text:
Beauce, France

Beauce is a natural region in north-central France, located between the rivers Seine and Loire. It comprises the Eure-et-Loir modern-day department and parts of Loiret, Essonne and Loir-et-Cher.

The region shared the history of the province of Orléanais and the county of Chartres, which is its sole major city. Beauce is one of France's most productive agricultural areas.

The name derives from Latin Belsia or Belsa, said by Virgilius Maro Grammaticus to be a Gaulish word meaning "grass plain, cultivated plain." It was formerly spelled La Beausse.

It is the setting of Émile Zola's novel La Terre (The Earth). The region also gives its name to the Beauce region of Quebec.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Beauce, France


text:
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title: SIGPLAN


text:
Talk:Nicci French

Untitled
I sure hope that Nicci French didn't write the piece because the grammar isn't very good for journalists and writers. --TracyRenee 12:15, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * No, I did, but feel free to edit if you think the text can be improved. [[User:MacGyverMagic|Mgm|(talk)]] 12:56, Nov 30, 2004 (UTC)

"The People Who Went Away"??
What is that supposed to be? I have read all books by Nicci French but have never come across this one. amazon.com doesn't know it either. There are no Google hits for this title. There is not even a mention of this book on Nicci French's own website! So whoever wrote this list, would you please provide a source or delete the title, thanks! - Or do you perhaps mean "The Moment You Were Gone"? That was written by Nicci Gerrard, not Nicci French. --Katie1971 (talk) 12:32, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

 * It looks like it was a short story that was published on its own. Look here. It also passes the google test and looks like it definitely "exists". It should not be removed from the author's bibliography.Gwynand (talk) 13:01, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

 * OK cool! Thanks for finding that out for me. - I had googled for it but not found anything! Thanks again Katie1971 (talk) 09:25, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

Notability
I don't think there is an issue regarding "notability". Nicci French books sell by the bucketload, they are rather good and at least one has been made into a Hollywood movie (namely Killing me Softly).82.110.248.146 (talk) 16:09, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

 * Agreed. I've removed the tag, I don't see any current argument for contention over notability. Gwynand | Talk•Contribs 16:15, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Kirkus Reviews
Kirkus Reviews has covered at least 10 books by Nicci French. See Search Results: "nicci french" (page 1) where they do not all show up as the top listings, unfortunately, so consult page 2 at least.

2 or 3 starred reviews: The Red Room (2001) and Blue Monday (2012). Maybe also Killing Me Softly (novel) (1999) for which search results display one star but there is some mixup concerning Killing Me Softly: Erotic Tales of Unearthly Love, ed. Gardner Dozois (1995). Neither one of the reviews shows the star, only the search report. --P64 (talk) 22:43, 22 October 2015 (UTC)

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title: Talk:Nicci French


text:
Talk:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact/Archive 1

Pre-history of the pact
I miss the pre-history of the Pact, but am not (at least not at the moment) sufficiently knowledgeable on the importance of USSR switching foreign minister Maxim Litvinov for Vyacheslav Molotov, or the long-lasting but slow and ultimately failed negotiations on a similar pact between London/Paris and Moscow.

I think a factual resumé of the driving forces/underlying needs would be of interest. -- Ruhrjung 01:16 5 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Now added. -- Ruhrjung 14:25 10 Jun 2003 (UTC)

wordings on Litvinov
It's simple, really. Litvinov was both a Jew and an advocate of an alliance with the western democracies against the Fascist powers. When Stalin became convinced that Britain and France wouldn't fight (although he was wrong about this), he fired Litvinov and replaced him with Molotov, whose foreign policy ideas were consistent with Stalin's--to buy time to get the USSR ready for war, even if it meant making a rotten deal with Hitler to do it. John

What about a paragraph worded:
 * Litvinov's line, as an advocate of an alliance with the Western democracies against the Fascist powers, seemed less feasible than Molotov's program of buying time to get the Soviet Union ready for war.

--Ruhrjung 10:12, 20 Oct 2003 (UTC)

Stalin cincerely negotiating with the Western European powers?
It's mostly accepted in Polish historiography that Stalin pretend to make deal with western allies only to make pressure at Hitler, when his initial offering to divide Poland were ignored. Waiting for discussion before i will change the article to reflect this opinions.

Also, there is something wrong with one paragraph which ends suddenly in mid of sentence. szopen

Paragraphs ending in the midsth of sentences are unfortunately not quite uncommon on wikipedia.

If you clearly qualify that opinion as "widely agreed" or "held" or "believed" or... by Polish historians, I think it would be of great value. If you, on the other hand, aspires to claim the Polish view to be nearest to truth, then we are in for troubles and edit wars and more people giving up on wikipdia. I hope you realize this. --Ruhrjung 09:57, 12 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Of course. I am veteran of multiple edit wars, hardenet combatant, and combatants now that the best thing man can do with war is to avoid it :) Szopen

I realized in retrospect that I'd commented on your comment from 26 Nov 2003. ;-))) Nevertheless, it seems as if we are in agreement on this point. --Ruhrjung 15:59, 12 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Stalin speach of August 19, 1939
Stalin speach Aug 19 1939

http://home.swipnet.se/nordling/Stalinspeech.html

Molotov's program versus Litvinov's

 * By then, Stalin instead possibly approved of Molotov's program to provoke a war between Germany and the Western countries.

This is highly speculative and lacks any proof, should be removed.

"Fascism a matter of taste"

 * see for molotov's comment: http://www.wpunj.edu/~newpol/issue18/jacobs18.htm

Christopher Mahan 19:04, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Are you serious?

Do you really think it is suitable to create an edit-war over that quotation's location to the introduction? Couldn't you come up with some more cooperative solution than re-inserting it repeatedly? --Ruhrjung 21:35, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)

SOV-GER relations
The following excerpt caught my eye: Thereafter, Nazi–Soviet relations began to cool and the clash between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army seemed increasingly unavoidable.. What are the sources for such claim? AFAIK there were no visible signs of cooling, the relations seemed the best of the best. That's why the German attack was such a surprise.. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 22:10, Sep 15, 2004 (UTC)

Well, maybe you are right. I must agree that it was no reciprocal cooling. What fluttered in my brain was a perception of a shift in German propaganda and rumour campaigns in Western countries, combining old anti-Bolshevist concerns, that the Nazis so to say shared with influential layers of the population in the occupied countries, with the own Lebensraum-rhetoric for Ukrainian wheat, etc, etc.

However, factually the relations began to cool in the autumn of 1940. But it might be argued that this was due to provocation from the German side, and that the Russians did what they could to appease and accommodate.

In my opinion (I can not support anything by sources right now) the clash between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army seemed increasingly unavoidable, although only the fewest believed Hitler would wilfully enter into a two-front-war, so the Western front had to be decided first, and peace reached with Britain.

The surprise was the "early launching" - while Germany seemingly still was in need of the Soviet friendship - not a Soviet-German war in principle. --Ruhrjung 22:43, 2004 Sep 15 (UTC)

 * Yup, the matter is a bit tricky since the official propaganda on both sides still supported the everlasting friendship, the Border of Peace and such. However, objectively speaking the cooling was rather an overall post factum feeling than a decrease in bilateral relations. Since there were practically no cultural relations (not surprisingly, to say the least), we can only speak of economical cooperation - which lasted until the last minutes of the German-Soviet alliance. I guess everyone heard of the last supply trains crossing the border just minutes before the Wehrmacht started its march eastwards.

 * Those relations were never very cordial, but IMO they didn't deteriorate much between August 1939 and June 1941. Perhaps a post-war analisis of sources and speeches would suggest that but it was definitely not the case at the time it all happened. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 23:24, Sep 15, 2004 (UTC)

--

Nazi Germany vs the Soviet Union, or the Nazi empire vs the Communist empire

 * "By early 1941, the Nazi and Soviet empires-in-being shared a common border running through what is now Lithuania and Poland."

Germany controlled millitary and politically, not just Lithuania and Poland, but also Finland, Hungary and Romania, all three countries in war with USSR from June 1941, even in the South and North, the German army was not exactly on the Soviet borders on June 22, 1941. In fact, the Soviet and Nazi empires shared a very long border. It could be possibly that Soviet Union didn't realize (or didn't want to believe) this fact. --Vasile 23:56, 15 Sep 2004 (UTC)

"German allies"
I am not happy with the following sentences:

 * By early 1941, the Nazi and Soviet empires-in-being shared a common border running through what is now Lithuania, Poland, on the German side being brought Finland, Hungary and Romania.

 * Romania had lost Bessarabia, and Finland had lost Karelia, due to unprovoked Soviet aggression. By early 1941, there was definitely nothing like Finland, Hungary and Romania "being brought to" the side of Germany, except the highly realistic fear for new Soviet attacks, which in the case of Finland had led to Germany effectively revoking Soviet's requests for support in case of a new invasion in 1941, and thereby made clear the limits of German interpretations of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact — which of course might be more rightfully viewed as a changed German position. However, this can not rightfully be described by the terms "ally" and "military alliance".

