text:
Maritime Mobile Service Identity

A Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) is effectively a maritime object's international maritime telephone number, a temporarily assigned UID issued by that object's current flag state (unlike an IMO number, which is a permanent global UID).

An MMSI comprises a series of nine digits, consisting of three Maritime Identification Digits (country-codes), concatenated with a specific identifier. Whenever an object is re-flagged, a new MMSI must be assigned.

A "maritime object" could be anything that requests an MMSI identifier.—e.g., a vessel, fixed offshore installation, mobile unit, maritime aircraft, coast station, etc. Communications may be routed to "individual objects", or to "groups of objects". A group call to objects can be based on an object's locale, owner/operator/fleet, type, etc. or combinations thereof.

MMSI are formed in such a way that the identity or part thereof can be used by telephone and telex subscribers connected to the general telecommunications network to call any of these objects automatically. Communications are sent in digital form over a radio frequency channel.

Types
As of 2024, there are six kinds of maritime mobile service identities:
 * Ship station identities
 * Group ship station identities
 * Coast station identities
 * Group coast station identities
 * SAR aircraft
 * Navigational aids and craft associated with a parent ship

Maritime identification digits (MID)
An MID consists of three digits, always starting with a number from 2 to 7 (assigned regionally). A second MID can be assigned once the first or subsequently allocated MID is more than 80% exhausted, and the rate of assignments is such that 90% exhaustion is foreseen. A listing of MIDs assigned to each country can be found in Table 1 of ITU Radio Regulations Appendix 43.

The first digit of an MMSI
The initial digits of an MMSI categorize the identity, as defined in by Recommendation M.585. The meaning of the first digit is:

 * 0 Ship group, coast station, or group of coast stations
 * 1 For use by SAR aircraft (111MIDaxx)
 * 2-7 MMSI's used by individual ships, beginning with an MID:
 * 2 Europe (e.g., Italy has MID 247; Denmark has MIDs 219 and 220)
 * 3 North and Central America and Caribbean (e.g., Canada, 316; Greenland, 331; Panama, 351 through 357, plus 370 through 373; United States, 303(Alaska), 338(domestic), plus 366 through 369)
 * 4 Asia (not the southeast) (e.g., PRC, 412, 413, and 414; Maldives, 455; Japan, 431)
 * 5 Oceania (Australia, 503; New Zealand, 512), and Southeast Asia (Philippines, 548; Indonesia, 525)
 * 6 Africa (Eritrea, 625)
 * 7 South America (Peru, 760)
 * 8 Handheld VHF transceiver with DSC and GNSS
 * 9 Devices using a free-form number identity:
 * Search and Rescue Transponders (970yyzzzz)
 * Man overboard DSC and/or AIS devices (972yyzzzz)
 * 406 MHz EPIRBs fitted with an AIS transmitter (974yyzzzz)
 * craft associated with a parent ship (98MIDxxxx)
 * navigational aids (AtoNs; 99MIDaxxx)

 * Notes

Ship station identities
The 9-digit code constituting a ship station identity is formed as follows:

 * MIDxxxxxx

where MID represent the Maritime Identification Digits and X is any figure from 0 to 9. If the ship is fitted with an Inmarsat B, C or M ship earth station, or it is expected to be so equipped in the foreseeable future, then the identity should have three trailing zeros:

 * MIDxxx000

If the ship is fitted with an Inmarsat C ship earth station, or it is expected to be so equipped in the foreseeable future, then the identity could have one trailing zero:

 * MIDxxxxx0

If the ship is fitted with an Inmarsat A ship earth station, or has satellite equipment other than Inmarsat, then the identity needs no trailing zero.

Group ship station call identities
Group ship station call identities for calling simultaneously more than one ship are formed as follows:

 * 0MIDxxxxx

where the first figure is zero, and X is any figure from 0 to 9. The particular MID represents only the country assigning the group ship station call identity and so does not prevent group calls to fleets containing more than one ship nationality.

Coast station identities
Coast station identities are formed as follows:

 * 00MIDxxxx

where the first two figures are zeros, and X is any figure from 0 to 9. The MID reflects the country in which the coast station or coast earth station is located.

Group coast station call identities
Group coast station call identities for calling simultaneously more than one coast station have the same format as individual coast station IDs: two leading zeros, the MID, and the four digits. They are formed as a subset of coast station identities, as follows:

 * 00MID0000 for any coast station using the MID
 * 009990000 for any VHF coast station (regardless of MID)

US Coast Guard stations use a non-standard MMSI: 003669999 - any US Coast Guard Base station Note that administrations in other countries may use different formats.

Reference: ITU-R Recommendations M.585-7

Search and Rescue Transmitter
AIS Search and Rescue Transmitters (AIS-SART) have an identifier related to the manufacturer, rather than a country's MID:

 * 970YYxxxx

The digitals represented by the two Y characters are assigned by the International Association for Marine Electronics Companies and refer to the SART manufacturer, while the Xs are sequential digits assigned by the manufacturer identifying the SART.

Federal US MMSIs
In the United States (one of whose MIDs is 366), federal MMSIs are assigned by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and are normally (but not always) formed as 3669xxxxx. Non-federal MMSIs are assigned by the Federal Communications Commission normally as part of the ship station license application and are formed as 366xxx000 for ships on international voyages and ships needing an Inmarsat mobile earth station, or 366xxxxx0 for all other ships.

The United States Coast Guard group ship station call identity is 036699999, and the group coast station call identity is 003669999.

In the U.S., MMSIs are primarily used for digital selective calling and for assigning Inmarsat identities.

Exhaustion of MMSIs
Because all ships on international voyages, as well as all ships fitted with an Inmarsat B or M ship earth station, are assigned MMSIs of the format MIDxxx000, a serious problem has arisen internationally in assigning sufficient numbers of MIDs to all administrations that need them. For example, a country having 10,000 Inmarsat-equipped ships would require 10 MIDs just to accommodate those 10,000 ships. If 50,000 boaters decided to fit small Inmarsat M terminals, 50 additional MIDs would be required to accommodate them.

The problem exists with Inmarsat-equipped ships because ITU-T recommendations require that Inmarsat ship earth stations be assigned the identity (MESIN) TMIDxxxYY, where T indicates the type of Inmarsat station, YY indicates the Inmarsat station extension (e.g."00" might indicate a telephone in the bridge, "01" might indicate a fax machine in the radio room, etc.), and MIDxxx indicates the ship station number, which relates to the assigned ship station identity MIDxxx000.

The MMSI was meant to be an all-inclusive ship electronic identity, used in one form or another by every GMDSS or telecommunications instrument on the ship. Questions have been raised, however, whether the MMSI can in practice totally fulfill that role. ITU may eventually end the practice of relating Inmarsat MESIN identities with the ship MMSI identity.

To help mitigate against MMSI number exhaustion, manufacturers are required to cripple DSC-capable radios so that an MMSI number can only be entered once, which means that a device owner cannot move the radio from one boat to another. This is especially egregious for hand-held VHF devices, for which a single MMSI number makes little sense.

The World Radio Conference, Geneva, 1997 (WRC-97), adopted Resolution 344 concerning the exhaustion of the maritime mobile service identity resource. In view of improvements to public switched telephone networks, and new capabilities of the Inmarsat system other than Inmarsat B or M, previous restrictions should no longer be applicable. All nine digits of the MMSI can be used in such cases, and no longer need to end in trailing zeros.

title: Maritime Mobile Service Identity


text:
Albert Johanneson

Albert Louis Johanneson (13 March 1940 – 28 September 1995) was a South African professional footballer who was one of the first high-profile black men, of any nationality, to play top-flight football in England. He is recognised as being the first person of African heritage to play in the FA Cup final, in 1965 for Leeds United.

Career
Johanneson, a skilful and swift left winger, was recommended to Leeds United by a South African schoolteacher and joined the club in April 1961. He stayed there for nine years working diligently at his game, and by the 1963–64 season had established himself as a powerful attacking force providing 13 league goals, which assisted in Leeds' promotion from the Second Division.

In 1965, Johanneson earned his berth in the Leeds team at the Football Association Challenge Cup (F.A Cup) Final played at Wembley Stadium. While Leeds lost the match to Liverpool, and Johanneson regrettably did not play his best, he made history by becoming the first black person to feature in the final of the world-renowned football competition.

Over following seasons, a spate of injuries and the emergence of Eddie Gray left Johanneson on the sidelines, and he made only 10 further starts for Leeds before manager Don Revie released him in 1970. Later that year, Johanneson joined York City, scoring three goals in 26 appearances before retiring.

Life after football did not treat the South African well, and he became somewhat of a recluse, painfully suffering from a severe addiction to alcohol. Johanneson died alone of meningitis and heart failure in 1995. He is remembered fondly by Leeds' fans of the 1960s for using his distinctive natural prowess to illuminate Elland Road.

