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Talk:Intelligent design/Scientific supernaturalism?

Scientific supernaturalism
I have a tremendous problem with this sentence, in the first paragraph of the intro:

 * More broadly, ID is a challenge to the concept of naturalism within scientific philosophy, and an attempt to reserve a place within science for the supernatural.

Can we really say this with a straight face? I have no problem with accurately representing what ID claims, but I do have problems couching the patently absurd in neutral language. Graft 19:25, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * it may be absurd, but that is precisely what ID is attempting to do. the proper approach i think is to look at the article and say, "i think that's crazy," rather than to alter the article to deny or obscure exactly what ID is attempting to do.  what do you think?  Ungtss 00:18, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * It's obviously impossible for ID to reserve a place for the supernatural within science, since the supernatural is, by definition, out of the purview of science. ID may CLAIM to be a challenge to the concept of naturalism within scientific philosophy, etc., but this cannot be. It cannot BE a challenge to the concept of naturalism within scientific philosophy, because this is impossible. Scientific philosophy requires naturalism. It cannot operate on the supernatural, which is by definition impenetrable to scientific investigation. ID may either be a challenge to science itself, or it may not be appealing to the supernatural. It may claim to be the above, but it cannot be described as actually BEING the above - it must be wrong if it makes that claim. I'm not familiar enough to state which one of these possibilities is the truth. Graft 00:26, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * may i suggest that there are two competing definitions for scientific philosophy:
 * 1) one, held by nearly all mainstream scientists, that it requires naturalism
 * 2) another, held by prooponents of ID, that it does not require strict naturalism.
 * you might want to consider that until about 1939, the vast majority of mainstream scientists ascribed to "orthogenetics" -- that is, the idea that microevolution occured naturalistically, but macroevolution occured through the intervention of God. that illustrates a different approach to the question, "does science = naturalism."  ID simply ascribes to the "old way."  it may be the "wrong way," but it's still an alternative.  Ungtss 00:35, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * Would it be fair to characterize the ID argument as a criticism of the arrogance of scientific naturalism--the claim that everything can be best explained via science--rather than a claim that science itself needs to incorporate the supernatural? In other words, could we accurately portray ID as an argument that science should allow for the possibility of realities (a first-cause "designer" of life, in this case) that exist outside the purview of naturalistic science?--BTfromLA 04:04, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)
 * that is EXACTLY it:). to take it a step further, to ID, the "supernatural" is just as "natural" as anything else in the sense of being real, tangible, and powerful -- the supernatural just APPEARS supernatural to us, because we cannot yet understand it or the laws of nature by which it operates.  In fact, if there IS a creator, he is more "REAL" than WE are.  To exclude the possibility of a designer for life on earth -- divine or not -- is to arbitrarily eliminate a hypothesis from the realm of possibility -- especially when (ID argues) there is a substantial amount of evidence to make it a reasonable belief.  maybe ID is crazy ... but that's their view of science, and i think it's only fair to articulate it clearly on the page:).  Ungtss 04:33, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think this conjecture has stepped outside of the normal range of ID and scientific beliefs. There is a subset of ID that does not raise questions about the supernatural -- for example, the part of ID that would hypothesize a natural designer (e.g. aliens). But the most common form of ID finally proposes that the personal god of Christianity is the hypothesized designer. Such a god is clearly supernatural, e.g. not bound by the laws of physics, and separate but causally powerful in the natural world -- in whatever way that might be possible. It may be fair to point out that some forms of ID might be arguing that supernaturalism should be admitted in science -- which could be logically permissible if your philosophy of science doesn't explicitly exclude the supernatural. But that's about as far as I think we can go -- unless you can find a respectable published account otherwise. --Rikurzhen 04:45, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)
 * i agree. that's why the text says, More broadly, ID is a challenge to the concept of naturalism within scientific philosophy, and an attempt to reserve a place within science for the supernatural -- a broad statement that i think is appropriate, and should not be erased as was suggested at the beginning of this discussion.  i was just presenting one of several ID views on the supernatural that i thought complemented his comment:).  Ungtss 05:49, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * However, what a critic of that view might want to argue is that ID is a terrible wedge to get supernaturalism into science and that a natural designer is all that the empirical evidence for design might ever support. I think that's a charitable way to interpret the original post, and I think that's an important point. --Rikurzhen 06:22, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * It is a misunderstanding of the Christian conception of God to say that He is "not bound by the laws of physics" as Rikurzhen does in his comments above. In fact the point is the that He, God, designed/created the laws of physics. The thrust of the ID argument is that nature offers abundant evidence of this. So saying that "God is supernatural" is in perhaps misleading; in reality--for those that believe in God--he is the source of nature! --DannyMuse 06:36, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * The notion that God is supernatural is the standard Christian philosophy. For example, some suggest that amongst God's properties is omnipotence, and so God can do anything logically possible, including the physically impossible. I recognize that there are less prominent Christian philosophies that would incorporate a God that does not have the power to alter the laws of physics after creation -- however that God would clearly not be part of the ID theory since ID proposes that natural laws are not sufficient to explain biological complexity. --Rikurzhen 06:56, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * DannyMuse, perhaps you're thinking of arguments related to the anthropic principle. --Rikurzhen 07:06, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * rikurzhen, i think we need to recognize first that there are a great diversity of views within christianity regarding the supernatural -- for a brief list, see Supernatural. you've listed two possibilities: one, that God is limited by the laws of physics, another that he is free from any law whatsoever.  but what of the possibility that he is a Law unto himself -- that he embodies principles of order, logic, and causation which are only partially reflected in his Creation?  the last is not necessarily "less prominent ..." CS Lewis argued that philosophy very cogently in "The Great Divorce."  If God is free from any law, then discovering his handiwork would be impossible -- he would be a true "God of the Gaps."  But if he is a Law unto Himself, we'd expect to find a "common theme" throughout all of his artwork ... and that's what ID is claiming.  Ungtss 15:13, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I believe this thread has confused intelligent design with creationism. ID encompasses a small subset of creationist belief. This is why many people think it is merely propaganda -- because it does little to support the Christian conceptions of God, but it does challenge natural evolution. But it does have a fairly clear definition, which we should keep in mind while we craft this article --- Intelligent design states that life is too complex to have evolved without the intervention of an (unnamed) intelligent designer. I recognize that Christians have a wide variety of views on God, but most of those views are not applied to intelligent design -- for good reasons. The hypothetical designer must have the power to meddle in the evolution of life on Earth in a way that suggests the existence of a designer, not merely a natural process. Thus, it could be a natural being, such as an alien. It could also be a kind of god. The problem of course, is what kind of being could be suggested by evidence of design. Parsimony favors certain beings over others. So conjecture about how all the Christian ideas of God are compatible with ID is basically a discussion of creationism -- where all/most Christian ideas of God are compatible with almost any theory. --Rikurzhen 18:39, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * i agree with you for the most part ... but with one important caveat. you said that id was a subset of creationism.  don't you think it's more fair to say that creationism is a subset of ID, since all creationists believe in intelligent design of necessity, but believers in ID need not believe in God?  Theistic creationism is one of the potential identities for the designer, but not the only one -- and is therefore relevent.
 * by analogy, punctuated equilibrium and gradualism are alternative descriptions of the broader "theory of evolution" -- but both are relevent in a discussion of the theory. wouldn't you see that both theistic and non-theistic potential designers are relevent to ID?  Ungtss 21:19, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Actually neither of us got it strictly correct. ID is the claim that life is too complex to have naturally evolved without the intervention of an intelligent being. Not all creationist believe that -- for example, a creationist who believes that God created the universe in such a way that complex life is possible without direct intervention. That may be a small set of people -- theist evolutionists and proponents of deism. Likewise, ID permits a non-theist designer, and I suspect there are even fewer (or even zero) ID supporters who actually adopt that view.
 * My broader point is that ID proposes an intelligent designer that has an active role in the design of life, such that physics and alone is not sufficient to explain life. Thus, only certain views of God's interaction with the world are even suggested by ID. A historically passive God would not be suggested by evidence of an intelligent designer.
 * I am a scientist, and I am personally open to the idea that empirical evidence could be offered to suggest the existence of the supernatural which science would accept -- and I've read philosophy of science paper to that effect. So to the original question in this thread, you can take that as evidence that some philosophies of science permit scientific evidence for the supernatural. However, in the particular case of ID, it seems astronomically unlikely to me that such evidence will be found to support the supernatural in the details of complex life. My appraisal is that ID has not offered evidence of even a natural creator. --Rikurzhen 22:33, Nov 25, 2004 (UTC)

