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Talk:RAF Bomber Command

Question
"Bomber Command's other main function was to provide tanker aircraft to the RAF." Are we sure about this? While the aircraft were ex-bombers, are we sure refulelling wasn't the job of one of the other Commands? DJ Clayworth 06:28, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)

POV and Bias
Rather then discuss the detailed history of bomber command. This page compares and defends the actions of bomber command. It does not even mention that this group was denied a campaign medal for WW2? Someone needs to rewrite and give this page and the group the justice and respect that they deserve. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.47.178.137 (talk) 21:26, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

 * A critical analysis is not required to pay lip service to any particular point of view. The notions of "justice and respect" are entirely valid but they follow the line of a tribute which is not within the scope of a reference article.

 * That said, there is a little too much acceptance of USAAF claims at face value. Certainly, the largely-USAAF led Oil Campaign was the turning point and denial of oil was a prominent factor in ending the war. The overall tonnage of bombs dropped was quite similar for both services but to a large degree, this assumes the same methodology as what Harris was accused of: judging the success of the raid by the tonnage of bombs dropped. It also needs to be remembered that not all American daylight raids achieved their objectives. The Norden bombsight was useless in cloud and the H2X radar - a derivative of the British H2S radar - was not sufficiently accurate for blind bombing with any guarantee of success. Under those circumstances, the USAAF indulged in a bit of area bombing of its own.

 * P-51s may have swept dozens of aircraft from the sky at a time but the lack of fuel/oil denied far more the chance to get off the ground. Flanker235 (talk) 04:50, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

 * The British had undergone in 1940/41 what up to that time had been the heaviest bombing in history so one could reasonably assume that they were in a position to know what caused the most damage to (their own) industry and production, and the results of this knowledge they put into practice in the subsequent bombing offensive against Germany.

 * One of the discoveries of The Blitz was that small high explosive bombs did almost no damage to industrial machinery unless by a direct hit and at most would blow out the factory windows spreading glass everywhere. For this reason the RAF went to ever increasingly larger bombs for destroying industrial machine tools such as industrial lathes, milling machines, etc. They also discovered that if you could set a building on fire the machinery inside would be ruined due to warping at high temperatures. So they started to saturate an area with hundreds of thousands of 4lb incendiary bombs. They then needed something to blow-off the roofing materials, as roof tiles were sufficient to stop a 4lb incendiary at its terminal velocity. So they came up with the 4,000lb High Capacity "Blockbuster" for this purpose. To destroy the machinery inside they standardised on the 1,000lb Medium Capacity bomb - see images.

 * The post-1942 RAF Area Bombing offensive was planned based on the experience gained from the Blitz. The British didn't need to build 'fake' test buildings to see the best way of attacking industry. They already had first-hand experience of it with their own factories and industrial areas. To think otherwise requires the trusting innocence of the simpleton.

 * The post-war bombing surveys need to be read with this simple fact in mind. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.74 (talk) 10:29, 19 May 2016 (UTC)

http://ww2history.com/experts/Tami_Biddle/Effectiveness_of_Bomber_Command Khamba Tendal (talk) 22:43, 24 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Just asked this on the Luftwaffe page. Why does this article not have a section for War Crimes? 105.4.2.48 (talk) 23:11, 5 December 2018 (UTC)

 * Possibly because at the time it wasn't a war crime to bomb defended cities.

 * ... which is why at Nuremberg Hermann Göring wasn't charged over his bombing campaign. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.48 (talk) 09:47, 21 December 2018 (UTC)

"They also discovered that if you could set a building on fire the machinery inside would be ruined due to warping at high temperatures." Not sure about this. I read somewhere that one of the main tactics was to destroy the roof of factories etc so the rain then damaged all the machinery via corrosion etc.--JustinSmith (talk) 10:40, 21 December 2018 (UTC)

 * Possibly, but the factory workers could have just put tarpaulins over the machinery when it was raining. If fire warps the bed of a lathe or other machine tool OTOH then even if it still functions that tool is effectively ruined, as it can no longer produce parts to accurate dimensions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.48 (talk) 10:55, 21 December 2018 (UTC)

Non-British/non-RAF
"Many of Bomber Command's personnel and squadrons during the war were neither British nor part of the RAF; a large proportion came from Commonwealth countries, or occupied Europe." Is this misleading? Whilst there were certainly many squadrons from overseas, the fact that their members wore RAF uniforms, flew aircraft with RAF markings, were under RAF operational command and their squadron badges bore the words "Royal Air Force" would seem to make one think they were part of the RAF. Greenshed 22:34, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

Agree. The same point can be made without employing the "neither/nor" approach.--Buckboard 06:23, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Maybe. But Greenshed's reasoning is incorrect: wearing uniforms which resembled RAF uniforms is not the same thing as wearing RAF uniforms. Using "RAF markings" and being under RAF operational command was simply a practical matter. And No. 6 Group, as an RCAF unit, certainly had a degree of operational autonomy.

