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Aid effectiveness

Aid effectiveness is the degree of success or failure of international aid (development aid or humanitarian aid). Concern with aid effectiveness might be at a high level of generality (whether aid on average fulfils the main functions that aid is supposed to have), or it might be more detailed (considering relative degrees of success between different types of aid in differing circumstances).

Questions of aid effectiveness have been highly contested by academics, commentators and practitioners: there is a large literature on the subject. Econometric studies in the late 20th century often found the average effectiveness of aid to be minimal or even negative. Such studies have appeared on the whole to yield more affirmative results in the early 21st century, but the picture is complex and far from clear in many respects.

Many prescriptions have been made about how to improve aid effectiveness. In 2003–2011 there existed a global movement in the name of aid effectiveness, around four high level forums on aid effectiveness. These elaborated a set of good practices concerning aid administration co-ordination and relations between donors and recipient countries. The Paris Declaration and other results of these forums embodied a broad consensus on what needed to be done to produce better development results. From 2011 this movement was subsumed in one concerned more broadly with effective development co-operation, largely embodied by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

The concept of aid effectiveness
Any discussion of "effectiveness" must rely on understandings or assumptions about aims. In public discussions of aid effectiveness, the general aim is usually assumed to be boosting the development of recipient countries and, hence, the well-being of people living in them. But "development" and "well-being" are complex and slippery concepts. The most popular summary indicator for a country's development is probably average national income per head in its population, but this indicator does not capture inequalities of wealth and power, or the structural characteristics of the country's institutions and economy. Since the 1990s the prime purpose of aid has widely been seen as poverty reduction, but this, too, can be interpreted in a variety of ways (How soon? How sustainable? What level?). Such ambiguities should be clarified or at least borne in mind when considering aid effectiveness.

Under the main international definition of aid – Official Development Assistance – any self-seeking motives of aid donors are supposed to be strictly subordinate to the objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Such motives – which may involve strategic alliances, diplomatic trade-offs, commercial advantages and other political benefits – are nowadays usually discussed as obstacles to aid effectiveness rather than alternative aims.

In the first decade of the 20th century, "aid effectiveness" was the declared focus of a movement joined by major donor and recipient countries and aid-related organisations, involving a series of high level forums on aid effectiveness. The agenda of this movement was largely about good practices in donor-recipient relationships, and in some cases these good practices became seen as proxies for aid effectiveness.

History
The historical themes of aid effectiveness are rather different for humanitarian aid and developmental aid, so these have been treated in different sections below.

1945 – early 1970s: Post-war boom
Although US aid is widely credited with having hastened the reconstruction of western Europe after World War II, there have been doubts about the effectiveness of this aid. G. A. Duncan in 1950 deplored the governmental character of Marshall Aid, arguing that private loans could have achieved the economic purposes more efficiently. He acknowledged that the provision of official aid also had other – political – purposes.

When US economic aid shifted from Europe to poorer countries – as initially signalled by President Truman in Point Four of his 1949 inauguration speech – the strategic framework was one of building a "free world" in the face of communist threat. In the 1950s, official US development assistance was mobilized alongside military aid within the Mutual Security Program. A 1957 Senate Special Committee report admitted it was impossible to prove how effective US aid since World War II had been, but considered that, without it, several countries might have been lost to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. For greater clarity in future, the committee attempted to distill the purposes of US aid into four:

 * The defense need: aid could persuade and enable other nations to be military allies (important for maintaining air bases in distant parts of the world).
 * The economic need: aid could bring more nations into a global system of commerce that would benefit the US.
 * The political need: aid could be one factor (among many others needed) for helping countries to make "long-range political progress toward freedom" rather than totalitarianism.
 * The humanitarian motive, which was seen in responding to "natural disasters or other unexpected conditions".

The first of these aid drivers could be seen, during the Cold War, as part of a competition with the Soviet Union to win influence. But aid was often observed to fail in this respect; for instance, in the 1950s and 1960s Egypt and Afghanistan took aid from both sides without making a decisive commitment either way, and large Russian support to China and Indonesia did not prevent those countries' leaders turning against their former patron.

A more detailed theory about the kinds of effect and the causal paths through which aid could be effective was developed by Max Millikan and Walt Rostow in the mid- to late-1950s, expressed in "A Proposal" of 1956. This propounded that aid in the form of investment funds could promote the "take-off" of economies into self-reliant growth. It further suggested that this economic transformation, channeled properly, could produce a free and democratic type of society by providing: a constructive outlet for nationalism; a social solvent by interesting the urban elites in a dynamic agricultural sector; a stimulus for the emergence of authentic leaders; incentives for the attitudes of political responsibility needed to support democratisation; and feelings of international solidarity. Rostow later elaborated the "take-off" theory of development in his more famous work, "The Stages of Economic Growth", in which he stated that greatly increased economic aid was needed in order to outrace the effects of population growth.

In 1966, Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout published a still more sophisticated and influential macro-economic model of the way aid could boost development. It involved identifying for each country whether the bottlenecks to economic growth lay in the availability of skills, domestic savings, or export earnings. In this way, an appropriate mix of technical assistance, grants or loans could be decided. The focus was on achieving a target level of GNP growth, which helped consolidate this as the prime indicator of aid effectiveness. At this time Chenery and Strout pointed to the Philippines, Taiwan, Greece and Israel as examples of countries that seemed to have achieved self-sustaining growth rates with the help of aid.

Early 1970s – mid-1990s: The rise of neoliberalism
The end of the post-war boom – marked particularly by the oil crisis of 1973 – was a watershed in attitudes to aid effectiveness, as it forced a reappraisal of the existing models.

In the 1980s and 1990s NGOs played a greater part in international aid.

After the end of the Cold War, the declared focus of official aid began to move further towards the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of development. The countries that were in the most need and poverty became more of a priority. Once the Cold War ended, Western donors were able to enforce aid conditionality better because they no longer had geopolitical interests in recipient countries. This allowed donors to condition aid on the basis that recipient governments make economic changes as well as democratic changes. It is against this background that the international aid effectiveness movement began taking shape in the late 1990s as donor governments and aid agencies began working together to improve effectiveness.

The global "effectiveness" movement
Aid effectiveness became more strongly recognized as a global multilateral objective in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, which established the Monterrey Consensus. There, the international community agreed to increase its funding for development—but acknowledged that more money alone was not enough. Donors and developing countries alike wanted to know that aid would be used as effectively as possible. They wanted it to play its optimum role in helping poor countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals, the set of targets agreed by 192 countries in 2000 which aimed to halve world poverty by 2015. Over the following nine years, a process punctuated by four high level forums on aid effectiveness (Rome 2003, Paris 2005, Accra 2008 and Busan 2011) consolidated a set of recognised good practices in aid effectiveness, and a framework for monitoring them.

In 2011 the dominant global agenda on "aid effectiveness" was subsumed in a broader movement for "effective development cooperation". This was embodied in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) mandated at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. GPEDC endorsed the prior "aid effectiveness" principles and commitments, and added others more widely concerned with development cooperation.

Another global partnership that follows the "effective development cooperation" approach is UHC2030 (the International Health Partnership for Universal Health Care 2030), formerly known simply as the International Health Partnership (or IHP+).

See below for more details of the aid effectiveness principles and practices advocated by this movement and its component partnerships.

Humanitarian aid effectiveness (historical perspective)
Widespread famine in Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) led to greater NGO involvement in events like the Biafran airlift being attempted for the first time. The way in which aid was allocated during the 1983–1985 famine in Ethiopia forever changed the way in which governments and NGOs respond to international emergencies taking place within conflict situations and raised disturbing questions about the relationship between humanitarian agencies and host governments.

Findings and critiques on aid effectiveness
There is wide agreement that aid alone is not enough to lift developing countries out of poverty and that it is not the most powerful potential instrument for promoting this end. The debates on aid effectiveness are over the degree of significance of aid's effects, the extent of its unfavourable effects, and the relative effectiveness of different kinds of aid.

P. T. Bauer
British economist P. T. Bauer argued that aid did more harm than good, notably in his books "Dissent on Development" (1972) and "Reality and Rhetoric" (1984). The main harmful effect was that aid channelled resources through governments, enabling inefficient state planning and producing a general "politicization of life" in which the population shifted its activities to the political sphere rather than the economic one. On the other side, Bauer saw aid's benefits as being limited to the avoidance of commercial loan costs, which he did not consider to be a significant factor in countries' development (pp. 47–49). He believed that the choices of aid projects were usually controlled by recipient governments less interested in alleviating poverty than enriching the elite (pp. 49–52).

