. For example, Sein Gay Har, a major Burmese retailer that began in Yangon's Chinatown in 1985, is owned by a Burmese family of Hakka ancestry. Moreover, Burmese businessmen of Chinese ancestry control the nations four of the five largest commercial banks, Myanmar Universal Bank, Yoma Bank, Myanmar Mayflower Bank, and the Asia Wealth Bank. As the indigeneous Bamars were known for their graceful hospitality towards non-Burmese ethnics, newly settled Han Chinese immigrants following Burma's acceptance of free-market capitalism in the latter part of 1988 began to capitalize on new business opportunities and carving out new niches that the Chinese community were well-known for specializing in.

Within every Burmese city and town, stood Chinese-owned general merchandise stores as 40 percent of Burmese Chinese acted as merchants and traders across the country following the Second World War. Multivariated businesses that have sprung up include Chinese-style bakeries and patisseries, noodle stalls, watch repair shops, cosmetic retailers, and grocery stores which soon emerged as the focal points of economic life across various small towns throughout Burma. As the Chinese immigrants became more ambitious with regards to their commercial business activities, they began to seek and conduct more aggressive entrepreneurial and investment dealings by venturing out into business opportunities that were thought to be more vastly profitable, such as liquour stores and pawn brokerage houses. Today, Burma's Chinese community is now at the forefront of opening up the country's economy to conduct foreign business and direct investment, especially catering it towards Mainland China and other Overseas Chinese businessmen and investors as an international Overseas Chinese economic outpost. Beijing's receptive patronage of Burmese Chinese investments has led China to become unilaterally proactive in close engagement with the Overseas Chinese business community and leveraging the country's geopolitical power and global economic influence to help Burma's Chinese community stay close to their ancestral roots in order to foster even deeper and intimate business ties with the Mainland. Much of the foreign investment from Mainland China now entering Myanmar is being channelled through Overseas Chinese bamboo networks. Many members of the Burmese Chinese business community often act as agents for expatriate and Overseas Chinese investors outside of Myanmar.

Chinese entrepreneurs have been increasingly involved in Mandalay's economy since the imposition of sanctions by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s. During Burma's open-door immigration policy in the 1990s, Mandalay became the most attractive destination for massive Chinese migration and newly settled Han Chinese immigrants. With the onset of economic liberalization and the rise of free market capitalism in Burma, members of the Chinese community gravitated towards business and adhere to the Chinese paradigm of guanxi which is based on the importance of having contacts, relationships, and connections as essential ingredients for entrepreneurial and investment success. Following Burma's new market transformation, Han Chinese immigrants from Yunnan were able to illegally obtain identity papers on the black market to become naturalized Burmese citizens overnight. Identity cards were not only used for new Chinese immigrants to stay indefinitely, but to also bypass legal barriers on foreign ownership of businesses such as hotels, shops, and restaurants. A substantial increase in foreign direct investment has poured in from Mainland China with much of the capital ending up in Burma's real estate sector and Mainland Chinese immigrant investors have been able to circumvent the foreign ownership ban as many of them were able to obtain Myanmar identity cards via bribery or marriage to a Myanmar national through intermediaries who themselves are Burmese citizens of Chinese ancestry. Retail outlets were opened by Chinese entrepreneurs, amongst their various business interests ranged from cement mixing to financial services whose unbridled financial ambitions have literally led them in the clandestine takeover of Yangon and Mandalay's economies through having turned them into the luridly prosperous business and financial centres that they are today. As Mandalay became more economically prosperous, large influxes of Han Chinese immigrants have continued to settle there as their prime choice of destination since the 19th century, resulting in a furtive sinification of the entire city. The transformation of Mandalay into a booming modern metropolis filled with foreign businesses and gem trading centers occurred under the auspices of the entrepreneurial Chinese minority. Many Chinese-owned and operated Burmese businesses such as trading cooperatives, market stalls, food joints, traditional Chinese medicinal clinics, hotels, and gemstone mining concessions have also flourished.

Today, virtually all of Mandalay's and Yangon's retailers, hotels, restaurants, financial services providers, and prime residential and commercial real estate have entirely come under the ownership of Chinese hands. Entire swathes of prime residential and commercial real estate in key sites in Mandalay have been completely acquired outright by wealthy Chinese businessmen and investors. As an influx of newly minted Overseas Chinese emigrant investors have poured into Myanmar flush with vast amounts of foreign capital, shrewdly investing it in various privately-controlled businesses including wholesale marketing, gold and jewellery shops, hotels, restaurants, real estate, and jade mining concessions. Of Mandalay's population which stands at an estimated 1.2 million strong, as many as half of the city's residents are of Chinese ancestry with the city's seven of the top ten entrepreneurs being of Chinese descent fully controlling 60 percent of its entire economy. Mandalay's 100,000 strong Chinese population comprise a mere ten percent of the city's entire population yet the Chinese own all of Mandalay's retail gold shops, gemstone mining concessions, foreign business offices, and timber trading companies surrounded by the large Chinese-owned Victorian villas scattered on the city outskirts left behind by the British colonialists. Gemstones and gold bars are among the many the goods sold on the Burmese commodities market and represent a key focus commodity of value eyed by many Mainland and Overseas Chinese expatriate entrepreneurs and investors. Foreign purchasers of jade and gems have been flocking to the city of Mandalay, with clients from Hong Kong continuing to be the source of main customers. Mandalay has been virtually sinicized economically and culturally, to the resentment of indigenous Burmans, who have been entirely displaced into poverty-stricken shantytowns in economic submission. About 50 percent of the land plots in Downtown Mandalay are controlled by the Chinese. Whenever a large commercial real estate project, such as a hotel or shopping center is about to be constructed, the project is typically under the hands of a Chinese businessman and real estate investor. In addition, more than 50 percent of the commercial business activity generated in Downtown Mandalay is derived from the eclipsing plethora of Chinese-owned shops, hotels, restaurants, and showrooms that predominate the area. About 80 percent of the hotels and guesthouses, more than 70 percent of the restaurants, more than 45 percent of gold and jewellery shops, about 30 percent of jade and gemstone trading, and nearly 100 percent of the sale centres for Mainland Chinese-made commodities in Mandalay are owned and operated by the Chinese. Henceforth, Chinese entrepreneurs and investors have acquired all of the Central Mandalay's economic crown jewels and have been disproportionately responsible for generating much of the city's output of commercial business activity relative to their small population size. In Central Mandalay, about 80 percent or four out of five gold and jewellery shops are Chinese-owned. In addition, all of Mandalay's shopping malls and hotels were entirely built by Chinese-owned construction and real estate development companies. Besides Mandalay's economic development being shaped by the immense commercial business output that has been largely responsible on behalf of the Burmese Chinese business community's contributions, their commercial business activities have also been amplified with the additional investment facilitation by expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and investors channelled through the bamboo network. Wherewith the augmented investment support patronized by expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese investors have economically revitalized and continued to overshadow Mandalay's central business district. In addition, the apparent influence of Mainland China is also ostensibly felt throughout the city, where the local inhabitants have alluded to Mandalay as a "Chinese city" dominated by an inflow of international expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese capital, with much of it invested in hotels, restaurants, discotheques, and bars. Mandalay's other major industries include sports where the nation's popularity of soccer has sprung across the city. The Burmese soccer club, Yadanabon FC represents the city in the Myanmar National League, making it the nation's first professional soccer league. The strong economic clout exerted by the Chinese in Mandalay, Yangon, and other parts of northern Burma has entirely displaced indigenous Burmans into poverty-stricken ghetto shantytowns on the outskirts of major Burmese cities.