 * During 1943-45, No. 54 Squadron RAF was based in Australia, its Spitfires had Australian identifiers and it was part of No. 1 Fighter Wing RAAF. It still wasn't an RAAF squadron. Grant65 | Talk 15:39, 17 July 2006 (UTC)
 * Further to that, RAAF uniforms resembled RAF uniforms only in the insignia and general design; they were a different colour, being a kind of royal blue, rather than the blue-grey of RAF gear. (The RAAF did use grey-blue for a period after the war.) And during the war, King George VI held the ceremonial rank of Marshal of the RAAF (a post now held by the Duke of Edinburgh). Grant  |  Talk  05:16, 4 August 2007 (UTC)

There is a common misconception that Commonwealth air force units had some sort of independence of action during WW2. They did not; the RCAF squadrons for administrative simplicity were collected together into one group (6 group) but were still very much an integral part of Bomber Command and under Harris' guidance and overall command. Harris did not have to defer to any equivilant line of RCAF staff command- this would have made operations exceedingly complicated. Similarly with the appropriate fighter units and RAF fighter Command, and 2 TAF. Harryurz 20:36, 5 August 2007 (UTC)

 * You are correct. 6 Group was not "attached" to Bomber Command as if it were a completely separate entity; it was as much a part of Bomber Command as any other Bomber Command group. The paragraph describing 6 Group should be reworded a bit.--BC 21:24, 5 August 2007 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but you are both overlooking the political level, which is always superior to operational control. Since 1931, the Dominions have shared the same head of of state as the UK, but the UK has had no control over the foreign policy of the Dominions, let alone political control over their militaries. Dominion air force units, and personnel were part of the air forces of sovereign powers and were part of RAF formations like Bomber Command and the Desert Air Force only for operational purposes (as were USAAF and even Soviet units on some occasions).

Under Article XV of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (1939), which was essentially a mutual defence treaty between sovereign powers, separate squadrons were supposed to be formed in the UK from Dominion air force personnel. Operational needs meant that many personnel served with units which which were technically part of other air forces. So that in an RCAF Lancaster crew, you might well find three RCAF guys, one from the RAF, one RAAF and a Pole. The fact that the Dominion governments did not enforce the legal requirement for their personnel to serve only with the air force of their own country, reflected the good relations between the Commonwealth countries (including the UK) and not some mythical ability of the RAF to do as it pleased with essentially foreign personnel.

They means 6 Group was not "as much a part of Bomber Command as any other Bomber Command group". Because the Canadian government could have withdrawn it at any time it pleased. The non-Canadians serving with 6 Group would have to have been transferred to other units. Grant |  Talk  00:14, 6 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Grant, thanks for the background. I realize that the group had a degree of autonomy and that since it was Canadian it obviously was not the same as other groups. It was still, however, part of Bomber Command rather than merely being "attached". By definition, Bomber Command consisted of several groups, and 6 Group was one of them. Even Air Vice-Marshall G.E. Brookes (Air Officer Commanding 6 Group) said: "We are proud to be part of Bomber Command and will do our utmost to maintain its high tradition".--BC 03:19, 6 August 2007 (UTC)
 * I guess it comes down to how you understand "attached". I am not implying that Brookes and 6 Grp developed and implemented their own operations, independently of Harris and more senior commanders. Brookes' role was the same as any other group commander; but he answered to the Canadian government, which could certainly have a vetoed use of the group, a squadron or an individual member of the RCAF.

 * As an illustration of how the independence of Dominion personnel and units could play out, RAAF doctrine in 1939 largely dismissed fighter squadrons (as opposed to bomber, "army co-operation" and maritime strike/reconnaissance roles), which explains the eccentric spread of RAAF personnel/squadrons in the various RAF commands throughout the war. This doctrine was the cause of a disagreement between the British authorities and the RAAF over the operational role/training and equipment of No. 451 Squadron RAAF, which the RAF wanted to convert from army co-op to a fighter unit. A stand-off resulted and the squadron sat non-operational in the Middle East for all of 1942, until the RAAF relented. Perhaps Japanese raids on northern Australia had impressed on them the need for fighters by that time ;-)  Grant  |  Talk  05:58, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

