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Siege of Sevastopol (1941–1942)

The Siege of Sevastopol, also known as the Defence of Sevastopol (Оборона Севастополя) or the Battle of Sevastopol (Schlacht um Sewastopol; Bătălia de la Sevastopol), was a military engagement that took place on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. The campaign was fought by the Axis powers of Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union for control of Sevastopol, a port in Crimea on the Black Sea. On 22 June 1941, the Axis invaded the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa, with Axis land forces reaching the Crimean peninsula in the autumn of 1941 and overrunning most of the area. The only objective not in Axis hands was Sevastopol. Several attempts were made to secure the city in October and November 1941. A major attack was planned for late November, but heavy rains delayed it until 17 December 1941. Under the command of Erich von Manstein, Axis forces were unable to capture Sevastopol during this first operation. Soviet forces launched an amphibious landing on the Crimean peninsula at Kerch in December 1941 to relieve the siege and force the Axis to divert forces to defend their gains. The operation saved Sevastopol for the time being, but the bridgehead in eastern Crimea was eliminated in May 1942.

After the failure of their first assault on Sevastopol, the Axis opted to conduct siege warfare until the middle of 1942, at which point they attacked the encircled Soviet forces by land, sea, and air. On 2 June 1942, the Axis began this operation, codenamed Störfang (Sturgeon Catch). The Soviet Red Army and Black Sea Fleet held out for weeks under intense Axis bombardment. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) played a vital part in the siege, its 8th Air Corps bombing the besieged Soviet forces with impunity, flying 23,751 sorties and dropping 20,528 tons of bombs in June alone. The intensity of the German airstrikes was far beyond previous German bombing offensives against cities such as Warsaw, Rotterdam or London. At the end of the siege, there were only 11 undamaged buildings left in Sevastopol. The Luftwaffe sank or deterred most Soviet attempts to evacuate their troops by sea. The German 11th Army suppressed and destroyed the defenders by firing 46,750 tons of artillery ammunition on them during Störfang.

Finally, on 4 July 1942, the remaining Soviet forces surrendered and the Germans seized the port. The Soviet Separate Coastal Army was annihilated, with 118,000 men killed, wounded or captured in the final assault and 200,481 casualties in the siege as a whole for both it and the Black Sea Fleet. Axis losses in Störfang amounted to 35,866 men, of whom 27,412 were German and 8,454 Romanian. With the Soviet forces neutralized, the Axis refocused their attention on the major summer campaign of that year, Case Blue and the advance to the Caucasus oilfields.

Background
The Soviet naval base at Sevastopol was one of the strongest fortifications in the world. Its site, on a deeply eroded, bare limestone promontory at the southwestern tip of the Crimea, made an approach by land forces exceedingly difficult. The high-level cliffs overlooking Severnaya Bay protected the anchorage, making an amphibious landing just as dangerous. The Soviet Navy had built upon these natural defenses by modernizing the port and installing heavy coastal batteries consisting of 180mm and 305mm re-purposed battleship guns which were capable of firing inland as well as out to sea. The artillery emplacements were protected by reinforced concrete fortifications and 9.8-inch thick armored turrets.

The port was a valuable target. Its importance as a potential naval and air base would enable the Axis to conduct far-ranging sea and air operations against Soviet targets into and over the Caucasus ports and mountains. The Red Air Force had been using the Crimea as a base to attack targets in Romania since the Axis invasion in June 1941, proving its usefulness as an air base. Likewise, the Wehrmacht had launched a bombing raid on the Sevastopol naval base at the start of the invasion.

Since the beginning of Barbarossa, the offensive against the USSR had not really addressed Crimea as an objective. German planners assumed the area would be captured in mopping-up operations once the bulk of the Red Army was destroyed west of the Dnieper river. But in June, attacks by Soviet aircraft from Crimea against Romania's oil refineries destroyed 12,000 tons of oil. Hitler described the area as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and ordered the conquest of Ukraine and Crimea as vital targets in Directive 33, dated 23 July 1941.

The Command of the Army (OKH) issued orders that the Crimea was to be captured as soon as possible to prevent attacks on Romanian oil supplies, vital to the German military. Hitler, impatient with obstruction to his commands to advance in the south, repeated on 12 August his desire that the Crimea be taken immediately. Over a month later, during the capture of Kiev, Generaloberst (General Colonel) Erich von Manstein was given command of the German 11th Army on 17 September. After only a week in command, he launched an assault upon Crimea. After severe fighting, Manstein's forces defeated several Soviet counteroffensives and destroyed two Soviet armies. By 16 November, the Wehrmacht had cleared the region, capturing its capital Simferopol, on 1 November. The fall of Kerch on 16 November left only Sevastopol in Soviet hands.

By the end of October 1941, Major-General Ivan Yefimovich Petrov's Independent Coastal Army, numbering 32,000 men, had arrived at Sevastopol by sea from Odessa further west, it having been evacuated after heavy fighting. Petrov set about fortifying the inland approaches to Sevastopol. He aimed to halt the Axis drive on the port by creating three defence lines inland, the outermost arc being 16 km (10 mi) from the port itself. Soviet forces, including the Soviet 51st Army and elements of the Black Sea Fleet, were defeated in the Crimea in October and were evacuated in December, leaving Petrov's force as Sevastopol's main defence force. Having cleared the rest of the Crimea between 26 September – 16 November, the Romanian 3rd Army and German 11th Army prepared for an attack on the port. The German 11th Army was the weakest on the entire front, initially containing only seven infantry divisions. The Romanians contributed a large force, but were only lightly equipped and generally lacked heavy artillery. The weather turned against the Axis in mid-October and torrential downpours delayed the buildup. This gave Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, time to bring in men and materiel from Novorossiysk. By 17 December, the weather had cleared sufficiently for the Axis to begin a major operation.

Axis
The German 11th Army, commanded by Manstein, besieged Sevastopol. At the time of the final assault in June 1942, 11th Army consisted of nine German infantry divisions in two Corps, and one Romanian Corps, being the Romanian 7th Mountain Corps. Significant support was given by the Luftwaffe. The Oberkommando der Luftwaffe dispatched Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) 8th Air Corps for support. It consisted of nine Geschwader (Wings) containing 600 aircraft, all coming under the command of Generaloberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen. Among this contingent was a powerful concentration of medium bomber, dive bomber, and torpedo bomber Geschwader.

Naval support came from the Italian 101st Squadron under Francesco Mimbelli. It consisted of four motor torpedo boats, five explosive motorboats, six CB class midget submarines, and a number of 35-ton coastal submarines and MAS boats. This force was the only Axis naval force deployed during the siege. It had been requested by the Germans—the only time during the war that the Germans spontaneously requested Italian assistance. Although Bulgaria was not technically at war with the Soviet Union, its naval staff worked closely with the Wehrmacht, and despite not being committed to combat, they provided bases for the Axis naval command (Admiral Schwarzes Meer, Admiral of the Black Sea) to operate in the waters of the Black Sea.

The Axis order of battle:

 * German 11th Army
 * 306th Army Artillery Command
 * Elements 672nd Artillery Battalion—one Schwerer Gustav Dora
 * 833rd Heavy Mortar Battalion—two Karl-Gerät
 * 688th Railroad Artillery Battery—three 28 cm lg.Br.K
 * 458th Heavy Artillery Battery—one 42 cm Haubitze(t)
 * 459th Heavy Artillery Battery—one 42 cm Gamma Mörser
 * 741st, 742nd, and 743rd Artillery Battalions—four 28 cm Hb. each
 * 744th Artillery Battalion—two 28 cm Küst.Hb.
 * 624th Heavy Artillery Battalion—six 30.5 cm Mrs. and nine 21 cm Mrs.
 * 641st Heavy Artillery Battalion—four 30.5 cm Mrs. and one 35.5 cm Haubitze M1
 * 815th Heavy Artillery Battalion—six 30.5 cm Mrs.
 * German LIV Corps
 * 22nd Infantry Division
 * 24th Infantry Division
 * 50th Infantry Division
 * 132nd Infantry Division
 * German XXX Corps
 * 28th Light Infantry Division
 * 72nd Infantry Division
 * 170th Infantry Division
 * 22nd Panzer Division
 * Romanian Mountain Corps
 * 1st Mountain Division
 * 4th Mountain Division
 * 18th Infantry Division

 * Luftwaffe
 * Luftflotte 4
 * 8th Air Corps
 * Lehrgeschwader 1
 * Kampfgeschwader 26
 * Kampfgeschwader 51
 * Kampfgeschwader 55
 * Kampfgeschwader 76
 * Kampfgeschwader 100
 * Sturzkampfgeschwader 77
 * Jagdgeschwader 77
 * Jagdgeschwader 3
 * Jagdgeschwader 52

 * Italian Regia Marina
 * Quarta Flottiglia MAS

Soviet
The defence of Sevastopol was provided mainly by the Black Sea Fleet and the Separate Coastal Army under Petrov (which had been shipped in from the siege of Odessa). The Black Sea Fleet sent 49,372 personnel to fight as infantry. Most were not trained for ground combat, and the act was an ad hoc emergency measure. The naval brigades formed had four to six battalions of 4,000 men, allowing them to absorb significant losses. These forces were well armed, having a variety of artillery and mortar battalions. Almost 20 percent of the Coastal Army were naval personnel. In the Separate Coastal Army, the strongest divisions were the 95th, 109th, 172nd, and 388th Rifle Divisions. They each had around 7,000 soldiers, the rest of the Red Army units having around 5,000 personnel. Some 5,000 reinforcements made it into Sevastopol in May 1942. However, Petrov's army lacked tanks and anti-aircraft guns. The garrison also lacked food supplies and mortar ammunition, which would severely sap Soviet strength. Poor communications between headquarters and the front lines were also an issue. Petrov found it difficult to respond to Axis attacks quickly.