 * thanks! i'm not an expert on the topic by any stretch of the imagination -- i'm mostly just interested in learning and making sure both sides are accurately represented.  i really appreciate your perspective -- it's rare to find a biologist who even considers the hypothesis before determining the ID has failed -- if i may ask, do you think evolutionists have provided substantially more evidence for naturalistic (i.e. macro)evolution than ID has presented evidence for a designer?  if so ... what does it look like?  Ungtss 00:02, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * After Darwin, the null hypothesis is -- I think rightly -- that natural evolution is sufficient to explain complex life. It is the most parsimonious explanation -- predicts the fewest kinds of things and fits with naturalist physics, chemistry, etc. Thus, the burden would fall to ID to provide an example of complex life that cannot be explained by natural evolution. The reason current biologist reject ID is that while it could (in the logical possibility sense) have been true, so far there is truly no evidence for design. Whenever ID claims have been examined, and some of them have been very sophisticated, they turn out to not require a designer. Having gone thru so many such cases, the current consensus opinion is that ID as science was simply incorrect -- like so many scientific conjectures. However, the unfalsifiable claims that are sometimes associated with ID are of course beyond the scope of science.
 * In my opinion: Falsifiablity is much more likely to be essential to science than naturalism is. Falsifiablilty is the major philosophical problem for creationism/ID whereas naturalism is merely a conclusion of science, but open to revision. However, many scientists and some philosophers may claim otherewise. --Rikurzhen 08:28, Nov 26, 2004 (UTC)

 * thanks for articulating that so well for me:). i especially appreciate your description of it as a "null hypothesis" -- that explains why evolution is considered "fact" despite gaps in the evidence -- because nothing "better" has been presented.  and the lesson learned is that if ID is ever to make headway, they'll have to present a comprehensive theory that explains more things than evolution, more accurately and more parsimoniosly, instead of in vague and unfalsifiable, "look -- THAT sure is mysterious" terms.  thanks again!  Ungtss 13:24, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * A null hypothesis is a concept in statistics. The concept within scientific philosophy you mean is that of paradigms.  The theory of evolution by means of natural selection is the central unifying paradigm of biology.  It is the best fit model within certain caveats, that explains the observances.  Naturalism allows the use of Occam's razor; falsifiability is important because the way you derive a paradigm is you falsify the alternatives, i.e. you can't prove a positive.  That point is one of the reasons why irreducible complexity is such nonsense; you can't prove it. Dunc|☺ 13:40, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * thanks for clarifying ... another point tho ... just 'cause you can't prove something doesn't mean it isn't true: it just means you don't yet have to tools to study it. that's why i don't think ID is nonsense ... it may be dead wrong ... but i think humility requires us to recognize the limits of our knowledge ... and that ANYTHING could lay beyond those limits ... even God.  Ungtss 14:08, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * What you're talking about here is, what is within the limits of scientific examination? This is why much of creationism is considered mere philosophical speculation by biologists, which is one reason why biologists dislike attempts to portray creationism as an alternative to evolution. --Rikurzhen 18:56, Nov 26, 2004 (UTC)

 * Another common bit of wisdom within biology is that you can't prove a negative. This is exactly what ID attempts to do, and why biologists will never take ID seriously. Graft 15:59, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Bolyai and Gauss's negative (non-euclidean geometry) was einstein's positive (relativity). Ungtss 17:12, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think that particular bit of wisdom may be better expressed, "lack of evidence" does not necessiarly imply "evidence of lack". So for example, lack of evidence of RNA to DNA transcripion (see the central dogma of molecular biology) was not evidence of its lack (indeed "reverse" transcription was eventually discovered). Because finding exceptions has become the rule, the only way to truly prove a negative in biology is to actually test all the possibilites (e.g. you could test each gene in a genome). ... resolving edit conflict ... what Graft said below --Rikurzhen 18:56, Nov 26, 2004 (UTC)

 * This is why I said "within biology", where lack of evidence often means you simply missed something or don't know where to look, and can't be taken as proof of anything. Mathematics (and physics) are far more theoretically rigorous than biology can be, which is more dependent on empirical observation. Graft 18:50, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Has this thread been satisfied? Can anything from this discourse be used to improve the article? --Rikurzhen 18:56, Nov 26, 2004 (UTC)

 * just trying to sharpen the issues a bit ...
 * thanks for the "lack of evidence versus evidence of lack" -- i guess in my mind they're not mutually exclusive -- you can truly never prove a negative ... but that doesn't mean that "because you can't prove it doesn't exist, it exists."
 * interesting distinction, Graft... point taken:). and i'd definitely agree with you on the topic of empirical i.e. observable biology ... but the questions of evolution and creation revolve around more theoretical questions ... not "what happens now" but "what happened then?"  i.e. "HOW did life begin?  HOW did whales get back into the ocean?  HOW did man and apes diverge?"  that's stuff we can't verify empirically because we weren't there ... but can only infer from the fossil record and beliefs about "what seems most reasonable" ... after all, ID won't dispute any observable and verifiable biology of today ... just the inferences about the past, which take a more theoretical flavor.  what do you think?
 * i've found this thread to be very useful ... sounds like we've got a good group of perspectives around the table ... would anyone like to incorporate this into a brief discussion on "the philosophy of science and ID?" Ungtss 19:06, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * On improving the article, perhaps we could talk about the historical memetic evolution of scientific philosopy from protoscience to science proper, and how the IDists want to revert back to a form of protoscience which given the advances in scientific philsophy within the 20th century (viz Kuhn and Popper) makes it pseudoscience. Dunc|☺ 19:12, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * And Utguss, IDists do dispute observable and verifiable biology of today; that is the crux of their and other creationists arguments. Now, another aspect of scientific philosophy that is important is the principle of uniformitarianism; the assumption that the same forces acted in the past as they do now if, unless there is good evidence otherwise. Dunc|☺ 19:12, 26 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Perhaps one thing that does not come thru clearly in the article is the distinction (or lack thereof) between philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism as it relates to ID. --Rikurzhen 20:06, Nov 26, 2004 (UTC)

 * Mr. Harris, i am not aware of any conflict between ID and the observable biology of the day, especially as i do not dispute it myself -- i only question the "principle of uniformitarianism," as i find it to be a big assumption. as to the evolution of science from protoscience ... that takes for granted naturalistic assumptions that are not universal -- one pov of several.  would you please point me in the right direction of finding ID literature that disputes any of the fossils found, or the nature of the genome, microevolution, or any experiment or observation done today?  i think what you will find is persistent and occasionally annoying challenges to INTERPRETATIONS of science based on naturalism and uniformitarianism.  Ungtss 00:21, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * That does not surprise me. You have persistently shown that you have a lot of enthusiasm and a complete lack of knowledge.  Creationists' principle argument is that evolution is statistically unlikely.  They do this principally by constructing strawman arguments of evolution.  See any creationist book that discusses anything other than metaphysics.
 * i'd like to come to a better understanding, sir, and i think the first step is to realize that neither of us is an idiot. would you consent to that a priori assumption, just for the sake of argument?
 * your statement above showed that you did not understand what i said. creationists did NOT dispute that evolution is observable today ... and THAT is all the science can VERIFY, empirically, because that's all we can see today.  what creationists argue is that the evolution observable today CANNOT account for things UNSEEN -- the alleged evolution of all life from a common ancestor -- because it was not observed firsthand by any scientist, because is not supported by fossil evidence, because it is extremely statistically unlikely, and because (irreducible complexity types would argue) it is logically impossible.
 * evolutionist arguments for common ancestry are NOT based on empirical evidence. they are based on empirical evidence EXTRAPOLATED through the assumptions of naturalism and uniformatism, assumptions which creationists reject, a priori, and evolutionists accept, a priori. Ungtss 15:37, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * On metaphysics, ultimately we cannot know for sure anything, e.g. George Bush may be a terrible figment of our collective imaginations. That is why the first principle of science is naturalism; it places a limit on what can be known and excludes speculation.  There can be speculation outside of science, but only knowledge within.