Personal life and legacy
In 1963 Johanneson married Norma Comrie, a pharmacist originally from Jamaica. Together they had two children: Yvonne and Alicia. The couple's marriage lasted 11 years, ending in divorce. Albert was dogged by problems with alcohol and ill health before his death in 1995. His body lay undiscovered for a week in his flat in Gledhow Towers, North Leeds. Albert's nephew Carl Johanneson is a former Leeds super featherweight boxer.

In January 2019 Leeds United and Leeds Civic Trust unveiled a blue plaque commemorating Johanneson, his contribution to football and the city of Leeds. The ceremony was attended by Johanneson's family and ex Leeds United footballer Brian Deane.

In late 2020 a picture of Johanneson was erected on the side of a building in Leeds, featuring himself beside Kalvin Phillips and Lucas Radebe.

Johanneson in popular culture
Today, Johanneson is hailed by many as having helped pave the way for the scores of black players that make up the ranks of the English Premiership, especially those with South African roots.

He is also viewed as a courageous pioneer with regard to the racial discrimination he humbly endured from spectators who hurled monkey chants and bananas at him from the sidelines. In the words of footballing legend, George Best within whose era he played: "Albert was quite a brave man to actually go on the pitch in the first place, wasn't he? And he went out and did it. He had a lot of skill. A nice man as well ... which is, I suppose, the more important thing, isn't it? More important than anything."

Johanneson features in several chapters of Kester Aspden's book The Hounding of David Oluwale, about Nigerian immigrant David Oluwale, who lived in Leeds for 20 years during the 50s and 60s. Writes Leeds United bibliographer Sam Gibbard: "Aspden details in several chapters Albert Johanneson and his experiences playing for Leeds United, drawing parallels between the two men, two of just 450 black men living in Leeds during the early 1960s. At the start, their lives couldn’t have been more different, and yet both men’s lives ended tragically and needlessly early".

Johanneson is currently featured in the Out of Africa Campaign, a UK Heritage Lottery-funded, multimedia project and touring exhibition focused on the contributions of footballers from Africa who have made a substantial contribution to transforming professional football in Britain.

In 2010, Johanneson was featured in an exhibition examining the history of South African footballers in the United Kingdom as part of the FIFA World Cup celebrations that took place in South Africa. The exhibit was researched by the Sheffield-based Football Unites, Racism Divides organisation and was hosted by the historic District Six Museum in Cape Town.

In 2015, FURD and the District Six Museum and illustrator Archie Birch, from Cape Town, have joined forces to tell Albert's inspirational, yet sadly poignant story in comic book form: Albert Johanneson: the First Black Superstar.

Honours
Leeds United
 * FA Cup runner-up: 1964–65

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Albert Johanneson


text:
User:Anthony/QingPL 2.0 (draft)

QING PUBLIC LICENCE

Copying, distribution, public performance, public display, digital audio transmission, and use of this work is permitted without restriction. Circumvention of any technological measure or measures which effectively control access to this work is permitted without restriction. Preparation of derivative works is permitted provided that you cause any such work to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License.

Notwithstanding any restrictions on the preparation of derivative works, you may aggregate this work with another work or works not released under the QingPL provided that a visible border surrounds those parts released under the QingPL and that the text "This work is released under the QingPL" appears prominently within that border at either the top or the bottom.

title: User:Anthony/QingPL 2.0 (draft)


text:
BMW M41

The BMW M41 was a straight-4 turbocharged indirect injection diesel engine produced from 1994 through 2000.

M41D17
The M41 engine was the first four-cylinder diesel engine from BMW.

The engine was derived from the six-cylinder BMW M51 engine and shared 86% of its components.

This engine became available in several models of the E36:

 * 4-door sedan
 * 5-door touring
 * 3-door compact

Fuel consumption is around 6.5 L/100 km in combined use (EUR) in the 318tds 4-door sedan version.

Applications:
 * 1994-2000 E36 318tds

title: BMW M41


text:
Albert Lewin

Albert Lewin (September 23, 1894 – May 9, 1968) was an American film director, producer, and screenwriter.

Personal life
Lewin was born in Brooklyn, New York and raised in Newark, New Jersey. He earned a master's degree at Harvard and taught English at the University of Missouri. During World War I, he served in the military and was afterwards appointed assistant national director of the American Jewish Relief Committee. He later became a drama and film critic for the Jewish Tribune until the early 1920s, when he went to Hollywood to become a reader for Samuel Goldwyn. Later he worked as a script clerk for directors King Vidor and Victor Sjöström before becoming a screenwriter at MGM in 1924.

Lewin was appointed head of the studio's script department and by the late 1920s was Irving Thalberg's personal assistant and closest associate. Nominally credited as an associate producer, he produced several of MGM's most important films of the 1930s. After Thalberg's death, he joined Paramount as a producer in 1937, where he remained until 1941. Notable producing credits during this period include True Confession (1937), Spawn of the North (1938), Zaza (1939) and So Ends Our Night (1941).

In 1942, Lewin began to direct. He made six films, writing all of them and producing several himself. As a director and writer, he showed literary and cultural aspirations in the selection and treatment of his themes. He was the best friend of actress Devi Dja and cast her in three of his movies but failed to get her a leading role in The Moon and Sixpence (1942). In 1966, Lewin published a novel, The Unaltered Cat.

Films
As director:
 * The Moon and Sixpence (1942)
 * The Picture of Dorian Gray (1945)
 * The Private Affairs of Bel Ami (1947)
 * Pandora and the Flying Dutchman (1951)
 * Saadia (1953)
 * The Living Idol (1957)

As screenwriter:
 * The Fate of a Flirt (1925)
 * Spring Fever (1927)

title: Albert Lewin


text:
Kaminia, Achaea

Kaminia (Καμίνια) is a village in Achaea, Greece. It is part of the municipal unit of Vrachnaiika. Kaminia is situated on the Ionian Sea coast, 15 km southwest of Patras, and 6 km east of Kato Achaia. Since the 1980s, the village is bypassed by Greek National Road 9 (Patras - Pyrgos - Kyparissia). Kaminia had a small train station on the currently unexploited Patras–Pyrgos railway.

title: Kaminia, Achaea


text:
K. C. Irving Regional Centre

The K.C. Irving Regional Centre (Centre Régional K.C. Irving) is an indoor arena located in Bathurst, New Brunswick. The arena is home to the Acadie–Bathurst Titan, a hockey team of the QMJHL. It was named in honour of businessman K. C. Irving. Opened in September 1996 and built at a cost of $21 million, it is the largest arena in north-eastern New Brunswick.

There are 3,162 seats for a total capacity of 3,524 at the hockey games. For entertainment, the capacity may be expanded to 4,400. Around the rink there are 24 private boxes. The arena has two ice rinks: "The Eddy Rink" where the Acadie-Bathurst Titan play their home games on also where the seating capacity is located, and "The Richelieu" rink which is the home of The Bathurst High School Phantoms Boys and Girls hockey teams and is hosts to many minor hockey, figure skating and other events with a smaller seating area. The centre also has many canteens and a walking track as well as an Acadie-Bathurst Titan gift shop and the offices of the Acadie-Bathurst Titan management and the City Of Bathurst Parks, Recreation and Tourism Department. The operations of the centre are run by the City Of Bathurst and their union workers from CUPE Locals 550 (Outside Workers) and CUPE Local 4632 Kc Irving Event staff and Security

Banners
President's Cup (including President's Cup of the club when the franchise was operating at Laval)
 * 1983-84
 * 1988-89
 * 1989-90
 * 1992-93
 * 1998-99
 * 2017-18

" Hardy Cup" ""(Won by the 1972 Bathurst Alpine Papermakers) at the former Bathurst Arena also known as "The Barn" The Hardy Cup, was the Canadian national Intermediate "A" ice hockey championship from 1967 until 1984. From 1985 until 1990, the Hardy Cup was the Canadian national senior championship for Senior "AA" after senior and intermediate hockey were merged by the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association. The trophy was retired to the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1990.
 * Note

Retired numbers (including players of the club when the franchise was operating at Laval)
 * 10 - Claude Lapointe
 * 17 - Mike Bossy
 * 19 - Neil Carnes
 * 21 - Vincent Damphousse
 * 22 - Martin Lapointe
 * 30 - Gino Odjick
 * 37 - Patrice Bergeron *First Retired jersey from The Acadie Bathurst Titan since relocating from Laval PQ
 * 66 - Mario Lemieux
 *  1  - Roberto Luongo* Second retired jersey from The Acadie Bathurst Titan since relocating from Laval PQ

title: K. C. Irving Regional Centre


text: File:West Province - Bamileke Dwelling.jpg


text:
Talk:Muzak

Merged from Elevator music
Elevator music has been merged to Muzak per WP:OVERLAP - overlap, context, and duplicate - the two articles work better together, otherwise Elevator music fails  WP:DICDEF. The section is at Muzak, and will need editing to reduce duplication.  SilkTork  ✔Tea time  12:02, 15 November 2016 (UTC)