 * Later, all the Baltic states became Nazi-policy states, under German protection.

 * The term "Nazi-policy states" seems obscure to me. A more mainstream view, and probably more correct view, is that Balticum was occupied by Nazi Germany until the Wehrmacht's retreat in 1944.
 * /Tuomas 08:19, 16 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * At least Lithuania, the greatest state in the region, had a local government, under Germany protection. For clarification, see History of Lithuania. --Vasile 01:45, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Well, not necessarily so. One can surely say that - for instance Lithuania - was occupied by Germany - with all consequences of this fact. However, one can also say that Lithuania was allied to Germany (or at least large part of the society was). In Poland and Belarus the memory of the Szauliu Sajunga is still present. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 09:21, Sep 16, 2004 (UTC)

Romania and Hungary had fascist governments and were definitely allied to Germany. The most appropriate term for Finland is "cobelligerent". AndyL 14:14, 16 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Finland allowed Germany to attack the Soviet Union from Finnish territory, starting from June 22, 1941. Finland fought alongside Germany from June 25, 1941 until September 1944. What reasons make you think the appropriate term is "cobelligerant" not "allied"? --Vasile 01:23, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * It's simply the term I've heard used to describe Finland. See AndyL 01:32, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * "Technically", Finland was not an ally of Germany, in sense that they didn'have any piece of paper signed. In 1941, Germany was so powerfull in Europe, it couldn't had partners. Maybe "satellites" is a better word to describe the situation. --Vasile 01:52, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * I believe that the reason for the word "cobelligerent" being better than "allied" is the fact that Finland did certainly not share all of Germanys values or objectives. For example, Finland did not send her Jewish citizens to Germany (At least not on a large scale - some individuals may have been sent there). --Kooo 01:37, 2004 Sep 17 (UTC)

 * Every of these countries had its own objectives in the war. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1,700. Finland have not sent its Jews in Germany, because probably Germany didn't ask that. There is no connection. --Vasile 01:52, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Actually, Germany did ask Finland to deport its Jews and Finland refused. AndyL 02:18, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * I hold the most important reason, for the Finns, not to enter into an alliance with the Third Reich was that they were ideological adversaries of the Nazis, which the German ambassador Wipert von Blücher stresses throughout his memoires. The Finns believed in democracy and the rule of law. The Jewish issue was secondary, but the Finnics had every reason to fear the Nazi race biology, contrary to their Finland-Swedish compatriots, which may have made it natural to side with the Jews against their perpetrators. Nevertheless, opposition against the ties with Nazi Germany were not stronger in fennoman circles. --Ruhrjung 08:34, 2004 Sep 21 (UTC)

 * In 1941, Germany needed Finnish and Romanian military not ideological support. Both of these allies refused to deport their Jews to Germany. For Germany it was more important that these countries were in territorial conflict with Soviet Union, and they had important millitary contribution on the Eastern front. --Vasile 03:16, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)
 * Nope. In 1941, Finland and Romania needed German military support against the very aggressive and threatening Soviet Union, that already had taken important parts of these countries, and didn't seem satisfied with that. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Romania was somewhat different than Finland. For one thing 50% of Romanian Jews died in the Holocaust, a large number were deported to "the east" and were sent to concentration camps in the Transnestria region (such as my father and grandfather) - some (my great grandmother for instance) were deported to Auschwitz. While it is true that a lower percentage of Romania's Jews were killed than in states allied with Germany the figure is still significant, particularly when compared to the 0% of Finnish Jews who were killed. It's true that in 1944 the Romanian government refused to continue cooperating with the Holocaust but this was after the tide of the war had changed and because Romania's dictator had been threatened by the Allies who told him if he handed Jews over to the Nazis he'd be held responsible. Romania had had various fascist governments since the mid 1930s which cooperated with the Nazis to various degrees. This was never the case with Finland and while the Romanian policy towards the Jews was opportunistic and depended largely on self-interest (as well, to be fair, the King was opposed to the anti-Jewish policy and apparently did what he could to interfere with it) the Finns never cooperated even when it was in their "interest" to do so and did not have a fascist government or implement any Nazi policies domestically, whether they had to do with the Jews or not. The Continuation War was a resumption of the Winter War which had been fought when the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany was still in effect ie it was an attempt to regain lost Finnish territory regardless of who was on whose side in the larger European theatre. I think that's why generally the Finns are regarded as "cobelligerent" rather than Allies of Germany. AndyL 14:02, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Is not here the subject Romanian history, but just to correct few confusions: a) The "figure" is not accurate. For Auschwitz deportation of Romanian Jews, Hungarian government was responsible, after Romanian government ceded a part of Transylvania. b) The first pro-fascist and pro-German Romanian government was installed after the France defeat and Soviet ultimatum, in July 1940. c) It is difficult to credit the King for "opposition" to Romanian official policy until August 23, 1944. There are more few things I disagree, but my suggestion is to move this part to "History of Romania".

The state policy against Jews wasn't used to discriminate participants in war (for example, France). --Vasile 17:03, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)
 * Yes, I'd tend to agree on Romania, particularly about the KingAndyL 14:34, 18 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Also, I believe there was a difference from a military point of view. Romania allowed German troops to travel thorugh Romania in order to get to the Eastern Front and Romanian troops fought alongside German troops on the front in a high level of coordination. Possibly, I'd have to check this, Romanian units ultimately took orders from the Germans. Conversely, German troops were not allowed into Finland and, AFAIK, did not fight alongside or in close proximity to Finnish troops in the northern sector. Yes, Finland and Germany were at war with the USSR at the same time and I expect there was some common strategy involved but the level of coordination between the Finnish and German militaries was of a completely different order than that which occured between, say, the Germans and the Romanians. AndyL 14:10, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Indeed, Romanian army was (in fact) subordinated to German comandment, in the name of "coordination". As my knowledge, German troops used Finnish territory to launch the attack of June 22, 1941, and I suppose that for example, there was some amount of coordination on the siege of Leningrad, between Finnish and German armies. The peace treaty didn't make any diference, I am not able to see any kind of military reasons in distinguishing Romania by Finland. There could be political reasons, after the war Finland was kept outside of Soviet-led empire. --Vasile 17:03, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Finland's territory was used for blocading the Gulf of Finland by means of sea mines at the opening of Operation Barbarossa, which clairly wasn't the most appropriate thing to do at the same time as the government declared it's neutrality in the conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. But in early 1941, which was the time frame for the quote I question, Germany was formally an ally of the Soviet Union which made it impossible for Finland to be an ally of Germany. For more details, and a rather npov-ish account of the political development with regard to Finland, see the article on the Continuation War.

 * Would you, by the way, like to be more specific about how Finland's territory was used for attacks (other than the sea mines) on the Soviet Union before the Soviet air strikes against towns in Finland on June 25th? There is much in the history of Finland that I've not yet learned about, and this seems to be one of these points. /Tuomas 22:00, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * In early 1941, Germany wasn't an ally of Soviet Union. M-R Pact wasn't an alliance pact. I do not understand why it is so difficult to admit this Finish-German de facto alliance. Even the wikipedia article about Continuation War says: "On 21 June, Finland's chief of the General Staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally informed by his German counterpart that the attack was to begin." What else could show more clear than that the alliance? There were formal members of Axis that learned about the attack from the news.
 * "In practice the Wehrmacht already held the northern half of the border to Russia." and so on, from the same article. --Vasile 22:37, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * First of all: "In early 1941" is not the same as "in June 1941".
 * Secondly: "informed" is not the same as "allied".
 * Thirdly: as far as I'm informed, German forces did not attack over the border before Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union. It can equally well be described as letting the Wehrmacht carry the burden of the defense of northern Finland in order to scare the Russians away from Finland. If the Soviet Union hadn't attacked on the 25th, or the following weeks, Finno-German relations would have been very complicated — this is nothing to conceal, and the attack was in that respect so to say welcome for those circles, both military and politic (including some in the cabinet), who hoped for a chance to re-conquer the Priozersk–Vyborg area, Finland's industrial heart and home of a tenth of the Finns. (Not to mension those smaller circles where hopes for a conquest of East Karelia had thrived all since the independence and the Russian Civil War.)

 * I used the term ally deliberatly for the Soviet-German relation during the M-R Pact. Actually in the hope that you, or someone else, would protest. I'm only happy, as this raises the need for a more stringent use of the term. During and after the Winter War, Germany acted as a proxy for the Soviet Union to hinder help from other countries to arrive to Finland and also by putting diplomatic pressure on other countries as well as on Finland. Germany declared explecitely (i.e. the German ambassador to Helsinki and high officers in Auswärtiges Amt) that Germany's and Finland's relations impossibly could be too formalized since Germany must prioritize her obligations to the Soviet Union — and that, they said, ought Finland also do. (I.e. in Finland's case, the obligations spelled out in the Moscow Peace Treaty.)

