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User:Rovoam~enwiki/Nagorno Karabakh Republic

Nagorno Karabakh Republic (Armenian: Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետություն), short name Nagorno Karabakh Azerbaijani: Dağlıq Qarabağ or Yuxarı Qarabağ, literally "mountainous Karabakh" or "upper Karabakh"; Russian: Нагорный Карабах, translit. Nagornyy Karabakh; translit. Lernayin Gharabagh), historically known as Artsakh (Armenian: Արցախ), is a region of former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, in southern Caucasia, located about 270 km (about 170 mi) west of the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. This predominantly Armenian populated autonomous region had been placed under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan by an arbitrary decision of Stalin in 1923. Karabakh has declared independence from Azerbaijan on December 10, 1991 and established Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). The NKR's sovereign status is not recognized by any country in the world.

The region's area is 4,400 km².Last official demographic data for this region have been received as a result of the Soviet population census in 1979. At that time the general population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was 162,200 persons from which 123,100 were Armenians (75,9 %), and 37,300 - Azeri (22,9 %). The region had no border with the neighboring Armenia, being separated from it by a narrow strip of the Azerbaijan land (so-called Lachin corridor). The capital is called Stepanakert (Xankəndi in Azeri).

The name of this small region, which was a little known outside of the Soviet Transcaucasia up to the end of 80th years of XX century century, now has concentrated in itself fierce ethno political and geopolitical disputes which in combination with other reasons have led to disintegration of Soviet Union.

The war for Nagorno Karabakh became the longest and one of the bloodiest conflicts in states-successors of Soviet Union. According to last estimations, it has killed 15000 people, and the number of refugees has exceeded one million.

From the point of view of international law this conflict is an example of contradictions between two fundamental principles: on the one hand, rights of people for self-determination, and on the other hand, a principle of territorial integrity according to which the state borders can only be changed under the peaceful agreement of parties involved.

Not going down deeply in ancient and medieval history, nevertheless, it is necessary to notice, that the Armenian party can present impressing number of neutral sources which testify, that Armenians prevailed in region during more than millennia. The Turkic population has appeared there not earlier the beginning of XVIII century century, having established eventually the board above the Armenian majority in the form Karabakh khanate, included in structure of Russian empire in 1813. During soviet time, as well as in imperial Russia, administrative borders of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region do not coincide with ethnic borders.

Nagorno-Karabakh became a subject of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918 when both countries declared independence from Russia. Azerbaijan claimed sovereignty over the province and sought to conquer it with help from the Young Turks. Territorial dispute has not been resolved until 1920, when both young states became part of the Soviet Union, and actually lost their independence due to the actions of Russian communists (Bolsheviks). In December, 1920 the Azerbaijan communistic government has dropped former complaints on Nagorno-Karabakh and some other territories populated by Armenians, recognizing these territories as part of the Soviet Armenia.

However, later the Azerbaijan new Soviet government has renewed the complaints and has addressed them to Moscow for support. On July, 4, 1921 so-called Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has voted for inclusion Nagorno-Karabakh into structure of Armenia. But next day, on July, 5, the new session of Caucasian Bureau has reconsidered its first decision in favor of Azerbaijan and ordered to place this territory under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. This part of resolution of the Caucasian Bureau has been implemented in 1923, when Autonomous Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was formed.

Supporters for the Armenian position frequently emphasize, that resolution of the Caucasian Bureau from July, 5, 1921, was obviously accepted under the Bolsheviks pressure, and, in any case, this resolution contradicts with the principle of self-determination and cannot be considered as valid: the problem should be solved by the countries, which it directly involves, and not by the Committee created specially for this case and inside the ruling party of the third country. When Mikhail Gorbachev has come to power in Moscow and has started the campaigns of publicity and democratic reforms in the end of 80th, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh reemerged. Encouraged by universal relaxation of political restrictions after decades of government repression, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh now have decided to address the problems to the international and Soviet heads. Complaining about "forced Azerification" of the region, the majority Armenian population started a movement to transfer it to Armenia. The conflict has been strongly burdened by the massive anti-Armenian pogrom organized in the Azerbaijan city of Sumgait at the end of February, 1988 - the first explosion of ethnic violence in the newest Soviet history.

In November 1991, seeking to squelch this movement, the Parliament of Azerbaijan abolished the autonomous status of the region. In response the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians held a December 10, 1991 referendum in which the overwhelming majority of the population voted for outright independence. The Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh boycotted this referendum.

These events led to violent actions against Armenians living in Baku and elsewhere in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis living in Armenia. As a result, a vast majority of Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Armenians in Azerbaijan (except for Nagorno-Karabakh) were displaced. A land war between Armenia and Azerbaijan followed the events of civil violence. Military actions were heavily influenced by the Russian military inspiring and balancing on the rivalry between the two neighboring nations to keep both under control.

Azerbaijanis were driven out of Nagorno-Karabakh and territories neighboring Nagorno-Karabakh (populated by Azerbaijanis), which are still under control of the Armenian military. An unofficial cease-fire was reached on May 12th, 1994 through Russian negotiation, and continues today. Today Armenians remain in control of the Soviet era autonomous region, a strip of land (called the Lachin corridor) linking it with the Republic of Armenia, as well as the so-called security zone--strips of territory along the region borders which had been used by Azerbaijan artillery during the war.

Today Nagorno-Karabakh is a de-facto independent state calling itself the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. It is closely tied to the Republic of Armenia and uses its currency, the dram. Successive Armenian governments have resisted internal pressure to unite the two, fearing reprisals from Azerbaijan and the international community, which still considers Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan. The politics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are so intermingled that a former president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Robert Kocharian, has become first prime minister (1997) and then the president of Armenia (1998 to the present).

At present, the mediation process is stalled and ongoing as both sides are equally intransigent. Azerbaijan insists that Armenian troops withdraw from all areas of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno-Karabakh and that all displaced persons be allowed to return to their homes before the status of Karabakh can be discussed. Armenia does not even admit that Nagorno-Karabakh is legally part of Azerbaijan, arguing that because the region declared independence at the same time that Azerbaijan became an independent state, both of them are equally successor states of the Soviet Union. The Armenian government insists that the government of Nagorno-Karabakh be part of any discussions on the region's future and rejects ceding occupied territory or allowing refugees to return prior to talks on the region's status.

In the latest episode, representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Russia and the United States met in Paris and Key-West, Florida in the spring of 2001. The details of the talks have remained largely secret, but reportedly the sides discussed non-hierarchical relationships between the central Azerbaijanian government and the Karabakh Armenian authorities. Despite rumours that the parties were again close to a solution, the Azerbaijanian authorities, both during Heydar Aliyev and after coming into power in October 2003 elections of his son Ilham Aliyev, have firmly denied any agreement has been reached in Paris or Key-West. Recent round of talks between Azerbaijanian and Armenian presidents, Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan, were held in September 2004 in Astana, Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit. Reportedly, one of the suggestions put forward was withdrawal of the occupying forces from the Azeri territories adjacent to Mountainous Karabakh and holding referendums in Mountainous Karabakh and in Azerbaijan regarding the future status of the region.


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Constance of Arles

Constance of Arles (c. 986 – 28 July 1032), also known as Constance of Provence, was Queen of France as the third spouse of King Robert II of France.

Life
Born c. 986 Constance was the daughter of William I, Count of Provence and Adelaide-Blanche of Anjou, daughter of Fulk II of Anjou. She was the sister of Count William II of Provence. Constance was married to King Robert, after his divorce from his second wife, Bertha of Burgundy. The marriage was stormy; Bertha's family opposed her, and Constance was despised for importing her Provençal kinfolk and customs. Robert's friend, Hugh of Beauvais, count palatine, tried to convince the king to repudiate her in 1007. Possibly at her request 12 knights of her kinsman Fulk Nerra then murdered Beauvais in 1008.

In 1010 Robert went to Rome, followed by his former wife Bertha, to seek permission to divorce Constance and remarry Bertha. Pope Sergius IV was not about to allow a consanguineous marriage which had been formally condemned by Pope Gregory V and Robert had already repudiated two wives. So the request was denied. After his return according to one source Robert "loved his wife more."

In 1022, a trial accused clergy members of heresy, Constance's previous confessor Stephen included. Robert had his wife Queen Constance stand at the door to prevent any mob violence. However, as the condemned clerics left the trial the queen "struck out the eye of Stephen... with the staff which she carried". This was seen as Constance venting her frustration at anyone subverting the prestige of the crown. At Constance's urging, her eldest son Hugh Magnus was crowned co-king alongside his father in 1017. But later Hugh demanded his parents share power with him, and rebelled against his father in 1025. Constance, however, on learning of her son's rebellion was furious with him, rebuking him at every turn. At some point Hugh was reconciled with his parents but shortly thereafter died, probably about age eighteen. The royal couple was devastated; there was concern for the queen’s mental health due to the violence of her grief.

Robert and Constance quarrelled over which of their surviving sons should inherit the throne; Robert favored their second son Henry, while Constance favored their third son, Robert. Despite his mother's protests and her support by several bishops, Henry was crowned in 1027. Constance, however, was not graceful when she didn't get her way. The ailing Fulbert, bishop of Chartres told a colleague that he could attend the ceremony "if he traveled slowly to Reims—but he was too frightened of the queen to go at all".

Constance encouraged her sons to rebel, and they began attacking and pillaging the towns and castles belonging to their father. Her son Robert attacked Burgundy, the duchy he had been promised but had never received, and Henry seized Dreux. At last King Robert agreed to their demands and peace was made which lasted until the king's death. King Robert died on 20 July 1031. Soon afterwards Constance fell ill; she was also at odds with both her surviving sons. Constance seized her dower lands and refused to surrender them. Henry fled to Normandy, where he received aid, weapons and soldiers from his brother Robert. He returned to besiege his mother at Poissy but Constance escaped to Pontoise. She only surrendered when Henry began the siege of Le Puiset and swore to slaughter all the inhabitants.

Constance died after passing out following a coughing fit on 28 July 1032 and was buried beside her husband Robert at Saint-Denis Basilica.

Children
Constance and Robert had:
 * 1) Advisa, Countess of Auxerre (c. 1003–after 1063), married Count Renaud I of Nevers
 * 2) Hugh Magnus, co-king (c. 1007–17 September 1026)
 * 3) Henri (17 May 1008 – 4 August 1060)
 * 4) Adela, Countess of Contenance (1009 – 8 January 1079), married Count Baldwin V of Flanders
 * 5) Robert I, Duke of Burgundy (1011–21 March 1076)
 * 6) Eudes (1013–1056)
 * 7) Constance of France (b. 1014), married Manasses, Count of Dammartin and had issue.