'By 1945 46% of Bomber Command personnel were from the Dominions' - complete rubbish! Deleted. Even a moment's coherent thought shows that statement to be laughable. Not to decry for a moment the vital contribution of the dominions and other overseas airmen and other personnel but we can't allow such tosh to stand as fact 80.6.147.186 (talk) 04:26, 16 December 2008 (UTC)

Good point, I'm trying to find any reference or source of that statistic; it does seem a tad high, although various internet articles state that by 1945 25% of the Command were Canadian and 10% were Australian (though its unclear if its simply aircrew or total personnel!). The serious lack of manpower that dogged the British armed services in the late-war era is well documented, so I suspect its possibly of the right order, but I'll try and confirm before anything is edited. Thanks Harryurz (talk) 20:54, 17 December 2008 (UTC)

According to this fascinating paper its 30%, but there's other detailed info here people may find interesting Harryurz (talk) 21:24, 17 December 2008 (UTC); http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.html

 * Actually, most of the Dominion crews would still have been British Subjects. Australians didn't get separate citizenship until about 1948, although Canadians had had their own since the 1920s. Many of the other Empire 'nationalities' would have had British Passports, even if they had thought of themselves as, say, New Zealanders first, and British second. As for the Poles and Czechs, these aircrew had been given British citizenship when it was realised that any of them being shot down and falling into the hands of the Germans could have been legally executed as 'traitors' by the Polish government in Warsaw and for the Czecks this also applied to the regime in Czechoslovakia. This is the reason that few Polish and Czeck RAF aircrew returned to their home countries after Poland and Czechoslovakia had became Soviet-run after the war, having legally become Britons they were entitled to remain in the UK. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.251.19 (talk) 22:25, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

 * New Zealanders didn't get separate citizenship until 1949. For Australians it was 1948. Canadians were still British until 1946. Before those dates RCAF, RAAF, RNZAF, SAAF, RRAF, and IAF etc., aircrew were all British subjects (the equivalent of being British Citizens today) just the same as any airman from England, Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland.

 * RAF aircrew from the occupied countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, were refugees and effectively 'stateless persons' as their countries and governments no longer existed in a form recognised by the international community, nor did these countries have a legitimate government recognised by The Crown. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.11.207 (talk) 15:02, 4 September 2016 (UTC)

Legality of Bombing
Under The Early Years of the War, the article says: "The British Government did not want to violate international law by attacking civilian targets ...". Lower down, under Casualties, it quotes a review by the Red Cross as saying "... during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property ...". Which is correct? Peter Bell (talk) 00:22, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

 * Actually, the legal onus was on the defending power to protect its civilians, if necessary, evacuating them out of harm's way. It was illegal however, to deliberately attack defenceless civilians, which is why if the Germans had withdrawn their AA guns and night fighters from the cities leaving them completely undefended, the RAF then would have been on very shaky ground legally. The Germans couldn't have done this of course, as it would have been seen as abandoning the cities, and perhaps even Hitler's government might have had trouble from adverse public opinion, not to mention the fall in industrial output that would have ensued as the workers became unavailable to the aircraft and munitions factories. As they say nowadays, the German civilian population were somewhat 'caught between a rock and a hard place'.

 * Basically, the safety of its citizens was the responsibility of the defending power, and it had the alternatives of either using force to defend them (which Germany did) or of removing the defences from around the cities and relying on the legal protection that was available, which, if the RAF had continued to bomb the now-defenceless, cities, would have resulted in an uproar among neutral countries, and in diplomatic protest from neutral governments.

 * This all equally applied to the British, and they had faced this same dilemma earlier in the war, in the Blitz on London and in the bombing of Coventry and various other cities, although the British had carried out a large scale evacuation of its children to the safer countryside, and overseas to Canada, Australia, etc., but this evacuation overseas ended with the torpedoeing and sinking of a ship carrying evacuee children, the SS City of Benares. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.251.19 (talk) 23:08, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

 * "This all equally applied to the British, and they had faced this same dilemma earlier in the war, in the Blitz on London and in the bombing of Coventry and" - This all obviously does NOT equally apply....Just read the article about the Blitz <>--93.218.136.160 (talk) 08:03, 26 September 2012 (UTC)

 * Lets see some RS.Slatersteven (talk) 16:02, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

 * I think you'll find that the Nazi government cared little about who it killed at the time, e.g., Guernica, and being accidentally killed by a bomb that falls wide that's intended for a factory is little different from being killed by a bomb deliberately aimed at the civil population. You still end up dead. If the German government had wanted to keep its population safe it could have evacuated it's population to the countryside, then they wouldn't have been in the cities when they were bombed. That wasn't the fault of the British, and they would have bombed the empty cities quite happily, as that would still have destroyed the factories and workshops.