 * There were no attacks from Finnish territory prior to the Russian air strike, were there?
 * /Tuomas 23:10, 17 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * 1) 1941 (early or June): What was the moment Finland agreed to the military cooperation with Germany, accepting their troops on the Finnish teritory?
 * After the Soviet Union in July 1940 had requested rights to transit troops over Finnish territory, Germany made a similar request, and was actually concluding the negotiations faster, why the agreement with the German army was reached a few weeks before the agreement with the Soviet army. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * 2) Alliance: Having some common interests. Could be "partnership" a better word?
 * Nope. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * 3) June 22, 1941 It is not credible the idea that the German forces did not attack the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and they just waited to be attacked, contradicting their military theories.
 * Actually, THEY were not the target of the attack. The Soviet Union probably feared that they would be better defended than civilians in Finnish towns, why the latter were targeted. If it's "credible" or not is a ludicrious argument. Facts speak for themselves. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * 4) German policy: In summer of 1940, Germany applied similar policies toward Romania and Finland. This made possible that Romania, Finland to find some strong common interests with Germany. The German attack of Soviet Union was predictible (and was predicted by Britain and France) long before. --Vasile 13:34, 18 Sep 2004 (UTC)
 * In the current situation, and after Stalin's veto against closer cooperation with the strongly neutralist Sweden, Finland had no other power to seek protection from, and had to pay dearly for that protection - not the least after the war. But Finland thereby protected the civilian citizens from the catastrophy many other countries were hit by. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I am no friend of broad left-hand marginals, why I re-broaden the column again.

Finland, being a democratic country ruled according to its constitution, did not agree on military cooperation with Germany before the launching of Operation Barbarossa. Finland agreed, within the first half-year of the Moscow Peace, to transfer of Soviet and German troops over Finnish territory. There remains controversy to what degree Finland's president and/or prime minister were involved in the decission. The post-war trials touched this topic, but were not given chance to investigate it properly, why Finns in general seem to view the trial's conclusion also on this point with a great deal of suspicion. — But in any case, transfer of troops is not ruled out by international law.

Finland, on a tier below that of the the civilian state-leadership, also in practice left the defence of waste but lesser important areas to the Wehrmacht. I don't know about the exact time for that, but I would guess within a frame of 6–8 weeks before Operation Barbarossa. This was a dangerous game, there is no question about that, but what would have happened if the Soviet Union didn't attack is a question for what-if historians. You are free to believe, or not belive, in the Wehrmacht's immobility there, but unless you can present sources, I think it's better to leave the time-honored consensus as it is, since that has been read by a lot of people and if it really is wrong, one would think that someone ought to have reacted before.

Having read on this issue now and then for the last 15 years, or so, I can not right now think of any source in any language I read (German, English, French, and most recently also Swedish) that convincingly has demonstrated exactly when and what Finnish and German generals agreed on, but it seems obvious that the professional leadership of the Wehrmacht during the later stages of planning for Operation Barbarossa were allowed to hint at the plans for their Finnish collegues, and to carry on hypothetical discussions. Discussions that after the final order for Operation Barbarosa was given, and particularly after the Soviet attack on Finland, quickly could be converted to de-facto agreements between the general staffs. One example of this was the river Svir-agreement, that the Finns referred to plenty of times later on, according to which the Finnish army planned to meet the Wehrmacht along that river.

The exact choise of term for the Finnish-German relations between the Moscow Peace and the Lapland War is tricky, and much discussed. Partnership is not too good, since that carries a meaning of equalness, which clearly wasn't there. Finland was in dire need of a protector, and there were only two alternatives. The Swedes and the Nazis. Stalin could enforce his opposition against the Swedes (there were also Swedish and Finnish opinions opposing such a solution), but he could not enforce opposition against protection by the Germans. Finland thus was partly dependent of both the Soviet Union and of the Third Reich, and de facto threathened by both, although we tend to forget the danger Sweden and Finland feared from Germany since, ultimately, other dangers became realized.

After June 26, Finland and Nazi Germany were brothers in arm, co-belligerents, and for a few weeks in the summer of 1944 they entered what by ordinary definitions had traces of an alliance. The Finno–German relationship had all the time from August 1940 some traces of patronage, but client-state may be a too strong term.

Co-belligerents is the term the Finns favor, and in my opinion their arguments are strong enough. --Ruhrjung 08:34, 2004 Sep 21 (UTC)

 * It seems that on the co-belligerent-page the Finnish-German relationship is held as an example. If the word "allied" applies, it should be mentioned there, that the usage of the term in that case is disputed. (The following may not be 100% factual) Also during the continuation war it came possible for Finland to attack the Murmansk supply line, which was an important supply line for the Soviet Union. However, Mannerheim refused to attack the line, because it was outside the former Finnish-USSR border. Germany insisted that Finland proceeded, but they did not. This doesn't really seem like a relationship that allied countries would have. It would be nice if someone can confirm this, I believe I heard it in school, on history lessons. --kooo 14:57, 2004 Sep 21 (UTC)

Partnership doesn't imply equal-force partners.
 * Nope, but some kind of equalness. Either in influence or in force or in something else. The Finns had no say in any joint decissions. With regard to the arms deals and the thereof dependent troops transition, the Finns had to accept the only offered help on given conditions. With regard to Operation Barbarossa, it was designed to make it hard for the Finns to say no-thank you, but nevertheless, that was what their state-leadership (president and Cabinet, the parliament wasn't formally informed, but the outcome of a debate there would have been negative, although not unanimously). This changed swiftly by the Soviet attack. I hope I don't confuse things when I believe to remember that Finland's prime minister while speaking to the parliament matter-of-factly concluded that Finland obviously was in war, since the bombs rained down outside of the building. In that situation, the neutralist opinion among the politicians and in the public opinion had lost all credibility, and initiative went over to the interventionist camp, that led to the almost three year long occupation of East Karelia. But that didn't make the Finns partners. The plans for German warfare were drawn up in Berlin, and the Finns had their own agenda, that for instance included not to cut of the railroad from Murmansk, not to advance south of river Svir or east of Lake Onega, not to cut of supply lines to Leningrad, and of course not to participate in the siege of Leningrad. And the Wehrmacht had a whimsical agenda of its own, that changed with the phases of the moon and the psychological state of the Führer. In a partnership, the partners are expected to listen to eachother. Here, the Germans spoke to the deaf ears of the mute Finns, who wisely realized their small size. --Ruhrjung 08:57, 2004 Sep 22 (UTC)

Your details about Germany-Finland-Sweden relations are very interesting. But,
 * Britain was also in war with Finland -considered to be Germany ally, like Hungary and Romania. American policy discriminated these de facto Germany allies. Shall we consider this official American point of view, as the historic truth?
 * Britain declared war on Finland since Britain was an ally of the Soviet Union who was at war with Finland, not since Finland was an ally with Germany - which we by now have established that she wasn't. --Ruhrjung 08:57, 2004 Sep 22 (UTC)
 * Did UK also declare war on Bulgaria who wasn't at war with the Soviet Union? [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 09:55, Sep 22, 2004 (UTC)
 * The British declaration of war is interesting and not one of the simpliest issues to get straight. Emotionally, the British could not have delivered a more effective blow than the declaration of war on Finland's Independence Day, but it seems pretty clear in retrospect that it was primarily a consequence of failed diplomacy. What Britain wanted was guarantees for the integrity of the suply lines from Murmansk, and the way the Finns, typically proud and careful with promises, answered these demands didn't travel well. The British were given what they hoped for, but the Finns didn't manage to express that, and the British didn't manage to interpret Mannerheim's variety of diplomatic language. The only blow the British ever delivered was the actual declaration of war. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * Bulgaria was in war with UK. --Vasile 17:51, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Finland was in in the beginning of their war with Soviet encouraged by Britain, France and USA, in addition to Germany, to continuing fighting, perhaps also given lose promises of military aid by one or all of the above, and at least the US strongly opposed their first peace agreement with the Soviets. As the war went on the Finish became German allies and the Germans used Finish air, water and land in fighting and transportation. In addition the Finish were important allies, if not very cooperative, in the Germans siege of Leningrad. Moravice 14:00, Sep 22, 2004 (CET)
 * Finland was, after being unprovokedly attacked by the Soviet Union supported by all of the League of Nations, virtually by all of the World, except for by Germany, who instead made what could be done to contribute to Finland's defeat against the Soviet Union. Finland was not "perhaps" given "lose promises of military aid". Finland was actually gives promises of military aid, dates and numbers of troops specified. Moravice better repeat the events of 1940. The articles on the Winter War and the Continuation War could be a good point to start. The remarks above are totally out of touch with reality. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was obsoleted by Operation Barbarossa long before the siege of Leningrad, and the Finnish "contributions" to the siege was limited to the re-conquest of the territory that the Soviet Union had gained as a consequence of the unprovoked attack after the Soviet Union having attacked Finland by military force for the second time in less than two years. Wolfes don't look better in the clothes of the sheeps. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Germany used Finnish territory from June 22, 1941. I don't say that Finland attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
 * In your last somewhat radical edits you proposed that Germany should have used Finnish territory for the attack on June 22. I remove that claim. If you dig up some credible sources, it may be time to discuss that issue again. --Ruhrjung 08:57, 2004 Sep 22 (UTC)
 * To consider that Hitler did a pact with Soviet Union, having interest in a long-term economic relationship, is absurd. The destruction of the ("judeo-bolshevik") Soviet Union was Hitler's most important external priority. He needed as much allies as it was possible in the East. In the summer of 1940, marechal Pétain of France proposed to Hitler his military alliance, knowing that he will attack the Soviet Union. (Pétain was refused.) On the other hand, to explain this pact with Soviets, it was very difficult to be explained by Hitler's propaganda fellows. "Lucky" for them, the attack of Poland followed very soon. --Vasile 15:07, 21 Sep 2004 (UTC)
 * Yes. It's absurd. It was surely not ment to last longer than the war in the West, that in turn wasn't ment to be "long-term" at all. /Tuomas 14:09, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Britain was at war with Bulgaria because B was involved in the invasion of Greece (& Yugoslavia) & thus making war on UK troops there. USSR only declared war when she had occupied Rumania, B promptly surrendered & her negligible armed forces went to war with Germany under Soviet control. Neil Craig 10/11/4