Artisan goods manufactured historically by indigenous Burmans have been entirely displaced by inexpensive Chinese consumer durables such as textiles, machinery, and electronics in terms of quality and price. Areas such as tapestry weaving, gold leaf carving, furniture crafting, and precious stone polishing which was historically a source of livelihood for indigenous Burman artisans have been entirely taken over by the Chinese. Many artisan products historically produced by the indigenous Burmans have been entirely displaced by cheaper Chinese imports and higher quality Chinese-made products. Burmese entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry dominate every major Burmese artisan business and industry sector including silk weaving, tapestry, jade cutting and polishing, stone and wood carving, making marble and bronze Buddha images, food products, temple ornaments and paraphernalia, the working of gold leaves and of silver, garments, pharmaceuticals, match manufacturing, brewing, and distilling. Burmese entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry have also have established heavy industry joint ventures with many large Mainland Chinese conglomerates. These industries include shipbuilding, copper, nickel, oil and natural gas, cement, base metals, coal, fertilizers, jet fuel, industrial minerals, kerosene, steel, tin, tungsten, agricultural processing, forestry, airlines, wood and wood products, teak logging, timber, rice, building and construction materials, machinery, transport equipment, and plastics. Chinese-made consumer electronics, beer, and fashion are also large industries. In Yangon, the Hokkien community have cornered small and medium-sized family businesses in teak logging, rice, bean and legume trading, and cooking oil production while the Cantonese community are well-known for their niches in the small-scale manufacturing of handicrafts and similar artisan retail products.

Between 1895 and 1930, Chinese-owned Burmese businesses were initially concentrated within three sectors: Brokerage, manufacturing, and contracting. Under British colonial rule, the Chinese share of the businesses was reduced significantly from 28.5 to 10 percent in manufacturing, 26.6 to 1.8 percent in brokerage, and 31 to 4.3 percent in contracting while Burmese Indians improved their economic positions significantly and controlled a larger proportion of the businesses within the three sectors. Other major sectors between 1895 and 1930 that declined included banking and money-lending, dropping from 33.3 percent to zero. Trading changed from 13.3 to 12.6 percent. Similar drops in market share occurred in the import-export trade, extraction, distribution-supply, and business partnerships. However, the Chinese share in milling increased from 0 to 4.5 percent, agents from 13.3 to 15.6 percent, shop-keeping from 6.7 to 18.3 percent, and merchanting from 12.3 to 13.1 percent. Of the 47 rice mills in Burma, 13 percent of them were Chinese controlled and were utilized for rice exportation and processing by Chinese rice merchants. During the last few decades of the 19th century, the Chinese turned to rural money-lending as an additive business and investment revenue stream. Burmese businessmen of Chinese ancestry also ran illicit opium and gambling dens, teahouses, liquor stores, and also acted as agents for the production, sale, and export of petroleum and natural gas products.

As Burmese Chinese businessmen and investors became more financially prosperous, they often coalesced their financial resources and pooled large sums of seed capital together to forge joint business ventures with expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese businessmen and investors from all over the world. Like other Southeast Asian businesses owned by those of Chinese ancestry, Chinese-owned businesses in Burma often forge corporate partnerships with Greater Chinese and other Overseas Chinese businesses across the globe in search of new business opportunities to collaborate and concentrate on. However, most wealthy Burmese businessmen and investors of Chinese ancestry have voluntarily chosen to stay in Burma or have concentrated their efforts on surrounding Southeast Asian markets such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand as well as the Greater Chinese market such as Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Many Burmese entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry also have friends and extended family members in Mainland China, as China's economic reform since the late 1970s have produced auspicious economic conditions for them to support their corporate objectives on top of private wealth accumulation in introducing the wholesale market of Mainland Chinese products into Burma and other Southeast Asian markets. Besides sharing a common ethnic ancestry, cultural, linguistic, and familial ties, many Burmese entrepreneurs and investors of Chinese ancestry are particular strong adherents of the Confucian paradigm of interpersonal relationships when doing business with each other, as the Chinese believed that the underlying source for entrepreneurial and investment success relied on the cultivation of personal relationships. Moreover, Chinese-owned Burmese businesses form a part of the larger bamboo network, a business network of Overseas Chinese firms operating in the markets of Greater China and Southeast Asia that also share common family, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties. As the Overseas Chinese bamboo network has been largely been responsible by acting as a conduit to channel in much of the foreign direct investment into Burma and other parts of Southeast Asia. For the Chinese community, business success and entrepreneurial dynamism is attributed towards a confluence of being flexible and adaptable towards changing business environments and economic climates, a militant desire to acquire wealth, relationship-building and networking skills, calculative risk-taking when evaluating risk and reward, ability to be forward looking, scientific and technological skills, ability to think logically, rationally, and prudentially in a business setting, an ability to sell and market, capability of leading and dealing with people with different personalities and skill-sets from different walks of life, exercising impulse control to delay instant gratification, frugality, a clear vision, shrewd allocation of capital and resources, a strong work ethic, trustworthiness, creativity, making the most of the opportunities when they present themselves, looking towards the future, and upholding family honour.