Trademark Status
The statement "The word Muzak has been a registered trademark since December 21, 1954 of Muzak LLC,[4]" is supported by a dead link. The WIPO Global brand database shows a TM registration in Germany in 1965, now inactive, but nothing earlier. Only a French TM registration (from 1987) is still active. I'm not sure what the original writer intended to convey with the statement, but it is inaccurate and somewhat misleading because it does not convey the geographic limitations of the registration or that at least the earliest registration is now inactive. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.168.162.7 (talk) 17:17, 4 March 2018 (UTC)

Yesco confusion
"Muzak merged with Yesco in September 1986. When Muzak began programming original artists in 1984, it was after merging with Yesco, and the programming was done by Yesco."
 * In addition to fixing the chronological contradiction, suppose one of you rewrites that without the grinding example of WP's endemic, compulsive name-overmentioning? (We need a good acronym for that syndrome, too.) – AndyFielding (talk) 11:33, 6 November 2021 (UTC)

Was any research actually done?
The article currently claims that there was internal company research done to prove that their music was effective, but the claim is unsourced, and I couldn't find anything proving it in the literature. Indeed, even now it seems that the effectiveness of music on productivity has not been fully proven. Did Muzak know if their music actually work? Kczaj (talk) 05:20, 6 July 2023 (UTC)

Section on World Trade Center
I've added an issue template to the section regarding Muzak's connection to the World Trade Center, which is too excessive and unsourced, and I don't see why it should be significant to the article as a while. 46.39.172.198 (talk) 22:50, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

 * I removed the whole thing. --jpgordon𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇 00:21, 8 October 2023 (UTC)

Muzak on FM Subcarriers
Muzak initially distributed its content over electrical lines. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, it transitioned to using subcarriers on FM radio stations. Source: Subcarrier Signals: The Unsung Heroes of the FM Dial - IEEE Spectrum. Philvoids (talk) 16:12, 13 June 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Muzak


text:
Talk:Anal retentiveness

Bulking up article
I appreciate that a second paragraph was added, but it's unsourced and it conflicts some with my understanding of the term, so I'd like to see a valid reference if it's to be included. Here's the text I removed: The so-called "anal" stage of infantile development denoted and named from discovering and playing with the infant's own feces is also characterized by learning that screaming and yelling causes a parental response. This learned cause and effect carried on later in life was named anal-retentive - or to stay in the (retain) anal developmental stage. Calling anal retentive anything to do with constipation is a modern misnomer. More accurately described, an anal retentive individual would be one with a character disorder exhibited by tyrannical behavior. Presumably the negative name was Freud's own description of those individuals with character disorders who would never seek psychoanalysis. The main presentation of character disorder is that the rest of the world has a problem as opposed to neuroses where the neurotic individual thinks he/she is the problem. Only neurotics seek help yielding hundreds of subset disorders while character disorders are still a mystery and have no subsets. I've never heard of anal-retentive personalities being "tyrannical". I'll go ahead and trawl some university psych websites and see if I can find a good reference. --Hurtstotouchfire 07:22, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
 * I think the article covers the conversational and psychological meanings, but doesn't have the medical definition. According to The American Heritage Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Anal-retentive (adj) Indicates personality traits, such as meticulousness, avarice, and obstinacy, originating in habits, attitudes, or values associated with infantile pleasure in retention of feces. I think it's worth considering for inclusion in the wiki article article. Possibly a range of it's different meanings in each field, and a range of meanings in differing dialects or communities. This could absorb and categorize the different meanings without causing contention by eliminating the need to have a single narrow definition, arbitrarily chosen. Penyulap   talk 12:42, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

Proposed merger with Obsessive-compulsive personality disorder
DISAGREE I'm going on record as saying that the proposal to merge this article into obsessive-compulsive personality disorder shows a complete lack of understanding of the term. I'm anal retentive, but I certainly do not have a diagnosable mental disorder. The suggestion that the one is a subset of the other is patently offensive. My counter-proposal is that the merge tag be removed from this article as soon as possible. --BRossow 04:32, 31 January 2006 (UTC)
 * I agree. Anal retentiveness and OCD personalities don't have enough in common to be in the same article. Anonymous 3:57, 27 February 2006 (GMT)
 * I don't think merging them is appropriate, anymore than merging Astronomy with Astrology would be appropriate, but I do however feel there should be mention that some of the behaviours that Freud was trying to codify in his patients are more accurately identified today as OCD. In modern times, the term has fallen out of its intended usage and become a term applied to somebody who is neat and tidy, but not to the point of mental illness reffered to as OCD today.  --Darth Borehd 20:47, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

Obsessive-compulsive personality is a personality type. Not a disorder. Not to be confused with OCD (Obsessive-compulsive disorder) which is a disorder. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.110.91.93 (talk) 09:48, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

But has anybody managed to answer the vital question: should "anal retentive" be hyphenated? ;-) (I too would call myself anal-retentive!) Autarch 10:52, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

 * No. It should not be hyphenated.
 * OCD is a result of a chemical imbalance and is most successfully treated with anti-depression drugs. The anal repressive personality, as Freud explained it (and named it), is the result of early childhood learning.  金 (Kim) 22:28, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

 * It's hyphenated only if it modifies a noun. I am anal retentive. You are an anal-retentive person. Jordan Brown 05:52, 29 November 2006 (UTC)

Revision of "current usage" definition
I'm not totally happy about the "current usage" definition even as originally proposed by User:Wayland and which has lasted till now. While pedantry is implied by the term, I think a better definition would refer primarily to neatness, tidyness, order, & cleanliness.

Now this entry shows I'm anally-retentive myself. But have I contradicted my own argument?

Mmowat 08:27, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

Is there any reliable evidence that the continued popular use of "anal" after its discreditation by psychologists has something to do with it being a nicer form of "asshole"? --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 00:35, 4 June 2012 (UTC)

Awkward/biased sentence
"These people develop into neat, organized, careful, meticulous, obstinate people often men with money who are passive-aggressive." Is this really part of Freudian theory, or is there some 'countertransference' going on on part of whoever wrote it? The tone seems hostile and biased towards such individuals. And the sentence construction is also quite akward. Not to be anal =)

 * It certainly reads as non-NPOV, and there's no source for all those adjectives. Men with money? Heh, you wish. ;-) It was correctly taken out from the article I believe. Raystorm 13:41, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

I'm, at least as defined as my sometimes competition, "anal retentive". As an IS consultant, and a former military intelligence person, I believe I have every reason to be so, and don't view the appellation as a negative.

To those who are more casual about solutions, I appear obsessive. However, their lives might depend upon that obsessiveness. Do you want to fly in a plane designed to "their" standards, or mine? Airport Controllers? SWAT teams?

"To every thing there is...a time and purpose."

Excellence in detail is neither needed nor desirable in particular situations of course, and conversely, too little attention may destroy any act as well. I suspect the latter situation to be far more prevalent however, given my ability to command decent sums as a consultant to rectify them. Still, excellence is a lot cheaper in the long run.

Isn't this commentary proof enough that "anal retentive" exists as a human condition?

If not, I can go to much greater detail.

Well, the nature of Wikipedia pretty much implies anal bias. --Humanophage (talk) 22:57, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

Differences between anal retentive and anal expulsive
Can someone please help contribute what exactly causes either of these please, and what also causes neither? It's not clear between the two articles what the differences are in the causes. E.g. in anal expulsive it mentions that the child was "liberally" trained. What does this mean, and in what way would the child have been trained in order to have become anally retentive? --Rebroad (talk) 20:38, 7 March 2009 (UTC)

References to The Nurture Assumption
I don't really think they are appropriate here, so I took them out. The concept already has basically no empirical basis, so a reference like this is both redundant and tangential. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.10.126.184 (talk) 06:10, 9 June 2009 (UTC)

Vandalism
Someone should have a look at these changes (link to history comparison) which are still active in the current article version. In fact, all changes after 23 February 2010 seem to be made by some jokers (apart from the reversion, of course). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.179.234.67 (talk) 03:50, 19 March 2010 (UTC)

Anal retentive (new section)
I wish there were twenty readers who would all list their understanding of anal retentive, so that we could see a spectrum of thinly divided choices. From this, to order these thoughts from the extremes. Then to come to a generalized understanding of the term anal retentive. I am not getting that so far.