Additional resources

 * Jessee, W. Scott. A missing Capetian princess: Advisa, daughter of King Robert II of France (Medieval Prosopography), 1990
 * Moore, R. I. The Birth of Popular Heresy, 1975.
 * Lambert, Malcolm. Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation, 1991, 9 - 17.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Constance of Arles


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Howard Frazin

Howard Frazin (born 1962) is a composer based in Somerville, Massachusetts. His works are published by Edition Peters and he has served as president of Composers in Red Sneakers. He served on the faculty of the Longy School of Music and has taught at New England Conservatory, Northeastern University, and Roxbury Latin School.

Life
Howard Frazin was raised in Lincolnwood, Illinois, and graduated from Niles West High School. He received a bachelor of arts in English from the University of Michigan in 1985 before beginning his formal musical training at the New England Conservatory, where he studied between 1984 and 1989. In 1994, he earned a master of arts in music composition from the University of Minnesota, where he studied with Dominick Argento. Frazin subsequently settled in Massachusetts, living in Cambridge and Somerville.

Music
Frazin's music is for the most part recognizably tonal, described by New Music Connoisseur as inhabiting "a slightly clouded tonal world that ably weds aspects of Leonard Bernstein and Olivier Messiaen."

Among his most noted works is the oratorio, The Voice of Isaac, commissioned by PALS Children's Chorus and published by Edition Peters. The piece is a retelling of the Biblical story of the Binding of Isaac from Isaac's perspective, scored for chorus, soloists, and chamber orchestra. Writing in The Boston Globe after its March 2003 premiere at Jordan Hall, the critic Richard Dyer described it as "clear in design and Brittenesque in texture," going on to note, "in the children's voices, the story took on an almost unbearable poignancy."

In March 2007, Frazin's Theme and Reverberations for Two Tubas and Orchestra was premiered at Boston's Faneuil Hall. It was performed by the Boston Classical Orchestra, under Steven Lipsitt. The tuba soloists were Boston Symphony principal Mike Roylance and pediatrician/jazz musician Eli Newberger. The Boston Classical Orchestra later premiered Frazin's overture for orchestra, In the Forests of the Night in 2009, based on William Blake's Poem The Tyger, which had previously inspired Frazin's song for voice and piano The Tyger.

Frazin's works have been performed throughout the United States, Canada, France, and Russia, including festivals at Aspen, the Banff Centre for the Arts, the Gamper Contemporary Music Festival, Yellow Barn Summer Music Festival, the Janus 21 Ensemble Summer Series, the Composers' Forum of New York, the Society of Composers National Conference, and elsewhere.

Career
In 1991, Frazin joined the composition faculty of the Longy School of Music, where he continued to teach until 2009. His works were regularly featured on the school's SeptemberFest, including Amid a Crowd of Stars for baritone and orchestra, which inaugurated the reopening of Pickman Hall after extensive renovations. While at Longy, Frazin founded a composition class for undergraduate and graduate performance majors and founded and directed a young performers composition program in the school's preparatory program. Since 2009, Frazin has taught at the New England Conservatory, Northeastern University, and Roxbury Latin School.

From 2002 until 2007, Frazin was president of Composers in Red Sneakers, a Boston-area composer's collective. In 2008 he co-founded WordSong, an organization that commissions new art songs from multiple composers all set to the same text, and presents them in an intimate, discussion-based setting.

title: Howard Frazin


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Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Michael Harrell

 This page is an archive of the discussion about the proposed deletion of the article below. This page is no longer live. Further comments should be made on the article's talk page rather than here so that this page is preserved as an historic record. The result of the debate was DELETE. jni 15:15, 26 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Michael_Harrell
The very definiton of vanity --Preisler 21:09, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC) This page is now preserved as an archive of the debate and, like some other VfD subpages, is no longer 'live'. Subsequent comments on the issue, the deletion, or the decision-making process should be placed on the relevant 'live' pages. Please do not edit this page.
 * Delete, I concur. Inter 21:46, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Strong Delete, "extraordinarily handsome" is as vain as you can get. -- Riffsyphon1024 21:50, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. —Mar·ka·ci: 2005-02-19 21:52 Z
 * Delete. -- Antaeus Feldspar 22:11, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. Another vanity-filled article that makes me sigh and ask "Who bloody cares?" Zzyzx11 00:33, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete, not notable, vanity. Megan1967 01:47, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)


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Financial risk management

Financial risk management is the practice of protecting economic value in a firm by managing exposure to financial risk - principally operational risk, credit risk and market risk, with more specific variants as listed aside. As for risk management more generally, financial risk management requires identifying the sources of risk, measuring these, and crafting plans to mitigate them. See for an overview.

Financial risk management as a "science" can be said to have been born with modern portfolio theory, particularly as initiated by Professor Harry Markowitz in 1952 with his article, "Portfolio Selection"; see.

The discipline can be qualitative and quantitative; as a specialization of risk management, however, financial risk management focuses more on when and how to hedge, often using financial instruments to manage costly exposures to risk.
 * In the banking sector worldwide, the Basel Accords are generally adopted by internationally active banks for tracking, reporting and exposing operational, credit and market risks.
 * Within non-financial corporates, the scope is broadened to overlap enterprise risk management, and financial risk management then addresses risks to the firm's overall strategic objectives.
 * In investment management risk is managed through diversification and related optimization; while further specific techniques are then applied to the portfolio or to individual stocks as appropriate.

In all cases, the last "line of defence" against risk is capital, "as it ensures that a firm can continue as a going concern even if substantial and unexpected losses are incurred".

Economic perspective
Neoclassical finance theory - i.e., financial economics - prescribes that a firm should take on a project if it increases shareholder value. Finance theory also shows that firm managers cannot create value for shareholders or investors by taking on projects that shareholders could do for themselves at the same cost; see Theory of the firm and Fisher separation theorem.

There is therefore a fundamental debate relating to "Risk Management" and shareholder value. The discussion essentially weighs the value of risk management in a market versus the cost of bankruptcy in that market: per the Modigliani and Miller framework, hedging is irrelevant since diversified shareholders are assumed to not care about firm-specific risks, whereas, on the other hand hedging is seen to create value in that it reduces the probability of financial distress.

When applied to financial risk management, this implies that firm managers should not hedge risks that investors can hedge for themselves at the same cost. This notion is captured in the so-called "hedging irrelevance proposition": "In a perfect market, the firm cannot create value by hedging a risk when the price of bearing that risk within the firm is the same as the price of bearing it outside of the firm."

In practice, however, financial markets are not likely to be perfect markets. This suggests that firm managers likely have many opportunities to create value for shareholders using financial risk management, wherein they have to determine which risks are cheaper for the firm to manage than the shareholders. Here, market risks that result in unique risks for the firm are commonly the best candidates for financial risk management.

Application
As outlined, businesses are exposed, in the main, to market, credit and operational risk. A broad distinction exists though, between financial institutions and non-financial firms - and correspondingly, the application of risk management will differ. Respectively: For Banks and Fund Managers, "credit and market risks are taken intentionally with the objective of earning returns, while operational risks are a byproduct to be controlled". For non-financial firms, the priorities are reversed, as "the focus is on the risks associated with the business" - ie the production and marketing of the services and products in which expertise is held - and their impact on revenue, costs and cash flow, "while market and credit risks are usually of secondary importance as they are a byproduct of the main business agenda". (See related discussion re valuing financial services firms as compared to other firms.) In all cases, as above, risk capital is the last "line of defence".

Banking

Banks and other wholesale institutions face various financial risks in conducting their business, and how well these risks are managed and understood is a key driver behind profitability, as well as of the quantum of capital they are required to hold. Financial risk management in banking has thus grown markedly in importance since the Financial crisis of 2007–2008. (This has given rise to dedicated degrees and professional certifications.)

The major focus here is on credit and market risk, and especially through regulatory capital, includes operational risk. Credit risk is inherent in the business of banking, but additionally, these institutions are exposed to counterparty credit risk. Both are to some extent offset by margining and collateral; and the management is of the net-position. Large banks are also exposed to Macroeconomic systematic risk - risks related to the aggregate economy the bank is operating in (see Too big to fail).

The discipline is, as outlined, simultaneously concerned with (i) managing, and as necessary hedging, the various positions held by the institution - both trading positions and long term exposures; and (ii) calculating and monitoring the resultant economic capital, as well as the regulatory capital under Basel III — which covers also leverage and liquidity — with regulatory capital as a floor.

Correspondingly, and broadly, the analytics are based as follows: For (i) on the "Greeks", the sensitivity of the price of a derivative to a change in its underlying factors; as well as on the various other measures of sensitivity, such as DV01 for the sensitivity of a bond or swap to interest rates, and CS01 or JTD for exposure to credit spread. For (ii) on value at risk, or "VaR", an estimate of how much the investment or area in question might lose with a given probability in a set time period, with the bank holding "economic"- or “risk capital” correspondingly; common parameters are 99% and 95% worst-case losses - i.e. 1% and 5% - and one day and two week (10 day) horizons. These calculations are mathematically sophisticated, and within the domain of quantitative finance.

The regulatory capital quantum is calculated via specified formulae: risk weighting the exposures per highly standardized asset-categorizations, applying the aside frameworks, and the resultant capital — at least 12.9% of these Risk-weighted assets (RWA) — must then be held in specific "tiers" and is measured correspondingly via the various capital ratios. In certain cases, banks are allowed to use their own estimated risk parameters here; these "internal ratings-based models" typically result in less required capital, but at the same time  are subject to strict minimum conditions and disclosure requirements. As mentioned, additional to the capital covering RWA, the aggregate balance sheet will require capital for leverage and liquidity; this is monitored via the LR, LCR, and NSFR ratios.

The financial crisis exposed holes in the mechanisms used for hedging (see, , , and ). As such, the methodologies employed have had to evolve, both from a modelling point of view, and in parallel, from a regulatory point of view.