Defence of the pact
The following paragraph was removed and is inserted by me again. Imho, the topic is relevant. This does not imply that I find the text perfect, and I've not taken time to go through the edit history to establish the particular history of this paragraph, but the wordings may be the effect of Wikipedia's usual dialectic process, and in such a case it's not good to remove it as a whole:
 * Additionally, defenders of the Soviet position argue it was necessary to enter into a non-aggression pact to buy time since the Soviet Union was not in a position in 1939 to fight a war and needed at least three years to prepare. In addition the possibility that France and England would stay neutral in such a war, hoping the to fighting states would wear each other out and put an end to the comunists gouvernment as well as the nazis, was apparent. Critics of Stalin point out that one reason the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war was Stalin's Great Purge of 1936 to 1938 which, among other things, eliminated much of the military's most experienced leadership. They also point out that when Germany finally did attack the USSR on June 22, 1941 Stalin was shocked that the Nazis had broken the treaty and was unprepared for combat.

--Ruhrjung 08:57, 2004 Sep 22 (UTC)

I think this article (about a very difficult subject) has few points that are unclear.
 * Definition: The title of this pact is "treaty of non-aggression", and the definition consider that it was a "non-aggression" pact. Today, it is known, that it was not mainly a "non-aggression" pact.
 * Not much of a problem. It was announced as a non-aggression pact, and that is relevant to make clear in the article. It was more than a non-aggression pact, and that has to be made clear too. I think it is:
 * The pact was announced as a non-aggression pact, but in a secret appendix Eastern Europe was divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence.
 * This wording can, however, be improved. The division was not limited to Eastern Europe. Also Finland, Balticum and Poland were divided. And I believe the term secret appendix is less common than secret protocol.
 * --Johan Magnus 06:03, 23 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Reasons: The article only noted in the part "The Munich Agreement and Soviet foreign policy", some post-war Soviet explanation "to buy time since the Soviet Union was not in a position in 1939 to fight a war". In 1939, nobody provoked USSR. What war, in August 1939? Germany, also, had some reasons to do this pact.
 * USSR felt threatened, that's hardly questionable. And with all right. The article also says:
 * Defenders of the Soviet position argue that the USSR entered the non-aggression pact after the September 1938 Munich Agreement made it evident that the western democracies were pursuing a policy of appeasement and were not interested in joining the USSR in an anti-Nazi alliance which Communists had attempted to promote through their popular front tactic.
 * The Third Reich had the same reason as the Russians. Not yet prepared for a Soviet-German war. Go ahead, add that! --Johan Magnus 06:03, 23 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Finland June 22, 1941: Having German troops on Finnish territory and the Finnish autorities being informed about attack of June 22, 1941, logically, this was made with a reason. It is futile to discuss about proofs that Germany used Finnish territory since June 22, 1941. One can find a lot of Finnish resources, but being on the web, these have a great chance to be consider non-credible.
 * Don't forget that Finland also had Soviet troops on Finnish territory. And of course there were reasons. Plenty of them. The Germans wanted the Finns to join in their Crusade against Bolshevism, just like the Americans wanted the French and the Russians to join in their Crusade against (muslim) Terrorism just a few years ago.
 * The Winter War, the Continuation War and the intermediary uneasy Moscow Peace is one of the most discussed and investigated topics in the Finnish society. You can trust the Finns to control each other. Just see at the article on the Continuation War for an account that is, within the frames of its size, remarkably objective and balanced. One must concur with those Wikipedians above, who invite you to present credible sources for a German attack over the north-Finnish border at June 22nd. I have not heard of any attack — scouting might be another thing.--Johan Magnus 06:03, 23 Sep 2004 (UTC)

 * Alliance: 1941's Germany-lead alliance was not a partnership of equals or friends, or a kind of medieval fellowship. The eastern allies, Romania, Finland -being connected with Germany as a direct consequence of the pact- and Hungary -weird connected through Romania and Slovakia with the war -, were not equal-size forces, and they have different reasons to be in war with the Soviet Union. The term "satellites" could seem pejorative, but in my opinion expressed in the most exact way, the relation between Germany and them. Germany (with the help of USSR) put them on the "orbit".
 * Finland was, in 1941, "connected" to Germany due to Stalin's wish to soften up Finland, as a preparation for the coming invasion. Stalin could have refrained from vetoing a Finnish-Swedish closeness, and there had been less of a Finnish-German closeness to discuss.
 * The Nazis were in 1941 the (military) masters of much of Europe. Virtually of all the land mass, except the British isles, the Iberian peninsula, and the Soviet-held territory. Finland was like Sweden and Switzerland enclosed, but in no way a dependent puppet state like Slovakia. Finland had her own compelling reasons for building the strongest possible defence against the Soviet Union. Such a defence had in the given conditions to be build with German support. That was Finland's best chance. Given the conditions (including Stalin's request for a renewal of the carte blance for a new invasion of Finland, that Hitler rebuffed in November 1940), Finland acted more independently than any of the greater powers could imagine. I leave the discussion of the cases of Hungary and Romania to others, better informed, but I would suggest that it's unnecessarily provoking to call Finland of 1941 a satellite of Nazi Germany. Finland of 1918 might have been a satellite of Imperial Germany, but much had changed since then. ...Including serious plans in Helsinki for a re-union with Sweden, for which a precondition was a definitive Finnish acceptance of the loss of the Vyborg area, and acceptance of little-or-none influence over the discussed union's foreign policy. That was a grave sacrifice. The graveness clearly shows how eager the Finns were to achieve a stabilized relation with its eastern neighbour. And so does Finland's seeking support from the ideological adversary, Nazi Germany.
 * --Vasile 18:41, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)
 * --Johan Magnus 06:03, 23 Sep 2004 (UTC)

border states
user:Vasile proposed:
 * In the 1920s, fear of Russia and of Communism motivated attempts to political cooperation and defence treaties between so called border states and other Central and South-Eastearn European countries. Those treaties had never real power.

which was a modification of my earlier proposed wording:
 * ...Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine... In the 1920s, fear of Russia and of Communism motivated attempts to political cooperation and defence treaties between these so called border states, that however never were realized.

I admit that I'm not too sure about how the border states-concept is understood in English, and actually not too sure about the actual history at all. To be honest, the only thing I am relatively confident on is the knowledge on Finland's history in this context. I believe Finland also by English speakers is considered a border state during the inter-war era. Finland did however never ratify any treaty with the other border states. Nevertheless were the attempts to cooperation an important theme in Finland's foreign policies of the 1920s.