Dambisa Moyo
Noted Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has been a fierce opponent to development aid, and calls it “the single worst decision of modern developmental politics”. Her 2009 book, Dead Aid describes how aid has encouraged kleptocracies, corruption, aid-dependency and a series of detrimental economic effects and vicious downward spirals of development in Africa. She argues that foreign aid provides a windfall to governments which can encourage extreme forms of rent-seeking and through providing a positive shock of revenue, lead to Dutch Disease. Furthermore, this easy money offers governments an exit from the contract between them and their electorate: the contract that states that they must provide public goods in exchange for taxes. In short, it "allows the state to abdicate its responsibilities toward its people". It is important to note that Moyo alludes specifically to government bilateral and multilateral aid and not small-holder charity, humanitarian or emergency aid. Her prescriptions call for increased trade and foreign direct investment, emphasizing China's burgeoning role in Africa. Moyo also makes a case for micro-financing schemes, as popularized by the widespread success of Grameen Bank, to spark entrepreneurship within the continent on the ground level, thus building from the bottom-up as opposed to the top-down approach aid takes.

Econometric Studies
Many econometric studies have attempted to establish broad conclusions about aid, using regression analysis on a panel of recipient countries (seeing if their differing amounts and timings of aid received could be correlated with development indicators). These have created a mixed picture on the average effectiveness of aid, but one in which pessimism in the late 20th century has seemed to yield to qualified optimism in the early 21st century. See the table in the sub-section on "Major econometric studies and their findings", below.

Challenges for measurement
It must be borne in mind that such econometric studies face many problems. One challenge for assessing the effectiveness of aid is that aid is intended to serve a variety of purposes: some of it is aimed primarily at poverty alleviation, some at economic growth, and some at other objectives such as better governance or reduction of social inequalities. Often it is not very clear what objectives are foremost, making it hard to measure results against intentions. Roodman (2007), for instance, discovered that the results of seven previous econometric studies – including the very influential one by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) – could not survive defining key terms in other plausible ways. Moreover, different objectives have different implications for the time-scale in which results should be sought. Varying sectors and modalities of aid have different effects, as do the contextual factors in recipient countries. However, increasingly sophisticated analyses have made progress in accounting for these complicated effects.

Econometric studies frequently show more pessimistic results than might be expected from the accumulation of successes reported by donor and implementing agencies in their projects and programs. Paul Mosley termed this the micro-macro paradox and offered three potential explanations: inaccurate measurement, fungibility, and "backwash" or negative side-effects of component aid projects. The micro-macro paradox has also been attributed to inadequate assessment practices. For example, conventional assessment techniques often over-emphasize inputs and outputs without taking sufficient account of societal impacts. The shortcomings of prevalent assessment practices have led to a gradual international trend towards more rigorous methods of impact assessment.

Major econometric studies and their findings
The main findings of major econometric studies are summarized in the following table.

! Author/year ! Period ! Findings on aid effectiveness;
 * + Table of econometric studies on aid effectiveness
 * Mosley 1987
 * 1960-1980
 * Aid had no significant effect on economic growth. The reason seemed to be fungibility: aid likely released other resources for unproductive uses.
 * Boone 1996
 * 1971-1990
 * Aid had no clear effect on rates of infant mortality and primary education.
 * Burnside and Dollar 1997, 2000
 * 1970-1993
 * Aid had a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good policies. But the overall effect of aid was unclear because donors did not especially target such countries.
 * Svensson 1999
 * 1980s, 1990s
 * Aid had a positive impact on growth in more democratic countries. But aid on average was not channeled to more democratic countries.
 * Arvin and Borillas 2002
 * 1975-1998
 * Aid had no clear effect on GNP per capita.
 * Kosack 2003
 * 1974-1985
 * Aid had no clear effect on average, but improved the quality of life when combined with democracy.
 * Dunning 2004
 * 1975-1997
 * In the first few years after the Cold War foreign aid produced a small positive effect on democracy in sub-Saharan African countries, unlike in the previous 15 years.
 * Easterly et al. 2004
 * 1970-1997
 * The finding of Burnside and Dollar (2000, see above) is not robust to different definitions of aid and good policy.
 * Mosley et al. 2004
 * 1980-2000
 * Aid increased pro-poor public spending in low-income countries.
 * Rajan and Subramanian 2005
 * 1960-2000
 * There was on average no robust positive relationship between aid and growth.
 * Yontcheva and Masud 2005
 * 1990-2001
 * Aid by NGOs co-financed by the European Commission reduced infant mortality but bilateral aid generally did not.
 * Calderon et al. 2006
 * 1971–2002
 * Aid had no clear effect on poverty, inequality, economic growth or democratic institutions.
 * Mosley and Suleiman 2007
 * 1980-2002
 * Aid most effectively reduced poverty when it supported public expenditures on agriculture, education and infrastructure.
 * Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola 2009
 * 1981-2002
 * Aid was on average effective in reducing poverty.
 * Clemens et al. 2011
 * 1970-2000
 * Aid had a modest positive effect on economic growth.
 * Alvi and Senbeta 2012
 * 1981-2004
 * Aid—especially multilateral aid—significantly reduced poverty.
 * Kaya et al. 2013
 * 1980-2003
 * Aid to agriculture significantly reduced poverty.
 * Hirano and Otsubo 2014
 * 1990s, 2000s
 * Social aid directly benefitted the poorest in society, while economic aid increased the income of the poor through growth.
 * Nunn and Qian 2014
 * 1971-2006
 * U.S. food aid increased the incidence and duration of civil conflicts, but had no robust effect on inter-state conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts.
 * Arndt et al 2015
 * 1970-2007
 * Aid moderately stimulated growth, promoted structural change, improved social indicators, and reduced poverty.
 * Petrikova 2015
 * 1994-2011
 * Aid had a small positive effect on food security
 * Janjua et al. 2018
 * 1995-2009
 * Project aid had a significant effect on economic growth. Programme aid had a significant effect on social development.
 * Abellán and Alonso 2022
 * 1990-2015
 * Aid had a positive effect on access to safe drinking water, this effect being especially important when consistent long-term investments are put into place.
 * }
 * 1990s, 2000s
 * Social aid directly benefitted the poorest in society, while economic aid increased the income of the poor through growth.
 * Nunn and Qian 2014
 * 1971-2006
 * U.S. food aid increased the incidence and duration of civil conflicts, but had no robust effect on inter-state conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts.
 * Arndt et al 2015
 * 1970-2007
 * Aid moderately stimulated growth, promoted structural change, improved social indicators, and reduced poverty.
 * Petrikova 2015
 * 1994-2011
 * Aid had a small positive effect on food security
 * Janjua et al. 2018
 * 1995-2009
 * Project aid had a significant effect on economic growth. Programme aid had a significant effect on social development.
 * Abellán and Alonso 2022
 * 1990-2015
 * Aid had a positive effect on access to safe drinking water, this effect being especially important when consistent long-term investments are put into place.
 * }
 * Abellán and Alonso 2022
 * 1990-2015
 * Aid had a positive effect on access to safe drinking water, this effect being especially important when consistent long-term investments are put into place.
 * }
 * }
 * }

Aid fragmentation
Aid flows significantly increased in the first decade of the 21st century, but at the same time aid has become increasingly fragmented. There was an explosion in the number of donors, and while the number of projects multiplied, their average size dropped. Small projects being often limited in size, scope and duration, they resulted in little lasting benefit beyond the immediate effect. With more players, aid became less predictable, less transparent and more volatile.

Fragmentation means an increase in costs for recipient countries, as government offices are forced to divert administrative resources to cope with requests and meetings with donors Decades of development have shown that if countries are to become less dependent on aid, they must follow a bottom-up approach, where they determine their own priorities and rely on their own systems to deliver that aid.

Volatility/unpredictability of aid
Information, at the donors' as well at the recipients' level, is often poor, incomplete and difficult to compare with other data, and beneficiaries' feedback and formal project evaluations are rare. Aid is predictable when partner countries can be confident about the amount and the timing of aid disbursement. Not being predictable has a cost: one study assessed the deadweight loss associated with volatility at an average of 10% to 20% of a developing country's programmable aid from the European Union in recent years.