 * creationists assert that you are SPECULATING on uniformatism. what in this universe is uniform?  is time uniform?  no.  is life uniform?  no.  is F=ma uniform?  no.  is the structure of the atom and subatomic particles uniform?  no.  the only thing we THINK to be uniform right now is the speed of light ... and a few people even argue that THAT'S been changing.  evolutionists base their theory of evolution on an ASSUMPTION of uniformism.  maybe that assumption is right, but it is still an assumption. Ungtss 15:37, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Uniformitarianism is an accepted part of scientific philosophy. In short, one can be sure that the Darwinian algorithm works today as it did 100 million years ago.  Just as one can be sure that water boiled at 100*C, or that the Earth orbited the Sun.  You would not those would you?  If not, all retrospective sciences would not be possible.  Of course, it is possible that the Invisible Pink Unicorn (bbhhh) tricked us scientists by providing evidence for evolution to test our faith in her.  How stupid of us to have fallen for it.Dunc|☺ 10:58, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * i understand that it is accepted by most scientists. personally, however, i find it to be a big and scary assumption: bigger and scarier, in fact, than the equally a priori assumption that God created the universe.  Ungtss 14:23, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * rikurzhen -- that's an excellent point. how would you recommend fleshing that out?  Ungtss 00:21, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * It would be easy to point you in that direction if ID were interested in scientific debate - it has never engaged evolutionary biologists and always directs its arguments at the public (which can be fooled by sophistry). All of these are fine arguments to be having if there were some solid weight that ID is resting on, but the presumption that ID actually has anything with which to mount a challenge to the assumption of naturalism seems to be flawed in the first place. The only argument of any merit I've seen is Behe's irreducible complexity, which is hardly a challenge to naturalism at all. Graft 01:21, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * True. The naturalism debate is largely "academic". --Rikurzhen 03:09, Nov 27, 2004 (UTC)

 * i agree with you for the most part, but what i meant was that i think there are two parts to the issue here:
 * 1) -- empirical observation and study of life today and the fossil record
 * 2) -- interpretation of that evidence and inferences regarding past events, based on philosophical presuppositions.

 * i don't think you'll find anyone from id who disputes the empirical evidence -- the studies of the genome and genetic structure and evolution evident today and the fossil record seem to be accepted by both sides. all id + creationists dispute (to my knowledge) is the philosophical presuppositions that lead to INTERPRETATION of the empirical evidence.  while evolution, it seems, presumes naturalism and uniformitarianism and comes to the inevitable conclusion of evolution, ID does not assume either, and leaves open other options -- while creation presumes that order can only come from greater order and intelligence -- leading to their INEVITABLE conclusion that a God of some sort created the universe.
 * i think that puts the issues in a difficult place, because there's no evidence to argue over -- the ONLY thing to argue over is assumptions and philosophy. and those assumptions are beyond the realm of empirical evidence -- they are, it seems to me, a priori.  as long as mainstream science presumes naturalism and uniformitarianism, evolution will be the only logical conclusion -- and gaps and questions in the theory are just refinements leading toward that inevitable goal.  but if you question those assumptions, the SAME evidence can be interpretted in a radically different way -- but how can you prove or disprove the assumptions!?  what do y'all think?  Ungtss 03:21, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

The problem with supernaturalism, and the reason why I believe it has no place within science, is that, to paraphrase Lewontin, once God gets His foot in the door, there's no end to the mischief he can cause. That is, God can be invoked to explain ANYTHING - God is a wild-card that precludes the possibility of further inquiry. An omnipotent being can arrange things however it wishes; this negates rationality and empiricism. This may actually BE the nature of the universe, but such a view cannot be compatible with the form of knowledge we call "science".

I am somewhat mystified how we can say that ID mounts a challenge in this regard when it does nothing than present the rhetorical argument. A challenge would hopefully involve actual evidence of the failure of empiricism to explain the world. No such evidence has been presented. So I'm not sure what we mean by "challenge". What, exactly, are scientists supposed to answer? Graft 08:19, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * i guess what i was trying to say is that naturalism and uniformitism are non-falsifiable -- they cannot be challenged -- they are a priori.
 * in your first paragraph, you described God as the wildcard who can be used to explain anything we don't understand. but you stated in your second paragraph that ID must challenge empiricism by showing things it can't explain.  do you see the conundrum?  anytime ID points to something science doesn't adequately understand empirically (like, i submit, abiogenesis and macroevolution, but also such things as "how did the moon get into its orbit?" and "how did life survive on earth when the atmosphere was entirely carbon dioxide, with no oxygen available to form ozone, leaving early life completely exposed to UV rays?") those questions get the same pat response, "well ... that's not a challenge to naturalism ... we haven't fully explained it yet, but here's the best explanation we have thusfar in naturalistic terms."

 * ID finds itself in a double bind. every time it points to a "gap" in naturalism, naturalism says, "that's just a god of the gaps!"  what sort of challenge COULD ID mount to naturalism that wouldn't be subject to the "god of the gaps" response?

 * it's the same double bind that naturalism finds itself with ID, i think. everytime science points to a naturalistic explanation for something, ID looks at the new system and responds, "but God made THAT happen!"

 * and nobody's communicating very well:).

 * one could argue that naturalism and supernaturalism are both non-falsifiable in that respect -- because even if God appeared in the heavens with all his angels, a naturalist could just say, "oh -- it's just some plan by religious nuts using some holographic technology we don't understand." and even if science came up with all the missing links in the world, creationists could just say, "God just created those animals separately, too -- you haven't shown they were related, because you didn't see it."

 * does this make sense to anyone? Ungtss 14:23, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think, contrary to most movies, if the rapture happened and Jesus came down with a flaming sword, few scientists would be doggedly insisting that there must be a naturalistic explanation. But an unequivocal miracle is the only event that could overturn science. ID wishes to prove that life must have been formed by miraculous processes; fine. But merely wishing to do so is not a challenge. Correct? This is all I'm trying to say. Graft 18:10, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * i agree with you completely, and if we'd BEEN there at the origin of life, i think we could determine whether we had that "unequivocal miracule" or not. but all we've got now is our theories. in that context, when we don't have the fossils that showed how it happened, or any coherent mechanism for abiogenesis, i think assuming a miracle happened is no more tenuous than assuming no miracle happened.  Ungtss 18:27, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * This line of discussion has become derailed from the journalistic question of how to describe the ID claims, but I can't resist butting in to strongly disagree with what you just said, Ungtss. Think about it--you are claiming that when faced with the unknown, it is reasonable to assume that the solution to that problem of the unknown will contradict all established knowledge.  Do you really mean that? Is there any other question, in any of sphere of knowledge, in which you would accept such an outlandish assumption?--BTfromLA 21:03, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I didn't intend to derail the discussion from the journalistic question - this is precisely what I'm asking. is it appropriate to describe ID as a challenge to the concept of naturalism within science, since a) it's questionable whether supernaturalism is possible within the framework of science, and b) ID has not, to date, actually made any attempt to demonstrate the necessity of assuming supernaturalism. Graft 21:49, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * For my 2¢ about how to introduce the ID claims without getting bogged down in the issue of science embracing the supernatural, see my first post, above. --BTfromLA 22:33, 27 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I wrote this offline while traveling today, but it still seems appropriate. I think the sentence that originated this thread can stay, but it may need to be further explained or juxtaposed with a rebuttal. I believe that Graft’s comments in this thread are accurately reflecting to a good approximation the majority (or at least textbook) opinion of philosophy of science. In the hope that I can quell this debate and get the topic resolved, I will offer an alternative philosophy of science that should satisfy Ungtss’ objections. I do not take naturalism to be a first principle of science. Rather I believe naturalism is a conclusion of modern science, and like other conclusions it is open to revision. However, the kind of evidence that would cause a change in naturalism (as I said before) is astronomically unlikely to be found in the ID research program. It would probably require the direct and repeated observation of a miracle, of which the best explanation is divine intervention. At present, the naturalism hypothesis has been so radically successful in explaining the world that scientists have rightly adopted it as a working principle, see methodological naturalism. But I do not think that if pressed most scientists would say that they adopt philosophical naturalism as a *first principle*. However, a second related principle they seem to accept is that divine revelation is not a (reliable) source of knowledge; in contrast with creationists. For that reason, the suggestion that the god of Christianity is the hypothetical intelligent designer is completely out of the reasonable range of scientific speculation (lack of reliable evidence suggesting the existence of such a god). So, I think it is true (but a highly charitable stretch) to say that ID is an attempt to interject supernaturalism into science. To offer an analogy, this is like saying that poking an elephant with a tooth pick is an attempt to kill it. ID has been around long to enough to perhaps warrant the added statement that ID has failed in its attempt with respect to the scientific community. In contrast, the majority of the public already believes in the supernatural. --Rikurzhen 01:10, Nov 28, 2004 (UTC)

 * i think that's a great start of a description of the issue right there, rikurzhen -- would you be willing to write up a draft?