Regarding the modelling, changes corresponding to the above are: (i) For the daily direct analysis of the positions at the desk level, as a standard, measurement of the Greeks now inheres the volatility surface — through local- or stochastic volatility models — while re interest rates, discounting and analytics are under a "multi-curve framework". Derivative pricing now embeds counterparty and other considerations through the CVA and XVA "valuation adjustments"; these also carry regulatory capital. (ii) For Value at Risk, the traditional parametric and "Historical" approaches, are now supplemented with the more sophisticated Conditional value at risk / expected shortfall, Tail value at risk, and Extreme value theory. For the underlying mathematics, these may utilize mixture models, PCA, volatility clustering, copulas, and other techniques. Extensions to VaR include Profit-, Margin-, Liquidity-, Earnings- and Cash flow at risk, as well as Liquidity-adjusted VaR. For both (i) and (ii), model risk is addressed through regular validation of the models used by the bank's various divisions; for VaR models, backtesting is especially employed.

Regulatory changes, are also twofold. The first change, entails an increased emphasis on bank stress tests. These tests, essentially a simulation of the balance-sheet for a given scenario, are typically linked to the macroeconomics, and provide an indicator of how sensitive the bank is to changes in economic conditions, whether it is sufficiently capitalized, and of its ability to respond to market events. The second set of changes, sometimes called "Basel IV", entails the modification of several regulatory capital standards (CRR III is the EU implementation). In particular FRTB addresses market risk, and SA-CCR addresses counterparty risk; other modifications are being phased in from 2023.

To operationalize the above, Investment banks, particularly, employ dedicated "Risk Groups", i.e. Middle office teams monitoring the firm's risk-exposure to, and the profitability and structure of, its various businesses, products, asset classes, desks, and / or geographies. By increasing order of aggregation:
 * 1) Financial institutions will set limit values for each of the Greeks, or other sensitivities, that their traders must not exceed,  and traders will then hedge, offset, or reduce periodically if not daily; see the techniques listed below. These limits are set given a range of plausible changes in prices and rates, coupled with the board-specified risk appetite re overnight-losses.
 * 2) Desks, or areas, will similarly be limited as to their VaR quantum (total or incremental, and under various calculation regimes), corresponding to their allocated economic capital; a loss which exceeds the VaR threshold is termed a "VaR breach". RWA is correspondingly monitored from desk level and upward.
 * 3) Each area's (or desk's) concentration risk will be checked against thresholds set for various types of risk, and / or re a single counterparty, sector or geography.
 * 4) Leverage will be monitored, at very least re regulatory requirements, LR, as leveraged positions could lose large amounts for a relatively small move in the price of the underlying.
 * 5) Relatedly, liquidity risk is monitored: LCR measures the ability of the bank to survive a short-term stress, covering its total net cash outflows over the next 30 days with "high quality liquid assets"; NSFR assesses its ability to finance assets and commitments within a year. Any "gaps", also, must be managed.
 * 6) Systemically Important Banks hold additional capital such that their total loss absorbency capacity, TLAC, is sufficient given both RWA and leverage. (See also "MREL" for EU institutions.)

Periodically, these all are estimated under a given stress scenario — regulatory and, often, internal — and risk capital, together with these limits if indicated, is correspondingly revisited (or optimized ). Here, more generally, these tests provide estimates for scenarios beyond the VaR thresholds, thus “preparing for anything that might happen, rather than worrying about precise likelihoods". The approaches taken center either on a hypothetical or historical scenario, and may apply increasingly sophisticated mathematics to the analysis.

A key practice, incorporating and assimilating the above, is to assess the Risk-adjusted return on capital, RAROC, of each area (or product). Here, "economic profit" is divided by allocated-capital; and this result is then compared  to the target-return for the area — usually, at least the equity holders' expected returns on the bank stock — and identified under-performance can then be addressed. (See similar below re. DuPont analysis.) The numerator, risk-adjusted return, is realized trading-return less a term and risk appropriate funding cost as charged by Treasury to the business-unit under the bank's funds transfer pricing (FTP) framework; direct costs are (sometimes) also subtracted. The denominator is the area's allocated capital, as above, increasing as a function of position risk; several allocation techniques exist. RAROC is calculated both ex post as discussed, used for performance evaluation (and related bonus calculations), and ex ante - i.e. expected return less expected loss - to decide whether a particular business unit should be expanded or contracted.

Other teams, overlapping the above Groups, are then also involved in risk management. Corporate Treasury is responsible for monitoring overall funding and capital structure; it shares responsibility for monitoring liquidity risk, and for maintaining the FTP framework. Middle Office maintains the following functions also: Product Control is primarily responsible for insuring traders mark their books to fair value — a key protection against rogue traders — and for "explaining" the daily P&L; with the "unexplained" component, of particular interest to risk managers. Credit Risk monitors the bank's debt-clients on an ongoing basis, re both exposure and performance. In the Front Office, specialized XVA-desks are tasked with centrally monitoring and managing overall CVA and XVA exposure and capital, typically with oversight from the appropriate Group.

Performing the above tasks — while simultaneously ensuring that computations are consistent over the various areas, products, teams, and measures — requires that banks maintain a significant investment  in sophisticated infrastructure, finance / risk software, and dedicated staff. Risk software often deployed is from FIS, Kamakura, Murex, Numerix and Refinitiv. Large institutions may prefer systems developed entirely "in house" - notably Goldman Sachs ("SecDB"), JP Morgan ("Athena"), Jane Street, Barclays ("BARX"), BofA ("Quartz") - while, more commonly, the pricing library will be developed internally, especially as this allows for currency re new products or market features.

Corporate finance

In corporate finance, and financial management more generally, financial risk management, as above, is concerned with business risk - risks to the business’ value, within the context of its business strategy and capital structure. The scope here - ie in non-financial firms - is thus broadened (re banking) to overlap enterprise risk management, and financial risk management then addresses risks to the firm's overall strategic objectives, incorporating various (all) financial aspects of the exposures and opportunities arising from business decisions, and their link to the firm’s appetite for risk, as well as their impact on share price. In many organizations, risk executives are therefore involved in strategy formulation: "the choice of which risks to undertake through the allocation of its scarce resources is the key tool available to management."

Re the standard framework, then, the discipline largely focuses on operations, i.e. business risk, as outlined. Here, the management is ongoing — see following description  — and is coupled with the use of insurance, managing the net-exposure as above: credit risk is usually addressed via provisioning and credit insurance; likewise, where this treatment is deemed appropriate, specifically identified operational risks are also insured. Market risk, in this context, is concerned mainly with changes in commodity prices, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates, and any adverse impact due to these on cash flow and profitability, and hence share price.

Correspondingly, the practice here covers two perspectives; these are shared with corporate finance more generally:
 * 1) Both risk management and corporate finance share the goal of enhancing, or at least preserving, firm value. Here,  businesses devote much time and effort to (short term) liquidity-, cash flow- and performance monitoring, and Risk Management then also overlaps cash- and treasury management, especially as impacted by capital and funding as above. More specifically re business-operations, management emphasizes their break even dynamics, contribution margin and operating leverage, and the corresponding monitoring and management of revenue, of costs, and of other budget elements.  The DuPont analysis entails a "decomposition" of the firm's return on equity, ROE, allowing management to identify and address specific areas of concern, preempting any underperformance vs  shareholders' required return. In larger firms, specialist Risk Analysts complement this work with model-based analytics more broadly;    in some cases, employing sophisticated stochastic models,  in, for example, financing activity prediction problems, and for risk analysis ahead of a major investment.
 * 2) Firm exposure to long term market (and business) risk is a direct result of previous capital investment decisions. Where applicable here   —  usually in large corporates and under guidance from their investment bankers — risk analysts will manage and hedge their exposures using traded financial instruments to create commodity-,  interest rate-  and foreign exchange hedges (see further below).  Because company specific, "over-the-counter" (OTC) contracts  tend to be costly to create and monitor —  i.e. using financial engineering and / or  structured products — ”standard” derivatives that trade on well-established exchanges are often preferred.  These comprise  options, futures, forwards, and swaps; the "second generation" exotic derivatives usually trade OTC.  Complementary to this hedging, periodically, Treasury may also adjust the capital structure, reducing financial leverage - i.e. repaying debt-funding  - so as to accommodate increased business risk; they may also suspend dividends.

Multinational corporations are faced with additional challenges, particularly as relates to foreign exchange risk, and the scope of financial risk management modifies significantly in the international realm. Here, dependent on time horizon and risk sub-type — transactions exposure (essentially that discussed above), accounting exposure, and economic exposure — so the corporate will manage its risk differently. Note that the forex risk-management discussed here and above, is additional to the per transaction "forward cover" that importers and exporters purchase from their bank (alongside other trade finance mechanisms).

Hedging-related transactions will attract their own accounting treatment, and corporates (and banks) may then require changes to systems, processes and documentation; see Hedge accounting, Mark-to-market accounting, Hedge relationship, Cash flow hedge, IFRS 7, IFRS 9, IFRS 13, FASB 133, IAS 39, FAS 130.

It is common for large corporations to have dedicated risk management teams — typically within FP&A or corporate treasury — reporting to the CRO; often these overlap the internal audit function (see Three lines of defence). For small firms, it is impractical to have a formal risk management function, but these typically apply the above practices, at least the first set, informally, as part of the financial management function; see discussion under Financial analyst.

The discipline relies on a range of software, correspondingly, from spreadsheets (invariably as a starting point, and frequently in total ) through commercial EPM and BI tools, often BusinessObjects (SAP), OBI EE (Oracle), Cognos (IBM), and Power BI (Microsoft).

Investment management
Fund managers, classically, define the risk of a portfolio as its variance (or standard deviation), and through diversification the portfolio is optimized so as to achieve the lowest risk for a given targeted return, or equivalently the highest return for a given level of risk; these risk-efficient portfolios form the "Efficient frontier" (see Markowitz model). The logic here is that returns from different assets are highly unlikely to be perfectly correlated, and in fact the correlation may sometimes be negative. In this way, market risk particularly, and other financial risks such as inflation risk (see below) can at least partially be moderated by forms of diversification.

A key issue, however, is that the (assumed) relationships are (implicitly) forward looking. As observed in the late-2000s recession, historic relationships can break down, resulting in losses to market participants believing that diversification would provide sufficient protection (in that market, including funds that had been explicitly set up to avoid being affected in this way ). A related issue is that diversification has costs: as correlations are not constant it may be necessary to regularly rebalance the portfolio, incurring transaction costs, negatively impacting investment performance; and as the fund manager diversifies, so this problem compounds (and a large fund may also exert market impact). See.

Addressing these issues, more sophisticated approaches have been developed, both to defining risk, and to the optimization itself. (Respective examples: (tail) risk parity, focuses on allocation of risk, rather than allocation of capital; the Black–Litterman model modifies the "Markowitz optimization", to incorporate the views of the portfolio manager. ) Relatedly, modern financial risk modeling employs a variety of techniques — including value at risk, historical simulation, stress tests, and extreme value theory — to analyze the portfolio and to forecast the likely losses incurred for a variety of risks and scenarios.