Reducing the accountability of governments
Revenue generation is one of the essential pillars for developing state capacity. Effective taxation methods allow a state to provide public goods and services, from ensuring justice to providing education. Taxation simultaneously serves as a government accountability mechanism, building state-citizen relationships, as citizens can now expect such service provisions upon their consent to taxation. For developing and fragile states that lack such revenue capabilities, while aid can be a seemingly necessary alternative, it has the potential to undermine institutional development. States that rely on higher percentages of aid for government revenue are less accountable to their citizens by avoiding the state-citizen relationships that taxation builds and face fewer incentives to develop public institutions. The limited government capacity resulting from subpar institutional presence and effectiveness leads to: “ubiquitous corruption of state officials, large gaps between the law and actual practice in business regulation, workers who do not even show up, doctors that do not doctor, teachers who do not teach.”

In the view of James Shikwati, aid in Africa sustains political elites who implement a colonial or neo-colonial agenda of subsidy and distortion of markets which holds African countries back.

The tying of aid
Tied aid is defined as project aid contracted by source to private firms in the donor country. It refers to aid tied to goods and services supplied exclusively by donor country businesses or agencies. Tied aid increases the cost of assistance and has the tendency of making donors to focus more on the commercial advancement of their countries than what developing countries need. There are many ways aid can be designed to pursue the commercial objectives of donors. One of such pervasive means is by insisting on donor country products.

Others have argued that tying aid to donor-country products is common sense; it is a strategic use of aid to promote donor country's business or exports. It is further argued that tied aid - if well designed and effectively managed - would not necessarily compromise the quality as well as the effectiveness of aid. However, this argument would hold particularly for programme aid, where aid is tied to a specific projects or policies and where there is little or no commercial interest. It must be emphasized, however, that commercial interest and aid effectiveness are two different things, and it would be difficult to pursue commercial interest without compromising aid effectiveness. Thus, the idea of maximizing development should be separated from the notion of pursuing commercial interest. Tied aid improves donors export performance, creates business for local companies and jobs. It also helps to expose firms, which have not had any international experience on the global market to do so.

Fungibility of aid
Aid is often fungible, meaning that aided activities which appear to be successful may be filling a role that would have been covered anyway by local resources; the effect of the aid is thus only to release those local resources for other purposes, which may not be so desirable.

Conditionalities
A major proportion of aid from donor nations is tied, mandating that a receiving nation spend on products and expertise originating only from the donor country. Eritrea discovered that it would be cheaper to build its network of railways with local expertise and resources rather than to spend aid money on foreign consultants and engineers. US law, backed by strong farm interests, requires food aid be spent on buying food from the US rather than locally, and, as a result, half of what is spent is used on transport. As a result, tying aid is estimated to increase the cost of aid by 15–30%. Oxfam America and American Jewish World Service report that reforming US food aid programs could extend food aid to an additional 17.1 million people around the world.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as primary holders of developing countries' debt, attach structural adjustment conditionalities to loans which generally include the elimination of state subsidies and the privatization of state services. For example, the World Bank presses poor nations to eliminate subsidies for fertilizer even while many farmers cannot afford them at market prices. In the case of Malawi, almost five million of its 13 million people used to need emergency food aid. However, after the government changed policy and subsidies for fertilizer and seed were introduced, farmers produced record-breaking corn harvests in 2006 and 2007 as production leaped to 3.4 million in 2007 from 1.2 million in 2005, making Malawi a major food exporter. In the former Soviet states, the reconfiguration of public financing in their transition to a market economy called for reduced spending on health and education, sharply increasing poverty.

In their April 2002 publication, Oxfam Report reveals that aid tied to trade liberalization by the donor countries such as the European Union with the aim of achieving economic objective is becoming detrimental to developing countries. For example, the EU subsidizes its agricultural sectors in the expense of Latin America who must liberalize trade in order to qualify for aid. Latin America, a region with a comparative advantage on agriculture and a great reliance on its agricultural export sector, loses $4 billion annually due to EU farming subsidy policies. Carlos Santiso advocates a "radical approach in which donors cede control to the recipient country".

Cash aid versus in-kind aid
A report by a High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers found that only 6% of aid is delivered in the form of cash or vouchers. But there is a growing realization among aid groups that, for locally available goods, giving cash or cash vouchers instead of imported goods is a cheaper, faster, and more efficient way to deliver aid.

Evidence shows that cash can be more transparent, more accountable, more cost effective, help support local markets and economies, and increase financial inclusion and give people more dignity and choice. Sending cash is cheaper as it does not have the same transaction costs as shipping goods. Sending cash is also faster than shipping the goods. In 2009 for sub-Saharan Africa, food bought locally by the WFP cost 34 percent less and arrived 100 days faster than food sent from the United States, where buying food from the United States is required by law. Cash aid also helps local food producers, usually the poorest in their countries, while imported food may damage their livelihoods and risk continuing hunger in the future. Unconditional cash transfers, for example, appear to be an effective intervention for reducing extreme poverty, while at the same time also improving health and education outcomes.

The World Food Program (WFP), the biggest non-governmental distributor of food, announced that it will begin distributing cash and vouchers instead of food in some areas, which Josette Sheeran, the WFP's executive director, described as a "revolution" in food aid.

Coordination
While the number of Non-governmental Organization have increased dramatically over the past few decades, fragmentation in aid policy is an issue. Because of such fragmentation, health workers in several African countries, for example, say they are so busy meeting western delegates that they can only do their proper jobs in the evening.

One of the Paris Declaration's priorities is to reduce systems of aid that are "parallel" to local systems. For example, Oxfam reported that, in Mozambique, donors are spending $350 million a year on 3,500 technical consultants, which is enough to hire 400,000 local civil servants, weakening local capacity. Between 2005 and 2007, the number of parallel systems did fall, by about 10% in 33 countries. In order to improve coordination and reduce parallel systems, the Paris Declaration suggests that aid recipient countries lay down a set of national development priorities and that aid donors fit in with those plans.

Aid priorities
Laurie Garret, author of the article "The Challenge of Global Health" points out that the current aid and resources are being targeted at very specific, high-profile diseases, rather than at general public health. Aid is "stovepiped" towards narrow, short-term goals relating to particular programs or diseases such as increasing the number of people receiving anti-retroviral treatment, and increasing distribution of bed nets. These are band aid solutions to larger problems, as it takes healthcare systems and infrastructure to create significant change. Donors lack the understanding that effort should be focused on broader measures that affect general well-being of the population, and substantial change will take generations to achieve. Aid often does not provide maximum benefit to the recipient, and reflects the interests of the donor.

Furthermore, consider the breakdown, where aid goes and for what purposes. In 2002, total gross foreign aid to all developing countries was $76 billion. Dollars that do not contribute to a country's ability to support basic needs interventions are subtracted. Subtract $6 billion for debt relief grants. Subtract $11 billion, which is the amount developing countries paid to developed nations in that year in the form of loan repayments. Next, subtract the aid given to middle income countries, $16 billion. The remainder, $43 billion, is the amount that developing countries received in 2002. But only $12 billion went to low-income countries in a form that could be deemed budget support for basic needs. When aid is given to the Least Developed Countries who have good governments and strategic plans for the aid, it is thought that it is more effective.

Logistics
Humanitarian aid is argued to often not reach those who are intended to receive it. For example, a report composed by the World Bank in 2006 stated that an estimated half of the funds donated towards health programs in sub-Saharan Africa did not reach the clinics and hospitals. Money is paid out to fake accounts, prices are increased for transport or warehousing, and drugs are sold to the black market. Another example is in Ghana, where approximately 80% of donations do not go towards their intended purposes. This type of corruption only adds to the criticism of aid, as it is not helping those who need it, and may be adding to the problem. Only about one fifth of U.S. aid goes to countries classified by the OECD as 'least developed.' This "pro-rich" trend is not unique to the United States. According to Collier, "the middle income countries get aid because they are of much more commercial and political interest than the tiny markets and powerlessness of the bottom billion." What this means is that, at the most basic level, aid is not targeting the most extreme poverty.

The logistics in which the delivery of humanitarian occurs can be problematic. For example, an earthquake in 2003 in Bam, Iran left tens of thousands of people in need of disaster zone aid. Although aid was flown in rapidly, regional belief systems, cultural backgrounds and even language seemed to have been omitted as a source of concern. Items such as religiously prohibited pork, and non-generic forms of medicine that lacked multilingual instructions came flooding in as relief. An implementation of aid can easily be problematic, causing more problems than it solves.