 * just to clarify a bit further ... in my point of view, it is MORE reasonable to assume that order came from a designer than by chance. i don't see it as contrary to empirical evidence.  i have never heard of or seen order arising from non-order except through the influence of an outside force comprised of GREATER order -- and ultimately a force that has a WILL to bring order.  the arguments about the second law of thermodynamics and entropy, and the expanding universe convince me that that universe is LESS ordered than it used to be, not more.  i cannot fathom how the moon came to be in such a perfectly balanced orbit by chance ... and no scientific explanation has sounded even the slightest bit reasonable to me.  i think it's a miracle, and i think it's a miracle everytime a baby is born, or i see the fossils of the dinosaurs.  i won't deny it -- it's a priori -- but it's my pov and 25 years of education hasn't changed my mind yet ... and i'm not alone -- like rikurzhen said, the majority of the general public accept the supernatural already -- it happens to many of everytime we look at the stars.  that's the issue i'd like to raise on the page somehow -- an open and fair description of how and why the two pov's differ -- so we can get to the heart of the matter.  we can call ID crazy all day, but until we figure out and explain WHY people honestly believe it, we haven't provided a fair article.  please don't misunderstand me -- i'm not trying to convince anybody -- i'm just trying to articulate the mentality that's driving ID -- my mentality which i hold unashamedly -- so we can fairly represent it on the page.  perhaps by understanding my pov better, good scientists such as yourselves will be able to find more articulate ways of defusing supernaturalism.  or maybe not:).  what do you think?  Ungtss 01:28, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * just to sharpen the issues ... i think the ID response would be that empiricism is a superior explanation for MANY things that were once the realm of religion, amd and that is probably the reason for the confidence the scientific community has in empiricism. but just because a weapon works in one battle does not necessarily mean it will work in the next -- and just as BTfromLA said, ID is saying, "look, fellas, your empirical methods have worked in a lot of ways -- but we DON'T think they're working here."  not trying to KILL the elephant (because naturalism works in the vast majority of cases ... but not letting the elephant into the glass shop either (because in the opinion of creationists, science has failed to present reasonable naturalistic explanations for stuff like abiogenesis and macroevolution).  so ID is not trying to kill the elephant -- in fact, we're rather fond of it for the most part.  but we're just trying to allow for the existence of MORE than the elephant.  is this following?  Ungtss 02:25, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * As to describing ID, I (not surprisingly) agree--it seems that it makes more sense to describe the ID arguments, especially when referring to the larger critique of philosophic "naturalism," as a critique of the arrogance of the scientific worldview that fails to allow for the possibilty of non-naturalistic realities at any level of experience, as opposed to an attempt to make room for the supernatural within science. Does that dinstinction make sense?

 * And it follows from this that the ID proponents, though citing science, primarily aim their arguments not at scientists but at a larger public. (It could be argued that the ID movement is primarily a political movement, not a scientific one.)--BTfromLA 03:09, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Empiricism... that is definitely a first principle of science. Perhaps ID is better described an an attack on methodological naturalism; as a quasi-political movement; and as primarily directed at the public, not the scientific community. Related: the philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism articles are too short on details to support this article fully. --Rikurzhen 04:12, Nov 28, 2004 (UTC)

 * I don't think it's that easy to describe ID as a quasi-political movement, since the ID movement wishes to cast itself as a scientific movement, and present ID as igniting a storm of scientific controversy. This is a position easily refuted if so desired, but it's up to us how charitable we'd like to be with regards to that position. Not sure what the "neutral" thing to do here is. Graft 05:27, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * Of course. The point I'm trying to get at is -- is there a qualification or rebuttal we can attach to the sentence you first posted about that will satisfy the problem? For example...
 * More broadly, supporters of ID seek to challenge to the concept of naturalism within scientific philosophy, in order to reserve a place within science for the supernatural. The majority of the scientific community has not been pursuaded to abandon methodological naturalism. However, supernaturalism remains popular among the public in the US and other countries, where ID enjoys popular support.
 * A start? --Rikurzhen 05:54, Nov 28, 2004 (UTC)

Here's how it looks now, after some meddling by me. Comments?:

More broadly, the ID movement challenges the dominant philosophical premise of naturalism within science and throughout secular academic discourse; ID proponents argue that there are intellectually sound reasons for accepting the possibility of supernatural realities.--BTfromLA 18:38, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think it could be slightly more general. How about this?
 * More broadly, the ID movement challenges the dominant theory of naturalism within science and throughout secular academic discourse. ID proponents argue that there are intellectually sound reasons to investigate the supernatural. While the majority of the scientific community has not been pursuaded, ID and supernaturalism enjoys popular support in the US and other countries. --Rikurzhen 19:25, Nov 28, 2004 (UTC)

 * I think the change to "investigate the supernatural" is fine. I don't think the sentence about popular support and scientific nonsupport is needed in the first paragraph--those issues are relevant, but they can be taken up further into the article. I'm wondering whether we've arrived at a revised version of the problematic sentence that is satisfactory to both Graft, who raised the objection, and Untgss, an ID proponent.--BTfromLA 20:43, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I like Rikurszhen's proposal - I think leaving support issues out of the intro gives an unrealistic impression of ID - the scientific nonsupport and popular support are, I think, critical to framing the movement correctly. Graft 20:54, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I made one more stab at it. The first paragraph now reads:

''Intelligent design (ID) describes a set of arguments that claim to rationally support the existence of an unknown "intelligent designer" as the originator of organic life. Many of the ID arguments also claim to expose shortcomings of the established scientific theory of evolution by means of natural selection. ID proponents argue that there are intellectually sound reasons to investigate the supernatural. While the established scientific community overwhelmingly rejects ID's arguments, ID (and other claims of supernaturalism) enjoy substantial popular support in the US and elsewhere. ''--BTfromLA 21:36, 28 Nov 2004 (UTC)

 * I think the most recent 1st paragraph is close to where it should be, but I made a few modifications which I think frames the issues a bit more precisely. CO GDEN  22:34, Nov 28, 2004 (UTC)

Here's the current opening. Questions I have about it are below:

''Intelligent design (ID) describes a set of arguments that claim to rationally and scientifically support the existence of an unknown "intelligent designer" as the originator of organic earth-life, based on the premise that life is too complex to have originated entirely through natural selection. ID proponents also claim to expose shortcomings in macroevolution theory, and argue that there are rational and scientific means to investigate the supernatural. While ID enjoys substantial popular support, particularly among Christians in the United States, it faces overwhelming rejection by the scientific community, which views it as pseudoscience.''

1. Is it accurate to say that excessive complexity is the sole  fundamental premise of the ID argument? It may be--I just want to point out that the claim is new here.

2. Does ID really talk about means to investigate the supernatural? I thought they mainly argue that non-naturalistic options or assumptions should be seen as legitimate. But do they anywhere propose a method for investigating the nature of the "designer"?

3. In this revision, we've lost the sentence about the critique of naturalism. Based on what I've read (not that much--I'm no expert), that is very much at the center of the ID movement. Indeed, it might be seen as a fundamental premise of the movement; isn't that at any rate the main emphasis of Phillip Johnson?--BTfromLA 03:03, 29 Nov 2004 (UTC)


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File:Crowleys Ridge relief.jpg

Summary
Source:

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: File:Crowleys Ridge relief.jpg


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Talk:Cayley graph

History
What is the history of the Cayley graph? Did Arthur Cayley have anything to do with it? How about some theorems that use the notion? --Dbenbenn 05:46, 11 Dec 2004 (UTC)

TeX vs inline math
Mathematics Manual of Style recommends that inline math be used for very simple formulas, and it's now almost a universal practice for mathematics articles. Here most sections are still written using latex markup (I preserved the style in the section that I've just edited), but it seems like an overkill and I propose to uniformly switch to inline. Arcfrk (talk) 01:49, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

Moved from the article (OR)
I've removed the following text from the article. I am unfamiliar with the use of the term "Bruhat order" outside of the context of Coxeter groups, and in any case, there is very little of value for the topic of Cayley graphs (saying "minimal path" is the same as "reduced word" is the same as "minimal path" is nonsensical). Arcfrk (talk) 23:30, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

Ordering
The Cayley graph is a based graph, and determines two partial order, called the weak order and the Bruhat order. These are especially used for Coxeter groups. The associated metric is the word metric, and the norm is called a length function. Indeed, the word length makes it into a graded poset.