 * Instead the Nazis kept their population in the cities because they wanted them to continue production of armaments, which Germany was then using in the fight against Britain and her allies. So what do the critics suggest the British should have done - left the factories alone so that they could continue to produce more tanks, guns, ships, U-boats, etc., for the German war machine. Tanks, guns, ships, U-boats that were then going on to be used to kill allied troops, sink allied ships, be used to invade other neutral countries, etc. You see, almost all of these munitions were being produced by civilians, so even in ideal circumstances it would be very difficult to target these factories without some risk to civilians, and once you are forced to bomb at night with the limited technology of the time then you can pretty well forget any niceties such as minimising civilian casualties. It just couldn't be done. This applied to both sides in the air war.

 * Unfortunately for Germany, during The Blitz in 1940 some German bombers had accidentally bombed a residential part of the East End whilst trying to hit the docks, and because the British assumed it had been a deliberate attack on worker's homes they quite naturally assumed 'the gloves were off' and that 'what's good for the goose, is good for the gander'. That is when the British stopped worrying too much about the German civilian population. The fact that the East End housing bombing had been accidental was only found out by the British after the war, but by then it was a bit late for Germany. ISTR that the Luftwaffe officer responsible was summoned before a furious Hermann Göring at the time. The German leadership were in an embarrassing position once the British bombing started because they had entered the war on the assurance of Göring that they wouldn't be bombed, Germany being thought well-defended due to the Luftwaffe and their new radar systems. In this they were mistaken. And it didn't help Germany later when Goebbels made his 1943 speech about Total War.

 * Hindsight is all very well, as is all this post-war hand-wringing about the civilian casualties, but THE CRITICS haven't spent hours at home sitting under the stairs in the dark because there are German bombers overhead dropping bombs on them. THE CRITICS haven't had foreigners flying over THEIR country in heavily-armed aeroplanes trying to kill them. And THE CRITICS haven't had civilian friends and relatives killed and blown literally to bits only hours after seeing them last - at least I hope they haven't. And neither have most people reading this today.

 * The British had, and for several years prior to the RAF bombing campaign gearing up and plastering Germany. So the critic's opinion, like so many other's critical of the RAF bombing campaign, is pretty much worthless. When people are trying to kill you you do anything in order to survive. And that's what the British did, and if a few German civilians died, then tough luck. The British didn't vote Hitler into power, and they didn't ask him to invade Poland in 1939 or support him afterwards like the majority of the German civilian population did. And they (the British) didn't ask him to bomb Warsaw, Rotterdam or London, either. And they didn't invite him to attempt to invade them in 1940, which he was at the time preparing to do. The British had spent the previous five years bending-over-backwards trying to keep out of any war with Germany, and went through the humiliation of appeasement in order to prevent one, so they were pretty pissed-off with Germany already by the time war came in 1939.

 * The safety of its civilian population was a German responsibility, and if they hadn't been present in the cities when they were being bombed they wouldn't have been killed. That was the Nazi government's fault, as they knew damn well the British were going to be bombing German cities eventually - just like Germany had been doing to everyone else's. So that shows the sort of value the German government placed on its civil population.

 * You see, THE CRITICS (like hopefully, most of the readers of this) will go home tonight and sleep in a safe, warm bed, knowing that they will wake up tomorrow and carry on with their life as normal. They do not live in constant fear and worry for their life. Well, most of the inhabitants of Britain in the period 1939-1945 DID live in constant fear and worry for their lives. So you really needed to be there at the time to understand the complex reasoning and practicalities, not to say the emotions, behind why the British and the RAF and Commonwealth air forces did what they did. It makes a big difference if you've had people coming into your airspace in big aeroplanes trying to bomb the s**t out of you. People involved in doing this in far-off countries at present should bear this in mind, as people have long memories for injustice, real or imagined.

 * The alternative was to let the Nazis win. For large sections of humanity under their control (including large numbers of of Germans) it was literally a hell on earth. So the critics should really try asking the victims - the ones who survived - what they thought about German civilian casualties.

 * And as for the 'legality of the bombing' then I assume you are unaware of the sort of war it quickly became. It was a life-or-death struggle, not some gentlemanly game of cricket, although most people and services on both sides managed to keep things fairly civilised. But that only works when both sides have principles. It doesn't work when you are dealing with people like the Nazis, the SS, or the Gestapo. They were murderers. Unfortunately for the German people 'when you lie with dogs you will get up with fleas'.