Considering transparency, the amount of aid that is recorded accurately has risen from 42% in 2005 to 48% in 2007.

Improving the economic efficiency of aid
Currently, donor institutions make proposals for aid packages to recipient countries. The recipient countries then make a plan for how to use the aid based on how much money has been given to them. Alternatively, NGO's receive funding from private sources or the government and then implement plans to address their specific issues. According to Sachs, in the view of some scholars, this system is inherently ineffective.

According to Sachs, we should redefine how we think of aid. The first step should be to learn what developing countries hope to accomplish and how much money they need to accomplish those goals. Goals should be made with the Millennium Development Goals in mind for these furnish real metrics for providing basic needs. The "actual transfer of funds must be based on rigorous, country-specific plans that are developed through open and consultative processes, backed by good governance in the recipient countries, as well as careful planning and evaluation."

Possibilities are also emerging as some developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth, they are able to provide their own expertise gained from their recent transition. This knowledge transfer can be seen in donors, such as Brazil, whose $1 billion in aid outstrips that of many traditional donors. Brazil provides most of its aid in the form of technical expertise and knowledge transfers. This has been described by some observers as a 'global model in waiting'.

Using the private sector
According to Laurie Garrett, for health aid to be maximized efficiently and most optimally, donations need to be directed to areas such as local industries, franchises, or profit centers in developing countries. By doing so, these actions can sustain health related spending and result in growth in the long run.

Paul Collier, in The Bottom Billion, suggests a model he calls “Independent Service Authorities”. These are organizations, independent from the government, that co-opt civil society to manage aid and public money and incorporate the scrutiny of public opinion and NGOs to determine how to maximize output from the expenditure of this money.

Sensitivity to recipient country institutions
Since the effectiveness of aid usually depends on the good-functioning of institutions in the recipient country, and since potential recipients are very varied in this respect, Charles Kenny (2006) argues that aid strategies must be tailored to the state of institutions in each case. Where institutions are strong, it is appropriate to provide programmatic aid. Where they are weak, there may be a role for aid in analysis, consensus-building and technical assistance to improve them, and meanwhile other "insulated" projects might go ahead if they do not harm the prospects for developing sound governmental institutions.

Best practices according to the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness
The Paris Declaration and other results of the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (2003-2011) embodied a broad consensus on what needed to be done to produce better development results. Its principles lay open the possible ways to undertake, which can be interpreted also as the major objectives of good aid: fostering recipient countries' ownership of development policies and strategies, maximizing donors' coordination and harmonization, improving aid transparency and mutual accountability of donors and recipients, just to name a few.

The forums were supported by work done by the OECD, which had explored—through peer reviews and other work by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—the reasons why aid has and has not worked. This has resulted in a body of best practices and principles that can be applied globally to make aid work better.

Improving aid transparency and mutual accountability of donors and recipients
Some believe that the way to improvement is through better monitoring and evaluation, increased transparency, accountability and learning. For instance, Stefan Schmitz, a former senior aid official in the German government and the OECD, has argued that reporting duties, results-orientated action and ongoing performance assessments are essential for the sake of aid effectiveness, but political will must be already there for this to happen.

The Accra Agenda for Action states that transparency and accountability are essential elements for development results, as well as drivers of progress. Mutual accountability and transparency is one of the five partnership commitments of the Paris Declaration. Through 'transparency', donors and recipients can be held accountable for what they spend and aid can be made more effective by knowing the three Ws of transparency:
 * Who gives money to which recipient?
 * What project is being funded and for what purpose? and
 * Where?

Transparency offers a valuable answer to insecurity, making aid "predictable" and "reliable". Transparency has been shown to improve service delivery and to reduce opportunities for diversion and therefore corruption.

Transparency can be defined as a basic expression of mutual accountability. Mutual accountability can only work if there is a global culture of transparency that demands provision of information through a set of rules and behavioral norms, which are difficult to enforce in the case of official development cooperation. In particular for emerging economy donors and private development assistance, these norms are only at a nascent stage. Kharas suggest to adopt the "regulation through information" approach, which has been developed and has proven its effectiveness in the case of the European integration. In fact, at the international level, when the enforcement of mandatory rules is difficult, the solution could be to provide and make available transparent, relevant, accurate and reliable information, which can be used to reward or sanction individual aid agencies according to their performances. This means establishing a strong culture of accountability within aid, which rewards aid successes but penalizes failures.

To achieve this, literature on the topic suggest that donors should agree on adopting a standardized format for providing information on volume, allocation and results, such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), or other similar standards, and commit to improve recipient countries' databases with technical, financial and informational support. The format should be easily downloadable and with sufficient disaggregation to enable comparison with other data. Making aid data public and comparable among donors, would be likely to encourage a process of positive emulation towards a better usage of public funds. After all, official development assistance (ODA) is a voluntary transfer that depends on the support of donor country taxpayers. Donors should therefore consider improving the transparency and traceability of aid funds also as a way of increasing engagement and support toward aid inside their own country. Moreover, a generalized adoption of IATI would ensure the publication of aid information in a timely way, the compatibility with developing countries' budgets and the reliability of future projections, which would have a strong and positive effect on the predictability of aid.

Finally, to improve accountability while building evaluation capabilities in aid recipient countries and systematically collecting beneficiaries’ feedback, different mechanisms to evaluate and monitor transparency should be considered, such as independent third-party reviews, peer reviews or mutual reviews.

title: Aid effectiveness


text:
Talk:The Odyssey (album)

Untitled
To Muya:

Dear Muya, you say the album info box I've used is not standard. I find that pretty weird, cause it is just a real template, instead of a altered one, which you have replaced now. You can also see the template at The New Mythology Suite (which was there before I altered anything). Thereby, by replacing the old album info, length of the cd and producer are gone again.

Hopefully these are just some misunderstandings,

sc567

sc567,

The infobox I used is used for albums all over the site. When I replaced it I took all the info that was in the old box and put it into the new one. If I missed anything I'm sorry. Muya 10:59, 6 Feb 2005 (UTC)

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Fair use rationale for Image:SymphonyXTheOdyssey.jpg
Image:SymphonyXTheOdyssey.jpg is being used on this article. I notice the image page specifies that the image is being used under fair use but there is no explanation or rationale as to why its use in this Wikipedia article constitutes fair use. In addition to the boilerplate fair use template, you must also write out on the image description page a specific explanation or rationale for why using this image in each article is consistent with fair use.

Please go to the image description page and edit it to include a fair use rationale. Using one of the templates at Fair use rationale guideline is an easy way to insure that your image is in compliance with Wikipedia policy, but remember that you must complete the template. Do not simply insert a blank template on an image page.

If there is other fair use media, consider checking that you have specified the fair use rationale on the other images used on this page. Note that any fair use images uploaded after 4 May, 2006, and lacking such an explanation will be deleted one week after they have been uploaded, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you.

BetacommandBot 09:56, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:The Odyssey (album)


text:
Castlevania: Legacy of Darkness

Castlevania: Legacy of Darkness is a 1999 action-adventure game developed and published by Konami for the Nintendo 64. A prequel and expanded version of Castlevania, also released on the Nintendo 64 earlier the same year, it contains a remake of the original game with improved graphics, added villains, and alternate versions of some levels.

Gameplay
A large part of the game's challenge is based on jumping from platform to platform while avoiding environmental hazards, such as enemies and traps. Platforms are usually stationary, but some may rotate out from under the player, move through the environment like a rail shooter, and crumble or fall away underfoot. There are some invisible platforms that either afford players a strategic advantage or lead to hidden items.

Castlevania includes elements from the survival horror game genre. In addition to the trappings and narrative devices of Gothic horror, players are often placed in situations that evoke feelings of stress, anxiety, and vulnerability. Players may be trapped in caged fights with monsters, such as the battle with the Cerberus hounds in the Villa when the screen darkens to near-black. Some caged battles are timed, such as the boss battles in the Duel Tower level, where the player will be crushed by a falling ceiling should they not best their enemy in time. Vampires are often fought in caged environments, with the added complication that they can latch onto Carrie, Cornell, Henry and Reinhardt to suck their blood. If the player does not break free by rapidly rotating the control stick, the character's status changes to "vamp" and they will not be able to use their primary weapon or healing items. Unless a specific item is used to recover, the game becomes exponentially more challenging. Legacy of Darkness features two high-stakes survival horror sequences: In the Villa's maze garden, players must help Henry through the labyrinthine hedges while strong, unbeatable enemies give chase. In the Castle Center, players must carefully carry the "magic nitro" item through a nerve-wracking obstacle course to its destination. One fall or hit can cause the volatile chemical to explode, resulting in immediate death.