In order for the Chinese community to secure and protect their economic interests, the Burmese Chinese Chamber of Commerce was formed, of which serves as a guild, association, business nerve centre, and lobby group in addition to being a commercial lookout for local Burmese businessmen and investors of Chinese ancestry at the dawn of the twentieth century. Even more notably, the Malaysian business magnate and investor Robert Kuok converted Mandalay and Yangon into the largest economic hubs for Burmese, Mainland, and Overseas Chinese business networking and large scale corporate deal-making within the country. For smaller businesses and newer start-up operations, many self-employed Chinese street peddlers and retail hawkers at the humbler end of the economic pecking order make a great living selling cheap Chinese-imported bicycle tires to the indigenous Burman masses. The Chinese who dominate Burma's jade industry, have also been the chief driving force behind Burma's gem mining industry and jade exports. Private gem mining is a huge industry in Burma with many of the concessionaires being Chinese-controlled. At present, Burma's booming gem industry is completely under Chinese hands at every level, from the financiers, concession operators, all the way to the retail merchants that own scores of newly opened gem markets. One Chinese-owned jeweller reportedly controls 100 gem mines and produces over 2,000 kilograms of raw rubies annually. Since the privatization of the gem industry during the 1990s, Burmese jewelers and entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry have transformed Burma's gem industry into new retail jewelry shops, selling coveted pieces of expensive jewelry to customers mainly hailing from Hong Kong and Taiwan. One high-profile incident occurred in June 2011, where a gem market was forced to be shut down after a fight embroiled a group of Chinese and Burmese merchants over a business deal that went sour. Allegedly, the Burmese and Chinese merchants were embroiled in a fight over a deal that was worth US$5,300.

Burmese entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry are not just dominant in the big business sector, but they also predominate in the Burmese small and medium-sized business sector. Small and medium-sized enterprises that the Chinese have dominated include selling bicycle tires, auto parts, electrical equipment, textiles, precious metals, machinery, ironmongery, hardware, printing and bookbinding, books and stationery, paper and printing ink, tailoring, laundromats, dry-cleaning, jewellery, language training and tutoring, and money exchanges. Beauty parlours, construction sites, mobile phone sale centres, traditional Chinese medical clinics, restaurants, pubs, dry cleaners, laundromats, cafes, teahouses, casinos, gambling dens, breweries, nightclubs, hotels, and karaoke bars are also common establishments. The Chinese dominate both the legitimate trade as well as the highly lucrative illegitimate trade in opium and other unsavory drug enterprises. High-profile cases have involved the Burmese Chinese business elite such as businessman Lo Hsing Han and politician Kyaw Win, who have continued to control Burma's major banks, airlines such as Yangon Airways, teak logging companies, and gemstone mining concessions. Lo's son, Steven Law is also a prominent businessman well known for being at the helm of Burma's largest conglomerate company Asia World, whose investments include a container shipping line, port buildings, and toll road authorities. Law also has extensive business holdings in sports, where he is the majority owner of Magway FC, a Burmese soccer team. Law also presides an extensive array of investments in Burma's gem industry where it is valued at an estimated $600 million. His investment portfolio also contains a cluster of other business interests including the enumerable batches of ruby concessions as well as a stake in a mining concession situated near the Burmese town of Phakent. Given Law's notoriety in Burmese business circles, his conglomerate is also the most popular business partner for foreign investors looking to invest in Burma's private gem industry.

Mainland Chinese investment in Myanmar

Legal two-way trade between Burma and Mainland China reached US$1.5 billion annually by 1988 and additional Chinese trade, investment, economic, and military aid was sought to invigorate and jumpstart the re-emerging Burmese economy. An influx of foreign capital investment from Mainland China, Germany, and France has led to the development of new potential construction projects across Burma. Mainland China's outpouring of investment into the country has flooded the Burmese economy with plenty of cheap Chinese goods and services, in addition, to providing financial backing for new startup infrastructure projects across the country. Many of these infrastructure projects are in the hands of Chinese construction contractors and civil engineers with large scale construction undertakings of various classifications such as irrigation dams, highways, bridges, ground satellite stations, and an international airport for Mandalay. Burmese entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry have also established numerous joint ventures and corporate partnerships with Mainland Chinese State-owned enterprises to facilitate the construction of oil pipelines that potentially could create thousands of jobs throughout the country. Private Chinese companies, many of which range from small to medium-sized businesses rely on the established Overseas Chinese bamboo network as a conduit between Mainland China and Burmese Chinese entrepreneurs and investors to channel capital and conduct trade between the two countries. Mainland China is now Burma's most important source of foreign goods and services as well as one of the most important sources of capital for foreign direct investment in the country, accounting for 61 percent of all foreign direct investment from 2013 to 2014. Between 2007 to 2015, Mainland China's investment in Burma increased from USD$775 million to USD$21.867 billion accounting for 40 percent of all foreign direct investments in the country. Between 2009 to 2012, Burma was the second-largest Southeast Asian recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment capital after Singapore with much of the capital making its way into Burma's energy and mining industries. Chinese state-owned enterprises account for 57 percent of all foreign firms operating in Burma and are primarily involved in the oil and gas, power, and mineral sectors while private firms that engage in licit and illicit trade account for a majority of foreign investment in Burma's domestic economy. Chinese structural power over Burma's structure of finance also provides China to maintain a dominant position within the country's natural resource sector, primarily Burma's latent oil, gas, and uranium sectors. Its position galvanizes China's position as Burma's primary investor and consumer of its extractive industries, which accounts for a majority of Mainland China's investment holdings. Many Chinese investors have realized that it has been more advantageous for them to invest in Burma's mining, lumber, and energy sectors as a number of them have set their sights on Burma's high-value natural resource industries such as raw jade stones, teak and timber, rice, and marine fisheries as potential target investments of choice.