 * To really understand all this you had to be there at the time and see things as they (the British and their allies) saw them. Because we now know things that they didn't, see. It's called 'hindsight'. We all know that the war in Europe ended in May 1945 - well they didn't know any such thing until - you've guessed it, May 1945. So they did what they thought was necessary at the time. And if that meant bombing German civilians, well, that was unfortunate, but by then the fate of German civilians had dropped way down their list of priorities, especially towards the end of the war after the pictures came out from Belsen. Even at that late stage of the war, the German government could still have evacuated the cities if it had wished to do so.

 * Unfortunately, those civilian casualties were part of the price the Germans had to pay for getting rid of Hitler and the Nazi regime. For myself, I wish it were not so, but it was. But I also wish the Germans had just ignored Hitler and left him to get on with his painting, which, if more people had taken more interest in, and bought one or two of his paintings now and then, I'm sure he would have been happy doing. It would have saved the world a lot of trouble. And saved the deaths of a lot of decent, innocent, people, German ones included. ... but again, that's hindsight.

 * ... and if the entire RAF bombing campaign against Germany saved only one innocent Jew or Gypsy from the gas chambers then it was worth it ... and I'm not Jewish or a Gypsy.

 * ... and I suggest that the critics of RAF Bomber Command's 1939-45 campaign withhold criticism until they've actually had to face something like an angry man attempting to stick a bayonet into their vital regions, then they can criticise from a position of actually knowing what war and gut-wrenching fear is like, rather than pontificating from their safe comfy armchairs, while relying on other people to go out and do their dirty work for them. But that's just MHO. War - ALL war - is violent, brutal, inhuman, sordid and nasty, and nothing any lawyer says makes a jot of difference when someone is seriously trying to kill you and looks likely to succeed. Then you do what you need to do to survive. And anyone who tells you anything else is either mistaken, or a liar. And THAT is why the German civilian population had to go through what they did. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 19:59, 13 January 2013 (UTC)

I mean, even the fact that you would claim that the deaths of tens of thousands of German civilians, and 55,573 brave men from Bomber Command would be justified and worthwhile to prevent the death of one member of a preferred ethnic or religious group defies credulity. That kind of irrational appeal to ethnocentric base emotionalism and political correctness simply has no place in an informed debate on the legality (and morality!) of area bombing.  Azx2  06:53, 19 October 2013 (UTC)
 * (bearing in mind WP:NOTFORUM) replying to a 9-month old seems a bit pointless GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:35, 19 October 2013 (UTC)

 * Perhaps I didn't make myself clear. It's like this; When you are forced up against a wall with a knife at your throat, do you worry about the possibility of hurting your attacker, and it's legal implications, in order to stop him killing you.

 * There, that ought to explain in fairly simple terms what the original replier obviously failed to grasp.

 * My point also was that knowing what you would actually do is not possible until you have actually been in that situation, and that unless you have been, your opinion is basically worthless. A bit like advising a rape victim to just "lie back and enjoy it", it completely fails to understand the gravity or seriousness of the situation, or the extremely nasty, even psychopathic, character of the attacker.

 * The other point is that it was a question of moral principles, not "preferred ethnic or religious group"s, and that bombing German civilians, however reprehensible, was preferable to letting Nazi Germany win. That the life of one 'innocent' Jew or Gypsy - many of whom were actually Germans - and anyone else, Poles, Belgians, Dutch, French, etc., for that matter, was, at that time, felt to be worth more than the lives of numerous ordinary Germans, who had to suffer because of the 'guilt' of having voted Hitler into power, and thinking that war was all victory parades and marching bands. So bombing German civilians was perceived as being "the lesser of two evils".

 * So, it was a question of moral principles and perceived guilt. Germany was - at least temporarily - a democracy, and the German people voted Hitler and his regime into power. So they were not entirely blameless, it was a case of electoral responsibility. If you vote into power a warmongering-murderer who brings absolute misery to millions then it is not surprising if you are blamed, not unfairly, for the results. The bombing of Germany could have been stopped at any time if the German People had overthrown Hitler and his regime and made peace. Unfortunately for the German People, they tried several times but failed.

 * It was because of this perceived guilt in having started World War II that only Germany itself was subjected to sustained area bombing by the RAF, as the other countries that joined the war on Germany's side afterwards, Italy, Romania, Hungary, etc., where not considered 'guilty' in quite the same manner, and were considered more as victims of Germany, rather than aggressors. It was also for this same reason that none of the occupied countries, which contributed - albeit unwillingly - to Germany's war machine, were bombed in this way either.