(Note that the relation given by walks on the graph does not in general give a partial order, since if the group has torsion (elements of finite order), this graph is not acyclic, hence the relation is not antisymmetric.)

Path from the origin to g correspond to words in the generators that equal g (paths from g to h correspond to paths from e to $$g^{-1}h$$, hence to words for $$g^{-1}h$$), and minimal paths correspond to reduced words: the length of an element is the length of a shortest path or, equivalently, reduced word.

Then $$g \leq h$$ in the Bruhat order if a reduced word for g is contained in a reduced word for h, while $$g \leq h$$ in the weak order if a reduced word for g is contained as a prefix in a reduced word for h.

Geometrically, h exceeds g in the weak order if there is a minimal length path from e to h that passes through g.

The corresponding Hasse diagram diagram (for the weak order) can be obtained from the Cayley graph by removing some edges: only edges connecting an element of length k to an element of length $$k+1$$ are retained (these edges form the transitive reduction of the weak order).

terminology of this page
There are several issues about this page from the point of view of algebraic graph theory. Suggestions for fixing this are solicited. McKay (talk) 07:58, 9 May 2009 (UTC)
 * 1) The definition produces a graph with coloured edges, but in algebraic graph theory the edges are almost always left uncoloured unless the name "Cayley colour graph" is used (which is rare).  This convention can be seen also on this page with the theorem "A graph Γ is a Cayley graph of a group G if and only if it admits a simply transitive action of G by graph automorphisms."  If the definition on this page was applied rigorously, Γ would need to be edge-coloured in a particular way before this theorem is true.  However, the uncoloured version is true and less trivial.
 * 2) The page requires Cayley graphs to be connected, but in algebraic graph theory the disconnected case is usually allowed too.
 * So in the disconnected case, one has a group and a set of group elements that is not necessarily a generating set? Or a groupoid and a generating set for it? —David Eppstein (talk) 15:30, 9 May 2009 (UTC)
 * The former. For the directed case, a group G and a set of elements S of the group.  In the undirected case, S must also be closed under inverse.  In both cases, many authors disallow the identity element from being in  S. Excluding the case where S doesn't generate G causes more graph-theoretic trouble than it's worth, for example it means that the complement of a Cayley graph may or may not be a Cayley graph, the tensor (direct) product of two Cayley graphs may or may not be a Cayley graph, etc. McKay (talk) 03:07, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

Quick survey of handbook-type sources with combinatorial bias: I propose: McKay (talk) 03:43, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
 * Encyclopaedia of Mathematics, supp vol 3, p96: no edge colours, not necessarily connected, no loops
 * CRC concise encyclopedia of mathematics, p360: no edge colours, connected
 * Handbook of graph theory, p505: no edge colours, not necessarily connected, no loops
 * Handbook of discrete and combinatorial mathematics, p589: no edge colours, connected
 * Concise Encyclopedia of Supersymmetry, p84: no edge colours, not necessarily connected
 * Handbook of algebraic topology, p929: no edge colours, not necessarily connected
 * Handbook of computational group theory, p18: edge colours, connected
 * 1) Edge colours be treated only as an option and not as the starting definition
 * 2) Connectivity be treated from the start as a point on which there is common disagreement between sources.

 * No objections from me. —David Eppstein (talk) 04:17, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

Word Problem
When reading this article, I was somewhat surprised to see that although Cayley graphs are referred to as begin "a central tool in combinatorial and geometric group theory", no reference is made to the association with the Word Problem, one of the central problems in these areas! So I have added in a quick line about this in what I deemed to be a somewhat appropriate part of the article. I appologise for the sloppy editing, it is the first time I have referenced something on here!

I have also added a few alternative names for the Cayley graph which have been used in the literature (for instance, color group was used by both Cayley and Burnside). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 130.209.6.40 (talk) 09:42, 22 April 2010 (UTC)

Too much 'discretion'
The article right now (17:47, 19 October 2010 (UTC)) explicitly defines Cayley graphs for discrete groups; but if I do not miss something subtle, no explicit reference to the topological properties is made, and nor is any comparison or reference made to any kind of extension of the concept to groups equipped with more general topologies. My impression is that "discrete" just is a kind of substitute for "in most examples, finitely generated; and often finite". Of course, the discrete topology is the trivial one, and thus, if you don't employ the topology, "a group with a discrete topology" is synonymous with the simpler "a group".

The reason this bothers me, is that it does cause confusion. Recently, there was a math reference desk question Reference_desk/Archives/Mathematics/2010_October_15, asking for a simpler explanation than our article; and the first answer began like this:
 * The trouble is that a simplified explanation will lack formal mathematical rigor, and these are complicated and subtle concepts. A Cayley graph is a representation of a discrete group.  This is a concept that requires subtle understanding of continuity and discreteness (as well as formal definitions of graphs and groups).

Now, it would be rather hard to understand the definition of a Cayley graph for a student who does not have a good grasp of elementary ("naive") set theory. Just "understanding" graphs and groups by means of familiarising yourself with some examples (which is what school pupils often do, in lieu of assimilating formal definitions), is hardly enough in this case. This indeed may make the Cayley graphs a bit hard to digest for eight graders (even bright ones). However, there is no need whatsoever to learn about topology in general or topological groups in particular, in order to grasp the definition; and certainly no need to learn the differences between e.g. discreteness and connectedness for Hausdorff spaces, for a first understanding of Cayley graphs.

IMHO, the formulation "discrete group" thus is fooling not just eighth graders, but also reference desk answererers, getting them to believe that the concept is more complicated than it is. I'll remove it, and suggest that if it is reinstated the information that the group may be viewed as having the trivial topology is postponed until it is employed (if it is). JoergenB (talk) 17:47, 19 October 2010 (UTC)

Order of compositions
The order of compositions of isometries in the Cayley graph of dihedral group (with generators a,b) is wrong on the picture. For example, element ab should be symmetry first, then rotation and letter F near ab should be interchanged with letter F near a^3b. Similarly on the other diagonal. 95.40.141.15 (talk) 19:10, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

ab stands for "clockwise 90° rotation, than horizontal reflection", a³b stands for "clockwise 270° rotation, than horizontal reflection".

For the case, that you want to call ba what is now called ab, etc.: As the Cayley table on the right illustrates, group elements can be represented by permutations and thus by permutation matrices. You may check in the Cayley table, that p1 * p2 = p4 and p2 * p1 = p3. When ab wouldn't stand for "doing a, than doing b", it wouldn't correspond with matrix multiplication. We can also define Dih4 with permutations - and a * b with the group elements a and b and * denoting the group operation should correspond to a * b with the permutation matrices a and b and * denoting matrix multiplication. Watchduck (talk) 09:03, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

 * Thank you for your reply, but I still don't understand.

 * From the Cayley table of S_3 that you quoted we can read that (23) (12) = (132) (where (23) is element from third row, (12) is element from second column). If you composed these permutations from left to right, then first would interchange 2 to 3 and second would do nothing, and the result would be (123) permutation.

 * The usual matrix multiplication represents usual composition of linear transformations and these are composed from right to left.

 * Also, this is a quote from the page about dihedral groups:

 * "For example, S2S1 = R1 because the reflection S1 followed by the reflection S2 results in a 120-degree rotation. (This is the normal backwards order for composition.)"

 * (see also a picture in this article)

 * Best regards, 95.41.221.51 (talk) 05:45, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

You are right. The article function composition states, that (g∘f)(x) = g(f(x)) is the correct interpretation. It's just mentioned that It's indeed confusing. The German article states, that the other interpretation is also possible. However - I will change the graphics above, and use the "g after f" notation.
 * In the mid-20th century, some mathematicians decided that writing "g∘f" to mean "first apply f, then apply g" was too confusing and decided to change notations.