Red Army:
 * Coastal Batteries
 * 12 battalions
 * 3 batteries
 * Defence Sector I
 * 109th Rifle Division
 * 388th Rifle Division
 * Defence Sector II
 * 386th Rifle Division
 * 7th Naval Infantry Brigade
 * Defence Sector III
 * 25th Rifle Division
 * 345th Rifle Division
 * 8th Naval Infantry Brigade
 * 79th Naval Infantry Brigade
 * Defence Sector IV
 * 95th Rifle Division
 * 172nd Rifle Division

Red Air Force and Soviet Naval Aviation:
 * 3rd Special Aviation Group
 * 6th Guards Naval Fighter Regiment
 * 9th Naval Fighter Regiment
 * 247th Fighter Regiment
 * 18th Ground Attack Regiment
 * 23rd Aviation Regiment
 * 32nd Guards Fighter Regiment
 * 116th Maritime Reconnaissance Regiment

Soviet Black Sea Fleet:
 * One battleship
 * Two heavy cruisers
 * One Light Cruiser
 * Two Flotilla Leaders
 * Six Destroyers
 * Nine Minesweepers
 * One Guardship
 * 24 Submarines

First Axis offensive
The German 11th Army's first task was to break through into the Crimea. The cities of Perekop and Ishun guarded the narrow corridor of land which linked the Crimea to the bulk of Ukraine. Erick-Oskar Hansen's LIV Corps, with its 45th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, broke through at Perekop at the cost of 2,641 casualties in six days of fighting. The Soviet forces launched a counteroffensive against the 11th Army's flank at Melitopol. Manstein withdrew his other corps in order to deal with it. The resulting battle ended with the destruction of two attacking Soviet Armies. By the time that this threat had been dealt with, the Stavka had rushed in reinforcements and established another defence line at Ishun. Ordered to concentrate on the Crimea once more, Manstein launched his LIV Corps, this time with the support of the German 22nd Infantry Division, into the assault. The Soviet forces enjoyed local air superiority and armored reserves. They also outnumbered the attacking Wehrmacht. In spite of this, the defending Soviet 51st Army was pushed back. The Wehrmacht suffered 5,376 casualties in 12 days of combat, and the Red Army many more. By the end of October, the 51st Army was crushed and in full retreat into the Crimea. The situation in the air also changed. Arriving Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings) won air superiority for the Axis.

On 22 and 23 October, Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3), JG 52, and JG 77 crippled the Soviet air strength in the Crimea. Over the two days they destroyed 33 Soviet aircraft for one loss. In the six days from 18 to 24 October 140 Soviet aircraft were lost, 124 of them to Luftwaffe fighters. Heinkel He 111s of KG 26 and KG 51 and Junkers Ju 87 Stukas of StG 77 were free to attack Soviet ground positions, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Crimean Front on 27 October.

Initial battles
With the front collapsing and the Axis closing in on Sevastopol, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky assumed command of the port on 4 November 1941. The city had a civilian population of 111,000 in 1941, and most were sent to work on the three defence lines around the port. Only the 7th and 8th Naval Infantry Brigades were available for combat in the port. More naval infantry were formed from ships in the harbor. The 8th Naval Infantry Brigade was sent to guard the northeastern approaches near the Mamachai-Belbek line. The 7th (5,200 men) was deployed in the center, near Mekenzyya. With only 20,000 soldiers, Oktyabrsky relied heavily on his 12 coastal battalions to slow down the Axis. The 62nd Fighter Brigade contributed 61 fighters, which were able to achieve temporary air superiority.

On 30 October, the Soviet defences detected the spearhead of the German 132nd Infantry Division and shelled it at 12:30 on 1 November using Battery 30's 305mm coastal guns. The Germans designated the fort as Fort Maxim Gorky I. Wehrmacht lacked sufficient air and mobile units to force a decision. Instead, Manstein ordered Hansen's LIV Corps to head east down the Sevastopol-Simferopol rail line towards Yalta, while the 72nd Infantry Division was to head to Balaklava, effectively encircling Sevastopol. Once there, it would attack Sevastopol from the east. The 132nd made reasonable progress, but was stopped on 2 November by the 8th Naval Brigade. The Wehrmacht suffered 428 casualties. Manstein ordered a halt for a week, whilst bringing up reserves. Oktyabrsky used his fleet to bring in a further 23,000 men from the Caucasus. On 9 November, Petrov's Army was brought in, bringing 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26 tanks, 152 artillery pieces, and 200 mortars. The Red Army now had 52,000 troops in the area of the city. The Luftwaffe was considered weak (the bulk of it was engaged in the Battle of Moscow), so the Soviet Navy kept the heavy cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, light cruisers Krasny Krym and Chervona Ukraina, and seven destroyers to protect the port.

The Luftwaffe did what it could to disrupt the Soviet defences. On 31 October, the destroyer Bodryy shelled German positions along the coastline. StG 77 Ju 87s attacked and wounded 50 of its crew by strafing its deck and superstructure with machinegun fire. On 2 November Junkers Ju 88s of KG 51 scored several hits on the cruiser Voroshilov and put it out of action for months. On 7 November He 111s from KG 26 sank the liner Armeniya evacuating soldiers and civilians from Sevastopol, with only eight of the 5,000 passengers surviving. On 12 November, StG 77 sank the cruiser Chervona Ukraina and KG 26 damaged the destroyers Sovershennyy and Besposhchadnyy. But with the Luftwaffe units being dispatched to other sectors and theatres, the Soviet forces again achieved air superiority with 59 aircraft (39 serviceable).

Manstein wanted to launch an attack as soon as possible, but his logistical lines were poor. Wanting to avoid strong Soviet forces protecting the north of the port, including the 95th Rifle Division, Manstein chose to press the center and southern Soviet defences. He ordered the German 50th Infantry Division to probe the center of the Soviet line east of the Chernaya river. The 132nd Infantry Division supported the probe and was able to push to within 4 kilometres of Severnaya Bay. The 72nd Rifle Division, with the support of the coastal batteries, moved in to stop the attack. The 72nd Infantry Division continued towards Balaklava, and the 22nd Infantry Division joined the assault. Assisted by shelling from two light cruisers and the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna, the Red Army halted this attack, and Manstein called off the offensive on 21 November, having lost 2,000 men.

December offensive
Manstein recognised that he could not take the port quickly, and was going to have to organise a proper set-piece offensive. With German offensive operations suspended in December, Manstein found himself the only commander on the Eastern Front with an offensive mission. He was not ready to carry out his attack until 17 December. In the meantime, Oktyabrsky used the interval to sail the 11,000 soldiers of the 388th Rifle Division into Sevastopol between 7–13 December. Soviet engineers began laying extensive minefields and barbed-wire belts. By the time of the Axis attack, Petrov's force held a strong defensive position. The naval commander demanded that Petrov hold the coast along the northern flank of Sevastopol on the Belbek River in order to retain Coastal Battery 10, an artillery complex near Mamaschai. On the other hand, the German LIV Corps had only 15,551 men in its four infantry divisions (22nd, 24th, 50th, and 132nd). Over 7,000 soldiers in the German 11th Army were on the sick list at that time. It was also short of artillery ammunition and heavy artillery. In order to commit as many forces to the battle as possible, Manstein left the weak XLII Corps, containing just the 46th Infantry Division and two Romanian brigades, to protect the entire front from Yalta to Kerch.

The attack began at 06:10 on 17 December. The 22nd Infantry Division attacked the 8th Naval Brigade on the Belbek River, pushing west towards the coast, while the 50th and 132nd Infantry Divisions conducted fixing attacks on the Soviet center. The 22nd succeeded in rolling up the flank of the Naval Brigade after five days of fighting. However, Oktyabrsky ordered its retirement south towards Sevastopol, abandoning Mamaschai and forming a new front north of Belbek city and the Belbek river. In the south, XXX Corps tried and failed to break through with the 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions. Only minor gains were made against the 172nd Rifle Division, even with help from the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade. The 79th Naval Brigade and 345th Rifle Division arrived by sea as reinforcements, using the long winter nights and their naval superiority. Meanwhile, the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna shelled German forces whenever they threatened a breakthrough. The offensive came to an abrupt end when the Red Army staged an amphibious landing at Kerch.

Kerch landing
Between 26 and 30 December 1941, the USSR launched an amphibious assault on the Kerch peninsula to relieve the encircled Soviet forces at Sevastopol. It succeeded in gaining and sustaining a bridgehead for five months. However, a German−led counteroffensive named Operation Bustard Hunt destroyed the bridgehead and the three Soviet Armies supporting the landing in May 1942. This allowed Manstein to concentrate all of his resources against Sevastopol for the first time. The front over Sevastopol grew quiet and a stalemate ensued. The Luftwaffe kept up the pressure on Soviet sea communications and although supplies still made it through, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, commanding the Black Sea Fleet, was forced to reduce the number of coastal bombardment missions.

Soviet defence
Sevastopol was still a formidable obstacle. Its airfields provided a base for the Red Air Force to attack the Axis-held Soviet coastline and Romania proper. It was also home to the Black Sea Fleet. Its main fortifications were pointed seaward, while the land defences encircled the city at a distance of 15–20 km, with an inner defense belt at a range of 5 km. Enhancing the manmade defences was the forested, rugged terrain. To the north of Severnaya Bay there were 11 batteries and strongpoints. They were given morale-boosting names such as Stalin, Maxim Gorky I, Molotov, and Lenin. They were defended by the First Coastal Army. Elsewhere, the Red Army had constructed hundreds of timber bunkers with machinegun nests and 45 mm anti-tank artillery. Along the outer belt, concrete bunkers were less common, 19 being stretched across its 37 km. Soviet engineers laid thousands of mines, including PMD-6 wooden anti-personnel mines, TMD-40 wooden anti-tank mines, and barbed-wire obstacle belts.

Petrov, commanding the Independent Coastal Army, had a powerful artillery pool. Petrov had on strength some 455 artillery pieces and howitzers. Among those were 34 152 mm and 40 122 mm howitzers and 918 mortars. Ammunition was adequate for a battle of two weeks for these calibers, but 82 mm mortar ammunition was in short supply. The battles of the Crimean campaign had taken their toll, and scarcely any tank and anti-aircraft artillery support were available. A further force, under Major-General Petr Morgunov, was added. The Coastal Artillery Force was semi-independent for much of the siege, and had an initial strength of 12 batteries and 45 guns, although more were added during 1942. By the time of the German June offensive, the Soviet forces had available eight 305 mm, one 188 mm, 10 152 mm and 17 130 mm, three 120 mm, eight 100 mm, and four 45 mm guns.

Axis forces
By this time, the Axis was facing a serious manpower and artillery shortage. The German 11th Army's divisions had anywhere between 35 and 75 percent of their initial strength. The German 22nd Infantry Division was the strongest division, and was only short 1,750 personnel, while the weakest was the 132nd Infantry Division, which was short 2,300 men. The 170th Infantry Division had to collapse one of its regiments to bring the others up to strength. The German infantry force was a fragile force at Sevastopol and Manstein could not afford to squander it. German doctrine stressed bypassing strongpoints, but since this was not possible, German infantry were forced to reduce one fort after another. Some 65 Sturmgeschütz III assault guns were available to support them.