Plot
Set in the year 1844, the game stars the man-beast Cornell in his quest to prevent his adoptive sister, Ada, from being used as a sacrifice to resurrect Dracula. The game opens as Cornell arrives at his village, which has been burned to the ground by Dracula's minions. He finds Ada's pendant in a doorway and follows her scent to Dracula's castle.

During the course of the game, Cornell comes upon a grand estate owned by the Oldrey family: J.A. Oldrey, the master of the Villa, Mary, his wife, and Henry, their son. Gilles de Rais and Actrise have turned Oldrey Senior into a vampire. At Mary's request, Cornell guides Henry to safety. Later in life, Henry returns to Castlevania to save kidnapped children.

Throughout the game, Cornell encounters his rival and fellow man-beast, Ortega. Ortega has allied himself with Dracula to finally beat Cornell in combat, turning into a chimera like creature. They eventually battle near the end of the game, just before Cornell defeats Dracula and saves his sister. He only accomplishes the latter by sacrificing his man-wolf powers. Unbeknownst to the hero, acquiring this power was the true aim of the dark forces, as it was the perfect sacrifice (not Ada, as Cornell had assumed) to resurrect Dracula at his full power.

Development
Legacy of Darkness is a continuation of Konami's first attempt of Castlevania, also published in 1999 to create a 3D Castlevania. For example, Cornell was present in early development media and press information for Castlevania, but was ultimately removed before the game's release.

Legacy of Darkness's primary focus is on a new story (a prequel to Carrie and Reinhardt's adventures) in which Cornell explores new levels, as well as redesigned levels from Castlevania. Levels from Castlevania that have not been drastically changed (such as the Villa) are often navigated in a new or novel manner and feature different puzzles. Completing the game once unlocks Henry's quest, and he explores his own set of levels and new bosses. Many are redesigned levels from Castlevania.

Carrie and Reinhardt's quests are a secondary focus (bonus features), that can only be unlocked after completing both Cornell and Henry's quests. Carrie and Reinhardt's quests lack the voice acting, some cutscenes and the original level designs present in Castlevania (due to space concerns), instead adopting the new level designs (from Cornell and Henry's quests). Their quests also feature new bosses from Henry's quest, such as Medusa and the Queen of the Spider. They are also given new armor and weapon designs, though the original starting armor from Castlevania can be unlocked during Henry's quest.

In Legacy of Darkness control of the game's characters, camera, and frame-rate were streamlined. The game supports the Nintendo 64's Expansion Pak add-on, which allows for an option in which textures are displayed in a higher resolution. However, this mode has some frame-rate issues.

Castlevania: Legacy of Darkness was present within the series' original chronology from its original release until 2002, when a timeline published on the official Japanese Castlevania: Harmony of Dissonance website omitted it – as well as several other Castlevania games – from the series' continuity. The others also included Castlevania Legends for the Game Boy, Castlevania: Circle of the Moon and the original Castlevania release for the Nintendo 64.

In 2006, series producer Koji Igarashi stated that "These games were taken out of the timeline [...] not because I didn't work on them, but because they were considered by their directors to be side projects in the series". Since the 2002 removal, the events of Legacy of Darkness have occupied an ambiguous place in timelines published by Konami of Japan, Konami of America, and various gaming publications. The most recent English language timeline, distributed with preordered versions of Castlevania: Portrait of Ruin in North America by Konami of America, includes Legacy of Darkness but does not describe the game's plot. Igarashi later clarified that he looks at the titles as "...a Castlevania "gaiden" (subseries)" and complimented them by stating "...they both have a really unique take on the Castlevania world."

Reception
Legacy of Darkness received mixed reviews according to the review aggregation website GameRankings. Blake Fischer of NextGen said of the game, "Legacy of Mediocrity is more like it, at least in 3D. We hope the next installment on Dreamcast will be better, but until then, this is satisfactory." The planned Dreamcast game, Castlevania Resurrection, was eventually canceled. In Japan, Famitsu gave it a score of 28 out of 40.

The Freshman of GamePro said in one review that the game was "basically what the N64's Castlevania was meant to be. It's more of a remake than a sequel, as if you're being asked to forget the one before ever happened. If future Castlevania 3D games can build on the good things about this one (and leave out the bad), then maybe the series can have a bright future after all." Boba Fatt, however, said of the game in another review, "Legacy is bigger, but it isn't better. Even with four characters, the gameplay bites the big one. It's not worth a second look from Castlevania fans, or even a first look from newbies."

In 2012, Tim Turi of Game Informer felt that the werewolf form was interesting but not enough to make it a good game.

Time Extension placed the game 19th on its list of ranked Castlevania games: "While having another storyline to play through is welcome, Legacy of Darkness doesn't do a great deal to correct what was wrong with Castlevania 64, and the attempts it does make at providing something superior – such as support for the N64's RAM upgrade for higher resolution – are undone; the game's frame rate tanks when the RAM pak is installed, making it hard to play. "

title: Castlevania: Legacy of Darkness


text:
Manualism

Manualism is a method of education of deaf students using sign language within the classroom. Manualism arose in the late 18th century with the advent of free public schools for the deaf in Europe. These teaching methods were brought over to the United States where the first school for the deaf was established in 1817. Today manualism methods are used in conjunction with oralism methods in the majority of American deaf schools.

Origins
The first manual schools were in Paris, France. Abbe de l’Épée, a Catholic priest, encountered two teenage deaf girls while he visited a family in the poor part of the city. He decided to take it upon himself to educate them. He invented a technique called "methodical signing" from the signs the girls already used, with the combination of methods influenced by the writings of Johann Konrad Ammann and Juan Pablo Bonet. He created a one-hand manual alphabet to be able to fingerspell French words.

L’Épée opened a free national school for the deaf in his home, on 14 Moulins Street (now called Thérèse Street). After his death in 1789, Abbé Roch-Ambroise Cucurron Sicard took over as head of the school; it was renamed Institut National de Jeunes Sourds de Paris. The school received monetary support from individuals and grants from King Louis XVI.

Early deaf education in America
Laurent Clerc, a graduate from the school and pupil of l’Épée and Sicard, returned to the school as a teacher. He was teaching there in 1816 when Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet visited. Gallaudet met nine-year-old Alice Cogswell who knew no form of communication system. He learned of Sicard's theories and started tutoring Alice. Gallaudet traveled to Europe in May 1815 and attended demonstrations in France led by Sicard, Clerc, and Massieu. He returned in March 1816 and persuaded Clerc to return with him to the United States.

Back in the US, they searched for funds and public support. Together, they established the first deaf school in the United States on April 15, 1817, in Hartford, Connecticut; it was named the Connecticut Asylum for the Education and Instruction of Deaf and Dumb Persons. The school taught in French Sign Language and a version of de l’Épée's methodical sign taught by Clerc and Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet. The students attending the school had some knowledge of an indigenous sign language used in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. Out of the blend of Martha's Vineyard Sign Language and French Sign Language, emerged American Sign Language.

Decline
Manual education remained the primary method to educate deaf people until the 1860s. People then begin to subscribe to more oralist methods of education: lip reading and speech training. In 1867, the first private oral school opened in New York City. The oral movement took off in full swing at the Milan Conference of 1880 in which Alexander Graham Bell declared oral methods superior to manual methods. After the conference, schools all around Europe and the United States switched to using speech and lipreading, banning all sign language from the classroom. The deaf community was left in what some call the "dark ages".