Here, guided by the analytics, Fund Managers (and traders) will apply specific risk hedging techniques. As appropriate, these may relate to the portfolio as a whole or to individual holdings:

 * Fund managers may engage in portfolio insurance, a hedging strategy developed to limit the losses an investor might face from a declining index of stocks without having to sell the stocks themselves. This strategy involves selling Stock market index futures during periods of price declines. The proceeds from the sale of the futures help to offset paper losses of the owned portfolio. Alternatively, and more commonly, they will buy a put on a Stock market index option so as to hedge. In both cases the logic is that the (diversified) portfolio is likely highly correlated with the stock index it is part of; thus if stock prices decline, the larger index will likewise decline, and the derivative holder will profit. (Inflation, which affects all securities, can to some extent be hedged using inflation-linked bonds; diversification here is achieved by including  tangible assets and commodities in the portfolio. )

 * Fund managers, or traders, may also wish to hedge a specific stock's price. Here, they may likewise buy a single-stock put, or sell a single-stock future. Alternative strategies may rely on assumed relationships between related stocks, employing, for example, a "Long/short" strategy.

 * Bond portfolios, when e.g. a component of an Asset-allocation fund or other diversified portfolio, are typically managed similar to equity above: the Fund Manager will hedge her bond allocation with bond index futures or options. In other contexts, the concern may be the net-obligation or net-cashflow. Here the fund manager employs Interest rate immunization or cashflow matching. Immunization is a strategy that ensures that a change in interest rates will not affect the value of a fixed-income portfolio (an increase in rates results in a decreased instrument value). It is often used to ensure that the value of a pension fund's assets (or an asset manager's fund) increase or decrease in an exactly opposite fashion to their liabilities, thus leaving the value of the pension fund's surplus (or firm's equity) unchanged, regardless of changes in the interest rate. Cashflow matching is similarly a process of hedging in which a company or other entity matches its cash outflows - i.e., financial obligations - with its cash inflows over a given time horizon. See also Laddering.

 * For individual bonds and other fixed income securities, specific credit and interest rate risks can be hedged using  interest rate- and credit derivatives. Sensitivities re interest rates are measured using duration and convexity for bonds, and DV01 and key rate durations generally, and an offsetting derivative-position is purchased. For credit risk, analysts use models such as Jarrow–Turnbull and KMV to estimate the probability of default, hedging where appropriate. (At a portfolio level — often for credit-VaR — they may also use a transition matrix of Bond credit ratings to estimate the probability and impact of a "credit migration",  aggregating the bond-by-bond result.) Interest rate- and credit risk together, may be hedged via a Total return swap. See Fixed income analysis

 * For derivative portfolios, and positions, the Greeks are a vital risk management tool: as above, these measure sensitivity to a small change in a given underlying price, rate, or parameter, and the portfolio is then rebalanced accordingly by including additional derivatives with offsetting characteristics, or by purchasing or selling specified units of the underlying security.

In parallel with the above optimization and hedging, managers — active and passive — also monitor and manage tracking error, i.e. underperformance vs a "benchmark". Here they will (may) use attribution analysis preemptively so as to diagnose the source early, and to take corrective action. As relevant, they will similarly use style analysis to address style drift. See also Fixed-income attribution.

Given the complexity of these analyses and techniques, Fund Managers typically rely on sophisticated software (as do banks, above). Widely used platforms are provided by BlackRock (Aladdin), Refinitiv (Eikon), Finastra, Murex, Numerix, MPI and Morningstar.

title: Financial risk management


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Diana Garland

 This page is an archive of the discussion about the proposed deletion of the article below. This page is no longer live. Further comments should be made on the article's talk page rather than here so that this page is preserved as an historic record. The result of the debate was speedy delete. —Korath (Talk) 01:07, Feb 20, 2005 (UTC)

Diana Garland
Article about a non-notable school-girl, written by her best friend. Perhaps can be speedied as it is short and lacks almost all context. Delete --BM 21:09, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * 07:29, Feb 19, 2005 Academic Challenger deleted Diana Garland (content was: 'Diana Garland (Di) is a tiny freshman at Sandra Day O'Connor High School in Glendale, Arizona. She is a debater, but she has little work ethic. She ...')

This page is now preserved as an archive of the debate and, like some other VfD subpages, is no longer 'live'. Subsequent comments on the issue, the deletion, or the decision-making process should be placed on the relevant 'live' pages. Please do not edit this page.


text:
Russian Air Force

The Russian Air Force (Военно-воздушные силы России, VVS) is a branch of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the latter being formed on 1 August 2015 with the merging of the Russian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reborn Russian armed forces began to be created on 7 May 1992 following Boris Yeltsin's creation of the Ministry of Defence. However, the Russian Federation's air force can trace its lineage and traditions back to the Imperial Russian Air Service (1912–1917) and the Soviet Air Forces (1918–1991).

1991–2000
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union into its fifteen constituent republics in December 1991, the aircraft and personnel of the Soviet Air Forces—the VVS—were divided among the newly independent states. General Pyotr Deynekin, the former deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Air Forces, became the first commander of the new organization on 24 August 1991. Russia received the majority of the most modern fighters and 65% of the manpower. The major commands of the former Soviet VVS—the Long-Range Aviation, Military Transport Aviation, and Frontal Aviation were renamed, with few changes, Russian VVS commands.

However, many regiments, aircraft, and personnel were claimed by the republics they were based in, forming the core of the new republics' air forces. Some aircraft in Belarus and Ukraine (such as Tupolev Tu-160s) were returned to Russia, sometimes in return for debt reductions, as well as the 79th Heavy Bomber Aviation Division at Chagan in Kazakhstan.

In 1993 and 1994 Deynekin announced that a Frontal Aviation Command (Moscow, under General-lieutenant of Aviation Nikolay Antoshkin) and a Reserves and Cadres Training Command (Samara, under Colonel-General Leonid Stepanyuk) were to be established. But little more was heard of these commands.

During the 1990s, the financial stringency was felt throughout the armed forces made its mark on the VVS as well. Pilots and other personnel could sometimes not get their wages for months, and on occasion resorted to desperate measures: four MiG-31 pilots at Yelizovo in the Far East went on hunger strike in 1996 to demand back pay which was several months overdue, and the problem was only resolved by diverting unit money intended for other tasks. As a result of the cutbacks, infrastructure became degraded as well, and in 1998, 40% of military airfields needed repair.

The VVS participated in the First Chechen War (1994–1996) and the Second Chechen War (1999–2002). These campaigns also presented significant difficulties for the VVS including the terrain, lack of significant fixed targets, and insurgents armed with Stinger and Strela-2M surface-to-air missiles.

The former Soviet Air Defence Forces remained independent for several years under Russian control, only merging with the Air Forces in 1998. The decree merging the two forces was issued by President Boris Yeltsin on 16 July 1997. During 1998 altogether 580 units and formations were disbanded, 134 reorganised, and over 600 were given a new jurisdiction. The redistribution of forces affected 95% of aircraft, 98% of helicopters, 93% of anti-aircraft missile complexes, 95% of the equipment of radiotechnical troops, 100% of anti-aircraft missiles and over 60% of aviation armament. More than 600,000 tons of material changed location and 3,500 aircraft changed airfields. Military Transport Aviation planes took more than 40,000 families to new residence areas.

The short-lived operational commands were abolished. Two air armies, the 37th Air Army (long-range aviation) and the 61st Air Army (former Military Transport Aviation), were established directly under the Supreme Command. The former frontal aviation and anti-aircraft forces were organized as Air Force Armies and Anti-Aircraft Defense Armies under the military district commanders.

There were initially four such armies with headquarters in St.Petersburg (Leningrad Military District), Rostov-on-Don (North Caucasus Military District), Khabarovsk (Far East Military District), and Chita (Siberian Military District). Two military districts had separate Air and Air Defence Corps. When the Transbaikal Military District and Siberian Military District were merged, the 14th Air and Air Defence Forces Army was formed to serve as the air force formation in the area.

The number of servicemen in the Air Force was reduced to about 185,000 from the former combined number of 318,000. 123,500 positions were abolished, including almost 1,000 colonel positions. The resignation of 3000 other servicemen included 46 generals of which 15 were colonel generals. On 29 December 1998 Colonel General Anatoly Kornukov, a former Air Defence Forces officer and new commander-in-chief of the merged force succeeding Deynekin, reported to the Russian defense minister that the task had 'in principle been achieved'. General Kornukov established the new headquarters of the force in Zarya, near Balashikha, 20 km east of the center of Moscow, in the former PVO central command post, where the CIS common air defense system is directed from.

2001–2010
In December 2003 the aviation assets of the Russian Ground Forces—mostly helicopters—were transferred to the VVS, following the shooting down of a Mi-26 helicopter in Chechnya on 19 August 2002 that claimed 19 lives. The former Army Aviation was in its previous form intended for the direct support of the Ground Forces, by providing their tactical air support, conducting tactical aerial reconnaissance, transporting airborne troops, providing fire support of their actions, electronic warfare, setting of minefield barriers and other tasks. The former Army Aviation was subsequently managed by the Chief of the Department of Army Aviation. In 2010, it was announced that the 2003 decision to transfer Ground Force Aviation to the Air Force was reversed, with the transfer back to the Ground Forces to occur sometime in 2015 or 2016.

During the 2000s, the Air Force continued to suffer from a lack of resources for pilot training. In the 1990s Russian pilots achieved approximately 10% of the flight hours of the United States Air Force. The 2007 edition of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance listed pilots of tactical aviation flying 20–25 hours a year, 61st Air Army pilots (former Military Transport Aviation), 60 hours a year, and Army Aviation under VVS control 55 hours a year.

In 2007 the VVS resumed the Soviet-era practice of deploying its strategic bomber aircraft on long-range patrols. This ended a 15-year unilateral suspension due to fuel costs and other economic difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Patrols towards the North Pole, the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean were reinstated, bringing the planes often close to NATO territory, including in one instance flying over the Irish Sea between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

During the 2008 South Ossetian War, the VVS suffered losses of between four and seven aircraft due to Georgian anti-aircraft fire. The 2008 Russian military reforms were promptly announced following the war, which according to Western experts were intended to address many inadequacies discovered as a result. The reforms commenced in early 2009, in which air armies were succeeded by commands, and most air regiments became air bases. Aviation Week & Space Technology confirmed that the reorganization would be completed by December 2009 and would see a 40 percent reduction in aircrew numbers.