Given my limited knowledge, I am prepared to be corrected. But beside that, I strongly favor a wording that doesn't use weak phrases as "and other Central and South-Eastern European countries". There were not that many other countries there, that weren't border states. Further, I don't at all understand why not refer to the earlier listed states as border states. /Tuomas 08:10, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * It's nice that you finally admit you don't know everything. As a matter of civility, please don't just simply automatically revert to the previous version. --Vasile 12:37, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * I would be happy to see you expand your arguments on the border states. /Tuomas 13:02, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * A repetition of the wikiquette might be suitable. Ruhrjung 17:48, 2004 Oct 3 (UTC)

 * As my knowledge, the rules of respect between civilesed humans, usually learned in the childhood, are not included in a "code", so wikiquette can not cover all the rules. My suggestion is that the option of "revert" may be used more cautious. --Vasile 03:40, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

The definition of the pact
The pact duration was less than two years and affected in different ways these countries. Polish state was destroyed and divided. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania "joined" the USSR. Romania and Finland lost some territories to the Soviet Union that was not able to destroy them. There are any arguments that make possible to consider this disorderliness creating pact a "non-aggression dividing spheres of influences" one? --Vasile 03:40, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Yes, most certainly. It's almost a school-book example of division into spheres of influence, that within short time got consequences for all of the states within these spheres - their souvereignty and independence was violated. This is also expressed in the very protocoll, appendant to the treaty, in surprisingly plain language. There is no need to use euphemisms for invasions and submission under greater powers. --Johan Magnus 15:57, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

The protocols importance should not be over rathed though. The two parties interest in the countries affected is obvious, as many had not that many years earlier been more or less natural parts of the states. And a treaty not mentioning them would have far less value as an attempt to increase influence in a any of the countries would then be an offensive act towards the other party. For instanse would the German invasion of Poland force Russia to take action against them, as this could be a first step to invade Russia (witch it in fact turned out to be) and also because Russia had interests in Poland and an obvious responsibility to defend them. The treaty could thus very well have been initiated as nothing more than a non-aggression treaty. --Moravice

Germany vs. chancellor Hitler
Ruhrjung as a part of his recent (great, BTW) modifications changed the mention that "Germany supported Franco" to "the governments of Germany supported Franco" (or something along these lines). While I would be the last one to accuse Ruhrjung of any hidden agenda, I don't really get what is wrong in saying that Germany supported Franco. Both the government and a large part of German society supported Franco and I really see no reason to blur the sentence by adding some softening agents. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 20:40, Oct 3, 2004 (UTC)

With those states that are historically discontinuous, we (i.e. a seriouness-attempting Wikipedia) ought to be careful and precise. I note in Ruhrjung's edits also the insertion of "Russia" which in this very location may be motivated, but that in general must be cautioned against. "Germany" is today mostly understood as the Federal Republic of Germany, after the Union of East- and West-Germany, and has to be used carefully in historical contexts. --Johan Magnus 16:07, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * The matter of whether the present-day Germany is a continuation of all the German states in the past or not is a matter of personal view. As far as I remember according to German law the FRG is a continuation of the Weimar Republic, but on the other hand the state is responsible for all the debts of the Nazi Germany as well. So this is not that clear.

 * So, to make long things short, Nazi Germany article IMHO describes a period of history of Germany and not a separate, discontinued state. Similarily, Noble Republic refers to a period in history of Poland and not a separate state of its own. Having said the above, I must also add that I don't really understand the notion of replacing all references to 1933-1945 Germany to Nazi Germany. The only explanation I could imagine would be to blur the image of the history, something like saying "it was not Germany, it was some other state". I hope I am wrong. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 16:59, Oct 4, 2004 (UTC)

 * It was not the Federal Republic of Germany, nor was it the Weimar Republic or the German Confederation — it was, really, some other state.

 * This ought to have nothing to do with Germans avoiding or acknowledging their collective guilt. It's a matter of making the relevant distinctions. By not making them, Wikipedia moves itself away from the ambition to adhere to scientific norms.
 * Johan Magnus 20:22, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Was it the state that annexed the Weimar Republic? If so, should we treat all French republics as separate states? Other than that, I agree that this should have nothing to do with Germans (neither as a nation nor as a citizenship). This should be about the country. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 01:02, Oct 5, 2004 (UTC)

 * Do not confuse the disputable discontinuity by the Machtübernahme with the undisputable discontinuity by the German total surrender in 1945. But the issue here is if it was Germany as a country, or the state under Hitler's regime, that was an important support for the Spanish rebells. --Johan Magnus 07:58, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * It is also important to be consistence in the refrences to the different states and gouvernments. When this article uses Nazi Germany, Germany and the Third Reich for Germany and the Soviet Union, Russia, Bolshevik Russia, SSSR, USSR and the Red Army for Russia this could be very confusing. Especially when gouvernments from different periods in the same countries are mentioned without proper explenation (f.ex. the German Empire). Moravice Oct 5, 2004

 * I couldn't agree more, Moravice. Thanks! As to Johan's remarks: this article is not to judge whether the continuity was or was not disputable. In my honest opinion if:
 * Nat. Spain was supported by chancellor Hitler and his government
 * Hitler's government had a huge support in Germany
 * then it seems perfectly safe to say that Germany was supporting Franco. No need to add too many details that only blur the image. Similarily, one says that USA supported South Vietnam eventhough there was significant opposition inside of the Unitedstatesian society. The same goes for any other government in the world - why should we treat Germany in a different way? [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 09:27, Oct 5, 2004 (UTC)

 * Soviet Union – Russia – Novgorod, United Kingdom – Great Britain – England, Finland – Sweden, Prussia – Germany. That's nthing unique for Germany. As stated above, it's chiefly a matter of stringency. Encyclopedical standards are what we should strive for. And plain language, of course. I once again exchange the evasive language. The integrity of all affected countries was violated within a year. The countries were invaded and/or annexed. /Tuomas 10:35, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Reading the paragraphs above, I come to suspect that people here do not always get connection. Let me do a new try:

 * "Germany" can either be understood as the land, the country, i.e. the territory and its population.
 * or it can be a short-form for the Federal republic of Germany, i.e. the current state.
 * In a given context, it might of course also be a short-form for some historical state. But in a carefully worded text, it is to be avoided to use "Germany" in a way that might be misleading. Particularly if it is anyhow central to the context or if it's anyhow sensitive.

 * The issue surrounding the German acknowledgment of German collective guilt for atrocities that some might prefer to blame on "someone else," i.e. the bad guys in NSDAP or in that party's top echelong, is such a sensitive issue. Some Wikipedians may perceive German acknowledgments as unsufficient, and othre may perceive unjust blaming of generations born long after the war (by basic cognitive biases). This article mentions German support for the Spanish rebells in a rather parenthetical way. It's not the right place to investigate that issue. Hence it's no good to put in lengthy wordings about to what degree the German people was more pro-fascist than other peoples, the possible reasons for this, etc, etc. Instead we have to be as brief as possible in order to stay focused on the topic for this article.

 * In this exchange of thoughts, it's many times been stated that "Germany" in this context is not to be understood as identical with the "Federal Republic of Germany", which Halibutt may seem to disagree with. I leave that line of thought, since I can hardly add more substance to a debate, that I must hope is based on some kind of misunderstanding.

 * Tangentially, we've also above come to mention if maybe "Germany" in this case should be understood as "Germany, the country" opposed to its contemporary state and government. That issue is not thoroughly investigated above, but it is argued that it was the German government rather than the German people that moved the state to its support for Franco & Co. I would tend to agree, chiefly based on my belief in the limitations for an independent public opinion to push a totalitarian state in any direction at all. (Given that such an independent public opinion at all existed.)

 * In this very context, it's also central that it was the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis that supported their ideologically kindred, the Authoritarian/Fascist Spanish generals. The temathical opposition between the passive (non-Socialist) democratic governments and the active anti-democratic governments is highly relevant.

 * So, in my view, we see that we do not wish to use "Germany" in the sense of the country of Germany that acts somehow indepently of, or opposed to, its state. And we do not wish to be slappy and say "Germany" that soon might be Germany instead of Germany that as we all know would be as bad as to speak of England's abstention in the UN Security Council when we of course mean England's abstentation. &mdasn; So we need to write something else.

 * With regard to USSR/SSSR/CCCP, that are synonyms to the Soviet Union, they are lesser known in the English speaking world, I believe. I think it's less than reader-friendly to use them unless they are introduced first. And we ought to remember that people don't read web-pages in the consecutive way we are supposed to read paper-books. Jumps to the next headline, or over full sections, are rule rather than exception. I think the two parallel terms Nazi Germany and Third Reich are confusing enough. We don't need more confusion than so.

 * It's quite another matter with
 * Novgorod–Kievan Rus'
 * Muscovy
 * Imperial Russia
 * Bolshevist Russia
 * Soviet Union
 * Russian Federation
 * If those terms generally are exchanged for Russia that would mean a lowering of standards of Wikipedia. --Johan Magnus 14:33, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Johan, thanks for your response. Before I continue to reply to your comment I have some questions to you: Regards, [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 02:24, Oct 7, 2004 (UTC)
 * 1) Who invaded Poland in 1939
 * 2) Who supported South Vietnam during the Vietnam War
 * 3) Who are the members of the UN Security Council

 * I guess you mean "which" Germany? We can assume the Soviet Union/Russia, USA, etc to be out of context, can't we? In ordinary casual talk, I and anyone else would surely say "Germany" as often as anything else, but the point is that a greater degree of "formal" correctness is suitable in an encyclopedic text. No-one would have said that "the Federal Republic of Germany" did anything at all in 1939. So the answer is: The Third Reich, West Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany. These terms carry important connotations. West Germany was not fully sovereign, but formally still under Allied occupation. The Third Reich was an expansionist dictatorship that reacted against imposed "weakening" democracy and other conditions/effects of the Versailles Peace. The fact that there are plenty of unhistorical wikilink-references from "Germany" to the FRG is a minor error in Wikipedia that ultimately will get fixed, just like the many faulty links to Great Britain have been fixed to refer to the United Kingdom. I don't know if I've made this comment before, but I think Poles have a somewhat similar interest in links to the many Prussia? --Johan Magnus 18:12, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