Revival
While working at Gallaudet University in the 1960s, William Stokoe felt that American Sign Language was a language in its own right, with its own independent syntax and grammar. Stokoe classified the language into five parts which included: handshapes, orientation, location, movement, and facial expression in which much of the meaning of the sign is clarified as well as the grammar of the sentence expressed. Some sign languages, such as American Sign Language, have been promoted as the traditional way of communication for deaf people. Manualism is combined with oralism as the contemporary technique for the education of deaf students.

title: Manualism


text:
Hellanicus of Lesbos

Hellanicus (or Hellanikos) of Lesbos (Greek: Ἑλλάνικος ὁ Λέσβιος, Hellánikos ho Lésbios), also called Hellanicus of Mytilene (Greek: Ἑλλάνικος ὁ Μυτιληναῖος, Hellánikos ho Mutilēnaῖos; 490 BC – c. 405 BC), was an ancient Greek logographer who flourished during the latter half of the 5th century BC. He was born in Mytilene on the isle of Lesbos in 490 BC and is reputed to have lived to the age of 85. According to the Suda, he lived for some time at the court of one of the kings of Macedon, and died at Perperene, a city in Aeolis on the plateau of Kozak near Pergamon, opposite Lesbos. He was one of the most prolific of early historians. His many works, though now lost, were very influential. He was cited by a number of other authors, who thereby preserved many fragments of his works, the most recent collection of which is by José J. Caerols Pérez, who includes a biography of Hellanicus. Hellanicus authored works of chronology, geography, and history, particularly concerning Attica, in which he made a distinction between what he saw as Greek mythology and history. His influence on the historiography of Athens was considerable, lasting until the time of Eratosthenes (3rd century BC).

He transcended the narrow local limits of the older logographers, and was not content to merely repeat the traditions that had gained general acceptance through the poets. He tried to record the traditions as they were locally current, and availed himself of the few national or priestly registers that presented something like contemporary registration.

He endeavoured to lay the foundations of a scientific chronology, based primarily on the list of the Argive priestesses of Hera, and secondarily on genealogies, lists of magistrates (e.g. the archons at Athens), and Oriental dates, in place of the old reckoning by generations. But his materials were insufficient and he often had to seek recourse to the older methods.

Some thirty works are attributed to him, chronological, historical and episodical. They include:
 * The Priestesses of Hera at Argon: a chronological compilation, arranged according to the order of succession of these functionaries
 * Carneonikae: a list of the victors in the Carnean games (the chief Spartan musical festival), including notices of literary events.
 * Atthis, giving the history of Attica from 683 BC to the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 BC), which is mentioned by Thucydides (i. 97), who says that he treated the events of the years 480 BC to 431 BC briefly and superficially, and with little regard to chronological sequence.
 * Phoronis: chiefly genealogical, with short notices of events from the times of Phoroneus, primordial king in Peloponnesus.
 * Troica and Persica: histories of Troy and Persia.
 * Atlantis (or Atlantias), about the daughter of the Titan Atlas. Some of his text may have come from an epic poem which Carl Robert called Atlantis, a fragment of which may be Oxyrhynchus Papyri 11, 1359.

His work includes the first mention of the legendary founding of Rome by the Trojans; he writes that the city was founded by Aeneas when accompanying Odysseus on his travels through Latium. He also supported the idea that an incoming group of Pelasgians lay behind the origins of the Etruscans. The latter idea, from Phoronis, influenced Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who cites him [I.28] as a source.

title: Hellanicus of Lesbos


text:
Erik Barnouw

Erik Barnouw (June 23, 1908 – July 19, 2001) was a U.S. historian of radio and television broadcasting. At the time of his death, Barnouw was widely considered to be America's most distinguished historian of broadcasting.

Life
According to the Scribner Encyclopedia of American Lives, Erik Barnouw was born in The Hague in the Netherlands, the son of Adriaan (a history teacher), and Ann Eliza Barnouw (who tutored English). The Barnouws came to America in 1919, after the end of World War I when his father became one of the editors of the  Weekly Review  and later was the Queen Wilhelmina Professor at Columbia University. Erik attended Horace Mann School in New York City. Thereafter Barnouw attended Princeton University where he was an editor of the Nassau Literary Magazine. After the success of his play Open Collars, which he wrote for Princeton's Theatre Intime and which spoofed undergraduate life at the university, Barnouw collaborated with Joshua Logan on the Princeton Triangle Club's musical play Zuider Zee. In the spring of his junior year, he and fellow Princetonian Bretaigne Windust, together with Harvard juniors Charles Crane Leatherbee and Kingsley Perry, contributed $100 each toward founding the University Players, a summer stock company in West Falmouth on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Over the course of five summers on Cape Cod and two winter seasons in Baltimore, Maryland, the company gave the professional start to the acting careers of such future stars as Margaret Sullavan, Henry Fonda, Joshua Logan, Myron McCormick, Kent Smith, James Stewart, and Mildred Natwick.

Prior to becoming a professor at Columbia University in 1946, Barnouw spent the mid-1930s writing, producing, and directing a number of radio shows for the CBS and NBC radio networks. He also taught Writing for Radio at Columbia on a part-time basis. During World War II he oversaw the Armed Forces Radio Service's education division, based in Washington, D.C. He won a Peabody Award in 1944, for a documentary series, "Words at War."

In 1949, Barnouw worked with the United States Public Health Service on the V. D. Radio Project, a series of programs created to combat syphilis. The V. D. Radio Project featured a variety of programming—PSAs, interviews with doctors and patients, soap operas, and "ballad dramas"—and enlisted the efforts a wide variety of famous men and women in producing those programs, including Alan Lomax, Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Hank Williams Sr., Jinx Falkenburg, and Henry Fonda.

Barnouw was elected chairman of the Writers Guild of America in 1957 and also served on the Board of Governors of the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences.

In 1978 he became chief of the Library of Congress's newly created Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division.

He is best known for his history of U.S. radio and television, a three volume series first published in 1966. Volume 1, "A Tower in Babel," covered radio until 1933; the second volume, "'The Golden Web," covered broadcasting until the 1950s; the final volume, "The Image Empire," discussed the rise and growth of television. The New York Times Book Reviews (28 November 1971, p. BR 59) praised Barnouw's work as "continually readable and sharply observant." Written at the invitation of Oxford University Press, the three volume series "anchored his reputation as the foremost scholar of broadcasting." According to media historian Christopher H. Sterling, before the publication of this trilogy "broadcasting history was then largely restricted to a few popular picture books." Barnouw's publications "added hugely to the legitimacy of broadcasting as an academic subject for study, research, and teaching."

Barnouw is also known for his history of documentary films, and for his film about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which the L.A. Times said shook the industry. In 1971 Barnouw received a George Polk Award.

He took interest in the history of magic and was the author of the book The Magician and the Cinema (1981) which received positive reviews. He was a friend to the magician John Mulholland. While in high school, Barnouw catalogued Mulholland's books on magic. Since 1983, the Organization of American Historians has awarded the Erik Barnouw Award for films about American history.

In 2001, Barnouw died of an inoperable cancer in Fair Haven, Vermont. The New York Times quoted Sheldon Meyer, his former editor at Oxford University Press, "...Barnouw had an eye for the scoundrels, and the fakes, and the dangerous people. His genius reached generations of Americans across the radio airwaves, on the television screen and in the classroom." Upon reading Media Lost and Found, published only months before Barrow's death, Ken Burns stated, "Barnouw is our keenest observer of the frighteningly complicated world of media. No one has seen more, no one sees more, no one understands more than Barnouw. I am a huge admirer."

Selected writings

 * A Tower in Babel: A History of Broadcasting in the United States To 1933, Oxford University Press, 1966.
 * The Golden Web: A History of Broadcasting in the United States 1933–1953, Oxford University Press, 1968
 * The Image Empire: A History of Broadcasting in the United States from 1953, Oxford University Press, 1970.
 * Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television, Oxford University Press, 1976 (second updated edition, 1992).
 * Indian Film, Oxford University Press, 1962 (First Edition, 1962, Oxford University Press).
 * The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern Potentate, Oxford University Press, 1978 (new edition, 2005).
 * Indian Film, Oxford University Press, 1980 (with S. Krishnaswamy).
 * The Magician and the Cinema, Oxford University Press, 1981.
 * International Encyclopedia of Communications, Oxford University Press, 1989. (editor)
 * Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film, Oxford University Press, 1993.
 * Media Marathon, Duke University Press, 1996 (an autobiography).
 * Media Lost and Found, Fordham University Press, 2001.

Films

 * Hiroshima Nagasaki August, 1945, 1970
 * This film compiles footage shot shortly after the bombing by both Japanese and American cameramen.
 * The original footage was classified as "Secret" for decades and was only released to U.S. National Archives in 1967.

title: Erik Barnouw


text:
Talk:Berkut

The article is highly incorrect. Going to rewrite itAlexPU

title: Talk:Berkut


text:
Output-based aid

Output-based aid (OBA) (or results-based aid) refers to development aid strategies that link the delivery of public services in developing countries to targeted performance-related subsidies. OBA subsidies are offered in transport construction, education, water and sanitation systems, and healthcare among other sectors where positive externalities exceed cost recovery exclusively from private markets. OBA is a form of results-based financing, with similar principles as performance-based contracting.