Burmese attitudes and responses
As Chinese economic might grew, much of the indigenous Burman majority have gradually been driven out into poorer land on the hills, on the outskirts of major Burmese cities or into the mountains. Disenchantment grew among the displaced indigenous Burmese hill tribes who felt they were unable to successfully compete against Chinese-owned businesses in a free market capitalist system. During the Burmese property boom in the 1990s, Chinese real estate investors began building and speculating as property values doubled and tripled, which resulted indigenous Burmese being pushed further away from their native homes and displaced into the outskirts of major Burmese cities towards impoverished shantytowns. Underlying resentment and bitterness from the impoverished Burmese majority has been accumulating as there has been no existence of indigenous Burmese having any substantial business equity in Burma. The increased economic clout held in the hands of the Chinese in Burma has triggered distrust, envy, resentment and anti-Chinese hostility among the indigenous Burmese majority. Decades of free market liberalization brought virtually no economic benefit to the indigenous Burman majority but rather the opposite resulting a subjugated indigenous Burmese majority underclass, many of whom still engage in menial labor, rural peasantry, or illegal teak smuggling to make ends meet in a stark socioeconomic contrast to their modern, wealthier, and cosmopolitan middle and upper class Chinese counterparts. Thousands of displaced and dispossessed Burman hill tribes and aborigines continue to live in satellite shantytowns on the outskirts of Mandalay in economic destitution, given the glaring wealth disparity and abject poverty among the indigenous Burman aborigines has inflamed hostility by blaming their socioeconomic ills on foreign domination, exploitation, and systematic looting of their country by a relative handful of outsiders, namely Chinese.

Language
Most Burmese Chinese speak Burmese in their daily life. Those with higher education also speak Standard Chinese and/or English. The use of Chinese dialects still prevails. Hokkien (a dialect of Min Nan from Quanzhou, Zhangzhou and Jinjiang) and Taishanese (a Yue dialect akin to Cantonese) from Taishan and Xinhui are mostly used in Yangon as well as in Lower Myanmar, while Yunnanese Mandarin is well preserved in Upper Myanmar.

Although General Ne Win's rule (1962–1988) enacted the ban on Chinese-language schools that caused a decline of Mandarin speakers, the number of Chinese schools is growing again. (Note: Standard Chinese refers to the national language of the PRC and Taiwan, distinct from the Southwestern Mandarin dialect of the Upper Myanmar, Kokang and Panthay). At the end of 2012, Mizzima News reported that an increasing number of young Burmese Chinese are expressing interest in Chinese language, taking language courses even when their parents don't understand Chinese. However, this trend is not necessarily indicative of an interest in joining Chinese community or cultural organisations, as many of their parents did. Groups like the Myanmar Overseas Young Chinese League report a lack of interest from Burmese Chinese youth.

Religion
Most Burmese Chinese practice Theravada Buddhism, while incorporating some Mahayana Buddhist and Taoist beliefs including ancestral worship. There are also some prominent Theravadin Buddhist meditation teacher of Chinese descent like Sayadaw U Tejaniya. There are several notable Chinese temples situated in Yangon, including Fushan Temple (dedicated to Qingshui Zhushi), Kheng Hock Keong Temple (dedicated to Mazu) and Guanyin Gumiao Temple (dedicated to Guanyin).

The minority Panthay or Chinese Muslims (回教華人; MY ပန်းသေးလူမျိုး, lit. "little flowers") originated from Yunnan are mainly Muslim.

Names
The Burmese Chinese have Burmese names and many also have Chinese names. Given names in various Chinese dialects are often transliterated into the Burmese language, using phonetic transcriptions or translated. For example, a Burmese Chinese person named 'Khin Aung' may have the Chinese name of 慶豐 (Hokkien POJ: Khèng-hong), with '慶' (Hokkien POJ: khèng) corresponding to 'Khin', and '豐' (Hokkien POJ: hong) corresponding to 'Aung'. However, variations of transcription do exist (between dialects), and some Burmese Chinese do not choose to adopt similar-sounding Burmese and Chinese names. Because the Burmese lack surnames, many Burmese Chinese tend to pass on portions of their given names to future generations, for the purpose of denoting lineage.

According to publications of Long Shan Tang, a clan association based in Yangon, the ten most common Chinese surnames in Yangon are:
 * 1) Lee/Li (李)
 * 2) Peng/Pang (彭)
 * 3) Shi/See/Si (時)
 * 4) Dong/Tung (董)
 * 5) Min/Man (閔)
 * 6) Niu/Ngau (牛)
 * 7) Pian/Pin (邊)
 * 8) Hsin (辛)
 * 9) Kwan (關)
 * 10) Khaw (許)

In Myanmar, the majority of Chinese surnames are Lim 林, Tan 陈, Yang 杨, Lee 李, Chou 周, Wang 王, Chang 张, Su 苏, Huang 黄, Yeh 叶, Hsu 许, Fang 方 and Wu 吴

Cuisine
Burmese Chinese cuisine is based on Chinese cuisine, particularly from Fujian, Guangdong and Yunnan provinces, with local influences. Spices such as turmeric and chili are commonly used. Also, the use of soy sauce, bean curd, bean sprouts, Chinese pickled mustards, and dried mushrooms can be attributed to Chinese influence. The following is a partial list of Chinese contributions to Burmese cuisine. These are an established part of today's Burmese cuisine, and are hardly differentiated as a foreign cuisine.