In February 2009, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that 200 of the 291 MiG-29s currently in service across all Russian air arms were unsafe and would have to be permanently grounded. This action would remove from service about a third of Russia's total fighter force, some 650 aircraft. On 5 June 2009, the Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov said of the VVS that "They can run bombing missions only in the daytime with the sun shining, but they miss their targets anyway". Maj. Gen. Pavel Androsov said that Russia's long-range bombers would be upgraded in 2009 to be able to hit within 20 meters of their targets.

Also in September 2009, it was reported that an East European network of the Joint CIS Air Defense System was to be set up by Russia and Belarus. This network was intended to protect the airspace of the two countries as defined in the supranational 1999 Union State treaty. Its planned composition was to include five Air Force units, 10 anti-aircraft units, five technical service and support units, and one electronic warfare unit. It was to be placed under the command of a Russian or Belarusian Air Force or Air Defence Force senior commander.

In July 2010, Russian jet fighters made the first nonstop flights from European Russia to the Russian Far East. By August 2010, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the VVS Alexander Zelin, the average flight hours of a pilot in Russian tactical aviation had reached 80 hours a year, while in army aviation and military transport aviation, it exceeded 100 hours a year. On 15 August 2010, the Russian Air Force temporarily grounded its fleet of Su-25 ground attack aircraft to investigate a crash that happened during a training mission. The Russian Defense Ministry said that the plane crashed on 6 August 2010, 60 km to the north-west of Step air base in Siberia, according to RIA Novosti.

2011–2020
According to the instructions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on 1 September 2011, the unmanned aircraft of the VVS and the personnel operating them moved under the command structure of the Russian Ground Forces.

As of 2012, the VVS operated a total of 61 air bases, including 26 air bases with tactical aircraft, of which 14 are equipped with fighter aircraft. In terms of flight hours, pilots in the Western Military District averaged 125 hours over the 2012 training year. Pilots from the Kursk air base achieved an average of 150 hours, with transport aviation averaging 170 hours.

In February 2014, during the early periods of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the assets of the VVS in the Southern Military District were activated and flown to the peninsula for supporting the rest of the operations.

On 1 August 2015, the Russian Air Force, along with the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces and the Air Defense Troops, were merged into a new branch of the armed forces, now officially called the Russian Aerospace Forces.

On 30 September 2015, the VVS launched a military intervention in Syria, in Syria's Homs region. On 24 November 2015, during a bombing mission, a Turkish Air Force F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 that Turkey claimed had violated its airspace.

In March 2020, the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets by the VVS in Syria has been described as "amounting to war crime" by a United Nations Human Rights Council report.

On 9 November 2020, a Russian Mil Mi-24 attack helicopter was shot down mistakenly by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war killing 2 crew members and injuring 1 more. Days later, after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh with aviation to patrol its borders.

2021–present
Modernization plans and programs carried out since the 2010s are being continued into 2021 as a part of Russia's State Armament Program for 2018–2027.

VVS role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
On 24 February 2022, the VVS was deployed in support of the invasion of Ukraine. The VVS had reportedly deployed about 300 combat aircraft within range of Ukraine. Aircraft have also been deployed in Belarus for sorties over Ukraine.

On 25 February 2022, Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed several aircraft and set a Russian airbase on fire in the Millerovo air base attack.

On 13 March 2022, Russian forces launched cruise missile attacks on Yavoriv military base near the Polish border.

As of 20 March 2022, it was claimed that VVS carried out at least 1403 airstrikes on Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion.

The VVS has generally been noted by its relative absence from the invasion and has as of 25 March 2022 failed to subdue Ukrainian air defenses or the Ukrainian Air Force. It has, as of April 1, 2022, also failed to achieve air supremacy. Failure to achieve this has been attributed to the lack of SEAD operations on the part of the VVS likely due to the lack of flying hours for Russian pilots as well as the lack of dedicated SEAD units and precision-guided munitions within the VVS. These weaknesses have been compounded by the mobility of Ukrainian air defenses with the extensive use of MANPADS as well as NATO reportedly sharing early warning information with Ukrainian forces. According to the Ukrainian MoD, as of 16 March 2022, the VVS has also suffered at least 77 aircraft losses, however only 12 were verified by independent sources at the time.

In the first six months of the campaign, Russia's air war was largely a failure. An American intelligence analyst said that less than 40% of the 2,154 missiles fired by Russia hit their targets, such as the Zatoka bridge which sustained over eight air attacks before being disabled. The VVS reportedly flew over 20,000 sorties in the war, fewer than 3,000 of which entered Ukrainian airspace, possibly due to fear of Ukraine's sustained air defense.

The VVS has struck civilian targets during the invasion prompting an International Criminal Court investigation in Ukraine. Notably, during the battle of Mariupol it struck a hospital as well as a theatre.

Russian pilots in Ukraine are having to use civilian GPS units "taped to the dashboards".

On 19 September US Air Force General James B. Hecker said that Russia had lost 55 military aircraft due to being shot down by Ukrainian air defenses since the start of the invasion. He credits this success to the Ukrainian use of SA-11 and SA-10 air defense systems. As the US doesn't have these systems getting new missiles from European allies is a "big ask" from Kyiv. Russian airplanes increased their operations due to the September 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive. This was due to several factors including changing front lines, former safe territory is now held by the enemy. Or because they were under pressure to provide closer ground support.

On 8 October 2022 the chief of the VVS Sergey Surovikin became the commander of all Russian forces invading Ukraine.

On 10 October 2022 the VVS re-commenced the bombardment of cities like Kyiv and especially energy infrastructure like electricity grid facilities. The large-scale coordinated attacks also hit Kharkiv, Kryvyi Rih, Lviv, Dnipro, Ternopil, Kremenchuk, Khmelnytskyi, and Zhytomyr. The oblasts of Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zhytormyr, Kirovohrad were attacked on this day. When, by 17 October, these energy infrastructure attacks continued unabated the western media labeled the delivery system "kamikaze drones", and Ukrainian president Zelensky called this "terrorizing the civilian population". By 23 October (not yet two weeks) 40% of Ukrainians were without electricity and/or water.

Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian infrastructure again intensified with the deployment of the UMPK (unified gliding and correction module) bomb kits since early 2023, which allowed to Russian Air Force convert dummy Soviet-era aerial bombs into a precise ammunition. UMPK bomb kits are being particularly used with general purpose FAB-250, FAB-500 and FAB-1500 aerial bombs containing highly explosive warheads. These glide kits greatly increase range and also add an element of guidance, allowing Russian bombers, namely the Su-34, to execute aerial attacks from safer distances without entering areas covered by Ukrainian air defense systems. According to Ukrainian General Ivan Havryliuk, since start of 2024 year, Russian aviation dropped over 3,500 of these bombs on Ukrainian positions.

Wagner Group Rebellion
On 23 - 24 June 2023 the state-funded private military company Wagner Group rebelled against the Russian government citing increased tensions with Ministry of Defence leaders. With the majority of Russian ground forces already committed in the invasion of Ukraine, the VVS was a primary component of the Russian military response to the rebellion.

During the conflict, the VVS lost one Il-22M Airborne Command Post and five helicopters (three Mi-8, one Mi-35M, and one KA-52) as well as one damaged Mi-8. Two of the destroyed Mi-8s as well as the damaged one were Russia's newest Mi-8MTPR-1 Electronic Warfare variants. Up to 29 crew were killed, assuming the aircraft were fully manned, but the VVS has not released casualties. Wagner lost at least five vehicles during hostilities, but it is unclear how many can be attributed to VVS actions. Reports indicated that the Russian Armed Forces were failing to stop Wagner's momentum toward Moscow when a political resolution to the rebellion was announced. The U.K. Defense Intelligence reported that the Il-22M was a particularly high value asset, being one in a fleet of only 12 special mission aircraft, and that its loss could have an impact on the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Leadership
Previously the highest military office until 1 August 2015.

Since the merger between the VVS and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces on 1 August 2015, the commander of the VVS as part of the new Russian Aerospace Forces is titled Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Commander of the VVS. Lieutenant General Andrey Yudin became the first holder of the position until he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Sergey Dronov in August 2019.

Structure

In 2009 the structure of the VVS was completely changed to a command-air base structure from the previous structure of air army-air division or corps-air regiment. The VVS was divided into four operational commands, the Aerospace Defense Operational Strategic Command (seemingly primarily made up of the former Special Purpose Command), the Military Transport Aviation Command, and the Long-Range Aviation Command. This listing is a composite; the available new information covers frontline forces, and the forces of central subordination are as of approximately August 2008. Warfare.ru maintains what appears to be a reasonably up-to-date listing, and Combat Aircraft magazine in June 2010 listed their organization's estimate of the new order of battle.

This listing appears to be as of June 2009:

Regional air armies
Russian Air Force flights often use a callsign beginning with RFF: For example RFF1234.
 * 1st Aerospace Defence Forces Army (Moscow)
 * 4th Aerospace Defense brigade (Dolgoprudnyi, Moscow Oblast)
 * 5th Aerospace Defense Brigade (Petrovskoe, Moscow Oblast)
 * 6th Aerospace Defense brigade (Rzhev, Tver Oblast) (former 32nd Corps of PVO?)
 * 6963rd aviation base (Kursk Vostochny Airport) (Su-30, MiG-29SMT/UBT)
 * 6968th fighter aviation base (Borisovsky Khotilovo, Tver Oblast) (Su-27, MiG-31B, MiG-31BM, Su-24 )
 * 6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Voronezh) (Western Military District)
 * 1st Aerospace Defense brigade (Severomorsk)
 * 2nd Aerospace Defense brigade (St. Petersburg)
 * 6961st aviation base (Petrozavodsk Airport) (Su-27)
 * 6964th aviation base (Monchegorsk Air Base, Murmansk Oblast) (Su-24M, Su-24MR)
 * 6965th aviation base (Vyazma Airport, Smolensk Oblast) (Mi-8TM, Mi-24V, Mi-28N)
 * 7000th aviation base (Voronezh Malshevo Air Base) (Su-24M, Su-24MR, Su-34)
 * 14th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Yekaterinburg) (Central Military District)
 * 8th Aerospace Defense Brigade (Yekaterinburg)
 * 9th Aerospace Defense brigade (Novosibirsk)
 * 10th Aerospace Defense brigade (Chita)
 * 6977th Aviation Base (Bolshoye Savino Airport, Perm Krai) (MiG-31BM)
 * 6979th aviation base (Kansk Air Base, Krasnoyarsk Krai) (MiG-31BM)
 * 6980th aviation base (Chelyabinsk Shagol Airport) (Su-24M)
 * 6982nd aviation base (Domna Air Base, Zabaykalsky Krai) (MiG-29, Su-30SM)
 * 11th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Khabarovsk) (Eastern Military District)
 * 11th Aerospace Defense Brigade (Komsomolsk-na-Amur)
 * 12th Aerospace Defense brigade (Vladivostok)
 * 6983rd aviation base (Komsomolsk-on-Amur Airport, Khabarovsk Krai) (Su-27SM, Su-30M2, Su-35S, Su-34)
 * 6988th aviation base (Khurba, Khabarovsk Krai) (Su-24M, Su-24M2, Su-24MR)
 * 6989th aviation base (Vladivostok International Airport) (Su-27SM)
 * 265th transport aviation base (Khabarovsk)
 * 4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army – (former 4th and 5th Armies of VVS and PVO) (Rostov-on-Don) (Southern Military District)
 * 7th Aerospace Defense brigade (Rostov-on-Don)
 * 8th Aerospace Defense Brigade (Yekaterinburg)
 * 6970th aviation base (Morozovsk, Rostov Oblast) (Su-24M, Su-34)
 * 6971st aviation base (Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai) (Su-25SM, Mi-8AMTSh, Mi-24V, Mi-28N)
 * 6972nd aviation base (Krymsk, Krasnodar Krai) (Su-27, Mi-8, Mi-24P, Mi-28N, Ka-27)
 * 6974th aviation base (Korenovsk, Krasnodar Krai) (Mi-8MTV-5, Mi-24V, Mi-35M, Mi-28N)
 * 999th aviation base (Kant Air Base, Kyrgyzstan) (Su-25, Su-27, Mi-8T)
 * 229th transport aviation base (Rostov-on-Don) (Mi-26(T), Mi-8AMTSh(TM))

Helicopter regiments providing support to the Ground Forces include the 39th, 55th, granted Guards status after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the 112th, 319th, 332nd, 337th, 440th, and the 487th. There is also a helicopter regiment in the Navy, the 830th Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment.

Military Transport Aviation Command
Headquarters: Moscow
 * 6955th Aviation Base (Migalovo (Tver)) (Il-76MD)
 * 6956th Aviation Base (Orenburg) (Il-76MD)
 * 6958th Aviation Base (Taganrog, Rostov Oblast) (Il-76MD)
 * 6985th Aviation Base (Pskov Airport) (Il-76MF)

Long-Range Aviation
Headquarters Moscow
 * 6950th Aviation Base (Engels-2, Saratov Oblast) (Tu-22 M3, Tu-95 MS6, Tu-160) former 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division
 * 6952nd Aviation Base (Ukrainka Air Base, Amur Oblast) (Tu-95 MS16)
 * 6953rd Aviation Base (Belaya Air Base, located at Sredni, Irkutsk Oblast) (Tu-22 M3)

Forces of Central Subordination

 * 132nd Central Communications Center, Balashikha, Zarya airport, Moscow Oblast
 * 1st Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment – Su-24 – Lebyazhye – absorbed by 6970th Aviation Base, 1 September 2009
 * 764th Fighter Aviation Regiment – MiG-31, MiG-25PU – Bolshoye Savino Airport (Sokol)
 * 8th Special Purpose Aviation Division (Chkalovsky Airport)
 * 353rd Special Purpose Aviation Regiment— Chkalovsky Airport — Il-18, Il-76, Аn-12, Аn-72, Тu-134, Тu-154.
 * 354th Special Purpose Aviation Regiment— Chkalovsky Airport — Il-18, Il-76, Аn-12, Аn-72, Тu-134, Тu-154.
 * 206th Special Purpose Aviation Base — Chkalovsky Airport — Mi-8 helicopters.
 * 223rd Flight Unit – commercial transport – Chkalovsky Airport – Il-62M, Il-76MD, Tu-134A-3, Tupolev Tu-154B-2
 * 2457th Air Base of Long Range Radiolocation Detection Aircraft – A-50, A-50М – Ivanovo Severny
 * 929th State Flight Test Centre named for V. P. Chkalov (Akhtubinsk)
 * 1338th Test Centre – Chkalovsky Airport – Ilyushin Il-22, Ilyushin Il-80, and Il-82
 * High-altitude mountain Center for Air Materiel and Weapons Research – Nalchik
 * 368th Detached Composite Aviation Squadron (An-12)
 * 13th Aeronautic Test Facility – Volsk – air balloons

 * 267th Center of Test Pilots Training – Akhtubinsk
 * 4th Centre for Combat Employment and Retraining of Personnel – Lipetsk Air Base
 * 968th Sevastopol Composite Training and Research Aviation Regiment, Lipetsk Air Base, fighter jets MiG-29, Su-27, Su-27M, Su-30, bombers Su-24M, Su-24M2, Su-34, reconnaissance plane Su-24MP, jammer Su-24MP, strike-fighter Su-25, Su-25T, Su-25SM
 * 3958th Guards Kerch Aviation Base, Savasleyka, Nizhegorod Oblast, MiG-31.
 * 185th Centre for Combat Training and Flight Personnel Training – Astrakhan
 * 116th Training center operational use — Аstrakhan — MiG-23, MiG-29
 * 42nd Training center operational use — Ashuluk — SAM and targets.
 * 344th Centre for Combat Training and Flight Personnel Training – Torzhok (ground forces helicopters) (ru:344 Центр боевой подготовки и переучивания лётного состава армейской авиации)
 * 696th Research and Instruction Helicopter Regiment (Torzhok)(Ka-50, Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-26, has used Mi-28)
 * 92nd Research and Instruction Helicopter Squadron (Sokol-Vladimir (Ruwiki says Klin)) (Mi-8, Mi-24)
 * 924th Centre for Combat Training and Flight Personnel Training – Yegoryevsk Base UAV.
 * 275th Separate research and UAV squadron instructors(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), Yegoryevsk, Moscow Oblast. UAV Tu-143, Yak PCHELA-1T, IAI Searcher 2.
 * Russian State Scientific-Research Institute Centre for Cosmonaut Training – Zvezdnyi Goronok
 * 70th Separate test and training Aviation Regiment Special Purpose — Chkalovski — Il-76 and other.
 * 2881st Reserve Helicopter Base – Totskoye – Mi-24P
 * 5th Independent Long-Range Reconnaissance Aviation Detachment – Voronezh (CFE and INF verification)
 * 185th Centre for Combat Training and Flight Personnel Training – Astrakhan
 * 118th Independent Helicopter Squadron – Chebenki (Dmitriyevka), Orenburg Oblast
 * 4020th Base for Reserve Aircraft – Lipetsk
 * 4215th Base for Reserve Aircraft – Chebenki
 * 15th Army Aviation Brigade of the Western Military District at the airport Ostrov, Pskov Oblast

Warehouses, Storage and Maintenance Depots, Aircraft Repair Plants
(Russian: List of Aircraft Factories in Russia)
 * Central Aviation Base of Rocket Armament and Ammunition, Sergiyev Posad, Moscow Oblast

 * Aviation Warehouse of Rocket Armament and Ammunition, Yoshkar-Ola

 * Supply and Storage Depot of Air Defense Rocket Armament, Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast

 * Storage and Maintenance Depot of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Yaroslavl (Tunoshna)

 * 502nd Military Equipment Maintenance Plant, Fryazevo (Noginsk-5)

 * 1015th Military Equipment Maintenance Plant, Nizhniye Sergi-3, Sverdlovsk Oblast

 * 1019th Military Equipment Maintenance Plant, Onokhoy-2, Buryat Republic

 * 1253rd Central Radar Armament Maintenance Base, Samara-28

 * 2227th Armament Maintenance and Storage Base, Trudovaya, Moscow Oblast

 * 2503rd Central Base of Automated Control Systems Maintenance, Yanino-1, Leningrad Oblast

 * 2529th Central Base of Armament Maintenance, Khabarovsk

 * 2633rd Base of Armament Maintenance and Storage, Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast

 * 3821st Base of Armament Maintenance and Storage, Tosno, Leningrad Oblast

 * 20th Aircraft Overhaul Plant, Pushkin-3 ( not an inhabited locality, or name is misspelled ), Leningrad Oblast

 * 150th Aircraft Overhaul Plant, Lyublino-Novoye, Kaliningrad Oblast

 * 419th Aircraft Overhaul Plant, Gorelovo, Leningrad Oblast
 * 695th Aircraft Overhaul Plant (Factory), Aramil, Sverdlovsk Oblast

 * 99th Air-Technical Equipment Plant, Ostafyevo (Shcherbinka), Moscow Oblast

 * 5212nd Testing and Control (Docking?) Station, Znamensk, Astrakhan Oblast

Training and Research Organisations

 * 2nd Central Scientific-Research Institute — Tver
 * 13th State Scientific Research Institute "ERAT" Luberchi, Moscow Oblast
 * 30th Central Scientific-Research Institute (ЦНИИ АКТ) — Shelkovo, also includes research institutes in Noginsk.
 * Gagarin Military Air Academy (VVA) — Monino
 * Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy — Moscow
 * Zhukov Command Academy of Air Defense — Tver ( branch in the St. Petersburg )
 * Yaroslavl Anti-aircraft Missile Defence Institute
 * Chelyabinsk Red Banner Military Aviation Institute of Navigators
 * 604th Training Aviation Regiment — Chelyabinsk Shagol Airport
 * Voronezh Central Military Aviation Engineering University (VCMAEU)
 * Both the Irkutsk Military Aviation Engineering Institute and the Tambov Military Aviation Engineering Institute were disbanded in 2009 and transferred to VCMAEU.
 * Krasnodar Military Aviation Institute (L-39Cs); by 2016, the Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation Pilots College Named for Hero of the Soviet Union A.K. Serov
 * 704th Training Aviation Regiment — Котельниково — L-39
 * 627th Training Aviation Regiment — Тихорецк — Л-39
 * 797th Training Aviation Regiment — Кущевская — L-39, Su-25, Su-27, MiG-29
 * Syzran Military Aviation Institute (Mi-2, Mi-8T and Mi-24V, Ansat, Ka-226T
 * 131st Training Aviation Regiment — Saratov-Sokol — Mi-2, Mi-8
 * 484th Training Helicopter Regiment — Syzran airfield — Mi-24
 * 626th Training Helicopter Regiment — Pugachev — Mi-2, Mi-8, Mi-24
 * Branch in Kirov, Kirov Oblast
 * 783rd Training Centre (Armavir) (MiG-29, L-39C)
 * 713th Training Aviation Regiment — Armavir — L-39, MiG-29
 * 761st Training Aviation Regiment — Khanskaya — L-39
 * 786th Training Centre (Borisoglebsk):
 * 160th Training Aviation Regiment — Borisoglebsk — Su-27
 * 644th Training Aviation Regiment — Michurinsk — L-39, Su-24, Su-25, MiG-29
 * 705th Training Aviation Center for Training Flight Crews and Long-Range military transport aircraft – Balashov:
 * 606th Training Aviation Regiment – Balashov
 * 666th Training Aviation Regiment – Rtishchevo
 * Center for anti-aircraft missile troops, Uchhoz (Gatchina-3), the Leningrad Region. Chief – Colonel Alexander Dobrovolsky.
 * 357th Training Center, Belgorod. Chief – Colonel Viktor Baranov.
 * 834th Centre for Signal Corps Radio and ensure Novgorod. Chief – Colonel Vasily Fedosov.
 * 874th training center (settlement) of radio engineering troops, Vladimir. Chief – Colonel Yuri Balaban.
 * 902nd Training Center (settlement) of anti-aircraft missile troops Kosterevo-1, Vladimir Oblast.