Interest in OBA and results-based financing in the international development sector is growing. In healthcare, OBA is often implemented by contracting providers in either the public or private sector, sometimes both, and issuing vouchers to people considered at higher risk of disease or in greater need of the health services. OBA (in the form of results-based contracts) is also used for rural water supply in Africa.

One of the origins and drivers of the OBA concept was in 2002, when the World Bank Group launched its Private Sector Development Strategy (PSD), of which OBA was a key component. The World Bank has been the most active participant in OBA. In 2003, along with the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), they launched the "Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid" (GPOBA), later renamed to "Global Partnership for Results-Based Approaches" (GPRBA). The reason for the change of name was because the partnership "broadened its mandate in 2019 to incorporate more flexible financing solutions beyond OBA".

Definition and terminology
According to the World Bank Group, Output-based Aid (OBA) is defined as follows: "Output-based Aid is a form of RBF (results-based financing) designed to deliver access to infrastructure and social services for the poor. Service delivery is contracted out to a third party—public or private—that receives a subsidy to complement or replace the required user contribution."

As part of the process of OBA, "the service provider is responsible for pre-financing the project, and is reimbursed after the services have been delivered and independently verified."

Related terms
A similar term is payment by results (PbR) which is also used to describe the principles of OBA. In general terms, PbR is a type of public policy instrument whereby payments are contingent on the independent verification of results.

Results-based aid is concerned with incentivizing national-level outcomes and involves the linking of ODA (e.g. from bilateral or multilateral development agencies to developing country governments) to verifiable results, such as performance against one or more outcome indicators, or the successful implementation of a government program. Possible outcomes might include number of children passing an exam, an improvement in the infant mortality rate, or the number of people with a defined improvement in access to energy.

Results-based financing is concerned with the delivery of national or sub-national outputs, and could be used by developing country governments (national or local), public agencies, or development agencies as incentive for the provision of goods or services, create or expand markets, or stimulate innovation. Possible target outputs might include the number of vaccines administered, the number of teachers that are trained, the number of new electricity connections that are provided in a defined area. Results-based financing includes approaches such as output-based aid (OBA).

Overview
OBA is specifically targeted for individuals in developing countries who lack the financial means to pay for basic services. The service provider will receive subsidies to replace costs associated with providing the service to people, such as user fees. Individual agents will verify that the service is being delivered and based on the performance of the service-provider, a subsidy will be granted. That is how it is "performance-based".

OBA links disbursement to results. It is an alternative to the majority official development assistance (ODA), which is generally provided as grants, loans and guarantees, and is therefore disbursed in advance of delivery. OBA seek to provide incentives for the achievement of both outcomes and outputs by developing country governments, public agencies, commercial operators and civil society organizations.

OBA generally works through a private firm, or another third party, acting as the service provider. The service provider is responsible for the initial financing of the project and, only after results have been verified, will the firm receive subsidies from a donor. In such schemes, it is the provider who bears the risk of loss, rather than the aid donor, and output-based schemes allow for the tracking of results because of the way they function. Integration of the private sector into aid schemes is common with OBA, since they often provide the initial financing. The World Bank sees OBA as a way to improve aid effectiveness. This differs from traditional aid schemes that will usually focus on the inputs to service providers rather than the outputs. The donor is usually the World Bank, a government or an international organization or philanthropist that is part of the OBA scheme. Subsidies from a donor will generally serve to complement or reduce user fees. The subsidy is paid only after the particular service has been delivered to a community. The subsidies are targeted to poorer individuals, since OBA initiatives are carried out in regions with significant amounts of poverty.

In healthcare, vouchers are granted to patients who require medical attention and cannot afford or access it. These vouchers can be taken to hospitals or clinics, whether private or public, and they will be provided with the medical attention they require. The clinic or healthcare professional that provided the medical service will be subsidized for the delivery of the service by a donor.

Advantages
According to the GPOBA, OBA improves upon other forms of aid in a number of ways. The first is by creating transparency since the provider and receiver of any subsidy will be known to each other and the public. Performance risk is shifted to the providers in OBA schemes since they are accountable for what they deliver. OBA schemes are said to provide incentives for innovation in projects as well as a means for mobilizing expertise and finance from the private sector. Finally, OBA provides internal tracking of results.

Malcolm Potts of the University of California, Berkeley believes OBA schemes to be more effective than traditional aid projects because they invest in extant infrastructure. OBA schemes can provide poor consumers with the leverage to determine the quality of the service they are provided with. For example, in a health-care project, individuals receiving OBA will gain choice in where they want to go for their health care needs, essentially a choice between options in the public and private sector. With OBA, existing service providers are granted subsidies based on the number of people who use their services. In this way an individual can choose between multiple service providers, whether public, private or non-governmental, and only after the service has been provided do they receive the subsidy.

Compared to other aid schemes where projects were pre-funded by a donor, OBA uses explicit funding; if service providers fail to deliver, they and their investors, rather than taxpayers, who bear the brunt of financial loss.

Proponents of OBA argue that this approach is more likely to deliver the desired development objective, with less scope for waste and greater freedom and incentive for the beneficiary to innovate or achieve the desired objective at least cost.

Problem areas
OBA schemes have been criticized for their high administrative costs which exist for a number of reasons. The printing and distribution of vouchers can be costly. Also, there is significant cost in effectively monitoring outcomes of OBA schemes, and maintaining a process of transparency in OBA. Voucher theft or counterfeiting could be a serious issue for OBA projects. The sale on vouchers on the black market could easily disrupt the knowledge of where vouchers are distributed.

Possible criticisms include the need for recipients to obtain pre-financing, the risk of unintended consequences, higher monitoring and verification costs, and the difficulty of setting the incentive at the optimum level.

Performance-based conditionality has come under criticism for producing intermediate indicators which often distort the achievements of particular projects. These indicators, which only convey the success of certain actors and which are susceptible to manipulation, do not provide accurate indication of long-term changes of benefit to a region. Progress should be measured in more long-term objectives which encompass many sectors that contribute to the well-being of a population. For example, reducing child mortality requires many areas—health care, family planning and clean water—to be targeted, and even though intermediate indicators of an OBA scheme in one sector may appear positive, this does not necessarily identify progress in reducing child mortality.

The Private Sector Development Strategy which OBA is included in has come under heavy criticism for many of the same reasons the World Bank has been criticized for its work in the past as well as many new criticisms of the strategy itself. In response, it has been criticized for ignoring the many dimensions of poverty and not defining well how the "poor" would benefit from market interventions. The idea that private sector development and OBA will "shift risk" to private-sector service providers has been criticized since many private groups are risk averse when it comes to making a profit and thus would be hesitant in taking on projects lacking a guaranteed payoff.

Professor Robert Wade, of the London School of Economics, said in an article that the PSD strategy is: "A continuation of previous Bank policies to reduce the state to a coordination and regulation role, leaving private companies to organise production and service delivery."

Much aid is tied to conditionality and, even though OBA rewards performance, it will mainly reward performance in the private sector. The PSD strategy looks to the private sector to develop infrastructure that will benefit the poor. An issue that many multinational corporations will receive some of the funding for OBAs has not been dealt with very well by the World Bank. Not only does this allow them to further their economic control of infrastructure in poorer nations, they are also able to avoid many of the risks of OBA through various agreements and by passing on some of the costs to the state and the taxpayers. For example, the lease for a Guinea water infrastructure OBA project "allowed the MNC to protect itself against cost increases by passing them on, with the government regulator unable to force the MNC to disclose enough information to judge the reasonableness of the requests."

Privatizing basic services is a contentious issue because contracting out service provision to private firms may be detrimental to universal service provision. Private firms look to make a profit, and if this is their primary motive then universal access becomes less of a priority. Accountability to state services may deteriorate. Many critics have noted that in developed countries, the state is responsible for basic services that the World Bank wants private firms to provide in developing countries. UNICEF, in a study entitled "Basic Services for All: Public Spending and the Social Dimensions of Poverty", laid out moral, consensual, instrumental and historical grounds, arguing that state provision of basic services is mandatory regardless of circumstance.