What I wrote about matrix multiplication of permutation matrices makes sense, when the permutation's tuple representation is a row vector - and almost always the permuted elements are written horizontally. Only when column vectors are permuted, g after f and g times f go hand in hand. Sadly we have conflicting conventiones here. Greetings, Watchduck (talk) 18:55, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Clash of conventions in definition and example
The definition of the Cayley graph in the Definition section says that we have an edge going from 'g' to 'gs', labeled 's'; so that the edge represents multiplication on the right by the element labeling the edge. However, the fourth example and the attached graph use the opposite convention, by using a red arrow associated to 'a' to connect 'x' with 'ax'. The text correctly states that the arrow represents multiplication by 'a' on the left (rather than the right), but it is perhaps somewhat confusing to have this change of convention without any "announcement." Perhaps one might add somewhere along the line that one can likewise define the graph using left multiplication instead of right, or to modify the image/description to avoid the issue. Magidin (talk) 22:22, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

 * That is correct, and I have changed it. Five years ago, in the discussion above, the IP has convinced my to change it to prefix notation - but that seems to be unusual in Cayley graphs. There was a Stackexchange discussion BTW, whether or not the prefix notation was wrong: http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/146923/is-the-cayley-diagram-for-d4-in-wikimedia-commons-wrong --Watchduck (quack) 00:54, 28 November 2016 (UTC)

Why does "Cayley diagram" redirect to Cognate_linkage rather than here?
77.126.182.100 (talk) 11:36, 2 November 2012 (UTC)

wrong definition of cayley graph
"Suppose that G=\mathbb{Z} \! is the infinite cyclic group and the set S consists of the standard generator 1 and its inverse (−1 in the additive notation) then the Cayley graph is an infinite chain." no it isn't!!! between n and n+1 there are TWO edges, non one!--93.66.195.134 (talk) 12:26, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Reference dead link
The reference to the connectivity of the graph (Babai's Technical Report TR-94-10) is a dead link. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 180.48.56.132 (talk) 09:48, 15 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Fixed (replaced by published version). —David Eppstein (talk) 18:00, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

Elementary properties
This is a poor heading for a jumbled collection of properties, conventions and theorems; some of which are anything but elementary, because they assume a knowledgeable reader. yoyo (talk) 16:22, 13 December 2018 (UTC)

Expansion
I reworked the recently added section on expanding Cayley graphs, which contained some wrong statements, most notably about the relation between property (T) and expansion. Prperyy (T) is not equivalent to expansion of the Cayley graphs, for example free groups have an expanding Cayley graph but are not Kazhdan. It is not even equivalent to uniform expansion of all quotients since this condition holds for the non-Kazhdan group SL_2(Z[sqrt 2]). The example of abelian groups is not relevant for an article of which expansion is not the primary topic so i removed it. jraimbau (talk) 13:27, 19 November 2021 (UTC)

title: Talk:Cayley graph


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Parks in Chicago

Parks in Chicago include open spaces and facilities, developed and managed by the Chicago Park District. The City of Chicago devotes 8.5% of its total land acreage to parkland, which ranked it 13th among high-density population cities in the United States in 2012. Since the 1830s, the official motto of Chicago has been Urbs in horto, Latin for "City in a garden" for its commitment to parkland. In addition to serving residents, a number of these parks also double as tourist destinations, most notably Lincoln Park, Chicago's largest park, visited by over 20 million people each year, is one of the most visited parks in the United States. Notable architects, artists and landscape architects have contributed to the 570 parks, including Daniel Burnham, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jens Jensen, Dwight Perkins, Frank Gehry, and Lorado Taft.

History
In 1836, a year before Chicago was incorporated, the Board of Canal Commissioners held public auctions for the city's first lots. Foresighted citizens, who wanted the Lake Michigan lakefront kept as public open space, convinced the commissioners to designate two lots as public area. The land east of Michigan Avenue between Madison Street and Park Row (11th Street) was designated "Public Ground—A Common to Remain Forever Open, Clear and Free of Any Buildings, or Other Obstruction, whatever." This lot was soon expanded to Randolph Street, and it was officially named Lake Park in 1847. It was renamed Grant Park in 1901. A second parcel, west of Michigan Avenue between Randolph and Washington Streets, was designated Dearborn Park.

As Chicago grew, demand increased for public spaces, but the Chicago Common Council did little to address these requests. Instead, real estate investors realized that small public squares could increase the value of their property. In 1842, Washington Square Park became the first of these ventures, developed by the American Land Company. Similar projects were completed with Goudy Square Park in 1847 and Union Park in 1853. Although the Cook County Court agreed to allocate a major park on the South Side in 1857, these plans were rescinded two years later, and public outcry continued.

Chicago's second large-scale allocation of parkland came in 1860, when a large section of the City Cemetery was re-designated as a park. This was due to concerns led by John Henry Rauch about the possible public health impact of having a large cemetery on the lake. This new park was also named Lake Park; however, due to confusion over its name, it was renamed to Lincoln Park in 1865, in honor of the recently deceased President. Slowly, all of the graves were moved from the cemetery, greatly expanding the park.

Haussmann's renovation of Paris and New York's Greensward Plan in the 1850s and 1860s turned new attention to the role that parks can play in urban development. William Butler Ogden, the first mayor of Chicago, advocated for a state bill to create a large park on the South Side. Although initially rejected when proposed in 1868, the Illinois legislature accepted this plan in 1869. The objective was to create a system of parks and boulevards that would form a circle around Chicago.

In 1891, J. Frank Foster became the superintendent of the south Chicago park system. He advocated the spreading out of parks into working-class neighborhoods. These generally smaller parks would nonetheless be filled with playing fields and other facilities particularly 'field house' buildings. These facilities would provide all manner of recreation space and services to people of the surrounding neighborhoods. Olmstead's sons, Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. and John Charles Olmsted, designed many of the early neighborhood parks, and these ideas for neighborhood parks influenced national ideas of park design and programming.

Facilities
The Chicago Park District manages 220 facilities in 570 parks covering more than 7600 acre of land throughout the city. This extensive network of parks also includes nine lakefront harbors over 24 mi of lakefront, rendering the Chicago Park District the nation's largest municipal harbor system, along with 31 beaches, 17 historic lagoons, 86 pools, 90 playgrounds, 90 gardens, 66 fitness centers, nine ice skating rinks, 10 museums, a zoological park, and two plant conservatories. The Chicago Park District also maintains many special use facilities for activities such as golfing, boating, boxing, skating and baseball, as well as a number of specialty parks devoted entirely to dogs. In addition to maintaining its parks and facilities, the Chicago Park District holds thousands of community, holiday, nature, sports, music, arts, and cultural events and festivals for city residents every year, many featuring performances and workshops provided by nationally recognized "Arts Partners" such as the Chicago Symphony Orchestra and "Arts Partners in Residence" such as the Citywide Symphony Orchestra, the Albany Park Theater Project, Beacon Street Gallery and Theater, Billy Goat Experimental Theatre Company, Chicago Dance Medium, Chicago Moving Company, Chicago Swordplay Guild, Free Street Programs, K-Theory, Kuumba Lynx, The Peace Museum, Pros Arts Studio, the Puerto Rican Arts Alliance, and the Zephyr Dance Company. The height of these events are during the summer months at the height of the tourist season while children are out of school for summer recess.

Architecture
The dominant theme in many of Chicago's park fieldhouses are variants of either Georgian or Classical Revival architecture. Clarence Hatzfeld designed more of these fieldhouses than any other architect, as well as many of the homes in Chicago's landmark Villa District.

Similar to other areas of Chicago's built environment, a sizeable number of structures in Chicago's Parks are of exceptional architectural value. Portage Park and Jefferson Park are both listed on the National Register of Historic Places, and some like Pulaski Park are official landmarks of the City of Chicago.

Forest preserves
The green-space afforded by Chicago's parks is supplemented by the Cook County Forest Preserves, a separately administered network of open spaces containing forest, prairie, wetland, streams, and lakes, that are set aside as natural areas along the city's periphery.