Medical and athletic facilities

 * State Research Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine, Moscow. Chief – Major-General Igor Ushakov.
 * 5th Central Military Research Aviation Hospital, Krasnogorsk-3, Moscow Region.
 * 7th Central Military Research Aviation Hospital, Moscow.
 * Spa Air Force, Chemitokvadzhe, Krasnodar Krai. Chief – Colonel Theodore Barantsev.
 * Central Sports Club VVS Samara. Chief – Colonel Dmitry Shlyahtin.
 * 361st Center of Psychophysiological Training of personnel, Agha, Krasnodar region.
 * 709th Center of Psychophysiological Training of personnel, Anapa (now Dzhubga), Krasnodar region.
 * 464th Training Center for Physical Culture and Sports, Ufa, Bashkortostan.

The list of Soviet Air Force bases shows a number that are still active with the Russian Air Force.

With the Air Force now fusing into one joint service branch the personnel from the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces and their respective facilities, the following now report to the Aerospace Forces HQ:

 * Space Command (Космическое командование (KK)):
 * 153rd Main Trial Centre for Testing and Control of Space Means named after G.S. Titov at Krasnoznamensk (Главный испытательный центр испытаний и управления космическими средствами имени Германа Титова)
 * 820th Main Centre for Missile Attack Warning (SPRN) (центр предупреждения о ракетном нападении (цпрн)) in Solnechnogorsk
 * 821st Main Space Surveillance Centre (SKKP) (центр контроля космического пространства (цккп)) in Noginsk-9, Moscow Oblast

Early warning of missile attack:
 * Voronezh radar at Lekhtusi, Armavir, Kaliningrad, Mileshevka, Yeniseysk, Barnaul
 * Daryal radar at Pechora
 * Volga radar at Hantsavichy
 * Dnepr radar at Balkhash, Irkutsk and Olenegorsk
 * Oko early warning satellites

Space surveillance:
 * Okno in Tajikistan
 * Krona in Zelenchukskaya and Nakhodka
 * RT-70 in Yevpatoria (since the 2014 Crimean crisis, the status of Crimea, and thus of the city of Yevpatoria which is located on Crimea, is under dispute between Russia and Ukraine; Ukraine and the majority of the international community considers Crimea and Yevpatoria an integral part of Ukraine, while Russia, on the other hand, considers Crimea and Yevpatoria an integral part of Russia ) and Galenki (together with Roscosmos)

Missile defense:
 * A-135 anti-ballistic missile system
 * Don-2N radar
 * A-235 anti-ballistic missile system (future; after 2020)

Satellite systems:
 * Liana space reconnaissance and target designation system (3 electronic reconnaissance satellites 14F145 "Lotus-C1")

 * Air and Space Defence Command (Командование противовоздушной и противоракетной обороны (К ПВО И ПРО)):
 * 9th Missile Defence Division (A-135 anti-ballistic missile system) in Pushkino
 * 4th Missile Defence Brigade in Dolgoprudny
 * 5th Missile Defence Brigade in Vidnoye
 * 6th Missile Defence Brigade in Rzhev
 * State Testing Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Государственный испытательный космодром «Плесецк» (ГИК «Плесецк»))
 * Kura Test Range

Squadrons
As of 2014:
 * 8 × Bomber squadrons (4 operating Tu-22M3/MR; 3 operating Tu-95MS; 1 operating Tu-160)
 * 37 × Fighter squadrons (8 operating MiG-29; 3 operating MiG-29SMT; 11 operating MiG-31/MiG-31BM; 10 operating Su-27; 4 operating Su-27SM1/Su-30M2; 1 operating Su-27SM3/Su-30M2)
 * 27 × Attack squadrons (11 operating the Su-24M/Su-24M2; 13 operating Su-25/Su-25SM; 3 operating Su-34)
 * 10 × Attack & Reconnaissance squadrons (1 operating Su-24M/MR; 8 operating Su-24MR; 1 operating Mig-25RB)
 * 1 × AEW&C squadron (1 operating A-50/A50-U)
 * 1 × Tanker squadron (1 operating Il-78/Il-78M)

Equipment
The precise quantitative and qualitative composition of the VVS is unknown and figures include both serviceable and unserviceable aircraft as well as those placed into storage or sitting in reserve. FlightGlobal estimated that there were about 3,947 aircraft in inventory in 2015. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the share of modern armament in the VVS had reached about 35% during 2014. The figure was raised to 66% by late 2016 and to 72% by late 2017. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Air Force received in 2023 more than 100 new and repaired aircraft and 150 helicopters.

Estimates provided by the IISS show that VVS combat pilots average 60 to 100 flight hours per year and pilots flying transport aircraft average 120 flight hours per year.

Radars
The VVS operates several Nebo-M radars, that combine meter, decimeter, and centimeter range. First two Nebo-M regiments were deployed in 2017 to Saint Petersburg and Kareliya. In 2018, further two regiments were deployed to Crimea and Penza. In 2019, a regiment was delivered to Volga region. In 2020, two regiments were deployed to the Far East and Naryan Mar.

Additionally, the VVS operates radars that work in meter range only. Such systems are Nebo-UM (first units were delivered in 2018 to Voronezh and Novosibirsk, and in 2020 to Rostov-on-Don ) as well as Rezonans-NE radars that have been constructed in the Arctic in Zapolyarniy, Indiga, Shoyna and Nova Zemlya, with another in Gremikha under construction.

Ranks and insignia
The VVS inherited the ranks of the Soviet Union, although the insignia and uniform were slightly altered and the old Tsarist crown and double-headed eagle were re-introduced. The VVS uses the same rank structure as the Russian Ground Forces.

Aircraft procurement
Production of the Russian aerospace industry for the Russian Armed Forces, 'by year of manufacture (first flight):

title: Russian Air Force


text:
Talk:Russian Air Force

Russian Air Force Roundel
Has the Russian Air Force changed its roundel again? News articles and new videos exhibiting Russian military aircraft show that they have Red stars that lack the blue outline that was added in 2009 and they also seem to lack the outer red border from the Soviet Air Force. See here:

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/us-air-force-jets-intercept-2-russian-bombers-flying-close-alaska-rcna52781

https://youtube.com/watch?v=-8eG0vuTA0I

I will try to find more sources, all pictured here are Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers. Ace Combat Fanatic (talk) 17:01, 20 October 2022 (UTC)

Another video: https://youtube.com/watch?v=wATOXjw-KC4

Featured here is an Su-34 Fullback, this video is dated 18 Oct, 2022. Ace Combat Fanatic (talk) 20:17, 23 October 2022 (UTC)

Su-27SM3
The Su-27SM3 seems to be missing in the table "Aircraft procurement" Teun Spaans (talk) 18:35, 28 November 2022 (UTC)

WP:GALLERIES
Dear Nick-D would you consider reviewing the last few edits on this page and potentially considering administrator action? In accordance with GALLERIES I have just stripped out the separate section of pretty pictures, without additional data except in one case (Su-57 numbers) and am being reverted by anon IPs hailing from Taiwan. Buckshot06 (talk) 09:11, 7 June 2024 (UTC)
 * you must advance a valid, policy-based argument for any retention of huge numbers of pictures grouped in a gallery, you cannot just keep reverting me, or you will face administrator action. I am going to remove the gallery once more, and should you wish to reinstate it, in accordance with WP:BURDEN, you need to give some justification. If you give no such justification I will file an WP:ANI report. Kind regards Buckshot06 (talk) 21:16, 8 June 2024 (UTC)
 * OK I think these pictures are beautiful and the descriptions are quite detailed, and I hope to keep them Emperorpenguin20160923 (talk) 21:26, 8 June 2024 (UTC)
 * GALLERIES is a guideline/policy. You need to advance a reason that is based in WP's guidelines and rules, because as it stands, those beautiful pictures (and no none of them have a description, just the bare alphanumeric aircraft designators) have a place - but that place is on Wikimedia Commons. Take them there; advance a policy-based argument, not just that they're beautiful; or find yourself at ANI. And please, stop reflexively reverting me just because of WP:IDONTLIKEIT. Buckshot06 (talk) 21:33, 8 June 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Russian Air Force


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Flag of Kurdistan

 This page is an archive of the discussion about the proposed deletion of the article below. This page is no longer live. Further comments should be made on the article's talk page rather than here so that this page is preserved as an historic record. The result of the debate was KEEP. —Korath (Talk) 17:45, Mar 1, 2005 (UTC)