 * Britain on the other hand didn't start World War II, and had in fact tried for most of the thirties to avoid any conflict with Germany, so it is not surprising that after 1940 when they had faced the possibility of being invaded and enslaved by Nazi Germany that they weren't too bothered about the plight of the average German citizen. At that time Britain had more pressing problems.

 * As I mentioned somewhere else, it is a sad fact of life that if you start a fight with someone who then turns round and beats the c**p out of you, it's bit late to complain, as the likely response you will get is "Serves you right". Few Germans celebrating the victories in 1939-40 would have thought that by 1945 they would be living amongst piles of rubble that were once their homes and workplaces.

 * The moral of all this is that you should never start a fight, as you can never be quite sure how it will be fought, or how it will end.

 * ... and the other thing to bear in mind is that every war in history has been started or caused by fewer than 50 or 100 key people in power. All that misery caused by a few people who think they are going to gain from it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.24.216.123 (talk) 10:20, 9 July 2014 (UTC)

Cap Arcona Attack
Deleted the sentence on the air attack that sank the three German transports. It was carried out by RAF Typhoons of Tactical Air Command not Bomber Command and is thus irrelevent to an article on Bomber Command. The entry was also factually inaccurate in that the sinkings did not cause a firestorm. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.151.54.227 (talk) 16:09, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

References please!
Hi everybody! I'm the italian user who created the Bomber Command page in the italian wiki (here)... unfortunately I don't have books about Bomber Command in Cold War and I wasn't able to find out any good site... so, I've translated the paragraph from this page, but it's without references... does anybody could show me some good sites where take info? Thank you and sorry for my english (you can answer here or in my talk). --Bonty90 (talk) 13:30, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

/* The "balance sheet" */ Tooze and Speer's sleight of hand.
Added a brief account of Tooze's view of BC effectiveness contra received opinion.Keith-264 (talk) 21:06, 22 February 2012 (UTC)
 * good work--the reviewers in scholarly journals give VERY high marks to Tooze's work. Rjensen (talk) 21:09, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Eythenkew! The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway by Alfred C Mierzejewski is also good but somewhat fooled by Speer's armaments propaganda so skillfully demolished by Tooze. He's also more than a little unfair to BC (in describing the highly effective oil offensive of late 1944-1945 he labels American raids but then mentions other targets, omitting to mention that they were blammed by BC).Keith-264 (talk) 23:16, 22 February 2012 (UTC)
 * Well done! Similar things are written in Giorgio Bonacina, Comando Bombardieri - Operazione Europa, Milano, Longanesi & C., 1975, p. 429. --Zerosei (talk) 16:21, 29 February 2012 (UTC)

 * Post-war critics of RAF Bomber Command were placed in the unenviable situation of trying to support the proponents of other air force's air offensives which sometimes had difficulty dropping their bombs in the correct country, never mind the correct city or town. This at least the RAF usually managed to do correctly without too many problems after 1942 - and they flew at night. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.74 (talk) 15:36, 19 May 2016 (UTC)

 * It is a curious fact that while most post-war histories on the effectiveness of Allied bombing on German production understate or attempt to minimize the effects of RAF Bomber Command, if one reads the German leadership's statements made, and paperwork written, at the time, they almost completely ignore the US bombing, which is hardly mentioned at all, and the only importance they attach to it was the propaganda one, in that the civil population could see the American bombers overhead, and that for this reason the Luftwaffe was ordered to intercept them. The only bombing the German leadership attached importance to was the RAF's, which was seriously hurting Germany and the effects of-which were immediately noticeable by everyone.

 * It was after all the RAF's bombing that spurred the German leadership to pour men and materiel into the V-weapons, not anyone else's. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.249 (talk) 11:09, 23 December 2016 (UTC)

 * The British were reading German radio traffic via Ultra and so knew exactly what effect the bombing was having, a point not mentioned in earlier writings on Bomber Command due to the existence of Ultra not being revealed until as late as 1973.