 * Pauksi: steamed buns
 * Bèkin: roasted duck
 * Igyakway: fried Chinese doughnut
 * : fried rice
 * La mont: mooncake
 * Mi shay: thin rice noodle soup
 * Mi swan: thin wheat noodles
 * : rice porridge
 * : Panthay-style fried noodles
 * : literally "noodles laced in cooked oil," usually with chicken
 * : literally "beehoon soup with chicken or pork,"
 * : noodle with thick starchy gravy

Pre-colonial
The earliest records of Chinese migration into present-day Myanmar were in the Song and Ming dynasties. In the 18th century, Ming dynasty princes settled in Kokang (the northern part of present-day Myanmar). Chinese traders, however, travelled as far as the capital city as well as northern towns on the Irrawaddy such as Bhamo. Some of them stayed and started a Chinese community at Amarapura, and when King Mindon moved his capital to Mandalay in 1859, the Chinese were the only community that decided to stay behind. Many of their descendants intermarried into the host society and remain important and respected citizens of Amarapura.

British Colonial period

Another wave of immigration occurred in the 19th century under the British colonial administration. Britain encouraged immigration of the Indians and Chinese to British Burma, and such incentives for work opportunities and enterprise and for accumulating wealth attracted many Chinese immigrants. They primarily came to Burma via British Malaya. The Chinese quickly became dominant in the highly lucrative rice and gem industries. Many Chinese merchants and traders owning both wholesale and retail businesses. Unlike in British Malaya, where most Chinese were coolie labourers, the Chinese in Burma were largely from the artisan and merchant classes.

They integrated well into Burmese society not least because they, like the Bamar, were of Sino-Tibetan stock and were Buddhists, implicit in the nickname pauk hpaw (MY ပေါက်ဖော်, lit. "sibling"). During British rule, marriage between the Chinese and Burmese, particularly Chinese men and Burmese women, was the most common form of intermarriage in Burma, as evidenced by a High Court ruling on the legal status of Sino-Burmese marriages under Burmese Buddhist law. From 1935 until the end of British rule, the Chinese were represented in the colonial legislature, the House of Representatives.

After World War II, displaced Burmese Chinese (whose pre-war homes were in Burma), were the most numerous group of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to request repatriation to return to Burma, according to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

Post-independence

During the 1950s, Burma was one of the first countries to recognise the People's Republic of China as a nation. However, its own Chinese population was treated as aliens. The Burmese Chinese were issued foreign registration cards (FRC) in a tiered citizenship system adopted by the post-independence government. When the Chinese Communists expelled the Kuomintang, many fled to Myanmar and Thailand over the borders of Yunnan Province. The Burmese government fought and removed the armed KMT and forced them to Taiwan; those who managed to stay prospered. In the 1950s, discriminatory policies against overseas Chinese encompassed citizenship, government employment, approval for business regulations and licensing, loan extensions and permission to make remittances.

In 1952, Kheng Hock Keong Temple publications estimated that ethnic Chinese, who lived in enclaves in the area along Sinohdan, Latha, and Maung Khaing Streets (with Cantonese typically living above Maha Bandula Road and Hokkiens living below), constituted 9.5 per cent of Rangoon's population. During this period, there was a sharp rise in the number of private Chinese language schools, primarily teaching Mandarin, in Burma, from 65 in 1935 to 259 in 1953 and 259 at its peak in 1962, with many such schools affiliated to the Chinese nationalist (MY တရုတ်ဖြူ, lit. "White Chinese") or communist (MY တရုတ်နီ, lit. "Red Chinese") movements. However, fewer than 10 per cent of Burmese Chinese of school age attended Chinese language schools. Similarly, about 80 clan associations operated in the 1950s.

Socialist rule
In 1962, Ne Win led the Socialist coup d'état, establishing the Revolutionary Council under the Burmese Way to Socialism. In February 1963, the Enterprise Nationalization Law was passed, effectively nationalising all major industries and prohibiting the formation of new factories. This law adversely affected many industrialists and entrepreneurs, especially those without the full citizenship. The government's economic nationalisation program further prohibited foreigners, including the non-citizen Chinese, from owning land, sending remittances, getting business licences and practising medicine. Such policies led to the beginnings of a major exodus of Burmese Chinese to other countries—some 100,000 Chinese left Burma.

Although a kabya himself, Ne Win banned Chinese-language education and created other measures to compel the Chinese to leave. Ne Win's government stoked up racial animosity and ethnic conflicts against the Indians and Chinese Burmese, who were terrorised by Burmese citizens, the most violent riots taking place in 1967. All schools were nationalised, including Chinese language schools. Beginning in 1967 and continuing throughout the 1970s, anti-Chinese riots as well as Anti-Indian sentiment continued to flare up and many believed they were covertly supported by the government. Similarly, Chinese shops were looted and set on fire. Public attention was successfully diverted by Ne Win from the uncontrollable inflation, scarcity of consumer items and rising prices of rice. The 1982 Citizenship Law further restricted Burmese citizenship for Burmese Chinese (as it stratified citizenship into three categories: full, associate, and naturalised) and severely limited Burmese Chinese, especially those without full citizenship and those holding FRCs, from attending professional tertiary schools, including medical, engineering, agricultural and economics institutions. During this period, the country's failing economy and widespread discrimination accelerated an emigration of Burmese Chinese out of Burma.

Modern era
In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power, and gradually loosened the government's role in the economy, encouraging private sector growth and foreign investment. This liberalisation of state's role in the economy, if slight and uneven, nonetheless gave the ethnic Chinese-led businesses extra space to expand and reassert their economic power. Today, the majority of retail, wholesale and import trade businesses are run by the Burmese Chinese today. For example, Sein Gayha (MY စိန်ဂေဟာ), a major retailer that began in Yangon's Chinatown in 1985, is owned by a Hakka Chinese family. Moreover, four of the five largest commercial banks in Myanmar, Myanmar Universal Bank, Yoma Bank, Myanmar Mayflower Bank, and the Asia Wealth Bank, were all founded by Sino-Burmese.

Today, the majority of Burmese Chinese live in the major cities of Yangon, Mandalay, Taunggyi, Bago, and their surrounding areas. Although there are Chinatowns (MY တရုတ်တန်း; tayoke tan) in the major cities, the Chinese are widely dispersed throughout the country. Yangon is home to nearly 100,000 Chinese. The northern region of Myanmar has seen a recent influx of mainland Chinese migrant workers, black market traders and gamblers. In Kachin State, which borders China in three directions, Standard Chinese is the lingua franca.