My concept is a personality unwilling to give of itself, as in a child who comes to understand it can control its parents actions and time, by not excreting. Then generalizing, to every interaction, with everybody, for all times thereafter, brings to mind, why bother! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.195.246.52 (talk) 18:07, 1 October 2010 (UTC) I see that usage most of the time by people who want something and want to say something nasty about a person who won't give it. Other common usages tend to the nastiness of its sound. Some pop psych call orderliness the prime component. But the most common science texts non pop usage is that it means a person retains infantile characteristics of their socialization. Anal control being the first imposition of social norms on the otherwise uncontrolled infantile anal behavior. So anal retentive means in short infantile. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.164.85.224 (talk) 21:27, 25 August 2017 (UTC)

Move?

 * The following discussion is an archived discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

No consensus to move. Vegaswikian (talk) 17:21, 17 October 2011 (UTC)

Anal retentive → Anal-retentive –
 * Proper spelling requires a hyphen. The existing redirect from 'Anal-retentive' to 'Anal retentive' must be removed, and a new redirect from 'Anal retentive' to 'Anal-retentive' should be added. Thanks. Tabledhote (talk) 22:58, 10 October 2011 (UTC)
 * Any requested move involving hyphenation in titles is controversial and needs a talk page discussion. EdJohnston (talk) 04:03, 11 October 2011 (UTC)
 * You know, there's a book called Does Anal Retentive Need a Hyphen? (without one) If we could get a presentation copy, I'd go for the move. JCScaliger (talk) 23:25, 11 October 2011 (UTC)
 * I think its pretty funny that a book has been written about it, and since there is no concsensus on how it should be spelled, we should use which ever version has the greatest amount of google and other search engine searches. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia for the people, so why not let the amount of searches decide the matter.AcuteAccusation (talk) 23:37, 11 October 2011 (UTC)
 * There are a number of reasons 'why not' at Search engine test. Powers T 15:18, 12 October 2011 (UTC)

 * Oppose; should be Anal retentiveness (and Anal expulsiveness for its counterpart), which conveniently also solves the hyphen problem. Powers T 15:18, 12 October 2011 (UTC)

 * Oppose both are adjectives, use a noun form instead. 70.49.126.190 (talk) 03:54, 13 October 2011 (UTC)
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Alternative move

 * The following discussion is an archived discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Page moved. Vegaswikian (talk) 19:57, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

– As discussed above, we should be using the noun form of these terms, not the adjective form. Powers T 19:17, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
 * Anal retentive → Anal retentiveness
 * Anal expulsive → Anal expulsiveness
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Better meaning
I understand that this is effectively a real term in American English, though I have not come across it in the UK. Perhaps a note to that effect would avoid confusion for non-American readers. Also, the OED contains the following simple definition : overly ordered and fussy. (So in the UK, we simply say 'fussy' for the same thing.) It also says that this is the meaning in all varieties of English. This makes sense, since as far as I recall, it was a joke term used in American sitcoms of the 1980s, which everyone else vaguely understood as an insult of some sort. Thanks to this article, I've just found out what it means, although I don't think I'll be using it any time soon because it sounds liked it means 'deliberate constipation'. Summerdoor (talk) 14:01, 9 September 2012 (UTC)

Anally retentive means the sufferer is 'full of sh*t', and the only escape path is the mouth!. 'finger up the butt' has the same implications. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.219.69.226 (talk) 08:25, 15 October 2014 (UTC)

Redirect from anal fixation
At present "Anal fixation" redirects to this page. This seems unhelpful to me as anal expulsiveness is also an anal fixation, so some kind of short article on anal fixations in a general sense (possibly taking the form of a simple disambiguation page) should be made to avoid creating a false equivalence between anal fixation and anal retentiveness. Anditres (talk) 18:51, 10 June 2022 (UTC)

title: Talk:Anal retentiveness


text:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC;, lit. 'Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution'), also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,    is a multi-service primary branch of the Iranian Armed Forces. It was officially established by Ruhollah Khomeini as a military branch in May 1979, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Whereas the Iranian Army protects the country's sovereignty in a traditional capacity, the IRGC's constitutional mandate is to ensure the integrity of the Islamic Republic. Most interpretations of this mandate assert that it entrusts the IRGC with preventing foreign interference in Iran, thwarting coups by the traditional military, and crushing "deviant movements" that harm the ideological legacy of the Islamic Revolution. Currently, the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization by Bahrain, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the United States.

, the IRGC had approximately 125,000 total personnel. The IRGC Navy is now Iran's primary force exercising operational control over the Persian Gulf. The IRGC's Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia, has about 90,000 active personnel. It operates a media arm, known as "Sepah News" within Iran. On 16 March 2022, it adopted a new independent branch called the "Command for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Centres" involved with Iran's nuclear programme.

Originating as an ideological militia, the IRGC has taken a greater role in nearly every aspect of Iranian politics and society. In 2010, BBC described the organization as an "Empire". In 2019, Reuters described it as "an industrial empire with political clout". IRGC's expanded social, political, military, and economic role under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—especially during the 2009 presidential election and the suppression of post-election protests—has led many Western analysts to argue that it has surpassed even the country's ruling clerical class in terms of political power.

Since 2019, Hossein Salami has served as the IRGC's incumbent commander-in-chief.

Terminology
Government organizations in Iran are commonly known by one-word names (that generally denote their function) rather than acronyms or shortened versions, and the general populace universally refers to the IRGC as Sepâh (سپاه). Sepâh has a historical connotation of soldiers, while in modern Persian it is also used to describe a corps-sized unit – in modern Persian Artesh (ارتش) is the more standard term for an army.

Pâsdârân (پاسداران) is the plural form of Pâsdâr (پاسدار), meaning "Guardian", and members of Sepah are known as Pāsdār, which is also their title and comes after their rank.

Apart from the name Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,  the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify with the organization generally use Sepāh-e Pâsdârân (Army of the Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply Pâsdârân (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well. Among the Iranian population, and especially among diaspora Iranians, using the word Pasdaran indicates hatred or admiration for the organization.

Most foreign governments and the English-speaking mass media tend to use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) or simply the Revolutionary Guards. In the US media, the force is frequently referred to interchangeably as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US government standard is Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while the United Nations uses Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Organization
The force's main role is in national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also Iran's missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations. The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles.

The IRGC is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy, air force, intelligence, and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of Iran's military, which is called Artesh (another Persian word for an army). Especially in the waters of the Persian Gulf, the IRGC is expected to assume control of any Iranian response to attacks on its nuclear facilities.

History and structure
The IRGC was formed on 5 May 1979 following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new government and to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military, initially seen as a potential source of opposition because of its traditional loyalty to the Shah. From the beginning of the new Islamic government, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami) functioned as a corps of the faithful. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic entrusted the defense of Iran's territorial integrity and political independence to the regular military (artesh), while it gave the Pasdaran the responsibility of preserving the Revolution itself.

Days after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return to Tehran on 1 February 1979, Mehdi Bazargan's interim administration established the Pasdaran under a decree issued by Khomeini on 5 May. The Pasdaran was intended to protect the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the new government's Islamic codes and morality. There were other, perhaps more important, reasons for establishing the Pasdaran. The Revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime's tainted units. As one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran helped legitimize the Revolution and gave the new government an armed basis of support. Moreover, the establishment of the Pasdaran served notice to both the population and the regular armed forces that the Khomeini government was quickly developing its own enforcement body.

Thus, the Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to Iran. In time, the Pasdaran would rival the police and the judiciary in terms of its functions. Although the IRGC operated independently of the regular armed forces, it was often considered to be a military force in its own right due to its important role in Iranian defense. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military. The Pasdaran was "given control of Iran’s ballistic missile program in both missile employment and development.

Also contained under the umbrella of the more conventional Pasdaran, were the Basij Forces (Mobilization Resistance Force), a network of potentially up to a million active individuals who could be called upon in times of need. The Basij could be committed to assist in the defense of the country against internal or external threats, but by 2008 had also been deployed in mobilizing voters in elections and alleged tampering during such activities. Another element was the Quds Force, a special forces element tasked with unconventional warfare roles and known to be involved in providing assistance and training to various militant organizations around the world.