"put an end to their sovereignty"
There have been plenty of different versions of the phrase to sum up the effect of the secret protocoll for the affected smaller countries. I'm not quite sure any more which wordings I have contributed with, and which I've opposed before. :-)

However, at what might be a second thought, I've come to the conclusion that the partial invasion of Romania and the attempted but aborted full invasion of Finland do not really warrant the phrase "put an end to their sovereignty" — which is why I now changed that to "injured their sovereignty." Romania and Finland moved in direction of becoming satellite states, but the degree of dependency is surely possible to debate thoroughly. And also if they had developed into full-fledged satellite states, it's disputable if that is the same as their sovereignty having been "put to end." --Johan Magnus 13:23, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Maybe the word violate is more appropriate than injure? --Johan Magnus 13:33, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Not just sovereignty was affected for these coountries. Some states preserved their sovereignity, but they lost territories or change their political orientation. Polish simply diassapeared from the map. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania became republics inside USSR. --Vasile 14:04, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Nope. None of the affected countries preserved their sovereignity. It was, I agree with Johan, in all cases "violated" or "injured". The degree was different, and the gains were Soviet in some cases, German in some cases, and both in some. The Moscow Peace was by Moscow, and initially by Berlin, interpreted as a carte blanche for the Kremlin to interfere in internal Finnish affairs and also to veto far-reaching defense cooperation with Sweden, that in fact would have confirmed and cemented the new Finnish-Soviet border, but the Soviet Union clearly communicated to Finland how eagerly the Red Army waited for the next oppertunity to finish the invasion that had been interupted in March. /Tuomas 13:22, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

latest changes by Mihnea
Mihnea Tudoreanu reverted or reworded some of the latest edits by various users. What I have against his versions is:
 * Soviet Union also aspired to retake the lands lost after WWI - I see no need in blurring it by replacing the name of the country with "other countries"
 * Well, first of all, the USSR didn't aspire to take back any lands because the USSR didn't exist until 1922. You could argue that Russia aspired to take back lost lands, however. And second of all, if we're going to mention Germany and Russia, we should also mentioned the other countries who wanted to take back some land they had lost due to the Treaty of Versailles (such as Hungary, for example).
 * Why so? Hungary wasn't a party of this treaty. /Tuomas 13:11, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * The section is called "background", and it talks about the European background, so other countries besides Germany and Russia should be mentioned. Also, your wording seems to imply that Germany and Russia were the ONLY countries who wanted border changes, which is blatantly false. -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 12:41, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * If it is relevant for the pact, yes. Can you please show how it is? --Johan Magnus 13:10, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Neither Romania was part of this treaty. Hungary and Bulgaria obtained some territorial "revisions" due the German-Soviet pressure created in the period 1939 - 1940.
 * Then that has to be stated in the article - if it's relevant. /Tuomas 12:08, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * While Germany wanted Romania being its "friend" (even the Nazi leaders profoundly despised the Romanians), the desintegration of Romania was the main target of the Soviet Union interbellum policy in Romania, the situation existent before the Crimmea War being desired. The effects of the pact for Romania didn't stop on July 1940. The USSR still posed a clear threat for Romania. The SSR Moldoveneasca created in August 1940 used a historic Romanian name. Before June 1940 there was a Soviet-Romanian protocol reglemented the factual frontier situation, with France nominated as a guarantee of the peaceful status quo. After the annexation, that object of that protocol vanished and no legal act could ban a Soviet empire invasion of Romania. That made possible for Germany and Italy to appear as friends (or at least non-enemies) of Romania in the Vienna Arbitration of August 1940, for example. --Vasile 14:28, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * You seem to have answered your own objection. --Johan Magnus 13:10, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * "This was followed by a (smaller) Soviet invasion from the east on September 17" - the invasion by USSR was not smaller, approximately 1 million soldiers took part in it and they seized approx. 40% of Polish territory. What makes it a smaller invasion? --[[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 10:19, Oct 9, 2004 (UTC)
 * The fact that they took less territory than the Germans, of course. But I'll remove the "smaller invasion" comment if you wish. -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 11:33, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * I think you better not consider that a personal wish of Halibutt's, but more like "on general request". ;-> /Tuomas 13:11, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * Well, in any case, I have conceded this point. -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 12:41, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Another point: If you're going to mention the Soviet deportations, then you should also mention the German ones. Otherwise you're giving readers an incomplete picture of what was going on. -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 11:36, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * It is mentioned by the wording "similar to the Nazi terror behind the eastern front". /Tuomas 13:11, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * Perhaps, but your wording puts more emphasis on the Soviet deportations than on the German ones. This is implicit POV. Both should be mentioned equally. -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 12:41, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Let me state that I greatly appreciate the fact that Mihnea Tudoreanu contributes to this article — and many other articles. There exists plenty of biases, more or less inherent in the English language, in Wikipedia that really need to be addressed. But I would also wish a degree of respect for earlier Wikipedians' work. It is no good to assume all of their edits to have been done in bad faith. The idea, for instance, that terror in Soviet-aquisitions of 1940-41 necessarily must be less emphasized than is already the case by comparing it with the not quite as harsh German terror pre-Barbarossa instead of the considerably harsher terror post-Barbarossa seems very odd to me. At least, the insistence for this edit had required an honest representation of the dispute and a discussion at the talk page before the change. The Soviet repression is often mentioned as important for the relative lack of resistence from civilians against the later German occupation. --Johan Magnus 13:10, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Ploesti oil fields
Germany already proved its economic interests in Romania. The new German so-called "interest" in Bessarabia was a response to the new Soviet real interest for the entire province of Bukovina - not just the northern part as the second ultimamtum said. Germany did not want the desintegration of Romanian state as happent with Poland.--Vasile 14:43, 9 Oct 2004 (UTC)
 * Announced about this Soviet move, Ribbentrop had stressed on June 25 in his reply to the Soviet leaders, the strong German "economic interests" (oil industry and agriculture being nominated) in Romania, ensuring that Romanian territory wouldn't be transformed into a battlefield. Ribbentrop claimed that this unexpected German interest rose from his concern over the "faith" and "future" of what he pretended to be "those 100,000 German ethnics of Bessarabia".

Is this a reason not to link to Ploesti oil fields? Are you perhaps pushing the pov that the war was primarily ideological and that economic factors didn't matter much? /Tuomas 11:25, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * At that time, Ploiesti was only one the most known oil field of Romania. One German interest was in entire Romanian oil industry. Anyway, for Hitler the economic aspect was not the most important interest in Romania. (It isn't the nature of the war the subject of this article.) --Vasile 02:37, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * So you are pushing the pov that the interest in Romania was primarily ideological and not due to economic factors? Interesting! /Tuomas 06:03, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

secret pact
When the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was circulated, nothing in articles 1 through 7 concerns this supposed "secret pact" about various countries. The treaty states that the countries will not take aggressive actions towards one another. So whence this supposed "secret pact"? (Why do I sense the only reply I will hear will be some vague BS like "I heard it was uncovered in the secret archives when the USSR dissolved") Ruy Lopez 01:02, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Yeah, the "secret pact" is BS. I want to see an accessible and verifiable reference to a copy of the document before I'll accept this claim. Shorne 02:28, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Please refrain your language. The secret additional protocol is not a legend and even the Soviet Union accepted the existence of this protocol, long before 1991.
 * If the text of the pact would mention the "additional protocol" how this could be applied? --Vasile 02:46, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nazsov/addsepro.htm /Tuomas 06:05, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Wikipedia oughtn't to be a discussion forum, and Wikipedians oughtn't test personal theories by introducing them into the text to see if they survive - this is a dangerous habit that endangers the credibility of Wikipedia. Ruy Lopez and Shorne are kindly requested to study topics first and introduce changes first when facts and sources are established. --Johan Magnus 06:52, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * What "personal theories"? When I'm told there was a "secret agreement" appended to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, I wonder how this supposed "secret" came to light.  So now I have a link to what Yale claims is a secret agreement.  Where did Yale get its hands on this?  Molotov denied this to his death, you can read his book if you want (Molotov Remembers) where he says so.
 * I don't believe there was a secret pact. Molotov denied there was a secret pact.  How did you and Yale come to know there was a secret pact?  I don't mind if it's mentioned in the article that some think there was some sort of secret pact, but this document doesn't even tell how Yale came across this so-called secret.
 * And please don't lecture me about studying topics if you are so ignorant that you don't even know that this is disputed. You yourself have displayed no knowledge of this pact whatsoever, yet you're lecturing people on their supposed ignorance of the topic. Can you tell me what Molotov's personal opinion of the personality of Ribbentrop was?  No?  Maybe *you* need to study this topic first before you go around giving your little lectures. Ruy Lopez 07:18, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * I can't help to agree with Vasile. Lopez' language, and behavior in general, would need some improvements. In my humblest opinion, his credibility has now been seriously dented. /Tuomas 07:48, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * I wrote: are kindly requested. --Johan Magnus 18:06, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