Upper Myanmar has seen a demographic shift resulting from the recent immigration of many mainland Chinese to Mandalay Region, Shan, and Kachin States. Ethnic Chinese now constitute an estimated 30 to 40 per cent of Mandalay's population. Huge swaths of land in city centre left vacant by the fires were later illegally purchased, mostly by the ethnic Chinese, many of whom were recent illegal immigrants from Yunnan. The Chinese influx accelerated after the current military government came to power in 1988. With the Burmese government turning a blind eye, many Chinese immigrants in the 1990s settling in Mandalay. In the 1990s alone, about 250,000 to 300,000 Yunnanese were estimated to have migrated to Mandalay. The Mandalay's population from about 500,000 in 1980 to one million in 2008 and the percentage of local Burmese reduced to less than 50. Chinese festivals are now firmly embedded in the city's cultural calendar. The strong influx of mainland Chinese immigrants into Mandalay coupled with the presence of strong Chinese economic clout resulted the subsequent displacement of indigenous Burmese to the outskirts of the city creating racial tensions between the two communities.

There are also substantial Burmese Chinese communities outside of Myanmar, particularly in Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong, Singapore, United States (such as New York City's Henry Street ) and Australia. Zhonghe District, near Taipei, Taiwan is home to 40,000 Burmese Chinese (2008), one of the largest communities outside of Myanmar.

title: Chinese people in Myanmar


text: User talk:148.246.67.26

title: User talk:148.246.67.26


text:
Nantucket Sound

Nantucket Sound is a roughly triangular area of the Atlantic Ocean offshore from the U.S. state of Massachusetts. It is 30 mi long and 25 mi wide, and is enclosed by Cape Cod on the north, Nantucket on the south, and Martha's Vineyard on the west. Between Cape Cod and Martha's Vineyard it is connected to the Vineyard Sound. Ports on Nantucket Sound include Nantucket and Hyannis, Massachusetts.

Nantucket Sound possesses significant marine habitat for a diversity of ecologically and economically important species. "The Sound" has particular significance for several federally protected species of wildlife and a variety of commercially and recreationally valuable fisheries.

The Sound is located at a confluence of the cold Labrador Currents and the warm Gulf Stream. This creates a unique coastal habitat representing the southern range for Northern Atlantic species and the northern range for Mid-Atlantic species. Nantucket Sound has much biological diversity and contains habitats that range from open sea to salt marshes, as well as warm-water beaches on the Cape and Islands coasts.

title: Nantucket Sound


text: User talk:67.70.92.158

title: User talk:67.70.92.158


text:
User:Sechzehn

 ∞S echze h n 1 6 Ta l k∞

 Contact Me: Leave me a message | Send me an e-mail</FONT>

ja:利用者:Sechzehn de:Benutzer:Sechzehn

title: User:Sechzehn


text:
Category talk:South Africa

Africa-related regional notice board
I have created Africa-related regional notice board. —iFaqeer (Talk to me!) 05:38, Dec 7, 2004 (UTC)

title: Category talk:South Africa


text:
Template:SociologyTasks

If you have a sociology-related task that you want to bring to the attention of others, please list it at the Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Sociology.

title: Template:SociologyTasks


text: Category:Iowa General Assembly

title: Category:Iowa General Assembly


text:
Humanitarian crisis

A humanitarian crisis (or sometimes humanitarian disaster) is defined as a singular event or a series of events that are threatening in terms of health, safety or well-being of a community or large group of people. It may be an internal or external conflict and usually occurs throughout a large land area. Local, national and international responses are necessary in such events.

Each humanitarian crisis is caused by different factors and as a result, each different humanitarian crisis requires a unique response targeted towards the specific sectors affected. This can result in either short-term or long-term damage. Humanitarian crises can either be natural disasters, human-made disasters or complex emergencies. In such cases, complex emergencies occur as a result of several factors or events that prevent a large group of people from accessing their fundamental needs, such as food, clean water or safe shelter.

Examples of humanitarian crises include armed conflicts, epidemics, famine, natural disasters, energy crises and other major emergencies. If such a crisis causes large movements of people it could also become a refugee crisis. For these reasons, humanitarian crises are often interconnected and complex and several national and international agencies play roles in the repercussions of the incidences.

Categories
There is no simple categorization of humanitarian crises. Different communities and agencies tend to have definitions related to the concrete situations they face. A local fire service will tend to focus on issues such as flooding and weather induced crises. Medical and health related organizations are naturally focused on sudden crises to the health of a community.

Humanitarian crisis may arise from both natural and human-made conflicts and disasters. Humanitarian crisis from natural disasters include tsunami, earthquake, hurricane, floods, droughts, and wildfires that may result in disruption through damage to property, physical injury and death, psychological distress, displacement of individuals and families, and prolonged disruption in normal daily activities. On the other hand, crisis from manmade disasters such as wars, social unrest, protests, conflicts, and terrorist attacks have a broad range of impacts on the physical, mental, and social well-being of the individuals affected.

An ongoing or lingering pandemic may amount to a humanitarian crisis, especially where there are increasing levels of virulence, or rates of infection as in the case of AIDS, bird flu or tuberculosis. Major health-related problems such as cancer, global warming typically require an accentuated or punctuated mass-event to justify a label of "crisis" or "disaster".

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) lists categories which include different types of natural disasters, technological disasters (i.e. hazardous material spills, Chernobyl-type nuclear accidents, chemical explosions) and long-term human-made disasters related to "civil strife, civil war and international war". Internationally, the humanitarian response sector has tended to distinguish between natural disasters and complex emergencies which are related to armed conflict and wars.

Women's social status in humanitarian crises
Socially, women and children (mostly girls) receive a significantly decreased amount of attention in response to humanitarian crises. Women and children make up 3 quarters of refugees or displaced persons at risk post-crisis. A quarter of this population is of reproduction age and a fifth of this population is likely to be pregnant. In times of emergency and such crises, deaths associated with pregnancy, reproductive health, sexual violence and sexual exploitation increase drastically especially amongst females. During such emergencies, women lose access to family planning services, prenatal care, postpartum care and other health services. The heightened risk of female health and safety makes them vulnerable to disease, violence and death.