Notable parks

 * Burnham Park - 598 acre; runs along the Lakefront for much of the South Side connecting Jackson Park with Grant Park
 * Calumet Park - 200 acre; shares a border with the State of Indiana, and is also located on the lake.
 * Columbus Park - 144 acre; on the far west side of Chicago, considered one of the 150 Great Places in Illinois
 * Douglass (Anna and Frederick) Park - 173 acre and named after Frederick Douglass and his wife Anna Murray Douglass, it is Southwest of downtown.
 * Garfield Park - 185 acre; this west side park contains a grand conservatory and lagoon
 * Grant Park - 319 acre; located in The Loop; Home to Buckingham Fountain, this downtown park is also a favorite site of major festivals including the Taste of Chicago, Chicago Blues Festival, Chicago Jazz Festival, Lollapolooza and others.
 * Humboldt Park - 207 acre on the west side, was once a cultural center of Chicago's Puerto Rican Community and the site of a famous rally by pianist and statesman Ignace Paderewski that led to Poland regaining its independence after the First World War.
 * Jackson Park - 500 acre; located on the south side of the city on Lake Michigan, this park is famous for its role in the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition.
 * Lincoln Park - 1200 acre; Chicago's largest city park. Located north of The Loop, this is one of the more distinctive parks in terms of geography, because while it is centrally located in the Lincoln Park community area it spans many different neighborhoods throughout the north side as it is nestled between Lake Shore Drive and Lake Michigan.
 * Marquette Park - 300 acre; the largest park in southwest Chicago, it has a golf course and many other attractions
 * Millennium Park - 24.5 acre; Chicago's newest marquee park, opened in 2004, just north of the Art Institute of Chicago in Grant Park.
 * Washington Park - 372 acre; located on the south side, it was the proposed location for the 2016 Summer Olympics Stadium.

Arts Partners in Residence
Members of the Arts Partners provide quality cultural content to the parks of Chicago in exchange for the use of space within the park district. These Arts Partners include nationally recognized arts organizations serving park patrons and citizens of the public.
 * Albany Park Theater Project (Eugene Field Park)
 * Beacon Street Gallery and Theater (Clarendon Community Center)
 * Billy Goat Experimental Theatre Company (Broadway Armory)
 * Chicago Dance Medium (Seward)
 * Chicago Moving Company (Hamlin)
 * Chicago Swordplay Guild (Pulaski Park)
 * Free Street Programs (Pulaski Park)
 * K-Theory (LaFollette)
 * Kuumba Lynx (Clarendon Community Center)
 * Peace Museum (Garfield Park)
 * Pros Arts Studio (Dvorak Park)
 * Puerto Rican Arts Alliance (Humboldt Park)
 * Zephyr Dance Company (Holstein).

title: Parks in Chicago


text:
User talk:Simdave

Unverified images
Hi! Thanks for uploading the following image:

 * Image:DiGregoriosmaller.jpg

I notice it currently doesn't have an image copyright tag. Could you add one to let us know its copyright status? (You can use if you release it under the GNU Free Documentation License,  if you claim fair use, etc.) If you don't know what any of this means, just let me know at my talk page where you got the images and I'll tag them for you. Thanks so much. [[User:Poccil|Peter O. (Talk, automation script)]] 05:46, Dec 11, 2004 (UTC)

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Community areas in Chicago

The city of Chicago is divided into 77 community areas for statistical and planning purposes. Census data and other statistics are tied to the areas, which serve as the basis for a variety of urban planning initiatives on both the local and regional levels. The areas' boundaries do not generally change, allowing comparisons of statistics across time. The areas are distinct from but related to the more numerous neighborhoods of Chicago; an area often corresponds to a neighborhood or encompasses several neighborhoods, but the areas do not always correspond to popular conceptions of the neighborhoods due to a number of factors including historical evolution and choices made by the creators of the areas. , Near North Side is the most populous of the areas with over 105,000 residents, while Burnside is the least populous with just over 2,500. Other geographical divisions of Chicago exist, such as the "sides" created by the branches of the Chicago River, the wards of the Chicago City Council, and the parishes of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago defined the community areas in the 1920s based on neighborhoods or groups of related neighborhoods within the city. In this effort it was led by sociologists Robert E. Park and Ernest Burgess, who believed that physical contingencies created areas that would inevitably form a common identity. Except for the addition of two areas (O'Hare from land annexed by the city in 1956 and Edgewater's separation from Uptown in 1980) and expansions due to minor annexations, the areas' boundaries have never been revised to reflect change but instead have been kept stable. The areas have become a part of the culture of Chicago, contributing to its perception as a "city of neighborhoods" and breaking it down into smaller regions for easier analysis and local planning. Nevertheless, Park's and Burgess's ideas on the inevitability of physically related areas forming a common bond have been questioned, and the unchanging nature of the areas has at times been considered problematic with major subsequent changes in the urban landscape such as the construction of expressways.

History
During the 19th century wards were used by the Census Bureau for data at the level below cities. This was problematic as wards were political subdivisions and thus changed after each census, limiting their utility for comparisons over time. Census tracts were first used in Chicago in the 1910 Census. However, by the 1920s the Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago wanted divisions that were more natural and manageable than the arbitrarily-designated and numerous census tracts. The sociologist Robert E. Park led this charge, considering physical barriers such as railroads and the Chicago River to form distinctive and consistent areas within the city, which he deemed "natural" areas that would eventually merge into a distinctive identity. Ernest Burgess, a colleague of Park's who shared his thinking, was crucial in creating and naming the community areas. Initially able to identify 400 neighborhoods of the city, he considered that number excessive and trimmed it down to 80 and thereafter 75 by grouping related neighborhoods into a single community area. The Chicago Department of Public Health wished to present local differences in birth and death rates; it worked with the committee to produce the list of 75 community areas, which were divided into 935 census tracts.

After the community areas were introduced, the University of Chicago Press published data sorted by them from the 1920 and 1930 Censuses, as well as a citywide 1934 census to help collect data related to the Great Depression, in what was known as the Local Community Fact Book. With the exception of 1970 (whose data was published in 1980 ), it continued this publication for every subsequent census through 1990, expanding in the 1960s to also cover major suburbs of Chicago. The Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning continues this work by periodically publishing "Community Snapshots" of the community areas and suburbs, the most recent being data from 2018 published.

Only two major changes have occurred in the boundaries of the community areas. O'Hare was created from land that was annexed by Chicago in 1956 to control O'Hare International Airport. Edgewater was separated from Uptown in 1980 as residents considered being joined to it a detriment to obtaining aid for local improvements. In addition to these two there have been minor changes due to further annexations and additions to the Lake Michigan shoreline.

Use and reception
The areas are used for statistical and planning purposes by such professions as assessors, charities, and reporters. Shortly after their development they were used for all kinds of statistics, including movie theater distribution and juvenile delinquency. Although developed by the University of Chicago, they have been used by other universities in the Chicago area, as well as by the city and regional planners. They have contributed to Chicago's reputation as the "city of neighborhoods", and are argued to break up an intimidating city into more manageable pieces. Chicago was an early adopter of such a system, and most cities in the United States still lacked analogous divisions.

The areas do not necessarily correspond to popular imagination of the neighborhoods. For example, the Pilsen and Back of the Yards neighborhoods are much better known than their respective community areas Lower West Side and New City. In the case of New City this was a deliberate choice; Burgess opted for the less common "New City" to name the area as "Back of the Yards" carried a stigma after the publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, which made the area notorious for its poor living conditions. Some of these discrepancies are due to names that were common at the time of the adoption of community areas but have since been supplanted by others. The static nature of area boundaries is one of their benefits, but is also problematic at times such as when expressways were built in the mid-20th century and divided neighborhoods without the area boundaries being able to adapt. The concept of a "natural area" that underpinned Park's and Burgess's thinking has also been challenged.

Other geographic divisions of Chicago

Chicago is traditionally divided into the three "sides" of the North Side, West Side, and South Side by the Chicago River. These three sides are represented by the white stripes on the Flag of Chicago. The city is also divided into 50 wards for the purpose of electing one alderman each to the Chicago City Council. These wards have at times generated identities similar to neighborhoods. Unlike community areas, wards are adjusted decennially to account for population shifts. Another method of neighborhood nomenclature in heavily Catholic neighborhoods of Chicago has been to refer to communities in terms of parishes. For example, one might say, "I live in St. Gertrude's, but he is from Saint Ita's."

title: Community areas in Chicago


text:
The Best Christmas Pageant Ever

The Best Christmas Pageant Ever (titled The Worst Kids in the World in Australia, New Zealand and the UK) is a children's novel written by Barbara Robinson in 1972. It tells the story of six misfit children who volunteer to star in their town's Sunday school Christmas pageant, and end up teaching the town the true meaning of Christmas.