 * If RAF Bomber Command was so ineffectual as some post-war historians claim the War Cabinet would have known about it, and changed the strategy of the Force away from Area Bombing. They didn't, as they had information via Ultra on the severe impact it was having on Germany 'straight from the horse's mouth' - from the Nazi leadership, right on down to the relatively lowly DRB railway station manager, themselves. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.48 (talk) 10:08, 21 December 2018 (UTC)

Bombing Germany
The official RAF records show Bomber Command began bombing German cities on 11 May 1940, with the first raid taking place that same day at Monchengladbach. (79.67.102.69 (talk) 18:58, 19 January 2016 (UTC))

 * As has already been explained to you, the attack on road and rail links behind the German front line has no relationship to the major change in British policy caused by the attack on Rotterdam by the Germans. MilborneOne (talk) 19:50, 19 January 2016 (UTC)
 * That claim regarding Rotterdam supposedly changing British policy is dismissed by Worth reviewing. . dave souza, talk 20:38, 19 January 2016 (UTC)

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Conflicting death statistics
First we read : "55,573 were killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew (a 44.4 percent death rate)".

Later : "Taking an example of 100 airmen: 55 killed on operations or died as result of wounds" That's 55% killed. ?? Rcbutcher (talk) 01:45, 18 July 2016 (UTC)

External links modified
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I have just modified 3 one external links on RAF Bomber Command. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20070515080726/http://www.raf.mod.uk:80/bombercommand/mar43.html to http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/mar43.html
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080920162508/http://members.iinet.net.au:80/~tcosgrove/vcross.html to http://members.iinet.net.au/~tcosgrove/vcross.html
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20100503120450/http://www.theygaveeverything.co.uk:80/ to http://www.theygaveeverything.co.uk/

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Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 02:56, 10 November 2016 (UTC)

German casualties
I have removed a bizarre section dealing with the total German casualties caused by allied strategic bombing. There's obviously a place for this information on wikipedia, but it's not in the casualties section of this article. Pipsally (talk) 10:47, 28 June 2021 (UTC)

title: Talk:RAF Bomber Command


text:
Template talk:Listen

Recent changes and timedtext
When media is given timedtext captions, the reader can no longer simultaneously scroll the article and listen to the media. I don't think this is an improvement. I'm not sure where this new change was made or how/if it can be modified. Any help? ili (talk) 14:15, 6 May 2022 (UTC)
 * See T246035. Nardog (talk) 14:35, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Length
Now that the media player shows the length for sound files, this template showing it, too, is no longer useful for those files. Maybe User:Nardog can remove that feature again. It would still be useful for video files, but I suspect the code is, and rightly so, agnostic about the file type. I don't think the template is used for many video files, so maybe the functionality could be flipped: don't show the duration unless yes. -- Michael Bednarek (talk) 04:32, 19 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Barack Obama inaugural address.ogv[[File:Remarks on the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (August 6, 1965) Lyndon Baines Johnson.ogv|thumb]] The new player shows the duration for some videos too. It looks like it depends on the aspect ratio. We can make the length show only for videos. Should we? Nardog (talk) 17:49, 20 June 2022 (UTC)
 * That's weird. // IMO it's best to use yes, i.e. don't show by default, but allow where needed. -- Michael Bednarek (talk) 02:41, 21 June 2022 (UTC)
 * it depends on height. A video has to be at least 150px high for the duration label to show. —Th e DJ (talk • contribs) 07:59, 22 June 2022 (UTC)

Flex for side box
I'll shortly be rolling out an adjustment for Module:Side box which uses flex styling and more or less responsive TemplateStyles (see Module:Side box/sandbox and Module:Side box/styles.css etc.) on the nearly-complete mission to TemplateStyles ambox. I would just naturally have updated the module here to account for that, so then I went to look at the sandbox here and saw a recent adjustment from 220px to a "restored" 233px width. My preferred implementation would be to narrow the audio element back down to accommodate the flex styling, so I must ask, why was that done there? Izno (talk) 20:01, 21 June 2022 (UTC)
 * We picked 233px because that was the magic number of the shortest width that still showed a seek bar in the Kaltura player (see /Archive 3#Slider). Now that it's been replaced by VideoJS there's no reason to stick to it, so I don't understand why Michael Bednarek restored it in the sandbox either. Nardog (talk) 23:11, 21 June 2022 (UTC)
 * I think we'd have to take it down to closer to 200px, though I haven't played around with it yet.
 * Can I sync the sandbox? There's a change or two different from the main besides the width of the bar, and it looks like this module will be a bit more work than anticipated given the styling it outputs. Izno (talk) 01:22, 22 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Go ahead AFAIC. Make it whatever works/looks good. The only difference in the sandbox aside from the width is making the duration an opt-in as requested by Michael above. Nardog (talk) 01:49, 22 June 2022 (UTC)
 * I apologize for for restoring 233px in the sandbox. It was a reflex reaction; the behaviour of the new player hasn't sunk in here yet. -- Michael Bednarek (talk) 02:48, 22 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Please take a look at the testcases. There are some differences in appearance as this module now relies a bit more on the native side box styling. Please fuss with it in the variety of skins and accordingly resolutions on the test case page.
 * I'll push this live after I push the associated side box changes live and I get some agreement on the change. Izno (talk) 17:46, 26 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Now live. I await 'teh borked'. Izno (talk) 20:39, 7 July 2022 (UTC)

conflict with <score> tags' audio players?
Use of the template anywhere on a page seems to result in breaking the audio players of <score> tags?