The assault was based around battalion-strength infantry assault groups supported by a platoon of engineers and a few assault guns. Two pioneer battalions were attached to each division to spearhead the attack and break through fixed and fortified defences. The eight battalions of LIV Corps each contained around 386 men on average, and were equipped with 10–12 flame throwers, 28–30 mine detectors, 3,000 kg of high explosives, 2,200 hand grenades, and 500 smoke grenades. The 300th Panzer Battalion, a remote-controlled tank unit using the Goliath tracked mine, was made available for destroying fortifications. The total number of artillery pieces came to 785 German and 112 Romanian medium and heavy guns. Most of these were under the command of LIV Corps, the main assault force. To increase this arsenal, a number of super-heavy artillery pieces were made available. Three 600 mm Karl-Gerät self-propelled mortars (Thor, Odin, and one other) and one 800 mm gun (Schwerer Gustav), delivering 1.4 and 7 ton shells, respectively, and capable of destroying any fortification. However, the Karl-Gerät guns only had a range of between 4–6,000 meters, which made them vulnerable to counter-battery fire. Moreover, only 201 rounds of 600 mm and 48 round of 800 mm ammunition were available. Most of it was used up before the infantry assault.

More useful to the German infantry were the two 280 mm railway guns. Two 420 mm, two 355 mm howitzers were also available, along with four 305 mm mortars. Both of the 420 mm guns were of First World War vintage, short in range and with limited ammunition. Some nine 283 mm mortars were also available, but they were pre-1914 weapons and six had burst during firing. Artillery acquired from Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement, the Skoda 305 mm Model 1911 howitzer was also available. At the divisional level, 268 105 mm and 80 150 mm weapons were in service, including 126 Nebelwerfer infantry barrage rocket launchers. Overall, the German 11th Army's artillery was a collection of modern, obsolete, and foreign-built weapons. For the offensive, 183,750 rounds of 105 mm and 47,300 rounds of 150 mm ammunition were stockpiled, enough for 12 days of firing.

To reinforce the 11th Army, the Romanians were committed to the assault. The Romanian 18th Infantry Division was at full strength, and plenty of Romanian infantry were available. However, the 18th Division was inexperienced and made up of reservists. The Romanian 1st Mountain Division was considered an elite force, and its addition was to prove useful. They had 112 guns available, but virtually no engineers. The weakness of their artillery and supporting arms made the Romanian X Corps reliant on the German forces for anything other than set-piece infantry attacks.

The Luftwaffe had to compensate for the Axis artillery limitations. A powerful air armada was brought together. Under the 8th Air Corps, von Richthofen assembled six Kampfgruppen (Bomber Groups) originating from six different Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wings): KG 51 Edelweiß, KG 76, KG 100, and III.Gruppe/LG 1 specialist training wing. Dive-bomber support from StG 77 was also given to Richthofen. He could call upon three gruppen of Ju 87s. Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings) JG 3 Udet and JG 77 Herz As were available for air superiority operations. II.Gruppe/KG 26 Löwe was also available for anti-shipping operations, in addition to the air-land effort carried out by the 8th Air Corps.

The Luftwaffe could not support the land assault and maintain pressure on Soviet sea communications alone. With only KG 26 engaged in anti-shipping operations against Soviet sea communications, the OKW looked to the Kriegsmarine to supply Schnellboot (S-Boat) motor torpedo boats to help eliminate Soviet shipping supplying and evacuating the port. The time it took to dismantle and move the 92-ton boats by rail to Romanian ports was going to be too long. In a rare appeal for help, the German forces turned to their Italian allies, aware of their expertise with motor torpedo boat operations. The Regia Marina sent the 101st Naval Squadron, which brought nine torpedo boats and nine coastal submarines under the command of the highly competent Capitano di Fregata Francesco Mimbelli. The Italian boats were only 24 tons and the submarines were 35 tons, which made them easier to transport by truck and barge. The squadron was based at Feodosiya and Yalta, which made it the only Axis naval force to participate in the siege. It mainly engaged in offensive operations against Soviet supply efforts..

Air offensive
Manstein demanded an all-out assault by the Luftwaffe before the main ground action began. Situated only 70 km from Sevastopol, the German formations had barely enough time to reach altitude before reaching their targets. The 8th Air Corps began its bombing campaign along the north and southeast of the city. At the same time, German medium bombers conducted rolling attacks on the city, which included all units except LG 1, which engaged in suppressing anti-aircraft installations. Oil, electricity, water pumps, harbor facilities, and submarine bases were attacked by StG 77 Ju 87s. Von Richthofen watched the bombing from an observation post close to the front. The targets were badly damaged, and fires broke out all over the port city. The Luftwaffe flew 723 missions and dropped 525 tons of high explosive on the first day. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, just one Ju 87 was lost.

While the bulk of the Luftwaffe was busy with the land battle, III./KG 26 sought to break Soviet sea communications. They sank the tanker Mikhail Gromov, but the flotilla leader Tashkent, the destroyer Bezuprechnyy, and transport Abkhaziya escaped to bring 2,785 soldiers into the fortress. Air support continued with 643 sorties on 3 June, 585 on 4 June, and 555 on 5 June, with some German crews flying daily averages of 18 missions. By the start of the ground attack on 7 June, the Luftwaffe had flown 3,069 sorties and 2,264 tons of high explosive and 23,800 incendiary bombs were dropped. Many of the bombs dropped were 1,000 kg SC 1000, 1,400 kg SC 1400, and 2,500 kg SC 2500 bombs. The heavy-caliber weapons were aimed at Soviet concrete bunkers. Ivan Laskin, commanding the 172nd Rifle Division in the northern sector recalled, "Bombers in groups of twenty to thirty attacked us without caring for their targets. They came in, wave after wave, and literally ploughed up the earth throughout our defence area. German aircraft were in the air above our positions all day long. The sky was clouded by smoke from explosions of thousands of bombs and shells. An enormous dark grey cloud of smoke and dust rose higher and higher and finally eclipsed the sun". The German air campaign against Sevastopol in June 1942 surpassed by far the German bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam or London. From 3 to 6 June, the Luftwaffe carried out 2,355 operations and dropped 1,800 tons of high explosives.

On 7 June, Manstein ordered the ground assault. The Luftwaffe carried out 1,368 sorties and dropped 1,300 tons of bombs on Soviet positions, but the Soviet infantry clung on.

Ground fighting: 7–10 June
LIV Corps was to strike the main blow. Situated on the northeast edge of the city, they struck along the lines of least resistance, across the Belbek river while the German XXX and Romanian Mountain Corps conducted holding attacks in the south and center, respectively. Both the latter corps did not start major operations until 8 June.

The artillery bombardment targeted bunkers with 105 mm fire, which usually received 10–25 rounds. German Flak 36 37 mm guns also did an effective job of eliminating machinegun nests. The German forces were also quick to bring up 88 mm artillery guns to fire directly into bunker apertures. Between 2 and 6 June, the German 11th Army expended nine percent of its munitions (42,595 rounds, amounting to 2,449 tons of munitions) on pre-advance shelling. The railway guns also fired a few rounds at the main fortifications and rail lines, but most missed by some distance. The closest shell landed 80 meters away from its target. Soviet ammunition dumps were also targeted by these weapons, with no effect. The main fortifications, forts Stalin, Molotov, and Maxim Gorky (which lay in the path of LIV Corps) remained active. It was not until the afternoon of 6 June when a single 60 cm calibre mortar shell from the Karl-Gerät self-propelled mortar no. III, nicknamed Thor, knocked out Maxim Gorky's second turret, damaging the weapon. This was the only success of the German super-heavy guns, which did not have an impact commensurate with their expense. The Luftwaffe had a greater impact, using its Ju 87s to knock out the communications systems of the fort.

On the morning of 7 June 1942, the German infantry began advancing cautiously. XXX Corps attacked the southern positions held by the 7th Naval Brigade and 388th Rifle Division. The German infantry advanced behind air and artillery support. The infantry seemed afraid of their fire support and did not advance close enough behind it. The bombardment also failed to have enough of an effect. The Soviet forces held their fire until the German forces were well within range before opening fire, and little progress was made. Von Richthofen was angered by the fear of the infantry and called the day "a real disappointment". The next few days were not much better, despite the Luftwaffe flying 1,200 sorties. The pace of operations exhausted the machines and men. Often crews did not get out of their aircraft and made three or four sorties without rest.

LIV Corps began its assault in the north on the seam of the Soviet defence sectors III and IV. The 'Schwerer Gustav' weapon continued to fire against ammunition dumps, which produced no effect. Nevertheless, the 132nd Infantry Division was able to work its way up to the river. The 600 mm guns concentrated on the coastal batteries and Maxim Gorky fortress. Meanwhile, the German 22nd Infantry Division attacked further to the east. Some 200 Soviet reinforcements of the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade, protecting this sector, were lost in the bombardment, but the main defences held out. The brigade held most of its forces in reserve, while committing only a single company to cover the hilly terrain on the Belbek river front. German assault groups breached the first and reserve lines by 08:15. The German forces had to negotiate heavily mined areas, slowing them down and allowing the Soviet forces to make a partial recovery. Supporting operations by the 50th and 24th German Infantry Divisions failed, which cost the Wehrmacht 12 StuG assault guns. The remote-control demolition units were not effective as the terrain was unsuitable.

By 17:15 the town of Belbek was secured. The 22nd Infantry Division made considerable progress in breaking through the defenses of the 25th Rifle Division. The 50th Infantry Division supported the 22nd's left flank. Now facing the Germans was the Haccius Ridge, on which the fortress Maxim Gorky was located. It was flanked by several smaller forts to the east.

Now the 132nd Infantry Divisions was ordered to conduct a converging pincer movement on the Maxim Gorky fortress in conjunction with the 22nd and 50th Infantry Divisions, to trap its defenders against the coast. The 132nd pushed into the 95th Rifle Division's positions north of the fort, while the other two divisions attacked in a flanking move. While the Germans did make progress, nearing the main railway station just southeast of Maxim Gorky, they were stopped from achieving a full-scale breakthrough by the 172nd Rifle Division. The 22nd and 50th Infantry Divisions had been heavily shelled by mortar fire from the 25th Rifle Division facing them east of the Haccius Ridge, which caused heavy casualties. By 18:00 hours, the German attack was spent.

LIV Corps' losses on 7 June amounted to 2,357 casualties in four divisions, including 340 killed. It had also expended 3,939 tons of ammunition. The 132nd Division had exhausted all of its basic munitions load by midday. On the other side, the formidable Soviet defence lines east and southeast of Belbek had been overrun, and the Germans succeeded in advancing 2 km through dense Soviet defences. The Soviet casualties had also been severe. It is estimated that three battalions were effectively destroyed.

Manstein recognised the seriousness of the failure on 8 June. He was worried that the 132nd Infantry Division, locked in combat with the 79th Naval Brigade and 95th and 172nd Rifle Divisions north of the city on the Belbek river front, was "approaching the end of its strength". Once again, the army turned to the Luftwaffe for support. Richthofen responded by ordering attacks against Soviet supply lines. The same day, German bombers, including KG 100, began attacks on Soviet shipping. They sank the destroyer Sovershennyy and the survey vessel Gyuys, with the 4,727 ton transport Abkhaziya and destroyer Svobodnyy following them on 10 June.