Non-profit organizations such as the Women's Refugee Commission deal with aiding particularly women suffering from various types of humanitarian crises. According to the Women's Refugee Commission, during the first hours of a humanitarian crisis, women and young children are at most risk. During such an event, agencies and organizations approach matters variably. However, the top critical requirements within hours and months of the crises include: keeping the refugees and internally displaced persons away from danger, allowing access to fundamental needs such as food and healthcare, identification information, preventing sexual violence and others.

Socio-economic realities of humanitarian crises
Economic issues can lead to humanitarian crises or humanitarian crises can lead to economic downfalls. If it occurs after a humanitarian crisis affects a nation, it is imperative to return the livelihoods in the economic settings of the nation. One of the critical needs on the Women's Refugee Commission's list is providing education and economic opportunities in order to maintain the economic qualities of the region. It is done by using the skills of the displaced persons or refugees involved to provide them with opportunities to gain income.

If it occurs as a cause of humanitarian crisis, the society would have been in a state of civil insecurity and economic shortfalls, which could cause the government to collapse. This can also result from food insecurity, famines, corruptions and various other issues. Direct effects of this situation include human rights violations, violence and mass murders.

The El Niño weather pattern is expected to exacerbate hunger, displacement, and health risks globally. Governments and organizations like the UN Food and Agriculture Organization are focusing on anticipatory action and early response to mitigate the effects of climate-induced damage.

Environmental and ecological impacts
In the cases of humanitarian crises, especially natural disasters such as tornadoes, tsunamis and earthquakes, these incidences leave environmental and ecological impacts on the regions affected. The aftermaths of natural disasters can lead to a significant decrease in natural resources while making the region prone to future issues. For example, if a forest fire occurs in a large region, the area may be susceptible to air pollution, dust clouds, release of carcinogenic gases and others. Forest ecological wildlife, for example, is severely impacted by such events. In the cases of water natural disasters such as floods and tsunamis, extensive damage due to the water is prevalent. Fish, corals and other ocean life is impacted, which further impacts the livelihoods of fishermen.

According to the World Bank data, there is a worrying water scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa. The Stockholm International Water Institute emphasizes the need for urgent action in water policy, and suggests decentralizing decision-making to better manage the crisis.

Mental health impacts
Mental health impacts can cause additional concerns for populations affected by humanitarian crises. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that one in five individuals in a disaster-impacted population may already suffer from a mental health disorder that could then be exacerbated by the disaster context. Mental health disorders included in this estimate range from mild anxiety and/or depression to severe and persistent conditions like bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.

Acute mental health impacts
The stress of a humanitarian crisis can cause acute, or short-term, anxiety in the population of people affected. Humanitarian crises often displace people from their homes and cut off their access to resources, which affects their ability to meet their basic needs and creates significant anxiety. This acute anxiety may impact the population's capacity to care for themselves via the resources provided by humanitarian aid groups in the short-term. Acute mental health impacts can also hinder a population's recovery capacity in rebuilding after a crisis. Acute stress can exacerbate pre-existing conditions for individuals who already suffer from mental health disorders, making serious conditions like depression or schizophrenia more difficult to live with.

Chronic mental health impacts
If left untreated, acute mental health impacts from humanitarian crises can become chronic conditions. Large studies estimate that anywhere between 9 and 40% of refugee populations suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) brought on by the crisis that led to their refugee status. These studies also showed a significant proportion of crisis-affected populations (between 5 and 30%) experiencing depression. Though a few large studies have been conducted, research gaps exist in investigating chronic mental health impacts of humanitarian crises, which is why these estimates have so much variation. PTSD along with moderate to severe depression and anxiety can be life-long disorders without adequate and prompt treatment.

Responses
The WHO and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) recommend that mental health care should be an integral part of emergency response during a humanitarian crisis. The type of mental health care provided can range and vary based on the context and resources but can include mental health first aid on the front lines, community support groups, and routine clinical mental health care. The WHO also recommends that countries enhance their mental healthcare systems outside of the context of a humanitarian crisis so that individuals affected by crises can have access to the care they need once the emergency response is over. A 2020 Cochrane review of psychological and social interventions for the prevention of mental disorders for individuals living in areas affected by humanitarian crisis found the need for better studies to determine the impact of interventions following a review of current studies. Research states that mental health is often neglected by first responders. Disaster can have lasting psychological impacts on those affected. When individuals are supported in processing their emotional experiences to the disaster this leads to increases in resilience, increases in the capacity to help others through crises, and increases in community engagement. When processing of emotional experiences is done in a collective manner, this leads to greater solidarity following disaster. As such, emotional experiences have an inherent adaptiveness within them, however the opportunity for these to be reflected on and processed is necessary for this growth to occur.

Sustainable solutions
There is no singular solution to any one humanitarian crisis. Often, the primary cause of a humanitarian crisis is intertwined with several other factors. Further, one repercussion can lead to another which may lead to another. For instance, in the case of a flood, fish and ocean life is impacted, an environmental and ecological impact. This can further impact humans the source of income for fishermen, an economical impact. This causes the residents of this particular area to be stripped from their source of food and their culture of consuming sea fish. This can lead to women and children being forced to work in dangerous conditions to gain income and food, a social impact. Evidently, one crisis can have many impacts that are interconnected with one another and there is no single solution. The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University works to understand and find solutions to the intersection of various factors that contribute to humanitarian crisis.