Example:

Assuming this talk page currently still has at least 1 usage instance of the Listen template, I'm getting a non-functional audio player for the <score> above that (when clicked to play) seems to try to play a null file (instead of the <score>'s content) and fails, and also simultaneously seems to put the page into a weird state that requires a browser page refresh to get out of.

I'm not sure if this is a bug with the template vs a bug in the implementation of <score>'s audio player feature. 50.47.241.61 (talk) 12:57, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

 * Ok, further testing shows that it looks like the page having any file wikilink that invokes the audio player will repro this issue, so it's not specific to the template. It's looking more like a bug with <score>'s implementation. 50.47.241.61 (talk) 17:35, 17 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes. See T363630. Nardog (talk) 00:38, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Template talk:Listen


text:
Lion Rock Tunnel

The Lion Rock Tunnel, the first major road tunnel in Hong Kong, is a twin-bored toll tunnel, connecting Hin Tin, Sha Tin in the New Territories and New Kowloon near Kowloon Tong. It has two southbound lanes, and there are two northbound lanes in the Second Lion Rock Tunnel, with the toll booths located at the Sha Tin end. They are vital components of Route 1.

History
The construction of Lion Rock Tunnel started in January 1962. The tunnel was opened on 14 November 1967, as a 1.43 km dual-one single bore tunnel. This tunnel is often described as a by-product of the Plover Cove Scheme, which was a project to build a water supply tunnel through the range of hills separating New Kowloon and the rest of the New Territories. The tunnel was designed by Young Au Young, a graduate of Lingnan and civil engineer

The government later saw the need for another road link between New Kowloon and Sha Tin when it decided to develop the latter as a new town. The Second Lion Rock Tunnel, which is 1.41 km long and situated to the west of, and lying parallel to, the old tunnel, was opened to traffic on 18 January 1978.

The new tunnel serves northbound traffic towards Sha Tin, while the old one serves southbound traffic towards Kowloon. Traffic in both directions share one of the tunnels when the other undergoes maintenance.

Management
Since 1993, Serco has been contracted to manage, operate and maintain the tunnel, having successfully retained the contract in 1996 and 2000.

The Tunnel has achieved both ISO 9001 and OHASA18001 in 2004. The toll to traverse the Lion Rock Tunnel is HK$8 each way.

On 23 April 2012, Greater Lucky (H.K.) Company Limited successfully bid the contract and took over the management with effect from 1 August 2012.

Renovation of the tunnel
As the facilities within the tubes of Lion Rock Tunnel suffered from serious deterioration due to ageing, as well as broken concrete on the road surface which caused bumping when vehicles pass through, the Highways Department decided to undergo renovation works upon the tunnels in 2008. It will extend the lives of the tunnels for around 80 years more.

However, the renovation may cause even more serious congestion of the tunnels and may change the starting time for one-tube-two-way traffic (using one tube only for both direction of traffic) from 12 am to 9 or 10 pm. The fire-resisting shields on the wall of the tunnels and the ceilings would be renovated, while the words "LION ROCK TUNNEL" and its Chinese counterparts would be retained on the sides of the entrances and exits of the tunnels.

Current usage
With the rapid development of the new towns, the tunnels have already reached its saturation flow just like Cross-Harbour Tunnel. The flow was eased by other tunnels being put into service later, such as Shing Mun Tunnels, Tate's Cairn Tunnel, Tsing Sha Highway. Nonetheless the convenience of its connection and directness, with a lower fee than the Tate's Cairn Tunnel, Lion Rock Tunnel contributes to the highest daily average vehicles flow of all non-harbour-crossing tunnels. 90,608 vehicles used the tunnels everyday on average in 2014.

title: Lion Rock Tunnel


text:
Title Nine

Title Nine or Title IX may refer to:

Legal

 * Title IX - U.S. federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in federally-funded education programs
 * Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - law making it easier to move civil rights cases from U.S. state courts to federal court
 * Title 9 of the United States Code - the role of arbitration in the United States Code

Business

 * Title Nine Sports - American sports apparel brand

title: Title Nine