The period between 8–12 June descended into a battle of attrition. Several Soviet counterattacks were repulsed with heavy losses. The German LIV Corps extended the salient on the seam of the III and IV sector to 3 km, determined to break through before Petrov could reinforce his lines. The 132nd Infantry Division cleared the Haccius Ridge while the 22nd Infantry Division overran most of the Soviet 79th Naval Infantry Brigade. The Soviet unit tried counterattacking on 10 June, but was repulsed. The Soviet formation was effectively destroyed, with the support of the Luftwaffe, which used anti-personnel bombs against Soviet infantry caught in the open. Only one battalion (the Soviet 1st Batt./241st Rifle Regiment) was in a position to block the Germans from encircling the Maxim Gorky fort. Still, on 8 June LIV Corps had lost 1,700 men. In return, the lodgement in Soviet lines was extended to 3 km deep and 5 km wide.

In the south, XXX Corps made no progress in four days of attacks. They suffered 496 casualties at the hands of the 109th Rifle Division. The 28th Light and 72nd Infantry Divisions had succeeded in puncturing the Soviet lines opposite the 109th and 388th Rifle Divisions. The outer defences were broken in some parts, but the most were still in Soviet hands on 12 June. The main belt on the Sapun Ridge (Sapun-gora) was unbroken. Soviet casualties amounted to 2,500, including 700 captured. By 13 June, XXX Corps had lost 2,659 men, including 394 killed.

Air-land operations: 11–15 June
As the Germans made slow progress toward the main train station, Petrov withdrew the battered 172nd Rifle Division and replaced it with 345th Rifle Division. The 95th Rifle Division halted the 132nd Division's progress in the north. Although a relatively quiet day, 10 June saw the elimination of the Soviet 79th Naval Brigade and LIV Corps lost 2,772 men. Counterattacks by the Soviet 345th Division aimed at the hinge between the German 132nd and 50th Divisions were repulsed by the Luftwaffe. On 11–12 June, LIV Corps lost another 1,957 men. The Red Army had committed all of its reserves and were stretched dangerously thin. One more push might collapse the northern sector. But at this time, the tired German infantry were running short on reinforcements and ammunition.

In contrast, the Black Sea Fleet was bringing in reinforcements through Luftwaffe attacks. On 12 June the cruiser Molotov and destroyer Bditel'nyy brought in 2,314 soldiers, 190 tons of ammunition and 28 artillery pieces. The Luftwaffe turned its attention to these convoys. On 13 June it sank the transports Gruzyia and TSch-27, patrol boat SKA-092, motor boat SP-40, five barges, and a floating crane. On 15 June another 3,400 soldiers, 442 tons of ammunition, 30 tons of fuel and 12 tons of provisions reinforced the Soviet positions.

The Luftwaffe had flown 1,044 sorties on 11 June, dropping 954 tons of bombs. The consumption rate of ammunition was putting von Richthofen's logistical network under strain and he could no longer afford to fly massed bombing raids. On 11 June, he surmised there was less than two days worth of munitions left, requiring a change of tactics. Instead of carpet bombing, fewer targets would be attacked simultaneously, and aircraft would strike at designated targets in long and narrow lines. This was designed to maintain accurate pressure without wasting ordnance. Even this failed to alleviate shortages in the long term. By 17 June, scarcity of aviation fuel meant the Luftwaffe dropped only 800 instead of the planned 1,000 tons of bombs. Adding to the Luftwaffe's troubles in the sector, von Richthofen was transferred to prepare the Corps' Headquarters near Kursk to support the upcoming Operation Blue, the German summer offensive in southern Russia. He retained formal command, at least until given control of Luftflotte 4, but Wolfgang von Wild took over air operations over Sevastopol.

The primary objective for the 22nd Infantry Division on 13 June was Fort Stalin, blocking the advance to Severnaya Bay. It was a tough position. The fortifications allowed the Soviet forces to concentrate artillery against breakthroughs and machine gun posts protected the fort from southern and eastern attacks, but it was vulnerable from a northern assault. In addition, only 200 men from the 345th Rifle Division were stationed there. The Germans launched their assault on the position at 03:00 on 13 June with just 813 men. The 3rd Battalion was assigned to suppress Soviet machine gun and mortar positions located on the southeast as a diversion. The 1st Battalion, supported by five StuG assault guns, two 37mm guns and an Engineer Company, were to serve as the main effort. Some 200 and 110 men were committed respectively in each unit.

German bombardment began on 12 June. Artillery fire from 'Dora' had failed to neutralise the fort. Nevertheless, a combined arms attack from eleven 420 mm mortars and dive-bombing by Ju 87s of StG 77 knocked out the fort's main armament (three of the four 76.2 mm guns). At 19:00 the 22nd divisional artillery began shelling the fort and its smaller supporting fortress, Volga, located to Stalin's rear, with 210, 280 and 305 mm weapons. At 03:00 the German infantry attacked. The fog of war intervened. The Soviet mortar teams were not suppressed, and a fierce battle developed which lasted until 05:30. The Germans, with the support of five assault guns and a few 37 mm weapons, silenced the fort, bunker by bunker. In the heavy fighting a large number of company commanders were killed.

As the Germans seized this vital fort, the neighbouring Volga fort realised it had fallen and shelled the position. A company-sized counterattack by the Soviet forces was wiped out by German small arms fire. The Germans declared the position secured at 07:00, though some bunkers held out until 15:00. German casualties amounted to 32 dead, 126 wounded and two missing – half of the force committed. Soviet casualties amounted to 20 captured, the remainder were killed. With only 91 men left near the fort, Petrov did not order a recovery attempt – a grave mistake.

The fall of Fort Stalin meant the Soviet defenses in the north were on the verge of collapse. Hansen ordered LIV Corps to divert its attention to Fort Maxim Gorky and the elimination of the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. The 95th Rifle Division had been halting the 132nd Infantry Division's progress since the start of the offensive. The 132nd was reinforced by one regiment from the idle 46th Infantry Division near Kerch. The German 24th, 50th and Romanian 4th Mountain Divisions were to maintain pressure in the central sector while they pushed towards the Mekensia and Gatani Valley and the Chernaya River opening at Severnaya Bay. For three days, 14–16 June, the battle continued as the Axis advanced towards Sevastopol in the face of Soviet resistance. On 15 June the 132nd was within 900 metres of the Maxim Gorky's outer bastion (Bastion I). The front opposite the 25th Soviet Rifles was still strong, but the northern flank was giving way. The 79th Naval Brigade had only 35 percent of its fighting strength remaining. Blocking the way to Maxim Gorky were just 1,000 men of the 95th Rifle Division and 7th Naval Brigade.

In the south the Soviet 109th and 388th Rifle Divisions were forced back along the coast by the German 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions while the Romanian Corps' 18th Mountain Division dislodged the Soviet 386th Rifle Division threatening XXX Corps' right flank. The battles continued to grind on until 20 June. In six days, XXX Corps had lost 2,646 men. In exchange the outer defences of the 388th Rifle Division had been broken and the formation effectively destroyed. Still, the German advance on Balaklava had been halted. The Germans had not yet reached its outer defences and the Sapun Ridge to the east of the town was still under Soviet control. By 15 June, some 1,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,500 mortar bombs had been captured, indicating the Soviet forces had plenty of ammunition after two weeks of battle.

Despite shortages of aviation fuel and ordnance, the Luftwaffe had played a significant part in the success of the German operations. From 13 June until 17 June, it flew 3,899 sorties and dropped 3,086 tons of bombs. This average of 780 sorties per day was only a slight drop from the opening 11 days. Massed sorties were made on the city of Sevastopol itself. Bombing targeted hangars, port facilities, flak and artillery batteries, barracks, and supply depots with high explosive bombs. Most of the city was engulfed in flames. The smoke rose to 1,500 meters and stretched as far as Feodosiya, 150 kilometers away.

Ground fighting: 16–28 June
As Hansen poised his corps for the breakthrough against the 95th Rifle Division, 27 Ju 87s of II./StG 77 attacked Maxim Gorky's main battery. The Germans believed the strike had knocked it out as it stopped firing its artillery. The artillery bombardment began on 16 June. In the morning the attack by the reinforced 132nd Division collapsed the line. The Soviet garrison held out in tunnels, capitulating on 20 June.

The 22nd and 24th Infantry Divisions advanced from the northeast. They employed their Goliath remote control demolition vehicles with success against the timber bunkers. One exploded prematurely and two were knocked out by a minefield. Two Panzer III control vehicles were knocked out by Soviet anti-tank fire. By 19:30, Forts Maxim Gorky, Molotov, Schishkova, Volga and Siberia were overrun. The 24th Infantry Division in particular made extensive use of its Nebelwerfer rockets. The 95th and 172nd Rifle Divisions had been lost, as well as the majority of the fortified defences. Only the 25th Rifle remained in the line. Petrov rushed up the 138th Naval Brigade with an extra 2,600 men, which was landed on the 12–13 June. It prevented German forces reaching Severnaya Bay that day.

The Luftwaffe was also engaged in applying pressure to Soviet naval forces. On 18 June the cruiser Kharkov was severely damaged. Attacks on 19 June by KG 51 destroyed the anti-aircraft platform in Severnaya Bay, allowing air operations to continue unopposed. The lack of anti-aircraft cover made it impossible for the minelayer Komintern to enter the harbour with reinforcements. The lack of supplies resulted in Soviet ammunition and fuel supplies slipping to critical levels on 20 June. The Luftwaffe was experiencing shortages of its own. The daily average of sorties was now reduced by 40 percent. Due to the shortages of bombs, all ordnance had to be dropped individually to minimise wastage. Some experienced crews had to conduct dive-bombing attacks 25–30 times a day. KG 51's Ju 88 crews in particular had felt the strain.

The pressure took its toll, and between the 18–23 June, the entire Soviet defence line in the north collapsed. The remnants of the 95th Rifle Division was huddled into a 2 km square portion of coast line near Coastal Battery 12, north of the Bay. At 09:00 the battery and the division surrendered to the 132nd Infantry Division. Further south the 24th Infantry Division captured Bartenyevka, on the mouth of the Bay. The 22nd Infantry Division had reached the north of the Bay on the same day. The Soviet 138th Naval Brigade counterattacked, but it was destroyed without artillery and air support. On 20 June, the 24th Infantry Division tackled the main obstacle remaining on the north side of the Bay. The Lenin anti-aircraft position protected by the Northern Fort, a position which had a 5 metres wide anti-tank ditch, 1,000 mines, 32 concrete bunkers, seven armoured cupolas, and 70 earth-and-timber bunkers making it a formidable defensive position. The Lenin defences surrendered, having already lost three of their four 76 mm weapons. The Germans tried to use the remote-controlled mines to break into the North Fort, but they were knocked out. At 11:30 on 21 June the Fort fell after a sustained infantry attack. Around 182 Soviet prisoners were taken. The Germans began mopping up operations and clearing the northern shore. Most Soviet units were exhausted and out of ammunition, surrendering quickly. Others made attempts at a last stand. Some tried to evacuate across to the southern side by boat, but they were picked off by German artillery.