Output-based approaches generally will rely on a well-established market, something that is not present in many developing countries. The regulatory and institutional mechanisms of the market are almost non-existent in many nations where OBA is used, and this does not allow domestic firms to compete on level ground with foreign firms. Sarah Anderson of the Institute for Policy Studies said that many grassroots and community organizations will not have the means to provide initial financing for service projects. They will be unable to sustain themselves until they get a subsidy for their performance. Rather, global firms that are already well established will more likely get OBA contracts, and in the process many local organization will no longer be part of the scheme.

History
The first instance of voucher-based OBA was in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s. According to Malcolm Potts, these family-planning initiatives were very successful. There were few such instances where OBA was used for development purposes up until the new millennium. Voucher-based healthcare schemes were piloted in Latin America, Asia and Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s.

In 2002, the World Bank launched its Private Sector Development Strategy (PSD), of which OBA was a key component. The World Bank has been the most active participant in OBA. In 2003, along with the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), they launched the "Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid" (GPOBA), later renamed to "Global Partnership for Results-Based Approaches" (GPRBA). The reason for the change of name was because the partnership "broadened its mandate in 2019 to incorporate more flexible financing solutions beyond OBA". GPRBA exists to create "financial incentives for service providers to extend basic services specifically to low-income communities, while also providing incentives for consumers in these communities to access the services". The partnership has worked with various international partners to pursue output-based initiatives in fields of healthcare, water, energy, transport, telecommunications and education. Regarding the number and size of supported projects GPRBA sates that: "As of June 30, 2023, the GPRBA portfolio consists of 58 projects in 7 sectors, spanning 30 countries and 1 territory, for a total grant commitment of $304 million and cumulative disbursements of $233.6 million."

Examples
Interest in OBA and results-based financing in the international development sector is growing. The UK Department for International Development is piloting "cash on delivery aid" (a form of results-based aid) and results-based financing programs in a number of countries. The World Bank has launched the program-for-results financing in 2011, a new results-based lending instrument, and the EU is exploring results-based approaches for the aid component of the multi-annual financial framework from 2014.

Healthcare
In healthcare, OBA is often implemented by contracting providers in either the public or private sector, sometimes both, and issuing vouchers to people considered at higher risk of disease or in greater need of the health services. Two of the earliest examples of competitive vouchers and fee-for-service contracts in healthcare were implemented in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s. In Nicaragua, the Instituto CentroAmericano de la Salud (Central American Health Institute) began voucher programs for reproductive and sexual health services in 1995. New programs for facility-based maternal deliveries in Kenya and Uganda began in 2006 and 2009 respectively.

Information technology
In Mongolia projects to improve rural telecommunications have been undertaken. Existing communication operators bid for subsidy contracts to expand their networks and services to rural areas with poor access to telecommunications. The bidding operators were also aware of the risk associated with the subsidies, since they would only receive funding if certain outcomes had been met. These OBA schemes are meant to provide universal Internet access to the internet.

Rural water supply
Performance-based service delivery models for rural water supply have emerged in Africa despite the unfavourable institutional environment. Researchers proposed policy recommendations to improve access to safe drinking water in rural Africa. One of them is to design and test performance-based funding models at national and regional scales. This is similar to the payment-by-results scheme that the OBA approach uses.

For example, the Uptime Catalyst Facility, a UK-registered charity, delivers global rural water services through results-based contracts (RBCs). It issues grants ranging from $5,000 to $400,000 per year to rural water maintenance providers. Uptime works with more than 12 providers in 12 countries to bring sustainable drinking water supply to 1.5 million rural people. Indicators for measuring results are mainly based on reliability of the water systems’ availability and volumes disbursed. At a later stage, Uptime Catalyst Facility plans to turn this pilot work into a public-financing model in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In 2024, the Uptime Catalyst Facility expects to disburse "USD 3 million through RBCs linked to reliable drinking water services for c. 5 million people who pay a share of service operating costs".

Corporates and philanthropy can also take part in results-based contracts for water supply as part of their commitments to ESG (Environmental, social, and governance) and CSR (Corporate social responsibility). These kinds of contracts have reduced uncertainty and risk for the funder because the funder only pays for drinking water delivered by a professional implementer after the results have been verified. For this to work well, a data integrity system is needed. The water users pay tariffs which provides co-funding. Performance metrics for these results-based contracts are related to "quantity, quality, affordability, reliability and proximity".

Digital technologies can be used for innovative financing mechanisms in utilities sectors in Africa and Asia, such as results-based finance (RBF) mechanisms that are digitally-verified. In these schemes, "grant disbursements [are] premised at least in part on automated verification of performance indicators through digital verification, for example leveraging sensors or metering data".

title: Output-based aid


text:
Talk:AppleWorks

Windows availability
It probably should be noted that the only way to get AppleWorks 6.2.2 for Windows (Win 98 and later, including XP) is through the online Apple Store for Education. As I recall, AW 5 for Windows was a little more readily available; 6 comes on a "hybrid" disc - Windows and Mac versions on the same CD-ROM. --JohnDBuell 15:38, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

 * 5.0 was available on hybrid discs as well as Mac only and Windows only discs. The final update to 5.0.3 (Windows and Mac) or 5.0.4 (Mac OS 9/Classic) added nothing new, nor were any bugs or issues fixed from Claris Works 5.0v2, it was merely a cosmetic update to change some icons and the name to AppleWorks. I have a retail 5.0v1 Windows only CD-ROM. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bizzybody (talk • contribs) 01:16, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Un-do Function
In the past, it seems other word processors (not AppleWorks) I have used allowed you to go back and revert to many steps before. AppleWorks (I use version 6) only allows you to go back one step to the most recently saved version. Is there any reason for this? Is this typical of most current word processing software?

This might be a point of interest to mention in the article. W.C. 10:11, 15 March 2007 (UTC)

 * I think this is just an artifact of AppleWorks being old. It used to be that only being able to go back one step (Undo) or back to the saved version (Revert) was normal, and being able to use Undo to go back several steps ("Multiple Undos") was a notable feature. -- Hawaiian717 18:20, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

Split
This page ought to be split into three, as it covers three different programs with separate code bases, and the current title ought to be a disambiguation page. Two of the three programs do not really run on Macintosh, and it appears as if the Apple II reference were tacked on.

There is an incredible amount of information on AppleWorks "Classic" available through Apple II groups.

AppleWorksGS was actively pursued and possibly licensed by Quality Computers for an update, and BeagleWrite, it's main competitor, is not mentioned.

Tuor 02:08, 16 June 2007 (UTC)

 * Also...ClarisWorks re-directs here, but deserves its own article, separate from AppleWorks. — Wackymacs 18:15, 18 June 2007 (UTC)

I don't think there is enough info in the article to justify a split. When more is added, a split shall be considered, I think. Junh1024 (talk) 11:24, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

 * I agree with Juhn1024. It makes a good article as it stands.  I am removing the  tag. Softtest123 (talk) 15:17, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

Updates for version 5
The Mac OS update from Claris Works 5.0v1 or 5.0v2 to AppleWorks 5.0.3 is here http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=58268

The Mac OS final update from 5.0.3 to 5.0.4 is here http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=60620 It only updates the AppleWorks main program and is only needed if you're running it in Mac OS 9 or Classic in OS X.

The Windows updater from Claris Works 5.0v1 or 5.0v2 to AppleWorks 5.0.3 is here http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=58266 10 bugs are fixed from 5.0v1 but it's only a cosmetic "rebranding" for 5.0v2. (In other words the only differences between the CW 5.0v2 update and the AW 5.0.3 update are some graphics, icons and the name change.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.232.94.33 (talk) 01:59, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

68k/PPC move
It might be good to mention at which version ClarisWorks / AppleWorks went from 68k or fat code to PowerPC-only code, and which are the last versions that run on specific Mac OS versions. -- 92.229.181.234 (talk) 02:41, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

LibreOffice
Yes, LibreOffice can open Appleworks text files, but no, it cannot open Appleworks Drawing or Spreadsheet files. 96.231.17.143 (talk) 04:42, 29 September 2014 (UTC)
 * Source? The Mysterious El Willstro (talk) 04:00, 2 April 2016 (UTC)

External links modified
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title: Talk:AppleWorks


text:
Cabbie

Cabbie may refer to:

 * Taxicab driver
 * The Cabbie, a 2000 Taiwanese film
 * Lee Mroszak, a.k.a. Crazy Cabbie, deejay and former regular guest on The Howard Stern Show
 * Cabbie Richards, Canadian TV personality
 * London Cabbie or Cabbie, a board game

title: Cabbie