The Pasdaran is closely associated with Supreme Leader Khomeini who came to power in 1989, and used the Pasdaran to build support. Reportedly he reached "far down into the ranks and appointed new colonels and brigadiers. 'Khamenei micromanages the whole system, so everyone is loyal to him, He is hyperactive. He knows every low-ranking commander and even the names of their children'", according to Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The Basij and Pasdaran were instrumental in crushing the Green Movement, and this power gave them political supremecy in Iran. According to at least one source (Abbas Milani, the director of the Iranian Studies program at Stanford), the regime “clearly ... believed it was going to lose control, and the IRGC and the Basij saved the day. The result is that the IRGC now has the upper hand. Khamenei knows that without the IRGC he’d be out of a job in twenty-four hours.” Yahya Rahim Safavi, head of the IRGC since 1997, was dismissed as commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards in August 2007. The dismissal of Safavi disrupted the balance of power in Iran to the advantage of conservatives. Analysis in the international press considered the removal of Safavi to be a sign of change in the defense strategies of Iran, but the general policies of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are not personally determined by its commander.

Iran's top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in Tehran, Iran on 27 November 2020. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran's covert nuclear program for many decades. The New York Times reported that Israel's Mossad was behind that attack and that Mick Mulroy, the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was "a setback to Iran's nuclear program" and he was also a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that "will magnify Iran’s desire to respond by force."

The Corps have occasionally distributed food aid packages.

Military structure
In late July 2008, reports originating that the IRGC was in the process of dramatically changing its structure. In a shake-up, in September 2008 Iran's Revolutionary Guards established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The new structure changes the IRGC from a centralized to a decentralized force with 31 provincial corps, whose commanders wield extensive authority and power. According to the plan, each of Iran's thirty provinces will have a provincial corps, except Tehran Province, which will have two.

Cyber Security Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
In 2007 command for cyber security was established part of cyberdefense of IRGC. It was renamed in 2014, abbreviated GCDC or CIOC.
 * Advanced Persistent Threat 34

Basij
Basij Mustazafin were initially separate organization but were merged in 1980 into Corps and merged to its land forces since 2008. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia or "plainclothes militia" founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. On November 4, 1979, in an address to the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran hostage crisis, Khomeini ordered the creation of an army of "twenty million Iranians" (Artesh-e bis million), proclaiming:

"Equip yourself, get military training and train your friends. Give military training to those who are not trained. In an Islamic country, everyone should be a soldier and have military training. ... a country with 20 million young people [should have] 20 million riflemen, an army of 20 million'"

This pronouncement and Article 151 of the constitution, which calls for the government to "provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran," are believed to refer to the Basij. While "Iranian official estimates sometime put their total part-time and full-time strength at more than 20 million", others estimate the Basij as having "a core strength of 90,000, and up to 600,000" (CSIS, 11 January 2018, p. 4); at 100,000 with "hundreds of thousands of additional Basij could be mobilized in the event or an all-out war" (CRS, 23 May 2018, p. 18).

The Basij are "the most visible symbol" of the Pasdaran's strength, whose members "can be seen on street corners in every Iranian city". They are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics." Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and as morality police and the suppression of dissident gatherings.

Quds Force
The elite Quds Force (or Jerusalem Force), sometimes described as the successor to the Shah's Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000–5,000 in number. It is a special operations unit, handling activities abroad. The force basically does not engage directly.

Aerospace Force
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air and Space Force (IRGCASF;, officially acronymed NEHSA) is the strategic missile, air, and space force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. It was renamed from the IRGC Air Force into the IRGC Aerospace Force in 2009. It's 15,000 personnel man around 80 aircraft and operates several thousand short- and medium-range mobile ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3/3B with a range of up to 2,100 kilometers.

Navy
IRGC started naval operations using mainly swarm tactics and speedboats during "Tanker War" phase of the Iran–Iraq War.

IRGC Navy and the regular Artesh Navy overlap functions and areas of responsibility, but they are distinct in terms of how they are trained and equipped—and more importantly also in how they fight. The Revolutionary Guards Navy has a large inventory of small fast attack craft, and specializes in asymmetric hit-and-run tactics. It is more akin to a guerrilla force at sea, and maintains large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines. It has also a Takavar (special force) unit, called Sepah Navy Special Force (S.N.S.F.).

Intelligence organization
Corps Intelligence directorate are accused of meddling in the 2021 Iranian presidential election.

Size

The 2020 edition of The Military Balance, published by IISS, says the IRGC has about 190,000 active personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation (as much as 40,000 active paramilitary forces). It estimates the Ground Force is 150,000 strong and the Aerospace Force, which controls Iran's strategic-missile force, has some 15,000 personnel. The Naval Forces are estimated to size at least 20,000, including 5,000 Marines.

Senior commanders

 * Major General Hossein Salami (Commander-in-chief)
 * Commodore Ali Fadavi (Second-in-command)
 * Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour (Revolutionary Guards' Ground Forces)
 * Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh (Revolutionary Guards' Aerospace Force)
 * Commodore Alireza Tangsiri (Revolutionary Guards' Navy)
 * Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani (Commander of the Mobilized Basij forces)
 * Brigadier General Ismail Qaani (Quds Force)

Lebanon Civil War
During the Lebanese Civil War, the IRGC allegedly sent troops to train fighters in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC's presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the Lebanese Forces, Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the PSP and Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to preserve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.

2006 Lebanon War
During the 2006 Lebanon War, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border. Israeli officials believe that Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces were responsible for training and equipping the Hezbollah fighters behind the missile attack on the INS Hanit which left four Israeli sailors dead and seriously damaged the vessel.

2006 plane crash
In January 2006, an IRGC Falcon crashed near Oroumieh, about 560 miles northwest of Tehran, near the Turkish border, Iranian media reported. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders. Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander, and Iran–Iraq War veteran.

Gen. Masoud Jazayeri, spokesman for the IRGC, told state radio that both of the plane's engines had failed, its landing gear had jammed, and there was snow and poor visibility at the time.

Possible attacks on Quds Force
On 7 July 2008, investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh wrote an article in The New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a presidential finding authorizing the CIA's Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the Quds Force, the commando arm of the IRGC that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and "high-value targets" in the war on terror.

October 2009 Pishin bombing
In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni Baluchi insurgent group Jundullah claimed responsibility for the attack. The Iranian government initially blamed the United States for involvement in the attacks, as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and later Pakistan for their alleged support of the Jundallah group. The United States denied involvement, but some reports of US assistance to Jundallah during the Bush administration have come from Western sources. The attacks appear to have originated in Pakistan and several suspects have been arrested.

Syria, 2011–present
Prior to the Syrian war, Iran had between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers stationed in Syria, helping to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon.

General Qa'ani, Senior officer of Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, said: "If the Islamic Republic was not present in Syria, the massacre of civilians would have been twice as bad. Had physically and non-physically stopped the rebels from killing many more among the Syrian people."

Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers, along with fellow Shi'ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran's Basij militia participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces on 9 June 2013. In 2014, Iran increased its deployment of IRGC in Syria.

By late 2015, 194 IRGC troops had been killed in Syria; almost all of these soldiers were officers, with several even reaching the rank of Brigadier. Additionally, 354 Afghan combatants had died who were fighting under the command of the IRGC, as part of the IRGC-equipped and trained Fatemiyoun Brigade, which is part of Hezbollah Afghanistan. Another 21 Pakistanis also died as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

The Afghan and Pakistani immigrants volunteered to go to Syria in exchange for salaries and citizenship. The Afghans were recruited largely from refugees inside Iran, and usually had combat experience before joining the IRGC; their status as members of the Iranian military is only vaguely acknowledged and sometimes denied, despite the troops being uniformed fighters led by IRGC officers. They were trained and equipped in Iran, paid salaries by the Iranian military, and received state funerals involving uniformed IRGC personnel. Mid to late October 2015 was particularly bloody for the IRGC, due to them stepping up their involvement in offensives around Aleppo. During this time, 30 IRGC officers, including "three generals, battalion commanders, captains and lieutenants" and "one pilot" were killed in fighting in Syria, as were several Afghan and Pakistani auxiliaries.

The fallen included General Hossein Hamadani, Farshad Hosounizadeh (IRGC colonel and former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade), Mostafa Sadrzadeh (commander of the Omar Battalion of the Fatmiyoon Brigade), and Hamid Mojtaba Mokhtarband (IRGC commander).

Iraq, 2014–present
Two battalions of Revolutionary Guards were reported to be operating in Iraq trying to combat the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive. The IRGC is considered to be a principle backer of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a loose coalition of Shi'a militias allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In addition, Major General Qasem Soleimani was an instrumental force in the Iranian ground mission in Iraq against ISIS, purportedly planning the Second Battle of Tikrit. In December 2014, Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, a veteran of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, was killed by snipers in Samarra. In May 2017, Shaaban Nassiri, a senior IRGC commander was killed in combat near Mosul, Iraq. In December 2019, the U.S. Air Force conducted airstrikes on weapons caches and facilities of the IRGC-sponsored militant group Kata'ib Hezbollah. In retaliation, the group attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in the Green Zone.