While the main actions were playing out in the north, XXX Corps alternated between attack and defence. The Soviet forces held the Sapun Ridge and could observe German movements. On occasion they could deliver effective counter battery fire. Between the 21–28 June, the Germans lost 10 artillery pieces, including five 150 mm s. FH 18 medium howitzers. In the centre, the Romanians took up the slack. The 18th Infantry, 1st, and 4th Mountain Divisions, supported by 100 guns, gradually advanced up the Chernaya River towards the mouth of the river and Severnaya Bay. With support from LIV Corps on its left, the Axis captured all the Soviet defensive lines east of the Chernaya River.

The Luftwaffe had contributed 4,700 sorties in seven days up until 26 June. They dropped 3,984 tons of bombs. The daily average sorties had decreased 15 percent from the week before and 10 percent the week before that. The increasing operational readiness (49.8 to 64.5 percent) revealed the severity of bomb and fuel shortages. Von Wild, despite the withdrawal of some Geschwader for Operation Blue, did succeed in bringing in much needed reinforcements to bring the strength levels up to a standard not seen since the start of the offensive. The Luftwaffe continued the intense bombardment. On 26 June, its attacks supporting XXX Corps, devastated Soviet defences on the Sapun Ridge. It was the last Soviet defensive line between the Axis and Sevastopol.

Fall of Sevastopol: 30 June – 4 July
Oktyabrsky and Petrov were flown out at the last moment. Major General Pyotr Georgyevich Novikov took command of the defense. On 30 June, LIV Corps launched a heavy assault, supported by heavy Luftwaffe bombardment and several dozen guns. Heavy fighting took place for the next three days, but it was becoming clear that the Red Army could not hold their increasingly untenable positions for more than a day, at most. On 3 July, the last line of Soviet defense was breached. The following day, the last of the Soviet defenses were overrun and all organised resistance collapsed. The few remaining Red Army units continued to put up scattered resistance to the south of the city, which lasted until 9 July.

The fall of Sevastopol was announced by a special radio communique: "Above the city and port flutter the German and Romanian flags. German and Romanian troops under the command of Colonel General von Manstein, steadfastly supported by Colonel General von Richthofen's battle-hardened air corps, after twenty-five days of fierce battle, have as of midday today, taken the most powerful land and sea fortress of all that have ever existed in the world."

Aftermath
The Germans claimed that over 90,000 Red Army soldiers had been taken prisoner, and a greater number killed. This claim appears to be overstated as, according to Soviet sources, the Soviet garrison defending Sevastopol totaled 106,000 men at the start of the siege plus 3,000 reinforcements during the attack. Further, it is known that 25,157 persons were evacuated, the overwhelming majority either wounded soldiers or officers evacuated on Stalin's orders.

Romania's contribution was honored when the Crimea Shield in gold was first bestowed upon Marshal Ion Antonescu on 3 July 1942. It was awarded to him in Bucharest by Manstein, on Hitler's behalf. The second and last Golden Krimschild was awarded to Manstein himself, on 24 November 1942.

From 2 June to 3 July 8 Air Corps had flown 23,751 sorties and dropped 20,528 tons of bombs. German artillery had fired a further 46,750 tons of munitions, with total Axis munitions consumption coming to 67,278 tons over the course of one month. The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed 611 motor vehicles, 123 aircraft of which 18 on the ground, 38 artillery pieces, 10 tanks, a locomotive and a flak barge. Further destroyed were 48 Soviet artillery batteries, 28 barracks and industrial buildings, 20 bunkers, 11 ammunition depots, 10 fuel depots, a bridge and an observation post. Hundreds more motor vehicles had been damaged along with 7 artillery pieces, 43 artillery batteries, 2 barracks and another bridge. German aerial attacks had sunk 10,800 tons of Soviet shipping including 4 destroyers, a submarine, 3 motor torpedo boats, 6 coastal vessels and 4 freighters. 12,000 tons of shipping were also damaged, with 2 destroyers, 10 coastal vessels and 2 freighters among the losses.

Although ultimately a German success, the operation took much longer than the Germans had expected. Operation Blau, Army Group South's advance toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus, was just beginning, and the German offensive did not have the 11th Army to support it. Instead, the German 6th Army under Paulus was without crucial support, ultimately contributing to its defeat.

title: Siege of Sevastopol (1941–1942)


text:
Talk:Bandidos Motorcycle Club

Support Clubs
I deleted the section on the "Los Perros" support club. I've never heard of them. That's not to say they don't exist. They might. I've lost track of all the support clubs out there. They are certainly not the largest or the oldest. Support clubs are an important part of the organization though. Perhaps there should be some words on them. They can be roughly divided into three groups, American, European, and Asian. I'm not sure how to handle this without it turning into a list. Thoughts? War (talk) 06:27, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

ive never heard of "Los Perros" either. There are so many support clubs out there, it would be way too many to list and probably somewhat impossible. One note that I would like to bring up though is the fact there are different types of support clubs. A true support club, or "farm" clubs as they are called around Dallas/Fort Worth, are clubs that have been created by the bandidos or a club seeked that status and won it from the bandidos. they usually operate out of the same club house, wear reverse colors, and have a huge circle support patch to indicate that "true" support club status. on the other hand, there are some clubs that are forced to support the bandidos or be disbanded. they are forced to wear a "citizens bar". its a rectangular patch that says "i support my local bandidos". sometimes there are clubs that ask to wear the citizens bar to stay neutral with the bandidos and some seek the support status but do not get it, so they are offered to wear the citizens bar. so i would have to say that there are some clubs that would be considered "supporters" by law enforcement but they are so because of intimidation or have a fear of being seen as rivals, so they wear a support patch. its another way for the 1%ers to enforce their will on other clubs and demand respect. other clubs want the approval because they believe in the bandidos cause. another last note is that many bikers that seek membership in the bandidos will often have to prospect with a support club first, do their time in that club and then prospect for the actual bandidos second. this way the bandidos can keep tabs on a person and at the same time keep them at a distance just in case they are law enforcement agents. if they do good in the support club after a year or two and they can be trusted, then they will be asked to prospect for the bandidos. thats why they are called "farm" clubs, kinda like the baseball term, many players will have to play minor league, before they hit the majors.65.68.204.184 (talk) 05:09, 11 November 2008 (UTC)j.crowson november 10 2008

Support Clubs are not "forced" to do anything.They are NOT "puppets" or "ducks". They are a voluntary level of participation in social events, ideologies, and lifestyle according to physical, financial and chronogical ability. They are "required" to do nothing, legal or illegal. Much of what is read in these things is little more than law enforcements' onesided lies and propaganda and needs to be viewed with that scepticism in mind. Always consider the source. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.89.112.54 (talk) 16:53, 11 April 2010 (UTC)
 * This is a very valid point and a nuance well worth making. I have been troubled by the use of the term "puppet" or "duck" in referring to these clubs. These terms tend to be used by law enforcement and media to refer to support clubs in general. I am quite sure they would be viewed as derogatory terms (not unlike the discussion around the use of the word "gang") to members of those clubs. An additional distinction needs to be made as well. Was the support club formed specifically to be a "buffer" between the alpha club and the activities of the support club, as in the case of the Rockers MC in Quebec? Or did the club exist long before becoming a support club of the larger club, as in the case of the Grim Reapers in Alberta (now HA)? It might be accurate, however derogatory, to refer to the Rockers as a "puppet club" since they were created for the express purpose of supporting the Hells Angels in Quebec, but it is very inaccurate to refer to a regional club that was independent for decades, that is (or was) allied with a larger club, as a "puppet club". Garth of the Forest (talk) 14:56, 4 September 2012 (UTC)

POV tag
My standard paste:

This concerns POV tag cleanup. Whenever an POV tag is placed, it is necessary to also post a message in the discussion section stating clearly why it is thought the article does not comply with POV guidelines, and suggestions for how to improve it. This permits discussion and consensus among editors. From WP tag policy: '''Drive-by tagging is strongly discouraged. The editor who adds the tag must address the issues on the talk page, pointing to specific issues that are actionable within the content policies, namely Wikipedia:Neutral point of view, Wikipedia:Verifiability, Wikipedia:No original research and Wikipedia:Biographies of living persons. Simply being of the opinion that a page is not neutral is not sufficient to justify the addition of the tag. Tags should be added as a last resort.''' Better yet, edit the topic yourself with the improvements. This statement is not a judgement of content, it is only a cleanup of frivolously and/or arbitrarily placed tags. No discussion, no tag.

I'm just passing through on tag cleanup, but I'm not going to remove it here. I will point out that the above quote is from the WP policy pages on neutrality. And I will also point out that if one actually READS those pages they will find that simply saying, "I dispute that" is not enough. You must state reasons and recommendations for improvement. This is not an opinion, it is WP policy. Merely saying you don't like it or disagree is NOT a "POV dispute". We agree to disagree, here. Better yet, edit the topic yourself with the improvements. Jjdon (talk) 19:32, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

Support Club minor update:

made slight change in wording to reflect correctly were the 'cookie' is worn on the colors. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xabachay (talk • contribs) 21:02, 7 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Also often called a 'bullseye'.War (talk) 07:44, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

 * I've readded the POV tag. *I* dispute the objectivity of this article, which clearly minimalizes the criminal nature (as well established by history as documented in the news media) of this "club". This is not a "fan" page, it is supposed to be an objective article about this -organization- which is clearly criminal in nature. There are several editors that seem to have bias and I suspect onflict of interestes due to personal relationships. It is inappropriate for people with such relationships to edit. The whole article is a mess, and nothing more than a Vanity Page for this so-called "club". It ***MUST*** be cleaned up. It is an insult to the "objectivity" of Wikipedia to have this kind of fanboi page for a biker gang. Sad. Very sad...