 * Hmmm, it's the first time I hear that the very existence of the M-R pact secret protocol is disputed. The existence of the secret protocol was confirmed by Boris Yeltsin to Lech Wałęsa during his state visit to Moscow in May 1992. The copy of the original documents (Russian version; I believe that the German copy was destroyed during WWII) together with other documents, including those on the Katyn Massacre, was handed over to Polish historians in November of the same year. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 07:55, Oct 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * By the way, you can see the copy of the Russian version here and the map is shown here. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 08:00, Oct 25, 2004 (UTC)

I added the information how secret protocols came public to article. It was Rudolf Pikhoya, head of the State Archive Service of Russian Federation who published it. -- Whiskey 08:05, Oct 25, 2004 (UTC)

I knew that, as you stated, the USSR denied this until the early 1990s at least (well, Yakovlev indicated that the German microfilm version might be accurate a few years earlier). I'll look into this Rudolf Pikhoya stating a changed position in 1992/1993 at the library. I won't be editting the page any more until then (well, I think I saw a spelling error I might fix). Na zdravje! Ruy Lopez 08:17, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)

title: Talk:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact/Archive 1


text:
User:Pelasgian

Pelasgian is a predicate to one of Pelasgic descent. Pelasgians are the proto-Hellenes, i.e. the ancient ancestors of the ancient Greeks. Pelasghia is a lady's name in Greece and the name of a town close to Larissa.

User Pelasgian is a mechatronic software developer from Greece. I am about to create a not-for-profit non-governmental organisation for the purposes of improving the European business competitiveness through agile automatic production systems.

title: User:Pelasgian


text:
Automobiles Gonfaronnaises Sportives

Automobiles Gonfaronnaises Sportives (also known as AGS and Gonfaron Sports Cars) was a small French racecar constructor that competed in various racing categories over a period of thirty years, including Formula One from to.

AGS survived as a prosperous Formula One driving school, in Le Luc, near Gonfaron.

Foundation
The team was founded by the French mechanic, Henri Julien, who ran a filling station, the "Garage de l'Avenir", in Gonfaron, a provincial French village. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Julien regularly attended racing events in minor classes. Although not an outstanding driver, the technical knowledge he gained eventually prompted him to start constructing racing cars.

First car
Julien's first car, the AGS JH1, saw the light of day in 1969. It was a small single-seater, intended for the category of "Formule France". The car was designed by Julien's former apprentice, the Belgian mechanic Christian Vanderpleyn, who had been with the garage (and the racing team) since the very late 1950s and who would stay on until 1988. Soon, AGS went progressed and manufactured its own Formula 3 cars, which were ambitious but not good enough to compete seriously with the state-of-art Martinis which dominated the series at the time.

Formula 2
AGS took another step ahead in 1978 when the team started competing in the European Formula 2 Championship. Still, the car - by now the AGS JH15 - was self-penned (by Vanderpleyn), self-built and self-run. Formula 2 was a difficult task for the small team, racing 1978 and 1979 without scoring any championship points. The early 1980s were somewhat better. AGS was one of the few teams who ran its own cars (Maurer, Minardi and Merzario were the others), and eventually the team was able to score points regularly. Soon some victories came, too. AGS made history when works driver Philippe Streiff won the final race of Formula 2 in 1984, using an AGS JH19C.

Formula 3000
In 1985, AGS switched to Formula 3000 with the JH20, based on the Duqueine VG4 Formula 3 chassis. The JH20 used a Cosworth DFV engine supplied through the Swiss tuning firm Mader. Results were mediocre in 1985 and 1986.

Beginnings
By late summer, AGS entered the Italian Grand Prix in Monza, its first Formula One race. Its structure was somewhat bizarre: The team had no more than 7 employees and was still operated from the Garage de l'Avenir in Gonfaron.

AGS appeared with a car that was once again penned by Vanderpleyn. The JH21C was a strange mixture between former AGS F3000 vehicles and Renault F1 parts which were used extensively. The car was powered by a well-used Motori Moderni turbo engine (the only time these Carlo Chiti-developed engines were given to a customer team) and driven by Italian Ivan Capelli. A few weeks before, the car had been tested at Paul Ricard by Didier Pironi, driving an F1 car for the first time since his leg-breaking accident in the 1982 German Grand Prix. Due to technical difficulties, neither in its first attempt nor in the following race in Portugal did Capelli see the finish.

For the team's first full F1 season in, Vanderpleyn penned the JH22, which used a normally-aspirated Cosworth DFZ but was otherwise much the same as the JH21C. The car was initially driven by Pascal Fabre, who had driven for the team in Formula 2 in 1982. He proved to be a reliable driver, finishing eight of the first nine races, but was never in serious contention for scoring points and failed to qualify on three occasions. AGS improved in the last two races of the season when Fabre was replaced by the Brazilian Roberto Moreno (who saw his first chance in Formula One since 1982 when he had failed to qualify a Lotus works car). In Adelaide, Moreno scored the first championship point for AGS, which meant that the team finished the season equal on points with the better-financed Ligier and the returning March team.

Takeover
In, AGS started with a new car, the JH23, and Philippe Streiff as the team's only driver. Streiff drove quite powerfully and qualified well, but he saw the chequered flag only four times; in all the other events of that year technical failures or accidents were recorded. Financially, the year started well and ended with a disaster. AGS had a solid sponsor - the French Bouygues group - which promised to support not only the racing activity but also the completion of a new factory outside Gonfaron. After AGS had started work on the new facility, Bouygues withdrew from the team, leaving Julien without any support. To save the team, he eventually had to sell it to Cyril de Rouvre, a French entrepreneur with various ambitions.

Difficulties
Things went soon from bad to worse. The new team management changed frequently (Vanderpleyn for instance went to Coloni) and brought a lot of disorder. Worse was to come; Streiff was paralysed in a testing accident in Brazil before the season.

Streiff was replaced with Gabriele Tarquini, who surprised with some great performances in the first half of the season. He was very close to the points in both the 1989 Monaco Grand Prix and 1989 United States Grand Prix, but retired in both races. Then things went better in the 1989 Mexican Grand Prix, where he finished sixth and scored his first point. But after these highlights, the team was never able to be as competitive again.

In the second part of the 1989 season, the team had to prequalify - a task that was nearly never achieved by Gabriele Tarquini and Yannick Dalmas. AGS then finished 15th in the Constructors' Championship, equal with the Lolas used by the Larrousse team. During the summer months, there were strong rumours that AGS would soon use a new W12 engine developed by the French designer Guy Nègre. This strange MGN (Moteurs Guy Nègre) machine saw the light of day in late 1988 and was tested in an old AGS JH22 chassis in the summer of 1989. It was clear that AGS was not related to these tests; they were completely private attempts by Nègre. The engine never found its way to a Grand Prix but it was announced to be used in a 1990 Le Mans car called Norma M6. The car was presented and attempted to race, but failed to qualify over engine issues.

Finally, AGS had to use Cosworth engines again in. That year brought no improvement at all, Dalmas's 9th in the 1990 Spanish Grand Prix was the best result and by the beginning of the season the team was obviously close to its end. The team lacked money – at the first two Grands Prix of 1991, in Brazil and Phoenix the team's mechanics had to pay for their own hotel rooms. In the race itself, Tarquini finished 8th, which was the last finish ever of an AGS car. De Rouvre sold his team to some Italian entrepreneurs, Patrizio Cantù and Gabriele Rafanelli. Both changed little except for the driver line-up (Stefan Johansson was replaced with newcomer Fabrizio Barbazza) and the colours of the car (which were now blue, red and yellow instead of white). A new car, the JH27, was raced in the early autumn, but by then the team was in rags again, so the Italians closed the doors after the 1991 Spanish Grand Prix.

Complete Formula One results
(key)

title: Automobiles Gonfaronnaises Sportives


text:
Adams operation

In mathematics, an Adams operation, denoted ψk for natural numbers k, is a cohomology operation in topological K-theory, or any allied operation in algebraic K-theory or other types of algebraic construction, defined on a pattern introduced by Frank Adams. The basic idea is to implement some fundamental identities in symmetric function theory, at the level of vector bundles or other representing object in more abstract theories.

Adams operations can be defined more generally in any λ-ring.

Adams operations in K-theory
Adams operations ψk on K theory (algebraic or topological) are characterized by the following properties.
 * 1) ψk are ring homomorphisms.
 * 2) ψk(l)= lk if l is the class of a line bundle.
 * 3) ψk are functorial.

The fundamental idea is that for a vector bundle V on a topological space X, there is an analogy between Adams operators and exterior powers, in which

 * ψk(V) is to Λk(V)

as

 * the power sum Σ αk is to the k-th elementary symmetric function σk

of the roots α of a polynomial P(t). (Cf. Newton's identities.) Here Λk denotes the k-th exterior power. From classical algebra it is known that the power sums are certain integral polynomials Qk in the σk. The idea is to apply the same polynomials to the Λk(V), taking the place of σk. This calculation can be defined in a K-group, in which vector bundles may be formally combined by addition, subtraction and multiplication (tensor product). The polynomials here are called Newton polynomials (not, however, the Newton polynomials of interpolation theory).