Flag of Kurdistan
It is not a country how can it be a national flag? Also officialy there is no such thing as a Kurdistan. Kurds themselves will beg to differ with the validity of the status of Kurdistan itself. Hence its fictional or opinion oriented that Factual (note: nominated by User:Coolcat)
 * Keep. The Kurdish nationalist movement is notable, and so is its flag. Szyslak 01:32, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep, and expand. Megan1967 02:30, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Extremely important and notable. Strong keep and expand.--Centauri 03:30, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * By that logic we wouldn't have an article on the flag of Chechnya or Taiwan either. Strong keep Preisler 05:09, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep, possibly rename to more NPOV Kurdish flag. If any other Kurdish flags are in widespread use they could also be mentioned here. -- Curps 05:24, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep. Invalid basis for VfD nomination. --Andylkl 06:35, Feb 20, 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep Appears to be a politically motivated nomination. Wincoote 14:46, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Strong keep. Politically motivated nomination. Nightstallion 15:23, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep. Symbols of major nationalist movements/organisations are notable. As for non-countries having flag articles - we've even got an article on the Flag of Devon... Average Earthman 19:23, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep, possible rename, bogus nomination in any case - David Gerard 00:01, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * merge and redirect to Kurdistan. RJFJR 00:33, Feb 21, 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep -- Longhair 01:41, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep -- The Kurdistan Regional Government uses it. jdb ❋ (talk) 03:52, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Del There is no country or state that uses the flag. Kurdistan Regional Government is at best a political party. According to the Kurdistan article the region in question refers to a larger region well beyond the borders of the Kurdistan Regional Government. According to the UN and all UN recognised countries (198 nations I believe) including island countries Kurdistan is not a country. According to Iraqi constitution it is not a state either. It can be kept as a political party at best for that reason. Taiwan is a country according to the UN. China does not recognise them as a country I believe. Chechnya is a Russian state. Texas has a flag. "The Kurdish nationalist movement is notable" is a contradictary statement. If nation does not exist how can there be a nationalist movement, officaly speaking... --Cool Cat| My Talk 14:23, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep Cool Cat, see the definition of Nation. Whether something is actually a recognized political entity or not is not always related to its relevance. Only 1 nation recognized the Confederacy, and out of convienience.-LtNOWIS 04:31, 23 Feb 2005 (UTC)

This page is now preserved as an archive of the debate and, like some other VfD subpages, is no longer 'live'. Subsequent comments on the issue, the deletion, or the decision-making process should be placed on the relevant 'live' pages. Please do not edit this page.


text:
Talk:2005 in sports

Untitled
Just added the info regarding the winners of the 24 Hours of Daytona and the Daytona 500. I will be monitoring the auto-racing section throughout the year, adding info regarding championship winners, as well as winners of the more prestigious events, like the Indy 500, the 24 Hours of Lemans, and the Monaco Grand Prix. - Captain Spyro, February 2005

Note: I will also be covering the IROC series (International Race of Champions), as well as the Race of Champions, which was held in France last year. If you feel I am adding too much, please let me know. I'm just a hardcore motorsports fan. :) - Captain Spyro, February 2005

-03/19/05 - Added 12 Hours of Sebring update. As I said, my targets are the prestigous races of the world, as well as championship winners. I will not post full season results for any series. As far as the ALMS is concerned, I may add the results for the Petite LeMans. - Captain Spyro

---

Can someone add February to the football section, adding the Super Bowl and the Pro Bowl? I don't know how... it is pretty ridiculous that the biggest yearly event in sports isn't on here. Zellin

 * Done. Cburnett 21:33, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Sumo?
There was a pretty big event in Sumo today but I'm not sure where to insert it here. I added it to Current sports events already. --Do Not Talk About Feitclub (contributions) 09:29, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

 * If it's one of the two or three biggest events of the year in the sport, I suggest you put it in. There's enough weird sports on here to justify sumo. Sam Vimes 09:38, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

 * Done. I assume the list of sports is alphabetical? I think I stuck it in the right spot. --Do Not Talk About Feitclub (contributions) 11:03, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

August 2005 in sports resulted in merge to this article
August 2005 in sports resulted in merge to this article, interested editors may fetch the necessary info in the history (here). The editor  whose username is Z0 13:07, 7 July 2018 (UTC)

title: Talk:2005 in sports


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Law review

 This page is an archive of the discussion about the proposed deletion of the article below. This page is no longer live. Further comments should be made on the article's talk page rather than here so that this page is preserved as an historic record. The result of the debate was KEEP. —Korath (Talk) 17:33, Mar 1, 2005 (UTC)

Law review
Dicdef. Either needs to be deleted or moved to Wiktionary. -- Riffsyphon1024 21:11, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Seems to be an expandable topic (compare newspaper). Keep and cleanup. Meelar (talk) 21:51, Feb 19, 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep, and definitely expand. Megan1967 01:49, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep I've made it into a lovely encyclopedic piece. (pats self on back).  Still needs further expansion, tho.  Newbie BD2412.
 * Keep expanded version. But if this is a purely American phenomenon, it should probably say so already in the first paragraph. (And find a good category for the article.) / u p p l a n d 07:13, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Keep. Good expansion.  Rossami (talk) 08:37, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Comment, well now that someone has improved upon it alot, I guess there's no reason to keep the Vfd up. -- Riffsyphon1024 06:20, 23 Feb 2005 (UTC)

This page is now preserved as an archive of the debate and, like some other VfD subpages, is no longer 'live'. Subsequent comments on the issue, the deletion, or the decision-making process should be placed on the relevant 'live' pages. Please do not edit this page.


text:
Talk:Belgian Federal Parliament

Untitled
Do not delete, you must be kidding! Is this vandalism? --Edcolins 21:12, Feb 19, 2005 (UTC) The number of seats in the Chamber is constitutionally set at 150 elected from 20 electoral districts. Each district is given a number of seats proportional to its population (not number of voters) ranging from 4 for the Luxembourg district to 22 for Brussels. The districts are divided along linguistic lines: 10 Flemish, 9 Walloon, and the bilingual district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. Eligibility requirements for the Chamber are a minimum age of 21, citizenship, and residency in Belgium. All districts have an electoral threshold of 5%, except for Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, Walloon Brabant and Leuven; all districts are monolingual, except for Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde which encompasses both the 19 bilingual municipalities from the Brussels-Capital region as some 35 Dutch-speaking municipalities in Flemish Brabant, incl. 6 with linguistic facilities for French-speakers.
 * No, I asked for the merging/deletion since the same information that is posted on the Politics of Belgium page is posted here. The only thing I see that is new is just the names of the houses are translated into several languages. Zscout370 21:14, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)
 * Well, the article has certainly room for improvement and expansion, but I wouldn't merge it with Politics of Belgium, which is a much broader subject. --Edcolins 21:20, Feb 19, 2005 (UTC)
 * My question is what else could we expand on this area. This is from the article from Politics of Belgium: ''Chamber, the 'first house' of the Parliament

[edit] Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district This existence of this electoral district was condemned in 2002 as unconstitutional by the Arbitration Court (Dutch: Arbitragehof, French: Cour d'Arbitrage), without however requesting the splitting of the district.

The reasons behind this ruling are as follows: the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral district includes both the bilingual Brussels-Capital region and the unilingual Dutch Halle-Vilvoorde. Brussels is constitutionally bilingual. As such, its voters can choose candidates from both communities for European and national elections. However, because of the amalgated Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral district, that possibility is extended to the French-speakers in the unilingual Halle-Vilvoorde district. That allows French-speaking candidates from Brussels and Wallonia (thus from outside the Flemish region and from outside the constitutional Dutch-only area) to attract votes from outside their electoral district. The current amalgated Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral district breaches both the constitutionally established provincial borders as well as by the borders between the linguistic areas, and between the communities.

At the same time, Flemish candidates have no possibility to attract votes from Flemings living in Wallonia, even not from those in Walloon municipalities with legally established facilities. The court ruled this unconstitutional, to much controversy.

[edit] Senate The Senate consists of 71 seats. For electoral purposes Senators are divided into four categories: directly elected; appointed by the community assemblies; co-opted Senators; and Senators of Law ("Senatoren van rechtswege", in Dutch). For the election of the 25 Flemish and 15 francophone directly elected Senators, the country is divided into three electoral districts. Of the Senators representing the communities, 10 are elected by the Flemish Council, 10 by the French Council, and 1 by the German-language Council.

The third category, the co-opted Senators, consists of 10 representatives elected by the first two groups of Senators. Eligibility requirements for the Senate are identical to those for the Chamber.

The final category, that of Senators of Law, consists of those members of the Royal Family that are direct children of the reigning King and eligible to the throne. In the past, until 1991, these could only be men, since women couldn't be heir to the throne before that day. At this time, however, this is no longer true; and at this time, Princess Astrid, Prince Filip, and Prince Laurent exercise their constitutional right for a seat in the Senate. It must be noted however that since the Royal Family is supposed to be neutral, an unwritten law states that Senators of Law should not participate in Senate votes, even though they officially have the right to do so.''

 * Hold on, I am cleaning the mess in the Politics of Belgium article. --Edcolins 21:36, Feb 19, 2005 (UTC)
 * Ok, I will. The delete notice has been removed. Zscout370 21:44, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Electoral system
It is not clear whether the parlementarians are elected by majoritarian or PR system. This is much more important than how many districts there are. It is fundamental to the composition of the parliament.

Please be more clear. However, I've done some reading on that, and I think it's neither, they use d'Hondt. However, it's not that simple either, considering Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde...(Please sign your comments with four tildas so I can see who you are)Evilbu 22:11, 1 October 2006 (UTC)

 * d'Hondt is a PR system (though it slightly favours larger parties). --Roentgenium111 (talk) 22:22, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

this article has way too much details, while the Chamber article doesn't mention those!
Belgian Chamber of People's Representatives doesn't mention any of those electoral districts. It should be the other way around! More details about the Chamber in the article about the Chamber, than in an article about the bicameral parliament in general. What do you think?(Note : I'm not against details, I don't wanna remove any of that from all of Wikipedia, on the contrary...)Evilbu 22:15, 1 October 2006 (UTC)

Vocabulary
The concept of "competency" is not familiar to Americans and is not explained or linked. -- Beland 23:18, 9 November 2007 (UTC)

CD&V - N-VA
In spite of the election cartel formed by them, I think the number of seats of each of the parties should be made visible (not only the seats won by the cartel) as the CD&V is part of the new government coalition and the N-VA is not. --217.233.207.67 (talk) 17:22, 24 March 2008 (UTC)

External links modified
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Numbers in table and in tableau do not correspond, but no explanation is given. Source does not seem to support the event it is supposed to support.
Why do the the numbers in the table not correspond to those in the tableau?

 * table: N-VA = 25; tableau: N-VA = 24;
 * table: PS = 20; tableau: PS = 19;
 * table: Independents = 0; tableau: Independents = 2.

Or why is no explanation given for the difference?

And why does the first source not correspond to the event that it is supposed to support, namely "King Philippe of Belgium took the constitutional oath"?Redav (talk) 21:38, 16 October 2020 (UTC)

title: Talk:Belgian Federal Parliament