 * You must be more specific one what you object to. Your POV appears to be that the club in criminal in nature and the it's "obvious". I think an objective view is to look at the thousands of members with no records versus the relatively small number of multi-member criminal convictions. It paints a pretty clear picture. The vast majority of criminal activity is from people acting alone. This is no different than the bad cops in law enforcement, the pedafile priests in the Catholic church, or the steady stream of gov't curruption scandals. It's easy to be jaded and think that it represent the state of the whole. War (talk) 08:32, 10 July 2008 (UTC)
 * "Thousands of members with no records versus the relatively small number of multi-member criminal convictions"? Can you back that up with references? Sources? The sources I've provided seem to disagree. Proxy User (talk) 21:18, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

yep. it's just math. find as many references as you like, then subtract the number of members law enforcement claims there are. There you go. If you like you can look it up and learn about it here: Subtraction War (talk) 11:35, 27 January 2009 (UTC)
 * You're the one making the assertion. You can’t back it up with facts because it’s not true. Have a nice day. Proxy User (talk) 18:30, 29 January 2009 (UTC)

Club versus Gang
A couple of users (User:Proxy_User, User:War) are edit-warring about whether this is a gang or club. Please stop; instead, please discuss it here so we may reach a CONSENSUS on which it should be listed as. Tedder (talk) 19:41, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

 * I'd love to discuss it. However, there is already a discuss on this issue on Motorcycle club that pretty much handles this issue. (It is the link in question that is being editted anyway). I also think it's up to the person that wants to change a designation to justify that change. For example, if I change "Federal Bureu of Investigation" to "Federal Bozos Inc". I better have a good reason for doing so. It's up to the editor to justify the change...which Poxy User has not done. I consider his work here to be vandalism otherwise.War (talk) 19:54, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

 * You are talking about this discussion. Good point. So that is the consensus- club should not be changed to gang. I'm with you now. Tedder (talk) 22:35, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

 * No, there is not a consensus. I disagree. Established reliable and trusted sources classify the Bandidos as a gang. This is *NOT* to say all motorcycle clubs are more accurately described as "gangs", however *THIS* club (along with several others) meet all the qualifiers for a "gang". Thus it is inaccurate not to classify it as such here. This is not the Bandidos fan page or personal history page; they have their own web site for whatever POV they would like to distribute. Furthermore, I wonder if it's appropriate for users who have WP:CONFLICT to edit this article at all - though this is a secondary issue. Proxy User (talk) 08:45, 11 July 2008 (UTC)

 * I have no conflict of interest. The consensus I'm talking about was reached on the Motorcycle club discussion page (linked above). One disagreement doesn't change a consensus. Please stop reverting without providing a good reason. Tedder (talk) 11:57, 11 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Consensus reached with respect to some other article is irrelevant here. There is, here with respect to *THIS* article, no consensus. In any case, it's impossible dispute that this group fulfills a number of the necessary qualities  of a "gang" as discussed here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang. Do you dispute the Wikipedia article on gangs as well? Proxy User (talk) 15:29, 11 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Let me see if I have this right...you claim one article supports your POV but another should not be used against it. Wierd. Please get you argument straight.War (talk) 00:40, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

 * That the Bandidos are a gang is well accepted by everyone (including authorities on the subject) except Badidos associates and wanna-be's. You have a responsibility to disclose your conflict of interest. Which are you? Proxy User (talk) 06:23, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

 * I have no conflict of interest. I am not a member of any OMC, nor do I want to be, nor am any kind of associate. I have the benefit of many years of experiance is all. Years of experiance means meeting and getting to know many people on both side of the fence. I know Bandidos. I know Hell's Angels. I know Mongols. I know police officers. Knowing people gives a window into thier world, but I don't live in it. This is no different than my contribution to Titanium Alloys, which I also have many years experiance with. In short, I'm not interested in what "everyone knows" or what the gov't decided to call something. I make up my own mind based on the evidence. And so far you have provided virtually no argument for your point of view.

 * I think we're still waiting for you to provide a rational argument for your stance.War (talk) 06:46, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Comment I believe consensus is not reached when the discussion involves only three persons and that the ratio is 2:1.
 * Change to gang per Proxy User In any case, I would have to stand by Proxy User because he has provided five sources as evidence to his claim. To my understanding from Motorcycle club, Bandidos is regarded as a gang. Sorry if I get this wrong (I know nothing about motorcycle clubs/gangs/whatever), but people are inclined towards those who have solid proof(s) to their claims. With this said, it's 2 against 2 - once again, I'd like to emphasise that consensus is not reached. — Yurei - egg  tart  07:05, 12 July 2008 (UTC)
 * The fact is, it is also racist to suggest that while there are black and Hispanic gangs, there is no such thing as a motorcycle gang (predominantly white with notable exceptions). User War and his associates have suggested exactly this. Proxy User (talk) 14:58, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

 * The sources Proxy User provided are bogus. Try this: do a google search for "Bandidos Motorcycle Gang". You will get 3,310 hits. Now try "Bandidos Motorcycle Club". You will be get 9,730 hits. This suggests by a landslide that "Club" is the correct designation. I'm sure I could find in those nearly 10 thousand links a few that are just as relevant as the one's Proxy User found. He cherry picked to support is POV is all.War (talk) 06:54, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Oh and I completely agree that 2 out of 3 does not a concensus make. Furthur, I believe that that does not give the 1 any leverage to change what an organization calls itself. Exspecially when the change is pejorative.War (talk) 07:03, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Official reports from both the US and Canadian government are "bogus"? Numerous reports in the press are "bogus"? You've got an obvious POV that conflicts with the facts. As to what an organization calls itself, they can call themselves what ever they want, it doesn't make it any more true (certainly, they can call themselves whatever they want, but Wikipedia is about facts, not POV opinion). Also, with respect to a Google search, Google is the Wikipedia arbiter of fact? If Google says so, it's so? Maybe you should review Wikipedia standards for sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reliable_sources. Random Google linkies don't seem to be on the list, though official government documents and respected news sources do seem to qualify quite well...

 * It is not surprising that a criminal gang would like to avoid having such a label, the Italian Mafia used to insist they were harmless "social clubs". That the Bandidos dislike being known as a gang does not change the facts, and describing them as such is not pejorative when it is factual. The Bandidos have a known criminal history that is completely consistent and meets all the points of definition as a gang. Now, as to you, it is improper for a person with a conflict of interest to edit an article in the fashion that you have. You also need to consider your activities with this article with respect to WP:OWN. Proxy User (talk) 07:29, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Finally we are getting somewhere. Thank you for taking the time to explain your point of view. I think your main argument is that the feds call it a gang therefore it is a gang. Is this correct or did I miss something? Do you have any other evidence or is this it? War (talk) 08:43, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * Not so at all. "The Feds" (is that what they call them in Canada as well? The Canadians have your gang dialed in) certainly have a persuasive document. However, the free news press from around the world also describe the factual activities of your gang. Also, your edits, when taken in the context of the whole over the subject show clear bias to minimize the true nature of this group, and your bais connections to it. The fact is that news media and government sources tend to say the opposite of what you say. Wikipedia is not your soap box for your gang. This artical should be an honest and factual description of the Bandidos Motorcycle Club gang. Your POV bias edits stand in the way of that. Please review WP:OWN, WP:CONFLICT and WP:SOURCE. Proxy User (talk) 09:14, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * It's so incredible difficult to seperate your facts from your assumptions from your personal attacks. Please just present your evidence so everyone can make an informed decision. —Preceding unsigned comment added by War (talk • contribs) 10:11, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * I've read the report you cited earlier from the Canadian Gov't. Have you read it? Have you read the the previous reports? If you read them you'll see that they are mostly cut-n-paste copies of previous reports, time after time. They also make claims but don't back them up with evidence. Therefore I have a hard time taking them very seriously...and you should too.

 * As far as WP:OWN, WP:CONFLICT and WP:SOURCE goes. Sounds like the kettle is calling the pot black. All I've asked from the beginning is that you discuss your claims and that you cite your sources. That is bias?! Indeed it is. So far I'm still waiting for you to make you pov clear without the all the other pointless junk.War (talk) 10:20, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

You make an awful lot of demands, yet you are in no position to do so. I myself have no facts at all (that would be original research, wouldn't it?), but there are a number of reliable sources that classify the Bandidos as a gang, and you can find these as the sources I list for my edits. Now, once again, perhaps you need to more fully understand WP:OWN? And for as much as you protest, you provide no substantive argument in favor of your view. Neither do you show that there is any factual issue with my sources, your comments here constitute hyperventilating and foot stamping but lack anything that contradicts the content of the sources I have cited with actual facts and sources that contradict them in any meaningful way. Proxy User (talk) 11:14, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * As I already pointed out... most of the arguments the rebut you points are here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Motorcycle_club. I could cut-n-paste them but that seems like a waste of time and space. We're still waiting on you to support your point of view. BTW: when I say "argument" I mean argument. Not a personal attack.War (talk) 19:47, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

 * I can not change the general bias against reality shown in the article you mention (though in fact, the Mororcycle Gang section tends to support my edits), and at any rate it is irrelevant. The facts of this article stand on their own. I have provided absolutely acceptable sources that fill all the requirements of reliable, established, and legitimate sources for Wikipedia. Your "argument" (such that it is) is for an unsupported personal opinion.

 * As to your comment in the edit history "revert vandalism disguised as source material", that is clearly POV bullshit. My sources are both government reports and respected news organizations, source types that are extensivly accepted and used at Wikipedia, and they are not "disguised" as anyhting but what they are: valid sources for accurate information. It seems as though you would like to have it both ways: Follow the rules as far as references and sources, but only if they agree with your POV. How disingenuous. Proxy User (talk) 04:25, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Please stop reverting/undoing this article
User:Proxy User, User:War, I've added WP:3RR to both of your user talk pages. You have been fighting over this article for a long time now. Please do not revert the article further, even if it is changed by other editors. Leave it as it stands now and wait until a consensus is reached. This isn't a matter of POV, or ownership, or conflict of interest. It is simply an edit war at this point. Tedder (talk) 21:58, 13 July 2008 (ETC)
 * Reverting vandalism is perfectly legitimate, and well continue as necessary. Proxy User (talk) 04:16, 14 July 2008 (UTC)
 * According to the edit summaries, each of you is of the opinion that the other's edits are "vandalism". Odds are that, when this kind of situation arises, both such opinions are wrong.  I'd advise talking it out peacefully and agreeing what to do before going back to it.  A source of dubious or debatable quality is not "vandalism disguised as sources"; vandalism is useless edits like .  -- tiny plastic Grey Knight ⊖ 15:32, 18 July 2008 (UTC)
 * Official documents of two different governments and numerous well regarded news organizations are not "dubious". Such types of sources are used throughout Wikipedia. The argument that User:War is using is exactly the same argument that the Italian Mafia used for years. No criminal organization likes to be publicly shamed with accurate descriptions of their nature, because their nature is not honorable and the know it; it's embarrassing. None the less, the facts point to "Motorcycle Gang" as an accurate description of the Bandidos.