Preparing for humanitarian crises
Disaster preparedness is critical to building both national and international capacity to prevent, respond to, and recover from humanitarian emergencies. Disaster preparedness activities can be categorized into material preparedness (building to code, avoiding building in hazardous areas, strengthening homes, preparing emergency kits, etc.) and into behavioral preparedness (training, early warning, disaster insurance, etc.). The international community possesses five key to key entities for guidance programming, research, and funding for disaster preparedness capacity-building:

 * United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction: The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction implements the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). The UNISDR, led by the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction, serves, “…as the focal point in the United Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities". A component of UNISDR work is implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.
 * International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC): The IFRC operates around the globe and across all phases of the humanitarian programme cycle, helping affected nations by working with member National Societies and the international community to prepare for, respond to, and recover from “…natural and man-made disasters in non-conflict situations."
 * Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): OCHA is a United Nations office, “…responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies." OCHA's leader operates as both the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and as the Emergency Relief Coordinator, advocating for increased awareness of, preparedness for, and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide. As the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the OCHA lead also chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
 * Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): The IASC provides a forum for both UN-affiliated and non-UN-affiliated organizations to coordinate action regarding humanitarian policies, advocacy, and response evaluation and improvement. In 2005, the IASC released its Transformative Agenda with 10 protocols to, “…improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership". Protocol 8: “Common Framework for Preparedness” and Protocol 9: ”Emergency Response Preparedness” provide guidance countries and humanitarians can implement for risk assessment and preparedness planning. Additionally, IASC also oversees global humanitarian clusters as a part of the Cluster Approach.
 * Global Clusters: To aid coordination during the humanitarian programme cycle, the UN established the Cluster Approach. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations with explicit responsibilities for coordinating action within each humanitarian sector. Preparedness is fundamental to the Cluster Approach, with leaders within each global cluster working to build international capacity by developing standards, setting policy, and sharing leading practices for their sector before a humanitarian emergency occurs.

In addition to these five disaster preparedness entities, there is a multiplicity of government donor agencies that fund disaster preparedness activities, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and others. Additionally, there are many philanthropies that support disaster preparedness, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

NGOs and the management of human-made crises
Many actors are involved in the strategic management of humanitarian crises and emergencies. The United Nations (UN) serves as the primary international actor in humanitarian crisis oversight but has extended responsibilities and management roles to improve the efficiency of crisis responses. With the development of a cluster system, the UN's official organs have incorporated international organizations (IOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the coordination of crisis management.

By expanding the responsibility for humanitarian crises beyond the UN's singular authority, the number of actors involved in the coordination of the system has simultaneously increased. Requiring further attention to efficient cooperation in-between actors. Specifically, human-made crises, which differ from natural disasters in their fundamental origin of imposing humanitarian threats, create distinct challenges to appropriate crisis responses because of the new essence of conflicts. Today, conflicts are more frequently domestically fought rather than across national borders. Such development of crises has changed the ways humans are affected by conflict and asks for new response strategies to meet the needs of the people at risk. Thus, the multiple actors involved in human-made humanitarian crises, are faced with a challenging environment to establish efficient management and cooperation over the situation.

INGOs and NGOs are part of the clustered system of responsible actors in the management of humanitarian crises. They share organizational characteristics of a detachment from state association and a position of objectivity but differ in their level of operation. INGOs operate internationally, and NGOs pertain to a domestic level of activity. Non-governmental organizations overall have a non-profit structure, which means that they are solely providing services for the good of the population at risk and in need of assistance, without expectations of return benefits. Which allows them to focus on solidarity efforts in serving human needs and protecting human rights. The organizations are thus dependent on volunteers' investment in the shared vision of the entity. Their work also includes preventive efforts of serving as experts to deliver knowledge on management practices to the other actors. Additionally, by centering their work around a shared vision of establishing long-term peace through coordinated strategies of reconciliation and conflict assistance, they seek to efficiently fulfill their role in the humanitarian crisis management cluster.

The 2017 humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is an example that recognizes the unique position NGOs have and the responsibilities they serve in the international community. The crisis was acknowledged internationally when the ethnic group of the Rohingya had suffered from violent discrimination and denial of human rights for an extensive period. The Myanmar government prevented aid from both the UN and neighboring countries to support the ongoing crisis. Instead, the Indonesian government established a strategic cluster of cooperation between local NGOs in Indonesia and Myanmar. The alliance received the name of The Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance (AKIM) and provided relief to the exposed Rohingya people by getting around the barriers put in place by the Myanmar government. Several international NGOs were also involved in Myanmar to deliver appropriate relief. Their assistance allowed limited contact with the national government in Myanmar yet reached beneficial agreements with other local authorities, as well as established communication and cooperation with local NGOs and UN actors. However, because of the large number of actors involved in the crisis, the organizations faced challenges in the coordination between actors to provide efficient and non-coinciding crisis management.

In addition to the coordination aspect and its significance in humanitarian crisis management provided by NGOs, there is another potential strategy highlighting efficient communication to implement sufficient responses. NGOs often have to work with a diverse set of actors which may present challenges to efficient cooperation if expectations and goals divide across partnerships. To overcome obstacles within diverse interactions, NGOs may utilize three strategic environments of operation to establish efficient communication between parties. First, the “internal workplace” considers the diverse environment closely working with the NGOs, consisting of the organization's employees and volunteers from the crisis exposed area. Second, the “inter-organizational forum” addresses the communication line between the multiple NGOs assisting in the specific crisis, including the local authorities and the appropriate reporting to UN agencies. Last, “community relations” recognizes the multicultural dimension of the communication between NGO employees and the individuals at risk of the crisis. The communication and coordination between the various actors in humanitarian crises are essential components for ensuring security, limiting the conflict, and overall delivering efficient crisis management.

Besides the attention to efficient coordination of actors and the recognition of diverse environments of communication, NGOs can also adopt strategic thinking in their work with humanitarian crises. What identifies the approach of strategic thinking is an overarching awareness of the environment of the particular crisis and the context of the organization assisting. With a broader understanding of the needs of the people at risk, and what the organization wishes to accomplice with its work, there is a greater chance for a successful outcome for both parties. Strategic thinking, coordination of actors, and efficient communication in diverse environments are all potential strategies that NGOs can use on both international and local levels to address humanitarian crises. As each organization and crisis is different, there is no such thing as a perfect strategy to manage humanitarian crises across the board. Instead, it is suggested to use methods such as strategic thinking, coordination, and communication to develop a response that is suitable for the specific situation and allows for successful management of serving human needs and protecting human rights.

title: Humanitarian crisis