On 3 January 2020, Major General Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad International Airport along with the PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

2014 Israeli drone shoot down
Iran revolutionary guards said that they had shot down an Israeli drone approaching the Natanz nuclear facility. According to ISNA, "The downed aircraft was of the stealth, radar-evasive type ... and was targeted by a ground-to-air missile before it managed to enter the area." The statement by revolutionary guards did not mention how they recognized it as an Israeli drone. Israel offered no comment.

Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752
Iranian authorities initially denied responsibility for the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 incident. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) later admitted that the plane had been shot down by mistake.

The Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took "full responsibility" for unintentionally shooting down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 with a surface-to-air missile on 8 January 2020. President Hassan Rouhani stated that the plane was approaching an IRGC base when it was shot down: according to a senior Revolutionary Guards commander, the plane was mistaken for a cruise missile. On 17 January 2020, the IRGC, which shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane, were protected by Ali Khamenei in the Friday sermon. He said that the downing was a "bitter" tragedy and additionally declared that "Iran's enemies" used the crash and the military's admission to "weaken" the IRGC.

Special Operation inside Pakistan
On 3 February 2021, IRGC announced that it had conducted an intelligence-based operation inside Pakistani territory to rescue two of its border guards who were taken as hostages by Jaish ul-Adl organization two and a half years ago.

Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war
On 21 October 2022, a White House press release stated that Iranian troops were in Crimea assisting Russia in launching drone attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. On 24 November, Ukrainian officials said the military had killed ten Iranians and would target any further Iranian military presence in Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that these are likely Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC-affiliated personnel, as this formation is the primary operator of Iranian drones.

2024 Iranian strikes against Israel
On 13 April 2024, the IRGC, in collaboration with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Hezbollah, and the Ansar Allah (Houthis), launched retaliatory attacks against Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights with loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It was retaliation for the Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April, which killed two Iranian generals. The strike was seen as a spillover of the Israel–Hamas war and marked Iran's first direct attack on Israel since the start of their proxy conflict. The attack was the largest attempted drone strike in history, intended to overwhelm anti-aircraft defenses. It was the first time since Iraq's 1991 missile strikes that Israel was directly attacked by a state force.

Political
As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have influence in Iran's political world. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President 2005–2013) joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans. Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran's Majlis in 2004 are also "Pásdárán". Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats. However, IRGC veteran status does not imply a single viewpoint.

Strengthening the power of the IRGC was their actions against the Green Movement, where thousands of Iranians protested election irregularities in the 2009 victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over "a well-liked" reformer Mir-Hossein Mousavi. As "the demonstrations gained strength, the security forces swept in, arresting, beating, and killing protesters". The IRGC was thought to be crucial in crushing the movement which "marked a turning point" for the Islamic Republic. In a video leaked to the internet, the leader of the Pasdaran at the time, (General Mohammad Ali Jafari), opposed the protest as challenging 'the tenets of the revolution', but warned that it 'was a blow that weakened the fundamental pillars of the regime,' and demonstrated that Iran's rulers "could no longer count on popular support", 'Anyone who refuses to understand these new conditions will not be successful'.

Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country's military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the "guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements" which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him. The IRGC grew stronger under President Ahmedinejad, and assumed formal command of the Basiji militia in early 2009.

Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.

Economic activity
IRGC first expanded into commercial activity through informal social networking of veterans and former officials. IRGC officials confiscated assets of many refugees who had fled Iran after the fall of Abolhassan Banisadr's government. It is now a vast conglomerate, controlling Iran's missile batteries and nuclear program but also a multibillion-dollar business empire reaching almost all economic sectors. Estimates of the fraction of Iran's economy that it controls through a series of subsidiaries and trusts vary from ten percent to over 50.

The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction. IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects.

The following commercial entities have been named by the United States as owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders.
 * Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC's major engineering arm & one of Iran's largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects worth over $7 billion in 2006.
 * Oriental Oil Kish (oil and gas industry)
 * Ghorb Nooh
 * Sahel Consultant Engineering
 * Ghorb Karbala
 * Sepasad Engineering Co. (excavation and tunnel construction)
 * Omran Sahel
 * Hara Company (excavation and tunnel construction)
 * Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem
 * Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)
 * Fater Engineering Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)

In September 2009, the Government of Iran sold 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin), a group affiliated with the Guards, for the sum of $7.8 billion. This was the largest transaction on the Tehran Stock Exchange in history. IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran's naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.

The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency. The IRGC exerts informal, but real, influence over many such organizations including:
 * Mostazafan Foundation (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation)
 * Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs)

As an elite force with great economic assets it has developed into what some observers call an "untouchable élite" and somewhat isolated in Iranian society. According to a "former senior Middle Eastern intelligence officer", the Guard and their families "have their own schools, their own markets, their own neighborhoods, their own resorts. The neighborhoods look like a carbon copy of Beverly Hills."

Former Bank Ansar and Bank Mehr Iranian were run by corps IRGC Cooperation Bonyad until merger with state Bank Sepah.

In 2023, Israel seized millions of dollars in cryptocurrency belonging to Hezbollah and the Quds force of the IRGC.

Analysis
Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that the IRGC is "the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy." The once theocratic state has evolved into a garrison state, like Burma, whereby the military dominates social, cultural, political, and economic life, protecting the government from internal rather than external opponents.

Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations agree, stating that the IRGC has expanded well beyond its mandate and into a "socio-military-political-economic force" that deeply penetrates Iran's power structure. "The Guards' involvement in politics has grown to unprecedented levels since 2004, when IRGC won at least 16 percent of the 290 seats" in the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran. During the elections of March 2008, IRGC veterans won 182 out of 290 seats, helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad consolidate power.

Half of Ahmadinejad's cabinet was composed of former IRGC officers while several others were appointed to provincial governorships.

Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute contends that "While the presence of former IRGC officers in the cabinet is not a new phenomenon, their numbers under Ahmadinejad—they occupy nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios—are unprecedented." Additionally, Ahmadinejad successfully purged provincial governorships of Rafsanjani and Khatami supporters and replaced them not only with IRGC members, but also members of the Basij and the Islamic Republic prison administration.

The IRGC chief, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, announced that the Guards' would go through internal restructuring in order to counter "internal threats to the Islamic Republic." Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former CIA analyst, argues the Guards was created to protect the government against a possible coup.

Since the disputed 2009 presidential elections, debate over how powerful the IRGC is has reemerged. Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh see the irreversible militarization of Iran's government. Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, believes the Guards’ power actually exceeds that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Frederic Wehrey, adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation believes the Revolutionary Guards is not a cohesive unit of similar-minded conservatives but rather a factionalized institution that is hardly bent on overthrowing their masters.

U.S. Department of the Treasury terrorist aid claims
The U.S. Department of the Treasury claims the Corp has supported several organizations the U.S. deems to be terrorist, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Taliban. In the U.S. Department of the Treasury's report, four IRGC senior officials, Hushang Alladad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi, were specifically named for providing support to terrorist organizations. Hushang Alladad, a financial officer for the IRGC, was cited as personally administering financial support to terrorist groups including Hizballah, Hamas, and PIJ. Both General Hossein Musavi and Colonel Hasan Mortevazi were claimed to have provided financial and material support to the Taliban. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the IRGC commander in Lebanon, was claimed to have played a crucial role in Iran's aid to Hizballah. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Zahedi served as a liaison to Hizballah and Syrian intelligence services as well as taking part in weapon deals involving Hizballah. The U.S. Treasury report goes on to detail the IRGC's methods of support for terrorist groups: "The Government of Iran also uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by the IRGC and the Iranian government."

Corporations in media

 * Owj Arts and Media Organization, Tasnim news agency

Similar organizations
Since November 2023, the military of Islamic Emirate have created Supreme leader-led task forces in Afghanistan similar to the Revolutionary Guard.

Controversy
From its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its part in suppressing dissent has led many analysts to describe the events surrounding the 12 June 2009 presidential election as a military coup, and the IRGC as an authoritarian military security government for which its Shiite clerical system is no more than a facade.

Since its establishment, IRGC has been involved in many economic and military activities among which some raised controversies. The organization has been accused of smuggling (including importing illegal alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and satellite dishes, into Iran via jetties not supervised by the Government ), training and supplying Hezbollah  and Hamas fighters, and of being involved in the Iraq War.

In December 2009, evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy's body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran's militia groups in Iraq.

According to Geneive Abdo, IRGC members were appointed "as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions" during the administration of president Ahmadinejad. Appointments in 2009 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have given "hard-liners" in the guard "unprecedented power" and included "some of the most feared and brutal men in Iran."