 * But I guess I disagree that removing sourced material and replacing it with unsourced POV is not vandalism. Ah well... Proxy User (talk) 21:25, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Gang / Club
I give up any objections to referring to the Bandidos as a club rather than the gang they are. While I have won that battle here, it is unlikly that I can push that view on to the other Motercycle Gang articles, and I concede there should be consistency. Also I would like to promote more good natured editing associated with my account. Therefore, if War wishes to revert my edit on this point, I have no objections. Proxy User (talk) 08:50, 30 August 2008 (UTC)

 * My position is that you won nothing...but that is beside the point. I'm taking my hands off this article for awhile. I want to see how it evolves. I want to see if anyone else steps up to keep it honest, balance, and unbiased. So please, someone else jump in and fix it. The most obvious error is the "gang" reference. Proxy User is right in that if it persists here then it must also be in place in other MC articles. Most other MCs have a much larger and broader history of crime activities so it's a bit backwards right now.War (talk) 17:16, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

 * Well, that being the case, I've had a change of mind, I'm very encouraged. I'm going to have to put together well sourced arguments for the other Motorcycle Gangs on my list. Thanks. Proxy User (talk) 17:24, 3 September 2008 (UTC)

Club membership
Please tell the average joe how to become a bandidos back in my home town there where pisterilos and they claimed they were full and couldn't take new members so would you please tell me how to become one —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.193.253.244 (talk) 17:12, 5 February 2009 (UTC)

Opinion of one group and THE FACTS of THE BANDIDOS MOTORCYCLE CLUB...
I am new to this, so I will keep this short and sweet.

I am confused to the fact that some one has filled in a description of THE BANDIDOS MOTORCYCLE CLUB and they have never even talked to a Bandido...How does that make sence??? You can not describe a quarter if you do not look at both sides of it. This goes with every organization in the world. I am sure if I wanted to do a DESCRIPTION and HISTORY of the POLICE, I could find more than enough article to suppor that they are all baby rapers and sex offenders. Think about that. Does that mean that the entire police department does this, NO. So why would you classify every Bandido under one name. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.248.202.142 (talk) 16:40, 13 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Hello. One of the foundations of Wikipedia is to cite sources. If you come across facts in Wikipedia that are wrong (or even facts that are right!), find some reliable sources, then change the information, listing your new sources. In general, though, the banditos are classified as a gang by the media. tedder (talk) 17:02, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

First off, TEDDER, you spell Bandidos with a "t". WRONG Please do not use the media as a source, for one thing, you have threee different types of media, Left Wing, Right Wing, and those that are totally controlled by the government. That just tells me that you are using a source that has it's own opinion. How is that right? okcdozer 18 March 2009  —Preceding undated comment added 15:24, 18 March 2009 (UTC).

That' sjust how Wikipedia works. We do not develop our own opinions, do not do original research, we aren't scientists, sociologists or journalists, and we aren't insiders with exclusive knowledge. We just present the official points of view and some important minority votes. If you want do see your very own "insider knowledge" here, write a good book or article that can be published by a serious editor and we will cite it.--JakobvS (talk) 23:22, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

Rivals?
The Bandidos MC is not rivals of the Outlaws MC or the Mongols MC. They have a very good realtionship with both and even consider the Outlaws MC to be a cousin club. They also co-own a bar in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma together. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.111.8.76 (talk) 18:36, 14 February 2009 (UTC)
 * That's fine, but we need reliable sources. tedder (talk) 20:27, 14 February 2009 (UTC)

Bandidos Mc has no "rivals." They have an open relationship with all "clubs." Please show where you have a "reliable source" that states that the Bandidos MC has any rivals. As for the Outlaws and Mongols, they have an open relationship with both of these clubs. Again, please show proof of anything different... And by the way "I am" a reliable source, because I have interacted with both of these clubs personally!!!!! okcdozer (okcdozer) 18 March 2009

 * Wikipedia requires reliable sources, which means they must be verifiable. Claiming expertise is not enough- see WP:COS. tedder (talk) 15:17, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

I Wikipedia "requires" a reliable sources, please show me in writing where the Bandidos have claimed these clubs as rivals... okcdozer (okcdozer)
 * The source need not be the Bandidos themselves. The reliable source can be someone / something else. Yes, yes, yes, I know, the Bandidos are just a misunderstood community organization that distributes toys to disadvantages children... At least that's the line User:War was pushing awhile back. Proxy User (talk) 17:09, 23 May 2009 (UTC)

 * Again, you are confused on your facts. Can we please have editors that know something about the articles they aggressively edit?? The Hells Angels are usually the ones the claim toy runs. So, no...I don't claim...and never have (get you facts right) that the Bandidos distribute toys. Misunderstood? Absolutely... in the same way ANY organization that is secretive is misunderstand. Keep up the good and not so good work. I'm enjoying the show.War (talk) 07:24, 24 May 2009 (UTC)

 * Well, the bottom line is that most reasonable and unbiased people understand that biker gangs in general, particularly those at or near the top of the pecking order, are criminal organizations. In any case, as you are associated with the Bandidos, perhaps instead of taking this section off-topic, you might expand on the subject of Bandidos "rivals". Above it was suggested that the Bandidos have no "rivals", though violence between the Bandidos and several other biker gangs is well documented, so I think in fact they do have "rivals". Proxy User (talk) 00:51, 26 May 2009 (UTC)

 * First off, I'm not associated with the Bandidos. But on the topic of "rivals"...that's a pretty complicated topic. The more I think about it the more it could probably make an entire article in itself. Rivalry between MC's in general has a long, and as you have pointed out, sorded history. Unfortunately, this is another topic for which references are difficult, if not impossible to obtain. Also, the relationships between MC's are constantly shifing and vary by region. For example, the Pagans MC and the Warlocks MC used to be "rivals" for the state of Florida. Are they today? Not really. Concerning Tedder's remarks. He is correct. But I think the term "rivals" misses the point completely. In the MC world there is are people the clubs consider to be friends ... and then there is everyone else. The Bandidos consider many clubs to be friends but that does not mean that everyone else is a rival.War (talk) 08:03, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
 * "Rivalries" between "notable" biker gangs such as the Bandidos and smaller "clubs" and between smaller "clubs" themselves amy shift, but the relationships between the Big Boys are for the most part known quantities. For example the Bandidos and the Angels (Interestingly, the Über Angels stay out of Texas because they know the Bandidos "own" texas and would beat their ass...). A discussion of the relationship between the Bandidos and the other notable "clubs" might be interesting indeed, and I don't see why a very abbreviated discussion should take more than a long paragraph (we need not cover all the little wanna-be / fanboy "clubs")
 * But I think the term "rivals" misses the point completely. In the MC world there is are people the clubs consider to be friends ... and then there is everyone else.
 * You're talking in semantics no one else is interested in. To most people, you have just described a "rivalry". I suppose I could do the research myself, if no one else is up to it... -//- Proxy User (talk) 04:36, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

s

Source Material
Interesting document here: http://cryptome.org/gangs/bandidos.pdf Might make good source material for this article. Proxy User (talk) 17:06, 23 May 2009 (UTC)

Secondary Colors Image
Is there some purpose in a second image of the Bandidos "colors" when one already exists in the Info Box? Proxy User (talk) 17:08, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

NOTE: This author IS SW Houston, Weslyn 1st generation BANDIDO M.C. 1966 Bandido Boo Tinney MOTHER’S MIRROR Ursula Major Spirit Knight

The Bandido RED and YELLOW is the CORAL SNAKE not the scarlet and gold of the United States Corps of Marines. Don Chambers was a merchant mariner. He was NEVER a marine!!!! He did NOT draw FREDDIE! He was on the other side of the bar. It was NOT a cantina! It was a shop front in a Mexican strip mall!!!! I WAS THERE!!! I am Mrs William James Tinney Jr. ie “Bear” Tinney,, the FIRST SW Houston El Presidente. We were in TEXAS when the federales killed Sunshine. Wikipedia has it WRONG!!!! Ask Donna Lee if you don’t believe me. I am the child Don Chambers HATED!!! I am the child who had no problem telling HIM to clean it up!!! He was bullying Sunshine being drunk and hateful. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Boo Tinney (talk • contribs) 15:56, 15 April 2022 (UTC)

Accuracy dispute
Oh Please get your History straight on the Bandidos.Don Chambers was never in the Veitnam War.The colors did not come from the marines.It was the coral snake.The Bandidos did not start in S.A. Texas or San Leon,Texas It was in Houston.San Leon is were he went to a musem to study the Mexican Bandidos. He was the founder of this club March 4th 1966. And in the begining bandidos were spelled with a T he changed it when the FriTo lays came out with the little Bandito on the easer in the Frito packages.I know this because I'm his Daughter Donna Chambers

I just finshed setting his Headstone of what he wanted after 10years of pure hell from this club Gee the one he created which not be here if not for my Father. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.142.166.20 (talk) 17:09, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Can you share verifiable sources for this? It's important to understand that Wikipeida will only reflect what reliable and veritable sources say, regardless of what you know to be true.  It might be helpful to read WP:Truth to understand that Wikipedia is not the place to look for "truth" about anything.  That's not what Wikipedia is about.  See also WP:5 for a more general explanation of what Wikipedia does.  If you still feel this article is causing harm, please read Contact us/Article problem/Factual error (from subject) and also Biographies of living persons/Help.  From what I can tell, the the accuracy of the facts about how the Bandidtos were founded or where the colors came from is not going to damage any living people; they are just historical facts which natrually are subject to debate.  If you disagree and feel someone is being harmed, please explain.  Thanks!--Dbratland (talk) 17:43, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Donna is CORRECT!!! Don Chambers was NOT a marine. LINDSEY was the boonie rat!!! NOT DON!!! It WAS Houston!! NOT San Leon!!! My husband was William Tinney “Bear” Tinney SW Houston 1st generation. Donna has every right to disagree with incorrect statements being made about her FATHER. Falsehood harms HER AND HER FAMILY. Falsehood about the Bandidos harms ME! It is US the falsehoods are ABOUT!!! I AM A VERIFIABLE SOURCE! I was THERE! SO WAS HIS DAUGHTER DONNA LEE CHAMBERS!! Oh! IS DON’S OWN CHILD A VERIFIABLE SOURCE!!!???? Or Will Tinney’s WIFE??? The historical FACTS are FACTS and are NOT subject to DEBATE! The people who were actually present at the time KNOW what happened! Donna WAS there and so was I! I absolutely verify everything she has said about her own father and the birth of the nation.Don did NOT draw FREDDIE! Freddie has NOTHING to do with the frito bandido. Boo Tinney (talk) 16:19, 15 April 2022 (UTC)

having lived in the clearlake area san leon(20) yrs I knew alot of the old guard most of whom are gone like don johnny (JJ) jefferson An d i can tell you for a fact on his wall till his death in the mid 90s JJ had an ORIGINAL CHarter signed by 13 members includiong don jj shorty echols (who i believe may still live in deer park the date on the charter (hand written) was aug 15 1964 I would bet his widow pam ar pat I dont remember after peggy died who he married but i lived with jj for quite awhile and my wife took care Home nursed peggy until she died

and you get yours straight eye witness having lived in the clearlake area san leon(20) yrs I knew alot of the old guard most of whom are gone like don johnny (JJ) jefferson An d i can tell you for a fact on his wall till his death in the mid 90s JJ had an ORIGINAL CHarter signed by 13 members includiong don jj shorty echols (who i believe may still live in deer park the date on the charter (hand written) was aug 15 1964 I would bet his widow pam ar pat I dont remember after peggy died who he married but i lived with jj for quite awhile and my wife took care Home nursed peggy until she died — Preceding unsigned comment added by Musicbyd (talk • contribs) 22:49, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