Story
The book is narrated in first person perspective by Beth (Elizabeth) Bradley, daughter of the pageant's director.

The six Herdman children - Imogene, Ralph, Claude, Leroy, Ollie, and Gladys - are notorious for their rowdy misfit behavior, including cigar smoking, cussing, drinking jug wine, and shoplifting. They have never been disciplined because their father hopped a train and never came back when they were babies and their mother is always working multiple shifts to make ends meet. Despite their poor performance, the Herdmans steadily pass through elementary school (since holding any one of them back would mean having two or more of them in the same grade).

They go to Sunday school for the first time after being told that the church offers snacks. The narrator's mother is flabbergasted when they all volunteer for the lead roles in the Christmas pageant: Mary (Imogene), Joseph (Ralph), the Three Wise Men (Claude, Ollie, and Leroy), and the Angel of the Lord (Gladys), the last of whom likens her role to a character from Amazing Comics. Since they've bullied all the usual cast members into remaining silent during the call for volunteers, the director has no choice but to cast them.

Having never heard the Christmas story before, the Herdmans take an uncharacteristic interest, through which the narrator is surprised to find herself, and her parents, thinking more seriously about the story's harsher aspects: e.g., that the innkeeper forced a pregnant woman and her baby to sleep in a barn, and the Holy Family were on the run from King Herod, who wanted the baby Jesus killed.

Everyone in town is expecting the Christmas pageant to be a disaster, but the Herdmans' unconventional performances actually make the whole show much more realistic and moving: instead of walking on and off stage like actors, the Herdmans are a little uncertain about where to go and what to do, as the real-life Holy Family and Wise Men must have been; instead of laying the doll representing Jesus in the manger, Imogene insists on holding it, as if it is really her child; the Wise Men choose to bring the baby Jesus a ham from the Herdmans' own gift basket instead of the "crummy" frankincense and myrrh from the story; the shepherds are sufficiently terrified of Gladys to look authentically awed by her announcement of Jesus's birth; and during the final scene, the narrator looks over from the choir and is dumbstruck to see Imogene weeping softly while hugging the "baby". By common agreement, it is the best Christmas pageant the town has ever had.

Publication and reception
Robinson first published the story in McCall's magazine before it was adapted into a book, which sold over 800,000 copies.

Stage and screen adaptations
The book was adapted by Robinson into a play which was first performed on November 26, 1982, by the Seattle Children's Theatre.

The book was adapted into a television movie on ABC in 1983, starring Loretta Swit and Fairuza Balk, then an unknown actress. Robinson also wrote the adaptation's teleplay.

The Herdmans were featured in two of Barbara Robinson's book sequels, The Best Halloween Ever and The Best School Year Ever.

Dallas Jenkins, creator and director of the TV series The Chosen, announced in late 2023 that he was signed to direct a feature-length film adaptation of the book. Lionsgate and Kingdom Story Company collaborated on the production and filming began in Canada in December 2023. According to Jenkins in June 2024, the film and its production was complete with a release date set for November 8, 2024.

title: The Best Christmas Pageant Ever


text:
2004 Hamburg state election

The 2004 Hamburg state election was held on 29 February 2004 to elect the members of the 18th Hamburg Parliament. The election was triggered by the collapse of the coalition government between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Party for a Rule of Law Offensive (PRO), and Free Democratic Party (FDP). The election saw a collapse in support for PRO which had split after its leader Ronald Schill left in 2003. The original party and Schill's new party captured 3.5% of the vote between them, down from 19.4% in 2001. A huge amount of support flowed to the CDU, which won 63 of the 121 seats in Parliament, forming a majority government. First Mayor Ole von Beust continued in office.

Parties
The table below lists parties represented in the 17th Hamburg Parliament.

Background
In August 2003, Mayor von Beust made moves to dismiss an Interior official suspected of corruption. In response, Senator of the Interior Ronald Schill threatened to spread rumours of an affair between von Beust and the Senator of Justice. Schill was subsequently dismissed from the government. In December of the same year, Schill left his own party along with five of its members of Parliament, depriving the government of its majority. He subsequently joined Pro DM.

Election result
! colspan="2" | Party ! Votes ! % ! +/- ! Seats ! +/- ! Seats % ! colspan=8| ! align=right colspan=2| Total ! align=right| 824,317 ! align=right| 100.0 ! align=right| ! align=right| 121 ! align=right| ±0 ! align=right| ! align=right colspan=2| Voter turnout ! align=right| ! align=right| 68.7 ! align=right| 2.4 ! align=right| ! align=right| ! align=right|
 * bgcolor=|
 * align=left | Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
 * align=right| 389,170
 * align=right| 47.2
 * align=right| 21.0
 * align=right| 63
 * align=right| 30
 * align=right| 52.1
 * bgcolor=|
 * align=left | Social Democratic Party (SPD)
 * align=right| 251,441
 * align=right| 30.5
 * align=right| 6.0
 * align=right| 41
 * align=right| 5
 * align=right| 33.9
 * bgcolor=|
 * align=left | Green Alternative List (GAL)
 * align=right| 101,227
 * align=right| 12.3
 * align=right| 3.7
 * align=right| 17
 * align=right| 6
 * align=right| 14.0
 * align=right| 17
 * align=right| 6
 * align=right| 14.0
 * align=left | Pro Deutsche Mitte – Initiative Pro D-Mark (Pro DM)
 * align=right| 25,763
 * align=right| 3.1
 * align=right| 2.9
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| ±0
 * align=right| 0
 * bgcolor=|
 * align=left | Free Democratic Party (FDP)
 * align=right| 23,373
 * align=right| 2.8
 * align=right| 2.3
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| 6
 * align=right| 0
 * bgcolor=#2E8B57|
 * align=left | Rainbow – For a new left (REGENBOGEN)
 * align=right| 9,200
 * align=right| 1.1
 * align=right| 0.6
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| ±0
 * align=right| 0
 * bgcolor=grey|
 * align=left | The Grays – Gray Panthers (GRAUEN)
 * align=right| 8,878
 * align=right| 1.1
 * align=right| 1.1
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| ±0
 * align=right| 0
 * bgcolor=|
 * align=left | Others
 * align=right| 15,265
 * align=right| 1.9
 * align=right|
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| 25
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| 15,265
 * align=right| 1.9
 * align=right|
 * align=right| 0
 * align=right| 25
 * align=right| 0
 * }

title: 2004 Hamburg state election


text:
User talk:Pscheir~enwiki

Unverified images
Hi! Thanks for uploading the following image:

 * Image:Doa3_package.jpg

I notice it currently doesn't have an image copyright tag. Could you add one to let us know its copyright status? (You can use if you release it under the GNU Free Documentation License,  if you claim fair use, etc.) If you don't know what any of this means, just let me know at my talk page where you got the images and I'll tag them for you. Thanks so much. [[User:Poccil|Peter O. (Talk, automation script)]] 05:52, Dec 11, 2004 (UTC)

P.S. You can help tag other images at User:Yann/Untagged_Images. Thanks again.

Your account will be renamed
Hello,

The developer team at Wikimedia is making some changes to how accounts work, as part of our on-going efforts to provide new and better tools for our users like cross-wiki notifications. These changes will mean you have the same account name everywhere. This will let us give you new features that will help you edit and discuss better, and allow more flexible user permissions for tools. One of the side-effects of this is that user accounts will now have to be unique across all 900 Wikimedia wikis. See the announcement for more information.

Unfortunately, your account clashes with another account also called Pscheir. To make sure that both of you can use all Wikimedia projects in future, we have reserved the name Pscheir~enwiki that only you will have. If you like it, you don't have to do anything. If you do not like it, you can pick out a different name. If you think you might own all of the accounts with this name and this message is in error, please visit Special:MergeAccount to check and attach all of your accounts to prevent them from being renamed.

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Renamed
 This account has been renamed as part of single-user login finalisation. If you own this account you can |log in using your previous username and password for more information. If you do not like this account's new name, you can choose your own using this form after logging in: . -- Keegan (WMF) (talk) 17:47, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

title: User talk:Pscheir~enwiki