In May 2019, the United States accused the IRGC of being "directly responsible" for an attack on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman. Michael M. Gilday, United States director of the Joint Staff, described US intelligence attributing that the IRGC used limpet mines to attack four oil tankers anchored in the Gulf of Oman for bunkering through the Port of Fujairah.

In April 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRGC unveiled the Mostaan 110, an experimental medical device that the IRGC claimed could detect instances of COVID-19 using electromagnetic radiation. The IRGC's claims of Mostaan 110's capabilities were met with widespread criticism from both Iranian and international experts, who called it pseudoscientific and compared it to the ADE 651, a fake explosive detector with a similar design.

In December 2022, German authorities accused the IRGC of attempting to orchestrate attacks against synagogues in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and spying on the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Moreover, in 2020, IRGC members were exposed as having given a talk to UK students in which one spoke of an apocalyptic war with Jews.

Terrorist designation and sanctions
Since 15 April 2019, the United States, which opposes the activities of Sepah, considers the IRGC as a terrorist organization, which some top CIA and Pentagon officials reportedly opposed. On 8 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted in Hebrew that America's terrorist designation was the fulfillment of "another important request of mine." This designation was criticized by a number of governments including Turkey, Iraq and China as well as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran's parliament, in which members wore IRGC uniforms in protest.

On 29 April 2019, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Mulroy said Iran posed five threats. The first was Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. The second was to maritime security in the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, because a substantial portion of energy trade and commercial goods go through those areas. The third was because of their support to proxies and terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Houthis in Yemen, some Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and safe-harboring senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iran. The fourth was Iranian made ballistic missiles sent to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen for use against Saudi Arabia and to Syria with Hezbollah to use against Israel. Cyber is the fifth threat and a growing concern. He also said that the terrorist designation did not grant any additional authorities to the Department of Defense and that they were not asking for any.

The IRGC has never been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, although the UNSCR 1929 had its assets frozen (this was lifted in 2016). Since 2010, the European Union has imposed broad sanctions on the IRGC and many of its members, without designating it as a terrorist organization.

Although Saudi Arabia and Bahrain already designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, several countries such as Australia are examining the possibility to designate the group as well (Canada already outlawed Quds Force in 2012). On 3 October 2022, in reaction to the death of Mahsa Amini and the persecution of protestors in the protests that ensued, Canada officially sanctioned the IRGC. Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly announced sanctions targeting 9 entities, including the Morality Police and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and 25 individuals, that include high-ranking officials and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These individuals include IRGC Commander-in-Chief Major General Hossein Salami, and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC. On 7 October, the Canadian government expanded the sanctions, banning 10,000 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from entering the country permanently, which represents the top 50% of the organization's leadership. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau added that Canada plans to expand the sanctions against those most responsible for Iran's "egregious behavior". Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland added that Iran was a "state sponsor of terror", and that "it is oppressive, theocratic and misogynist; The IRGC leadership are terrorists, the IRGC is a terrorist organization".

According to Arab News, a 2020 report by the "Tony Blair Institute for Global Change" said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is an "institutionalized militia" that "uses its vast resources to spread a 'mission of jihad' through an 'ideological army' of recruits and proxies". In 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the IRGC is "probably the most designated organisation – one way or another – in the world among the organisations that we designate, including the foreign terrorist organisation designation".

In January 2023, it was reported that the United Kingdom was preparing to declare the IRGC a terrorist organization; this did not subsequently occur.

On 18 January 2023, the European Parliament passed an amendment proposed by the ECR Group, to call for the EU and its member states to include the IRGC on the EU's terrorist list.

On 19 June 2024, Canada designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization under the nation's Criminal Code.

Response to terrorist organization designation
The move was met with unfavorable reactions from Iranian leaders and militants. Shortly after the US announced the designation, the Iranian government declared the United States Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, as a terrorist organization. According to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the move "was in response to the illegal and unwise move from the U.S." On the following day, Iranian Members of Parliament displayed their support of the IRGC by collectively wearing green military pants and chanted "death to America" as they opened session. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani also responded to the move, commenting that it was a mistake which would only increase the IRGC's popularity in Iran and elsewhere.

Since the designation, the United States Department of State's Rewards for Justice Program has offered a reward of up to US$15 million for financial background information about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its branches, including an IRGC financier, Abdul Reza Shahlai, who it says was responsible for a raid that killed five American soldiers in Karbala, Iraq on 20 January 2007.

title: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps


text:
BMW M47

The BMW M47 and Rover Group M47R are straight-4 Diesel engines. Variants were manufactured by BMW from 1998 to 2007. BMW gradually adopted high-pressure common rail fuel injection systems over the lifetime of the M47.

M47D20
The original M47 diesel engine featured non-common-rail direct fuel injection and a 1951 cc block. First seen in 1998, the M47D20 produced 100 kW and 280 Nm in its original 320d/520d guise, and 85 kW with 265 Nm in the 318d variant. All M47 engines have one Swirl and one Tangential intake port per cylinder, which can each improve performance under different conditions. These features are not to be confused with swirl flaps, which were introduced in the M47D20TÜ.

Applications:
 * 85 kW and 265 Nm
 * 2001–2003 E46 318d
 * 100 kW and 280 Nm
 * 1999–2001 E46 320d
 * 2000–2003 E39 520d

M47R
Rover Group (UK) and Steyr (Austria), worked together to modify the M47D20 to create a transverse configuration for use in the Rover 75 front wheel drive saloon, as well as their all-wheel-drive Land Rover Freelander. The same engine was later deployed by MG Rover in the Rover 75 Tourer and MG ZT. The M47R ("M47 Rail") differs from the original design by the introduction of common-rail technology, a transverse orientation, different turbochargers and more sophisticated systems for temperature management. However, the core 1951 cc heads of the M47R and M47D20 are the same. Combining a common-rail system with a relatively small engine capacity created engine temperature problems. More hardware was added to help control temperatures which also helped to escalate weight, fuel consumption, and manufacturing costs. The BMW Steyr plant manufactured and supplied M47R engines. The original version used in the Rover 75 developed 85 kW at 4000rpm and 260 Nm at 2000rpm. A software update developed in conjunction with X Power, and released in 2002 after Rover's separation from BMW, increased this to 96 kW at 3500rpm and 300 Nm at 1900rpm, and was badged CDTi rather than CDT.

The M47R in the Rover 75 and MG ZT used a Mitsubishi turbocharger with wastegate, whereas that fitted to the Freelander used a Garrett VNT.

Applications:
 * 1999–2004 Rover 75 CDT
 * 2002–2005 Rover 75 CDTi
 * 2001–2006 Land Rover Freelander
 * 2001–2004 MG ZT CDT
 * 2002–2005 MG ZT CDTi

M47D20TÜ
The all wheel drive BMW X3 and rear-wheel drive BMW 320d models, built approximately between September 2001 and December 2004, were fitted with the M47TÜ ("M47 Technical Update"). The exact production week is not known and was probably later than Production Week 33 in 2001 (e.g. one cannot rely on a UK 51 plate registered BMW 320d to have the M47TU).

The engine capacity was expanded to 1995 cc, and it retained the common-rail injector system that had proven popular in the smaller M47R and larger M57 engines. These changes empowered BMW to increase torque and improve fuel consumption, especially at lower revs. However, these modifications added 50 kg to overall weight and emissions raised accordingly. In the UK, the new characteristics of the M47TÜ were sufficient to lift the BMW 320d into the next highest insurance bracket, and the next highest band for Vehicle Excise Duty (Road Tax).

The M47TÜ was regarded as so good that BMW made it available in the 320Cd Coupé.

The M47D20TÜ introduced new common failure points. Chief among these was a new 'swirl flap' mechanism embedded in the inlet manifold. This consisted of a number of butterfly valves within each individual inlet tract, which are secured to an actuating rod via two small screws. It has become clear that over time these screws can come loose via vibration etc. When this happens they can end up being drawn into the respective cylinder, causing significant damage to the piston, cylinder head, and valves. If unlucky further damage can be caused to the turbo if the screw then makes its way through the exhaust valve into the manifold and subsequently into the turbo. These failures have occurred in such quantity that a number of specialist BMW magazines have featured articles on the problem including information on how to remove the swirl flaps. For those who wish to perform some preventive maintenance on the M47TUD20 engine, there are companies who supply and/or fit blanking plugs to allow the removal of these swirl flaps altogether. BMW addressed the problem by introducing stronger swirl flaps and larger diameter spindles – made from plastic – in 2006.

Applications:
 * 85 kW and 280 Nm
 * 2003–2005 E46 318d
 * 110 kW and 330 Nm
 * 2001–2005 E46 320d
 * E83 X3 2.0d (up to end of 2006)

M47D20TÜ2
The engine was updated again in 2004 as the M47D20TÜ2 (for Technische Überarbeitung 2 = second revision). Still at 1995 cc, it produced more power across the range.