Could be true or not, is not reliable. You understand that? And others as well: if you have insider knowledge, don't take it to Wikipedia, take it to a publisher, then some day Wikipedia will cite it.--JakobvS (talk) 23:29, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

Asians
According to this: http://www.bandidosmc.dk/ there is a "Probationary Chapter" in Thailand, thus one assumes that Asians can become Bandidos. Indeed, there are numerous photos at that site of Asians wearing Bandido colors. This being so, I've added "Asian" to the "Ethnic Profile" in the side box. =//= Proxy User (talk) 21:38, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Houston, Texas
The Bandidos Motorcycle Club was founded on March 4, 1966 in Houston, Texas... Not San Leon, Texas... San Leon is the town, where he went to study mexican bandidos... By the way, bandidos was also spelled with a T, then in 1968 he changed it, when the Frito Bandito was came out. Get your history straight. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.54.188.10 (talk) 21:12, 17 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Do you have reliable sources indicating this? tedder (talk) 21:49, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

According to his daughter is true. Reliable sources is hard to find. And please change the Donald Eugene Chambers site, he was born November 23, 1930 in Houston. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.54.188.10 (talk) 22:47, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

 * Please read Verifiability.--Dbratland (talk) 23:06, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Splitting of Bandidos MC
Does anyone know something about the splitting of Bandidos MC into 'Western Hemisphere' (North- and Southamerica) and 'Eastern Hemisphere' (Europe and Australia)? 95.223.197.175 (talk) 16:11, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

History: Redundant and out of place website reference
At the end of the HISTORY section there is what appears to be either a reference or an unneeded and redundant reference to the Banditos motorcycle website. If this was an attempt to reference, it was done quite poorly and needs to be fixed. For the time being I will leave it, but will make it a comment. Satanhhh (talk) 19:13, 19 June 2017 (UTC)

Steel Heels
My friend reports there's a off-shoot organization for women called Steel Heels. Can this be verified and included? Technophant (talk) 20:16, 28 May 2023 (UTC)

The big boss of the bendtotes that started up in New South Wales had a plan only one person now his plan he's best man chose to be a CEO of the comancheros....... It was only a group of 20 men and none of years were part of it I mean you don't even have the correct spelling. Ban did os 58.111.113.225 (talk) 21:36, 5 June 2024 (UTC)

Hi Jason Peter Van uden 303 killer road Doonside NSW Australia.... When I first got the big bosses belt I didn't know until a couple of comenchros bowed down to me and gave me filthy daily look I disappeared out of the area into 2015........??? In 2017 NOK at droo... To split the belt up ...both winter.. aok 58.111.113.225 (talk) 22:26, 5 June 2024 (UTC)

The Bendhtote... Bigg boss came up to me in front of my mum's house sat next to me and said I'm sorry I couldn't give it to them and I'm sorry it took so long to give it to you I've got old there's not much I could do they're not the same as they used to be it's your belt now you can do whatever you what accept I said yes he sant next to me for 10 minutes jump on a bus and I never seen him again? 58.111.113.225 (talk) 22:31, 5 June 2024 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Bandidos Motorcycle Club


text: Category:1860s books

title: Category:1860s books


text:
Truls Mørk

Truls Olaf Otterbech Mørk (born 25 April 1961) is a Norwegian cellist.

Biography
Mørk was born in Bergen, Norway to a cellist father, John Fritjof Mørk, and a pianist mother, Turid Otterbech. His mother began teaching him the piano when he was seven. Mørk also played the violin, but soon switched to the cello, taking lessons from his father.

Mørk began his studies with Frans Helmerson at 17 at Edsberg Music Institute. An admirer of Mstislav Rostropovich and the Russian school of cello, Mørk went on to study with the Russian cellist Natalia Shakhovskaya.

In 1982, Mørk became the first Scandinavian musician to reach the finals of the Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow since Arto Noras in 1966, and won the sixth prize. He subsequently went on to win second prize at the 1986 Naumburg Competition in New York City and, in 1986, the Cassado Cello Competition in Florence. In 1989, he embarked on his first major concert tour, soloing with many of the finest orchestras of Europe. In 1994, he toured the United States with the Oslo Philharmonic, including debuts at Carnegie Hall and the Kennedy Center.

Mørk's discography includes an award-winning recordings of the Shostakovich Cello Concertos and of Bach's Suites for Solo Cello. He has recorded for such labels as Virgin Classics and harmonia mundi. Mørk's interest in chamber music led to the foundation of the International Chamber Music Festival of Stavanger.

In April 2009, Mørk experienced an infection of the central nervous system, presumably caused by a tick bite he received in the United States in 2006, with subsequent encephalitis, and paralysis in the shoulder muscles of the left arm. In the autumn of 2009, he expressed concern that he might never be able to perform again. After 18 months away from concert activity, during which time he was awarded the 2010 Sibelius Prize, Mørk resumed his career.

Mørk holds a Professorship at the Norwegian Academy of Music, Oslo. For more than 30 years, he performed on a rare Domenico Montagnana cello (Venice, 1723), whose scroll was made by Stradivarius. Norway's SR-Bank purchased the cello, and loaned it to him. The instrument was recently bought by the Dkfm. Angelika Prokopp Privatstiftung, which now loans it to cellist Harriet Krijgh.

Honors

 * 1991: Spellemannprisen in the category Chamber music, together with Håkon Austbø for the album Verker av Franck, Chausson, Debussy, Poulenc
 * 1992: Spellemannprisen in the category Orchestral music for the album Joseph Haydn: Cello concerts, with Det Norske Kammerorkester cond Iona Brown
 * 1993: Spellemannprisen in the category Orchestral music for the album Dvorák; Cello-konsert/Tsjaikovskij: Rokokko-variasjoner, with Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra cond. Mariss Jansons
 * 1995: Spellemannprisen in the category Orchestral music for the album Sjostakovitsj: Cello Concerts, with London Philharmonic Orchestra cond. Mariss Jansons
 * 1999: Spellemannprisen in the category Classical music, for the album Elgar: Cello Concert and Britten: Cello Symphony

Soloist

 * 1987: Truls Otterbech Mørk, Arne Nordheim, George Crumb, Ingvar Lidholm, Zoltan Kodaly (Simax Classics)
 * 1992: Joseph Haydn:Cello Concertos (Simax Classics), with The Norwegian Chamber Orchestra cond. Iona Brown
 * 1993: Dvořák: Cello Concerto (Virgin Classics), with Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra cond. Mariss Jansons
 * 1994: Grieg Cello Sonata / Sibelius Malingonia (Virgin Classics), with Jean-Yves Thibaudet
 * 1995: Dmitri Shostakovich:Cello Concertos 1 & 2 (Virgin Classics), with The London Philharmonic Orchestra cond. Mariss Jansons
 * 1996: Rachmaninov, Miaskovsky: Cello Sonatas (Virgin Classics), with Jean-Yves Thibaudet
 * 1999: Elgar, Britten: Cello Concerto / Cello Symphony (Virgin Classics), with the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra cond. Sir Simon Rattle
 * 2000: Benjamin Britten: Cellos Suites 1-3 (Virgin Classics)
 * 2000: Harald Sæverud: Cello Concerto • Symphony No. 8, "Minnesota" (BIS Records), with Stavanger Symphony Orchestra cond. Ole Kristian Ruud
 * 2001: Aaron Jay Kernis: Colored Field / Musica Celestis / Air (Virgin Classics), with Minnesota Orchestra cond. Eiji Oue
 * 2002: Grieg: Cello Sonata / String Quartet (Edvard Grieg Museum, Virgin Classics)
 * 2002: Henri Dutilleux: Tout Un Monde Lointain... / L'Arbre Des Songes / 3 Strophes Sur Le Nom De Sacher (Virgin Classics), with Renaud Capuçon and the Orchestre Philharmonique de Radio France cond. Myung-Whun Chung
 * 2004: Arvo Pärt: Pro & Contra (Virgin Classics), with the Estonian National Symphony Orchestra cond. Paavo Järvi
 * 2005: Johann Sebastian Bach: Cello Suites (Virgin Classics)
 * 2006: Reflection (Deutsche Grammophon), with Hélène Grimaud, Anne Sofie Von Otter and Staatskapelle Dresden cond. Esa-Pekka Salonen
 * 2007: Matthias Pintscher: En Sourdine (Kairos Records), with Frank Peter Zimmermann, Christophe Desjardins, Ensemble Intercontemporain, NDR Sinfonieorchester, Matthias Pintscher
 * 2007: Vadim Repin, Brahms: Violin Concerto - Double Concerto (Deutsche Grammophon), with Vadim Repin and the Gewandhausorchester cond. Riccardo Chailly
 * 2009: Haflidi Hallgrímsson: Cello Concerto / Herma (Ondine Records), with the Scottish Chamber Orchestra cond. John Storgårds
 * 2012: Einojuhani Rautavaara: Modificata / Incantations (Percussion Concerto) / Towards The Horizon (Cello Concerto No. 2) (Ondine Classics), with Colin Currie, Truls Mørk and the Helsinki Philharmonic Orchestra cond. John Storgårds
 * 2016: Camille Saint-Saëns : Cello Concertos Nos 1 and 2, Africa, Caprice-Valse "Wedding-cake", Hélène Mercier, piano, Louis Lortie, piano, Bergen Philharmonic Orchestra, dir. Neeme Järvi, (SACD Chandos)

Compilations

 * 1993: Movements (Statoil), with Leif Ove Andsnes, Ole Edvard Antonsen, Marianne Thorsen
 * 1995: Andsnes, Antonsen, Mørk (EMI Classics)
 * 2004: Cello Concertos (Virgin Classics), 5xCD
 * 2005: Haydn: Violin Concertos • Cello Concertos (Virgin Classics), 2xCD
 * 2006: Chostakovitch: Cello Concertos (EMI Classics), 5xCD
 * 2013:  Truls Mørk - Greatest Cello Concertos (Erato\Warner Classics), 9XCD

title: Truls Mørk


text: Category:1850s books

title: Category:1850s books


text: Category:1840s books

title: Category:1840s books


text: User talk:163.153.184.226

title: User talk:163.153.184.226


text: Category:1830s books

title: Category:1830s books