Justification of the expected properties comes from the line bundle case, where V is a Whitney sum of line bundles. In this special case the result of any Adams operation is naturally a vector bundle, not a linear combination of ones in K-theory. Treating the line bundle direct factors formally as roots is something rather standard in algebraic topology (cf. the Leray–Hirsch theorem). In general a mechanism for reducing to that case comes from the splitting principle for vector bundles.

Adams operations in group representation theory
The Adams operation has a simple expression in group representation theory. Let G be a group and ρ a representation of G with character χ. The representation ψk(ρ) has character

 * $$\chi_{\psi^k(\rho)}(g) = \chi_\rho(g^k) \ . $$

title: Adams operation


text:
John Thomas Davies

John Thomas Davies (29 September 1895 – 28 October 1955) was an English soldier and recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that was awarded in the British Empire, and to this day in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth.

He was 22 years old and a corporal in the 11th (Service) Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Volunteers), British Army during the First World War when the following deed took place for which he was awarded the VC.

On 24 March 1918 near Eppeville, France, when his company was ordered to withdraw, Corporal Davies knew that the only line of withdrawal lay through a deep stream lined with a belt of barbed wire; he saw it imperative to hold up the enemy as long as possible. He mounted the parapet in full view of the enemy in order to get a more effective field of fire and kept his Lewis gun in action to the last, causing many enemy casualties and enabling part of his company to get across the river, which they would otherwise have been unable to do.

He was taken prisoner after the action. During World War II, he was a captain in the Home Guard. He was buried in St. Helens Borough Cemetery, Lancashire, England. (C. of E. Section. Area 59. Grave 426.)

The Medal
His Victoria Cross is displayed at the Imperial War Museum, London, England.

title: John Thomas Davies


text:
This Fire (Franz Ferdinand song)

"This Fire" is a song by Scottish indie rock band Franz Ferdinand, the seventh track on their self-titled debut album. It was written by Alex Kapranos and Nick McCarthy and produced by the band themselves at their studio in Scotland during 2003. A new version of the song, produced by Rich Costey, was released as a single on 4 October 2004, titled "This Fffire". The single artwork is based on El Lissitzky's art work Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge.

Song history
"This Fire" was featured on the soundtrack for the 2004 racing game Burnout 3: Takedown. The song was later sampled for "Burn This City" by Lil Wayne and Twista.

In 2022, the Rich Costey version of the song was selected as the intro song to the Cyberpunk 2077 tie-in anime from Studio Trigger, Cyberpunk: Edgerunners.

Release and reception
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the song was released as a radio and download single, respectively, reaching number 17 on the US Billboard Modern Rock Tracks chart and number eight on the UK Download Chart. In Australia, the song was released as a CD single and reached number 62 on the ARIA Singles Chart. In the same country, it was ranked number 29 on Triple J's Hottest 100 of 2004.

Music video
The music video, directed by Stylewar, echoes the style of 1920s-era Soviet art and propaganda (Constructivism etc.), including Cyrillic lettering, and shows the members of the band spreading a world-wide "hypnosis epidemic".

Track listings
All tracks were written by Alex Kapranos and Nick McCarthy except "Missing You", written by Kapranos.
 * Digital download
 * 1) "This Fffire" (Rich Costey re-record) – 3:38
 * 2) "This Fire" (Playgroup remix) – 8:13

 * European CD single
 * 1) "This Fffire"
 * 2) "This Fire" (Playgroup remix)
 * 3) "This Fffire" (video)

 * Australian CD single
 * 1) "This Fffire" (Rich Costey re-record)
 * 2) "Love and Destroy"
 * 3) "Missing You"

title: This Fire (Franz Ferdinand song)


text:
Adipic acid

Adipic acid or hexanedioic acid is the organic compound with the formula (CH2)4(COOH)2. From an industrial perspective, it is the most important dicarboxylic acid: about 2.5 billion kilograms of this white crystalline powder are produced annually, mainly as a precursor for the production of nylon. Adipic acid otherwise rarely occurs in nature, but it is known as manufactured E number food additive E355. Salts and esters of adipic acid are known as adipates.

Preparation and reactivity
Adipic acid is produced by oxidation of a mixture of cyclohexanone and cyclohexanol, which is called KA oil, an abbreviation of ketone-alcohol oil. Nitric acid is the oxidant. The pathway is multistep. Early in the reaction, the cyclohexanol is converted to the ketone, releasing nitrous acid:
 * HOCH(CH2)5 + HNO3  →  O\dC(CH2)5  +  HNO2  +  H2O

The cyclohexanone is then nitrosated, setting the stage for the scission of the C-C bond:
 * HNO2 + HNO3  →  [NO+]NO3]−  +  H2O
 * O\dC(CH2)5 + NO+ →  O\dC(CHNO)(CH2)4  +  H+

Side products of the method include glutaric and succinic acids. Nitrous oxide is produced in about one to one mole ratio to the adipic acid, as well, via the intermediacy of a nitrolic acid.

Related processes start from cyclohexanol, which is obtained from the hydrogenation of phenol.

Alternative methods of production
Several methods have been developed by carbonylation of butadiene. For example, the hydrocarboxylation proceeds as follows:
 * CH2=CH−CH=CH2 +  2 CO  +  2 H2O   →  HO2C(CH2)4CO2H

Another method is oxidative cleavage of cyclohexene using hydrogen peroxide. The waste product is water.

Historically, adipic acid was prepared by oxidation of various fats, thus the name (ultimately from Latin adeps, adipis – "animal fat"; cf. adipose tissue).

Reactions
Adipic acid is a dibasic acid (it has two acidic groups). The pKa values for their successive deprotonations are 4.41 and 5.41.

With the carboxylate groups separated by four methylene groups, adipic acid is suited for intramolecular condensation reactions. Upon treatment with barium hydroxide at elevated temperatures, it undergoes ketonization to give cyclopentanone.

Uses
About 60% of the 2.5 billion kg of adipic acid produced annually is used as monomer for the production of nylon by a polycondensation reaction with hexamethylene diamine forming nylon 66. Other major applications also involve polymers; it is a monomer for production of polyurethane and its esters are plasticizers, especially in PVC.

In medicine
Adipic acid has been incorporated into controlled-release formulation matrix tablets to obtain pH-independent release for both weakly basic and weakly acidic drugs. It has also been incorporated into the polymeric coating of hydrophilic monolithic systems to modulate the intragel pH, resulting in zero-order release of a hydrophilic drug. The disintegration at intestinal pH of the enteric polymer shellac has been reported to improve when adipic acid was used as a pore-forming agent without affecting release in the acidic media. Other controlled-release formulations have included adipic acid with the intention of obtaining a late-burst release profile.

In foods
Small but significant amounts of adipic acid are used as a food ingredient as a flavorant and gelling aid. It is used in some calcium carbonate antacids to make them tart. As an acidulant in baking powders, it avoids the undesirable hygroscopic properties of tartaric acid. Adipic acid, rare in nature, does occur naturally in beets, but this is not an economical source for commerce compared to industrial synthesis.

Safety
Adipic acid, like most carboxylic acids, is a mild skin irritant. It is mildly toxic, with a median lethal dose of 3600 mg/kg for oral ingestion by rats.

Environmental
The production of adipic acid is linked to emissions of Nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas and cause of stratospheric ozone depletion. At adipic acid producers DuPont and Rhodia (now Invista and Solvay, respectively), processes have been implemented to catalytically convert the nitrous oxide to innocuous products:
 * 2 N2O →  2 N2  +  O2

Adipate salts and esters
The anionic (HO2C(CH2)4CO2−) and dianionic (−O2C(CH2)4CO2−) forms of adipic acid are referred to as adipates. An adipate compound is a carboxylate salt or ester of the acid.

Some adipate salts are used as acidity regulators, including:

 * Sodium adipate (E number E356)
 * Potassium adipate (E357)

Some adipate esters are used as plasticizers, including:

 * Bis(2-ethylhexyl) adipate
 * Dioctyl adipate
 * Dimethyl adipate

Appendix

 * U.S. FDA citations – GRAS (21 CFR 184.1009), Indirect additive (21 CFR 175.300, 21 CFR 175.320, 21 CFR 176.170, 21 CFR 176.180, 21 CFR 177.1200, 21 CFR 177.1390, 21 CFR 177.1500, 21 CFR 177.1630, 21 CFR 177.1680, 21 CFR 177.2420, 21 CFR 177.2600)
 * European Union Citations – Decision 1999/217/EC – Flavoing Substance; Directive 95/2/EC, Annex IV – Permitted Food Additive; 2002/72/EC, Annex A – Authorized monomer for Food Contact Plastics

title: Adipic acid