Applications:
 * 90 kW and 280 Nm
 * E87 118d
 * E90/E91 318d
 * 120 kW and 340 Nm
 * E60/E61 520d
 * E87 120d
 * E90/E91 320d
 * E83 X3 2.0d (end of 2006 onwards)

title: BMW M47


text:
Monoarthritis

Monoarthritis, or monoarticular arthritis, is inflammation (arthritis) of one joint at a time (as opposed to oligoarthritis, which affects 2-4 joints, and polyarthritis, which affects more than 4 joints). It is usually caused by trauma, infection, or crystalline arthritis.

Septic arthritis
Septic arthritis is an inflammatory response to an infection (usually bacterial) in the joint. Usually impacting large joints like the hip or the knee, it is a medical emergency with a mortality rate of about 10%. It is treated with oral and intravenous antibiotics as well as joint drainage.

Gout
Gout is inflammation caused by the deposition of needle-shaped monosodium urate crystals in the joints. It is the most common type of inflammatory arthritis in the United States. The disease typically affects a single joint in earlier stages but can progress into polyarthritis over time. It usually occurs in cooler areas of the body, often starting in the big toe.

Pseudogout
Pseudogout (also referred to as calcium pyrophosphate dihydrate crystal deposition disease) is another type of crystalline arthritis that presents very similarly to gout but is caused by the deposition of rhomboid-shaped calcium pyrophosphate dihydrate (CPPD) crystals. The knees, wrists, and fingers are the most common joints affected by pseudogout.

Osteoarthritis
Osteoarthritis is a degenerative, or non-inflammatory arthritis. It is the most common type of arthritis, affecting between 19% and 30% of adults above the age of 45. It is caused by a progressive erosion of cartilage which eventually leads to bone damage. It is a polyarthritis, but it usually begins in a single joint. Unlike other types of monoarthritis, which normally have acute onset, onset of osteoarthritis is almost always insidious.

Psoriatic arthritis
Psoriatic arthritis is an inflammatory arthritis common in people with psoriasis. It often presents as asymmetric oligoarthritis (impacting 2-4 joints) affecting the distal interphalangeal joints, although it can appear in a single joint. Joint-area discoloration, dactylitis, nail changes, and enthesitis, are common symptoms of psoriatic arthritis that distinguish it from other forms of arthritis. Unlike other types of inflammatory arthritis, which typically affect women more than men, psoriatic arthritis has no gender preference.

Diagnosis
X-rays, MRI scans, and other types of imaging can show bone loss and erosion from degenerative arthritis or later stages of inflammatory arthritis. Laboratory testing, specifically microscopic synovial fluid examination, is a more accurate method of diagnosing arthritis. By performing a joint aspiration, physicians can check cell counts and look for signs of infection (bacteria/fungus) or crystal formation to determine which, if any, type of arthritis is present.

Treatment
Monoarthritis is treated the same way as other forms of arthritis. Minimizing pain, preventing disease progression, and improving joint function are the goals of arthritis treatment. Treatment can vary depending on the cause and severity of the condition. Physical therapy, acupuncture, and anti-inflammatory drugs are commonly used to treat the disease. In more severe cases, intra-articular corticosteroid injections or surgical joint replacement may be necessary. Joint drainage and antibiotics are used to treat septic arthritis. Medications that decrease uric acid can mitigate chronic gout symptoms.

title: Monoarthritis


text:
Târgu Secuiesc

Târgu Secuiesc (Kézdivásárhely, ; Szekler Neumarkt; Neoforum Siculorum) is a city in Covasna County, Transylvania, Romania. It administers one village, Lunga (Nyujtód).

History
The town was first mentioned in 1407 as Torjawasara, meaning in Hungarian “Torja Market”. (Torja is the name of a stream nearby and is also the Hungarian name of the nearby village Turia.) Originally, the Hungarian name Kézdivásárhely was also used in Romanian in the form Chezdi-Oșorheiu, but this was altered to Tîrgu Secuiesc (now spelled Târgu Secuiesc) after the accession to Romania in 1920 under the Treaty of Trianon. The Hungarian native name means “Kézdi Market”, Kézdi being the name of a Székely “seat”, a historical administrative unit. Its status as a market town dates back to the Middle Ages. The city was taken over by Hungary during World War II, following the Second Vienna Award of August, 1940. A small Jewish community was set up in the 1880s; it numbered 66 in 1920. In May 1944, the Hungarian authorities sent its members to the Sfântu Gheorghe ghetto, and deported them to the Auschwitz concentration camp the following month. Sovereignty was restored to Romania following the war.

Demographics
At the 2021 census, Târgu Secuiesc had a population of 16,243. At the census from 2011, the city had 18,491 residents, of whom 91.1% were Székely Hungarians, 7.2% Romanians, and 1.6% Roma. The historical demographic evolution is as follows:

Demographic change according to census data:

Natives

 * János Balogh
 * Andrei Cadar
 * André de Dienes
 * Róbert Elek
 * Tiberiu Ghioane
 * Kató Havas
 * Gergely Kovács
 * Béla Markó
 * Roland Niczuly
 * Ioan Robu
 * Árpád Szántó
 * Nándor Tamás
 * Gábor Vajna

Education
Despite its relatively small size the town has a few notable high schools: Nagy Mózes, Bod Péter, Apor Péter and Gábor Áron, all bearing the names of important Székely historical personalities. Because of this, Târgu Secuiesc is considered the educational center of the north eastern part of the county.

title: Târgu Secuiesc


text:
The Night Climbers of Cambridge

The Night Climbers of Cambridge is a book, written under the pseudonym "Whipplesnaith", about nocturnal climbing on the colleges and town buildings of Cambridge, England, in the 1930s. The book remains popular among Cambridge University students and the 1930s and 1950s editions can be hard to find. It is often credited with popularising and inspiring the first generation of urban explorers and night climbers.

History
After extensive research, it was revealed that "Whipplesnaith" is a pseudonym for Noël Howard Symington, who feared retribution for his work. Eric Waddams, a choral scholar at Kings, who either took or featured in most of the photographs, was a contributor. There was also a third unknown contributor.

The book was originally published in October 1937 by Chatto and Windus and proved popular. The book was revised in November 1937 and reprinted in 1952 and 1953, selling out each time. The second edition contains a reordered selection of photographs and a missing diagram explaining the escape from the roof of the Marks and Spencer, as well as other useful information on night climbing.

The book was sought after, especially in Cambridge itself where it was regarded as one of few "guidebooks" to the routes onto the roofs of the town's ancient buildings. Famous climbs documented in the book are the King's College and St John's College chapels and the "Senate House leap" across Senate House Passage between Gonville and Caius College and the Senate House. The Night Climbers of Cambridge is often credited with inspiring the next generation of urban explorers and spawned many University of Cambridge legends and traditions. Since its publication several climbs of King's College Chapel have been completed.

A new authorised edition was published on 26 October 2007 by Oleander Press, Cambridge, to mark the 70th anniversary of the original edition. The new edition includes images digitally remastered from the original negatives, and has proved popular among Oxbridge students and urban explorers.

Similar projects
In addition to The Night Climbers of Cambridge, an omnibus edition of The Roof Climber's Guide to Trinity was published on 11 July 2011 by Oleander Press. Its introduction contains further details about Symington and his book. In addition it included not before seen information on night-climbing and urban exploring in Cambridge and the surrounding towns, villages and country houses. The Roof Climber's Guide to Trinity has remained popular, though it is easier to find in bookshops than the original Night Climbers.

Given its sometimes clandestine nature, some Cambridge students have described The Night Climbers of Cambridge as a modern day Marauder's Map of Harry Potter fame. In 2014, a team of Cambridge engineers designed an online app called the "Cambridge Marauders Map", which allowed friends to view their movements within the colleges of Cambridge and identify potential hazards. The Marauders Map app included many climbing and urban exploring features taken from The Night Climbers of Cambridge. The app is no longer publicly available.

Legacy
Symington stood for Harborough in 1950 as an independent Mosleyite candidate, receiving 273 votes. In 1958 he published the book Return to Responsibility: A New Concept of the Case for Fascism in the Post-War World.

Eric Waddams was head of music at Elizabeth College, Guernsey in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Night Climbers of Cambridge is repeatedly referred to in The Bad Quarto, a mystery novel by Jill Paton Walsh. Her novel mentions a supposed additional chapter regarding night climbing in St Agatha's College, the fictional Cambridge setting for most of Walsh's stories about Imogen Quy, college nurse at St Agatha's. Night climbing plays a central role in The Bad Quarto, along with a production of the 1603 quarto version of Hamlet.

title: The Night Climbers of Cambridge